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A NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SERVICES PUBLICATION

timing IS MONEY

HAMP & BANKRUPTCY

Credit union opportunity

JULY 2010

Makeover for reaffirmation agreements Visualizing bankruptcy data


FORTUNATELY, WE’VE GOT MORE THAN TWO DECADES OF UNMATCHED BANKRUPTCY RECOVERY EXPERIENCE TO KEEP EVERYTHING IN CHECK.

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDERS  AUTOMOBILE FINANCE COMPANIES  BANKS, CREDIT UNIONS, & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  CONSUMER LENDING ORGANIZATIONS  PORTFOLIO SERVICERS, OWNERS & INVESTORS

Since 1987, we’ve focused on helping companies deal with the maze of bankruptcy cases by consistently increasing recovery results, reducing loan losses and improving the bottom-line performance of their bankruptcy portfolio. Contact NBS and let us help you stay ahead of the game.

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SERVICES

9441 LBJ Freeway, Suite 250 Dallas, TX 75243 1-800-766-7751 NBSdefaultservices.com


FOCUS ISSUES

DATA

A NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SERVICES PUBLICATION

ISSUES

DATA

FOCUS

A discussion of current trends and issues in the world of bankruptcy and bankruptcy servicing.

Information aggregated from authoritative data sources detailing bankruptcy filing statistics around the nation.

Interviews with industry professionals offering insight into servicing and legal developments.

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NBS. HANDLING BANKRUPTCY CASES SINCE 1987.

IN THIS ISSUE

TABLE OF CONTENTS BALANCING THE BOOKS » Managing bankruptcy as a line of business: a credit union opportunity

2

RENOVATING REAFFIRMATION » A makeover for reaffirmation agreements

6

TIMING IS MONEY » HAMP and bankruptcy

10

BY THE NUMBERS » This is a description of the overall section

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» United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa

22

HOT SEAT: BRAD CLOUD » Up close and personal with the COO of NBS

24

CASE STUDY

Lance Vander Linden, Chariman lvanderlinden@nbsdefaultservices.com

The Ledger is a National Bankruptcy Services publication. © 2010 National Bankruptcy Services • All Rights Reserved

Paul Bourke, CEO pbourke@nbsdefaultservices.com

9441 LBJ FREEWAY, SUITE 250 • DALLAS, TX 75243 Contributing Writers Jennifer H. Brown, Dennis Dollar, Sammy Hooda, Joe M. Lozano, Adam Womack

Brad Cloud, COO bcloud@nbsdefaultservices.com

Magazine Design LTV Creative, www.LTVcreative.com PAGE 1

Larry Buckley, EVP of Business Development lbuckley@nbsdefaultservices.com

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balancin g the books BY DENNIS DOLLAR

MANAGING BANKRUPTCY AS A LINE OF BUSINESS

A CREDIT UNION PAGE 2

OPPORTUNITY THE LEDGER » WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM


FOCUS DATA ISSUES

However, if my experience in credit union circles shows any area where the banks have set a higher bar than we have even begun to lift ourselves to, it is in the area of bankruptcy management that credit unions are missing a true opportunity to help their members and enhance the financial position of their institutions at the same time. What do I mean? Don’t credit unions try to encourage members to reaffirm their debts in a bankruptcy so that they can maintain necessary credit at their member-owned cooperative? And don’t credit unions try to get as much recovery as possible from a bankrupt member while try-

ing to control unnecessary legal expenses in order to re-invest those recovered funds back into their members? The answer is yes, kinda. But, more often than not this is done without a plan or a strategy. Banks treat bankruptcy as a line of business. Many credit unions take whatever they can recover through reaffirmations, pay whatever the attorneys say they should pay to cover the filings and tend to be thankful for whatever recoveries come in. It is to the benefit of all credit union members when those who declare bankruptcy reaffirm and make payments to the credit union. It is certainly to the benefit of

BALANCING THE BOOKS » BY DENNIS DOLLAR

a credit union true believer, seldom do I find an area in financial institutional management where it seems that for-profit banks seem to be superior in their customer focus than are credit unions in their member focus. Because credit unions are not driven primarily by stockholder returns but rather by satisfaction levels of their member owners as their driving factors as not-for-profit member owned financial cooperatives, the credit union focus on service has been the differentiator which has consistently resulted in higher satisfaction levels for credit union account holders in every survey than for their banking competitors.

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AS

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DENNIS DOLLAR is principal partner in a full service credit union industry consulting firm, Dollar Associates LLC, based in Birmingham, AL. He is a former presidential-appointed Chairman of the National Credit Union

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Administration, award winning credit union CEO and two-term state legislator from his home state of Mississippi.

the members who reaffirm and now have at least one source of future credit that they will inevitably need the next time they need a car to get to work or a debit card to buy groceries with. Yet, when credit unions take somewhat of a helter-skelter approach to managing bankruptcy and do not treat it as a line of business to be managed and maximized, they miss a tremendous member service opportunity and source of potential income through recoveries and loss mitigation. Why is getting more reaffirmations a member service opportunity? Well, who needs to maintain a relationship with at least one of his or her financial institutions more desperately than someone who is filing bankruptcy and soon to sever his good standing with everyone he or she has previously done business with? I would submit that no one needs a reaffirmed relationship more. And, of course, we all know the reason why more reaffirmations are good for credit union members at large. Every recovery on a bankruptcy mitigates a loss that would otherwise cost earnings that could be invested in new branches, services, higher savings rates and lower lending rates. Dollar Associates was contacted by National Bankruptcy Services (NBS) in 2009 to help them evaluate the potential benefit to credit unions if they were to be offered a structured bankruptcy management program that had proven itself incredibly successful in the banking industry. As part of that evaluation process we traveled to Dallas to check out their operation with a recognition that credit unions needed to strengthen their bankruptcy management efforts — but still curious as to whether a program that has produced such outstanding reaffirmation results and reduced legal costs for mega-banks nationwide could be

