letters to editor LETTERS he spectacular performance of the Israeli air defence system—the Iron Dome—in the ‘Operation Pillar of Cloud’ in Gaza has sparked speculation in Indian strategic circles on the imperative of such a system for the country. Undoubtedly, the debut anti-missile shield has been proved as a ‘game-changer’ in the recent Arab-Israel conflict and may be capable of addressing India’s cross-border threat perceptions. However, the system should not be seen as a panacea as it cannot intercept the longer range missiles. Rather, the Iron Dome can be another system in India’s quiver in the long run while deploying the indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system and devising a credible strategy to counter cruise missile threats in the near-term.
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Project genesis
Many Indian defence planners are closely scrutinising the performance of the Israeli Iron Dome in countering the recent rocket and missile attacks from Gaza. But does India need such an air defence system now? Sitakanta MiShra discusses
Primarily, Iron Dome air defence system has its genesis in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, during which nearly 4,000 short-range rockets were fired on Haifa and other northern regions of Israel. A couple of years before this event, Israeli authorities were seriously looking for anti-missile options, including lasers and giant shotguns, to counter rocket threats. In 2004, then Brigadier General Daniel Gold was named Director of the Ministry of Defence’s Research and Development department, responsible for overseeing the development of new weapons systems. In March 2005, by cancelling “all the unnecessary bureaucracy”, he managed to patch together the concept for the system that would become Iron Dome.
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richardcyoung.com
Iron Dome air defence system has its genesis in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, during which nearly 4,000 short-range rockets were fired on Haifa and other northern regions of Israel
January 2013
Thanks for the well-researched story on the Iron Dome for India (Geopolitics, January 2013). In the wake of recent developments where the neighbouring countries are becoming unstable, the fact that the Indian defence planners have been thinking about acquiring a system similar to Israel’s Iron Dome for the country gave us a sense of relief. As Indians, we realize that the country faces threats to its security from almost all its neighbours and it is all the more necessary to acquire a defence system that will be capable of addressing India’s crossborder threat perceptions. The Iron Dome could be another system along with the indigenous ballistic missile defence system in the Indian arsenal that will provide India an edge over its enemies. After all, we happen to have one of the strongest armies of the world. It is a standard that we need to maintain. The new system as we all know holds tremendous benefits and the state-of-the-art technology can give us an edge over the rest by providing early warning and destroying the surface-to-surface missile, rocket or artillery in mid-air launched against Indian targets. What we need is figure out how best to handle this technology. Ram Kumar, Lucknow
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g DIPLOMACY
FRESH START: Newly-elected Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his wife Akie. The photograph is from our files and record the couple’s arrival at Rostock-Laage Airport for the G8 summit in June 2007
The reTurn of Abe
EGIERUNGoNlINE/ PlambEck
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Iron Dome
Apropos the story, Arming without Aiming (Geopolitics, January 2013), the idea is totally agreeable. In the present scenario, India is the only major country that makes a defence budget every year without a national security doctrine as defence planning is done in a stand-alone mode rather than take-all-along-mode. As the article mentioned, the Armed Forces were a poor instrument of policy. It was only after the disastrous Sino-Indian war of 1962 that the government was compelled to take up the modernization of the Armed Forces. I am quite sure that in democracy, the armed forces are expected to provide deterrence rather than fighting and winning costly wars.
