HASC Pentagon Papers Part VI B

Page 1

Part VI-B.




VI. B.

. ...





1963: .. ,1965 .. 1966.


", '



3 30 35

1967. 2.


STA'l'E!·i:~f.rS ••

Extra.cts fro~:l INU StateIllim"cS 1962-1965.-. April-October 1965.


133 1:77

1967 .......... . l'!FLSV P.0SI'.?IOl'I


Sl'.~T~!·r<:r1TS •••


188 189

1901. .. J ,9 0). ·r~­



1966. 196"( . ADDFJ-IJ)A •



..... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. ... .. ..


Hanoi Attitude on Bo:mbing 10 Septc!riber 196'7 ..••..•.. Chronology of Viet Peace Efforts Dec 1966-Feb 1967 ... T!~e ASn;;!0!'C l~ttcr to Ho Chi H1n1.1

5 ]\=,b 1967 ........ .

Tllblicaticn of F.sh::lore Peace Feeler AtteIilptS: ~,r,,, ..;:'n'; _ _ l'.. '-':'0'" l~c.

CC1!lpaI"isCll of




1'03+ _ .. v ...

f:L~1br~';crc- IJ3J



. ..•.




INDEX_ ----Pa:o'~.

Subject Stat~nent by McGeorge BUl~dy> Septe~ber T,n'~ t'.!l~!,.oe

HOll.se P·0,l'~cy

~L' •. J.;>\.<',;c·~D.(;n1:;·.)



25, 1965,. ~ ........ '.' ... ! .•.••, • ~ ••••• '.


. . '





Speech, "Day for Interllai,:ional Aid, II June 22,

. ,

7, 1965.......

Pattern for Peace Address .by President Joh..l'lson, April


Letter frol1 Amba.sst'.dor "Golc1bei:'g to Security Council, f


Correspolldcnce vJith Foreign Minister


1965.................. 16'

t-f.£1i te House Press Confel'er!Ce .......... "....•.•. , ................... "............. . , Let tel' from r'residcnt . Johnson. to U T1;~mt, July 28, '1965 •••••• ~" •.• ~ • •

Julr 30, 1965- ........


'lC~3 )0 ••••• ": ••••••••••••••••

0 c!,.ooocr ~. 2,

Rusk I s' l:~e'\;,s Conference.) Febl'tl&ry •





17 20


1965.......... 22

F~mfe,ni, l~ov-Dcc

Peace Overtures ••••••••• ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


SeC1:etary Rusk I s 1:o-:.:s Confel'cuce', Ho"vembel~ 26" 1965..................


statcm.ent Concerning


Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to U Thant, January

state Dep~·trr~nt p~c~s Release .',

fro1:1 State

of Union

5, 1966 ••.•••••• 30

(14 POints), J~1uary 7, 1966 ... ; •.••• 31


Janu:::.l'Y 12,

1966 .............. . 32

'Address by AT.lbs.sse.dor Goldberg to Ul1J.tE;d N?tiollS> F~br\t~.l"'Y 10, 1967.·.'.· .... - ......... ~ .. ~

# •• ••••••••

P.re-sident ;J chnscn.' s Lettcr to Ho Chi 1.~inh, Fcbrt~~..ry




•••••• ;

8, 1997......... ..

Ho Chi 1<1inh f s Reply to Johnson I s Letter, Febl'\u;.ry 10,

35 115

1967.......... 47'

.-Secl"ett#l'J' . '.

UThc Pe.th 1;0 Vi €tr:ezl , 'I Au~ust 15~ 196?~ ... i. •

• •• •• •• • • •• •••• •.•• •• •• •


Ar:,basCf"cto;'" Gcl(\be:q~ I s Sp~t;ch to the UnitGd H!3. J.;ions,

SeptembCl' 21, .


1967 ......................... ~ ..... ".... ".. ; . ". . . . . . . 14


St>.n Antonio }'ormula) Sel)tembcl" 29) 1967 ..• ·•..••.. ~ ~ ••... : • . • • . • • . • •

Goldberg at:Ser~te-Fore~bn Relcticns COl~nittee) l,!ovemb e~__~,~ .:.:.!967 .•. ~.•.••..• ~ .•.• ~ ~~: ..•• •....~ •. .... .. ... - . . ,........ . ...



II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-




eo • •


THE NEXT STEPS TOWATtD PEAC1~: St~tcraent by ~!c· George Bundy, Special Assistant to th~ President, S:::l>tcmb~:r ·80, 1903 (Exccrpfs)l







Thl: difficult sih!2tion in th~ troubled country of South Yict-X:u'!l is one which I h:wc even le35 d~sirc to d!scu~s, in substanth'e terms) than the otllf.!r qUEstions I kwe t~lke!l as CX'li~lple3. Th~ important mission of Secret.lrv [of D;fen::c HOUCi:t S.] ~!cXama!·.l and Gi.'lleral [M.txwell D.] Taylor is only just ending, und it woyhl L;:: .wholly innppropri:1tc for me. to comment on the course of ~ctlOn wluch nll1Y b$ cI105C~1 in the light of this mi::~ioll und of the continlling cO!!3idemtion . Wllich is goin~ fon-,urd in Saigon undN' the kulcrship o£ :.:\. rlll;ass~ldor [Henry CabotJ Lodge, and also in ·Washington.· . Yct it is not \\TOng) I think, to Si.l:r!!est that in this C<1SC !'tgil.ln theI'"'}



are two propositions, both them ~nd two kinds of 1:11'01' \,hich can result from an u!l\yilliilgness to accept them Loth. And n;.lin Lo~h propositions hU\'e been stated clearly by the Presid.:r:t. The iirst is that the object of American policy in this p~1rt of the world is to ass~st • a most d'lillCU c:~ 1t ana.' Important . ~ \ ng;llnst • CommU!llst • SUu'.-cr1. In s,ruggle sion-military, p:t.r~tmmt:t;y, and political. The, commitment of the United States to the independence of South Yiet-Xam goes b:,ck ll1!tny years. This commitment. \\';15 intensif:t!t1 and reinforced 2 ye~lI'"~ ago,

ul!d ~ince U:en a major coopcmth'e efi'?l"L h:1:: b;;cI! c~.rried ~onn1rd wltlllncr~a5mgcnel'f;7-alld ~t l~.lSt until rec~ntly WIth mcr':~lS1n(!' sueC€ss-by Americans .\yorking c1o~dy \';ith the Pi!Op!~ a~d Go ...e"l~nen!; of South Viet-~:lm. It is the polic\' or the linited States to sustain . that eITort. Yet it would be fol1y for the I"nited States to neglect, or to regard "r; 1" l'aCVe.Op:nents 1 . 1 m:E,} • W1'l]1.HlUl.£i!rcnce, po.lt!ca or• recent mont115 w1.te.l qucs!ion3 about the uLility of the Go. . crnmer.t. and people oi S.Juth Vict·Nam to suppci'"l each oth~r e~ecti\"e1'y in their contest \':ith com· lTlunisrn. The President hns illnde it denr· that the United States is not indi!Terent to these e,cnts :'!nd ref;arc!s them with g!"e;'lt concern. It is und mu:;t be the ~olicy of the 'Cnited States Go,ernmenc to ma!~G clear its interest in t';n:~te\'er impronments it judges to be neccs::;;lry, ~l"'lYS of c?tIrse \\'ith :l proper regard .for r\',~po_~:;ihilides wh:ch res~ In the first Instunce .upon the p~o!)la or SOllin \. !et-~ nm . .It is no secret th:tt obscr .. ers the s~e:1e in South Viet-X:t!':l bave often di ffered sharply in their il:terpr~tation of eyents.. From thcE9 " ~" t· •• I lerences tilere Il:'lxe come Gl.erg~nt recommenaatlOns r')r POllCY. d''lT 1 • , . l' ,., 1 • l ' .... '1 lere 15 notnmg (15Crewtr,o.£, In tile e::;::!:;te:lCi! or s!.lcn Gl"ere!lCM. In a. situ~,tion in ..,·hich C~15V solutio7!s ell) not exi::t and in wh!ch co:uW



• I" '" I 1 • DlltmeBts o.t purnoJs~ ane.~ ,. Jlope :1r'~ l!!,;!l. It IS O~I\" n::"t!.lra t.lat taera 1 t ~ i." ~,.' ., 1 o· ::.C>.,.~; t' ,,. ~ .~.::.; t ,,,, ""11" " SIlOll td h a e •. G•. i1..... In C.. C.l 'L_ •• ~r 0 1; • .lD.l ... _.ze •. _ .J .... ~ 0...:: tt, ..a ' ., 1v; IS ." ne:!.f.;st. . I-! n. 'Oil~·tlCU!:U· .-," nntlstl;:)\-e!"s:,e . e , · . i':itor& -. trut h to wmen •IS gomg • \,;e,'}' ., " • .. O!l t"11:lt erro.t .~ . , tr~~ rnnn ";';no 15.";','or!,:Il~ 13,OOtlfla, tl') 3ea ",," ~ ~1. t :..~ 1; __ . . "'... ~..,~ 1." ~ I~-l·"" ;tl -' th"'r" .,.~,.. ,..- .. _o r.:;e. ~ .. ~fleC. _.. ::' • _ .. 1.. _.,: LC;.J.";.:"l.on tl 1~"p,l .. l,.O ... r~ . . !.,) -",,.,,. ,: ~ ~u,. ,; .......'1·~' . J.- ""r'~r. 1· .!"".-. tl"''''~!). :f".~'" ._-., } an d n L •..h,O.L o. p .. o..... "-l,.JV.! ••.. \... 1\ I •• ...; In .v_\. C.. k:::.... lta v


't:. , ...



''':1"1\",,,'' '1; ... ",_", :'1~"·1 -.-~,; . ,der."n" reSDO;)::, •. ,.l._:. mu...,.• .: C"l ~J ..... fil!.Loot.) \\LI ~ee n ==j:"_:...a. ~n U.·_~.•;:a . ";b:l;L;~-




U.S. POLICY O~ YIET-NA)!: WHITE HOUSE STA'fEJiENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963 1 Secretary [of Defcns~ Rob-!rt, S.] :\fcXr.mara and Gt':ltrnl Pf:lx\\cU D.] Tn\" lor reported to the Pr('~ident this morning ~nd to the Nanonal Securitv Council this nfte!"l1oon. Thdr ret')ot't inclu<led It number of classified findings :tnd rec,ommendattons W lich will La the subject of furt]H~r reyiew :md acr!oa. Their b!lslc pres-::n!:ttion was (':1uorsed by an members 01 the Security Council and the fo1I(lwing statement of United StfLtt'S policy ,,,15 approved by thl) Prc.;;ident on tho bnsis of recommend:1.tions r.:;ceh-cd from. them :>.nd from Ambas~:ldor [Henry C~bot]



1. The sccuritv of South Yict-Xnm is a major interest. of Ole United Stc.tt's as other free'nations. \';0 will adhere to our policy of working with the p~ople. ::.nd Go\'t'.rnmcnt 0: South Viet·X~~ to dellS this country to commtUllSl11 and tJ) supp,r('ss the externally stmmhlted and supported insurgency ot the Viet (eng as promptly ns possible. Eilcctiyc perferm~l!1('e in this Imdertnking is the central ooj(;Cti\'8 of our ~ ,,~. ~ pOltey III ""OUL 1 ,'101.-...' a m . ' , 2. The mUit:>.r..- progmm in South Viet-N~m hes made progre...'S und is SOll.'ld in priIlciplc} though irupro.ements ~re bClllg ene.rgetieilly sought. : 3. lfajor U,S. nssistrrnce in snpnort or this milita1'"t" effort is needed only until the insurg;;ncy 1m3 be~n stlppre.s~~d or until tlle national security forc~.s of the GO\'ernmellt of South Yiet-Nr.rn are c~pabla of suppres~ing' it.. Secretary )[cX!l.mar.\ and Gene.r!Ll TnyJor reported their judgment thnt. the major part of the U.S. mi1il:1ry tr..s]~ cap be cOD:pieted by the end of HW5, nlthol!;;h tIlere mn:v be n. eont!Dumg reqU!rement for a. limited number of D.S. tr:.ining personnel. 'They reported that by the end of this ve:.r. the U.S. nro.zr3.m for tr~ining Victname.:?3 shouIa huy\: progre55,::d to'the poin(,..here 1,000 U.S. mIlitary personnel assigned to South Viet·X:un can be withdr~nm. . 4. The politicd situ~tion in Sonth Yiet-5am remniii.5 d('<)i?ly serious. The United States has made dear its coatinuing oppo5itlOrt to nny repre~sive actlo~ls in South Viet-Xnm. 1Yhile such actions h:l.\'e not yet significantly aiIcctt:d the military effort, they could do so in the future. . '5. It rem:l.ins t11e policy of the t"nited. Stat(:s, in South Yiet-N'nm ns in other parts of th~ world l to support tl1e dlorts or the people of that country to defc:lt, aggn:2~ion and to build 3. peaceful :mu frea "


'I. D~put!:le!lt




' .

o! Stt.te x::n:!i:l, Oct. 21. 19&3. p. 623. '



SITUATION IN SOU'l'ln~AStl' ASIA: Secrc{~ry Rusk's News . Conference of February 257 19G53 4

Good :tftC111001\ kclie~ancl g~nt1(>men. r shoulcllikc to bke a. few moments of Jonr mnc t?!ry to dr~\.\:> to~c:tller in the simpIC'st.and most '. fundamental w~y our amt\ld~ to\,'ard the situafion in SOUt1lc..1St. Asia.. . Some of the thbl':'s \\"llich I s11ull say will rCp~ilt , ..ll:lt hn3 heen said before, but memories here and abro;d seem to be somet.imes Sh~lt~ .And it. is important repeat. und clnl.w togeth~r tho~c matt.:;I'3 wInch are nt the center of tho problem, bcc~u:~· th~re ~5 u grea.t deal else Wllich is periJ.>h::r:'1.1 and tr:'llisitory: • .,. . 1. The nnt.Ions of Sout.heast .ASia. 11:lXc ft rlg11t to Jr\"e In pence, free from aggrc~5!On directed ngttiust them from outside thelr borders. Now, this is not an empty theory; it is ~ point of \"it~ll import:mce to the Sftfcty .find, imla<!d" the \'ery e:dstence of more t11rt11. a h~mdred smaller natIons all on-r tne world. 2. North Viet.-Xmn,·in c.allou5 disre;:;arcl 01 the !1gre~ments of 195-1 . and 1962, and of intl'rnatiorml law, 113.5 dil'~ctc(l and supplied t.he es.scnthll militarY personne1 and arm3 for a syste.mntic c:-.amp~lign of terror nnd guen~!1n. action !limed at the o.ertllroT> of the Goyernment of South ~tict-Xmn a.nd n.t the in1Dosition by force of 3. Communist te~ili1e. The evidence of ~ort.h Ylct-Xum's direct res)onsibility for thls n~gri:SSiOll hrts been repeatedlY pre~ntcd b\- the Lio·rcrnment. of Yict-);am, tllE~ Unite;:l Shlte3 -crnment, arid the International Control Com~li5sion. A fuU amI up· to-date 5~anm:U'y of the e\-idence establishing tHs respor:sibility will b~ avaihi.?!e .to y<}l.1 ..ithin a \"ery few clays. It is now lxnng processed for publIcatIon. . 3. The attitude of the United Stat;;5 tow'urd thrc.l.ts to the pc::tce in South~~lst.:\.S!a. has. beenma~le clc::tl" mnny times und in the most ~edous and f011nnl ways:. ..(a) by tha mtific;1.tioll of the :Jfani1a Pilct in Febnwrr 1955, 'which includes Sout~ Yiet-Xam as n pr(/to-::ol state; (This b~t\ty was approrecl by the ~en;lte by a vote of 82 to 1.) . (h) by u uecision of Pr.:~ident. Eis.:nnowcr in 1954 to extend aid to South Yietnam, who s~id in :!.-letter to the President of South Viet-





The implications of the




ha.e caused


concern r~g(l.t:dil:;; the future of a country t<::nporJ.rily dr.-ide;! b,r an artific!!ll military grul!plug, v;eake!lcd by So loz:g :!u1 el:h:!Usting WAr :!nd fac~ witb eIlt':nIc'S without and h:; the;ir sub,ersi.e co!l!lboroltor,s within. .

and h~ "Went on to SlY that The purposi! of this offer is to assist the GI).-erllme~t of Yiet,X!lm in de.eloping and ruaL'ltaiuing a strong, -n3ble state, c:lp:l.bla of resisting' atteIl1pted sub.ersloD or agg'rl?sstvn through military tlli!!tllS.

and tllen again (c) by the joint resolution of th~ Congress of t11.e United States, p!";sscd ill J.U~U5t 19Q± by 3. combined Yot~ of 50~ to 2, which st:1ted, among other tllings: Thnt the CO!!;r~5S appro.-es :md S'lN'lOrts the det.:-rminl!ti'}:l of the Prt'Si~leIlt, as CO!llmanae. i!l Coier, to take·alI ne.:..>ss3.:Y me:.sures to rep.?! an; :lrm~ attack against the for.::e;; of th~ Vnited States ~nd to pre'e!lt further ag~:ession.

and tllat 'J:he United Stat':?s reg:!.rds as .. Hal to its Dntio:lall!:1teI"€'S~ llnd to world peace the maintenance of intern:ltional p~:lce and sacurity in southe~t Asia.

and'tha.t • • • L'le tinited Stat~s is, therefore, p:-EI>~rcd, as the Prt:'Si:dent detc:o!nes,. to take aU n"':~c;S(U7 S!;~5. iuc1udin; th~ u.;c 0: ~r.!lcd to::,~, to as.s:st any member or p:otc...:'ol st.!t~ ot the S·n:,c·;;lSt" Asia C"Uecti.e D~f~~ Tr~~ty requesting aSii;;t~nce i:l de-fens; of Us fr~do~

. 3 I(

Cd) and then \"011 sliould remind YOllr~~In~5 of the statement mllde by Pre5idcnt JolinsOll 011 the oc.c'1SiOll of signing th~t joint l'e,solution:


. To all~ armed attack ur"m \):lr r')rCi's, Wt' shall Ti'l)l~. , Toa.ny in Soutl!('3St •.\£::1. who :!';:k our llE~lli in d':!elidin:; their frC'Cdo!U. n'c shall

gh'e it. , ." . In tll3t l('gion, tll«rc is not1!in~ we c"n·~. n(l~hhl: we ~c-:-l;-no territors. no military r.o~ition. no I!c·litj~a.l ambition. Ot:r Olle <1t:$lr~~r one d(:(l'rluill:ttionis that tb~ pcop!e o! South"ast Asia Lc Ji:!t i!lIK:l.CC to work out their t)wll.destinies in their own n'ay.


4. N"ow, it ]l:lS been stated o\'er ~nd o,'er ug;\:n that the key [0 pence in Sonthrost .A5in. is' the re'-ldincss of all tho::c 1n tll.lt arc:1. to li\'c at pen.ce and to lenye thi:ir lH:jc:hbor3 nlcne. Xo\\", tllel:e is no mystery about tllat fOl'lllUlation; those WllO are )lot leadllg their neighbors alone know exactly wllat it, ll1~ans. It is an obligatioll Wldt'l' th~ 1954: agreements: under the 1£'62 ;lccorc1s on J..:10S, and under genemlmternatlOn.li , law. The illC'!!;'tl infiltration or milittH"\: llersollllel and arms can1lot be described as "r(l(lYing your l1c~ghbor aloile.:t 5. There llfiYC be:ea negotiated settlements in Soutllcast Asia, the most r'ecent one as late ns 1962. Those scycral agret'mellts were intended to estahlis}l pcr:ce ill that are,l; compliance "'ith them by all concerned can nc!ncye that result, 6, Xo,,", since the Gmeta conference of 1962~ the t:nited Sf.ltes hfts be.en in ncti\"(~ and continuous cOllSultatiQll with other gm'erllments about tIle danger created by :u:grt'ssioll in Southeast Asia, It, hr.:3 been discussed in the t'nited X:nionE, ill t1le SEATO and XATO Councils, and on inl1umemble oec;1s1ons directh' ',ith other goycmmcllt~ thtou!!h . diplomatic channels. We han h<1<l direct diEcllssions with almost l 8'\'ery signatory of t!le :l.2:reemc:nts or 105-1 and 1962, 'Vhat is still . \ missing lS am:illdication....that Hanoi is prepared to 5top doing ""]lat ! it is doing a.rid what it knows it is doing aC:01inst its lle1f;hbors. The : absenco of this crucial element afl'ects the clu"!'ent discuSSlOll of "ncgo:tiatioll." Political cH:mnds ha.\"~ been and r.re open: :lild ft considerable i"numher of ZO\'cl11ments are actin:1\" intere5t~d )n keeping them 0Een to exp10re tlle possibilities of a. peaceful solution. 'But a· negot.iatlon aimed at the acceptancl1 or the confirmat.ion of aggression is not P'QSsible. .-\.nd a negotiation which simply cnds jn bitterness and hostIlity . merely adds to the danger. . ...........,7. Let me r~mLTJ.d you that on February 17 tlle President said, and' I inn quoting: ' . . _.\5 I h:J.'I"~ S!l.id so mtlnY. many times, and otb~r Presidents ahead (It me hat'c said. out: putJ..'C·se. our ob~ecti'l"~ there is ck!U'. 1"D:J.t purpose and tlmt objeeU.e is to join in the de!en~e a~d I.rotl:-ction of .fr~oIll of a [.raye pc.-QIIle who arc under , attack that is CO:ltl'olled !tIld that is dirt-cted fro:11 outside their country. We ha,e no ambition there for ourseln·s. We sce~ no dominion. We seek no COl~qU~St. W'e seck DO wider W3r, But n'e must rtll undersrar:d that we will persist in the def(:n~e of frc~dom 3.ll,.d our cO:ltinu!!lS" actions ...ill be those which ar~ ju::tified and those that -are made !l~es.~rr by tbe cl>lltinuing aggression of others, . These actions [he aaoed] will'be measured and fitting and adequate, Our StamiU3. :t.Dd the stamina of the Americ:m p-.."<I.,le is equal to the task.

. Let me conclude by re~1ffinning, still onc.e more, that the ce."'lt.ral object of .American policy and nction in peace jll Southeast Asia a~d the saiety of the inde.pendent st.ltes in that l'egion. Many of the peoples of that area Jun'e b~~n subjecte.d to 25 years of turmoil and ,'iolence'; they nre entitled to peace. T\l"e ourselycs much prefer to use our resources as a part of an international effort to assist the cc(.nolnic ahd soci~I de\'elopment oi tho peoples of tllat- area than to llaye them diverted into the hrt.l'5h necessities of resistinO' 3.!;O'resslon. , I am re{ldy for your q,ue.stions, gentleme.n. ~Q Q

..Q. -Jtr. $ecretir.r~ 1cnati.s tlLe a.s.soclatlon oj tlte lhz.ited Stafe.s (;01;-


ernm.ent v:ith the acf:il.'ities 0/ tltese n(ltion.~ you referred to whiclt. are . trving to keep open the channels of dipl.oIn(:cy? .'. . , .. •4... Well, ',0 are o1.il"5eh·cs in reguiar contact. with many gO\'etn. ments in aU parts of tile \';'orld, through diplom:ttic means. W·e hn\'e. ·not seen any b~si5 on wllich we can a~k anyone ~lse to speak for us, and we do not know of am.·one else wlto IS purportln~ to spenk for us.. But let rne COnll) ba.ck ngttin :with gte.tt emI,?Ittl.Sls--because I do think tlmt it is centr.:tl to this question ofnegotiiltlon. _-\nd that. is th,'ll. the missing piece-the miS3ing·piece is a.uy.indication that Hanoi is pre- . .pa.red to stop doinp: wlmt it is doing ag,\inst its neighbors. . So~', in many of fhe::;e postwa.r negotiations in the last 20 years, as you know, the nl'gotIl.ltions ha\-e l?-e~ frequently ana most often preceded by some imlication tllat tI10SC negotiations might have some cl~an.ce of. success. . Xow, that is the mi...~ing piece here-that is the mlssmg pIece. . . . ThE) object is tIle safety and security of tllese sm..."ller countries of - 'Southeast Asia. III that issue all of the smaller countries of the world ru",-e a ,-ital stake, It is at the heart of the nry structure of inter· national life, of t11e international stute S\Stem. .;\nd it is the missing element, tho l.tnre..'tdiness of Hanoi to stop' doing what it is c1oing~ that is tll& prcblenl in this thing caned negotiation. . :. Q. Jh'. Secretary, dla. y()~' gh-e that '1ne~·sage to Hanoi 'by way of the Chine-~e Com1lZunlst-~ ill, t1le WmoSaw meeting the other day'! A. We had a. talk-=-I think it \\'3.S Testeroay. That talk re\-ea.led nothing new in the bo\m positions ot the two sicles. That talk <lid not supplv the missing piece that I am tal~ihg about. There was no indication in that talk that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what tl1ey .are doing. . .. _ . Q. lYell, dit{ you u.se that clwn1l.el to get this 1eorl directly to them·P . .'\.. Our pt!lic"\", along the lin~ that I ha\'e 5umm~rized here, was . made clear there; it is made clea.r repeHth-ely with go\'ernments all· o\"er tho world, time and time again, and this was done yesterday. . Q. ~lfr. Secreta7'Y, there i.s speculation. kue that the If'nitea State.s it 'nOU] in. th.e proce:Js of e:cpanaing its 1'I7.ilitary Tole in. Viet-Na1l/, in -kopes tha.t this 'might convince the HanD;' g01:e1'1I.ment to provide tMs . mz.ssing link. . .~. I wouIdn!t speculate on that from that point of view. I 'Would urge j-ou to look at what I have 5.'\.id in my opening- statement. Look at all of it-look at all of it taken. together. That1s the policy-that is the policy. HOl! you feel you must act at a..particul:l~. ti:lle and under particular clrcumstanc6 under that pohey and wlthm that· policy-for e~ample, within the joint resolution of the C-ongress:"'" depends upon circun15t:mces from time to time, Bue the policy is to act to s~pport th~ indepen~ence and sa.fety of these countries of Southeast AS1:'_ Th'lt 15 the pohey. . .. And I 1rould urg~ .?u to gi"'e serio~ consideration to all of tIle . elements that Thn.e mdicated m my openlI).~ statement_ . ' . Q. M-r. Secretaru. S~cret(J:r!l·Ger..eral U Tkant; in.I.Yelf) Yor].; yesterday, in ·urging theVbeginning oj some kind of injoNP..al discus,sion·i to restore peace in Viet.1\·cm, said, "1 am. su:re tha.t th~ great American.·people, they only I':MIC the true jacts ana, the background to the de1lelOpmen.ts in South Viet-~Ya.m, 'U:ill a~l'ee with me t]...at iu.rtJ..e1' blood. B'hed. 'fr 'Unne~e$8a11l." Sow, are you, hidin.g an1l true 1acta from the


Amencan peopJef

• .


A. Well, I don't want to· comment on that particular statement in any personal sense. I believe that there h!ls been so~e clarification of thittstatemene since then. But, as I ha'\e said to ,ou ge4ltlemen before, I don~t know of any situation. anywl1e:e in the r.orld on wIUch the .Americnn people ll:l.e been better informed, in more debil, on a current ba.sis, Doth bv ufficials and b"\" the intensi'\e effort of So \"-j<Torous and free.pr.~ss, that Is th~ ca~e ~tb "~.espect to SO}lth.viet-Nam~ -



-4. .

Q. It/'I'. Scerctal'Y, Pf;l~a.ps, sir, !h!n !lOU· ~<?tll<l eea.rify tlti.s p~il~t. Tkert1 n.as been a notl.cC(;f.,?~. c(m.~idera(,le d1J1Cl'e7ICC OJ cmpho$18 ~n tlle statem.ents o/-tl,c gCiic1',ll objectives oj Unitc(l State.s policy in these terms. There 7t111.'( o!en. tim..:s 'lcl,cn the United Stat.es .policy lw$ been sa.ia. to be to defend the freedom. oj ate pcopl.c of VictNan~. There h-l.ve oeen o~her tim!s 1chen tli;Cpo!icy oj the Ullited. States ha.s been. said to be· to 'I'esi.st the. expan$i~jJ, oj Oidnesc Oommu1list agg1'cs.>i;;-1!-. Oould ;;ouclarijy tll/),t? :. A. I think those. two mean eX!lctly the S!lme tlnng. The e~plmslon or Communist a!!srreS5ion iIl\'ol~es the attempt to take oyer South VietNam. I think tl~.'l.t. is looking at· tho s~m"lC ~oin from hoth its sides. Q. lifT. Secreta1'!!! th~ Secrdal~'I/-Gcneral Eaid. hp had m.ade a pro''Posol to the United States. The. lVldie Hfj!lsC saiil1lc suck proposal 'ka·s been presented to fhe President. Do YOII, kMW of any such pro· 'R0sal! . • ~ . .4... 1Yell, we 1l3.~-e taI~ed o\-er the past 2 years mformally and on ! a: number of occaSIons lnth the Se~rctary-Gt'ncr<11; who carrIes t'. ~ery 111Ca.\")' re,sponsibility. in 11i~ role at tllC United X[!tion~, as \\'ell.as wit.h · many goyernmcnts m YaflOUS' parts of the world. Now', durmg that 2-ycal" period, various st/!!ge.:;tions bye be~n discu$sed-sometimes by · 11S, sometimes by others..... But tIle proposa,]s th!'lt I 1..110\"- about thus far haY6 b~e!l procedural in nature. 'I'he mlssjng piece continues to be tho abs~lce or :my bdicatlon that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing wllat it is doing ailinst its neighbors. · Now, these. suggestions ·and prv::edural questions Il:tY6 been dis· cusse.d, mnny of £hcm publicl)-. This. question of c!l11ing a. conference,' under wllnt circumstnnce5--.;,th~e are procedural D1!l.tters. 'Yhat we ate interested in, what is needed to re.store IP-!l.ce to Southeast .Asia, is substance, content, an indication that peace is possible in terms. of the appetites and the n.tfitudcs of the other side. Q•.11h. Secrd(J:l'y~ '/..Could you eva,zuat,; the situa.tiqn, th.e politica.l situation i.n So-'I.lth Viet.iYa.1n, in, t'ivs ligli..t of the 'I'ecent cJ,.lJ.ngc? of gO'l:el'lI.mcnt a.na, 'I.l.'lLethcr or not you. feel that an. effective governm.ent is 1l(fUJ possibl~ the're, and is tlll.J.t one oj the mi$sing pieces? .A. 'YeU, W'e h!l.~c be.enyerv deepl.... concerned, as yoU know, for some time about the que~tion the €ssential unity -an<l so1ichrity of the GO\'ernment. in S:uQ'on. Coniu::ion on that mntter-or the ~bscnce of unity-ramifies !n \'ariety of directions and, of cour~e, l!lakcs it that much more dIfficult for them and for us to !let effectively to insure the indepelldcnc~ and the s:tfet:v of South Viet·Nam. ,t\nd undoubtedly disunity and confusion in :Saigon inci'e~ses the expeet.1.r



t!on of the 'othor sido that, if they .per~ist, they ha'\e a. chance ~f



, So we e.t.ta.cll the highest possible prioritv to unity nnd solida.rity 3mong tho.Sout.h Vietnt'..mc~e leaders and its GOTcrnment. I can E;XprC5-S my belief, as \'tell as my llope, that at least some of the5e problems of disunity h:1.Ye been resolved. • The recentso--C<l11cd coup th!\t llwolnd-,....hnt-.sOmcthinO'Uke three c;'lttalions again, similar to the one of last Sept~mbel') did n;t intedere

"ith the opern.tion of tha ch-i1inn gO'nrnment, or did not create a

5itu~tion of bloo"ished witllin the country.

Bu~ we ate. mo\~ng ;.ith hope llnd expedation ~nd in tIle closest ti"orkmg rebho!lshlP ,ath tlle present Go-.ermpent In that country, Q. J1h.SefJretary, '!lOUT statemcnt SC';Tns to 81JF,t'Iest that on'y Ha'noi's c9gression gh.:cs any ~od!l all~ rn.ajor danger toW u:n.at some have also · described a·~ th.; coinddc-nt en'£! U:a1' in South Viet-i'fam. Did youl meal; ~o s.ugf~~t) sfr, thap if yoo,.t ootci-n ~1;idence thqt HG..Tioi stops aoing ttha" 1t'l.3 aomg, the limted Statca aid ani/, a:m:;tance to the Sout/;, fictnamese Go~'ernm(:nt '/.Could. 110 lOl!7Cr 'be 'l/.ecessary to handle the local problem?


A. Well, let.'s· be a, llme c:U'~turatc;:U;' flilS \\-oid- ''iiicugcnou5' eli!:'- -nlrnt.n ~'hCN arc tJI05C who use tha.t term, particularly in the CpmnlUnis~ world, ~callsc th~ Xo1't11 YictllnmC5e are Vietnamese and· the South Vietnamese nrc Victnaml'~c and they would liko to han e\'eryon~ bt!licvc that Hint is ,;-hat is me.Lnt ~y letting th~ Yielnnmcs~ settl~ thell- own problems_ l,ut nn tltt:lck by North Vu~t-N'nDl on South · Vict-Nnm hy military personnel tmd arIns is aggression contrary to ·established agr~ements. '\rithout the control of these operations from the North, 1\-ithout the m:mpowcr, the trained manpower sent from the North into the,South, Without tho supply of anns and other .kev items of equipmc:nt. from Xorth to South,· the indigenous nspect this problem, the genuinely indi~enou3 aspect of this problem, ~ot1ld be quite a diiTen'nt D1!!.ttel'. It. was this e:!ternnl asp~ct of the·matter which explains tl1(~ pre~encc of the .;\.meric::.n militan' personnel in that area, the rapid incl'easo in Americ~m p~:rEonnel 1961. It was tile escahtion of thnt infiltration. So I think we neecl to separate \-ery carefully th~lt part which is local,. that p~rt Y,meh is erternftl.; and tllil external palt of it is the crucial aspect in terms of the pacifica.tion of the c?untry and in ·tel'ms of the establishment of peace in ·Southeast ,.:ism. . Q. You. '11I.C!!1I. tl!en, also, si1', the ·tcitlu!ralcal oj ~;uclt 1'IUL1!pou:er as 'j;~ay hare infiltmtecl as being part oj stoppi.ng, aoing-. A. Well, that. is Wh:lt. they arc doing; that is what they must stop.



Q. J.lfr. 8ccre.ta:ry, ao y(JU expect. 'lI!o·re acth'e and p~rhaps collective $I.[.pport lroll/, ·other parties than .:isians to the .4.merican. ,effort. in Sout!o Tliet-i....am, ana. could yo-u. describe whether thr:!I h.ave given. any forme? pledges? _ A. Well; v.c have been discussing with other zo\'erriments) as yon know, for some time now, increased assistance to South Yiet-};am, political, thr01,lgh perEonnel, economic, in other wa'·s. We ha.e been encounlged in some cases to see that that increased assistance is forthcoming. 'Ve kno'" that ther.) are other goYe:rnments that "re considering noiV whether they might not be able to do more tbn they _ha.e ~een doing, not jmt those in .Asia. We would welcome additional

suppoi,t, al1d v.-e think it is .cry importnnt, bOtll ns an cncourageinellt and prncticd support for South Yict-Xnm aud alEO as an indication to tlie. other side of the intern:ttional objection as to wbat tIle other side is t.n-illg do here. . Q. ilh~ Sen-etary: in, onla fo ilifci'pJ'ct your sfa.icmMf. eprrectly) could you tell 'Us 1.Chetliel' or -not 'you mean. to suggest tl/at it ?Could be a precoJiaitie,n. 0; any 1icgo:tation or cOlljCi'Cnee tlwt there mud be al~ adual. cC8sati(m 0; tlds licnctration: or mCly:ly an. indication of that.? . A_ Ko_ I think that it is well for us and for cyel'j"0ne to concentrate on tl1e meat of the matter. The meil.tof the m:Ltter is that Hanoi is sending the:;e. people :md these arms into 80uth Yict·Xam contrar:to eYelT a!:r~emcllt and contr:ny to international }:1\'. XO\\"", if that prohlcl)l is-gr~ ppled '\l~h: then we pm get lllto deta.ils. We can consider whether fhe meat lln"o}ns tdlttle salt :mcl pepper and a dash of garlic, but here is the m(?at of the matter, and 1. think ',e ought to keep our eyes on that. 'That is the central, an-important element in this sifuntion_ .. Q. Jlb-. Secreta.;:.;, 1.{~Jtat l:ilid of legal oasis did tIle [.-11it((1 States lw"(-c to oomb flu; tm'gets oj Xortlt. YictSam? . . A. Self-defense of South Yiet-Xmn and the commitments of tIle tillited States with respect to the security and tIle self-defense of South Yiet-!\am. Q. :lh. SecretaJ'Y, if 'Ice cou7d tum /I'om. TTiet-;Yam· Tn'lejly: I 'lcondel' ij ·tee could go to the JIiddle East. I 'I.condc?', si.i'~ 'lchat '1ca-s the reason joi' 0(11' appr07:al 0; the shipmcnts oj tall.t·s to J.sraeZ? .-1nd: sec(indl1/: 1iOW tlwt tlLe Gel'1iwn shipmf:nts hal.'e c£c-lea, 'Il.:hat plal'..8 doc.s the Unital SMcs lUH.'c to see tilat Israel gets tl!e ren'Ulining part 01 the al"lil-S shipm.ent? A. On tlie first part. of your qnestion, we haw! been interested jn some sort l)r reasonahle bal~mce. in the ai'med fon'es in th.lt area. As "on know, 1Yestern Europe has b('cn the pril'nary ~uppli~r of arms to Isr:tc1. ,Ye- CIllr::c1n·s h,n-e tried not to be ~lctiYe in dIe X e,lr East in the arms field, although W~ ha\'(~ taken some stl'pS in tll;tt regard ~(!­ cause for Eome,Tea.l'S we ha\'c hc'{'l} tn'in!! to find some wil\".in "ll1ch to put some ceilhgs on thi~ ndgi\borlioo(r a.rms race in the Xe:fr ~ast.



Wehay<! 1ecn 'Workii1!?; with the gon~i';lmcllts cOllcen,cd to find out ,\'lu:ther it. is possible that this arms ra.ce migllL ~om(>how be turned downward. The second part of Jonr questioll I :un not able to get into-about t.he fut\W{'~. -

Q. llfr"Scci'ctm'y: in 1'(,'pons;: to


((ldiei' 'Illts/ion you f1ualcd

Ol~;llcSC Comllnmi~t ('."t.'Jian.~!oni.~m.-:.cltl:. the [ju';i'J'ilhHl:m'

inSouth ridNom.: out I don't ocliae yO!! 1iKntiol!c(1 Pt:iping (Ii' C'oli/Jillodst CMllfl in yom' oJicnin[l s:atemcnt. I 'l.UJilJCI' ,dt(:t!u:{' YOII could tcllus 1rl,,'1 you. bdi"'e tlle ro{<: oj Rca CM1I2 aild its guilt in this lladiculal' 0PCi'(l' tionis? . A. 'Yen, I H:illk in my earlier statE-ment I intended to comment on--

Q, r ou em pna.'}ized JJanoi. A. I intended to COlmnent in a.n;::wer to an earlic·r G.1H.'stion on Communist ng!!r('ssion and llO~ spc-cificalh', llece,,~arih- Peipin!! or the Chinese COlnmunist aggr('~sion at the. -~~m(' time. 'Hv\\'('\'N'~I think the role of I>eiping here is pretty dear, They )wxc gone to considernble lengths to make it puhlic them;;~h'es, They kU'e announced the doctrine of a militlllt world l'c\'olntion, 'rhich thl!Y not only h!l\'e adhered to in theo!"y but h:tn backed up in practice on more tklll one occasion. They have supported ihftt dO'~trin(' with ;l h3.1"51I11e5S which has created Ycry serious pr...hlel1ls ('\'en ,yjlhin the Communist world, quite apart from probl('n1s with the free world, Ko\,; \rc know that they l!;we oeCl1 l;h'ing enconragement, that they huve been selldin~ arms to Xorth Yict-Xam, that mallY of thest~ arms that we capture in South Yiet-Xam are of Chinese origin, Chinese maIlufacture, end they 11:,n: thr01nl t1H~il' military and undoubtedly their economic weight. behind what Hanoi is doing, and I would suspect that they have n "ery strong iiifluence i:!c1eec1 in lIanoi's attitucle in this present situation ..

Q. Mr. Becreta.i'!/: YOII mentioned IIanoi (!J.d Peipillg-u:hat about .thesldpmcntoj Iiu.ssian'WPI,rie.sto Xorth YiekY(!llz·J A. 1re h;n'ell~t vreci~e information on that. hut I think in the case of the Sm·jet Umon. jUdging from their public as well as primte statements 0\">:1' tho 1a.st 2 yenr:; or so, I thilik they hUYe all along taken nhout tIle same view of South Yiet-Xam us hil.\"(~ other memhers of the Commnnist'worl,l. Thev h:1'\"e had a EOln;;wh::tt different "ie', on Laos where they had a Yf:ry sp.:cific and clear commitm(:llt on Laos, but I think they 1It1.\'e b>i:ell less active in this present situation than these ot her two cnpitals by [t yery con~id!:rable-. Q. ,iVr. Secreta!'lh could g'6 return! .sir. to 'zclwt yO/.6 re·~t(Jted .sel.'e~·aZ times as a critical. point? Could yO-lt clarihl jar u·s -in a aiploJnatz'c sense '1.citat it i.s that the F·nitcd States 7.roulJ regard as e1:idence that Hanoi is .stopping aoing 1dwt.lt i.'i doing? How could t!d·s be con'lJel'te(l into a diplom(l.tit·lll~gotiable sit!llJ.ti.fJn? A. I don"t think that it r.:quire5 me n.t this time to try to spell thnt e \yould find out vel,\, shortl .... on the g"l'otlnd. as "ell out in detail. :lS throl1gh :Ul...- cliplolii:ltic ch:mncl, \\·!iether tl1ere has been an,· change in t~le PO~itiOli ill tha.t re:pect. But I dOl~'~ think i~ is, appropriate for' , me ~o talK·about cO!l~ple3: set3 of preeollcl1tlO!l.5 on theIr SIde or on our side or problems of that sort, becau.5e 'We sill ha'.-e this missing piece, which is t1le dominant_ eleme!lt i~l the .problem. . :.. _ ' __ . . Q. Mr. Scactary, '{IJue U'e ~a!!sfid, tl,a.t all s?1.ppli.-:s and infiltration. b'om the Xortlt Jtad 'been stopped! IN)'!lld tn.e [htitCJi States be co-ntent . to sol1:e tJ~ i.ndigenous a.~pects, til'; ch:il '(car c:spccls) by jree elections uT!{li;r internat.ional su pc;·ri.sioT! in South Fiet-:Yan.? . .A, 1\"ell, lees get to the first step ~~5t, nn~ th~n if '\\e ge.t. to t~at step, then I';e "ill haxe the luxury or mdulgmg ill the coaslderatlOll of the s~cond step. ~ Q, lrhd arc our po?icics v:i!h reganZ to tl,e iluligcnou-s a$pccls of a. ci.l:iZ u'od C(luld 'I/O!/. enlifj;1teTi.1U on thi.!,! . ..-t. "\y(011, I think thnc tlii: 'indin-l'l1ous nsp\?cts of it could be. brong1lt to 3. conclu~io!l Yery quietly ~m~ tll~t ,the So:!th Yictn:!mc~~ people cou1<1 turn back to the pru:;bn oi Lmldmg thclr country and nupro,'in'" their C(..nstitutio!lal s';~:t'm, e1c\':1tin!; the economic staud:u'ds of th~ country and (l'~t on WIth the 1l1odcl"!l!zation of the country which ha.s bCi:ll their ptl~p05e from the bl'~inning. .




..- _·S

Q. Eut onbt 'by 11liiitcry jo}'ct~Jl;'.1)<·c~'da1"1./?

. A, I :un not commcntln~ ort th:lt, 1 think thi\ lXlcifieatioll of the country \<;(\uJd I.H~ c;~sy if die external aggr('~::i(ln were ~toPI}'~d. ' Q. j11r. Sec/'[fery, for. '!liars 1iOW 'Wt~ l,ac:,; been. fall.:ing cl'out the warin Soutlt yit:t-.Yam. c·:; a qu;:;'tilla 1t'ar. And '!Jet today i1cic;' 'You. spol.e about. tll-=' cn)!!d ctttiC/.: and aggttssion ji'om aile natiol~ upon' olio:7ur, I 'U~olldcr, sir, if tlds is, i:~ wostancc, dumg:ng tll~ context of ow' ullJastalidin.Q 0/ tl!tJ war in Yict-Ncm.? A, no. I think nIl alor;,; we han~ put th~ fil1~('r on t1U3 questio:l of th~ infiltration of the per~o!md :md of t11C :n.ns itom outside as the key to the proLJcm: nnd if t~lo~e :l.re ~.:::gre,,::?>e ~cts) tll:.t js :lggre~z:ion from the Xorth: and that IS the t1ung wInch 15 at the he:u't, OI the problem, I wouhln't dUlractcrizc it as :1 different thing. Q. Mr, Secretal'Y? _ A. Sure. Q, I did. 'lJ.wd to c!C(!1' up ft(:o things here . . YOlt s:dil you had looked into this m.atte!" and I'I1'ondcl'id: di.d you know titere ~ccrc un:rutn.or{zed'l!.'irctaps and did ~IOU bov; tll.O'e '/J:a.s untrutltjul testimony under oath? Tllosc seem. to be the. pertinent 'Points. A. "Yen, I am nware of the circumstanc':5 im·-oh'ing both those points, but r \\oa~t make (l. charac.tl?rizaiion of either onc of thcm I!-t thjs point. . Q. Do you tldnJ: it's an Tight? Did you apprO'l)e it? A. no, I am not J11ftking any commer1t about what I did or did not appro\'o of 3.bour either O:1£: of tho::e points. Q. 1.1Ir, Secretary, ir~ past press conjcrenccs I bcliev~: you. hat'e reiterata!. tl(e theme th~~t the 'lear-and so has Sccrctai'1/ [of Dejense Hooert 8,] ..11('Namara~-th.at ilte 'lcar has to b~ 1COli. in tl,e South, Why 1lO1O is all t7d.s talb abvllt Hanoi nnel in{lltration from. the .Votth.? This ·is a rdath'cly n~w themc, oncast as jar as the emph1J.,sis is conccrned, Arc you stiTZ oj the 1il[nJ that tlLe 'war has foot 'lcon on the . . . ground in tlte South? A, Well, thnt part of it, of COlmc, is t'xtrem;:ly important and is . crucial to tht\ entire en'or-t. But. again let me ~o pack to my openi.ng statement, tal,en altogetht:r, Be~ause tlu:! :1~~rCSSlOn. these a~l!n;S5l\'e nrts from tJlC Xorth ]l:l\'e been-as "'c ha:::-c m~,de' dear re~ent1:r­ haYE~ been incre'1scd hoth with respect to manpowi:l' and with respect.


to :mmt~' c problem has incrc:lse:u in size and s~~'l~. .t~ld tJl~ 'nc~"ssa.ry s cp~) t 1lcrafore, change. 1.;"

& • Q. J.l/r. S~Cl'ct(!.;!I? A. Yes, slrt . Q. When 'lee 'were int'o!/"'c(l in the l{orean 'I.1~(1r Ohin], l{0.: shrJ.'~s ~fer of t"ro:ps to pC!?';iciplJte 'lOtH rejected. l.,rO~r; as~lur-.d~~:~'~;'d :.'1 South li.~i'ecll.s are being introduced into Yirt-'Yari1, '0 ;< •• ten u·s tc7tucm the sit1!a:ions diJjc,'l'? J. ". a" ']fOlt eI1 A· '1Y , the South. Ko:r~an p~rsOIUlc1 that :lre I"Ol.'1C" into South

Vlet-]);am thor\: for "'onlb·,· purp"·:::'· rrh"e\" "'1'11 be " 1 arc not !?onw ~ co ~ ....." J;,rhlm~rl':l'-lchngaged! 1 unr~~r.3[<lnd, on cnzi~le0ri.w t:!5ks }J:>:.;. ;n<'l' ~lll"l'C .L ey \\"1 . ' 1oc;!.l - f,.'11iH'OS '? ,~.~.. • ". h -" " "'" y' t'n ·1 L.~m cerlam in connection with tG10~C parLlcubr tas.;(s, '1 hey were reQue~tcd bv th~ Sont h Yietnam£:o>ernm~nt. They h:l\'c a limited ~i'::5ion. ., I thi T_ th"t.- . <, .;:: that p::.rtlcal:!.r poiut, . . ' n:.. ... exp.alll::.. The other qu~stion 15 yean; a'Yo b.d man'!" more compli -"<ion- in 'It Q .A~. -'h" C:o"·h r." ¥l d·.I .. . ,-,." .. A' The;, ~ "':;, ...,: ~l.Ot,:;(zns ao.c to qeal themst;b.:e.'J ij {lUGe.h:d? ,.. . ;e ~O~lll J .. orcan3 r.nd tile United St:!·,,~ "I'i:! "bl" ~o d f d ~outh }\.ore:l. 1£ att;!.cked, YeS, . ~-~ .. " .. -- L e en .• Q. AfT. S~er~tary, -:citlwut for.tmen.tin.g on sp~cific ·ut~lre ~ era~/~:'lf-d~ .~~d~ tm~ryJYum .~;:,~ 01. '!t~OU,T ec:rliS;T anslCcr~ tl!tt the coKcept v , - J. q l:S a],,, n;,e", ,:).G.es sccur.:y commztmrl!t] would. 2'n !lOUT ?;~Clo"g~!:c u.s th.e 1'I,g.~t to con.tinue att!~cl.:s, ~ ." , A.l·1.~ thlnkk tl:e que::~101l ;<,'as the 1::"'0 ,'1.1 basis io::- t'!-" acL;on "hat h ll.( 1Ji:I?Il fn -~n In th:!t Tt'{;.,rd. ,.c ".," "'.!t;;"






'Pe~;i;Vc,ll, that impli-:ti tl~e 'bro!1.!'i con.cept. oj sdj-rJefclI.se 1.':oulri A. Tltnt's.con·ect. . Q. -u:ould pel?:7,it jurtl:.er at!a!'l.:.~ ?);Uhout llcc;;ssariZy_ A. I was commendnorf on tho 1"...."1 b.\-'l~ .. "~~, J.t;:;:,. V'




o. Unasr that concept, :,117'. f{;;cre(C;l'ljl has t1..e Unitd St~7le'~t by'· all~u:ing AmCi'ic'lll comorzt lU~l>..:.1 iiY. SoutA l'ict-Nam., 'lnorlijZi:J, ii·s pl'eViolr.S pos~tio!t'on the 'role oj u.S. forCo8 ilL South Yiet-I.Yc.m? A••Well, ~g:tin1 the po1i~y rem!!.i.ns ~h~ ;~:.me. Look _at th() con· gre~s!On;11 resolutIon pa5::~cl by 3. mar~lIl or "If] to 2. };ow, til\} U~Q . o! a. p!l.tticular we!tp~n n~!!.y ihJ.nge from t.ime to til!l!l, or 3. type of ~l.lrcraft! but tltS poller 15 tne same. Wl1~n the ClrCtlIl'.3tn.nces or chnnrred cirl!umstance3 requir~' c1U!.nF.:;d actions, th05<1 cd-ions will bi! takel~ But that do-~ nof. me:1.U a!l1.tndcrI~·ing c11lmgll or policy. I have bi~d to PUt together in my op.:ning Etatement tho elementn.ry and basic polic\" within \"';hich Wtl !!.N opemting. Q. iVr.8ecr<.ta.ry, to go bad: to thi 7!~:7o!iations, is it a jail' ·sum· 'll/.a1Y oj'l.chat you. ha.l.,t De.:;t saying todr.y tha.t. the Unitt;d Sta.tes is 7I.ot prepared for any J;ina oj 'ne{lotlation on the war in South Viet-NaJn with the gOl:crnments 0/ Hanoi and Pdping 7tn~eS,s ,ana .until 'l.on.at 'l./I)!J, cdl tM., r./is;ing pz"!;ce h provideiZr A. Well, i "WouId think th;1t th:1.t Y;,ou1d,bc the e~sentia.l point in discO"ering .,:·ht:t~er w:h~t b bro~dly cal!t:d till) politica.l p:oces~ ",hethel" It's d!plom~tlc contads or wh:ltever~:m hdp brmg tIus question to a. "pc~ceiul solution. I think th:lt is cruci~\l to it. There ·is no pOlitical ~immick by which you can bar tht} other side from contiIming n2'!!rc~:;,bn if tb:x ~n"i~ d~t;;rjrI1l~cc1 to do so. T!l~lt. 11:lS to be: m;:-t. on .til(; p'o~md~ i<lCtllf,lly) d:n:eth-. TIt':re IS no po!itic,11 "lzitrdr wlllch wi11 chang,:t.hnt, until., that' "ill is ch:mg~d, l!Util the ~ •• ' . 1" , (leC]510H lS c. l~ll1~cCl on tne ot:ll!l' ~l(l~. Q. A 1'datcd q!I(."tiOi!, Jh', 8.:crctary-Q. Nt. S(CiY[CI"y! could "!fvu git:e itS yom' th;/il.:iilY on tltf. ,H'csent "L'cep:;:;n 0(,[;,;/ (!,xOiyhd to .111-. Clbr;dd oj D!,c,{. GC'i'ii;;UiY "by Egypf.? A. \reno \':e consid.;r tl:r: F-:-dcritl nepuhlic of Gc-rm:ll1\, th(', ~pokcs­ lll~n for tl;c Grrmnn pC(Jpl~ on intC'rJ1atio!1al Rjhir~, ire h3.\'e not jooked with [.,"01' UpOll :!!1Y in::1iment of East G('l'lflnln" or its Of.i<:i'1]S tlmt. 'would ~("\:m to Ul!derg:lrd or ~;l)(k:rl'ill tll~ d;yi::,im 'of the. Ge!'m:m people· or c:nbncc the po;;ition of the n·gimc in East. Gt'rmnny. , Q• .11P. Scc-rctOi'u. ]J[1.OS Is cl~o {! i,"i't oj tllh (tQgr<'5~1cm from. !Yorth l'i(,t-1Y({iil-. '[lIe 'policy Sft,!Cllien!S llwl yOl! lWi.7c beeli pl,.il·ing [oday a.pp?£/ (')uany to EM:;, do tliCy~ 0[' ju.~l for r~'et,Xam. ? .A. Yes, For bred t ,·'5 ~"k£. I did not include L:tos in cktull, but Ole tlle s~m~ Siiu:lli,,!{otlfains th~rc. 1n th~ case of J-':lOS, \';C IHt\'c an ttgreement. :loS rc:.:ent as 19G~. I don~t know of :mv sinde <In.:') sinc~ tIle siglling of tho~r: agreem~nts in which 2\o1't11 '~jc-t-~.ml. hU5 be<!ll. , in complinni:c with tJlem. Xo,,", complianc:e 'with tho~ :lgre~mcnts "Would make a big- contribution to th~ l)~:lce of SOUt1H!iiSt ,Asia. That js ithat tll£'',' were io:·. Their entire i)nl"pos~ \':;15 to (b~ic1c tlmt e\-ery.one "ould li!:l.\'e the J..r,ofiU1s nlone a:ld let ill!!ll1 nm tlK·h· O\ffi :dfaiI:s. That. is what. it W!\5 about. Q• •lfr. /Sun[m'1/: it sf!cil!s that tlLc con[jrcsdond opinion a/at h'1s , oeen C:t.'Jil\·ssal. our flu: hst couple oj'i.(:a.J:s 11M not f(;~USfd so much. (ill. goals of policy: 'i.':7ticl; YOg h'lie o!Jflinccl: but the abi.lity oj the _ United Statcs to ?'CaliEe. fll.on in SOUt71W.st _·1.:ii~. (Jan "!jOg $(1Y 'l.cky you t7dn~; tlle 11CU.' b.,d oj action 'i.tldch the lUg. has mor('~1 'up fo in S()utll.e(Jst A.~ia 'I.cill 'iY(llize titcfe goal.<, (In!/ mo1'C alan the po!icy of 8im])ly figMlng tlte 'I.!'Oi' out i11. the SQutb. illf..t v:e 'H:CI'~: follo.dng



' . '

A. Well, I think I \\o..ld go b:1C-k to the Pre~idt:nfs statement on Febl'u3.r~: lith and to the un.d\:rlring pCIEcy of the con{'"r\:~2ion:ll r~~o· lutiol1 itself. 1\1.nt is rl'qulrecfis r.:qt1in:cl. Th~ co!~mitm('nt the~e

is \'el'J claar with r\:Sr'~(-t. to this n~f!"r(,~2ion :mc1 our co:r:mitl!lc:nt to the security of tksc C(IUl~:ri;::S of :30~th:1St .-\sin. ' 1\0, I clon!t think ~me cV!11c11cok into the future and g.:t a, spec.ific allS\';er.to ):our Cl'':'::~lOll n~ t~ hen'; ~11ey '~i!l en:nfurtJly d;:.n:lop. The Otll{;l* SIde lS \'cry much i!n'oh'(:d m wri(m"" that &:c-n~rio .. I think tllC~. p~licy !l1lc1 {he d({e;:minatioa and the aftii.\lJ~ :tr~ <:h·nr.


. Q••111'. Sccl'dal'Y, '/ tile J:d:islr, cncZ tlte I?·l:.~$.:c:n G(il.'O'm~cr.fs. as cocl«<;,'mcn .oj the Celi~";:a' cVlli!r.:nct~: dctidi:J. to coni'O'£: if, in tll-C · aosence; of tltc. mtss?ng pfCC!~, 1.t:vu1cltitc United Statc3 lJ::'jl1'cpam:! tQ ,attend f1d.s conj';l'l;mcc?

A. Well, J thi11k t1\",y WO~tld be ill cO!lEulhlticm \\·ith

Ole< conference l,~·fcre


th~. memb~r:>


they cOlm~n~cl it. Q. Jh. .'::/fcret(fj'!/, if. is implied Oil tlt.; .suZ,i::(:l oj ~ICgOt;~7tt'OllS thnt '1tl,al yothe st7!Jing i.e; til!:.t :7u: ntinimmn on oiu' side t{'Olllc[ b~ a· slatzls QUO ante. '[hal is: at aloJ Z,~J.im;.i1ig oj tlt~ !{!!(;;·rilla. l('!1i': il/Ill South l'id-:VaM. 1.l;ould "(!1fl..ain 'I.dth £ts tti't'i{t;n"al i!it'::!Ji'ily (1;i!l in(lepcndence. A. Well, the llt':ut of Ule pr(.b1\~m

· tlle tCi:l'jlo!'i:ll hltl'grit r and

i~ un ass;lllIt upon t11~ safety and ind~pem1ence. of ~oulh Yit::t-Xam, If

· that is rt'1icnd :lIlt! l'i·nlo\·cd. then. thin~3 can l)\:~in to mo\-e. 'I'hilt js the h~art. of the' p:"ob!em, 'Th;"tt is '~hy we have force:; out· then!.

They c(}uld eOille hom~ tmMtT(~\~' if tl!a't probh'ln h:1Cl not been hy eggri'~Sio:l. Th.:-y llent' \rouM h::w l'i.'cl'\. there in the fir;;t J>lace, That is th~ cCi,trallJe:lri, th~ C:;~l'lli:e of the si(uatic.n, ;md that 15 the pn,l,lem th,,! 11;\:; to h~ c1('illt with. Q. 'l'l/anl.; you) .sit. Cl'e~ted



PA'l"1'}a~N PR-\CE Hi SOUTHEAS'i' __\S1.-\: .-\c1cIrcss by Prc:5iderif Johnsoil, Jonns Hop!dns V'l1i\Crsi~y, April H~l ~


Ln.st ,,:c~k 17 Mtions !;~nt their 'de,'I"s to some t';\'o dO~:1!n countries nn intt:r~2t in SOlltlW:uot ..:\si:'t. \\~e ari! joininf! thQ~t' li coun' om." '"\ ' , " .. ~ W!Ue.l • . 1- \';e bt'_len~ l' , :Ul{ - l tnes st:'..t!n~ :llt~rlc:m pol'ley ton!g!l w!'11 contribute towurd PC:1.Ct' in this are:1. of the world. I have COtlle l!ere to re~'i<l;\' once a:::!:1.in ,nth my own r~opI.: tIle ·de\>s of the Ameri~nn Go. . . emme:1L Tonight .Americ~m;; and Asians are dybg for 3. v;odd where each 1 '1'1' " tnc prl:1Clp . , 1e lor • peop1e may Cl\OO:C 1't,;; o~"'n paLL}' 1 LV c.lange. m lS which our :mc~s~or5 fou:::ht in til:) "llIe,s of Penns....h-:mb.. It. is :l. , . f or ,,;,1'1 - fl' .,- . • . •.• prmclple n,~.l Our sons gnt. tOnl!!:lt m t!H! Jungles of '\ !et·~am. Vict-:;\am is I,t:." ;1.\\"!i.y from. thi:; ql.llet I?umptts. \\-:"e h.n·e no terri, ton' th're. nor do \,'e seek :In,. The "U1: is arrt,· and brutal und difR· cult. Ancl some 400 young inen, born into nn Americ:-t that is burstin!! 'with opportunity :md prNnise, bye ended tll!~jr li"e.s on 'Viet- Xnm'~s st~:l.lnillg soil. .. • . - .. 1rby must \ye take nllS p:l1nfnl road ~ \\ 11'- lnt:::t. t111s nntIon haz:n·(i its ease: its interest, nnd its po\\er for the sake (If a people so far uwn.:r' . . 1re fight bec:lllse we· l:1USL fight. i~ we arc to lh:e in :t ',orId \.-}le:e en:r'; cot:!ltl'Y em shape lts own dcstmy. and only m stich 3. world WIll our irccclom be fili!'llh' ~cctrre. • • This kind of world wllf llt'i'el' be built by bombs or bullets. Yet tI,e infirmitiE_ of man are snch th::.t force must oftl?!l pre.:-cde reason . and the waste of \\":1r. the works of peate. 'Ye v:ish that this '\,ere not s~. But .we must deal with the \';orld as it is, if it is crer to be as we WIsh. ," • The world as it is in AS!:l is not a serene· or p-~aceiul place. The first r~llity is th:.1t S o1"th Yiet.·X urn has nttacked the independentnation of South Yiet-X!'..!n. Its obje<:t is total cO;1qn~3t. Of course, some of the ~oplt' of South Yiet-Xam. ~re participating ill attack on their o'\\n govemmfnt. But..tra!ned lni.'n ~md supp'l~t"~, orders nnd 'arm~, flow in fI. com:t:mt stream from 'Sorth to South, This support. is the he:n1be:tt of the \mr. ' .-\.nd it· IS a \'::11' of unp:t1"alli:1ecl br;.i.tn1itl'. Simple f:mncrs are' O,e targets of nss!tssim.. tion and kidna uin~~ w'Yomcn and children nre stran~lec1 in the night. because their 111en-arc loy~:1 to the:r go\"cmment .And lleJuless "ills!!::;:: are· l":l,a~ed bl" sneak attacks. Lnrze-sc.a]e raids are: con(~ucted-on town.s. anel t~rror strjkes in the l'e'llt of cities, The conflls~d nature of this conilict.Crtllnot m::.sk tb fact that it is the lIe'" ia.ce of an old en em•• ' O\-er this "ar-:md aU ~\.sia.-is anct1lt't" TI::llity: the deepening. Sll3.do\\" of COmml1n1S~ China. The rulers in Hanoi aN urged on. by Peipin~, This is a. f?gime "hieh 11~S de~tro\'ed fr~dom in Tibet! "'llich lUiS nttnckNI Indi:t. :md has bc{:n condellln~d bv the United Xations for aggr~;;;;iO!l ill Korea. It is 3. nMion whkh 13 he!p'ing the .forces of Yio1el~ce in ~!mo.st eyer\" confu~ent. The conte:.t in ,: iet.::sum . part.0 fa.'>1':'-1' ' d p<'lttem O.L~" lS nggre.:s1\"e 1)urpo5~s. Why are these l"c<l!ities our COr.C<":l':l? 'Yh,' are ',e in South Viet]\anl? ~ . We nJe there beeau.:e WI! h~n'e 3. pro;,;u::~ to l~e<:p, Since 1951 eyerv t· • p reS!(.cnt '1 • ' or- <"' , Of~' ."\.mencan !l::S Oil- en.:c• ~\ilmOl"t· to t } lC~ peop.c ~OULl \'lct' ~- .., II e h..,· h-l I";" ..··~ t0 1·",i!.-1 ',,,,·.1. ~ f en. d Thus, ~,...,. ••, e .,t: . ." .... ,: an a' ....... "e 1" ..·• e He1,.. ill'd·~O c.e oyer ril;mr ye;'l.r~, we :'l'."e ~~:tde r. n:l.tion:11 pled,;e to h~lp. South Viet'-~m l·r·s 1·T\(1 ...... ~n(1~ .'.1 . d",z"nd CJ.",.:. ,._.c,~\;.t ••: ... .. i'.'e• '-d I"mten'dto"::N:l) tll:lt pronuse. .. .;U1 To dis11mHn- tL1t. rAdge: to :!b~!lJO:l th!s S1n!l.l1 rlr..d br:n'e n~tion to it::; em:!nies, :1nd to the terror that n!l.!.5:' fO!JO;7, would be an unforgivable. '''rong. 'r~ nr~ also tht're to strcn~h;;n "'orId orc'!.;r. Arollnd the <r1obe, z' n1::1"I"m to THaI'I~tl'd1 nre- p~~plc "-"ho:13 -;"'dl-beb: I"C~ts in0 P:1rt "rom on the belie! that t112Y ('~n coum 0;1 !:5li the, :u'e :ltt!lc:·:cd, 'fo leal'e Of-' t ,' f. 11' " t!!e CC;!!i(:e.~ce C , \ le '_,\:11'.1 to·ltS :l~e "CU.' • .>n:U:f! or" :o..Jl t:lt'~ p\:opJ~ •m thl: \::llue of nn _-\rr.er!~:1n cO::-;,iiitri~i:!'It :mt! in the Y~h;a or ..:\.In.~ri('n.'s '"ord. 'I'he result ' . . ou.!d be: inrrc:!:i:d unrest, :md in:::t!l.hility, :lml im~n . wider war. ' .12 hn~in~


. "" ,'t.

J_et no one Ulillk for n llllllllC'Ut th:lt. r~tl:("lt from Yi::t-~~un would brin~ all C!l\l to conflict. The ballle WOi.l1tl bt' n::l1cwcd in one c.xmtry :\ml th~n uno~hc:", The i:catr;\l k~::i.'!l of ou!.' time 1S that, the app~tilc of nggrc,:;"ioa i,.. lI~\'cr sat~fica, To wilhllraw frc.1 ont) battlefield meaiis only to IJl-~p:lrl! for' the next. 1re must st~ly in ~(\t!thea~t.


Ashl.-:ls ,::() did in Ell1'\)p~-il1 th(~ word" of the Bib1e: "lIich~rt~ shalt thot! corne. but no il1rlhN·.~: 'l'lH,'re art) th(l~e who 5:1\' that. nn om' cl!'ort tlJ(,'r~ will bi} fntilethnt China's power is m:1i tlJ:1.t it is bound to di)min:~tc. all Sontheast ',Asia, But thcl"~ !:' no end to that al"!!;umcnt lmtil all of the nations of Asia are sW:lllowcd up, . , 'l'her~ ~r~ those who wonder why we 11:1Xe a rt!~ponsibi1ity there. ",YeB, we h:ln~ it th('r~ fvr thCl s:tme l'e;lson that we hav~ n. n:spcmsibility for tho defense of Eul'Op~. lYorld War II was fought, in both Europe and ,Asia, :Iud when it ended we fonnel om~i;lycs 'with cO!ltinu~d responsilliIit v for tIl'; def.:'llse of :freedom. Our objcctin: is the ind~pC!l(h;llce. of South Yiet-'Smn and its freedom from attack 1\~e w;mt Mthin£! for our5Clycs-only that the people of South Yiet·?\am be ullowcd to !!uidu their O'.\fl countn' in their . own way. We will do e"erythin~ n;,:cssary to Teach that objecti\'e, and we ,,;ill do only wh:1.t is ,lbEolutc1y necE5Eary. '. In reCi!!1t, mont 11s at [,l,cks on South 't,-iet-~ am WCl'e stepped tIp. Thus, it bilcame nece~~\ry for u;; to iw::rc;tse 01.11' r~~plm~ :md to m:lke attacks by air, This is not ;1. ch:mga of purpose. It is it. change in wl1at we' bcliere thnt purpose requires, We. do this in ord~i' to :;lo's down ag~:)l:~:;:;ion,. ' We do this to incrf:as;:: the confidence of the hrave people of South Viet-Sam who hayc br.1.nl .. borne this brutal battle for EO m:my years with so many casualties. . , . And wo do this to conyince the leaders of 'Sorth Vict,Xam-nnc1 all t\-ho seek to share their conquest-of a'simple fact: We will not .b", defe:::ted., ' We ,\;11 not !!row tired. ' • ,Yo will not ;1th(11".1.\';, eithe: op~nl\" or umler the clonk of :l. meanino-le.~ ngre-:ment. .w , ,,~c know that. nIl' attacks alone ,...m r..ot nccompli511 nIl the.:€! purposes. Btit it i! our b~3t and pr;1.yeriul judgment that they :lre 3. neC~SS::ln~ p.l.lt of tile surcst, rO:l.d to ue;1.ce. We hop.:> tbt pt?uce will come swiftlY, But that is in the hands o.thers bc.;idps OHrsch:cs. , Az:d \:,'e l.mGt be pr~p:mc1 for a long co~­ tmued conflIct. It '\'111 r..:qua·e p.ltlence as ",-ell as b.,wery-the mIl to endur~ as ,,;en . ~s th:1 v:ill to reSISt., , I ""ish it 'wre possible to com'ince othel's ,,:ith ","ords of wllat we no" find it n&:e5S:lr\' to 5:1" with Q-un5 :lnd pJanes: :mn.:d hostilih' is futile-ollr reSO~lrce5 n.re eqn;:! to ~lnY challen~c-bac:lU~e we fhrht"for values and we fizht. for tn·:nc:n!e. r:lth\:~' thin territon' or colonies, our p:ltienc.e :mcfour d~termin:ition are unenclin~,· , Once this i.:; de.H'. then it sh.)uld a150 be cle:ll' ril:lt t11i~ onl'( path for . reason!'lbla m':!l is the path of pe:1.ceful 5ett!~:nent, Suc}t·p~ace demunds:m inl.l~?~!1dellt ~\)tlth Y!:;r."X.1m-s~curcl .... Z1.1ar:mteed ;md able to shnpe its own rcbtro,!silips -to !til o:hers-f!'ee -from outside, interference-tied to no o.lE:l:1<:e-;1 military base fot no other country. These are t~le esxnti:l!s of am' flll:ll s!!tt!em:;nl. We "m net'c. be ~eco;}d 1.'1 th;;·5~:lr('h for such l!. pel!.C<3fd settlement in "net-~am. Th~!'e m:lY b-~ man". W!ln to this ki.'1.d of F,,;-;lce: in discusslon or ... "'. 1 .... • , • • ne!!v"lc1~lO!l '\\;~.l t!l~ ~O\'i:~!unf:~ts C(,llC.,r:!ec: m l:!rge ~r01:DS or In -11 ,... .; . -r.1 smn. t)~~S: III t;H~ !·i:.1i'U1:l!!.!lon 0 ... Ola 'i.;r~~r:~em.s or tne.r £tren~ len.






~, "t




mg w:tn ~t!\t' ones. 'ire h:n'e ::t:tis::d t!lis po~:tk.n O\'er :mu o\'er ::pin 50 times :l:ld mora to irie;,d and Ie-: alike, A.nd \';~ rea~:lin ri!;ldy with thIs purpcx for

unc.onditio:1:11 dlS;:U.ssio:ls. _-\.nd umi.l·tlt:u bl'i~N <1r:d !It:,:.:,s5;l!-Y dn' of ;)·?:l..:e v;e will try to hen I!' f • ,-. ,To, ~ 1~' •• .' -1 d' .CO:lillC~ 1!'(-;11 sprt:r.amg. \ ~ li!\ye no c:(:s:rt:: ,0 ::00 l·;lOU£:l.!li 5 .il! in b:l.tt1c-J.:>~:ms or Al~.::r;c!!.n5. \Ye b.';~ r..) d~sir..; to d(:\';lslat(: t!lnt v:hkh the peQil1c of ~orth Yiet'~<1m h;:\'i!,lmilr. \\'i~h toil ~nd s:lcrifice. 'lYe W!lll;sc our power \';i~h r.:~trajllt 2nd w1th nU the wisdo!u that wa can c{lm.Dl!\lld. But \':e will use iL


This ·w:••, hk('lllost

W2r~, IS




l"orwllat do


the people- of XOlth Yict-Xam w:lnt? The,' W:1Ht \\'h:tt their nci!!hbors :::.150 dcs:rL'-foed for their hun~,~r, hcalth ~for th!:':r hotlics, :t ch:lllcC to le:1111, prO~rl:S5 for their c()ulltrv, :md all c:ld to the h(.'lhb~c of l!1at erial mis~n-, ~\.nd the'~' would finci ull the~c tl1in!!$ i;w more readily in peaceful :l,:::sod:lt.ion wi:h othet:s th:11l in the (::;cl1css course of b:lttlc. Thes~ comMics of So~:thcasi: _\sia arc IlC.mes .for millions of illl. pon?rish('cl people, Each d:1Y rh:'se p~ople rise at dawn :u1d strng~!(' 1 1 lIlltl'1' . Iit to wrest • , • t.lI'OH!!:.1 tHt' llIg eXlstf:I~C.e lrom t 110 501'1 , '1')iCY arc OItt'!l-W!':1(,.-b:-u by disease..:;, ph1gucd by llUn~cr, and death comes :it tlil~ earl\" ng'e of ·10. -. Stal.;iEty antI p!::lce do not ccme ('<lsi]:; in sud! a lnnd. Xe:thcr inde, penden~~ nor 11l1l11:m dig-nity will c\'cr be \\"0:1, tllOUgh. by arms a101lt'. It 31':0 r.:'C}llires the works of pc.lee, The ..:\m('rlcan p~o\)lo h:l.ye ll(~lpc.] generOl!sly in times past in thCS'3 ,,;orks, all<1110\\' n1H'~ iuust be n much more ll'lassiyc effort. to improY(~ the life of man in t.hat conflict·tom corner of our world. ' The first step is for the countries of SOUtl1C!!St Asia to associate tllem:::eln's in a gr~;1tI~' cxp.mdC'd coopcratin: (:ffOli for dcy.:]opmeilt, - ,\Ye would hope that. Xorth Yict-::\~un wonld take. it.~ pbc(', ill tlle. comn'lon ell02-t)U5t ~ S?Oll :l~ p(l:t~(:flll coor~mtioll is pO~,ible. . f'he D11l1Cd :\ntiollS IS n)rc;1.dy IlC!n'e]y cng::g~d In dc\,t.]opmcmt thTS area, nnd :<s :Cnr back m lOC,l I conferr.:d ~\'lth our autllorities m Yict-X:lIn in conncction 'with the.il' work there, .AnU I 'Would ho1'(' tonight that t]le Secret.ary-Gr:ne.ra! of t-]le 'C'nitec1 ~n!io!1s.could llse ~h~ .1m:~tig.: of his grl':l,t. ollier, and his deep' knowledg.> or Asia to mlfl:1tc. as ~oo~ ~ pOSSible, 'nth the countrieS of tlmt nrc3., a plan ,for coop~ratlOn m mcrenS<'d de.Yclopm('nt, For 011r part I v.ill. ask the COIl!;.TCSS to join hi a billion-dolbr Ame-l'ic:m inn's!Immt in tllis effort soon ::is it is undcrw:l.Y. And I 'Would hope that. nll other industridi7.(>d cOlmtrics, inc1udino- tIl.? SOl'iet. Union., will. joint in Olis effort to r~p]ace d~pair witlthopc and terror with progrc..."S. .



The task is nothing lc~s than to enrich the hopes twd existencc of more tl1~m .1 hundred mil1!oll pc·o!',!e. ..bel ther.; is much to be done. The Y~lS~ )fc!~on(l" Rh'cr C:lll l);,'o"ic1l\ food and w"ter and pow~r on a seal!) to dw:~r,~ !n'~l our own TV-A. The 'wondm's of modern medicine c:m be sljrc.lCl tht'ou~""h "ill;v'rcs Whel'c, t.housands die e\'erv Ye.\l,' from s; , l' 1 d • P<!OP1C; I -, - I kill,S Inc.k of care, Schoo s ran ,0 oe cst[tO,lS.lC to tmm m t \e s: nceded to m:1!1'!(Te the proce~s of dexc1opment. And these objecti,e,st and mor.:, ate within the r(,:lch of a. coopemth-c o.nd determint~d effort. I also intend to exp:1Hd and spe<!d up ~ program to make ~l.\'ai1;\ble Ollr £.lrm surplusi!s to !',ssist in felXling and clot-hing the ni!e~l:r in As1a. 1Ve should not allo',,:, people to go hungry and we~r rags whtle our O~\"ll w:l.rchou~es o".erno\\" with :m n.bundance of 'Ilhe!ltand corn and rIce and cotton. . So I will ,-en' sllortly n:lme a special ten-m of outstanding patriotic t and distinguished Am'!rical1s to inaugurate our p;lrt.icipn.tion in these programs, This t.:am will be headed by )fr. Eugene B!:1c.k, the very nhle form(ll' Pres:d.:nt of the '\\'arId B:mk. This' wiH be a. disorderly p1a:lct for 3. lo!}:; time. In Ash, and elso\yhere, th(' forc,!.~ of the modern \';,or1d .l.te 5b.kin~ old W;lY5 .mel uproo!itl~ :mcient. ci\'ili7.'1tioli5. There will be t\lrbul;;nc~ nmf stnlgO"Ie nnd ~\en \·io1enc~. Gr~.u. soci;,l Ch:Ulga-415 we see in our own ~onlltn'-d(jes not :lh;;\v ('t)m~ without conflict. . We must n15l:l eXllCCt thilr MliO!1S will on occa;:ion be in dispute with us, It. mil\" ll~ bC':;l!iSL' ."~ :1.re rich, or pnwerful, ot" b?CiHlSt' we h:tve made s6m~·mi:'t:1kc.::. or b·~r:;n::e tht:\' hon,;5th' fl';\t our intemiPns, Howe~'e:, no n;ltiol1 nE-~d e\'(~r f~;1r [hiit we d~iire their bud, or to impo~<! our wilt!).- to dic~;\t<: t.h~:r i1\;:.ti.tutio~,;,

But. ,\,;e \,ill 3.1\\,:1Y5 oppl)~e the effort of one H:Hion to conquN' :In•ot1lt'r nation. We wi!] do this bc-c;'\u~e our (W;n ::~\~ldtY is :lot st:\k~, But them i, more to it rh:ul tlmt, Ollr g"nf:l'iltion has ~ clre:lm. It i;; :\ \'::!r\'·old d:':;1l11, Rut WI? h:l\'t.: the po......C"r! ~;nd no\, we hi\\\! the ,h t,",! • . ....... .,\ ' ....\'O .. ,t.!: Ol)f"-"r' "11;-' j' to ,.,., 1_., .1,,,. ('.l ,,~., For centllrit::, nations h:l\"e 5tru:!d~d t\ml)ll~ E.':\i:h Qthe:r, Bm· ":e . dre(ll!, of:'l. world \:h~r~ di~pmC's (l're 5e:tled by''ln';\" und rt.':lEQa. And wo wIll try to m:l!;:e It SO. "





, •• "';''''' \ •• ~ ... I".

I.l \:.



For lllOSt. of history men. have llntr~d al!d killed one ano~·hN· In ~3.tt1e. But we dn:a!11 of an end to war.AnJ we will try to m:1h

it SO-

. For all existence mOEt men h:l·\'e lin!d in IJoyerty, th:-i:~ltt:'ned by


hungt:f. }~ut we dream ft 'world ,,;here a 1 ,\re fed a.nd charged wit.h hOl-~- And we will hdi-l tQ n~:1.k.; it so. • The ordinar\- IHt'n .\Ud. WOmi'!l of Xorth Yiet-X:tm nnd South Yiet. Nn.ll1, (If (,hin; :lnd India! of Russi:1. :mel ..:\m~ric!\, am hl':'l.Te people_ They are nllt:'ill':ith th,) ~;1me proportions 01 hate :lnll fe"r, of h)\'e ;u\(l ho~. )[o::t of the:n ",.'LIlt t.he sam;) things for them;;;!lws and thr.ir f3.milii!~. )Io5t of the:n do not ''':lIlt tht-ir ::on.s to e\'er die in bat-ne, or to see their home~, or the hOnl~5 oi others, d~stroyeJ. 'lYell, this C:ln be their world n·t, )Ian no'" ha" the knowled~"­ a.lways b-~forc lle;tit'lt-to m;t~;:e tilis phn(ot seryc the real nc.!ds of the people who 11,e on it. I kno\\'" t11is wiUllot be ea5\'~ I know how difficu1t it is for reason t.o guide pas~i(ln, :mcl lo\'e to' master hat~. The cOU1plexltl(',s of this ,,0rId do not bow e:\sily to pure :mel cO!1;;istent :!.llS\\"ers. But. the simple truths are therG just. the ~ame. We must aU try to follow them:15 b~st \\e can_ . . 1re often say how impressive po\,er is. But 1 do not fL'1d it impressin.\ at. alf The guns and the bomb~, the rockds :1nd the ',;IrSl,ips, are all symbo!s of,llU!n:,n failure, They am ll.ece~s;'try symbols. 'Ihc\' protect what. we cnensh. But. they nre witness to human foll\'. A·dam built" :1Cl"(\~S a ~r<':1t ri n~r lS impressiw. • In the countryside ,~h('re 1 was bol'll, and where I live, I ha,e seen the night illuminated, and the. kitchen warmed, :md the home he.ated, ...here Ollc·e the c11eerk55 night nnd the ce~ls~1cssc.olcl held 5\\':1.\. And till this 11:1pprned beCatlSe electricity came to onr nrea. nlolig the humming .w~res of t.11C RE_"\.. Electrification of the countrysideye~ tha.t) too, 15 llnpreSSl\'e. .A riell harnst in a Inmgl'Y ];lnd is impressiyc. The sight of ll.:'nlthy children in a classroom is impre,ssi "e. These--llot mj~'ht\' arm~-a.l'e the ac111erenents which the American nation bclieves·to be impres5h-e. And if we nre steadfast, tl1e time may come \\"11en all othernaiions will also find it. so. EYery flight b.:fo:oe I turn out .the lights to sle~p I ask myself tllis question: :r[ayc I done crcrything that I C!ln elf) to unite this ·count.ry? Haye I done en~rything I c.m to help unite the world! to try to brin.!! penc€I and hope to all the peoples or the wor1d ? Han! I done enough( .Ask yourselYes that. qaest.iOl1 in your homcs-:t:Hl in this ha11 to' night. HaTe ,,'e, each of u~, all done nll we can do? Haye we done el1ough~


We mas well be Jh-ing in tIle timc foretold 111:1I1Y years ago "hen it was said: ';1 caU hen wn and earth to rt'cord this d:n- against "OU, that I ha,e :;et before you life and death, b!e~sing and cursIng: tIlerefore chOOEe lift'. tli:lt both thou and thy Eeed Ill")" 1iye.~) '1'his {;enemtlon of the world 'mu5t choo:::e: destroy or build, kill, or aid, nn.tc or under5t:md. ,re can do aU these. things on n. scale tll3. tJlt\S ne"el' been dre:U!:ed 0 f before. \fell, we will choose life. .And so c1oin!r, w~ wiJI prmlil o\-er the e..'1emies wit11in man, and OYE:r the natural enemies of all m:tnkind.




~'or mtl:l:Y ye:m:, South Yie:n:lm h:l:; been ph!l!g"l.'d into n war impo$ed on it by the Commu!li~t$, It h:1'; bc("a ubI\! to pre:;cn'c the intezrit\' o( its territorY :md irN'<.!t)!l1 ('il];' bec:tn:-c of the C(lur:1f!"e of its ~on$' and tlie fri('1~(!iy cOlln~ri(s uf thc' free \\'orld, which bn-e not, spllred either their ir;£,lld~hip (•• their gC:lerous ~~:;i~t!l.nce. . To the repl'escllt~ti\"Cs (,f those countrie5 present !It this ceremony, I exprc~s: in the !lame of the r..cpublic ,md peoplc of South Yictnalll, our pl"t)fonnd gmtitudc. which I e~k thrn to c(.n\"ey to their Goyern-



It is nl$o my duty to tell th~m what we nrc doin~ with their assistance. Some used to relic\"c the mist'IT flnd suffering of our people as a' result of the W~1r, to rehuHd on Otll' ruins, ~~nd to reconstruct our nation; some to help us defr!ld ourst>h,cs a~,:iIlst the Communist


aggres~ion. I. say "defend o:.mclns" ndyisrdly, for (lur primary objectn-e contlpnes to be tll(' se,lrch for peftCe and not the snread or prolong:!tion (If the Wflf. \\c do, certainly, wnnt pec.ce, "but not .peace st any price. If it is to be 3 ju::t and endurinf!" pence, the fono\\"in~ conditictDs must <be met: ~ , 1. Sillc(l the war fI(I'" in prO!:;f(>SS in Yietnf~m was pro\-oked by Communist eg~=resslo!l :md subycrsion, it is csscmid, fir:;t. of all, that these sub\'er~;i\-e find milit:try i!.ctidtics undertaken, directed, and supported from abroad np!.inst t.he indepC>!1dcncc end frecdom of the people of South Yiet-nam ceuse, r.nd that· the principle of noninterference in .he illte~'n:!l nfidr:> of the 1-\\"0 zones, n principle tlw.t was laid dO\\1l in the 195~ GcnCYil ~gret'm.cnt :1!Jd ill in!i:lll;,t!c>ud h~w, be respected. Consequently, the Conmumist regime of H:moi must dissoh-e :111 these fl'Ont org::n!l.:1tions !md n~~ncic5.it lw.s cren.ted in South Yietnm.i1 under the titl~ the "Front for the Librmtion (If tlle South," "Libcmtion Rr,dio Stfttion,'" and "Pccd/s ReyollltiOll!l.r\" Patty," nnd) it must r(;~O\'e irom South Yietll:1m the troops ana the politicd snd miIit:1i}" le~dt!.s it hilS seat th('1"(\ il!eg;llly_ 2. 'i'be intcrn:tl rtfri~irs of t:1C South YietMme~e people must be left to the di$crction of those people in conformity with democratic principle:; i'..nd ";ithout an::- fore:zn interfe!'t:nce from \\'btcnr source. That will be Ce::.sib1e, (Ib·.-iot!~ly, only wh('n the nggrc5s1on by the Communbt. rcdme of H:il1oi find its c'1mp'1lgn of intimid(l.tion to which the people of Sout.h Vietnam bye beerl subje,~tcd have been terminated. 3. As soon as nggrcss:on hits censed, the GoYerum(-:1t· of the Republic ofYictnnm ftnd the n:ltiOlls th~~t com.e to its .lid will be nhlc to suspend the mi1it,:l~" mC:"lsures in the tt'?ritory (of South Yictn:ln1 ,~nd beyond its bound:.ries th:;.t ~re no,,\' neCeS5:1ry to defend t!!:lt t('rritory ag;lin~t Commmmt ~ggri:$S10n, :'IOT(:OVt:'l'. the Goyc'rnm('.nt of the Republlc of -rictn'1m is prep::'l'cd to r.sk fri-::!ldly nutlol.S the;l to rC~10\e their milit;:ry forc~s from So;:th Yictnillll. It rcscrns' the ri;ht, howenr, to take whiltC\'C. mC,,5urcs ftre ncc"ss:~rY to sCe th:"lt bw flnd order are respected throughout tll:; t{'r:itory~ of South Yictlle.fi1 nnd to insure the Sonfety of the South Yietn;1mcse p'::l'plc, ftS \\"('11 as the right to appeal agd:1 for foreign :lssist:~nce in the c:'.sc of further aggression or t.hrc::Lt or l?g;rcSSlOn. .

i.~.5tly, the i!ld£'p~ndcnce !'.:ld freedom of.the people of South Vietn;:-.tn mt:st be cITcctln:ly g'..hl~:mtead" , • " If the Comrm!::ist re:::;ime in H:'.noi si::cerdy \·;t'.!ltS pC:lce, If It J?U;S the interests of th~ n,:tl')D :"bo\-e those of ~~;). ideology or I'. p:my, 1f ~t , ".lc~m.m':5t' peu?1e e.r.d .; l " p" V)!. - ot -outhe"st ·\.s1·' we.nt:> tne l.lC? t.l~' _"I H:~ ."~ v to Ih-e in pe"c~ i"~'r-"l of w-'r prvsJ'~:lt\· 1;~5te,...i:l Ol pO';eny, lreellom inste:ld of sl;\"~~;::' it"h:'~5 'o!1i;, 'to pel,t :'.n -end to ~:~g.c5~ion:: ,. . Tbi:; is the O!1!y p;..... h t:!:'.t we b::hn . . e C;'::l lC:'..11 ::~ pe:'.ec 11 t~c ~touth Vietnl'.mesc pCI~?le :;,c to be eble to enJoy the mll ~.:nefit;:, Vl t~e aid th.,t the irie;ldly ni!.ti,ms h,,,yC ;;0 gmh:ruu;;ly bn:shed upon It.

, 4.





'J:gX').' Oli' A

])J~l~:t' JO}11"·;SOr~1 1~rll

JUI..Y 2S,


O:i Vn~'i'NAM: BY pnJ!~S!~ CO~~1?I~11j~I~]CE 01i'


1~S5 1

My feHow Amerk:111$, not lOIl~ t1g0 I rt:'eci'n~d i\ !etter from e "'oman . iu the


She KrotC.

