T H E AG U S TA D E A L : W H AT N E X T ?
geopolitics Vol III, Issue XI, APRIL 2013 n `100
defence n dIPLomAcy n secuRIty
BUILDING IT BIG
Development of indigenous battleships, so vital for a blue water navy, will catapult India into the Great Power League
V. K. SARASWAT ON INDIGENISATION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY
WHY PAKISTAN LOVES AND PROMOTES TURBULENCE WITHIN
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING COASTAL SECURITY
India has found its way into an elite group of nations that has the capability to construct all types of warships — ranging from Aircraft Carriers to Nuclear and Conventional Submarines to Destroyers and Frigates.
The US and India blame China of hacking their crucial sites. But China refuses allegations of such activities and claims itself to be a victim of cyber attacks.
As DRDO struggles to meet the requirements of the Armed forces, its Director General, Vijay Kumar Saraswat, talks about his relationship with private and public sectors while choosing partners.
NEVER ENDING LOVE
The aerospace industry has strengthened India’s hand enough in the turbofan space so much that the Indian aeroengine market will amount to $10-15 bn in the near future.
As Lockheed Martin eyes the NMRH programme, the company talks about the latest technology solutions in Aviation Systems for the Indian defence industry.
Unhappy over losing out to the Europeans and Americans in the multi-billion dollar race, Russia still holds the top position in arms exports to India.
CATASTROPHIC DECISION (P58) There are legitimate questions about the viability of the proposed NCTC which is based on the US model and fears arise that such a NCTC cannot work in India.
REVIVING FRIENDSHIP (P64) Myanmar’s military-regime has presided over a free and fair by-election and is attracting foreign investment. These changes have opened up opportunities for India.
P M INDIA
MAYANK AUSTEN SOOFI
COASTAL SECURITY (P54) Post 26/11, India has implemented the Coastal Security Scheme to strengthen coastal patrolling and acquired several vessels for this purpose.
CHANGING RELATIONS (P76) India’s vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC is going to adversely affect bi-lateral relations between India and Sri-Lanka.
K SRINIVASAN Editor
PRAKASH NANDA Managing Editor
TIRTHANKAR GHOSH Consulting Editor
SAURAV JHA Correspondents
TRISHIT RAI, RIJUL S UPPAL Chief Visualiser
AJAY NEGI Designers
MOHIT KANSAL, MODASSAR NEHAL, NAGENDRA DUBEY
ARTWORKS Photo Editor
H C TIWARI Staff Photographer
HEMANT RAWAT Director (Corporate Affairs)
The VVIP helicopters deal, which faces an uncertain future has put a question mark on several projects involving Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries.
Conceptualised and designed by Newsline Publications Pvt. Ltd., from D-11 Basement, Nizamuddin (East), New Delhi -110 013, Tel: +91-11-41033381-82
ALWAYS IN CRISIS Pakistan, a failed country, has a unique style of resolving a crisis by inventing a bigger crisis so that the older ones get paled and move out of the limelight.
T H E AG U S TA D E A L : W H AT N E X T ?
geopolitics Vol III, Issue XI, APRIL 2013 n `100
defence n dIPLomAcy n secuRIty
BUILDING IT BIG
Development of indigenous battleships, so vital for a blue water navy, will catapult India into the Great Power League
V. K. SARASWAT ON INDIGENISATION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY
WHY PAKISTAN LOVES AND PROMOTES TURBULENCE WITHIN
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING COASTAL SECURITY
Cover Design: Artworks Cover Photo:
INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) under renovation at Chernomorskiy yard, Nikolayev, Russia.
The total number of pages in this issue is 76+4
for NEWSEYE MEDIA PVT. LTD. All information in GEOPOLITICS is derived from sources we consider reliable. It is passed on to our readers without any responsibility on our part. Opinions/views expressed by third parties in abstract or in interviews are not necessarily shared by us. Material appearing in the magazine cannot be reproduced in whole or in part(s) without prior permission. The publisher assumes no responsibility for material lost or damaged in transit. The publisher reserves the right to refuse, withdraw or otherwise deal with all advertisements without explanation. All advertisements must comply with the Indian Advertisements Code. The publisher will not be liable for any loss caused by any delay in publication, error or failure of advertisement to appear. Owned and published by K Srinivasan, 4C Pocket-IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi-91 and printed by him at Nutech Photolithographers, B-240, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I, New Delhi-110020. Readers are welcome to send their feedback at firstname.lastname@example.org
LETTERS TO EDITOR
AVINASH CHANDER, Distinguished Scientist, Programme Director, SFD and Director, Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL)
The cover story, Becoming a power that counts’ (GEOPOLITICS, March 2013), about the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) missile projects, an assessment of its future development and capability to provide the Indian Armed Forces with strike capability against enemies, was well covered. The story has depicted an accurate picture where India is systematically developing a number of missiles that will have air, ship and submarine-launched variants in addition to the ground-launched one. The most visible example of the DRDO’s evolving capability is, unquestionably, its missile and strategic systems cluster. As we all know India is going to play a crucial role in maintaining peace in the Asian and South Asian region, it is important to have a cluster of missile systems. However, in the tactical realm, the DRDO’s main successes till date have been the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile (SCM). The latest development of the Agni-V last year has put India in a group of nations possessing the ability to deliver nuclear payloads over intercontinental ranges. As the story points out, the DRDO’s plan to take things to the next level with the development of multi-role missiles in which the same missile can be
Air Defence at Sea, in (Geopolitics March 2013) was interesting to read. It the latest developments going on in the Indian Navy as it plans to acquire a three Battle Carrier Group force by 2020, that will enable the country to implement its maritime military strategy and become a significant player in the Indian Ocean. At present, India operates INS Viraat, which is under refit leaving the Indian Navy with no-carrier group. It is important for the Indian Navy—a significant player in the maritime world—to acquire more than one aircraft-carrier to protect the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As the Indian Navy plans to become a three Battle Carrier Group, it already has two aircraft carriers on order: the 44,500-tonne INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) undergoing extensive modernisation at Severondnisk, Russia, and a 37,500-tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) being built at Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL). As the story suggests that the trials are more or less successful, except for the defects in the boiler, it is expected to arrive by early or mid-2013. It will be joined, hopefully a year later, by India’s first in-
AIR DEFENCE AT SEA
By 2020, the Indian Navy plans to become a three Battle Carrier Group force that will enable the country to implement its maritime military strategy and become a significant player in the Indian Ocean, writes SUNIL CHAUHAN
ir defence at sea, unlike submarine and surface warfare that pre-dominate the underwater and surface water world, is characteristically most difficult, most obscure and of course a very expensive business. It calls for a wide range of technologies and also considerable tactical skill along with preparedness and commitment. Navies have struggled to find counters and solutions to the diverse threats posed by precepts, principles and tactics, denial, layered defence et
al. The battle for the Philippine Sea with its crushing victory for carrier-based air defence in the face of heavy air attack was the most important punctuation in the consciousness of world navies in general. Modern technology offers a variety of assets for air defence at sea, such as active and passive sensors from airborne and ship borne platforms for early warning of approach of aircraft or anti-ship missiles at great ranges. Systems are available to track both manned aircraft and missile targets by radar, and close in, by
optical and both active and passive infrared means. Weapons can be deployed by air defence aircraft and by ships, the latter in area or point defence modes, with guidance and homing devices in the same spectra that are used in tracking. Finally confusion, seduction or diversion of the threat may be carried out by electromagnetic or physical means. However, these assets cost money, often a great deal of money, even for those states that have the resources to deploy the full range of systems and the con-
MIGHTY PRESENCE: The Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier is set to become the core strength of the Indian Navy March 2013
stantly increasing diversity, performance and sophistication of the threat will demand steady improvement of air defence assets and, perhaps, even more important is their control so that the ability to achieve the aim of air defence is maxi maximised. The control becomes even more critical in the case of those maritime forces with limited resources available for the air defence. Consequently, it is entirely reasonable that air defence at sea should be planned on certain principles derived from the study of technology, practical experience in exercises at sea and wargaming ashore. The Indian Navy today is a significant player in the maritime world, sitting astride key sea lines of communication for energy security and projecting power. It operates a balanced force comprising an aircraft carrier, multi-role destroyers and frigates, fleet tankers, amphibious ships and a multitude of other aviation and subsurface combatants. The present force levels of the Indian Navy are being further augmented to encompass future tasks in support of India’s economic interest and, at the same time, confront the emergent maritime challenges of piracy and sea-borne terrorism in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) while shouldering the responsibility of coastal security as laid out in its Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP). It’s rapidly growing capabilities and force levels in the coming decade will enable India to emerge as a true ‘blue water’ navy and a global maritime power. The fundamental and defining precept of Indian Navy’s ‘blue water’ capability would be its capability of air defence at sea. For maritime supremacy at sea, air power and air cover at sea and maritime reconnaissance are essential, as epitomised by the old naval dictum ‘what you cannot patrol you cannot control,’ and means must be devised to include maritime reconnaissance and air defence commensurate with the operational role of the Navy. For maritime operations, whether it be for sea denial, sea control or diplomatic flag showing and power projection and humanitarian relief in peace time, the employment of naval maritime reconnaissance and air defence assets is most essential but an expensive proposition. The larger ‘blue water’ navies, like that of the US and the French, operate www.geopolitics.in
The IAC is expected to be commissioned in 2015. Following its launch, the Indian Navy is expected to officially rollout its plans for a second indigenous aircraft carrier IAC-II, which will be larger and more potent than its predecessor large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers like the USS Nimitz Class and Charles de Gaulle with their integral F-18s and Rafale and other potent air defence assets. The Royal Navy despite its manifest downsizing has plans to operate US-built Vertical and/or Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) Joint Strike Fighters from a 60,000-tonne futuristic carrier design. By 2020, the Indian Navy plan to become a three Battle Carrier Group force. It has two aircraft carriers on order, the 44,500-tonne INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) undergoing extensive modernisation at Severondnisk, Russia and a 37,500-tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) being built at Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL). INS Vikramaditya will carry 16 new MiG-29K aircraft, as well as an assortment of Kamov-28 and Kamov-31 helicopters and now that the trials are more or less successful, except for the defects in the boiler, it is expected to arrive by early or mid-2013. It will be joined, hopefully a year later, by India’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, which, like the Vikramaditya, will be equipped with a Short-Take-Off, Barrier-Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) design and is slated to field a slightly smaller air wing of 12 MiG-29K aircraft. Both aircraft carriers will also carry India’s indigenously designed Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The IAC is expected to be commissioned in 2015. Following its launch, the Indian Navy is expected
to officially roll out its plans for a second indigenous aircraft carrier IAC-II, which will be larger and more potent than its effi predecessor. Its large size and more efficient launch system will enable it to field an aircraft wing that is superior both in size and diversity. Request For Information (RFI) has thus been issued for 40 new multi-role fighters. With the core of these three aircraft carriers, by 2020 Indian Navy would have created a powerful modern ocean fleet, with over seventy corvettes, frigates and destroyers, over twenty submarines, including four nuclear-powered ballistic missile-capable submarines, up to six general purpose nuclear submarines and about fifteen conventional submarines. This force structuring will enable India to implement its maritime military strategy and be a significant player in the Indian Ocean. But this large ocean fleet would need to be protected at sea. The detection of a carrier battle group was not an easy task in the last century, but with present maritime reconnaissance and attack aircraft, satellites and advances in detection technology, aircraft carrier groups can be detected easily. Even Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), or drones, can now fly for long hours, detect and attack ships on command from their operators. In due course, UAVs will be ship-launched, and be difficult to detect by radar. Large platforms will become easy targets at sea for long range missiles fired from planes, submarines, UAVs and ships. Thus an aircraft carrier group operating in a threat zones requires a large screen of ships and submarines to ensure its own safety from hostile submarine, surface or aerial attack. Hence there is a debate on the role and need of aircraft carriers in futuristic scenarios, especially with the emergence of high speed precision weapons and sea skimming missiles which can take out large platforms at sea. The potency, therefore, can rapidly morph into a disadvantage, unless there is credible air defence for protection. During Operation Parakram in 2002-2003, the INS Viraat was hastily retrofitted with the Israeli Barak Anti-Missile System once it dawned on Indian Navy that it would be particularly vulnerable to submarine-launched Harpoon missiles. The most recent threat to India’s carMarch 2013
Om Prakash Singh, Bengaluru
Apropos the story, Is India Ready for the world Stage? the idea is totally agreeable. The idea clearly states that India must overcome its fear of overseas military interventions and send its troops to Afg
IS INDIA READY FOR THE WORLD STAGE?
SYMBOL OF VICTORY: Afghan National Security Forces stand in formation after the flag-raising ceremony in the Alishang Valley of Laghman Province
dards of initial or basic training as the training period is reduced to six months or lesser. Newly-raised battalions in the best of armies take three to five years to settle down and build internal unit cohesion and esprit de corps before they can be employed for military operations. Also, it is often forgotten that counter-insurgency operations are far more complex than conventional operations against the enemy arrayed opposite one’s own force. Counter-insurgency operations are small-team operations in which success is heavily dependent on very high quality junior leadership. The standards of junior leadership in the ANSF leave much to be desired. Not only are the ANSF illtrained and badly led but are also poorly equipped. The ANSF lack high mobility vehicles like the US Humvees and are incapable of launching quick reaction teams to either come to the aid of besieged patrols and ambush parties or to exploit fleeting opportunities. The Afghan army lacks firepower resources as it has not been given any artillery. In fact, combat service support elements are almost completely nonexistent. Accurate and timely intelligence is the bedrock of successful counterinsurgency operations. The ANSF do not have an integral intelligence establishment and are dependent mainly on ex-
eneral Joseph Dunford assumed command of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) troops in Afghanistan on February 10, 2013. He was charged with the responsibility to supervise the planned draw-down of forces by December 2014. The first few NATO-ISAF convoys had begun to roll down the Hindukush and head towards Karachi. However, gradually but inexorably, the country is crawling towards the edge of a precipice. The situation in Afghanistan does not warrant www.geopolitics.in
a hasty withdrawal. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are unlikely to be capable of assuming independent charge of security by the end of December 2014 due to structural as well as functional deficiencies. The present security environment can be described as a stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. While the Taliban are following a wait-and-watch strategy and keeping their powder dry, the NATO-ISAF forces and the ANSF are failing to make further gains against them. The ANSF operate with confidence during the day in conjunction with the
NATO-ISAF forces, but the Taliban rule large swathes of the countryside by night, collect taxes and protection money and administer their peculiar brand of Sharia justice. The ANSF are reported to be on target to raise their force strength to the planned level of 352,000 personnel (195,000 army and 157,000 police), including 25,000 Special Forces. This large force level has been raised in a short span of a few years. The rapid raising of new combat battalions almost invariably results in a dilution in the quality of intake of recruits as the catchment area is limited and low stanMarch 2013
OLD ALLIES: India’s External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid (left), with the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, in New Delhi in November 2012
ban have emerged clearly from some recent incidents. The Taliban destroyed six US Marine Corps Harrier fighter jets and severely damaged two others in a daring attack on Camp Bastion in September 2012. It also launched several such attacks on coalition bases in 2012 though not with as much success. Even though the Afghan
wary of the presence of foreign troops and the neighbouring countries may not be so easily forthcoming. However, it is the best option under the circumstances; otherwise the probability of a major civil war will loom large on the horizon. The High Peace Council of Afghanistan released the ‘Peace Process Road-
The ANSF lack high mobility vehicles like the US Humvees and are incapable of launching quick reaction teams to either come to the aid of besieged patrols and ambush parties or to exploit fleeting opportunities.
As an aspiring though reluctant regional power, India must overcome its fear of overseas military interventions and send its troops to Afghanistan if invited under the UN flag to discharge its legitimate regional responsibilities because peace and stability in that country is vital for Indian security, argues GURMEET KANWAL
“The DRDO’s missile cluster is increasingly focussed on tactical systems and by 2020 we intend to have some of the best missiles across various classes in the world.”
Asim Sinha, Delhi
digenously built aircraft carrier followed by the second indigenously aircraft carrier, INS Vikram. I would like to thank GEOPOLITICS for coming up with such articles which provide valuable information to the general public and to the Defence Forces as well.
SEEKING A TARGET: DRDO’s Nag, a third generation Fireand-Forget anti-tank missile developed in India under Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, is launched from its carrier
he most visible example of the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDOs) evolving capability is unquestionably its missile and strategic systems cluster. If the unveiling of the Agni-V last year was symbolic of its competence in the development of land-based strategic strike systems, the recent final developmental launch of the K-15/B-05 missile heralded the maturing of its underwater launch technology. Taking its work even further, the DRDO is also developing a whole gamut of tactical missiles even as it continues to sharpen India’s strategic deterrent. However, while DRDO has ‘captive customers’ in the domain of strategic systems, it has to compete with the so called ‘import route’ as far as providing tactical missile options to the armed forces is concerned. In the tactical realm, the DRDO’s main successes till date have been the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and the BrahMos supersonic Cruise Missile (CM) both of which have received substantial orders from the military. To build on this, the DRDO is putting in place limited manufacturing processes for missile avionics that remove production bottlenecks. Interestingly, it is also tying up with foreign partners for access to front-end missile technologies for some projects in order to expedite missile delivery cycles through joint ventures. The maiden launch of the Agni-V last year put India in a group of nations possessing the ability to deliver nuclear payloads over intercontinental ranges. The Agni-V, to DRDO’s credit, combines a number of recent technologies that makes it a contemporary system in the same class technology-wise as Russian Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) of recent vintage. For instance, two out of three stages of the Agni-V are made of carbon composites that help manage the missile’s fuel fraction by reducing weight for comparable length besides increasing the overall structural integrity of the missile. These carbon composites have been developed by the DRDO’s Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), Hyderabad
used on targets with very different profiles is still doubtable. If it is achieved it will be a great success for India.
India is going to have ground, air, ship and subm arine-launched missiles to provide an impregnable strategic deterrence, reports SAURAV JHA
BECOMING A P OWER THAT COUNTS
ternal sources. This is a major operational deficiency. The desertion rate is higher than average in similar circumstances; many cases of fratricide have been reported and the Taliban have infiltrated their men into some of the battalions. Under these circumstances, morale is bound to be low. Some ISAF Generals have praised the performance of a few ANSF battalions in recent operations, but most operations are still being supported by ISAF advisors and are not being conducted entirely independently.
Taliban Resurgence: Daring attacks
The strength and the potential of the Taliwww.geopolitics.in
Government has certainly come a long way in ensuring that the country is soon free of foreign forces, the present state of the ANSF does not inspire much confidence in its ability to guarantee an acceptable level of security when the NATOISAF drawdown has been completed. An objective military assessment would be that the ANSF need to be supplemented by an international stabilisation force. Such a force could be constituted under the aegis of the UN and could comprise troops from Afghanistan’s neighbours who have a major stake in the country. Such a force will not be easy to assemble as the Afghans themselves are
map to 2015’ in November 2012. It envisages that by 2015, Taliban, Hizb-e Islami and other armed groups will have given up armed opposition, transformed from military entities into political groups, and actively participate in the country’s political and constitutional processes. It also envisages the appointment of Taliban commanders to key positions such as cabinet posts, governorships and police commands. This is wishful thinking that is divorced from ground realities. If implemented, it will lead to the further polarisation of Afghan society on ethnic lines as the non-Pushtun warlords will resent beContinued on page no. 80 March 2013
ghanistan if invited under the UN flag to discharge its legitimate regional responsibilities because peace and stability in that country is vital for Indian security. The present security environment can be described as a stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. This is because India has had historically friendly ties with Afghanistan and would wish to see a stable government installed in Kabul that does not lean excessively on any of its neighbours. India had supported the Northern Alliance during its operations against the oppressive Taliban regime and it has become important for us to send our troops to Afghanistan to maintain peace and stability there. R K Banerjee, Kolkata
THE CYBER TE PANORAMA
1 DANGERS Cyber terror is getting increasingly dangerous for national stability. They are capable of breaking into ATC towers, stock exchanges and the national security grid. This creates a dangerous situation for a country’s military and economic security.
2 AMERICAN CO’S AFFECTED Alleged American victims of cyber attacks include Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Adobe, Google, Intel and others including small names working with American defence and aerospace. It is alleged that hackers linked to the PLA stole blueprints of the F-22 and the F-35 for PLA’s own stealth fighter programme
3 INDIAN NAVY HACKED In 2012, while INS Arihant was undergoing trials, the Eastern Naval Command, responsible for operations in the South China Sea, allegedly came under a cyber attack on systems containing sensitive data. Bugs that relayed data to IP addresses in China were planted on the systems.
INDIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICER BECOME VICTIM In July 2012 high ranking officials of the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Indo Tibetan Border Police found their emails hacked. The hackers even breached the National Informatics Centre. December 2012 Allegedly12000 id’s were hacked
CHINESE REACTION China refuted allegations of hacking, and claims to be a victim of cyber attacks itself. China’s military also denounced Mandiant’s report as it concluded that the source of attack came from China. In turn, Beijing has blamed the US for using internet security as a means to put pressure on Beijing
7 INDIAN CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Indian Computer Emergency Response Team was the nodal agency responding to cyber security incidents, but as it couldn’t thwart growing number of attacks, the government charged the newly formed National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre with protection of assets in sensitive sectors.
5 OTHER INDIAN VULNERABILITIES A Bloomberg report said that hackers based in China could have had access to ITC’s network for over a year. A December 2012 attack by Pakistan based hacking groups left 300 Indian content related websites hacked and defaced. From just 23 cyber attacks in 2004, India now faces more than 10,000 attacks every year. www.geopolitics.in
6 AMERICA’S REACTION The White House issued warnings to China and other nations after cyber attacks at some of the biggest companies. President Obama also signed an executive order to create voluntary cyber security standards for companies running critical infrastructure like the electric grid. December 2012
â€œI do not discriminate between priv while choosing partners. Industry f VIJAY KUMAR SARASWAT has a portfolio that will be the envy of many: Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister; Director General of the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO); & Secretary, Defence, R&D. A Doctorate in Propulsion Engineering from Osmania University, 64-year old Sarawat is a dyed in the wool scientist who has spent a lifetime in defenceâ€”designing, producing and testing a variety of complex technologies. He was the man behind Prithvi as also the successful testing of Dhanush, a missile on-board a moving ship, with very high terminal accuracy. He played the lead role in embarking on a challenging, futuristic Air Defence Programme. He has spearheaded the concept of theatre defence systems and integration of national air defence elements. He has conceptualised and established facilities for development of Micro and Nano Sensors for future avionics. In an exclusive interview with the editors of GEOPOLITICS, Dr. Saraswat has outlined where India stands today in its indigenisation programme of defence production. Excerpts: www.geopolitics.in
vate and public sectors or me is the same” Sometime back, the Defence Minister said that the growth of the indigenous defence industry in the country was very slow and we must complete our projects on time. What have you to say about that?
See, development is a very complex process. In the development when you start, particularly when you are doing mission mode projects which involves delivery of systems and equipment to the armed forces, it is not DRDO alone. It is DRDO, it is an industrial base, it is the academic institutions, all put together and of course finally the policies and the profiles of various agencies that count. In our system today, we have taken long time in the projects which we started say in 1980s. We
completed many of them in 2000. We took almost 20 years, but the projects which we are taking today, what we took in 2001, what we took in 2005, we are able to complete them in time and in an accelerated manner. So there is a message in this. The message is very clear. When we started projects in 1980s, our industrial base, our technology base, our preparedness in the market, our productionisation methods, they were also coming up and they were not readily available. So, you have to make efforts in all directions simultaneously, not only in designing systems and producing systems. You had to establish infrastructure. You had to establish infrastructure for
INTERNALSECURITY manufacturing, for testing, and also you were dependent on a large number of foreign countries for some of the critical items and technologies because they were not available in our country. So, when you put all of them together, they became the causative factors for the delays. It is not that that the DRDO or the Indian scientific community was not capable but the support system was missing. That support system is what has come up in the last 20 years. Today, when I talk of Agni… DRDO started Agni programme… Agni-V programme only in December 2008 and in April 2012, we launched the missile in four years. No country can think of launching a long-range ballistic missile in four years’ time; even today (that does not happen in) the developed nations. That means the capability has now come of age. Today, there is better industrial infrastructure: many of the technology constraints which we faced when we were doing Prithvi or when we were doing Akash or we were doing Agni-I, have been overcome. So, as a result, today the eco system is far superior and hence the delays will be reduced. I am not saying that the delays will not be there but what used to be about 10 years-15 years, it may be one year or 1-1/2 year, that kind of delay because these other delays that I am talking about now i.e of one year to two years are not due to the lack of infrastructure or lack of testing facility. It is due to the complexity of development. When you do development, there are successes, there are failures. So, you have to account for those failures. While we do what is called risk mitigation in a big way when we plan the project, when we decide the development strategy, we also identify that these are the areas in which I have risk; these are the areas in which I am perfectly certain of doing things. So, I do strategic planning using what we call as risk mitigation plan. We apply parallel approaches. We use multiple agencies for development. We try to see if collaboration is needed to mitigate that risk. So all these factors (are there in what) we are planning today. This has also become possible because the technology control regimes which were applied to India in the late 1980s and 1990s and early 2000, they have been—to some extent — relaxed. I am not saying they have been relaxed completely. They have been, to some extent, relaxed enabling us to have access to some of the critical technologies
Now I want to clarify two issues on this: it is
I do not know how many of you were there in
not that India does not know how to design and develop a seeker. We know it. We have
the early 1980s when we started Akash programme, we wanted to have homing RF
done it in the AAD programme. We have done it
seekers but found that no country was willing to
in some others like the Nag programme. which were earlier denied to us.
