Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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The Defense member of the NSC Planning Board indicates the options available to the U.S. with regard to the Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the increased ris:~s associated with pressuring France to continue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the communist advanc~ can "more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at Geneva "rould lead to communist subversion at a late date and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an increased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be lost." General Bonesteel Memoranduin for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1954..........................................
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The draft instructions for the Geneva Delegation, which have be en approved by the President are sent to the Defense Department for' comment. According to the instructions , the U.S. is "an interested nation ,,,hich, however , is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." State Depa rtment Le tter to R. B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 May 1954...........
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France is convinced it is facing CommUJ.'1.ist China at Dien Bien Phu not Vi et Minh rebels. The Frenc h request the aid of competent U.S. military ad'v-ice , i.e., a U.S. General to confer "ri th General Ely on r egroup ing forces in Indochina. Pari s 4287 to Dulles, 10 May 1954 ........
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The United St a.tes " p o sture ': a.t Geneva is inte rpr eted as I1to cheer the players ll rather than "to pitch." 'rhe draft instruct ions to the Geneva delegation imply a "prof ound poin t" -- ,,,ill the U. S. admit diplomat ic defeat and c ease to use th e confer'ence to'\<rard its ends if the conference appears to go against the U.S.? Genera l Bone stee l MeNorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense , 10 May 195):,........................................ .
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The Presiclent approves i nformi ng the French of his conditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina . Even though premature, the dec i sion to inte rn a t ionali ze the must b e made . Pr es i dent Ei Senh01{er ,vould ask C ongr~ss ional author ity to commi t U. S . forces provided : (1) t here was a French r equest , ( 2) that other nations vi01.11d be r e quested ana. viOuld accept, (3) that the ur "iOuld be not ified, (4) tha t France guarantees independence in the Fr ench Union to the Associated States, including the option t o withdral{ at a:o.1Y t ime, (5) that France would not vri thdra\'l its forc es after the i ntervent i on , and (6) that an asreed on structure for united action is r eached. Dulles 4023 to Paris, 11 Hay 1954 ... ........ . ..... .
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