Dr.,\r, l'\!n. I·r.::;s!r.,:~·:I'; In my hultlh~.) w~y 1 !lin wTWn;,; to YOtl a?out the ('rist" in Yic-t nam. ! h:wc:'. son who i5 no,~' in Yi~tl!~1tll, :>Iy Imsb;m,l s.:rn'(l in \rQ~:d W~r II. Our country \\';\$ at W:l.t, but f:l.W;, thi; time, it is just so:ncth:n; that I




w(:n, I hi),\,O tr!.;d to··:'.n5We1" tli:1t que:::Hon do;~clls of times and more in jl!'~~cli('::lly enry Shlte in this Union. I hln'e discus5ed it • }'>:11t'l!!\t...·c 111 '\ \1 ' ' '.} '' f u11r HI .. ~Pl'l'1' ,In \.. \ itSh'mgiou ' m,.\,:lY. In ' ti~n ri1nCl5CO

ill June. Let'me :lg;tin, now,. discuss it here in the (",st, room of the "'hite Hol.lso. . Why must young Am.:rici\i1s, born info P. le~ld eXllTt:~nt with hope' end with ;o!dim l'~'Olai,,::, toil ~md suficr i:nd sm!le~imcs clio ill sllch t1. remote end clistnn t IJl(l.cc? . . ~'IIE L}:S50~


. The nnswcl': like the wn. itself, is not· an CilSY oue, but it echocs clearly from the Pil!Dfd lr:.550ns of hdf e centur\', Three times ill my lifctililC, in two 'Yodel 'fars end in Korc:l., Aincrl(';uls h,1.\"o gOlle fnr Ir:uds to fight fl)r Irc.:-clo:l1. ,\y c.-lw,\'o h~.l.rncd at n.tcrrible llUd brutul cost th~:.t retreat docs not bring s,lfcty end w~!!knc'-3S clocs not bring P C i ! C C , " . · . . It is this lesson thil.t hfts bNught us to Yietnmn. This js !\ diffcren t. kind of WitI', 'l'herc are no mr..rehing armies or solemn dcc-l.mHions. Some citiz(,llS of South Yietll"~ll1, i'..t times \yith undcrshmdi1.ble griey. 1" 1 l' ~ ances, ) uwe J,Oll1CU III tnc nt t~e;;: on Llc:r own gO',enUllcn t. But we must not let thi:: m:1sk the cCHtritl f;,1Ct. tlHl.t this is r~f(lIY war. It is guided by X orth 'rietn~m, tll.ld it i:; spurred by Communist China, ]ts goal is to conqurr the South, to defc;1.t Americ<\11 power, and to extend the Asi,'!.tic dominion Of communl.';n1: TheN are great stnke5 in the bn.bnce. .' . . Most of tho non-CommunisL nations of"A:;in. cnnnot, by tbemsch'cs and nlon('., resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian comnlUuism. . . . Our power, t.herefore, is n very yit:1.1 shield, If we are drh·cn from tbe field in Yielunn1, then no nation cnn O\·C1" azain h:l.VC the same confidence in .American promi~e or in ....'l..mcric::m protection, In each lr.l1d the force:; or ir.d('p~adcllce would be considerably. wcnken('d r.nd au .:\'si:1: so thrcatclw:l by Communist dominntion ,,'ouId certainly imperil the security of t.he United State:> itself. . We did HOt. choos~ to be t.he gU;11'dinTIS llt the gllte, but there is no one cIsco Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring pCllce, becn.usc we le:ltned ·from Hitler r.t ")Iunich that success only feeds the appetite of r.ggTession. 'I'be b:.ttlc would be rcnewed in ouc countn: r.!leI t.hell another country; bringing with it perhnps enn h:.rg~r nnd- cruder conflict., as we hnyc Ie:!rIled from the 1t'3sons of hi5torv, . ~rOl'eO\'C!', we' nre in Vi~tnnm to fulfili one of the most solemll pledges of tbe American X ,'l.tion. Three I>residenls·-Pres:dent Eisenhower, Prl'sidcn~ Kennedy I l1nd your p:'cscnt 'presidC'nt-o\'er 1,1 years ba\'e committed them:<eh·cs and h,1\'C proml.5cd to help defend this small il.nd ydianf, n;:.tion. Strem:thc~ed b\· th:'l.t promi~c. tho peop1c o! South Viet·n:1.m h:iyc fou&ht for nHmv 10:1'; yC;1:'3, 'l'hom~,nd$ of them hl\\'o diNt Thous!!nas mOrC,!l:n·c bC':H crip?lcd all!! sc''!.1'l'cd hy \\,:11', V;c just c:'nl!ot: 110\\' di;:iOHor Ot!r word, or :\b:mdo!l our commitment, or leave those who bdiend us "r.lid who ~I'u5t(;d \15 to thl: terror t1l\d rcrrc,;si')!1 and ' . . murder tlU1t would follow, 'flu:;) then, my Cellow Amr:ric<111:s, is why we ilr~ in Vietnnm.



" 'DcI'Mfll\en!

or SL'!e i'uh!ic;HNJ.'\ i9t'..!. Rc:r~,,:J ,l.Uf;l.I<! IN,S.


'Yh:1t, r;rc ?tll' to:"!ls in th~t w~lr~sl:1illi!d J:tT'.(!? . ' }m;{J we mtc'!!:.t to Cl)ann('t~ the Ci)mmull!st~ tb:~ we c~maot be ddcntcd hy forL'c 01 (inns Dr 1,y S\l'lt:::'i(.l' ~, l)(JWl'~. Tb{'y tl'i! not. eil.sih· cOllviac['d. In recent. ll10:\t~15 they Jlt1.\"t.' r:rt':,t!.Y incJ"t'i1:::ed t.1£'l1' fighting fOl"CC$ ~l~d thdr ::Unrk!S i:.l\d th~ nlllI11:.:i: (Ii i!lCitJ('!lts. I han t\sked the comnll~ndi!lZ g('!ll'rd, G:-n;:ord [\Yilii:'\.~n G.} \y c~>lil1or~hnd, wh::l .



, '. . . .

more he Il£'c-(h: to~I;1t.'t.'t this mounting :'~;~(r<,s51on. He lu!s told me. W r. will mcrt h~s needs. ~~ I haye tothn' ordcr.::d to Yictn~l!i the Ah· ~robi!o Dj\"lsioa and ct'rtl,in other f'm:d ":hith \rill 1';\i5:; 0:11' fL:.:htlm: str('ar:th from 75,000 to 125,003 m~n ~11mo:;t ill1mdi:'.it:l:--. }\ddi~lf)n;:l fOi'c~3 will be nCNlcd luter, and th(:y will 1)0 :s~nt 2$ r.:'que:stfd. 'fbi;:; \\:jJ1 l!li1ke it neeeES:U-Y ,to incrciI:;c our ilc-lin; fizhti1l 6 fl,!"t'es l.y r::cising the monthly dritft cdt from 17,000 oYrI' n pc-!"i()d of timc to 35,000 p~r month, flnd ior us t.o step lip our C,llllp;lj~n for yolUlI.l.u-y c·nJistments. , , After tIlis P,~$t \\':'erk of ddib~;.ttbm. I he\'!: conduJ,;d th:1.t it. is not C2scatirJ to order l\c,~~!'i"c lmit;; into service 11m\". If that ncc\:·:;sily sho1-1M bier he indicitted, I \rill dye the mt:.a~:r most c:~reflll consideration r~nd J will gi\'c the co\.mlry~duc t'..nd i\clcqutte l1Citi.~c before tt\king such r.ction, but only nftc!' fuH P!.:'p:l.r:ltions. We 11:1ye nbo'di5CUSscd with the Gonll'llnlcnt of South Vietnam " lntdy the sleps ihllt we will t:1ko to suhst::utidh' increase their own cfrol~t, Loth on the b!lttlc-ficJd ltw:l to\n1rd l'cfoj'm end progress in the \'ili:1grs, Amb:lssftdor. LQd~c is now formuhltir;g r. new program. t.o be tested upon his return to that. area. , .


. I 1111.\'e directed Secretnry Rusk and Sccrct!!.TY ~IcNamarn to be t\.'\:nilnb!c immcdhltdy to the Congre3S to rC;'iew with these committees, tIle npproprit1te cO!lgr{·.,siord c()m:nittce3, what we pliln to to in these nri):l,:;, I hnve ~skcd tl1CHl to be t!bln to i\nswer the qUf3tiollS or any ~lcmbcr of Congress. , , Sccre-titry ~rc:\ flUltlril, in addi tioli, will nsk the Scr.nte Approprip.~ tions Committee to add n li' nitcd amount to present lc~isldion to help meet part of this new cost until fl stlpplcmontr.1 mC.1';Ure is ready, and hearing., cnn be held when thc Congress assemble:; in January. In tho meantime, we will usc the authorit.... conli~illcd in the present defc!,!se 'appropriations bill under considcro.Wtion,. to transfer funds in addition to the lldditionnlmolley that we \\ill ask. rrhcsc steps, like our actions in the Pllst, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an ena to nggre'5sion and a peaceful settlement. ' 'We do not went an expanding struggle with consequences that no one Cim percch"e, llor will we bluster CIt bully or flr-unt, oui' power, but we will not surrender and we wiU not retreat, for b(!hind ottr American pledge lies the determination llnd ff.30UrCes, I belie,·c, of all of the -American L\r.tion., ... U.S. WEI.COl!F.S UXCOXDITIOXAL DISCt'SSIOXS

Second, O1lce the Communists know, ns \fC know, thnt a nolent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable. • We are rCtHly now', ns we hnve ahri!.Ys been, to moye from the batL1didd to the conference t:~blc. I han Shlt.:d publicly ~nd. mnny tim('s, Ilgl1in and eg'lin, Amcri~,~'s willingness to bcgia unconditional di5Ctlii5il)l~:; with l'ltly gO"crnlllt~nt dallY phcc at any time. Fifteen efiorts h,;\"c L~NI m:ic1e to ..st:~rt th~~c di,;cti'$ion5 with the help of ·10 natioIls throughout the world, but th~rc has be-ell no answer. nut'we arc gl)l!l~~ to co;)til:u(' to lJcr;:.iit, if l)C'l~j.;t we 1111.151, until <lentil find cle.-;olati:)n h.\'."c }c·d to the 5:,!llC cO!1:er~nce tab!e where other:) could now join \IS llt 11 mu~h sm;,llcl' C1l3t.


I han' SPOb'tl1l1:1IlY til1l~5 of our oblf'ctin.':i ill Ylr:lnum, So h:15 the , Gov('mm~nl uf SOl: th Yil'~ li:l In, l! :~nni h.1:' $~,t ru~th it,; Qwn prniNS;lk .\re are l'~;1cly to di"Ct:,,~ tb'ir pr~lpt\':::!S 1m,] o~tr prl)p~)5:ll.,: and ~'Uly J>rop(\s:~!;. e,[ any pn-crnml'nt. who.:c peop!o m:ly 1)(' 'lfi"C'ctt·d: for we fe;!!' the lUcetin::: l'I.lom no more then WE.' [(\1: tb b;ltddidd, In this pur:5t'iit. v;e wdcu!!1c and we ~,;;!t tvr th(l C(I:1C('l'll iwd the flssist:mcc of nnv nati ... u ~md al! lidion:" If the Unilc-d ;\tlli(la,; .1ne! its ')fficif.l"5 or nll....· (Ian (If its 11·1 IIlc;nh':fs C:":.U hy der:d or v;ol'd, prh-,ltc ··.·initidi,·c or public action, bri;,g tiS liea~'er :'I1·}~(lnor:.. b1.) lJE::lc,-', thell they .\';ill hr.yc the S~lPpO:·t uncI the gmtitud'(, of the l;nitc-d Stt~t~5 of .tl..lllE.'rt.?1l. . I ha .... (' dirC'cled Amb:1--Z:::1do!" Go!dl>~rg to g\1 to X C\'; York toduy and to pn'sentimmcd;:~tc1y to S<!('r~~;1rY G~ilemt U Tlamt :11ctl~r from mc requesting that Illl of the rl'50urccs, cacrgy, tmd 11l1lrtl"!ISC pr.;sli~e of the• United X. r. t!O!15b~ cnmlo"l.·ed (lnd to ,. ,J to find W;'J'OS to h;1lt n?:;~l'cssion _ ... brmg peace Hl Yictntlm.



l'uta'OS}; or u.s.


I made n SiIllil;1l" reque-,t ut· San }'l'illlcisco a frm- weeks r.go, because we do not sc~k the dcstructio:1 of imy government, 1101' do-we co'.ct P. ioot, of [lllV tt'rrit~Il'v, hut· wc insht. tlIld We will nhnrrs iU:;lst that the people of Sout.h Yictl1ilm slwll 1I:1\"c the right of choice, the. right to shr.pe their own destiny ia frec election:; in tIw south, or throughout nU Vietnnm \l1iJer illtern~tionfll stlp0r\"i~ion, nnd they sh.,ll no~ luwe Liny gon:rnll:ent impo3cd upon them by forcc :1nd teITor so long as we can prc\"Cnt I t . · . 'l'his was the purpose 01 the H)51 azre~lI1cnts whidi. the ComnlUnists have now cruelly shilttered. If the mr:chillerY of those agreements \\";15 tragically wed:; its purposes still guide" our fiction, As battle U;;t.'3, we will continue es best we can to he1p the good people of South Vietnam (>nrich th,:) conditIo!1 of their life, to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and sheltcr the homeless, r.nd help the ftumct· to i!lCr~:15e crops, und the worker to find it job.

It is 1m ancient bilt· still lE.'rriblc irony that while nu:ny leaders of men crc;~te diyision in purS111t, of grtmd f,mbitio1l5, the child rca of mlln are really united ill the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and

re\.... nrding· toil. '. . As I said at· Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope HUlt one d:1Y we' . can help ell the people of .Asin towllrd that desire. Eugene Black htlS made great progr~.3s since my p.PI)carl'.nce in B:tltimore in thnt directiort-not as the price of pCilce, fqr \\'c nrc re::dy dWfi\OS to bl.'(lr a more painful cost, but r~lther as 1'. Pi>rt of our oblig!ltions justite towm-d our fellow man. •



nlso p.dd DO"" n pe.50:H11 notc. I do no! find it cn~.r to send the flower of our yonnl, our fiut:5t :young !ni::li l!lto k:ttlc. I have spoken to you tod!,y of the tiiyis!on;; !ltld the forces .U1d the bf.ttf:iions . and the units. But I know the-Ill aB, eyer\" on.::. I h'ay(\ seen them in 2. thousi:ud strcct5. of c hUlldred (own'!, in -c\'ery St;;.tc in thi.:. l"nionwc.-king' r.nd hnl·?hing and bui!ding, and flUt'd with hope nILd life. I . think th:lt I kn')~, too, how their roothcr;; wcq> and 110\''- their filluilies I SOITO\\". This is the most· agoni:dr.g and the most pnin[ul duty of your Prc3idcnt.. i . Let me



LETTER !-'RO:\I I'lmSIDE:-tl' JOI!:.,\SOX TO U TlIAXT, SECl!ETAUr '(;l~:,\ElUL OF TIm t;XITED NATIOXS. JULY 25, 1965 1

His ExceI!ency U THAXT. Scc~tlar!l. G~ncn!l ~f 0e [:nituz Umted .:.\ atwlls, ~\.} •



)'IR, SECP.E1'_U~Y GEX:F;r:AL: I w:mt you to know from me of the Ycry gre:1.t p~r50nd confidenc'! \,·hich I pbee in Am· bassador Go!t1b:::rg. Hi" appo!!ttment ;13 permanent r:?prcsentath'c of the United St:ues to the l'nited X.Hions-aud his :lccept:mce of this resp0::lsibility b thc circum::t:U1,:es~l';, I hope, stro:lg e\idcnce th:lt this Governmt'i!t: pbces the \"Cry hi.;hest import:1.IlCe on the work of the United XtHiOllS and will contimte to gi \'e it our utlUo,;t support. I }w,\-c in:;tructt:'.:l_:\P'lh:155:1dor Go!db.::'g c:speci:1.1h- to m:lintuin clo::e conillct with you on the situation in '·ietn:wl. totir efforts in the past to find some '\',1Y to I~mO\'e th:1L dispute from the b:lttlefidd to the negoti:1ting t;lhle :lre much :lppreci:Heu :mel hi~'hlY v,lIued by my Go ....ernm<:>aL I tnlst they will be continued. '" :\re;lnwbjl~, 115 I stIlted publicly hst .-\prif, the GO\'ernment of the United St:'.te:; is prep.tr~d to enter into negotiations lor p~acerul settlement \dth!)u~ conditions, Th'1t remil.ins our policy_ .4..nd as,! st':.te.d in S~n !r:~nc!;;c~ l:lst month, we hopc.th:lt the,mem. bel'S of tne lmtecl );:UlOns, lr:omdu:.'!l1y. and coll,~ctlvel\", lnll use ~heir infl~cnce to bring to the ~cg[)tiati!:~ ti!.blc ;111 gO\'er~:ments m.oh·ed 10 nn attempt to bIt ill! ~ggres,,1(tn and l:\'uh-e :'1. pC:lceful solution. I continue to hope that the ("ni:edXatic.ns caD, in fact, be cllec:th-c in this w!;ud..' , I hope that '-Oil ~\ill co:nnmnirate to 115, thr01~::h Amll:1ss:1dor GoMherg, finy lidpful su;;.:-stion:;; tb:ll m:iy occur i:'l ypu that can, strcnt:then our common se::.rch for the road to peace In southeast




. '


Sincerely, LYXDOX



B. Jom;sox.



DE. . .R )'In. PRESIDEXT: The Pre:"idt:'nt of tlle Unitt:d Sh'1.tes e.nnounccd on July 2S, 1955, CErt:~!!l stcps bei!lg t~~ken by my GO\·ern· meat to lend flll'ther a!'S!st;lr.ce to t1)« RepubEc of Yieti1~rn in r('si~ting armed ng!!.c5sion. . , At the s~~me time tI,e Pr.:=id('nt re~ffirmcrl to the ~ccr('t:l:" Geneml of the V'nited X atiol1s the wilEl:::ne>'s oi tht' Ln1tc.1 St:ltes. to entr:l' • t 0 DC'g:(I t·1:1 t · ·lor pe<l<:(:~t! . 1 S(, t,lo. 6" }. d· m l(Ins ltl'ment. wltt:Ot!t CO:1(.ti1('n5, ~tn agmn inntcd :-.11 ll!l'mbcrs of the ("nited X:lti-:·!';". i:lllidd:dh- :md cvliecth-ely, to U5C their influe::ce to 1nbg :lOOllt di"C:H..;~i(la£ 1:1:1 ne,;oti:tting forum. On.J nl-, :!9 tbe Sc('rct:lrY Gcaeral irnmedi;~t('h- sent ;'l. most welc(.me m1d :lpp;occi:Hed rcp!y, 5t~ting hi:: ceterruillat·i<.n to pursue his cliorts to r(,n!ove the dispute 0\-':-1' Yietn:~m ire'z:) the bdtlefield to the llez(ltbtin~~ t:lhle. , The S~'Cl!ri~y Council, which h:t5 !l. Je:;ithn:'l.tei:lt,.est in t!lC peace or south'::~5-t ...\,,,,i:,, h.-oS been kept bformeo of the Do1i,~Y e,f lll'- G(ln~rn· ment \':ith respect to the c:tn;-?:'(.us Cmtf5C o[ e\:cnti: in thnt p"rt- of the world. For (ox[;mph, my lat(> prNl('('c,;,:(.r, Amb;':s::::cor .-\dld 'E. Stc,-enSoll, told th.~ Coundl more th::n :\ ye.lr :'.~I..) on ~r;~y 21 1964:

* ~t'*

the t·rdt~d S:~!C~ h~s ::0, r~~-:!tt


1i,:1tro!'.:! f!:iHt!1.::" vbj~~th"·~ ~ny,y!1cre

in SOUt!l~:l~t A~i:l... L.S . pcHcy i.,r ~I)!l~:!··:-.~t A:O;!:l i5 "'I;ry ::i;!)p:-::.. It i~ tht:: ;'!,:5~C1:-~· lion c,f p(·.:.:,ce ~u t!.:lt t!!~ P~(!!1!":~ 0: th~1i ~r,..~!. ca!'l ~" !!hr}l"t t:~{':r o";.\-u h~<1~p'~:ln~nt b'i.i~:"f·':': i:l '··'1·. ·(:\·(:4 ... :.;;·)ci .... -ic··I~ t\~\: ... ·l~··\· f-pr·h" C~'OO~I" fo'" t!·e"·::(:h~c~ ,,·;tpouL int'e·;i~~cn~c r;~;~ t!lC ~~;t::!d~. t






.. w





~remb~rs 01 t};c'C(ltincil :;!;o :\rc :~\... ~rc (If t11e pro!c.n:;"d and r~pe:ltcd. euol'tsof tIle V.S. GO';em;!lC':lt to op"!) :l p;1th to p~::c(.f\l1501I!iil)n of the di,:putcs (of 5'outh('r;,,( .\'~i:!, hc-;i!lllill': with our ;l'.'Ccpt;:l:ce of the terms (Ii the Ge!lc\'a .:\.cc('\ds oi ID.'iL • Tilcst;' effort:-. }l;!YC indudcd-


Various :tppro:1chcs t.) IhHwi, Peipi:;~, :md )"1o;;c(w•. Support of peacciul on';turc~ by the L'nited Kin«doll\ C:lnnd~l, nnd the Hriti5h COlumonwe:1lth of Xatiolls. '" , J'ftyorablc rc-:1ctlor,5 to pr(\p'):;:l!" Inm!c by Ii llon:>Iillcd nation:>, end !il.ler by the' G('Y(:illlll('nt of India.. • Appron11 or efforts by the .So:crctftry Gcner:1.l of the United Kations to iultiatc P~:lC; tnlks. Endorsement of 11 hr~er I'lI}C for the Fnitrd X:ltioas !Il southel~st _lsi::, including a l'"~X, mii:::ion of nh5t:rn::rs :11(>n~ the frontier betwecli Yie(Il:lm :llid C:1mbL,dia, n l.'".~, mission illn~.s~ig::lt(' n1leged suppn-:;sioll (If minority ri~l1t5 in 'Yictn:lm, nnd a t,~. lm-it:ltion to Ihnoi to p:lrtieipntc: in S('curity Council discussions of the incident in the GuU of Tonkin, Mnjor P:Ut!cip:ltion, dirl'ctIy l1:!d through the United X:itioDs, in economic ::nd SOci:ll Gen::!oplllC'nt projects in southeast Ashl, A direct appc.ll hy thc Prcside:~t of the United St;ltes to the members of the 'C"nitcd X:ltions to usc their influence in briuging all p<'l.rti(:$ to the pe:tcc t;lblc. Rcpc<ltcd ll.3sertiQns on the highest nuthori~y th . tt. tlll! United Stntc3 is prepar~d to eIl6:1~i! in n('2ot!<ltions or discmsio!ls of nny clwr~1cter with HO prior cOlldition~- wlwte;;er. On nt.lci!$t 15 occn$i(ln~ in the p:,:;t four find flo huH ,-eur:>, the United Stat£',; 11115 initi.1ted or supported error:;:; to re50h-e the issues in southeast Asia bv pC;lceful n('Q"oliatioIlS. . . I am sure th:1t the othel' members or the Security Council sh;1re the deap r('~.;ts of m. Go\-ernrnent in the i:~ct th:lt none of th(':;c initiatives he.s met \\ith un)' (:\"or:lble re~p(ln5C \~·btet;er. It is cspccbUy unfortunate thd the regime in II:t:1o!, which, dong with'the Hepublic of Victn!\m, is most directly im'oh-ed in the conflict, h~lS denied the competenCt' of the l"nitcd Xl1tiO~1S to concern it$€!lf with thi., dispute in any m:Ulner and h:,s cn~n refused to p~lrticip~,te in the discm:;ions in the Council. . . Nonethe1e55, our commitmC'ilts under the Chftrter OE thc United Katioll:> require us to per:;i:;t in the :'e;l!ch for e negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence tbt ranl:?;l':5 the Republic of Yietn:un.. This . 10 , tne , 5C:lfcn rDr pC;lCe-\relg . 11$ cspecU1' ..IIy Fespoll"~'b'" lllty--to p('r~l"t upon the mcmber$ of the S.::cltl"ity Couacil, the prim:lry org.ln of the United X:'ttions for peilC~ and security aIT:lir3. The purpose of thi;; c()mmunic;ltion th('n~fore is to reemph:lsize to the members or the Council th£! ;(\llo·.d:l~ point:5: First, th.lt the t"nitcd St,ltes \\ill cO;lrintlc to proyide, in whate,'er measure :1nd f.)!" wbtcnr pe:if}d i,; ner·?"S,lry, tl::sist~Hlee to the people of the Republic of Yi~tMm. in defending their indepeadenc£', their so\'eri:i6nty, :md their rig3t to choose t!:eir 0\\'11 go\-crnm:nt :md make . their own deci5io~s. . Second, the "Cnited Stutes will continue to assist in the economic and soci;ll ;1d-.-:lt~ceme:tt of sc>uthe:1~.t .:\.'5i.:, under the leadership of Asi~:n countrit's .l!ld th~ l"nitcd );",\t!()ii~, .1nd will continue to explore all addition.,l possibilidc,;, e$peci;l!ly in connc::tic.n \~-ith the g,ei!.t project:; t:!kin-z sboc in the I.o\~'er :\re~:l}n:::: B;\:;iu. 'l'hiru, the tnitcd St;\t~:> will cOl~tinue ~to explore, ir,d('p~nd('ntly and in conjunetion with other.~, ,lll pl)5~ible routes to an honomble . and duri!.ble pc.lce in ::outh~;~:~t ':\:~i:1.. Fourth, the rnited 5t;ttt-s 5hl:1d,; re;!::h-. :lS it hi:".> in th~ 'O·....;t. to colIabomte unconditi,):dly with me:n!x'f.$ or the S.;curi~y Council in the se:lrch Cor tln :lcccptabb rormu!:1. to re':~l)re pe;lCtl :!nd se.:uLity to that are:! of the world. It is the hone of lin- GI},Crnm~!lt tbtt the members of the Securitv Coundl wilt ;O!ne!l"I~\' find the m~~\~s to re:-p,)ad errecth·~ty to the chal1eng~ r.!i.;~d b\' th~ nre,:~::: st,1!c or :d;lb~ in $t)ttthe,l .. t "\5i.l. I re::pccUnlly l"t~(l:i-:"t' th,!t thi-;' N!l:::)ltnic;lt kn b~ cir~;j!;'tt~d to the metl1b~r$ or the l·lii~-:,l X;~tion~ iI": ~l ::~ct;rit;- Council d{jCUnl~!1ta Accept, ExceH>?I:':·Y. th~ ;l:w:r::llce 0: my Li:;h':5t coa~!.!er.ltlon.





.J. GQwn::p.G.


WITn FOln~IG:\ }!IXISTEI: }'''\Xl:'A:\I 01-' lTAT,Y, xon:.:\11ml!···lJECE:\lmm, 1~165 I ~




F,\.:\ta~r·5 Ll-:nt-:u TO

Prn:5wr;x-r tTom,sox,

K OVE:>.Ir.F.R 20, 1%5

Hon, LYXDOX B, JOHX50X, President oj tl!,; lhit£'d Stales. ~rP.. Pfa:swF::\'[: In the i!lten'ic\~' which YOU gr;ldou~h-llc('orded me at the CI1d of :'hty you rcpe . . . ted /,[lCW your firm intc·nti.)!} to seek assidnou,.!y 1\ nCZl)ti:lted :,oluti'.lil for the conflict in Yic~n:llli, In the liope of being icblc to Ils5i.;t in th.c r~aliz~\tion of this noble purpose, I bring to your :tttcn:ioil the {o!1o\>'ing; , On Thtm;cby, Xon:1\ber 11, in Hanoi, If-;', Chi :'Iinh, itud the President of the Council, Ynn Dong, exprcs3ed to two PC!"50l';:; (known to me) the strong desire to find a -peaceful sl)lution to the conflict in VietUllm and, in summary, stated-:,ccourding to what they wrote me-thatin ord.:r Co:: t1:c p~~lC~ negoti:1.t!o:Js to C'om~ about, th('r~ will b-~ p.ec('ss:!ry Ca) :\ (by !lir, by S~.~, by bnd) in th.:: entire tl·rri!.ory oi Yi·::t;l~\cl (north :tncI sout!:); tb: CCi';;1tiO:I--t!nt is, of al! b.~l;::;w:::lt opt.:i':nion, (i::e1udl:\g thercfor~ also t~(: c;"!5~:.~tiun of (!\~b:,:~r~::l~ion 0: further ~·\.:!l·~ric~":.n t:-oop~); {(t) j, clect\r~ltion according to \'.-hica the G(':l'~\·~1. :lgr.:c:<l~nrs of 195-1 wiil b~ t:,b:l! !!5 thi! b:t:;i~ for the Il,::go!htlons·-~ d-:c:b~'lHol~ m;d~ up of th,~ iOllr point.~ {-)rl:n:I:l't'd by Hanoi, points th:~t :~r" in r~:'.!i'Y tho,! cxp!;w:\tion oi til£! G':ll·:\-'l. text and w!lien. thcrcfore, c:m bQ r.:duc~c! to :t sir.;;l(' point: !\ppll;::l~ion, in oth~r words. oi the Gen.:v:l. accord. ce:ts~-fit·~

'l'hc text of the communic;!tion "hid: I have recei\'cd adds th:lt"the gon·mment· in Hanoi is pr.:p;lrcd to hliti:'.te m:goll.diolls without first requiring :1ctlld Witht!.r:Hi':~! of the ~\meric:1n troops." . 'l'o the 5:!nlC interlocutors Ho Chi :'Iinh s,lid: "I lUll prep,!r~d to go an}"\yh.:r~; to meet ,myone," These nrc the f:5sentid points th:1.t one of the t"..·o interlocutors of flo Chi ~ linh and Y:1n Dong sr:nt me in W'l'itlnz lil3t IJight !lnd which, in this letter of mine--cllnfidcd to ~rr. A. Gol'i.ibr·j:g, fit? u.s, ro?prasenteth-c. to the IT:X., so, th:lt he can deliver !t promptly ::.nd confidentl;llh'-I b:-lm:: word fQ!" word to your ::UentlOn. You sureG- h:n-~ oth~r element:; by wl1kh to judge the import:~nce of the :lbon!. As Pr.:.~ident of the 20th AS5e:nbly, ::'$ :'!. 11igh offici::.l of It:lly, es :l sincere friend of the 'United St:ltC$ and of yourself, r hope th;>.t thi3 contribution to t!:e sought-for pe:~c<:fu1501uti;)n, :t1w;\)"5 more necess;!ry .:.ncl more un:ent, m:,y be :1 useful one. And I am at your disposition for :my step 'ibn you 'consider opportu:le in the ID:1Uer.

AmXTO?E F.\XF.... XI.


His Excel1enc,r _-\mxTOJ,E Fom)n JIinistcr of Italy,


DE.m )'lR. F";'XF.\:\I: :'fy GO';('rnm~nt i:; most cr:1fcful to YOU tor y~lUr .he}p and cc.op~r:!dO:l in tr;: .. ::mit~!n;: \"icws~ ;dtributed to the ~orth '\ ~~t~l:ll:l,;~e G9',ernr:li:nt on Dt:;c.ti:"ti;,ns i.o dc-:!! ";..-ith the problem of 'H:tn;:m. \' e h;,';e c:lref::!!y (,x:!1~lbed the Sll':::::c-stions you V

hn\-e cOIl\'C'Yi:d.


I \,'i::h to mitke !!1(~ f,-,l].)win! coml~lents:

. 1. .~sit 11,1\5 r(:?,:>;~t('dly st:1t~d,. the l>ited StJ.t,:;; is prepared to enter l!1to dEC~!;;~40n;; 0: !~<,gOtl;:.tiCl:1S w1t~, an .... ::;C'\·e:-m~\er.t at any ~ime without lilly preco:::2itior.s whr.t~oe\'(:r. I£:;:mrm this willl!l~ne:;s.


2; ;-\.Ithough th~re is ~O;!ie n~11!i.gliity in t!;e st:lteme:lt of Hanoi's PO$ltl,)n t ~;our sour{'"c Ec-r:-ns to I!~ciC'ate thr,t I!;.1r.ni \,·ould tl~rec that ,. 'tl • 1 lbas!5 ' of t:;.;, GC:1enl. - 2'"rccnegotl:!llO!!.' lm;.it .J~ unC·.':'i:'",cn u!~ L,!.' • meats uf Hl;;·~ withrJat f.ily qua!if;,~;:!ior:.:: or cc,nditb:1S. We fo; our p::irt would b(: \·.-iJJin; to !Oi.:;l;:? i~l n~z(.~i:,:i(lIls oa 1!li~ h~.;.is \'\'itho!l t any qu::jific:dions or conditiolls. '- 22

3, Thc' l:niteu Stutes do('-;; not, howcye,', agree \\jth th~ contcntioll HUll tbe four puints :ldnu!o:ed b.r Ihnlli ctlll$tilt:tt' :m authentic !nterpretnti(.n {If the GCllC\':l :1~l'ecmcnts (If HI["L E!(,l!le,a[s in the four point5, ntotnbl;.\- the 11(.!it k':11 lm's;r;H11 of the S(\-c.:~lled N iltioll111 Libef:1.[il~n Fn)nt, h:1\"(' nQ b:l~i~ ill the OelleY:l :1;reem('nts, ~md Hanoi's app;m:nt in~i5tcnce 0:1 :1 prior uel.'bmtion :1el'('ptin~ the four points tllU~ npP(,:1l'S hvth t(, be iI1N!!si~lt'llt with til~ :1~reciilcnt:'; and ·to rcquir~ a sub:>i:mtinJ co:!.litirm to ne;,.':i:1tiolls. Xc\~erthl'lc~s, we nre prep:ned to indu<le {ht,;,e four points fur C'C'.llsidcfati(.n in :my peacc t:l!ks a10:1; with any prop'~tll;; which the Ul:ited Stutes, SOllth Vietnam, !lnd other gonrnmeats m:1:; wEh to nd\-rLl1ce. 4, y {lur sources ~11;;o mention nnoth(;i' npp:ucnt Ihnoi condition calling for a ce:lsc-firc nnu (,ther 111e:15Hre5 i}riof to negoti:1tions. The United Stntcs wodd b~ Pl'~p'll'cd fOf llcg:oti:1tiollS without the impositioll of (lny conditions of this nil-tmc. Howc\"Cr, if n rcduction or cessation of hostiliti{'s were to be nrrnuf::ed prior to negotbtiom" it seems sdf-c\'ident that it would lwxe t(1 be on nIl l.'quitable and reciprornl b2.sis, If there we:'') n cC'.';s:ltion of·certain military ,lcth-itie5 on the one side, there \\'on.1d 11:1\'C to be f!1l cquh-:lhmt cessation of military 3l'tidtic5 on the' othl'r_ 'rho formuhuion propo~('d b;.\· llimoi's leaclers docs not nppC:1f -to meet this tc;')t, for ex.:.mple, ill, that it imposcs no re.::trllint on the continucd infiltration of f(ll'ces lmd C.quiplllcnt from ?\orth to South Yictnam, ·5. The U.S. GoYe1'l1lnenl notes the mC~~:l~C com-eyed thut Xorth Vietnnm ,'.-odd lJOt iilsist on the uctn;ll withdraw.l! of .Amcric.1ll row.',; . prior to. the initiatiun of negotiations. Howe\'cr, the chrificMion of , this point, tllou£!h not withc,ut, signilic.mce in the light of conflicting p~blic st~l !CDlcnts by Hanoi on tIle subject,stiU Ie:: \-CS the questions (hsCu;ised In 2 !lnd. 3' ebo\'c.. ' . We nrc thus fur from pcr.su'l(ied th;lt stutem~~ts by Ho Chi ~i:hl1i' allel Phnm Ynn DOll~ qtwtcc1 br' your It:l1i:1n sources indico-tc 0. redl . willingne:;s for uncoiulitioIl:l1 ncgoH:l titms. \\e would be ple;15cd. for our p:lrt, hOWCYCf, on the b;\::j,; of the comiUcr:lttOIls set forth e.bo\'c and perll!lp5 in k:ht ()f auy further soundings your source,; m~:.\" make with Hanoi to d!SCU~5 th15 m:ltter further WIth YOU, I hr. asked ADlbi1.sS:100r Gc.ldbcrg, who bc;m this letter, to m~lkc himself a \-Ililable to you at !lIly time for this purpose. Ftu'thcl', if it den'lop,; following such di~cu5sion:), or furiller contact by you with your SOurCES, th:1t ndir('ct discus..;ion with your Itdi.Ul sottrc~s is deemed fniitful, a 'r~pl'esent,~ti\:e of the 1Jnited States would be nuthori7.~d to meet with.them pd\';lt~ly, . Fintl.l1y, I~t me m;\ke it dc;,r tbat YOli il.re free to draw on the coutents of thi:; letter, in any way vou may de::ire, in cOIllmunic:lting with your sources. ,re would welcome YOtl!' continuing 115sist:mce on this Imporh,nt matter. With the ilsSUrtmc~ of my highest cOllsidcmtion, ,Sincerely yours, .~.





R t:SK,

DEcElm£R· 13, 10135 DEAR ).iR. SECRET_-\.RY: I rec~h-ed.on December 6 your letter \'.'bich . Amb:l5:w,dor Goldberg h.1d pre;'i.)u.;ly announc~d me on Xo,em-





The same &lY I 5umm:1.ri7.etl in 11 document of mine es:)~nti:ll obser,:\tions m:lrlc b:t you on '":lfi(>uS points and I h:n-e just feceived word th~t on W ~d:1eS~h:: b;;t, December $, s:!id docume:;t h-lS been confide:lthlly Jdh-er<.>.:l i:ltl) tb: n;mds of a qu:,!ified repre.'eilt;!,i ....e in order to be forw:mbd tl) H:l!!()i. I think, .15 of web,', s.~:d dQcument h!lS alre::.r!\' re;1.c!l~d it:; fin~ll cle~tin:ltion. . . 1 would lik~ to ,1Jd I d<.>:ire, :-'Ir. 5eaet~ry, to tll:lnk you very mud1 for the confidr::i':i! and trust in nn- per,~on YliU and the J,merie:1n Go\'ernl!li:nt h.1"c cunfirmed in your lei.t'cr. "r C:l.n :15sure you th:lt, as soon ;i~ I recel\'e :'''-Y l"c.lctlon on the points·contained in t!Ie letter, I will inform \'Otl i1~1:iledi.lteh', . , Anti'iip:1.ti"n~_the'p!e:Bure meeting you next week in W:1;;hirig~on, . I rem:llfl, :\fr. ::::ecr':£:ln', . ,






cm;cF:RxIXG 1964



.' . The. North Vietna<.tese regime has made. it clear agr>.in e.nd again that it l"ill not enter into any discussions unless the conditions it has set do~a for settlement aie accepted as the basis of negotiation. These conditions, amounting to a surrender of South Viet-Nam to Communist domination, and formulated most forcefully on r".pril· 8 J 1965 by Premier Pham Vant Dong in his ufour points) ~' include the withdra!"al of United States Hilitary Forces and ac.ceptance of the program of the Viet Congo Not only have the l';orth Vietnamese reiterated these conditions on !).umerous occasions, but tll:::y have pcreUlptorily rejected the repeated atterr:pts of the United States to Hnd an aVCU'lle to peaceful settler-lent, including notably the President's' declaration of Ap'dl 7) 1965) that \-le stand r~ady to engage in un.- ' conditional discussions.

In this regard, the Sec'retary made ·the foIlot-ling stiternent in his press conference of November 26, 19~5: ~

It is true that last aut~En Ambassador Stevenson was infolillcd by the Secretary General that he had been ,formed j,ndircctly that Hanoi lio'uId be vlilline to' have a contact with the United States and that the Secretary General had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site •. 1I • • •


1J~'1hen t'his matter arose) it \-:as considered' in the light of a great deal of infori:lation available at the time about the'attitude of the authorities' in Hanoi and, indeed, of ,other governi:l~nts in the CO:lii<!unist world. I am not at liberty to ci.te 511 0: thes·~ cC!~~tF..cts, ,,,bien ~·:ere nUl':!er,. 1. .. ' .l' ous, 'J..~ut: YOv ~.;;j.~~ recal.L tHat ... ;:.:: Cana<..:..l.a.n t." • .l.nlstc·c at Externa~ Affairs repo~t~d to his ?ousc of Co~mons in June o~ this year that the Canadian Co",~issioner on the ICC had mada several trips to P.anoi over the eight months prior to the end' of May. There were other public indications such as the failur~ of the Polish p~oposals on Laos and the refusal of H~~oi to a~tend th~ UN Secucity Council in August. I myself had ~ nu~be~ of discussiops ~ith the represcnt.:.ti.':es of oth(!'( govern::;ents) i::clu~i.ng Co;;:::n.i:list .~-

c;ov"'.,.""-.......-s . . ."'-\... clv:..:bt ~r,a: He.r~c.i o.




t::'-~-.~~ c'e-l' .~::.,.".,.: :,,~":',;.:•. a ;,.'-:\,.:--"'"


Asia based


- ....L.I" e~~,·-~-··-e OC ... e.t";,,c .... t..t.....L no: p'l'i??ared t-c disct\:SS p~2C-= in ~


U~O~ th~ u3re0~=~t~ ~f 195~ a~d

',,-- ...\..\).J.::;'.1U ,,' .•.. ~ "'h'" '11.:-:-1· ..hS ""· of: !.






. '




... -~-~. . on a~a . . . ". . -:,\,o- S~:·t"'" vu., ~e~-v-T"~~A~ -h~ '-~~~- "-r~ r ~ l'U V ........ ", •.:. ... ...... ';-"' ... , 1'.. "I, ... .!.c:",,_~ LoG L o· r 19'1 0'+ !<auo. .creased its infiltration, including units of its regular army. They und0ubt:~dly felt they t ...ere on the threshold of victory. Just yesterdaY'Hanoi cenied that they had made a~y proposals for ne~otiations •. - ,.) d.:l.l.I.

--,~, -~~ ~ooC'~,j~

:.."Throughout' all of last ye~r, the general attitude of the CO~Jnunist world was that they might consider so~e device .to saye. the face of the United States while they themselves ltlposcd their will upon South Viet-Natl. Our attitude \vas and is that we are not interested in saving. face but in savi~g South Viet-Na:;r. '.;

lilt is worth recalling that Pr.esidcnt Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching revie\y of the : 'situation in Southeast Asia early iii 1961, and deter"; mined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller' nations of Southeast Asia.. I1resident Kennedy t stalks lvith Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led .to_._agre.t;Ulent__ in pJ;in- ..... ciple on I.aos but not on Vie~-N"ar.\. - The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an agreement "ihich failed because Hanoi refUSed to cO::lply ... ,dth it in any .my, shape 01' IOl1<l. Nevertheless, during and after that conference the United States has 'had re路peated discussions about the popsibilities of a peaceful settlemeltt in Southeast A~sj.?.路 -- . UHanoi, in their well knm-ffi four points,' has indicated its basic position on Viet-Nam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that. their points can be discussed along with all other points pres~nted by other Governocnts.路 They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they kno\-l the United States t-;ill take, namely) that North Viet-~am must stO? its aggn::ssion against South Viet-Nan and discontinue its effort to iopose the progran of the N'ationa.l Liberation Front on South Viet-Nan by force. "There have been many effoi-ts by the United States and by other governments throughout the past five years to achieve peace for the nations of Southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplo;::atic proc~dure there has not been and there is not now any indicatbn from Hanoi that . they are prepared to a:c~?:: the self-d<!ter:;-.inatior. a:"l.d indepe:'ldent e:d.st~;lCc of their neighbo:s free COl;ut=ies 'rather than wha~ the cc~~unist countries r.ave COilie to call their wars of natio:1al liberation.




: "You are familiar \-lith t!any ,initiatives ..~hich have been tCl.ken during' the past year to bring this matter frora the 'battlefield to the ~onference't?blc 'but you are also familiar with the.increased infiltratipn by North Viet-Na~ to ~.pose their \.:ill by force. .' " , , .


"Our task remains, ,therefore, that which President' Johnson has often stated, namely, to assist our friends in South Viet-Nam to repel the aggression against the~ and,' at the same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has .' repeatedly declared, ,,,e are prepc'.1:-ed for unconditional dis'cu5sions with the governments concerned; or, as the 17 'nonaligned nations phrased it, negotiations without pre conaitj.ons. ", ' '.



Office of Public Services Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

4/17d - 1266BT路

, 26

Sl;Cm~T,-\l~r I~[SK'S ~EWS C(lXrEl~·;~.:\Cr:,

196.5 (Exct:rpts)

:\OrE:\Wlm 26,


Sin,~e mY rctnnl fr •.\nl the I!ltl~r-,\mct'it;::El Colli'~;:i:nt;:e I h:,sc l"c:\c[ wh:'.l h:d b~~tt :;:Iid durin;! !:i\" flb~£,llc.; :tbllut tIlt' :::o-cd!~~l pc;~('e [c~1er;;

of b;t autumll. I h:\n~ ~J,,~ ~l'ca thl! fra;u:t:>lIt 0;1 thi:; subjl'c~ v;hich appe.lred n:cciHly in :l n:'.ti'n::lll!::l:;";1l.iae. It i:; true th:~t b~t :luttaan ~\nlb~~..;~ad(lr 5te\ t!a:o:():! \\-:15 it~f(fl"[:~t~d. by St:;:4·~t~trY Gt~~t~:-:ll U 1'''hant th:lt he 11:1.] be.::! infi,:'Il:el! indi:-.:~cd:· tli:tt Il:l!:,)i "w0u!d be \\'mi::g to have :'. Clm!;lcr with the l-n:tel15t;ltb :lnd th:1t tbe S~C;et:l'T Gi::~t'r:ll had suzg~.;~el! l1::t:;':",):l t~5 a suit:1b!e sifc. • Whcn thi- nl!'.tter :!l'U:{-, it W:1S cO!l~jdered in t11C li:ht. (If It gTeat deal of iI~forn~:;tion 5'yl!il::blC' :It th{' tirne about- t:':~ :l~ttittlde of the nuthoritic::; in Ihnoi snd, indt';;d, (If othc-r g.:m:rrtl~:ents in the Communist \\·udd. I lim not f!t liberty to cite dl of :!tese CO!HS('t;;, which were m:mcrous, but you will r':(':tU thnt thE- C::';l:-:dbn )'lbister of Extern::} Affdrs !{'ported to hi" Hon::{' of Cc·ml!~o,,:s ill Jnne of this _. . .."r ~l·,t 1",,,, -1'-':''::; ... n·\·. h., C,1 H '1~~ I :-~\Cr_l -" -. (\1 )C .1 .. .. l .. o Cn~'-. . C.l •. n C.€1 ••1."I._.("'t.. o~. ~.lc IC':"""\ ,\.., •••• ..• ne trips to H !Hloi o;'cr the S Ina:!!!!s prior to t!lC end of ).fity. There were other public bdirfJic'!l:; such [:s t:H.' f::ilnr~ of the Pcli;h proposals on Lf:oS r...ld the r('ft::d c,f lhnoi to e.ti<::!1d tlH: EX. $.:ocmih· Council in Au~ust. I !UY::cli hud a number of d.iscu~sio:1S with thc'reprcsentnti\cs of ot!!!'!" it)\'(';'nmen!~, indudhg COililnUt!i;:t pn·t.':llnlc:nts. It sec:ms deer beyond :1 per.1dye:lturc of doubt tbi; t lIar-oj W:lS not prepared to (Escu;.;s pc;>'cc in SQud.!c::;:t .Ash b;lsed up.):llb i:gri:o?mcnts of 195·1 and ]96~ Sl!n kc·~:i!!,: tow::.rd the lifting of ':::~ic::~~io!l rr .... ainst South YictnaIn. Illdecd, in'the htter P!!1"t of 196·! '·lIa'iI.1 i inct~nsed its infiltmtioll, inchding l!!llt.; of its j"(,",ul::.r arrm-: 1'11c,' undouhtcdh' felt. thnt thEY were the trn'c::~hoid of \i('~tori. Ju~t, yc:;teru:l\Hiluoi denied· thrrt th'; b~d rr:tdc f:l)\' pronos~ls io: ner.othtioHS. • Throu;hout nIl of i::st year, the gC::!lcrd nttitude of ti!{' Communist' world lr;lS that t.ilt'" mklJt c():!~idcr some dl'\'kr to H!YC the fnce of the Unit(-d States \"'hil; thl'\' the!nsch'e~ imu05cd tb:ir will lipan South rietnr..m. Our flttitud~ Wi!:; and is th:;t we He not interested in sa\in~ fr.c(; but in s;lying South \,ie~1Jam. It is worlh Tccdlin:-; that. Pre~jd~lll Kennedy [;ud his princip~l adds!":!'s 1l1:1dc n iar-re::d,in;::- re',1'-,\' of the situe.tion in southeust A~ia ellrly in 1flGl, r.nd dc~('~;nined to do e\"cl"yth:!1g p(j~siblc to find a pCi'.ceiul settlell)cnt b~.i'ed upon the intezritv r.nd thc s:lfet-; of the smaller m~tions of southc:.-:st Ash:. Pl"csidc;lt Ken:wh·'s tr:fks with Chairnun Khru;;!tch(:\" in June 19!H lcd to agrel'!.ce:lt p,inciplc on L!lOS bat !Jot 0'1 \-ict!1:1m. The both:"! Confere:lca succeeded in . cOlduding the :;gree;}l~at of 19G2, un ngrcemcnt Wllich f:liled because Hnnoi refused to ~omply with it in tHy ,n1}" S!J:!pe, (I~ form. X e,'crthcle:;s, during :1ud ufter tUe.t conference tlw 'Cnilcd St:He.:; h~s h~d iepe:1ted discussiollS ~bout tbe: possibilities of r. p.:eceful settlement in SQUtlJC;1st }.sb. Hanoi, in th(.'ir wcll-Imo\';n' fOllr points, 1::1£ indic!ltcd its bllsic position on Yictn:!!l1. They b \"(~ refuscd to accept the sugg~stion tId,. their l)oiats (fln be di:;cm~rd 11lon~ with f!ll olll;:!" points presented by other ~c,\·ernmi'~ts. ThC'.... th.:refvrc, exclude i:l ndnlnce the positioIl wflich th.~y kt!o\'; the' Lni!ed St:ltcs and other.:; will t:lke; nameh', t h:lt X orth Yit'tnnlH mu"t stop its nr:~rrssion 1,::..!i~:;t South Vietn:~m nnd d!;CO!lti:l1!c its e;;ort to in~Do~e the prozr:illl or the Xlltional Liber~1ti;)n Froat 0:1 SOlith Yi~:n:~m h\" force. TIH're h:m~ been rn:lm- c-f1"c·rts b,' the t;nited- S~:1t<:5 ~nd h\' other go\'£·rnme~,I.:' tLro~!g!J('lli the P:1St "5 ye~;"5 !o uC'!:,ie"e P.:':lC(: ·for the nation;; of !'{.t:th(':~!jt ...\:;in. L<!;n-i:lg :~~idc ~1n qll('stio:1.'; t1 f dipJOllUltic proccdarc-, tb'rc hf:5 not been :~:~(llh(':-e i3 H0t n(J\~' !!lly indic;,t!,)Jl from ., ttl", ...... _,.1 t() ,.('crll. " ,. tl 1\;~ Sc.,!(·(.t;Lf~l,ll.! l,' .' j ...... • nd .. 1.0.; t 1,1.. .<~. " .. r"" !J)"t).lllt: .....; tln :l 1,1"" the incirp(,!:d(·:lt (':\i~t(,llt"C of ,~!dr ll{'i~hho~ i:S fr;:i:! (,0l!nlri(s mthcr tll,'ll ,",II:! t the Cc,mmunist cl}:mtrii~' It:! \'C cO!I~e to c:lll thl'ir W,\IS (Ii nati,)n:lllih.:ri! tion . . You nrc {;:;~!i1i:lr ";ill! mnl\\" inifiJ:in:.:; \d!:eh 11:1ye J,e"It taken cur· iug the past y.:-;;,r to ki;:~ thf; !!~Qtkr in,"'lD tbe k~'l;:!"i·:·~d to the conLuI;




on •






ference t:.ble and you Il~e n!!':o fmuilhr with the increased inftitmtiQn by North Yietl\~m tOlmpo5c' their will by Corce. . Our tl!.::!; rc!illains, thcrdort!, I!mt whidl rr('~hkllt Johllson lws otten· staled; lliuncl;:., to tl~si~t onr friC!l(L... in Sou.th Yictnl\m to repel the aggression 1l6:!l!L'it them lwd, !,t the S:lIne tunc, to keep open e\-ery pONihilitr of I! p~:lc!'rul s('ttli'rn~ilt. For this purpose, as Pl"t:'sident JohnsolJ. 'ht~S repNttC(Uy dechred, we nre prep.lri:d for uIlconditional discU.';sions with the glwerumeutti conct'rH('d, or, as the 17 nontllined nations phrt!s~d it, Itegoti:Hio!15 witlH.ut preconditions. QuesliM. ).fr. Scc/'etary, 111 the li91lt oj your statement aoout the Vietnamese sil!uzlit)n, if today u:e h'ld such a:n, indication th.l'ou9/~ MI'. 'Thant or ali.Y oliter c}«([nne! tit'll ti!t!1 I.-ere prepared to contact, apparently without Sptct/:c COTtditioM, 'lj:ould I/:C QCtEpt? . . Answer. 'fell. the l'rc~idel1t h'15 s~1id. on more thilO one Occ1l5ion, . and' so hu,'c I, that we arc prep.tfcd [01' unconditionl~l discussions or, as the 17 MtiOllS put it, neguti,\tinn:; without precondition. . In \"jew of the sl:ltemcnt made b\' Hanoi in the ItlSt 24 hours, I would not predict th:lt this is likel.'" "to occlIr in the next week or so. fJut:sfion. Well, 11;OlJU '!IV!! sa!}, tilen, tltal u'e hare .somwhl1t ~ojlencd our positi.on; [}lat i.s u-hc:rca.., ltz.~t year u. e sensed-we aftaclted some

condition.) tv our position, that this timc--


Answer. X 0, I think this is a problem of nuance here. President ," )lm::ou s;lid in April of this ye:).!', publieh' and clearly, without fl.uy doubt whaten!", that we Ilre prepared for ·unconditional discussions. . . Prior to tllitt time .the diseu55ions bad been printte; that is, our attitude on this bed been prinl.tc: . I have I!1v::;clf spent hours and hours and hours since 1961 with repre:;entati~-es of the other side t:1Iking about pe.lee in southe:lst Asia. There WIlS ne\'er any period when we were unwilling to talk about pe'l.~e in sou~he:'\st .;\sia. . Now, at the time last !"!.utuinn, I wllnt to comment, llnd I c.!uno& pursue it, th.1t this. was not the only contact by t!.1l_y meaIlS. There were meny contacts with the other side, including Hanoi. This was not the only contact. . . . This p;1rticltlaf incident hnd to be looked at in-ilgains~ t!le backgto~nd o( a Yery considenlblc ilcth-ity tbj,t was going on among the foreIgn offices of the world, to determine whether or not this particular thi'lg made!!. sigaiJic:!.nt difference. . . Question. J1r. ScCl'£i!l/"Y. are ·yov, .saying iha! there 11:as no chan!le in American policy in $0 ja/' as ne!lotiation.s are concerned dating from la.st April 71 . Ans\\-er. 'Well, in .-\nril the Pmldent sdd at B:lltimore that we nre prep<lred fOf uIlco:1ditiond dis<:nssioas. I think th.lt perhaps that was the first time tb,t it h,!d bCi.'ll saId in jU5t those words pubIick But this WIlS llot !l. ntl1jor ch;mgc in th~ sense tn'l.t for the P:1St v 5 years we have been in continuous contact with represent;lth'es of the Communist world a.bout oeare in soUth':~5: As!:!, There hilS ne.er been !lny ce55,t~ion of discussion 0:1 this sub-jcet. There has h~s never been any luck of oppo)rtu:lity to bring this matter of pe:l.ce to theco!ift!.t!ZlCC ! ~~b!':?, ii the othi.'f s:d~ is pr~pared t.) stop tninO' .. ,oe . .torce 011 ~I)Ut. ~ h ".·letnam. to •unpose t"nel.i' wlii . " I:> So th:"l.t if there \\'~tS :l. difference in the public W;l.y in· which this mattcr w:!.s stated, there ~':lS no difr'are;;~a in the basic objecti~e of


the t;nitt'd States, and lW diITc-;"('ncc on the PC,illt lhnt \"c were in CO!ltnct with the ('('l11lllllni;;l world, -Quc.~:i(ln, WAUl !/OU H!~! tdtJ.o'.d l'riConditiolls, llf)wdu, '!Iou are iall."i1i(J only al,ou: ·u:i:l!GI.!t ?;(co.id!fio:l'~ of r;.:~:il)Q iii tl:~, ,mm6 room to open discussi01i:;, arc YOll r.(,~, biCaU$( ymi l{~t(d artifllit'!T oj cO:ldition~ 'Wnicl, tile Ullifid S{i!ffS teo;!l..! kan' in fams ofilte sdllfmnd to De readIed at any $ucl~ discussions. . Answer, Well, I do not snppoi'C thl:t anyone would expect the United Sl:1tC5, in ngr..:t:'inz to disc\!$sic'!1s \\ithout pr('c(lndi~io:1s, to imply t!Jereby that. \\-C Pore £(lin~ to nc('('pt the prOZTilm of the other ~ic1c in snch discussions. Qut.$tion. Tl:aejorc you concede tltat the oillu side 1L'i{l also come u;itit 1'[$ preconditions. ' Anf.'\*cr. 'YeB, we h:1\"e dre:\dy s.:::id to the oth~:, side-\,c haye alre,.dy s::.id publicly to the other side th:::t we are prl.'pnred to ,talk about their propo~als nlon~ 'nth the propos:1ls of nil the other go>ernml.'nts conc<?rned, ~nd ti!ey han turned th:lt down. . Qur.s!ion. l'o!!r point i.~ t!ta( as oj today, aside from tlte i(;c1.nical problem 1d.ic1! you call f.;Ui];~ a matinJ ~tGrtc:d, tJte .<ituat-Zoll is thfli 1Ce arc u:illi1i!J to listw to ll.dr pll:co]ldition.~ jor sdlloiiwt as 'well as our OU.'Ti, ilIa! tl:£!j are not v:illir.!l to /i.~fen to our l)mcr:dificns as 'I.cdi- as theirs. .. Answer, Well, the question of whether, for e:mmp!e, their four points, )'Ir, Roberts, fire precondiiioncd to allY di;;cllssion, or nn~ conference, h~s yari.:d a lit tIe OYer time, ~ • 'l'hl.'re hnxc been mOnlt'nt;;., quite frllukly, when it has eppearcd that they were rlgid pr.:condir.ioi~5, th~t thc:;c four point;;; lrou1d hu\'e to be acc..:pted bdo:'c there can b~ :my serious di~cussions. There b\'c bern other times \\'11en we lw,d the impl'c::sion th:lt. there were not mce::;:;arih- preconditions to di~cU~5ioIlS, but that they would be the points on ,~'hkh the other side would in~ist as neccs:.'iU'Y for peace, .. I \\"ouId-om:l bas tbe impre~:;ion that in recent weeks t!H:ir r.ttitude . has be<'n moying tow::lrd Ihc.:e four point:; as preconditions somev.-hat Dlorc than might h!'.\'c bec:!! our impre:>sion Cor a time. \Ye don't know; ,Yc don't know. But what we arc s:n-ing is thnt if the\' W:lnt to come to tl1~ confcrence tublc, if the," \\:,:nt to have di;;cu:;~ions, we will discuss, and in th05C disctlssions t1;c\- cftn s;w nllYthinzthat the\" W:l.nt to. But we must be frce to say a"nything 'thnt" we .,,1mt to. .And then we will try to find our whether there is :1 b!lsis for peace. . But.we nrc not gOln!! to limit di;;.ctissions to their four points, . 1\0\\', the::e ha\"c got to be discussions in which £oYernments can talk like gow:rnmcnt;:, di~cu"s their pI'ohlE-1m, tllcir intercsts, th€:ir · demands, to sec \,..hcther i~ that kind of mutunl discussion there is any basis for pe~1ce. Xo,,", \\'C did that in 19G1, on Lno:5, :md it srclJlcd, in the Vienna cOD\·crs.ltiol1s bi.'twe('n Chairman Khru,.:hch{'\- :\nd Prc::ident Kennedy, that there \\'as ~, be~is for ~~ scttl.:ment of the L~lOti:ln question. Ko such b:1Sis !\ppe~rcd in \li~cu5;:ing rietn:un. lYe got tile conference: :1!ld the i:!?reCment on L:los. •.\nd- liS I pointed out in my st:~tem(:nt, the problem with tIle.t is that H:111oi ne\"cr complied \';ith it.. . .' re~ul:1r

· But I don't w~mt to le:;\"a the impr(:;;::ion thllt we nre-I th!nk it is to bt! cle:tr on two thingsj tbt we ~re prej):,red for discusSl~~S, \\ithout. ,c~:lditions, \\;thout prcconJWo:ls, But \';c are not gOlJlZ ~o proIl~lSt: 111 :!d'"ance or ~"!.~ llny ti,l!lC tbt we llre goiI!g to gi\"e aWlly .he b;l:HC Illter':5ts of the ::,outh \ letn:lmf:5~ PCOp~\! :1lld South YietnerI1, end th.: ilit~:-e,,:5 of the United :3tlH~,; whi.':t we L'O into such dhcussion5, The oth~l' side i.~ not goin:: to do t!:~t. " . · So the problem is to find oat '.'.'hefhei, gh'C!l the attitude;), the mterest;), the commitment" oi the two sides, ii pe;lCC is pos:iib!e, 1:t1port:!ot

29 .

LETTlm }-'P.O:\I :\:\I!USSADOn AHTIIL'R J. GOLDmmG, u.s. m~pm:SE:\TATln~ TO THE UX1TED NATlOXS, 1'0 SECI:J~T:\ltY GEX::;!!:\I. U TH:\:\,T, JA:,UAHr 5, 19GG I His Excdll'llCY U 'l'HA;>;T, . Secretary Colicral, United Nctil)ll.<;. DEAR )'In. Sr-:Cilf.TAUY GEXERAL: !o[y GO\'cmment h:~s'during the pest 2 '\'ceks bc~n tt~1:i!lg l~ namb~r of steps in pursuit of PC;lCC which ftow in p."!.rt frl.lm ottr ohli~il.tions und.:r the Lnitcd XI~tions ehetter, of which we ille mc.st mi!1dful, end in p:n-L from the I'.PPc;11s which His Holiness the Pope t'.nd you r.(Mre~:;~J. just before Cl.u·i';lm~~ to us and to others. I bdit~ ..'e it- \\'ould be of mterest. to you, m ~d(ht!On to wh:-!.t we he.n: 11lie;1dv conllnuHic.~ted to YOll printteh', mlll to ell Sh~tes members of the "Cnited ;\1'..tiOIl5 to know morc precisely \\"lh~t we ha\'e dOlle, fl.nd Wh:lt we h:1YC in mind, . You ",ill ob::C!Te thtt we h:n'e illr~:~d'y rcspondt'cl ill terms ';'hich go somowlult beyond the l!.pptds e:n-ltCr tHldr.~sscd to us, PreSIdent Johnson disp:'.t.:hca me:55:~~(:5, tmd in scyel':tl Cilses person:'..l repre5enh~tin:s, to His Holine;;:> the Pope, to the Sccrelt!ry Ge:J('rd of the United ~:,til)n5 end to II COI!sidcr:1ble number of chiefs of st:1.te or he~ds of government, re:1ffirming' our cleo-ire promptly to echic\'c 3pC!lca:ul scttlc:ncat of t·he conflict in Yietn:ll1t and to do all in our power to mon thd conflict irom the b:,ttldleld to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of X orth Victn:l.n1 h.1.s not bel3J1 resumed since the Christm:1.s truce. Among the points made in ollr mC5S:l~!.'3 convoyed to II number of go\'crnrnents 1:1'C the following: Th:lt the V'nitel SUttes is prep::I'ed

for discus~ion5 or n~g.)thttions with<)ut an, prior conditions \vhat~ soe\'er or on the b::5i., of the ·G~ne,';J. ;\ccorc!s of HJ5·1 nnd 1962, that a recipror.-,l reduction of hostilities could be en,is:1ged and that a cease·fire mid;t be tile first order of business in ilu\' discussion or ne6otintiollS, th~lt the Lnited States te:~1:!i!ls pl'~p:U"ed to withdr(\\\' • its forces from South -rietHlun its sr)on ::s S,xtth Yietn:llu is in a position to determine its own future without cxtem;11 interference, that the United St:!te:; dt'~ire5 no continuing milit:lr.\- presence or b;\ses in . Vietnllm, th:!t the future politicl,l structure in South Yietntltn should be deterrni~Nl by the South Yietn:1mese people theimeh'cs through democmtic procc~ses. tl!lcl that the ques!ion of the reunifict:tion of Yietn.:uIl5 should be decided O\'•" the free decision of their two the two 1 peop,es.

I should appr,:ci:!te it if this letter {'ouM be communicated to ell .members of the "Cnited Xations e.s :! Se.~urity Council doclllneni. I should urge th~m in ex:unu:ing it to re,all President, <TQbnson;~ l~tter of July 2$, 1965, to the Secret::!'y Gr:n"r:l! in which the Pre~ident inrited flll mcm bers of the rnited X ;,tions, indi\"ldu:~lh' and conec~ th-ely, to usc thc·ir influence to brbg f!bout unconditional dis('u~sionsJ and my letter of July 31. 1955 (dN'ument. 5/6575) to the President of the Security n·,:.lUcit in which I .said, inter di.~, that the tllited St:ltC$ stands re::dy, 1:$ it h::s in the p~st. to coll;,bor:1te unconditionally with members of the Sc.:urity Coundl in tl:c se:1!'ch ior an :lceeptubl'e formub to restore p~acc :md security to tbt ureft of the world. I should 110pe th:,t Oll the present occll:;ion 11150 orr;IiIlS of the United t\atioliS and ::11 St:1te::: woald gh-e eYen more e:!rnc3t thQu·yht to \..hat they mi~ht co to help to nehie',e these cnds. '" Sincerely yours, ARTHLR






u.s. OFFICIAL POS!l'LOX OX nETXA~\I: St!!le Dep3rtl!lent Press Rclc.:se t J:muary 7. 19CG 1 The fc.llowing statements nrc on the public record about elements which the rniled St:nes bdie\'es (':111 go into pe!lce in southenst .~~ia: 1. The Geuc\'n Agre('mcllts of 1954 and 19G2 arc .10 ndequate busis for peace in southC;'I.H Asia; 2, We would \<;c1corne fl. conference on southe.1st Asia or on any part. thereof; . 3. We would welcome "negotbtions without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it; _ 4. We would welcome unconditional discussions us President Johnson put it; . 5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order 01 business at /l. COl' rcrCllce or could be the subject of prdiminary discussions; 6.. Hanoi's four points could be discussed fllong with other . points which others might wi:=h to propose; 7. ire wtmt. 110 U.S. bases ill 50uthe:lst Asia; 8. l\c do not desire to ret:lin U.S. troops South Yietnum after peace is fls:mred; 9. We support ifee ekctbns in South Yietuam to give the South Yietn:ul1c;;c n f:0',CrIHlH:nt of their own choice; 10. The question of n::unific.liion of Yietnllnl slwuld be determined by tlie Yietll[\n!e.~e through their 0\\':1 iree decision; 11. The countric:s of southeast ~\.:;i:1 c(ln be lloJ1:1.lined or neutral if thnt be their option; . 12. 1Ye would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southe::st Asia th<1n ill w.~r. If there is peace, North YietnaIl1 could p:utidpate in .~ redoilal effort to which we \i"ould be prep;ued to contribute :1t lenstS! billion; 13. The President has said:


The ,'ictCOllg ~'ould not.h~,\"e difficulty bcin; uprcscntcd :lnd h:wing their views r"prC5i.'!lt(路d if for n mOmt'!lt H:IMi c!!:dd~d :;~,c w;lntC'd to cease :lssr('ssion. I don't thil~k ! hit would be rill ill'iUrmoullt:lble problem.

14. We It:lye- s[dd puulicly and pri\":ltely that we could stop

the bombi!Jg of Xorth Yicl!l<l1l1 n$ a step towurd peace although there b.s not been the sli:::htest hint or su拢:zcstion from the othl'r side as to what they ,,;oulll do ii the bomC[ng stopped. I Dep!:tOZ:':Il: or St:.~ p:ess re:~'<l ~"" t

<!3~~! J~. 7.1!>j5.









Not too nl:my ~reiU'S :1g'O Yictn:un 'W;15 :'!. 'P~:lc~Cul, if trouble!i, land. In the north \\":~s :m inucp~ndei1t Comnmlilst go\-ernment. In the south 1', pe')ple stru~gl~d to build 1\ lI:~tiO:l, with the friendly help of . tho Unitc::d. St:lte::. 'I'here were som~ in South Yictn:1.tn who wiihcd to (orN Commun~:;t rule on th~'ir 0\\"11 people. But their pro;rC;35 Wt15 slight. 1'heir hop~ of ~UCCl\~S W;\5 aim. Theil, little morl! than GYCilfS I1go, :-; ol'th Vietnnm decided 0:1 conqu.:>sL FNIll tbt d:1Y to this, so!dici:S :mcl supplies h:1\"c mond from north to south in a swelling strc.lmswdlo\\-ill:! the l'CIHIl:lnts of re,-olution in il£:~ressit)il. . As tIle ~U~~:tl.llt lllounted, our cholee gmdl!:u.lv bcc:lmc de:lt_ We could Ie::.Ye, Ub:lIH.loilinz S'~H1th Yietn:llH to its :ltt:lckers and to certain c~nque:;t, or \\'e couIer ~t;l.y and fight. beside the peop!" of South vIetnam. . We stayed_ . And will st:'.\" untilllg~re55ion h:15 stooned. We will stny bccnu~c :, 'Just n:lti~ln c:'tnn()t It':n-e to the crudt.ies of its enemies tl pcople who hi'.vC st:'..kcd their liYc5 and indcp~ndence on Americil.'S solemn p'lcd;e-:1 p!.cd;~ wl:ir.;h Ilt\5 grown through the commitments of three :'\meric:m Pl'c;:ideuts. . We will stay because in ~biit-nnd aroul:d the world-inc countries wh05(; indcpe'ldencc rcsts, in hrge me:lsur':\J on confidence in .Americ:t's word and in Amerb'.'s protection .. To yield to [orce in Yietnam would we;lk~!l th:lt confidence, would undermine the independence of me-nr bnds. and would whet the appetite of the !1ggre;:sor. We would 1:1\-e to fight in one bnd, :tndwc would h:'!. \-0 to fig!tt in anothet'or ab::!.!ldon much of Ash: to the do:ni!l,1tion of Communists. And we do not intend to tlb:mdon Asi,\ to conque:,t. . Last ye~r tite ndurc of the Wilr in Yietn:1m ch,1llgcd Ilg.tin. S\\'iftly mCre;l5i!l~ numbers of armed men frolli the north crossed the border to join forces th:tt were l:.lri:01dy in the south. ..:\tt:\ck and terror in.creased, spurreu e.nd encoum::;ed by the b;:-Ed tlut the United St:ltes lacked the will to continue :lnd thd their YlcWn- WaS nee-r. Despite our de.~ire to limit conflict, it W:lS ncCeS5~\r}- to tlct: to hold back the mountin 6 ag6re~sion, to giye cotlr:1;e to the people of the soutb) and to l1l1'!.ke our firnmcs" cle:lr to the north. Thus we beg:m limited gil' action agllln::it milit:try t:m;:uts in X orth Yietn,lm. \\ C increased our fighting force to its pre:;e~t strength tonight of 190,000 meo. These man,; hn \-e Dot ended the I'..z£:rcssion btl t they h:t \-e prenn ted its success. The !:.im:> of the eaem)'-bese be~n put out of re:lch by the skill and the brln-en' of Americ:lns :md their allie$--llnd bv the endur,ing com'l~g~ (If the "South Yietn:Hne~e who, I can tell you, "hese lost elglit men b;t YC;'tt for eycry one of ours. . . . The enemy. is no longcr dose to victory_ Time i5 no longer on his SIde. There I:' no c:!u~e hi doubt the Americ~n commitment. Our dcd..:i'H\ tl) :;t:lnd finn h:'..$ been m:ttched b...- our de~ire for ne:lce. In 190.) t1lo11e we h~d 300 prh-<lte t:'..lk~ fll!" p~~:ce in Yictn:1nl ,,;th friends nne! r..dn~G:lrie5.• throu~!1011t the world. .:> Since Chri,;trt~:~;; your GCt\-crn:n~:1.t 11:13 h!.b')red :12)lin-w;th !!n'l"'in. emIenc:ur;!n::e-to · .. .... ~ atlOo r.:>OlO\'C :my o:!IT!<:r to pe::,ceful :se~t!e:.lent



For 20 d:~ys now we flnd ota' Yietnl'.mese !'.IIies hflye dropped no b'ombs in Xorth Yietnnm. . Able find cxperirHced spokesmen IaH'c ,isitcd, in b!'!!e.li of America. more tha~ 40 countries. \'i e h:n-c tnlk~d to morc than a hundred gon·rumcnts-nU 113 th:!t we h;1\'e .rhtions ',\ith. a!!Q some that we don't. \'ie tulked to the Lnitcd X~tions and \\'e b,e e~l!ed upon all of it~ m~mbers to m:lke allY eontributiOD tbt they call towiLrd lieIping obtum peace. In public st!!tements nnd in prh'ntc communic.1tion:s-to ad,er, sarics and to irie-aes, in Rome l.:ncl l\'arsaw, in P;1ris and Tokyo, in Africa imd throu£hout this ·hemisphere-Amcric~!. has wade her position frbundnntl,Y clear. . . 'Yc seck n(>ithE', territ O1'y 11 or bllSCS, eco!lOmic domini! tiC'u or military alliance in Vietnam. l\'" e ~ght for the pi'indple of sdf~determimnion­ that tIl(~ people of South Yietn:1l11 ~hould Le r.ble to chc>o~e their own course, choose it in free elections without \-ioleace, wit!wut terror, and without. felr, Thc peop!e of en '-ic!n:!!U should me.kc a free decision on the gre;:t. question of reunification. This is nIl we want for South Yietnnnl. It is tIll the people of South Vietnam \\'ant. And if there is a sim:le nation au this eilrth that desires less Hum this for its O\nl people; then let its ,o:ce be hefLrd. We ha ,c aho lIl~lde it. cleat-from Hanoi to X e';; York-that there are no arbitrllry limits to our sc~rch for peace. We si;:nd by the Genen, u~reemc!lts of H~5{ r,nd 1962. We will meet r.t. tUlY conference tfibie: we will discuss any propoE'e.1s-4 points or 14 oi·!Q--and we will comider the yicws of any group. \'ie \\'ill work (or a cease-fU'e 110W or once di~cu~5ions h[t yc began. \\c will respond if others reduce their use of force, and We will withdr;t\\" ou.r soldiers one~ South ViNnnm is secure!y gu;~runtecd the right to shape its O\';n iuture, . We h:lse sl1id dl this, ::.nd we hf. YC :lskcd-aud hOPed-~nd we have waited for a response, So far we h~'j"c receind no response to pl'o\-e either success or failure. We hl~,e cf~rricd our quest for peace to m:my nations end peoples becau~e we share tbis phnet with others who~e future, in ls.rge measure) is tied to ou!' o',';n action, ~nd \\'hose cou,"1sel is ncceS5::i\' to our own h~~.

We ha\'e found llndersbnding end support. And we know they we.it with tIS tonight ier some response that could ICl1.d to pe~ce, I wish tonight th~t I could gin: you :~ blueprint. for the course of this conflict O\-el' the combg n:c·nths, but' we ju,;t {,:,:U10t ho's whe.t the future may require. \\- e lll:~y hayc to hce long) ll:'lrd combat. or a long. h5!.rd conference, or eyen both at once. Until pC!lce come5, or if it docs not. CO:llC. our COl1rse !s clear. We will :let ~s \\'e llll:st to hdp protect the independ':!lce vf the ,'aliant 'people of South Yiem~'~m. We \\i!l stri,e to limit the cun{!ict, for we wish neither incrc.l:s"d destrt!ction 1101' do \\-e W:lnt to b,,'ite incrl!.!sed d:1n~er.

But we will gin our fip:1!!bg men wn . ,t they must h::n;: e,cry gun. e,erY dolhr, :md. c\'cry d!:c:sion-·',\"~:\tenr the cost or whatever the



And we will contin::e to hdn the p~t)pb or South Yictn:~m C;1.re for -e t'l"t "re r",-·',.-:>·J b,' l,'r~le "r"'t" .. u'n the \..111 .....~\.!:,) .- "ud tho::" 1 ..... '~\~:'.,:'fC • v;:. .. ll l: •• ~ p··"'r" .l'6 t.:~~ _ ... cl',n'Y fCTwf:rd the hr:;;!u:g clJpes of p(!.~ce £.s best. they c~a amidst the uncert:lln t<::rror5 of W:1.r. Co..




.And let me be ~~1'50111tdy c!c~'.r: the d~'.Y:i ml'.)" become m.onths, ~:nd mouths m:~'y b0CO!He yc:~r,." but we will stu), :'.5 10116 !!S eggrc3s1on cOllun~nds us to b:~ttle. ' There m:!y be SO!1.1C who do not W:lll~ 11cncc--whose ambitions stretch so fill' t!Hlt \\";tr in Yietn:1111 is but. ll. welcome l~iJd cOln"enicnt episode in an immense desiga to sulrlnc history to their "wilL But for others it. mU5~ IW\\' be cl(':u' the choi\!t} is not between p~;lCC and victory. It lies between pc~,cc and the r:..... eges of c. conflict Irom which they Ctln on1\" lose. ' The people (If Ylclil:1m, Xorth and So.lth, seek the se.mc things: tht' shared needs of nw.n, the nc('d:i for food i!!.!d shdtC'r t1.nd educ:ltionthe ch~1.nce to build :\Ud work :'..ud till the s1)il, free from the crbitrary horrors of b:1.ttlc--thc dt.'sire to w;!lk in the di:::nit-y of t.ho3e \\"ho mitster • • ~ • ". ~.v d l' thel.r OWl! <lestl:1\'. :r or m:'.uy p:ll!l! U1 Y<!:1rs, In W:1.1" un ren) utlOn e.nd infrequc:'tt pC~lce, they ha \'e struggled to tuUm lhosc needs. It i:; £I: cri.me l1g,linst rnr.ukind that so much COU!';l~e, and so much "..m, end so Dl:1~I}:- <1re:u115, mU5t be flunb Oil the fires of W;lr ~'.iid de:lth. '1'0 all of tho5e cl'.u;;ht up in thi$ conflict, Wil therdo:e S:lY r.ge.iu toni~bt: Let us choo;;e pe.~ce, r.nd with it. the \\'ondrous wor1:s oi pe.1Ctl, and~beyo:ld thilt, th~ time when hope re:!.chcs toward consu!:!l!ll:ltion, Rm! is the se:-,:mt of life" In this work. we pbn to disch~1rge our duty to the people whom we ser'ic. 'I'his is the ste.te of the Unioll. • But o,er it. ~lll--\n:t1lth, promise, and cxpcct:1tion-lies troubling e...,':2reness of .:i.meric;m mea t'..t \\·2.r toaigM. . How milr.y men dlO lis.ten to me tonight hitH scn-ed tteir Xation in other wai'$? Ho\,; ..-en- m~w\" ere not here to listen? The "'-~r in Yk,ne.m is not' m::e the.se other 'W~lr3, Yet, fbelly, 'war is ehn1)"s the S:lme" It is yOUllg men C\'lltZ in the fullness of their promise. It i~ tr)ing to kill tl. D1:\n th:l~·YOll do not eveD know well enough to hte. ,' Therefore, to know v.-:!f is to know that there is still IDeane.55 in this 'world. ~rany oC vou sbre the b:.rrden ot this knowled a 8 toniO"b~ with me. But thcfl~ is" a differwcc. For finelh- I must be the onec to order our gu.'1S to fire, e.g:'.U!5t all the most im\"ard pulls of DW o.e.slre. For we have children to te:lch, und we 11:1.>0 sick to be cured,·and we ha ....e men .to be freed, 'I'here are poor :0 be lifted UP, and there llre cides to be built. end thc:'e is u wodd to be helped" • . Yot we do ,;hf>t .. e mu.5t. , I ~.m ~op::~ul, and I will try as best I C~1n, i..-ith e,erything I have got, to end this b:ltt!e !lnd to re~Ui'n our son.s to their desires. Yet as lon~ e.s othe,.:; mE chl!enza Amei'lC.l'S security end test the de9.me::s or our be1ie:.5 with fi!'~ :lncl steel, then we must stand Of see the promise of two Ce::turie5 tremble. I belie"'~ tonigh~ tblt you do not went me to tr', that risk" .And from. th::1t belief YOtir Pre$ider.t sumrnous his stre:1'gth for the tri:'!l.s that by i'_he:1.d In the d-ay.s to come. . The work oust be our ,,;ork now. Scarred b\- the. we::.knesses of .., • .1 Goc.I nl~ly oller ~ .- 1 man) ~'1t!1 "::1:ite . .·cr gtu~~nce us, Tle nlust De'J. . e:tn~ . . c55 and 'alone v,-itu our moi'taiit'>, stri,e to e~nobla the life of m:lll 'on earth. • . tlle







I ~









I appreciate vcry deeply the honor which Howard Unh'crsity has .p.1id.. me tod3Y. The ideals How:1rd has stood for, and the pioneering things it has achie路.cd, in its first century :lre no. meed}" of local but of nationJI and indeed 'intecu:!tional significance, For the future of our democr.1cy de~nds on the opportunity-such as. Howard 'has alw3Ys sought to prodde-for every American to devdop to the: fullest his inborn potential of dlar:lcter and intellect. In pursuit of this ideal r fec! certain chat Howard will provide in . its second century a leadership 'no less important than in the century you ha...e just completed. . You may be Sl!re that when I use die word "leadership" in conne.:tion with Howard Vnh>crstty I am not thinking in the abstract; J apl thinking with gre:lt admiration and g,;lt!tude of one particular le~der, your eminent President and my dear friend and colleague, Dr. James M. N:lbrit, Jr. As you know, when the President ask:::d me to assume the post of United States Represent:ui\>e to thdJnitcd Xations and I h:ld to find :l Deputy Representath'e who couM share the immense difficuhi~.. of that vital work for peace, J sought Out Jim ?"abrit; a~d by dint of h:'l~d negotiating I managed >to get him for one year> D<.:ring that YC:lI r had countless occasions to be grateful for his clear and vigolOl!s mind. his (lbilit}> to see to the: heart of 3> complex prob!em. his force of ,h:traw:r. his charm and persuasi\'encss-~ll of which mlde him a most effective :lnd memorable advocate of the United States in the councils of the world.

I know you are as proud as I am of the s::rvices Dr. ~3brit h:ts rend~rc!d his country> An4 mu.:h though we :;.t the l':\ miss him. we must acknowl路 edge ch:l.t here at HOW:Hd University he is still rendering an outstanding sen'ice to his country. .

.It seems to me fitting th:.t, in the pre5cn.:e of Dr. ~:lb:oit who路sharedwith me for more th,;:m a yelr in the sc!ar.:h for peace. r should r<:port from. my


United N:!.ttons vantage point on where we now st.md in the unceasing effort to :lchb'c :!. just and th'':oor:lh!e n~goti::tcd settlement of the ccamet in Vietnam. It is equa!ly fitting tint this report sho~Id be m:'H!c on :; unh'ersitr campus, (or no lssGe of o~r cby h;lS brought forth a grc;l,cr In\,oh'cmcnt 011 the p:lft of our uni \"Crsitics th:lI1 thi3 one question. OuufJ~.t t.Q..9;:£!!.!b.e_f_g_~Lt.q.I~~!lC.~ in~TIe!n=!mJ.!.~Lq;9}.~fl...til!.l!..0}lLI~L !.~t \·"£C~?_r!.!#if_:l'<e.ruil:a.h;tL~~QJgq;g~g .Q.!l.thi.Lt;(:OIJP.y-.>!!J._!!fli!t1.!;!L . nJl_i!l.~~.r_Qt~t;!J~m£m~....I~pQ.r.i~_@..d.~)'-':;JJ~5.;_rrQ.!1Qu.n~c.,ntJ.l~?J.:Jj:..tb..~go.!:.~m:_ !!l.~!!~.!!:.!~h·ed, ar;ls:!!S QY w"rI£U9der?jm:!~dingR~"'~J~'!.!Il :!mt~:;e.f£l~y_ G~.n!:i.:tULTh;1.!JJ.J.~yu.to.ikL:lll~Ul.lte.t'i.ic.\):L\\it.h_r.:!r:i.9.:..li.p.~riQil;tli!i~$':=

and the perplexing evcnts in ~bin1and Chin:t. Right now we are in the midst of :ll'!o:hcr pa:1~c in the fi:;hting, the Lun:lr Nev,. Ye.1r truce. Thus this may be a good m~mcm to :lSSess the pres;;nt status. of our efforts for . p..":lce. In such an assessment, a responsibi!e o$ci:tl must, in all that he says in public, a.oid damag1ng the hopes for progress through prh'atc diplomacy, But in free seciety he must also accept the inc;capJble responsibility [0 keep the public ndeqt!:ltelr informed, It is dimcult to deJ.I on both levels at once but it is essential to do so :lS well as we can. Let me begin, then, br X~;gt~Qg..Jh~p.;t?ic;_4:\m;:!i~1l,!'LP..;:~£~.gill1~j!l V~l:- , .!till!!:... These aims" have: bcen st:!ted many times by Presidcn: Johoson and other responsible spokesmen of the United Stares: They h:n'e been stated over a Spill of two ye:1rS, but the ebb and flo',.... of the military situ::.tion during th:!.t time has not mide them any less \'.:lEd as guidc1;nes for peace negotiations,' We not subscri~ to the faIse r:otion t..;:!.t :1' strong military position obviates the desir:l.bllity of seeking pe:\ce thro~gh negotiations. Today. therefore, I wish to r~';icw the ess!n..:e of these .\m::riean aims.



'[h~ U.!lili;fLSi~t~.uG~k~ :q;.!~!i~k:l]2.cl.\!.~!Q.!}J.I)..Yk~r.:;m.. \Y.e...4.o.!19LS~J; tb~JUKQ!1.(liQQ.n;l.!...s.l!rr.en~~;:'Qt.o.uL:td.!e(i~.d!!~_We...s;:~k..;l.se.t.t!.cQ.l~n~_whQi~ .lCUllS \~i!Lz:.~.0LQQ!_JtQiR di.~l+.~iqi]J ._bllUr.om_ g~.n~in:! .-~g'!.~!~~g!)£...2

..~t.tkm'):J)lJ~~hQ!o;,wJ.t.l!:ilLrr<2u:J~<:i1i~~Al~ Yi1,1Lim~n~~.t ~lem-~~!!Y.:..:...~ th~')1:9rd~.9Ltb~_\.bi)il~_~ro.;:n.'JruQu~;~~Ih.u~;~1;:{il~n.Lo;.!he ~~LiQ..Yie!: ~m.iI.ep~Jld.~J~[l_.t.h~_r.~.2~i.r..e}~..a.n9 . willi . ngne5s_oLthr.:. _plctk~~Q.~.c;e.m~d._~ .~:j:pltKe ~np. ~:Qrk Q:,tupge;h.~L:l. j!t~t _::md.r.e).5.9p:!bk so~uJi.o;},: As President Johnson s~id a week a~o here in '\Vashingtoo: SGch a solution "will invo!\'e •.. concessions on both parts".

¥le .~nor ~g~~egJfl_ ~.. :hQ!Y. ~Y4~~_?g:!b..s.LC9m.ITlJd!l isn}:.._jY~.. ~g~~ 1





see~ 31l":llJl;:.r.!~;!.!) ..sp ...~::e_ pUn.l:..ien::e....l(L...,.il:!; . .r.Qr..a_p.erm:t!)e~t. .•::.!!l:;n9g..

'''p;esense'' ... q~ .. ?_r;y.. J~nd:::-~.l!1~ary. or ..o:herwi5c:-::i!l .. Xie,n~r:n;....nor.~c: • • • , '1' 'I' ·S h \ •. _)!Ilp05.~~ICJ.n..9.!!l. !:!1,~t.1.rY :l).:~n~e_o,! . O~~l. .l.e_n,:lfol.

~~r~ ~o..I1~~.!~.~...!;j_ 4~ ~r:t iEj~ry. ~_.~!.:!.iQ.I~.::.? _C~i.n::l_ ~or...t~_!f-'..;:e?~~n. ai!Y _oOts lesitimate interests.


We sc~'uQjl.~,;JI£J9 ti\~p.ss>.pk9L~utll Vi::.~!.!;m!.. ~h£_:llTIrm.:!!~~r;_~x.cr~~-: .i>f the rioht J>! sel{:9_etcill!igl~i.Q:.;=t~~;:...l!ght..J!!~~SiJ,~ thdr. o\::'~-fl?lili~~_ . ~e$tinJ. free. of .. e~\terp.:11 . iJltcdcr..:ncc. ;u;J.. fpr~L~ntl. Jhro:l~h..tl~lnocr3ti~.

•pr~esscs. _l~. kC5:pipg ~\'i~!1 ~~e. ~'ln~~:~c~4.~o.ut.l~'yi~r.!~~~~sE_~~~:~!!~~e~~·~ .policy of natior;at ft:co_n.ciH~J;o=!>.Y·~E.9 .!l.ot $~::~_ t~ l!.xd~Q.£ ~£}Y. ~;:gl!.l-;'!t. 9( !~e ~o~th Yictn3mcse. pc~.p!c_J!:!?!l!_I~~a~~.fuI.. p~~~!icipJt!?~_ Iil:_t£l.::.~r__~C?~~~~1~~ _futu.rc,,,.We 3re. prep:m-:J .to :!~~~pf. t4~. !'C§.l!lt.S .0.( t~at 4,;.:!s:o!l.\\:h~t~ve£ jt }~la y be~_. W ~ 5~ ppp!!th~_ c=!.r1 Y. C~I}~u. !fll!!~tio.l!_o.~ .::t..~~~~_.:.r~~;c_ ~2.~st ~~t:~~~1. ,system i~ ~ou!h, YLet!1:lll1.. ~.~(bv~.!~()t:t!~ th~ p.~~.;~-:s.~ 1:~i.f!g E::!c!~.~,!_~~~,e~~! .As reg3:rds ~or!h_ ~~~~~~.a.~l,-~:.~ h:l'~e _~.o_£~~ig.~~_ ~n_;t.s_t~.~.j~O!YL :l_f!~.~":~. dp IlO~ sc~JU9.. o~:erthr:o~\:j.ts ,go\:~rnn~~l}t. !~·~~t.e~~r_it~)d~f:ltogy., .\,~~..:l~e,. . prepared fully .t~, :C$P;!~t i~~ .~:t,:~~ei~n,~:: a'!~Ltcgit.oxi~t integrity _~g(;UO_ ~l}t'::.L ,into spcciflc ~.mJ~rtakings to tll:!.t end: We believe the r.:unific:ltion of Yictn;lnl should be decided upon thro"l.lgh :t


£~ec choice ~i" .~hc_l;eople~·~~ :~9t~. rE~' ~~~~h___;~d ,th~"S~'trth x~~th;~c

outside interfact1ce; and the rcsults of thltchoice also will h:n"c our full s!!pport, .

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• •



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.... _ _ _ _ _


_ _ _ • _ _ _ _ ..... _




• __ .-

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EjJla.lli:...2Yh~Q."p,e3f.~j,~.J~gQ,-e.Q~, ar~ )~'in~.ng .~Q_lll.a..k~~~r .cE~"!!!!!~t.:

_f!l.mt.glD1Qnej:'.Ji!1~Q.L;tIl~L~,e?..Q!tF~.U9_.l_ !RtJ'~iJ:llq~Lcoopera ti \'.Lejfcm.!9_ ..hril}g.JSLaIl_Qf South,~ast-L\~i=b incl'd91tIg :'\o!tn ~·iet~gt.1he b~neB.~~_.Q.f_ .cconomk..~.nd. .s.thj;lLr:e~Q!lstruCJiQ;"L?mL~!:c..lgpp}£!!t whisluhat area so _~.Q.(d.)L(I~e.9j:.