Have technology-denial regimes related to seeker technology been relaxed? Because that is more than 60 per cent of the cost of a tactical missile? Where is DRDO today in terms of the area of seeker technology in general?
Let’s discuss the cost separately and we will discuss the availability of seeker technology. The first thing is that seeker technology is part of the tactical missile systems and all our programmes that are being initiated today whether it is LR-SAM collaboration or it is MR-SAM collaboration or it is collaboration in the forthcoming new collaboration SR-SAM. In all of them, seeker is one of the main factors because when we look at tactical missiles, this is a frontrunner requirement because that gives you the accuracy. That gives you the punch and also reduces the cost for damaging a system because if I do not have a seeker, I may need five missiles. If I have a seeker, I may need only one missile. There is a ratio in which the number of weapons required to the amount of damage that takes place. So seeker technology is a requirement. Now I want to clarify two issues on this: it is not
give us front-end sensors like klystron.
that India does not know how to design and develop a seeker. We know it. We have done it in the AAD programme. We have done it in some others like the Nag programme and all that but there are some elements of the seeker technology which are critical. For example, if you take an IR seeker. In an IR seeker, there is an element called photodetector. Photodetector is a technology which is available with about four countries. That technology if you have to set up today in this country, you have to spend something like `800 to `1000 crores. So, we need a facility for producing that detector in numbers and to the quality which is mill quality is about `800 to `1000 crores. Now in the past, we found that it was not cost-effective to do that and hence we did not set it up. Now, today when we are going to these nations for collaboration, it is basically to see if we can capture some of those missing links. That is the idea. The same thing happens in the RF seekers. There is something called a power amplifier in a RF seeker. Now, there is also a similar technology which requires a klystron or a magnetron or a gyrotron or many of these things which again require a special facility
amounting to large investments. We have not done. Now slowly what we are… first of all, that situation has changed because they were earlier denied to us. That is why, the original Akash programme if you recall … I do not know how many of you were there at that time, in the early 1980s when we started Akash programme, we wanted to have homing RF seekers but when we went ahead for two years we found that no country was willing to give us this front-end sensors like klystron, magnetron, and the IR detector. We took a decision and that was a correct decision because we found that if we wait for that, we will never be able to do Akash and we made it. At that time, Phased Array Technology was not there. It was still monolithic. So we were only doing what is called the present system, the command guidance, and it came out very well because with command guidance— and the type of computer technology that has come—has improved the signal processes. Today, we are able to get very high accuracy in the command guidance system of Akash. So, these are things which delayed those programmes. The difference between us and the developed countries is this: If Russia, France
The difference is this: If Russia or France or
US wants to build a missile today, they do not have to go and build a pump for control system. Today, if India has to make a missile, it has to also make a pump. or US wants to build a missile today, they do not have to go and build a pump for control system. Today, if India has to make a missile, it has to also make a pump; not only missile, a pump to pump the oil… That means, you have to develop a pump, you have to develop photodetector, and you have develop material. In those years, we did not have titanium material. So, for the rocket motor of Akash, we had to develop titanium alloy in my DMRL whereas in US, that fellow goes and picks up titanium. He goes and buys 400 bar hose for supplying air into the missile. I have to develop that hose. That is why I was talking about the industrial base in the country that it was not up to the mark. We have made a tremendous progress. Thanks to three departments—Space, Atomic Energy and DRDO—that in critical technology areas, high pressure hydraulics, high pressure pneumatics, many materials, many electronic components, the status of the industry in the country has gone up. There are small and medium scale industries today, whether they have done it in collaboration with the foreign companies or themselves but today it is available and that is the major difference for our ac-
celeration in the programmes.
But you are still pursuing the Government Owned Company Operated (GOCO) option for some classes of components?
Why do we do GOCO? Missiles, defence equipment, volumes required are very, very less and some of these technologies, for example, high pressure hydraulics is exclusively for aircraft and missiles and tanks and things like that. Numbers are very small. Now infrastructure required to produce these systems costs lot of money. So, what we do? No private company is in a position to make that investment because return on investment for him is going to be very poor. Numbers are very small. So what we are doing in such cases, (in) all critical areas—I will give the names also—what we are doing? We are setting up the infrastructure for producing those components and subsystems and since it is a repetitive job, it is not R&D. Once we have established it, it is a production job. So, we do not want to do it ourselves. It is not cost-effective also because the overheads become very large when we try to do it in the government. So we give it on a GOCO basis. A good private company,
a semi-private company or a public sector can run that facility. We transfer the knowhow. We transfer the technology. We set up the production process and they do the production. This helps in two ways. Now when I want to do new system development of the same type, infrastructure is available for me. I go there. I do not have to do it in-house and my production requirements for the system are also managed. We have set up a facility in Hyderabad which is producing servo valves today. Servo valves were denied items to us from the … In fact, in Prithvi programme, we took electrohydraulic system because servo valve immediately after first launch became a denied item. Then I had to struggle to develop servo valves, set up a Production Centre, and then make Prithvis. Can you imagine? Why the delay takes place? I have to do that. Then only I can produce. Otherwise a foreign company would have simply gone to MOOG, told him, ‘Give me ten servo valves’, he will give him 3 months’ time, and he will put it on the missile and he will use it.
But aren’t commercial grade Electrohy HYdraulic Servo Valve (EHSVs) available off the shelf?
Yes, but our EHSVs and commercial hydraulics EHSVs are different. Ours is a much costlier EHSV because of the precision. The commercial hydraulic EHSV is one-tenth the cost of a normal system whereas ours is a very… We are now giving (that )for PSLV. We are giving for many of the space programmes. We are giving for our complete missile programmes. We are giving for our aeronautics—that is LCA programme. So, that has become a centre for developing and producing servo valves for all aerospace quality products. This GOCO model works very well where the cost of production is high, infrastructure cost is high and the volumes are small. If the volumes are large, I have no problem. For example, titanium; titanium technology we developed in DMRL. We thought that there is no point in us doing it. Even Midhani doing it is not enough. So now we are giving titanium technology to Kerala KMDC. Now, they are making 500 tons of titanium per year. They can export because it is a general purpose item and we can also make use of it.
So are you encouraging the private sector also to innovate in such technology domains?
Some companies in the country are grooming themselves to become lead integrators tomorrow. This is going to happen in the area of radars also. We want to and, in fact, that is our endeavour. DRDO today has got almost about 400 industries to 800 industries working for three different departments in the country for various areas: electronics, mechanical engineering, hydraulics engineering, materials, integration of the systems and fabricating infrastructure for us … like my launch sites have to be built, launchers have to be built. So, they all are done by industries.
What is the role of the Technology Commission as proposed by the Rama Rao Committee for the defence sector?
That is different. That technology commission’s role is different. What I am talking right now is that participation of the industry in the DRDO’s programme and I am not discriminating between private and public sectors. Industry for me is the
same. We have a system of choosing the production agency, but one thing is certain. If any company has been partner in the DRDO’s development programme and that product in which they have partnered with us is going into large scale production then the development partners are given preference in terms of the production orders. This is the policy. Otherwise there is no motivation for them, incentive for them. So that policy is there. So we take many companies which have been development partners. For example, Akash is being now produced by Bharat Dynamics Limited. There are large numbers of industries which build subsystems of Akash for us. They are today supplying items to BDL. So there is a policy as a system of selection of production agency and so on.
So, in the next few years will we see a private company as a lead integrator for any of DRDO’s products?
See, that capability has to evolve. Lead integrator is an agency which has got not just manufacturing capability. Lead integrator could be only those agencies who have got knowhow as well as know-why capability. Know-why capability means you should have developed products of your own, you should have some design capabilities and, of course, the basic
minimum infrastructure for doing these things. When I look at many small and medium scale industries, if you look at their total HR or manpower, you will find 80 per cent of them are shop floor people, only 5 per cent will be in the design house.
So what about the majors such as Tata Power SED, L&T, Punj Lloyd, etc.
They have and they are. They may not be. Today, they are not probably for the full system but major subsystems, they are the lead integrators. For example, in my Pinaka project, Tata Power and L&T are giving the launchers. Launcher is not a small system. It is a huge system. It has got thousands of components, devices, electronics, mechanical, computer, everything is there and they are doing it and they developed it for us based upon our specifications. Some companies in the country are grooming themselves to become lead integrators tomorrow. This is going to happen in the area of radars also. Today, Bharat Electronics is a major radar house but slowly I am seeing some companies like Tata Power, L&T, and may be a few others are gearing up to become lead integrators for radar systems. It requires knowledge of that system. A lead integrator cannot be a pure manufacturer or a producer. It has to be a design house. It has to be
We have set up our industrial infrastructure on borrowed tech and that is why our industries are not in a position to do development in a stand-alone mode. a development house and that capability resides in few companies in the country. See, many people are running the cement plant but they do not know how to set up a cement plant. They have taken the cement plant technology from A or B or C. Now they are doing operation and maintenance, probably optimising the performance by way of choice of materials and things like that but if you want them to augment it say from today’s 10 tons per month to say 100 tons per month, they cannot do it of their own. They have to go out again to the same OEM and then do it because they never understood how to set up a cement plant. I am just taking cement (as an example) because it is one of the things. So that is the biggest problem in our country. We have set up our industrial infrastructure on borrowed technologies and that is the
reason why our industries are not in a position to do development in a stand-alone mode and that is where DRDO, that is where CSIR, that is where Space Department, that is where the Department of Atomic Energy, and some other institutions who have the development capability and design capability. That is why Raksha Mantriji is telling that industry should have a R&D base. When you will have R&D, then you will develop these capabilities. Then you will automatically become a lead integrator.
So, what will be the consortium model, going forward because as you said they don’t have too many design capabilities going forward except in a few places such as software, etc. The consortium model for tomorrow is we will select lead integrators but it is not cost-effective for any lead integrator to manufacture everything in a Lead Integration Centre. It is going to be a disaster. So, you should have large number of companies to do supply of subsystems, components and they should be done to arrest the standards so that quality is maintained. Companies are there but some of them are not in a position to maintain the quality, supply it, and we had to then… this supply chain system has to be completely oiled so that there are no delays, there are no quality problems and there is
a system by which there is accountability among these centres. Suppose tomorrow I have to make, say phased array radar. Phased array radar requires thousands of T/R modules. It requires a mechanical frame. It requires a cooling system. It requires a power supply. It requires computers. It requires electronics and it requires electrical engineering to connect everything. Now, for this a lead integrator can do assembly but frame can come from somewhere. T/R modules can be produced in another electronics industry which can be tested, supplied, certified, and given to us. So this approach of what we call distributed manufacturing has to be followed.
We have to have this approach then when we manufacture aircraft. The Western countries do so, like they do it for the Airbus.
Absolutely. In fact, you are talking about …the company which is making the engine is a lead integrator for the engine. Like that. For example, what we are doing today in Akash, launcher is coming fully assembled from Tata’s. So we are doing that. Missile is coming fully assembled from BDL and radar is coming fully assembled from Bharat Electronics. So we are doing that and the total weapon system is then integrated and supplied. (To be continued)
MADE IN INDIA
Lockheed’s George Barton speaks about the company’s business plans
India must move ruthlessly to prevent foreign manufacturers from dumping yesterday’s technology.
D E F E N C E
B U S I N E S S
WHAT NEXT IN THE FINMECCANICA CASE?
Navy radars to boost Indian industry
The AgustaWestland VVIP Chopper deal won’t die alone. With Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries involved (directly or indirectly) in many other Indian defence deals and indigenous manufacturing programme, the Finmeccanica story has the potential to cause a decade-long setback to India’s defence modernisation plans. A special report:
The tender for the surface surveillance radars for the Indian Navy under the ‘Buy and Make (India)’ clause of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) aims at indigenisation in defence production. Geopolitics looks at the development.
he VVIP helicopters contract has enough, specific provisions, including an integrity pact, under which “strict action including cancellation of contract, recovery of payment, blacklisting and penal action can be taken against the vendors” for any wrongdoing found
AgustaWestland AW 101 Chopper that rocked Indian defence procurement
anytime during the implementation of the contractual obligations. More than this deal being hit, what is worrisome for the Indian armed forces in general and for foreign military vendors in particular is that this case has the potential to torpedo several projects involving Finmeccanica, its subsidiaries Continued on Page 34
ith the Government stressing on increasing indigenisation in defence production, the Defence Ministry has issued the country’s first tender worth $120 million (Approx. `650 crore) for supplying surface surveillance radars for the Indian Navy warships under the ‘Buy and Make India’ clause of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). Continued on Page 29
‘MADE IN INDIA’
AERO ENGINES POSSIBLE DIPLOMACY
India must move ruthlessly to prevent foreign manufacturers from dumping yesterday’s technology, writes SAURAV JHA
Nothing should, however, stop heightened domestic research and development (R&D) in propulsion technology as that is the best guarantee to hold foreign companies to their promises as it were. According to estimates, India’s aeroengine market alone (summing over various acquisition and upgrade programmes) will amount to $10-15 bn (Approx. `55,000 to 70,000 crore) for the next ten years. Since a lot of this will be met via imports, a very large offset opportunity exists for India’s emerging aerospace industry in this domain. These opportunities span the entire spectrum from supplying engine components to providing Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) services. In fact, MRO-related expenses can often exceed the initial procurement cost of an engine. Main-
tenance which includes dismantling, inspecting, assembling and testing aircraft engines is, however, the single largest MRO segment. Engine Maintenance constitutes 35 per cent of the overall cost of maintaining an aircraft. More than twothirds of engine maintenance is taken up by the cost of materials, with labour accounting for another 22 per cent. India’s MRO segment is expected to grow to $2.6 bn (Approx. `14,000 crore) by 2020. Now, aero engine components that are likely to be sourced domestically include casings, blisks, shafts, housings, stators, pump housing bushing, sleeves and sub-assays. This would mean that there will be ample business for existing Tier-2 and Tier-3 players. The Tier-3 segment, in particular (theoretically any company which has some casting and forging capability and can build fasteners, bearings, wiring
s India and China build their respective aerospace industries, the one glaring gap remains their inability to mass-produce wholly indigenous modern aircraft engines. It is that one major area where both countries remain dependent on foreign support to varying degrees. In the next few years, India, however, has the potential to create a major domestic industrial and technological base in the arena of aero-propulsion by leveraging its diverse military aviation purchases. Clever use of the offsets that will mandatorily follow with most imports will not only allow the domestic aerospace industry to integrate itself with global supply chains but should also facilitate the timely transfer of technology in critical areas. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) must act ruthlessly in this context by not allowing foreign majors to offload yesterday’s technology.
g DEFBIZ for the Indian Navy’s MiG 29K. Jaguars and provide 270 F-125IN turbofan Further cementing its Tier-1 status in engines. After Rolls Royce pulled out from the engine space in India, HAL has also the Jaguar re-engining tender, the IAF was been entering into key joint venture partallowed to take matter forward with Honnerships in this domain since eywell on a single vendor basis the Nineties. The most recent and it seems that the aforeof these is International mentioned deal valued Although de-linked Aerospace Manufacturat around $800 bn (Aping Limited (IAML), prox. `40,00,000 crore) from the Tejas programme, a 50-50 joint venis likely to go through. ture between HAL Once again, HAL India needs to keep building and Rolls-Royce will use its existing which inaugurated JV with Honeywell on the Kaveri programme for a `135 crore proto garner a share of newer programmes like the duction facility in the offsets from this Bengaluru in Februdeal. Advanced Medium Combat ary. The unit, with HAL’s engine dia strength of about vision has also been Aircraft (AMCA) 100, incorporates Rolls executing component project. Royce newest manufacorders for other American turing techniques for making Tier-1 suppliers like Pratt & aero-engine components and Whitney (P&W). P&W sources some 130 different compressor parts for components for rotating and static enthe company’s Trent family of civil aero gines from HAL, Koraput, and could ride engines, as well as for a number of other this existing agreement for discharging marine and energy gas turbines. IAML is any offset obligations arising out of the starting with a vendor base of about 225 supply of F117-PW-100 engines as a part small and medium enterprises vendors of the Boeing C-17 purchase by the IAF. and this is expected to rise quickly over GE may look to do the same for its own the next decade. The Bengaluru facility is extant offset obligations given that it is also likely to help Rolls Royce discharge now the beneficiary of a $558 million (Apoffset obligations that will arise out of the prox. `3,000 crore) contract for supplying supply of the IAF’s Hawk advanced jet 99 F414-INS6 engines to power the LCA trainer’s Adour Mk871 engine and the CMk-2. The contract also has the option 130J’s Royce AE 2100D3 engines. for another 100 engines in the future. HAL Meanwhile, Honeywell was issued a and GE have an evolving relationship in Request For Proposal (RFP) by the IAF the components space since 2009 and last October `to completely re-engine 125 it would be interesting to see if the F414
harness and machine structural sheet metal can become a Tier-3 supplier), is likely to see a major influx of new companies. Getting these potential suppliers—many are small firms—to conform to aerospace standards will require a degree of handholding from the sourcing firms and the government. In that sense, the emerging aerospace Special Economic zones (SEZs) in peninsular India are likely to play an important role. Tier-2 players i.e those who will build engine hydraulic systems, electrical power systems, etc. will, of course, also be subject to competition from new entrants. For instance, Wipro Infrastructure Engineering has in place an agreement with Spanish company CESA (Compania Espanola de Sistemas Aeronauticos SA), a subsidiary of the global aerospace and defence corporation, EADS, for the manufacture of precision engineering components including hydraulics. Ultimately, however, a lot of the business is likely to emanate from subcontracts issued by India’s only existing end-to-end company in the aerospace business: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), also the only Indian Tier-1 player in the domain of aero-engines. HAL’s engine division, that has a long history of licenceproducing various imported designs, is set to be by far the biggest beneficiary of the acquisition push. Currently, HAL is building engines under transfer of technology for all aircraft acquired from Russia in the recent past like the AL-31 FP for the India’s Air Force’s Su 30MKI and the RD-33 MK
A FLEET OF SUKHOI’s: India can leverage the experience of building aero engines and carry the legacy forward
SHAKTI: HAL/ Turbomecaneca’s joint developed Heli Engine
like the Adour Mk 811 for the Hawk is produced in India. In any case GE’s technology transfer proposition made under the offset obligations for the contract will also be interesting to see. It could be that HAL’s Shakti engine experience with Turbomeca (part of Safran) is providing the template at some level for these JVs wherein HAL has increasingly moved towards full assembly of engines and even limited co-development. The Shakti engine which powers the HAL Dhruv, HAL Rudra and will also power the HAL Light Combat Helicopter is an up-rated version of the Turbomeca Ardiden and was developed under the aegis of a HAL-Turbomeca joint venture. HAL’s tie-up with Safran also includes Snecma HAL Aerospace Pvt. Ltd. (SHAe), based in Bengaluru that manufactures high-tech components for aircraft engines. However, not everything is hunky dory between HAL and Safran. In November 2012, HAL looked at commercial bids for 240 engines (plus another 240 as offsets) for the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) programme. The international tender had followed the breakdown of talks between Turbomeca and HAL when the former had asked for a rather high fee to convert the existing Shakti engine for use in the LUH forcing HAL to float a global tender. Turbomeca, however, emerged as the lowest
cost bidder while LHTEC, the joint venture between Honeywell and Rolls-Royce, offered the CTS800 at a cost 33 per cent higher than Turbomeca’s bid. Nevertheless, the engine contract has not yet been awarded. The fact that HAL at the moment still seems to be looking at various options is also indicative of the fact that the Indian aerospace sector now has more options than it did in the wake of the 1998 Pokhran tests. SNECMA and, therefore, Safran actually seem to have lost favour in other quarters as well. Early this year the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), DRDO’s jet engine design laboratory, revealed that the MoD had discontinued discussions with Snecma on bringing it in as a partner for improving GTRE’s GTX35VS Kaveri engine. Although de-linked from the Tejas programme, India needs to keep building on the Kaveri programme for newer programmes like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project. Given the specifications of the AMCA a much higher thrust engine, than the designed output of the Kaveri, will be required for the AMCA even though it is envisioned as a twin engine aircraft. Accordingly, recent tender documents show that GTRE’s next turbofan is in the 110 KN wet and 75 KN dry thrust category. An engine of this capability will certainly
require GTRE to master Single Crystal Blade (SCB) technology, integrated rotor disk and blades and superalloys of nickel and cobalt. The Kaveri currently uses directionally solidified blade technology and neither that nor even first generation SCBs, that can now be fashioned in India will suffice for the new engine. Snecma, far from agreeing to transfer any relevant technologies, was instead offering that the Kaveri’s Kabini core be replaced by a Snecma ECO core which is the heart of the Snecma M88 that powers the Dassault Rafale. While the Kaveri project has been the subject of much derision by various quarters, the fact remains that it has strengthened India’s hand enough in the turbofan space to resist being a dumping ground for yesterday’s technology. A lot of the delays in the development of the Kaveri project can also be attributed to the fact that India’s industrial base has only now come up to provide the necessary components for prototyping complex devices like the modern low bypass turbofans. All the new activity detailed, however, means that engine development can now be speeded up using domestic resources and this will naturally make foreign partners more amenable to offering better terms of trade. In fact, it is now time that we move quickly to set up a High Altitude Engine Test Facility at the earliest to reduce our dependence on Russia’s Glomov Flight Research Institute (GFRI) and expedite the process of development. It is also time to integrate the Kaveri as it exists onto one of the Tejas demonstrators because it is only when an engine actually flies in the relevant aircraft that designers gets the best feedback about the design. There is simply no short cut in this matter. Even as India moves forward with domestic R&D, all eyes will be on the enginerelated offsets that flow from the mother of all aircraft acquisition programmes the MMRCA contract. The MoD, the IAF and DRDO must ensure that SNECMA is not allowed to manoeuvre around technology transfer obligations this time over as it has tried to do for the Kaveri improvement contract. In fact, given the massive order that SNECMA will get from the MMRCA contract, in any case it makes no sense to bring it in separately for improving the Kaveri. The MMRCA contract itself should give GTRE and HAL what they need by way of next generation engine technology.
H. C. TIWARI
“Our price will be below the budget the Indian Navy has to execute the programme” GEORGE BARTON, Vice President, Business Development for Ships and Aviation Systems, Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and sensors, speaks to GEOPOLITICS on his company’s global business model and plans of developing business in India. On the M H-60 Romeo
A couple of things had gone on the programme. We delivered our 150th aircraft last week (March) to the United States Navy and in the US, Sikorsky is coprime with Lockheed Martin—Sikorsky builds the airplane and then when they have it finished, we give them part of a cockpit, they fly it into our factory. In we go and we put the back end and all the avionics and all the mission systems and do the
systems inauguration. And we also do all the mission development for the US Navy. In India, competition that would be coming up in the Naval Multi-role Helicopters (NMRH), Sikorsky will be the lead and working with the US government to offer as a direct commercial sale and Lockheed Martin will be subcontractor to Sikorsky so that India has one entity to deal with. We have built our 150th aircraft. We have a contract from the Australian
Navy to build their maritime helicopter for 24 aircraft. We were just awarded in November a contract from Denmark to build their maritime helicopter. We were very happy about that. News-wise, we have the first aircraft for Australia in the production line and it will be delivered in December of this year. So, that will be our international MH-60 Romeo and we have delivered couple of MH-60 Sierras to Thailand
We will be offering a combination of MH60 Romeos and Sierras. And we feel that this will more than adequately meet the Indian Navy’s requirements, as we understand them today.
On the co-production and co-development in India
And we are expecting the RFP to come out later this year certainly before the end of the year and we have been in discussions over the past year with industry, meeting and trying to develop relationships so that we go into this contract. We will be able to develop an offset programme that is very competitive. And also one of the requirements of the contract as we understand this is that there should be co-production and co-development in India. So we are lucky and we would do that. And, of course, we currently have a joint venture with Tata on a C-130 programme and we are working with Sikorsky and how to determine the best-offset programme that we can provide to the Indian Navy and the Indian government.