The LDP’s victory under the leadership of Shinzo Abe in the just-concluded elections in Japan bodes well for India-Japan relations, writes RAjARAm PAndA
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fter three years in opposition, Japan’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) stormed back to power in the parliamentary elections that was held on December 16, 2012. The victory means that former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo gets a second chance to lead the nation after a one-year stint in 20062007. He would be Japan’s seventh prime minister in six-and-a-half years. The LDP’s decisive two-thirds majority in the Lower House, along with the support of its coalition partner, the Komeito, www.geopolitics.in
will give Abe strength to take hard economic decisions at a time when Japan is under recession. Both the LDP and Komeito have closely convergent positions on the inflation target; dealing with the high yen; and spending up on infrastructure. Many will keenly observe how Abe deals with the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the right to collective self-defence. The traditional interpretation by the government has been that the Constitution prohibits the exercise of the right to collective self-defence. There are fears that changes to Article 9
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and to the government’s interpretation of the right to collective self-defence would shatter the trust Japan has gained from the international community through its adherence to its constitutional no-war principle in the decades that followed the end of World War II. Both the LDP and the Japan Restoration Party are known for their hawkish attitude on constitutional issues. They call for revising the Constitution, including revision of the war-renouncing Article 9, and for exercising the right to collective self-defence. If the right to collective self-defence January 2013
is allowed to be exercised, Japan would be legally able to take military action to defend a nation with close ties with Japan if that nation is militarily attacked by a third party. It may be noted that while a constitutional revision requires the support of two-thirds of the Diet members to initiate a national referendum on such a revision, changing the government’s interpretation of the Constitution related to the right to collective self-defence does not require such a procedure. The LDP and other parties calling for the exercise of that right can enact a bill that will change the government’s traditional interpretation. Exercising the right to collective self-defence could open the way for putting Japanese nationals in harm’s way by involving Japan in military conflict not directly affecting it. The LDP draft calling for revision of Article 9 to create a National Defence Force (NLF) states that the proposed NDF, under a specific law, can take part in international cooperative activities to help maintain peace and security in the international community—a concept that can be used to justify Japan’s participation in virtually any type of military mission abroad. Considered one of the more conservative figures in the increasingly conservative LDP, Abe, during his previous tenure as prime minister, pursued a nationalistic agenda pressing for more patriotic education and upgrading the defence agency to ministry status. Nuclear energy ended up not being a major election issue even though polls showed about 80 per cent of Japanese want to phase out nuclear power after meltdowns at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant caused by a massive earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. But then the fact remains that being an island country unlike Germany, Japan cannot just get energy from other countries in a pinch and, therefore, has to rely on nuclear energy. As a result, the staunchly anti-nuclear Tomorrow Party, formed just three weeks ago before the elections, captured only nine seats. The LDP is the most pro-nuclear party, and has said Japan should decide over the next 10 years what sort of energy mix is best. www.geopolitics.in
Although the Fukushima nuclear cathat a landmark 1993 apology for sex tastrophe highlighted the inherent danger slavery needs revising. Abe is said to have of operating nuclear power plants in Jaexpressed regrets not visiting Yasukuni pan, Abe opposes the elimination of nuShrine, which enshrines Japan’s war dead, clear power. He says nuclear power plants including Class-A war criminals, during his whose operations are judged safe should term as Prime Minister. China and South be brought back online. But it needs to be Korea oppose such visits, saying they renoted that nuclear waste storage facilities flect Japan’s reluctance to fully atone for its at such plants are almost full and that no wartime atrocities. technology exists at present that can enWhat does the change in Japan politics sure the safe, essentially permanent stormean for India? Going by the experience of age of high-level radioactive waste. the past decade or so, the bonhomie beA government led by Abe could mean tween the two countries will only be deepa substantial shift in Japanese policy, not ened further and the political change will all of it comfortable for Japan’s neighbours be a booster rather than a dampener to this and friends. A segment of the electorate evolving partnership. The Abe regime will favoured the LDP’s vows to build a stronprovide further impetus to this process. All ger, more assertive country to answer intold, against the background of China’s ascreasing pressure from China and threats cendance of a rising power with global amof North Korean rocket launches. Abe bitions, Asia’s two largest democracies and has asserted that he will protect Japan’s second and third largest economies, re“territory and beautiful seas” amid a terrispectively—Japan and India—have found torial dispute with China over some uninstrategic convergence. This development habited islands in the East China Sea and is complemented by common state behavthis policy stance endeared with the Japaiour such as common liberal-democratic nese people. values, and the absence of any historical One of the new parties, the right-leangrievances unlike Japan’s neighbours such ing, populist Japan Restoration Party, won as China and South Korea. 