These, then. are the peJC;! aims .of the United States. They parallel [he objectives stated by the SOi:th Vietn:lmcse Government at ~r:lntl:l. Our aims are stricdy limited and we sincerely bdic\'c th:::y contaln >lothing "inconsistent with the interests of :lny party. Our public pronounc::::nems of thcm-h9th in Washin3ton :md at the United ~ations-are solem~ commitments by the United States. Our ad\'ersuics have also p!aced [heir aims :lnd objectives on the public record over the Plst two years.::Lh:_Jf~~i.QU~g!11~flL9Lth.~~~ ~j~}.sj.uh.~_ .~~l-k'!?wn "f2.!lr p~g-:t.s" .!l.U:.!.!!!!>'!' which I wilt..s..1.!mi)H!iz~_lYithg!!tJ~~. -Re!:.t!!!-g.lO:2..!!!~hl~o_m5helLO~J.:l_!.~:}ni~o~ogy~


I~e first"p'oim calls for rcc£z.l}jtion [he b~~!f.1l~J~(W.!!Lr.ig~j?_ ot~he ~~e!~~~E.~op!e: ~Jce, ind~F.enc:l1;'~d~~I~igilll·>-u.nlt.:r:'il.:'Jsl_l~ri~".ri;!J. .io!egritl.:.._l~ also..9n~for .the ~~~j.9.tLQ.f :llt~~rL9.i w~r.. 2.p!I1~Lthe ~Qrt~.i.... ~e endin[~f Un~::::£ S,~int::n'e~:i~~ in t~~_~.9£;hi_ili~ witMr.!1~:?l qLa.H.

Y.!:Ii~_d St2~££::'''1L.@j~.li:m:..p_eI.so~"d .!lEg, wc=!pQ.!).LQf atl kjD~i...J!j~,_4~s:. I!l.~nt!ll}g. of .-)m~ric:m b;!.~.:lng.Jhe _~JJ1~~U;!~i.Q.u..o.b~:b;!.uh.~]_t$!:C(lLt.h..e_ Umte . d State.> ..mmta:y:! .,' r'::an;:e·t oWit· h S'OUt.'h__\•..•.:c:.tna~_

The United S;:ates would not find any essen,i;l diCi.;:ulty with a rcason:lb!e of any of th;! t;:~m5 induced in ~his point. Our ch:ef CCOCWl is what it does not indude: namei;. thJ.t Xorth V:etn::mi :11:;0 cease its interinte;pt~!at!on


~'ention in tl}.~,~q':ltht.S.'l~:lll ofjll,~cts C?f W:1I~gJ..~nst the S01.!ti!,_:ln4_,~~i!~ .~!~!! ~~~2.~~cs f~~~_thc S\)~~: Such:1 requirement is &l'."iously csscnti.1t t..·'1·~··' to t h:: "F:::!::': to w.I!':n tms nm Fo:nt retcrs. ' 't d ' I • 'I' .! 't' G ts 'l ~~_P~:?.£53~e$ !.o~e nl! It:!r ~.::=~~.~::.._~~~'~::g£~~:~~.:.. tJ

It provides thlt)r.~:.t!~!}g.Jh~~J~~f1!Lr.Ql)jfi,e:t\;p.n_oCYi~~m,..,hotb...th:. North and the Sv~Hh must refrain from joiniq~~,f!L8j!!,a~:: ,~lj.!1n(~~_~nQ.

t!l;l..t ~~,~~.sh£l!!!dp_c_rro,'JQ.rcign .,b~,~.::s. J.l:«oPS. QCr:JiI.!~a:(y. pe"?.Q'!J,Q~U.!uh~it.


Herc again, the only'rcJl diffi::u:ty is the omissiorl of :my. obEga~ion on the' North to w!thdr.lw its military for.:~s frem the SGu:h-a!though th~ Geneva Acco:ds which established the ccmarcation Une in Vic.olm forbid military' interference of any by O:lC side in the aff;lirs (If the o~her, and even go so far ~s to forbid civ!liaos to cross the demilit:1.rized zone. The thi~,.F9.~!lt calls ~~Jh~_?~~~k~~flLOL!h~~~~u~h) igt~~~L~~I~~!!L ~Cf:C?,:.~~E~~~'i~h .~t~.pr?g~3:~_~f ,~he,.~atj,oo:lI.Jib;!.r:ltjoD }='r.ont. Jo.r .SQl\tn..


_Yietna~". ZTE~- P9.!E!JI.,QL.c_q~:§~, ,\Y~~ Jl»t. ,2. Pilr~, .QLth~.,O~;t;Y;1_.•:\.<;'C.OIdJ_, at all. It introduces 3 new clemen;, wh!ch I skI! &s:gssJa.ter: in .this ~::!alysis,1

·T~~·_(~~~~~~p.?i~i~~if;.J~i~4s_~l~~·~~i_~~~,n.~5::~~;~~t~,~,.Y!~tQ~n),..tQ. k,

s:.~t;:::d, bL~~e.F::~pl,:: _~U)'2~~~~n~~~~:i~.~2.~~. ;l.nyJC~::ig1). .im~If~.r:~n,c~, We, have no difficulty with this point as was indicated'in my speech to the Gen· er;!! Asscmb!y on Septemb~~ ~~. _ There has

;lpparently been

added :l.~,fi(tjLP-Qjl1t--;-pu~ fOJ~~:~r.d.:;n!(re.

,pe~~edly_c;~d~,,?>=,.J. ,by .P'9A,fJ:m.qi_~!tcL;I!~_~:!..ti2n2i L;Q:;rJ~io.Zl ..f(oI:lLsi!:l::e

th. ~.~r:~~cI:;!~~n . , .?~.!!:~,~~?'!"p9,:~!~ ~., . ' l.~_~ • \.', .. T" fi~" d ,P£~:).I905· . <:l!~.. '.',~!l_~}~£.~~'!l~.~,t.~;.e_, , h.}' HI? G,hi ;.ri.!l~d!1 J~I}I,!~(r.,J966. when he s;lid !~:!.~i.f.~h-:.Y!}i~;;.d.~:;n~~, !~an):~v~,!}~~ ~~C~L.it rI!~~.t.. ~e.~o6r:i,ze !h.e ,~~li~g~!J_.i?e~!lt~cmf~oIl,t.as.,the .. T ' , . , ! . S • V' d __. ,s?t~ ,ge~u~r:~.t~£r~~~~~I.~:~ .. £t.,t h~. P~?c£. £t... PU!!l, _." ~:;f.1~f£,_ ~~.,. engage ~!!.EEg~tb~\:i~_i.~If~is)Ji~e5h~ th,!~4 oJ !h~_~·.f..o~rJ:o:n.~.{'"i~m)du~es a_n.~~~.~:em~£!~~'~ichi~~~,,!l,o.~ p.:lr; 6( ~he, GenC\'a Accords. / . . Now, from this brief summation, of our aims and L~OS:: declared by Hanoi, it is de.!! th::ot there ::ore arc:!s of agreement lrld areJ.s of disagreement. Recent public Si::!'eml!nts by H.:lno; b\"e beca hdp:u! in certain aspects, but how great tIle dis.:lg'l!cments are is s:i!I uncertain l~~.!use the stlted aims of Hanoi still contlin :l. numb;;r of ambiguities, I would like to dlscuss some of t:~ese ambiguities be'::lUse they rd.lt,; to very consequemial ma.ters, There is ambiguity. for CXJ:np!:, on the role of the ;\ationa{ Libe.at:on _~iont in=~~~.~~7>~1itiQ.!.~, ··i~ h;~~~-;I;;;Jy· ~~r~a·~'h·~' s'i~~;';;;~'t"~fH~ Chi ~rinh and ott:cr spoke5men fOi cur :l.dv::!5.lries who h:t\'e s::id that we . •in: Ftont;!s '"en;: SO.~ I ' ., must reCOJnlze g~:lu!ne l:!pr;:sent:a:l\'e ot·ch" ~ ~CUyh V'letn2rnese . ft· . " ' . . I' to' h T d F'cop.e', 3n~ r..e:;o~!ate \\·1:"1. It. ~ _~ 5.~:~ P-=-.!..!!~,~:'..~~ !~'~_a£; _~~~; ~ 'J


to Ce3se our r~~?;;~~:~~,~2Lt~.!,9~yeml!!e::t!!f. S.!i~on ~r'.9"ce;;lo,:1!y .wicl-t.thc F~~~tJ in~fSj~~C~9.Q._~h;s, pcinuv.o,uldhnpc:il. the.s;:.l:::n.£or p>=.l.:e.. For th~

Front has not been chos::n hy ~ny democr.ltic prc:e$S to represent the' P'':op!c of South Victilam .• Kor has the Front b;;r:n rcro.;nizcd by the world community. It is 'p::Clitlent to ro;:ca!t th~lt more tkm 60 nations rccoc;oize the Gm'emment of the Repub!k of Vietnam in SJ:;on. \':hcrcas none re,o&nizes the L\:l<ion.ll Liberation Front:ls a go\."ernment. . . Q~. ~he, pili~~,h=1.~q,. ~,C!!,llC,.Pll?iic.,g:l!~.l}l~nt.~ .s~;:H. t,Qsal1. f9.r,t~~~'atiQI1;t\,

!-.i~ra_~i,o.:~, .f~!?~~ .~~~..giy~~~.:~. pl~5:.<;.~~~~i~<;.~..t...t.h~.r~e&C!t;;t.t~.l!g ~?g$. R t • • , 1 ..' Id b b' h f h·~,~ .w~:.~ t~::.P9.s~~~~~~.!...4?~~.=!~,ve~~'l.£~~l t .• t~.;.P~~:;P~~~s_~,:!>~_· . .'".!...r!g !.s~;,. or .P.~~i9.;!.D,tJoh!1~Qil •. aLl.9ag a.;o ~$JulY•.I9(,5, ~ai.d.t,h:1.1~;.thc .xift~Ql;lg )'i:Q!lld.

. ~Q~J!~.\:~ A!.~fY!.tI .~!.l, ~~!!l'; ,r~pr~s~n..:est~J~ j!l.h~~~glJ!.~r,yj<:~!!_p:,:~~~.n!.e~t. if H;lI~'5?~ .f0L a l]}9..:1~Jl....4~cg~?_~hillj!..~y::.£t~, tg, c;~=!.s..e_aggfc.?si.~·. He added .ili;!.t th.iLdi~L!:l(~u,e;~m.JP.h~!.1'U(d?;! "a.rrlm!!ri}!.<!.gil;~!e p'~Q.g!=-mJ: ..!md th:lt "I think that cou td be worked oat"•


.... -:... . !d3~~HO ..~h~..r:~k~L~h~ _N;l!i,~n~l J~!9cr,;:!,t!9!l .I:.[Q.n~


.A f!l.£t,hct:. am b.!gui,ty

in dIe futl.!r<! p.:>li=ic:tllife of South Viern.1m. Har.oi asks that the :lffairs of So~th Vi~t'n;~-~ s;ttki"'i~-;~~""ord~I~~"~t:rth the program of the ~atiollal Libcr<ition Front". Our adversaries, in their \·3f10u5 conm~cnts on this point, take no notice of the inrern:ltionlUy recognized. Go;'crnment of SOuth Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders hlv\! .taken, and ha\'c currently uncer way. and the instiwtions they afe now, cre· ating, for the purpose of p:oi,'iding their country with 3. constitution:ll and repres.:ntatiw: government. Nor would their statements seem to l.:a\'e aay phce for the South Vietnamese who h~\'e p~rticipated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpretation would pose serious o;sL3c!es to a settlement. However. some claim tna: what ,the National Liberation Front re:l1ly seeks is no more th:'ln the QPportul~ity to ad\·an.:c its program peacefu!iy along with other dements :lod groupings in: the South in a free political environment. We ha\'e already made it dear that we do not wish to exclude any seg· ment of the South Vietn.tmcse peop!::: from peacdu! p:micipation in their country's futur.:-, and that we support a poricy of n:donal reconciliation endorsed by the South Victna:nese Government in the ).fanib. COI<lmunique. Indet'd, as Sc;;r:::t<.!rL~,~~~~~~iQ.j!L:;.n.,ir,t~.!'~i:~.~J;tJt....!\:~J.;.,jfJheJGeLCc.ng ~\'I?le ,~<? }a>: Aon:I.l..t?,:::i.r: d!'l,!S,_:\·!lH..ct?y!d,tcJouncl. ~o pcrmit them..to t;:ke p~ r~ .in..tl~e ~()~~.~! ??li.• :~~l. p'r<?c.e.s~;~. ~!l. ~o.~~h. ~~e~n;lm. F h ,.... 1: • ~t" .-1!.!t J~..'-~m9l.;;~!.t!~.s•. 3JvCCp.n~~(nJ~g J->~ .• !i~.c~'.1j)'U~L.Q\s;.lg!).,.1rC.Q?Lt!l~

·_SQ!!tlL.::Li.em;!@!.,. ,Wnst does H~noi mean by "foreign troops"? They clearly inch:cc in ~1is tc:rm !:h~ fo:ces ~f [1-.:: LlliteQ St;>t~5 and ether coun••Ol.!t r..!-.:y hJ\'e ne;;::r 2:cm:r1e • • d tue t. !-. • tries 3:... :n~ me So:!cn. presence 0"r. their •

.. ' : .


own fortes in the South. Of cours::, a one·sided wi:hdrlw:ll by our s~ce


would net icOld to 3n :lcccl1table peace. All cxt~r!l:tl forces must withdraw, tho;e of Hanoi as well ~s o:m, if peace is to be achic\'cd. Tlt_e,~J~. ;!..n.!~Jg!!it}' :ll~.? in H~noi's .E2!~<!~!:£.tim~s, of ~he with· .4~.!'.:~Ulf e=5lcfQJH2:.'S~ Do cur 3d'ccs3ries consider withdrawal of ro~ces

a precondition to nc£o=iations, :IS some or their S:;ltemcnts imply: If so, this 3gain would raise :l serious obstacle to pm.;rm. But if they look on withdrawal of forces 3S a Pwv!s:on'to 1:--;: incorpcrated in :l sealement, this dearly could be worked out. The Uni~ed Statcs and its :!llks are 3lrcady on record in the ~hnib Communique that ,hdr for;~s "wilt be withdrawn ••'. as the o~her sice withdraws its forces to the !\crth, CClses jnfihr~ltion. and the b'd of violence thus subsidcs, Those forces will hi! withdrawn as soon 3S possible and not 1:1te( thao six months after the abo\'e conditions h3\'C been fulfilled".. Further, we h:l\'c indic.:lted ou: willingness to join in :1 ph:lScd and supcn'is:d withdrawal of fore.:::; b:; bach sides. 3S

~~:~!,. ~~E~}s,.a.rn~;gu:ty irt. H:u;?r? p~si.t.!on, ~;uhc. c~ss:g!p.i.l_QLbp11l9j;t}g_ ~J.]\~!.£~ Y!.~I!~m. ~U~l}le.uh~ir... puJ?ik st:!t~JI;~(lKb.a.R_dem:loclea.. that

t.~~kY.Z!#ngJ?~. ende.d uncon.di~iqn~lIy> \YithotJt. any,_~.efc;.renc~3Q,~.P.o~~~Qk .. !esp'~~~~j.£?r:~. ~dr side. pE-.the Q~bELh!!!}g,_qt,!~u~~!=.-!!rh_~_~P-Qk~!l}.~n..QC hJnoi S.:lid that "if, after the ddinitiyc and unccr:ditional c~~_~g2.~,,~Lth_e


~~~_l~! J~£~~h. }~~~~~:ll1]~~~1J~_~re;n,!!el!t, .• J...miLpr~OS;t1 wjJlp~~,~ ~~ne!.:':.!!,~ ~;u~.i~4>·. And just this week we n:m seen a further statement. in an inter ....jew by the }:o£.~i!..Vie.~:;.-':R~~EQf~ign ,M1..ig~,fl_ ti);!t !=£?~a..ti.Q.!l,Qt t~~_!?O-,-'.!~I!!g~.::£?uld lc3..4. ~.g~[:? !x-~!y~~n_ ~9.r,h..Yi,e~!l~m.,aQ(L~h.<:.JI.:s:.:. Many of their st:ltcfl!er.ts' insi5~;!1g that the bo.n!>:ng cease have also contained o.her expressions, stIch as th:J.t the Amer:can military presence in South VieUlJm b.: completely withdrawn, and th:1t the "Four Points" o~ . I an d a~cepted as "h'" . "1 H anOl· must be rCCO;Olzec t e OlStS--or pOSSlO y as" a" basis-for settlement of the: conflict. This cr¢:ltes ::n add1tional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi m::ms to add still other pren~;v,iating conditions. T~e position of the t:nited S.ates on this bo:nbing question

has been stated b)' a numocr -of Administra:ion spokcsmei'l, including me at the United K:Hions. '!"~..: ~t;Ei~!.?s:!~~~ _r~.:~}:!!!1j_Pfep~ze4.!Q_l.:l.k~_th<:.. D.z:s,Utep __ and.ord~ess:Hi~?~~n b~:2.~ir:6_c:~_:.:-:?£~\_yi~~:~I~·U!~~ IIl9f}1~lJt ~:e3Z~ ~~_':I_:~~LP.E~~~!i:,,~£..~h~!.~\:h~t, !~~ t.his.,~t~p .\yilt.k a.n_m:ered prompcl,}cb.}:, ~uangiP!~.,I:e~ponsU9.!':~:JP~ .. ~:t:~_tr9.:}1-:.~9nL~:!:_t!l~i!:!:., In his letter ot February S to His Ho!int:s>, Popc P.:w!, Pre$idcnt }o::nson Slid: " ..• I know·' you wo~ld no. ex~,::ct . us to r:e.iu.::c military action unless th~ other side is willing to do likewise. \Ve are pre?lfCd to discuss the bJbnct:d red'Jcuon , in militlrj' 3(;ti,lty, the cessa:ion of has.irides or any ·p:actical 3rrangements


whkh could lc-1d to the;:! results. We s!dl continue OUr CUOriS [or :1 pcacdul :mJ hono:J~)Ie settlement untit ther :l~C crowned with success." Some analyst!' cont~!~J tbt our term~ of settlement sho~ld be morc' precisely defined. But it is vcry Ji5cult to bc mo:.: prc.:i$c in Jd\":!nci: of negotiation and p.miccbrlr in !i~ht of the subs::lntivc :l:nbi~lli;.ics on the odlcr side. But wh:H<;!n:rqucstio:1S m~y j,.: r.l:s::d. ther shadd ar:J c:in hest be resolved in dis:ussio:ls b::twecn the pmics who have thc power to re50! ...e them, For our p:lrt) we st:l!'lJ rcauy to ncbu,i:HC ingooJ faith iln.:onJitionally to rcso!n!:lll out5t:mding quc\tions,

, Th~l!oh~_i.~~:\:e}__apPJo:l,:Jl. tp_~~g(j~i~i(lluj?J~~~,, __ \ \'e ::::~ our.-:!!!~, 95Lf!ot ~s,k.Q!JJ: ac!.'.:cr?;lri£.?1.Q.~,E.t;PL.. :]~,~ prc;:~~n9,i'iC?:.'l. ~O_d!.?.~l:'S~.iE~.2..£..r:£g~~ .tiations, ~ny poi nt_ o( .o.;Jrs_~p_;'_~i~11' ;h~Y.~mXiJiJ\'~=E.?i:;ctio;lS.~ ~or do we • out the d'15Cll$S!Oll ,., ". howev;:r CII:1CU 1'/':- I . ht rule or' any PO!r.ts 01. t,.;:lr~, t ' tney nug appear to us, \\'e ar;; wi!lin:; to d:s~uss :lnd ne;oti:l.tc no: only our own points b:!t H:moi's "Four Points" and points clmn:l.ting from any other source, inch:d:nz th:: Sew:tary General of t~e 'Vnited >::ltions. It remains to b;: seen wheth;;:r our ad\'us:!ries share this conccpt of nego- ' ..,ti.~~k!.n5._ As I ha\'e ;i~~;·d}:-pcir.ted ~!, their-\,:l~f~s pubff~-dcd;-atio;s' of peace aims hl\'e often been coupled with statements cbt the gOJ!s they put forwud must, for c:\Jmplc, be "accept~d" or "reco,;nized" as the "sole. t soun db'" · n or ...tne most correct b'" lSIS or "h t e on.y lSIS or "hb" t e aSls ,or baSIS the most correct political solution". • , Such statements contain still. further ambi.;uitr~in one sense the most fund:tm~nt:ll of all, since it.rdates to the concept of n~got!Jt!on itself. ,D~ ..0.:~~E!~~eaI~E:?-_t_,t~~'2Lh,_'.:.~ilJ.~'1:;. ~o ,~n,t~LI!.c;.g91.i.atio~.9nt\·,)L there is 3n.......3SSUt.u:ce in ad\':lrlce th.t the-.-cut.:omc ..---_._-.. - _._-"-" .. ---.wi!! be on thdr -.....--terms..and _---.~::~.J!!..Eue.~?, sil:!plI_I·l,ti.fy_th;;...;~~tuh~.Y l;:!··:,;__;V,~~~gYJ~~,~~4? Such an ' ,attitude would not be conducive to pc::::: and would make the oudeok for a settlement b!e.lk incecd. _--~_.-._.--_._





Jf.._o.!l.Jb\!_p.th~Lh'>!JI_q, };:Qrtb_ri~.'.l.1;:l:JU.!:C(;U9_S,:}Y.._th.~uh;.,iLPqi.f).t~3.!'~ .DQL pte~o;;:Jj;iQ!) s.. to _d.iicU.$~i.o.ns.•ocncgoti.:) tio.r.S,_lh;:,n_ the., Pr.O,5F~C.ts sb..?.:~

,be m9!~pr,o..I.!?l?i flg~ , Our negotizting approach would 'permit c:.lch side to seek



the other side's pOiition. It dC<!s not require the ac.::ept:mce in aevance of any points. le:m of a!i thos~ whose meaning may be in need of cbrifi"::Ition. We do not ask tbt of f-bno:-:lnu progim toward a settlement will facilitated if H:lnoi do:::s not :lsk it of us.


rn this situation) how can we !::~st mo\'e toward



One essenti:!l e:dy st!? is to :malyze the positions of :111 parties in o,ce~ to ascw:l!n whether tr..e~e is so:r.e dem;;n~ or some kernel cemmo!). to :l.!!. M:my student·; of the subject h:!\'C po!atd to one fact which flU), pro\'e to








that both sides have pointed



Gene\"a A&rccments ~f t,954 :Ind 191b as an 3cceptable basis for a peaceful settlement. ' . . . . But I must add quickly that this does nut neccss;lrily indicate a real mc~t. ing of the minds,becJuse of doubt$ dl:lt ;til sides interpret ·th, G~ne\'3 Agreements in the same 1;oht. H.moi has said that the essence of the Gene'"a Agreements is cont:;ineJ in its "Four Points". B'ut the four po:r:<s would not put Hanoi under ~ny restraint or oblig:ltio!ls in i~s hos~i!e :lctivitie5 :tgainst tlIe Soudlt which the Gene,";! :\"ocds explicitly prohibit. . Besides, as I already pointed outt these points insist that the South's future b-~ regulated in accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the Gene\'a Accords and did not c·..en exist when they wcre written. And in any case, if the Geneva Accords were t~ serve as :l bJsis for s.::ttkmcnt, it would ob,jousty be n.:ccssaiY to revitalize the international machinery which they provided for supcn'ision-which is prcscntly operJting under sc\'cre Iimit.1tions; to incorporate effective international gU:lrJocccs; :lnd to updlte other pro"isiolls of the Accords which on .heir face arc ck~r1y out of date. Despite these problems of interpret~ltion, it can ~ SJid that if the meaning of dle GenC:\"3 Agreements wefe lccep:ed .as a matter for genuine negotiation, then the. cons'Jnt reference to these agree:11ents by both sides would be more than a verbal simil?;ity; it would be a sisriificant and hopeful sign pf.the prospects for sctth:mcnt. . Fr~m aU this analysis, there emerges one basic :lnd piJctical qu'estio~) nnd it is this: How :lce :lll these apparent obstacles to :l settlement to be o\"er-. come? The first :lnd essential"pre-requisite is the will to resolve them-=-r.ot by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms. but through a process of mutual accommod:ttion' whereby nobody's \'i.al interests are injured, which would be:l. poHtic:tl solution. S~aking for the United States GO\'ern~ ment, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United Scates to seek and find :1 poEtical solution. The next question, then, is by what procedure SL:cn a political settlement can "be reac~ed. One well-tested and time-proven way is ,the conference table. President Johnson hlS repe~ted!y m.ted our readiness to join in a .conference in Geneva, in Asia, or in any'other suitable pllce. \Ve remain prepared to•.ily to go to the· conference table as scon as, and whcre\"er, our - adverslri.:s are prepared to join us. There is also a..second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: namd)", piivate negotbtions-dther by d:rect cor:tlcr or throu(;h an intermediary. Th:~e is much to be said for this p!iv:;te method, for in :t situa\ tion as gra\'e as this, with its compfex his:orid background ~md· its pres-. cnt potitic:t! cros~· curr~n.s. it would be cxceedins!y difficult to ncgo.ilte

in a goldfish bowl. "



I tberefore :lffinn that the United States Government stands lCldy to take this route also toward a poli.ical )cttlement. And- we 'give OUf assumnce that the secrecy :lnd security of such prh'a,e exp!oraticms would be safe· guardcd on sid::: Of cours.: we do not and should, not ask that free. dam of expression hi! cUrlai!eJ in the slightest degree. :\cverthdess-:ls that conspicuous champion of free expression~ Dr. Erwin D. Canham., re· cently reminded us- :.0 o:lc's credibility ought to suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circumstances. Let .me quickly :!dd tfiat :It til is juncture I do not want to raise :lny false hopes by this remark, I am simply st:lting a principle which is inherent in the cons;cpt of the st.::rccy and securitr of prl\o:lte explorations. . Such the~ is my :m31ysis of the proh!ems invo!vcd and the me::hods to be employed in seeking a negot~:lted solution of the Yietnamese cooPiet. Nor should we overlook the possibility chat n.::gotiations, private or public, might be preceded or b.dlit:!tcd by the process of mutual de·escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a formally negotiated <c;uefire. This, of course, would be welcome on our part. It is altogether possible. too, th:tt there will be no negotiations culmin::!ting in a formal agreement; that our ad\'ersaries will sooner or bter find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gr3duaUy come to an end. , Perh:lps this ,rill indeed pro,'c to be the: outcome. But O'.:r most reo ~pected military authorities have caqtioned us not to eXf'Cct L\at this will happen quickly, and that we must fa.:e the possibility of a long struggle. Sure~y, if there is any contribution tbe diplomacy can make to h:utening a just and honorabfe end of this Struggle; we cannot in aU consckncc spare ° any effort or any bbor, d3y or night, to make tnat contribution-no matter how difficult and frustrating the d!ort may be, or how many fats: starts and failures and new bcginning3 it may ~n[ail. As students of his.ory know, one obstacle to a negotiated cnd of any wac can be psychologid. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to pe:lcemaking arc: by nature very different.• And yet a st:lge inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on sice by side. Many dtizens, \'iewing this complex dual process~ are likdy to be con' fused and distressed by what see:ns like an inconsistency in their leaders' policies. Some comphin tha. the talk of peace sug~ests a weakening of our resoh-e and of our will to win. Simultaneous!y others 'Comp!ain thl. the continued military effo:t su,;gests an attempt to bring the: advets:try to his knees, [0 bteak his will-3nd thus casts doubt on the sincerity ~f our will to peace. The great diffi~u!ty or achieving peace should serve to remind us chit there are substant:al conflicting interests at sta~e which stuoborn!y resist


·solution; tlla. rea.:c c:!nnot L~ bought at any price, nor c:m relI confli.::ts of purpose h;,: w:l.\'cd :1\\a)' with a ul:tgic wand. Ily the same to!,enJ t~e ferocity of war shot:IJ not be an indtcmcnt tu hatred but rather .1 stem disciplinc-:l remind;:r of the iml'C!otivc dut)· to cldinc rest'Onsib!y the limited interests for which o:Jr sold:crs fi~ht :mc1 which a reace settlement must protect. The effort [f.} make such :l respousib!c ce:initio:1i and to carry it through the process of pearc negotiations. is "piled high with difficulty". A genuine meeting of the minds may neyer be whony achic\'ed. It is unIikd)' that terms of settlement for this stl!bbClrn conflict can be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. nut it is in our highes. national interest th:lt an accept:lhle, !i\':lble solution should be found. Let no one suppose th:zt p:;triotism. which is so inspiringl)' displayed on the b:mlencldl is no, also prescnt at the nego.iating table. AU our recent Presidems have testified to our country's dedication to negotiation as a me:ms of p::acefully bridging qiffcrenccs. President Eisenhower said in 1955. on the eve of the first Summit COnference with the Soviet leadership: "We shall work with all others 50 that peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the dash of the battte. field.'; President Kennedy, in his In:mgurat Address, said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negoti~te." . And President Johnson has summed up the true vatue of ncgoti:ltion as follows:. • ____ .. - ."To negotiate is not to admit failure: It is to show good sense. \Ve believe that collective bargaining is working as long as parties s~ay in negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of f:lilure. And so also in foreign polky. There) too, th~ rule of 13w and the resort to the bJrgaining table are the hallmarks of success." And to these words the Pn:sident added spedficaI1y: ''This rule ap?!i::s without qualific:!tion to Vietnam. We shaH count it a mark of success when all the parties to that disput~ are around a· conference ub!e. We Amer!cans are experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear from negotiadon. And we: Americans know the n:lture of a fair bJ'glin; none need fear negotiating with us." I am sure all. thre~ of these Presidents would a'7.ee todal." th:lt the effort 0 1 to discover through negotiation. the commo."l ground Oil whkh to build :l just and honorable peace) is worthy of our most sincere and dedicated efforts.


'lI~s Excell~ncy

110 Chi 1-1inh President D.emocrat5.c Republic of Vietnam DearKc . President: 1 am \'lrithig to you in the hope that the conflict. :i.n Viet': rtam can be brought to ?11 end. That conflict:. has already taken a heavy toll--in lives lost> in \wtmds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in si.mple human misery. If \'le fnil to find a . just and peaceful s~ll.ltion> history ~'lil1 juclee us harshly . . Therefore, I belicvD that '·le both have a heavy oblign.tion to'seck cm.·nestly tr-.::; pnth to peace. It is in response to .. that obligation that I am \·:riting directly to you. ' ..' . .



\.Je have tried 9vcr the, past several years) in. a var5.(~ty . of "laYS and throq; h a number of channels~' to convey to you and .your colle"fgues our d:=sirc to achieve .:t .peaceful sett).emcnt. . 1?or ,·!hatever reasons) these efforts have not achieved any rc'1. ts • . '- . . . . SU ". . . " . -'- :-.' -----:..... ;..: -:--



. .' ,It tnay be that our· thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours) h~ve been distorted or misinterpreted 2S they passed thiough the~;e various channels. Certainly thnt is ahlays a . r" (langer ~n J.llC!JXCC t CO~Uin~a _:LOn • . . 1






. . . . .'




There is one good ,·my to overcolP.C th:ts problem and to. move fonrard in the sca;:-ch for a peac€!ful sctt1.ercent. 'fhat is for u.s to e.l'fEx'.ge {Cir- d:i.T~ct .talks bct"leen trusted reprc~e""'-"""'i\"J," ,.. ce""\ ~-o s~t . . .;-··,. -,...., a'-a-' cla-c of ... ·H .... -=-I.·.~.;;. 1',... c:! '-~\L·';.. C~" •. HQ C:"u ,v'J'"!:r-' V,U t~c> !h.. 0 ':" ' . t S ' • I • l ' . 1 . J d ' pu b1_LC1:y. uen taLKS snCU~Q no~ )e use~ as a propagan a exercise' but should be a se:-ious effort to find a vlorkablc and mutually acceptable solution. .' 'l



In the past t\{O yeeks, I have noted public stateruents by repre-senta ti "res of your goye!:"n,r:ent suggestin3 that you \iould be 1 1-0 ... ... P ---ep"r::.c ~_(.;;

tl." \'~"':: of



... {r,.,. ....... __ '-""

n"\'-;-"'~ I.._""_\..-."'~

b~~l ~tC>i,..,l _.c. __ c<_

talt-• • ,!>

t·•d_t"n rnDr,",-:>"\I-a_ ..... ,_1;;::>_ ...... p ._:~. c :"!S:>.4 tl u ""'•, e..-:n. -._ __ ","' __

th~ !tc: rh;2 t_-.I •••• v", Go tr"r';""",'<:. .\,; .,... -.....,.!--, "f'o~r: t i .. • rl,..ri __ ..... _ _ "':t-r-·· 4-11 ~II ~~"d Cl-··~';"l!") .. ~.L.1" c 1 - """\~ ..... t ... ~_._ 0 ---.:.t'n"''''O .:. lvn":'''-l l,h f'~.,.,,:<:.I.'-i~!..._.... u ...... 1,,:::L.o_i!6 pc .. ;.........• .;.:~.... :,;:, (.··6~'·~::; your· CO!_Hltry aDd al I. ·!;1i1i taty ac tions agains c it. In the las t c:n"...... ..l!.". l£. :0-.... . . . nd r~{'-"·"·"-";t.~·;.l--,.. .... i-~ed us .:ndi· 'CJ, ~"' ...... l._ ;;.:>F~·\~">~·u~.:... . ;1-::' .... -::~ h~'l:l ._:;.. as.::.u:.....· .:.., ....:.·ec'-1\i. . . . _J _~



that this is in fact your proposnl.

l.et me. frankly state that I ~ec tHO great 'difficulties this proposal. In vic~'l of your public pos5. tion) such acti.ol1 on our part \·;ould inevitc.oly prodUCE"! w6rldtd.de speculation that disct1ssions were under \·:ay and \'l:)'uld impair the





,' ..




privacy and secrecy o.f tho'se' clisCll~:;sions. Secondly, there ,-,ould inevitably be grave concerti on our .part ~'~hether your government ,·:ould make use of such action by us to improve its military position. . \-lith these' problerns in mind,' I am prepared to move even 'further to\'lards an ending of hostilities th:m your Goverpment has Pl'oposed in either public statements or through privhte. diploma tic channels. J. 'am prcp3.Tcd to order a cess~ tiO~l._~,~ J~Qm~ing ~gains t, your, country and the stopping of t'urthet:' . .,e.ugmen tation of US forc~.s in ..South Viet-Nam as. soon as I am_ assun~d, tha t 'infil tr'ation into' South Viet-Nam by land and bi, s'ca'he's' :stop'ped. These acts of rcstrnint on both sides \vould, 'X believe} make it possible for us to conduct seriOllS and private discussions leading ·tm'lard an early peace •

.' I ,make" this p~6,posal' t'o you nO\'l ',dth a sp~cific ~ense of ,'urgency arising, from the i.rom,inent Ne~'l Year holidctys in Viet- , '. ,Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see noreasQn. vlhy it could, not take effect at the end of the Ne~·: Year, or Tet, holidays. rrhe proposal I have made \.;rould be greatly str.~ngtheTJed if your rtlilitary riuthorities and those of the 'Governroen,t of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate 'an extcllsio'n of the l'et truce. ,,'

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose', there are several possibilities. He could) for example) hav~ our re~:-e5entetiv:;s r.:eet in Hosco·...• ~·;here contacts heve already occurred, They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangerJents or sites in mind) and I v70uld try t~ meet your suggestions. The important thing is to end -a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples"and above all to the people of South Viet-~~a7!l. If you heve any thoughts about the ac tions I propose) it would be most important that 1 receive them as soon ,as possible.. .

Sincerely) ':

Lyndon B. Johnson


To His Excellency ll.r. Lyndon Pr.c~idcnt , United states of Al'leric!l,



. JO;l~.S?n,



February 10, 1957, I received yO'll' messtl.ge. This is L'JY reply • .'. Vietnam j.s taousends of miles ·«·,;ay from. the Ullit!!d states. The Victnr-.mcse people have nevel' done f:..'ly hurro to the United st'ttcs. Bu';; contrnxy to the · pledges made by its represente.tive c:t the 195)~ GC!lCVa conference, the U.S. Govern.rc.r:nt bas ceaselessly intel'ven.::d in 'Victn~, it hes tml!::ashed end intensified the riar of aggression in South Vict!1e.;~ .dth a. vic·. . to prolo~lgine the p.?..rtition of ViCt.!lE).rJ and turning South Victucm into a. neo-colony and a .. milit~.ry base of the United S~ates. For over t~.;o yea.rs nO' !, t:'e U.S. Gove't'nm('nt has, \-lith its air e.nd nt-xt.l troces, c~.r;d.cd the '..:ar to the Uemocr,d,ic Rcpublic of (North) Viet:;".::!, 5.:.. indel"},:;nclent 8!ld sovereign c01.m.try. I

The U.S. Goyern!(,ent' ho.s com:;utted ..... r.t· cri1:i~s, cdr.1es against peace and "'~3ftinst mankind. In South Vietnam, half a tnillion ll.S. r. 11d setC'llitc troops have resorted to the most inhlli'"1lan '·:Ct.pO!1S t:.rd the most. bt~rb(trol.ls methods " of' ,;"..rfl:.re, such as nfq)fl.l:n, toxic cllf:::>..1.cals ~.ud eases, to fol8.SSaCi.'C om' compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villF!Gcs to th~ gr.ound.· In Uorth Vietnam, thousen~1s of U.S. aircl'af't h!;ve dropped huudr{:ds of thOtlS«!lc1s of to!lS of bo:nbs) destroying to,".'l1S, villnses, fuctodes') schools. In your l!.!ess~se, you r:pparen'i;ly deplore the suffcrinss E:ond destruction in Vie::tn'1a. Mt).y I £l.sl. you: Who h~,-s p~rpet.rat£!d these monstrous crines ~ It is the Unlted Ste.tes E'.ndsntdli te troops. 'l:1C u. S. Govcrm:l.ent j.s entirely , responsible for the e;d~rc!lldy serious si"tu.;1.tion ill Vietnam, .'


war of eggression against th~ Vietna~ese people constitutes a to th~~ cO'.!Jltrles of the socialist c~-n'p, e threat to the national ind€p~::de!1':-= i:'.·")·ie~-:~:; ~, :::.:;.:j a s~!'iol.is dC'..!1ger b peace in Asia and the ~orld.



T'ne Vietnamese people deeply lOVe independence, freedom and peace. 13ut in the face of the U. S, ageression, they have risen up, lli"1ited as one Clan, · fearless of" sacrifiCeS and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resista11ce urltil they have won eenui!1~ independence and freedom. · ~d true pe,~ce. Our just cause enjoys strong sy;npa.thy and support fro!:il the peeples of the wh~le ;.:orld, including .broad sectionSc of the American ·-people. Th~

U.S. r}c"'I·ern~~nt ha.s u-'lleashed the t:ar of aggression in Viet!1t=t..m. It !:imst ces.::~ t:-:is ;':;S!'"';3.,bn. That is the o~l:{ ;;$.y to the restoration of pea~e. Tb.~ U.S. G0···...er::::=nt ::lllst sto!, de.'iniiively and ll.'"lco,,"'1ditione.lly its bo;;.bins raids a..'1-; all oth~r acts of ~';!lr a5uinst the Df:Inocratic Republic of Vietnam, withdra~ ~cm South VietncA all U.S. end satellite troops, reCOGnize the South Vietne.m Nation:'tl ?ront for L5.bel'E'.tion, and let tlH~ . . Vietna.-uesc people settle themselves tr~eir 0 .....'11 affdrs. Such is the ba.sis (sic) content of the five-Doint stand of the £:overnment of the Dc.mocratic Republic of Victn~.::i.-~-~;h:fch-er.15odies the cssenti.!.:.l principles e~d provisions of the 1954 Geneva a;ree~~nts on Vietn~, it is the b~sic(sic) of a correct politic~l solut:ton to th~ Vietne:u problem • .'


In your rnessnee, you sug~est'.:!d direct tnH~s bet','lccn the DClnocn.tic Republic of Vietnam and the United states. If the lIt S. GOYCTniT!£:nt really ~al}t:s,_,thcse _,talks) :1.t_~lt~~".f.~,l·Et_o:f_"t;ll. __sto~1"cO:ltH-:"tlonaily-Tts'b;~~bii1g": _. l'!'.tds r.n~l r,ll other r~ct,s of t-I"T f>.gainst the Del;10Cl'a.tic RcnubUc of Vietnam. It"Ts'''o;il aftel: the \Ulco:lditionul cessation' of the u.s. bombing "re-ids ar'1d' all o~liher acts of vle.r e,gc;inst the D~::loCrrttic Reyublic of Vietnr,m tll!~t the 'Denocrv.tic Relmblic of V:i.etna;n c..no the United ste.t~s could enter into t!!.n~s eild dis(:uss questions conccTn:i..ng the t·,.:o sides. ----



'" The Vietu£i!!icse people will never SUb2it to force, they '\-:ill never r.ccept ta.1ks under the threat of bombs. Om" cause is e.bsoultely j,,\st. It is to be hOPed tha.t the U.S.- Government -will e.ct in p.ccordE...nce "~ith reason. Sincerely,

-,Ho Chi Ninh

. •. ~. __ .:"_ ,,:,t··-

18' f '"

~1J\RCH 28,

NO. 70'

1961 ,






... '...


RUSK l S ......:... SECRETARY . .... ~...

. ...'. .......


..' . .,




' ••











"., !"'The fotim.;ing is the State Department's release' of "S'ecretary of State Dean Rusk f ""


ne\·/s conference, which



is authorized for direct quotation:





Earlier "todaYt the Secretary


··~eneral of the United N~ti6~s~ U Thant, made ~u~lic

some proposals \vhich he had offered to a number of govern-:-

ments involved


the problerr. in Viet-Nam on ?-larch 14.

The follo\.,ring day I \·:e gave the Secretary General.our ..

interim reply, stating that

~e ~dlcomed

his initiative,

and, . after consultation \vith the Government of Viet-Nam


and other


we ,,,,,ould give him a more considered

reply. On !-!arch IS


t.;e delivered that reply to the


Secretary Gener.al: a:-:d you no\... · ha''''e tpat in front of you. In esse::ce I the Secretary Gen"eral proposed that there be a

gene~al standstil~

truce in Viet-Narn/ .,

that there then be preliminary talks leading to a

. .






. In o'Ur ;reply I we. 'ptatcd


we accepted the

. outline of his propo;;a.ls r that "\'l~ \'lot'l1d J)e gla.d to ~

l~rn~nary discussion~.~~adL?g

conference, .... .











of that




We do not yet have in front of ltS the full text - -. _.. of "'lhatever reply Hanoi. may have d'elivered to t;he S~cr~tar~1 --.- -.

.. ,

• •" ,

Hhether Hanoi will make





_ . _ _•




_ _ _•

public I do not n0'W

He do have a public statement. .. fronl'Hanoi.which seems. ... ~.

That public. statE'.!!.1er~t of . .

to- ;indicate their attitude. . . . . - -' yesterday said that; .



!'To call on both sides

cease 'f;i,re and held

. ....

1).l1conditional negotLations,·whLle the United states is

aggression against Viet-Nam, and taking


'serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet':"Narn, is to make no


betyleen the

aggressor and the victim of aggression, to depart from reality,' and to demand that the Vietnamese people '~cept

the conditions of the aggressors. II

And then it adds:


. ':.' IIAnd, ......


- - .. - -... - .... -- ..... it is necessary to underline

by the ~;ay I -. -. --- ---- -- '-':'0'" --:---:--- .,.-_.' .~..-.. - . . ".--;--- .:~:-. --., . . ... .. .-. .. :.. .:. .... ..


.. "' ..

.••..'. 'l.


---", ".---.,-_.










once has


the ,vie"ls .of the Government of Hanoi I which


with the

'Viet~Nam .

out tnat'the



absolutely no Viet-Nam





Nations, and the

. r~ght.to


problem has no



interfere'in any way in the

'. .

. . . The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi

has 'once

~gain ta~en

·a. n~gafive vIe,q tm';ard an


initiative taken'by.someone eLse to move this matter '"..

~: 'Im~ght

. .-,'

. ;.


":." ~:.:. ~_....:.•..: ..•.-:..

" .:, .,....... ...

• • • ~.. :.:




.. .



• •• ;.-:...... ,,_:.


say that the recent publication of

the .3:i:<::ha!1ge bebleen President Johnson and Ho .Chi. 1-1inh; ·end today's pUblication of the proposals of the secretary

General, and the


it, illustrate the problem


that' we have had from the




Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclusion. l-lany, governments, many. groups of governments I •


many world' personalities I have tried t.o take an ini'tia ... · tive to move this conflict toward a peaceful settlement. There has invariably been a positive alid a constructive response from the United States; and there has


been ~ n~gat~ve and host~le and l at times, vituperative . ..



'. • *." . . . :


PR 70 When'one looks ,

'ha,ck over the long J;ecord of ,




taken by many

personali tles and, govern.ru."ents I and, groups of, governments I ',one sees the record of Hanoi's intransigeance" ~Tith

'sucli' pllrases-'as .. tha.t sort:- -


"s\dndle 1" and'" farce, It and vlords of


- -'




-- _...

:':..~ ,







-. - .. -..

::'NOvl, vie



- --.... - - .'



< , .: ;' ,




-... - -..:. . ',- '"'



.. 1 ........ -





-do 'not:" ourselves believe that peace is ,



'pO路f ~the' busin~ss of tr~e Unit~d Nation-s.-. "\'7e- b~ii~ve, that

-no '-na'tion 'can say

that a \.;or1d organization represemti'ng" ,,' ,





:-maiJ1~tatn{f.g' .th:e::'''p'eacf5-; ~-:-The--



C=-_.: . ~ ~ ::.

-:'Charter provides for it; the obl?,gations of the nations Qf the world are involved; and the issue of peace is at ,


.... -stake. 'Nevertheless, we have never insisted that the



).8 the sole mechanism for dea1i!lg


this question. There is

nOy1 pendi~g

before the Security

Council a resolution offered by the United States '~ca'"ili~g for-'-a ~eaceful' settlerne'nt of thi's problem.

the attitude' of Hanoi and


tOl'Tard the involvement




.. . " "of .the United Nations'., When the ..soviet Ambassador .

~, t. -.'





. '. .

said at the" Security councii -th~~c .

. . .





the U. N.· I .it •• _ _ ...... -.-: -






• ..






This' is n'ot the'


.. ..... -


is a ~atter :for' the : G~n~va






-~.:. -:~:.::.


~. ~

.. -,"

" :':"machil_;l(~ry I " .Amb~ssad~r .G?ld.be~g said,·' 11Alf ·r~ght, .. If .













~:that is your view, 've 'tl~ll ~~g~ee wJ.th thai; ':ti-i~ri let

:: .; :-::.:".~ .;. ~ ;. ~ ~ . . :-=-:. . :.- :" 'us use the Geneva machinery'~ It • ~-:







:.~'......... .:.- . . . . . .~;, . . -.*

. 1:>;( :tb.e at1;-i. t~d~ of




and peJdng.



.". ...

. . . . .'






:' .. !

For '



." "0 • • ' : "


examp.!~ '.:.

' ; _.. ~.

·thc;t; JUa.ch;i.neFY ha.s pot b~€m avC\~labie to respond favor-


• ..:. ':.••••


~•• ::~.:'


~Ply to


: . . ......... -

..~; - - ..




.- _

.. . . . .



....... "' ... ;a.

.. .. ~.~


Prince Sihanouk J s request t~~~ the' Inter- .

:: ::;~~I~~at7~'~'1~'~r~l :~~l~i'sEion' ~tep 'up "~ts a~~ivities to :'~'~:J;~~~~the neutraiity -and the ter~it:'or'ial "int~grit~ :.:~::

of . the


That machinery was not available to ensure



of the Demilitarized Zone


. ~

North and South·Viet-Nam.


So we would say to the authorities in Harioi

• that., surely, there must. be some machinery some\.,here which can open the


of peace.

If not

the united Nations, then the Geneva machinery;

,.... - .-.. --- ..----._----_. ---_ ...




not' the Geneva'machinery', then the re'sol.lrces of quiet •.• _.- : --=..: ."'--.: • ."

diplomacy. .




'-::~"~:-:~.:';'-~:\.~i~~~~~11- ~~~- ~~~;. ~hat' the excha~ge bet\>7een . ;'''





.. .. -'



.. .



PR 10


Pres;tdent ~ohnson and ~o Chi l-iinh has been mad? 'pub~ic, and U T.hant's proposa~s'and ~ur reply ?~ve been maqe


• 'public, that there.is ~othing ~n the private record. •








'I. •



di~fer~nt l~ght

.thro\'ls any

·~ou no~





on th5.s

have in the public record.

Despite all

efforts made privately by many people in many •

.the private record and



... . .



~g;reement. ~ . '.. .. ...'" . ,.. ..












...". .. ;.: .


o~ ~he



,Public record are no,·, in




-.. :.' -'.'. ~~....•: ......•:.- ,'.



.1 dq hope that tIle. ?-uthorities ,in Hanoi "~Otild . '. .

....... " ... ;..... .

"' '::.':~:.~







give ser~ous thought" to '. the present situ~tion. . If .they ... . .... . . ..






. have supposed that they would be able to obtain a mili-.'






· to.ry victory in. th~ Southr they must, surely I now put · that hope aside.

If they have had any hope that there

would. be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely, '

· they must. no,", kno\·; that al..l of the groups' in South ..


.& ••

Viet-Nam, l'lho have some differences al11o!,!g themselves r are resoived to bring into being a Constitutional Government in \'lhich ·those various groups can ,,,,ork to. gether



a basis of the free choice of the Soutt. people with respect to their future; and

that. one point, on \'lhich'they are generally ~greed - in-"South Viet~UcJtl~'--i~-that t~ey 'd~-~~t'~dsh the"pr~g;~'-'"





.,', of H.anoi


PR 70, '

the LiberatioI]. Front. th~t

If Hanoi supposes

s9meho\,1 international

, opinion., will come to their ;rescue, surety. 'they must ;.






" 'kno~'l :that \';hen they rebuff'the United Nations Organi~a".



. .

, ,~ot hri?9 them sup~or~ ~"n' other parts of the world •.






- - And:, .surely I they must 'un'derstand that all smaii nations . " . . -- ....... -who: are





re~~lt'" of some gr~at~r pm1er h~ve'

a :.

~F.:~r~s~~- in the' ~~~,ii ~y :~'f' s~ut~' y~~t-N,am 'to c1et~~"Ini:ne i ~s " • .' . '. ".. :,? -:.' .~::~ ~~; :'.-, . ': "own fl.lt1.1re for ~tsel~. And,· surely,

-.; ;.u~aer .cont~nui~g .E·:·~,~f~~~ons



. ,

Hano~ must not


~isap~~~h~n~i6n;~thatl som~~o"'l' some

.\·l;i.t:hin .the

u~rf~d;:St~tes I!l~ght

cause us to

. ,

c ha.~ge our att~tud'e to;"ard our com.rnitmcnts to south V;i.et ...Nam. aIr~O?g ~s (

Becacse afthoutih there may be'scme differences . those differences are trivial cOlilpared to the

'di,fferences betvleen all of us, on the one side, and Hanoi'· on the other. so~e.


fashion I in : n ,u.t...!. ::" 1'"\ 0';-'- " ·;i i't_ 11



make use of so~e machine~y in wh~ch'to be responsive '~"'.to

"the m'any eff<rtsvlhich we and others 'have been maki!1g

toward peace over the"last .


'several years •

-'-' .. -_.w- . .:


.• "55

" ":,~ PR





,It is no good to brush aside the 17 , -.. . .' ~ '. . : ..~



, nGtiop.s I and the Br;i. tish Com.mom'leal th of Prime r·Ii'nisters I .....

and" Hj,s .Holinesp . 'the Pope, the Secretary Genel:?l, and ;.

" the Prepident of India l and all


others who have

been trying to find sor.-Ie basis on \'lhich this matter ,

~~~la be moVed ~~wa~d I



a penceful conclusion I and suppo~e

:,th~tr somehO'i'l { \','orld opinion is supporti!lg th6n1 in , .:'~<;':



efforts to se;i.ze South Viet-Narn by force 9



pO l'l~:. ,Would advi?,e them to believe that'; :-.1 . ..: ',.... '.- . . - :.... .'. .. .. :.. ; . . .,' ..





" ': fClfr .as "ie are concerned( ".,e are not calling the search" : ..:" . . .. ... -. '. . .-... . -: .' :.;.~.'




~or a,l?eaceful s'ettlement to an end because of Ho

Minh's reply to President Johnson, or because of

. de

• .I.. J.I..



h' "" W_1~C.!

t""I.ey seem , t 0 be

t • I,.a.~.l~g


chi t!'\~

\..ovlara~ U Th an. .1..~ I s


py priyate and public means, ma "'Ie ,,\,;oulc1 hope that we ",ould. get some re~ponse through' some channel that "Iould b~gin to bri~g this thi!l<}'wlthin the ra!lge of d.iscussion

set tler:v~:!nt.


No;~ ,.

I '"a-n rer:.dy i.or i'our questions.


Mr. Secretary I :you ha.ve outlined all of


Ylhy they t" surely, must not

various elements.


What is it then you think that makes "






face of ",hat must' be

a loss of international support, ,

and these other adverse factors?

A ,

I can't

Well, it is very hard to say. ",

ente~ ~nto

the minds of the leaders ,in Hanoi on a matter :


of~that sort. i .

I \'lould suppose, "really, that they are

under pomc misapprehensicim.. They

a~e ,maki~g

some mis~


and misca1culatiors on




,the state of international opinion, or the state of ,

• _





OpApl.OA ",;l.t:hip the Un;Ltec1 States,

It f


'~ :

possible even

that they still have some slender hopes of some military"

success in the South. I just don 't knO'Ii what is in their minds. ,~~"'at

I am




of v;i.ew, the



so far as




understand their

pillars of their hopes are

from under them, and they should become


in peace, and at an early date and not at some long , delayed



date. Mr. Secretary I your statE:ment today in

reply to U Thant has sa;i.d

involye.."ne'nt for the




the;re ,'lould be "an appropr:tate of South Viet-Nam throughout

. PR " ,:. . th,e ent;lre procesp of' ,





:.,~ JVol.ild. Y01.1 ::;~'el1

that ..

: co l3.ed him ·in .. t



a peace. n

out a 1i tt1e more ~ sir?

..!'. .... ...


:.A ',' ~lel11 obyj.ol,lsly I any discussipn "''lith -,



: ~'~orth ~iet-Na"l1 about . peace ,in Viet"':'~a.'1I must 'directly i



involve the Gov~rlli~ent of South Viet-N~~. .' '. .

~:.n10re. them,


. . '


Indeed, as .

one -:·oc,~C).s;ton:· s~S'ges,!:-e~ d~Fel2~ ~ tc)~~l? behlcen ,:

:~ south Vj.ct-Nam fu'"ld

North Viet-:2{am;

They have propos,ed I

'.,' .

. ,,~~ :the qUest:ion of possibly extendi!lg the Tet standdo\OTnI

the 'l'et Cease-Fire •. We ,,'Qulc1 S1.lpport· that as a means for coming

'to , 9'r'l.pS ·.on·n 't' th' '...~em., ,.. • lS . pro.C' ,-:e wou Id ,

t"n~n.k tl'la ......


'.j.. ~


would, be' a very. good idea if Hanoi ~lere to accept the

proposals of South


for direct talks to move

There ,are many opportunities available! you .:-:.,.,see •


.' 'I'here ,~ou~.d.: bed:b:ect. talks betvleen Sa;i.gon an~,

Hanoi. ' There vlOuld be talks bCD-Teen ourselves and' "


PR 70


Hanoi. There "lould be t.alks under' the auspices of the tv!O




! !!

G~nev~ ~onfcrences(.or


under the

auspices of the three membe:r"s of the International




Control Conunission.


Or there cO?ld be intermediaries,


such as the ,Secretary General of


or; some ot~er disti?guished. g~ycr~ental or non~

; !



Nations, ,

. I '


, i




Any of these methods are

• appropriat.e and useful, .as far ,as \'le are concerneq:





." ..


,':rho problem



find a, .

proce~~l;,e . . - -'





~s. th,at hO'

one -has been ab1e to


. or a method ,olhich r apparently ( is ",,' <. - :


,. "


Hr. pecrctary?




If Hanoi persists for months

years in ,its attj.tu?e, l'lhat



~nc. e'lE:l

our responsp. -.. -then be? .


What vifll our c,ourse 'be? A ~':e

We shall meet our shall de

COIT'..mi tments


, ·59

in south




. ' ..



.. :......... .






. ....


.. .

}lr. Secretary, at the end of the




l'lar, as ! r'ecall,

Ko~ean •

entered into talks ,·Ii thout a truce


qnd the. fighting for blO ,years. . . .. continued ..

l\'ould you


expfairi, "lould this formul~ to \·~~i.ch you have: r'esponde.d today,"'cOUldi t be a:'l~ad t~ . ."

that' same sort of :thing .. ..' .'







"., "' peace talks wi th,o.ut .any" change ~in the, fighting?"" .:





i'le11, let me remind you,


Harsch, of

m9.~telementary position on this "matter of talks.'



We will talk this afternoon or tomorrm'l morning without . . '." .. . .. '

.... .. ,"


.,~:;-:-any':coriditions of any sort on" ei thet-;;ide '~"


are pre'..


. par"ed to talk' ,·,hile the silootmg' is going on. ~



other side v/ishes to


. 'rai~e

with their demand that


It" the

. .

' .




major condL tions I as -t::hey





be an unconditional permanent

.. pessation of the bombing I ,,,eare' prepar"ed 'to talk about conditions.



discuss the conditions . .·,hich r.1Ust

precede the initiation of formal negotiations. Or if they do not "Fish to start at that end-that is: \...hat do


do about the shoQ.ting-·-t'la are

cf t !.-o.o

"'~O·}..' ~;",':I IJ_~.. ~".

.I.:, ...... ::'_


\.;ozk· back from

that to the practical means, by t'lhich you: reach the final settlement.





are prepared to talk without any



. ,. .


conditions of .any sort, or about'conditions.'

." .....




----------~==============~~~'~~~. rsr- :c::r;;-;=;=

, PR 70









NOl·{, let me say that "le (10n I t ourselves fully' ,


understand "lhy there ca~not be' 'discreet talks even though' the 'shooting i's going on. a

are a,·;arc of

NO"l, \10



the element of s::>-called face, but face is not a suhsti",tute for very serious practical problems that we race ,

0# '


on the military side.

':' Nmv, I remind you that' ','~ discussed Berlin \'lhile the blockade ''las si(ill in effect.



Korea "'hile the hostilities, ..... \-iere still in effect. -. deed,







Korea after the

,"; tions ~tart~d than ha"d 'o"~~urred, before the negotiations started. ' l1e talked about the Cuban missiles while the


Cuban missile sites "lere being built by the hour in Cuba. So we are


to' talk without any change in the

mili tary s'i tua tion "lhatever


'But. ",e are also prepared to talk about .changes in the





cannot do is to •

cormni t ourselves to a permanent and unconc1i tional stoppage of the ·bombing ",;ithout kno\.Jil1g l::hat the 'practical, Iesults of that ,·;ill be on the military side. No one has, been able to tell us, for example, , just as one


tnat ff we stop· the

. .. .


bombi~g th~se .

three'div~sions or more of North Vietnamese ·troovs that


are now in and on both sid~s of the Demilitarized Zone :.,; . . .. .. .~.~




will not advance to attack our Z,!arines .who are six miles a~tay


. ..,"





...... ! .

.' .


."... ~




.. .






• Now I ,o~vio~sly, these are importan: pr~.ctical

. "': '" '" qu~stions.

So lye v1ill talk at this moment, or "Ie '1il1

talk about any other circ~stan;es in "1hich the other. si~e

might think that they might


to talk.

But "7hat

we cannot do is to .stop·half the war and let the other "




. '


" ......

half of the \'mr go on unimpeded •. .. ~1r.








Secretary . -I when you refer,. \-Then:

"farred in our -reply to the Secretary Gen~ral

.:", .: .:.






l'-le' re-



a general ."



stand-still truce, are ,ve. ~alking at that point_ of a cessation of tl1e bombing, and cessation of infiltr.ation from the North? .A

I ,,,ould suppose that a general stand-still

truce would involve :an elir(\ination of all military action :of all sorts on both sides. . No""

one reason \'lhy there

has to be some discuss.ionof that is that it is necessary for both sides to understand ",rhat in. fact


pa~ticularly in a. guerrilla situation vnler~ the situation

on the. ground. is somei . .hat complicated. .

'. ..

And so there needs

to, b.e ,some discussion of. that point 1f it is to be a pro.



. .~r.acted stand-still. '


.'.. J ' ",

62 .




But, if that 'can be achieved, then



cun move

ip.to, the preliminary po1.itica1 discussions ,路:hich might open the \vay for a rec,onvening of the Geneva Conference or some other appropriate for'tl.:'1l.

But a military stanCl-


St:~i~ .. ~'lOUld involve the concept of st~ppix:g the military action on both sides, and that ,certainly ,'muld inc1ua,e stopping the Q,




. ....-:.

};1r. Secretary I just


Thant t s路. previous fOl"1Uula?

differ from l-ir'.



does this fOrInt.!J.:.a ...


A ' : Well, I think that he ,,-,ould perhaps be If t~ere is a major

. _. the better .one to s::O!mnent on that. ,


. difference 1 I think that this docs place emphasis upon a~mu~ual stop of the military action on both sides as

an important first step. As far as his earlier proposals ,...ere concerned I the three-point proposa~s, you recall that 'they envisage that v,e\'lOuld stop the bombing as the first point.


second point, that there ,,,ould be a mutua;L de -E5ca~ation of the military actionj and! third, there ,,;ould be discussions ,among all those involved in the conflict. We l?aid, nYour point one, stopping the bombing,


give,S us ~o particular problem, but "lhat do you have from -





Well, "lhat he had from路.

,the other side about point t,路;o?tt .





. . .. ~

-, . .



1'H. /u the other side about p~int .



~.;as a complete rc1ection~


'.,. that there \-,ill be no' mutual de-escalation of' military action. ".. .....



.. .




.... . And on point



thre~, the ~uestion

. ..... "'

ot dis.c·u~sio~s

'with all. the patties involved in the fighting, the' other ... side has consistently said in and ou~-from time to time, rather--that the Liberation Front'must be accepted as


. .




the sole spokesman for the.South Vietnamese people. ,

. .' . -' J: ' :-, ,·ie find disturbi!lg the refus~l of Ha~oi to en,g~ge in discussions\dth' tl~e 'Gover~~nt in ·Saig-on·. 'We '.. think ~hat "l~uld be an appro;,riate "ray to pegin~uch dis:-• ~ussions, and the possibilities of peace might be opened up if that channel \'lere to become active. Hanoi has refused to


But thus far

it .



11r. Secretary, how would you distinguish ,


bebleen this proposal and the President's proposal to Ho Chi Minh? Well, 'I think that pernaps the Secr.etary


General' s


is somet'lhat broader, in that it \'lould

presumably apply to a cease-fire throughout all of ' VietNam, Sou~h Viet-Nam a~ ,.;ell as, the diseng~gement mili-

tarily. bebieen North \Uet-Nam and' South Viet-Name

. that.


it is some\·:hat



.. ~ ~


.' 64


So to



. that is something which


are perfectly prepared to

discuss \'lith ~epr~sentativ'c~' from the othe~ side, or are perfectly prepared to have the Goverrunent of Saigon



discuss \·lith the representatives from Hanoi. l-1r. Secretary I wha t


;those critics \·!ho




raised the A

t.hat the President I s letter in

Well,! C:lon It

.' ".



.. .


your ans\·;oer to




\·;hat they are talk-

.. :...... ".


. .. United states is demariding proof ~n'advance that infil-

.- ..

~: • • , . '



would have stopped. A

We didntt talk about proof in advance.

The words used \-lere Ilassurances that infiltration he.d stopped'. 11 .



it is your contention that the price



not raised, that you're on the status quo ante as

far as that is concerned? The principal point here is that

A .



Hanoi has increasingly emphasized during this past year .its inflexible demand that a st?P in the bombing be '.


permanent . and unconditional, , . and that in J.













. PR }O


,.that, there v:ould be nO'indj,cation from Hanoi as to comparable or correspondi~g military action, they


would take on their side.


......-. • . Nm'l, just recall, f<?r. example, during the' 37- ...- .. ..- --.... day pause at the beginning of' last year I .Ho Chi ~-'!inh .




sent a letter to the Heads of



states, and in

that letter he demanded that the United states mus.t end uncondl tionally and for good ail bombing raid~ and :,_t~_e.~

__ _

acts, war acts against the Democratic Republic of' Viet.- ...... ..... ... .... _.. - . .,. . .





...... .




C?nly in this ,¡my can ,a poli tica~ solution of the .... , . -"!"--.. .. .,-'!-'"' .......




,,' - NOv7, that in5isten_~~_ upon the stoppage of the

bombing I vlhich "lOuld be permanent and unconditional,


been a major increase in the public o,emands of Hanoi during


past year.

And that makes it necessary for

us to know ,..;hat '-]QuId happen if l/le conunitted. ourselves to any such cessation. •

The l,'lorth Vietnamese representative in 'Paris on February 22nd said that ~le must state in ac1vance at .


the time of any cessation of bombing that it \'1oul'd be permanent and unconditional. ,Weli, that means 'thaF-~i~--- 'must know \'lhat the eff~cts would be.

'._--_._. . ---..--_._-tion continue? Wil.l those ..



. ."


three divisions move 'against



.66 .


Are the~i going to continue their haif o·f.

our Narines?

the \>l;:tr?' No one has 'been able to ,.;hisoer .. to us that that "lould' not the result. . ..be .


.No one, private citizens; .

":.~~governments, H;:moi's o\m ~epresentatives, governments ;- :-. . ": .. . . . . . "








~. _. fri~ndly to Hanoi.


one has been able' t.o ''''hisper to .

"-;.' us that ·there ,·,o~ld b~ ~ny chang~' in the' present 'miiitary , . ' ..



~act~cs an~



Hanoi with


to seizing


.. ~'7,~;.

South Viet-Nam by force. .

. '.

; ... ..:: .~;;:.:. .. :"-' :;; '....

If any of you" gentlemen have any infonllation ... •

..to,. ~h~ contra.ry 1 ~. ,·;oulc1..~e glad to hear. it . .. ":: =: ........



... ~ ..




. .' .

< " \ . _•• 't


_. - Q . - Z,1r. Secretar~-:--


. .Q

.- _.

Yes? . May I ask you' if the channels dirE?ctly to

Hanoi remain open after this




and if

so, are ~e putti~g these pro~ositions that you have just 'stated directly to them? ·A

remain open.

'A's far as y;e are. concerned I the channels They' have been open all along.


I have

referred t.o the fact that nothing ".;e have hac privately



. throws any diffe.rent light on '<that you now know publicly. about the... attitude of the two ·sides. poi~t

exaggerate the



. .








But.r shouldn ~t .

remain open. ·l'7hen_.y.ou

." '-..




Vick up the telephone' an<.1 ~obody anst.;ers on the other .

Or if you find yourself

, end, ''is that a channe+ or not?

. in: a, telephone 'conversation'


and the other end ha!1gs up,


I \iil1 leave it to you ~s to-;diether that is

a channeL . " ,c.~~ .. say at the moment, thz..t our channels are not: very . . " ,






~ ~.







l1r. secret~ry, is the amount'of recipro~ity,

, Q



that '-'"







the bombing a negoti-






abl.e cOImuodity I or is there a decisive-:"'rnust there. be a'. ': , . ."

'. ' •• -

....... -



.' _. 0...

.. •• , ~ "



',: COl\lplet~' ,st,npp?-ge 1~ 'h1firtr~t?:~n-) -~r-·l~,'-·..--.. ~_::_'n. ;,:':;:,:~~,:~~~::~'~~'


.:.." ~




:'.: .~. ~.:.. : ~,;'t.':':·.· .' :...... ':,,:


,,' A







.. ~



~ ~. "



. : - <'-.',

I don I ~ '-1ant' 'to give 'a cat~gorical response,:


President Johnson in a-recent press con- _

ferenee said that \'7e ",ould be glad to hear of a.lmost' anythi~g

from the other side.

But that doesn't mean that we

, can live on just nothi!l9 from the other side, just nothing. I".point out to you that'duri!lg theTet pause, at the end of \.,hieh Ho chi ?-1inh gave his reply to the •

letter which President John30n had sent to him it" the ginni~g

of the Tet pause, he had



other alternatives

" have =said, I!M~. Preside!lt, time is rather short hcr~.~_._. ~~, ... _ ,



,'" "



.,.---:..-- •.~-..•




.', , . 68 "

.... ;

.... "-



1'K IV


need a Ii ttle more, time on this. II


0" 0

He dic1n t t say' tha t.


Or he could have said, "l don't particularly like your '0



but here are my <?ol.mte:rproposals. II

- 'say that.

He didn't

In effect, he called for the capitulation of

South Viet-Nam and capitulation of the



in ~outh ~iet-Nam, and a permanent and unconditional ~,t?pp~ge



.~ .'""'









? s~~ •.

. , Y~S, '.:


of the bombing.



Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the

-.. -....



.public and private record,, being the same! ."'lhat exactly ... .. .

. .


-- .-.- •... -.-

do you mean?

Do you mean there is



,-no\.] in the ''lay of negotiation? -... - .. prIvately - . . 'A


What lIm saying is there is nothing

in the private record that reflects any different view -on


part of the authorities in Hanoi than


now, have

on the public record., Q

l-f.r. Secretary, could you explain '-ihy you

haven't published the


of four other letters that

' '.? you recen,t '.... y sen!.... t 0 ..nano~.

, . A

Because "le do not vlish ours'el ves to ,

. estapl.ish



point that a private communication with


if Hanoi "lishes to make public a







communicat.ion from

, as they did in connection \.;ith ,




,. ':the exch~~ge bet\'l~en 'President ~ohli:~cn and Ho <;!hi .Hinh, "



that is a choice which th~y can make. .



'. .




But I think it

.. .: .....





coul(be very important in the futur~ that Banc;:>i at "




. -., -... :'


..... " •


• #...


:.~!' ,i~~st--kn~~.,··t,~at it ~s possible .f.or'them ·to c,~;nic;;te-"-~ ," : 'p~~vateJ.j,· i

,,;ith' .~~' ~~'ithout

'b~t:o~ing p,UP~~C/" to


the .. -



iextent that you gentlemen 'iould'let us get a~~ay'. "7i1:-J~",_:,; _.",



,:.' "" ..... -~:',:,:.:~ "':::':. Q . '·':Mr. -:-Secretary 1 Point (b) of the .United· ,....




. " . .....





. . . . . '"


" . . "'.






' . " .. •


: .; '\.~tate~ a,n~~'1er }alk,s ~DoUt prel~minary t~lk~., ,Wha~ f s " •



; . . . . . .




• ...

~ ... _," <&!



. -. ..


.... ,




'., your u,nderstanding _of '..


\-;ould take'


• ..


,p~~,t -in • ~

.. z

. .


• ~

' : '.



.' .

those .... '.


talks-:-just Hanoi and .. . Washington . . :I . or would.it be Saigon ~




... '

., '.

, ,9re~t d,etail because vle nee9- to kno\,j 'vhat tJ:.le attitude . of Hanoi \V'ould be and '<1hatthe general situation ",oUld, be. .In our reply we did say that of course the Govern-

'ment cf South


will have



be appropriately in-

volved throughout this entire process 1 . inter~sts and vie\is of our allies \>lculd also have .·take~ fu~ly ir:to account. pr~cise




did not, try to make th~t·.,

in detail.. ~ecause \ve "!ould be interested JI].



•• 5


' ...


. , .

.. ', ",

., .. '



.\. '. '. 70. '


.' ",

. "--




_knOtYi~g ,,,hat Hanoi's response to the Se<:retary , initiativ~ would be. -








l-lr. 'Secretary, you l:'eferred to the' fact: -

that there "las no contradicti.on betvleel1 the




. . liecord as far as peace _talks are concerned •.


I vl?nder if you Vlould be. prepared to' comment no\·'- on ;


rep?rts concerning the possibility Warsaw,.

..- A-


of negotiati.ol1s in


If your question is '-10uld I be- "1i~ling to I

is no.


t~link _t;~e



a tti tude of Hanoi on

these matters"IS"- fairlY._,clear at the pr~sent time,. but."' I do not want to point the.fi~ger tolor close the door on,

any contacts that might occur any\.;rhere in any capital as far as the futUre is·concerned. .:




Secretary, thank you very much •



: 71


em'ity twtl I'eac~ to the Ct)uatrysillo) c(\uld r:-o fon:'m'i~ with un the 5( r{'ilgth we could hOll" to ¥l\'C It: Th~ lotr!1 £,fi'ort in tIle :;::onth t':l!lnille'd prlm:1l')", C\'i'!\ a5 the bomh!li~ of miElan hw, 'gels in tite Xo"th was c:u'rie:l on--initia'lly to dr:'nWll2trutc r.:,~~h'e hut nlw:l\'s.:tnd b:lsir.alh· to m:tke lIitnoi!s inflH rat ion far- mol'\! dif.icnlt ~nd co:;t.1Y and to pr.::.·.. cnt. l('ycls of new men and .. t:qlllp;n(,!lt th:lt could oi"l\, "l'it!'lll·"·l~ • . .., 1·',' tI'" i........ I. l:'-.. o~ gucrl'ilh \\'(\r~:H'c: Im:1til,.Jr maw.· tim::os O\·er, r' '1"Ihon fro:n Xorlh •• l.ot' :';\<:,11 :1CI( Yi('~·X:lln, the rcqulI'(·!n·:n[ for fo:·i.:cS in the Simth, . , (0) \\'0 clH'o";"'ged the South Yictnamc,-;c in .the:r OWll resolve to mon.} to a con"litutionnl b;!'sis of go\'ernment, a pl'c~es5 ~()t unc1N'way formnlly tlY' Prime )Iinistcl' Ky in .Jnnu:u'·I." oJ of. 1 (\·~·1 dN anc,l .t 1011O\'.'r,!Cl" S!!lce tl tat ' tun::: ill the face of all the difi1cultics ~mc1 c1nll!'~~:::'; of nUeml>tin'" ,te :uen' b " In n countl'y ~ t o CI't.:a a a':;:5 without poEti.::. cal ""1'''1''l~J "'I cc nllCl' l',n'~1g':(1, })F , terrorlsm , and b'· guernlla. and comcntional militnn- action. J (i) W'e ,encoumgcd the South ':-ietnamcse nt .tilt) same i21!le to p!'o'::ccc1 on the tl'.lf.'k t1lnt has now hecoine l'i.'concilhl.tioH) the holdintT out to mcmbc:s or the Viet Cong of the pO.3sibilitY of rccntermg the politic'l! life of their country \meler peac~flil conditions. In ess!;'nce, we scck. a~d would accep~ n fair c1ct£.'rmination of the, \~·tll of the p~opre of South Yiet-X am alOllO' the lmcs. t1.ell. sumri)<1l'ized by Ambi's:;ador Goldb~n:! s ChICa!!O sJ)(;i:ch of )ora" l~. 195'1".14 The3e were the South Yietnt1lne~e nsp~cls of om" policj:: But t!!en, ;lS previously, the policy was secn III thc w!d~r context of the future of Sontht'ast Asia. So it was thnt President Johnson lent our strong support in April of 1965 to the deyelopment of rcgiO:lnl coopi!mtioll and of E:conoinic projects created throtlO'h Asian initi;lti\'e;. B\'.. this \'ital element in o~r policy-we made flear ag:lin that oar undcrlrinfT objcc~ ti\'C \\'115 lto do what we could to assist in the cons~rtlct:I\'e tasl. of b\'ingin~ «bout n South- , east Asia of cocpel',~th'c and indepcndent na· . tions, wlmte\"el" tlwlr intel'llationnl postures might b~. • Wehnd :t Eecnritv joh to do itl Yiet·Xn·m and were joined m-Ct' time by five of her a1'e:1 nations in supplying mHlt,H'y forces to do that job. And we. nrc ;l,;sisting Th'litnnd ag;linst a concertccl ClImesc Cotn!!luni~t and ~orth Vietnamese ei~ fort at extel'l1flJ sub\'crston, :m effort ber/tlll-to keep the recont straiglft-ns early as.l0G2 and clearly and dc!initi\'(:ly by Deccmb:;r lOG·!, before our mnjo)" dt'cisioIl5· in Yict-X:un. Our \ '·'.Ir~" , 1 • • ' \'1'0 . n1l'd ':\.~\ SI',. ..... \..18 llTl<1i!rta!ungs l'cm~\m ~


In essence: (a) Our objccth'c rt'lIluinec1 soldy that of protecting the inc1t'pencli:ncc, of South Viet· Nam [1'0:11 cxtc,'nnl interfe~'~r:ci' nnd [01'('(\, \To (bcliIlOd, and st iII dcdine, to thr(;~'ttcn the; regimo in Korth Yict-Xam it~~1f or the tCl1'itorr and regime of Communist China. •: (b) We indic:1ted in April of 19B5 that we , • . were prep:u'cCt~ f or (1"ISCU3310m or ll('gotli1tIons 'without condition, and we hftyc r~lentle3s1\' ptirsuccl our own cITort5 to enter into rnc:min;· iul discn~~ions as wen as fol1o\':ing up on "'a host of })cacc initiuth-e3 by others, Unfortunnt:ly, Ihmoi has c1u·ng firmly' to tho objective of Insuring a Commt!ni~t takeo\'er of South· Viet·Nan:; and has refused to entcr into any fruitful di~cussio"s, InrleQd, Hanoi has tejec.tod nny disctmioll3 whate';er-initin,l1y un lCES its basic objcdh-e was nc.~eptcd in adnmce throllo-l1 the so·called ':third poiut," more recently t~· less we ngr.::ed t~ a complete cessation of the bombing ,,·ltllOl1t any rc;:pomir\! adion on thdl' part. . Ihnat's flhilo;:o'lihr tow,lrd l1e.~'oth~tion '" l~as now become uuthol'itulinly. ~waih\blc, p~U" rr while nc""o· ttcu1arly in the - • I section on "fi"":lt:n b, ,:, 0 t Iatmg I!1' tIe captmcd rr:mat'r:s of one of tlH~ Korth Yicinamese lender:;, Cc):nrade Yinh, (c) 1Ye continued to p1al~e ere!'y possihle c·m- . phnsjs on the crud"l ~10nmilitaty a~pects of the conflict, gr':!ltly sfrf:ngthcning our own COIl-' tl'iuution to the c:;Ecnti~lly South Yieimtmese task of l'esto!'ing 3tabmt:~ and control in thc countryside and working fot' tlli! WeH,ll'e or the people. (el) ::\!.ilital'ily, 0111' action:; were diredec1 to produg to XQ[,th YietSnll1 that. it:,: efi'ort 10 t:tl,~ o\'er the SOUlll Ly milit.1!'\' fOlW!- mus: fail and to extending an~l enhrd!1£!' the areas in' whidt the "ital busin~5£ of 'br,fr'lging real £c-







' ' ' \ J\;



. .~

- - ..


•• <



- _ . _. . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . .


But we look~d b~\'onc1 t!~c:;e) undo \,,:c must The fir5t qUe;;iiO:l ~i!('m<; to lUI) l>0th S<'l'll'lltc . still look b"yv!Hl th;.~~, to th~ whole qt~<:.;tio!1 nn<1 diEieult. At SOil:; point in the histo!'y 1 ha\'o.': of the future of South(.'ast A:::i:\ and to the role recited w(' bc'cl1i1lt' c\l:1ill1iaell, d01:b0i'iltcly :nul 1 • • 1 p:'O(,'~55, t 0 '} ..' · .' t1 I\! ll;'tllon~ •. ~.o!~ tl It!" t.tat we (:,an p1ay · m nssI2dng by f orm,\ 1const!tulw:::1 l l:! SUl)l)(::~ nl":':t to C01~::f;lidat(' their lHltio;lal ind<,p<'nd~ncc of th~ rr<,~d(lm of South Yict·;:\am from ('xand to impron! th~ welfare of their p::ople. tcmal int{:l'rcr~ac~, That co!mi1itmellt inch:ded This) th\~n) is !l. l.:;rcbol\cs nc.::ount of wfhe a. s~ro:l''' tr('~'tt\' obl:"flticn, .. nel th'\t is f> char. ".0 .0 hlh to Yi::t·~~m,n En'n wilhin its own terms, part of the stOI'Y. J~ut v..1mt is p~i'hap;; more to it may ~mit wh:'l.t o~hcrs wou1t1 include . .:\.ncl,· the po:nt. is llmt g;'c;'lt l)ow(,rs must fflCC two 10nO' ~s it ma . . ~ccm, it, is still illcompkt~ in t",o ccntml points: o 1 " Il WOil 1" ' ,,' r~spccts b~t (1 t~1:,C J' le!' t 00· mUC,l~llnC (a) .As Irving l\l'~~ol has pointed out in IllS tOCo\·er. . , 'recent nrtide in It'ol'~ign AITairs, the re.} defini· }i'itst, it is .plainly iun.dequate to io~us sole1y tion of ~ S"1'cat pov:cl' is that ilot only its nco an om' policies tow~ml Yiet-Xam or ercn to,;'urd . ~~ cases " , 1 't (.ce,me" 1 '" ~ t 0 ac t bons hut. the In } W.Hell Southeust Asia us n wh01!!, Tho5e policies ~rc have Hl:tjor COn~i!ql:~:lces. :\ t .(;\·o'·Y st::ge in the intimatdv l'('lated to the rC3t of Asia j to the imViet·Nnm story, it 1\;15 s:!;;med c1carto the le!'tdplication; of Asian dcY!)l~pments fO!' other ers of this cOlln~ry th~t not to net ,,"ould 1ut \'0 are:tS and, in the kit nn[tlYSl~, f91' 0\\1' own un· tlH:! coTitrcst cfl't'cls. This is the way th:lt succc:s• ti(lnn.l s::curitYi Md to om' 'ccatrnl world pursiro choices h:ln~ ::ppenr~d to four SllCC('SSlYt1 . posc-tlle cr~lt:on of un international oruer or, Pl'esidt'nts, independent states. (b) The second ly)int tktt ~l gl'cr.t power canSecont1ly, I h:we tried to i50bt~ what! ,('(;m. t] . .l!l tllcmSCl\'C;) " allec t not cscnpt: 15 lilt.Its f,ctlOns sider to lW.\'i} been the major polley decIsIons.. the stnkc3, When gi'i!:1t powers commit themOb\'iotlsly, 'policy is not just n matter of sil1$'le . 1 CO.Ul';C 01~ con:;ch'cs, by treaty, and by n tob tlecisiolls, howc\'er fully con5id~rcd.•\ "<.lsi. nl:mduct extending over many years, an eLement of ber 01 It'.::ser polley dt'cisions h;l\'C accompallled reliance C0!l1t'3 into being, both within the area tl\cse basic ones) nnd the way in which n basic and ".. ithin other areas ill ""hie}) commitments, policy is carried out in the end nfTects its subhave also been undertaken, stnnce:. I In\\'e not tried to cover, for example, Yet. all this beir!£; said, I do not. t11ink ontl decisions on the b~1:!nce of effort within South cau conclude th:1.t b~i;~n~sc we s:lic1 or did a, we. Vict-N'nm, decisiom 0:1 particular negotiatin'g' musL n~ci:~s" ...ilr S:'..Y m: do o-in :m 'old phra::o • II• for Ollt:.', do not b~llc\'c ,. 1 t proposals! <lccisio:lS ~n t!~c p~c~ and nattU~ ,of of Bismarc1(s. So t 1:\ tho bombm cr of ::\o~'ln \' lC't-);~un, or the slwJe the (;lCS50!1 in invol\'(:mcnt,!' is th!lt we are the :md difiicult probleln~ o\'er ~l:e YC<11'3,Or U:nit;d of history. ' ,.' States influcnce tow;lrd politIcal progrt:.'5sm tI~e priSOLlCl'S H:tthcr I tllinl: we shou1d be focusmg on the South. I know full well that thCi:C are nreas in seco:lc1 O;ird, ltnd fom'th questions I h:lve listed j which many of yotl undoubtecl1Y 11olc1 strong aborc. views, I welcome discussion of .them. These arc big questions, anaH I ha\-c tried to do nnything to(]llY it is to streSS tlmt the. "Ihe Lesson in InvG!v?menJ" matter has reallv b;:-cn looked at for n.t )en2t' '\Yhnt l then, is ;cLJle lc~son in in'·oh-emcnf'?, the lnst 13 vcnts· in this kind of larger frame· '-Is it that we lH1YC b:!<!n happ!::d into ri. diw- work. The i)olicics followed today are, as th~y cult sitn:'ttion by a s:;ries of lesser decisions taken must b~, the policic3 of this ac1minis~ratiol.l. Xo one can say wk:thcr another ac1mini2tratiorl with no clear yicw of their imp1icutions~ -Is it thnt we s!wuld nc\"er hnye become en- 'Would ha.e~ done the s:\nH~. What call b~ snic1 is that the umle1'1ying \'icwpoint and nn~1.1ysis O'l'l'I'ccl in Southeast Asia ~ , of fuctor31u1Yc be':ll hu'gely simi1~r throughout b ':"1s it that we should nC\'er hu\'e attclnptcc1 to the last 13 wars, if not longer. support South Yict-N~'n ~ " 'l"his cloes not pro\\ of cour5C, t1mt this -Is it tlult, ha\'ing supported South \'\ctNnm in cc'rtnin respects (inr.luding po treat~·) amtlFis ha.s been corred, The V'nited States and h.-wing become deeply cng:tgl'd In ~outn. has no, divine dirm;:ns:ltimi from error, and~ the most that ,,'our lc:-.dcrs at t'tny lIme can {.o 13 , Cl'l.:& .Asia, ,';e S110tild noneth~1e3S have dec:di!dto eX(;lt tl:~ b<!3t lillman jud~mc:~t :,md In!?!'.,l Ol' should no\\' dedde--to limit the actions ";e s(;n~c ~i which tlt(!y are cnpnbk:. I, fo!' on::,! am take or en'I} to withdraw entirely? convinced thnt this has been done. at aB stages. ~







wci~ht and innucn,=:! to !l~lp r.:~.)h·(: cis-

UNUm) N..1.1'IONS. N. y" S!!pt. 21 -~'O!fO\\'ilW i$ lIl!! text of a sp~cd: to :; i:Ii:/,O'. 11SSC::,1!>ly

dcU~'crecl toao),

(. Arllwr J. (;o:dbrg.. chicf representative:

Ulli~cd Sta:~s

'l'oday, as cy;;~' at' this time, we ?P(:1l ~ new diaptcr in tb hi3torv Cit t!l~ Umted K;;t:(;ns. Wc open on hoppful note Wi~!l you!' £Con:~Eu !\~a!l' cscu of RUlilCmi:q ejeclion as Pf<'$:d~:lt. for ?,ou arc not Oil!Y l:nowil and re. s?~c~cd by your coUe::!"\les th"o, ..,.'r.nut , a" tt:c we;!? as an able aPG distin~(l;5i~cd dlp!om<t~lst; }"0:1 <'l~o h2\,C t:1C distil''', • lirsl ...• t 'Ion 0,"b' eli!g tl1C lapres~n~at!ve of a country "f Eastern Euro'ic to be e!cct. · h···.. , ed t 0 tl us .!ga (lthC~ . \lle of ti~~ United, Stat(:s welco:n~ th:s dcvelo;>:ne;;t as or.e fur!h~~ sign of the. (:vo:~ltion \'Joh!ch hr:s been ta~:ing plr.!c':: ill til;! relutio:l5 amon"




tOil St~tr::3 of Eastcri1 Europ\:! and of otl~

er parts of the world. Ma\' all members take this new step :\3 a r';i:1i:!d~r of the truth which a' Il"!o!!crn' Danish 53.2::! h:;,s conlpresscd into .these \Ilords: "Coexistence -- or no' existence." \~Ie congratulate you, Mr. Pr.;sidcnt. and pledge to you Our cooperation in the disdlCl.rge or ~'our difficult and im. . portant office. I take this occasion al~o to p::y trib. ute to ~:our dlsti"gui;hcd prececcssor. tlle Prcs!aCllt of til.:: Twenty-First Scs. ~"'.n, Ambass:lc!or Pazh',':::k of Afgl:anis. . W~ share the r..:!!'l!ration or all .egations for the re50t!~ccft:!n~s:) and patience with which he c"uidcd u; . t "nrouga more ,meetmgs of the Ge!1cral' .Ass~mbI:; than h::.ve been prc.;ldt:d over by an! o~ler ma n in tile Ilistor:': or this orgamzatI911. This annual general debate ser\'~s the Important purpOSf!. of anowin:; each' lllembcr to Jay bcfora tile entile As. sembly, at the outs~t o~ O:lr ~ssio:1 its maior concerns in the jnternati~!lal sphere: I :;haU not attempt to tou'.:h on ~ all the iSSUeS 011 tile "zenda to which my country attaches imc;ortance. This statement wi.U concentrate on certai!l is,Sues wIl:cn, in ou: view, are of· trans. ;'~ndcnt signiCic::nce to ";orld peaCe. ·The Conflict in Vietnam First among thc~e i5 .the co:;tin~ed tr~gic con Wet in Vi~tnam, For tI:e er:. tire community of n~t1ons. the search for peace ill Vietnam remains a n1:tttc. of the first priority. for peace in Viet. nam must and should b~ our m::.jor co:\. cern. Indeed, pursuaat to its Chartcr, t~~ United ~etioI1;; has the most e:.;pHdt flgnt 2nd Guty to t:(·:~cern itself \,..i:h this, qucst:O;J, as it a)cs with any b'n::.:.~h of or ti:rc:d to t!:~ p~.!ce :!ny-,I:hcre in .Ul~ world. . (

}ro~·"!ing ttli~ cf;n\"ic"I:on"is-V:;-if';. niY~riln:~nt COn tim:;:.:; to sec!: th~ 2;;. p3rt!C:i;~!:O:l Ct~ ti!~ U:1i!c~d ~";r!:=~!1;;

in tlH.' qU!!:;t fc;- P':Jc::: in "'i:c-a:'!:l\. F.\'~rr lnernbcr ~i1d, C\4crr Oi"~:.~! (\: t;lt! Ua!tc<.! N::!tioIl5. this As;;~mb!y ind·.:r.cd, s~?rc5

the Charter (lb!i~.!tic:t of lc:.di!!g .it"

putc.s ~nd c(J~rii~t$ u~t\I:~\::l 1~~t!')!,!5 7;:.'

pcacc!ul nlcans. ''rc.day, ('~5~itZ V:':;; t.i!sapraOi:1tnlt-nts. I rci!~'r. ~t~..• Ot!r ~t1re~! tr) all members of el~ lj~ited K:!~i0;:S. ia· divk!m!!iy and col!~cti .. ~l~.', to a~~q~ that (.!JUgation - to US';) t::<::r inflr.:(';ilce ·to help brkg the Vi,-:~:::::n c~,,,fiict to a!l end by p~a.cr.:i:..'-l. mc:l.nS, The dist!ngn:5:~~d cl~i('61~~S \\'!~o p:!r... tkioat~ in this dr:b;. tc ,,*"iH undot:c.t!:dty

"·~~ r.la1


"'PI'-+: n'- C" ..... '1 ~::o. ... ,!V'..,~ .. ~i . . ~t'~"tQ£o~ .. I.~\ Ct.!~~ S •..:-.:.>... ,:, ........... !J


as to how t!lis can be 'orc::,;ht ~:~ut. . r.tj' cc1cciaHcrt ,':HI Hst~n t? t!lcI:'l v;i:h clo;t; att~ntion "'lid r.::~::::;;t. .~ <.~ '-'''!'''s As 0'" c''''';~r'b"tlo~ vl,.. I ...... h 'to t~··, ............ rlis::ussionof this is,\:~, !~~ r.i~ state as _~ '~u",*,",lo


PLt;C.~St,;~l&·" ) a~

-:-. •

. . ..:~' •• c-" ~ "l":'\~'" P(\,)S I....~ t!:'It ~h., tO~""~ ~.·;I·I~ ......r...... ~c;;.:... .:.

of my Go\·~rnm~nt. Our basic vi~ ...t: .1:; O~~ v:~l!cil, 1 :!:n sure, is sh:l~ed OJ' Hi; g:«:t !:;;jority of this AS:;~ill~~Y: th::!t thh co~:t:-:t C:<:li 2:ld should b eo:1::<J hy a p!1ticll sobE,m at the carU~3t p')5S~b~e ti:~:;;. A r~liHt~:Y" solution is not t.h,; 2,115w·:r. 1'0,' o~r r.3.rt. Wil do not !'·~~k to bnn;:; ":.. m1!it~w s6tut!ori on '~;\)rt!i Vi~~~;~::! cr-eii- -it$ ·ad.11crcnts:'By th;; san':~ token. in Edc!ity to a political s1)iutio:l. \~t~~.'::.~~1~2tr.~nr~ NOrt!l \:!~tnanl and Us ,,:.~b:!rcn.~s to :r:tpose -i' 'nliiit~ry -'so!iit!onu;,iil" SOtltil Vietl}am." . ,- '--'- -_.. ~. . Proccdurc5 for ~ Solution The question' then natur"lly :!rises: By what proceclul't! can a po!:t:cal soj,ltion be reached? Qrte 'VcU .. te,;!~d '~;3y !5 the conference table, 'Vi! ara ?rep~red to follow this path at any time - to go to the conference tablil in Gc:;(!\'a or a..y other suitab!a Tllace. ' There is a ·secor.g wz.y t') purs\:~ a pOlitical settle!ll(!nt: through ?ri\'ate ne· gotiations or discussions, 7he UnIted States stand~ ready to tak;; this roate also - and, in so coi:tg, to gl\'e ass~!r· ances tilat t1:c confid~:!ce :md pd;'2CY of such 'uegotbtions or discussions would be fully respected by our GO'iem· Inent. . It may btl that negotiatic~s or discussions might b2 prec~Gd or facl!it?~ed by nlutual Ii1!Etary rcstr~h~~) OJ' the sell. ing down of the co:,f1kt, by c~·e;caht:on

either with or y;;thout a

fo~mal ce2S~'

fire. This rOl:te, too, we 2:e prepared

to foUow.