CONDUCTING MISSIONS: A pair of US Navy Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawks on a mission
already. Development-wise, the programme for only backup for production, we recently signed a contract with the US Navy for five more years of production for an additional 120 aircraft. So, in total, the US Navy will buy 296 MH-60 Romeos and 278 MH-60 Sierras. With that volume, we are able to offer a very competitive price as team Seahawk and in fact for the United States Navy, we had a significant reduction in our price from the first multiyear to the second multiyear. So we view ourselves as being very competitive internationally now. Additionally, we have extremely robust training and logistics systems that are provided to the Navy and our internation-
On being the best as you claim
al partners Denmark and Australia and we feel that that will be a very big solid point for the Indian Navy and the Indian government.
On the relationship with Sikorsky
We also have a joint venture with Sikorsky called the ‘Maritime Helicopter Support Company’ and we provide the logistic support for over 400 MH-60 different versions and the Navy is very happy with that. The Department of Defence has held up that particular programme as the model for all performance-based contracts in the US. So, that is kind of in a nutshell on what is going on domestically and internationally specifically for the NMRH competition.
We have the most capable anti-submarine warfare helicopter and anti-surface warfare helicopter—maritime helicopter in the world today. No one will ever be able to take a peek with our system that we have out there today. It is the most sophisticated helicopter in the world today. And we have a logistics training system that is by far the best that we can bring into India and bring to Indian industry and have that same robust training system in place with the Indian Navy and there really is a third reason: because of the (numbers) that we are developing for the US Navy and the additional 32 international aircraft that we have. We have a very competitive price. And you really need large quantities to bring your price down. We have that today and so we feel we are very competitive on the international market now.
On the price
I do not have a comment on that today. We will have to wait for the RFP. If the Indian government were to contract with Sikorsky, we would offer ...I can tell you a price but I am not allowed to tell you a price. My guess is that our price will be well below the budget that the Indian Navy has to execute this programme.
On the anxiety in the US about rotorcraft developments not kicking off with the speed they should
What sort of rotorcraft can we expect in 2030?
I think the Future Vertical Lift; the ability to carry more, the ability for high speed will be there in the next ten years. And I think Sikorsky has got a tremendous capability. Other OEMs are developing some rotor technology. There is experimental aircraft out there today that are doing turbofan technology. So I think high speed, highly sophisticated mission systems, multi-role aircraft, and the ability to carry large payloads will be there. I think in the future in our area, we are going to see mission systems miniaturized and our ability to do many multi-roles with less gross weight, weight is king on aircraft. One pound is equivalent to million dollars savings. So weight is a big deal and that is what we work on; reducing weight, increasing processing capability.
Will the weight of the craft come down by 2020? www.geopolitics.in
HEAVY LIFT: The flight deck of a C-130J Hercules at Ramstein Air Base, Germany AF.MIL
We work on the avionics side, Lockheed Martin. That is how we do the mission systems. We also have some special projects that we do enough for the US government. With regards to that particular announcement, Sikorsky is already I think on the cutting edge the self-development for the S-97 Skyraider raider plane. And we are also working with them on that project, we are providing equipment for that and as a mission systems’ part, we have few processors that we are doing for that aircraft. The programme that they just signed a team agreement on is the Joint Multi-Role helicopter for the US for the joint forces out in the 2022 - 2030 and Future Vertical Lift. Lockheed Martin separately has won four contracts to develop mission systems for that. So there are two programmes are going on development of the aircraft and development of mission systems. So we have four avionics companies that have four mission systems being developed for pieces of the system to be developed. So that would be developed in parallel. But we are also working with OEMs that are advancing greater technology to provide systems architecture solutions for them as they go forward on these highly capable aircraft.
We are working today in nanotechnologies and in increased process and capability. Just in the last five years, our ability to do what we have for mission packages’ size and weight have been reduced significantly. And the open system architectures that we designed are really futuristic in the fact that we will be able to rapidly insert technology and that will be the key for the future -- how quickly can you insert technology and keep pace with what is coming. In today’s environment, we see the improvements in technology taking place but with old architectures, you cannot insert it rapidly or it is very hard. And so that is what we work on; Lockheed Martin is open systems. In fact, we have a new programme where you just recently won a contract to modernize the cockpits, C-130 cockpits for the US Navy. And the programme is called FACE - Future Airborne Capability Environment. And essentially what we are doing is developing the ability to take applications just like you have on your cellphone and plug them into aircraft and rapidly do that. And same thing with the hardware we are working. Our system will be able to plug and play different hardware and that is the key. It is having a flexible architecture. You know, if you had a system that was designed in the 1980s and you try to bring 2013 technology, it is difficult. So it is not now with the new
architectures. (It is a) Very exciting time in aerospace in history, particularly in the helicopter industry.
We will work with Sikorsky on the projects that we develop but we will focus on the mission systems and the capabilities that we can bring to India whether it is labs to do future development, whether it is labs to do co-development. We are looking a range of projects that I would want to put out now because it will be a competition. But we, at Lockheed Martin, will be able to bring on the NMRH programme…will be high technology solutions for Indian industry and hopefully, some co-development systems that are on the Romeo today that the Indian Navy would like to have.
On transferring technology
Currently, this is a new development. The US Department of Defense has started specifically to look at India and the issues of co-production and co-development. And we in the US industry are finding that very helpful because that helps us be able to offer our equipment and that is what we want to be able to do and so particularly in the time of sequestration and the budget drops in the United States, we want to be able to engage internationally and sell our products internationally.
RUSSIA SCORES DESPITE THE LOSSES DIPLOMACY
India has veered away from Russia to source arms but the fact remains that the Russians still hold the top position in arms exports to us. A special report:
nhappy over losing out to the Europeans and Americans in the race for multibillion tenders such as the MMRCA and the attack and heavy-lift choppers, a Russian official from Rosoboronexport chided India for its love for weapons from other countries at the recently-concluded Aero India in Bengaluru. Comments by senior government functionaries have also suggested that such a situation exists in India as it expressed its desire openly to diversify its source base when anguished over the frequent jacking up of price of Admiral Gorshkov by the Russian side, former Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta stated that India should stop putting in all its eggs in one basket in terms of procurements. However, a look into the recent trends in Indian weapon procurements by GEOPOLITICS suggests a different picture that Russia may have lost its share in percentage terms from the Indian defence pie but its sales volumes continue to soar and are expected to go further north in the next 15 to 20 years as well. The Government also agreed that India should look at other options to meet its requirements and started exploring the American and Israeli options in a big way and from 2004 onwards, several government to government deals were
signed with the US and the Israelis. But almost a decade down the line, courtesy world’s largest importer of military hardware,India, Russia is still the number two in terms of global arms export business after the US and number one in India. India is one of our main clients and we are and hope to continue as its key suppliers, a Russian official said. He said last year alone, Russia signed deals worth more than $4 billion (Approx. `22,000 crore) including 42 new Su-30MKIs, 59 Mi-17V-5 helicopters while the volume of other contracts already signed with New Delhi is around $8 billion (Approx. `44,000 crore), which is yet to be delivered.
The Russian defence marketing giant Rosoboronexport has estimated the sales of at least $3-3.5 billion (Approx. `18,000 crore) to the Indian market in the next 1015 years. “Its share in the military hardware sales to India may not be 70 to 80 per cent as it used to be at one point of time but in those days, India was not spending on defence modernisation as much it is doing now,” officials said. Moscow may have lost out to the European and Americans in deals such as the MMRCA and the mega deals for the attack and heavy-lift helicopters but silently bagged the “granny of all deals” in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) which is expected to be at least
GUARDING THE SEA: Nerpa Akula II Class, INS Chakra makes its way into India
twice of the size of the $18 billion (Approx. `2,00,000 crore) Rafale fighter aircraft deal over the next two decades. It may have lost out to the American Apache in the 22 Attack helicopter tender and to Chinook in the 15 heavy-lift chopper segment but remains a major supplier for the medium lift helicopter requirements of the Indian armed forces with the recent over $ 5 billion (Approx. `27,000 crore) contract for 147 Mi-17V5s for the IAF and the paramilitary forces. The Americans may have won the race for supplying the heavy-lift C-17 and the C-130J Super Hercules but the Russians will get a big pie of the Indian military transport requirements through the
FUTURISTIC FLEET: Test Flight of the PAKFA, from which the Indo-Russian FGFA will be developed
multi-role transport aircraft co-development programme. Moreover, what makes Russia the strongest player in the Indian defence market is its willingness to share hightechnology equipment is second to none for India. “What Russia can and is offering us, no one can match those commitments. It is supplying India weapon systems which others would not even dare to mention in the government-to-government meetings,” a senior Defence Ministry official said. “The Russians gave us the INS Chakra—a Charlie Class nuclear submarine in the 1980s and early 90 to help us build our nuclear force. They have delivered to us the Nerpa Akula II Class submarine again last year which is unimaginable with the US or any other country,” he said. In the recent past, The Indian armed forces, especially the Navy the IAF, have not been very happy with defence deals with Russians owing to their not so good experiences with the deals such as the Gorshkov because of delays and the MiG series aircraft due to lack of spare parts and servicing support. Russian officials say the main reason
behind the lack of spare parts support was due to the closure of several industries in the post-Soviet era but the situation has improved considerably and the Indian experiences in the recent past with modern Su-30 and MiG 29 fleet are totally different. “The contracts for the extended spare parts and life cycle support at the initial stages of the deal are also helping in addressing the support issues in the forces,” they said. Officials said the Russian side, which was once a monopolist, has also now started to offer joint partnership and co-development plans to battle with foreign competitors over its share of the Indian arms market using advanced forms of military-technical cooperation. “I would like to emphasize that we have abandoned the practice of simple selling, seeking more of joint programme to produce defence equipment, including for third parties. This gives us a chance to keep slightly ahead of our key rivals,” senior Rosoboronexport official Viktor Komardin recently said. An example of such cooperation is the development of the Russian-Indian Multi-Role Military Transport Aircraft Continued on Page 28
H. C. TIWARI
VIKTOR M KOMARDIN, Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport is dismayed at the Indian media for the manner in which it is reflecting the Russian arms industry. “Be fair,” he said repeatedly during the media interaction at the recent Aero India 2013. Here is an edited version of what he had to say. On India’s defence relations with Russia
I see that little attention is given to the role of Russia in strengthening Indian defence and the Indian defence iw ndustry. A lot of attention is given to the last purchases of military ware of other countries as a great deed, as a great achievement in building up Indian defence. We would like to draw the attention of the Indian press to be fair to the Russian role in building up Indian Defence. Many write that India has moved from a simple formula of procuring readymade goods to acquiring technology and move over to a stage of industrial cooperation. To other countries in the world, it is really a new stage but not for Russia. Russia came to that stage 50 years ago. The first licence of manufacturing MiG 21 FL was signed in the year 1964, which means that next year it will be the fifty year an-
niversary of Indo-Russian industrial cooperation with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited(HAL). India has made 480 aircraft with its own hands. Later, in the mid-Eighties, licence for the production of MiG 27 happened. Again, there was transfer of technology. Since then, it has made 165 MiG 27s. The licence for the production of the Sukhoi 30 was signed in the mid-Nineties. All in all we talk about 228 aircraft to be produced under that licence. Separately, within this project, there is also a licence for production of aircraft engines. We signed the contract in the late Seventies for the manufacture of T-72 tanks. In the mid-Eighties, the licence for the production of BMP 2 was given to India. In the late Nineties - at the end of the century—the licence for production of T90 tanks was given -- which is under fulfil-
‘DO NOT TUR CASE YOU LIK ment of this contract. In the mid-Nineties, the licence for production of Brahmos missiles, supersonic Mach 3 missiles was given to India. Now, we have Brahmos for surface launch, sea, surface and underwater launch. Now this air launch version is under development and it was to be fitted to the Sukhoi 3oMK, a grand project. Also the project for the production of artillery projectiles, tank projectiles, antitank projectiles plus the latest contract for the licensed production of Smerch projectiles is under discussion now. This projectile industry is also licensed. All in all, only as capital procurement we have more than two dozen contracts which covers billions of dollars in payment and in profit and transfer of technology. This
g DEFBIZ is the investment of Russia in the creation of the Indian Defence industry. Only in aviation with Russian assistance, five major industrial aviation plants were created: Nasik, Koraput, Lucknow, Hyderabad, Korba and the design section in Bangalore. Next, the multi role transport aircraft. It is a joint venture of Russian technology. There is a special formula to administer the project. The fifth generation preliminary design contract is over and now we are at a stage to create the contract for research and development for making a prototype. This is a highly secret project, very sensitive: only Russia gives it. This project is the first in the world where only two countries acquire Fifth generation technology and only Russia gives it.
On India’s defence purchases from the US
When I read that United States sells billions of dollars worth of readymade transport planes without any transfer of technology, I say that is unfair. They turn to the Indian press to change the position
the narrow fuselage and you pay twice the amount of the Russian aircraft. I cannot see any military logic in it. And then I say, all those military contracts were won by the State department of the United States of America. It had nothing to do with the tender. It had nothing to do with the technical characteristics. The Mi 26 helicopter lost out (in the tender). It cannot lose against the Chinook, because the Chinook is a baby in this sphere of heavy lifting. The Mi 26 can take the Chinook by the collar and carry it to any place.
On whether trade with Russia is better than with America or others
Arms sales, military technical cooperation is politics. Now, we are at the stage where the United States is politically more inevitable. I don’t know. Therefore, billions of dollars are paid for fewer procurements, no transfer of technology, no licence, fewer procurement for billions... The Indian delegations at the negotiations with Russia ...they bargain for every
RN YOUR BACK ON US IN KE SOMEONE ELSE’ and not speculate. Please keep Russia in its proper place in the creation of the Indian defence industry since India and Russia are strategic partners. When we discussed the IL-76 transport planes it was around the sum of $80 million or something, and then you buy without any tender, the Hercules for $150 million. I cannot understand why you spend $10 billion for ten C-17 Globalmasters which is needed to fly over oceans. Only Canada, Australia and the United States have it for global transportation of goods, not within the Indian territory and you say that is proper. When 70 per cent of Indian armaments - air, land and navy - are Russian, you buy Hercules that cannot accommodate a Smerch or a tank. It’s just cargo with
rupee, regardless of the big investment or the intellectual investment in creating the Indian defence industry. Russia created the Indian defence industry. Is there any proper evaluation, any thanks? I accept politics. I know there is politics but fair things should be kept fair. Russia is a strategic partner. I think there is a national consensus within the Indian people and Russian people that we are friends. Russi-Hindi bhai bhai. We don’t have any political, economical, social problems. We want to be dealt with as partners, as brothers and friends and not turn your back on us in case you like someone else who will give you a sweet or a chocolate. Suddenly we are secondary and others become friends. India tells, ‘Please don’t trade with
Pakistan’. United States trades, France trades, they sell Agusta submarines to Pakistan and Scorpene submarines to India. Ukraine trades, England trades, everyone trades but Russia. We do not. Is there any proper estimation of it? Hardly?
I want to say that the Indian press does not give proper place to Russia, a friendly country and a strategic partner in many things but also in military technical cooperation.
On the issue of defence sensitivity We can see the issues of defence security and national security as sensitive and secret subjects. In Russia, it is so. And no one will know the real players in Russia. If 50 per cent true of what Russian correspondents write on military and defence problems in Russia, they are the best written articles. But we see there is a different approach in the government to the issue of defence security. Some countries tell us, “Never mention a contract, never mention a sum”. Other countries prefer to demonstrate open tenders. They don’t keep secrets. We Russians say that this subject should be secret. Therefore, we are not open. I say to the Indian press, “Go to Mr (N A K) Brown (Air Chief Marshal) and ask him about the sum, about the contracts”. Ask your commanders, your chiefs? He knows the limits, what to say, what not to say. I think you have some strategic interests in the region, you have some issues and I don’t think that your Armed Forces wants to disclose everything. On Life cycle costs Look the tanker that was bought, it is a passenger plane converted into a tanker. It is a two-engine aircraft. Ours is four-engine aircraft and drinks more kerosene. Maintenance of four engines is twice as more as the two engines. Maybe technologically a little bit higher, but our transport plane prepares for fight in combat operations. with necessary anti-missile, etc It is military. Not just tanker plane to carry kerosene oil. But your military procures it, it is up to them. Nothing unusual If Hercules is put on tender, it will never win because of the price. it does not accommodate military equipment, only soldiers and cargo, and you boast of buying a perfect thing, it’s nothing perfect. But then it is your choice and selection. April 2013
Continued from Page 25
Russia scores despite the losses
FUTURE MEGA OPPORTUNITIES FOR RUSSIA
(MTA), which is expected to fly for the first time in 2017 and enter production both in Russia and India in 2019. The dominance of share of Russian equipment in the armed forces also may have come down in the recent past especially in the IAF, with the phasing out of the MiG 21s, MiG 23s and the MiG 27s but with the FGFA and the Su-30s, of which
ALL IN ONE: The BE-200 Amphibious aircraft can be used for both Amphibious warfare and emergency fire fighting situations
• Project 75 India: Russia has offered its latest Amur-1650 class submarines to India, which is planning to issue a global tender for six diesel-electric submarines expected to be worth over $15 billion (Approx. `72,000 crore). • India is vying to purchase six nonnuclear submarines to boost up its undersea warfare capability. The deal may be expanded by acquiring the know-how to build more such submarines at Indian shipyards. • As part of project 75 India, Indian Navy proposes to have a undersea force of 24 submarines by 2015. India already has 10 Kilo-class submarines and has set up a line to manufacture French Scorpene Submarines at Mazagoan docks in Mumbai, the first of these submarines are expected to roll out by 2016. • 123 Naval Multirole helicopters (NMRH): Under this project, the Navy is planning to procure 123 NMRH for deployment over various warships. • The tender is expected to be the biggest for NMRHs outside the US. • Russia has plans of offering a Kamov naval helicopter for this Indian navy tender expected to be worth over $5 billion (Approx. `27,000 crore). • 56 Naval Utility Helicopter: Under this project, a twin-engine variant of the Kamov chopper is being offered by the Russians. The helicopters are intended to replace the single engine Light Cheetah and Chetak choppers of the Navy at a cost of around $1.5 billion (Approx. `7,000 crore). • 197 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Helicopters: Under the project, the Indian Army and the IAF are looking to induct 133 and 64 light utility helicopters respectively. The Russian Kamov
226 Sergei is one of the two contenders for the $3 billion (Approx. `16,000 crore) contract for providing light choppers to the Indian forces. • 2 amphibious aircraft for the IAF and the Navy: Russian Beriev is looking to offer its Be-200 to meet the amphibious warfare requirements of the Navy and the IAf around the Island territories of Andman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep. The two forces will have six each of these machines, which is likely to be a common one, at an estimated cost of over $2 billion (Approx. `11,000 crore). • In the Navy, the Russian side has offered to upgrade the fleet of over 30 Kamov-28 anti-submarine warfare choppers. • Upgrades of key weapon systems and aircraft: This is expected to be the biggest business segment for the Russian side in the next ten years. With India planning to upgrade its existing aerial
and land fleet, the biggest beneficiary would be Russia. • Already HAL has submitted a proposal worth over `11,000 crore to upgrade the existing Su-30MKIs to be converted into the more powerful Super Sukhois. The MiG 29s are already undergoing upgrade in Russia and few of them have arrived back in India. • The Army is also expected to soon go in a big way to modernise and upgrade its infantry combat vehicles and combat tanks. The Russian side has already started supplying new equipment for the T-90 tanks, of which over 1,650 are to be procured by the force. • Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle: The Russian firm manufacturing the BMP ICVs are likely to partner with an Indian firm, which is most likely expected to be a PSU, for a multi-billion dollar contract for providing FICVs to the infantry and para military forces for their operational requirements.
around 450 pieces would be inducted verall, Russian equipment would go beyond 70 per cent in the IAF in next two decades. In the Army as well, the planned induction of over 1,650 T-90 tanks would ensure that the firepower of India is dominated by the Made in Russia marking. The increased induction of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, Smerch multi-
barrel rocket launchers and Russian air defence systems would ensure the high visibility of the Russians in Indian forces. The Navy, which has at any point of time at least three to four of its warships under construction in Russian shipyards, is also likely to witness the same trend with majority of its underwater and surface ships being from Russia.
ROHINI: 3D radar developed by DRDO for use with Akash SAM capable of tracking 150 targets
Continued from Page 17
Navy radars to boost Indian industry â€œThe Defence Ministry earlier this month (in March) issued the contract for procuring 31 surface surveillance radars that would be equipped on the warships of the navy to provide the platforms with a better capability for target designation during wartimes to the anti-ship, antisubmarine and surface to surface weapon systems on board them,â€? Navy officials said.
The Request for Proposal issued for the radars also requires the participating vendors to provide a simulator for the radar systems which will help the Navy personnel train to handle the radars in a better and efficient manner, they said. The Ministry and the Navy have, at present, pegged the requirement of radars at 31 only but the number of radars to be procured as part of the follow-on option is expected to cross more than 110 radars, they said adding that the equipment was intended to be on all the warships of the maritime force. The tender was issued by the Defence Ministry after due diligence of than more
two years in which the Indian private and public sector companies were asked to submit detailed reports about their products and intended partners and how they were looking to execute the project of such a magnitude, they said. The tender was issued on January 15 and the Ministry had asked the competing firms to submit their bids by April 9 but the date can be extended as some of the firms have sought more time to respond to the RFP. As per the tender, the Ministry wants the selected vendor to deliver all the 31 radars within 72 months of the date of signing off the contract with the first two
g HEMANT RAWAT
WEAPON LOCATING RADAR: Indigenously developed by BEL
systems and the simulator to be delivered within two years. Keeping the futuristic operational requirements of the force in mind, the Ministry has asked the vendors to provide a modular radar system to enable the replacement of parts and spares without difficulty and easy rectification of faults, if any develop during operations. The Ministry said the radars will be integrated with the main weapon and sensor suites of the warships on which these will be installed and should have the operational capability of “all round search, detection and tracking surface targets in various modes and also to be able to detect moving and stationary targets”. The RFP specifies that the radar should be able to track not less than 50 targets at a time and should have capability to adjust to false alarms caused by the clutter of rain, storms and other atmospheric reasons. It also wants the vendors to provide a system that can survive and work effectively even in an adverse Electronic Warfare environment. A total of eight teams including 14 firms are taking part in the Indian navy tender. The contender teams include the team between Tata Power Systems and Indra Defence Systems of Spain, Italian Selex has teamed up with Alpha Design while defence PSU Bharat Electronics Limited has decided to go alone in the contract. Another Government-controlled firm called BECIL is teaming up with the Russian Rosoboronexport for supplying the radars to the Navy.
L&T has tied up with European giant Cassidian for the tender while Data Patterns of India has joined hands with Reutech of South Africa. Indian firm Nova has tied up with a Danish entity called Terma for the tender. Mahindra Defence Systems has tied up with Elta of Israel after it had to cease ties with the Swiss Rheinmetall which was blacklisted by the Defence Ministry for its alleged involvement in the Ordnance Factory Board scam of 2005. Mahindra had snapped ties with the Zurich-based firm soon after the Defence Ministry blacklisted Rheinmetall along with Israeli IMI, Corporation Defence of Russia and Singapore Technologies Kinetics and two Indian firms for their alleged involvement in the multi-crore ordnance factory scam and debarred them for further business dealings for 10 years. Due to blacklisting of Rheinmetall, another tender for replacing the air defence guns of the army has also been affected. “Defence Ministry invites request from Indian vendors only, who may form joint ventures with foreign firms to produce radars in the country for the requirements of the Indian Navy,” says the tender document highlighting the role of the Indian industry in the production of the radar systems. “The RFP has been issued under the ‘Buy and Make (India)’ clause and hence the equipment must have minimum 50 per cent indigenous content on cost basis,” it says. Officials said the first tender issued under the ‘Buy and Make (India)’ category
will help the industry to develop its own capabilities in collaboration with the foreign partners as the Request for Proposal mandates that the radar system should have at least 50 per cent of its content built indigenously, Defence Ministry officials said. This is the first tender of its kind in which the indigenous industry has been given the responsibility of producing a military system on its own and based on the experiences in it, the Ministry will further ease or modify the DPP, they said. If the project achieves success as expected by the Government, this can also be made a template for more future projects with small adjustments and changes in the DPPP clauses. The first ‘Buy and Make (India)’ project planned by the Ministry was the Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle programme in which again Indian firms were asked to tie up with foreign vendors for offering the combat vehicles for the Army. But the tender was withdrawn by the Defence Ministry after it found that there was a lack of clarity on various issues in the Expression of Interest (EoI) issued by the Ministry and the Request for Proposal for it will be reissued after making necessary changes. To provide a greater role to Indian industry in defence production, the Defence Ministry had brought in an amendment in the DPP in 2009 for creating a new category of procurement called ‘Buy & Make (India)’. Under this new category, supply order will be placed only on the Indian companies, that in turn will have to negotiate with interested foreign companies for technical and other production arrangement. This procedure will enable the Indian companies to explore a combination of alternatives, the best of which will be selected by the MoD. At the same time the foreign companies that would play an indirect role under this provision, will be compelled to set up joint ventures with Indian companies, for the simple reason that it is only through the JV that they can supply their products. To do away the possibility of Indian companies becoming a trading centre for foreign companies, the Defence Ministry has put a bar mandating that the indigenous content in value terms of the contract should be at least 50 per cent. This would ensure that only serious Indian players with long-term vision of becoming a true defence manufacturer come into the business.