transferred into the credit union space. What we found at NBS was a program that would translate itself very well to fit a pressing credit union need. Just the legal savings alone that come from the systematic and structured volume approach implemented at NBS would be worth a credit union carefully examining; however, it was the reaffirmation rates in excess of 50 percent at mega banks (not the most popular institutions with their customers these days) that convinced us that the NBS program could produce even more impressive reaffirmation rates at member-owned credit unions. Certainly, anything that NBS does in its systematic approach to required bankruptcy response filings and respect from bankruptcy trustees can be provided by a local team of attorneys with careful monitoring by credit union staff. But is it? Most credit unions have not been treating their bankruptcy portfolio like a book of business. Even though there is considerable potential income and member service opportunity there, few credit unions hire or manage closely the expertise — either in-house or through a third party — in the bankruptcy arena that they do in their investments, lending, collections or even fee income. While credit unions manage their investments, lending, collections and fee income down to the penny, most could not validate their effectiveness in managing their bankruptcy portfolio. Do we have unnecessary legal expenses? What is our return on investment? Are we maximizing our reaffirmations? How do we know? These are questions that are rarely, if ever, asked by most credit unions. I’ve had credit union CEOs tell me that they, when their bankruptcy legal expenses were audited, had discovered hundreds

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of thousands of dollars of legal filings that were not even necessary under the 2005 bankruptcy reform laws. Another shared with me that he didn’t realize until he asked that over forty percent of his members with reaffirmations had never paid a single penny toward their reaffirmed debt. Most credit unions have more bankruptcies to manage today than they did prior to the bankruptcy reform legislation that was intended to make the process more productive for creditors and harder to beat for debtors. Some larger credit unions are averaging 50 to 100 new bankruptcy filings per month. Although the present economy is driving much of this growth in bankruptcies and the number could diminish somewhat when the economy rebounds, we are in an era where bankruptcy filings will never go away. Perhaps they may not even decrease, if the growing number of attorneys advertising for bankruptcy business is any indication. Managing a bankruptcy portfolio of hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, of dollars cannot be treated lightly. Banks have realized this well before credit unions. And their bankruptcy returns have been better than those of credit unions in most instances. We are convinced that any credit union with a sizable bankruptcy portfolio that cannot be managed daily by existing staff to the level that they can answer the previously mentioned series of questions at any time should look carefully at experienced and proven third party bankruptcy management support. From our review, NBS has the best program in the country in this field. Its potential for credit unions that need to treat bankruptcies more like a line of business is significant.


FOCUS DATA ISSUES BALANCING THE BOOKS » BY DENNIS DOLLAR

MOST CREDIT UNIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TREATING THEIR BANKRUPTCY PORTFOLIO LIKE A BOOK

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OF BUSINESS WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM « JULY 2010


Renovating  Reaffirmations A MAKEOVER FOR REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS BY JENNIFER H. BROWN

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A

reaffirmation agreement is a binding contract between a debtor and creditor that allows the debtor to repay a personal obligation that would normally be dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). The agreement is completely voluntary for both creditors and debtors. A debtor generally enters into a reaffirmation agreement to repay dischargeable debt when the debt is secured by a lien on property that the debtor wants to retain. A reaffirmation agreement is only enforceable if it complies with the governing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code codified at 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d), and (k). Reaffirmation agreements have not always been allowed, and were almost banned by Congress in 1978.1 After much debate, Congress allowed reaffirmations under narrow and monitored situations;

hence the original section 524(c) of the Code, which governs reaffirmation agreements, was created.2 As originally enacted, the Code gave courts a pivotal role in the creation and enforcement of reaffirmation agreements. Subsection 524(c)(4) of the 1978 Code stated, “In a case concerning an individual, to the extent that such debt is not secured by real property of the debtor, the court approves such agreement as (A)(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and (ii) in the best interest of the debtor; or (B)(i) entered into in good faith; and (ii) in settlement of litigation under section 523 of this title, or providing for redemption under section 722 of this title.”3 Since that time, reaffirmation agreements and section 524(c) have gone

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through many changes. In 1984, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 modified section 524(c) to state that a reaffirmation agreement was not valid unless the debtor’s attorney signed an affidavit acknowledging that the agreement would not cause undue hardship on the debtor. Boilerplate disclosure statements and a longer time frame to rescind the agreement after it was filed with the court were also instituted.4 More changes regarding the reaffirmation agreement came with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, including the addition of 524(d). This new legislation added two new requirements to Section 524, including changes to the boilerplate disclosure statements, and a requirement that the debtor’s attorney certifies that he or she fully advised their client of the legal


FOCUS DATA ISSUES RENOVATING REAFFIRMATION » BY JENNIFER H. BROWN

In order to simplify the reaffirmation agreement process, an official bankruptcy reaffirmation agreement form, known as the B240, was adopted in June of 1999, which included all of the required elements set forth in 524(c). The form was developed as the result of a recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission which asked the United States Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to “prescribe a form motion for approval of reaffirmation agreements that contains information enabling the court and the parties to determine the propriety of the agreement. Approval of the motion would not entail a separate order of the court.”6 The B240 form had been around for several years, although it wasn’t until after BAPCPA went into effect that it be-

came a staple in most courts because of the detailed requirements set forth in the reformed litigation. Originally, the document was “recommended” for use to the various jurisdictions, but by 2007 many courts had incorporated the form into their local rules as a mandatory document. Although some courts utilize a local version of the B240 form, the National B240 remains the most common form required by bankruptcy jurisdictions today. Since the B240 became the universal reaffirmation agreement form, the committee that developed the form has changed its structure and appearance several times. The latest change to the document came in April of 2010. Official forms B240A & B240B (also referred to as Director’s Procedural Forms), as well as a new national coversheet, Form

WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM « JULY 2010

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consequences of reaffirming the debt, and that the agreement was an informed and voluntary decision.5 By 1994, court hearings were not an ordinary occurrence on reaffirmation agreements, and much of the reviewing and approving became the responsibility of the debtor’s attorney. The Bankruptcy Code was amended most recently in 2005 through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA made several changes to the provisions governing reaffirmation agreements, which included the expansion of the section 524 by adding subsections (k), (l), and (m). The additional language that was added to 524 included very specific provisions concerning the form and required terms of the reaffirmation agreement.