There is, on the other h::nd. ger that the t:, •.. fEct



y ccntin!;e :.:ntlI .,.~ -~----.. one s:de finds tb: bUl'd'.!n of war too e~jlaust;!1g or too cos~ly, ~md that the



fighting wm enly grad!.!C!l!y cnd, WithOUt n!:~~U~ti(\~s and \t~·itr.ou~ an 2grced sctti;::i!:ent. Ceri2in!y this is a grim pros;')cct. for it weu"! mer:n p:o!or.g':!d c~n.ni~t a.!d t!:!ci:)dy. It is in ess~nce a -mIlitary S:>i~!tlO:J, and. it is nvt one we s~ek. V/C c:!r.&"\~st!y 1:0;;~ U!at it is not the couree in which o:!r 2d"(:rs:d~s '.':]1 pi!r..ist. In ?:1)' evc:~tJ tb:r.-: ":ill h~ no s!ackcni,;Z in O!~r rc~'!ve to h~:i1 SOH~h \'i~tn:!!n c~. ~e.r:d it3 r:;:lit to G.;tc:rn!r.~ •• t .... hS O\";n ,ut~lr.: by p~Jc(':i\!! means znd 'free from external fllrc~.


t;cmm!ttco n,; Wi': a:c Ui <I p" ..ri:"'~l·· s')!utioa throl!;:l disr;,:5sio:1$ or nClo· th~t. dcsp:t~

thtio:ls. v:;; r\:g:<'t

tfforts, No:-th Victn:!:~l ~Ivl


T:l:my adh~r·


r,a\'c not y(':t c:;rt~~d to this obj;;c. ti\·c. tut \,;C S!i.:!lI co::tlt;u~ ill our d· forte;: and v:e ho:-:e th:!~ v/hat \':\! SlY to:!?] mar help to br:r.z r.'}arer til\! ti:nc \1l1~cn th~ t\:iu s~clcs Vi!H. s~t clo\,;n t(>~\lthcr. . •. The Atti~ud~ of Ii:moi It is said by SO~.lO: tnat H,!l';>i will agre~ to Lt:~in nC6oti~t:Ci"~S ir th~ ttn!ted S:"tes c~?~;c.; U:o bo:nhin,; oi North Victnam-~h~t this b~)!~~b:!'.; is the sole obstac!e to IicgoU::tt!!')r:~. I ·l;o;.:ld note that in !ts pubHc s~:!tc:::~rits Hl:10i has m~r.:,!\· indlca:cd that tb:re "coulci" be - ,; .. t'I!)H~ ~. 1:. .< t!· .... :~'" s'o"",'d nt:go\.l~ ;.e bc-· •. 'V:""b .. ;I''' ..... Tn..:c) s~r::~ ~o\"'~::1=~nt5-~5 vIe a as our

.. G~r. #;rat and - ~3V~ .e:,pre3sed tne,r b~h~[ or assunlpttOn tl1~~ n~go· t~at!On5 Uv:o~:id .. bczin, perhaps seon, if th~ b,)r.~b;n:;;s 'v~,e stop;.~d. ':.1e have gl\·.:n t::C5~ C:Q'i':7!3S l 011S of bdief cur :most ca:eM att~ntion. Bu~ ~!!c,,'l third L>::l.rt'; - incluci:l~ theE'! <:!o':ern; dist:ngu!~!~~d



i~~lt"~(:uE15 t

,.f~~f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t~~f~l~;'~~{%f a;Ur;Qri!2~!Ve rn,c:'S5:!'!"e IrC-Zr! ~!~nOt tna!,.

. ,~. . ~· -;-'~:t71-' 4,.~.w·-··~:':~-'-:'--1~:~:'; -;r~··,:--T' .; t.n·., .... \,.(; .•.0 J,\ .!a"c .. !.9 ...."~q~.~".\1.~~!S'_'!.

tllC: b'!.I:!b!ng.,v.:"-I:e .. ~t..'?Q~~d. We ha,'e sought such a m.;s:;~g,~ directly from Hanoi w:th·:)ut success. On its part. the United. S~ates would be glad to consl~cr 2:!d discuss any p,opo5?1 ti:"t \~'ot!ld lead promptly to productive disCU5S;Oi:S that might bring about pc:!ce to tho: arc:!. We do not. howcv~r, concc'i\"c it to be un,ca~onab!~ for us to seek en light. tenment on th!s imp:>rt<!nt q!.!cstio:1: Does 1':orth Vietnam cenccl\'c t..'1at the cessation. or bo:nbb~ would or. should lc'?u to <l!iy otl',er re')utts th~n n;eanirrgful ncgot!at!ons or ciscuss[qns l~r:cl:?r ci;currlst~nce5 ':/n!ch ,,;ou!d not rli52.d1~·anta~e eitilcr sr~e? '

"·~tif"'-·O\·t'\.... \'i:'- al~o ha'''e..... .... it \'....... .... b:'\l:""'V-'" .... .. '" addr.~~s Otl>:::::!';cs. to ·tho~e ~.".

••• _ .. -


a rig:lt to

gO\'ernment:; , Which 5Up?Or~ HenGl S . ca~l;a and wl:kh ha\'c stJ.tcd to U5 their. bcn~·f5 cbot!t }I~ntJ!'s intt-ntioiis· and. to.· ~~t this ct:~stron tv th~:'t". : ,, __ , If th~ Uni:ed St:ltcs Wf::'i) to ta"e ~.:t: .f'; __ " sJ.~n a"d orc:o.r a prio:' CC:;5at~on ~ 1!l~ t ., of the bC1:nbing. \t.:h;tt \·.·ouki. t~!cJ tnen , ."Hil f~' -nd how GO or r~l.r tom 4.1"0;"'" •• U~" ~ woui:! the}, then us~ their l:-!Iu(:_~c.e ""d ...y o··"·~ in orcl."r V Ie.· .. J... - to mo\'c..I t,le • n;;;:l conflict pror;l!"t!y tOV;:l.r", a p~'1.cc. -r,'











lui r~io!l.!ticn? Ccns~rUl:t:\'e :m5wcrs to thcs::! qucS;

110ns w.J::~::! aid in th~ s~arc~ for peace.

.·tt is widdy ac{'cjl(cc!


li!at t!lC Gen!\'a

Asrceln~nts 195! and 1952 51:0,,1.1 consmtlt~ thcb>!s:s fa:, ~Wcmcllt. We 2gl'CC. In o:.:r \~ic\·t, this entairs: . i. A ccmjl!etc cc~~c·fire and <lisen,;cmc:\t by :!.!I 2ri,,~d per.:;()nnTin

.iiSt5-·1\o:til-· ~~::~t{··S:S~ih -\"fdrna~1r~6ira

~~i;ic::r(!?·tc:-S·t:~fl"actro.-1Vias 'ciitea f.:ifoY-i!i.:i··G~:1et·a A:;ro:cments.

2. No militarv

ot b(l~~~


armed p(!r50n-


to~f.e 'liijii:fal;rid'Tlr~orili DfSoUtrl'\';~tnam C);,:~pt these under the contn)l of tj~e respective goycrn· mcnl~. This would m~~n wlthd,~win<1 or d~!no!>mziI1J all other trooos, with: drawing· cxt~rllal :ll1!itary and related personnel j:ltrOGllCecl from outside South Vietnam, and tile e\'acua~!on of mili-


an aerj:,;d tra~~:! Sc[;c':!u!e,,- This too '.~,:as "on-t . ,........ .~.r;::-r;- Gn_n~,_ ='."<3 " ~ .. en.•l?""~,,, u•.G_r t.l_ ..... gr"e·



I, [



as sQon as l::ossib!c




• tilUS sumiliarizln~ the central eleIll '''·' o.• t' G~ne\':l Agreements, '" -I note • :;':':; _~a\. as.~.~~dcnced it the communique. issued at Nanlla last October 25. the Government of South Vi~tnam bolds similar ....iew.;. • We mzke this <lllthoritath'e sta~ei'i1ci1t. Mr. Prcsid,:mt. in th3 hope tr.at a seUte-mcnt can b~ reached by re~iiirming the principals of U,(! G:::nem .>\greem"nt al~d by makin~ use of tit~ macbinerl created by those a~re~mcllt5 - i::c!t!di~g in psr- . ticulara ri'.:ou\'Cr.td G~r.e\·a CSlnfercnce in. w~l!cii all cor:cerr.ed parties. can 2£)propriately participate.


An {'.dd!ti!l;J?l .Question And we suggest that a further questioA is in C~Ger: Does l\orth Vietnl:m azree thzt the. .foregoing points are a correct interpretation oi the Ge:le\'a _-\grecments to which it r:of~s5ecly sub3~ri~es? . , . To this question ht me ap;;end this plain state:mmt about t!l': aims ot the

United St<'.tc;; toward North Vl'!~an~. The United St<\!!:s has no desl~ns on the territo:-f of N!)rth Vietna:'n: we do' not sed: to o';r;rt~r(i\'; its gO·lemme::t. whate\'~r i~s ii!~Q!og~'; and we are' full] prep3=-'~ to tcsfl~ct its s~\"cre!~nt1 and territorial intcarity a:;d to e~ter into sp~cific \In:!~rtcJ:i'!;;5 to that er.d. By lile s3m(' toke:l. it remains our vlc,v tn?t th~ P~·)P~·~ 0: South Vi~tna:n sl,ot:~d bw: th·~ rii.~lt to wJr~: 0<:. their own. p.,:itical tutU!;) by p~a:e;l!l mi;a::s, in acco:da,1<:e w!th tht! princip:e of se:f· d-:::.~:-l!!i~attonl ar!G ,1,:!tiiClUt (:;~t~:naI in· i t~rrcrcn-:,,; :.'!1d th:lt this ri;lIt to.) 'shcald . L"" ..·":":~.':-tr·rI b.'L:tlL <

.......;.. .... 9~"'~ ':;,:fi:·r ..: -; ·-l!;~ .....~:r:-f:·::.i p..-.;.;;:;:::.: ....... ~ . . ".al.h'.. I,.: lit.l}; 1..1 h.,.. P·J . l ...C..~ ...


::.:~ ul"·

~r ..So!~t11 "\~i~t~::.;:il ·~ho;.t~~!· '~:i\·i:" t.!iie~:tig c-:;';'ii:\:c'as' ii:st.cEss ··dti!.::n5· -\'.:ltn- [toli

ri;;h\:f in ··6\'~r:rscis~_..\';·c'·c:i,)·r.;£cci::· t~;-':"i;···ti"i:i~· ·if.\:r~ci..,l~nt or tlle: S::mtl1 .Vietllamcs~ pcopb ;:;!i0:111 b;a c::d~~:"d fronl such ;1~nc~~ul parUci9ati~:l.. ~....e \·:o:.i.ld~.. ~to~sh!~r.w it S\!~9~~ther \'t·is~ 2;~d p=o,m•. if ,.t:l:S _~,:9t~t:t.r~;n·ci~:~ .:ifCo!>; stacl~' to r7·~,ace. t~at ~i):)r~o:"iat~ ,ts3~~r· anttts "orr this nl~~tt:1" 'b~ co:~z~(!~r'id 'in conn~ctio·n~·~~:!JJ!· ft.. p~Jrr~ir~~~~Je!!1~~t: It S11CU!d b..) not~d !n iht; CO:iJ!~~tion that the G:Y;~:;:m!!ilt cf Sr.uth· ViatJ:am

has stated th!!t it has


ces:re to

tJlrclt::n or h1ma ti!!) peo?!~ or tit~ No:th;" that it 5\)(':'3 only to·r~?oh·e jtS p.,Uticr:l

rnents. 3. Full r~Sl)cct for the international' ''frontiers of 'tilt: states bord~ring on North ar,d South Vict:l~m. as '.';ell as ~or tl}C dcmar'~:J.ticn Il:.e and demilitarIzed zer.e between Nonl, and South Vietnam. Thls too was called for hv the GC:1e..-a AgreaClcnts. • • 4.. Pc?c?fcl $ettl"m~nt by the Deop!e III both North and So!.:th Vietnam of the qu<-stiO:1, of rcm1ificat:on. without !orcign bt{'dcrer.ce. 1'his teo was called lor by ti:~ GCll~"a. A£ri:C:nents. ~. Fir-ally. ~:on of all the fo~e­

go~ng b.i~~ ?6z:e§{i. . ~9~~1_U~~gt~~t!DI:al..ma.. _~.hlJlgo.., This too was cal!~ for by the


And it is om' Ct:r~Ii':r vb'·' t:l:1t ~('J~~~h 'Vi~t!~:~u~r.!'~ \\:h") ~.!'c. \l:~n~rt:;' -to


\f:it:1:.lUt e:.:t~rnal in-

te.fcr<'l!c(:; "nd that it is p:eparca fo:, "reco:tcma~ion of aU cl·~r.;cnts in the SQ~ dety." It is a!s::l not'.!worthy t!:at the peop!~ or South Vietr:.am ha.w just concluded a p!:ltccful el::-ction under a Ii-::W constitution, and h:;,vc r~ad~ progress in the dcmocrat:c process. Let me add that my Government remains willing, and in~{~d has alrc?dy begun. to m,'.l'e a major commitmelit of

ina "iews of th·~ Unit-:\! S~ates on the r~quir<!:n\!i1ts of p~ace i:l th(l Mlc!dle Ea5t h::.\'e b~cn set (o:.h b;i President Joilnsorl. no~:-{bh,· "in his s~\t~~r.1~nt or Jun~ 19 whidl f<!m::i.ip.5 (ll:r policy. In' tbi!t st~.tent~:at nly GO;'''i!rnn~~:1t app~a!ed to all the p2rttes to a~"?t r.o rigid "ie\\' on the me ..~o(l of bibgir.~ p::02ce to th~ area. Rathe.. W~ .hav~ emphasized throughout that th~re is S,):,;,.~t!lir.g "lore b2sic than m~thods: th~ simp!:;) wi!!" to p~ac~ There m\!st b~ presi::1t on bot!l sid~s an amrr.~a:h·e will to re;oh'a the iss~l;:s, not throu:;h nl~ dktation of ter~s by (::;!lcr sice. but t1lrough a pr~.::·~;:;~ of r.!\!tual acc"!'i~:r:o:iatlon in ,...hich nobojy's \·!tal' bt<:r;::sts are injur~d; b s::e.rt, both sides ::',~st h~\'C the w!ll to WOi'~ out a p')E:'icat solution; bo~h rnust b-e CO:TIi!i!tted :J the pea~e: a:~ r.o ap?ro;l:-i~te n'!~th~d. such as geed O':i!ces 0; rn~cli~~:O!l,


be f'xcJuded.

y.:~!r:rZ~i'';ll' S~ssi~nts \:/~ik.

In c2nco: it nlUst be said th~t sudfa wi!! to p~acc was not rm~P.if~3t in th~ r~ccnt em~rgeilq se~s!or: of the Asscmb!!'. -it is gr~at!y to be hop<!d that. after

sjo~r refb:tion by aU conc;:rncd, a new and bctter nloJd \f,"iH tl~tergc - ", n!ood resources in a multilateral coo;:erativc I '1'la\.tOn .' an d nlagn~n:m:ty.. •• . eHart to acctleratc ir, aU of Southeast· o~# re':~!~Cl Asia the b~nerits of economic developSurely the purposes of peace cannot IT'~nt so s!lrdy Jleec!~d there. When the b::: s'1m,;d if the ri;ht of a m;;mbcr stat6 conrIlct is caGed and peace is restored, til its natio:l~! life is ·not l':cccotcd and we wodd hope to s~c North Vietnam . rew~:::ted by its neighbors: nor if mili. incl'ldcd'in that effort. . w..y success bllnds a mcm':l3r state to' the fa::t that its neighbors ha'ie ri~hts . . Constructive. R:plies Urged and intc:cstscf their own. In the interest of progr=ss along this I!l realis::l. it is perhaps not to'be road to peace. we r:!rnestly hope th:lt p~ct-=d that .cc::mdliatlon a"d ma;;na. constrllcth'e ailSWC;'S to the qucsnons we ni!i1:ty \;l~n ap;~car o\·en~~g~H; but surety have raised w;U soon be for';1comlng. enzn:tr r.;list at lea:;t ~h"e vtay to tolcrWe are 311 too con:;cious n:at the pre:>. an~e anel to the will to Ike to.;ether in ent reality is one of grim 2::!C h:ush c·:m- pea-::e. Once that will is manifest. the fliet - a!reaoj' tr<lg:cdl!y and unduly tC~IIlS of se!t!ement ca:l be evo/t.ed. prolonged. Surely if tll~:,e is zny contri· The principles 'Nhich my Government bution that dip!omacl', whetiler bilate:al bcii~\'~3 can bring p<:ace to the re~ioil or f1lultilatcral, C(,.I1 maka to hast~n the a~e these: . . end of this conmet, none in this Assem• in the area mus~ accept . l,;Ea<:h r.atioii bly can in good consd~nee spar~ any effort· or any labo. to make that co:\- the: :;ignt of others to live. Tne least th:lt trioution - no matte:' how frustrating this requires is that all should renounce past efforts may ha\'~ been. or ho','.' a~y s,?te 0: claim of betliJciency. which 2S lor.g ago as 1951 was found many new b~ginni;~gs m?.y be rt!'1uirea. We of the Unit;d S~a:e5, for o'.:.r part. by tha Sact:ritr Coun~il to hi! incon_ stand ready to m~ke tha~ effort and to sis:ent \\-ith- peace. t;Tro:)[Js m!lst.b~ w~th~rawn - and persist in trying to ov~rco:ne all obwithdrawn in a context· of peace. .Fo;" stacles to a s'~ttl~:nent. some parties cannot be I~rt t,ee to asTh~ Preslcent of .L'le l.!nlted States, sert the rights of war w:t!!~ others are ~eaki:lg specifkally or Vietnam, has s:;id: "We r\mericai1S !:r.ow the nature'of caned up,)n to abid~ b~' me rules of pea!:il. ..... ~rh~re must be justica for the refl!> a fair barg3.i:l: M::~ nNG fear negnt:at· ing with \:5." In thfl f1c:d~!e sp!dt of gt:i:3. The nations of the' area must adthat statement, and sp~a:{:ng for the dre5S the~nsd"es at ta~t. \\'ith new en· determinaUon to succe<:!d. l;n:t~d States Go\"~rn~~nt. 1 a!iirm \v!th- 1:rgr and out r::s~,....ation· the ,':tmn~;:es5 of the to the pHl.ht of thos'::l WilO ha\'e been Unit!!d StJ.'eS t,) sec!{ a~d ibl :a p~Uti­ rend~red hGmcl~ss or displaced bi' wars and conflicts of the past, both distant cal so!uti::l:l of th~ cor.flict In Vletnam. . I tu~n nCJv: to the ~!idcl!a E~s~ a sec- and recent. ~ft'ee and i:moce:'\t paSS.1:J>. through ond 2~ea of co:!mct w:1ich is hoth tragic in itst:!t ar.d da!lg.::ruu5 tv the p'~a:::e of i"t~rnatiOl~al· wato::r.vavs must be ass\!r::d for aU natb::s. Oni;! of the lessons tile \':orld. of th:! recent conflict is thlt maritima





~i6hts n1ust bl! ras~ccted .


t.:The \vasteiu! and ctstructi\'e arms' race in t11~ region must be curhed. tilereby m3k!n~ 1Il0.r'~ fe30U'ces available for econOlDlC de . . e:opmcnt. *.--~

~Th~ $t3 tus of J;::rus~!;::m mt!5t r.ot l:e decided unn~.t~ran:· but ill cc.n:;dtltlon , ••:rh 211 cor.cen:eu, and in recObilitiOn :e n:storic iut(!rest of the l'lre~ gr~at ',.giens in the 110ly ?I"ci:s. .' c;rile p~Ut1cal jnc'"p~ndence and te;rito:ial bt-:ogrity cr.~:\ st:!.tcs in the area i!lU.t be respected. . t;Bound:<ries 'must be accept;;d ~nd

C· >

o!b~r arrar:g(,r:lt:nt~ rn~d~t su?~rS~~llng

tempo!e.!:! and oft~n \':ol~~~d ar:nistice

. lines. so as to :?~f(l~u security to all parties <,Zi\inst terror, destructlon and

"ar. , These arc ir:\PJ: tlnt general 'princirc~'s t'l'" ples on ",t>:~!l , .. ~ b~!I',,·,~ ~t".' ... ~';.. -"t ,,_ peace of to~ ar~a. \\:!1;t~ tee rnn~il r~ . spo!ls!bH!ty 1i~5· \\~!th the p:frt:\"Sj th~ United N~ti~as 2n~ cv~ry n~~nt'b~r st?.!e. jndudi:l~ lay owr. cou:!t!"'J., mU3t h~!p if,' the s<:ar":~l fo:' J:·~1ce, For it is in th~ highcst int~m"tt'):,·;Untc.c;;t, ~.s w"H ~.S in the Llticn21 in~.?r~ts of th~ p~!'ii~.i, that r,e?,~ ~hcu!ct ha aci,icv/:G as soon "

•••'1 ..... I


25 }lOiS!blc.. I



my. 0\'.':1 country. i><It most

therish~1 WiS!l

(or t;l;) Middle Esst has .Jong br.:;n a:t !!;c cf p~ace ia v,,.hich \Il¢ could en}:.:; g~'jd r~::tioas v:i:h 'cv~ry "natio~ 0: t1~:tt i~~io::. In su;:h a ciii:\ati! of p~acc t~~rc is Jl.lttdi t!l~t ''le coul·1 do, and wlIu!d t,;: gl::d to do, i~1 c()')p~ra­ : lion ,vith -on~~'r D!£:iilccrs 2::0 ,:;rth the gifted l\~~l)!~ of t1:~ re~ion H.s~l!. R('" gi0!13! .cco:iftm!c c~\"e~')f::i~~nt; the full .' ~i':~ ilit .lt:~,):i "o~ ti:~ ;~:Uf~"C5: th~! GC....~.\..\.~ t'l" "0.o· ~ \"~t·w ••• ___ .~ r"-tnr·,·;n" t::"- \. ~L",~..' ...'.l 0' 1 l !'loe . \,ne d~SCi t to hUir;.~tU l.!S~ --- th~s~1I 2J~~d I!ol \\S~r (.:- :!!'~~:ln~:-n~sf ?:-~ 1!:~ \\·6r~:, to \'/111Cll nly cOiJnt!y_ ar;d I an1 st!re ~l!~:'ly both in ,,:,.1 ot:ts:r.a the 1,~[ci·:!1;: E,.st, would p~~~a to c!;:\'ote our £r.~'zles, I turn r.ow to a third l:lOr.!cnt,):!s probl(!m: th~ se;:~ch for rdi:!b!e progrants ot int~rna!1v"n~! CiS.lrn1an1~:lt and ?ml!' CCt:ltro!, particdarly in the. field Qf nuclear \:;cano~s. . . Step-by.step· p:o.;ress in this field, v;bich se;;!:~cd O!.!t of r~ach for so i:12:"1y ~ears! h~s~ riiOfi! ..!i!~~i'~!Y beco:~:~ ~ a i~at­ lty. Slgntrlc~nt l:t:'utat:ons r~ga:'c!ng nu· clear Wcnp.i::3 l:?::e l:~;)n a-:.::e!':d by the nuc1~ar po\\·trs in the .t\llt~rctlc TreaW or 1959; i:l tha Pa~tial Ncdeac Test :Ball Tr~atl o~ lSS3; 2:ld o.lly last )"ear in the Ou:er SPlCS Tr~aty.. ' These su:ce3si;'e S~~;)S ha\'e er.co!.!raged us to con~ir.;;~ tackle' Ci.e of the ftlost basIc as;~c!s or t!'ie n!.!ciear dilemma: tr,e t~,~:at of the S;jr~:.1 of nuc1~ar \'l"ap()flS to r,~ore a<!d. n:c:e n~­ lions. This posz~ G:lI! of the grasc~~ dangers tQ p~ace an':!, it!.1ccd, to t~e survival (of m.:<!~::nd. Tr.e 1o:!1:-"f tr.ls prob!em rennin5. tee travcr the c!:m~~r







My (j?,'ernm~n.~ !m bn~ bc~n "cry


21,,·<: t.)

~:'!:S ~:n~e:. ,In r~:t'::.r:~e

,I'~w:!-l.. 'W'¢ t~y~ g!\~en tr.~ h!~:~~'s~ p;:Cri~V

~ .. jthe 1S.~3~:·':l. D:~~~~r."l:>~cnt CO~r:l:t· tee to ~h~ ohi~c:h'e of a non·pro!ife:ra-

tion t~ catr. • Last n'o::tn tHs k::g cnorl clib:n:a~ed

in th~ st~ultar.~tJ~s t~~~linz by th~ Unitc:d Sta\·~:i and th~ So·;~~t t:~:t):& of ice,,6! __ '

~ __


Ar . . . . . "' .... -'~ ......

!:.r..-.... 't·:h~


gerecl by this cccision. On the C',:n:trary•• to the extent that t:li! t!r:itcd St"t~.; wi!! , be better aD!;:) to m.::ct its intcr::~tlonal defc,,~i,c rcsp'lnslbiUti{:s. and to' respo~d to app~a!s fro:n stat::.> th.Citl;ncd by nuclear b!::.ckmail, t:le pre5~:lt safety of many other countries may in fact be enl1anced. . , . . .. .i ' No ,1Htts!ops on i>n.;~ilcs However, we hl!,\'e riO ilh.::)ior:5 that the constru~tlon ar.d d~?~o:iment of m15~ sHes of ~my !:bd is. the pr~;cm:d road to sccmity. It is not. The eve:lL. which led \0 our <1edsion s::"pty und~r$core the urgent in11'o:t:=!J!c':: o~ pl.!r.s~h,g ll~~O" tiatiol:s on a limitati',)l1 of s~~tczic offensive and d:,iensiv~ I!l!SSn~s. D~$pite Ollr lack or SUCCCS:i thus f?.r, th~ United States rer;uit:s ready to Opt'll talks on this subject at any time. : .: Mr. P!csidcnt. th.esc.' dc':c!op:ncnts once again cl~n1C.!!l3tr,).t~ tne \irL~r,t nc~d not oal)' for a no:!'r,~(\l:~eration treaty. but ior aU the ncc~:;s:Hy s,~p;; tow?rd general and complete di~ar;;u:r.cnt. Let no one inl,~gil~e that the bunch:g or ac.Itu" .,. " . . 'h t. "\ ISI,!On c.t a nuc,,:,,~' ~O::t:j L,~!y5 c"ca;> secun:)'. True secunty for C',!l powers, nucl('?.r and non· nuclear a1ik~, lias in' prog.ress 07'1 lh~ £:n~ir¢ rang~ Ot ~~rrt1S c~r.:~·ot



t:!S:"!T~:~r:l~Itt 1~1i'23u:"es -

control of th~ str:~~<'l:ic arms race, a· ,·cdfiab!e Cv:l;~:'e~!~'nsi\'e tc:\t b:in, ar.d a Cl!t·o;f of D:;:)~,:~ti');! o~ ns· s!onabl~ rn:~t~r!~!5 for \\·!:~rtO:15 rl·tr~~5e.;" The su:n of s~.::h :tct:; w:;1l!c!? i';"bti!ld a more s~c\!re world for 21t -: Mr. P.r<$id~nt. th~ i;)'.!:th gr.::at pro~· lem ,:-:uch· I_ wis:l t,~ cl;~::!.lE~ i3 th~t of assurIng se!i·d~ternl!!:~t~O:l a~ld full n~·

tior.h?od t? .a!l.peo?;~s who s.!1l E';e ill colomal suo;ccttO!l. . • Our ~\s.st!:lb!y a~~:tda I~-r:-jnd$ \!, n-,:.t the '·. ·ork cf en;::!ng tI~e co~cJ:~l ~:{. is iar frol'!'\ finished. In fa-:., tl~~ h.1~,~~5~ probl£'Uls ha\,i:) r~::lain~d lln:il th;) .l:.:-~. This is true aboyc an in t:'le so:.:t::i.>:n . portion of U:e Af!"ic2:l coati::('n~, ,\~Z:~:'~~ white mi;"oi"lti"s h""c b···-o~'''' c,,,,·~ .. ,'-. tri;nch~d .in t~e1;-cl:>m,f;'i;;- O\~-/{;:: majo~m~s, Itt much of th:; ~:'C:l r:£· $ .'. not one e\'il but twu evils w:::c!l. :::,:. ' one guis~ Ot another, g') h~::d in ;!".: .~: to!onialism • -cn.:d , , am! that tH.!t!cuiarl'l ot tense agamst hi.!m:.n rig~ts. r2.cill cis· criminatio<l. The Oppos!tion or tha t;n!~€J S":~::::; to these tv,·in evils cra~,:...s strer:~t~: frc::l tw~ of th~_dcc?~st e.!cr:\~:;ts b O~!r c.';.n natlon:!l lire: O:,lf h!5t()~1': s!a::d ,,3 :m anticolo;~ial power c.r:d O:!f co;:t1n:;i!1~ stfugg!e a~~inst 'raclal inju5tic~ ar!1onz . our ovm peOi\le. '

My country, founc!cd on tl:c t',roilosiUqn tflat all r.l(·n a:e cr~;!,·~d cC';u:!i and h.l\"~ equal rights b~~orc the I:n... - a:.d ,;u.rrcp,tly engaged iii a v;~oro:.ts nzUollwide pro~.am to =aak~ t!~.1t f.:(J!.:;!!it ..• r<::11 ..for all its citizens - C;!:1llct :l,-d wi!l not a.:!opt a dv~!b:c stM:d::rc! of wl>:!t is -hap?~n:ng in t.:~ souti!:m pa.rt Or JUPI..:t. To tr.os~ ":;10 arc uTIl'at:er.t fo~ re~ dress of gr!cvar.ces \':c s:::l!l show th:lt \\-e syn~plt!l!!'~ \t:ith thC!~l a~c s~rport l'lc:r o!)j~;:th·es. e.en thot:~a we may ,not ah\:3Ys 2gr~~ (\tl the ~::;~cific ste:ls


b~ tak~n


OV the interr:~ti(lr.al to:~l­ ~ .. , ...

·70 tf:Ca!C \r!lci~ on U-:c o~h;:~r b~nd. resist aU ch:!ng~J ","e shaH contir.uc to in· S!st that th() \'."2"': to prc;cfn: neace is • • • • to • not tne st:omcrg~'!~ce OL 1~~lt!rnate bit~\·· anee$, b:Jt t:e!:' tim::'iy r"d,e:i5. Ar:d we stIll! tmceas;:;:;ty bring ht'~11C t.) t!:c:n Amcric<!"s profo!.!nd co:wict!oa that 2plrti~£:id--Hl;~ c';ery oth~r Corm of \t;blte s'..~p'i'~\n3.~:;-ls., iI..S ri\:~ l1fcdecesso;' 'Adlai Stev"nso)n slid, "racist. in i~s origin.). arro(!_!rit in its h:1P' ":'l~nt{tioa'l and, in its CO:is~CiU~ncc5, potentially c!an3~rous fo:- s.lI." J.Yr. PrcsidC'nt. (:urit!t' the cC:~1:ng"thrc:; reonth;; the G:::,cral AS;t':nbly \-;ill add.ess its~ir l!O~ only to tb; ~,:est:o"s we na\'c cliscus$~d i!l this s::!t~;'jH~nt but to· a &


vast r:~n~e of ra?.t!t:"r5 ~fit!~t~r:g th~ p~ ..\C~ " and \vz!f:"!t"c of r:':.~::i::d. b,:,~h no;. . · ~r;d

in tll~ b:;z. futur.-. l\!y c;:-l.:-ptio:t wil! sec;: tu -p~:tki;)?t~ C0n;:ru~tive!y in the Ass~mb!/s nn.l~y conce;ns: and on a nunlbcr 'of to!)~CS of r.J.:"tku!~:" int~r~~t \I;~ s:~~:t p:C$~';ll prO~·j~=t~5 c: O!ir o·. \·n: The Unite:! Stat;:;; tu:n5 to th~se tasks

· in a lllood of so:':·r c!c!~r:l!i~?tk:n~ Ou:o · distinguished S~cr"t:try G-~::~:"2r, in th() introductioil t·) his anr,'l:!! rC?Jrt. h:;s m2cfe clear h:s vi:;w that this h~.s not been a good y~~r fer eli: United Nations; and we :!zree wi:h tb::.t assess· ment. ll:c fa:.:!t Hes r."t in toe organiza' tion itself but b cu~s~h·c:;. its ~er:;bers: and.it is to our c,n: '~oE::!es that we must all 100;' if we c!esirc a tetter· future. . . ;, . In sen·ing· the cause' of a just and peaceful world. we afe not permitted the lux~ry of be1n;; cas'!;,. dl,::c:.:::!ged. Indeed. the most i(!!biddlng G~5t~cli!5 arc precist"ly . tho;\:! whlch sho:.:!d call fo:,h · our n1vst p~r~:~te~t ciiorts'. Nor shc,~td · we look for R:ly alter.:!ati\·c to the Unit· ed Nations, for there is r.~:!~. Ye2r in and F:tr out, thro:.:gh all tr.c clific!.l!ties L~at m:ly arise. \,;e must s!,l\'c to b~ tn.:;:. both in word a;-;d GCi:C, to t:ti! t:er~a· nent pledge of pc!!::e 2:l.1 j:;sUcc- v;n:t:h we. as members. na\-e t:!ade to t!1e Cnit· cd Nations a"d to or:e a:!o~!:e:,. As tllis Twenty·second Gc~e.al As· sembly O~=il5:.. tho U'r:Ec:ed S~2t::; c!"!:a again sl)!t:~n!y relffinns its ce·.otio.~ t~~

th:lt plccge.

" . ".


of J

'I I

: ~


Ending Pride}', October 6, 1967 "


\lIETNA1\l 'l'he PrcSl:1mt's Remarks in San "hll~n;o lJ!'ion: the Nationd r.'cgislulh:e Conference. St'li!rmbcr 29, J9G7

Speaker Earnes; Got'ernor IIuglzes~ GO:JcnlOtSmith~ COllgressmalll{a::cll~ Representative Grall(w:~ most distinguished lrgi5!aiors, ladies and gentlemen: I deepl}' apprccbte thi3 oPPoi:tunity to appear before organization who!'c members contribute every day such irnpor[ant work to the public affairs of our State and of our countrr. rhis ~wnjng I came here to sl)cak to yca about Vietmm. , I,do not l1ayc to ten you that our pcol)1e arc proFoundly concerned


about t11:ltslrugglc.

There arc pas$ionatc convictions :lbout the wisest course for our Xation to 拢0110\:', There arc many sincere and patriotic Americans who' harbor doubts about smt:lin!ng the C0mmitmcnt tllat threc Presidents and a half a million of our young men h~\'C mack Doubt and deb:\tc arc enlarged because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil-of povcrtyof religious and faction~l strife-of ancient servitude and modem longin6' for freedom. Vietnam is al1 of these things. Vietnam is als~ the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an :'ippctite for conquest. It is the arena" \\'here Communist expansionism is most aggrcssh"cJy at work in the world todaY-\\'hcre it is crossing international frontiers ' in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kidnaping; ,...路here it is mthlessly attempting to bend free pe,oplc to its will. . Into this mixture of sub"cnioa and war, of ten'or an.d hopeI America has entcred-with its materbl pO\\"cr and \\'i~h its moral commitment. \Vhy? . , \Vhy should three ,President3 and the elected reprcscnbth'cs of our people h<lxC chosen to defend this Asian mtioa more th?n 10,000 miles from America:1 shores? W'e cherish freedom-yes. 'We dlcrish self-determination for an 路people-yes. e abhor the political rrm ..dcr of ~n}' st:l.te by another, and the bodily murder of ~..ty people by g:ln65ters of wh:-:tc\,cr ideology. And for 27 yc~~rs-s:ncc thr~ d:lYs of lend-lease-we h;wc sought to strcn,;thca free people against domination by aggr':5Sh'c [orciciU powers. . .,. . . - .. . 78


J3ut the key to all we b.\'c done is rC:llly our own Sl'ClH"tty. At times of cri$~s--bcforc a:::1~ing AmC'ric=r.llS to fight and die to re~ist aggre3:,ioa in a forcizn land-c\:ci=y-An~eric:ln rrcsidcnt has finally had to ans\n~r this qucstion : , Is ,the a~'gres5"ion a tluc::t-notonh' to the immc~btc victim-but to the United St~>.tC5 of i\mcrica and thc peace and security of the entire world of which we in America ,arc a very vital,part? ' That is the qnes:icn w11:'("h Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lvndon Johnson h:ld to an;;wcr in {:'I.cin\!'"-, the is:mc in Viclnar::l, ,. That is the question that the Senate of the "Cnited StatC',; an:;wered bv a yotc of 82 to 1 when it ratified and annw\'cd the SEATO tre::ty .i~ 1955) and to which the ?\lcmhers of t1:c United Slales Congrci';; responded in. a rcso!ution that il pa,;:sed in 196J by a ,"ote of 50,} to 2, "thc lIniicd Statl's is, therefore, prrparcd] as the l)rcsicknt dl.!tcrminc:;~ to take all nccc:;s:lry stcps, including the mc of an-ned force, to (\:,sist any member or protocol st~tt~ of the SOUthC~5! .-\si3. Col!rcti':l~ Dcfen:'ic .aSslstmcc . .m (,(:.(,11$c 1 C 1" , 0f't 1 ~ f'lCC(,om. T rcat)" rcqucstmci , Those W110 tell m now that ""C shou1d ab:mdon our ('ommitm;::-nt-tllat seeming South Victnam from armed domil~~tion i;; not \\'orth the price ,\"C are p3.yin~-mnst also ~ns\\'cr this que:;tion, And the test they mmt meet is tl~is: '-, rhat would be 111C cons:~qnc-ncc of letting :1rmrd ag!!ression ~Q;aimt South Viet'Ham succeed? What \\'ou1d follow in the ti~~c ahead? \rhat kind of worlel a're they prcparl'tl to Ih'c in 5 mon~h:; or 5 'years from tonight? For those \\"ho ha\'c borne the rcspomibility for cL-ci,io:1' dl1ring tl!C':,c past 10 years, the st:1.hs to us h~\'c seemed c1(':tr"-~I~d lEm: SCCl"::C'd hi;;h. Presidcnt Dwight F.iscnho\\'er s:lic1 in 19j9 ,: . ~'Stralcgieal1y) South VjC'tn~m's c:-\ptur~ by the Co'mmunhts \\'ou:d ,bring thcirpm','cr s('\'cr31 hundred mill's into a hitherto frec r('~io;.'!., The n~mlining countries in South('~"t :\S!:l \\'ould b~ mCll:1ccd ~IY:l grC'::tt [L:"!n~­ ing morcmcnt. The freedom of 12 millioil people ,,'ou1d be lo.,t im:'ncdiatc1y, and that of 150 milEcn in adj~cent bnds \\'ould be scriomIy cnd:mgered. The loss or South Vietnam \\'ould set in motion a crl!~;1b1in3 process that could, as it progressed, h:lYC gr~we conscquencc-: for m and for frccdorn. . • ." And President John- F. Kennedy said in 1962: .cc. • • '\'ithdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Th:1 ibnci might mean a collapse of .the entir~ arca." 'A year later, he rcaffirmed that: " , '",~re are not going to withdraw from th~~ effort. In my opinion) fo~' us to wlthdraw from tll;:.t effort would mean a colhpse not only of South Vietnam) but Southeast Asia, So we are, going to stay thcrc/' said President " K enncd v. ' . This is not simply an American vrewpoi~t, I \\:ou1;1 h:!.\'C YOliI('~isb­ tive kadel'S kno;\".l am gO!..lg to caU the roll now of those who "lire i!~ that part of the ",'orId-in the great arc of Asi:m and PaCific nation3--::lnc1 who be:!.r the' respomibmtr for leading their pcop1c, :1nd t11C rC5po:~5ihi1itv for the fate of their peop!e. . '.' , "




, ,.The Prc,.5idcnt of the Philippines hacJ this to s::,)': "Vietnam is the fOClIS of atlcntion npw..•• It may happen to Thailand.or the ])hilippincsJ or anywhere) whcrc\'cr there is misery, disease, ignorance ..•• For you to n:nou~cc your PO.5:tiOil of leadership in Asia is to, allow the Red Chine,}::: to gobbl,e up all of AS13.." The foreign :l-.1inistcr of Thailand said: , _ ' "(The American) clcci!'loa will go down in histol")' as the move that 'prevented the world from hn.\"ing to bee another major cO;lfbgratioll." The l)l'jmc ~lini:~tcr of AU5tralia s~jd: . "\ Vc .are there ))ccamc while Communist aggression persists. the whole of Southeast Ash is threalened." l>rcsidcnt Park of Korea said: ,. , "For the first time in OlU' history, we decidd ~o dispatch our combat .troops overseas • • • because in our bdicf any aggression against the 'Republic of Victnmn n:prcscntcd a direct and grave inc!1~cc a~:tillst the security and peace of free Asia) ,md therefore cJircctlr jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own peoplc." The Prime :Minister of ~hb.y$ia warned hIs pcople that if the United Slate5 pulkd out of S01.lth Yictnam) it wO:'lJd go to the: Communists, and <lfter that) it would bc onl}" a matter of. time until they mo\-cd • "1· ~ .agamst 11e1g.1 xmng states. Thc }lrime ~linist(;r of New Zcabnd s:tid: "We can thank God that America at least rcg;mls ,iggrc5sion in Asia ''lith the same coaccrn as it rcg:mh aggression in Europc-ancl h prc'· " parc({' l() 1" Xl.C:: up Its concern WI·11t~ctlon. The Prime Minister of Singapo!'c said: "I fcd the fate of :\si:t-So~1th and SO~1i,hcast Asb--will be decided in the next few years by ,·;ha.t h~~ppc:rtS out in Victn~m." . I cannot tell you tonight a'i your Presidcut-v;ith certainty-'-that a Communist conquc:::t of South Vict!13.!l1 would be foUO\\*ccl by a Com~ munist c~:lquest of Southeast Asi:t. nut I do kr:ow there arc North Vietnamese troops in L:::os. I clo:know th:lt there are l\orth Vietnamese 1 . d guernllas .". . lIt'III l10rtnclst , T1' d T ' k-now t1lat tnere ' .tramc tomg l:l.llan. _ CiO are, Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Bunm. And a Commui1i~t coup w:ts barely aycrtccl in Indonesia) n!e fifth b.rgcst nation in the world, . So your Americ~.n President canaoi tcll you-\,;jth certainty-that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist 'pO\,'cr would bring a third world ,,"".r much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that tllis would not be so. But all that 'we ha\'c learned in this tra~dc ccntup:J strO!~g,h' SU'TO'csts ..., _ ,to me tIl at it wodd be 50, As President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so, I :tm not preprrred to risk the security-indeed, the SUl"i\'3.1-of this American X3.tion on mere ,hope ancl wishful thinking. I am com'inccd that br seeing this struggle through 110\\', we ~re gre~t1y reducing the thances of a much larger warperhaps a nudcar \\*3.f. I would rather st ...nd in Vicm~~in, in our time, and I



t.\ONi:.lAY. OCTO:l:it 9, 1967

by meeting this danger now, a11el facing up to it~ thereb)' redu.cc the danger for our children and for our gr~mdchildren~ I want to turn now to the strusglc in Vietnam itself. There arc questions about this. difficult war that mu!;t trouble C\'crr reaUy thoughtful pcr~o:l. I an!,going to put some of thesc -qm::5tions. And I Ct1ll going to gi\"(~ you the vcr:. bc~t ~:;S\\'ers that I c:m gh'c you. First; are the Victnamc.:;c--·with our llc1p, and tbt of their other allies-really making any,progrc55? b there a forward mQ\'emcm? The 'reports I sec make it dear that there is. Certainly there i~ a p05iti\'c 1110\'('ment toward constitutioml go\"crilmcnt. Thus far the Vietnamese h3.ve met the political sc.hedulc that they bid down in J~Hlt:ary 1966. The people wanted an dectc:d, respomi\'c go\·crnmcnt. They wanted it strongly enough to brave a "iciom campaign of Commuaist terror ~l1d assassinatioa to ,'ott: for it. It Ims been ~aid th:lt they killed more civili:ms in 4: 'weeks trying to keep them from "otin:; before the ekCli0!1 than our Americ.itl bombers haw killed in the 1ig cities of ?\onh Virln:tnl ia bombing military targets. On'f\o\'cmbcr 1, subject to the ~('tion, of course, of the CO)1';titllcnt Assembly, an eb:ted govcrnment will he in~mgurat('d .mel :m ekcted Senate and Lcgisbturc \:'ill be installed. Their rc~pon~ib;Ety is dear: To answer the desircs of the South Vietnamese I)('01)1c for sdf·c1ctC'l'min:l.ti011 and for l)(~:\Ct\ for an attack on corruption, for eco>,o:n:c dewloprneilt, and for social justice. There is progrcss in the \':<11' itdf, stc:-:dy progr('~s cO:1:lic!·:-rinz t::e war that \\'C ~re f:ghting:; r=~thcr dr:nH:1t!C progrc::s ccn:lid~ring the situation that actu::llr pre\'~ikd \\"11('11 we ~:~i1t our tro·:>ps there in 19G5; when we intcn'cned to prcwllt the di~:llcl1lbr'rmcnt oCthe country by !he Vi,.:'tcong and the 'North Yictn:l1llcsc. ' The campaigns of the hst rC:1r dron::: the el.cmr from m:1nr of their major intqior ba)c,5. The mmt~ry \'ictory almo.::t within H:U1CeS gr:\~p in 1965 has now been denied them. Thc grip of the Yictconz on the p'cop1c is being broken. , Since our commitment of major 'forces in July 1965 thc proporti.:m of the popubtion Ii\"ing under Communist controll13.s been rcducc{1 p . :well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the popubtk.:: has grO\\11 from about 45 percent to 65 percent-and in the cont(,5'~{'d arc(5) the tide continucs to rUll with us. But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese ha\'e suffered severely, as ha\'c we-particubrly in the First Corps area in the north, , . .·here the enem)" h~s mounted his heaviest attacks) and \\'h~'rc hi~ lines of communication to North Vietnam arc shortest. Our c~sualti..:'s in the war hayc reached about 13,500 killed in a~tion) and about 85,000 " \'''"ounded. ot thOse 85,000 wounded, we tliank God that 79,000 of the 85,000 h:n'e been returned, or will return to duty shortly. Th:mks to our great American mr::dic:\l science <lnd the helicopter: I know there arc other question.;; on your minch, and on the m.incl5 of ma!1~'J s:ncerc, trollhJcd :\!l1eriC~;15= "\Vhv not nc~otb!c' l1o\r?" so . many ask me. The am\\'cr is that we and our South Yj::tn:"m(,5'~ J.m·;s are whoIly prcp~rcd to !lcgoti:l.t~ to!:i~ht. J




I am ready to talk witl1 lIo Chi Minh, and other chiefs of state路 concerned, tomorl'Q;\"" .I am ready to ha\:c Secretary Rust with. their foreign l'ninistcl' tomorrow. I am ready to send a trusted rcprcscntath'c of America to any spot on this earth to talk in IJublic or private with a spokesman of Hanoi. 'Vc have twice sought to have th.c imtc ~f Victnam dedt ,rith br the . United I\ations-and twice H;:noi kiS refused. . Our desire to negotiate p(,~>,I.:c---through the United Nations or out--lms been made vcry, vcry clear to Hanoi--dircctly and many times throug1l lllird parties. - : As we haxc told Hanoi time and time and time ag<lin, the heart of the matter n~ally is this: =I'he United S~:1.tes is wiJ]ing to stop all aer1:11 and ll:!\"al ~omb:lrdm('nt of Nonh Vietnam W11C!1 this wlH lead promptly to productiyc discussions. ,,'c, of course, as!,lH11C that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam \\'oulcl not take advant:lge of the bombin~


cessation or limitation. . -But Hanoi bs not ~tcceptcd anr of thcse prOp053.Js. So it i3 by Hanoi's c1!Oicc--an.c1 Iiot ours, anduot the rest of the world's--that the w<.u continues. . .

"rh /', in the bee of mi!it~ry and political pro2;rC3S in the South) and the burden of our bombing in tHc.I\orth, do thc), insist and persist wilh tIle war? . . Fwm many sc'urccs the ,:l1Swcr h t11e S:1.me. They still hope that the peopk of the United S~;:tcs \riII not sec this stru~!gk thr0a~h to the \'CiT emt As onc Western diplom:tt reponed to me ~~11y thi:> \~:cck-hc h::~1 just b:::rn in J hn0i-c~Ther bdic\'c thC'ir staying power is grc:ltcr tktn . ours and that they cau't lose." A visitor fron; a ~Commt1ili:>t capit:ll h;l.d this to say: "They expect the war to be 10:13, and th~t the Am(. iC:\il5 in tile cud wm be dcft.:=tt~d by a brc:!1;down in Bl')r::k, r~ti~u.:::, and p3ychological factors,'~ The l)rcmier of North Yictll:im s~id ?s br b~ck tis 1962: "Amcric~Hs d~ not like long, .inco:lclusive war. . . . Thus \\'C are sure to win in the end." - Arc the North Yictn:uncse right about us? . I think not: No. I thlu1-. the)' are wrolig. I think it is the common failing of tot~litari:m regimes, thlt. they cannot really understand the nature. of OUl-- democrac\,: _.The)" mistake di5~ent for dis1oyalty; -Thcy mistake' restlessness for a rejection of policy; -They mistake 2. few committees for a country; .-They .misjudge indh-idual speeches for pubEc policy. .


They arc no b.::tter ~uitcd to judge the stren,gth and p\rsc\,crance of America th:ln the Xazi :md the Stalinist propaganciists were able to judge it. It is a tr.:gcdy that they mast disco\路cr these qualities in tIle American peoI?lc, and disco\'cr them throu~h a bloody war. . .


And, soon or htc, they will c1isco';cr t11'::111. In the mc:~ntimr, it shall be our polier tv contintH~ to s::ck l1cgotiati0!1s-co~1fidcnt that rcasoa will. so~nc d:1Y prc":1H; that 1I~n0i will ·realize that it just C:ll1 nc';\!r win; th:1t. it win turn away from fightin~ :1nd start building for its own pcople. . Sincc \Vorld ,rar II, this ?\ati('~ has,met and ll:ls mastered rn:my c11allcngcs-challen,;cs in Gn::cce ;n1d Turkey, in TIcrlin, in Korea, in . Cuba. . '\TC met them bcc<n.15c bra\"e men ,,;ere wining to rh!~ their Eves for their nation's security. Al~d brawl' men ha\'c nc"\'cr lh-cd th.~n those who . carry our co!ors in \~ictmm at this \"('iT hour. " The price of these efforts, of course, has been hC3xy. But the price of not having made them, at all, not having seen them through, in my judgment ,,"ould kn'c been vastly greater. . Our goal has been the s:tmc-in Europe, in As!::t, in our o\\-n hemisphere, It ha~ bccn-:lml it is no·.,;---pl':;cc. And peace canr:.(>~ he s::-cul"cd by \\"1:;h(,5:; pc~cc cannot be prc.~cn'cd by nohle wore\) <Ind pure· intention;;, c~Enduring pc~ce,n Fr<mklin D. Roosc,'dt said. ':cannc·t be boui;ht (~t the C05t of other people's fn~cdQm." Tile late Pre5:idcnt KCHl!cdr put it prc,isdr in 1\o\"cmhcr 1951, when he :::: id: "Weare nci ther '.,-m'mc'ngc:)"$ 1101' app(,:l~crs> nei ther h~nl nor soft. 'Ye ~re Americ:ms (k,termincd to defend the froati.:rs of frt~cdom by an hOllorab!c peace if pcacc'i5 po;;sib1c but by :).rrm if arms arc mcd • » agamst us. , The true pt':1Cc-l;('qx:rs i:1 till? wMId tC':1i6ht arc not tho::c Wl10 urge us to retire from. the fidel in Yidn:;m-·wllo tell tl5 to try to find t1:.~ quid:c~t, clie:!.pest c:-:it from tl1~t tormented bncl, no m:1.ttcr wh::t the com::qucnce~ to us m~y be. . . The true pcact'-L('cpcr~ :lfe (hose men W110 st:md out there on the D'MZ at thi~ \"Cry hO~ll') t:tking the ,\"orst th::lt the enemy (':111 gi,-e. The true peace-keepers are the soldiers \";ho ::ire brcaking the terrorist's &rip arouml the \"ilbgc3 of VictU:1rll--the civilians \·;110 afC bringi~:g medical care and fopel ~nd cduc?.t!on to people .\,·ho h::\\'c already sufTcrcd a • r . g~neratlon o. \1 ar. . And so I report to you th:tt we arc go:ng to continuc to press fOl"\r:-:.rd. Two things we must GO. Two things v:c shall do. Hrst, we must nnt misk'ad our enemy. Ijct him not think th:-:.t deb:ttc and dis::cnL \rill produce wavering and withdr3\\"at. For I C<!ll a~surc you the}' won't. Let him not think th:"'.t Pl:otcsts ,rill produce surrender, TIecause thcy woa't. Let him not think that he \\'i1l wait us out. For he won't. Second, we will provide all that our hr:lYc men require to do the job Ulat Dlll5t be dllllC, And that job is go!ng to be dOlle. . These g~lIant men h:l\'e our pr:lycrs--hC!.yc our thank3-ha\"c our heart-felt prai:;c--~r.? o~r deepest gratitude. . . Let the \\"orld knm·,. that the kcep~rs of p~ace will' endure through every trial-,md that with the fdl bad~;ng of their countrymen) they ~rc going to prc\"ai1. .




__ UNITED STATES SF.X.-\TE • .COl!~tITT.E}~ 0:-\ }'Ol!EIGX nEL.\ T1OX3,

lra.shin!.;l,jll. D.C. . . The committee )Il~t, p-arsunnl to nOiicc, d 10:05 n.m., ill room 4221, New S~!lntc OJTIcc :GuiMillg, S!me.tor J. 'Y. Fulbright (ch:1irman) prcsidulg. , ~ Pl-CSCllt: Senators Full)l-i~ht, Spnrkmun, ~rnn~fidd, ~Ior~~. Gore, IJRtlschc, Symington, I)dl, )IcCartln-, nud .Aiken. '1'hc C}!.;\m~I_-\x. 'r}lO co:.mniUrc \rill come to order. We meet this m,Ornill2: to contiuue ft. series of hc~rings on the role that the Ullited !\.1tiolls should pby in settkment of the YictuaIll conflict. 'rho c(,'1!lJ1itt~c, is considering two r(:~olutio1l5 con'ring the question of suhmittin~ the Yi('tnam wtlr to the United X.1tiOIlS Security Council. Hoth- Senate Concurrent l1c:;olutiou 44, iut!'oduced by the distinguished Seuator from Ol"~gon, S~nn.tcr ~Io!';)e, 1\ncl Senate RcsQlution 180, introduced by the -senior St:ilator from )'Iontana, Mr. Mansfield, with 57 cosponsof3, nre bcin~ c(lnsid~rcd by tho CODlIJ.litlt'c.

. '

. We arc nrY h~pn\- indeed thi.511lCtmiu2: to \yclcomc- the TIcpr':5cnt;'tti"o of the Uilitcd 'Shues to tlle 17nited ?\atiollS, Amb;1::S&do:r ,Arthur Goldberg. ~Ir. Amb;1SSft d01", will you rroc~cd?






. .Ambi:issndor GOLDnEr-G. 'l'hiillk \'OU Yen- much, )'h. Ch;lirnHln, .' and members oI this committee. I should like to say I am tlC~omp;lnicd here today by )'Ir. Joseph Sisco: the able and dedic:lted _-\:;~i3~t1nt . Secreter\" of St.1.te for Intcrllilt:oDi!.l Org~lliz:ltioll Affalrs. :Mr. Chnirlll:ln ~nd gelltlell1~1l, I ~ppreci:tte' -.cry much your invitation to appear before this committee and to give testimony in .. p.u~lic se!3i?l1 o~ the important sl.1bjcSt o!: the re51)OI:si~i!ity of the UDltcd NabODS ill the search for peace III "lctu~m. ThIS 15 the grit \8.men of Seuate Concurrent Resolution 4,1 introduced by Seuator )'Iorse, and of Senate Resolution 180 intI·od.uced by Sene-tor :'Iansfic1d and many other Sc:,nato!'s. . -I should like clso1 };1r. Chen-man, to express my eppreci:ltion to the committee v.hlch he.d s.:hedulecll!lc to appear last week to defer my appesranc,e ",·hlch \ras impossible e.t th~t time because of a meeting .



i,! :!~e S('cHl'itv Coundl arll.l oth('l' l'Ol1~ult:\til)n:ion lh~ ).Jiddle L:Hlem U.S. I should like ttl::;.) to th.mk Dr. ~ttll-C\- who WtiS so ~incl as to :lrmngc £01' thi$ d:1Y which Wits more com~enl('at. _' ,At the very ~ut:;et let me' say tl~ t I ngrec completely with the ('on~ept or the l:espousibility of the l:nited :\atiol1s whh:h li!1l1erUc$ both }"t'$l..\lntions. In prept'l.riu;.!: Ill\- te"titnm!\" 1 IH1XC h\l~ell note oCSNitltOl' ~It)r$e's comment, ill lhe' 'h~tU'ill~:' i)~r'lre thi:s cmmnittce on October 26, l'cfcl'l'lng to SCllnttll' ~r7m::fidcl's resolution find I Quote Scn:ltor , Morse, who s:lid hI p:nt"l think it pro!J:lbly would 4e the most appropriate type of rcsulutil.ln tu send to till' 1)rcs!1.1cnt, f,)I', after oU, this ough t tv be .1 teamwork pl(l~-.'" ," " , I need :>C'<.1reeh- tld(hltthis time that tbe Senator m;1cle It Yen" clear thi,; W ..B witht.ltlt prejudi('e to his own dew:> in the nuttcr. It is my considered "jew .1S the U,S. l~epr~"cntati,'c to the United Kntions Hull the ndoptiuu of S(,:1:\tl)l' ~I:m:-fiddt:; f('$u!llti<)Il at this time will Stll)pnrt the ('f1"lIrts 1 h:1YC bc~n lll:tkin::! nt the United XtltilH\::> at. the direction of thl' l)r('sid('ut to enlL:.t the Seem"it ,- Council in the sca1'ch for pc:tCC in Yieln;ull.

. L'-,,1sis .ll the






t;XI>lm 'rIlE ClL-\Rl'EI:

Any flnalysis or the pl'\)blcm of ,n.x. inmln'mcnt ill Yit:'tmHu must

stnrt with the lJIlitetl Xtltions Ch.11'tcr. Under the ch;lrtt'l', the Lnh('d Nntions nnd its members htH'e' ;1 sPN:ific OU!ig'lti(Hl to COOp~nlt(' in

the tn:lintcu!tHC'C of intcl'll<1 tillll:ll pe;lC'e nnel sccuritr. This obli~,\ti.)n is d~.trl)· $~t forth in thl' pt'l)\'isitlH;; of the ch~lrt('r, in(~ludin; i'p~l'n~l'!!Uy tbe f<..lll,wJnl'l'· ' , A~'(ide 1 I;:trilgl',lph 1, wllich st.ltcs' tlle' fil'::;t p{u'posc or the United" , T


NntlOu:; as: "'. '1'0 m~illt~b illt"rll;\tioa:ll p~:\Cl' and "f'~lrify. n:\d to tbt l'nd: to t:lkt· ('fiprti-.:e c:ollccti\'c UE':ls.n:I':' (Qr th·~ pren'lltioa :md fC'lao\':tl of thr,,!\ts w t!H.' 1>1';\(,(" :mt\ (01'

tbe supprt::;,:io!\ t)f ~ct$ of :\g~rl',,:;;oll or othl'r brl':tc!h.'s of Uu: p~:\cc. :md to bri:tg about by llC":'~l.ful me.HI:;, .u:rl ill ct)uformit)', witll the prinrilM,: of jU5tic(' :lt1d intern:ltioll:lll::w, mljll"t1:1l'lH or !'I·ah'm,'u: of int,'rn:Hlon:d di:>l'Uil"S OJ' $:tU:Hions ,..-hich mi:;ht INld t.):\ b:-e:lch of the pN1Cl'. " " • ,

" Article 2; pili-.lgmph 3, u-l!irh iuch;dc$ :Ull(';lg the p:'indples biading

~lpon all memhcrs the f u l l o w i n g : :



All members shall ~Ntl£: thdr i~tertl:\tion:tl disp\tk$ by,p!'icrful nli.':ms in such


Om:Hl'!f th:\~ illtern~tiol.:'lllC':\cc ;md

security, and ju"ticc fire Toot ('nd;Ulgt'r~d.

: 'Article 24. p~r..tgraph 1: In ordt'r to CUHlfC pr()mpt :md r:ffecth'c !\cUon by the Unit.:-d ~:\tion:" its lrcmbers conf'!r on the S~cur!ty Coul1rU-pri:n:\ry rcsponsib:lity for the maiatcll:mcc of intem:ltio:~nlIR':'C(' :\nd $ectlrity. :md !lgrcc tn:lt ,in c:trrying out it:> dnties ml~cr , tbis responsibility the S('curity Council !lets on th~ir bdl;\!f, '

•.-,Article 25;


• The lIerl1bc.-;; of the 'United Xntions :\gr.:c to :lCCi'pt !l.nd eMry out

of th<: Security Cotmcil in nccol't\:\IlCf' with the pl'('$Cnt Ch:\rter. •


the decisions •

: ' And to these prOyi5ions should be added all of dl<lpter5 VI and YII of the chm-ter which confer bro.ld powers on tbe Sceurity Council for the m:lillten,'lnce or intern.l.tionul peflCC :"lnd security. " lIo!el)~"er, it is oln'iou5 thtlt the,;c pow~r5 and, obligiltio!ls or the . United X~tion5 :lpply to the sitUtltion in Southe.ls.t Asi~ in geneml • Il:nd Yietnnm in l)arti~lll;\r.

• Sl:K\!Il' YlETX\l! COXnICT '1'0 l:XlTEn X':\TIOX~

~ _ III sllyjn~ thi:; r 11111 mincl!'ul (If the ~lr~lmlC'nt tIt;lt is ~f)rncti!l1C" Ill,ldC', - ~ndn tltKt out of the enitl'~l ;\atio;t", th~\t 5c\-cml of the priacip;.\l -. pt\rtic~-the ])('mo('mth' Hcpublit;: of Yi~tnal~, the H('pul)lir of YietIlam, iUid the I\:npJe'::i H!:'puhli!: llf Chi,..,--<m~ 110t in -the Vnitcd ;\:\- . tlon:; and th'lt it i... there:,.)rc, not il. suitl1hle pbrc to d('~'..l Wilh the Yictn:1Ul que,;ti(>!'i. 'i'he pr~mj,:.c i:;. llf COU!":'c, :l ('lct, hut the conC'lu;::ion i5 incorred. The c:11l11·tcr cxpJiritly prln-id('i; fpr the- l't'spon,;:bility "Hel pil1,ti('i');l~ion vf lil>iim~I:lber~; fvi' ex. . unplc: Artit:1:.' 2, p:mlgmph 6, pr(,yille:;'file Org:m:z:ltinll "'kill ('Ilfllr(' th:lt sh\tl':: wl11ch ~\rl' not )'Il'mh::r,t (If t1w Flti~(,d - -N:ltiolls :let :11 :l('con:!::IICt' with th.':,(.' prii:dp}.::; so f:tr ~,,, lll:lr bl' llCc~,,":\ry fer tl:c Ill:lint~nan<!(: of int~rn;lt;o;::\l pc:tC,' ;H .. d ~l'curitr •

.And nrtide 3:! pl'u\-idc:; ill P:\l't, 1\111'.1 I tlg:lin quote, tk,t-A~\\- Sl:l!.' whkh i.-" I;()t :\ nti'mb,.'l' of t!:l' 1:nitNI X:nio:'.", if it i;;!\ p:~rl.r to!l dispute illHl,'1' C::l:!<jrl.'r;'tirm by tll!: S,'cmity Cou:!cil, ~h;lll b·:- indted to p;trtid:>:ltl', without \'o~!'. in the cli;:cu""j(lll l.-i:tling to tlw di;<put('.

, -- It i..; <"1<:,11', .th,:/,\,fo!'(', :'Ir. CiHlirmaH, tlltlt t\t(' United ;\;It!OnS h~1'; n dut\- to m't f(ll' p~:l(,C in Yictn:llH, ,1lld thnt the itl\"ll!n~me-ilt of llomnemhcr;-; i" l\u nh:;t:wle to s\I('h .It'tl.)n, The que~t it'll therefore at'i:,l's: "-hy bs sHe'll ;:H:ti(lri '!lot t:lb:l1 ptH"t'? - I LE'lic\-e it wlmM h~ u'5£.':t!1 tll tIl(' eommittt'c if J re\-ic\\- kicfl,:- the record of our ende:tyor;; in the S~{'mity Cpnnl'il to obt"~ln such .lct!.t)\l . .










01:' COUXCIL .lIE:mn:U5 T(lWAlm nEnA1'}~

.Ambf,55:1UO: GOLD::::r:I:G, It is il!lPortanl, to '!'tote :1bo, :'f1', Ch:,h'm:1n

and gC11tlcn:.e;l, th:lt the So.it't TInioa mlCl Hulg~1i'i ..,·rdtl;;d throu~bout

to. c..-en join ill th~ consuitfttio!ls which _.\.mb~:;5:l.dO!' ).l:tt~ui held ~1mong th(l. COtlncil meHl1>el'S. 'l'he Soviet l'CP!'e5~nti\.tin', Amba:;s:1.dor FedorcnkoJ sent a kUcl' to the l)residc:lt of the COtillcil St'ltUl~ his nstron~ objections" to the procedure fol1o\';ed by .:\r.nha:'5ador -)'h1tsui, and charging him ,,;ith lI:;teps th:lt;:O beyoad the limit. 0: his confidcrlce imc! 'Viobte the Seem'ity COllaril';; rules·of proccdure ~ud est.:,t)]ishcd pr,\etice." A simihlf lc·ttct" \\-llS ::1:~o Seut by the Bnb:ri:'!n repl'i:scnh:th-c. I necd scarcely r:dd, :'Ir.. Ch:1inn~1!l, th~,t in our '\"iew f',nd I think in the ncw of many Illembers of the Council .Amba::s:ldor :'fr.tsui acted guit.e properly in doing what, he did and quite within hi~ euthority a:; l~resident of the Council in repo:-ting to tb.~ membcf3 of the C01.ln.dl tbe results of his con5u1t2tious, . • . My own c~n\tlSS t:1kcn indcp~ndciltly of th!lt of Amb~:ssedor :\r~tslli .coufirmed hIS assessment th,'..t the members of the Council were (Tenet'ally uU'\\illio& to proc('('d with 'n s1.lbsten.th-c· discuss!on de:;pite"'the ."strong and exp:-css preference of the United States th~t we get on




' . : ,'"

"\rith Hle cleh:ltc. I sliould ~1so like to lldd.\\<C did h.n-c somewh:"lt of 'it. e. . en in the proc~s of ; ·inscribil12: nn itcm, I mncle a shltcmcnt 'or a subshmth'c character· ill ,support of.illscriptioa bCC.1U$C I cOlJl(HlO.rdi~· ,\\'oid·it, and other lnelll·..........bCl'$ spoke to the subsh1.uce in de'lliag with the in::;cription Rl.\ttcr tlS is aw~r~nt from the record you htl\"c kindly j111o'~\'cd me to file with the . .... '. '. -comnllttee. Indeed my ('tlm',\:::S showcd that this im\\"minglie~ to get on with . tlu~ d~b~te was {(\\.lull {:\"Cl\ tln10ng thQ~c members who· h.\(l ,-oted affirm.\tinly on iU5::'riptioIl iu the Iwpc th:lt snch t\ \'ote might. sway the Ilcg'lth-e ll·ttitude of the SO\'iet Union and Frt~!l(.'e in p~l"ticul:tr. !.

~ ... -si:tbshmth-e deb.ltc as h.lppCIlS in the U~X.




Rr;lIAL1' OF 'l'HE .-\D)lL."'lSTIU,TIOX


Now, )'Ir. Cfutirm:ln, this is the recol"l:l. of my effort:; on behalf of the Administratioa and the Pl"c$idcnt to Cillist the 'United ):ations and $pccifically the Security Cot,utt'il in the search £01' p';-,lce ill Yiet.n:nu. I lUust confess thnt the r.1ihm·~ (lr these efforts ll;ts been my keenest disappointmc!ll !lud nw grcn.tesl frustl'atil.)Il (lUrillg my st'f\-ice for our GoYcl'1ln1cnt t1.t the United Nations. I frankly ht1d hl)ped £vl' a much morc constl'tlcth'e and positi\"c role of the United N:1.tions when I took ()n this assignment for our cOl.mlt'S. But., )1r. Chairman,· in spite of these l'cbuff::, J do 110t int~ndJ as long <lS 1 occupy my pr~ent post, to diminish lilY e:ITorts ill this- C'uuse. ~ . . . I l'epeat iny COnyictioll tlu~t, SenD-tor }ohllsfic1<l's resolntion, if it is . adoptc.:ll)\~ tho Sena.le, .-15 I hopo nnd trust it.will be, will support the en'orts I fni11113.kin~ '1t the "C'nited XatioilS :1.t the President's dircction. ''1'he resolution; ns~I lmdcl"sl:mcl it, is intcndc~ to express the scnse or , ,the Sena.lc Imd appropriate1y Ie,we;; the timing f~nd circumstances or . at,lion in the Sectll'ity Council for Pl'l'sicicntbl determination. . For my p~rt. I promise this coalluittc'e nUll th(; Amcrk;m people, in kC~l)ing with the spirit of thc n~.soll1tiollS that. ymt are considering, to pcr~o\'el'C with all the resources at my COmllh'lild lo the cnd thil.t the Sccmit\" Coullcil may CtU'l"\" out its dear respOl!5-iLilitic5 11lld~r the charter with rcspoet to Yietluun. I sllf!U do so in the cum-iction that if there is :mv contribution that diplon1ftc\"-,.in or out oi the United Nn.tiol1s-cD:n mt!ke to hasten the end or titis c'onflict', none or us can in good conscience Sp:U"c nny efl'orL 01' fiU\" labor to make that contribution-no mntter ho\\: frustrating past·cfforts may hiLYC been, or how' . ~any ne\\" beginning:; m~y be .l'eqllii'cd. The ~ldinirablc cOllrage and perscvcraUCC or our men on the 'b~1ttleficld must be funy matched by . ,our pcrs~yel'.mcc in seeking, through diplom~cy, to find the common .on which a fair and honor:1.blc politic~l s~t~leme~t. C!lU ,be W


..... I thnnk you Ycry much, )Ir. Chairman.

. ,-, , " ' .....

.' .. " The Cu.uu:\r.-\x. 'Ihnnk you, }oIl'. :·\lllbnssl\dor. . - .1 think that is an extr.,\ol'c1inarily denr and "\ery finc'statement, and I think it does great credit to yoLU' l'CpreSeDtntion of this country in the United Xntioas.

" . .

-. " "


Tl1ere nrc a fe'\\' questions I want to'go into quicklj·, much quicker than I 'Would lil~c, in order that other members may have an oppor~

, ~~ity to put questions.




'. -. . lNTEX'l'IGX '1'0 }tECOX,EX:: GEXLYA. COXFEItE~CE . . ' -

' . '

.~ May I nsk regarding the current proposal that submit, which~ . ' . " _ •

" ;


you hs,\"e or expect to 'e.

Calls {or the convenin; or nn fnternatioIl:ll conference for the pUl-po~e or estal:>- . i:\ SOutliC-.lst .-\si:l b!lS~d upon the pdneiples o( the

lishin~ A p~:m3r.l!nt p-~ace Genc\'~


'., ,

.. 87






SUm-ill' VI!:l'X.nI COXFI.ICl' TO l!XITED XA'l'IOXS . . -


· . ~S it proper iutcrpl:~t that ~5 mC;1Iiing the $~mc as the l'ecouyel~in~ ~! the Gc-n~\';l c(lUfCrI'HCC under the codHtii"m~m::hip of. the United Kingd0D1 tU!d the F.S.S.R, with tho $:lnl..~ Incmb.:rship participating? Amb:l::::edm' Gou>1n:t:G. Yes, 11;-. Chi\i!·m~\n.. · . It is intended to rC:lfilrm out' wi1!inQ:n<:~s to hilYC that done. Ii. is · elso inl(·ncli:·d to .add a litt1e more ili.'xil,nity bCC<'HlSe th;::l"c hl1\"e bC~ll .some indic.ltio:!s from the ot1(·1' s!clc th;lt pt'I'Lnp3 some other con~ {cronce midI! he des.tt·:,blc. But W~ would be cntirdv willing, ~nd we ). . ould b;: interpreting thi3 Ch:.U5i: to mC:l11 that thtl Genc,a confer\.'llce,

,yith the s::nnc mCil"lbcrsbip should b(rcrOtl\·imc-d. 'The Cm.IR)rAx. On sen-r.,l occ::tsions, tlie othel' side, the N'orth Vietna!llC5C ..md. I lhinkJ ,;lS ono of your cit.1 tio!!;; of the Chinc3c s:1id, that th;lt is the ()omp~te!lt forum in which this matt or should bi) settled; }:; tbt not cOlTed? '. .. " Ambassador Gor.!>l:l:nG. '1'h(,1"(, han, b~en some rccrnt statements pnrticu1::.rly from Chiao. further ql::1!ifiyjn~ their fo1'l11(,1' position, find , 01.11' formulation wus intended to be nlor\)- cncom["las5in~ so ~. ;; not to ·exc1uc1c.~ny type 'of intern,1tion:-:1 c.onfl'l'cac(', but\re beiic\'o the ll105t -appropriate ,,"Clnlet be the recoln-ening of the Genenl.Confcrence as yon hln;c s : l i d , ' .' :. ' , : . '1'ho CUAIf:)UX• .And· from time to time', the So\-kt Union bas 0.1:;0 'stated th:1t the c(lnfcrrltce w::s fl proper forum; j,; thftt. llot correct? · 'Ambass!1dor GOI.m:EI!G. 'J'h:1.t. is C01Tl~ct, bu!: the SCI\"i~t Unioll has ·not rcspomlcd to our repeated lm-1t:ltion to them to join wilh the 13ritish in reconvening Ow confcr~nce. . • ' rl'he Cm.ll:~[AX. I rC;11ize tha t. .' ~ '. :'.' :: ... ' . . • ... - ." ~ECONYE:\,IXG o~· CEXJ~YA . ,'.

cO:\,}'r:r:BXCE .'

.:- "::.



Lot lno 53Y, I crrtninly mn' symp.lthctio \\·jfh your yi:;w tllat IImioi bas been \"('1...,. \lllresponsh-c to thcs{' oITers :1nd it i5 Quite b{'\"ond my comprehc:mion as to \';hr. I don't Undl'l"5tftnd tbdr l\'\uct:'llCO O!' t.beir rcCusd to do it except p~1s5il;1=, they m:1y .interpn~t thi;; mo\"e to mNlU the United Xntions is r'oin~ its;:li to \lnclcrt:~~~c to dt-;il with Ow sub·stnutive question. Xo\~: tbls may be n. polnt., I am not c1c~r, I don't _ lmow,.of course., whether or not th~it is their reason, but if th(tt shodd · boso that. they interpreted this as'il moyo on cur 11:1rt to uso thi} U,N. · to·.soh·o tlh1 problem then thc:-", not bciIl~ a memoer h:1\-e some re:1.son fofit. EnD so, I woi.ud not :1~ree with their posi.tion nt nIl. I think that . _. it would be perfectly propcr~if they would agree to come and submi.t the matter to the United Xetions. . .... But in Rl?Y rasc, seeking to find ~ome b~sis upon which we might gct 1!. recon,enmg of the Gene\":1 conference, It· h:1S seemed to me tlw.t this • point is very important. I confess that if tllis lS the purpose, to reconvenc the Gener~ conference, I c~nnot p05sib!y l.mdersL:md the 'attitude or the French Go,crn.ment or of th\) So..-iet. GO\'ernment in · refusing to tako the position in the Security Council th!l.t- this \,\0!llcl be .: .'1!. proper mode o.f procedure bcc::tusc you do not deal WIth it . suostanhnly. . . ' I think some of the st~tements of the Soviets and of the French · that. I ha"e seen and some which '\ou cite see·m to indiea.te that they believe, too, thf!t we are attempting to use the Securit\ Councll' · itself to deal tdth the substanth-e question; is that correct?" .. .. ... .' .



, "Am1:l~,ssedor GOLDi~},~RG. I shared your appreucmion$ t190ut thi~, ,. Mr. Chairm,:.1tl, 11tHl in the inscription dt'hate in 1SnG dtcl' li.-;tcniu';7 to the comments m;l(lc b\" tIle Sodt'ttTnion IUld b\' Fnmce :md h;l\'ill~ 'react some oC thC6C eJitol:id~ whirh' tlpp,:!.~rcd·at n;'c lime, I :specifiedly addrc;;scd lllJ$eJf to thnt problem in thc S'-UllC li,;ht t~:; you h:n-e jU'it done, tryit:g to nh~kc cbu' that whilt' we be1it:n~, :llld h;~d to be!ic\'e under the cll:lrter, that the Security Council h!'l.d ('omp~tence, ne\'erthele~s, in li~ht C'C what thcy .we ::;,1yin\! r.l>l'ut it, it \\'us not our 'propos:l1 th:lt the U_~. itself scttb tli;; rn,lttcr, but rathel', we WCl'€! trying to get the gr{,;l.t, influence l'.!ld prestigc of the Security Coundl behind the l"ccoll\'enin~ of the Geuc\"i1. conference, :lud I think the st~\temcnl YOU nHl.de· toe!.l)" is ..I. helpful st~tem('nt. I endO!'$i) it COn11)lctdy. nll,1 I also urn puzz1ed why, in light of tht'ir c:vntcntion OIl the ba5is th~l t the Gencnl ('onfcrenct' is the fonlln, wh\· thc\' can possibly objc(!t to a Security Council re301ution whith supj}orts "the r~c·on­ YClling (If the forum wllk'h it is tl55('rted by them is the Ilpproprbte forum. The CHAIP.ll.-\X. 'l'h.1t, 15 right. This 1'(,,11h' j li$t'.3 11 qU(,3tion of their good f:lith, in lilY mind, If n;c\" ]"J)(l!Jy nrc iutcre~tcd in beintr of .Hsist• stoppmg • "lUIS l ' scnOUi; • n'"l. ~lln at II I~5$ to llllGCl'st:IU' 1'" d W1iJ fLllce m conl!;ct, they would ri'fu:,c to rCCOrlYE'He tne cO,nfcrencc 1f the mcmb~l's of the Security Coundl S0. rec<?il:ll1l'nd.: That would p:lrlicul:trly apply to France Elnd the Sonet Umon who h:wc both on numerous occi!.sions. stated publicly th:lt thi:> ''''IS the Wily to. procc~d. W

A'l'TITt:D}; . O}' XO~;l'E!nt:tXEXT )tr:~mEl~s or COt"XCIL

Now, I nm n.ot rnmr.: of the :Rf::yious statemcnts ot :wme of the SccUl'it,}~ CoundL IOU don't h:wc time l of course, to outlint} them, but· in your {'onsultntiot!$, I C:\fi't. undcrsbmd why they \\"~Hild 1\ot, at b\5t nine ot th~mJ agrce to this • . Do you think they und{,l'st:md t1th pr.;nt? , Amb::.:'~:ldor GOT"Dll:;~G. 1 think they lllU;;t underst:1nc1 it, )'k' .Chairm.m , nnd gentlemen. I hayc b~fLll'e mc' the statement I llmde, wllich is in your record, after the d()b:1.tc that we hud in :Fel~l'lltlry ofHl5G, and"~ suid thi:5-1 should like to fCll.d, if lIMY, just a p:mt.graph 'or two. DOltperllli!llrnt lll!:'mll':l'£ of the

Now I $h:.1t tum to l:ome of the qu~sliolls r:\iscd by membcr5 in the COur;;c or .our di~cu;:sion. I should lik~ to d,;:~l with whitt \\'!!s first pointed out by my fri~nd, our former PF('.~id~nt, the Rf:pre;;cnt:uh'c of Fr;ln~£'. who!'~ wi::dom I han' l{,;lrn('d to nppr~ciatc vcry IIIuch ;\ltd who~(; fric'lld:;hip 1 de~p!y ,,:;lue, The qll~3tion he rai::cd'i.. :m import~nt OM ~nd ft.-.S b~Cll rai5Cd by othe.s, U,e rcprc::clltativc of ·?Iali, the represt'llt:lth'(,' of Ug:\ucb, and it .h:ts been :ten'rted to by the rcpresent:lth'c of Bul::;arb. and I thhlk W:l5 ru~:ltil)ned :tlso by ou!' e~tecmt!d COl1C:l~UC. Mr. Fcdorcnko th~ Sovk,t l;nion. Their point is this: It h:\s becn pointed out -by them th:lt the Ccnc\';\ COltr.~rcace nt which :1!i p~rti+::s to tlze conm~t nrc represented, bns b~~n the intern!'.tion:ll body which has in the p:i.st d(':\!t, \\'it!l the , problems of Yk':n:ull. :ll!d it llilS been rlaimcd that it still rem;,iIl5 the :Jppropri:ltc body to co :;0. '1'he t'nited S:!ttes hns no qlL'l.rrel with this cvntc!ltioll. We h.we repeatedly $t~ted th:.lt we would welcomr: th~ r(:col1vcnhl~ of the Gencv:l con· "terence for this purpose. It hns been corrc~t!y fAlintcd out tl:=,,~ the purpose of our draft res~ltttion is to !lS5:5t in whn.~ thus f.\! h h:!5 not b,;:~n pO::5iblc to r';:l!ize, the reco!wenii!g of the Ger.c\'!l Conference. Thnt 'h:i.s not b.:-cn po~,,:blc to rt"JE;:eDot bec~H:5e of !lny op;:>oshion on the p:trt of the C'nitcd Stt,tes."Qui!;} the COtl:trary. Una.:. the;c circta!lst:lnCC5, th('=cforc, til'! cKo!ce befor... the mcmbc:"s of tile


'Securjtv Coanci! is not whcth~r to de.~l ,:;:th this probli;'m in the COlillCit or to denl with it in Gen.c\';'t, bnt whether to d(';\l ....ith it :It r.ll. Th~ door to Ge:1C\':: is &t lC!lst .for th~ tim'! b~in£ closed. and the qu~:,;tio1\ w(; h:we to d'!cide i~ :i. pbin ,



: SUB)!IT VIE1'X:t,'I COXFLIC-r '}'O, 't~lTf!D N;\TIOXS'

$ud simple on~: ,Do \\"0 \~'i~h !l150 to c:lo~c the doo .. to the. United N:t.tions! What \Yill the people of the world $~\y if we do? , ,

"",'1'he CH.\mlU,x. You hft\'e m~lde thtll very clear this morning~ . nmeh cl('al'cr th:ln it 11:1s CYCl' beea m:1d-c before, although I think your spe~ch in Au;ust wcnt Ycn' f~lr iii this diret'tion, I must, say I . tbought it '\'(\5 1'111 cxccll~nt spccch I'md I :Ull. at a lo~s to undc:3t:Uld why so In:l11Y members of the .:\:;scmbh- h.l,\"c recenth- made sPeeches " ~liiit~ill .01 oill", countr'.", :mel of the boiubing in yiei\: of your speech. I cnn't bdic\'e the\' tUldei'stand ",h:lt wc re(~U.r mean, So I nm partieuhwl:r plci13ecl th~lt yOllsup(ort this rc~olution of SCHittO!' ;:"Imlsfield, I predict. that if this i$ properly lli'mdled, aud I hnye cn:ry confidence it \\'!U be by y~u" th:1.t this will m'lk~ ~ great imP:'l'ESion UPO:~:l mnn1)~r of tnose pt'\lplC who h:\\"o' been cl'ltIcal. I don"t sec ItOW they could , obi~ct to thi:> procedure. ,", , :Senator Sp,\rkmil.u? . ' SCIl<1tor Sl'AltK:\US. lI1'. Chairman, let me StlY t.h:lt I certtlinly endorse cn'l'ything the Chairman lUl'; said. I h:l \'C been \'cry much impressed with your st:ltemcnt, Ambri~s:ldor Goldhei'~, It secm~ to Dle tlu'.t. you h~l.\"c goae into tho m ..1Uer mo~t c,uC{UllY·1111d point.edly, and I don't :;(~c much Mt. to qut'stion you about, '. I tim puzz1ed as is the Ch:1irm:lll. about the :l~titude of m:lny of these countri('s, :is to why thC'y could uot :\ccept wh:tt seems to be the clcar rC;>\IOl!5i~ility of the Security Coullcil. ~mdcr the ch:li'lcr of the Umtc'( Xatlons to hlke some, kmd of achon. It. seems to me 'that you }h\\,~ probed in ju:;t ~lhout C\'Cl'y ~ircction th:l.t j'Ott C~1I\ to , find some ndlon tl1at they could ngl'cc to tilke. , . ,,' .. "




ox ltECOX\',EXIXG Gl::XEn,




DoCs the GC'ncnl Conference lhn'c the power to rccom"cnc itse1r? .Amb~ls~nc1t'r GOLDHERG. Under thc rulc$ of the cQnference, the two cochairmcn~ the So\,icl Union Ilnd Great Britain, Ill:lY reC01lvene the' eonCcrence. ' , 8eni1.to1' SI'ARKl!AX. But it c.lnnot be' 'reconycncd unless both chtlirmen ngTee to it? . Amh:lssaaor GOL'DUEltG, 'l'htlt is c~rrcct. " " Senator Sl·ARKl!~X. And so fnr', the chairmen have not agreed to do so? '. "'v " ' 'Amb~lssaclor' GOLDDEl!G. The British have repeatcdl)- indic~1ted theil' wiHingllc:;s to do so by public sttlt~ments and by prh'iltc letters to the other COc1l,\i'mU\.tl as recently as in the Assembly of the United Nations l:\st man til. _• , . . .' Senator Sl''-\R~l[AX, Does tlle So:det representntive gh-c reasons for his l\U\\;1lingnc$$ to recon,cne the conference?, . .Amb~fldor GOLDBERG. BilSicll.Uy, if J wcre to interpret his reasons, his r~a~ons nrc that Hanoi does not want the conference recoD\"ctll'd. He nhnl.Ys StlYS thtlt the Soyiet IT.nioll does 110t \\~ant ttl, bl!! he tll\\'a\"~ letlds tllC st:ltements made eitlter b\- Hanoi or the NLF, and illterpl'c-ttl.tion is thilt tllilt is the bllSfs for the deci:;ion taken by the 'Soviet Union. 'I'hat, is nn- interpr('tdion, ~Ir.. Ch.lirm:m. also asscrts that thcy nre umril!im:, but that is roy, interpretation. , Senator SURIuu.x. lIow many countries ·con5titut~ the· Ge~c\a Conference? ," '., . - ,. . : , ' , . . ...









',,; 'sun~Il'r . yn:TX.nI CO~FL1C1.' TO ljXll'Ell KATIOXS

;. AJUi)ilSS~dor GOLDBERG. 'rho Genom Confer~ucc. there arc cIuite a number. . .. .' . ..... " . -' : 'The CfU.1R:\UX• •·he YOU ti!.lkil:?; -:\l)out the 19~a onc or the 19G2, one? There ate nine in tile fil:st; l.fin the sccvnd. ", .: : Amb;:'::$~ldor GOLllI;}:~G. Th~re llre it hr6~l" mt:nb~t.. , : Senatot SPA m::\u,s. J?ourt£)cn in t·h:: O!W th(\t· pl'~n:n$ r.t the present timo. I bc1ic\-e YOl.l b \-0 put to thrm thtlt we would be \\illing to proceed ll!1dcr cHhN' the 19·),1 01' ih~ 19G2 m'l'~ln~~mcnt; i;; that right? Amb:lssudor GOLDn~!!G. 'l'hi~t is con·-:ct·. Ahllough we do fed i.h:1t if it conference were to b~ heM it would b~ highly de5ir:"l.hle to c1c,tl with both issllc5 bl'C"!l.tlSO it would be nCCC'35:lry to dc.'ll with peace ill that p;lrt of the world, :,mcl would be lli~hly d~3imble to deal with the p1'ol,lclll5 in Laos, G.ll1loodi.l, bc..:au5c·~t.hcy .we rda.ted problel1ls, ns \\'cll ns ,\:"ictnanl. . ... , Senator Sl'AnK:\IAx. But the mcmbership is powerless to act in the 'ab3('nc~ of the ~l~reCUl('nt of tho two ch.lirlllCl1. . . Ambassador C;oJ.nr.};p.G. Th~lt is corr~~t, Sea~1tt)r Sp:~l'kman. , Senfttol' S?AI:n:;\U.X. ),11'. Ambfl,:s~ld(tr. I \\'~nt to commend you for ",-hut I cOnS!dcl' the excellent joh that you hayo bC(,l1 doing for us in the Unlt-E'd X;ltious.<1!ld for your pn'Jcnt.!1tion here todilY. ;Junbasslldor GOLDmmG. Th~lnk you. ..