DEF BIZ HAL-ROLLS ROYCE PRODUCTION FACILITY STARTS International Aerospace Manufacturing Pvt Limited’s (IAMPL) production facility was formally inaugurated by K Naresh Babu, Managing Director, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL-Bangalore Complex). Incorporated in July 2010, IAMPL is a 50:50 Joint Venture Company (JVC) of HAL and Rolls-Royce. The facility will begin manufacturing production components later this year. At an investment of nearly `135 crore over an area of 7,200 sq mt, the unit incorporates the latest Rolls-Royce manufacturing techniques
JOINT EFFORTS: HAL Managing Director inaugurating the IAMPL facility
for making 130 different compressor parts. The newlyinaugurated facility will have about 100 employees. HAL started producing
the Orpheus engine under licence, followed by maintenance of the Gnome engine and the 501 K industrial gas turbine. HAL is the produc-
HAL’S `763 CR HIKE FDI LIMIT IN DIVIDEND DEFENCE: USIBC
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) paid `763.45 crore as second interim dividend at 634 per cent on paid-up share capital of `120.50 crore for FY 2012-13. The dividend cheque was presented to the Minister of State for Defence, Jitendra Singh, by Dr R K Tyagi, Chairman, HAL in Delhi. HAL paid the first interim dividend of `48.20 crore for FY 2012-13 on December 7, 2012. HAL has set itself on the path of self reliance and to the greater national cause of indigenisation of air defence capabilities. The company has already drawn action plans to meet this objective.
US-India Business Council (USIBC) has pitched to hike foreign direct investment (FDI) in defence from 26 per cent to 74 per cent. Sources in the Commerce Ministry said USIBC submitted a wish-list to Finance Minister P Chidambaram outlining its expectations from the general Budget 2013. In a letter to the Finance Minister, accompanied with a memorandum, USIBC President Ron Somers stated that US and India shared common goals in national security and technology. “USIBC strongly advocates upward revision of India’s FDI cap in the defence sector from the present 26 per cent to 74 per cent in order to allow for greater investment and transfer of technology by global defence companies, resulting in increased opportunities for co-production, joint
manufacturing, and offset partnerships with Indian industry,’’ the memorandum stated. Welcoming the revision of Defence Offset Guidelines, that allowed foreign manufacturers to forge partnerships with a broad range of Indian partners, Somers said to focus investment attention towards areas of critical need such as civil infrastructure and energy, the Indian government would have to carefully consider how these ancillary sectors could help bolster India’s indigenous defence manufacturing capability. “Expanding the definition of offsets to allow for investment in civil infrastructure will only help drive companies to further dedicate their offset commitments to areas that help build India’s defence industrial base,” it added.
tion agency of Rolls-Royce’s Adour 804/811 engine for the Jaguar aircraft of IAF since 1981. HAL is now successfully manufacturing the Adour MK 871 for the new Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers. As a result of strong collaboration, both HAL and Rolls-Royce have progressively contributed to the development of Indian aerospace industry. The JV is also committed towards developing a robust supply chain management system to ensure nurturing of small and medium enterprises and will have about 225 vendors initially.
LALL FOR CYBER SECURITY Dr. Vivek Lall has been inducted into the Joint Working Group on Cyber Dr Vivek Lall Security led by the National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon. India’s National Security Council approved setting up of a national cyber security architecture to protect critical information infrastructure and other networks. The goal of the proposed architecture would be to prevent sabotage, espionage and other forms of cyber attacks that could hurt the country. A national cyber security co-ordinator in the National Security Council secretariat will bring this work together.
DEF BIZ $50 MN CONTRACT FROM BAE
Elbit Systems announced that whollyowned subsidiary M7 Aerospace LLC, will be working with BAE Systems to provide logistics support for the T-34, T-44, and T-6 aircraft under a contract awarded to BAE Systems by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). Under its NAVAIR contract, BAE Systems awarded M7 a subcontract of approximately $50 million (`250 crore) to be performed over a five-year period.
FIRST F-35 WITH CENTRE WING TAKES FLIGHT The first Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II with a Centre Wing Assembly (CWA) built at Lockheed Martin facility in Marietta, US, was flown for the first time. The aircraft, known as BF-25, is an F-35B short
takeoff and vertical landing variant and was delivered to the US Marine Corps. CWA is a major structural component and represents approximately one quarter of the aircraft’s fuselage. Approximately 350
CASSIDIAN HANDS OVER 100TH EUROFIGHTER Cassidian has handed over the 100th Eurofighter to the German Air Force. The Eurofighter is amongst the most modern multirole combat aircraft in the world. The planes are the German Air Force’s front-line fighters and will
remain the backbone of its combat aircraft fleet, particularly in the light of the new orientation, according to General Lieutenant Karl Muellner, Chief of Staff of the German Air Force.
F124 FRIGATE TO BE MODERNISED Atas Elektronik and Thales Deutschland have joined hands to modernise the combat system of the German Class F124 frigates. CEOs of both the companies recently signed the contract at the Federal Office of
people were engaged to build this aircraft under the F-35 programme in Marietta. In addition to CWAs, technicians also applied specialised stealth coatings to F-35’s horizontal and vertical tails.
Bundeswehr Equipment, in Koblenz. With deliveries scheduled for 2017, the “HW Regeneration CDS F124” up-gradation by the two companies will refurbish the hardware of the Combat Direction
System (CDS) and will also update the software of the system. The up-gradation is based on the know-how and experience gained during the F124 construction and service phase, in which both companies were involved.
SIKORSKY SELLS 30 CHOPPERS Sikorsky has entered into agreements to sell 23 S-92 helicopters and seven S-76D helicopters to Milestone Aviation Group, a global finance company that leases helicopters to high-quality helicopter operators. The agreements also include options to buy up to an additional 14 S-92 and ten S-76D helicopters. Sikorsky expects to begin delivering the S-92 and S-76D helicopters beginning in 2013 and continuing through 2017.
SAGEM WINS OPTRONIC SYSTEMS ORDER Sagem, a unit of Safran, has signed a contract with French naval shipyard DCNS, main contractor, for EOMSNG (Electro-Optical Multifunction Systems) that will be installed by 2014 on four French navy amphibious and projection vessels. Developed and produced by Sagem, the EOMS-NG is a day-andnight multifunction gyro-stabilised optronic system. It offers complete functionality over 360°, including infrared surveillance, identification, tracking, laser range-finding and fire control. Controlled from two consoles, the EOMS-NG system will help in assessing the ship’s immediate environment, control self-defence weapons and enhance safety of helicopter operations.
TEXTRON VEHICLES FOR AFGHAN ARMY Textron Marine & Land Systems, an operating unit of Textron Systems, announced that it has been awarded a $113.4 million (`600 crore) contract from the US Army to supply 135
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV ) for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The vehicles were being contracted through the US Army Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.
BRAZILIAN SUB FACILITY INAUGURATED
DCNS has officially inaugurated the Metal Structures Manufacturing Unit (UFEM)
in Brazil, which comprises all industrial facilities and special tooling needed to manufacture outfitted hull sections of Scorpene submarines under the PROSUB programme. This latest development reflects the success of DCNS’s partnership with Brazil and the progress of the PROSUB programme.
IS NEW MD
FAURY IS NEW CEO OF EUROCOPTER
Atlas Elektronik has appointed Alexander Kocherscheidt as Managing Director of the company. Kocherscheidt He will function also as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and will be responsible for the Finance Division as well as for the Human Resources, Legal and Compliance Divisions. Kocherscheidt succeeded Dieter Rottsieper, previous managing director.
EADS Board of Directors have his career, Faury excelled at appointed Guillaume Faury Eurocopter in various manas the sucagement positions cessor to Lutz before accepting a Bertling with very senior role at effect from May Peugeot. With his 1, 2013. Bertling profound knowlhad been at edge of the divithe helm of the sion, his leadership group’s heliskills, and his broad copter division industrial expertise, since November I am convinced 2006. Guillaume is the Welcoming right person to Guillaume Faury Faury back to drive Eurocopter’s EADS, Tom ambitious innovaEnders, Chief Executive Oftion roadmap and global ficer, EADS, said: “Early in positioning.”
SWEDISH CONTRACT FOR DIEHL Swedish Defence Material Administration signed a contract with Diehl Defence to deliver IRIS-T SLS surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for the country’s armed forces. The new units comprising the IRIS-T missile, missile launching station and fire control system will improve national air defence by providing protection against air attacks and from a large variety of threats includ-
ing missiles, helicopters and aircraft. The Swedish Army will operate SAM fire units, together with a new Command and Control System as well as modernised sensors from Saab.
Continued from Page 17
WHAT NEXT IN THE FINMECCANICA CASE? and other companies in which the Italian group has capital investment and interests. That apart, it can adversely impact government policy vis-á-vis foreign military hardware buys. This can be gauged from Defence Minister A K Antony’s statement at a press conference during the 2012 DefExpo in Delhi, within days of his ministry black-
The policy of banning every company that comes under the slightest cloud should be immediately done away with, as it does not help the cause of armed forces modernisation. So should the provision to cancel the contract. If the product that has been offered by the company, which come under a taint at the stage of implementation, then the contract obligations should be completed by the firm. However, completion of contractual obligations doesn’t mean the company that got involved in graft will not go scot-free despite the wrongdoing. It will pay up and face financial penalties that would be so severe that it would not only recover any loss that may have been caused to the nation’s exchequer, but it would make the firm think twice on getting into underhand dealings.
listing six companies including four foreign companies, for their involvement in the corruption case against former Ordnance Factory Board Director General Sudipto Ghosh, who has been convicted in the case by a special CBI court. Antony had then said that the 10-year ban on these companies doing defence business in India would apply to ‘their
ancillaries’ too and the entire ‘Defence Ministry family’ will have no business to do with these companies: Singapore Technologies Kinetics, Israel Military Industries, Zurich-based Rheinmetall Air Defence, Corporation Defence Russia, Delhi-based TS Kisan and Company and Ludhiana-based RK Machine Tools. In the case of the AgustaWestland deal
AgustaWestland AW 101 VVIP Chopper, and (Below) Luxurious Interiors of the Chopper
for the VVIP helicopters, the contract and the integrity pact provides for five-year ban in case of any wrongdoing is found during the tender or after signing of the contract, which has been incorporated as per the Defence Procurement Procedure 2006. If things come to such a pass, here is what the ban would mean for not just
India and its armed forces, but also for AgustaWestland, its parent firm Finmeccanica and all its subsidiaries and ancillaries: • As and when the AgustaWestland deal goes down, it would take along with it, the MMRCA deal too. For, the plane selected by India under the 2007 tender is the French firm
Dassault Aviation’s Rafale combat aircraft. But how is Finmeccanica involved in the Rafale deal? European company MBDA manufactures the missiles that the French combat planes are armed with. Finmeccanica has a 25 per cent stake in MBDA. In its January 2013 brochure for India, the Italian group has claimed that MBDA is part of its group companies. The MMRCA contract is yet to be awarded and cost negotiations are in progress, though Dassault has already indicated that it will have only European missiles on Rafale. The weapons package comprises a mix of MICA and Meteor air-to-air missiles manufactured and supplied by MBDA. So are the air-to-ground Storm Shadow/ SCALP and the maritime superiority missiles such as the Exocet. Another Indian project in which MBDA is participating is the Mirage-2000 upgrade programme that too has been won by the French. In January 2012, India decided to buy 490 MICA missiles worth $1.4 billion (Aprrox. `7,700 crore) for its 50 French Mirage-2000 combat planes in the IAF fleet. This project too may suffer. India’s prestigious 45,000-tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) too will face a major setback, as Finmeccanica’s subsidiary Selex ES has been awarded the contract to supply the Indian Navy with its RAN-40L 3D Air Surveillance Radar that is to be installed on-board the IAC, under construction at the Cochin Shipyard. Finmeccanica’s subsidiary WASS is the winner of the Indian Navy project to upgrade its 128 A244 lightweight torpedoes on all its 13 operational conventional underwater combatants. The contract was awarded to WASS in 2010. The above projects apart, Finmeccanica’s NH Industries is competing in the $1 billion (Aprrox. `5,500 crore)
The Bofors scandal rocked Indian Artillery Upgrade plans, and the Army has been without a new and superior 155mm Howitzer.
COMPANIES FACING A BAN FROM FINMECCANICA FALLOUT
tender for 16 Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) for the Indian Navy that is at an advanced stage of finalisation. NH90 is the helicopter it has fielded against American Sikorsky’s S-70B in the tender. In August 2012, India has issued a fresh tender worth $4 billion (Aprrox. `22,000 crore) for 56 more MRH in which NHI will again participate.
• Though AgustaWestland is not in competition for the 197 Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) tender worth $1 billion (Aprrox. `5,500 crore), the tender process is on the verge of being cancelled, despite reaching the final stages when India is to decide between the Kamov Ka-226 Sergei and Eurocopter’s AS 350 Fennec. The rea-
son, if and when it is cancelled, could also be the revelations in the recent Italian probe into Finmeccanica affairs, which has thrown up corruption allegations in the LUH tender too, with Italian prosecutors claiming before the Busto Arsizio court that an Indian Army Brigadier, identified only as Brig Saini, had sought bribes from
fence policy. Nine countries—Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Syria, and Yemen —exhibited critical risk, lacking basic measures such as controls to enable accountability, making institutionalisation of anti-corruption mechanisms in the sector near impossible. South America and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, showed lower risk of corruption thanks to strong technical controls in areas such as administration of audits. The study, to index government defence anti-corruption means, analysed what 82 countries do to reduce corruption risks. These countries accounted for 94 per cent of the global military expenditure in 2011, equivalent
to $1.6 trillion. The study also estimated that the global cost of corruption in the defence sector to be a minimum of $20 billion (Aprrox. `1,10,000 crore) annually. It also found that politicians exercised little oversight, the armed forces feared blowing the whistle, and the citizens were kept in the dark. Only 15 per cent of governments assessed/possessed political oversight of defence policy that was comprehensive, accountable, and effective. In 45 per cent of countries there was little or no oversight of defence policy and in half of nations there was minimal evidence of scrutiny of defence procurement. The study also found that citizens were frequently denied basic knowledge about the defence sector.
THE GLOBAL SITUATION When it comes to dealing with corruption in defence deals, almost every country in the world is at a loss for ideas. Or. that is the outcome of a Transparency International study released in January this year. About 70 per cent of the nations globally left the door open to waste and security threats, as they lacked the tools to prevent corruption in the defence sector, the first-of-its-kind study found. Those with poor controls included two-thirds of the largest arms importers and half of the biggest arms exporters in the world, the study said, noting that Germany and Australia were the only countries that have strong anti-corruption mechanisms with measures in place such as robust parliamentary oversight of de-
MADE IN INDIA MANTRA The Rafale deal has also come under doubt as MBDA (25 per cent shares with Finmeccanica) manufactures the missiles that arm Rafale.
AgustaWestland to keep it in contention in the tender. AgustaWestland was, though, eliminated later during the down-selection phase. • AgustaWestland has also established a Joint Venture ‘Indian Rotorcraft Limited’ (IRL) with Indian private sector Tata Sons in 2009 to set up a final assembly line in India for the AW119 helicopters in Hyderabad Aviation Special Economic Zone. • Though IRL has claimed the Italian probe and the Indian investigations into the corruption charges in the VVIP helicopters deal may have no impact on the JV, it is up to the two partners to either continue with the JV or not, as a fallout of the blacklisting if and when it happens. However, IRL will have no scope of participating in any military tender in India during the period of the ban though it may be free to join any civilian tender, as the Defence Ministry ban usually does not apply for the civilian sector. The JV plans to start production of the eightseater AW119 by April 2014. The Defence Ministry’s ban order on Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries would be implemented only in the defence sector and these companies will still be eligible to participate in the civilian sector, be it business tie-up with PawanHans for
On the policy front, the impact of the AgustaWestland affairs is that an already cautious Antony is now convinced that going in for global tenders will tarnish his image as a ‘Mr Clean’ with every deal coming under a corruption cloud. That has led to him pushing to give priority to indigenous defence industry in future military hardware tenders. Defence imports by India will be ‘a last resort’ if a particular weapon or equipment could not be manufactured domestically and the ‘ultimate answer’ to avoid controversies was ‘maximum indigenisation’. Considering that India is expected to spend $100 billion (Aprrox. `5,50,000 crore) this decade on its military modernisation, it is a huge market that global defence companies would like to venture into. However, the companies have a major uphill task to convince Antony that they will not indulge in any wrongdoing. In this regard, Antony has asked his ministry officials to take a second look at the Defence Procurement Procedure and the Defence Production Policy and to include provisions that will aid indigenisation of military technologies, including providing the Indian defence public sector undertakings and private sector defence firms that first right of refusal of a project before the Defence Ministry goes in for a global tender. India, at present, relies on 70 per cent imports to meet the weapons and other systems required by its 1.3-million-strong world’s second largest armed forces after China’s. According to Stockholm-based Swedish think-tank SIPRI, India is the world’s largest arms importer with 10 per cent of global weapons purchases, worth over $13-billion (Aprrox. `72,000 crore), made between 2007-11. India overtook China, which imported arms worth over $6-billion (Aprrox. civilian helicopters or with the oil sector for offshore transportation. • Finmeccanica’s ban, which seems likely now, will bring to an end a 40year relationship that the Italian major has had with India, beginning with the supply of 41 SeaKing helicopters to the Indian Navy in the 1970s. In these 40 years, Finmeccanica has employed 200 people in India and has set up a corporate headquarters in New Delhi, apart from cooperating with Indian
Depending too much on imported equipment is costly and may also land us in trouble. So, to the maximum extent, we must try to indigenise. Zero import is not possible, but maximum (defence) purchases should be indigenous, A K ANTONY said recently. `32,000 crore) between 2007-11, to be perched at the top of SIPRI’s tally of global arms importers. China, during this period, has been propelled into massive domestic defence production and exports, aided by its industry’s reverse-engineering skills and the demand from its close friends such as Pakistan and North Korea. India’s defence imports are mainly sourced—about 80 per cent— from Russia. The rest of the imports come from the US, Israel and France. But these are usually government-to-government contracts and not open global commercial tenders. Most of the commercial tenders that India had floated are facing delays, largely due to allegations of bribery, undue influence during the selection process and foul play. This includes the $5 billion (Aprrox. `27,000 crore) artillery modernisation that has been hit over the last three decades due to the Bofors bribery scandal. India had opened up the defence sector for cent per cent private sector participation in 2001, after keep it as an exclusive public sector domain till the advent of the 21st Century, almost five decades after independence. It also gradually allowed foreign direct investment up to 26 per cent.
industry majors such as the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, Bharat Dynamics Limited, Bharat Electronics Limited, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, as also with Tata Sons in the Indian private sector. It is also seeking to forge new strategic alliances with the public and the private sector companies in India and with government-owned laboratories. According to one estimate, Finmeccanica’s investment in India is said to be over $12 billion (Aprrox. `66,000 crore) for 2013 alone.
soldiers have died in Siachen INDIAN ARMY
For the first time, the government has accepted that the number of Indian soldiers who have laid down their lives in the Siachen sector, ever since the Indian Army made its first foray in the region, had reached 846 soldiers. “A total number of 846 Armed forces personnel have made supreme sacrifices on the Siachen glaciers since 1984”, said the release. This includes deaths due to the The government has put cargo terminals of eight sensitive and big airports like Delhi and Mumbai under the security cover of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) in wake of inputs received stating that the cargo terminals of big airports could be targeted by terrorists and due to increase in theft of passenger cargo. Cargo terminals were hitherto under the security of Airport Authority of India (AAI). The CISF will also be deployed to guard Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Kochi and Ahmedabad airport cargo termi-
mar and to hold strategical positions located in the country. The Indian Army and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) started a joint patrol last year. Conducted in close coordination, the patrolling is spread out along the border: from the northern-most point in Arunachal Pradesh to the southern edge bordering Tripura. The armies of both nations have had substantive relations since the early 1990s, largely due to geographical contiguity and the precarious security situation in India’s Northern-Eastern states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur that border Myanmar. India also has an arms-equipment supply-based relationship with the Myanmar armed forces while the Myanmar Navy is often invited for the Indian Naval exercise ‘Milan’.
extreme climate and terrain conditions, which causes more casualties in that sector than battle does. Hypoxia, high altitude pulmonary edema (or ‘altitude sickness’ in mountaineering lexicon), avalanches and crevasses have also taken a heavy toll of Indian lives. New Delhi has decided not to differ differentiate between those who died in combat and those who died in an avalanche.
cargo terminals under CISF
`52,264 crore for Internal Security
The Central spending to counter internal security challenges is set to cross the `50,000 crore-mark over the next one year, twice of what was being spent so far. Ministry of Finance gave a 19 per cent hike of `43,700 crore for the internal security establishment which will reach `52,264 crore for the next fiscal year, though most of it will be utilised to pay salaries to the central security personnel fighting Terrorists and Maoists in J&K and North eastern states. H. C. TIWARI
Supplementing its ‘Look East’ policy, India has joined hands with Myanmar to conduct joint patrolling along the 1,634 kms border area between the two countries—a move that has raised eyebrows in Beijing. India and China have for long competed for access to natural resources like gas in Myan-
kms joint border patrols
nals. The move has come at a time when there is a tussle between Ministry of Civil Aviation (MCA) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) over control of airport security. While the MCA wants its own force, Aviation Security Force, to replace CISF, MHA has remained non-committal preferring the current arrangement.
It was a proud moment for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) when Pranay Sahay, DGP CRPF, bid goodbye to a 124-strong female contingent going on a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission to Liberia. Having already sent seven battalions to Liberia, India sent the first allwomen police unit of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) peacekeeping force to Liberia in 2007, with more batches in the following years. The Indian Government took a proactive role in creating new models of community and service-oriented policing in Liberia. In particular, India’s CRPF has facilitated Liberian women’s involvement in the National Police Service and law enforcement. The country’s premier Intelligence Bureau (IB), entrusted with internal security related matters is facing a shortage of over 8,000 personnel. Against the sanctioned strength of 26,867 personnel in IB, only 18,795 personnel are available with a total of 8,072 vacancies which is 30 per cent of the total strength. The vacancies have accumulated in the bureau as a result
China has raised its defence spending by 10 per cent, a rise that has worried India. India’s defence budget is constrained not only by decreased funding, but also by a distinct lack of strategic planning. In Beijing, the new President, Xi Jinping, began his stewardship of the party and country by raising the defence budget by 10.7 per cent to `6.5 trillion ($119 billion). Last year, China’s budget stood at `5.8 trillion ($106 billion). In the past two decades, China has carried out a massive reversal of its dependence on imports. According to Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China, which was the largest recipient of arms exports between 2002 and 2006, fell to fourth place in 2012 while India has become the world’s largest recipient of arms, accounting for 10 per cent of global arms imports in 2012. India’s budgeted defence expenditure is only 1.79 per cent of the projected GDP for 2013-14, much less than the 3 per cent being demanded by the armed forces and strategic experts to ensure requisite deterrence against both China and Pakistan.
8,000 vacancies in IB of the ban imposed on direct recruit recruitments. About 1,500 posts of deputa deputation could not be filled up due to unavailability of suitable officers and personnel. The Bureau has conducted direct recruitment for various posts on a regular basis since 2008. However, the induction process has been affected due to lack in training capacity and cadre
CRPF female contingent on UN mission
boost in China’s defence budget
management consideration. Further the actual induction figures are much less than the selected candidates as a large number of selected candidates do not turn up for the appointment. The recruitment process in the Bureau is open and transparent and the Bureau has taken various measures to ensure fairness in the selection process.
crore Mars project India’s efforts to send a spacecraft to Mars took a huge leap in the month of March when the payloads were finalised and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is looking at November, 2013 for the launch of the satellite. The Rs 121-crore Mars project, envisages launching a space probe using the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) which will use an indigenous cryogenic engine for the launch. It will be placed in an elliptical orbit, the nearest point of which from Mars’ surface will be 500 km and the farthest point will be 80,000 km. The PSLV C25 will be required for the launch. The sub-systems are currently being tested at the satellite centre.