JENNIFER HARDWICKE BROWN is an Associate Attorney with Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., with a primary focus on the Consumer bankruptcy portfolio. She is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma College

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of Law and has been practicing law since 2007.

B27, were created in December 2009. According to the US Court’s website, “The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules developed and recommended implementation of the amended reaffirmation forms package, which has been reorganized and substantially revised to make the reaffirmation form easier to complete and, as a result, to reduce errors. The forms also are intended to be easier for the court to review.” The Advisory Committee recommended to the various jurisdictions using the new forms that they should allow a six month transitional grace period for the courts, debtors and creditors to implement the new forms. At that time, many jurisdictions announced that they would be using the new forms and coversheet, although a handful opted to continue using their own local forms.7

In February 2010, the US Courts website announced that they were changing the B240 reaffirmation agreement form again. The Committee stated, “Director’s Form B240A (Reaffirmation Documents) integrates the Reaffirmation Agreement, disclosures, and other documents necessary for a debtor to reaffirm a debt. It has prompted a number of suggestions since its introduction in December 2009. After consultation with the Bankruptcy Rules Committee, B240A has been modified (effective April 1, 2010), to incorporate some of the suggestions made since December 2009, and instructions have been drafted for the form. The new instructions identify governing law, and provide directions for use of the form.” The new forms replaced the most recent December 2009 version all together, and

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the January 2007 versions of the form were brought back as an alternate document. The instruction sheet created by the advisory committee describes the differences between the 2007 form, which is now the alternate form, and the new B240A form (04/10). The January 2007 version of Director’s Form B240A (now designed as B240A/B ALT) which implemented the reaffirmation disclosures and form requirements of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, carefully tracked the statutory language and organization. As a result, the form was quite long and some of the most significant information needed for court review followed many pages of preliminary disclosures and information.


FOCUS DATA ISSUES

HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE TOPIC OF MUCH DEBATE

agreements are a great tool for allowing the debtor to pay on their collateral over time to their secured creditors.9 No matter what side of the spectrum you fall with regard to the great reaffirmation agreement

debate, it is clear that as long as reaffirmation agreements are a hot topic within the courts and the bankruptcy community as whole, the laws surrounding them will be ever changing.

NOTES 1. National Bankruptcy Review Commission. “Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years.” National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report, Volume 1 (1997): 145-178. 2. Id. at 146. 3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 4. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).cite web url=http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h103-5116 |title=H.R. 5116 |accessdate=April 19, 2010 |author=103rd Congress (1994) |date=Sep 28, 1994 |work=Legislation |publisher=GovTrack.us |quote=Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 6. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report at 145. 7. See e.g. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts Local Rule 4008-1. 8. http://www.uscourts.gov/bankform/index.html 9. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report at 148.

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Based on the authority provided by 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(2), this revised form organizes the required information in a different order, bringing information important to the court to the beginning of the document while directing the debtor’s attention to pertinent disclosures and definitions that must be reviewed before entering into the Reaffirmation Agreement. It also streamlines the documents and uses language that is easier to understand. To avoid redundancy, some the required disclosures are included in the Reaffirmation Agreement and are simply referred to in the Disclosure Statement.8 Reaffirmation agreements have always been the topic of much debate, and many parties argue that reaffirming debt defeats the purpose of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, while some believe that reaffirmation

RENOVATING REAFFIRMATION » BY JENNIFER H. BROWN

REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS


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COVER STORY

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HAMP & BANKRUPTCY

ISSUES

DATA

FOCUS

IS MONEY

TIMING IS MONEY Âť BY ADAM WOMACK

timing BY ADAM WOMACK

March 24, 2010, the Treasury Department issued Supplemental Directive 10-02, which is its first substantial guidance change to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) as it relates to borrowers who are in active bankruptcy proceedings. Some of these changes will impact servicer and law firm processes as early as June 1, 2010. For a loan servicer, it is important to identify which loans will have these new bankruptcy rules (and when) so that you can properly implement a HAMP management process with your bankruptcy vendors and law firms.

HAMP IN A NUTSHELL OUTSIDE OF BANKRUPTCY Before outlining the impending bankruptcy changes, some readers may appreciate a refresher (or primer) on the basic features of HAMP. This information is offered only as context for a discussion of the bankruptcy changes, and should not be relied upon by a servicer, law firm or other related industry partner for any aspect of HAMP compliance. Generally stated, a servicer may be required to follow HAMP on a given loan for several reasons, which include: (1) it is

owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, (2) it is owned or guaranteed by Freddie Mac, and/or (3) it is covered under a Servicer Participation Agreement with Treasury. Although mostly uniform, HAMP guidance for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Treasury are issued separately via their own communication processes and new requirements can have different effective dates. For example, the subject of this article, Treasury Supplemental Directive 10-02, controls servicer HAMP actions on loans covered under a Servicer Participation Agreement, but not if the loans are

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ON

WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM ÂŤ JULY 2010


ADAM WOMACK is a member of the State Bar of Texas and currently serves as VP of Operations at NBS, which provides comprehensive bankruptcy services for its loan servicing clients. Prior to joining NBS, he managed business operations for mortgage and consumer servicers and investors, including most recently, Fannie Mae. He has also provided legal representation to consumer and mortgage secured creditors.

owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. It is expected that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will issue separate but similar announcements that adopt 1002 bankruptcy guidance changes, but, at press time, the announcements and effective dates have not issued. After tackling these investor nuances, a servicer’s HAMP process is substantially uniform and follows a general path: (1) Initial eligibility and NPV—checking that the loan is, for example, a first lien, and secured by a property which is borrower occupied, and the net present value (NPV) of the property as it relates to a foreclosure outcome is positive or negative when compared to a modification outcome (NPV results may or may not affect HAMP eligibility dependent upon the loan investor or insurer) (2) Verified eligibility—evaluating that the borrower’s documented financials (e.g., pay stubs, W-2, tax returns) establish a housingdebt-to-income ratio of greater than 31 percent, and that the ratio can be lowered to 31 percent through a standard modification waterfall: reduction in interest rate, term extension, principal forbearance, and/or voluntary principal forgiveness (principal forgiveness parameters will likely change in future updates to HAMP)

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(3) Trial plan—establishing a monthly trial payment based on the 31 percent ratio, and tracking whether the borrower can perform under that payment for a period of three months (or longer under limited circumstances) (4) Permanent modification—converting a successful trial plan to a permanent modification and managing the subsequent performance of the modification (certain servicer, investor, and even borrower incentives can accrue based on the completion and ongoing performance of the modification)

HAMP BANKRUPTCY GUIDANCE PRIOR TO TREASURY SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 10-02 Some may have encountered the joke series involving “what is the world’s shortest book”—a tasteful example might be “America’s Most Popular Lawyers.” Similarly, a book, let alone a page, devoted to formal HAMP bankruptcy guidance would have been hard to assemble up until now. Previous HAMP guidance concerning bankruptcy addressed two areas. First, a borrower who is involved in an active bankruptcy proceeding is eligible for HAMP at the complete discretion of the servicer. Second, a borrower who has received a Chapter 7 discharge but did not reaffirm the loan is potentially eligible for HAMP, and, for those loans, the servicer must insert approved bankruptcy language into the applicable HAMP documents. Based on this guidance, many servicers likely chose to direct HAMP resources upon borrowers not in bankruptcy. Although excluding active bankruptcies may have alleviated many servicer processing issues, it did not insulate a servicer from all bankruptcy issues, such as, a borrower who is paying under a HAMP trial plan and files bankruptcy midstream.

NEW TREASURY GUIDANCE EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 2010: A borrower in bankruptcy must be considered upon “request” It is not hard to understand servicer concern (or plain old fear) related to performing the various HAMP communications and document collection requirements for a loan under protection of the bankruptcy automatic stay. One only has to review a

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few selections from a long series of court decisions finding servicer liability (even punitive awards) for crossing a sometimes cloudy line between bankruptcy management and debt collection. In fact, decades of loan servicing have brought specialized bankruptcy processes and technologies to avoid communications or other practices which courts might interpret as prohibited debt collection. With servicer concern likely in mind, a primary feature of the new bankruptcy guidance states, “Borrowers in active Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases must be considered for HAMP if the borrower, borrower’s counsel or bankruptcy trustee submits a request to the servicer.” Aside from the obvious concerns over performing different bankruptcy management processes based upon a “request,” there remain other significant issues. A beginning issue is that the type of “request” sufficient to trigger a servicer’s mandatory HAMP review is not defined. Outside of bankruptcy, this is not as important because servicers are required to complete a standardized outbound solicitation process for all loans potentially eligible for HAMP, and borrowers have specific requirements on what information they must provide in return. Inside of bankruptcy, a “request” could take many forms, such as, telephone communication, letter, petition language, Chapter 13 plan, Chapter 7 Statement of Intent, or other filed notice. If Treasury’s intent was that the borrower must submit standardized documentation (Treasury Request for Modification and Affidavit) to evoke a “request,” then this could be cleared up in later guidance or FAQ. In the absence of defining a “request,” it is not far-fetched to imagine


FOCUS DATA ISSUES PAGE 13

TIMING IS MONEY » BY ADAM WOMACK

IT IS NOT HARD TO UNDERSTAND SERVICER CONCERN (OR PLAIN OLD FEAR)

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trustees implementing blanket HAMP requests at 341 meetings, or model Chapter 13 plans including mandatory HAMP review language (think Rhode Island, Southern and Eastern Districts of New York). Beyond defining the trigger for mandatory HAMP evaluation, borrowers in bankruptcy may present unique challenges based upon the timing of the request. In Chapter 7, it is foreseeable that HAMP evaluation requests could occur anytime during a very short bankruptcy lifespan. In the event a request fell proximate to the expected discharge of the case, servicers would understandably prefer closure of the Chapter 7 case instead of pursuing a more complicated process within bankruptcy. Unclear in the guidance is whether the servicer would have discretion to wait for any bankruptcy event to occur or pass after a “request” is received. For Chapter 13 cases, a servicer has significant issues to resolve regarding its proof of claim, other proofs of claim, plan language, all which are in the backdrop of either heading toward a plan confirmation, or understanding how HAMP would impact a previously confirmed plan.

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Servicers must work with borrower or borrower’s counsel to obtain any required court or trustee approvals Simply stated, Treasury expects servicers to cooperate with the borrower, borrower’s counsel, trustee, and court to effect all necessary approvals, and servicers cannot place the whole duty upon the borrower’s counsel to effect approval. To comply, servicers will likely rely upon their bankruptcy vendors and legal counsel to ensure appropriate legal agreements and notices are secured, since jurisdictions vary wide-

ly on what is required to properly complete a loan modification in bankruptcy. It is fair to say a minority of servicers, vendors, and firms have pursued nonHAMP loan modifications in bankruptcy over the past several years, and may be able to utilize this information for HAMP. However, the majority of servicers will likely encounter this issue for the first time once HAMP review in bankruptcy becomes mandatory, which places experienced law firms and bankruptcy vendors in an important position to drive compliance. Over time, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will likely establish acceptable fees for management of HAMP in bankruptcy, which may ultimately drive how servicers choose to develop internal and external HAMP bankruptcy processes. Borrowers who are in a trial plan period and subsequently file for bankruptcy may not be denied a HAMP modification on the basis of the bankruptcy filing Before this guidance change, servicers utilized their own discretion (subject to applicable law) in determining the effect of a bankruptcy filing upon a borrower’s HAMP trial plan. Likely in response to servicers’ divergent activities to date, Treasury directs servicers to “not object to confirmation of a borrower’s Chapter 13 plan, move for relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay, or move for dismissal of the Chapter 13 case on the basis that the borrower paid only the amounts due under the trial period plan.” A related accommodation for borrowers in bankruptcy is that servicers must extend the trial plan period by 1-2 months (5 month total) if such an extension would help in obtaining any required court ap-