" Sen~\tor Sl'ARK~IAX. That is all, ~lr. Cbaiw.l?-ll. t

~ ... : ;


!"~:".'- -:r.[ElIIlE}-~S}IlI'


01' GEXE'·.\. COX}'!~nE!\CI:S

.. CIIAIR~!:\x.li'or the record, ),11'. Aml),15Sadol', unless it is alr~o.dy in would you ilm'rt the mCll1bci'~hip or b,)th Gmcv;,l cO!lfcrcncC's ~ma also the pr~5ellt lllembc-rship of the Security Council? . A1Ub~ssa.dor G(l!.Dm:l~G Y cs; 1 shall be nry ghHl to do so.. . (The material referl'eJ to follows:) ... ' .' ' ,

. ."






... ~




195·1• 6,-

19G2 I~


.. ~urm:l.

C:l.mbodia .. Chint', (Communist) . . France . IJ!\.os

Cambodia Cnnn.da China (Communist) .


United Kingdom United St:l.tC5.



. •. ',.. .

.. ~ '}'rnnce .Indi~

.. -: ... ~





.. .......




.-.: .. ,

Lnos: '.



Vietnam, St!l.te of (South) , Vieln:UIl, DCmOCf>1tic ncpub!ic or . (North) I



'l'hnibnd . United Kingdom

.. ,..United States' U&&~


.. "* ..


.: "ictnam, R~pub1rc of (So~\th) Victn~lm, Dernocr.ltic Uel)uLlic of " . (North) * '



P.-\RTlCIPA'.1'IOX I?: z'Omn.;I••\'l'IOX . OF U.S. ,\"IETX.UI

\r.u: l'OLICY .

. . 1 haxe another' quc3tion. You lUay 1l~13'\\"cr it or not. just as.you like. " Did :rou 01' )fr. Si..:co p;lrticip;'lte in Iornm];:ting our gonmmclit's Yiettiam~o policy in carrying out of t!:.c 'hlr? . , Am.bas~ldor G·OLTmi-;l~G. J would like to SUY th13: I nm. often talked to about the~C' m.:ttter$, bu.t I clO oper-ttl' ,,mati-the restrictions tlult are imposed by the L"'nitcd l\o1tio!ls Ptl.rticipatioll.:\.ct b:; Co!ig1"eS5, which I think a!~ approprinte restrictions, .At the U,N". I stute the yiewpoint or th~ U.S. GOYi>rmllcnt as ddefmined by the l>rcsident, fllld I ha,'c participate.d in m,'\llY me~tit~g5J hQ\\·eyc1.·, Oll the Sl.thjcct, elf YietmllU. . Senator .:lIKEX. 1 ll(\hct} iu the 1:1St pi~ragmph of YOl.ll" stetem.ent you S3Y tlHlt you prornise to pN':;~~e:'e ~dth all tl~e rcsources nt yo!-u' comil~;lild to the end tlU\t the the :;eCU!1ty Conncil may c;m-y out Its clear rc~pon'!-ibilitic; under tho ch:wtcr with l'c-5pt'ct to Yif!tIl.nn. _. Ko\\', the resources itt your commaud would oe wh~te\"er the Prcsident decides YOU should lUl,YC? ' . Ambns:;ado; GOLVl!!::P.G. 'l'hat is correct. and I e.1Il confident that those resollree-s will be to'flilable if the Senate 5CCS fit to pass this usolution.


. Senator .AIJa:~. or CClur.sc, I will Sii\" this. It is entirely pO~$ible th:lt tlle Pl"l'sid('nt tmd the SCc~cf~lry oi State might not :;cc eye to eye 011 the £1('g1';;(, of l'C$OUr~es wl11ch you should h:l \·c. . - Ambas53dol" GOLDUE1!G. ,rell) I know o1'.1y onc way ~o usc my resource:: f:lld tll~t. is to usc them fully. I don't know nny otucr .way to usc them. : ScnatOtAIKE:S. Y C5, I am sn~'ing t11~t. 'fhat is nnJ )Ir. Chninnan. The CHAU!)IA::\.

S~ntltor ~hnsfield?'

~llIIT.\'l'rOX5 Al'~LtC.U:L}~

'1'0 'rUE UX!TED

.. :-;ATlO~S

Senator ~L""::\SfIELD. Mr. A1llbassndorJ 1 W3.nt to CClngrllhllate YOU on fin cxcdlent ste.iCUlCUt. I think you huxc put the qti.c:;tion iu proper . pcrspectin~ bef6re this commi t t.re, I \'ery n~uch'appreci:ltc the .coHoquy . . between you ;lud Ule Ch!!.irm~lll of this conunitte~rcbth'c to the Hlllita. tions which npply to the U.N., and ~ rcco~nitl011 of the Iilct that it i:; .. no~the U.N. which will make ~he fmal dechion but1lct us hopeJ some, . thinu like a rc.connued Geneva cO:lierencc.· . . , :. 'l'bis rcsolutiondocsl1ot hand you !lIly blnnk check, ·nnd I think that - ought to be kept. in mind. Xor docs it :lllow, if itis passedJ any authorit:r to the U.X. to dictate a peace in Southeast .:\sh\. "




'The pendiug.l·c501utlon is entirely nd,isory. at least the l'csoll.l'tion -cosponsored by 5S Senators. It pl~ces the President in no stro.itjncket. Jt.le~\·es the CG.llduet of foreign policy c:m Vietnam where, in the end, -'only It can be, m the hands o! tile Pre~ldeut. . : In my "riew' the adoption of this .resolution wou1d say to th~ Pres: Ident most respectfully, that the Senate hopes that he would see the desin1bility or trying ngllin to op.m the qucstion of YietnnID to iormcl. consideration by the U.X. Security Council. Furthermore, we would say to him thilt we thin~ it is dcsimble to take timely no~e of the deep c~ncern oyer vietnam which hll5 been expressed by more thim .



.' ..

SUB::.n-r \'lET.NA.'.I COSF!JICT '1'0 uNITE:Q Xo\TIOXS

" .100 miti~ns during'the curr~nt st'ssion 01 the Gelleml.{ssembly and try to com-crt th~5!:) words of cone~..n into e U.N. nction for uc~cc. "'-..:. We would say {urth~l' by the p~;:.gtl of this resolutioll) in cITcct,thet if a U.:K. cOlltribulio!\ to pe<lct' is not forthcCtIUiug it ou~ht !lot to be because this X.liiolllws oeeD lHl\';illing to act posith'ely under the c11!l.rter. . ~n the contrary, we wo~:ld !,-s~ the rr~s!de!l.~ to copsider ll1:'!k}!lg , clca}" to thc'world tIl:!t tIus N:ltlon wIll submit the ISsues or "let-nam to the formal proct'dutcs of the Security Council in iUl effort- to mOYe the sc~rch for solutiolls from the battle5c1d to the Ilcgoti;lting table. . . In sum, the Senate res!)ldion ,\"ol.tld $l!gg~st to tlu~ President thnt he collsidcl' nct-in:; on the prcmis? t.h'l.t- tho U.N. could be a point of entry to the ru~td to pence eycn If it IS not. the pbce where peace i3 negotiat.ed in the cnd. . . '. . . . The U.N". m~Y not proyc useful in titi" cormcctloH, but no onc can bltunc.tllc Prcsi(!C'nt or this Xation of llOt :lctlllg in good f':lith to try to fine! out 1)''0 nn lniti::tin im'oh-ing '"otc;; wl10 .is willing to try for a ju;;t }lC:1C~ by this route ~md who is mIt ,,,mingo . . In my judg;ncnt, win, }o:::c, or <tril.W, this Nation h;,1s cYCl"ytlling to gitirt nuel ne.tiIiag to los'c by hlking th'lt initi.1th"e. . .." . 'l'hnnk )-OU, :\lr. Ch:1irlr!f:u. ..; : : ", The GH.\m~L"'x. -Senator )'IoRsE. . ..... ,- ... I





SenittOl" ).IOl:5E. ~Ir: .Amh':lssadol·, I think you hiWC made a pO\i:~r­ (ul statement thi:'i morniug. )'Iy l>rediction-i$, blight of futura developments in .:\Si;l, it is going ttl be t1 historic one. I h.wc in mind your "ic;ws in rcg:n'cl to United Xati(l!\S l);1rli.cipat.ioll nnd settlelU(:nt Vf this war from the '\'('1"Y b~~inn1ng. I think I yioh!.te no cO;lfid~w:~ 1,), saying, nt your llwit:ltio!l, fwent. to your Supreme Court office three days after. your npmiuation :md prior to your confirm~1tion :lnd we tdkcd about my view:; illl·cg.lrd to United Xatious responsibilitie3. You v;ill rec~ll at the time of the steel cast! we were down ~t Hie White House together tl-ud the I)reiidcnt ask-e(l us to h1.1k :l.bout. it further. . 1 mention th~t .only because I think wany p'coplc do not know ·l\·ht'l.t the Pl'~id~nt'$ position wr.s from the Ycry beginning. There is no doubt th:tt he has alwn.ys welcom.cd nppropriate 1Jnitcd ·Xatiolls participation ~nd inten-entio!l i"'l trying to seck a peace in Southc;1.st Asia. AI:d, as you point out this morning, as his Aiub!lS5~dol' you h~l.ye -sought to sen-a th:1t purpose on the p~wt of the PresIdent· . It is truc, flS you pomt ont in yow.'-stateme:nt, th~t I quickly endors~d - the 1-Iansficld resolution. In that record which you uceur.:.tely quoted from, I pointed out I thought 'it was importunt that we build a bridge between the COng;·C.53 and this Administrution in trying to resolve some of the5~ foreign policy (liffercnccs. I. think it is a. grei1t mistake wh~n people don't Wf!.nt to cross those brldgC3. You ha\"c crossed one this morning by ap~e;lring before this comnuUee in n public henrhlg, 8.S I think you sl;ould ha\'e done, ns you.were always ,dlliug to do, and which I think is in keeping with our whole system of rep~es~~t~th-e government. _ .:." . . . :.:' . : ;."

.* .. *






'. :


Now, as fnr as neut'fl11i1..;tion, we h:n-e snid 'that \\'e do not as e matter, of Jl!luciple, aUll I JCpet"lt. l~~re. do no~.. ~n 8.11)" way oppose neutrdl/::,hml ot South '\ leta,HIl. 1f South. V1CU1:1.tll wilnt:; to be

neutral. Why do I not c:xlend it to :\o;lh Vietnam? '\Ye would weIcotile the ncutr:l1izethn of X .. rlh YicLu:'l.nl. but I t1Hl b(;ing realistic, 'Xorth Viet.nmn is ~ Cornmuni4 ro,.,.imi!. profc$st'clh' 50. <'l,ud I don't \n1nt to put a barrier in. the W~\ \' of seltl<!ment bY ·11.ddi:1g a now term since my ide.'!. is to h~,-e a :)cl.ll~mcnt, If we, the United Stales, ,',:cr~ to put. rOr\n1r~ a POSitioH iUlhiy th:1t the price of e. $cttlilment in Yictn~lU is tla ncutn:liz:1tion of NlIrth Yietil~m!) we would be putting a b£tl'rlcr in the ,-;a) of n settlclllI.'nt in lir~ht of tbe nilturc of thell' regime. So we h[t,e gone fl.:; ftlr 1t:5 we can reil.son~hly go in silying that so far as U.S. policy is conc~rw'll> if tha pt!oplo) of South Yietu:lm \nmt to be mm{rul. nOl1l1lincd that is their ileci,;io!l, th:lt j" acceptable to the United States. " . . The Cu.uml.~.s. I think Senator Gore 11:15 ro.isc(l a wry >alid pc.int that. has bothered me, hut it scem~ to me thh is the kind of question that the cour(-rence i\t, GClwnl should decide. We don't It:).n~ to decide that in ndnmce. It is n, pmhlcm tktL has nhr::rvs both('r~d me. , ,'Amb~lss:1clI)1' GOI.})l:l-:"u. YCS1 I would e£';l'ec'th:lt is a prop('r subject 'within the competence of the cOnfCl'cllcC: I [~:\\"C an intcrprct'o.Uon . . , SClttltor Go;n~. 1Ir, Ch:~irnH'm. the contradiction hits not bt'cn rcsoh'ed nt elL 'rhe r\.'soluti.lit prvyidc$ th<1[· the Gcncn1 accord wouId be adcqltiltc bfLSB for pC:l{:nful settleml.'nt. The GClh.~nl accord dO~3 not pHlkc reference to two Sl\l'~\n\te l'olitic~ll entities; in f:1CL, it. definitely yulcs thCiI\ out. • ' 'I'he CH.UR).r;\x. The Sl'n:\tor is corr~ctJ but tJH~re is a. propo~:11 for discu~sion

bctore the Si.!~llrity Council to seck {l. reference, '.I.'hey don't '

hsyc to accept this itUcrpret:1.tiou.


- Scn~tor Gmm. I know, but wltn L'is the'position of 'the U.S. Go\crn. mont? This is the point :l.~ which I am aiming. ' . '. . , Amb:lS3~dol" GOLnT:}:l~(:. )Iay I n.l1swcr it., Senator GOP-E. Will we accept the netttmlitv of Indochina as a basis of peace? 'rill we. ill fact, nccept rcunific,ttion, self-determination of onC' country? Will we. in r~l.ct, be s::.tl.;fied with the Geuen1. accord eos a bnsis for pc.loce? It nppe~\r:; now thef. we will n o t . · .

The CUAn~~IA.x. I am llt)t Sllre about th;1t. . Atrib3.sst1dt"ll' GO'l.utn~i~(;. I w~\Ut to nlake it e:"plicitly c1Cilf and it , does not app~llr to be !l\l\\', With ctae respect, I w:mt to make il explicitly ckl.r we t\ccept. the GeneYtt ~lccv!"d as a b:1.5is Cor p;;ace. I also I

want to Ineke it explicitl\" dear whca we Qfrcr a rC$olut!ou that, is the

. offer. We :we l'Nl.dy to lic:lr other views, including the yicws of this

committee, \\lien I put


piece 01 p£l.per for inform~l.l disGU5Sion. it is

quite :\~rect1.ble to me til l>ut a pi2i:C or pa.per before the Security , Council without going int,,, contrvn~rsi:ll det:!il, saying we accept the ~enenl accord ~lS tl. basi", f'!l" pettee. \Ytl ask for the recvm-ening of th e

, conference ttnd we rCCI)~ut7.e the' competence of the eonfereace to , settle, t\djudicate it or rcbt ell problems. ram perfe9t\y willing to pn t that in the reSOlution ,UIU I think th:.lt me~ts your point of .-ie\\-, , Senator.

;The CHAIInIA~. The St~lIntor froUl Ohio.



.• ,



FOl~ llOC{;~n::\T,\l'IOX



IX U'.X.

. 'Senator LA{;;:;CHE. ,:\rnb~:;'S:ld(lr G.)!dh(!r!{, I nUl f;r.ltcful to "ou lor your very li.lcid pr~:>cnt;1.ti'Kt ~md dl)cutl~cnt;ttion ~)f t111~ effori.; of

the lJnitt'd StutC5 to h:t\'c the United ::\!ltiua~ t~!kc juri.,dicti!.lI1 of the

VietJimll dispute. ' . , ,Ul1fOl'tulltltely thr~)tlgh the Pl'l)p:lgll1\cb of the, C ...mmull!st5 twa in 'many inskmcc,; thruucih stlltcm[<nt:~ of uninflll'Iued iudiridtds "wjthin ollr own count!'y. the iln p:'cs,;ioa hns 00('1\ g:l iite;:! tht1.t we sotight to eSC:lp~ the rIghts imd thc p(lWCI:'~ of the United ::\:1t10!15 . to iHt~rVcnc for the cstil.hli5hmcnt of pe:1CC in llri'.l~ of the wldd wl1cI"c yil,\lcllce existed. , ' . Your 'pr~senl:~til.)n r('~~rl'ttttbly wi1~ Hatb? he:1('t1 funy b~ thc p~0pIe of the N:ltll,J!l. hut the dl.)l.~umcnltlttun wlach YOU 11:1YO gn'ca retutcs. complclc1y eve:'y nrgll111cnt tll,lt h;ls been m~ule that our GO\"('mment, ll'~$ not exteuded its effurts to l.l.!H-e the United XdtioIlS h!kc jurisdiction. I wnnt to chrol101ogic.llly fuBow your pre;;entaii '1il or what has been dOlle. You ci~e the effort.s of the C.~'~illb(ldi:U1 G oycnUIlC:lt. to1,wc tIle Unitrd XilfjPll~ cheek to e.scc!'1~1in whethrl'


not: there wrrc

un1i:.wful tnm5~~'.::,sions on their border hv' the Commu:lists, .:\.ncl the United !\atiuj~:> did tilh jurisdidion, bttl Ctlmbodi:! llll:11h' dropp~d its petition. Is th;lt correct? • " • - Ambtl$:>:ldc.r GOLDDJ::!:G. Th~t is correct, Srll;l.tor.





IS CJ:SSA'1'lOS OJ.' r.OllfHXG'l'H'}:J:EQl'lSITl! '1'0 SE'rTLF.~!EXl'?



bcen struck l)y the ull,mimous recommendation

or flU the

\\-itnc5~(,s who h.lye (Ome up on the )Inh':;fieJd nnd )f orsc l"('3olntio:15

11cri'toforc, to the' dl'c~t tl:~t we didn't bye it ch:Ulce of sC~Uriil!~ ~lction 'in the Srcllrity C('Ul~Ci1 t1ll1c!;,; therc "'ilS n cl'::sdlo;"t of the bOl!lbing first. E~lch wiluc,'::$ ::k1 t~d thi~ in the r~\:('rd. , , 1 '\'nl.S W(llHtl'l , .n~ W.l:'1.t 1 • • 11 1 1• • . Y(It:r (:'~'n ,\"1C\\"5 wei'(' '~'lL,l rc::;,1'{: to t H::; pc.mL Amb.~~:;ac1Ol' G0U)l;r::!G. "Yell, lily own "jew itl-out lh~!t. i;; th:!t at the mo!Ucnt lk:t. i:; pl'oh:,bly not the detcrmiliin~ f:lctor. It lU:1Y drc~t" ilS I ~3.id, other conn t!'i (:3) hut tIw dctc:l'lni!lll~~ f'lcl!)}' from th~ ~t;!:ldp~)i!!t of coulltri~5 tllat. could (Ib3tl"ud Security Council :lctioa 11:lS h~en t~1is concept of no c(l:npdcnce, bce:HIsc Ha"Hoi i":l)"5 no comp~teace. But, as 11wy(' 8uid, I don't tllink i~ srl'YCs their interest to pUr:;tlc th:lt,; ~nd I am gtlill~ to ntD.kc mlO:her C'fi01't. , Senr.tor J'EL! .. J1ul would it not he correct, to put it in n more efiirm~tiye W~ly, that. the d1l1llcC's or.Sttccc~s of some po:;ith-c action involving either resolution \\'ould be, better if there were :l. c:e5s~ltion of the hornl}ing? , AlUbns~":ldor GOLDnl::RG. I don't, InHlkly, know tb(~ ~n5wer to that question he-cause of the cxperi~nce that. we hr..d during the bombing pattsc. '_' , ' . Sennto!" PEJ.L. Excuse me for intt'nl.lpting1. I do not ml'~n n bombpause. I am muong thosc who arc r;1ther co;;ct'mcd !l~ the ide;). of eo pause becaus:: I c~n see the thing blo'wing up furth~r at the end ?f it.. 1 meun CCSS.,1.tlOn. Ambas~;1dor GOI,Dn:r:!~G. E\·en with respect to thilt. You re- ' membei' I s;lid HHlt at th~lt time when we were engilged in r.n indefinite 'pause, I consulted. Xo...';, the yi(ywpoinL the:1 on the pt!rt of m~ny countries was that. if this wus the situation we ought to denlop ~rh'ete diplomacy. If we Lrol..l$::ht it to the Scc1.~rity Council, there wou.d be a public expo:;ition, people would h:n-c to, t:!l:e a 'position, and i~ l';ouJi! be far b;;tt~r, th~l'efore, to explore by l)m~atc (hplo!lli!.cy the prospect of another fOrtUll, the GCll?nl coaf<:rence, Doni! so on. '. ,, So I reulh- Cilnnot honesth' ,s~n-. ' . I will S:lyWin c:ludo:'1 ill al1s;\"('r~to yOU!' remark, that I ban no doubt tha.t thnt would ~fr{:el tl.c judgment of SO:lle. But with respect to those countrics thtlt c~n ob~tl'uct the action, those with tho velo 1?o~yer, et the mO!n(:!lt I don't think it \\"ould il.f~ect their judgment.



95 .

- . Senator PEJ.1•. Ri!:.:hLJ npmoeci:ltc yom' PO:litiOll, aud 'your OmC~i'll. positioa, too. Bul, f thin.k the record should \'cry dNrly shoW" thn.t eyery witne35 'rho hilS come haoe on tllis res~lutioa h~s specifically" stated thaI, the rC301ution did not hn\e n.. ch~llcC i.mle3s there w::.s :l.. ceSsation of the bombing. . . .' Ambr..sSitdor GOJ.I)r.r.l!G. Sena.to~·, I might say this is a subject I _ am quite pr£:r~rcd to hl!k tlbol!t; we tidk iLbout- everything ill nego"' tiatiu~ t'. rC30!uticm, but I am quite dc.u: in nw 0\'.:11 mind tha.t on . tht:.b;sis· of e\:l:,o\" tr..lkI hr~\'e bd. tl~3·i5 !lot the'determining.factor for tho Soviot trnion ~lld perhnps J?l-;'1.ltCC, btit. trli~t docs not. llle~n that we ought not to try_ . . Senator }lEU.. Thttnk ..YOU• "IE'ICO~G


li'innlly, I 11<1.\0 one specific quc3tiorf on your testimo!.w in COn!lCC. tion with. the (b:~Jt re~oltlti'):l, sccti·)u (b), the 5~\me one [hilL Senn.tor ,",' 1 • ::symmglon en'e\\" om' attentIOn to. 1t says1.')t;\i there shc·uld be 1:0 miUbr,r for.:~s Or b::s~ II1:\hbia~d or SU1'I,ort!:d i:i North Or South \'i~rl::~m other tkm those undr:r thr: CO:lttu! oi the r~.sp~~ti\'C: gowrmncl!ts, :Illd !"Ill other tro.:)~).s :lllr! r.rmcd p~rs:mm:l s:lould he withdmwn or

demobilized " ..



Docs this apply to the Yic!.cong? . Gor,!HlEr-G. 1: cso By the \\"~1Y. thisi.. not, intended to be n formul::.tiva of om-so 'I'his is intended be our intcloprct~;lio!l of wht1.t th~ Gentw3. :1.cc(,::ds wou\tl rcquire, nnd ~lgain this was put·, and sp('cifJc.llly put. by mc in the form of ii, questll.)u to th~ other sidt', is there dis:lgrct'mcnt th~t this is whnt the Gem'nI. :"l.ccords rt:!quire? ' ., :. : S~nntor rl:l.L. Ih,t would t.his not, in f:ld, be dmo3t. e. prc,"cnth'c factor in anything c(nning out·? In o:ht'l' 'word::, would it. be c(luceh-." '0 " "let~l::.m W.li!?l 1 ' 1 'IS ablOJ 'm yom' VICW, tn:1.t t!lil.t P')\"lW:l or" ,':'outu l C01 lHnU!ll5t . (!I:';Clp.llh' ,.. l' o~o ,..lCtnJag {l~('!P' I' . l'me \Yl)l..l.Cl 1, OIl' , lln(.cr Wllm~IY drop its wCilpons ~nd dCl)1(,l)mi:c while those ))ortions 'which arc tllldCi' the Ky g~nrnm('nt's l"l';;iwc m:l1ut;li!l(,cl then \H'il.pOns? Am})i1,:~ador GOWll?:i:t.1 . .:\~aill, I would answer in term:; th'lt. the Chairman put it. '1'11i:; is \,"h:lL the GC!l1:nl acc(,:;:ds, iu our view, pro· vide; l!nd theN i:~ ;.1 m:1lter which on~ht ~o he disc'assE.'d in the Gcnc,'a conrerence fl.S it, W;1S discu~5ed in 195-1 nnd in 10u2, Ther~ were decisions m:1de in both 19.5·1 and 1902 al)ou{ the dis:1rmiug oI irrc[;ubr forcC3, ~md tlus obviously would be ft suhject ftpiJrOjfl-iatc for discussion in the Gcnen1- cOnfE.'l"t!IlcCS. This is not put. fOf\nllod to be any barri(,l". . SCIlfLtor PELI.. I l.mc1erslnllcio . . Ambss:;~do!' GOLllm~r:G .. As t s:lid, the language of the resolution • sub"Jcd t 0 (15CUSSIOllo t· . T"" t 1to bp a stittemcnt m . rcsponse lS filS 15 mtclI(lC{ to the statement yerY orten nude that wo don't state wh:lt we think about the GC:lC\"t\ accords. Thi:;-is what we think. We nte ready to talk about what oth~r people think ahout the Gcne,·~\ ilccorck . Senator PEt.L. Right. I think. we hnyc ffil.\de a grcftt st~p forward here today in the :135ertio'l1 of our \\"il!in~ncss, if nOC055:11'\-, to ncgoti:1te with the representatiycs of the XLF ~because that has been an inhibititig factor. . '., . Ambassador GOLnnEItG. ' ....ell, I 'think the President hIlS frequently sa.id thnt is not an insurmo:.mtable problem) nnel I was rep~ating it in that context.. . . Senator PELT•• I understrind and I thank ,on \'erv. much 'aud I think we arc \"Cry lucky iudeed to hilxe you "'as our 1mba.ssadol' to the United Xiltious, and I wish you the bC:it in your effort:"> al(\ng this line. . . . Amba;;sadQf Gor.uBERG. Thank You. Ambass:1.dl)~O




The' CHAllm... ~1 Sel.l~t~~. ~Ip9a~thr~





YU:l'X.:\>I COXfLICl' TO


11.5. W1THDI::\.W.,L OF Tl!OOl'S }'.r.O:\I Yll::TX.UI

Senator )fcC,U!THY. )[r. Amh'l$s:!dor, I hin'\) a few qUC$tiO:~5, one which mons on In)In the l·crE.'rene~ Sellittor }'cll has m.ule to Your


of the


a.ccord:;. Do 1 tmdcrstnnd tlh"l.t this i$ the

Administl'ati,)u's positiou in the rnited X.ltions, slwuld thesc other conditions prenl.i!: th::t. vou would withlmw troop:'? . , .Amhtl~S:lal.r GCLimElto. This i;; whtn the Gcncn'l ~cco!'d::: pl"(lyide .and wo s.,\id.we ,,"ouM be wilIiU':!; to \~~ them as a ba~i$ for s:ctdemcnt.

Scm1tlll' )fCCAP-IHY, Is thioi fimitcd to \\"h:1.t h.wp;;u.s in Yi£·tlUUll? . Amb:1ssnd,).. GOLD.B!.:!:G, I mn 50rry I am l\ot r'ollu\\ing :yuu, Senator )IcC.·\lmn:, The c(.IIlsid';I"i:.tiun of whether you wouId -with<.1nH\' l:i limited to wh:H wi;;ht h.1 ppcn ill YictIlflln. Doe:> this ha n~ .reference to other pi'.r!;; of SoutllNl::;t, .:\,;.l;l {'l' not? .Aluha$g:!dor GO!.nl~J::i:G ,re tl.re ;.11:;0 very iuter(;:;.tcd in (tb5('tT:1nc~ '. o{ tbe lOG:? '1cl't.1!"(ls in hlOS, "elT much so. We \\"oldd like the L~os

tlCt'onl tl) be COlI.D!i~d with. . Senator :\IcC.\i~nly. Whci"c would t41S k1Y~ us in the lii:ht. vf wh~lt the Secretary of St:\te S11id in his l'~\th~'r wen puh1ici7.~d p~'CS5 couference of Oc:tobcr 12 when he lalked :1bout the threat. of .! biilioll Chill~:;e wit!l ml~lear \,,:caI('!l$ to all Svutllt:'ust Asi:\ t'l.!ld beyond that to the. UIlIted ~t:ltC$ lt~i:lf? . ArfJ "tiC gl)ing tl) l(,~l\'t) this critic:l] :1r{';1. op~n to !l billlfl,l C'hine~(; if the oue:;thm of SOllth Yictmrm should be scaleu within the limits YOU h~ye' dcfined or not.? . • .-\moa:;~:ldor GOLl>m:nG. 1 think th~lt question ought 10 hesddresscd . to the Su-l"c:nry llf S~~~tc. ' , Senator. )Id~,\l:Tay ...\U right, I will il.s.k the S~erct~lry. Senator Per,I" 'Yhc;t? . . Sen3.to~ )lor.sE. Where? [Laughter.] IS rI':OCEEDr~G TU!WtiGIl THE U".X.


EXl::r:CI:5£ Of Fl"i'H.rrr?

.• Sen.~tol" ~IcC.\l:'fny. One other (iUe~tiO!f rel:tting to timt pre5S conference. You seem to think th:lt . I> l'ocecdin g" thi...; 1nn- tlu'ough the . 'United Xlltioas is \\'orthwhi1e, at leitst the efi'orts YOU are idkillg .about J C\'cn though it. m:ly not ("ome to \"Cry much, • ,- " Now, the Secretltry, whe:1 he held 11 press confereuce, s.liJ ~1hout .' . what YOU Ii;!xc S:lld in terms of proce$~ but then s:lid, "Oll the other hand." there :'tre some l)roblem~ about going through 1111 cxercise of futility, if thi:; i:; what It appe,lrs to be. to satisfy some critics among .our O'rJl people." _This is not p~1tlicular to the process lIe was tbi!1king about. But, .on the record, you'don't think thh; is nCl'css,lrih' an exdci5c of (utility?' . Ambl153!l.doi GOLDT:E1:0. If 1 thought it \\'.1£ an eXercise of futility, .. I would not cngt\gc in it. . ' . :.. Senator ~lcC.-\nnI'r. Yery good, Thmlkyou niry much.

, 97





Extracts :from North Vietnamese Statements on The Four Points • •• Extracts f'rom ]I;orth Vietnamese Extracts





on the

Stateraents on The

Fr~)llt I s Gene\~


100 105

Agreements. III

Extracts f'ro;n north Vietnamese Statements on the U.N.. • • • •


Extracts f'rca lIorth Viet-narlcne Statemcnts on !,!ediation Ef'forts .by oth~r Couutries • • • • •


Extracts i'ro:'J. !{orth Vie"tnaInese Statements on the Bombing Pause •.


Extracts f'ro;n NorthYietnarJ.ese Staterr:ents

on u.s.


.. .


Exceryts :Cra:!! South Vietnamese Iiatio!~al 1it(:2'ation Front -- north . Viet.na.1'!1ese :F'atherland Front.-);. Joint State~~ent of O~tober 30,19(2. 129

Report. of the" DRV GoveTl1m~nt Subr:dttea. by Phar.'l Van Dong to the DRV Hationa1 ASSC1;;.bly on Jil)ri1 8, 1965 • • • • • • • • • • •


\'1"L4 "AuthoTi2.edll St.at.e.:"lent Rejecting the 11 Hon-Aligned. !;ation Appeal • . • . • . • • • . . . .. . • • .. ,. .. .. .. ~ .. .. • . • ...


lilian Dan editorial, April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV as the Only Genuine Representative of the South Vietnamese People. • •


DRV t:~~'hite Paper" on "U.S. Aggression and. Intervention L.'1 Vietnam tt • • • • • • • • • • • .. .. • • • • •



DRV Goverriment Sta~~ent on President JOhnson 1 s July 28; 1965 Fress Conference statement • • • • • • • • • • • . • • •


Le Honne Interview "vith lio Chi Kinh, Aug;..tst 15, 1965



Quan Doi Hhan Dan Editorial of' August 20, 1965 Criticizing A.J. • t at l·!e{ v 3.' • 'r' t . .l"\v"temp·s 1.8..... I.. loon ?-ll ~ l.e nam . • • • • • • • • • • • • •


SUBJECT DRV :Embassy in l~osCOtr Issues "Correction" of Lord Brock.lay

Press Interview • • • • • • • • • •


DRV Foreign l,1inistry l·lemorandum of September


23, '1965 .

Vietnam Courier Article on .IIHorl Should t.he !-lost Correct Solution to t.he Vietna.'ll Proble;:! be Understoo:l II • • • • • • • • JOL.'lt

.Asahi-~.~ainichi Intervie~l

with Pham Van Dong

October 1}, 1965 • . • • • . • • • •

t,lai Van Bo State.'!i.ent, January 5, 196',


... . . .... ... . . ..... . .....

. .

Mai Van Bo Stat.eJl'l~nt, }i"cbrua:ry 22} 1967 ~hSl!l

160 164

Hanoi on

• . • • • • • • • .

Trinh InterviCl-l "rith Burchett • •




179 181

Van Dong Speech, 1 Sept· 1967, on 22no. Annivel'Ss.ry of the

Fou..l1djl1g of the DRV • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •







!!O~5! VI3:I~j·:;~~~~5E STAr-r:·:;~~:T"3


Tii!:: FOiJR FOr;:;7S

(Report of ?ha:~'Van Dons to N~tional Asse~bly April Tab H, pp. 1-2)

8, 1965 -

" ••• The uns'We7:vi~ policy of the DaV Go-.;ernlT.ent is to respect strictly the 1954 Geneva. a:?;ree:lents on VietI".2lil and "to implement correctly. their ba.sic provisions as er.foodied in the follm.ring. points. • • II ItT'ne. zoverment of the rev is of the vie..; tnat ,the stand e;...pounded here is thc' basis· :for the soundest poUtical settl~r.tent of the Vietnar.l problem. n "If this basis is recoGnized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settler-ent of the Vietllalll' people, and it viII be possible to consi~er the reconvenin~ of an inter~ztional conference alonz the pattcrn of the I95h Geneva. conference on Vietnam. Ii ..,'. .* . lIT'ne DRV.Goyern:r.ent declares that a:rr:i approach contra.!'"';" to the aforementioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tend.ing to secure U.N. intervention in the Vietnam 5i tuation is also inappropria.te. Such approaches are basically a.t varia.'1ce -with t.he 1954- Geneva agreements on Vietna.ll. • • \1 (V1Ul statement rejecting ~'a.b 3 1 Pl'l. 1-2)



non-aligned nation appeal -

lITo settle the Vietnam problem at present., the only correct ,·ray is to carry out the points laid do\m by DRV Premier P'nam V&'1 Dong on 8 April 1965. II 11T'ne D3VGoverriment is of the vie,., that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the sound~st :political settlement of the Vietna.il problem, I!' this basis is recognized, favorable conditions w~l1 be created for the peaceful settleraent of the Vietna.'":l problei:i and it 'Ydll be possible to consider the reconvenins of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnar.1. tt

.. "T'ne DRV Goverrc.ent declares that any approach contrary to the a.bove ... • t 0 secu~e a u.11. J.nterventJ.on J.S J.nayp7:opr~ave; any approacn .c..~er.~n3 V' b eeause suen . ap,roach es are J.'n"'h ~ e ~~evna~ sJ.uuavJ.on J.S a~so J.~a.?prOprlave} basicaJ.ly at varia.l1ce '.lith the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnc.m. lI . •











2) t~e i'o~?:-e:.d.c~ ~t::.'":. ~;·C::l t~at ~5)



DO=3 a.t

tr:~ scco::~

of ~f:a::: a.sains't the D~::~ocrat:.·~ ~e?:Ao!.ic 0: ~:iet:'''::':.l, people settle the=selves t~eir 0-1't~ affairs. • •

. . . .. . . 5+ ... a~e=.e:n


scssio:1 of



its le't the Viet-

~~t~~a~ fro~ So~t~ Viet~~~)



'. ~'-, Po 1 c!';;:. susper.slon 0.:.. U. S • .'l..' .:..~'" .....~c;'.s, l':'Y _'-', _.... 0", '.:0



lIT'ne rev Gcverr.:"ent affir;~ o~cc a,:ain t:i.at t:;,c fou:--point s~anc. ::-:ade 'li 1C"~'" , ' ...~ 01' a. pO..G.·~J.cc:..;,. ..... -, se~' ......,_e:.:en...... :puo c on 8 .i-,..91'1'1 _,;)0) lS 'tr.e on_y sour,d b asJ.s 1I of the Vietna."!1 probletl.

(l~c DRV reaction

to Canadian disclosure of rrdssion to F.a..'1oi - Tao 0, p. 1)

, ..," .. '.<. . . . . cl ... eny ~. ~..... . , h 'rne ....l'oreJ.gn ~';J.ru.s",er s~aver repca ... e vna,-c. t'.:o ne ... our conG.J.",J.ons 'lOJ.C had. previm:.sly been outlined. by t.he P-..l·i~le l·iinister of liol'th Viet:ne:;l on April 8) t.:".lten as a whole, representee. the lia."loi Boverr.::::ent t s apl'roach to a. settIel.lent ~ n 11-

(}lhan lP..n protes ~s U. K. Govel'l1r..ent IS cormivance 7 June 1965 - Tab P" .p. 4)


U. s.

"Once a.gain, vIe stress tha.t the Vietnar:J. ?roblem can be solved. only in accorclance v:i th the four points r,lentioned in the state~ent a.nd resolution of the DRV Gove!'r':ilerlt and i'Iatj.onal AsseL:loly and tne five points of the 22 l:'arch 1965 state<::.ent of the llFLSV a..l1o. on the condition that the U.S. im, l' ~ t·.i, .. · .' .~" ~ . ~ SOUi;n '" ,;-vJ.evna.'r!.l . .t. • per~a lSCS 5 op I"ne~r aggreSSJ.OIl, ;-T:l.vna.ra'\f Irora 5 .L..L.h ...0p ... eJ.r attacks aGainst the n:;.v) respect a.'1d ir.:ple:n.ent the 1951.. Geneva agreenents on Vietna.-a, a.'r1d let the Vietna.-:!ese people solve their O1m probler;.s -without a:.y forei[;l1 ir.tervention. n

("",nite Pa;,Jeru on "US aggression e>.nd intervention in Vietn'a.ra

Tab Q) p. 6)

tlT'ne uns\-iervins policy of the mv Goyern.,,;,.ent· is to strictly respect the .1954 Geneva agree.:!ents on Vietna:;-. a!'ld to correctly inpleiUcnt their basic provisions as e..ibodied in the fo110'..;1n3 points. II


11 .1." , """ ... J J..'!! '" ,,"-.,l..iO"""c,"' ., cJ.. ~na.· .!t s .L..he Tae D:\,. Govcrn!::env no_o's \'r.~1i "nc &tJovc-::!e.uv_ ..... """.. J.. ". basis for t~c .sourldest :poli tico.l sctt1cr":'en~ of the Victn221 ?roblel~1. If L'.. ... . ".L" .... ~ . . . . ·0 '11 '0'"v c,._. ...;...-" o~.l·c,..-: .:a "'' ' oh"n'" ...m.. s ...oa:as. 2.S acce:g"Vco' l .I.avorc.O.Le C~~a.l -.a r.s "\lJ.. u .L o... " .;.. peacei'u.l Gcttle:ucnt of the Vietr.e:;i :proble:r~ and it iTill be possible ~o con5ide~ the reconvening of an intcr~~tior.alconferencc of the type of I'

the 1951~ G:;;neva conference on Vietna.:a. 11 C~verr.mcnt of the Dzr..ocratic Republic of Vietnc.:.. . -:. o.ecla~cs that a!?l)2.·oach. con~ra:.ry to the a.bove sta...'1d is irre1evz.,.'1t, any a:ppro:;.ch 1eaCi1l5


eny to a. U.!·I. intervention in tne Vietnc>..!l situa.tion is also irreleva.'1t J because such C-!?pl'oa.ches a.re 'oasically a.t.. vo.:ri~"lce 'Yrith .the 195t~ Geneya, e.greer;Lcnts on Vietnar:1.. II (T'oons I~at (RcWlification) kcticle by i'!guyen Va..."1 Vinh July 1965 - Tab RJ Ill'. 1~-6) "Toe D:..1V Goverr ~lent is of the opinion that thea.oovc-:ne!'ltionec.· sta"'ld .1.5 ..,e h b asl.S . f or a correc ....... pO.Ll. . , ...... ' ...t,!le - 11·.J • 1 t,l.ca1 so1.J..· i.t.vlon 'Co "J..C Gns.mcse proD em. Only throush recoGnizing this basis ,·d.ll the pe;;,ccful settle'.1ent of the '1...1'''''''~ ~ d .1.. ' d · ..."nruT.cse pro;.) erl oe a:;: 10:'(4e Gno concu vl.ons ln 1i'm.cn :!.." c['.n ..oe cond uc'Ce Vle favorably and \-rill it be possible to think of convening an international conference of the type of ~be 195 1:- Geneva conference on Viet!'..a.ra. tt J'"

..... ..1-.





llTne four-point pros.!'a"1 a.s set forth by Premier Pila::l Va.'1 Dong and the '\1.0\-15 as set forth by the HPLSV in its 22 i>!arch ste.ter<:.ent are truly constructive and. p::-actic:;.l.lI

nIf the U.S.

i~perialists a~.!'ee to accept the above-centioned conditions

of the people' in both North ant South Vietna";lJ 'Wi th tne::l anYl'There at any rlO!:lCnt. II


,·Till readily negotiate

(D;;tV Repor-.t on Ghanaian n'.ission to }Ia,.'1oi - Tab S)

(D3.V sta~~c;:".ent on ?resident J ch."lson t s July 28 J 1965 p!'ess cOI'..ference Tab T, 1'.2) IIFor the U.S. Govcrr'..;:tent there is only one



to a."l honorable peace;


th~t is,

to co:.-rcctly ir.lplciilent the 1951~ Ge:1eva. a~ee::lcnts on Vietnz..'l end acccp·t· tee four-~oint sta.'"lc. 'of the rev C~vc:::-l".mcnt.1I t11~ore l'ccently,


8 A?ril 1965 , it r.cde clear its' f'om.'-point stand


a bc.:lis for tile sound.est poli tico.l settler..ent of the Victr.:?.~ problc:a, II

(I.e Monde interview

~rltil lio Chi i.finh - Tab U)

. uT1le U.S. Goverr.::lent rr.ust 5ive ta.n~ible proofs tha.t it accepts the fOUr-1)oint sta...'"ld of the GoverI'.r::ent of the Di3.V ,·jhich cO!lfor&lS to the essential political end. military clauses of the 1951~ Gene-va as-L'ee:aent on Victr.~.1.; it nust ir.tl!.cdiatcly stop the air attacl~s a~s.inst. D?.V terri~orY, sto:!,) fo:'th;·rith the a:;eressive \-tal' asainst the south of our country, and ldthdratl fro:.l there all U.S. troops and lFeapons. That is :peace in honorj there is 110 other 'Ylay out ~ II (G,u.c..."'l Doi


Dan 1J.itoria1 of Ji.ugust 20J


1965 _. Tab V, p. 1)


"Only "Then the U.S. Goverr.!!:lCnt-·shO"t·lS concrete ::-.anifestations of its recoznitio~ of the fo~r-point stand of the DRV Goverr~l~~t and the fivepoi:lt stand. of the I&ISV can there be a. basis for the :pea-centl. 5et.tle~ent of the '-Tar in Vietnam. 11 a-"

(nRV Er.lbassy in 1,1oscOi'l issues ltcorrectionll of Press Intervie'-T - Tab ,\-1 ) . "T'ne four-point stand. of the DIlV Govern.-ncnt as expounded. by P:emier E"la..'ll Van Do!1,3 on 8 A3>ri1 1965 is' the basis for a.ll so~des.l~ polltica.l solutions to the Vietnam question. If tllls oasis is recoenizcd" favor~ole conditions "Till be cI"ea.ted for the pee.ceful settlc"!:'.ent of the Vietna.-n proolera a.."'ld it vi11 be possible to conside;- tl1e reconvening of 8011 internationa.l conference of the t~~e of the 1954 Geneva. co~crence on Vietna:.l. II

(pna.'a Van' Don;3ts 1\ationel Day report AUGUst 31" 1955 -.Tab X, p. 6)


. 1e ...mo


I!~his fO~-'Point stand. fully COnfO~1S to the' most ir.-."Oortant "Ooli t.ica.l . of'_ ........,.,:> "'.... n .::.~ ,.-.. • _.~ 19,1' _ ::> r .... t,;ncii•e .. c;e-",,..,.'. ...::........ s on V·'.I·... l.e ",ne.:.., a.:."'d ......ne

"'"TId -.• ,. :.:.."'~" ... ,""\1' ,o ... ...... ..:.:1._:1. _ .... _ o"·~·s-to.,.., y.... ... -".;;>

' d l.S . nO"¥T O:i.. .... . ....... ....... • ..." ...ne \"le,\T '"C~a.~ "nese asree:-.cn ...s t'.us", o.e co!'rec,,_y l~ple~cntcc1.. T:'1is i'our-?oint stand Dust be soler:mly a.ccep~ed. by tlle U.S. lTO:::' ....


"oefore a politica.1 settle::e:r..t of the Vietna.."l !"I"'''d • II con .. .J·e~"'" \of .....!f_wv-



can be

(D~Y Forcicn m.nistT'J mCi:lora..'tldu.~ of Scptci"u.oer

23, 1965 -

Tab Z) p.


It'?nc f'our"point sta.'1d. of the DRV Govcrn.-r.cnt • • • is the sole basis for a scttler.i.~nt of the Vi'etnaIil proolem. kl'J 50lut.ion at varial"lcc "ith it arc inaTmrO"l):rio.te and so arc any 6ouJ.tions lI'oich seek U. H. intervention in tile Victnen situation, because such solutions are rtmd~~cntally contrary to the 1954 Geneva aGreements on Victna.,,:-..1I cOl~rcct

ltT"ne u.s. Goverr,,~ent must solerr.nly declru.'c its acceptance of this four-point sta..'l1d befm7e a political settlement of the Vietna:.l probler.1 ca.T} be considered. • • • tI

'(Joint Asahi-r·~inichi interYim·; ,dth Fna..rn Ven Dorgin llinoi in October 4, 1965 - Tao CC, pp. ,l-2-h-9-l0-il) "Premor Fnail Vall Don~ of the DRV'stated in a veT'J strong tone on that lThe present Victna..-n. J{ar ca.'l never' be settled u..."'lless the United States accepts the four conditions presente~ by o~' side. And ,dthout that, there also can be discussion. ,II




"\'le proposed four conditions for the settler.:cnt of thc present "Tar

sor.:e til:lc a[;o. T'ney askcd for respect of the Geneva asreeUlcnt of 1954 cor.cerni~~ the Vietna~ question and sousht the correct observance of the basic clauses of this agree:n~nt. He proposed at thc tir.!.c that if the U!litccl States ,\-iere to issue a statement to thc effect tha.t it accepts the fo\ll' conCi tions) we ,"Till aGree to negotiat.e at a:ny til-:le. n IIIl' the Uni·ted States \fa.."'lts negotiations, it must accept the four conditions end recognize the lWISV. u

lll-le have announced that if the United States issues 8 statement to the effect that it irill recorr.nize the four conditions" i-Te mil respond to talks. T'ae United States, hmicver, has no SUC11 intention.'! "T"ne only just 'Way to settle the ·Vietna.'"1 issue is to accept, in line vn. th tile 195}" Geneva azree::1cnt, the four conditions proposed by tile north Vietn~~ese Gov-crn.'":lcnt and the stand e>.:plained in the 'NFISV's l.~ch statement. 11 • Ullorth Vietnam 1 s four cond.itions are in cO!TI.plete accord. ·wl til every onc of the essential} political, ar~d r.~lital~ provisions in the Geneva accords of 1951.:.. Tne four CO::lCi. tions alone can be the basis to bring '8 cor~ect solution to the Vietn~~ issue. T'ce U.S. Goverp_~cnt ~~st decJnTe clearly tnat it a.ccepts the fou:, conditions. A politice.l solution can be considered. after'that. 1I




F?.O:·~ ~OR7H




(Excerpts fro~ Joint State~ent of Octobe~



30, 1962

Tab A, pp. 2, 4)

U • • •The Vietna.':l Fatherland Fro:l"t :10lds th?t the NTLSV, \·;nich ca::leinto beinz ot·ring to the gro,·f..h of t::.:. South Vietna~ese p~ople' 5 struggle and ~:hich rallies broadly the patrio~ic and anti-U.S.-Die:.l forces in .... V'l.e~na~, lS ~,e h genu~ne ".1.' ... d Sou~n represenva~J.ve o~ t'ne peop~e v~ere, ~n is one of the decisive factors for their certain victo!~ •. The Vietn~~ Fatherland Front fullY'supports the progra~ and the urgent steps advocated by tile N?LSV to realize ina.cper.dence, der.iocracy, ir.rprovelo1ent of thapeople' 5 living co:-.ditio~s, and pe.::.ce and neutrality in Sout.h Vietnan~) in an advance to~·;a1'(i tnepeaceful reunification of the father• ....' .... . and 1ana. l.ne program and urgenv si;.eps 01 t.ne l~l'~"'v ~eet.. t·ne l.nve:-esi;.S aspirations of the South Vietn~~ese people and confor~ to the p=actical _.L_~,.... a'" P"'-s"n'" .. v •••• II S Huat.J.°on l.'n <South Vl.' to: .L
















t:\!'ne It.r rn';ll"'on v;_ c~"'-~-·s~ co.... .;..~-'-r·;o.Ls 11_ • • • Sou"'h I.. \" .. ",y.. \,. ... <v;ill develop ~ore and more their valiant andindo::iitable tradition an:! unite morc ~nd more ":idel:,r 2.nd closely wi thin the NFLSV to directly oppose the U.S.Dic:.i clique.) II • • •



fro~ National Assa~oly Statcwent ?ublished July T<?b BJ pp. 1 and 2)


5, 1964 -

, " ...The U.S. Goverc~~e':it tlust put an end to its aggressive i-:ar in South Viet-:la.-;:, 'l-1ithdra~,; all its troops and l·:eapons fro;;]. there} ~.nd let the South Vietn~~ese people settle their o~m inter-:lal affairs by the~­ selves in 'accordance ,·nth the program of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietm.::-•••• II II • • • T~e Naticrral Ass~;:1bly of the D~V i~7101eha;~rtedly SUP!=-Jrts the National Front for the Lib~~ation of South Vietn~7! and fir~ly believes that the So~t~ Vietn~~ese people, ~~o a:-e closely upitad under the front's banner and are heightening their dete~ination to fight and

to loTin ••• tr

(Excer~t f~o~ T~xt of lo~: -.Tab

F, p. 2)

DRV-USSR Deleg~tions' Joint stat~~ent, FebruG7J 10,

The Soviet Unio:l fully sl!p?')r7.s the just and heroj.c st~llgg1e c.·_-o ...... - . . ·• r-"'c", a-,T ne-·'·-"' ... .;t·· ... t: .... \"..c:.VJ, ~~c.. YJ '. .~'-4.\.#.c...:.. ..... oJ "~l' ",,., 1. c·......... "J.!'~ S O~l,,:l 'e~':o ·""'l.'''' oJa ,t .. .1.· -1 Vl· e......,n....-"'e:> __ c "''''0-·1" ,t';... ;,_t,; a-'" • v .--.;-.... ..o ,.,...,.:".; '"-u .... c;.;... .. "" ~"" ... -;\.4 __....5:.1 - Th" ..... 1,-:=.",1. net o Fro:lt for the Lioe:-atio:l of Sou.th Vietn;:.! ... _II 11 • • •

~o'" l·"'o.·""-"-":,,-c~ J. #... - ; . . : " " . . . """'-::.. • • 1.;;) c.".~










(Report by Pham Van Dong to tge National Assembly Ap~i1 8,' 1965 Tab li, p • .5) In response to the ~p?eal of the l!FLSV, the South Vietna.":lase cadres; a~en, and ordina~1 o~ti~Qn$ rczrou?~d to tho north h~ve fl •••

enthusiastically voiced their readiness to return to their. native land and to fight, a~s in han~, or to do any work to contribute to the a.'1nihilation of the ener,w and to national salvation ••• If

(DRV-SOVIET CC~':lunlque issued .April 17, 1965 -' Tab I, p. 1) " ••• the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of the ~~ll and aspirations of the people of South Vietna~, its only. legitimate representat.ive •. The progra:a of the iront enjoys (the broad?) support of the mass.of the'people because it proclaims independance, de~ocracy) peace, an end to (imperialist?) inte~~ention .. t·~on ~n .....:..' .• i de~ocra.t·~c coa1·~¥~on ... • ~~d t 'ne lo~a ~ouvc V"~e~n~~ O~.. a na~~ona~, governr..ent car~ing through a policy of inde~ndence and neutrality in full coni'o~ity 1dth the Geneva agreer.:.ents of 1954; •• "

(VNA on 17-Non-aligned Nation Appeal, April 19, 1965 - Tab J, p. 1) II • • • The ~7LSV is nOH cont!'olling three-fourths of South Vietna.."il' S territor.:r and t~~o-thirds of its population. It is clea!' that at the present tL~e any sol~tion to the South Vietna..~ issue ~~thout the de~ .cisive voice of the NFLSV is i:-::.practica1 ••• 11

(t:N'nan, Dan" Editorial April '21, 1965 on the !\~V ~ Tab K, pp. 1,2) .i ••• In the ,.:or1d, the voice of the NFISV is the decisive one in thesettle:.:ent of the'Soutb Vietna:u q~estion ••• 11

..... ' A. ~"""'LSV






everybcd.y I:lust see that the

• . • . 1eac.:.ng •. .:..' .. . . V':l.e~na:;,ese . . . 1 s s't.rugg • 1 e, ~s • a ,~:!'l.~cn.:l.s ...ne ?O\::~~ peop..l.e

real force ~:::ich decides the p:-esent as ~·:ell as the future of South p ' C'no'\: ~ i . •cas . on ::-.a-r.y occaSl.ons . assert.e , d"""na", .... · t Vl.ena::i. rer.aer :..•-_3:1. the ~~V is the only legal re?resentat~ve of the South Vietna~ , .... tI topol_a ",l.on ••• 106

" ••• Just as the !2'"LSV Ce!"~tral Co:::::ittee declared. in its cO::'Wiunique of 15 April, a':ly settle:::.ent of the South Viet!'l.a.~ questio':l '\-:ill lose its practical and positive ~eaning if it is'undertaken ~:ithout the partici'Cation of the ~?1SV in a .decisive role ••• "


,4th •v... .... 0 U co ..... ':r.~~''''~ "1~ co ...... ~ .., ....... o,.,.cnt ••:.... !-i\".o._c... .... -~t t .... ••• ••••.• are entirely useless if they still refuse to 1-r.ithdra:·: fro::! SO\lth Vietna.-il -'1 t'ne1.r . ,t roops ana. a11 I" " lar:o. ' ~eans--a~li.~ ....nose 01... c:.J. Klna.s 0 f 'V<ar r.la "ene ~h ~ 11" ..... , . . ·1" ." ," '1 t"nelr ~~'1"1.~a~ •cases ~ e sa~e ~~es--~! ~ney sw~ _ QO no" Q~s~an~_e a_ fI • • • c;... "'nd



no'To+~ "'~~o""'~ -b .,_ .... ""''"'" •• .J



in South Viet"::o:.r.-., if the traitors still surrer:der the South Vietn~ese :l I s sacreQ, r~g~ws . ' .... t 0 1.naepzn " der.ce anQ• d·e~ocracy ...wO ~.e 'h US' peop_e •• 1.mperialists, and if the NFLSV-..the or.1y genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietna.':lese people--does not have its 'decisive voice. 1I

(DRV \'lhite Paper on nUn:ited states Aggression a.,d Intervention in Vietnam" Tab Q, pp. 1, 2, 4 an~ 6) ---

" ••• The NFLSV, fou~ded on 20 Decer.:.oer 1960, !:lore and more clearly proves to be the sole ge~uine representative of the people~ the mobilizer and organizer of all patriotic forces in South Vietr.~':l ••• 11

" ••• It unites, all social strata, classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious gro~ps, and patriotic personalities, irrespecthre of political tende.:cy, to fight and overthrol: the rule of '1"~s~s ar.d t"ne~r age~ws, • ,, .• dence, d e~oc~acy, ' the U•• S ~r.lper~a acn~eve 1.n~epen better living conQitions, peace, and neutrality for South Vietn~~ and eventual peaceful national reunification ••• n n ••• To date, the }:7i.SV has gained control of four-fifths of the terrlto:y and 10 willi on people; that is, t1,:o-tbirds of tbe poP'ulation in South Vietna:n. It has baco:i!e a po:.!er!'ul force ~:~ch has? decisive voice in the South Vietna.":l pl~oblem ••• (f

" ••• The United States ta1l<s about i ts de~ire to hold discussion with a vie~ to, finding a pe~cefcl solution to the South V~etr.a":l question, ~~t it re~uses to recognize the }~SV as the sole genuine representative of the south Vietn~~ ~~o~le. It is obvious ~~at the United states ~~nts' • ..... " .... fl ne~wner peace nor nago~~av~cn ••• " ••••nl ne-o .: a~"; " .... s 7.'_ .'1,"1_' S ""01.''J..:> f,l-.e ,_ " U ...W.:.. .... _v.. ... ... "-_ '~" e......:..::,.;. .....eiy _ us"'less <;; _ •• U.S. imperialists s7.:"11 y.;rsist in refusing to 't':it~d.ra't.; fro:l South ",'l1 ':"ne~ -.:. -.,..~_c:._ -1 S o~ - ....d "'ho '""'.... r ·-00"'\-.. . :'.;;J. ... ""..: -,~~ ..._'.c:.",c;:. .. ~'j l·';_~S :"". . . J'" co... " se o-~J.. V.;e........ ~ . . . c;.;._. the~r 5~te11ities) a~d to dis~a~tle all their.nilita~ bases in South Vict~aT.) if the Vie7.n~ese traitors cO':ltinue to s~~~endor to the'U.S. imperialists the SO\lth Vietna~~se people's s~cred rights to indeper.dence, 0~...... "'':'


""•• G.J.~

Cio ••,,-,,-

... ~_


- ....


and it the NFLSV--the only ge~~ine rep~esentative of the 14 reillion South Vietna.::lese people--isnot asked to say its decisiva ' say ••• If

(Exce:-pts troIn Nguyen <Van' Vi~ht s 4-part article issued 'in IlReunificationU , a Vietn~~ese language newspa?~r on July 2, 6, 9 and 1;<- Tab R; pp. 2,3 ) II • • • The United states still carrie s on \·rar in the south and. still refuses to recognize the presence of the ~rl..SV--'t-lhich controls tlost of the territory and populat.ion of the sou.th and '.Thich leads the sacred resistance of 14 tlillion people in South Vietnam. Therefore, the United states continues to be fought against by the South Vietn~~ese people, and thcre can bOa no peace ••• " o

Horeover, they have bra.zenly stated that they are deter.:lined to eli~inate the XFLSV fro~ all international co~erences, and, at """erst, ~hey can regard the NFLSV o~ly as the tail of North Vietnam ••• II 011, ••

II • • • In tne- p~'t the ;.r.1eric~ns did not . .·rant to negotiate ~Iith the CPR or to recognize the Pathet Lao. The French did not ,·rant to recognize tho Viet l·tinn a~d the Algeria:1 FL!~. But fina.lly they ,·:ere, defeated and f,orced. to negotiate ,·;ith the~. Concerning t.his point, in -·t.... '" • sr.a"Ce:;;.en~ .. . t'ne N-'-~V' . IJ..ny nego-c~a't.l.on .•.• 1. S !a':'lOUS 22 !·.a.rcn l'.:',L..:. aec1area.: l-r.tt.'-1 the U.S. ir.roerialists about the South Vietna.":lese. 'Oroblem \.;5.11 be useless if the U:S. imperialists refus3 to respect and'strictly implement •~the Geneva ' , "C._e .''1-, U.S. ::J.l._l.l:.ary • , • . •o~-ses, an;J., . . J ' -'-' • accor~, 5) ab 0il'l.sn '\·n.t.r:.a.ra~·r .rrcm South Vietnam all the soldiers, t'leapO!1S, and other ,·:ar materiel of the United States a,11d its satellites, ,if the sacred rights of the Vietna:::ese people--independence a:1d c.e.":10c:-2cy--continue to be offered to tbe U.S. 1r.lp-erialists by tha kneeling traitors, and if the NFLSV--the only . . legiti~ate °representatiye of 14 ~illion southern people--does not have a decisive voi~e. a. II. ,f!

(DRV on President Johnsonts July 28, 1965 Press Conference Tab 'i', p. 2)




(LB !~O:ill~ Inte!'""vie1-I ldth Ho Chi Hinh--¥.~noi B:-oa.ccast. in EnSlish; AU@lst 15, 1965 - 'lab U, p. 1)

- t'ne Sou~n . • V'~e~~~~ese . ••• (Q) .t'

- . .oe 1 eft. 1,,0 so1ve tneir • o~m affairs ther.lselves l·rl.t.no\!.t forei~:l intorrera:1Ce and on de:;;.oc:-atic U

?eo?~e ~us~



-(A) U • • • on .... ~e .."..... oas!.s 01 vne proc;ra:,l 01 1;.ce "~s't,.1.' lX;:< L 'i, ",ne so1e authentic representative of tne South Vietr:a:1l people ••• II .L"



(Ph~ Van Dong's Natio~a1 Day Report~ August 31, 1965 ~ Tab X, p. 1)

n I t0 "C.,e . h preSS~:lg • • . , . . -1-' •• •• • •• n response rcqu:1.re:ne.n"s or ... nc pal.r::.o1:,~c struggle, in 1960 the NFiSV c~::e into being, closely uniting all . 'strata of the people hold~ng high the banner of patriotis~, and starting the resistance t-:a:-- against U.S. kparialist aggression ••• rr The NFLSY, nOH· controlling r.!o;:'e than four-fifths of South Vietna.'Il "5 territory and oVer t~·:o- thirds of its pc?alation, is tbe . ,.., rep!"esenl"a~!.ve J. " .. ., , of' S . , V' • only genUl..le o~ t.nepeop..:.e 0_ ou'C.'l de ...na..":l. ""Ina II • • •

internatio~~l p~astige passing day. The Fro~t is nm'1






every the-reG.l waster of tbe sit.uatiO:l in It ~ust have a decisive say in the settle~ent of the

South Vietn~. South Vietnam question ••• n

(DRV _~oreign l{inistr-.1 He::lora-:;dum of Septei:-!ber 23, 1965 - Tab Z, pp: l,2,-3)

u. S. troops \orill not 't.n. thd:ra~I, but


cling on i.o Sou.th Vietna,lj the United states' aIvlays raga~ds Sout!1 Vietna::l as a separate natio:l, t!1at . 1.. 1y; is to say, it .~·;ants the parti tio~ of Vietnar.l. ,,0 ...s p~'O1 o~g;ec.•.::.nd e:J..m:~e . t'~e .·...,T lgen~l.na ' o·~ it does not recog~lze ~:~S"·' v, ...ne so_c repress.n~aJ.~ve ~~. • tOne ., V"::.et.na:::. -~..s a :.la~· t · o.!.~.<''''.!. ...·n, e -~ J.ry to peODle 0,1.ro Sout.n .. e.l.4 ..:.e.C~, :1. t S s ... ..,_...'::5 ':'0 ~ " achieve at the confers:-!ce ta.~le 1·:hat it has been unable to gain on the battlefield ••• " If • • •


The NFLSV, ins or{;anizer a-::d. leacer of the Sou.th Vietna::lese Deonlets fig!1t agai-::st t~e U.S. agg:-essors, ~as gained ~~?ath'J) support, ... ".. •• ~ :." :1~1 1 Yet and recogn::.•.• 'tJ..on I'" rein eve:- " orcac.er s~~t.::..o':1S or ... ue 1':or...~ s paop_es. the U.s. Govcr':1;.:a:"!t refuses to recog':!ize it as the sole genuine repre• peo?~e~: .. .. Sou~~ .• V'levn~~. ... . .cec_a~ea . , . .:.' - t ~. t d oes sentat-iva o~ toe 11:, oas wn~ , .. ,,",. . . . . . . . . . ... .. not r~ga:-a v~e lron~ as an ~r.~e~nccn~ pa~~y In nego~~at.l.ons. T'nl." • S If • • •



This fu::ther e:c;>oses its tal~s about r.e:otiations as a n:.ere s;·n.:-:dle. There ca~~ot be a~y nego~iatior.s.on t~~ South Vietn~~ p::oblem vdthout +i....~ .~,. s·_' . ..;.':' ", •.a ~..t 1.. 'J naVl.ng _ "s d~· .e":,,,s:,·"I1~ " s<::.~y ..... U This stand also ~:'oceeds frqr.~ the legiti~ate as,?ira-vl.ons of the peo?le in both 2orl<;;s, e.s e::;loodied in the pr'3gi>alii 6£ t.hg ...... ". 1ana....... . anc•.-c.h "l~-S\T' ., nd " l.e"tna::n r a-c.L.e:: ~ ron-v .. a t 01....... ... ne 1\';<1., . , nQ..~e1y, peC.ce, l.. nde"" t'e.V II . . . .


ence, \lni ty, and de:::ocracy .... If

-- ----- ---------------------------(DRV Hessage to the Austrian Red Cross Society, Septes:.ber 25, 1965 Tab :_.\) u ••• The cnl~ .

ger.l:.ir.e rep!"esentative of the South Vietna=.ese people is· the NFLSV. The Red Cross organizat~o~ set up by the front is the . 1y organ servl.ng . ,vne . l.n .......eres~s ' 01........ , , lvl.et.n~~se l' . " on une ~ou~n peop1 e ••• ~

(Joint Asahi-?-fainichi Inte:"vie:-t ...:ith Phare Van Dong in Hanoi, October 4, 1965 Tab C~, pp. 3, 4, 8 a~d 9) U ••• It is very.foo1is~ of tne United states not to recognize this Liberation Front ,·;hicn is the only force "Ihien has the ability to settle . . . ·,..o·o~.:."... It the Vl.·"'vV. . n-.., .. ~,,,~...

01 ....

" ••• The best ~:ay is for the United states to negotiate first 't·rl.th the Liberation ?ront. That is only r.~turc:.l, considering that the United . ac~~a_~y , l ' ll.gn~~ng "'..,. ..' .. ... . T'ne U" states l.S ~ne L" l.Oerc:.vlon :~on~.... nl~eQ• S'"~a~es should negotiate ~,rl. th the Libe!"2.tion Fro'1t of the SmIth first of all. However, it 1·;i11 be out of t::e question if it lolere to take the attitnde of negotiating i·;ith the Liberation Front as if it 't-rere conveying a favor. The ?ri~a~ and decisive party for the United states to deal'\nth.is the Liberation Front ••• tI n ••• ~S long as the Unitpd S~2.tes does not recognize the ?eo~le's Liberation Fro'it of the south, there -C2.:l'not be any negQ'tiations.:. It

" ••• Hno is fighting the United States in the .sou:'!!? It is the . , .yev, , t,..:;e .. US· , • • .I. l l.'bera...... l.on ar:r:.l. ....nc. •• sl....~. e l.S esca1 a.I.' ...1.ng t.ile vIar agal.nsv the north. Does it thin~ tl:~t it can negotiate 'Vrith the north alone and ·settle the p!"oble:r:? t

• • II



(Joint State~e~t Cctober 30~ 1962




-~ ~

pp. 1-2)

the Vietr..a.":!ese people a::;.d the GOye~:-.:.":te:r~ of the correctly the 1954 Ge:l.cva Agree."Tlents on Vietnaw ••• II II •••


consta.'1t1y i.":!ple:::ented

II • • • This is a. just struggle, \'Ihich co::fcr.:lS to the 1954 Geneva agree.":lc:lts on Vietna:":l ••• 1:

(DRV ~!atior..al Asse.':1.bly State::lent July 5, 1964 - Tab B~ pp 1-2} The took pa:-t in ccrr:n.it!:lents: l.m.• egr:l.I.t...y 01 II • • •



U. S. Goverl".-::en:C as ~·:ell as the gov~rn.-r:.cnts of the countl'ies ~-lhich the 1954 Ge:l.eva cO~1fere!:ce on Ir.dochi."la ::n.!st live up to'their respect and sovereignty, independc:lce, ll.'"lity, and territorial V·l.e,,-r;a"l, ~T ~ ~. ..c. al aHallS ~"'...." ana. re1ra111 lro::J. l.n"erlCrl.r.g 111 l.ts J..f."er::1~ ••••. ,J.

" " " ' . . . . .

II • • • \O:e da;nand that the 1954 Geneve. agree:-.ents on l..'nple:nented •••• 11

(DRV Foreign

Hiliistry Letter

Septe'lber 4, 1964



be strictly

Tab C~ pp 1-2)

The DRV Goverra-::cnt has Ii!cre T.r:.an once stated its eagerness for peace and its cO:lstant desire of respecting and co:-rect1y ~~p1a~enting the 1954 Ge:leva agree:::ants 0::1 Viet-~a.'!l •• ,II II. , •

The DRV Goverr:!':le!1t ••• ea:::-nestly requests the cochair:1en a-'1d the participants of the 1954 Ge::eva cO:1ferer..ce on Ir.dochina, in accordance i'lith point 13 of the final declaration of the cO:1fere~ce, jointly to study such r.:aast:::.'es as r~ht prove to be necessary to secure fro~ the U.S. Gover~4ent a., i~~ediate -" "" ~ . • • t... • ..... DRV .. ena.• 'to ~_ ac uS OoL prOYOca'VlO:1 a.:.~a sa ... o"age agal"!1S u T.!1e • a.."1Q.• t 0 T.~e aggressive "lar in Sout::. VietnC::,1, as xe11 as the ,-:it!1d!'a-.-:al of all t wS. troops, nilitary perso!'mel, a..~d ar:iiS fro::t South Vietna.":'l, thereby ins:n'i.'1~ respect for • 1 a":!en-ca -..... l.O:l • -, ,_9~1 ana.• corracu~ l;":lP 01.. "ne )..;. G-eneYa agree::l.cnus on V"3.e'Vn<l:'7l i-I3.'t'n a vie~l to rJaintaining and consolic:.ating peace in Indochina and southeast Asia •••• II • • •


(DRV Kote of Protest Isst:ed Febru~~

9, 1965 - Tab E, pg'2)

'l"espected a::d cor~ectly i.':!?le..7.e::tea the 2954 Geneva agree..-:enr.s on L'1clochina" "rill cer~ail"'.1v not at int1":liciatiorr•••• 11 . be cc:-:ed ~" the U.S. atte.'l:;lts II


t:\l1...e &4

V; e...\I ·~~ ... ese -<>-,....1 •• C:-... !' ..... """::'_ e -""'d c:..... ....... '-',!. e _


r,:);T ~a"e ,J.w'J Go~·e-"""'e-J.. v ....... u •• ,,) ~-,1.0 ., .. 1 •• ,'V

.,1~.,.·;:vs _.,




resolutely c.e:::~::s ttat the U.S. Goyerr:.. ~e:.t corl"~ctly, i::lple.":.e:lt the 1954 Geneva ag::-e~:'1e::.ts C:l Vietna..,,:: ~-:d stC? at once the aggressive ~'..a.r in So-.:.t!1 Vietna."l 2.'1d all acts of ,,:ar against the nitv•••• 11 u ••• It


.,:. ;.

• • • I!Tl"la -::::-:0 gove:-!:-:.e:4tS ..• regalitd end. t~a 1954 Ge:1eV2.

inter~atio:!cl. la~~i

•• • UThe t;'ro sides 1.:!:.E.-:1:L-no:!sly nv"~e t~~~ fOl" the P2..st 10 .zre2's c.:1c. more t~e U.S. GO\:"e:,!-:::.cnt has S2.0ote~6sd t~e 195!} Ge~c-\"·a a.g~es::e:!ts 0:1. Vietnam, soug~t to hir".de~ thl1 re11..'1:'::'cc.ticn of: .t:.e:,!!2.:::, z.r:.d ti.::":2ed Scut:::. Vietr:.a;t i.."lto a ne:'i'-type colorlY ar..Q a nilit~"y basa o~ the Un:i~::,ed. St~.:tes •••• II

•. . 2:The t"t-:o gove~n:-::.e:l~s fir=ly. sta:::~ -fo~-- t,:;a c.e:~!:se 2.~d i-::.ple::ter. tc.tic!l of the j..954 Ge:::.eva azree::i.e::-.ts 0:;' Indoc:::i.'1a., ~esolu.te:!..y c??ose the U.S. violc.ticns of the saiC: 2.gre~~e:::t,s; a.-'!':' C:e.-":2::!d t~c:.t ell pe.!'ticipar.ts or ~1la 1951~ Ger.eva. cOl"f'e:"e~ce res?ect c.::d co!':-e"ct:'y i!:1!)le.:::.el:t the.~.· As a cochai..-:l2.11. of the Geneva corJ.'e::-6!':ce 0:1 :!:nc.oc:1:'na, the Soviet tbion i-!:Ul d.o its best to ......:.e·"·-.:.c:::."'_.:.,' o·~~, ......... ·-·~.:.. -"0·~... .:. n", 2..~,..;. - C -, G-Y"'....... \;;"'V"c:. c:.,5."-.,..---,,,."'.!. .,;,c..- s'· w.~:'...Jv. ca;_.:'~.lv S 0" ... I-":OC~"~""'~.\.... :..~.C"•••• !I e-.··s" .... ~~ .;~4V ..








\.I •• "

5, 1965 - Tao G, pp. n.

t 'ne


The -

u. s.

~~?a~ialists t acts of egg~~essio:J. 2.:."1d ~~;a.r

":·~O·::':' ::-:"<:""l -yo ~\.4 ... -..1"'0_ ...... "_"'.;,



a·l.·s...... c~'a..,..~ u - '"'

r.-'C"o..,c-": ...'1-

~. ~,,,.. ~ 0V •• _ ..'


co::stitu~e v~oletio::s

.....-1 0,· •~o·".. - 1·iO .. ..

L"1 Viatnc:..~ a.:::-a, of '9)J, _ ..,. Geneva ~g~ee~e:1ts on of ~~te::-!!ational la~ and ~~~itestatio~s of

.:.~--.,..,"'l <:> " .... 0 ...... u ... c.,. ...:' __ y\.4..J_.L

T'I"o'ic . . . i~;o·'\ :\.00 -- o .~... _ .•••

II ..

l..t .. l e

,!. .....


first of all the

., people ••••



DO'l"::,fS ••,J

t: ••• T"l''''


1965 -


this ___""io ;:-~

.,, _ _ _ .... !:' oe:c.~.:'-"1 _""'_¥_ e .;..:.." -."-l1 1_ _ 'h~





4""l P? ,-, 2 ,.

<>-"..,', ._._ .. _ Jo~·""<'o'!'\



S""cryo~e ;OO:,·S


a lat!E!l.

c:,- -_ .... _ ~.,:.":-~ W.

7.0 _ --~,. e... c:••j

the U.S.

~ 0 ...

Geneva ag::... te.."lents •••• It II .... By ~tt.ackir:.~ t~e D~V they caYe cv::l?letely sc:.~??ed. the GC:leva. a.gree.'':le~ts cd. grossly violated i~~e::,natio:lal lc..~·! a::d cJJ. ht=c.."1 la~\s. ""'5'" ~o'"t' "."'; .... c ..... ..:~;,. ... es • ••• II ..46'-' " '0":1 • J.. _ ... v~.:.c_...




("D?V Statc.-:.c::.t

.r. !

J, pg. 1)

It is the U!l~-!e::,\~~ policy o~ the D?.V Gove::':"_':1.m:t to strictly respect Ge:leva. a.g::'ee.":ents on Vietna':!. a..~d. to correctly in?1e.7.e:1t their ba.sic provisions a.s e::~bodied i..'1 tn.e foi' md!g .. poi!;.ts: ••• U II • • •


on Sus ....~ e""s.:o"\ (DRV .. S"'a.l.e::-:l<>""':' "'.. ..Va""" •• -..

o~ ~.+·+·;:oc' C' !f.·;:O~T J. U •S• r. - - _ .•.r ..... .. -tl


o'...9o'li '

?ab N, pg. 2)

II ••0' The peace-J.·-:rd,"""'1g peoples and govc:-!".::.ents. in the ,-:orld. are fi::,:".ly de:7.a.~d.i.~g: tha.t the United States e:lCi its a.gg:-essive '-!ar' in South Vietna::l,' stop for good the save.ge bc::-~bi.'1g and strafi!ig rc::.ic.s agai'"'l,st the DR-V, and scrupulo"..!sly observe and ·cor:.ect1y i,,·!!.p~e.-::l~:lt the 1954 Geneva agl'eer.lents O!l Vietna."":l. .•• 1:

(DRV tI't"fnite Paper

Tab Q, P? 1, 6)

" ••• But the he=oic South Viet~a~ people have risen up in a~s agaL~st the aggressors for natior;.2 salvation a::,i self-liberation. Theirs is Co thoro\!g?-~y just struggle 't'!~1ich fully coni'or::ls to the 1954 Geneva a8re~ents and to international la. .: •••• II has a).;.ra.ys .... u_ • . held that the co.-. ·_~ec~_ ....~~~~~~e-':'a~~on of the 1954 G~eva a.gre~,,:ents on Vietr.a~ is the correct \-:ay of settling the South Vietnarl p:.oble.~ •••• 11 liThe

D~V Gover~'"lent


(Thong Kat p.rticle July 1965 - Tab R, pg •. 2)


(~1!a.'J. Doi Hha."l Dan Editorial J,.ugu.s~ 20, 1965 - Ta~ V, pg. 1)

(Joint co:,;:u!'"lique .. 'SeZJ:'e.:1oe~ 16) 1965 - T~b YJ pg 1)

" ••• The DRV Gova!'~1:~e'!:t has on re?eatec! occa.sio:!s decl~ed that ""!lte:-nation~l jy speaki!lg tee co::;sid.a~atio~ of t11e .U.8. Go,"arr~~ent t s l';a.~ acts . agai."lst the DRV and the U.S. l'rar of aggression in So't!th Vie7,na."'l falls ~Ii:'h;:l } c,.,"'...... ... oe.;.e o!1"'t".L.zc":""'~n"'·s ";",,\·':""he 'C~1 G"''''le r~ cO""'''e'''e''''ce on T-...t~c·n';T\"3 '. t }.e . '" .... ".. ce o~ ~ ':''''e II... • ....... .1.. .1..,;'_ '" ..... 1.0.. -.1..,4 "C.. ..~Q. ;..:.....~ and not of the,United i~ations. .tJ...~.:y U.N. r~soli!:'io:l ;n furthere."1ce of the above U.S. scha:te~'!ill be null ar.d void a."1d ,,:-:ill co~pletely c!iscredit t~e United lrcr;;io:;,s •••• I: •



.......... ,

:rThis sta:."1d proceeds fro:J. the ::ur.de::.entaJ_ principles of the 1954 Geneva agree."':'le:!:'s, . . :~ac!l raccg:lize the na-"vio:lal rig:rts of the Vietna."!!.ese ...... .. peop1e -- l:la.epenQe~(;eJ So";te~0:1gm.y) tt."l:l. ..y, ana ~e!,~J.~orJ.~ L"l""egr:l~Y and iro::! the essc:.:;:tial ::1; litary cla.1!scs of the said a.~a€::lents. t; -J.,






lI'i'he 1954 Ge:lGva agree.":!ents a=e an international legal c.ocU::lent ,·:hich all participa..'1ts !:lust respect and correctly :i~ple:1ent. At the 1954 Geneva co~er~nce the U.S. Gove~r~e~t, th!'oug~ its delegate, recognized ~~d pledged respect for the~. Yet th~oug;out the past 11 years it has syste~atically violated the.a a.."'ld had thus brought about Co serious situatic:t L"1 Vietr.Gr.l •••• II

(Vietr.a.':l Courie~ :,-=,ticle - Ta;, BE, ~p. 1-2) I: •••fha Ol"'y ~:ay out ~o!' the !.i.S. :i-.:ps::-ialists ~s to put an er:d to thei~ a,ggl"'essJ.ve ~;a:r, ",0 ~·~~.:vt:c.ra. . ;· u.!. ..~s~ ..roo:?s c.r:"" 't>:eap~:ls as ":e__ as "t;::ose 0: .a,. " ••• .,,_... ....... d ",ne2r sa.. e~_J... es, .. 0 respec.. ~~e :l.r.a.~?s~Qe:lce, sove~e~gn..y, ur.~..y, 2..'1 ter:-itorial i.'1teg~:'ty of ou:!' country as sti'Oulated i.."l the 1954 Ge:teva ..




~"""";' 'II"

3 C're~- "",.I. S


e. ....c •• v





" . ,

. . . . .

. , .



S~~TR:\C?S F~~O:::



S7;s.. T~~::;:::?S C?r


TiE ij. !:.


(D?.V St~te:-.e~t Eejecting 17 Eatim: Ap?~e.l - Tab J, pg. 2) It • • •



s":'-~d vc;:.... ...

in the

D~V Govc~::::.e;:.t t:ecl<:.~es

_~'Y\-'-U~OU··:'I0';~':"Q· •• c.~__ _ -_ ....... vc;:J

t ....••c-v ~.:.

~c. ••..~r

a. . .;.o· . roac:' co::t~.::.r..v to the a"::love sec-..:.re h c,:::J~i_ eo ., .... 0:\"""'....0........ A'!" ..... ~··'"'~c·:1,.,.S """e is _ _"""_ ., ... ~.:...=. j ·o.",,!:o,s"' """_'""'"' c;; snc _..... \,.Ie:. • c the 195!;. Ge::eva 2.g~aa"':le~'ts. on Vietna.":l ••• \I

--r.~" c;.:. ..,J

Vietn~~ sit~atio~




Tab Q, Pg. 6) Re:::riblic of Vi€:~n~"l declares that any e~p~o~c~ cor.~r~y to tha a~ova' st~~d is irrelev~~tJ ~~y ap?~oac~ le~ding to aU.:!. i::te~ve:1.:'i0n i""'l :'::e V:'et:12."l s.ituation is a.lso ir::-eleva.!:-t" becat:.se s~c~ a??~o~cr.es are basicil1y 2.~ v~iar.ce with t~e 1954 Geneva agrea~e::ts 0"" Vietna.";l •••• 1: . I: ....

The Goverr-::-::e:1.t of t::'e


'" " ... .. P.... _ C.:. _ _ 0'" -s.:de".:. ·;o'.~."".·.s~"",.·.rs .r,,'·y 2~. '190'5 Pr(.>s~ Co,,",__·7'e!'e-.·.c,'" ~+·a:-·",·-..·~yo,·7. (S';"a:':''''--''''':' Tab T - pg. 2) ,~c.~"


"'11... •••• u.. ... r.0 • e·... e .;5






o.£.1... :"';"'.0'" 1.. ..... .',c.', ....•,07. e.. -.-...... 7·'."' _ .. e ~_'''''so''''-_ y _ ..... - +.0 _ e-:: "'-y v




•• _

TT.!. · u ••.T..•

i.."l Vietna.':l •••• II

?ab Z, 1; •••

The U.S. au't::orities


by eve-:y !:ea::s



U:1ite.:l te:-::.s •••• II

U.:\:. ~esolt!:,ion .;-! :'-.:.:-the:-a.::ca of t!-!e above U.S. sc~c.-:te 1,,1.1J be ::cl.l a."'lc, void a:"..:i ~·::':l cc:::?le~.;ly eisc::-.;~:'~ ~.-.e Cni'teC r~at.io!'!.s •••• II I: ••• J.::'!y


I: ••• ",_i·....... v~ .:.. -"C'~VI ....... _'"i .......t.1J '-_ -;:''''''' __


..... -~


0--' _

~.r..·e __

••• -~ - .... ~ C".,,.......-~ ............. -...: .::c::._;,••~.. W-, ....:' ... W.:..l c;..:._.....


O'.r~l~ ~:;e ·~~1"o~ld.

so a::."e ar;.y. so1·" u~~o!:s

i:-.. £.?:)::.~o?:"'ic.:~e

,.. " ~"::!!.cn

i::. the


beca~se suc~ solu~io~s a~a


Vi..;.~nc:."ll. II



V~etna~ s.itl:r:.t:.o::., Ge~ava ~~~a~~e~~S


E}:Tl':. CTS ??. C:·: !~:~.::7H t!I?:~:~~~~~~S:;; .§:::;:~*·~~S C~i 1~3DI;.:~·:C:~ ~?FC::~tS


:~:::~:! C~:;:~::-t:I~S

(i':!1a.."'l Dan ?:'otes·ts U. I. ! s Co:--.ni:vz'::1ce ~·:it~ U. S. June _ 0 .....

':"l-.=. t",~....


T-":': -..,



G' v ....,,-... ----.:.IS , c ___ '.C•• "

2::.d the


'"'..~... --~, .:-_ \oJ.-,"'.::Ie:..-


'::0-" ':'i·-!> --0 , oJ ....... V-':~.... c..,5

t~e ~·f"ar

....... 1965



a;?rov~n& ~d SU?~o~t~~s t~a vic~£~s



::a ca."'! b-at


'"'. _Go..,



'P _-.;


in 'i'ier,:1Ol ••• It


~~grezso~s a~~ ~~:~~~~~~.t~a~

-9'I .0'" " 7, _


e~\!o::..::-a.ge .t~e


Tab V pg • s·~a.."'!c.

to cz::'=-y


to oppcse

stC) tha~ ~~~~a5~~o~ ~~d .~it~out

asg~cssio~ ~~ t~ai~ str~J~le


c..E[;:-'assc:"'s to co::t;i::u.e t;:cir


(Joi.."'lt .~.sehi-!~:c~""lic~~

pp. 2,'3,' 9) dOes

";:a.=' • ••.•








7:~o:l.t 0:"



:..:::.~ -'::':;'..;! i':'~c:-;


cO:::'::'io!:.tio!!s to

is Se·::~..:..e:~3)

so:::~~ .••• u


:i • ...

This tir.:e, in the tao;; of the

::o"t;.~ting ~o....e::en~ ~o~ an end -... ·0 .:.}.~ .... - ... "'~ s':'_--";Y1·· 1."•• _. ~..,.,;..,; U\J..I.U_ ••s c..r.~'W. ..,. ~.:. --!3

:-o_v for~·;ard




to by a cessa:tior: of thei!' a6ants by the ?;3o?le a!'lc ..

u ....T~e


atta{;:~s ag~inst,

lib.e!'at::o~ a~_1;y


as to state

It has gO!le. so raspcr~c.ed


the U.S. c.~g::esso~s in South Vietna.--: ••• n

DRY c:o~,.ar~~e~t :-.esolu~ely e:.:~ses t~e U.S. GOllern;.':la:-.t': 5 t:'''ic!{ in tne so-calla':: Sl:s;::e:lsic:l of ~:.~ :-tics ~gcinst ~·!crth Viet:l~.l e.s a deceitfu2. :::2.~ei!ver cesi6::e~ to· pa...·a the t·:ay for ne:·: U.S. acts~:a!" .. The 'C~.., ... .,. iO'l:, ... .... ;:., ~ -.e.v-:>'~-=.... ~ w<;7"v,-:,-·.!'o-~-':'s ;_40. ... +"-=> "'-e fi....,...i,,. _. .. _":''-"v-_ i:J.... • _1i;if..., -c.i..'_ ...· """'" .....:.""" •• ..., ..,.,.¥ t-:o . ....--'d c:.. - •."-J d-'''-;-~c;::.'.-.........


•l"I..... . .:. .... '" r,~a.t, "'~.¥

:' _••6


T-'" -tn So·,\.to ....... V';",,:,,_-,,, ... 0 .... ""'..., • .~c:....4 ",1& - v w.;c:.., •• ~ "' .., ,.:.. ..... ~..:"'I'" r c:..... ....;a·s a....... -i"'lC'¥ .:one D~.;.·lT, ...c:.,....: ;::; ,,"c:._ t".. V ......

..... ... .:.."'e-.'! ';':"s :> .:..\.10.:..., ..... u.-"

-·n··~ li •.:.. \I:e~



~-"-=>C's';v::> -::..;,~~ if "'"



':.,-~"o';~" - .... ~ 'f'or 7.0"'d ~'.I"\."'.\Oi 5_:'V·c:.~~e _ .....;5. o:;. ••\..: 1 _ ..."ve:. Q.W-c: ... -,.,..··"lo~,·s'y 0'0 :.~""" ~.~.~ c ........ ~ .. QCl."I.y ~-.,...-l..;-:> ;:. ,:,n..:. -e!'~-::.~e..,.. ... ~ s . . . !- .. ""'" c:.;.,- v ........ :1 \';... '...........," -"".w '9::: _ J-r• G.3'";,,'!r~ ......l.""" ....... s v,," L;.:,~. """" _ ··...•.<:.:.'n..""J.·'ne D·:'~T ..--·~_·;~·l. ~'f'l"': -~.... ""~-.:. ~~ v' ~l.ei:, ."\v ~o·~ ... ,c:;. __ .•"' .• v ____ ~.::; 0""0"" •• '"' a'=-'~-=n 0-.... ........ ...,a.:.I.- .:..l\,.. 1".-... _i'o"~ ... _-:''''_ .... 0,.. ..... ~.,,'.; C sta:ld :lade r' ... ,,-- O~ 8 ~?~il 1965 is ~~e o~ly sou~d basis tor a polit;cal _








_ ' ••


sattle::er.t of tne

Vietn~"".l p~oble:a. Sf

Dan Protests U.K. Gove~~e~t's ?, 1965 -./fab P, p. 3)

the United stat.es,


:' ••• In r:id-:':ay, ~;-:fle ·t~a ;; .s. l~:;:.c.ing cil"cles boasted ~~o;!:·.:, a p~i.:.sa

- .:"" ...... =-



... v•• ~

-.;--...... ....... : ....•• :;y ~ ...._.t..' ,.... ..-.!.~ .. ".;e...... --· <=. __ .::>v. :,'·es -:-A "'•• '1_ ... ) c:.t:.-:.~



.:.~o v •• ~

t! v ••

-i-·.i~"" .........3r.;_a._~ .. 1.:s...v S

r~;A ~"'\04

".~.;. ••v ....