INDIA’S INDIGENOUS WARSHIP BUILDING: A CASE STRANGLED BETWEEN MOD & COVERSTORY
In order to develop a truly world-class edifice in India, the country must match resources to its overall naval strategy and grant autonomy to the yards, writes VIJAY SHANKAR “—all carpenters; blacksmiths and other artificers are prohibited being employed in the building of boats…”
--- The order from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company
n November 1788, an intriguing order was passed by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company. On the one hand, it sounded the death knell for private shipbuilding activities in Bengal; while on the other, it underscored the strategic linkage between economic power as a function of British colonial venture and the challenges that an opposing maritime capability may pose to it. Specifically, it prohibited ship construction of any nature on pain of physical punishment and forfeit of properties; but far more insidious was the systematic obliteration of a vocation and the skills in-
trinsic to it by targeting blacksmiths, carpenters and artificers who were singled out for special retribution. The shipbuilding industry, through this instrument passed into the hands of the colonists, worked to its bidding and grew under its decree. Whether it was the shipyard at Bombay or Calcutta, their purpose was to service the Company’s enterprise, and in time the Crown’s imperial ambitions. Ancient India was one of the leading maritime nations, which at some point of time possessed the tidal dock at Lothal (located in the Bhal region of modern Gujarat) which dates to 2300 BC and stands testimony to the vibrancy of the tradition.
It had colonies in Cambodia, Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Socotra. Indian traders had established settlements in southern China, in the Malayan Peninsula, in Arabia and in Egypt. Through the Persians and the Arabs, India had cultivated trade relations with the Roman Empire. There is also a treatise named Yukti Kalpa Taru (an 11th century AD compilation by Bhoja Narapati), offering a technocratic exposition on the art of shipbuilding. It sets forth minute details about the various types of ships, their sizes and the materials from which they were built. Such a vast undertaking could never have occurred without a close union between a deliberate imperial policy and a nautical strategy to realise it. Significant to early Indian maritime endeavours was the mercantile pursuit that drove shipbuilding. The nature of hulls—deep and bulkhead free—was designed for carriage of cargo rather than for survival in action damage. Even the colonisation of South East Asia was more on account of a migratory stimulus than one urged by conquest. This outlook changed
with the coming of Vasco da Gama and his fleet of four small vessels. The difference was the Papal Bull (the Aeterni regis Papal Bull of June 21, 1481, by Pope Sixtus IV granted the Canary Islands to Spain and further discoveries in Africa to Portugal. The Inter Caetera Papal Bull of May 4, 1493, granted most New World discoveries to Spain. Problems cropped up over time with these arrangements, and the Treaty of Tordesillas of June 7, 1494 attempted to settle some of these difficulties, formalising some of the implicit understandings of the earlier Papal Bulls. The Treaty of Tordesillas settled on what came to be called the Tordesillas Meridian running through the Atlantic and separating it into the Western and Eastern Hemispheres, giving rights of exploitation of these regions to Spain and Portugal) that he carried and the cannons onboard that sought to enforce the edict that it proclaimed.
armed forces and the strategic decision making process: a paradox that defied norms of nation-building progression. The operational canvas (inexplicable not to have been apparent), is a transient that abhors futuristic force planning. So, it was after every five years that the planner was condemned to an exercise that perceived possible threats and acquiring/building force structures that attempted to cope with those threats. It was, therefore, the immediate intimidation of the changing global scenario that drove plans and consequently resulted in the amassing of forces. Unfortunately, this inspiration of the instantaneous intimidation was the pretender that served to fill the strategic space. The significant pitfall that plagued the operational perspective was the continuous struggle to catch up and keep pace with a future that the planner neither sought to shape nor forecast and contend with. The malaise of our current strategic situation is the emerging time, technology and planning gap in the materialisation of appropriate force structures
SERVING THE NATION: (Below)Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) is one of India’s leading shipyards and is located on the West Coast of India at Vasco da Gama, Goa and has been building ships since 1957.
The absence of a rational theory which integrates the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force (and, indeed. naval forces) with a convincing contract for use is one of the first imperatives that the State must seek to reconcile
The events mentioned above (the Papal Bull and the Regulation of 1788) are sinister in intent. But, from the coloniser’s perspective, the first event articulates the critical prerequisite to link and formulate Strategy around Policy; while the second is symptomatic of strategic suppression of a potential adversary. Nations develop power in all its dimensions to assure the well-being of the State, the security of the nation and the development of its people. If this is—in the broadest of terms—the existential theory of a state, then national strategies are formulated to chart a longterm course in order to seize and exploit (peacefully in the main) the opportunities that the global environment offers and to iron out perceived distortions, if any, to their concept of sovereignty and bring about a favourable outcome. In this context the nation’s strategic posture is a declaration, more by deed than words, of its orientation, will and intent. The strategic posture purports to mould and shape a future that would benefit its larger objectives of development. The process is always filled with the hazards of conflicting interests and, therefore, it demands the weight of the nation’s comprehensive power, both soft and hard, to uphold posture. It was Clausewitz who first noted an area of darkness when it came to characterising the complex relationship between national strategy and the military
resources that were needed to muscle and enable that strategy. He perceived this region of obscurity as one caused by the lack of an understanding of the nature of power and the need to sculpt it in a manner that it promoted national strategy. Specifically within the framework of the military as a tool, he identified this as a failure to distinguish between the maintenance of the armed forces and their use in the pursuit of larger objectives. This quandary was not unique to Clausewitz’s period as the dilemma continues to contemporary times when the momentum that propels the development of armed forces builds logic of growth that defies purpose and is often self-fulfilling. The absence of a rational theory which integrates the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force (and, indeed. naval forces) with a convincing contract for use is one of the first imperatives that the State must seek to reconcile. From this resolution emerges the concept of ‘Strategic Poise’. India’s armed forces have traditionally evolved to cope with the operational scenarios. At genesis, this may have been attributed to the military’s role in creation and upholding the colonial empire. However, post-independence, it deliberately brought about a separation between the
Policy and Strategy: A Linked Phenomenon
that work to shape the future. The case of our strategic maritime posture and the resources needed to promote it as a function of declared policy is the study in point. Such a strategic approach, primarily, derives from two critical characteristics of the international system. The first of these is the endemic instability of protagonists involved in the system; whether it is their politics, national interests, alliances or even their historical antagonisms which when interacts with the larger global settings causes friction, a sense of deprivation and generates a chemistry of volatility. The second is the function of a state as a sovereign entity that is charged with guardianship of certain specific and at times unique set of values sometimes contrary and at others in opposition to the macro system. It is worth remembering here the words of the Russian Fleet’s Admiral S G Gorshkov. Addressing the issue of linking Policy with Strategy of building a powerful oceanic fleet, he had said, “A most important factor that was taken into consideration was a firm recognition of the align-
ment of forces in the world arena, the strategic situation existing in the oceanic theatres—the prospects of developing naval technology and weapons and also the economic potential of our country.”
India’s Maritime Orientation
Strategic maritime orientation derives from policy and encompasses a theory of naval war, force planning and warship production, consistent with both policy and theory. From the maritime perspective the overarching policies that would drive both planning and construction ought to be the ‘Look East Policy’, ‘The India-Africa Forum Summit’, a yet to be articulated maritime energy security policy and a potential maritime security concord with Japan and the USA. The common thread in all these security compacts will be the ability to control far flung oceanic spaces and, should the need arise; deny access to these very spaces driven by a collaborative logic. A four fold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is
largely functional and task-oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units, escorts and scouts, denial forces and auxiliaries (the last include logistic and other support and coastal security ships such as patrol vessels, seaward defence boats, mine layers, sweepers, tenders, etc). In addition, contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate. The constitution of fleets must logically be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war, as deliberated earlier, is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces or deny these spaces depending on circumstances and the correlation of forces. Against this frame of reference, the fundamental obligation is, therefore, to provide the means to seize and exercise that control. Pursuing this line of argument, the rational formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the escorts and scouts depends our ability
to exercise control over sea area; while on the aircraft carrier group assisted by strike and denial forces depends the security of control. Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces and therefore must lie at the heart of the force generation programme.
Higher Defence Management and Shipbuilding
Higher defence management in India suffers from two critical flaws that impact unfavourably on the ability to adopt a strategic approach to maritime force planning and naval ship construction. The first of these is the lack of sincere integration of Naval Headquarters (actually Service Headquarters) which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is denying the former to be a part of the Government’s apex decisionmaking structure. This condition exists despite recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) report for reforming the National Security apparatus submitted in February 2001. The disjoint has led to establishments such as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO, a part of the MoD) failing in their primary task of attaining self-reliance in weapons systems without being answerable or indeed accountable to Service Headquarters and, downstream, to the shipbuilding programmes. The Navy on its part has no say in the matter other than to propose continued reliance on imported systems, the adjudication of which is presided over by the most unlikely and by ill-suited agents—the bureaucracy in the MoD headed by the Defence Secretary. Consequently, delays, inefficiencies and sub-par decisions then become normal to the process. The second debilitating flaw is another set of bizarre impediments that come to play when a comprehensively considered case from Naval Headquarters is meaninglessly put through multiple layers in the three departments under the MoD as well as its finance wing and then to the Finance Ministry before reappearing on the Minister’s table. These Kafkaesque processes not only mock maritime force modernisation but also compromise attaining a strategic posture.
The Indigenous Enigma
Since the licenced production of the first major war vessel of the ‘Leander’ class, INS Nilgiri in the 1960s, Indian naval shipbuilding has come some distance,
contributing much of the platform requirements for maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to construct all types of warships—aircraft carriers, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with thirty more major ships being at the various stages of build. However, beneath this inspiring number lie some fundamental weaknesses. The conundrum is embedded in what is meant by ‘indigenising.’ To illustrate, in warship construction the thumb rule goes something like this: materials (steel, etc.) contributes 70 per cent by weight, but only 10 per cent of cost, while the payload and propulsion plant which adds just 25 per cent by weight, contributes over 60 per cent of the cost. Therefore, if by indigenising is meant sourcing materials locally, then an argument can be made that the warship under construction is 70 per cent homegrown! This misleading notion manifests in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns; for the key to efficient warship building lies in an autonomous design capability (which does not weigh at
all) and self-reliance in access of pay load, both of which are weak areas in India’s shipbuilding narrative. The problems associated with the lack of accountability of the DRDO, reliance on import of payload, bureaucratic processes and the flaws in higher defence decision making have already been pointed out. What it does is to complicate an already undermined situation. India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises 27 shipyards, of which six are under Central Government control, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are, however, not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the Central Government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking shipyards: Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of Indian naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and privately-owned Pipavav Yard (recently been awarded construction
ROLLING OUT: INS Teg, which rolled out from the Yantar Shipyard, Russia, was handed over to the Indian Navy in April 2012.
of five naval offshore patrol vessels) and the Larsen and Toubro yard (involved in the construction of submarine pressure hulls) are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier. The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping, is presently building India’s first-ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building with neither design competence nor autonomy in access to payload; but this is not to mean that that the government shipyards have design or payload access. Planning and professional directorates at Naval Headquarters-led by the Directorate of Staff Requirements are accountable for defining staff requirements of the ship, evaluation and selection of payload which sets into motion design work. Design for naval warships, particularly major war vessels, are generated by the naval design bureau, a department under Naval Headquarters staffed by naval architects who are responsible for generating design drawings
India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises 27 shipyards, of which six are under Central Government control, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain
(from concept to detailed design, based on which ship building is enabled). So far so good. But behind the facade of a vast design agency are a set of small back offices which are manned by a bank of consultant designers from collaborating foreign shipyards and teams from the original payload manufacturers who are, in fact, the intellect behind the creation of the detailed design drawings. For example, in the case of the first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC—a class of two aircraft carriers being built for the Indian Navy by CSL) they are the largest warships as well as the first aircraft carriers to be designed and built in India. The first ship of the class INS Vikrant will displace about 40,000 metric tons, 262 metres (860 ft) long, configured for Short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) and have a tailored air group of up to 30 to 40 aircraft. The expected delivery date originally scheduled for 2014 is now slated for 2017). Fincantieri, an Italian firm, provides total design support for the hull and its fitting out, while the Northern Design Bureau (Russian) along with Mikoyan (also Russian) make available aggregate design back-ups for the aviation facilities. While it is a statement of fact that a certain de-
sign involvement of equipment manufacturers is inevitable while generating detailed drawings, the problem arises at commencement, where the preliminary phase of design consultancy is sought and remains active through fitting out and trials at the design bureau. At this time there emerges a duality in the process since such consultancy is most beneficial in the yard where the ship is being constructed and accountability on realisation of the ship or a specific system can be squarely apportioned. In sum, we have a design consultant controlled by a ‘super’ design agency which, in turn, dominates the Indian ship building yard which has neither design competence nor control over selection of payload or other equipment and yet carry the burden of liability for performance. It does not take a management guru to suggest that when design competence is weak and control over payload remains in the hands of equipment manufacturers outside the country, both design expertise and consultancy must reside in the shipyards. Shipbuilding Programme: The Resource Mismatch Major shipbuilding programmes (these do not include Auxiliaries, minor war vessels and aircraft) for the next two decades include the following: • Two indigenous aircraft carriers at $5 billion (Approx. ` 27,000 crore) each. • Seven Project 15A/B Guided Missile Destroyers at $750 million (Approx. ` 4,100 crore) each. • Seven Project 17A Multi Role Frigates at $650 (Approx. ` 3,600 crore) million each. • Three Arihant class SSBNs at $ 1 billion (Approx. ` 5,500 crore) each. • Three nuclear-powered attack submarines at $900 million (Approx. ` 4,900 crore) each. • Six Scorpene class conventional submarines at $600 million (Approx. ` 3,300 crore) each. • Three Landing Platform Docks at $400 million (Approx. ` 2,200 crore) each. The total capital expenditure on these projects spread over a period of two decades is approximately $30 billion (Approx. `1,60,000 crore). Allowing for another $10 billion (Approx. `55,000 crore) expenditure on other units and air-
None of the three documents issued by the Navy intended to provide a strategic framework for growth and development of maritime forces have the ratification or the blessings of the Government of India or in fact of the MoD
BUILDING TOGETHER: (Top) The FREMM multipurpose frigate, a ship designed and under construction at DCNS/Armaris and Fincantieri shipyard to be supplied to the navies across the world; and (right) nuclear-powered attack submarine at Île Longue French naval base being built by DCNS
crafts would suggest, assuming that the planned cash outflow over the period is maintained, an annual outlay of $2 billion (Approx. `11,000 crore). This figure, when placed in perspective of the Navy’s
share of the defence budget, $6.74 billion (Approx. `3,700 crore), amounts to almost 30 per cent of the Naval budget, putting intense pressure on the other budgetary heads, making management of the Navy untenable, suggesting a major mismatch between Policy and the Resources demanded to power Strategy. It may be noted here that for the year 2013-14, the Navy’s share was 18 per cent of the entire defence budget of $37.45 billion (Approx. `1,90,000 crore) . This would be redolent of a need to question the a priori: Is there a cogent theory that links the promotion and nurturing of a maritime force with an accepted contract for its use? In other words, does the Strategic approach have national recognition? Three documents issued by the Navy intended to provide a strategic framework for growth and development of maritime forces: ‘The Indian Maritime Doctrine’, ‘The Future Indian Navy’, and India’s ‘Maritime Military Strategy’ (the documents have been authored by the Inte-
BUILDING GIANTS: An oil tanker being constructed at Pipavav Shipyard with private sector, which is located on the coast of Gujarat, India.
To run the gauntlet in India’s charge and to suffuse maritime strategic space within the selfcentric power structures of the contemporary world order, we have no option but to bring about a makeover in orientation.
grated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence Navy in 2004, 2006 and 2007, respectively). However, none of these have the ratification or the blessings of the Government
of India or in fact of the MoD, if anything, this underscores the gap between Policy and Strategy.
Run the Gauntlet
In a recent exchange with the Chairman and Managing Director of one of India’s PSU shipyards, in a moment of misplaced vain and glory, he proclaimed that his “order books had been full for the last 14 years”. His memory had to be jogged that the Yard had not delivered a single warship over the same period! This anecdote is symptomatic of the hobbled state of shipbuilding in India. The root cause lies in the lack of integration of the professional patron, the Navy, in the highest decisionmaking structure that appropriates and dispenses warship building tasks. Left in the dilettante hands of the MoD, the casual participation of the bureaucrat leads to, as mentioned elsewhere, Kafkaesque progressions that confounds maritime force modernisation. There also exists the perverse anomaly of an approved shipbuilding programme strangled by not only the hesitancy to commit resources (after all, the defence budget as a part of GDP is at a low of barely 1.79 per cent), but also, and this is more important, for lack of resolve and discernment of the demands of
a strategic approach, its linkage to growth and the nature of power play in contemporary geopolitics. The need for publicprivate partnership and initiatives which unshackle the PSU Yards from the tyranny of MoD control and devolution of design expertise from the central bureau to the Yards, along with selective empowerment to choose payload within the restraints of staff requirements becomes an imperative. The yards in this context will need to be given the freedom to seek out investments to enhance capacity if at all timely order-book-execution is to be achieved. To run the gauntlet in India’s charge and to suffuse maritime strategic space within the self-centric power structures of the contemporary world order, we have no option but to bring about a makeover in orientation. Its ideational foundation rests on espousing a strategic approach and is enabled by transforming the shipbuilding edifice through the mantra of ‘integration of the professional patron into higher defence decision-making, provision of matching resources to reconcile strategy with policy and to unshackle the Yards and enthuse it with autonomy’. (The author is a retired Vice Admiral.) Photo on Page 42 is of a Minehunter undergoing repairs at Brest submarine base, France (Courtesy: DCNS)
geopolitics INTERNAL SECURITY
COASTAL DEFENCE The Indian Coast Guard has a formidable challenge in protecting the 7516 km-long coastline of the country
B R I E F S CISF’S OWN INTEL SCHOOL
Rising industrial espionage and changing security and terror perceptions got the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) to open its own intelligence training school at Ghaziabad to provide training to 800-1500 personnel (YoY) of its crime and intelligence wings, deployed across the country. The faculty of the ‘Intelligence Training School’ will comprise of its men deputed at IB training schools along with instructors from the IB and other agencies. The school began operations on March 1. So far, CISF was dependent on other agencies. The CISF earlier sent personnel to train in the intelligence schools of these agencies, but they were unable to provide required slots to fill the void of trained personnel.
CHINESE EXPLOSIVES UNEARTHED
H C TIWARI
Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and Odisha police have uncovered a huge cache of Chinese explosives. A raid during an anti-Naxal operation helped uncover the illegal weapons. The personnel raided certain places in Pinamali forest from where the explosives were recovered. The seized equipment included three Chinese made hand grenades, at least 117 Gelatin sticks, 30 kg of iron chips, one live landmine, 22 packet of liquid explosive and two packets of live wire from the Maoist hideout. “The explosives were dumped by the Maoists in a plastic container in the dense forest,” said SDPO (Laxmipur) Y J Rao.
SITUATION IN NE HAS IMPROVED: HM
Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde stated that the security situation in the NorthEast improved significantly and the Centre provided `1659 crore for the modernisation of the police forces. Addressing members of the Consultative Committee attached to the MHA, he said Mizoram continued to remain peaceful and Tripura has shown remarkable improvement. He also statd that Arunachal Pradesh was peaceful except in districts with presence of National Socialist
Z-PLUS FOR SIX MORE VVIPS
The top secret Yellow Book of the MHA has got six new names to its list of VVIPs to get Z-Plus Security. Union Minister for Steel Beni Prasad Verma and five others will now get the 36 personnel wielding SIG 551 rifles and marching in a long red beaconed motorcade. Earlier requests had been turned down when P Chidambaram was Home Minister (HM) as he wanted to trim down VVIP security and phase out NSG’s spe-
cialised counter-terror force from VIP duty, but HM Sushil Kumar Shinde obliged these individuals. The Supreme Court had earlier slammed the government for diverting security to protect VIPs. In an affidavit before the Supreme Court, the government had mentioned an expenditure of `341 crore incurred on VIP security and that 8,049 personnel were involved in VIP security as against 3,448 in crime prevention and investigation.
(DoT) so that operators can be asked to provide them the tower location of the caller as soon as the caller dials 100. This move is aimed at reduc-
ing the response time and is among the various projects that have been initiated in the aftermath of the December gang-rape.
GPS TO TRACK DISTRESS CALLERS Delhi Police is working on software to give the exact location of a caller when they dial 100 in order to be able to reach the distress caller faster. The agency wrote to the Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA) to ask telecom operators to provide tower location of the callers. If the caller has a GPSenabled phone, the location will flash in the control room, that can guide the patrolling van to the caller. Delhi Police is also in touch with the Department of Communications
H C TIWARI
B R I E F S
MoS Home, R P N Singh told Parliament, “There are reports that some organisations like BKI (Babbar Khalsa International) in the UK are striving to revive Sikh militancy.” He added that the government was keeping a close tab on the activities of such organisations, and that the Indian Government had conveyed its concerns to UK authorities on various occasions including during the
BABBAR KHALSA FANNING MILITANCY
Council of Nagaland factions. Referring to Manipur, the HM said the security situation improved with a decline in casualties among civilians and security forces. On the ethnic violence which took place in Assam last year, Shinde said currently the situation in the area was under control and the government is watching it closely. He told Members of Parliament that he also met a delegation of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Home Secretary reviewed the situation in detail.
HM APPOINTS SPOKESPERSON
recent India-UK Summit. Since the attack on Lieutenant General Brar - who had commanded Operation Blue Star, 1984 - it had become clear that pro-Khalistan terrorist outfits such as the BKI have been trying to revive Sikh militancy. The Government of India had banned outfits such as the BKI, International Sikh Youth Federation, Khalistan Commando Force and Khalistan Zindabad Force under Unlawful Activities Act.
The Home Ministry appointed senior IAS officer Nirmaljeet Singh Kalsi, Joint Secretary, MHA, as its spokesperson in a bid to shore up its image. The Ministry has been at the receiving end for some time now. The MHA fumbled after the December 16 Delhi gang-rape incident and hanging of Afzal Guru and subsequent issues.
ASSAM POLICE TO GO HI-TECH
NO SUICIDE “I don’t want to commit suicide, I am sure govt will repeal AFSPA. The voices of protest cannot be ignored for long. This is my way of protest. I am protesting by non-violent means.” Irom Sharmila on why she is protesting by fasting and not committing suicide
Assam police have started upgrading technologically to keep tech-savvy criminals at bay. The latest innovation is a mobile application and an SMS service. The proposed mobile application will be a major tool to curb the rising menace of vehicle thefts, police believe. The work to install an independent server of the city police is almost complete. Once launched in public domain, the proposed mobile application will allow anyone
BE CAREFUL “It is unfortunate that an impression has been sought to be created by certain communal elements that all
to inform the office of SSP regarding a vehicle theft in their vicinity, just by sending an SMS. Within a minute, the server will alert all police stations and the traffic department about the vehicle theft, along with the relevant information,” said a senior cop in state police.
Muslims are terrorists, and Muslims are often discriminated in our country in getting jobs... as mentioned in the Sachar Committee Report.”
Markenday Katju Press Council Chairman
H C TIWARI
TARGET: CYBER SECURITY “Government is aware of the nature of threats in Cyber Space and is taking measures to address these threats by way of an integrated approach with a series of legal, technical and administrative steps.”