54 seats. The party is led by the bombasThe China challenge is driving Intic nationalist ex-Tokyo Governor dia, Japan and the US to come Ishihara Shintaro and Osaka to a common platform. This Mayor Hashimoto Toru, development needs to be In 2006, Abe had both of who emerged as appreciated against the polarizing figures with background of the expredicted that japan-India forceful leadership isting security alliance relations had the potential styles. Ishihara was relationship between the one who stirred Japan and the US and to overtake japan-US and up the latest dispute the deepening strajapan-China ties. With with China over the tegic convergence of islands when he prointerests of India with this vision, the future of posed that the Tokyo Japan and the US, culIndia-japan relations looks government buy them minating in the trilatfrom their private Japaeral dialogues between optimistic. nese owners and develop the three, of which three them. rounds have already taken It remains to be seen how place. Senior Japanese officials Abe will handle Japan’s China policy, briefed Indian and US officials about though he is talking tough towards China. the security dilemma that Japan confronts The LDP platform also calls for developing with China as territorial dispute over the fisheries and setting up a permanent outSenkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China post in the disputed islands, called SenSea that escalated to the level that has rung kakus by Japan and Daioyu by China—a alarm bells among strategists. The third move that would infuriate Beijing. During trilateral meeting explored the possibilities his first term as leader, Abe also insisted of working together in the region. The trithere was no proof Japan’s military had colateral has attracted criticism from China, erced Chinese, Korean and other women which has blamed Tokyo for spreading its into prostitution in military brothels duranxieties about Beijing’s rise among other ing Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia. He countries. later apologized but lately has suggested The three countries are also looking at
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January 2013
The fact remains that even for deterrence, we need the top level to spell out the plan of action. There had to be standardized planning along with demands and allotment. In order to stabilize the modernization of our defence forces, we need to allocate the funds between indigenous and external procurement of equipment appropriately. I liked Perspective and the story behind it and the effort made to showcase the main idea.
Geopolitics is doing a good job and I feel that it has adequately filled a major gap in the Indian defence publication scenario. In the last issue, issues related to diplomacy with neighbouring countries and South East Asia were published, especially ‘The Return of Abe’ which highlighted Indo-Japanese relations and the optimistic future of both nations. This shows that India is being accepted by our East Asian neighbours in term of trade and strategic affairs. I strongly believe that under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, Indo-Japan relation will touch new heights and one must not forget the cultural relations we share with Japan which can certainly create the base on which diplomatic relationships are built. The article dealt significantly with the historical perspective and ground realities of Indo-Japan relations in term of trade and strategic affairs to counter China. Our historic relations have lot to do with this development as China an autocratic nation will remain both an opportunity and a risk for both Japan and India. I get a lot of details from your magazine. Keep up the good work.
S Kumaramangalam, Bengaluru
Romesh Sharma, Guwahati
PERSPECTIVE
ItaKING StOCK: Seen here at Defexpo 2012 Defence Minister AK Antony will have to make quick decisions to expedite purchases for the armed forces
Arming Without Aiming
DPR
coverstory
India is the only major country that makes a defence budget every year without a national security doctrine to guide its demands and allotment. Defence planning is done in a standalone mode rather than in a take-all-along mode. How long will this directionless defence budgeting continue? Isn’t it time for a transformation, time to make sense out of the current, all-pervasive ineptitude and tunnel vision that surrogates for national security & defence planning and budgeting? Raj Mehta analyses
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n their sometimes patronising, yet compelling and thoughtful book, Arming without Aiming—India’s Military Modernisation, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta state that “after Independence, the Indian Government decided that the Army was a poor instrument of policy. Accordingly, New Delhi pushed aside military matters to focus on development and diplomacy”. The authors point out that the political leadership, in the wake of the disastrous Sino-Indian War of 1962, was comwww.geopolitics.in
pelled to go in for urgent modernisation; a slap-dash exercise that was repeated after the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and again in the mid 1980s during the General Sundarji era which is remembered for conceptualising/seeking a deep strike mechanised capability. The last ‘modernisation’ spike occurred post the Kargil War of 1999, when the defence budget once again crossed 3 per cent of India’s GDP. The authors (critically) mention that, post Operation Parakram period, India, in 2004, developed a limited war strategy; ‘Cold Start’,