~aase·ss~ding airc~a~ t~ ~~~~:~cita~ ~~d strike NCTth Viet~~~ 2~d r~~i~g .,...,o ... ~, . ... "'00 ..... - c.o........... ....... ~ ,·-::.!:', ·.. s .:_......+ ~ ...... :.:.. "'.:.1"'I'!:I"" i-..~ ... sa _-r::-c.:. ... s. ~ ~ . . . ~_.:. ... "S ••; .. .=. '"' 'tJ~ • . \#_ :'i;) ."",_•..... .Jt.J... v 0 ...,,,,_ ..... '/~ _v •• _ ' . .'"'.1. _ _ . . . _"'" '-


~o ~~~ersta~d t~at in~e~sific~t~o~ ~r.~ e~?~~s~on the~agg~assive·~~r in ~'';e':'---",,\';~~·o"'!l~,:,.. . , . . ....... .:,..~r o~ .:.~~;; ~ .:--~yt:-.,-is ... s '\s .:.-"o~ ~~" ~... ...•• c...• ... .::. ".~.;; c;;.o;._... ::''''~ .. vj . .I. ....v ...... .;.. _.~_J¥ .:.c..... _ u . :. • .:...,~ I.-u,"" c:.. o"'"""~-:·s -"'0'·":" --~o.:. ..·-.:.~o·-s -.,.~ ~~~e ~~-,.1' .J..Jt<III ·o'... s· G...:.. . . ~"""'·d -.:. .... wGv C-..J.-..., hC;;o ",,_c:.v_ ".. ~ ••~ c--se C";c::. - __ • , t,,"":::'J -"'e -=-_ '0'''· _v"' ... ..._.'" ••;t= c:.v


c:,"e.s.ti~E i'~vore.b~e. oc~:iitic::s

fc::, ;.::e ca::-:-,rins




1401ioy. 11


(Joi~~-: ",I1.s·~':i-:·:~ir!ic~i


Teb CC, p;? It, 7) C;


.....I'T'"n_:::. at one ti!;:tS but that


onlv "

n~o~~g~~cizad tt~t it h~d sus?encad c..2.~TS • . Eo~:~v;::", :·:a l·re::"a r:o~ able


'1 !:,:) U S "0'''''''''' •


. (D~V Stater.-.ent July 5, 1964 - ?ab B, Pl'. ·1-2) t: •

r.r"t:"h ..."'e-~"'a' to !\ '!:!o........:.:., ... :\- +!'e ......."'oJ", . r. ....._·b'_;S7.S 'n"v~ ..;-..."w.. .:>"'s~. 6~"" v., . 1:; , _ e· """"", ..... . US • • ..... _ _ co. . " ..... ....

• ......

fied t~eir provoca~ive ar.d sabotcge activities their ~·:Gr to the north .•.. I:

~~ th~eate~ed

to e:<tend

• ,. • ... , y 01...:.l.. .. -'-'" .....1. h U• S• . • •• t'ne ,,+i.,a"l.Ona... 1-.sse.'?.:l .., ••e D.'?''.f • reso.Lu ... e.LY c.a::ar:c.s ~;'l~~ "e Gove!':-~:!c;).t stop at once all its provocative c:.d sabot~e activities against I'




(DRV Foreign XinistrJ Letter Septe~ber

4, 1964

Tab C, pg. 1)

U • • • Since ih .. tL;....·rarrantec. attack a.gd. . .~st the D:?V 0:1 5 August 1961;, the U.S. Goverr~7le:r~ ha.s increased its w.i;U. tary build-up 1.."1. South Viet:1a."':l • •••• /I and sout 'neasv. A.sl.a

-.- .-.-..-.--_._"-

• .outJ.·· carryl.:lg ... nl.S

1 arge-sca1 e novc":.en-'-.:-' ... 0.:. 'troops, .' ... ne US •• authorities have openly ~~~o~ced the possibility that wider action against IIT"il ~"in e




V·l.e"na:n . , !:Ugn" oeco::te neceSS<lry •••• II l'

(Ifua.."l Da., FAiitorial, Dece.":loer 19, 1961;. - Tab D) II ••• l ..'hile be1..'1g 1l."lable to idn in South Vietna.":l., they even threaten to · , . ,open:mg . a.t 1:;aCK t'ne ~T'" i-..orl.lh , vnus a ne~'; t'lar •••• 1/

(DRV!-Tote of Protest February 9, 1965"- Tab E.1 pg. 1)

The 7 a.."ld 8 Februa!'y 1965 air attac!< is a !le~'l, extre.-::.elY serio'J.s ""e ......... e.:.II.. ~.:. cu. -~ ..... ~r .:. .... e r< .. _'" ;-'-e\,.(.4 S':'"'c;:.v,",,,, -.:. <>-a. ..... ...... S.:.v ';'}.e D~lf ... os .II. . ·o ....~ ~.,zen ~":J ........ ...:; u... v ... ""6 v.. •• ~ , a· ,_ • ·vio1ation of international 1a...: a~d the 1954 GC:lCVa. agree.-:'.ents on Vietna..":l., and .a."l intolerable challenge to the i-TOrIe. I s ·peoples •••• II II •••

·"c';' ~"

0.;0 - '.-""" .,~


(DRV-tJSSR Joi."lt State.-:'.e::t Febr~ar-.f 10, 1965 - Tab F, pg. 2) lI'i'he t'IO 6-'",,,,--':''; co-c.'<>-:n ....... !>!:'- .... ess.:ve "'c+·s on .. .. 0-ove""--e-""s .. ,_..... " ..... ,;. ct: ... - c-i'y c:..:..... ....... ..... e ~uo'" .l.. ~ 196~ of the United Sta.tes~ especially the barba.ro~s attac~s by the v

5 August

u.s. 121


U.S. Air Fo::"ce on the territory of the D:tV 0:1 7 and S FebruarY'of this year. 1."'1 t!'le eec:.s or Do~ Eoi and Vi.'"'l!l Li.~~. ?hey regard these acts e.s cc:r.p1et;ely i."1co~sistc~t ,;;i~h i:'lter:1a.tionu la. .r ar.d the 1951;.' Geneva l~g~ee.":lci!'lts .•••• 11 ~----------------------------

Tab G"pp. 1-2) 1: ••• F.or over 10 years no~:, the U.S. :L-nperialists have,·;aged an c:zgressive 't;ar in South Vietn~";l i.."!. a."l atte.":l"Jt to t~!1 that zone into a U.S. ne~·:-ty?e co1o:-~ ar.d military ba.se a."1d to p~"olong the partition our cot:.&"ltry •••• II .


S'l ' n

-- - ~ '7.0 a.'1 a:"l.Ie.~':)., ~

1ves .:.rO::l 4'':'" .I."'e U•S• "••, e 1..... • {""""-sse -".....co. ,,""

, . • "t~1e::";sa . \. e:.wrl.ca~e

i:-..periaLists e.re feveris:uy i!'ltensifyi.-:Z and stepping up the .aggressive ~rar. in Soi!th ViatnC!.":l ••• the '\'rar is bei."lg ~C'~"ied to the north ,·:ith repeated air and naval attaczs being braze~y laur.ched on ~~ places, of the territor,y of the DRV •••• " '. ' 1I0t late, the U. S • imperialists have put foro'lard misleadi."lg td'.( ~b~ut of the ~lcrld are i\111v., a\·;are of their peace erA ne6o~iatio~~ The 'Oeoules ..


aggressive and ,...a.rl ;ke nature. To step U~) aggression in South Vietna.":l 2..rtd to bO:lb the north are part o~ their' policy of special 'Yrari:a:-e.. By such a.cts, they also aiil at bringing a:)~u~ an.adva."ltageous position so 'as to be' able, in case of necessity, to negotiate fro~ a position ot stre~~th. This policy is w:ro:'.g and' C2.r..l'lOt be carried out. _, •• II "

(Ph&'l Va!) DO:1g t s Report to DRV I~ational Asse.':lbly April S" 11

.t. ' .... . ., . . . . ;. are ,00 • '1"2gne • d "to . ••• rlocay, "ne US' •• ~per~aLl.~~S


1965 - Tab H, pp.2,),5)


t 0 ...vue " G-eneva·

agree:nents 0:1 Vietna.'"ll. but "lith t,ne ai:7L C?f distort.ing the 1?asic prL"'lciples .of the agl'ee::ients' i.'1 order to perpetuate o~ COU11try1 s division and to consider the north and the south as t\'to e."ltirely dirfe~ent nations.'•• ",It -' 'P ..... vo:'!.~son .... ',. P t',,,: ' • •• I n On; ...s spec:::c!'l, _resJ..cenl.l spo~e 0... peace, ne e~· 0 ...P ...v!le lIar, 2..""ld uncpnditional nego';,ic:.tio:1s,hoxever, the U.S. goverr;;"':'.e:'lt is no..., .. ....,:., . . 5ot.!.!h ~r' ... ' d'l..."'~ .I.' :u:\.ens~l~TJ.r.g "ne .agzressJ.ve ';Fa:.":ul 'Il.e"na.-n. a.."'ld eM-en "ne ';tar '.:co Morth Vietna~; ~1d accord~"1Z to Gene~il Taylor1s state~ent~-~here will be ';!"I';· .Lo ':'~e "'-·";-5'"u "Yo ...J·~ .... "" •••• 1/ no 1 ~ .... "''' v.. a:7-"'ess;o>'\ 00," ..- •• co.5c:.-..~ 1~ .. \I~. l!.:e.:. v. ,,~.a;., II


By er.gaging :"''1 this hig~'Y c.a!'lge:rou.s nUit2!'Y' adventure; they stupidly ~o?e'to cow cur people and also int~~~date peace~lov~~gover:-~e~ts :'l ... ' peoples' 0-£ the a:lQ peGP_-cS ::..1'1 "t:le' \·ro::,,_c.. lney nope 0.1.... t.tla... our peop1e a."ld. tne ..••··0.... ....1·:;;1 ...... ou..." ' .o~ -","; .:.II...... ..... "s ':''he,~r -tn'a 'OoSl",l.On ',:." t 0 S.ll.l" t.,',:t... • '0· ___ __. . - C ., . . . ..&'e-'" . c;,., ~.\,4 "'.. fJ ',"'-il" ,'f J. b e.... tro:n a "':e~ to a strong position 1tt . . . ,. II •••


.. 'II



7..' . ; ...


.. -."



..... + CC·L··-·' ...., "cue ( (iTO".......... • ....... ... ~

f.. . . . . . . . . _~1 1?,·,.1C)6!\ - MJ.~""" I, pg. 1) -

, . , _....

the United States is still ke':::Ji:1g a coilrse fo:" the eAter-sion ." . . . t'fie pec?~e . . .o~. ~o~vn ~ ,:.' l".levna~ ,:. of t.e o~ a~gress~on aga~~sv ana• d ce s no·u h act.s seek to ej~lore ~ye~ues leadi~ to apea~e=ul solution of the Vietn~~se proble::. 11 II • • •

lilt is sig:1ii'icant that the state..;-;,ent by the U.S. Preside~t on a so- . called ?(;~ce:ul se~tle;::e:;t hC!s been !:ace at atL::e ;·;hen fu.rther bC::loir:,;::s of D .• , -s. • ... i" tt' . • ~ne verr~vo~y oJ. ~ne ! e::loc~a-:.:tc .itepuo..!.:!..c Ol ne' na.":1 a:::-e . a,{:!.ng ; .....ace, ,·rnen .:.~ ,.~':'1-,0r ""'o,,~':e"""'s 0::0 .'-", ...,';1';':' y "",';"'5 ., ... ~ "'e-c;.;J. -ons ·0 u .. e ro c c.:.re J.";, ........ .:1 • ",".: ... v ... r_ ••\;;... ... -i_ c~ ........ _ .... v v South Vietna~ to sten aRaL~st·the .. uo the bloodv.. a~~:::-ession -.oeoDle .. of South Vietna.'":l e:lC these aggressive actio:ls cO~ltir.ue •••• II ~






::l ..... "G.J,



Cio• •U





State~e~t Rejecting


Katio~ Appec1

Tab J, pg. 1)

To seothe a~d. I:'~islead. puhlic opinion, on 7 Ap:-il 1965, u.S. s""'o'.,--e o.:'t lJe~c!!'. -""'d ..1.". ;:~d~n~Y'l4e~~e ;n SouJ..h ..I..,'" \;; c._. "';ov ....... __ ". Vie.l.r.""" _'" .<;:. •• , of unconditional nesotiatiol:s tm';al'd a political. solu.tio~ to the ~';ar i.71 South Vietn~~. He even p~o~ised to set aside 1 billion colla~s to' develop the econo~yand raise the living s~ar:dard of the peoples in southeast Asian countries. 3ut in.this ve~y sPeech, Jo~nson decla~ed that the. United States '-rill not ~·!it!:dra:;·l fro:r.. South Vietna."il and "lill intensify its air. raids against Rorth Vietna.::. II • • •

';c·e""':' T:\n'v':C:l ..,rO~"IY\50"" . ...,,j......... ..... ., Pres _ ~."



---------,------------------(r!ha'"l Dan Attac~-( on President Jo;-,.nson t S ;·ray 13.) 1965 Speech - Tao


" ••• ~ce again Johnson cia.~o:-ed that the United States is ready for unconditional discussions. B~t he coul~ not hide his sinister design, ,·:hich is disclosed i.'"l his ot·;n s,?eech. Be!.'ore SP02..1.:ir.g of uncondit,ior~al discussions, Johnso::. decla:-ed i:,:lat tb~ Unitec' States ,·rill not abandon. ~"'s co"·.".;.:.¥'e....,.:. ':'0 -;':'5 ho,",c}.--",> i - Sa-;r.o'" -C,' .. ...... -.:, .; ,..',.., .,.,....:.er s 1:' ....e-'·~ ....6,. of '''n-I" ".;,_v.,••• v", _v .......... _.c •• _.1 -6 '0' Cl... ••...,-, ........ v .::.''' ...... .... co~ditio~a1 disc~ssio~s) he th:-eatenec that if North Viet~a~ refuses to ·· on foj. ' S t · · . ., , C!'_l.y' ., nean c'2 • ..:nc.ge t 0 "T • h V" . nego t J..ar.e • ems, i:,n:LS \.iJ.....,..._ ,·.ori:,. J..evna.'1l; ••• \I II • • •

As' rege.:-ds ~Zo~th Vietna;:l., the U. S. ~-:l?erialists have u..·lceasingly

W;."f·e"' -r_-ierl_ +'h~':r 'n· It ....... ~ •• s_'; _ "._1,.;. •...ra'"_ 0-.:..... _":es:':'~· ,,_ .... '",.:..; " v_o•.••••


II .... ~'!le" u..

This is

-c--e~eo-4.Jv _ 0


~'"l ~de~iable

.., '0':'" O·ov_';o~~s-:.'Y _ .... ..1.0

fact. s"':""o"e "'_h - •••• II

., _ .... =~......

esc c:.-c;. ... - ••~cr ft





... . ; ....



':'~e 1"..

l........ .

'...'.... ., .... _". ._. c:.- c'",;"'O'e""o"s -" . . . "'or """0' ;.,. are • • ...


" ..

~~e so-c~_e~ unco~aJ..~J..on~ c.J..scusSJ..o~s



pp. ~-2)

1905 - Tab

(D1V Stata:::e!".t

....:.+·.;S :: . . . 6 ....."':-_1'. en_ ~"."'.a.-i-. "" "'... +·0 '" .... ..,-.;: _ - 0.". 7 .f:••....... v i1 1965 U.S. P:'Gside:;t Joh::sc:'l had to spe&.'.c .of ul'lco::ditio!1,u discuss:'o!:s a!~d .. , .. , .. ~., i--· ~ , p •..:. ... -:.:..~.:,., 0""'''' "'01"'.;.. ~ ... .:-... ~~ neace;.1.L!. se7,~... 6::e:!r, 0: ~:!a JJ..e~~e_~. uroo__ e.'":'t ......~Uv ,iJ""'h~.. '"..c; ...... " •• c:..'Vv_ """'0 • ,:. 'these hv-vocr::..r.1.caJ.. :. :or.::.s) a:lot.:1sr 10, \.i"" , U. S. "roops :leoVe oeen sen" 1.10 II


-. US'" •••. orne • • ~r.:.. c";.- .,'_5 r.O.:. • ........•~.: .....•.:.i- .-."'........ "..,




.. •













South Viet!'l~~, t~us orl.!'ls~g r.~e st.re~;vh 01 .v. t.roops ~ne:,e ,,0 ne~~y 50 000. u.s. a.i~ re.ids against ,~·:orth Vietnc.~ have i."1creased !ou:,lould. a.s co.~parec. ';:ith t~e pe::icd fro::'. 5 August 196!;. to 7 April 1965 ... ~\I .'t.:..


cessation of the South Viet::la":!esa people r s jl!st struggle .• V' ... t~e e:::di=:,g' of the U.S. bO::lbi."'lg ~'1d stra.i'i.~g of ho::-~n 2e ... na."':l~ .nas ., - ••. .. .J ' US • • G-ova:-,:.:.-r.e::-r, c_ca::-1y revea!.eCl l:~S SC3e:::e (,0 prep~e £0:' an t !1e intel:Sii'icatio::l a~d expansio!1 .of the l';a1' against the DRV •••• II

':By mcldng a conditio!'l fo!'



I:The DRV Goverr!."J.e:!.t resol1.!tely e:-:r..cses t!1e U.S. Govern,:en~rs trick i11. . ~. .,...... 'T .L" V· . ..L ~ul the SO-CaL"11eel. suspensJ.on 01 aJ.r ra~o.s a~a::L.'1s-r, l\or . . n :..e"C.r~'":l as a \4ece::..,r" ma."'leuYcr desig:.ed to pave the ..lay fo:, ne"r U.S. acts of i'rar •••• 11 .:2,'

(Nhan Da!1 Protests U.K's CO~~'1ivance ~dth the U.S. J~'1e 7) 1965

Tab P,pg. 2)

II •• ·.Bei."lg bitterly defeated in Sout!1 Vietna.:l and st:'onglyprotestec! and conde.:i'~'1ed by the '1:orId peoples ~ the U. s. i.'?periil.i~ts are madly stepping . . . "Cine . ,-[ar ~ . . by so c.'o';"'l.~ +·0 oaef'". out ·O.L~ +.'ne';';'· •••• 11 up anQ• e:;,.:panQ~ng no:nng .•.u~., _. ...... ,,1"".I:''''sse ~ ~<;;,

Tab Q, :9p.2-5) It •• '. In a.Tl atte:::.pt to find a '1~ay ou't of this crll.:~bli.~ positionJ the United States plots to extend.. the '.-lax b.eyond South Viatna:n t s borders.

"Since early 1961;. the U.S. rulir.g circles ~Tl ~la.shi."lgton have envisaged "';"e .,<:>,.. "ro....... •n Vi e...w.n-........... .. II "'... ...-.. ... ..., 0 1"..

<>"'r~ri C c;;;..a. tI _ T':? •.0

II •••

J,. .... '"



lJote!·!orthy.is pla.'1 Ko. 6 'tlorked out by It!alt 1'[. ROStO\'I, ·the policy

0 ' . .L ",.. . . l "'I"lne~ 0 1.'" .... P _ - .... - -"ne. U• S • 5·... ~a:",e e,ar"C:len". l::1.S p1a'"l emPJ.sages ...." "';lree st.ages: "'1.' rs'" s"''' (:'~. n"'v-' '010"" -e " " T " • • • , .1. • , 1 lot I.t~o-. ~~ ~ ¥~as 0: ;.a1.p~o~g pO~~j seCO~Q s~age: nav~ a,,'tacxs

·on No~th Vietna.";l coastal i.'1s~ulatio!1s; ~d third stage: l';orth Vietna":l •••• II .

air bo:":":lings 01

The United Sta.tes saJi:s that 'it t'rt:.."'lts a 'Oeaceful , settle.~ent· of the 'ou':'v ~+. f',"'.''?- ss::re 7,~_~":,,.·e "'7. .,l.;"~.,l. >'10'" ,.".:.;.,0.• ..,..._.,. --- u'ec'--es -'::'.. ",..G.v _ ... Trol" i . _ •• lot : . _ ". . '.<;."1<, either oper~y or ~'1de::- the c2.o~k of " ""'e--" e"'s c.o'" --......e-e"'''!. ¥'oe-ce-"", .... c;..;. ___",-1 --=:;_.:> _.. "". .n. c:, .L settla~ent \·:hic~ does not i::.cl\;,c.e the \";it~c.:,a,..;al of U.S. satellite trocps fro:l South Viet~a"l ca.."'l."lct be regarded as s':c!'l by sOl!!:d-±ced people •••• II


. 11 •••

~,•• -.,.. ...... ~~ lTl.'e.l.",\r .. e;. li u ••.::;..... •• ,





" ...





tIThe United States says 't!!a-=. it ~·;a.~-=.s to see;-c a -oeaceM settle::le!l~ of the ",:ar in Vietr.a.:1 -bd~a~3e i-:, ~·:a::.~s .'Oaace to be cUicki·,t res-:o·"e:i· but -- ~t; dee::s it Iiecessary to i.-w:crease l~S res"':or;se a!ld r.:a.J{e attacks by air •••• lI .





II ••••~·:-!l';' C


talid:1,g abc\!.7. pet.ce, t?le U:!ited. States CO:'lti:.u.e to b.tc!1sify

the \'f,,-r in Sou.th Vietna.~ ~d to o:d.c::d. t!'lC ~';ar \dth its air fo::-ce a:ld naV"J

to KorthVietna."l.

t:nf'o::ese~ablc conse~r..:.e::ces •••.• 11

This r:i.a.y lca.c to

liThe 2.5gressive 'and bellicose fet:~ill'es of the U.S. Goyer:-_~ent are further laid ba.::-e· ~y the follo";li!";g a::-rcgant t.ct::.C>:l: en 2!, Ap!'fr 1965 P::-csice:l7. .,,""~ .... ~::> ,·~':'::>"t·S ."..l~~C-"'''' l.!? .....:, •• <Ou· .... ,:,r.e \.I.. "~01e •...• _ 0-"_.11-ie'!'''l~''''' _ \.1••;;...1 ..... ............ c::.uc. "'''''..;e. t:! •• :.. ':'~e""""'o \.> • • • JO ·:1• ••.... sO.,.,.....':es'::-~<>':'e..l orO )"0 -":~ec -=-"'0"'" ....... c tr.;"'.:. ..... ." ..... .:.-" co-"'.:.~ ~",A .... "'r ... 0':> ... ~'" .:.r~.,..,..:; ... o-.::"'i ~··... ~·... s " .V ••1_'_. -.. .I.. ••• u.! V _<;; ..... •• .:» = ...... ;-c;. u .:. "'...... ... ...... _" .""'co-. ..c;. . . t;. of t?lc Chir.cse Peoplas Re?~blic ~o~~d the Pa::-acels of Isl~~s, as a cc~bat zone of the U.S'. a::-.::ad forces. This::'s in essence a ~ove to. .·:c::::-c a bloc}:age -u· .... ·, ~-..! ..·" .,...,.:.,·o ... c;.,,_.. .... 1"0"'" 1 ~.,..-- .... ... c:.....:.. e .......... .... ~,.::~ ~''''lT v •• \4, :_...'- f·.1.l .... S~·.1e t.:..,c c:.- p........a.:--..... . . _c;..oc_..:.vc-" of ':'}o.e 11 adventures •••• ~



<;.. ..






(Tnong· !.~at Article July 1965


.;. .......



Ta.b R, pg. 2 )

ObViously, as lo~g as t~e U.S. i~periilists con~L~ue to spin such stories a.nd to e)~lain the sOl.!thernpeop1e ' s u~ris~~ as a reactio:l to l!orth Vietna.-:ese aggressio:~ so as to h~ve a pretext for attackir.g the D1V, this \-:ill !:lean that the U.S. i-:l?erialists st n ] ":ant to cO:1tinue '·Ta.r and that it "r-iJ 1 be ir:l~ossi';)le to achieVe P?ace; in other ·Hord.s) the ',:, • S" ., 1 " 1 Unl.vea. ~a~es "IL con ... mua:-co a.... ac;c t,ne 1\or~n a."1a. l,.!1e nor~nern peop e "rill be obliged to return blm·;s •••• II Il • • •


.L •

..,. ,


• .,



• ,





Gove~~lent State~ent


T, pg. 1)




on President


July 28, 1905



This hy?oc~itical tilk car~ot ~ossibly cover up a.~d distort the truth. L~ fact, the U.S. Goveru~ent ha.s sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agree.. ,,,,,,,,""0 ..!...,... . . . ..., .:.................. ':"':'\ i "'I"!""" "",,' ~.~ . . . . .'""_.!...; ~t"\:l" l!::'c:' ."...~;.".." ..... sl~ _n ... eriit:)Y\ e 0' me •• I1... 0""•• Vi_ev ••c::.,._,) c; ..? .... 6a. 0.,:.-0•• _ ••1:.e...... ~\,_O.:._CJ. ", .. 5,) co .. ".....\.:.o.... e , se-':' ~>n t~e .;""".L -, ~i'"l"'a.;-S 0-'" ';"n,:, 'T-ie.:....,,..-~s'" ""-0: ...1 U 5 ......oo-s ""'--"'r.s~ ..... •• ........ ern..c.J,. _.... .!.... V_ .....<:,. •• <;; !"C: '_ ... .~!1e , 5ou.,;'l .t." 'tT· • '""'''' ., ... " " " . .. • • • .&..' v l.e..na'":'!i::se peop.l.e, ,oC.::loea. ana S"ral eo. t,tle ~errl.~ol'y 0... \.Ina !J!. 'I, al1d has go~e to the length of bltl.;'1.t1y stati."lg that it i·!ill not uithdra~'l from. South Vietna:n., •• 11 tI • • •










t; ••

c:.O'~-;" ':""\:>~1

II • • • It is talking abO'l!Jv peace Cl:!.sc:lssio:ls to cc~cea.l the 3'12..'1. for i."'l.... ~"'-=-1.·n.:.:.e1, • .I.· .;on o~ te. . . s'_·_..._.;e'" \f;'''', . T~·S· a.-e,<=:-lC'1'" -;.::: to ""....o·'o""~.;.:;a -;~.\04CJ. _..1.\# _.y "'.ne '~::)-:.A.!..l.· c.:-. '-' ...J--,_.. J. Viet~~~ £:.r.d to stick to SO~:~ Vietn~~ in a bid to turn tha.t zone into a U.S. r.c:! ty?e colony 2..-:.d !:d.li-:'a~y ba.sa ~o::- attack against the DRV, tbus "'0-' c.; II jeoparcizL;3 paace ir. Asia "'"



--(,..10 • •







_ -.



. 1:?ne inV Gove::-r=.e::t o~ce asa:.n e:·~oses t::e U.S. aut::o::-ities I eeceptio:1 ",':",c"ss":o-~ ~n ~.:c.'.:o"s ...... • ..... _ .... _ •• c:...:. ... _ •• .:> > ~.·.··."'._"c:"';", .. __ ee-se'>"lce c:. e.. • _..l. _..... "'_.0euve .... .. oJ.-=- """C01"'r~'::.!.';o",,-, to i"l?OSe by forCe on the Viet~~7.ase ?~o?le s~~=ission to the U.S. policy ~......





..... ~

t">!> ......


~~--r::>ss.;on c,; _ . . . . . . II




(Quan Doi 1,r:~a."1 Ja-"1 ~dito:-ial k:sust 20, 1965 - Telo

V; pg.

sec~.clearly t~e s=okesc~een:


... ...-.....




the United


St~tes neve~

_....-_......_... 2-1~, 6)

Tao X, pp.

" ••• The e:...-tensio!1 of air attac~~s on r:ort!1 Vietna.'!l by the U.S. :i::-.!Jerialists is a!1 extra:!ely blatC!1t ";-2.1' act agai,-1st t:te nav, 2..'1 ince,e:!cent a.."1d sova:-eign ...·,,. 'i_".".'_·s ~_:!':_ G.... - ""OS':' C'-·~';o"s ,do"~"'''oo~ ~"·"e--·-··c .:. .:. It.l.'; v_ .i.. t~'" 4." 100'J / -;. G~n""'-'=> ·C.:. "" ',..... c:.,::;. Cu ..t;;'J.!.vv 0'" .4 couu Indoc!1i~a, of the U.};. Ch2?ter, and o~ in·:'er~ational la~1. !n their e5~a!.ation agai:1st !';orth Viet~e..-:1 ·t~e U. S. ~'""lge::!:'a.lists ha.ve co:::.~itted in:1l!.~a.'1e crr.4.es, bO:::lbi."1g a."1d stra£'~g de::1sely populated e.,:"eas J ma..,y hospitals ••• 11 OJ

~-;;;:..;. _



" ••• The U.S. :u"!l'Oeri21ists still cor~t-::lue the escalation in the north •••• ·' '.ihey nay eve:! start a nel'T Korean 1·:ar 1..'"l t:tis area •••• I:

I!l- his spzech on 23 July Pres:.c.er-!t Joh~son eve=-! bega."1 to talk about to discuss Ea~oil5 pro;osils, to ~e~tion the questio~ of re'!""lo~ y..; n- ·vT ": ~.:.~-....., -"0"':'"';! --e ,~,. s·,' t;'.!V·..:.5 r........ .: • ,... U ~ .... J. -:-5 ",C;;\;~.C. c... i;. ~ •• "t.:lcre suc:!~ a cna.'"1ge.? I 5 vn~ a.., . .; ~na··';ca":' .: 0'" 0'".;. !"as'n; '1 ".,.,0.. cone'"...,.s _':'o'~ ~e::.c::.? .-.. ... Lt..t.... •. '* ..:-.;....... ,..:. 0 .... I w .. -i -...... .. _ ..... II • • •





.. ,







~t:a: •••• u


......... CL"1 atte::pt to "t,C?lks a:'o'.!t peace -.;. ':" ::'o:'e 1:e talks about, peace ...ee n:O!"e ~e steps up ~c~~so:!




IT • • • As


I:'• • • ..... I~e .:.. '~o"" ...


T ·'1<> ~"'';C'''' ~ ... ·0 ';'~e "'o'~-'" _-if. O·~·'r'\ ... ·O·H.S'_"T· " . "" 'U •S• C"'C!)"I .., c;..:.c:. .. _ . . 0'" _ ~.~", " •• 1:0 •.• .. c:.... \,0 ..... •• ~ \,I") v .., tI

ccnstitu:,es an irltolora!:llc -act or a~S::-G::sio:!;. To bo~.; co~,~ oefo!'e the threc.ts of the tJ. S. ; -:1.pcrialis:'s or to cC':::?~"c::use -~:it~ -:'he."':l ,·:o~lc constitute a:'l ect of er.cou!·age.::e~t fr~t:ght '·!.::i:.h i..~ccl.cula~ly serious cc:lsequences •••• 1: ........ .. ....... .. .. _.-.. .. 4' • •




(D?V Foreign !':::"''1istry ~{c."':lorar;:iu.-::. Se?te:::~e!' 23) 196;

Tab Z) pp. 1-2)

• 1I • • • ~i.'1cc.7 Ap:~1196? the U.S •. ~~t:;ori:t~~~.h~ve 0:1. repe~ted occas~ons proless~~ rea~~'1ess ~o ene~e ~ 1~'1ccnQ~-r.~o~al discussic~st C!..'1d made propos~ls fo~ Co Ice~se-fire)' a :s~s~ension of the bo~bing ot the

.... I ",",' • . • S P .• . ·nor"ll. bU-c.::'S:tS l.n ,,:11.5 ve-ry PC!'l.C{! "na~u. • resl.QC::1"r. decided to se::d in 50 J 000 t!ore U. s. cc::-~ba.t ';:':;:,oops) raisil".g in SOUt:1 iJiet!'le:"l to nea~ly 130,9~O; a~::! a ~t:.rt~er dispatch C!.nnou!1cad •••• JI .L"




J O:1nson . n'aas the U. S. stre!'l&t!1. has a!so been

liThe 1u..'1.con.ditio~al disc::ssions I· prc?osc.l of the U.S. au-:'horitias is but 2.:1. atte~pt to'co~pel t~e Viatn~lese people 1:.0 accep,- t.:1e~ O~':n terns •••• 11 •



ceC!.se-:'ire I trick of the iJ. S. authorities is desi8~ed in fac~ to co.~pel t!'!e Viat~C::leSe people i:'l both zones· to lay do"t-nl t!1eir a."'mS ~!hi1e U.S. trcops continue to be reir.fc:'Acec., to oCcu.!'y· 2.;'1d. cOJ::.':!it aggression • • ' '_n~s 1 ' ,~s .." .. . .1:.0 p_ay , .. " t0 conso1"' 2og2o).."1s·' ;' Thetna~. a:.so a:l e.:t;~a;~:.y.:. lor tJ..':!.e ~aa.ve the puooet a.~~inistration a~d a~y) to increase forces' for fur(,her a~15a.'1.sion of the ,::a.r i.'Il Vietnaza •••• II II •••




(Vietna::! Courier Article - Tab 33, pg. 1)

.:. .... e _"~ ";~-e~;""­ SUC;l alle5atio:1S as "Oee.ce, disc~ssions "Cut fo!'th ,.,..~ VJ ....c:...L ists -- are b~t deceitful. rrorcts. The U.S. :tr:tperialists have openly unleashed l'!ar agd:.st t!1e D?V ••••·11 fl • • •


(JoL""!t Asa.--:i-Xa ~ ~ichi L'1te!'vie:'; pp. 1-2" 7) 10) ~!o

the U:lited

Va'1 Dong Cctober4)


'.i'ab CC


desirm3 peace. They have no in~e!:.tion at a!l of e~dir:g t~1e ':;~ •••• a~a th.ey not e:·:-.p2.!:d~~ ~':ar i..~·both •"'~a .... e 5'0'"':'~ " ... ,,:: .~.. -'-he "'0 ..."':'.r; ... - ....... .,,',., "" ..... ·oe'.:..~·e·'e .;~. ... ..,.~ "'.~"'" .a ._. . .:.".••. . , ·.·~i'e ••• ;-.:.. .:.,,~._.~.:; ....:." ...........::>c:.-ce?· m_:"~"~~/_ _ S-:-·lla,,_ v • .... II

~"".1'-~ ~v"·.c; .. J ':'~e v..

• • ••• J

--~ .::.~.:-~ .;..~:\~ ~.:- +-""'--::7 f'l\ .....~~ ... IiJ_ ,.. ....... ~-c")'>-s~ "'5 c. ...'-'- .:.~ey, v.~ L,,_.~ ...".. " •• c.:.w __ v .. ~r:;;j _ ...... ", •• _.; _ C;:c::, .., t~~.t'\.e"'_·" _ __ _~O''''C' .. \:;:

'CC-'O-i--S .;~ _.,;:)



":"~e u..

"'o~':'~ ••• II.a, :'~e·iI.;;;

i._·_'_ ::-. _ ..,



~,:t~e,..~ec.:...:.. v .......

"'';''d ...,"' ~J.. ...... c;.... •.c""'-the>'\ v_--Q. • • •

That is.very

.foolis:~, b~.rt it nS??-3:;s to be t~e t~t!-:h. That is "-ihy ~·;e do not tr~st their peace proposu. I..""l 7,~e c~cice b.;;~~·;ae~ a.cce?ti:-~g t!~e uO~SO::' pro:;Josal ~d cont~~:':!g the . . :2: J ~·la c~~ose th~ CO:lrse or CO:ltir.u.~.g ~;a.r ~~lithout the slig!'ltest hcsita"t:'o:l •••• n u ••• The

--~.,·-s.!.. \I


Its the

zrc~~cs~ ~~il~~e co~~e~c~ce t~b:e 11 • • •





f;;.iled. so

~ ... •• .;:.;:::i


':'Co • •


to b:-L:g

•••• j' t

?l-'esic!errt Jo~:"SO;'l :OezE...~ to· t.:- ~ ~~ c:.bou.t :?e~ca negotiatic!:s ~2.lf a

ea~ 2.~O. -

r.:.e:.t of



.!.'.... --..,...'.. \.. ;., •• ...: i:U_ v";!


"':o~·:evc"" _,


U. S.

... ,h{;-c"~C~ It . . . . . .




fc~ccs ::.11 Sc~th

sue'....-e _


!)::,~"'':..!. ""';.......~,!!C~ ""'_"" _ _ )



r:orth iiiet!lc..'":1 •••• It




~~ o~,~::.~~t"",; ... """" ...... _ _ ....

•• _

::escala:ted I! the

.... ~~ ~":'"'c'nl"e-

_ _ _, . ' "

'\'i~ a~ai..~st


(7hc Joint StatC::1cnc ~·;ns isst:cd 011 the occ~sion of a visit t·-~o;..... .1.. .l''''O~l V\..V I"\~. o~" ... ;.)~...

19 .v. 0 3'_)

IG!'2 ,v of e.

r;?LS~! dclci;,;.tio:) led by 'l"thc- S:;~tc..7:.C:lt J b::"o<:ctcast in r-:r.cli~:. b~' ilz.:-.o:' IS 'r.!,\. C~ Octo':)c~, 30) 1962 accuses the U.S. and the Dic::\ l:cJ.iCli.!CH of violt=.tir.g t:-tc Gencv,~ .:~rcc:::.cnts. It also st.atcs the F:'O:lt j ...·:hich C<:'-:lC i::;;,o bcir~~ o·..:in.:; to the bro~·:th of the So~th Vict~:~~czc, is the Gc:-~~inc rc?~c!:icnt.:~ti\"'c of the South Victn::.~,cse PCO?].c. It calls fo": ncut!'alit.y of South Victli[:,'il) and fo~' :peaccfuJ. r ctL'1ifi cation. )


.. 11..:-10


n • •• 1.



GC:lc::·al i:Q.:Jrcn

V~~ f~i(':!.

Botll par-V:lCS note th~t o'\te~~ the r.\2,st ciCht yenrs. or so the people a!~d the Govc~r;::C!it of t;1e DR'! CC~ist~rt.J. "t it:ole:::c::1tcd co~~:'ectly'

¥h~_al ~~!: aG9~~~:\~·~~~~:;.~~i:~~i;.~~~~C?~~·l~·~~ji~~~;~ ~?'~~~j!i£~~t[~-~_·.=~~~~p~£i~t~~~is ·.ha·{e·~Ji~~·te~.: v·";-.,:,,.,.., ... - ~""':l d':)"Io-·c:·::'l'~ J..~1n 1'-0 D;~·'. . . Die.""l ~ ~~.;.~:~_~ ~~ _:~ ;~.l~:~ .~~~;-=~:=~ ~~.:~~. ~_.~V~1~:'::'~:!:~~.:::::~:~\ ..::!:~:.~_ +~~.; _·L")~~~::~:~:_.:-_-~ ._~

,t\cr~ . .i

:,.ttv _ ••O.


--'0"\'''' ~"v~ .. ·~o~~ r:~~"",l- .. :i.~ ~O·1·:·~ ':'1J_t:->

vO ~.~ ••.!),,<=,_, 5..:.00",-::,<:

-I-S--:-':::-:.::":~"-:f"..-L.·;'·-';~ .. ..,·~1· .,:.......,:-.:.. - J . ' • • l .....k: • .;..--.!._S"u c,,,<,:: l) O"l,1.!l.:; ... 0





.. mho ____ _

"I.e _.. ,~.J.C.".J"",c,,_O:1 0-". v.• _ ... C 2.:, .. "',....... l~,..S. 1 e :'::;:J...£..t.~ ;-"';"-.. J..;:~.; .• -'::;"'...~.:.:;~ J..l~" . ,,", . ··S···~.' :pc<. v.:.,,_o .... l.~"_.",,l !-' ........ ,:...'-~:1v-.t;, t ...l,l Otl"n


·Victn2_":l into a r.c·,' tYl)C U.S. colo:1] and



base ••• Ovcr 10,000 U.S.

officc:z"s end me:1 a::d hund:,cds of thO~tsz;~ds !':go Dinh Dic.-:'l troops a~"'::4cd "lith rnodcrn U.S. \·:et-..po!""~s a11d !!oxious chc.'~'!ict:!l are rcpc~tedly' cond.uct:L~ tcrro!.'ist.. r<.dds and bc.::.,o2.:'ot:sly perscc-..:.tingthc South Victn~;:\eGc people, rCi~2.l'dless of aGo: sex, relieion) !1tct.iO!1a.lity, o!' po1itic~1 tc:-,dency. ~·rillio:!s of So':.!th Vietn<':;:csc ?Cr:52.nts h.:.vc bcc~ herded by th·~ U.S.-Dic::1 clique :bto concc!.tration C<::;iPS J

so-called. strdegic hc.;:llets ••••

liThe U.S. i":lperia.listsare also plottinG to use South Vietna::t as a base to sabo·~~3C the peace a:1d neutra.lity of C<-:.tbcdia and kos, threaten pc"'-ce in sOl.lthc[;.st Asia e.nd the ,·:odd, .and, at the se~7.e ti."7lC, to n.:.ke South Victnz.:l a provine gl'o'..l!1d for t;-~e s1.~ppre3sio:-l of the naticnal liber,:tion I:10ve:acnt in' J...sia) Afl'ica, a.'1d Lat5Jl A!:i::!rica. Il}3oth parties dcnOU.:lce to ;·;o:dd public opinion the cri.";11n.cl. U.S.-Die.il schc:ncs and ~cts J 5eve~el~,r COr;,dC7Jl the <!E;.;reszlve a.id ~';arlikc policy' 01 the u. s. j;~1)criaJj5~.~) LUlU the antinatio~al and a:."1ti.d~~ocr~~tic policy of t.he l!go DL'Jh Die::: aut!lorities J hJ..'1,Scrs-on o~ t~c United States.

In the face of the. U.S. l . . :lpC-:i<>J.ists I aggressive acts ar.d l;~o Dinh Die.~ls traitorous acts) t~e South Vietn~~ese peo?le havc been cc~pcllcd to r:i~c u? to struEglc for their ri3ht to live a:1Q for indel)endeilcc) de.-:;ocracy, a.-:d peace. This i:; a just s~:::·u'ZGh.~ l:::ich cOJ:.;."'O;::lS to thc:_19.5_LGp_!}9'l<l __ _ 112.


FGt1:erlC'-1d Fro::t o~ :':o:-th Vietn~. ~ . is the replace.i1c:1t for the Viet :l,rL"..'1 The F~o:1t o:-8c:-.izes a::d ccordir.?. tcs ill the r. ass 6r5an.iz~tio~s J the trade t:.nic.~s 2.~:d t:1C t;-.1.''::';; politicc.l pc~rtics. (:..1.l 17.o.":;oe1's of: the ;;<'.tioniL h.ssc~bly ~e elcecteG. as :::e::l~~~s of t~e :~atherla.::d Fro:lt.) ill these o:"ganiz2.ticr.s operate: u:.d.~!" tho aesis o~ th~ Fa.the~la::d. Fro!'".t as '(:011 as indep~n1ent!.:·.




V,.s, ............ "t."""'" to the . n:d.ncinlc:; of the U.N. Charter <IT.d the spirit :.;;..J. ... ) . . oft11e-f(i55-Bar\dt~:~S-ccnfc~c~;cc. This 5tru~Glc is an intcer~l pa::.'t of the I:\o\[c:~cnts fo;:' n<lotiend libc;:,<,:"ion ~nd peace in the v:orld. Yct, in their snccicl. re!)ort to the coch;:.i~j.~(;n of t:1C 1954 GC'lOV,?. cc·nfcrcnce·~, the Indian ~d Ca~adi~_..'l dclce;;.tcs to t;le L'1tcrmrtiond Co::::niss:i.on haYc deliberately tuned into the U.S.-Dic.-n allegation) :!d.s!'cprc~;cntins the South Vietn<::;;:csc people1s . "'.,. t'J.on ane..SUO","C:;:'Slon . . b-~r ...tine · '!.T.hO!"...,l.h,. ""'; -1<, an just strugg1 e uS lJllJ-Ltjra In_s.,J.v ... o~l"'ense ..L to the s£~cred TI.:.triotis::t of the Victn[:.-:.cse people. The VictnC'.;::csc people fro;n ~!orth to' South energetically object to it. ... "'1'00-"''''+5 c-.. ulv~......

0'1 10


113. • •• The delcgc::.tion of tho NFLSV ":clCC:7!CS the policy of the Viet.ncun Fathe::-1a::d F!'ont for nationcl rcunificc::.tio:l on the b~sis of independence, democracy, .,.nd by peO-cerci ::1.0e.;} 5 , ~dthou.t coercion or annox£.tion of one side by.the other, and taking into due consideration the leeitimatc interests and asuil'ations of the Dooule of all shades in the t-;[O zones. This policy matches th~ political progr;''';l t~e r-;FJ.f~)T[J "I':hich provide a IO!' Ireunifyi!18 th~ country step by stcp by peacc:'ul l:1.cans on the basis of negotiations bC'brccn the t;·:o zones and discussions in .,:11 foms and tlcasures beneficial to the Vietncl..!tese people ar~ fatherland'.


DRV TEill·!S

* Special report to the


iszued 1.'1 Saigon on J~~e 2, 1962.


of the Geneva .Conference on IndO-China,

IIBoth sidez hold that, at a tbc ~':i1e:1 the cot:...'1t!'y is still tC:i!porarUy divided it c:'S a 1:ll!St to 'boost the stri1s;lc for nO::-:::lll :a:'t01atio;15 bet\·:~cl1 the people of the ZO:~C5 in the cco:;'G:::ic J cultu",cl, and postd fields. 'The Victn,,;;t Fathcrla:-.d F:-o!"t't ~:::d the !';FLSll ..-:ill striv.;'! to ovcrCC::1C dii'f:'cultic3, create fe.vorr.blc co:;,ditio:ls fa"!' rcp~czc:;,!.ati\"'cs of mass o!'J~~izatio!ls of the t,·:o zo~cs to cont<'.ct each o-;;,hcr, ar.d at. the SD.::lC t5.":l~l to cxchange culturd articles of these I:!<'.SG orsa:;.izatio:;.s J s"..lch as filr;:s, boo~:s .. il!'ld papc~'s. 115. Both sides ~c very happy to note th~t the just strusgle of South Victn2..";l(;se cc~'O~triots for the c7l2.:lein"t.io!1 of South Victn",I:t <l:1d that of all the Victn~,,;~esc' 'Deoule for neacei'ul natio!1al rc,t:lllication have ~':on thQ t',ctive a.."1d 'l-ram t.?p:::,o\'~.l ~~d su?~;rt of the i·:o:dd I s peeplcs, :L'1clt:.dir:,:; the progrcssive uconle 'in the United States, and the o"ovc:,!",;:wnts of :::0'-'17 " cot:.:rt..-ics. C':1 beh?1f, ~ t' 1 ~'t' ./-' J. • • "'h ' lor ~ th' 0... ne pcop~e 01 co n zones J ",ne "~':o Slc.es C::'Cp!'CSS " c,:1.~S .a" v ..~, \..L.uao, 1 e .i. suppor".

. .

IlEoth sides hold tn5.t thc Vietnt::,ese and the ~·:orld IS people have a cO::-:r.lon enc."JY, U.S. ir.lpel'idis::1, the ;·;ar-secking diehard of the colonialists and imperialists. 'l'ne zmti-U.S. struggle of the Victna."Jese people and the struggle of peoples for natio:1al indcpe:1d.c~ce 2..l:d peace ar~ closely connected ldth each other. That is ";h:- both s:'des ,·;ar;-:u.y ";elco::;e the peaceful settle:aent of the Laotian question E.;"':.d the fe'matio:1 of the Nation"J. Union Gove~'!::;;,ent in laos. 'l'he peaceful. scttlaent of the Laotian isst~e proves that. i....l't·::..national disputes can bE: settled sC'.tisf2..ctori1y.:by :near,s of negotiatioas. Both sides dc.";1a."':.d. the scrupulous respect for C"..nd strict i::lplC'::;.entation of the 1962 Gcne\'a agrt:C":1(:nts on Laos J <'.."1d thc cO::lplete .'lithcira1·;al fl'o::l 1.::'05 of all oilite..ry men of the United States and its satellites.

liThe t1':O sidcs protest asai.'1st the infrin.r;e:::ent upon the sovereignty and 'territory of Ca:::boctia by the South Vietna":lese ':.nd The.i authorities on U.S. orders. TheY"relcc::te the proposal of Head of Sktc P:.':L'"1CC i!ol'odo::l Sihal10uk for cO::1Venir,g a.."1 inte::,nt~t.io!1al conference to discuss to guarantee of C2.:.ibodia l s independence ~'"1d neutrality. liThe t~::o sides de:na.'1d a cC::ip1ete ,·:'i't.hdra:"'a1 of Ar.-.erican troops frQ;'ll Thailand, a:1d the dissolution of the aggressive SEl,TO n:ilitary bloc headed by the United States. "Both sides support the stri.lsgle of the Chinese people to liberate 'l'aiHan .and oppose the schc.":le to crotto t~·;o Chim::.s, support the Chinese people in their defense of natio!1al sovereignty a.."1d te:::-ritor-.:r, support the proposal of the CPR Goverr.i:lC;lt for the settlc.~ent of the Si.'1o-L'1dian bo::.'der questio:1 by peaceful negotiatio!15 , a:1d de.~a.,d restoration of the legitin:ate position of the CPR in the United r;ations. 116. The bro sides unadr.ot:.s1y hold that no:·radays the ~';o~'ld' s people.1 s forces of natio:l<ll :L"1c.e:x;::de::ce a.--:Q peace are s~ron.se~' than the aggressive a.'1d bellicose forCeS of the j;:pe~ialists ~eaded by the U!1ited States. l:o r:att.er ho',: 5:;:::"1) they a",c, tbe peoples i.:::-e 2..~~e to ..:i..'1 i f they are u..'1ited closely and + , va.;..~a. -.,. .. . 1 "'. . .\. h e ., ... . , ill" ,r.as :,:<'.,uy ev'i l ' s"rugg_e 1::0:l6:l u•S • -u~€:.~ cl'l.que S,," des:lgns and the South Viet~c.;-:eze cc-";t:?c:.t:-icts t str:~Gle is still difficult, hard, and.



1011[;, r.o rCG.ction<'..ry force in South Vietna.il. 'FROiIT


check the gro;·. .th of the patriotic


1I'l'b5Ln-Fd..:l,;!-.!qlL§5?1~i;.lLY:.i,Q~1l~~~!!.£S:£~12~,tl::LoJ:!L~!.2 !.~=-(tg~:?l_o.!u~q~e and r.tore,. "he"", "~~l:-~':' -,....; l·T'''C'''~':'~'')l'' ':·.,..~.;4':'';0·1 ",..,.; un-:':'o -0"''' ..... ~~ -o~·" ··'J.·..;ely "'Id. ..~i..:. .~ closel\'" Kithi:1 the ::-:-ISV to c.ir·3ct1y 0":)100::;0 the U.S .-Dic.-;-. c1i01.:'0. The 16 -1'fjj-l" 0:"-1" :o""'-n'v.'-.:;:i:::-;::-;·-s-;"--c-c-::::~:; ~l'.- -S"~;"l'':'';''O' -..::, - c. ... c:" .; "c14v .L. n' ,.. <::, ·u. . . h "oJ_ .... v .. .J.'" _ ...:1 ...... :;~ -o-:':'",~:;~ Vi) V ...... v J '" y "-"v Viet.n~~cse cC::;"tpntriots I liberation struggle, and endeavor to C:itulatc \·:ith each ot:wr to bulld :~o-:.'t.h Vic'v~<:::1 i.-"l'.:.o a st.::'onz and firi:l b ...sis for the struggle to rcu.."li . tc 1:.nc cou:;.try. The socii1..1ist. cou:itrics, the pe~.cci'uJ. and neutral countries J the peeples of Asia} Af:4'ica) a~ld ktin iberica} a.,d pcncc-lo\'il".g pco'Olc thrcuc;::c-.;,t t~c ,\,;0::'1<1 ,,;ill oovio-.;,sly s'Uu'Oo:::,t norc l-fholehc8.rtedly and practicaUy (;·!ord indisti!1ct) Sou"t.h Vietn-;''";le$~· and all the Victna-nese. people. The U.S.-Dic~";l clique ,-rill certainly;;lOCt. "Tith failure. The Vietna,'";lese people fro:;,. north to 50~th \-;ho arc closely united and v,-ho struggle resolutely, "''ill undoubtedly ach:'lcve stlccess. /I ~~~_-l--<::..:.,~!.'oo4 _ _::~: ,.:.!.:~':::~..:::~ .. ~.!.:':--'-.::.~~:._ ~:.:::_ _ W':'~:._~_~a C:::~2;.~_....'i...!!




.i __

\1;. ...





HO CHI I·amps n;TI:RVIF1'[ APiLlL 5, 1965



• t erv~e.·t ' . \·:J... ......'n v... osn~ ,....... a 'i'-' "'-}1'" _""K<l.1'10 o~ AtI.(:. a"a, org ~.•n (llo I s lJl of the Japanese Co;:r:mrdst Party, v;~S broadcast by Hanoi VNA in E~lish on April 9) 1965. no e:·~re3sed the yic-.'; th,.t to settle the South Vietna."':lese question first of all the U.S. must ,·:ithdra::·: fro:il South Vietna::l, let the South VietnC'.;';lese people decide the;l1Sclyes their 9.,'11 afi'a:l,rs, and stop their provocative attacks c.3a.inst the D~V. u'i'he carrying out of these basic points "lill bring about favore.ble conditions for a conference along the pattcIll of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach 1·;hich is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people. ll ) ft

IlQuestion: The U.S. ~"perialists have suffered repeated defeats 1.11 South Vietna;':l Hm-:ever J they are st511 conte"':lplating brinsing in supe!'>.eap':n:.s, up-to-date ",capons in <L'1 atte:"upt to subjugate the Vietna.l1ese people. Fro;;]. the peoplcls . vie":point v:hat is the character of the imr 1.."\ Vi(;:'c,na:n and i·:hat is its significance in contempo!'.?ry history? 'The U.S. l,,,;;pcrialists are said to have landed the:nsclves in an e:nbal.'rassing dilc:::'"la in South Vietnall. ";hat j.s the relation bet1'~een th:i.s pos~tion and their recent fz:cnzied aggressive acts vis-a-vis North and South Vietn(!."':l? In such circU;llstances, vlhat is the most important irr.mediate task of ~he Vietnamese people? 'OVES

"Ans...:ert' For over 10 years no:':,


U,S. jp...E£rialists_ hn:vc




v;ar in Vietn::t.";l in an atteo"r.'::lt to turn th<et zone into a U.5. nc~·:-t~'Ue _ .... _South __ ---Jo_,,colo!):~d military base and. to prol'?!!.,; t[,~~tition of 01.11' coun~~. 'I'hey have ~broueht in over 30,000 troops and militer-.f perscr...'''wl, thousands of air. craft, hu.11dreds of i..-arships and hundreds of thous&'1ds of tons of arms, they have carried ou~ a Rost ruthless policy of terror and repression agaL~st all patriotic people in South Vietnaill. IlConfronted l-iit,n such a situation, ~~!;ryakiot.s in the sc:.yth h.?~ ha4. to rise UP against the U.S. a~gressors in defense of their life and their cou..,t2';'L~ This struggle has r';corded. tr€.::!.endous victories. Over three-ouarters of the ":ith trio-thirds of the populatio:1 have been liberated.. The ·United States and its agents have sustained heavy' defeats. The U.S. special in South Vietna.:n is going bar.krupt. :






fllf the ....... South Vietnc-.:::ese 'OeoDle are bccomi.r>.e every stronger and winning ...._----_._-,.-_ .. ever greater victo~'ies) as the .f2ght goes on, that (proves that?) their causa is just 1 because' they ~e ani'::.t'.ted ~.;ith an ardcr.t natriotis!:l ar.d p.uided bv the _sound 'OO~iC" of the ~:FLSV. ':'i'le ~'lar being viaged bYOur.coi-:;.patiiot~ :1..'1 the'south 's" .. ..' . . .~orc2gn .". , l. '" peop1 os reVO.luv)on?.ry '..:a::- aga~nsl" aggrv3slon, Ior nc:raonal'~ndependence and peace. It is a..'1 active part of the,l-;orld peoples IJOveu.ent againsthi:''np~rialis::l, colonidis:ll, a.''1d neocolonia.lisn, headed by U.S" imperialis~, for national indepcr.ciencc 1 de~ocracy, pe~ce, and social progress. Lo



'l'h-ctt is


the reusoa v:hv the pec-olcs of the . .·:holc ;·:orld arc cxtcndiI'~ us their s\:::pathv and S~l:Ji)O:'t. ~:he i:1cl'casin,s victod.cs of tho South Viet.na::lCsc p~ople ;ho~·: tht:,t in OU!' epoch, a n.:1tic,a closely united an.d v:agins a resolute st:'U531e is fully c2.;'Jt-.blc of dcfec:.tin,s the :ir.q)(:rialis"\:, agGressors, ho,';cvCl' ferocious) cruel, a.'1d ";ell c.nacd they may be.



-------_._----_ __





!lIn an attE':r;;)t to extricate thc:::selvcs f1'0:" their kl)at.s~ --.the ,.------_. .. ._------__.-.-U.S. .. :irn:aerlalj.:;ts t!.!.'t(! feve:"'is~lv int~~~sifvi;,~~ C:!'"..'i 5~e~J0in:! l.!'O t:~e &.~;:!"('!ss:;.vc '·!ar in Sout.h Vict::e:r. lfhc;r have or'o~6ht in U.S. 1:1a:l~:i.lles a~d. South r:o~ec.n 1:1CrCCnal'ies, the:i.r planes are daily strt-.fin.; and dtt-;:pting n2paL-a bo:::bs and toxic Gas on liberated areas J destroy-ins hospitt'.ls, schools J e.nd pagodas J and massacring the civnian POp1.11t.tion includine old people, ;':o::1.cn, ard children. On the other ha~dJ ~hr:. ".~:r;.r is bej.H!! carried to the nor·t.h "t°iith rc:)en.tr.o ~1!:.~~.J2.t:~l !).L-f·ac1r s 'oci-c ~~"""t'7.n~'-" 1 ~"~-lC~)":Id O"!'l _ ... ...-:,..y 1"'\l"c"'''' 01' .;.~:"!t ... ~""'''~l'''O''''''''' 0""" the DDV c.;.v..... ..... -!':.' ...... t. ... ~...,..!-.j4 ....... c. ....... ..:~ _ _4=-..:::.:.::\~~~.-=--t,.,..!~.:.:.~~_~ . _._:__~......Hean;';;1ile the i·;r-.r is j.nt.ensified in l.r-.os c..rlQ proYoct.t:i.C!:s 2re St.ilgCQ agC:~J.nst. Ca"'J.bodia. '1'he U.S. i2Dcrj.alists t acts of Z~!,,;,f:rcss:!.on 2.n~l ~':~~'in Victn~.;-:l ~.:re of .. .. ---~---------------.~ the ut:l:OSt f!!~~vit.'t; thc~," grossl"'if trc..'":l'JJ.e uno!! the 1951..:. Gc;:eva a~£;"e~~;;.cnts on V£ctn:~.1-a~~(i··:c;;S£itutc··~foi~rfo;iS-of. .-intei:r~ction:';l-ia;-~nd -;ru1ifestaTfonSOr

. __. __--__- __




~~a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-,....---- --

.disre:;e.rdfo~ori-d 'Dub}~ic oomlon .. -


. . . .--.




liThe U.S. rulers claiIa tholt the nortn is ";aging C!.£.;gression on South Vietn.:.";! a. . ld that t.~eir attacks on the north aID at puttine an er-d to the assistance extended by the no:-th to the South Vietna;acse people. These are deceitful cO:1tentions designed to fool the ":orld' s peoples and to cover up the U.S. am:;ressive acts •. It must be polnted out that it is the 1esitimate ~i3ht of the South Vietna~ese people to drive out the U.S. ezgreszors J to defend their country and to decide the::l.selves their o;m intern<;.tionr.J. affairs. It is the sacred right of the Vietn2:;wse L, the north as ,-:e11 e.s in the south to oppose t.nci. defeat the U.S. imperialists I aggrcss5.vc act.s to d.efend their national :i.n:l.ependencc and their life. ?hc U.S. l,-nperi<.'.lists I net.s ~ hOiWVC!' frenzied ar.d reckless they may be, cannot prevent the Vietna7:~esc people, from. carrying on their patrIotic struggle lU1~:U fina.l vic;tor"'.:r. IIQuestion: There is nCM lauch talk about· Co peaceful settlt.:.";lent aI1d nesotictions. to end the ...:e..r in South Vietnan. '-[nat is in your vie~·:. the minir.n.lJ',l basis for the scttlc.!1cnt of the Vietna.rn. proble:-n?

liThe Vietna.i:.ese 'Oco":JJ.e cherish oeace and h~.ve at. . :2.ys respected and correctly :L::ple:,cnte£ the 1954 Genc;....~ agrt::c::',ents. HO";ever j they are d(;ternined to .fight to the C:1d against. the asgrcssor3. If the U.S. i."ilperi~J.ists stubbor-n.17 per·si::;ti..'1 their policy of a,zgression and . . :ar, they ....rill ccrta:t111y suffer a hurui1iati..~ defeat.



I'Question: vfnat is your appraisal of the Indochinese peoples I recently held in Phnom. Penh?


IIAnSl-:er: The Indochinese peoples I conference convened at the L Prince f·!oroci.o::l Sihanouk, .the Ca:n.ooci.ian heaiof state, has recor~~ successes. This is a big victory for the peoples of Victna, C:,' Laos in their united strl.:,Ggle agalJlst thoir cO:!~"'lon ene.llY, the V ~'I'hUe the United St,ates is stepping up ,~nd expanding the aggrc~. South Vietuc:m, atte.cking the DRV, intensifying the l-tar in Laos, - encroaching on the tcrrit02:{ a.'1d nati(,nal sovereignty of C?~'nbo~' of the conference sho:-rs t.he deteri:lination of the three Indochi:· to fight against the U.S. i~perialists in defense of national 5 an~ peace in Indochina ~~d southeast Asia.

"Question: Of late, the U.S. :imper~a1ist.s have sche.'l1ed to dir,: actionary and militarist ..'japanese ad:-::inistration to rapidly co: Japan-ROK t?J.ks.They also plan to set up the SEA'i'O aggressive. This is directly related to th~ir aggressive acts ii'1 South' Vie~ your asse5s~ents of the dangerous designs a.~d activities of t!:c. Japanese reactionary forces on Japanese soil and of the Jap~"1t:::', struggle agi':inst these dar.gerous sche::1cs and acts? IIAns"rer: The Japan-ROK talks arc a maneuver of the U.S. imper:: establishing the SEATO aegressive military bloc and intensifyi!'. tions. This maneuver is in cO:-.1plete contr'l0.iction l-:ith the in~ Japanese and Korean peoples and poses a thY-eat to peace in the ' the ";orld. . The U. S. iraperia1ists ,-:ho are the aggressors in SO:l also occupying the Japanese islands of Okha;-:a a.'"ld Ogasa;'iara E!. South Korea.' The Japanese l.,ilitarists ,-rho have colluded with t., States and repressed the Japanese people have also sent sailort technicians to help the United Statc:s in South Victna.'ll and all::. territory to be used a.s a base fOl' aggression aea:L'1st Sou.th Vit • . 1· .I. t'ne co:r:::lon ene:7iY 0! "'h ... • :unper~a..~s"s are "e peop1es oj.~ ,,', ~~el.lna:":I.J U~'. The Sa'7Le r::ay be said of the, Ja.pa.'1cse l:lUitsrists and the South: The Vietna.-;;ese people fully support the struggle of the Japanet: . the Japa.~-ROK talks and the ret.ctionar:. . policy of the U.S. :imp, Japanese L".ilitarists. They sincerely thar~ the Japanese people s~pportL~ their struggle against the U.S. aggressors.

"I take this o'Oportu.."1it.'i to COl"..VilY r:v cordial greetings tc board of lJUd{A7A and requ.est yom- paper t~ convey to the irater; people the grcetir..gs of rdJ.itant solidarity of the Vietna.'lcse r: W

.135 .

(The first section of this rct)ori ,·ms bro2..ricast by H[moi Vl!i'~ :i.>'l E:1.:;lish on Apr:il 12, i955. 'i'he concludiJl':; section cont~d.r.ir-G Ph~.,;:1. V::.n Don,: I s fol:.l" points ...·:2.S tr<:ms1atcd by FaIS fro::l a H2.noi Qo;:;es::'ic brodc"st on April 13. The four point,s and other Pc::'tinC<it e:·:ccrpts fro:n the report <'.l'C included. belo;·;. l'h~ r(;p,)rt co;,tains a 1cnethy indictnent a.,:;<linst U.S, act.iV'itic0 in SO'.lth Vietnam as ,\-lell as a repol''!:, on condition5 jn North Victno.:n.) The ung,·;crv:i.ne policy' of the D~V Govcl'n,acnt is to respect strictly Vic7,na~1 ';..'1cl to j;,lplc:n.cnt cOl'rcct.ly their basic provisions ,~S (:l:loodicd in the follo:-:inocY Do:ints: . II • • •


1954 Geneva a£l'Cc:;lents on


4 POIN'1'S

"3. The ~~cl'nal f'.ffairs of South Vic~n"::~_?-ust be settled 1:::< the _~ou:!-~ Victn~,cse 1)CO;).L(: "hc::lSCl.V2S in accord~mcc ',lith the Pl'09;l'c::J. of the 1:FL5V "d.t-hout an', fo~~ii,~{ntetiCr:~nce. ------------.--.--~ 114. The peaceful rc;,mificat:!oh of Viet.nc;.,·!! is to be scttled by the Vietna::!cs·ep-eo:.;re:lnbOfh-zo~es, idt.nout eryf(;::e1-;~nInt?ercnce •. "This stand of the mv Govcrr.c-:<cnt tL'1qncstion2.bly enjoys the ~pprova1 e.nd support of all peace ad justice-loYine goverr.::-.cnts ~::d. pco:,lesb the rrorld. The goycrn::-,ent o;,~ th~ mv is of the vic;.·; th2.t the stad c).,~our:d.c::i here is the basis for the soundest politicc.l scttlc::lcnt of the Victn?;:l 'OrableJ.. .---.. ..,..-----.-----_... --------~



mv Govcrr....ent

de:clal'es thc.t


appro.::.ch contr<'.ty to the cfOi.'€.i.ilentioIlt

us r;OVES

".As for our eO'ierr::tent and people, the:t ha\'c continuously strUSGlcd to the Geneva aZl'(!c;7:.(>nts on Vietn2.!J., kos, ~nd Ca."bodi<:1. cmd cO:1sidcl'cd these ael'Ce::lCnts as a leGal basis fo2' the r,acr.::d ,md invi01<:1.01e n~tional interests of the people of the t.hree. friendly countries.


IIPresident Johnso:lls' 7. April speech is full ~f irreconcilable contl'adict:i.ons bet",cen the deceitful "lords and. the cl':bi:lal acts of the U.S. GoV'crn.ucnt in Vietnam. iJS mViiS

112. President Johnson swke C'. lot ,,-bvut South VietTI:>::!l s bdcnendence: South vi€:t~ITi r:ot be cc-..:r.cC to a.~y -for·d.::;;l-·Jntcn·cntiono-; "b-oUi1d to any alliar'tce a:1d ,dll not allo,'; C:..1-"y cOtmtry to set up its u:iJ.itn.ry base there. Roo·rever, it is the U.S. if;1~c!'ia.list::: ,·;ho are see}:ins at 2.l1 risks to cling to South Vict:v::~. and have inc!'.:::ased the nu::~ber of U.S. c('l~bat units in South VictnC'..-:l and the T,l,:-:ibe. of as[;!'essive acts ~zainst 1;0Z'th Vietnc.:n in an atte:lpt -to cling to South V:i..etn<,~"!\. It is crystal clear that the U.S. Govcrr;lcnt is v:agir.g this aggressive "':a:- c.sai::st. South Vietn2.::1) but it has braze•.!y accused North Victn2':l of bei...;g the C'..[;E;!'essor. Pres1.dent Jolmson st2.tcd in his speech that I:-(:e ,·:ill not ,dthdrai'; Flolicly or ur.der a7'.] (i·;ord indist:L"'lct) cti:::'ee;acnt. 1I This b!'azcn. statc:ner.t has cc::-.?leJ.;.cly laid bare the U.S. policy on Vietna. It is a threat to -..:o::-ld public opinion.


b:i1l:i.o:"l dol1i:.!'s. b~t 19~:£.C?££.~s ~o the southc.:l.st Ash:!2_p.9::>P+cs. The U.S. mpe::"ialists arc reall:: the Cl'eators of a..U dan:;cr of· ~':ar in Victna;n, Laos, and other places. They have co:;:.:nittcd considerable Cl'i.'":'linal acts t;>.nd hnvc twcn used toxic eas not only in the ,·,oar, but. in· the repression of anti-U S. people in the urbXl centers •


. "4. Presidc:::\t Joh:l50n threatened to continue the use of force. This· threat can.'1ot £iEh~en us. -'i'he lhetna£cse people are dctem.i.i'''!cd to fight and ,·:in. Tncy are not afrdd of an;:,. difficulty or ene.~ly. As they arc suffering defeats, tho U.S. imperici.ists ~-:ill ccrtai.11.ly be dcfeG.ted co:npletely. As the U.S. Goverr,,';'lent has been urged by public op:L"lion the . .:orld o'fer and in the United States to l-:ithd::.'a'.'/ its troops f1'o::1 South Viotna.:';'l and put an end to the \jar against the De.';'lccratic Rcp~lblic of Vietnam, President Joh,.'1S0n '\';as obliged to utter de:-;!aGo£;ic . . :orc.s, and these ";ere only maneuve::'s or tricks amed c;t deceiving public opinion and appc.?si:lg the increasinsly ":idcsprcad and vigorous opposition in the United States a.'1d· tha r:orld oVer to the ljar of aggression in Vietnam. "SO, our VietTI<!:nese people aTJd the lro~ld I s people 1:!tlst heighten their vigilance a&ainst the U.S. imperialists I ne~'r acts of ,,:ar and, at the sa.-ne time, against their dcce:"i:.ful mo\"e to intensify the Hal' under the label of peace and negotiations and to slander other people as .'mrmongers ••••

lilts sound progra:!l constitutes the barL.'1cr of unity and struzgle for national. salvation ••• ,·lith a vie;', to achicvi.!g independence, d e.;':lOC racy, peace,· and neu- . trality in South.Vietn2m, and'eventual peaceful re~"l.ification of the countr,y. The statement of 22 Uai'ch 1965 of the front is resounding in the flOrId as tho strong voice of a people deterir.ined to fight a'1d to ";in, ·the voice of justice, the voice of the just cause of the Vietn~~ese people a."l.d of the present epoch •••• liThe Govern.i1ent of the DRV sternly excoses a."l.d denounces to cc:.roatriots in the l-:holc country and to the peoples of th~ ";orid the. neff, e:-::trcmely' serious 1-Tar a.cts of the U.S. iilpcrialists: on the one hand the la.t ter are intensii'yiP.g the a&&ressive . . ;ar i..'1 the South, a.."1d on the other they are launching air and naval attacks on the north. US MOVES

'roy engaeing in this highly da~~erous military adventure, they stupidly hone to CO~·i' O:1r 'Oe07.lJ.e a~d also ir,t5;::idate 7.leaCc-lO·l; 'is Eo...e~r:::l~mts and peonles ··h .... m·· h ... 1 ---)l1 " e lror.La. lne;~")e t.na~ our ~eo7.l 0 and the 'Ccc.oles of tho ',Tc-:-ld 'foill fli.'1ch out of fear) and thus they \·d..U be in a position to shift -from a w~ , .. ----.... --.--..---~o a s~ror~ pos~~on. -~'---r-


IIBut in the f"co of their n(i..: aCG!'c::;sivc nets, the Victnr::lCse PCOi)lc froi:! the south to the north n!'c '-:i.!Gin.J an an til<: Morc resolute strllm:1e, and the ,-:orlci I s peoples .:1·C cx;:'c~ding ~:; <:an all th.; To,orc v:i,[;or0<15 stli)?Ort. It is clem' that still heavier defea.ts arc in store for the U.S. :i.;npcrici.ists ••••

liTem years aGo the F':'cnch Expcditiom~!'Y Corps, in spite of its 200,000 crnck troops, ended in defc~.t at Dien Bien Phll. A U.S. cxpcdition(...:.·~r corps \-Till inevitably r..eet ,-:ith the s.:::l.e i,gnc::liniotls fnto in South Vietn::,-':l. For their part, our southe:ncc::'lpatriots are preparc~ to fisht '-;ith dctcr;:.in<:~tion, to fight to the end, and to i'ir;?rt until not a sinGle U.S. soldier is <,.rry 10:1ger to be seen in our cou;-.try, even i f they .:ill have to fiL;ht for 10 or 20 years or 1::ore, anci hoxcvcr gre~.t their difficulties a.'1d hardf3hips r;.ay be (22 i{arch

:...... ...... 0':' t'ne 1965 S\.lave.:!.e!1~

'-"'LSu) y.


Il\-;hile intcnsifyi.'1g the e.ggressive \-;2.~ i . . 1 South Vietna.-a, the U.S. :ir.tpericiis t.s are eA"}x~:.dil13 it to the i:orth .-:ith th0ir air force on the grounds that tho D~tV is at the origiJ:l of the p.:triotic strtl,1g1e i.."1-South Vietne,;:t. These arc obviously i;npudent acts and pcri'idouz tricks of corsairs ••••


liThe entire people of the nor~h, united a.s one, C.re deterrn_:i..'1cd to struggle in a sclf-sacrificlr<; spirit to dei'eat aU enc:ny a;gre3sive sch€:<les, to dofcnd the north, a.'1d, norc closely than eYe!', to sta::d side by side ,-lith our southern 'co:n?c:triots and l-/:101chea:rced.ly sapf>ol'c, their liber.::.tion struggle till finil victorj. urn 1ayiJ".g h~ds o_n the north, the U.S. flamO:1gers cxpose thc'::selvcs not only to \·:ell-descrycd counterblo~-;s i11 the north, but also to still more te11.ing blo.-;s in the south, as 1';as pointed out in the 22 i-ic.x'ch 1965 statc:::ent of the libora.tion front: liTo defend the beloved north, the ar:-::ty ami people of the south have vented their fle~cs of erser at the U.S. aggressors and their agents. If the U.S. l..:lp,;rialists lay hands en the north of our fathcrl<>.nd oncc.1 the amy and people of t.he south are resolved to f.trike bdce or three t:imes as hard at -the.-a ••• UIn +h .: '-5· • U''''' ... t 0 ... cS e -cll'CU; ..... ar.ce s.1.h .1 v.o r.;.ore .~. .I.re!1z~ed ... vne n:LvCQ S'""a...... es a...... ... vE;;!1pvS cxte:1d the .-;m· to ~~or-th Victna."it, the nora disastrous ~-:ill be their defeat! An a:1ti-U.S ...-rave of i.~dLsnatio:1 is no~·: surging up in the r;or1d. The govcrr..-:te:1ts and people of tee socialist cour.tr·ies, natio.;.alist cO'U1'1trics, bte!'national organizations, peoples the ...·o::-ld ovcr.1 er.a progressive circles and various social strata in the United. States itself are cxtendine an ever Ir~ore resolute and vigorous S~PPO!-t a::.d assistance to our just struggle •••

IIToday riC arc rauch stro:16cr tha.'1 beior.:!J strong in the north, strong in the and strong in riorld.-;ide su:;port. For their pa..-t the U.S. i'i!pedalists e.rc



bein3 bogged c.o~·.n :in South Vietn",i\ ar~d c:1countcri,'1g great difficulties in various fielcls in I,l<tny places. Tnat is ,·:hy om' people arc all the mo~c heichtc!".in.g their ,·;ill <tnd deter.:lination, arc a:l:L,,::ated uith even ereater enthusi'lsa .:.n.d confidence in their just and ccrtaillly victcriou5 struggle, and arc rC:iolvcd to devote all thch forces to cU'ive the U.S. aggressors out of our countl'y, to defend the north, to liberate the south, to eventually build CI. pC.:lcci'ul, reunified., ir,c.cpcndent, dc;nocratic, and p!."ospcrou5 Vietnam, and to contribute to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and the ...rorld •••• FRONT

11~.e. yt<ol~_.E.~?ple.

ot::J'Jle ~~th _"_r.~~!!!Q.y.-!:£?p.~lr~~1'!gJ~.?j:!.h~~ta~~-a~It~

o.Lt.hQ...~:?~~?XJ.}.;~L~hq, ...~t:~t..c"::E:!t....9J~_i!0.9.3iq~n~~_Ef!.t?}Qr}·~:'lcLJ)::'Q.n"t-, they


sir.!ultancously ccrryi.."1,3 out p!'oduction, fighti."1g, and co:ab:lt preparations, aeterrained e.G t.hey m'o to do their best to build and. defend' the north a."'1d to extend ":holehearted support to 'the cr~use of the liberation of the south. In the ptesent juncture, ill social strata and all citizens must rlerk more l-lith a higher sense or Ul'e;Cll.cy a,,'1d higher p!'oductivity. Everybody must, according to his capacity a.'r'ld strcnsth) r.~:e his most effective contribution to the com.";1on cause of the country.

"In·the process of production and fightin~J the administration in the north ";ill be ever more consolidated and ever stronger. The northern part of our cOWltry, the DRV, l-Till bring into play its graat :impact as the base for the liberation of South VietnC';n and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland • ••• US


is that in ~~e!lt .~op.th~}..1!!. ha!? be~ de~}~ l'::id~~_2:e~ose the U.S. j,,':merialists 1·:ho are ste-:)oing un t1'!c ,·mr of an;~rcssion in Sout.h V:Lctna.it and inc:rc?s.irlg J..~~~].'_.c;£'~.2_9l_..!!:.a;:3sc:.i;~·(-E9.r'~C; "yictn~-:t:This-u:oYcnent includes a great ml.":lbers of' A:;lCrican peo?le from all ,·:alks 'of life -- "lorkers,youth, l-:omcn} students, intellectuals, religious people, conercss~en, ~~d journalists. The struggle foms have gradually beco::te stronger ar.d more abundant.... . I~~at c~~.c~2~~_~.<?_'p"~_£~d and..!:~husias.!-ic:

thtiQ).J·e~'37,at~s ~!:.SeJ.f. ?__ l!;g~!1t.

IIDear cern'ace deput.ies of the !?ational Asse:::bly) the anti-U.S. struggle of our people has received never-before-seen 'sy<:":pathy ~"1d 'r:ide support fro-it the people. in the ":orld, fro::!. frater!1cl socialist cOU!-ll;ries to people fro:n all '\-ralks of life of various ~':cstcrn cOil.""'ltrics, includ:L'8 the United States. This is an event havir.g ~, internC'.:tional meaning of great i T:J.porta.'1.ce ••••


~J:ft~~~_~O t~y_~o {t·:i~~.2.~~~t_<:.:1:i t<?..-£~-~G.~ bl{!£k ~n~~U:b~~te.!

thc!-~?,r thi.:~l' h~~yc


1iber~tio~ ~~r





to_ tht'


FOl:SX':!-}ll!l.c,J+ bccaus. c the B!1V h.;!5 cal'sc_Q.

in the south.

"1-[e must UT.';'lask the U.S. azgr.::ssors l...."1 tilJe and vi[;ol'ously tmd sharply because thcy ~rc used to stcalin,:; \-:l1i1e cryins for help. i-;e must u~-;akcn thcl'iorld1s people to these disho;lest trick::: of the U.S. bandits. C~rc Iii'lst be tahn ..:hc:1 they speak of love z.."ld ju.stice because they surely \-:ant to get in a house -\dthout having to break dC'\';-n the door. I: ••• '


V!~\ ulUJf}!OJ::'Z:~Jn S'lt.~.'i.?:.:~;!:7 R=~JSC'.rII:G



I:O~,;-:;t\T·.LG:;3:J I~~IO:; !1.P.i.T~~~L

(Vi::'\. O?Oo.QC:?5t 2. sto.J.;e=lcnt A?r:i.1 19) 1965 in Sn;:;li5h i~~ich :l t had bc·~n Uaut!1ori~cdlt to issue r~jcctin;; tile lfl r:on-Alig~1cd Irn"'vion ep?~a.l p~~5z:!d at the Bel~~:a~lc r.:~etin5 of nO!l-c.li[;llCCL cot:....T'J.tric5 on i·~rch 15, 1965. '.i:he Ife.u~.;horizo.tion\l ~ .. ~ "r5 ) lIas oy ~!l~ l·JJ1:r..S vry 0""J. ~~o· :.~el.En .h.l.:.;a_ • ...


., ...







UIn poin'~ of fact} since 7 Api'il 1965} the U.S. ir.llx~ria.li5ts have introci.uced. into Sou',,;h Vietne::; ·~'.lO more oo:l:;talions of U.S. ~·:a.rir.es tot~..ling 3)000 :nen alld a lro'[;e QlJ.G!ntj.',,;y o~ r.!oa.Cl'n i·:ce.,ons. /u:!Crica.n ;:.ircl'aft haVe continually bo::,bed i:\any tmms aJ~~ ·vi.lle.ges) so·.ring so r;luch r.10ttrninG cnd dc:vcs'.;o.~,,;ion in both SO"J.th and !:ortl1 Vietn:;:;l. It is cl~<:.r that Jo::':130n ts speech is but a smol;;cscreen to .coyer up the U.S. inr.9~rie.J.ists t ne~·T militexy advcnttD:~s in Vietncr;,) directly jcopardizi;-ig pea.ce and security of the peoples in this area. liTo settle the Vietn~:l :pror)lc::l at present, the only correct ',.'CoY is to carry out ·the points la.id CiOi;."1 b~r f!!:Y ?rc~;:i.e~_?na:~·-VanDO:-1t; O!L$j~piI:1.1925.:

"H is the uns'.:crvi~S"yoliS:" of t?le J!.?;J Govcr:'_-:'.~!t j!..o_?j~;::i.:~:~:Ly_:t:~SP~9.t. the 1951, Go!1CV~_ .~Gre,?0~nts 0!l.Yi~--=.;!"!£~~!!(l--=~Q3_Q.!].'ectl::::.j·9'Ole::~ej1~...:.;nsir.J?~.~~9 provisio~s a.s c;-;:bodie:i :!on tte fo~~O'.rhJl:i2?Qi.~§..:. Ill. Reco,g.d.tion of the basic natiom',l rights of the Viet::l8.::lese people: peace J indep:.m:lence J sovereisnty J unity) and 'lierri toria1 intcsrity. According to the G~neva. agree:l8nts) the U. S. C-overr!;-:-l<:n t r::ust \rlth::ll'C\-T fro::l South Victnarn all U.S. t:r·oops} r.rllltz.ry person::.·:;l, ~cl "CaTIOnS .of 2.11 kinds, disr::a.ntle aJJ. U.S. military '":lases tnere, cancel its r~ilitary !lllia.ncc .rlth South Vietnam. It must end itspo1icy of inte~Ye~tion ~T'J.d aggression in South Vietn~1. Accordir~ to the Geneva azreC~e~tsJ tne U.S. Goyern~ent ~~st stop its acts 01'. rIa.!' acainst j';orth Vietl~e..-:lJ co::-,pletely cea.se aD. e!lcroach-nents on the terri tory and sovereig:::..ty of t~e D3.V.

112. Pend ins ':.;hc peaceful rC1.:nification or ViCtTk'1:<l) ,;hile VictnO::l is still t~:r,po::'·(.~::-ily tii'Tided int!:> t~-:o ZO;:C5) the r:.ili t!~.:r:r provi~iol1::; of the . 195h Ccn.:!vo. e.2;::.'cc::.cnts on Victml.::'. ...ust be strictly l'c~pccted (.:hil~?) the t'iO z.ones r.lUst l'cfrain f"ro~ll joinir~ e::.~y tri.li tD.ry allie,lice ,ri~h forciGn countl'ics j there rust be no forc:i.(:n ::tiJ3....;nry bo.sc" I troops I m~tl 1;-J.D. to.ry pel'::lOnncl in their :rC5~Ct1Vi:! territory.

"3. ~'hc - intern3.1 Rffairs of South Vietn~.l:1 nus-:; be settled by the South Vic"'.:.no.::,e5C p~o.?lc tn.:::::scl\"es in accordance .;1 th the If?rSV proBra!':lJ w'ithout fOl'cir;n interference.


114. The peaceful reunificction of Victnr'-"1 l.S to be settled by the VietIl$.l:,ese people in 'ooth zones) v;i thout a.'y foreien interference.

"This stam1 unquestionably enjoys' the approval and support of all. peace- and jus':,;icc-10v-.Lr!G GOyern:;lcnts <me. :peoples in the '-lOl'ld.·


._----------_ _----_. __

IITne D:W C-ove::.'n:"(?!1t 'it> of the vie'vi __ that th~ abovc-c:-:vou!1dccl stand is... -----------_. .. .---_."'._-.If. tnis o2.:;is :i,s reco~nized) i'~vo::.·o:olc condltio!1s irill be cr.::o.tcd i\n' the n22.CCD'iJ. ~c-fflc:;:c!1£ of .Jl~ victni;-nroblC;-:l-~.nd i t-~6.il-hc- '~o~~iolcjQ' .:----.-.-'--.-. - - - -.. ._". _. . 0.----. - .. --.. - . - -:cons:tc.cl' -.;n(! reCOllY;:;::J.n.; 01 e.n :tntc:t'nc.tJ.ol:al co!1i'erence ~l'l the tla~-.:;ern of tge 192~G~lleVc. c021i'crC!!Ce on Viet£e!.l. - . ~ ..r~!:e b~S~~~l~ ~l:.c s~~~~~~~_?Q.~J:y.:!:c:~~1_.9C~!;~~_:-;9rLt_Q):'_t;.l~ v:ic.:tl1~~:1_!JA.Q1).1t;m, --.---.~-----._;.- ~-




-4 -



"Tne mv Govern.o;,ent dccl~'es t!?~::; e~~ror-.c:l~ cont-=:::EY. to !l~e above _stand 2E j.r~a~,~.~on[.~.§~~j 2.!l:r aUE1·o~c11 tr:!!~c.in:; to ~9.S;tlrC a U.l:!. ~n~~.r.1:~r~kl.9l).. in the Yiet':!E.~ silur:.ti£."1 is els'2.~}:!:§'2~~.?tc J becD. use suer! Cl)l)rOaCncs 8.l'"C basically at v~iaI~cc 'I-,i ~.;h the 195 ir Geneva. a81'Cci!:cnts on Vietnal:l. t'Among the 11 cO'J..'1tries ,·;hich sent representatives to the meeting hel,l . Bc.,..c;raa.e .... O~ 15 ,. '19'-05, so:ne . . . no',;. Sl.en , 'tne . . apJ!:;al l.ssucd . -oy thJ.s ., J.n ,·.Coren o.d Iileetin~. Others J ,,-no signed It because they t.;ere not accurately ini'onued a.bout the bloody l:ar pTovoE.ed in South Victna:;l by the U.S. ir.11X!r:ta1ists and the letters I :pil'at:i.cd attacks ae;c.in.';t the mvJ have nO~7 ShO"n'n umnllinzness to suP?ort thc.t appeal •••• 11 -

(The !~h~n D<1~ editorial T.:<1!'}:s a 5t::'cI'10thcaing of the DRV cha'!'<~ctcrization of the 1:?I...SV role in South VictnC'.;n, rnarkin,:; it out as the lIonly" genuine rcpl'cscnt<.ti\"c" of the ......... MUS\:,. h ., . e • fl South Vietn<1'":l.csc peoD1 e .mJ.c • ave 11'4 1(.5 dCC~ZJ.\"C VOJ.C The follo~·:in6 c:·:t.racts fro;;t the cditori~J. ,,;crc broadc<1st in E!li;lish by Hanoi Radio April 21, 1965.) IIFro:a a place in tho liber<.ted area in 501.:.th Vietna.'7l, on ;>.2 l·~arch 1965 the epic :;tatc.T.c:"):~ of the !:FLSV Centra]. Co::-::tittcc ";;:,5 broadca~t allover the "'orld.. ~'jithin only a rJlonth, this appeal for n~tional salvation has r<.pidly 'Won a broad a."1d po~·;erful respo;.sc th::'ouShout Vidn'::;il. )D_th~L!"iQl:j.\l..)_th!3 voice of the }!PLSV is the dcdsive one in thc_ set~1£~c:·i1:...-C!.Lth~_So~~~£l:..S~~t!!€:~_ -'11 of .man QUcst.J.on, one 01 t,ne POS.., If:lpOr,,anG qucs..,J.ons at. preseD" on ,'.1·'lJ.'c'n1 a..L. 1.iCind is-focusing its attention. ... •

- : ; ' - ' : - , - - - : ; : - . - - -...- - - : . - - - '




Ir;'iith its just cause of national liberatio<l a!~d its correct line of resistance for national salvation, tho i~:?IJSV h2.S _£_~_n'(.¥'~~1y.lsd th~_§~Y.1·!l Vict,n~'''e5c ue:mlc fro::1 one vict.or': to ar;other. At nrcso:1t., over thrBc--fourths of th;··tcrrIt.o;~y t·..;o:thirds"·~fth~ S~uth 'Vietn<:':~lc:):; "cO;lt:[1tio:1~_hav~_Qc.QI} ll.berat-cd-.-Thc·-Yl:ont h~~s-'actucllyb~,co;~;c' th--;-o'!~C:ll"li-;'~;-~~d guide of all of:- the life of the: 9 millio<l people -1n tho liberated arc2.s, ,·:hUe the pccpl':} in areas under the tc-aporary cO:ltrol of the enl?'::lY are constC.'.nt1.y turning their thoughts to the front and respond.ing to and c2.rrying out all its policies. The front Is prestige in t.he ;wrld is ero~·;ir;s daily. 'The fre:'1::' a"1d the m:;.ss organizations affHi?tcd ,-;ith it have c:>kblished rel.?tions ,·:it.h htmdrcds of international and national org<'_'1j.za.tio:1s in the ,·;o!'ld. It XLs_e_tj:up__


-facets -

repl~~cnta~ivc Ol'.s_~m iZ2-:,?~€":~!;)~_c.9.:uQyr~.~E_.i.tLAs.ia..J_.~~~:'99_?..!._1\;:r;l..c.a..J_.?-nd_.L.1-t~1'"':.