RPN Singh Minister of State for Home
he term maritime security, which has no universal legal definition, is defined as comprising those issues which pertain to the sea and have significant implications for the country’s security. It covers many policy sectors including seaborne trade and commerce in energy resources, the management of living and non-living marine resources, the delimitation of international seaward boundaries, and the deployment and employment of naval forces. Elements of the maritime security regime could be coastal security including port security, vessel security, facility security, resource security, environmental security including management of oil spills, security of seafarers and fishers including search and rescue. Assessment of the Indian maritime coastal security challenges must commence with a statement on the maritime boundary to comprehend the enormity of the problem: India has a 7,517 km-long coastline of which 5,423 kms covers the mainland and 2,094 kms encircles Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) Islands. The country has an EEZ of 2013410 sq km. To secure the coastline and the maritime area of interest, a layered security system that begins beyond the country’s physical borders with at-sea presence to deter potential threats is required. Maritime domain awareness through surveillance assets intelligence sensors to track and interpret a matrix of real-time images sourced from satellites, drones, ships at sea and manned surveillance aircraft and identification of all vessels at sea, to increase warning time and engage the potential threats at the farthest point possible. There is a multi-tier arrangement for the maritime security of the country involving the Indian Navy (IN), Coast Guard (ICG) and marine police of the coastal States and UTs. The overall responsibility for maritime security rests with the IN. ICG is designated as authority responsible for coastal security in territo-
Following the attack on Mumbai from Sea in 2008, the coastal security, but there are areas which need relentless systems, writes MONISH GULATI
rial waters assisted by state marine police and other central and state agencies. The Indian Customs, which patrols the sea up to 24 nm to prevent smuggling, has also been brought under the coastal security mechanism. The three-level Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) delineates the geographical limits and responsibilities: • Marine Police would be responsible for patrolling up to 12 nautical miles; from the coast • ICG to patrol from 12 to 200 nautical miles and • IN to patrol beyond 200 nautical miles. Post-Kargil, in October 2001, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was appointed to review the national security systems. This started a series of events which led to the
present day improvements in the coastal security. In January 2004, the Department of Border Management was created in MHA for effective management of land and coastal borders. Thereafter the Kargil Review Committee’s comprehensive recommendations prompted the Central Government to launch the Coastal Security Scheme. The Coastal Security Scheme was implemented in the 9 coastal States and 4 coastal Union Territories (UTs) since 2005 for strengthening infrastructure for coastal patrolling and surveillance. 73 coastal police stations, 97 check posts, 58 outposts and 30 operational barracks were set up. The approved outlay of the scheme was `400 crore for non-recurring expenditure and `151 crores for recur-
In di India nC n e ri Pol Ma i
* M M 0N 20 om the shor fr
: Beyond 2 00 avy N N an ard: 12 u G to st a 1 2 o t o Up NM ce
COASTAL SECURITY SCHEME
THE LEAKS government has undertaken many measures to enhance the vigilance through well-trained manpower and well-equipped ring expenditure for 6 years. The scheme was later extended by one year up to 31.03.2011 with additional non-recurring expenditure of Rs 95 crores. The procurement of the 204 interceptor boats was done centrally through M/s Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), Goa and M/s Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited (GRSE), Kolkata. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has signed a contract in March 2008 with these vendors for supply of 84 (5 Ton) and 110 (12 Ton) boats. Besides, an agreement with GRSE has also been signed for supply of ten of 12 Ton boats for A&N Islands with higher specifications. The coastal States/UTs carried out vulnerability/gap analysis in consultation with ICG and recommended an addition-
al 131 coastal police stations including upgradation of 20 existing Police Stations in A&N islands and procurement of 225 boats under the Phase-II of the Coastal Security. The Phase-II has a financial outlay of `1,579 crores to be implemented in a period of 5 years from 1st April, 2011. A Comprehensive Security Plan for A&N Islands with an implementation period of eight years, in three phases 2012-2015, 2015-2017 and 2017-2020 was also formulated. The comprehensive security plan is in two parts; Part A is taken up under Phase II of coastal security scheme and Part B is taken up in the state plan of A&N Islands. A scheme with an outlay of `342.56 crores and six years implementation window with effect from 2005-06 was formu-
PHOTOGRAPHS: INDIAN COAST GUARD
GEARING UP: Commandos of Indian Coast Guard jumps out of an Indian hovercraft to perform a drill
lated for creating additional infrastructure for ICG to ensure intensive patrolling and surveillance of the close coastal areas of Gujarat and Maharashtra. Under the scheme, ICG is to procure 15 Interceptor Boats and set up three Coast Guard Stations in Dhanu and Murud Janjira in Maharashtra and Veraval in Gujarat. The procurement of the 15 interceptor boats from M/s Bharati Shipyard Ltd is scheduled for completion by March 2014. In addition, for protecting naval bases and adjacent strategic installations, a specialised force (Sagar Prahari Dal) consisting of 1000 personnel equipped with 80 interceptor boats is being raised by the IN. The physical security of Indiaâ€™s major ports is being ensured through the deployment of the Central industrial Security Force (CISF). An informal layer for surveillance comprising fishermen and coastal villagers has also been added Local fishermen and villagers have been organised into groups (Sagar Suraksha Dal and Gram Rakshak Dal) and trained to keep a vigil at sea as well as along the coasts.
Maritime Domain Awareness
For achieving near gap-free electronic surveillance of the entire coastline the Coastal Surveillance Network project is being implemented. This project provides surveillance up to 25 nm into the sea and involves the setting up of 46 static radars along the coastlineâ€”36 in the mainland and 10 in the island territories. Phase I of the project is nearing completion. The network has other components; one of which is the National Automatic Identi-
BUILT TO INTERCEPT: Indian Coast Guard Ship (ICGS) on a mission to intercept suspicious vessels entering the Indian coastal region
SECURITY CHALLENGES—THREAT DIMENSIONS • Expanding dimensions of Asymmetric warfare • Unconventional attacks by improvised sub surface, air and cyber units. • Technology availability to non-state actors. • Paradigm shift in the maritime security concept in India post Mumbai terror attacks. • Jihadi Terrorism-Information suggest that al-Qaeda remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. fication System (NAIS). This chain of stations, inaugurated in August 2012, tracks and monitors vessels by receiving feeds from AIS transponders installed in sailing vessels. The data generated by the static radar chain, the AIS sensors and the Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) installed in all major ports as well as in the Gulfs of Kutch and Khambhat is being integrated. While all big fishing trawlers (20 mts and above) have to install the AIS type B transponders, the small vessels are proposed to be fitted with the Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID). A uniform registration system to register
MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES • Long Coast line 7516 Kms • Far flung Islands on both sides • Nine maritime states • 13 Major and 187 minor ports • Unresolved maritime borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh • Troubled waters in the South.
all vessels in the coastal states has been set up and different colour codes for fishing trawlers has been assigned to various coastal states for easy identification. Also Distress Alert Transmitters (DATs) are being provided to fishermen so that they can alert the ICG if in distress at sea. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has developed the INSAT based DAT which is used to transmit emergency conditions and position location to a central HUB station via UHF transponder of INSAT for rescue operation. All the data generated by various surveillance assets is fed into a single centralised database the National Command Communication Control and Intelligence Network (NC3I), to create a composite picture for Maritime Domain Awareness.
Indian Navy (IN)
The IN, has contracted for MicroCoMPASS (micro-compact multi-purpose advanced stabilised system) turret-mounted, multispectral optronic sensors from Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Ltd. These will be fitted on board the 11 HAL-built Do-228211s, as well as on all 10 of the 600-tonne waterjet-driven fast attack craft (WJ-FAC) that have been built for IN by GRSE. IN is also looking to acquire its own fleets of amphibian aircraft, and has opted for a fleet comprising no less than 12 amphibians capable of undertaking tasks like
SAR, maritime surveillance-cum-reconnaissance of island-based territories and supporting special operations. The IN has also contracted for eight Boeing’s 737-derived P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft with options for another four. The initial delivery is scheduled for May 2013, with another two aircraft to be delivered by the year end. The P-8I has a radius of action of 1,950 kms with an endurance of four hours. The aircraft has the state-of-the-art Raytheon APY-10 maritime surveillance forward radar covering a 240 degree field. The radar has special features such as an air-to-air mode and interleaved weather and surface search capability. The aircraft has Telephonics APS 143 C(V)3 ‘OceanEye’ in the aft with a coverage of 120 degrees. The ‘OceanEye’ has a maximum range of over 200 nm. The aft radar and Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) are the two significant features of the P-8I. It will also be equipped with three major weapons comprising the AGM-84L Harpoon Block II Missiles, MK-54 lightweight torpedoes and MK 82 depth charges. Less-expensive and shorter-range Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance (MRMR) aircraft are being procured for IN and ICG to supplement the coverage of P-8I. Inshore, and at strategic locations like A&N Islands, new Dornier Do-228NG aircraft, and UAVs like Searcher and
Heron will provide local coverage. The government has approved the IN’s proposal to acquire nine advanced MRMR aircraft, which will cost upwards of $1 billion (`5400 crore approx). The MRMR requirements reportedly do not include anti-submarine capability, which adds cost and often requires the use of a larger plane. It will be an armed aircraft and the 2010 RFI suggests that it will be required to carry both torpedoes, and some form of anti-ship missile. Several global aviation majors, ranging from American Boeing (P-8i Lite), Swedish SAAB (Saab 2000 MPA), French Dassault Aviation, Brazilian Embraer ( P-99), Antonov(AN-148) and European EADS(ATR-42/72 and C-295 ASW).
Indian Coast Guard (ICG)
The ICG’s seven 270-tonne Extra-Fast Patrol Vessels (XFPV) and twenty 260-tonne fast patrol vessels (FPV), being built by the Goa Shipyard Ltd and the 12 licenceassembled Griffon 8000TD hovercraft/ Air Cushion Vehicles (ACVs) that are now in delivery by GRSE will also to be equipped with the CoMPASS (Compact Multi-Purpose Advanced Stabilised system). The ICG presently operates 28 Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd-built Do-228-201 maritime patrol aircraft and will receive another 16, by this year. The USD 20 million contract to Elbit Systems for equipping them with CoMPASS optronic turrets has been inked. For coastal maritime patrol/SAR operations, three Do-228-201 twin-turboprop STOL coastal maritime patrol aircraft of the ICG have each been fitted with the Swedish Space Corp-built MSS5000M airborne maritime surveillance
system. The ICG is also acquiring up to six MRMR aircraft worth `11 billion, for which the Beriev Be-200 amphibian and Bombardier Aerospace’s Dash 8Q400MPA have been shortlisted. The ICG has conducted flight trials of both these contenders. The Dash 8Q-400 is equipped with the EL/I-3360 mission management suite sourced from Israel’s Aerospace Industries. The suite includes a chin-mounted MSOP FLIR turret and a belly-mounted EL/M2022(V)3 search radar.
The eighth ship in the series of eight Water Jet propelled IPV (IPV Rajdhwaj) for ICG was launched on 29 January 2013 by GRSE. The fifth vessel of the IPV Class ‘ICGS Rajratan’ was handed over to ICG on 28 January 2013. ICG ACV H-190, the fourth in the series of twelve ACVs was commissioned on 19 February13. ICGS C-401, the first of the series of thirty-six Interceptor Boats designed and built by M/s Larsen and Toubro, Surat was commissioned at Porbander on 20 Dec 2012. The 30 metres long Interceptor Boat with 90 tonnes displacement is fitted with state-of-the-art navigation and communication equipment and medium range armament. ICG Station Mayabunder, the first ICG station in the North Andaman Islands was commissioned on 24 Dec 2012. The station is a part of ongoing efforts by the Coast Guard to strengthen Maritime and Coastal Security.
With the involvement of multiple agencies, nine coastal states, four union territories,12 ministries and eight departCOMMANDOS IN ACTION: Indian Coast Guards are always ready to protect the coastal areas of India
ments of the Central Government the main challenge is the cooperation, integration and coordination between various agencies engaged in coastal security at the organisational and functional level. Establishment of common protocols and conducting joint exercises and training would aid the process. The Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) have been established for sharing of intelligence and effecting coordination among various agencies. These Centres have been set up at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair under the charge of existing Naval Commander-in-Chief as the Commander-in-Chief Coastal Defence. The JOCs play a very crucial role in the functional coordination between the various agencies. The full extent of task at hand can only be felt when all the surveillance assets including satellite inputs are in place and available. As surveillance assets are being procured from various agencies their integration within the composite picture is a major effort. Another issue to ensure gap free electronic coverage along the coastline, which is a daunting task, is the inclusion of standalone unmanned surveillance assets in the surveillance grid. Devices such as the Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS) for remote and not easily accessible areas would be required. Besides the HR feature of staffing and issue of adequate funding of the various components of the coastal security setup, the basic and most important aspect is of training; both within an agency and interagency. To that end a beginning has been made with the MHA’s approval to establish the National Institute of Coastal Policing to impart basic and advance training to the 7,500 odd policemen that man the coastal police stations under the scheme. Maritime coastal security still remains a work in progress. However as procurements take shape key voids in the framework are getting filled. In the meanwhile the challenges of an ill-defined and complicated maritime environment, with a vast expanse, requiring large number of surveillance assets, high costs in capital & operating expenses remains. The author is a security analyst
WANTED: A VIABLE NCTC
The proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre requires changes in its structure and powers for it to work in a federal and parliamentary country like India, argues DEEPA KANDASWAMY
he recent Hyderabad twin blasts has got the Central Government and the media asking for the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to be given greater powers as many assume that centralised intelligence gathering would have averted the Hyderabad blasts. But, intelligence-gathering cannot be fixed like religion with tenets, theories and themes, as a nation’s intelligence agencies has to adapt, accrue and adopt new techniques to keep abreast of the changing equations between governments and terrorists and among terrorists themselves! But what does this have to do with NCTC which has just completed a year of conception? There are five points that will provide the answer: •
: The former Home Minister, P Chidambaram, might have had the best of intentions when he chose to copy the US model and re-create it in India. But, repli-
cating a model has never worked in India as it has to be first Indianised by adapting it to the Indian environment before you can get it to work; otherwise, it becomes unusable. The current NCTC model is as silly as replicating the US kitchen model and expecting it to function in India where the variables like the food, weather and processes are different. The Indian democratic structure is at complete variance with the US structure —we do not follow the federalised Presidential system but a parliamentary one. Our President is not all powerful like the US President. She/he is elected by the Parliament and not the people unlike the US. So they aren’t accountable to the people the way a PM, CM, MP or MLA is. The current NCTC model is full of loopholes as it follows the US presidential system and takes power away from the state governments; • The current
NCTC model is flawed as it has made the covert intelligence gathering agency like Intelligence Bureau (IB) something akin to the state police! The very nature of intelligence gathering is secret. But by giving the IB powers to arrest and prosecute in local courts, their concealed identities become known to a wide array of people. This is extremely naive; • Intelligence doesn’t stop at borders. By sidelining the various state police, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), etc. the current NCTC model is based on the assumption that the relevance of intelligence information does and will stop at the border! Also, threats needn’t always emanate from inside the country. With multiple intelligence agencies and multiple investigating agencies like National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Security Council (NSC), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI),
LYING DESOLATE: Aftermath of the Hyderabad Twin Blasts that left the city in ruins
Intelligence Bureau (IB), RAW, Crime Branch-Central Investigation Department (CB-CID), etc., the thread of intelligence doesn’t amount to a stop at international, national and state borders. Apart from this, it will lead to ego clashes as the IB doesn’t have boots on the ground the way RAW and the state police forces do. With different agencies possessing different vital pieces of information, the current NCTC model relying on only the IB, the intelligence coherence and information thread is broken, making the whole process ineffective thus giving anti-India forces the go-ahead; • We all know how slow the wheels of bureaucracy turn in a single ministry itself. Now, to expect two such ministries to co-ordinate and keep track of information is like asking two grandmothers who are knitting separate sweaters to combine them! Now, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) gets the intelligence information from the various intelligence agencies, both external and internal. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) takes care of the Indian defence establishment and investigations. In short, the input is given to the MHA and we expect the MoD to give us the correct output. While it is understandable that India doesn’t want too much power concentration in the hands of any single minister, effective action cannot be taken if there is an intelligence-defence disconnect. Lately, as we have had coalition alliances ruling India, the MoD and the MHA can go to two different political parties which makes it all the more dangerous. Also, we do not want a Pakistan-like situation in India which is bound to happen if the NCTC is given life in its current form as it comes directly under MHA, which makes the Home Minister more powerful than the PM as he will also be the head of counter-terrorism, head of intelligence with power to arrest, investigate and prosecute anyone in the country! Also, for the same reason, it essentially means that the NCTC comes under the Central Government. Also, it is common knowledge that intelligence agencies in India are abused by political parties to get back at their opponents — political and non-polit-
ical. This is the major reason why state governments oppose NCTC. Take the Maldives mess, for example. We have managed to complete the infamous Chinese Chain of Pearls by actually shoving Maldivians into the arms of the Chinese due to inaction on the part of the Indian Government. Considering Maldives is just 18 kms away from our coastline and will slowly become the Diego Garcia of China and its multiple uninhabited islands possible host to already anti-India terrorism groups, why did the MHA completely fail to act on the matter? Or, take the multiple Pune blasts in 2012 or the Hyderabad blast in February 2013 despite the availability of information in two Congress-ruled states (the argument of the state and Central Government doesn’t hold water here), which couldn’t be prevented even though MHA said it had information about it; and • Cyber component of intelligence gathering, terrorism and war is not even factored in the current NCTC model. So it is not surprising that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Defence offices were hacked in India and the Pentagon in the US by the Chinese. Imagine, if we had a centralised intelligence database which got hacked by a terrorist outfit, can you imagine the amount of terror it could unleash? Also, they can modify the information or conduct a fire sale and we would become a crippled country. The NCTC in its current form has inherent inabilities to adapt to new threats.
Modifications to make it work •
The NCTC should be made an independent organisation like the Election Commission with constitutional powers where political interference of any kind cannot be tolerated if it is to be truly functional. It should be the centre where threads of intelligence from different security agencies are connected and analysed. More importantly, all the intelligence gathering agencies should be made to report to this single organisation which will be held responsible for any counter-terrorism intelligence failure. It should be audited annually by
PC’s UNWORKABLE IDEA Copy the US model and recreate it in India. But, replicating a model has never worked in India as it has to be Indianised first by adapting it to the Indian environment before you can get it to work NCTC model Intelligence Bureau (IB) akin to the state police! The very nature of intelligence gathering is secret. They can’t be in the open. With multiple investigating agencies like NIA, NSA, CBI, IB, RAW, CB-CID, etc intelligence gathering will be better. Just leaving it to IB that has limitations will be self-defeating. NCTC under Home Minister is agency under C entre open to political misuse. Need to be independent and at arm’s length from government. NCTC not geared to cutting edge threats so to speak in its current avatar.
the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to ensure effectiveness and not fall under the purview of the Right to Information (RTI) Act. • By removing the powers of investigation, arrest and interrogation in the current model and leaving those powers with the state police or the defence forces, the stealthy nature of intelligence gathering will be preserved. This major flaw in the current NCTC model should be removed, so that the states don’t feel their powers are being infringed upon and fear of abuse of
A FEASIBLE MODEL NCTC should be independent like the Election Commission of India. Should stay away from political interference, and should be solely responsible for counter-terrorism intelligence failure.
Should not be involved in arresting or investigating and should leave those powers with the state police. This would keep stealth in the intelligence process and also not create a parallel to existing state police.
CT cells in every state police headquarters should collect data from district police stations. This data should be dispatched to the NCTC. This should even apply to agencies like R&AW. NCTC should analyse this data and dispatch it to concerned state and police departments to take necessary actions - interrogate, investigate, arrest and prosecute.
Instead of having an un-necessary number of security agencies in the country, it would be better to abolish these agencies and re-assign their personnel to various CT cells in various parts of the country.
Need cyber-security professionals at the counterterrorism cells to ensure that NCTC is able to effectively deal with any cyber threats to the country.
NCTC against political opponents will be removed. This will also empower state police as otherwise there will be the NCTC police and the state police working against each other instead of together. Also, NCTC could concentrate on intelligence analysis and threat perceptions instead of acting on the threats that can be best left to the policing agencies. • To stop ego clashes between intelligence gathering organisations and abuse of state police, it becomes important that the state agencies participate just as central agencies do. So, in every state, the police will have a Counter Terrorism (CT) headquarters which gathers all the information from the various police station CTs of the state as all district police stations will have CT cells. Every state CT HQ will have to directly report to the NCTC as far as intelligence gathering on counter-terrorism is concerned. This should be made mandatory for RAW and other agencies. NCTC will have to dispatch the relevant information to the state government concerned with the status of the alert — dangerous, serious, average or mild — and the state police will have the powers to interrogate, investigate, arrest and prosecute. • We have many security agencies and the disconnect between them is leading to more problems and successful terrorist attacks. Maybe some of these agencies can be abolished with the personnel reassigned to head CT cells in various parts of the country. While the MoD can keep its investigative wings and prosecution wings, it should be informed about threat perceptions by water, air, sea and cyber space by the NCTC. • Instead of creating a new Ministry of Internal Security or making the Home Minister too powerful as the present NCTC model does, it would be better to make it more effective to handle all kinds of threats including cyber security. Nowadays, physical wars needn’t be waged to bring a country to its knees. Messing up the information of a country’s database or communication with our increasing reliance
on technology would be enough to dilute the analysis of the intelligence gathered. We would need cybercrime professionals at the CT cells to ensure that the NCTC is effective in dealing with cyber threats. • It has to change with changing times, ensuring it can adapt to face new threats like cyber warfare and guerilla attacks. While terrorists have adapted, Indian intelligence and security agencies are still stuck in the cold war mode which explains why over 100,000 Indian civilians have died due
While terrorists have adapted, Indian intelligence and security agencies are still stuck in the cold war mode which explains why over 100,000 Indian civilians have died due to terrorism since 1990.
to terrorism since 1990. Increasingly, it is also becoming politicised with multiple organisations and inputs. Even if the Central Government wishes to establish an NCTC, it has to invite the state governments’ inputs and feedback since without their cooperation, the NCTC will not accomplish anything. If the NCTC, with suggested modifications, is implemented, then maybe we could reduce the number of attacks and progress towards eliminating the threats against India
It is internal battles that constitute the real challenge to Pakistan
POWER SHIFT IN CHINA
Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, was elected President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission (CMC). He succeeded former President Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in January 1974. Xi’s new role was guaranteed last year with his appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the real source of his authority in China, but the title will increase his public and international standing. Xi’s formal appointment as head of the world’s most populous nation was followed by the naming of Li Keqiang as Premier, marking the final step in the nation’s once-in-a-decade power handover. Li, who succeeded Wen Jiabao, rose through the Communist Youth League and has close ties with both Xi and his predecessor Hu Jintao. He is seen as among the CPC’s more reformminded officials.
Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela for the last 14 years, died following his treatment for cancer. His death was announced by the country’s Vice President Nicolas Maduro. The popular but controversial Chavez had won his fourth term last year, but his failing health never allowed for the swearing-in. The military officerturned-politician had managed to win both friends and enemies as he launched poverty-fighting programmes, nationalised key industries and forged alliances with leftist leaders in Latin America—particularly the Castro brothers. With his anti-Capitalist outlook,
he had forged enemity with the western nations, mainly the US. Never mind the enmity, in a statement by the White House, President Obama said: “At this challenging time of President Hugo Chavez’s passing, the United States reaffirms its support for the Venezuelan people and its interest in developing a constructive relationship with the Venezuelan government. As Venezuela begins a new chapter in its history, the United States remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” Chavez’s political
thought took him on a path from social democracy to what he called “Socialism of the 21st Century”. His opponents accused him of becoming a dictator in the mould of Fidel Castro, who Chavez once described as being like a father to him. Though a polarising force at home and abroad, there was no doubt that he was a popular leader, especially among poor and working class Venezuelans.
MUSHARRAF’S HYPED RETURN TO PAKISTAN Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has pledged to return home after nearly four years of self-imposed exile in Dubai to contest parliamentary elections. Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup and resigned in 2008 when his allies lost and a new government threatened him with
impeachment. He left the country a year later. Musharraf currently faces arrest in connection with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, on charges that he failed to provide adequate security to the former Prime Minister before her assassination in 2007. Musharraf’s All Pakistan Muslim League
CHAVEZ LEAVES BEHIND ‘21ST CENTURY SOCIALISM’
QUE COMUNISMO’S PHOTOSTREAM
O N LO O K E R
(APML) party announced that party activists and supporters would accompany the former leader. The former army chief has said that he would lead his party in elections this spring.
CHUCK HAGEL IS US SECRETARY DEFENCE
SEC DEF PHOTOSTREAM
Chuck Hagel was sworn in as the new US Defence Secretary, a day after the Senate approved his appointment following a bruising nomination battle. He replaced Leon Panetta. Hagel was confirmed by a 58-41 vote after Republicans stalled his nomination, questioning his past positions on Israel and Iran. President Obama said he
was pleased at bipartisan support for Hagel, “I am grateful to Chuck for reminding us that when it comes to our national defence, we are not Democrats or Republicans. We are Americans, and our greatest responsibility is the security of the American people.” At his confirmation hearing, Hagel wanted to reassure the Senate Armed Services Committee
that he was ‘fully committed’ to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He also apologised for the ‘Jewish lobby’ comment, saying he could not be defined by any single quote. During his time as a senator, Hagel angered Republican party leaders when he pilloried former President George W Bush’s handling of the Iraq war.
O N LO O K E R
There was increased strain on the already-volatile US-Afghan relationship as Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused the US of having a secret understanding with Taliban insurgents, to stimulate violence as a ruse to keep foreign troops on Afghan soil. The comments, coming hours before Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel was scheduled to hold a joint news conference with Karzai at the presidential palace, were the latest —and perhaps the most baffling—onslaught by the Afghan leader against one of his nation’s closest allies, leaving US officials covertly fuming and overtly struggling to limit the fallout.