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which epitomises lean and mean shallow offensive operations by dispersed, integrated mechanised forces. Cold Start, the authors impute, assumes an ‘escalation threshold’ in which India can operate short of invite a general war or nuclear retaliation. The authors state that, in recent years, the Indian strategic security focus has veered towards deterrence and counter-insurgency operations. The prevailing strategic environment has forced India’s armed forces to prepare for the possibility of a ‘two front’ war, while the Army and January 2013
other security forces are engaged in fighting an ongoing ‘half front’ internal security war. Internationally, the ‘Look East’ policy has resulted in deeper budgetary support for the Navy and Air Force. The Army, as a consequence, has had to accept ‘a reduced position (for modernisation) in the Services triumvirate’. While it is clear that in a democracy, the armed forces are expected to provide deterrence that caters for avoiding rather than fighting and winning costly wars; the fact remains that deterrence itself needs apex level spelling out and huge budgetary support. With India’s institutional denigration of the need for military capability co-terminus with economic progress, development and capacity building, the military establishment has savagely been undermined. In this stark introduction to India’s security dilemmas, several things stand out. Foremost is the fact that India’s security perceptions have been driven by external forces—the wars it has fought and neighbourhood developments
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—rather than by deliberate design. The military wasn’t a national priority with the founding fathers and remains neglected to date. Secondly, India does not have a capstone document that spells out its national security concerns from which the individual and Joint Service apparatus can exact their missions and tasking. The dichotomy hits you with a resounding slap—how can you make a budget for defence forces if you have no common perception of what the apex leadership wants from its defence forces; in what priority and to cater for which all threats and up to which extent? Thirdly, true Jointness, when it has occurred - the 1971 Indo-Pak War is a good example that has taken place more by luck and chance; by intervention of charismatic, apex level political and military leaders than by Constitutional mandate or by design. Fourthly, while military modernisation has indeed taken place; by default more than by design; the apex level structures that facilitate warfighting and that level of political and military leadership haven’t kept pace. When push comes to shove, will the mindsets of the past still clog apex level leadership thinking? Don’t they need an upgrade? Don’t they need to be transformational; indeed, yes, is the blunt and unqualified military analyst’s response. The Internet is chock-a-bloc with articles and comments on the nitty-gritties of the Indian Defence Budget; on who will get what percentage of scarce funds will be made available. It is pointless writing on the detailing of defence budgets unless one first understands the context within which the budget either serves its intended purpose or, in the uncluttered words of George W Bush, former American President is: ‘Just a budget... It’s got a lot of numbers in it!’ Clearly, ‘this quaint simplification’ does nothing to reassure a billion-plus Indians that their country is mentally and physically well armed with the ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and ‘means’ to safeguard the sovereignty of India against external and internal threats. Against this background, one may focus on the complexities involved.
What do ends, ways and means signify?
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Arthur Lykke, the US War College strategist teaches that ends (strategic objectives) explain ‘what’ is to be accomplished. Ends are objectives which, on achievement, serve the desired national interests. For India, a desired End State could be to develop individual and Joint Service deterrence sufficiently to prevent any attack on India’s sovereignty/sovereign interests. Ways (strategic concepts) explain ‘how’ the ends are to be accomplished by the employment of strategic resources. The concepts must be explicit enough to provide planning guidance to those (the Services individually and joint, Defence Research Development Organisation {DRDO}, public, private, military-industrial complexes linked to defence) who must implement and resource it. In the Indian context, employment of Cold Start in a conventional limited war scenario is the way India can achieve deterrence. In a nuclear war scenario, the No-First-Use policy of the Government clearly explains that if attacked, a nuclear response by India is assured. Means (resources) explain what specific resources are to be used in applying the concepts to accomplish the objectives. Lykke suggests that tangible means include forces, people, equipment, money, and facilities. Intangible resources include things like ‘will,’ courage, or intellect. Finally, he expounds that Risk explains the gap between what is to be achieved and the concepts and resources available to achieve the objective.
american National Security Strategy (NSS) Underpinnings
The American government, for instance, outlines its major national security concerns and how to deal with them in the form of its regularly-issued NSS document. The document is deliberately general in content unlike its spin-off National Military Strategy (NMS) document, which is specific in content and akin to the Indian Raksha Mantri’s (RM’s) Directive. The NSS document is created by an iterative, interagency process. It communicates the Executive strategic vision to Congress, keeps allies informed; keeps political supporters in the loop, creates internal consensus on foreign and defense policy and lends credibility to the overall political agenda of the executive head, the President. On May 26, 2010, the latest National Security Strategy was issued by President Obama. The Strategy advocated January 2013
Feburary 2013