P.:ncrica. 'i."'he front I s Central Co:,~,littce has re,sularly excn2J1gcd letters and mCssagcs- \-lith the govcrmlents and state leaders of many countries. , liThe foundation day of the front, 20 DecC::lb~r, has becc:ae one of the anniversaries to \·;hich progressive people and political circles in mar,y countries are Pnyin8 great lnportance. On the l'ostrulls of variou3 international conferences of r.tc.ss organizations, the voice of the front I s delegates is regarded by all as thr.t of a vcliant fighter on the front line agai.'ls"i:, U.S. • • ., • "'. .....LS·· • .. ' .....' d t'no I.l ,. 1 t lmpCr~tw..lsm. Inc l· .~r V reore3cr:t..;at.J.v9--f~,:,_~_~!:;5'&._ r:~lR£Q;~n!Jse .F~~9jl. P..~ conference last reoru[:'!'L....£,:'1Q t~ecE:;:t l_Qih cr:,[9·ve::£.m~X-9f ~h~~?-np.w"1g.9..~tl­ -ference as the only ~crlUine rc~resentative of t.il.{L!J;;!'9..ic SQ.1.).:ULYj,et.nam.es~ .peonle. IfFaced .-lith the grea.t prestige of the IJrL'5V, the U.S. :imperial:i.sts and their lackeys arc extrt;:;:e1l frightened. In an atte:npt to overshadow the front1s role, the U.S. aeeressors have endeavored to doll up the Saigon puppet . . .... ~' ... .I."ney • ' 1 e t 0 C.C h ~cve ' . 1-' goa..t.. - 'I Ch' aamJ.nJ.s"ra: ... ~on. BUv ....~ill never b e ao t,.iCl1' .<lJ.r;na.'"1 A. N. Ko~:-:.gin decl~e~J..2d2:y_~ve~::'b9.S7 m1.J...s_t sec t!!,at the ~·rFi~~Ehich... is_ lead~fL..tJJ~~~u tll..y;he~1?-a7':c~.e.. ~eC?P.1~' e. _ ~:t.~~ee~~).. .t.:'3_~_;'_c..~_J_~tc~=-!ih~£lL9:~_~id£s .!.be .p-rQ.s~l}t as ,·:el1 ?S t:-!~ i'u~1.g'E of _S2~1-h_Vi.~tllA?_ Er€',':!ie:r...9hc1.1 En-l~d he.s on ma.1"lY occasions as~ertcd th~t the 1;:"151/ is the orJ:] leg~ rcprescntativa--


of the South Victnc:::t popu.latio:l, r....'1d the Chines:;! people fil..r:ly rc:;pond to 5c:1d to the South Victn(';:lcsc people all natc~'ial aid to defeat U.S. ir.merici.is::!. President Sw.arno has very correctly l'(.::lt--rked that no";)ody rcgar(ls t!le Sdeon rc.:;:i.!:lc as ~ government. It is the United Sto..tcs \-:hich is occupying Saigon.

-thc-22- !·;ardl-s·f~t·c.;cj1t-·of··thc -f·;nsv and ..:;ill

liThe role and mission of the I·:n.SV have been entrusted by history and recognized by a.U t.h~ Vietnr-;,:csc people ar.d people all oyer the 'I-;01'1d. Just as the !;?ISV Central CO::-:;'littcc dccl2o-:.'cd in its cc:;~~u,'1i(lue of 15 Aor:iJ., any settlc.:tcnt of tfic-South 'Vietr;;';-'Ot,-cstion- l:,ili-lose itn •pra~iTc'ai-~nd 'DOsit'iva !!lc~:.~!~~·-fr-it is un':icr£~}:c.'-iJ~h9tt("tl."'Q=-pa~t:~~j_~at:iQn~oLth~:as.\~-·'·-·· ctccasive role. . . 'IThe U.S. imperialists cmd their lackeys a::-e stubbornly intensifying and expandine their "1-:201' of q;zrcssion in SOi.tth Viet!1C:~. They lTill ccrk.inly receive nore telline b10...·:s fr9:;'( the l;PLSV and. the 14 million South Vietnamese people. The front has clc.:lr1y dci'in'cd its stand:


liThe South Vietn<3..':1cse people and their ar'l.'1cd fOI'ces arc rC501ved never to relax the:i.r gl'i» on their al'i:1S so lon~ r..::; they h2.ve not reached their goals: independence.) dc:nocracy) peace, <,.nd neutrality ••• , ~I1d e.l1....neeQti::. 3!·t.~~1}i}...E.i.t11.. t.b.c__U_.§.. __ j;:lp'~!;'.i_~.:t~s.t.~u.~:Lt.hiq,...!":<.Q0~n:La1:~ ..cnt;i1:o1s.. ..us.e.lc3,s..if_.1hpy _ _ _ .• _refuso _ _ _ _ _ _to _ • __ _ _ _South _ _ _ _ Victnc::.";l _ • __ ... __ _ _.?~l ... _ _ ._,_ ••• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .--- __ .0_- •• cUl _ , __•• • ••• _ stin ,·;ithdra-,.l fro:::, their troops and kinds ___ . ______ . ____ .0-~d ____ . ___ ._____ _ . ___ ._____ _.. _.. ' .. _. ___-.__if . ____ ... _. _still .. __ . ___ of 'tic,!' Bat.eriel mC2..1~S - -. . __c..."ld those of._.the. ".;,<ltcllites thc~: do_ ... d' 1 11'" , . .., S· 17' > • ~ ... '\. t . t t~ , "1 ~~ ..?:~~~c!:'~'."£_':::: __ -,=E.~:!.:r r;'l..Lh2~_~<::"~§__~!.l:_.o~~vn _'.=!-~~!l~~)~1:1__ ~ .. ~~ _ r~ .E.:t:s. .. ~_~ surrender' the South Victnc:.-::cse 'Oeon10 IS sacred. rir;hts to indE:l)er.dBnce a.."1d dc.~oc"l:~.g;...y to-·f11-~-U.s.-£-::;-c£.iiji~f5~=~~~i__:G::'~ib:~:.....i:1i:;~!1 =-1h~~Q.~i,1Y-=gQiiU:lnc__ _ rcprcse:nt.:.t.ivc of the 14 miU5.on SOi.:.th Vi_9t!l~'C;;c PBoDle--·does 1)07. b~y'CL.i..t§ . o:eciSi'YC-vo'ice. II ~




.l. •


(On July 10, 1965 Eort.h Victn~1I=l. released a u\-J'nite Paper" on IIUS Aggression and Int0l'vC':ltion in Victnanll 1·:hich had been prepared by the mv Foreign j·;inistry. The timing of l'elcase of the ,·rhitc paper t·!<l,S rdatd. to the 11th anniverso.ry of the siening of the Geneva Agrec:ncnb on Vietnarr. on July 20, 1954-, but the p3.pcr itself ~·:as prep<trcd in !.j,.;~y, 1955. The full text of the p.3.per ,·:as released by Hanoi VI;;i. in English July 16. The v:hite paper is divided int.o six chapters. 1 2

:3 4

5 6

First US intervention in Vietnam. Second US Ll1t,cl'vcntion in Vietnam, systelr:1.tic sabotage of the 195~' Geneva aereemt:nts. US e.l'l:tcd agGression usains'.:, South Vietnam. The United States l,nmchcd air and naval attacks on the

DRV. The so-called 1-1ill for peace of the aggressors. The sound b:i.sis 'for a scttlel1":8n-t of ~hc Vietnam problem.

Excerpts from chapters V;':o, three, four and five and the full text of chapter six are given belm·l.) Chapter 2 tI, •• The U. S. policy' of into:cvention has t~'all~pled upon the deep aspira tions of the people of South Vietml.!ll an~l of all Vietna.:n for peace) u..11.ity, indepo:ldcnce, and dernocracy. Even the rights to life and peaceful labor have not been rC3pectcd by the ruthless fasdst dict<l.torial policies of the Ngo Dinh Die;;). achninistration. Therefore, exercising their rights of seli'defense and self-determinlr.ion -- i·:hich are the inalienable rights of all peoples -- the undaunted South Vietna.:a people have resolutely risen up against the U.S. imperi<l~ists and their agents.

liThe patriotic m~ve;r;ent in South Vietnam has rapidly developed into a mightly tidal t-:ave t·:hich threatens to st·:ecp ai·:ay the positions of the United states and its agents. Once again the U.S. policy of intsrvention in South Vietnam has sustained disastrous failure ••• 11 Chapter :3 .


I~?ut the_ heroic South Vietn-am ps?.plc hay~ ·_risen .1.1}). .in.a.rl~s. against the a~?cssors for ~8.~io::al ~2.1vation and self -lib~rati(ln. Theirs is a thorou2:c::~ c ', G"'-e-"" --l'''e''''~'''''s ~'ld +0 h -~ull''1 -'-}1e ..'9 ..v.;u-l. ",,,.5"'",',--1'0 ". "::'''7.- '-hie ~.,--.- ... --• •C"l'l"or"''' ~":'''_ .. "'0 ''' .. _", - ~~_""::d :'<;' .e.;';~;::..:.:L<::::::- _.c;., v





liThe front has succeedod in rallyinG ove:n broader pa t.riotic forces to the strugr;lc apinst the U.S. ulpcrialists and their South Vietnam ·agents. Our southern compatriots, ,·;no enjoy the bro?.d syr.1pathy and vigorous 'support of the peoples of t'he socialist countriE:s and peacelov"ing people throughout the ,,:o:rld, havo scored increasing victories. '"~£, d' __~, ',r'rs,f h • 1 '1 ~ ~ ~. ~.... .l''' t' •• v ~.e ~!!:'._"_,_•. as_Z~~S~.S.Q;~r9_""O ._O;L... f:.ogr:::lll"nS..9~ ...l.D,? •.. el~{:+1·.Qr~. and J.O £lill_~<?r:U?§q?J._~ j_.tt.~t.~~, ,3}:;'o_-:,tht~Qs.._o,L..th.c_ ..popul~ :ti~~-:.~n_.S.o~,i;h Vietmm. It hels bcco:r!e a 'CO:'lel'l."ul force '\·:hich h::.s a decisive voice in




_.. -_ .... ,,'- -_." --. "'.

liThe front is enjoying gro~..d.ng prestige in the t·:orld. It has successively established official reprcsent,ltions in Cuba, JUgeria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, China, and the Soviet Union. It bas also est-1.blishcd a perir,,'l\1cnt represent-a tion to' t!1e Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council in Cairo and a pCnL1.nen~ observer ncar the executive cornmittce of the International Union of Studen~s in Budapest. "Its delegat.ion have be'on \·rarlllly Helcolilcd to various intcrnation:?l conf'ercnce5, uherc the:l ;',0re reearded as the Eenuin;; represent::. ti ves of the South Vietnam pC0PJ.C. In particular, three r.-:ajor international conferences l':erc rcce!ltly held to express the ,·:orld people's full support for the patriotic movmne.1.t in South Vj.etnan. They a.re: the meeting of the Interna.t:ional Tr.tde Union Co",;nitte~ for Solida:-ity Hith the Harkers and People of South Vieballl, held in Hanoi at the end of October 1963; the International Conference. for Solidarity I'lith the People of Vietn2.11l. Against U.S. Il:,perialist Aggression and for the defense of peace, held in Hanoi in Nover.iber 1964; and the Indochinese People I s Ccnference held early in ioiarch 1965 in Phnom Penh. CO!1'~7tittees for solidarity ,·;ith the South Vietnam people are being set up in an increasing n1.t':iber of oountries ••• ;: Chapter


lIThe quesl.~on no 10:lger is 'Hhether \-lar ;is beini: lost, but hm·[ fast the United S~tes and South Vietnam are losing it and, 'Hhether there still is any flimsy hope of saving the situation.



'~!1 an at..tE?2'-:>t to find a ~·;av o.~_91_thj.s crumtJJ..DZ_P.Q..s...itiQili......:b1;e United St3.tes plots to exte!1G. the ,':ar ceyond South Vietna'-!'s b0rders.

tlSince carJ.:t 19~!.;. t~~ ~§. rulin[; ci~2].e!; i~_~7asnin~t0!1 h~t'"e e~vis~f.Ej carrying the :.:?.':' ~o j'hrth iJiQ.;.Itrt.~. l':~~Y pl;-.ns hav·~ bsen r.-:ap?ed out by the U.S. strategists in tne state Depart::.e:1t.and the Pent;.e;on. Note~·:orthy

is clan no. 6 \·;orkcd out by \·b'l.U:Jf •.. R:Q.~t9}·;, _th~.. poli.cY.Rl?nn~r__o:Lthe U. S': Statc- Depii'~~~e'nt~: "~~'l'~~s...p.lfl.TL.Q.m~~~~ze.s ._three. stages.:. ..:.. lirst_stage:. n~~~i~~Q!.~i.t-ig;·~Q.£Ji~~.2h.Qr: £i..PQl't ;__~.g.99:n..c1.§y.'lEc :.___rla \~l_ ~,t b.G};p_o!.l.JJor.th. Vietn~m coastal i~st.3.Jj.at~9.ns; and th1rd~R-.R~~.l:.J)Q::lqj.J:l~~oJ·_}J.9J:.iilL Vietnanl •••

"These are cynical prc!Ilcdiatcd "Jar activities, brazen violations of the soveroienty and territory of the DRV, undeniable violat.ions of the 19~' Geneva agree-:nents on Vietnam and all nom,s of international la'". They pose a heavy threat to peace i.'1 Indochina and southeast Asia. That is the reason "-'Thy the U.S. air and naval att:..>.cks on the territory of the DRV have been sternly cond£lrnned by the peoples of t~e l·:hole i-TOrld and by many governments... '

J lIThe U.S. Gover14ilent bas put fOri·;ard one arGument after another, and published a blue boo1-: and a Khite p-3.per il1 an attempt to cover up its aggression in South Vietnam.

\lSinc~p'rJU9.§.5. ..~ ~~Lr.;:~~ide..Q~ J C?h~~s_on E.~ repea teeny stated that the United St.ates has oo",e to South Vietnam to defend. freeclo!n, to a11m. the people or south Vietnam to guide their mm country in their m·m way. He also has accused lJort.h Vietnan. of aggression against South Vietnam, and he has said th~t the Un;..t~.i...~~Lt.?-..tQ.s iSJeadx._to _~!g?-.gc =l-~ ~'1co:1ditional discussions to find a uea<:.eful suttlem;:mt of the__ ~ar .in Vietnam ••• "After the conclusion of the 195!} Geneva agree,nents, when Vietnam' was temporarily partitioned into t1{o zenes, the South Vietnam people longed to see South Vietnam achieve independence, democracy, peace and 'neutrality. But the United States had set up a fascist regime under the Ngo Dinh Diem brotilers ahd, later on, under a succession of military d;i.ctators, it sabotaged the peaceful reunification of Vie-cnar:: as provided for in the Geneva agree;:;'£:;'1ts. It has brought into South Vietnam nearly 50,000 troops froIll the United states and thousands of mercenaries from a nu.mber of satellite cotL'1tries to i-;age, togct!1er ,-:ith the Sai~on puppet amy, an undeclared t·:ar, thus encroaching on the sovereignty and territory of Vietnam. It is CF3stal clear that the UnitcdStatas, instead of defending freedom, is carrying out an armed aggression in South Vietnam. It does not a110,-; the people of South Vietnam' to guide their o:·;n country in their o~m ~:ay, but is stifling their deepest and most sacred aspirations 'in an att~mpt to turn Soutb Vietnar.'4 into a U.S. li:ilitary base and ne1"type' colony •••



nIt is a fact that u.s. puppet troops arc fighting against the South Vietnam Liberation Ari'iY and p~ple lihich are led by the NFLSV. The.-.l!.tli.:t.eq States talks atout its desira to hold discussion i~i.:th. §.. V.i.C\·I ~o J}n~.~.g apca~~"'u~C-s~TujIo'n--tO-ihe-' S-o~'th- vie~ij!i ·Cii;e·s{~QPJ~ut_~i.;r§E§.i:?§.. J9_ reco~nize the l~FLSV as the sole £9mine r£fOreSel1tat:Lve of the South Vietnam ~--- .... - .....---.~ .... .. ---.-- ..-- ...... -- -...- ._------. --.. -.---~--.--.... ~.--- ........ .........-.. - ... .---.people, It is obvi.ous that the United Stat~"Emi~.J]ej,t.DQ.LR~~P:?-!'J9.r




. neeot~~~_c:n. :OVES

"The U!!~~ecl..§.t,..J.t~s _say'!,_ that.i:~~:@r-ts .~y~~g.~fY.-l __~q:t.tJ,~2~~nt__9Lthe in Vietn:>.l'",J. ·b'J.~':' at the Sa.:'19 tblC it declares tr£it it \·:i11 not l·;ithdra..." ei th a1' oo~nJ.Y__9r P,Q.-:c.\~.l· :t:J1; c;.~Q.il:U?f ~-..A~~ni-q.gf.e~i~asr.~o!n~!i.t~~~:.P..Q~~ ~tq~-_~ttleillent ~l~~~_£.~:rt: inclug,e t::.s. Ktth:ira:;:::?:.t_Qf..1L._S~ __ s.A.t~l:)';t.t~__tr_c_op~ from. South Vietnarl cannot be ragal'ded as such by sOl.md-!":..:!:!lde.=lJ?E9P.}._e.. It on.ly means -{Sa t the Unit.edSt.ites, . .;nich"7 has launced as arr~£d <,.ggression against South Viet.nam, is insolently aSKing the heroic South Vietnam people to lay do. .·m their arms and surrender to those on ~·~hOl; they have inflicted defeat after defeat. This is the kind of negotiations fro;;]. a position of strength repeatedly mentioned by the U.S. ruling circles, from Johnson to Deak Rusk and i·icNarr:ara. But they should not have any illusions about it. The ~dor.dtable South Vietnam people deeply love peace, but ~hey are determined to struggle against the U.S. l.."'1perialist aggressors; never ,·jill they lay do,.;n their arms Ulltil they ,.;in final victory. 1-:ar

tiThe United States sa;r.s t!~t i!:,]·:ants .!9_..§e~~~l£.aceful_set~1.~!!:~ll~ of the \·:ar . in Vietna:n be(!fi1ASe it ..... i·'a:1ts neace b~ ouickJ.'! but . -. . ..-.---.-::.--...• - ..~-to .. '~'--'.. ..... restored . . . . . . ,......... J.t dee:ns J.~ necessa~'v -r.o ~ncrease !.'.3 res'Gonse and. r.ake atu!cks bv .'.J.1'. l'raile Preside::.t Johnson says t:-a:' the United states t·:i11 strive not to extend the hostilities, !·~:c·:ell Taylor, the initiator of the theory of special ~·:ar, ,,:ho is no~·; the plenip.;t,·;;·ntiarJ representative' of the U.S. Govern'ment in South Vietnam for carrying out this kind of ~;ar, hl'1T!tly st.;>Ja-S...tha.t no lir.lit exists b t~_'p'9J.~n..~}?-1 ..fL~s:.?:12·~<t~9.!L~f_~!.!..~:~.r., apd ~t:"t..t . America r.,ay directly erlt~l' th'3 ground fi.f.htin::; if nf:!~€:ssarY~ ,

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ • __


~ ___

.. r _ _ _ •




_ _I



_ _ _•


_____ •

_______ •

_ _ ";


r. • c 'La . 1l"::tn~~ ,-' • J C'.·;xm v De'lCC,


._-'~~~:" \...:0 \'.~'!. ... 1.1,0Q.JIJ-!'"



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V'\---::::;:::: .J..Ct.,. .. ::.:. .. ,i.


C::'j.:.. l,

d' So. ' J' '• ~ ",le U" m. t.e·, .. l.T;:'CS con ':':l.!1UC (,0 ~n ,,~msllX



1"\.·~~":'~-l.-~:::;::-::-~-'::~1-i:-·~-;··"Y:-~~· .~-;-.~-- ,,:)9' -d· . .. -. 1..0 t: ..•.. v_.ll.4 t" ... ~. . . . :...~ ..·.-Lv.... _I.tS c:.J .• .l.O ... Ct.= c;.n '.

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....... -;-.~-----.--:.~--..,;;;....



to i:ort~ \o:l.Ci:.p.3.n. l;l1S r:~'1y lc.:-.et 1:.0 U:llor·~3cc::toJ.c CO:1SD(1l~'.m;::cs. .....---.. ..... -------------._------------.. 1:. clear thu~ t:·;o U.S. af;[;l'05S0rS and '\·:ar::)!1G0~'S ar.:; usinG double talk to cover up their ne..1 dant;crous r...ilit=try adV0!1turcs in this area ••• nav:r








... ..!·O "_,,,_0. S..!·\.r'.v_S


~ .. ;:') 7; ~.41\ . . . .to '1C""': ~,,·i ~ .1.1 ~ "'! .... O''"r.. :''')~ ~\_5 :..l<;:nu-"'.,-..!.2n .... Q,.:..~s~.:.::"nr,_vn"'_.s::>'_'~'i.::..(3~


.!:@-..1'-jn SQ..'l'~h. V:i.C'tr:<"~l.l. stcc:)l.l}.K...!:lO the '@.-1~ of d;;~tr1-1C't.iQ!.1 ,d:ton it~_air: i2r£e a.g~inst l'!ort11 '-.·i.~~na::l, a:nd menaci11g the territ.orial t·:aters of the DRV \'Iith its naval forces, in an atte:::pt tq turn defeat and Hoa}:ness into Victory and strcnp,;th, r;et out of its present i:::pass in South Vietnam, and obtain at the confer~ilCe t..::.ble l·rh5'-t i t cannot dn Oil t!1c battleitili.

IlThe so-called ,·:ill for peace and cconorr:.ic "aid recently mentioned by Johnson are but fa.:r:iliar tricks of psychological \·,nrfare of the U.S. imperialists designt:d to sootnG and. deceive public opinion and cover up their atte;::pt to cxtO!1d. the ,.;;:.1' and enslave the Indochinese a!1d southeast Asian peoples. But such tricks, hm'lcvcr perfidious, can fool no one. The U.S. rulers kno:·J better than anyone else ho'·: many countries have courageuusJ.y l'enounced the noose of U.S. aid and ho~·; r.2ny U.S. personnel'carrying out the Food for Peace and Anian~e for Progress proerams have baen e:x.-pelled from Asian, African, and Latin American countries. It Chapter


tiThe South Vietnar.! Ar..:y and- people, starting i·rit.h almost' b-:.lre hands, h3. vo scored gl'ca t achieve::<e:l'ts, racorded glorious victories, anc. driven 'tne U.S, imperialists and their agents into a corner. L~ an ~ttew~t to retrieve this critical position, the U.S. ir.:perialis:ts are emb;l.rki;g on - ne'·') extrerr..ely dangeriolls r.li.litary advent';.res, thel'eby threateni!1g peace in Indochina and southeast Asia ,lilore seriously th,l.n ever. lIIn its 22 H"..rch 1965 statement, the 1IFISV Central Cor.,,·1ittee e:A-posed the U.S. ~:olic:; of a;:,;:!'e,3s:,o~ G.n(t ~::a-rt derriO:lstratea the inev~t---ability ofL"7!~(;ria.lis;"sl their de£'er'lt, and r."~de cJ.ear its sta:1d on the South Victn-?r.l proble~: • ' -"'-"



tiThe South Vietr,;:.w peo?le and their :.rr.~i2d forces are reZlol'led never to lose hold of their a~s so long as th~y.h~ve not ~c~ched their basic goals, namely, indepcr.G£!nce, dc;;;ocrac~~, peace, and neutrality. The South Vietnam pcop1e a.l'edeter;rd..ncd to go on striking h.3.rd at i;.he U.S. aEe;ressors


'm the Victnap!cse peDDle and ~~he DR'! C-overn:?:£lnt \·:art:!ly r.=:'l.l:.Lg!.:ld

SUl)'::Iort this




st.and of the

~jFL'iV. ----

l1The DRV Governr.:cnt· has ';lh:ays held of the I95t"} Geneva a£ree:;ents on


the correct ir.,-::>le!'i0nt.ation

vTet;a;-iS1h;Correct ~rav-;-f-s-~~Gtii~g_.----_.. --.-

tile-South Viclnam problem.

nOn 8 April at the second session of the third national ASS01:ibly of the DRV, Premier Pham Van Dong once again !J".ade clear the position of . the DRV Govemmen~ regarding the present situation in Vietnam.



''J.he unsHervin~ 'CoUcy of the D~V C-ove:rm:tent is to str~£.tly_.!'Q.s.?_cct the 193~ Geneva agrec,;).ents on Vietnar.l and ',;,0 correctly ilr.Dlc;;;ent their 'bas~; p-l'ovlsions as -e:::.bodied in '~;ie follo:dnF.POin:,(,s:--"Ts~-;- Pham -Van--i)-;ng's 4.points at Tab H~


"This stand \U1questionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and people in the world. liThe DRV Govermnent holds th~t the above-!llenti oned st.:md is the b-::.sis .L" ... .. • J.. . . . . ., ~-,- -~-for vn 0 soundest 'Ool~"lcal se.. v 1 e7r!~nT, 0.. T,ne Vl.e "n;.f,l -orooler:-!. .1.1 ..nls ceSJ.S ~~eDte~ f2~~ibie-conditions wi11 b~ created for the.~~2ceful-settle~-. ] .em an.d :Lv '.L '11' .'1 d .1.' monv 0.1.. th e V"le... nal:l prOb ";1. __ De possJ.O e '"to conSl.~~~~£>E-=, ~ . . ., 1 ~ '" . , . '" 'h 19<::' G ~g 01. an :UlT,ern?'l,lOna com erence oJ. "ne v;roe oJ. ~. eu:± -eneva co!!::.. • ference on Vietnam. ;0


. UN








liThe Govern:tent of the De:nocratic Re~ublic of Vietna.m declares i!b~l a~ E:.:9..'Oroach contrary to tee above st-J.nd is irrelevant, an;'L~To,}.9.h..1Sil-dir:K to a'· U.!:. interventioil i..vl the Viet~r:.:'i sit1.8.tion is also irrelevant, because ~~~h a:Doroa;:es a.re Casica.lly at vari::.nce ,·;ith the 1954 Geneva a;res~~::ilts on Vietnam. Hanoi, Hay 1965.

. 151

D]V GOVsru:: 3!";r ST:\??;:~3!:T O!i F?3SID;~!:r JO!!i~SO!! I S --JUrY2b) 1965 F:~~3S CO:';Z::~:i:C;~ S'L\'l'E:·~~l-;rl' (Follmdn~

Prczic.cnt JohnSO:1 I S press confCl'cncc Stc:tem9nJc on

July 28) the D3V issued a Govcrn:::~n'c st~tc~lcnt (on AU~1.lst 2) S....... a .. Ct;!cnv ou.; O:~.J.\;-;-.::.r.[; any rc~el'ence .r.t t.0 .' cono.e:::""11n~ 'tee vne Pr.:!sidcnt':; l"efc:rcnccs to the UlV1s "four points" or the RF'L. T"Ilc Statc~~icnt focus~d on criticis:!t of t.he build-up of U.S. forces in South Vict.na::1. a11d tile continued U.S. bo:-"bi~ of Horth VietnG!o':l. Follo',iin,:; are excerpts fro:-:t the Enelisnlal1{:.·uo.r:;e brocdcas t of the Statc::cnt 'oy iIc.noi Radio.)






• • ...'

ltT'nis h:''Pocri tical talk cannoJ~ possibly cover up and distort. the truth. US 1«J.'ES1n fact, the'y'~.9. ~_g.9..Y9:~:~:!q~"t.J1A~§~?Q:~.s£Li;h~):95!;._G~r:§!f!:~.a.t:;£~E9:t~s on Vietna.ll, t242.":11?lcd U.~1 in~~t;l-::!o.t;~2:'12.:U.~~·;S 1 continuously ~n:!;;ervcn~JE-_th~ internal afi'airs of the_~_Vietnc.::'.ese troo"O!:i a:::a.inst the South ~~--~ ~ ~ ~ neo'Ole_~ sent U.S. _ , , _____ ._ _ _ .. __ .. , _

.".00$_ .. _


... ...... ....... _, •• "._ ..... .. -,. ._..!"•• .....


. . - . - -.... -

.... - . -.. :-__ ......... _ .. _ -... _ _ _ -_ •. _

Vietna:r.c~~~~?J.c.J bC?;;!~e(l §,~!lcl s'::~F-a;@.9-_~]].§_j;e:;l:ri tory._.Q~_tqe.~DaV} _~~ .. !:~.~ .5.?p'~.

~!~':'!:G~~ .o,f .~~~~~~!;?_l.~~~+.lJ2Q.Lll~"}~~!~1ll-:r.9:~."q)ftHt,.Y.J&tE.1?1l.


lilt is also a. fact that the U.S. Goverl".n:.ent is ,.,aging a "lar of a.Bgression It. is tC'.lkinr.; c:.bout 1')cace discussions to conceal th~ ulan for

Victn~;'\ •.

Jn~~n;?J..iUt(:L~!£.~.· JtsdeiJ~~Is:t~roI~~ {p§etiu~!-glY \hE~~~i ~Qn...2.CVietna-n and to sticl: to South Vietnc1;l in a bid to turn tha.t zone into a . U.S. nei.'" t;y-pe colony a.l'ld m:i.litary oG'.se for a;ttack.a.gainst the rev) thus jeopardizing peace in Asia ?Jld the i{orld ••••

IITne D:3V Govern.1lcnt ·soler..n1y declares that Vietntl."l is' one, the Vietna:nese

one. T'ne U.S. itlperie.lists h:.:.vine encroached on VieJ~na.~ese ~erritory, every Vietn~£sc is duty-boun~ to fi&ht against the U.S. aggressors for r...~tional sa.l'ie:tion. T'nis is an itl:prcscriptible sccred riGht of the Victl"~leSe people. ~ne Vieth~cse Deople, rr&llions as one"are determined to stand. firr:l on the frontline of the . . lorld people's stru5{;le against



itlperialism, colonialisn~ and neocolonia1is~ for peace, national independence} democracy, and socie.l pro5Tess."


"Even if the U.S. ir.~pzriclists scr.d in 100,000 0::- 200,000 or more A:neriCal1 troops) even if the stil"uSGle is to lest 10) 20 :;ec.l'z,) or :nore, T'nc Victm.:::cse p~oplc arc c.etcr,:ul1ed to fi~ht until cO:'~J?lctc victo!"y. I'


lIT'nis sta."1d as 1-;c11 as the 22 Ea~ch 1965 sta.tCl:~ent by the iiFiSV have elictcd ·,;c.r••l approval and support fro;;1 rr..eIJ.Y GoV'crn..;.ents and fro:a the '\-lorId f S people.



"u.s. P"rcsident Joh."-lson has spo}:en about an honorable peace. It 'till be recalled that all' alon~ for the past 11 years the C-overr.::lcnt of the D~W has repeatedly put forlir~rd reasol'.able a.."1d sensible proposals \r.i.th a view to achi.cvlDG a peaceful sett1e::i~nt of the VictIk'1.::1 problc::t on the CD-sis of the 1954 Geneva a8ree::tents. "l·~ore on""\....8 Auril it ..r.lc~de cle~ it,s _ _ _ _recently _ _-_. __ ....... ... ....1965 _ .... _!_,..._four-'Ooint .....-.-.. . . . stand ....___ ._ '4.POINTS as a basis for tfle soundest poli'"ical sct',,1e:Tlent of the Victna.';1 problcr.•• " l~


_~::. .:c_~".oo;' ~._.~_..~.!~_


_ r _ _ _ _ .....•~...






(On AUu~st 15, 1965 Hanoi broadcast in English t~c text of Ho Chi l·i:inh I S responses to four quc5tions sub:aitted in l:riting by £):,_~n~.h..£~§ond~p.t tC;>.:r_r..~. ;'~C:~~" ~l?E~ Devillers. Ho l.."lsisted tht,t the US oust give ':ta.'igible ~roors"i-that it accepted the Dayls ufoU!' pointsll and appeo.red to co:npletcly rule out a...v role for the GVH in any negotiations. ) IIQuestion: Does the position of the Govcrn-nent of the De."i!ocratic Republic of Vietnalll. reilain that y;onich ,,;a.s defined by Pre..-nier Pha-it Van Dong on 8 April, na.-nely the' South Vietnalnese people tlust be left to solve their Oim affairs the.llsclves ydthout foreign .interference and on de.;nocratic bases?

IfQuestion: Is the DC"!locratic Republic of Vietna.!l ready to accept, so long as the South Vietna."i!ese people l·dll so desire) the eXistence of a., autono:n.ous South·Vietna.-n, neutral of course, .but disposed to establish 1-lith the north the relations.--impli~d by fraternity and a commo~ nationality? ...... .. ~

IIAns~·ler: Of course, Alo~ i'lith preparations for the nm.®.{l:\.i~1.J...rYJ~~~?-!-i(m.~9f Vietl1a.'a..!'!h~ch ':lilJ bu~rrtQ.~g}!i_~ffi:9!-!QLl?~.~g.~f~l.J\1.~~ns, on the b~s~~.~.f. ~h~ ~ free .£9n§cnt of t1.?:~-E5?rth..~"1d th~L~9,g~hJ a£.qgr~.~fL~~ thE:...P..~2Zr~'!t_2f :th!J~~"y : -, .and ,th~ .. progra:a., of. the Vietn~.;n .. Fatherlar..(L-EJ:.ont, our entire people are no;': . struggling "rith the~ main a."ld r.rl..ght against the U. S. aggression 1.'1 our country to defend the DRV, liberate South. Vietna~, and achieve peaceful rcunification 1 ' highest goal of al~ the Vietnao-nese. IIQuestion: In case the U.~. GoverD:"ilent ,,;ould sole.imly reaffirm its rdJ.1 to respect. the basic principles of the Geneva agree.-nents -- namely, W1ity and : independence of Vietnau and prohibition of any base and any presence of foreigll troops on. its soil -- "muld the Goverr.!i1cnt of the DRV 2.gree to discuss \'lith it 1. the conditions a.,d guarantees for disengage.!lent "Thien this u.s. declaration J ,\,lould :imply? Also, in yoUr opinion, is an end to the U.S. air attacks against the DRV territory a sine qua non condition leadi,'18 to a settlement of the ' . Vietnap problem? •

4 ~TS

lIAnS'.'rer:To this end, t~..._~. Goy.~!..f.=!1e:l't r.t2.lst_..fQ.ye t..e.ueible-p.r.p.ofs_that.it... C oLs,s,h four poin" s"'a.."1d 0':- tho'" v m .... J',s,' e D:tV ", ic' on! to

. . t~ee~~se~JCitinoin;rih-i~d-;-r;£iitl~·lr~r:~~~~E~lth~~f92.,-·I-G~ev~·'·i.;~e~;~~t'on . "'. . . . _ ,. ........ .,:).,. . . . . . . __

____ .._ - ___.. ___ ._~... _._..... _~_ ._._..7:.. _.......... __ ... _-. ... __ .__... • L • • .I.' d" 1 ... .... • .&..&. 1 . . . . D::IlJ . '.&. .J. V~e"n<!;nj ~l.E!£~.l;.~~]J}1:.~;or s"'0!L_I.>...~_~~r ~g:,v.,~?.p.K!;La.e~.=!.-:ls_'1-.... .• ,,-.~~Q;:;J.J{QJ'Y, s ... op

fu.tl1~·~J.1L~l].~_agg:;.~~~=i:Y~_~~~ _~ga;e~t _~h£... s.~~~~l}: ~.2f ,P~~!'~~y')_..§::!d ,,~t~~~ £ro~.c!~all_~~S. trcops and ;.;eapons. That is_peace ~~!:i. there ·is no o ... ner r:ay OU'ii.


'!Qucstion: Do you think, I路jo. President, th.:!.t the solution to the Vietn~il proble.7l depends directly on the Ha.'1oi and l'lc1shinston govcrl"'~ents -- ldthou"; the holding of <"'1 international conference - or do YOtt think t,hat it ,rest: csscnticlly i-lith the ,WLSV and the'Vietnr.,-:tcse authorities in Saigon to fi."l: a settleilcnt ?

i i i~

! 1

! iI f


(\UA:1 DOI NHAN DAN EDITORIAL OF AUGUST 20, 1965 CRlTICIZlr:5" An~pI'S AT }3DIATIO~: IN VIE'l'NAN (A co...:r..cntalY signee. uOose~/ern in the PAv..~ daily net·!spaper, Quem Doi ~:han Dr,!"., r:~kes the first open . "..... ~.... .:. .:. .• • 4' t" ft th .:. cnv~Cl.sw. OJ. a""e;-;ip ... s a ... OU"Sl.ClO me"l.a um OJ. e V'l.e"nC\r.\ ... t 0 USb v con.!..L'1"... l.e ... 'L~~ a1so expresses D':lV' •• S~:r:1Sl.\'J.Vl."'Y •• 0.,-b~ .... n.. raids. The follotiing excerpts t-:cre taken f'ror:l the text of the co~~enta~J as broadcast August 20, 1965 over Hanoi VNA in English.) L

" •• • Can there be any conciliation bet't':een these t\·:o diametrically incor.lpatible stands? Conditional or unconditional?

4 PJI:ln'S

"The Vietna.-::ese y~ople have ah:ays been stressing that only ~hen the U. s. Govern:n(;~lt shOt·is cor..crete i.an:i festations of its recOgni f.;-:0n'of -ihe-four~oi'nt' 'stand- 'of:" "t:;e" DRV 'Govei:r;;ei;£""anc{ the h~~~.P.0;~~ ;:~1n~(Q'Cihi ~Jf~s.i<i~n·th~.rs1- ie=~a Q,~si.s..!.~tQ_e....p,ei.cefp.l settle;;1ent of the \-iar in Vietna.':1. liThe U.s. imperialists have talked so much of their stand of peacef'lll negotiations s unconditional discussions •••• At first hearing, -people may think that the U.S. i~perialists put fon~aTd no conditions vmereas the Vietn@nese people raise certain conditions. liThe truth is that the Vietn~..":lese people do nqt put any conditions to the U.S. imperialists. They only der-land that the latter strictly

imple:nent the provisions of the Geneva agree\.1ents t~'hich were signed . 11 years ago and imich the U.S. imperialists undertook to respect. ~Ll't'-f ·J. ... d~ L' t0 The conuen" o~ ne our po~n~ s"an o. our goverr~ent .con~orms the main political and militar,y provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

liB-I so' dOing, h01{ can it be said that the Vietha:nese people put forward new cOl'lditicns to the U.S. imperialists? CI\':''lat is the .stand of the U.S. imperialists? Since 1954 the U.S. ir.1p'~rialists ·ha.'re sabotaged all political and r.nlitaI"'J prOvisions of the 195!;. Geneva agrea~ents. \'lhereas these agree:.:ents recognize

the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity




"By raising the st~nd of di$cu::~ior.sJ

peaceful negotiations and

\!r.co~di tional

tho U"S.· ir.~?o~i~li;:;t:: ?l.!~~\:O ~ d.::.r:< sc~c~c o£ 1~g31iz­

ing their acts of serious violations of t:le 1951;. Geneva .agrec;;;ents over the past 11 years) cor.-.pelling the Vietnc:.r.lf:Se people to recognize th~ presence of U.S. troops and the e7~stence of U.S. milita~J bases in South Vietn&~, and im~vsing on the South Vietn~~ese people their lackey goverTh7.ents.

"Therefore, the so-called unconditio:.al discussions proFosal of the U.S. imperialists actually asks for one basic condition: recognition of the sabotage of the 1954 Geneva agree~ents ~f toe U.s. imgerialists and recogni tiCJ of their aggression in Vietriar.-~ in the past as -well as at present. US1{OVES


".to__l?~:C!:~._?__~~_!'.9r_~hi.s ..§ec~~~Z'!1.__pe?:~~_, Johnson has b~ ballyhooinf; tha.t the United States has Made conside:::-able concessions, TJIat ~laS'nfng-tont;rfea agaL-l-and tgaii,-io-change-ii's-at£ffude';-inatthe Uni ted sta~~s dO~§..2lQ~_g.?~~(L_f.r~_~..•~l~~:'~:ip.n~-.tAr.O!lVto.~t....alLYietn~ and is ready to discuss Ha!~oi t s.....,-,p:ooposals •••• •• : "•. '." ,.

_ _ _ _ ~..........~ ....~.".:............ :,.l ••.:-,.~••:,..... -..'.~:'... '.~'-:.-.o



"This nsychological ~·;ar trick of the United states l·;as c>-.-oosed by the U.S'. - pre-ss-'J:tseli-;AP-cO~Clent,eCCt:nclt;1hatse~-;to-be~on:­

cessio.-ls ~ias-'consider~d: by t-lashington as ci tactical measure,

and that tl.9.goti_a,~~ons. f.ligbt_1:;?_~r.oJ...9.nE~.:Cs.9~~~S-.tQJ;~Lth~....§smt.LYi..{!~na:It . puppet ad.'71inist~ation a. breathi~g spell • .........- . . . . . . - - - .... _

.. _ . -

. _ ...... •• - . . . . . . . . --~ ... - . . .,....-


.... _.~ • •_<' .............. _


. . . . . .-s".

liThe policy of usin~ violence to force th-; Vietn<'~"1cse people to recognize the U.S. cor:r.iitions and to 5ub::lit the::lseh-es to the a~gressors has been o?~nly stated by Johnson. He said that to continue bo....bin~ No:-th Victna:n alc.,;;; ifith inte~lsii'yinb te:ororist raids in South Vietna."'1 l'e~ains a. ko:," to victo:'j' and only this COl!olo blc.,,~ C:l!) ptn:-~\!::.~!.:J .~;Q~-tb V~. r.:t:~~~. Tho U:ai tod st:r~.o~ ~tl:li holds that it is necess~ry to continue raiding and killing until t~e Victna~ese people lose all ho~es in victo~f. That weans the United states'must fight until their aggressive goal is achieved.

JlObviously, llhile talking of peaceful negotiations the United States has not in the least given up its agzressive stand.

long as the U.S. aggression continues, the Vietnar.lcse people ~re resolved to resist a6gression until co~plete VictOl'l. USo

liThe aggressors cannot


put on a par



the victims of

' --~-~

liThe U.S. imperialists are the aggressors, the Vietna..":lese people are victir.:s of 'aggressio:1. In order to solve the ' . .ar issue in Vietn?:rl, the U.S. aggressors ~ttst stop their aggression. That is the only correct meaSure to restore peace. in Vietn~~ •••• "Our people, v:ho have suffered over 20 years of 't.;ar, profoundly p~ace, but peace must al<~ys link v~th national indeper.dence. o.E.e_~~n,~?}:,E.~~::~ . . '0'":-~__b.J-.... ' US" ·_1''''' Nt ~ "...!ee~L.~n..~.,. • •.. ?'-~P'9.r.1:'?".,..-~. ~!,s... , &i."'~:n",_ ...o_.c:::--~ r'r'J.. .~ut.._ agg'r ossion to the end a~d the Vietna;':!ese people' s tho:..~ough stand to


lr.&DIA 'fION


~2.~~~!:l~~i:i_~~~_.agi~e.s.s?~:~·.·.~r;~~~~;~~d§·r{~~~~\ ,~he".:~ai~~f:s.f0p.~Jli~~·t aggression and ,.rlthout a?proving and supporting the victi:as 'of ag:" - -.. . - . __ . . --_. . . -...._-- -.. ... -.-.. . . . . -:--.-- ---.........--~~--





_gro9...~~~_?-_t:!.l!9.91..r_,s~~y.gg.!..~_.~g~nns _:c..g~.jlggt~S;;.q~? ,._ ,_~_ c~.IJ.~P.1J:r-~_~D~

_c:9}!~C?:gE?J~i!.~..?-gg.r?-.sso.r.S. . ts::LcQn.tinue.. :th,~i.r~ ?Eg~e:SS.j,.9Jl.·

The situation in Vietnam at present is vcry tense. The o~ly . cause or this tension is the liar acts cor.witted by the U.S. aggressors. To :-elax. the th e ques......J.on • no~,: . '....... 0 reCO::-J:le;:h.4.... ., sho~.j . t enslon, 1S no . . ",nau... b.l.h 0 ... Sla.es less intransigeance, b~t to co~pcl the United States to give up its aggressive sche~e. As for the~, the Vie~n~~~se people hold that only b7'deter~inedly str~ggling against the U.S. aggressors can the situation be relaxed."



(On' August 24" 1965 a DRV spokes:i,'lrl b ~!oSC01i issued a statcrr.ent stressine the DRVis h points ,,:ore the basis for the sC\:!1dest political soh~tion to the Vietna~ose ql:estio!1.. This statei:!cnt was iss1.!ed after western press agencies incll:ding (AP. kF? and 17) had quotio Lord J3roclmay as saying that the l{orth Vietr.an:ese a••bass<,.dor i ..'l l':osco";-f told him thut llHahoi h!l.c novor ::::.:td th~t ~ll U.. S .. fo:'Co~ lr.U:;t. bo ii'ithdr(ti':n before neeotiations fo:, a cease-fire or peace begin" They did not i."lsist on, thiso tl Lord Brockr;ay a1so said tho D:N ambassador told hi.ln Hamoi 'r;as prepared to ~ake one concession !~ beyond tho Geneva Agreements ie Sout~ Vi.etna~ should have tempo:rarilly a sepera.te gow3rnr.ent" a democratic, natior...o.l coalition~ both politically. and r;:ili ta.r~ly neutl'al o ,) . II ••• According to a VlL!t corresponce~t in HoscO'l'; J the spokesr.-.an of the DRV Eartbassy in the Soviet Union has issued the folloiiing sta teffient:.

liOn 19 August 1965 Nguyen Vall Kinh, DRV' ambassador to the Soviet. Union" receiVod Bl'ock"r;ay, chairman of. the British CorJilittee for Peace :in Vietnam.1 at .the latter's Oim request$'

tiThe spokesman of the DRV Eroeassy in the SO'dct Union recalls that at; this meeting Ar:;bassador Nguyen Van Kin.:'1 e:A--plained to Brockcay that tht;L.f':our... ~. PO,~?~._~~§:.r~~ _~f .~h~_P'.R"" q,oy'eT.r..l):Eln~3:.~_~~1?91m.4esLpy_Rr~:;d.er.. Phalii._Yan ,Dong, 4 POI.I1S.J?.ZL8.-!~ priL~bS is _i!~e ~,;..s:ios f_Q~~ll_~_9.V.:,?;f;.~j:.__ P.QJ.~t..tG~3-sp.l1;tiQns._to_t!1~ _ Vic:.Jnam question. If this basis is recoP,nized. favora.ble conditions 'Vdll ::

1)0- creaFed "Ior-the PGacef~lsf;,t~rem-ent-'of -t"Ec"Vietna;'-·Drcbi"C"r.i and--it--~iiliDO possfo~e-to ~~.:is~der"]he-r~~2.~Yin.1~,!i~Cf~~'!i]!1:t.~..:n~~¥Q~~f· cQr.1f;~_tpnge.~ot

,:the ~tJY~or _~~~,J?ai...,~~~,l!.e'(~ _6o~~.rPI1C~.2!),J~~e1I)?iRo



"All the reports released by a n~~ber of \';estern agencies 'hhich do not conform to those exp1a."lations are .dthout foundation and intended to distort the trnthoU ....


2D V FO~·'IGM :\l!..h

),fI?>.l.IS"l"P.Y J,N!.O·,·)'\~:mr.'f 0];<' SF.PT?2·:nER 2 L. • l_~~ I.


(The DRV Foreign ~,anist:ry ~{emol'.).nd\l!l. broadcast in Encrlish by Hanoi VNA Septc::iocr 23> 1965 st.ates that the ' l t &.l.or ' nRV's four points arc the IISO1 e corrcct bas).s a settle.:-aent. Follo.dng are excerpts from the 1·~e;n9randum.} f.)

? -


11 • • ::Sinca ? Apr-il 1965 the U.S. authorities have 0:1 re:;>eated occasions professed readiness to engage in. 'unco.1ditional discussions' _~:,:td r.~de proposals for a 'cease-fire,' a. 's~spensio~ of the oo~bing of the -north.'-·"Bn.t it'is'in this'very p0riod that U.S. President. JOh..... S071 h~s . dccideci':'~o 'se'nd in 50,000 more u.s. co:abat troops, raising the U.S. strength 'in South Vietna;n to' nearly 130,000; and a fu.r-ther dispatch has also been announced. - .- - I~._. ~~

"Along \-lith the 'introduction of various types of modern \·,e~ponsl into the SO'l!th V1.ctn~"':l battlefield., the U.S. authorities have u.sed B-52 strategic bO:<1bers aud toxie gas to mass;.cre the people and raze . villages in South Vietna."':l. 'J.'hey have unceasingly 'escalated' tbe a:ir 1-:ar of destruction against the D?.V; U.s. aircraft have bombed even schools, hospitals, da;ns, ~.nd densely populated areas, r.lassacring civilians and disrupting the peaceful labor of \he people in North Vietnrun. II '0

, tiThe above facts sho\-1 that the U.S. Govern.";lent talks peace to . cover up its wal' assigns, and each tir.:e it sneaks of lpa~tce negotiation~ it takes a further step in intensii'ying the ~,:ar of aggression in South. ' Vietna..';i and in 'cscalatir,g' the 1-lar in r::orth Vietnam. Faced \iith ever. stronger protests fro:.'. the p.~oples of the v;orid-,-including the i..":leriean people, it,has been compelled to resort to hypocritical talks : ~~E-t. -'_Pil~\c~~~&9~i~tio:1,~' ...viith ,.a ~.im-1. to _!le:c_ciying at::~2.~pa~~i~~ J>3ace-and just.ice-1:~v?:ng.. ,?':1..~~~~._o?i!li<?n~ II

genuine representative of the

of fact, its schehe is to


p~ople of So~~h Vie~na~. As a r.~tte~ to ~~chicvc at the conrc~e~ce t~cle

\,nat it has been unable to e;ain or. the ba.ttlefield. The 'lietna:.-:ese people "'ill never acce?t such insolent co~ditions. u US lWVES

liThe • cease-fire 1 trick of the U.S. autho~ities is clasigr:ed in fact "to cor-mel the Victr.a;.,ese .'Ceoole to laJ" dO~'::1 their . in.both"zones' '"1 e U• S • ~vroops com,lnue .,. . d . ... arms '·;n~ :to.oe.re:!.n:orce , ''to occ'.!?Y ar..:l• co;.:::l.~" aggression against Vietnc.r.i. This is also an atte:-:l?t to play :0-:: tiree '" ,. . .' . . . to· '::..nc:';ase :.orces ... a~e 'tne pUpp3~ aC1lan::..s~~a~:!.on ano. am:y, t o consol J.' d for further eA"'Oansion of the t-:ar in Vietna.";l. But the Viet:la.'7.ese people v:ill never slacken their fight sO lo;.g as U.s. troo?s still occupy Vietna"':!ese territ07j and so long as thei:' sacred. no:tional • '. .. "', • ~ -.L ~.. . . . 1 . J •• ' rl.gn ... s--:!.nc.cl)Cna.encc, sove'!:'t;1.r;':1.:r, un~ "y, ,,1;U 'ter::.. ~"orJ..a_ ::.n\'~gl·l.;:.:r-are not achi~ved and. guaranteed. Let the United St<:.tes s'.:.op its aggressive ~"lar aeainst Vietnm:l a:ld. 'on. thdra\·; fro::!. Sout!l Vietna-a c:.~d Peace l·ril~, b~.. ~r.4lecl~ataly restm.'ed •••• II .


the:nselvcs the ~ight of bo~bing the DRV, an countr/. They have seriously Violated. the 1954 Geneva agree:..€mcs on Vietn~, grossly trar.:plcd 'uilderfoot international 1m·;, and co::,,:.rl.ttecl r::.onstro'J.S crir.:es against the Viet:1a..7.0S~ p~oDle. No',·; they are saying that they Itd.II _~~~se b?:nbing. the.. north t if t~ere is SO::l.e trqsponsel fro::! HanoL" ' l1\fl1at is I:lore,

th~y brazenly arrogcr~,e to independe~t and sove'!:'eign

liThe D:t'l GO'lerr~ent sole::l.nly di::clares that the U.S. au.thorities must stop their ,crir.:i.nal t-:ar acts against the D?.V. }:'hey.. ftave no right. to imoose any condition on the D?.'l Govcrn.~ent. Besides, they r.lust end .the ":~r of aggression in South Vietna..-:i:~ ': .11'"


NFLSV, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnanese people's fight against the U.s. aggres'sors, has gained S'y-;;...patby, . support, and recognition 'i'ro::~ ever' broader sectio:-ls of the l-:o'!:'ld. ' s peoples. Je~ the U.S. GO'lerr::.,~nt -::efuses to l\~cognize it as t!1e sole genuine representative of the p~ople of South Vietn~. It has ce~lared ·~~a..t _.?:f.d~e_~ no~ re~a:-d the' fro:1t as an indeper.dent 'party in negotia-' ._~ions •._ T~is_, fu~ther ex~oses its talks about negotiatio~s C.s a .:e'!:'e . dl""" .. '" •• U' m'un e. Inere canr:o~. .oe any nego~~av~ons on .1.' "ne ~ou~.n de~na.~ proo.lem",';"'ithout_. tr:e'-l:FLSV n<lving"J. ts cec:Lsive-"say • II'" .. - ," ,_. _.. ' .. ~rhe




"T"ne USa·' ".l." '.&t. • ,0";/ ever-j r.l5ans •• Uv:"lO~l.,,'!es a!'e c;._so J.evenS:l"1y ...1..7.fl.ng

to secur'e~'a' U.• N. inte7/ent:"on in VietnC',!1. They have 'requ.ested help fror:l the United }!ations :::e;;:bers~i? at large in getting peace talks started. t This is a ::-:2.neuver to l!se t?le United. Nations to i:-:lpose on the Vietna..';ese people'r.ego:'iatior.s under U.S. ter7.ls."


. UN

Geneva confe:-ence on Indoc~-:.ina) a:::d· not of tte United i-~ation,s.,._}.ny • l u!' ... ::e!·~nce 0: 't::e a::>:Jve U ' rc::so1" ll'tl,On :In • •S SCl~e:::e ,.n.'11'.,00'._-". nu11 J... .. ",..... •• and vOl.d ana i~11 cO~D1e;:.ely a~sc~ea~;:. ...ne Un~;:.~a ~a;:':lons ••••

'U"',l"" • h. .... •




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'Il ..


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tlTney have striven to entice politic:ll c:'rcles in a n:.;,:;:be~ of countries to respond to their p~o!,osals and to co:::e out. uit.h c.0~a:1cls for 'negotiations,' fo~ fa cessation of all hostile act~vities,t and for t concessions' fr9::l both siC:es, but t:> eq~ate the victi:l ,·;ith the aggressor is to fall into the U.S. i:c.nerialists' 'trao and to ner;ate ~all'eleroientari p~'inciples of 'frccC:o::: and'·'justice. The::'ero::-e the U.S. s6he::i.e can by no means deceive peace-and freed.o:::-loving people in the. world. II


liThe lofty ains of the Vietna':!ese people t s just st~:.:ggle have .!Jeen fully crab?died in the fou.r-point stand of the DRV Go.... err:..ent.". "This stand proceeds froi.;' the r·.lnd('.:~enta1 princ:'ples of t~a 1954 , • ,'" . . . . . ., . ,. h .... Geneva agreer.'len vS, i·i:l:lC:l recogn:l za ;:',"!C n<:~~l.O~a.&. r:::.gn;:.s 01 -c..e 'I'l.e'tna..-nese people--indepar.o.encc) sovereignty, unity) anrl te!':'i tOi,'ial' ,'. 'integrity~~and frow the essential' military 'clauses of the said agraements." ~,.


liThe 1954 Geneva agrae-:r.ents a!'e

international legal docu....ent correctly i~ple~e~~. At the 19'5lj.':Geneva confe;cnce the U.S.' GoverO:llent, through its delegate-,-···· "recognized and pledged respect fo!' the~·•. Yet throughout the past 11 years it ha's zojste::latically violated therr. ar.d has thus brought about· a serious situatiQn in Yietna.'li."·-'--'----- -. 2.:1

~hicn'al1·part~cioants ~ust·respect a~d



lIThe four ..uoint starA of the DRV Goyerr.:::.ent also coni'or:ns to the actual situatio; p:'ev2iling in South Vietna.':l and throu~hoat Vietna.":l -for more than 11 years nc".·:--the United states has eng2.;;ec. in agg!'ession • .. V·.:." ' ,. .... .... aga:lnsl. l.e vna::l ana saoo;:.".~ea peace l.n InaOCnlna and sou;:.t.eilS;:' As~a, and the Vietn~lese people have been fighting against the aggress?rs in defense of their sacred nation2.1 rights." 'Of

" . "

liTo settle the Vietna.:n probler.l it is essential to re::love the. roots of the serious situation in Vietna~--U.S. aggression. Any approach which puts the aggressor and t~e victim on "the sa~e footing or .~hich 1" .. .,..,,0 b' does no ... p.. oceaa lror.;, ...:1e rea_, Sl. ..uav~on In V".L. levna..'!l .., t.n._1 1a)._ r~ng t ..... 1 .:. . . ~. V·.... . 1 If ' abou a se" y e::1en", or ... 5e le ...nc:.::-. 'proo e;l. ~ .I..






"This stand also p!'oceeds fro;1 tbe la.::.:ti'i:ate aspirations ;{ietn'a.-:-te-se -'people in ooth iones, as' e;::bo:iie~ in the progra.":l. of ... .:. a"'~ ~·n~ ... of .Lhe ~"'"''i ~v· n ~e1y, pe a ce, V~e""n"'" 't'a':"ne-lA"a.· "'ro ~ ,,:.,.v v' ~\~~'.::J, -pendence'; unity, ar.d c.e::::ocracy. U ...




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of the the .• :Luae-

"The Vietnar.:.ese y:!o?le and the D~V Go'!c:'n":l.ent earnestly call on the goverh..":l.ents Clna peoples of the ,,!o!'ld to resolu.tely st~.!e;glc and de~and that the U.S. Gove~~":l.ent ~cce?t t~e four-point siand of t~e DRV Gover~~ent. The U.S. Gove~~e~t v.ust pu.t an ir._7.ediate e~d to the air "rar against the D?.V 2.nd. cO:.1pletely stop enc!'oac!1i~g or~ the '12:tter"s'sovere'ignty 'and secu~i ty • ' It l:ust i:;-:.ediately end tne \·1a..~ aggression in South Vietna..':l and ';,:ithdra"'i all U.S. troops and lr~~_p?,:lS_ ,~,:x:o~ t~ere •••• I;




t:The four-point stand' of the DR'! Gove:-n:.:ent is enjoying an eversuppo~tfro:.l 'the' p~ace-l:o\;:tng gOire~::;e:lts and peoples allover the ~·;or1d. It i.s the sale correct basis fo:- 2. settle:lentof' the Vietu2...'l!. 'Droble~. Al>if solutions at variance t-d.th ,~,~appropr~~te and 'are any solutions ';{nien seek U.N. intervention in the Vietna~ situation, because such solutio:ls a~e fundamentally 'contrarj"to the 1954"Gineva. _....agree:::.ents ----_.._----_ ..-. __.. _-- _.- .... - .._._..... . .. -- ." -. . - on ...Victnai'l. . -..-.- I;

\.;arr.tcr-'sympithY ind"

Ji', 'are



'!..~he . .ll,.S .,. G.oV~.-r:n;.-l~:mt ~u§~ .. ,~~:J.,cm~ly


geclara its acceptance ot settle~ent of the Vietn~~ ~an'-be '~<?o~sidei~9:~-:~~'" ' .......... -- ... '.. . . ,., ..

this four-point stand before a political


VIE'1r::~·i ~CU1If:~ J\:1l.'ICLB o;·r !'!!v~:! S:-iOULD T;nt :';CSr:' SO'i.U'l'IO~~ '10 ?iG VIEt£'~·::\:,r PI!OJ!..::::·; :>:'; tIi:i):~~St:C\:D':



(On Scpte:noer 27 :-Ianoi I s V!:A :l."1"'Pnglish, bro~dcast a "Victna.'l Cot:.rier ll article entitled. "Eo~'; Should the !':ost Correct Solution to the Victna-:i Proble."l be Undc!'stood?" This article \-;as ori~bclly p:.<blisncd on July 9 in the, Victna:nesc-lan:;u~e nC~'iS?ape!', 'rho:'-£; Eat (;(C1.L'1ii'icaticn) as Part III of a four part se:dcs called u:-!ith any t:."Pc of "reI' the U.S. inmerialists i·;ill surely fail ~d i':e Hill 'surely \.;in. l : The, July 9 editio:f' states that ~',,-:' _:,": ,~,., .. lithe DRV Govern.":'.cnt is' of the o':Ji.'''lion th~~t the aOovc-::1.entio:lec. st~"1d (four points) is the basis for a correct political , solution. The Septe::;.bcr 27 e=tic1e stdes lithe n:!v Goverr,,':te:it' is of the vie:-; that the sta;:d expoll.o"'lded above (four ,poi:1ts) is • .I.or ~.... '..L po'1'" ..L..Ll e."len ... 0.1. "ne V·· ~ "n.e som:c.os" lr.1C~1 se"" lc......nc.i":l t ·ne b as~s '1..1 "'h .. 1· t, 'd pro.., a"l. J. e arr.1C e •• as SC::lc·,:aa. 1. ... 1.0~S J \·:.llcn are g~ven belo;·[J ,·:hich do not app~".r in the origmalJuly 9 ar~icle.) J..:o';"

'.l,. •




, II • • • These dictators succeed one a.'1ot;her at the becle and call of the state Depart:r.:.ent and the CIA.

IIAccording to wa-y Anerican congreSS:len and ne':~spa?ers, th.e Saigc:l Government, ,·:hich is sO:lething co::tplet-ely alien to the South Vietnr;;;: people, can-"l.ct exist even for a \.;eak \-d.thout Altierica."1 dollars and troops, eve."1 in 1958 ~"'ld 1959 ,·;hen it "fas said to enjoy a certain stability. T:1hO:1 does it clC'.i--a to represent, especially in such a deteriorating situation as today? ••

'IFollo,.;ing the 22 1-~arch 1965.1\918'1/ stat e.":1ent , the Central CO:::r.i.ittee of the Vietna;n Fatherla:.dFro:1t issued a declaration on 27 I;Lerch and an aooce1 on 6 April 1965, excerpts of l':hich are as follo~"s: if the U.S" Govern."iient"' is ad~ant not to L~ole"iie~t the G~eva Agreenents en Vietn~~ ~'1d does r.ot resoect the L'1dependence,~sovereigntYJ and territori~ integrity of Vietn~~ and is·rash . enough to step up its aggressive "la!' i.'1 i-:orth Vie~na.7., it \·;i1lcertilily suffer a bitter failure. . at the ha.-:c!s of over 30 million' Vietn~ese ' . peonle. ," ~


!1'!~.)..!!~£P_C.~Y?~!?~, ,s?v:~reignt:r,: :un;ty,. ~n~ 'te:,.rito:'i~1:. i ~~~~r~!~ _'?£_~~. count~i as stio~lated in the 1954 Geneva ~gree~ent5... ' •

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"If U2 do not solve the South Vie~n~_-::. proolc:n on the basis ot these funda.-::.ental conditions put forth. by the p~o?lc of the t~·:o zones of Vietnam and if '\>:2 accept the U.5. ~~criCllfsts' t:.r.conditional discussions offer, this ...:ould ,bo tCl.n;-.:,:~ou:lt to co. . . 1.n:: to -th~ coni'erenc., table to recognize their aggr~ssion ~nd their pal~na~e~t presence in Sou~h Vietnam' and negotiate 'under the pressure of their bo~bs. .~~~ £Qllq1r/_~~<:~§...?:r.~r~~i~~~?:gg!.!?~E~~~..C:?~. i~-=o::?:..lle? .to s1t at the

.co!lf:erence_ta.ble_"lbi1.eL~.tLen.~;J'y"..p..~tsi_s,t,s.5JL~,i,~._i.igr~_s~fcri·.·uf1tl~-,'~t C].c.cepA~Jl.t.S_tJ.~::!ils,_~an" ~h~~_'p.9A'9-~rLy"~~~d t~ its en_q~J7_,Ce.~~.~1:!.l~~_ ~ot."




PHA!\1vAN D6~LDi~~05Ili~-6CTOn}Ef{~o5

(The Asahi inten-iev: published inJapanc5c in Tokyo' on Octobel.· 5 and The 1'fainichi int~!rvicw published in Japanese on October S;plus written questions ~u1.swcrcd b y Pharo Vc-.n Dong for Mainichi published in Tokyo on October 9 al'e 111c1udcd bt::low. BO.th articles and the written questions spell out the DRV t s position that if the US wants negotiations it must declare clearly that it acccptr. tho four points. ) Asa.'1i Foreign News Editor W ciryi.1 I-lata on Interview With. Victm'.mcse ~ier 'Phctm Vc.n DOll$:




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IIPrer.o.ier Pharo Van Dong of the DRV stated in ct vel'y strong tone on 4 October th?t I The present Vietnam. war can neyer be settled unless ~ United St~tes accepts the four co:ndition~"yl'escntcd by_our side. And without that, there also C<:'.ll be no ro,discussions. __ . )· ....J:,"' 1 IIDuring the intcl'vieWI we co.skeel considerably frank questions, but on each occasion~ the Pl'eroiol' smiled calmly, and as if to say thC'.t he had been waiting for that question. He explai.ned carei\tlly why North Vietnam. is taking th~ position that it is now taking. He also repcat.:::dly asked us lito understc:.nd this point fully and make it known not only to Japanese people but· also to ..('.m.e ricc>.n. people. \I The Pl'N'nier is a <l,'l1iet gcntlcm .... n with a reddish lace, aged 57. The gist of the questions and answers exchanged between us \vas as follows: llQuestion: The peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war is the most pressing que~tion today. We have come to yO\l1' co\mtl'y, seeking an opening to f>cttlement. What arc yo.ur views toward negotiations? UAnswcr: Your question touches upon the most important cmd basi~ question of the present time. However, as a friend, there is one t."ing which I wish to ask you [il'st. Do you thin.k that United Stc_tes is rc".lly seeking an armistice and peace?

us .


(We replicd that t..~.: United States can probably end the war itself ' .. t ~ db"~""" · . .Sl:1Ce · . t'fie U·...' ........ e d if h rle, u~ "'la~ we. .. \.h"lIlK ..~.na_ n~~ea S.....' .. aces n<'.s commh itself in various places, it find"it difficult to end the war unless it can save face, and in resPOnse this. he replied): No, the United States is definitely' not desiring peace. They have"no intention at all 01 ending the 'war. As a




matter 0:( fact, ~re they not expanding \'12.1' in both the so'\.,th (l.nd the, north, 'while talking about Ecacc?-:(h~y"stfiCb'cYi'~~~-iI;'p';~~~-;~''''~~(l"'tl;C!~'ti1i;.~t~~~ 'i{ th:~y-i;;ti~~';'i;~~;:c;:~-c their fo rc (~s..!::.n..c!_.~~.l:~l1[;.t!!,~.!Uh_~ ..1?e~EJ!.i!~Z~ ..~g<='~Q~t_ -thcl~o·;th;·-tii·cY~·~ill-p;;;Z:~~c-~·-ai~~t~·. That is 'lcry loolish, but it happens -t~ 'b~-ti~e'''t;~th:''Th~ti;~~'hy we do not trustthcir peace proposn.l. In the ~~2~9.~ ~~_b.':.~:~·5:.~:~ .~~.<:,E:P..t~.~g _~~~.~_-!.~.?'-!~~_~~!'J?!'.~?9.?i:.L~:J.l£.S.Q.g~.inui ll.~_!h~ \Va r, • we chose ...the course of continuing war without t.~e slightcst hesitation . _ _ •_ _ _ _ _ ._____ .. _ ...... _.,._w __· _.......... ·-·.. - ................- . - .. - ....- - - -.. - - . - . - - -

IIQucstion: The U.S. authorities concerned say, however: tWe wish to settle the problcrn in accordance with. the spirit of the. Geneva Agreement. The United States does not have any territorial am.bitions toward Vietnam. It does not even wish to. set up milit?ry bases there. Vietnam should settle its own internal problems without receiving lnter• icrence from outside. t1 If your contention is that their words contain no sincerity. why do you not respond to such discussions, or advocate negotiations from. your side? Frankly spea..1.dng, \vhy can you not tak.e the init~~tive in order to eli:ninccte the_possibility of the misund.;rst('21din~ that it is the Unit~d Sta.tes which is !)l:oposing unconditional disci.1.ssionsand it is the North Victna:::l:'csc side ;:'hich is insi:;ting on contin~ing the wa~

-4 P()IN'I'S , \


VIc -;ronosed . four conditions for th.e --"--

settlement 0:-......the_----

Ecsent :!.~~_~~~~_~~m5:..~g9.J~~y_<::~.:~c_~.t9..r_..~~.~p.gS~...2.;.~h:~_Q}~~9y.a. ..Ag:r:.£l£!~en t-?i}1~:-: . :::,?_~:.c.e ~:r.:.i.~~~ 9~5: ._yi_~.~~~al~:-...9,':l ~s.tion .ap.~L;;.9Ug,ht..th..~ ~ ..cOr ~ e ct .. ob~ervancc 01 the basic c.1.a~~~_~R..g.i~.t1,l~.~ _<!:g::.-_~~mc-nt. 'We proposed ?t the --"if';;:;; ·t.h2:t-ifth-~-·linitcd 'St<,-tes were to .issue . a statement to the effect thC'.t it accepts the four co,?ditions, we will agree to negotiate C'.t any time. However, the United States refuses to accept these conditions. They have no intention of ending the '\'>,ar. We must expose t.~is fact thoroughly. _There is no other way for us to expose this fact to the 'whole world and, shame them except by firn1.ly fighting agai.nst their aggression and defeating them completely. Weare determined to do so.


uQuestion: What is your evaluation of the activities of. third parties, such as t.~e call for the suspension of the bombings against the north and peace negotiations, advocated by. Ghan? and othel' n~maligned nations?


"AnsY-lcr: The United States is proDosing oeC'.ce talks, in which it ..,------......:~----~.;... docs not believe, in order to eSCe,pC criticism :troIT.. these third oarties of good inte~tion and ;-;;;fd-·p,;bl{;;R~pi~-[~~~·~;;hi~h·'i;-;t~;,.dii~~·;:;;ti~g-~-;in-;; it. Througf;:thes~c~a;ioils-~;;.ethod·s·'th~'-u~i~d-St~te-s--i~"t~·yi;g ..t~t;:;s·t·o\ir-attitu-de. Their peace calls are a tnrcatto us, similarly as their war expansion policy. Question:

IIQucstion: If that is so) thcl'C is th.e n\cthod of \lsing the sa:-.lf; n'lcans ag,dust them, seiz.ing this o~portunity when the United StOltes is talking about peace.

"Answer: It is not possible to s,-izc ·this opportunity a'ad move 101'war<1 toward pe=>.cc bcca·~~~-~-the 'US-~'ide-hR;-~Z;' si;;~·C"~i·ty;t·;'jj~···it' is possibicTo-scf;'c-thTs-oi;i)o~tu~~itya}~d'-cxpos'(;'-t·lle"tril~'·~ati.,:;;e···o£·the


Of course we welcol"nc those neonle who al'e !na~-dn9 veo.dons efiorts l ~.!-~_g~~~}2~~£~~i.~!:.~_~.;..P.~~':.£.~:._.y~ care plannh1g to prove to these people by actual de.cds how laddng in good intentions th(; United States is. The way to prove this lies solely iIi ell'iving the American. aggressors to the wall and by pressing them to the last poin~) or in oth.er wo:::ds, in continuing the wal', . . States.

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liThe Liberc-.tion Front in the South and we in the North must fight and win. Until th.en) the United States will not wake up. The leaders of the United St~tes are fools. Therefore,. we must fig:lt m01"C fiercely and win . g'reatcr victory. 01 co\u"se, we will have to be preparc:d to sustain still greater hardships and sacrifices in the future, but we will nevel.· give up. llQuestion: We understand fully your side I S determination. However, we wish to ask yon O!lCe again whether there is rOOm lor th.ird-party nations of Asia to c>:ct within this diificult situation. At the same time l in the sense of moving forw,lrd even by onc step. what will you do it the Unitc:d States were to agree to suspend bombings against the North?


IlAnswer: (With a big smile) We <:m.cl the Lib.oration Front o~ the South will make the ultimate p:::ovisions fo::: the scttlcrnent of the Vietnam ----~. --question.. Of course, third pa~~ics c'\J::i~lJiill_c..£:t'tai~ rolcs J but the final deciders are ourselves and the neopIc of the Liberation Front. ......~ .......... .. .... ...-----~--~.



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nTh e moS t lr!.por,an~ . , ......n:tng ' . . lOr • t'ne U·... • 15 nh.C d __ :-S...... ... a ... es t 0 rccogulze the st:rcn~th of the J.Jibel"~tion Front. V! e highly evalua-:e the Liberation Frone s military C'md p;litic<d power. It is c. very great force, and it is the only 10l:ce which truly rep:::escllts the people of .South Vietnam. I ask you to study their policy platform vcry carefully. Their policies ar~ very correct ~ ~. .'~e exactly suited to the actu2. 1 situe'. tio:l i.1. the South. It is Yc.!...'L foolish of tne United S:c,tes no: to recog::l.ize this Libe:-c>.tion Front which is the only f~~;;:ich ha7theabiiity-~:o-s·~'.:·tic-!~.e:'lid·in?:n;·-pl:obycn1~:··tt must be said that th".t is why the UJ;.itcd S;ates is repeating failures. Question:

"Q1.1cstiO:l: C<~n ncgoti.,tioas be realized i£ the U'1itcd St2.tcs recognizes The Pconle IS Libcr;,tion :r'ront of the South? The United St2.tes i~ . saying that it may rccogn.i:~e it as 'a P;:I.l"ty to negotiations. ~

IIAnswer: The best w<:5 is fo::.' _~hc _Unitc(~ States !? ncgotia te first with the Liberation Front, Th<~.is_?!..~L~~~·.~1:1~~~' _.~~~:.0_~l.~::.~~:.:S_.~~.<:'~_ ;!~~__ Unit~~_~3.~.~'=.~ _~.~._~_~~_~=~b: i.;~g~.~~~_;:g . ~. ~.~ _~~}).91~~~t~~~. ~~~~,?nt~. l'11C Un:'~ed States is spreading the argument that we of the No~:th <'.re the cnc:,!lY, b1.1: that is only an excuse for cxpand~ng the we-.r to t.he Korth, It h('.5 alreZld)' been made clc~r that the question of the South cannot be settled. thro . .!gh bOP."'.bings against the Korth. The Uriited St;:-,tes should negotiate with the LiberZltion Front of .the South fi"l-st of all. :fi~;~:,;;;'~~:--it-~~Tll··l~:;oU:t--o.f 'th~-q~ie~ti'o!~'''ir-1-'· \"e-::e "o---::;'-::e··-':;n"c---a.-::;t·:1.:'c.;·;-0·--/ne(10;·~"""'1-ncr \":"~l t;",·, T 'b"'-""';Oll Fron'" "5 1'£ L, to ... "" L. ........ l 0 0 ...... .. "'... J. ... c .. 1








it were conveying a favor. T.2!.~_J:~.in~I~r;~l dec!,si;2.J?~~~y..l£~!:~.~UJ..=!.i.~.::..c! States to deal with is the Liberation Front. II

Full Japanese Version of MAINICHI Cor:::'cs?Ondcllt )linoru Omori I s Report ---------------~ From Hanoi on Intervi;:;w "[ith D::{V Prcrrdcr Pn"m Van. Dong: ..

IlM.l""I.lt'HC!-II head. office foreign news dcpa:::tmcnt editor Omori--This r':!portel' had an interview with Nortn Vietna:mese Prernier Pham Ve.n Dong for one ho1.1l' and H':tccn minutes from 3:00 p. m. on -:1: October. The premier, at this intervie,:.'. clarified a very :finn determination of resistance against the United Stat~s a!ld mack the following points, saying tnat thel'e is no l'oom lor negotiations: To uphold lour conditions to the lC'.st, no intention of negotiating with the United States under the present situation. liThe premier m<'..de clear the following points: I) He has no inten-

!!01:,?_t ..~~~ .. ?T!~~_g~.t1~~f~.g~~E~~t~{~:~g~~}~I~:t!~~~S..~l~:~~.~:~~.~i>~i~~E ~~i~t ··s.~tu<~·ti.o;';;-

'"h U::11't co'S" ' .. · .. e ... "aloes wan"s ncgo.l;1.l.10ns. h Inus .. ('.cce?~"Lh e lour con d·11.10ns _ an!i rc CO&'~~:i£=0~i.~~!.}:~y.C) y--tD:~ jJ.~it~ 4§~~ ~~:~j"9~??iii:~E',,;~?'p'~'~ckj bombings ag:l.inst the north at one time b . .1.t that was only a pretext lor PWSE Sti:~~g-ti;e~I~:;i-e-~c'~la'ff~;t't;r' f.ii·s·--;·:d·~ ·is··~~·;i~g ;~i~ ~ile·s·;"·and· i~· t ..~·~ '£~t~tl'eJ anti-air ii~pow'~-;:- :£1';;;' missiles to dfles will be ?trengthened; 5) He - relics on aid :from brothe::: socialists countries; 6) The Libcl"1.tion A::.-my side did not lose in the fighting .in Chu L<d; 7) Mc_c!.~~:!~~:::.~L..t.~!.!d _P_~~:~.~_ will have so:nc effects but final settlement must be made by the P?_rties dh-cctly in";~i~e"d- {;'th~'~',~a"~:;'-a;:;:d-BYY"is-sfci-~is-~·t-;~;it...;;:~~~r;;-i· ci;~--;-c-~~tacts .,) "

T~ ,J.J.










with-th~ SO\.;th-Viet-;~;;~-~;·d:people I s Liberation Front.

The intervie\v

liThe interview with the premiel" took place in the reception ro.on"1 01 the president's of'ficej it ,\V?S a jobt interview by this reporter and the ASAH!I s foreign news department editor Hata. The premier was wearing an old but clean white shil·t and well-creased yellow trousers. He has a broad fC?rehead) and his eyes arc mild. However, ~"lhcn. he talks about the United States, his eyes gleam, with tile fierce flame of fighting spil"it. He was deeply impressive, voicing t.1).roughout th~ inter\rie\:1 his fierce determination that the present situc-.tion leaves no room for .,negotiations. The contents of the interview wi6 PremIer Pham Van Dong were as follows: II Omo d: Today, in 1965, wh.en the 20th century is nearing its end, it is not reasonalbe that war is' still going on. W c cc~n well understand North Vietnam l 5 position, but is thCl'C no room for negotiations betvlcen the north and the south?

IIPremier Pharo V<'.n Do'ng: You::.' questj.on is a basic question l and I think it also has news value. r'will tell you about the possibility of stopping th.e 'war. M:r. Omori says that he understands our position, but the most important thing is whether the politicians of the United States have any intention of stopping the war. The United S'cates reinforced its military stl"ength in the south by 100, 000 men in a very short period Qf time. Why did it do so? That is bec2.usc the Un.ited StC'.tes has been repeating mistakes ana failuNs in th.e south to date~ and ha.s fallen into a bog, The United States will be crushed in the S01.::'t.1. if it does not send in huge reiniorcements. That is why it has brought in a large number of troops. IIHowev~r,

a very iml)ortant point is thc.t even if it brings in huge military strength, the situation in the south '\vill not change. The United States and allied satellite forces number 150. 000 men, and t1:e puppet t.roops num1;>er 600,000 men. They certainly have great iirepo'wer, but it will not change the victory in the liberation arrny side. The United • States is providing a very good target for the peopic of the south. You know from your own. experience of fighting t.he Americans that they have no spiritual power. Furthermo-re, the United Stc.tes is '.'{aging a war which is against justice. It is the U.S. soldielSwho are at a loss in a b?ttlciield. where the· topography and. climate are u.1'lsuited to, them. Therefore! L1.e Libel"ation Army will win without fail. The Liberc.tion Army will secure greater victory t1.an t..1.?t in the battle of Ban Tsuon {meaning the lighting in Chu Lai--M.AlliICEI} in the future.