The top US commander in Afghanistan, General Dunford, warned his troops to be ready for increased violence because of antiAmerican statements by the Afghan President, days after members of Afghan security forces killed two US troops and a US contractor in two separate shootings. Dunford and other top US officials have rejected Karzai’s allegations of collusion with the Taliban. Karzai had said, “The Taliban themselves are every day in discussions with the US yet in Kabul and Khost they set off bombs to show their prowess to the US.” He added that “senior leaders of the Taliban and the Americans are engaged in talks in the Gulf state [of Qatar on a daily basis”.
FRANCOIS HOLLANDE’S POPULARITY SINKS FURTHER
FRANCOIS HOLLANDE PHOTOSTREAM
In attempts to improve his miserable approval ratings and popularity with the people, French President François Hollande intended to renew contact with the people—in the style of Charles De Gaulle—and instead found himself overwhelmed with the anger of the people. Since assuming office, Hollande has experienced the fastest drop in popularity ever seen in French try politics. presidenHollande is now nearing the lowest approval rating of any French President on record: Nicolas Sarkozy. The French military intervention in Mali, which the Socialists hoped would improve his presidential stature and neutralise the right’s charges of dithering, produced only a slight, short-lived bounce.
Hollande’s biggest problem is that he’s not just unpopular in one political demographic, but in many. He is struggling to find convincing counter-arguments as unemployment is rising, economic data looks more dismal by the week, industrial output is taking a nosedive and a recovery is nowhere to be seen. The President had vowed that by the end of 2013 he would stop the ployment rise in unembut that now looks impossible to achieve and is a broken or post postponed promise. His non-aggressive, com compromise-prone charac character partially explains why the bitterness expressed in the public does not focus on his personality, but on his ability to push France out of economic crisis.
KARZAI’S HITS OUT AT US
AMIDST SCANDALS AND RESIGNATIONS VATICAN ELECTS A NEW POPE With a puff of white smoke from the chimney of the Sistine Chapel and to the cheers of thousands of rain-soaked faithful, a gathering of Catholic cardinals picked a new Pope—Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio from among their midst— choosing the cardinal from Argentina, the first South American to lead the church. The new Pope, Francis, is also the first nonEuropean Pope in more than 1,200 years and the first member of the Jesuit order to lead the church. “I would like to thank you for your embrace,” the new Pope said from the balcony on St. Peter’s Basilica as thousands cheered joyously below. “My brother cardinals have chosen one who is from far away, but here I am.” Francis asked the audience to “pray for me, and we’ll see each other soon”. The new Pope inherits a church wrestling with an array of challenges that intensified during his predecessor, Benedict XVI, including a sexual abuse crisis that undermined the church’s moral authority and difficulties governing the Vatican itself. He will also inherit power struggles over the management of the Vatican bank, which must continue a process of meeting international transparency standards or risk being shut out of the mainstream international banking system. After years in which Benedict and John Paul helped consolidate more power at the top, many liberal Catholics also hope that the new Pope will give local bishops’ conferences more decision-making powers to help respond to the needs of the faithful. Cardinal Bergoglio, whose family roots are Italian, is generally thought to have come second in the last conclave in 2005, which elected Benedict XVI as Pope.
TIME TO WALK THE NEW YANGON TRAIL
India has done well to stay glued to its policy of engagement with the ruling regime in Myanmar since the 1990s while making its preference for a democratic government well known. However, there is still a long road to traverse and the need of the hour is to chart out right strategies to maximise gains as that country undergoes political transformation, writes BIBHU PRASAD ROUTRAY
t is only uncommon that the appointment of an ambassador to a ‘non-plum’ country generates so much of brokering within New Delhi’s power centres. But in the past months, the selection process with regard to Myanmar did, providing thereby many interpretations jostling to capture the full picture. This was seen, as several newspaper reporters projected, as a contest
between the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) establishment and the Congress Party high command, each with their preferred candidate for the job. This was also described, as some of the analysts mentioned, a decisive, yet unprecedented role played by the assertive President of India in favour of a particular candidate. While both these accounts were fascinating and captured
truth to some extent, it is also important to see the process in terms of a divide among the Indian strategic community as far as New Delhi’s policy towards its Southeast Asian neighbour is concerned, i.e. the choice between idealistic and pragmatic approach.
Choice between candidates
In December 2012 and much of Janu-
g HOPEFUL FUTURE: Pro-democracy supporters cheer as elections bring an anticipation of a good future
ary 2013, media reports speculated the likelihood of two candidates: India’s former envoy to several countries including South Africa and former Governor to West Bengal, Gopal Krishna Gandhi, and India’s current ambassador to Afghanistan, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, as the new envoy to Myanmar. Either of them were tipped to replace current ambassador Dr Villur Sundararajan Seshadri, in office since July 2010. The 67-year-old Gandhi, a former Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer of Tamil Nadu cadre and grandson of both Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi, reportedly enjoyed the support of the Congress Party’s high command. The media speculated that the choice peeved the IFS establishment, which vociferously argued that the post must go to a career diplomat with previous experience of serving in a challenging country. The 56-year-old Mukhopadhaya, in Kabul since May 2010 and due for a transfer, fit the bill, almost perfectly. According to media reports, Gandhi’s supporters, on the other hand, vouched for his experience as ambassador to post-apartheid South Africa and Lesotho in 1996. However, the intervention of the President, who according to an analyst, still “continues to assert himself as a notable player in Delhi’s political parlour” ended the debate in favour of Mr Mukhopadhaya. Barring any last minute trade-offs, the current ambassador to Afghanistan will replace Dr Seshadri in Yangon in the coming months.
Choice between strategies
Idealism marked Indian foreign policy towards Myanmar till the 1990s. While maintaining minimal contacts with the military junta that had captured power in Myanmar through a 1962 coup, India chose extend its moral support to the prodemocracy movement after the military’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power in Myanmar in 1988 and overruled an electoral verdict in favour of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 national elections. Not only did the Indian Embassy in Yangon (then known as Rangoon) became active in helping pro-democracy activists,
India provided shelter to a large number of pro-democracy activists on its soil. All India Radio (AIR) carried anti-military broadcasts in Burmese language, before they were discontinued acceding to the Myanmar government’s requests. In 1992, India partnered with the US and other Western countries to sponsor a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the military junta for its violations of human rights. Former Defence Minister George Fernandes’ official residence housed Myanmar democracy activists, where a large picture of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was placed. During Prime Minister Chandrasekhar’s regime India provided political asylum to two Myanmarese students, who had hijacked a Thai aircraft from Bangkok to Calcutta on November 10, 1990, to draw the international attention to the situation back home. However, a dramatic and yet decisive shift—from such idealism to pragmatism—started occurring in the late 1990s. Amid disappointment expressed by many within its strategic community, buttressed by accusations of abandonment by the pro-democracy activists in Myanmar, New Delhi started engaging the military junta. One of the analysts was to rue the fact that India had abandoned the Gandhian principles. “Under Suu Kyi, the Myanmar people have been emulating the non-violent methods of Gandhiji. We will be betraying the memories of Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other freedom-fighters if we fail to support a Gandhi-inspired movement in Myanmar”, he wrote in a column. New Delhi started viewing the prodemocracy movement in Myanmar as a lost cause vis-à-vis the overwhelming supremacy of the military. Not surprisingly, the Indian stand was made fairly clear in 2006 by Pranab Mukherjee, then External Affairs Minister of the country. He said that India cannot ‘export democracy’ to neighbouring countries and that India had to deal with governments ‘as they exist’. There was an overwhelming feeling in the policy circles in New Delhi that India’s strategic concerns in Myanmar would be difficult to fulfil unless the government to government contacts were firmed up. These concerns included India’s search for energy resources, acting on the remaining strength of the insurgents operating in the northeast, pursuing New Delhi’s ‘Look East’ policy, and dealing with
THEIN SEIN was appointed Prime Minister by the country’s Military Junta in 2007. He retired in 2010 to fight elections as a civilian. His party won the 2011 elections, and Thein Sein was sworn in as President, with the Military Junta dissolved the growing presence of China. The shift in policy, from idealism to pragmatism, resulted in India making significant headways in Myanmar. It can be safely assumed that among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have moved in the right direction without a hitch is that with Myanmar.
A new Myanmar and India’s growing imprint
Myanmar has changed enormously in the past two years. A military-dominated regime which tolerated no resistance has presided over a free and fair by-election, allowed the Opposition to win the maximum number of seats, released jailed opposition activists, eased restrictions on the press, allowed journalists banned from entering into the country for decades to travel almost freely and is also
LOOKING EAST: In view of the nations look east policy, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh engages in talks with Thein Sein, President of Myanmar, as the two nations partner in trade and security cooperation
seeking foreign investment. Such changes have opened up opportunities for countries like India. If high-profile official visits are indications of commitment to take the relationship forward, there have been plenty between the two countries. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar in May 2012, the first Indian premier to do so after 25 years since Rajiv Gandhi’s trip in December 1987. During Singh’s visit, 12 agreements were signed, including one that extended $500 million (approx `2500
crore) Line of Credit to Myanmar. President of Myanmar Thein Sein paid a state visit to India in October 2011. In July 2010, Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the now defunct State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), also paid a visit to India. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi visited India in November 2012 and President Thein Sein could be revisiting India in March 2013. Apart from these, ministers and secretaries from both sides have exchanged periodic visits in recent years. Indian
Defence Minister A K Antony visited Myanmar on January 21-22, 2013 and discussed bilateral defence cooperation and capacity-building measures for Myanmar’s armed forces with his counterpart in Naypyidaw. The visit came shortly after foreign minister Salman Khurshid and Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, in his capacity as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, visited the country in November-December 2012. Both countries have moved ahead to establish several institutional mechanisms for engagement on trade, security as well as foreign policy consultations. Significantly, earlier meetings that involved high-ranking officials and were limited to the national capitals have started dripping down to the bordering states. On November 9, 2012, for the first time, a high-level meeting of the IndiaMyanmar Border Trade Committee was held at Moreh in Manipur. As a result of this meeting, a representative office of United Bank of India (UBI) was opened in Yangon on December 5, 2012. Though the representative office does not handle any financial transactions, officials liaise with the Government, banks and traders to resolve issues relating to settlement of trade-related transaction between both the countries. In the last week of 2012, India and Myanmar reached an agreement to open the fourth Border Liaison Office (BLO) in the Nagaland sector. Three BLOs are already in operation in the Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram sectors. BLOs have served as mechanisms to promote cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of both countries. The BLO forum has been a product of a highlevel meeting between the two countries in May 2012. Officers posted at the BLOs discuss and sort out issues relating to local security and crime, to strengthen bilateral cooperation on border issues. On October 29, 2012, entrepreneurs from India and Myanmar met at Yangon to discuss ways to promote bilateral trade in agriculture, timber, pharmaceuticals, tourism, textile, automobile and livestock. The India-Myanmar joint trade commission has set the target of doubling the existing trade of $1.5 billion (approx `7500 crore) by 2015.
New Delhi has done well to stay glued to
g INDIA MYANMAR BORDER TRADE Although trade in traditional goods on headload basis has been the customary practice since a long time, the Border Trade Agreement signed in 1994 gave it a legal framework. The Moreh-Tamu point in the Manipur sector was operationalised in April 1995. Under the 1994 Agreement, a second border trade point at Champai-Rhi in the Mizoram sector was opened on January 30, 2004. A third border trade point is proposed to be opened at Avakhung-Pansat/ Somrai. India also proposes to build a 45 hectare Integrated Customs Station at Moreh. India and Myanmar have agreed to upgrade the status of Border Trade to Normal Trade and have expanded the tradable list items from 18 to 40 since 2008. With an estimated border trade of US $12.8 million (approx `65 crore) (2010-11), major items bought by Myanmar traders from the Indian side are cotton yarn, auto parts, soya bean meal and pharmaceuticals, (reports also abound about smuggling of items like fertilizers, vehicles particularly two wheelers etc.); betel nut, dried ginger, green mung beans, black matpe, turmeric roots, resin and medicinal herbs are the main items sold from Myanmar to India. According to the Myanmar Department of Border Trade, the border trade turnover between India and Myanmar has ranged from US$10 to US$22 million, (approx `50 to 110 crore) though it is probably higher if informal arrangements are taken into account.
its policy of engagement with the ruling regime in Myanmar since the 1990s, reversing its decade-long policy of supporting democracy movement in the country. The gradual pace of transformation — from a purely military to a lopsided civilian-military combination in the Parliament — suits New Delhi’s policies. It marks a continuation of New Delhi’s engagement with the regime in Naypyidaw. Even if Myanmar rewrites its 2008 Constitution, paving the way for a purely civilian government in the country in 2015, the regime would still consist of people who would have done significant business with India. Additionally, the absence of spoilers is one of the important reasons behind New Delhi’s decisiveness. All the north-eastern states have not only been supportive of the Look East Policy, but have contributed to its content and pushed vigorously for its implementation. They have also put pressure on New Delhi to take up the insurgency issue seriously with Myanmar, asking Naypyidaw to carry out operations against the north-eastern rebels. India’s capacity-building assistance to the Myanmar military in the past years as well as its aid in the form of road building equipment have allowed the latter to increase the frequency of its operations against the Indian rebels. Gautam Mukhopadhaya, if sent to Yangoon, can rely on his experience in Afghanistan, where India has done exceedingly well against huge odds to carve out a favourable image and craft an alternative development model for the war-ravaged country. India would need his skill to implement similar models in Myanmar, where several bilateral infrastructure projects are far from completion. Unlike Gopal Gandhi whose fondness for Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement is well known, and hence could have been less palatable to the Myanmar military, Mukhopadhaya’s businessman-like approach would be much more suitable. China’s profile continues to grow in Myanmar, both in terms of its economic and strategic presence. The combined amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, reached over $20 billion (approx `100000 crore) in Myanmar in 2012, accounting for nearly half of the total $41 billion (approx `205000 crore) FDI received by the country during the year.
AUNG SAN SUU KYI, one of the world’s most prominent political prisoners, was released from house arrest in November 2010. She fought the 2012 by-elections and was elected to the Lower House of the Myanmar Parliament. China has also started mediating between Myanmar’s ethnic rebels and the government. Competing with China and squeezing it out of Myanmar is none of India’s stated official policy. However, in a reform-bound Myanmar, India must take advantage of the enormous prospect of trade and business, especially in gaining access to its rich gas fields, many of which are still unexploited. The scope for the Indian embassy in playing a key facilitator in this area is enormous. For New Delhi, there is still a long road to traverse. Its projected gains in Myanmar would be shaped to a large extent by the changes that occur in Myanmar in the coming months and years. It will also be linked to New Delhi’s capacity to take advantage of the evolving scenario. When almost the entire world is converging on Myanmar, the ability to take prompt decisions and pursue them vigorously would be the key. This would require some additional institutional capacity building on the part of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Some rethinking on the content of India’s framework engagement in Myanmar that has been deliberately kept apolitical and non-controversial would also be necessary. The appointment of a suitable envoy, thus, would mark the fulfilment of the first of several such requirements. (A Singapore based analyst, the author was Deputy Director, National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi)
ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI: Kayani is the first Pakistan Army officer who held the position of Director, ISI, and then went on to be COAS.
akistan has always been an enigma. There is hardly any economic development, rather, crises follow one after the other. In recent years, especially since the nuclear tests in 1998, there has always been a new crisis subsuming the older one. It appears that the Pakistani style of resolving a crisis is to invite or invent a bigger one so that the older ones get paled and move out of the limelight. The questions that arise are: How long can a state address a crisis, by ignoring it and moving into a larger crisis? What sustains Pakistan? And, for how
Injecting sectarianism into its trouble-spots appears to be a deliberate strategy of the Pakistani establishment. But will the strategy succeed at a time when the biggest threat to the country’s stability comes from the Pakistani Taliban? D SUBA CHANDRAN discusses the situation long? Four recent developments in the last couple of months will highlight the Pakistan conundrum: the return of Tahir ul Qadri, a Pakistani-Canadian holding a dual citizenship attempting to rewrite the electoral process; sectarian violence in Balochistan; the offer of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to have a dialogue; and the new military doctrine. Of the above four, the last two need to be looked into, for the other two could be understood in a larger perspective. Since December 2012, the TTP has offered to negotiate with the Government more than once, however with a caveat.
March 2007-2009 — Lawyers’ Movement — Movement started March 2007 against the unconstitutional sacking of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, and ended March 2009 after two years of numerous arrests, reinstatements and sackings.
g The TTP has put forward the following demands as preconditions: removing all laws repugnant with the tenets of Islam, redrafting the constitution of Pakistan in accordance with the Shariah, giving up the support to the US in Afghanistan, and revenging India for 1971.
TTP and the myth of military response
Though there has been a serious public debate in the Pakistani media about this talk offer, there was no major response from the Government. Hence the TTP made the same offer again in February 2013. Is the TTP desperate to enter into a negotiation, or is it a ploy? Recent incidents of terrorism, including attacks on security forces, bombing of public places, kidnapping and subsequent killings of government functionaries and paramilitary forces do not indicate that the TTP is under pressure to negotiate with the administration. In fact, there was no pressure applied on the TTP to negotiate! Consider the following questions. When did the last major military operations in FATA, (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) bordering Afghanistan, commence and at what scale? Are there military operations ongoing in North and South Waziristan, the bastion of TTP? Has there been any other strategy to neutralise the TTP in the region, except the drone attacks, which are primarily targeting the al Qaeda? The answer to all the above questions will be ‘No’, except for a few military actions taking place in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies (territories). These two agencies are not the main theatre of TTP’s mil-
itant operations; with a substantial Shia population in these two Agencies, there is a strong sectarian component attached to what is happening there. Outside the FATA, it is surprising to note, that despite the continuous attacks led by the TTP, there has been no coherent political strategy to deal with the Pakistani Taliban. Despite repeatedly debating both inside and outside Pakistan, linking the TTP as an existential threat to the country, neither the Parliament nor the political parties engaged in any serious dialogue in dealing with the issue. There seems to be a naive belief cutting across the party lines that once the American forces leave Afghanistan in 2014, stability will return to the region, and the TTP’s raison d’être will disappear. Hence the political elite seem to be buying time, hoping that the TTP phenomenon will subside in the next two years. On the other hand, the military is in a Catch-22 situation—whether to deal with the TTP militarily or engage them in a series of tactical deals. The military and its intelligence agency, the ISI, for long have been using most of what constitute the TTP’s leadership, as a strategy to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. Some of the current leaders of the TTP are second generation mujahideen or the first generation Taliban, who had earlier fought against the anti-Pakistan leadership in Kabul. In both cases, until the last decade, especially till the formation of TTP, they were very much a part of larger military strategy of Pakistan vis-àvis Afghanistan. In short, the TTP’s support base and leadership has always been a part of Pakistan’s cross-Durand strategy
ZAHEER UL-ISLAM: Lt Gen Zaheer ul-Islam took over the position of the Director-General of the ISI from Ahmed Shuja Pasha in March 2012.
towards Kabul. For the military leadership in Pakistan, it is unfortunate that this section has turned inwards, east of the Durand and started looking towards Peshawar and Islamabad. In this process, a section of the TTP is closely aligned with the al Qaeda and the other with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar. Clearly, the TTP is not a monolith today, and this ‘divide within’ makes it difficult for the military to deal with the situation. The common strategy employed by the military has been to engage the TTP in multiple deals, and create a pro-military section within it. Maulvi Nazir, who was killed in a drone attack fired by the Americans from across the Durand Line, was one of the most prominent pro-military TTP leaders. What is less known is the earlier attacks (including a suicide attack) on Maulvi Nazir, by the other sections of the TTP. Today, not only the political elite but also the military is divided on a long term strategy vis-à-vis the TTP. Immediately after the attack in August 2012 on
PAKISTAN: LITANY OF WOES
December 2007 — Benazir Bhutto — After being in self-exile for nearly eight years, Bhutto returned to Pakistan in tober to fight or the General Elections. It was during these campaigns that she was assassinated in December 2007.
December 2011— Zardari escape to Dubai — President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, left for Dubai in Dec 2011, citing medical treatment as a reason while, he was in the midst of the ‘memogate’ controversy and it was speculated that he had left the country fearing a coup by the Pakistan military.
April 2012 — Yousaf Raza Gilani disqualified — Prime Minister since 2008, Yousaf Raza Gilani was retroactively dis a ified by the pre e o rt o a istan Refusing to reopen corruption cases against Zardari, the Prime Minister was found guilty of onte pt o o rt and th s dis a ified
Late 1990s — Still continuing — Violence in Quetta: Quetta is currently under one of the most violent phases in its history. In a grip of sectarian genocide against the minority Shias, Quetta’s Hazaras, comprising the majority of the Shias, have faced the brunt of this targeted violence.
KARACHI IN FLAMES: Rescuers carrying sheets to collect body parts after a bomb exploded in Karachi
violence in Karachi and Quetta will highlight the intensity of the attacks and the inability of the State to deal with them. Perhaps, these attacks are led by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). But can these organisations be viewed separately? Is the LeJ independent of the TTP? Don’t they work in tandem in the FATA?
The New Military Doctrine
Is there a new military doctrine for Pakistan vis-à-vis the TTP? The discussion on a ‘new’ military doctrine presupposes that there was an old military doctrine. It would be useful to analyse the old doctrine and its underpinnings to appreciate the contours of what could be the new doctrine. The old doctrine, though was not written in black and white, is based on the much abused concept of Pakistan’s Strategic Depth in Afghanistan. Though everyone is attempting to debunk that there was even an idea of strategic depth in Afghanistan, it is common knowledge in terms of what Pakistan wanted to achieve in Kabul and the rationale behind it. The reason for Pakistan’s search for a friendly regime in Kabul is two-fold. First and foremost, Islamabad wants to ensure that no regime in Kabul uses the Durand
the Minhas airbase in Kamra, the Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, made a public statement on the new enemy that Pakistan had to deal with. Earlier, there were numerous high profile attacks by the TTP on military and naval installations including the attack on the Mehran Naval Base (2011) and the Military Headquarters in Rawalpindi (2009). When General Kayani made that statement in August 2012, followed by the debate on a new military doctrine, everyone expected—finally —that the military would take the TTP threat seriously and engage it militarily. However, any such thoughts about a military engagement with the TTP proved to be short lived, as the political elite have started working towards a road map to negotiating with the TTP. No political party in Pakistan seems to have any strong objection to negotiate with the TTP. As a result, led by the religious parties, especially the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F), the negotiations with the TTP have already started. Will this lead to desired results at the ground level? As the ongoing killings and bombings in Karachi and Quetta would reflect, there is unlikely to be any ‘going slow’ by the extremists, be it the TTP or their sectarian surrogates. Sectarian
Line (dividing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan) to Pakistan’s disadvantage. No government in Kabul, including the Taliban, has ever recognised the Durand Line as the final border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kabul, irrespective of whoever has ruled it since 1947—monarch, communist, radical and secular—has always considered the Durand Line as one ‘imposed’ by the British and has never reconciled to it. Pakistan’s fear is not that Afghanistan will be able to militarily redraw the Durand Line. Such a military strategy from Kabul’s side is unthinkable and may lead to a disaster for Afghanistan. Nor will any government in Kabul attempt to militarily redraw the border between the two countries. Neither the political elite nor the military in Pakistan is worried about such an eventuality. But what the military and political elite in Pakistan are deeply concerned about and afraid of is that any Pashtun (dominant tribes of Afghanistan)
TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN: Pakistani Taliban leaders with other militants in their stronghold.
nationalism cutting across the Durand Line spreads into the FATA and KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as NWFP). Such a situation is totally unacceptable to Pakistan; given the ‘fiercely independent nature’ of the Pashtun tribes, it may not be difficult to incite such a sentiment, cutting across the Durand Line. With a substantial Pashtun component within, the military in Pakistan is frightened of any such possibility. It is precisely because of this fear that Pakistan is willing to allow the Taliban to influence the FATA and KP, for it would undercut the secular Pashtun national sentiment and impose a pan-Islamic religious identity across the Durand Line. It is precisely for this reason that Pakistan would allow the TTP as well to function
Resolving crisis through a bigger crisis
What sustains Pakistan? How is that it is able to survive one after another? What keeps the country going? While there could be multiple interpretations, one could be in terms of how each actor pushes the other to the brim, but ensures that the system does not collapse. The Pakistan Muslim League-
Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) have been pushing each other to the wall, but the moment each party realises any further push would endanger the system and in turn affect their survival as well, they pull back. Why did the PML-N, whose hatred towards the PPP is well known, not push the case of Tahirul Qadri beyond a point? All that the PML-N could have done was to provide support from outside and let the PPP government fall, but the Sharifs were too smart to know the consequences. They supported Qadri to an extent that it threatened Zardari to seek the help of PML-N; at the same time, the Sharrifs also do not want to see Qadri stealing their thunder as they fear that the military and intelligence organisations are behind his vociferous return. It is for the same reason that Imran Khan also did not support Qadri. The tussle between the judiciary and executive could also be seen in the similar perspective. The judiciary attempted
across political and military elite is that once the Americans leave Afghanistan, there will be equilibrium in the system. Will it be so? In retrospect, it appears that in the recent months while there may have been multiple crises — between the judiciary and PPP, among the political parties, Tahir-ul-Qadri and Imran Khan, the real threat seems to be the TTP. With the political parties overenthusiastic in negotiating with the TTP, whatever the new military doctrine was aiming at has been nullified. If the violence in Quetta and Karachi is any indication, then one could conclude with ease that the real problem for Pakistan is the TTP, particularly the inability of the government, opposition parties and even the military to chalk out a strategy to deal with the TTP. Viewed thus, the question arises as to what will happen if the dialogue with the TTP fails? The answer is that there will always be another crisis to divert the domestic opinion. For in-
in the FATA and KP as long as they do not cross the Pashtun-areas and spill into the rest of Pakistan. The same logic could be extended to what is happening in Balochistan now. In the last few years, there has been a substantial increase in sectarian violence in the province; the Federal Government is well aware of the problem and the perpetrators behind it. It appears that Islamabad is purposefully allowing sectarian violence to simmer in Balochistan, for it would undercut the Baloch nationalist sentiment. It is applying the identical strategy that is being used in the FATA and KP. It may be noted that the Baloch society has never been overtly secular or even overtly religious. The tribal system, with ‘the Malik’ at its head, did not give much of a space to a Mullah; for the Baloch, his Sardar was everything and the Mullah played only a ceremonial role. Going back to the original question, the second reason for Pakistan’s search for a friendly regime in Afghanistan is India. Pakistan is afraid that New Delhi will exploit the anti-Pakistani sentiment in Kabul, and create a situation conducive to India. More importantly, Pakistan is deeply scared of a situation in which it has hostile countries on its eastern and western borders; worse, Pakistan will loath to have these two hostile countries collaborating with each other. As a result, Pakistan would prefer to have a friendly regime in Kabul that does not provide a space for India. Now, any discussion on Pakistan’s ‘new military doctrine’ should take care of the above two issues. Has anything changed substantially in terms of Pakistan’s perceptions that would make one to believe that the new military doctrine will be different from the existing one? Pakistan, especially its military, needs the Taliban in Kabul and, by extension, the TTP in FATA and KP. And by further extension, it needs Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and related sectarian groups in Balochistan.