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provals or receiving a full remittance from the Chapter 13 trustee. Substitution of income documentation (optional) Although not required, a servicer may utilize the bankruptcy schedules in lieu of the formal Request for Modification Agreement, but the borrower’s execution of a Hardship Affidavit is still required. If the schedules are greater than 90 days old as of the date of servicer receipt, then the borrower must supplement the bankruptcy schedules with updated evidence of income. Also, if sufficient tax returns have been submitted by the borrower through the bankruptcy process, then the servicer can utilize copies of these tax returns for HAMP if they can be procured from the borrower, borrower’s counsel or court.

NEW TREASURY GUIDANCE ANNOUNCED BUT NO EFFECTIVE DATE CURRENTLY RELEASED: Waiver of trial period plan for certain bankruptcy loans (optional) Current internal process and technology complications likely prevented Treasury from announcing a formal effective date for a servicer’s optional waiver of the trial period when 10-02 was first released. If the complications can be overcome, the concept is that servicers may count prior bankruptcy post-petition payments as proxy for completed trial plan payments. When implemented, this flexibility may enable servicers to better manage Chapter 13 pre-confirmation requests for HAMP, and target performing bankruptcies for borrowers who have not formally requested HAMP evaluation.


FOCUS DATA ISSUES TIMING IS MONEY » BY ADAM WOMACK PAGE 15

BORROWERS IN BANKRUPTCY MAY PRESENT UNIQUE CHALLENGES BASED UPON THE TIMING OF THE REQUEST

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DATA STATE-BY-STATE FILINGS PER CAPITA

D.C.

> 7.5 6 – 7.5 4.5 – 6 3 – 4.5 <3

FILINGS PER CAPITA: TOP 10

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State

Filings Per Capita

FILINGS PER CAPITA: BOTTOM 10 Percent Change

Nevada Tennessee Georgia Michigan

10.32

-0.91

8.02

-0.60

7.83

+0.24

7.44

+0.67

Alabama Indiana California Illinois Kentucky

7.14

-0.29

6.95

-0.33

6.39

+0.79

6.35

+0.72

6.12

+0.28

Ohio

5.88

-0.17

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Filings Per Capita

Percent Change

Alaska South Carolina District of Columbia North Dakota South Dakota Texas Wyoming

1.52

+0.08

New York Montana North Carolina

2.74

-0.19

2.74

+0.03

2.76

-0.21

State

2.07

-0.10

2.11

+0.15

2.22

-0.17

2.24

-0.06

2.24

-0.01

2.48

+0.01


FOCUS

TOTAL U.S. FILINGS 2006-PRESENT THROUGH MARCH 2010, INCLUDES CHAPTER 11

DATA

180,000

ISSUES

160,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

Jan

Apr

July

Oct

Jan

Apr

2006

July

Oct

Jan

Apr

2007

July

Oct

2008

Jan

Apr

July

Oct

2009

Jan

‘10

TOTAL NON-COMMERCIAL FILINGS 2006-2009 1,600,000

CHAPTER 13

1,400,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

TOTAL: 585,386

800,000

248,751

TOTAL: 820,560

1,000,000

320,799

TOTAL: 1,085,660

1,200,000

360,459

TOTAL: 1,431,667

CHAPTER 7

404,550

1,027,117

725,201

499,761

336,635

0

2007

2008

2009 PAGE 17

2006

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BANKRUPTCY IS NOT THE END OF THE ROAD.

Call today to see how NBS can accelerate recovery through precision auto loan bankruptcy management services.

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SERVICES

9441 LBJ Freeway, Suite 250 Dallas, TX 75243 1-800-766-7751 NBSdefaultservices.com


Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

Ratio of Chapter 13 Filings

8,407

48%

52%

265

83%

17%

9,301

82%

18%

4,011

58%

42%

59,053

77%

23%

7,387

83%

17%

2,791

90%

10%

1,135

74%

26%

317

73%

27%

25,706

76%

24%

19,249

58%

42%

924

81%

19%

1,714

88%

12%

20,505

77%

23%

11,167

74%

26%

2,475

93%

7%

2,516

72%

28%

6,601

76%

24%

4,324

39%

61%

957

85%

15%

7,093

76%

24%

5,730

78%

22%

18,545

86%

14%

5,509

88%

12%

3,678

58%

42%

7,690

73%

27%

669

85%

15%

1,941

74%

26%

6,820

75%

25%

1,472

82%

18%

9,810

78%

22%

1,656

92%

8%

13,366

80%

20%

6,465

56%

44%

359

89%

11%

16,975

77%

23%

3,462

83%

17%

4,539

78%

22%

9,570

73%

27%

1,375

85%

15%

2,364

53%

47%

454

90%

10%

12,630

54%

46%

13,860

51%

49%

4,017

67%

33%

450

79%

21%

9,314

69%

31%

8,170

80%

20%

1,659

90%

10%

7,494

83%

17%

337

86%

14%

Please turn the page for a visual representation of the information in this table.

WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM ÂŤ JULY 2010

FOCUS DATA

Ratio of Chapter 7 Filings

ISSUES

Cumulative 2010 Filings

State

PAGE 19

STATE-BY-STATE TOTAL 2010 BANKRUPTCY FILINGS AND PERCENTAGES OF CHAPTER 7 VS. CHAPTER 13


SEEING SPOTS STATE-BY-STATE TOTAL FILINGS AND STATE PERCENTAGES OF CHAPTER 7 VS. CHAPTER 13 FILINGS ALASKA Total Filings: 265 Chapter 7: 83% | Chapter 13: 17% CALIFORNIA Total Filings: 59,053 Chapter 7: 77% | Chapter 13: 23% ALABAMA Total Filings: 8,407 Chapter 7: 48% | Chapter 13: 52% ILLINOIS Total Filings: 20,505 Chapter 7: 77% | Chapter 13: 23%

LOUISIANA Total Filings: 4,324 Chapter 7: 39% | Chapter 13: 61%

INDIANA Total Filings: 11,167 Chapter 7: 74% | Chapter 13: 26%

MISSOURI Total Filings: 7,690 Chapter 7: 73% | Chapter 13: 27% MICHIGAN Total Filings: 18,545 Chapter 7: 86% | Chapter 13: 14% PENNSYLVANIA Total Filings: 9,570 Chapter 7: 73% | Chapter 13: 27% KENTUCKY Total Filings: 6,601 Chapter 7: 76% | Chapter 13: 24% CONNECTICUT Total Filings: 2,791 Chapter 7: 90% | Chapter 13: 10% MASSACHUSETTS Total Filings: 5,730 Chapter 7: 78% | Chapter 13: 22% COLORADO Total Filings: 7,387 Chapter 7: 83% | Chapter 13: 17%

PAGE 20

GEORGIA Total Filings: 19,249 Chapter 7: 58% | Chapter 13: 42%

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MARYLAND Total Filings: 7,093 Chapter 7: 76% | Chapter 13: 24% MINNESOTA Total Filings: 5,509 Chapter 7: 88% | Chapter 13: 12% UTAH Total Filings: 4,017 Chapter 7: 67% | Chapter 13: 33% NEBRASKA Total Filings: 1,941 Chapter 7: 74% | Chapter 13: 26% MAINE Total Filings: 957 Chapter 7: 85% | Chapter 13: 15% HAWAII Total Filings: 924 Chapter 7: 81% | Chapter 13: 19% VERMONT Total Filings: 450 Chapter 7: 79% | Chapter 13: 21% WYOMING Total Filings: 337 Chapter 7: 86% | Chapter 13: 14%


IDAHO Total Filings: 1,714 Chapter 7: 88% | Chapter 13: 12% KANSAS Total Filings: 2,516 Chapter 7: 72% | Chapter 13: 28%

FLORIDA Total Filings: 25,706 Chapter 7: 76% | Chapter 13: 24%

FOCUS DATA

DELAWARE Total Filings: 1,135 Chapter 7: 74% | Chapter 13: 26%

ISSUES

For an alphabetical listing of the information in this graphic, see page 19

MISSISSIPPI Total Filings: 3,678 Chapter 7: 58% | Chapter 13: 42% OREGON Total Filings: 4,539 Chapter 7: 78% | Chapter 13: 22% NEVADA Total Filings: 6,820 Chapter 7: 75% | Chapter 13: 25% ARIZONA Total Filings: 9,301 Chapter 7: 82% | Chapter 13: 18%

WEST VIRGINIA Total Filings: 1,659 Chapter 7: 90% | Chapter 13: 10% VIRGINIA Total Filings: 9,314 Chapter 7: 69% | Chapter 13: 31%

OHIO Total Filings: 16,975 Chapter 7: 77% | Chapter 13: 23%

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Total Filings: 317 Chapter 7: 73% | Chapter 13: 27%

NORTH DAKOTA Total Filings: 359 Chapter 7: 89% | Chapter 13: 91%

TEXAS Total Filings: 13,860 Chapter 7: 51% | Chapter 13: 49%

SOUTH DAKOTA Total Filings: 454 Chapter 7: 90% | Chapter 13: 10% NORTH CAROLINA Total Filings: 6,465 Chapter 7: 56% | Chapter 13: 44%

TENNESSEE Total Filings: 12,630 Chapter 7: 54% | Chapter 13: 46%

SOUTH CAROLINA Total Filings: 2,364 Chapter 7: 53% | Chapter 13: 47%

WASHINGTON Total Filings: 8,170 Chapter 7: 80% | Chapter 13: 20% WISCONSIN Total Filings: 7,494 Chapter 7: 83% | Chapter 13: 17%

New Hampshire Total Filings: 1,472 Chapter 7: 82% | Chapter 13: 18% New Mexico Total Filings: 1,656 Chapter 7: 92% | Chapter 13: 8% New Jersey Total Filings: 9,810 Chapter 7: 78% | Chapter 13: 22%

ARKANSAS Total Filings: 4,011 Chapter 7: 58% | Chapter 13: 42% OKLAHOMA Total Filings: 3,462 Chapter 7: 83% | Chapter 13: 17% IOWA Total Filings: 2,475 Chapter 7: 93% | Chapter 13: 7% RHODE ISLAND Total Filings: 1,375 Chapter 7: 85% | Chapter 13: 15% MONTANA Total Filings: 669 Chapter 7: 85% | Chapter 13: 15%

WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM ÂŤ JULY 2010

PAGE 21

New York Total Filings: 13,366 Chapter 7: 80% | Chapter 13: 20%


CASE STUDY

SPEAK TIMELY OR FOREVER HOLD YOUR PEACE: ESPINOSA’S IMPACT ON CREDITORS HALED INTO BANKRUPTCY COURT BY SAMMY HOODA

CASE OVERVIEW In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, the United States Supreme Court held that “a creditor could not use a Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 60(b)(4)) to attempt to set aside a chapter 13 confirmation order which included a controversial ‘discharge by declaration’ provision.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. ___, 2010 WL 1027825 (2010). In Espinosa, the debtor filed a chapter 13 plan with the Bankruptcy Court that proposed to discharge a portion of his student loan debt, but he failed to initiate the adversary proceeding as required for such discharge. The creditor received notice of, but did not object to, the plan, and failed to file an appeal after the Bankruptcy Court subsequently confirmed the plan. Years later, the creditor filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) asking the Bankruptcy Court to rule that its order confirming the chapter 13 plan was void because the order was issued in violation of the Code and Rules. In affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that confirmation of the chapter 13 plan, which contained provisions constituting a “legal error,” could not be vacated as void and the creditor’s due process rights were not violated. The Court’s ruling rested on the reasoning that deadlines within the Code and Rules have meanings and untimely attacks on orders will not be allowed merely because the orders were unwise, unwarranted or violated the Code. The Supreme Court stated that, “Rule 60(b)(4) strikes a balance between the need for finality of judgments and the importance of ensuring that litigants have a full and fair opportunity to litigate a dispute.” The Court admonished that, “Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a license for litigants to sleep on their rights.” This ruling emphasizes the necessity for all parties to follow the Code and Rules and the consequences for failing to act in a timely fashion.

PAGE 22

CONCERNS FOR CREDITORS Espinosa outlines the importance of plan review and timely objections to plans that do not conform to the requirements of the Code and Rules.

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In the Supreme Court’s eyes, even an unscrupulous debtor’s attorney’s bad-faith litigation tactics does not alleviate a creditor of its duty to protect its legal rights. Thus, simply filing a proof of claim in a case is no longer enough. Now, the onus is on the creditors to ensure that they are treated fairly under the plan and to speak up “timely” if they have any objections. However, it should be noted that this case involved an unsecured, priority creditor and it is uncertain whether the Court will extend its ruling to secured creditors as well. Within a footnote in the case the Court explicitly states, “We express no view on the conditions under which an order confirming the discharge of one of these types of debt [debts that are not dischargeable under any circumstances] could be set aside as void.” Therefore, the application of this decision on secured creditors is currently unknown. What is known is creditors should proceed with extreme caution nonetheless, especially because this was a unanimous decision by the highest court in the country.

BENEFITS TO CREDITORS Creditors should appreciate that the decision recognized the debtor’s “procedural error” and the court’s “legal error” committed in the course of this case. But the Court was unwilling to allow the creditor to take advantage of these errors because it failed to act timely. Thus, creditors must be cognizant not only of their compliance with the Code and Rules but must monitor the actions of other parties, including courts, to ensure that their rights are protected. Though the heightened requirement on creditors seems unsettling, it does present a unique opportunity for creditors. Following the Court’s decision creditors can and should freely object to debtors’ plans that fail to comply with the Code and Rules without the fear of being chastised by courts or debtor’s counsel. In acknowledging the procedural and legal errors committed by the debtor and the bankruptcy judge, the Supreme Court gave a stern warning to both regarding their respective conduct. Though


Another potential benefit for creditors is the possibility of collecting fees and costs associated with plan reviews. It is likely that any push by creditors to collect these fees will be met with an equal resistance by debtors, for sure, and maybe even courts and trustees. However, creditors do have a convincing argument that after Espinosa, the Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden on creditors to review all chapter 13 plan provisions to protect their respective interests. This is an ideal time for creditors to come together and begin a movement towards establishing fixed fees for costs incurred by creditors for plan reviews.

CONCLUSION Though considered to be a landmark victory for debtors and their counsel, Espinosa offers the possibility of many benefits to creditors. First and foremost, the decision accentuates a bankruptcy court’s duty to confirm chapter 13 plans only if the court finds, inter alia, the plan complies with the applicable provisions of the Code. Next, the Court cautions debtors’ counsel to carefully consider both the substantive and procedural postures in which they present claims, defenses and other legal contentions, and reminds debtors’ counsel of bankruptcy court’s sanctioning power. Lastly, creditors may use the decision to advance ideas such as, a National Model Plan and fixed fees for plan review, which directly benefit creditors. Regardless of the underlying benefits the case stands to offer, the Court’s decision holds that creditors must be active participants in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, if a creditor is notified of a chapter 13 plan’s contents and fails to object to confirmation of the plan before the time for appeal expires, that creditor has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and the creditor’s failure to avail itself of that opportunity will not justify a court setting aside a previous judgment simply because it is or may have been erroneous.

WWW.NBSDEFAULTSERVICES.COM « JULY 2010

FOCUS DATA PAGE 23

the case allowed the debtor to discharge his student loan interest without following the proper procedure, the Court cautioned debtors and courts to be mindful of their actions in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, creditors can rest assure that bankruptcy courts across the nation will be scrutinizing debtors’ chapter 13 plans and instructing chapter 13 trustees to do the same. Another benefit to creditors is that the Supreme Court has instructed bankruptcy courts to use the sanctioning power of Rule 9011 to police debtors who try to circumvent the Code and Rules in the hopes that they will not get caught. Espinosa, 2010 WL 1027825 at 17 (2010). These two underpinnings of the case can be regarded as shift in the current bankruptcy process, which will likely benefit creditors in the long run. This decision will likely spark a sense of urgency in the National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) to adopt a National Model Plan, which has been in the works since 2003. Currently, less than fifty percent of the jurisdictions have a mandatory Model Plan that debtors are required to use without substantial deviation. The other jurisdictions either do not have a Model Plan or its use is not mandatory. Thus, in these jurisdictions debtors may use chapter 13 plans that adversely affect a creditor’s rights, for example including a “discharge by declaration” provision, and failure to timely raise an objection binds the creditor to the terms of the plan, as in Espinosa. The movement toward a National Model Plan will likely be spearheaded by the NACTT’s subcommittee on Model Plans. It is also likely that courts will be on board with this as well because of the Supreme Court’s emphasis that bankruptcy courts have an obligation to perform its own independent review to determine that only proper orders are entered. In addition to trustees and courts, creditors should also get involved in pushing for a National Model Plan because it will ease the burdensome task of reviewing debtors’ chapter 13 plans.

SPEAK TIMELY OR FOREVER HOLD YOUR PEACE

» BY SAMMY HOODA

ISSUES

SAMMY HOODA is a Bankruptcy Associate at Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. In 2006 Sammy received a Bachelor of Science in Economics from University of North Texas. He went on to graduate as Valedictorian from the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University, where he also served as the Editorin-Chief of the Thurgood Marshall Law Review. During his last semester in law school Sammy served as a Judicial Intern for The Honorable Jeff Bohm, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of Texas. Sammy was admitted to practice law in the State of Texas in November 2009.