PROTEST: The supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami lead protest in Lahore demanding justice against America
to clip the wings of Zardari and PPP, through its multiple pronouncements. The military moved behind and watched the situation. But, is it a pure coincidence that the situation in the recent months did not go beyond a certain point between the judiciary and executive? The above could be a conjecture as well as an explanation. But the larger belief cutting
stance, a few violations across the LoC in Kashmir will ensure that deflection. How long can Pakistan survive a crisis by inventing or inviting a bigger crisis? Nobody has a ready answer. After all, Pakistan has always been an enigma. (The author is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.)
DIPLOMACY ALGERIA LIBYA
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: OUTSIDE INFLUENCES The Arab Spring has cast the differences between Arab sub-regions, societies and states in a glaring light. External actors must match this complexity with more fungible and subtle strategies if they hope to succeed in this fractured region in the future, says CLAIRE SPENCER
he Arab Spring has thrown many things into relief since early 2011, but none more so than the increasing fragmentation of the Arab world. Where previously the shared characteristics of authoritarian systems allowed for ‘Arab states’ to be analysed almost as a single category, it is the differences between Arab states, societies and subregions that are proving critical, and are rightly now attracting more attention. This means that external interest and prospective engagement in the developments and transitions taking place from the Mediterranean to the Gulf (Persian or Arab) will have to take these differences on-board, and in more detail than hitherto. Not only are more actors involved— including more international and regional actors with an interest in energy supplies, trade and investment as well as regional security—but these actors are also inter-
linked within and across the Arab world in ways unforeseen as recently as two or three years ago. The speed of events has also strained the ability of the international community, variously defined, to keep abreast with developments, engendering an inevitable time-lag of reaction to events rather than the emergence of wellthought- out policies or longer-term strategies. Only in reaction to the emergence of a credible resistance movement in the east of Libya by the 19 spring of 2011 did the international community devise a plan of action and support for the uprising, legitimised through the UN Security Council, Arab League and then directed and managed by NATO. Although ultimately successful in securing the removal of the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan crisis underscored the reluctance of the traditional ‘coalitions of the willing’ (the US and individual European states) to intervene directly in
the conflict on the ground as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing the lessons learned from the previous decade, intervention this time was to be limited to protecting civilian lives from indiscriminate attack through airstrikes on regime targets, then in more openly providing air-support to the eastern rebels gathered under the
WITH MOST G8 AND WESTERN FUNDING BEING SUBJECT TO NEW FORMS OF ‘PRO-DEMOCRACY’ CONDITIONALITY, THE EVOLVING SITUATION HAS NOW MADE IT EASIER FOR EXTERNAL ACTORS WHO ARE NOT DRIVEN BY NORMATIVE AGENDAS TO STAKE A CLAIM TO THE REGION’S FUTURE. April 2013
RISING UP: Public revolts against ruling regimes has resulted in civil war in some nations and has made the situation catastrophic in the Middle East
Transitional National Council. It was the intensification of both targeted airstrikes and the accretion of western Libyan, as well as eastern, resistance groups that allowed the collective resistance movement to claim victory once they had overrun the bastion of the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli in August 2011. The success claimed for the Libyan operation has come to haunt internation international attempts to devise a solution for Syria, where lives lost to violence escalated to an estimated 7,000 by early 2012 and nearly twice that six months on. The lack of consensus at the United Nations over the root causes of the conflict, and over the local and wider risks of a Libyan-style international mission, have also highlighted the difficulties of creating any kind of international template to react to domestic insurgencies of the variety and complex-ity seen across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the past year. External actors, and many more of them than were active at the time of the Iraq crisis of 2003, have thus found themselves caught between short-term and longer-term priorities, and between
Changing dynamics of external involvement
For the traditional assistance partners of the Arab world, the competition for influence, both local and international, has raised a new set of challenges. With most G8 and Western funding being subject to new forms of ‘pro-democracy’ conditionality, the evolving situation has now made it easier for external actors who are not driven by normative agendas to stake a claim to the
tactics and strategies barely capable of capturing the increasing inter-relatedness of developments in the Levant and Gulf region in particular. Where financial and technical rather than military assistance has been the re response—as in the European Union’s en enhanced neighbourhood policies towards the ‘revolutionary’ states of Tunisia and Egypt, and the ‘reforming’ states of Mo Morocco and Jordan—the risk of outsid outsiders being seen as trying to influence the course of events still unfolding has also provoked local and international con concerns, as witnessed by Egyptian debates over whether to accept a $3.2 billion (Ap (Approx. `17,000 crore) IMF loan in budgetary support for 2012. Even the large-scale restructuring funds agreed at the G8 Deauville summit in May 2011 and supplemented at the G20 summit in Cannes in November 2011 have been slow to be disbursed, and have raised local expectations of new lines of assistance, when in reality, the $38 billion (Approx. `2,00,000 crore) pledged largely represented existing funds to be chan channelled through new or existing mecha mechanisms. Identifying the best targets for this assistance, as well as engaging in lengthy assessments of each economy’s absorptive capacities, will take time in a region that remains both sceptical of US and European intentions and internally divided over how to realise its own needs and priorities.
region’s future. Russia and China’s veto on the failed draft UN resolution condemning the use of violence against civilians in Syria in early February 2012 was based on an alternative set of international principles than those invoked by others under the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ criteria. What publicly shapes the Chinese and Russian agenda is a belief that foreign interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is not admissible, even with the best of intentions. Less publicly, other strategic agendas apply, whether these relate to fears of opening the way to greater international scrutiny of Chinese and Russian spheres of influence elsewhere, or more directly to Russia’s access to the port facilities of Tartus in Syria, and regional energy supplies in the case of China. Those with commercial or mercantile agendas, pursuing investments and contracts without strong conditionality, such as Turkey and the Gulf states in addition to China, also stand to gain from the rapidity with which they can identify and seize new opportunities across the Arab world. The advent of new international actors articulating an interest in the region, such as Brazil, India and South Africa, also increases the ability of both new and old political systems to explore new avenues for external support. The risk is that the influx of new investments, energy and trade agreements will bolster otherwise fragile regimes, reluctant to respond positively to popular demands for reform (as in Algeria or the broader Gulf), or strengthen the ability of vested interests to mount a revival of the status quo ante (as in Tunisia or Egypt). Exploring and exercising options that eco go beyond traditional security and economic relationships with the EU and govern US have also allowed interim governments such as Egypt to undermine the EU’s newly articulated criteria of ‘less for less and more for more’ as a measure of democratic transitions. When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has acted in less than democratic ways over the past year, the EU has not ventured to impose sanctions in the absence of US urg back-up or a credible alternative to urging the military authorities to move the political process on. For the proponents of democracy and statebuilding, above all the US and EU, the renewed vigour of inter rejectionist arguments and the new inter-
LIBYAN CRISIS: A civil war and NATO-led military intervention in 2011 in Libya, resulted in the ousting and death of the country’s former leader and at present is governed under an interim constitution
HIGH TIDE: Mass protest in Tunisia
national activism place them in a difficult position for two main reasons. The first is that a decade on from the launch of the ‘global war on terror’, the ‘West’ has lost much of its local credibility as a collective champion of democracy promotion. In states such as Egypt, where cases of extraordinary rendition have been much commented on, and where President Mubarak played a critical role in support of the US’s strategic defence of Israel, the change in emphasis in US policy since early 2011 has neither been universally welcomed nor believed. The second reason is that the West’s strategic priorities still remain, as was witnessed in Egypt, in the ambivalent, but still intact financial and technical support given by the US to the Egyptian military, despite growing local opposition to the SCAF. Across the EU, similar examples can be found, of France’s strategic support to President Ben Ali of Tunisia until very late in the day, or Italy and the UK in respect of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, which have been rapidly reconfigured to engage new local actors and local dynamics. To the credit of Tunisians, Libyans and indeed Egyptians, many have demonstrated their ability to make distinctions between different types of external actor and agency and have drawn their own conclusions about who they will and will not engage with now and why. The appe-
legitimacy for concerted external action have met their match in Syria. This, rather than the Libyan example, is more likely to prove to be the test case for future regional conflicts, especially if, as is feared, the Syrian situation degenerates into a sectarian civil war or spills over into the neighbouring region. For the US and Europe, new approaches to anticipating rather than following regional developments are clearly needed, if only to keep pace with the new range of external actors less hidebound by concerns over international legitimacy than the traditional ‘Western alliance’ continues to be. The battle for the future of the Middle East is in many ways indicative of a wider set of re adjustments to the nature of international order in a world of shifting balances of inter-and-intra-regional power. For the old global powerbrokers, led by the US, the inter-related challenges of the MENA region have also emerged at a time when public support for more robust international action is waning in both Europe, pre occupied by the Euro crisis; and the US, preoccupied with its domestic agenda.
tite for learning from and communicating with the outside world is also strong among the younger generations who have mobilised and participated in change, but with the added distinction that they now challenge and contest attempts to impose terms for these relations from outside. At a time when Europe above all, but also the US, has less economic capacity to respond generously to demands and requests originating from within the region, this change in local attitudes is significant.
Speed of change
What this means for the outside world is that fortune will favour the flexible and light of foot over the next few years. The implications for the slow-moving machinery of international consensus-building have already been felt in the challenge of responding to the crisis in Syria, and the success of Libya—registered in hindsight, but not always felt or publicly expressed over the summer of 2011—may be the exception that proves a larger rule. The fact that NATO, for example, has not been invoked by its members in the course of diplomatic efforts to curtail the violence in Syria demonstrates the limits to the use of external military power in situations where the full dynamics of the conflict are both contested and impossible to grasp fully from the outside. Both international and locally driven attempts to establish
The author is the Head of the Middle East & North Africa Programme, Chatham House, London. This article was originally published by the United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK)
INDIA’S FLAWED SRI LANKA POLICY India’s vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC neither helps the Sri Lankan Tamils nor furthers our national interests, comments PARTHA S. GHOSH
ri Lanka is probably the lone experience in the world where a national victory over a secessionist army becomes a liability. Not a day has passed since the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 when Sri Lanka has not been subjected to criticism for its human rights violations. It is a truism that Human Rights (HR) violations are condemnable across the board, but, it is also a truism that such violations inevitably occur in any war situation. Public memory is short. People seem to have forgotten the way LTTE used human shield to prevent the Sri Lankan army to penetrate into its bastions with total disregard to people’s safety. During the last two years, before every UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) meet, there is a debate in India whether or not it should vote in favour of the US-sponsored resolution in the UNHRC aimed at censuring Sri Lanka for its ‘war crimes’. As was the case last year, this year too, India voted for the US-sponsored resolution on March 21. It is a different matter that the wording of the resolution was not ‘strong enough’ in the eyes of the erstwhile United Progressive Alliance (UPA) component, DMK, because of which it has left the ruling coalition at the Centre. On March 21, 2013, India endorsed the US-sponsored resolution against the background of a charged public opinion created by newspaper reports and TV footages, particularly the killing of Prabhakaran’s youngest son Balachandran. The footage, borrowed from the British Channel 4 documentary, created instant history. Their impact, coupled with the relentless pressure exerted by DMK and
AIADMK, made India depart from its policy of not voting where an individual state was to be censored. It voted for the resolution. The same Balachandran story and the same Tamil Nadu political hysteria are once more working as catalysts on the eve of the UNHRC meet. In the 2012 UNHRC vote, 24 members voted for, 15 against, and 8 abstained. This time, 25 members have voted for the anti-Sri Lanka resolution; 13 countries voted against the resolution supporting Sri Lanka and 8 countries abstained. Last year, India was the only Asian country to vote for the resolution. This time, South Korea was the other Asian country that voted for the resolution. Indonesia voted for Sri Lanka and Japan abstained. Last year, China had also voted for Sri Lanka; this time it was not there at the UNHRC having completed its two-year stint. Last year two SAARC members, Bangladesh and Maldives, opposed. This time also two SAARC members have opposed— Maldives and Pakistan. Be that as it may, the question is: Do India, Sri Lanka Tamils or Tamil Nadu gain anything from the vote if the idea is not to score points over Mahinda Rajapaksa but to see how best the Tamil interests could
DO AS I SAY: DMK leader M Karunanidhi with the Prime Minister. The DMK recently pulled out of the ruling UPA.
be served? But before addressing that question it is important to underline that like many UN bodies, UNHRC too has more cosmetic value than real. The record shows that UN has done precious little to either prevent HR violations or do justice to HR victims. It was only after a million Tutsis and their Hutu sympathisers were butchered in 1994 that the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into being in 1998 through the Rome Statute to prevent incidents of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Notably, Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the ICC. The 2013 UNHRC meet is meant to serve two purposes—one, to put further pressure on Sri Lanka to implement recommendations of the report of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), and two, to seek a political solution to the Tamil problem. While both questions are intertwined and while optimists would argue that the first contains seeds of a political settlement of the Tamil question, empirical research from other
g countries suggests that it happens exactly LTTE had systematically exterminated all the other way round. In the Sri Lankan Tamil politicians resulting in the present context it would delay the second objecleadership vacuum. The Tamil National tive. Instead of trying to find a political Alliance (TNA), which came into being in solution the debate would veer around October 2001, just before the 2001 parliahow much has the Sri Lankan governmentary election, consisted of All Ceylon ment done to identify and punish the war Tamil Congress, Eelam People’s Revolucriminals, which essentially means courttionary Liberation Front (the Suresh facmartialing armed forces personnel. There tion), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organizaare two problems here. First, the issue is tion and Tamil United Liberation Front. It so emotive in Sri Lanka that it would be conceded that LTTE was the sole spokesvirtually impossible to institute court man of the Tamils. In the post-LTTE phase martial against accused soldiers who are it is groping in the dark to reinvent itself. national heroes now. From India’s own The political agenda it flaunts is largely experience in Kashmir, North East and in outdated not because the issues are not 160 districts where the Maoist militants relevant but because the situation has are active India should know better that to changed. It requires a new language and a handle allegations of HR violations is not new orientation. It still demands merger simple. In spite of widespread popular of the Northern and Eastern provinces. resentment against AFSPA (Armed Forces This demand is one that no Sinhala leadSpecial Powers Act) the Indian state has ership worth its salt would concede whatnot been able even to amend, leave alone ever lip service it may give to the Indian or abolish, the act. other interlocutors. A political solution to the Tamil quesIn the given situation TNA will have tion requires politics of scale because polto make compromises. It serves little itics is the art of the possible. Sri Lanka purpose if TNA continues to boycott the Tamils may be at present a demoralised Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) lot but they alone will have to find for after all through this procedure a solution to their problem. alone it can re-enter the politiNo UNHRC resolution or cal mainstream. In politics it India-Sri Lanka no amount of Indian and is important to understand international pressure one’s relative strength. trade has been would do the miracle. On Given this reality the latsystematically growing ter should start with a the contrary, they may prove counterproductive and reached $5 billion limited agenda to extract by fanning Sinhala chauwhatever little it can. (Approx Rs 27,000 vinism making Rajapaksa Commanding an unprecmore powerful and defiedented Sinhala support, crore) in 2011 ant. Tamil diaspora pressure the ruling United People’s too has mere news value. The Freedom Alliance (UPFA) nostalgia of diaspora Tamils for can make concessions which no their lost homes is real and for that they evenly balanced political situation can. are willing to make financial sacrifices It is the best time for Sri Lanka Tamils to but they will not return to Sri Lanka. A grab the opportunity with utmost pragJNU doctoral student who did extensive matism. fieldworks amongst the Tamil diaspora in TNA’s Tamil Nadu support has limthe West found that hardly five per cent ited efficacy to help solve its problems. of them were in a mood to return. More Tamil parties in India are playing to their were willing to buy real estate in Jaffna or respective galleries by using the Sri Lanka Colombo where they could spend their card with the ostensible purpose to barfamily holidays. gain with the centre. The same DMK chief The problem at hand now is the poK. Karunanidhi who was so circumspect litically unequal situation that exists beonly nine months ago (June 2012) to tell tween the Sinhalese and Tamil leadership. the Union Home Minister P. ChidamWhile the Sinhala leadership is in the baram that the demand for a Tamil Eelam hands of a towering leader its Tamil counwould not be discussed at the forthcomterpart is just the opposite. Any political ing conference of the recently revived deal means a clever bargaining depending TESO (Tamil Eelam Supporters Organupon the acumen of contending parties. isation) and that the latter was meant to
INTO THE STORM: Sri Lankan President Rajapakse is facing allegations of Human Rights Violations during the LTTE war.
discuss merely the various solutions to Sri Lanka’s Tamil question is now up in arms to hold the Manmohan government hostage to the TESO agenda to teach Sri Lanka a lesson. He not only threatened to withdraw DMK ministers from the central cabinet unless India insisted at the UNHRC meet on an independent inquiry into the HR violations in Sri Lanka, but also went ahead and withdrew his support from the ruling centre. It is legitimate to ask the DMK as to what was the substantive change in Sri Lankan political reality from June 2012 to March 2013. India-Sri Lanka trade has been systematically growing and reached $5 billion (Approx `27,000 crore) in 2011. Indian investments in the country are on the rise and there are nine projects in operation at present worth $168 million (Approx `900 crore). A reversal of the situation would throw Sri Lanka into the lap of China which has already made its presence felt in Sri Lanka. It invested $1.4 billion (Approx `7500 crore) for the modernisation of Hambantota and Colombo ports. The China factor has the potential complicate the Tamil question making it even more difficult to solve. The irony is that while in India its domestic politics seems to have all the legitimacy to influence its foreign policy, in the case of Sri Lanka its domestic politics is expected to play no role. Does India expect that Sri Lanka must remain unaffected by what happens in Tamil Nadu and subjugate its national interest to the UNHRC resolutions just because it is a small country? Do Indian politicians think that they alone have the monopoly of playing to the galleries? (The author is Senior Fellow, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and Editor of India Quarterly)
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
he DMK has left the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the Centre over the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and what it refers to as the betrayal of their cause by the Manmohan Singh government at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Meeting in Geneva. But, what if the government had heeded to the DMK’s advice and persuaded the United States to sponsor a really strong resolution against Sri Lanka by mandating a UN or international group to investigate the ‘genocide’ in 2009, when the separatist LTTE, arguably the deadliest terrorist outfit in the history of the world, was decimated by the Sri Lankan security forces? Would that have really helped the cause of the Tamils in Sri Lanka? In my considered view, that would have really worsened their plight, making the majority Sinhalese harden their stance towards the Tamils and render the national reconciliation process on the island nation all the more difficult. In fact, if one sees the role of the DMK dispassionately, its concerns for Sri Lankan Tamils are equivalent to shedding crocodile tears. There was no clearer evidence of this than at the time of the UPA victory in 2009 that coincided with the last Prakash stand of the LTTE against the Sri Lankan forces. After creating a furore over the war in Sri Lanka during the elections, the DMK’s only concern after the results was how many and which cabinet positions the party would get in the new government. Besides, the DMK, or for that matter the AIADMK, has never protested against the periodic renewal of the terrorist list by the Union Home Ministry and that list proscribes the LTTE! And, all these years, it has been one of the most important components of the UPA. Second, I have serious problems with the disproportionate influence of Tamil Nadu politics on India’s policy towards Sri Lanka. After all, many Sri Lankans consider themselves to be descendants of King Vijay, who had gone from Odisha to establish the kingdom of modern Sri Lanka. In fact, most of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka (and the Sinhalese), who constitute the country’s majority, have their origins in Odisha, Bengal and Bihar. The point is that the majority Sinhalese are as proud of their Indian ancestry as the Sri Lankan Tamils are. What they resent is when the question of Sri Lanka is discussed in India, only the Tamil factor is taken into account. Be that as it may, the fundamental issue is how genuine, principled and consistent the nations are on the question of violation of human rights. It is easy to pass a resolution in a UN forum against Sri Lanka, a relatively lesser power. Can one visulalise a situation when the UN or any of its affiliates deciding a course of action against countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where the level of human rights is much lower than Sri Lanka by every possible yardstick? Besides, what is the sanctity of such resolutions that the UN passes when these are, more often than not, defied by the
countries concerned? The case of North Korea easily comes to mind in this context. It is, perhaps, not known to many that the day the UNHRC passed the US-sponsored and India-supported resolution against Sri Lanka (March 23), it also adopted a unanimous resolution condemning human rights violations in North Korea. The resolution denounced the torture and hard labour sentencing of repatriated North Korean defectors and political prisoners and urged guarantees that humanitarian aid from the international community be carried out under appropriate monitoring. But will that happen? It was not the first time that North Korea was warned by an international organisation. On March 7, 2013, the UN had imposed sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear explosion on February 12. In a strongly-worded resolution, the UN Security Council had unanimously expanded the scope of the already existing sanctions against North Korea by targeting the illicit activities of its diplomatic personnel, transfer of bulk cash and the country’s banking relationships. It is well known that countries such as China, Pakistan and Iran have always helped North Korea, despite its growing international isolation over the Nanda years, thanks to the clandestine and illegal nuclear and missile business. But what may sound really surprising to readers, and it did surprise me too in a big way, that despite North Korea’s strong Pakistan links in the fields of nuclear weapons and missile technology, which, in turn, have serious consequences for India’s security, New Delhi happens to be Pyongyang’s second largest trading partner! Trade between India and North Korea has seen a large increase in recent years. From an average total trade of barely $100 million in the middle of the 2000s, it shot up to over $1 billion in 2009. In the year 2011-12, the figure was about $800 million. The trade is overwhelmingly in India’s favour, though. This figure does not include the massive food aid of soyabeans, rice and wheat that India provided in 2011 and 2012. What is most noteworthy is that while every Indian is badly affected by rising oil prices and the government-run oil companies express their helplessness in view of the fluctuating price mechanism of global crude production, the same oil companies are exporting diesel and other petroleum products to North Korea regularly. If the respectable Forbes magazine is to be believed, the fuel is not supplied directly but sold through a network of traders and banks in Dubai and elsewhere. It is difficult to fathom our government’s love for North Korea, unless we take into account the fact that it is a fellow ‘nonaligned’ country. But the question here is the sanctity or efficacy of the resolutions of the UN or its affiliated bodies such as the UNHCR. Viewed thus, the entire episode on Sri Lanka is much ado about nothing.