FOCUS

Up Close with Brad Cloud BY JOE M. LOZANO CLOUD

DATA ISSUES UP CLOSE WITH BRAD CLOUD » BY JOE M. LOZANO PAGE 24

HOT SEAT

THE LEDGER: What companies did you work with prior to joining NBS and in what capacities?

ing goals with vendor productivity, getting the real return on your spend. A challenge I strongly believe we have now solved.

BRAD CLOUD: CitiFinancial — Director of Loss Recovery; California Federal Bank (Auto One) — Senior Vice President of Servicing; WFS Financial — Vice President of Regional Business Center; Hibernia Bank — Vice President of Consumer Credit.

L: What brought you to NBS and what positions have you held at NBS?

L: How did you hear about NBS?

If two words were to be used to describe Brad Cloud, they would be “natural leader.” After five years of working with Brad, first as a Senior Vice President and eventually as NBS’ Chief Operating Officer, he has been successful in his approaches with staff, clients and colleagues. His demeanor is relaxed, which I attribute to his Louisiana upbringing, while his analyses are impressive and astute. With a laugh akin to Roscoe P. Coltrane from the Dukes of Hazard, Brad is a “good ol’ boy” who’s easy to work with and even easier to follow. As the Chief Operating Officer at NBS and a former client, it was interesting to gain Brad’s perspective on managing a bankruptcy a portfolio then and now. To that end, he offered the following thoughts and experiences.

BC: My first management job in 1992 included handling bankruptcy cases. I had no idea what to do. I met Lance Vander Linden and began the outsourcing experience, learning a lot a long the way. L: As a previous client of NBS, what were your expectations of a national vendor that handled bankruptcy cases? BC: Foremost are compliance and consistency in bankruptcy. Also, it would be critical to have the ability to forecast losses, expenses, recovery, and liquidity on a part of the servicing portfolio that is mostly overlooked. L: What was a common issue that you had managing bankruptcy cases in-house? BC: Numerous issues always existed — consistent performance, expense management, and overall compliance. The answers always seemed to become more expensive in hourly billing. L: How many employees did you have before and after retaining NBS as your national bankruptcy company? BC: Different scenarios based on volume — the average would be roughly twenty FTE in a bankruptcy unit. After outsourcing, I usually had two to four. L: What was your biggest concern in outsourcing your bankruptcy work? BC: The data / document exchange was always the first impediment. Also, aligning our servic-

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BC: As a client since 1992, I took part in many discussions over the years for improving process from the loan servicing perspective with NBS / BVW. When approached by Lance Vander Linden (president of Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C.) with the opportunity to improve NBS’ operational effectives, I thought it would be a great fit. My roll has been consistent with daily operational management and sales. L: What have you learned as the COO of NBS in processing a bankruptcy portfolio that you were unaware of as a client? BC: Complexity of Bankruptcy. As a client you understand bankruptcy to be a federal law — the same everywhere. Now as you get into bankruptcy this deep, every Judge, district, jurisdiction and trustee has different interpretations, agendas, and views. I have learned and am still learning the need to be very reactive in the world of bankruptcy servicing. L: Do you have any insight as to the next biggest issue(s) car and mortgage servicers should watch for? BC: I continue to read and watch the loan modification / loss mitigation progress or lack there of very closely. HAMP and other creditor programs have been mostly unsuccessful to this point, along with many borrowers still with negative equity and delinquencies rising. I would look for increased bankruptcies and bankruptcy judges having the ability to modify loans. L: What interesting personal fact do most clients not know about you? BC: Most of the clients know me pretty well. In this industry the one fact everyone is most surprised to find out is that I do not play golf. I get many opportunities but have never played.


LATEST NEWS NBS APPOINTS DANIEL D. GRAY AS GENERAL COUNSEL

GRAY

National Bankruptcy Services’ President and Chief Executive Officer, Paul Bourke, announced today that DANIEL D. GRAY has been appointed Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary for NBS. Mr. Gray brings over 20 years of legal experience and 24 years of experience in the housing and mortgage finance industries. Gray comes to NBS from Fannie Mae where he served as Associate General Counsel in Fannie Mae’s Legal Department. During his twelve year tenure at Fannie Mae, Gray managed a team of attorneys providing support for Fannie Mae’s Credit Loss Management Division. Gray also provided support for Fannie Mae’s National Servicing Organization, eBusiness and Southwestern Housing and Community Development Divisions. Gray received special recognition from Fannie Mae for his contribution to the company’s Hurricane Relief Effort.

ABOUT NBS OUR MISSION IS SIMPLE. We strive to improve the bottom line performance of our clients’ bankruptcy portfolios through careful, efficient and client-specific management of each individual case. NBS provides nationwide bankruptcy management services to the following types of organizations: * Residential Mortgage Lenders * Automobile Finance Companies * Banks and Financial Institutions * Consumer Lending Organizations * Portfolio Servicers, Owners and Investors Learn more about how our services, our technology and our people can help your organization today. Contact us and let us have the opportunity to discuss how we can work together. NBS is a leader in bankruptcy servicing for the consumer finance industry. NBS is a subsidiary of Advent International.

Most recently, Gray played a key role in the development of Fannie Mae’s REO Rental Policy. Gray’s prior experience in bankruptcy includes serving as Fannie Mae’s Consumer Bankruptcy Lead. In this capacity, Gray managed consumer bankruptcy issues for Fannie Mae nationally. Gray received a Juris Doctor degree from Suffolk University Law School and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and Economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Gray is licensed to practice law in Texas, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SERVICES COMPANY NEWS

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Headshots of Cloud and Gray courtesy of Nathan Whitney Photography.


JULY 2010

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Timing is Money: HAMP & Bankruptcy

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