IIOmor!: The U. S. side S?ys that it ,\von in Chu Lai, but what is the true situC'. tion ? "Premier: The United States claimed a false victory for propaganda: purposes. It brought in huge forces, and 'it has to make propaganda to encourage them and also public opinion.,vitnin the United States. In fact, the United States sl.1ifered c. big failure in Chu Lai. The Liberation .Army completely dostroyed four battalions consisting of 1, 000 r:Len. You v. . ill find, out abol.lt this if you go to Saigon and ask .Ame~路ican soldie1"s who actually took part in the bc-.ttle of ehu Lcd. l'~cxt, I wish to touch, \lpOn questions of politics. The United States sent its expeditionary forces into South Vietnam, and has decided to carry out direct aggression by itself. This proved to the South Vietna!n.ese people that the United States is a robber. All strc:.ta of the people, even the puppet military forces, will come to stand up and fight against the U.S. fo:rces. The United States has already lostiace. This, too, has brought good l"esults for the Liberation Army siele. The people do not yet know the huge size of . the military forces the United States has bro'ught into South Vietnam, . and in South Vietnam: a saci-ed war of resistance against the U. S. forces is continuing. llMcanwhile J the United States is even resol-ting to atrocious methods;. The people's sense of r路esistance is being l<mned by these atrocious methods. The U. S. forces are like an island isolated in a sea of people l s hatred, and if they were to take even one step out of the island. they. will be destroyed. What can the U.S. forces, isolated on an island~ do? This is proved by the history of t..'lc war of resistance against France. SlOmori: What the United States rec.ily wants is to stop the war. The problem lies in the fact that the United States has made a promise to the South VietnC'_mese Government and the world, and I think the key to settlement lies in how the United States can save face:

uOmori: What do you think of t.~e mediation efforts of t..'le special envoy of Ghanaian Presidcn: X:crUL"'lah and the 17 neutral nations? /uPremier:


us l-:OVES

~~~~~cr~ :.Unless we. sec the. pniteclStates~ ..?:·.t:~~ ..s;l~<;crity_.a~1· ~fi9. ;:t~ J 9.::J>~t~~$_~ ~..~'~)._Y:'.<:"_~1l!~2~_f~~..L!~~.~ ...!:~:~.? ti ?:.\g_~.~!.£ ..Y..:1:.~ ~ ~ct~.t~~e.~ c.t the mo:n~nt., the Unitcel. Statcs is__ testing t:.s.- While =-=-:..::..._-. __ .. _---------_._-----_._. ...... _........ _.-...._-_talking ........_- .....about ----.P_e££..~I .._~.tj...s..~.J:..~~~tc.l1~~g ..~s. At U1\; s?rl1.C thl1.c, it is laying plots against wo::ld public opinion, too. World opinion is fiercely against the United Sta.tes •.

U{In reply to Hata t s question C'.sldng,. liThe United States must talk aboutpcacc to the world; is it pot possible. to grasp and utilize this point?) Premier: It is not yet possib~e to grasp that chance and move :f orwarcl to peace. We 'will prove justice to the 'wor lcl ,villi 2_ctual deeds and drive the United States to the wall. We intend to fight through fiercely, in both Nort.h and South Vietnam, prcpal'ed for still' greater difficulties and further sacrifices. Therefore, we W~'L:nt you to understand our position,. For that purpose, I will explain briefly the importallt . points of the prcsClit . . val.· situ?tion in t...~c north and t..'1.e south. The. U .5. forces carried out operations to build ioothold bases, just as in the case of French Gene!'al {Tussini--p:lOnetic}, but failed. Neither U.5. Ambassador Lodge nor General Lansdale has been able to bring about big political results. Their war is no different from that of Ngo Dinh Diem. The United States definitely cannot win even if it increases its forces in t..'lte south. "Omod: However, there is order in matters, and as it is not pos sible to settle everything at once at one stroke, whc~t wi 11 you do if th.e United States were to suspend bombing against the north for a long period of time. . .

. us l-roV,SS

lIPremier: The United States l escalation a!Zainst the north has _ f.<:.~!~~.~o}~r. Its greatest failure lies in its having been unable to bring the north to t..'-le conierence tiSfe by t..1):-e2'C·ni-;lg -0 'pinTon~on-ili e"Co";t;;'-ry ;-is~~ta·~·tfl;g-t~·'d·~;n:~~d-the·. .~; spens ion of U. 5. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _~_ ... & . _ u _ _ _ _ _ • _ _ _ _ _ ..... . . - - _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


b~mbings against the north.



Ea:~~~.!.!._.~?:~T~.t.~~l.§~?:~.£~ .. P;-gp'~gc:-.:q~ze~ it ~~~?e.:9-~.5: '?2:nbL--1Z.~_~g~!~~.~~.~.::.~_~!.~~_t.9E'_~.~~<::.~_~y.~, How.:'

ever, we were not.able to rcsDond, as the susnen.slon of the bornbings ~.:.:.!im~.~. at eEc~~~ng_ ot:!" c~:,:..~~?t tO~~c:::~~~-~~l:..ich ~:,:i.~~~;~i~ p.i~. ~·iP.!y accep:. The temporary suspension was rather a pretext for further es-C-aia.;ion. Vie ca!'~"lot possibly accep: such tcmpol'ary suspension or such demands. Rathe::.'J we are pushing forward preparations to expose !further


fu:::thcr the United States J plots. 'N e will iurther strengthen Our antiair power '\\'ithout iedl. And, we will p:::ovc: the unprofitablcncss of the United States I escalation. "Omori: Is North Victn2'.rn using missiles lor t.'le defense of Hanoi? Premier: Yos. we used them, exactly as you s"y. Omori: How many times have you used them? Premier: r c:o not remember exactly how n'l.~,":)y ti:ncs \~'C u:,;cd th,cn\~ ht.; Q\!:t: ;l.i~~ clo!6n:; 0 \vct':..po:l.t.: J fl·OiYl rl~i!l~ilc S to rifles; aloe eiieetivc, and we will stNmgthcn all of them in the future. And. we will eiicctively increase c.amagc to U. S. plane s and pilots. The pilots arc all c:... cellent Ame:rican iliel'S •. but if escal"tion is f~rthel' pushed iorw2.rd J the casualties among them 'will rise to several thousand. 1l1'0ward. Hata J s thxce questions, t.~at is, 1) the people of the north all have l'ifles today, so does the strengthening of anti-air firepo'we:r mentioned by the govcrmnent me,'.n the increasing of n1.issiles?; 2) Do you intend to attack the other side IS take-o.:I (nc:_sshin-kichi) bases for planes) from the N01-th?; and 3) Are you using planes for defense battles? The premier said t..~at he could not :reply to questioll Z. but said as follows in anSWC1' to questions 1 and 3: Premier: \Ve will strengthen.all kinds of weapons) and in the future) we shall rely on brother socialist nations. We are also using planes. uOmori: Is the north. in contact Vv'ith t.1-te People t s J..liberatiol1 Front in the south? Premier: We are in full contact. Omori: In what way are you maintaining contact? Premier: That, J. cannot say. However, what I wish to say is that the Liberation. Front has great authority and prestigc in the. south.

III hope you w:.ll tell the United States this fact. The people now holding political power in the United States ?~re fools. They. cannot see this fact. VTe haye been sayIng that the sole representative governm.ent in the south. is the L~be-ratT;-n-·If~o-~t-.sJ4e·:···The·- tinit~'d' S~at~s-sh~~.Qdkn;\v-­ thc:t:--M;:-O;;;'''c;?i~;g';~ .negotiations. but as long as the United State s . docs not ~"ec:£g.niz..9 the PeO~_e~.~..1:!p..£!.~~LoE ~r~"?-~...9Lth~_.~2~th~_~~~-J;.~ cannot be any negotiations. The -Liberation. :Fron.t side h<?lds the key~ both-pofiticC'.ll)' a~~ ~ilitC'.ri1y. We highly estecn1. and re~pect the People) 5 Liberation Front. uOmori: Ii t..'-lc Ddt cd States we:::c to recognize t,\c People! 5 Libera tion Front as a pa:::ty to nego'.;i2.tio~ls, will it be possible to discu,ss the problems of. t.....e south?



I'p . . relnlel':

db t lc,CSlra:>_c, ' ~, .QUI. ,I.' ,., proo "1en. cmos ~na t· 1S ... I.nc 'Who i.~i~g.~~~~:g._~::.~__q~i~~~.~~.S~~~q§ j!l__~h~._s.9.~l~h,.J.. _It.i$_the)ib~r.atio'!l:.F ...ny.• , . ye tJ ·'C.'1.C ' U ' " 1S esc<l.1a.mg ~. .... . . t'ne norm. ..' D oes J~na • S • Slee ~~c war ag?lns;; -it 'thii~~' th~'t" ;;c·go·fi2.'t~"~~i t1~' th:e~~o;'th-'~i~~i~"~:~d"~'~'ttl~ 'th'e problem? A third party's contribution to settlement is lin1.ited. ... .nC'.~~


, wo~_



nO:nori: Before caminohere, 1 stonned in DJ'akc:.rta 2.nd discussed .;> •• with Indonesian Pl:csident Su.'<.arno abottt the possibility of seeking a way to settle'::'"lcnt by holding a surnm,it conference of the lc:?cCl:s of. Asian nations .near Vietn~m and about the possibili~y of adopting <'. declaration for settlement of the issue at an Afro-Asian conference. What do you thin.1.;: of these ideas?






uPremier: The ·most important point in regard to t.~e Vietmtm question is that all matters :must be pushed forward in close liaison with our side a:ld '.'lith the People's Liberati(;m Front in' the south •. It is possible for thi.rd narties to make cont~ibutions to a cert2.in extent-;-but the finaCs-ettle rS:- ·01' decide~-s-:-~ci~~~:;cii;'~--~~rth~-i~ib~;:~'ti~;~'F~'o;t - . - - - - - - ---------- ----_. .... ---- ------- ---'"-_ .... - ------ -.... .. .... of the south. ~-


UHC',ta then asked: liThe United States says that it respects the Geneva agreement and that it does not h.ave territorial ambitions. It also says that t.~e Vietnam question should be settled by the Vi etnamese people themselves. Is it not possible for you to take hold of these statements and. propose negotiations on the,basis of your :four conditions irOln your sice? There are some poople even in Japan who think that it is the No",th Vietnamese side which is rejecting negotiations. uTo this, the premier replied as follows: Premier: In that regard, :!!.!!....... have armounced that States issu.es a statement to the effect . . - if the'United .. _--- -_. - ... --.-~., ---_..._-- - -- - ... -- ......- - ._.", '_.'"' .. .._--- - - ....t..1:.at it will recognize the fou::: conditions" wc -".:ill respond to talks. The ....unitecfS-t2.tes. h-as-;;-;';uchintention. \if~-a;~;~'~dy't~-'iight -as-long as -necess~ry. Vie have faith i;-i:h-e--Japanese people! s friendship • . The United StC'_t~s is attacking Victna:m from bases in Japan; we hope thC'.t the goocl, sense of Japan will stand u.p and see to it that t.~e ground is laid 'lor the maintenance of tl'uly :friendly relations in the future when our country becomeS united.

----_ --however,


1,Iainicni Questionna:'::.-e to Pha:n. Van Dong:

ItMino:::u Omori. chiei io:-e:'gn news editor of Mainichi l submitted a questionnaire regarding a peaceful solution to t.~e Vietnam dispute to


North Vietnamese Premic::." Pharo. Van Dong, i::::-respectivc of the ,1 October interview with him. MAL~rCHr l,"ccelvcd a cable reply fl'om Ph<~mYan Dong on 8 October. Here 10110w e:.. ccrpts fl.-om. Pham Van Dong's impOl"tant answers, omitting the same answers made by him ~n. the above h~terview. IIQuestion: What do you think ccbout President Johnson I s proposals for llunconditional talks 11 and IIpeace talks? II

us lmVES

nAnswer: President Johnson began to talk about peace negotiations half a year ago. HO\'levcr~\vhcn0\'er abO\.£p·~;:~~··~~c··o·~:cfe·~~~f


rcIniorCen';~nt -oftil-e-U-:S-:-io~~-;'5:; So\:tl~'''Vi c~.~~:;,. c~i~_~~:~_~~~~i~_~I~".~h.e­ ~~g~.:i-.~~~~?.~~?- .Y.~!?~;?-'

Johnson h<,.5 been speaking about peace while carrying out the war. His "unconditional talks ll \'.'ould be nothigg but the Vi~tn~.e .~.~E~_~~ acc:..~.?.!~:!S_E?.~~.J:l"1e_.Q~-,,,:p_~:.9.P'o~S!_~2.~1di~~Q1_s. In a word, President Johnson! s hypocritical appeal for peace is designed to cover up W2.r activities, to cheat .the wo:dd, and to dodge the protest of the -people of the world, including the United States. nQu~stion: What is

opinion of the neutral Afro~Asian nations! wish for a settlement of t11e Vietnam war?



UAnswer: The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government heal'tily appreciate the fact that many Aho-Asian peoples and govcrnm.ents are won'ied abo\.lt the Vietnam issue, that they bitterly denowlce the U. S. imperialist aggression in our country, and that they support our patriotic fighting iro!D- the bottom of their hearts. We believe that the socialist co\mtries and the people <?f t..~e world) including Asi a ?nd Africa, will strengthen their sympathy with us and their support for \.lS to completely smash the U.S. imperial~st aggl'ession. The onlyjust \'!.?::J' to s_~ttl~.1).e Vietnam ~~e is ..!9_~~J.E~ in..}i~1~~yj.,t:h_~h~J...9_~LG~.;1.~ya3'-gr_e,e;-:lcnt. Jh..~ 10Ul' conditions p:::oposcd by the North Vi(!tnamesc governn1cnt and the stand explained' in the N.FJ~S'VI-s-Mar2n st;t~~;'t. "'----_ _ .. _ _ .. _ _ .... _ _ _ _ _ _ .... , . _ _ _ ..... _

.... _~_ ... i

uQuestion: Concerning the so-called fou::.- conditions which you subrnitted to the DRV i. Pa:di2.ment lc.st April, should we understand, them as your ultimate c~nditions? Can we not consider them. preconditions for talks? /Answer:

llQ1.1estion: What will be your countri s response if the United States stispends its nOlthcrn bombing fa;:, a ~ue pe:dcd? Also, do you think the U. S. forces will bomb Hanoi in the ncar future? nAns,ver: The U.S. imperialists are shamelessly J escalating! the war and bombing North Vietnam. As the result, however, they are meeting an intensiiied offensive by the South Vietname:;c pe,oplc, as well e.S huge losseE' ,inflicted by the North Vietnamese people. Not being the least dau..'1.ted, and intensifying their enmity against the U. S. aggressors, all"the Vietnamese people are strengthening their determination to fight for national salvation. Availing'myself of this occasion, I ask MAINICHI to • co::wcv to the JaD3.:1CSe 'Ocoplc our deeD J gratitude for extending warm help to our patriotic anti- U. S. war. U . . L


THE lID'] YORK 'rIli[::;S) FRIDAY, JMftJ.~HY 6> 1967 "Eycl)' l;rop~•.~;l.l :limell at 1':-0" A!'I~('Ii wh.~tl:~r tht'rc W('f~ nlotin~ t~ S{:ttl~'li!Cnt (.r the Ykt· Xo!'th V!i':n:t!H~$e tr!)Dp3 i:\ !h"\111C:~ pl'C'b:~~nl uu:';t. co:':.rOl'n~ Srj~l~h Vii-tn:un. !,!r. Do diu not to tht' T(';ll:ty of th~ war," he; ri:spo!1d dirccth'. lIe slid th:!t s=ti{l. hla other v~"ord~1 the ei~", Uth~ nl1l1oi ft.,·re~s ('If the N:!", Un~tio:l In~!5~ be rn~t'~ b~J th,n:.f.l I.,ib~r;.~tion Fron.l [lh'! tw(:C'a th:! l:.. mrric3.n ~!:~rc~F;;= Vict(~(·~gl anti the pi'ople


Vittn"l1l1(s'! Vlctl:".l. and ~c.uth \'i·~trn.nl ~l"C ~ufIiclc:nt to the rcspon::;rou:ty l"[ the .ArnC';'i- ht,lr! in ch.:'("!; lil~ ,A'Ja"lic~n (:x .. can :lggrcs!:>v!' r.1ust b:! well de- pc:litiomry fo!c;)," and that the! fined, • 1"~~'ls ~ou!d lIl;:<) "rcclIll t(} 0:1 a qUl'l'ti'):l ab~,:t Prcmi-'r South Vj·.'l:r'.ln the men who Pl::lll: V;m Don;;'s .int~:'k\':, in \' :~:<'~:' .~C~II rci:ruu~cd in the li;i.::C'l v(":~t~:;:b,\· v~~th .tI:~o-rn:;{..!1 uO, ... 11. E, fhlli!ll1!"Y, a:l as,;i.,hnt mauIII a pr('f;l:\' to his answer a~iru!, cditf.r {'f tl'hc N~\v Yo:""k! to one- qUt"stl.)U, ~Il". BQ s3id, 'l;h:1r.~. (!lid p:\lticul~,.h' on thd "Fe·r tet'\! ::ul·l~ (>[ y.:ars th,! st:'.tus of Hanoi's f(lur.. poi~lt t Vie!t~aln.c.:-''! !J("QP!c h:t\·~ bc~n PC3.cC" p~ogr:\lnt ~\~r. Bo rcru~:.:Ji ~,n,~ ~l~ltlO:1, O!lC' people, !'ric~kto co:nfllcut on U!~ n!!:'~lfS!l·.;dl In;: tn~ ~:l!nc 14t:lgu:'1Z'~~ article, but s:~!d t~o fo1k,~.;\ill·~:! 4·\'l.~I!H~ it h:ts sc!n~tilnc5 bc.:C'n "TIll'!' Unitt~il f'tat.;:; l:nlSt ih~f tlh·:~k'd. it h:ts b~dl ~ttl!~ to rc:rcCOr;n!z~~ thr.= ~;a.Uo:~(ll I,rc:. r ..~ .. c:;tabUsh its n;LU(,nal u:lity each lllion Ji'ront of SO~til Vi<:tnt,m, tim\! It 11:1s l'cco\'~rc(l its in\t,:hich Is the O;~ly <~uth~!lt!C n·u .. dr-pi\nd("nce.'. r,,~~lltative (>f the! Sou tit Vi;tor th~ b?mbi!l?~, !.!:-. So So:lid

an1 ttc

rHli p ~mID Ifl'/"/"I) ft•. J.i(1 J. Cj'u'illl"} j'llJp 1,.;_.1

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I I ,

!i i



~. tb;:.t U1CY' J~"!d f:-.. 1.1~U to unc!cr.. namcs(! p~c,pJ~, to ll~&O'l:ltc minc mol'"l\:', cliscr":mi::c the with , thcr.\ and scUll' ;,11 the CCOnOI!1.Y 0"' shalte th~ Go\'cmquc,;tt(':l~ of South Vidn3m. mcnt. !H"IlOi1. if>!"•• its f,1l"l, in;;ist.-; "In the li{;Jtt of their fnorthat LIe Um.<:d S,:ltC:5 r~c('g- fccti\"cn~5~, and the' \In:mlmous niz~

the i01.!t-pnlllt

p:0gr:~nl ?~

a. ba:;is f~r a. S~tU\"!i!i"l1t o~ t.he COnCC11lnatil)h of \'lhicl\ they atc \rietn:J.m~5'.' pmblcm, a!ld to the oloi~d," lw s:,ld, "if the d':lH()!l~tr;l.te its j!oo1" ...iIl t,~· United ~;t:lte:; comes to halting stl)jljiini.: the l.ou~bin~ of 1\C.]'til the b(l:llh:l.=-dm~'lt dcfinitivd)' Victn:!!n d:;finitivcly and \\:ith.. tl·" 'out co:.d:tiO!lS," am,l \'."/~tl lOt;.• Ct,:: "'t' ... l lOllS. l!;; .ac .. \',ill be n::>.mh:cd ,iliU studied III this, ~.~r. Bo f,C'cmcu to by the (H~llOiJ GO\'cTlllllcnt. rcp~<1.t th~ Prci"lllr.r·s cct'hratiCin "If, :;it',r the d~finith'c and ·tlnt the fOil=- points :!zo a b:lS;s :for S!~tticlnC:ilt l.:!.thi;!" than a uncf.inuitin!l:tl C~i:sation of the bo:nb:~rdm('nt.~. the American :cc.mlitio!l fo,' t.~lks. i H:>.nc.i's four II:)ir.ts ar~: n~c. Governmcnt }Impost'S to entcr o:;nUb!\ of the ill(l~pemlen::e, into eO:I:a('t ,~'jth tilt: [JI:llloil St)vcrciznt.r. w:ity allU tcn·~t1). Go\·~r.in;tent. I b~licv~ th~t this rial lnlq;rity of Victn:llll lind pmpo~:>.l ".ill ba examined an.d thc withdra'.';:!l of Un!l.cd St.... t~s studied, too," f"Ter::; frc:m the ar.oil. ~;ld;ng :Mr. B:l wa!'i not a~!tcd abot! rcunificaU,,~ of Vj\:~l4!m.; :-\:_ and did liot YOhl!lte~r t'l com· s;>t!c~ {(If the mHit?"l"j' pro"_'i!j!"~:; tn'C:~t on the Chinc~. So\-lct sl'lit of the If:'! G'·nc~:.l agrc::;;ncn: J!:; 1t rd;~lc5 to tJle '-;2r--a. fa .. ibarri :1;; ffJ!'cf!;'n i(,re'::;; scttlv. Ivorltt! thC;,1C at tila Frellc!:, p:.~. jnl':nt of Sr;uth Victn"rn's Inter. :ty'p current congress, In,,1 affair:: by tha ;;'Juth ArYid Y. Pcl:;he, <" T!<e:n'bcl' o! in'l~cs':! III 2.~co!d:Jr.Ce wIth tb~ th~ Politburo or till! Stwict p::"', lpro,:r:\:!l of th~ N;,tlc:lal L!b~r- .ty, told the! congress toda.y th;\t ;?.Uon }"'rv::t t~i:d r.'1~c~~ul f\;unl. iChina.ts refu!ia.l to act jointly In'."lt!on oi· Vietllam by the lwith otl:~r C'ornmuilb;t couaIp:'('pl('., vI North :md N)uth tries !a SI!I'I'c>rlh!1:" Victn~;" 1\\,ltl\"ut fnrdr,n Int':rr"r"n".. , , "c:trrl~s w;,t.:r to the mlll of th:: , 0.11.::;tioncd abo,lt tliC! pr/~sihll- : Americ,m imjJ~r!:l.H~ts ;l.:td cn· .It:: {.f a!io,..:in~ (,th"r \\'{':;l.:! II e....ur.\l:~~' them to clll~t~e t!:cil ,jrturnali(;ts to '·i~lt· North Vi~t- a~;f!rCE51v!1." :nam !l'o\\', Mr, BQ l':ti!l that h(' ~.~r, Pd'·I,e repnr!cd tl:nt Dl',r.





llot lJl:tl~rs!;!nd th,·ir c;!- .lh:l:1 eo CI<mrmmlst lnrtic5 h:!( t!IU"I~Slll for 5u-:h ll. ri,ky :l.'i- G(,(~::trcd t1::?t they favor a wo,l'. !;Ir:l!m~nt. and expr,~:.;.sC'd r~~l";t C'.nu:lu:list C(Ju!cr."neCa But I~u! ('oul:1

t11:1t, ,cunsi:jcmltlon:: oi ~:lkty

t':{}U~Q. not l)~.rlnft hfs Govc:nl-

mcn\ t~. ;J.rhmt as m:l:.Y :1.5 It V/c.ulu 1..·.0 to.


!~I I..cng(., the! Itall:m ll~rt:

cbl~!'t al~(l the lno:;t inljlQl't.nn

('m:l:;n Co:mI1U:list l\t the Ce· 17css, t;..!d th~,t he p:ef':!t;:d "c,; Cll:lligC:; of opfll!on" ?:"Id "till:' tll:1.t';r:<1 rtlcctlnl:s" rath~r lb.~ to wotl:l n5!A!mbly.

.•JJJ 1


li 0 It ~'.ll . VIE T N A 1-1



Fm'oi '1P"'\ 1. . .SI>"I:~ ~ .. I-, 0150.Gi,!':r 28 Jan:.:al'Y ..£ .. ...-. I"tc"I'J . . . tio"a .... ..- CC -.; n E'l~l ";:::... 'to





t~l'c;:t) H<1!l0j., 28 jum;al'Y--!~G~~1c:l D:lj 'i'l'inh, birv fo:'e.icn !li:1istcl'. hils 61'<!ntcc! -.:n intCl'vic\I to ~u:;;tr.:.lian jou:';ulist. UD.tr.::d Bl:rch(·ct. Questions rind .,nS\lcrS fol10"I: , <!.~«:stioa:

Hr. [·:iltistcr. ,·;ini; in you;' vic,; a:-c the j,lcst siCa:l;fic<:.nt recent, dcvelop·~ tle:lts in thc V.i.~":l;!U \ar, a!ld ,mat 'U'C the Pl'O:;pcct;s fo:;' tne .i.r,!!:.ediat~ lutu.!'e'?



V.8. lJ:lpcl"tialists arc t;:le;int; t!H.: !lost

b~:abarvtl=> \:~~

ac(;!'csslon s,J",thf\-,st As'.!.- ~-. and the \lo!'lci. Il.a: they l1a\"o !;ust,Ht~cd r,eavy c;c:'c.:: ts in SOlltil ~rd in lIort·h Vic:tnam~ ~'h~' p!:upJ.c of SC't.tth Vict:t~~!:l~ figl~;5!,e \l.:t.h [:;~"cat hCl"l)i.~!\. h!.lvC foi!.cd. all tlicir tll.1it.-J.l\Y P:!,;'.!:l~ in SlJii;c or the cOi:!!;;itr.:cnt:s of oY·cr 1 Qi:iIi9n 1;.S • ., puppet" .md s~1:c:i.:i.i"Cc t!'.:ops. 'in.c pcople of i~'jrth V::'l'~!~!.l h.:vc not been ~:',d ;lill neve:' be cO~lcd by t:!C b;;di>~ro~s b(;r!:bin~ hlid3 of the iJ ,S, l!:ipe!'i.,liS ts <!nd ~n ... e deal t thc,,1

.....·'... _·'nc:t



.~~\"'f" ch'5'~~!'"f'IJ ........ ~'"

,_ .... _





... _ _ ...... ..... ..,.;.... T;ll,c·"d:c,·',"'l'· It:)'f n ~'·lri MOr'f'. oJ rC~"l0I15'1v cca'''''' ';"'1 ""~









... _

.. n




... _


.,.A'ii Viet:r:1!.1C3C ?c,;,plc a!'C :·c:;o::,l!te.ty fiGhti.!lC~·;;;~i?!st: the U.S. <1~£;!'csso"t'$ to dci'er'.t1 '. thcir s:tc"'cd P..atl01U1 rlchtsa.;-,d t~l.fi.:i.l thc'i~' c'.d..! to the o;coples of the friendly cO'.L'1tricf; n.O~1 st:";';CGlinB t"i:- the!.!' :i.r~c!~p~n(~I!CC find !!·c:::don. 'l:hc i'oUr'-~Oil1t st:md of th~ D:"(V Govc~n:JCH~..I i~ e st.and of i!!dc~~!:d!:!1cC and p~~c~" !Ile! it j.s \;!!e e:;:p!'c5sion... '0;" th.e !lHldi:.!:tcnt:~l princ:ij,J.cs ~nd tt. c I:!2'!in pl·o'li.sio!ls ot. the 1954 Ceneva· C\e!'CC!.!~ ..1~JS on Vic:tl:~~. It is tl'e cas:!.s fo .. t.!!c r.:ost CO!'l'cct !;o:i.iti~a:, :;o],ublor. to th~ V~.et:1ar.l pl"l~blc!.l., a basis ;:!rl.r:h flU:!.!, neet.s ti:~ jeep &spir<.1t..:!.Q:ls of the Victr..;:'::tesc p~op~.c.t a:\d. fully COrllO!".lS to t'~l~ spl rit-. of the fivc-!'J].rtt; ~taic::!·~nt 0:: tnc 1: r;'!:s VI th~ only z('r~'.li~c rC;lr'csC;;\tative of the pccp~ ~ of South Vie:tna';l.

of the \:o~:td i:~cluc.i!'!~ very la: ee scct:.o~'lS o~ t.~.~ populati.on or the United St':ltes itz~lfJ r.!.O:-{lI r:.!1d. !.!o:;·c stronGly Zl.:P;O!}C 0\..::' jt.:5.; stand ani dCrla:1.t\ cv~r ilOl·!! f:'rt!:!.y that the U,S. ir.i;?"2r!.a:='is'ts stop the':'!' t'!:lr o~ E~b!'f;ssio!1. in Vietnan and 1,:';; the Vietn~!lesc ~cop:tc ~cttl(' th~i!' o,:n, ai't,drs th.,ttselv:c::.. 'L';!~ ~C~P~tCS

The U.S.


i!.1pcri~li:ts t.,ll~

of peace

!~esotiation:;. b~!t

thc:r sti:;.l shot·: (;rea t obc!uracy.

~!.".z3icent Johnson I:ci;·cnt:::.:i stated ~iith !r.tpt,;dCIlCC tha.t !le v:5J.:· {;O on int:C!lS1fy.!.ns

th.!! .,~r cf ae~r'cssion i!1 a!'\. c.tttr.~"t to elL"1g tr:· t;hc south .and to p~o!onz the V~ctr'_'~;l. B'.lt !~~:H·i!!v!;!' p~l'fic.ious t!'le' :.:lne!.4V.Cl": "o4f th4c Y.S. inp'l!'!.alists .tia:t° be. the ifiet.r.rlc!esc pc:o l>:!.C:. unl ted as on~ t'.~n ~md !'C:.:.:,in: rtei the:- hardships ~or





sacrifices, .arc c:C!tc~:!:tinc1 to car:'] on. tr.eir resish~c.<l .:at' ~o the e:1<! t.o sai'~;;l!al'd .. the inc!cpt'ndc:l.cc ..:1'1 !!'C"CO~l of the fathcrland. ant!. cont!'ibu~e to the .t.lrlintcn:mce peace in soutb::<lsC :.sia "nd th~ \1orld.



1n the filce or cocv:::cnt.,:.';,

CVidc:1CC ~nd \!:rc~:itncss

::'Cpol'ts 'fro!! to!'cii;n

I' ___ ....... _ _ _ _ _ , .. "" ;"I"",.';c:;n ....... _ _ _ ... • .... _ _ _ _ , 'a_ u"'Y .......... _ .. "" __ to ,. _... ~";l"!'\.&..,, ..w ~I'_:t!\~~~~SI ';""~'''4''1'';''l·. joU-t\':~1.;:~ts \~asl'{ltt:"r."" '·o"'I;';·.,·"o"'\~ cla';~

U.S. aircral7t hav,;: b,::en st:'i:':in3 01!2y at iSi2:.t:!!';i t2!'.:;~ts and not at civilian in'lj,n'l;h Vietncir.l. t:hat arc:: J'ou:- '15,(:\;:; 0:\ t!1is s\!bJc..:t"? ~;:.~;t1cr:


!;le ;;P.V :':0 an i!lcer,~nd<:nt a!tl; sQ'lel"ciC:l cot.:d;::,j' and the U.S. il:1!)el"ialists !:tt.;:) '" bsol~~~ly n:. !'l~;;; to viol;:. t!; this ~l'ep~nd";lc!: and SO"·Cl·C~Zllf;:i •



~6 . :~!.~.:~£Z~" .. - .. ~,


: aU!




bo:r.bm.:~ ·of an:.' po:.nt of J.t;; 1;crri\;Ql'Y. \:i~,;t;hC::- '" r.:ilit~l'J or a civilian b.!i'~e t / · is .\ b!o.t~:~t :'~;Jt of ~~!;.t·CSSiC:l c.:nc. a!! unpm'd(.':!~blc c::'it:c. It is t!n

I! .$.

\!!.l.1cni ....l>lc fa."!t th~t civili.a;. tUl'ga.ts t!1 l~o!:th Victn2.!,! have been o.ttac~-::cd. ~!~e pi;:oPlCS o! ti";~ \!u:'i.d.· j.n.:..!.udin& lal'Gt;: sodivns of the ~.f.l~l'icw.'1 P·lCP:.C. ell'O stl'onsly l'!'ot·estinc ~i;a:in$t i!".c- U.S. lll!;c!'inlists: sav<!.[;~ acts e;f a:;;gl'Ct;:;:'C.:t. ~'hC



l'01ic15 and cUi othel'

LlUSt stop dc!'initive;'y ;::'.rld 1Jnconditic!l¢QlY the bO:lb.in:; of ~;a!' azainst tlte nil.V.


Que:;tion: 'l'1I':; United State:; has spc!:cn of' t h ... need tOl' dialq; itself emd tl",e mv. \-Io1.l1d you co-;n..':!;~t en this statt:!.1.ent?






1:!Sl.-ier-: 'l'h::: United St<!.::es h~s ..,ade SI.,ch st~tCr_i~:lts. but in it~ teeds it !!as sh6u."l th~ :,:ti::ost c1Klur'a~y ~nd p~rfid:; 'J.',d com.i!l;;'~s the csc<!l2.ticn. stepgi!lS up &r!d e:ip~:c·:!l.g th~ ~EGltessiv-= t:~!... :f it ~~~eaJ.l~t \;an.i;s tal~:s~ it: t'lust. l. . :.~St h~lt unc,ondil::"O!lally the b~·t!~ll"l~ I'aids ~nd all othel" ilt.ts or ~:~r ~eair!5t. th~ . nail.' It is c:lly aft!..".:..' the \,n~vr.ditiol~O::' ccss<!.tion of U. S. b,'oting ami ,u.2 o!;h(:;:' acts of \-:~~!' ...~a.inst the D?y tnat the::.'c C('v.l~ .l'~ talks bet~:ecn, t:1('; DRV c.nd tn.; United Sta~~s. ~ ~hc

foor .. poia t stand and the ccr:rfct attJ."i;d~ of the DRV (!:A'crru:,cnt enj oj' ~ \Ie are sure; (;i{::r' strc~1e;:!r api)!'f.J'ta~ and SVP;';;;!'!; r.N£- all r-c?c!) 1 ct.'ins' a'lc. j~s\;i ce~ 'lovine peo?li.~s al!c. 6o:.;enu:lent':::.in the '",:).>:'l.d. If'the U!l"it.ed Stat;cs rcfuses to li~ter! t'o r-e~so!l~ it \I~.l fu.~r:r:le!" u:-!!:~a5k.l.t5o;!lr .;:'$ a." obd1.!rate awr~s5o!."'. 'rhe Vietna;;:~s;;. p.:oplc a!' ..~ dete-I'Ll.l!!;.;d to fiGd· '';'f".t,2.1 1;~b.:.l victory to clei't::!.d tb~ no.t'th; 1 ib<H·<!.t~ the south; ;:::hleQ,;' the p>!u~du::' !.".;unif:::"c<ltior.. or l;hc f.at!:·::-!'lan1, \.;;;:: contribute to the J;l·li~l t::(,;~'!.ce or !,O"!N !r~ thi.s ~:r..:a ar!d in the \:cl'ld. -.. -_ .... ....


:,179 -'


v-----. N~v YORK Tn:ES


23 February 1967 P1

/fanoi Offers Anew To Job! U.S. in Talks.

If Bqmbing Is Ended: :~_


By !lE~1t1" TANNER Svtt!&t to Tilt :'t'" Yetl: Tirnts

PARIS. Feb. 22-A spokesman fot' HanOi i'1!:1.U'irmcd today its oCIer to enter into talks with the VllitCii' ~tates if Amcric:m bombing attacks . against North Vietnam were unl.'onditio.laJly

~nd . th(' failure of tilt' rnt'dialiCln Iltt"mpt('d In London by

and penna-

halted. Mtli Van Bo, the Norfu Vietnamese representative in Paris. indicated that bis Government's position on Ulis pOint bad not cllan;ied in spite of th~ resumption ot American bombing Feb. H' following a six-day suspension. . :Mr. Bo made his statement In a conversation with reporters from The NC\V' York Times at the headquarters of the Rortil Vietn:l.Ihese mission ncar Montparnnsse on the Left Bank. of Paris. B('Core llis statement, there had be('n widespread speculation for s~'\.. elQ,1 days that the n~ntly

North Vietnamese position! had ~3.i"den('d after the re-} sumptlon of the bombings I~

)!inistcr Wilson and the S(lvid • Premier, Alcksei N. K05ygin. Tht'! prim:ip:l.l reason for tht, 'p('cul;;.tion was a m('ssage from President Ho Chi Minh to

Ilwn 'afl'airs:~-- .. }orr. Bn said tod,ty th:tl Ih" Prc!<ldcnt's ml'''$;\~(' h~!l refr.rred to thc t(,rlllli nC a ",~tttl'­ mt'nt and n.lt 1(\ the pr(\('''~'; of t::('ttin~ peace t:llk,; slart('d. • Tb!'rcCof£'. be

Pnpc Paul VI on Feb. 13 reo stating Hanoi's four-poInt demand~. including withdr~wal of


it did not

,rr>nl'titutc a dl,lll::e ill the : ,'j('tnam(',.:c l'".;;iti"'l\. i Mr. Bo TC'pt':ttcd C>\'('T :md : over that the hall of Aml'rican American fol'l.'l's from Vietnam. : b\1mbing Imd to be "permanent As originaUy put forward in and uncl'IlditulI1:ll," April 195:' by North Vietn:t.m's H.~ said thE" };('rth Yicln:lmf'sc Pr('mi('r, Pham Yan Dong, these would not tallt "under b"mb~" demands were described as tile (It' "lht' Om'at of bombs," He bll!'t'> {(It' a p('aceful l'cttlcmenl sa id Ulat :l.tl\' l'l'''''':l.tilln tiC b"mb· The)' called for United States withdr.nval from South Viet· ,-' inJ! that wa.~ nlll dr.'Lrly labeled "perman('llt and uncondililmal" nanl, a prohibition azainst tile would k;wc the "threat of stationing of any for£'ign troops bambinI:" inla(·t and thus would in Vietnam, a. settlen.ent o! '\ South Vietnam's intenlal affair.; • con!:til ute 3'1 un:\\·cl'plablr. inll:rrt'rr.Il\'~ v, ilh \.11" negotiation. in accordance with the political pro<Yra.m n! the National LiberaA!'ked hc.w a distinctic>n could l tion" Front, and a rconificatlo;) be made bctWC'I'll a trmporar:r and a permall.'nt hall to bom}). ! of North l\!ld South Vietnam ; without !nrci~n Jnt('rIerC'l1cC. ing. he an!:w('rt'd that the t:nited State's would base to dcdare ; JIo Chi :\fInh ('i ..... ]1.'1ml1IngaL Ule ouL"ct that the b"lt was 1 President Ho Chi Minh, In hl~ ; "pcrman(!nt and unconditional." : mes.'l:lgc to the Pope. phrased Trinh Intl'r\'l('w Re('alll'll , t.he demands as follr)\1/s: \ . "The U.S. imp('rialisls must , Mr. Bo !'aid that Nguyen Duy : put an end to their aggrcl'slnn '\ Trinh. tl}e North Vietnamese : in Vietn'lm, end unr.onditiClI1:tlly Foreign lIlinisler. made an 1m· and definltivel}' the bombing pOltant gc;;ture or goodwill tnI,ward the United States in late ~ and aU other acts or wa.r against ; Janu::tn' whrn he told WilCred the Democratic Rr.public of Vletnllm. v.'ithdraw from South' . Burchett, an Australian cor· .l1'spondcnt, that talks between Vietna.m all American and lOatellite trol)ps, r('co~nize the South ; Wa.<:hington and Hanoi would be !Vietnam National LIberation . po~slble If the bombing !:toppcd. 'Front and let the Vlctn:l.me;;e 'fhe North Vietname~e reprrst'ntati\'e said tbat that had p~2I?ifl._t.hI'l]Il"cl\:e!! _s~ttl!! their constituted a basic change In Hanol's position, Earlier, he said. his government's l'tand was that if thp. Unit£'d States l'topped bombing unconditionally. tht<; new fAct would be studied and that, if Washington tht:n proIPosed to nl'gotiate. this proposal :::U.~o would be studied.



lir. Bo charged that tb(' United Slates Government had !'I:'spondcd in "bad faith" to the North Vietnamese "gesture of soodwill"


He asert('d that neither Pre"id<'nt 'Johnson nor Sccretari' of Stale Dean Ruslt had 'ever qu,)ted Mr. Trinh's statement. tully or accurately. 'l'hi:;, he added, Wi\.<; proof


bad faith l'inee ll:1.nci's r~al position w:t!l fully known and u!1derstood in Washington. HI! repealed sl!\·cra.l lin\l$ that the Himel! Government had mad~ its "g~"lurc" and that it was up to the United Stalt'!': now to make the next move. He said a "conce5s!on" of the kind that was made by !ltr. Trinh in

the BUrchett interview remained ....-alid·' only it It WIlS followed up by the other side. . 1<tr. Bo's remark .. indicated th.'tt the NorlhVietnamese would not be moved bv President Johu!:;on's demand for a rerlproeal 1':\(Ive on their part to :l.l'co~npany any United States ce~<;,lion

of bombing. ],-11'. Eo. ~ l<lightly built nliln in his late {orUC's or earlv fifo tic.!;, was \\:earin:x a. basin!'!'s

$uit when he rc(:ci\'cd his vis!. tnTS in a. sitting room that was ....imply .but cun1!Orlably· furnished.




l:h?lrs and a !<ola. were groupt!d ltround a. low table, Deep-red az;t~ca

plant... were stan<l!n!i on the table and on a hi~h sid\'!board, The only decoraUon on the wall was a portrait of Ho Chi Minh.

Mr, Bo 'carrles the rank of

a. minister plenipotentiary and i... Hanoi's chief . I i~

His nti>::.:itln ,'C'\'upic·.!; a mod-!

,·:;t lhr.<c·"lory brkk lu\l1s£, at· ~ Rue 1;2 Venit'r, OVCI' tlll! l'nU·i\tWI· i.; th.., I'mbll~1ll or N",lh'

\·it>l":\Iu. a l:hld ~l;\t' :\nd a ~t)ld. l'o;:wltc"l un :t r"d });Idi;:r'uund, MI'. no, llllllt'!'rllning hi.. rc-

m:u'k!> in lu,:n with N\'~y !>mU<'s and ('Illfltiun-rhnkl'd :<:\'ow1<;, an-

:<wert'd qur,,{inn:-; t:ll!p(1!'aul'IIu.4~·

r I't'lu'h.


:lnd .'x-



He Ul,ul(' it "tzar lbat thl:; and Ullt an "jntl'rvit:\\-," lIe MliJ th:\\' ~.'r, an intc:n'icw lie WQuld ll:we mSI"l!'d on written question... and would h:t\'p. gi't'C'n written W;I~ ll. ""()m·"\·~\li(.n"


He a:;lt!'d tha.t hi..; reo

nlark:;' be I"rport(:d fait-Iy a."\d

• cOrl'eetlv.

, lir. Bo indicated. but did not :;pecificaUy lOlly, that the four point program of Hanoi was sUbJrct to negotiation once I Umted States-North Vietnaml!Se talk!': had started, When al'kcd whether the four points constituted abz;olutc terms for a settkment or whe~l!r a compromise IniJ;ht be

pos;;lble, he· an!>wereu that he coul~ !lot S:ly what would hppen In any tallis !'ince no talk..;

, wrre no\V talting place. Mt. B. called the four PO~l1l<; "the most correct" solut1o~ A..c;k£'d whC'ther this could be tra.nsla.ted il\to English all "the

be;;t" solutiun, he said "no," , It is "the mo;;t correct" solu. bon. be dedartd, br:tause 1t would .. ssm·e the North Viet. namese people the fun exercise IIf their national rights, feltl independence and lasting peace,


Europe, '.


Strolll: Bnd.ing for Front ' ltr Eo \vaf\ asked about the l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . - third' of the {O\u' points, whir.h to :aCCi:pt Amerh:an law. calls for the s.'ttI('ment of the "Th:1.t.'s whit the \\'1'.1' Is about a{(airs of Sout1l. Vietnam ac- --Vietnamese independence. All cording to the program of thc the rest is prup'iganda,' JI~s National Liberation Front. turnell out by a. propaganda ma.He said tb:\t the No:th Vlr.t· chine." namese Government re'garded Mr. Eo made a distinction bethe National Liberation Front tween the American pec.ple and ' as the only hauth'mtic tl'prc- leaders of' the American Gov~ent;lU\'e" or the South Viet· ernmellt. 1Ir. said llll~ people , " l i k e aU people;:;," wanted peace namese p"ople. He !'::lid thl! program of the and that the North Vietnamese front \Va.." to gi\"c South Viet- knew thi);. nam indept'lId"ncf>. drnlocrac)', lIe :;;~id lhe· spirit (If Amenpeace and neutrality. He added can oHicials was illustrated lethal Hanoi supported thi~ pro- ccntly by a statement by Gen. gram and regard;,d all thl! prob· Curtis LeMay iormer' Air lr.ml"i of South "\';'lctnam as the Force chic! of staff. sole coneeI11 of th~ front. }.Ir. Bo cha.rged that the genThcr(>(orc. he stated, thr.r~ crl'\l had advf1rl\tl'd ~atur ...til'll' could be peace ,only if the bombin~ of the North and h:td United Stall'S settled South dct"illred that. even it two briC'ks Vletnamese problems with the, l"C'maincd untoucheu it was too front. mUC'h.' Mr. Bil dcnotillcl'd In strong The North Vietnamese rC'pemotional terms the continua- rescnlative said this wa~ the lion of United Stales bombIng: language of "Lhe cannibal'> ot lIe charged that the United Ille 20th century." He addt'd States government was commlt- that he c()u~d not b~lievc th:;~ tOn "crimes" in Vietnam __ the ger:l"!rnl. though rellrc~ dIG I 1 ~ • _. not reClect the st."\te of mind of "crimes whIch a.re worse than offiCial \Vashington. -thosj! of Hiller." He saId "mit1I0us" ot VIetna.mese sUf!erJ'd Critlrism by J.t'i'>t!1Y Rl!t'aUl'd :Mr, Bo,asserted that the onGeneral IA~ra." hal; frequl'ntly gin of the war lay in the An\er!· ('aIled for litcpped-up bombing can decision to, support. the of North Vietnam. i "phantom govcrnmcnl." or Ule In an' article for U.S. News I and World Report la!'t Octobcr. late President of South Viet- he dcnoul1J;cd t!\c United Stall'S Mm, ,Ngo Dinh Diem, and to stratcg}' in Vietnam M the bring In an expeditionary force '·ultimn.le III military bllndne;:;s" of morp th."1.n 400.000 nlen to and saJd: waJ;c what he deSCribed as a. "The only way to .....in a war' colonial \\";\r, is to escalate it one war or i He said the American people another above what the enemy' had to be told abc,ut the "war can take." crimes" committed by their Last month he said in an inGovernment. terview with The Associated Mr. Bo's voice choked when Pre;:s: he ~aid: "U Is not our aIm to Invade • "One mu.'it demand that the North Vietnam (It' destroy American Government stop the North Vietnam. What we wanl, war against an entire people to do Is stop them from carry-'I whose on~y crime 1s to reCuse Ins: out their aggressIon."




1 September 1967 Hf~iOI


Pham Van Dong Speech Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1506 G!.1T 31 Aug 67 B LTexiJ Hanoi--The 22d anniversa~ of the founding of the DRV has just been celebrated at a grand meeting in Hanoi. President Ho,Chi Minh was present on the Presidium • .l\mong those on the Presidium \-Jere Vice President Ton Duc Thang; Le Duan, first secretary of the VVlp· Central COI!l.mi ttee; Truong Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the vl']P Central. Committee and chairman of the National Assembly Standing Cornrr.ittce; Premier Pham Van Dong, member of the political bureau; and Vice P"..cernier General Vo Nguyen Giap, member of· the Political Bureau and cormnander in chief of the Vietnam Peopie's An~. :Nguyen Van Tien, head of the permanent l\1FLSV representation in the DRV "Tas present. Members of the diplomatic corps in Hanoi and foreign guests n01'1 visiting Vietnam also attended the celebration. After the opening speech by Chairman Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong delivered an important speech in ,-rhich he review'ed the si~vuatiori in Vietnam expounded the Just stand of the Vietnamese people, and reiterated their determination to march fOl'\.rard still :nore .vigorously in order to "Tin final victory over ,the U.S. aggressors. Premier Pham Van Dong recalled the brilliant victories won by the armed forces and people in both the north and the south in their fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, as well as in economy, culture, and other fields. lIe stressed that all this had driven the U.S. imperialist aggressors ~nto a serious impasse and isolation in the United states and in the world. He particularly -pointed to the grolofing indignaticn among the A~erican people of all strata over the U.S o ruling circle's policy in Vietnam and expressed the Vietnamese people's firm support for the just struggle of black people in the United States for freedom and equality. Premier Pham Van Dong vehemently denounced the U.S. imperialists, ;'Tho, although· suffering h~avy defeats, are still obdurately intensi~ing their war of aggression in South Vietnam, escalating their war of destruction against North Vietnam, and, at the same time, staging an election farce in South Vietnam in . the hope of dolling up their puppets and making fallacious allegations about peace negotiations in an attempt to mislead \-1orld public opinion. Recalling the stand of the Vietnamese people regarding a political settlement of the Vietnam problem and the question of negotiations, P"..cemier Pham Van Dong said: On these questions, the the DRV government, and government's four-point solution to the Vietnam

stand, viewpoint and attitude of the Vietn~~ese people, the ~~LSV are very clear and correct. On our .stand: This stand is the'basis for a correct political people.


1 September 1967


In the very days "lhen the United States expanded the war from the south to the north, brazenly carrying out air attacks against the DRV, our eoycrnment proclaimed its fOi.lr-point stalld and the }j1"'LSV issued its five-point statel'tent.. That is the st~ndpoint of our people's inalienable nationfa riGhts, and an expression of the main military and politic~l provisions of the Geneva ageements. That is our people's fighting stand against the U.S" \...ar of a8gression. Along 'T;Tith our military and politicf'..1 victories and, at the same tempo, the strength and justness of this stand have become ever clearer, and have "lOn ever more resolute and vigorous approval and support from the world's peoples, '\-lOrld opinion, and progressive l.rc.erican opinion. On its side, the UoS. r~vernment has so f~~ completely failed to propose any solution to the Victn~a problem. All it has been doing is quibbling and resorting to hypocritical talk, putting form:1.rd nOi-r lh, nO'ii 7 points, "lith the sole purpose of camouflaging its aggressive design to cling to South Vietnam at all costs and to prolong the partition of our country.

On the 28 January 1967 statement of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs: vIe knO'tf quite well that the Unit~d States does not want to negotiate a settlement of the VietnaTll problem, because imperialism :i;s aggressive and ,.;arlike by nature. All it 1Qants is vTar and it is stepping up its aggressive WaJ.'. To make it possible for everybody and for ;'Torld opinion to see clearer through the U.S. peace negotiation hoax, and., at the same time, to shmv our good .dll, our foreign minister issued his statement of 8~January 1967.


The U.S. ·Government has brazenly unleashed a criminal "mr against the DRV, an independent and sovereign st~te, a socialist state. It must therefore dcfinitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and all other acts of ,·rar against the DRV, and respect its independence, sovereignty, and territory. That is a legitimate demand of the Vietnamese people, and also an elementary requirement of international law. If the American side really wants to talk it must first of all stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of ,·rar against the DRV. The United States has no right to demand any reciprocity whatsoever. Yet it is asking ~or mutual deescalation, and to back this piratical clalin, each time it clamors about peace negotiations, it steps up its aggressive war in the south and its escalation against the north. By so doing, the U.So ruling circles hope, through bombing, and under their conditions, to force us to the cOTl.ference table. l'lith regard to the "lOrld's peoples, including the American people·, they hope to confuse "Thite and black, a.l1d blur the line betvTeen the aggressor and the victlill of aggression. Our people deeply love peace, but this must be real peace closely linked to independenCe and freedom, not the kind of P~erican peace under thc iron heels of the aggressors. So long as the United States pursues its aggreSSion, 'VIe ,·,ill continue to fight. As the ~~LSV has said in its statement, our southern compatriots . \>lill resolutely fight on until not a single j\Jllerican aggressor is left on their beloveq soil. Our people ..rill never submit to force and "'rill never talk under the threat of bombs.


1 September. 1967



Our people are making every effort to step

Ul) th~


military and political fiGht on the battlefield, and, a-c the same time, the struggle on the international front. They have unceasingly developed their initiative and offensive position and exposed the true] features of the perfidious U.S. aggressors. i l The U.S. governrr~nt has provoked the vffiX of aggression in Vietna~.

It must cease its aggrcssion; that is the only way to peace in Vietnam. The U.S. Government mURt defini ti vcly and conditionally stop the bombing and all other acts of ,·rar acainst the DRV, va thdra\'; all U.S •.. and satellite troops· from South VietnClJn, recognize the NFLSV, . and l.et the Vietnamese people settle their ovm affairs. There is no other '"lay! Premier Pha.ll Van 1}ong pointed out: Our people I s great resistance 'var against the U.S. aggression and fm.' national salvatioa is a concentrated expression standing on the frontline of the revolutionary strugf;le of the ,.;orking people and the oppressed nations in the world azainst the U.S .. imperialists and for peace, national independence! democracy, and social progress. Our victories are :;t.lso victories of the revolutionary i forces in the vlorld. Other peoples fully 'understand this fact, ,-Thich is ~lhy the ! support movement for our people is gaining in strength, scope and depth. As a matter of fact, a 1vorld people's front in support of Vietnaln against the U"S .. imperialist aggressors has gradually. taken shape. The more our patriotic ''lar ru:ives the United States into the impasse and record~ great victories, the mightier, the deeper, and the broader the 1'101'ld peopJ.e I s movement in support pf us grovls, taking on diverse f'orms. On the 22d celebration of NationaL day) our people extencl cordial greetings and heart-

felt thanks to the fraternal socialist countries \>lhich are granting to them vrholehearted support and assistance in all fields--moral and material, political, military, and economic. vTe vrarmly hail the fratcl'nal Soyiet people ,·rho are recording great achievements in building the material and technical basis of comm.unism. This yeax, we '\-,armly celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Great Oc:tobcr Revolution vlhich ushered: in a n<m era in the history of mankind.~ strongly inspired the 'Working class and the . oppressed nations, and shm'led ther.l the way to mal.e revolution, to ,·ripe out, step by step, imperialism and the other reactionary forces, and to win victory for socialism 011 a world-vlide scale •. vIe are unsl·rervingly follm'ling the path of the October Revolntion,the path of the Great Lenin, as ..re have been doing since the founding of our party. \'le are doing our utmost to bring into play the revolutionary ardor of the masses and to overcome all difficulties, determined to ''lin victories in our revolutionary cause and, in the immediate future, to \'lin victory in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and, at 'the same time,. make our vl0rthy contribution to the revolutionary cause of. the "rorld t s peoples. v1e ,\,.arrnly hail the fraternal Chinese people ,·rho are successfullJr buildine socialism. In our present struggle against UoS. aggression and for national salvation, the great

Chinese People's Replblic is our great rear and the Chinese people are brothers, as close to us as the lips and the teeth. The resist the U~ited States and aid Vietnam movCluent of the several hundred million-strong Chinese people, a broad, deep, pm-Terful and diversified mover.lent, is a brilliant manifestation of the militant solidarity bet\.;een the tvlO peoples.

NORTH VIETl'Ltu'1 China's successful test of 'its hydrogen bomb and nuclear .varhead missiles is a positive contribution to strengthening the socialist countries; vigorously stimulates the peoples who are struggling for national independence, and is a great encouragement to our'people's struggle against U.S.egg~ession and for national salvation. True to Marxism-I..eninlsm, our party and people have al....rays been strengthening solidarity ..lith tlie fraternal socialist countries and the international communist and '\-mrkers movement on the basis of Narxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. On the 22d celebration of Nation~l Day, our people eA-Gend cordial greetings and I sincere thanks to 路the fraternal Khmer' and Laotian. peoples 1-rh6 have all'lays been standing on our side in a spirit of mutual approval and support in the stl~ggle against the common enemy, U.S o imperialism, to defend national righJGs. Ue deeply rejoice at the happy development of the militant solidarity bet"reen our people and, the Khmer people as shoi:m by the establishment of' diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level bet,-:cen the t"lO countries and by our country's statement to recognize and respect the present frontiers of'the Kingdom of Cambodia. OUr people resolutely.and unreservedly support the people of' },:rab countries . . rho continue to carry aloft the, banner of struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the I路sraeli reactionary forces, in. defense of their nationc. ~" independence and territorial integl'ity. the 22d celebration of National Day, our people extend cordial greetings and sincere tha...l1ks to the international. YJ91'king class, the Asian, African and Latin Ame,rican peoples, and the peace":loving peoples throughout the YlOrld, including the American people, who are actively supporting our resistance against U.S. aggression and for: .national salvation. On

TtTe' are very glad to note that the movement of support for our people is being more and more closely combined with the strtlggle of the working people and oppressed nations in the YlOr1d for independence,. i".ceeg.om and their vital interests and against the U.S. imperialists' policy of intervention and, aggression in various countries.\fe higllly appreciate the success of the first session of the Bertrand Russell International Tribunai to judge the U.S. imperialist aggressors and expose their odious crim~s in the south and in the north of' our country: criloes of aggression, crimes of war, and crimes' a3ainst mankind. The Bertrand Russell International Tribunal clearly shOlvs that the broad sections of vlorld opinion and the conscience of progressive mankind are 011 our side. Pharo Van Dong said: More than ev~r our compatriots and fighters all' oyer the country nurtur~ deep hatred for the landgrabbers, resolutely turn their hatred into strength ~~d determination to fight and to win, give play to their initiative and offensive position on all fronts--:milit~"7) political, and international--and strike even harder and more accurately at the U.So aggressors. On the occasion of the current'National Day, all our people further arm themselves with the rock-like vlill of President Ho as '~Xpressed in his 17 July 1966 appeal: "le are determined to fight until total victory, to perseveringly fi~ht a protracted war, fearing no difficulties, hardships and sacrifices. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom! Once victory is "lon, our people \-lill rebuild our country and provide it "lith bigger and more beautiful constructions!


1 September 1967


This ~p1endid victory day is a\路raiting Compatriots and i'ieht.ers, march fonrard with the mettle of victors, vIith the determination to defend the north, ~iberate the south) proceed toward the peaceful reunification of' the fatherland, bUild a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and poi-:erful Vietnam, thus contibuting to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and in the VI"orId. The U.S. imperialist aggressors \-!ill surely be defeated! Our people will be victorious!





SUBJECT l~VProgr.run

Enunciating Major Aims, Made Public in

Februa~~ 1961 • • • • • • • • • •.• • • •. • • • • •

. . •• 189

. Statement ·of' Central Connnittee of ~lJrISVJ March 22, 1965, Pl'oclaiming the NFLSV' D Five Points Concerning the lfar in South ° Vietnam and. its Settlement • • " • • • • • • • • • • • • " • • 193 Statements of l'WISV Central Committee Spokesman on May 12, 1965, , Reiterating the Central Coromittee's Statement on Mar 22, 1965. 199 "'

NFLSV Central Committee Statet~ent of June 12, 1965 Assailing U.S. Aggression. • • • : • • • • 0" o. ... . . . . . • •



. .


Restates Peace Conditions Against Military Escalation ••• 206

IWISV Spokesman in Algiers, December 20, 1965 • • • • • • • • • • 201 . Liberation Radio on B~bing SuspenSion, January 11, 1966 •

• 208

I{F!sV \-Ill]. Not Recognize U.N. Decisions, February 3, 1966. • •


NFISV Pres.idium HaD.s presid.ent Ho r s Appeal, July 21, 1966 • • • 211 NFISV :Attacks Peace IlFa rce tJ of liSA Countries, August 22,

1966. . 213

lntervie'l-l ·~Tith the VC on Hll..Ylt1ey-Brinkley ShOrT, Aug. 27, 1966. • 215 Burchett °Interviel-IS NFLSV Presidium Head, September 14, 1966 •• 218 :Po1itical Program of the SVN lrr.;F - full text adopted by congress of the Front convened Il1~d-August 2967, September 1, 1967 • • • 222






(The ten-point progr~~ of the ~~V was radioteletyped by V1~A in English to Europe and Asia on February 11, 1961. VNA statecrUlatthe prograIll of ~he "nc.Tly founded ll NFLSV had Itrecently" been released by LNA (Liberation Ner:s Agency), the official organ of the NFLSV. Listing of the ten points is prefaced b.1 mention of tho struggle of the South Viotnamose people against Japanese and French domination, and the crimes perpetrated by the cruel and dictatori~l United States·-Dier.t rule.) " ••• The NFLSV undertakes. to unite people of all \.zalks of life, all social classes, nationalities, political ~~rties, organizations, religious cOi'l!llUnities, and patriotic personages in Sout.h Vietnam, without distinction of their political ,tendencies, in order to struggle and overthrov; the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, the figo Dinh Diem clique; and realize independence, democracy, life improvement, peac~, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and advance.-... --to\·la.~'4 waceful reubification of .the fatherland • ---,.





th~ NF1SV

includes the


10 points:

nl__To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of thc U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem a~inistration, lackey of the United states, and to fonn.a _~~~.~~al _d:~~~~z:.C3:~ic coalition administration. "The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imp'3rialists. The South Vietn<.mese administration is a lackey ~hich has been carrying out the U.S. im~~rialists political lines. This regime and a~~inistration must be overthro\~1, and a broad national democratic coalition'administration formed to include representatives of all strata Qf the people, nationalities, political parties, religious co:r.:nunities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people's economic, political, SOCial, and cultural interests; to ~ealize independence and de~ocracy; to improve the people's.living conditions; and to carrl out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland • . u2"~To'bring into being a broad and prog~ssiv; democracy_ liTo abolish the current constitution of the flgo Dinh Diem dictato~lal a~~nistration, lackey of the United states, and to elect a ~eft ~at~onal Asse~bly thl~ugh universal ~Uff!!_ie • ....



liTo pro:nulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of e>"1>ression,of the press, of assembly, of association of movement ••• (ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom of belief with no discrimination to~~rd aqy religion on the part o~ the state; and to gran~ freedom of action to the patrioti9 political parties and mass orga.nizations, irrespective of political tendencies. liTo grant generai amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration c~~ps under an1 form whatsoever, abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic larTs; and to grant the right of repatriation to all those Who-had to flee abroad due to the U.S.-Diem regime •••• ,


"To abolish the economic monopoly of the United states and its 'henchmen; -to build an independent arid sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the . U.S. -impenan:sts-and-tne-Tuling clique, their stooges •••• --_ .. - .. -.- .• --.- _....... .. . . '

UTo help northern compatriots who had been forced-or _enticed by the reactionaries to go south after the res~oration or peace to return to their native places if they so desire~ •• H~MTo

national and jemoeratic education -_.build --.._... __ ..a--._------------.. .. -- ......... - ..-


and culture ••••



"6--10..... --_ build............. a~ a~ to defend the motherland and the people. - -----.---_ ... - '-'. ._ :"

"To build a national armY ~efending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the systero of U.S. --military advisers •• -----------_ ..... ------.-.. _. . -- -- ----- - ... _.. -








. "To abOlish all the military bases of foreign countries in South -Vietnam.---- -----.- - -- _..., ..... - ., - , .


"7....To guarantee the right of equality bet-Heen nationalities ••• ; to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas Vietnamese. .


"To, insure the right of autono:ny of the national minorit.ies; to set up, "Within the frame\,"ork of the great family of-- the Vietnanese people, autonomous regions areas inh2.bited by minority peoples; ••• to abolish the U.S.-Die~ cliquets present policy of ill-treatnent and forced assimilation of ~he minoriti nationalities... -


"To protect the legitin:ate rights of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietn~T;esc nationals abroad.

"8-...To. carry .out a foreign policy of peace and neutra.lity. efTo cancel all unequal treaties signed ",-i,th foreign countries h'J the U.S. henchmen ",l1icn violate national sovereignty.

liTo establish diplor.latic relations ",i.th all countries irrespe-ctive- of JX>litical regime, in accordance wi.th theprinciples of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the Bandung conference. "To unite closeJ.y with- tho peace-lo"'vi.ng and neutral countries; and to e)..-pand- friendly relations 1o.'ith Asian and African countrie~, first of all, l~th neighboring Cambodia

nnd Laos.



------ ...--_


__ -

"To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming military alliance ",1.th any country. .. _ -

.. _ _ •



• •


liTo receive economic aid frortl any countrY' ready to assist Vietnam conditions attached. ' -.- -.--luthout ......_. -_ .. -_. -- .



U9":..To establish normal relations bet't-reen North and South I .• Vietnanl as -afirst-step tOvrardpeaceful reunification of. the country • .. -. -. _.*. "-' . . ' . liThe urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country h'J peaceful means. The NFLSV undertakes <the gradual reunification of the count~ qy peaceful means, on the pI~ncipla of negotiations_and discussions bet~~en the ~wo zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national re~nification, the gover~ents of the tno zones will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or favor val', nor to use roilitar,y forces against each other;' to carr! out ~cono:llic and cultural exchanges b~tween the t\;ro zones; and to insure for people of both zones freedom of Illovement, of livelihood, ar~ the right of mutual visits and correspoodence •


"10--:-To_ o~~~~.~ggr~~_s.?-!~ t-.~!__a.!!.~ _~c~~ve~_.~e~~!ld _~x:~~_p~ac~ liTo oppose aggressive wars and all foms of enslavement by the imperialists; and to support the national libera:t.ion struggles of peoples in, various. countries.

"To oppose \-:ar propaganda; and to deilland general disannament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

"To support the movements for peace, de'1locracy, and social progress in the t-:orld; and to activeJy contribute to the saregual~ing of ~3ace in Southeast Asia and the ~~rld •••• H





-(According to a Liberation Radio broadcast ·ofHar:;h 23) 1965, in Vietnar.:ase t!) South Vietn~m). the ~~LSV Central Committee held an important press conference to proclaim the NF.LSVtn l;''l.vc.-point :;t.:4tcmQnt concc.rni113 t.ha

escalation of the w&r. The lengthy statement. -contains only-.a small paragraph on negotiations. 'It states Hat present· all negotiations are use:less as lo?g as: ' . . a. The u.S •. imperialists do not withdraw . all the troops) ",eapons and means of war of the Unit.ed Stat-es and its satellites from South Vietnam and. destroy ~heir military bases in South Vietnam; 11 . ·b • . 1IAs long as the s~cred rights of the

. South Vietnamese people--rights to independence and democracy--are still .sold by the Vietnamese traitors to the u.s. imperialists;' c.


nAs' long as the ~-FLSV--true and only representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people--does not have the ·decisive voice.") .

At the press con~erence) Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho EFoC laimecCan-import"ant-{ive':-point ~~~iteTIie~t ._~2.n·de~n!~g. tP.J!.~§J;~~~ttc 't'7~r-see1dng and aggressive policy of the U S_•._ _imi)~rial in-g·outh\iie-tnam"and -enunciatinO''''the •._•_ _ _ _ _ _i.sJt;'.. _ _ _. _ ..•. _. __. ___.:.... ___. _ _ . ________ ... _ _ _ . _ ....0 _ _ heroic South Vietnamese people's unchanged standpoint WhiCh is resolutely imp-eiialistS -_ ...__ ... -to...--..kick ,_..........-C;u-tt1ie-U-:S. - ---_.-._--_._-.--------U •••







lin order


\-le understand that the cor:-ect Vietne~ese translation

of this point states that negotiations are useless as long as the U.S. imperialists'have not.yet withdra\~ all the troops, etc. .193

in order to liberate. the south, build an independen.t, . de;o~i;tic, - pezce£~l~~and-neutral"South--~iiet:nam~" achieve-nat:Co-ilaf·'tinific-ation-:-,H.ere-{s'--ihe" ~"FLSV "'s't:ate~ent ~abotl-t-the'-lntens{f{cat{oI.t and enlargei:!ent by the U.S. imperialists of their agg~essive war in South


. Vietnam: n • •• F acea. .'H~tn . ,


• present and extreme1 y grave tne situetion, the 1~1SV deews it necessary to solemnly proclaim once more its unchanged stand of struggling agai!lst· the A:nericans to save the country. .!pe,JJ .S. imp~!=,.?:.a,IJ.~~.~.. a~_e_._s,~bo~eu1;'s. pf th~ Geneva Acco.I.~§.) extremely rude and cruel aggressors .end warmongers, and deadly enemies of the Vietnamese people. II . . . .


Thi Vietnamese people are 't'lell aware of the

value of those accords. The Vietnamese people have always and correctly applied those accords and resolutely struggled .so that those'accords would be implemented in accordance with the spi1:it and letter of this international docum'3nt \-lhich has all the characteristics-of-iegaii-ty. On the-other-hai;d-:--Q-:-~!. ...~~p?E{eI{s~~~-~a~~f_th~~~...1~5!Jc~y.-s_ in South Vietnam have gradually and in an increasingly q,!;.~~~,IlJlli~.!.lI!?!_~_r a~21:.e.~_..~,~ t~h~~~.9_~~~y?__i\£~_Q~~_~_ and- -(~~ord indistinct) destroying those accords by onenly waging an atrocious ",~,i.r- in "th~"'pasf'lt'--'­ years-'-'\vi th-;'v{e~q--to'and--oppressi'ng-th-e-"'Sou th ,"Vietnatllese peopfe~-turnin-g--South' Vietnam' into 'one 'of--their-::-colonies ancfffifiitary-bases-;-ana-partrifon:tng-Yietnamese territory forever.

-·Soutn-V':Letnam'--over e'nsiav:Lng -

Naturally the criminal actions of the U. S. .. imperia~ists and their lackeys aroused hatred throughout Vietnam and gave r~se to a \'lave of boiling anger throughout the world. Public opinion in Vietnam, public opinion in Asia, and the impartial public opinion the w~Fld ·over severely condemned and energetically protested against the cruel actions of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and loudly demanded that·they put an end to their "lar-seeking a41d aggressive actions against the II • • •


Sou~h Vietna~ase

people and that they cor~ectly implement the 1954 Geneva Accords. But all this fell on deaf' ears. The U.S. imperialists continued. to trample on Justice and to rush ahead vlith their piratical 'War in South Vietnam~ .


The heroic South' Vietnamese people' are determined -£o-krck-oi££-tne-U:-S-;-lmperialis ts' 'in" order co iiberate---------_ South--v.ietrla.n; bUiIcr-in-inde-p-endent-,---democratic) .~.~~eful..L3y:..d_ ... ------------ --------------_._n~~tr~l South Vietna~; and, advanE~_ tC?~·lar.Q.. national unification.

=:--.. . _~~ .. _.. ~._·The South Vietnamese peopl~ are

fond of peac~) but_ the South Vietnamese people cannot stand idle and let the u.s. aggressors and their lackeys freely trample on the country and dominate the nation. They pref~r death to bondage. The 14 million people have risen in _ one bloc end struggled gallantly to defeat the U.S. invaders and-the country-sellers, liberate South Vietnam) achieve independence, democr~cy, peace) and ~eutrality in South Viet~am) and contribute to maintaining (peace in Indochina?) and southeast Asia.

US lofOv"ES

~ • To escape this dangerous situation, the U. S. ~~"pe:-ialists_~re engaging in ex!:rem..elY dani!:..r~~~ II •

adventurous military actions. The fact that . they lntroduced into So~th--Vletnam combat units of their air, naval, and ground forces) additional U.S. weapons) and mercenaries irom·South Korea and other satellites and used planes' "to bomb the DRV and the Laotian Kingdom and·, so forth does not reflect. their strength at all. On the' contrary) these are the crazy actions of a (hooligan?) "lho, fac~d with dea¢llock) -engages in adventurous acti01.1S'. They cannot threaten anyone. By its nature, the U.S. imperialist scheme'of intensifying and enlarging their -present aggressive wa~ reflects one of their humiliating defeats. It proves that their ll-year-old colonialist and aggress~ve policy in South Vietnam and their socalled special "Tar have gone bankrupt. '. /



. ••• Sl.nce

r ' .,..

Since the U. S ~ imp2riells ts have bogged do"m - and--ai;~st died during the special "-Jar, they· '~ill be. completely \-lip2d out in (the regionctl w·ar?). If they dare to e'xtend the "-Tar to No::th Vietn&!l, to all of Indo-· china, 'arid further, they \-1ill face more humiliating defeats more quickly. Previously, '-lith e'illpt~ hands the .. southe;-n po.oplg go~l t h<'!:wy 111c.-is on the U. S. :impe:::;inlists and their lackeys and fulfilled a great and glorious revolutionary task. Now, with their m·m strength, ''lith the\vholehearted SU'DPort of 'Om-Jerful North Vietnam and .. .. the rich and pm·:erful socialist countries, and "'lith the sympathy,' s~pport, ~~d encouragement or the Asian, African, and Latin AEerican countries and all peaceand justice-loving peoples the 'World over, 'the South Vietnamese .people will surely end gloriously triumph ,over ~he,U.S. aggressors and their lackeys in any regional or s'Oecial' ,,,ar 't\"aged by the latter. Now ID-:)re than ever be£~re, the Vietnamese ..r__ .__.. __ - ___South .__ .• _. ____ .. _ .. '., .. ' people _ firm~ hold rifles in hand and struggle to achieve their f~~-d-affieiltali.oaf:wf11_~~i--is _E~-k~~~__~':1i:~3:_11e-i!_~'S :-.JI!.lP.~£~-~*:ists and build an independent, democratic, peaCeful, and neutral SouthVletna;:----.--..-------- - - - - - - U .


must-.. ,-.-


- _ . ' _ .~.- 'The NFLSV asserts once more that the U.S. schem.e of introducing U. S. and satefli,te air, navar:-and-groun<f. force units into South Vietnan and bombing North Vietnam and Laos to reduce the combativity of the South Vietna~ese people, to stop the aid of the North Vietnemese and world peoples to the just struggle of the South Vietnamese people, and ~Q.....~1-:e_~~~__?_~~_r..ong position from which th~y ~_~!"!._f9.~_C_E?_._th_~_~!;'J...?y_and the -South'vie-in-arr:es-e-p-eo'ple--fo-sell their fatherland to theill cheeply -thi:oug11'-certa"in nego-&tiations -is only" an, erepty drea.~-of-nien-'t~l10-·are--crazi-· ~iliI~8Iryand e.dventuro_us-~.~~ta~ily. ---

-- --"--"-The South Vietnamese Deo'Ole inform the' U.S'. i~perialiSts and-their--facke'y's'~'--lYdu'arehool£gans-'- You a~-s'tu-pT(i~-Ho~7can -you-h():,i-to-dec-e-ive-i)-eooIe-~qneneach ....----,..---.-.-.-.-. __ ...- .,.- ------.~--.:- .. -•.. , - - ~- ---_ ..",,: .. __ ._.. _.. - - ------:tl.me a:rter nl.ttl.ng tne north \'l~tnout \·larnl.ng you repeat !gain-endagain-th-i:fYGuaon-6t-~ntena-E()'"erilargetnewar ) ..


I that --


that the: attacks are re~ali~tory reeasures, that, the b--· """cr{ -0 ~bo·.... cr"'~ i-1' -nd a-:'-:"-~-'-1··'s'-'-::y Ll.c:.CK c:._ -e··-'':'-:;;e',{·'a·'' c:. ... u. ' " ' . 1 . . .:.ll.>o-L~o c:.' 'l.:~l. neo0l..:..a... ns) c:.:.


g-o--forthf-You-'ere' to ... _-_.-_. __moye--s-iU?{(Cl.7hen-you-s~y--y'ou'-'·]~nt .... _.. _---_ .. -_ _... __ ....- --_... -_ ..... --- --.... t -. .. . .... h ""h S ...• V. t ...

neg01.1a e rrom a POSll.lon.o=~', s~~angLL.

1 e OUl.n ~enailiese"peop"ie-po"int'their-"£ingers in" the faces of the U.S. imuerialists ~~d thei~ lackeys a~d tell the~: 'Your . only . .·my O\tt is to \·lit:hc~rc.\-i f-::-cl:l South 'Victn~l!l. If you stub~ornly pu::-sue tee T,~1a:;:) you \'lill suffer the greatest and most humiliating defeat you have ever suffered.' ...


... •• ______ 4&


At present all ne~otiations are useless C!.S long as the U.S. impe:::ic.1ists do not,withdr2\'1 al~,._~£:t·~_,t~_oo.P~-, \!~apons.) .,and me~ns of \Var of the United Sta.tes and its ~~_t~llj..t,C:,s._trom So~th. Vietnc..TI1 and destroy their military l?~~.?.~i1LSQUJ:lt. Jietna.m; 2S long as the s2cred rights of the South Vietnam~s'e' peopl-e-:'-':r'ights'--ic;-rri(1ependence -and~~oc~y--(are-Stl-ll sold-f) .by.the vietnamese traitors 1I • • •

·S~_the_U~S ~ iBP~~j·.~~~_s.~~L ,§,P~ i~_.1:~C?~ig~~~~s._~Jif ~!.!:-_~V_~~~t.~~ ~~~_~n~y~r~p~ese~~~tiv~~f J~

million South Vietna.mese pgopJe--does-1)ot h2ve the deciSive-voic-e:--Hlt"h regardto the South Korean clique 2nd other satellite,s of the Americans "to,ho are pla.nning to introduce mercenaries into South Vietnam, the Soutb Vietnamese people tell them the follow'ing: Although you are involved in \vaging the W2r, you \'Till never be given your share. You are simply shameful sC2pegoats for U.S. imperialism. Since nearly 30,000 U~S. generals, field grade officers, and .men with nearly half ~ million lackey troops are being heavily beaten by the.army 2nd people in South Vietnam, what 'can .a·handful of you do?

" ••• 3. 1he heroic South Vietnanese. peopie 2nd libera-' tion trooDS are deterrnined to fulfill their· sacred mission ;hich -isto ~hase 2T,'lay tile U-:-S .. · iiperIalis-ts to-"liberate-


• • • • _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ . _



• • • _ _ _ _ .._

• •' . .







South Vietnam and to defend North Vietnam. Vietnam is ~~e, ~qe, VIet!t..?-.I1l~§.e ...peRpl~~~e__~ne_).-!':.~~_tP~~~~_si~_~h _c:-re £~~ Their affection is as high 2S a mountain and as deep as the· se·a. Tlts truth is es sure as the sun rises in the east. Nothing can change it. In their hot ?nd /deadly




deedly struggle egainst the U.S. i~perialists and their "lackeys) the South Vietnamase, people have always received the great, and extremely precious assistance of 17 million ~ortharn brothers. The northern cOBpatriots are' enthusiastically working day and night for the southern part ?£ the country. On bal1alf of the 14 million South Vietnamese people, 'the NFLSV wishes to extend its full confidence , dnd unch~~geable promise to the 17 million northern compatriots. The Souta Vietnc:rr.e,se' pBople are dete~ined to fight and defeat the U.S. im?erialists~ ~~~.?~~?~~ South Vietnan..'ese people and liberation :t~,9.oP.s.,,?-re, determEied-tofulfili-'theIi--'sacr"ed mission: to chase a~'J-ay tbetf:-S-:-imper:Lalists, to :liberate-S'outh VIetnam, to-defend '.ihe north, ,and-tC;edva:ric-e-io~iard-fhe reunifl.. CJ'





.... 11 • '• •

The N:?LSV




eh~ays relies primarily on ft$, mVl1 ----~



" ... '.Ail people must be united. All people must. be armed and must heroically continue to move fortvard "lith the determination to fight to \-lin over the U. S. enemy and the Vietnamese' traitors.

toi.e are absolutely convinced that wi. "lill ce,r,:" tainly be victorious. 1?e ~lso pledge to our beloved Vietnam that we are determined to strike strongly) truly strongly; to strike ~o the last man, to th~'last breath) to the'last drop o~ blood; and to strike very ac<;urately at tee' heads of the U.S. euany and his lackeys. vIe are It . . . .

S~te~.:l1in~d to l~be~te_ the south~ protect the nortE-;--and

raunify the fatherland. .. -.. ----_............. . . . ......----

i i









force and-ability, but is ready to-continue to-r'ec'el-ve assistance, moral y----and m£::eriif:-Tn-clucfing-ass'fstan,ce •ail ---_....... - .-- --_. --- . - - - - --- ....... - - ... in "leapons and tvar materiel from the socialis t countries -alid-naii"onafi-st countrles,-'a:"Ii-'t,jorld-·-organizations and ' ~llp~a~':IovIng peop-les-throughout the -,10rIa-.--!-1ore-6ver , the front reserves for itsel-f-tfe'right to-buy,\veapons and war materiel from any country and organization ready to sell them to the South Vietn&uese people help them ',strengthen their defe41sive potential.



(Liberatio:1 Racio ~rc2.c.cast on ~-Ia.y 1<1, 1965, in Vietn2.'-1cse to Sot.?-:.21 Vietna::t, a ~:ay 12, 1965 statement of a N?LSV Ce~t~al Co~~ittee spokesman. The broadcast reitera-:'es the ~?LSV1S five ooints. It 1_ U'i"'g --, ---s -r": c>..,'" U .;:,. ~ a""-; n' I '":.nc a 1 so co!,l:.,_e!~ _ 0-'!~ _cCt;;..... .... ~_Ol_=> ~__ c._~. lithe econoznic tric:-C c?lle':: coooerc:.-:'io:1 for eco:10:-:lic .1o.CJ. .. .f'-..... \;:; _ c;. __ 0-' __ 0-";:: _ t::c .. _ _ Q.. evelo'or·'e:>n . . n 0... -no" ':-"1-, ~ cre-·H uS"'o"""'-c-''''''''''''s 01deceitful peaceful negotiations ll • The statement stresses the role of the K:?LSV as the true maste:::' of South Vietn~a.) .10,




liThe South Vietnaillese people I as \-,ell as the Ca!:0odian peo?:!.e a:1d other fraternal peo;.:>les in soutl1east F.sia and throughout the \'lorld, 'i.·Till' never forget the past 11 years of miserYt shaille and suffering causee by the 4 billion dollars of U.S. ·aie. President Johnso:1 mace a great mistake. u.S. dollars cannot corrupt, seduce; or subject the Vietnamese a:1c. other Asian peoples. (?i-le say) to the U. S. imperialists f fac~ that the p_sian :;>eo?les, ,-ii t:1 thei2:* culture dating bac:\. thousa:lc.s of yea:::-s~ Hith their traclit.io~al :::-eS?8ct. for justice B.:1c. c.isdai~ for ill-s-otte.r! \-lec:l th I ana. \,;"it.h tI~cL:- :::-espcct for illoral princi?les a~d virtues I can never be su~jected by violence. Povzrty ca~:1ot change -their hearts and misery cannot soil their purity and honor. You U.S. im?erialists are conceited and cisdai~full ~ecausz you a2:*C \~ell-off, but you have gained and ,-:ill gain only" insults I shame I c:.nd ban:\:r'l1ptcy. Your 4 billio:1 dollars cannot "Ourcnase (feH "\-lOro.s indistinct) South . ~retnaii-·and·-cannot.-p-ul:chase-··i;e~c·e--fo::- -the pirates. -----IIAt present I "t-n -en even 40 billion c.ollars you can !;mrchase only the souls of a fe~·' more scor.:;;s of cou.i"1try-selling , traitorous Vietnaillese such as Ngo Dinh Die~ a~c Phan ~uy Quat. Formzrly, in order to deceive l t.he fascist Hitler had to inve~t something called spiritual values. Today U.S. Presic.e::.t JO:J.:1S0:1 need only vlear c.ollars and guns on his chest i~ place of a religious ~edal ••••


tJ~·lhat is notG"::7or"thy i:l 1:!~J..S tric:, is 'Cne U. S.. i!;.~?e~::alis ;'.:} e\r~l effor~~·tci· c~a&.t= a ~s~~o~ccsc::'ce~- tC) 'co\7e~ u:)" t:1~2ir colo:;ialist.· z:.i6 :"e:l-

:~ c6§·~_~~·~ ~~~~,~~~~~~~~9-.~~-~t~~:~-_r~~·~·~~j~· .~.9_q.;~~4?n~~~~li ~ c~!.~~r. -_a.c.ti 0::.$. . ~~:. ?_O~ ~:'1- '\1 i e t::; 20:.1 c:.~d North \lictr:c:.:!:.. Of coarse I if ·.:-:I1e U. s. 2.gg~esso~s carry out asg_ ••... - •.• - •• --, ••• - •....•• - .•. -..








T': i ' :l .:...-~


rCSS2.0n ny !"2S02:";:'2.:1C' 1:0 Iilll':' ;:arv :Jca:1S I ':";c 1:", .. e \ le'"Cn~:~~,=- e .J'::' J2. ...... r ... •·• 1.' .L t: i-"r,,,,,, c-·,..· ...v"' 0"-'~CCf·,..::.-:~ 0'" "'-or"-.; ~,~ .....1..- 0 ':"b-'" I-1.· C· ;.i.t...., "" .... \.:;..: c... ___ \".;.'-. ~.,IJ-c::::l.:;,.,.;. .I. ... -"'.' "'-.1 .... _t,;,::~ _ '- __ ,,":; '-.r;;,;; 1-'0;"" _c '-.;.:_ - r.~ ..,J_

~c.l sa



peaceJ \Oie \"!ill fiS-h.t. Ee \-lill fight. u::.til fi::.a1 vict.orYr tm.til r:ot O:1e u. s. aggresso~ ~er~l3.i7!s en ou!' Vietnc:.:::ese terri tor.lT • To ca~ry out

their colo::ie.list 1 asgress: 'l\; ?olicS'1 the U. S i::!?crialis W have ~e.. ( - .. .... , sortee. to ml::\2:::-OU5 cunnJ. . ns stra:;;;age:-::s C::!Q. trJ. . C;;;S ane:. ,·:ore:. :::...nctl.s-;::::...nc-;:, <#



the t:caa.i tio::.al \·!icked effort to sm·; c.isunio;;. •••• Ills

the South Vietr..a:-;;ese peo;?le IS :::-e:;olute stn:;-gle c:;z-l.nsi: t:;c

____ ,,_

~c;rr~{C'·~::_1'r7~ -_~










S"'\7~ <;....·c

+-....-~ _l.. _


s?i=itual and mate=ial assistar..ca to our

con~-~·""'y __ .~J...

. "\.'-:

_~ ..........


t"'._ • ...


A.J~ ...........


pros·~cs3ive mar:.:,i~c 's struggle for natio~al libcra-



I inclt1di:~g T.."Je2. ;?c:1S c.!:c (=~f;; "~·!or(:'s ir1c1is tinct) 1 an illegal act? Is i t incol"r.::z·~ to S2.~F t~~t tl'"':.~ foreiS~l i.:1tcr'\~c11tio:1 in mZ:!1y rOri7'..5 th.c:t asgra\T.:ttes t.::e Vi.ctn2:.::~es~ s':' tlla.tio~ is no!~c other "tr1a!1 the l;lar of L:.gg:C~5sion 1;.~:::ged by t!~e U.S. i:T!~)e~i?. li.sts 2.g2..iy!s·t 6:..:~ CO\"~:1t~y? t'l1~!t is th.e sic::.i fic2~~!C<:! 0:: .Jo!!:.:so:, I s u:1co::di tio::Jl n0C!otiatio::.s? Do

~1.!~~~~:~~~~~i~~(;~{~~X;:~~.~~-:~~~~;~~;.~~;f;~~~~~~~~~{~;_\·:·:~~~~~~i~~·=~·E~~·)~~'~~-:;~:~~~~~~:~ __ "At present, the

natio~alist cou~tries in southeast ~sia c:~c CO!1St:.i tu~e a ST.c.:tt forc~ t:n2ni:-.:ot.~~ :~y Sl::)~)or;,:i!!g t~~Q \7i.c::::'2.:-:-:~9~ ?co?l~'s p~triatic st~~gglQ. ?~2~cfo=c, i~ ~~0ir atte=~~ to isolzt~ us a~d rea~ce their sha~2ful isolatic~, t~e U.S. i~?crialists have



thei:: c\.ri.l a!1\!1 \7ilc ir:~2~:·~i. o;1 of so~·}i:1g c.ist!:-~io~1 2.!:~c:-:.g a11(1 tc:zing t..d.\l'Z-.~!~c:.gc of t:'!e::l. B~:':~ i!'!. fac~ of t11c corr0ct at\:itude Sh':·i·7!1 ;)y these r:atio::alist cou:1t:::-i0S f JohnSO:1 has lost. his C:1.thl1sic:s;-.l. It is cryst,:l clear ti;at tr:o U.S. i!~,?0:::-ialists arc very cruel and ct:n::ir:~:' I es?cC!ialJ.~' l.:~"len th0~l r:c:vc st1f£(!~c(!c1 l1c2'v:{ (~ef0~:ts and ar--e 0:1 a c12sp2ra~c ?~~:1. Llo':~':C""l(::;: r c1ic:.::'.o:"ld cuts cic.r:-:.o~. . J. ..... co~;cc2.1,!d


tli\o:\'1 ~o::--e t::.c. :: e";~-:r 2.11 t>.e u.S. i:,'~:'Je~ialistsf c<3ccit::~:l a::--~c. PS~{c::o:ogi~al \·."a~£a:-e :-.:e:'511::'''::5 a::--,z u3~l2S~ I J.~O sa't:::2r :~o~·; cu~::.i~g a::c bra2e~. It ca~r~o'~ be ot:~c;~,.ti.se. ~V(;:: -:::":~i;:- ::-:ost ~~ce:1t. !,:zr..s'.;.~~ (?~:c.s or:ly a=ous~~) t~c a~s-er of prog=~ssive ~a~~i~d c..:1.C millio~s o~ ho~ast 1>:::2::':C"':1. ?Go?lc.

g T

~I.;:;~C:":. 0.:..,= .. ??-::-.t.1_9~~~ st2;:'.c:i.s c:xt;:-2;:-:.2:1y_ <:=.~e2.:::. __ .~~n.~...X~:LS.V.. 2? _~::.;~~ hc;.s_ .. ful,ly_.re::lr:c·ccc~ .:.:::c .u:-~c:"1c~:::;-~(: .as:)ir~. ::~_o::s, st .~:.::'C:1 . C"6~,"' d~~2~ninatic~ of 14 ~illio:1. 50~t~a=n ~ec~la. It is also the unswc=V~tc. ~.e:,:2.~ . t

~~~Y~I~g~;;-~~~·l;i~}~}~{;:-~}~·~.~~·;~::::' .;~,>£~~ ~:'~~- ji:ij=·i9·?/~;:~:-;~~:?: ~:~.~~ 7-~ '~_-'rc200


112--':'he -oeo':)le ofhe::-oic Sout::'


~dc:-';: ~ne

are resol vee to

i~. .;.;--::. ·l-~'"5 -........ ":-"~':'-~:z.-' ..,.....~_c:. ;9.;: -';:-0--6· ·-~··.--·";~"~7-:- ;:;:;,---....'1-- -,' ·'t;'·{-l-~ --:.:~-i-':"'-:~- ;~.~ ::..:::: =..~-.:... _ ...':> ~ ______ _5- Oll_. LO·~l-'; ___ __ ~OU ___ ~ _<:.: ...... "- ••• / ;) ... __ .... c .• ---\..,,-"'---I.'~'--"'l \.,to..... :;.; --.;:'.;.. ,.- - - . , . ';-.:..--~~-~":·-_:;1-·-·.... :..;-,-:::--:,;..-:.. '.:~-:;.-; ·1-....-~:L ";-'l~-.~.;""::~-.;-..: ,::.----......,-.:: --~-;:. "1"- _ _-,:;-.:. - ..... - -... ~ .. -~-. Cc:.:.oc_a ... _c t Oo;;:c,-,"I.::':"U_ r -:-.!.\.., .,"' ........ _c:._ ~v~ ..... v.;.t.;; .... ,c. •.l, c:.:_ ... "' ...\ ~ .. '-'_ ... o,-,c_,",-

U •S•

..:; ~;-c'-::;'To"';"- ----..-.- -------------.-----.--.----------.-..-.-... -.. _ .

.:..c.. _ C .. l.,...!... ;. • • n• .. \,..-!.. ____ v·-··--._I..,..._~_L_ ... __ _ ........ _._. ·-a·~·:·o·";"Y·-·:

"3--Th~ ~~.o;:1_e_a~_~ ..~~b.e.:::-_~~_i.o_~_!:=:9_~2~._0i. !!.e_~~~~._.S.<?~.~\ :!ietr:c.::l ~::-e resolvec. co!':",oletelv t?:.eir SaCY2ct ._ ... _ .•••.... _to _ _fi.llfill ., ..•. _. _ _ _ _ _ _• . . • __ .•. _ . . . ._• • • . _ •.••.. _cbtv ..• _.1._\·;hic!1 •.....•...• - is . . . . .t·o":.ciC~-·t:1e .. _ ....•..•. _--U. S. im':>eri c.liS~5 01.!t in ore2-r to li!:'erc.~e South Viatna:,', c.ne. ':>ro'.:ect ., .. ';- ... ... _------------------ - ----_.-._---.. --- ... --- .. -- ._-_ ..---- -. -- ....... -- ---~ --.~-,,----.:.-.-




':3--,P,.11 tne un'i tc~1 c.r~d c:::;;:ed p~o?lC! c.!."c risi:lg u? he~oic.:..ll~/ i l l ol"dcr reso~..':.!tel~;" to cefcat~ t:'!c U.S. !Ja:·.c~it5 c:~c. tr:2ir lac:~2~-.5. I:1 ti,:(; na!".:c of l.:~ :aillion SOU't:l \7iGtr~~~.~~5e oec~2.~ I .t~c :,:?z,s\r sol(::-.:~)-.y __ c~.::clz.::-c in its fi'lC-0Ci.~~·;: S;'-.2.t2se::t. t~:2-t Ut~:e SOU-:::1 \:i..-2t::l.:-:~·~::;s6h-O(;(,:)}.0 a!~,-: t.Z1C:. . :. -..:~ . --)-'~."::- .~.~ . . --.-..~..--~--:.....::c.. ', ..... -,:;--..,.:~. --~---.:----.,..:-.,"..:.,-..=--*'. ~--..::'~;-~':--. . ~ :.-.. . _- --"-.-.. -:·. . ·-::1- -.~: . . . .-- ...:...-~- !.-" ~~ c. . .L~ •• \..:\..~ ~o_\..'-~~ <... _ ...... ~.~ ...... o_\ ....:'-- '; .. L.O C.. _ • .;~ __ ~ .. O •• ,- •. ~~~'._ \~t.;~.. J() ... ~ c..~ _0 •• ,< ~!:. \". ... \.:,:.-

( •• "'",




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UThrougr1 the u.s. presica~tfs 7 .~?::il S?~~c::'t C-.:1Q (sc:,.rel-al \':o~·dsl iEcistir.ct.) o::e car! sec t:12::: t£1e 'U S. i:-."!."')c ri 2. 1 is ts a::"e c:·:t~e::~(!1:1 9

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?2o?le a~~ t::e o::-sz.:;;i zcr c~d leace!' of the S01_~th Viet~2.:~:.asG ?E:o;.2.e:'s s;:rl;~g'lc fo~ s~lf-l~~~~2..-::c:~·1 ag2.i~st t!-:z. U.S. i::~?~!'i.;::!.is~s I ~~!.;:.~:"i~.z: z..:--!.c. agr-cs.si\7C ~oli.cy a::c. c..gai:1s 0,..·)·· C::' .:..:...1--'·_·-::,,-_c._,,.. ·--:.:...0··........ ':"0 .:...~""'~ ~-.:..~ ... -".i-'""' ..":... ._i".'~._~ . \".. .. :::. ........ <::--.:0..., '- .. _c.. c--.:: ..... \.. L. .... l.! .... '.:; __ c..0-1..

r~?::,,·~sc:1~ati ~le 0= ti:~ SO!..!:::~ 'lict!!a:::23~










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::O~C~Sr t·::~ :\~?~S'l is -;::. . . 2 ~.:-:.c~O~. ".:;:::~~!. :'5 S::~~:s:1i:;.g t~1C st~c::st:: of t;c


i=-,-.?~:-:"c.li.st. c:1(~ co~c~~:a::'i.s-;: 2.~g::es.so:::s.


"Eve::::y:n:e k:;,c:·!S that (fe:;-: ~·."o=cs. i~{_':'stinct.) t.ha USSR/ C:'ina .. a:!c _ .. ______ ,.L.':='_ D·"'''''''' _,",""". "'ct';v..,,'v s;;""\':)O-:'..~i'!"\:, ---J t'l-le -- So::;;'1 .. V~et-:'.-;=' <:'oc';::> 1i S"". . . co~'''''-...· -_ "'es 1-ia na~~S2 pec?le in their s~=asgl~ fc= s~~£-li~~~~tio~. It is t~U5 clee~ that tha So~t~ Viatna2 revolut~on ~as ~ee~ cr~a~ized and l~d ~y t2~ N?~SV. ?~is t~;;th is as s~~ni~g as t~e s::n. ?~e D.S. is?~~ialists, T


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~~6·i;-;'\--~-'.:-~-~~~c-~-~-rvc"-·cl-o~·qnt . i~ \.riC~·at o~ i.:.~"lC ?~:~:"'~:1.t b;;.,l:..::c~ o~ Scu-c11--'1:.a:f:!-a~:1-:---·-"------·-----·




IJIn Vie'!:naril, in ]\.sia and ~he ~-.~or.Lc.1 \·. . ~ere \-lill th2 u.s. i:Llp3~i.r.. s'-, ..<"O:,....~l,- .... -.1 cO','·.;~,·,·,. _. _____ t.= ""0 '_._""c ~.,"-"'.,::-i-f,; ...... __ +-~"'" _ •• <;;:; "''''.,.. ,., So~,t:~'l ~!~..3tr.2:..1 2.:1c1 to stri;<e ~ort?l \i=-et::1~:l? :t: is clec.!" -t:1.a-: i~ ~~~e ?~ese:-~t. 1~c-"t...:> ""0 ':i ~i= __ "-~ ,,-•• ..... 'C_ ~v _ _ .;;J



\1 _ _





o~r ccu~trYt Pres~cz~~ Jo~~so~ C~~ o~ly C~0053 a~c is o~­ liS-e:G. to ChC05~ o:::e of th.ese ~~'JO c;z~is:'o~::_; ei the:- to prolo::S' a~1c. e:·:?e.~c. t{1C eS-0"Yt2ssivc t-1C!.,r in 9ur cou:'1tr~t or to £ollo~'l t:;'c t.:a}l' out rase:'\i:;;c. fo~ t>.e '0 . . 5. i:~\?crialists!: that is" to quit S01.:t~ ,\lie:::::a:-{l as S00:: 2S ?OS3:'.::i.:.C:


I: .?_s fo~ South and of \·:i11 cC:1tiY!ue tl;,2 r~si5t2..:"'. ca =or =i\~-e 0::- te:1 ~'cz.:=s ~~O::-C!. I::1 reality \.~.(! r::ill ha\re "to lose onltl (t·;o;:c. i.::(:ist:'r~ct.) fin=..l \l2-Ct C:::v 'i;~ill C-2=t·:-~i::'.ly be ct!~s.. '2.l:1e SO:1tn Vict;2:.::"':.'::s·~ i..:1C '\liet:;a.:-.:2:sa ~eo?l~ ~2.\1~ s;-~"or:1 t:~Z!::: tllCY !?::0~~~" C:cc:.t.l! to bo~c.c:.gG I ~:ld t::0:l a:r~ c..;;·;:a~:-~li~~(~ to :ight t1!1til ......... .; -,';. cto:::Yr a!'~c to exte:'~2.inate t:-:e U.S. b~:~cits to t::c lz. s-:'·::-::..:~ 2-rl .:...'---"-.:.. .... -,,;·~un.t!:'y; ~o =c.~te~ \.;::z..-:' sc.~::::£":"cc t:~ey h2.. \:,~ t.o e:·H~1:.::C ••••


n~n tIle strugs-le asainst 1~1 r~1.illio:--: Sout=: 'lict.:;~~~2S~ :),20:.)10 I '/c:":' a~~ \!!lc~;:;2.~ to t·,·i!1 a~d ~.::::el on the contrZ:.::-y I ;,€;i:lg bi t-:'e~l~( c:~::e,~t:=(11 a~~ ~c~ you a~e planning to (?fisht) all 31 2illio~ Vi~t~a~~sa p2o?la.

It is true that YOu J :".'0::", .... _ (:-·-e ~"<=: - ··o_·_.;;c - r"._ ___ ,.'"~'_ o""·



rU5~: \:0 de2#,\:.:1; u::112ss ;;TO~

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nav"'c t..~S~·lercc. a::c are e~s::Ie!"'2.~g ~fOLl (fS~'l -:::c=cs i::ci.s ti~ct.) all t~0 ?20ple are prepared a~d (?assage i~ci5~inct~ 7eO ~illic~ pco?les t~z b~ot::.erly COu:1-~~"ies t t-!i t;1 t::.:=ir ~~~t2r~!~1 close f::-ie~~d.s~i? z..rc a:'s.')


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e:~ter~i~.?.ti~g t:1c U.S. a;g=~.ssO~3 to tl""~c lr~s':..: ex?2.~c. t~;e ~·;ar to I~orth Viet:1'::':-.l 2..:1.c, I:;C:cc::i:-:a


::-' __ ~."O·"i.-:> ~._

..;.. _ 50'";-;,,,j'l _ ......... __ _ .; .......... ..... ,· .....

r.'.a:l if t~'1ey V(;:"!':.:t1re to ancl c:1cro2.cn 0:1 C!ii::.a.

l!:LSl! CE;·;'?:t;:.1 CC::·:I??I::::: S':'A,!l::·::I:T ASSJ!..!.LI~:G



JU:J=: 12. 1965


C!l Ju.r.c 14, .1965, a ~;;'LSV of Ju..'1e 12, 1965 a~':ied at n+·'he U S .-.-;';:tf.:::.., ..;-.,...,---,·~-'·.:~.t..SI .:.! -e·~· :'lo-••:-.u.,.._O~~s ::>c+s ;:>r::.~ .. '"" ··.!"' ' ..... -_ _.... --. c·.ece_';-:-·_··~ul .,., tricks': of esca'ati::g th~ ,.:a.:- ~i So~th Victn£::n. It also • • .... ... • ....,.. ~ •• I .t' • •• ~ -. l. 2~ ) re~t,cravcs ",ne i.:L-':l\: 5 .J..:l.ve POl..!l-VS O..L i·.;.arc.. ~.

(Liberatio:l Radio :-deased

Central Co:-=:ittee v.l




"::!,..., ....


U?aced ;':J_~n trlcse co~c::~ete act:!.o~s ~ C(L~ O~e sa~r_..... a:!ythi:1g .-e:t:Ct;~lt that. the c_ -.---- . - ..• -- _ -. ..... ._ • . _. . . . . . .... __ '.. ,. •• .. __ . ." ____ _ (!s a-''''e c-r-~~"'t l':- e- 1 t..!"'::-"1 ~~ T,n~~ -: . . c.os':)""'! Cc: 0 t ~ 2.~l-:--ess" Vi: ..·..2Y\ L"'1 ~';~.";-

2i,;.t,."O"'\~ 'to'

~F~;;:~~"}~i~~~~~~~:~~:~~~l~~:;~~~;~~~i~:;~~~;~~~~f1~;iCj~~~lfti~ri1~~~ 1951,.. . ..

c.ctC::'. :ri!:So.!\.Oic!! to ~(:s~~~:. .::..~:~~ -:)~"'0te~~ t~e Gc:~e ~-~ aCC01"j.S 0;1 \:i(!~~~.::;.? ·r!Ol~_~2L:,~~-o~:e-·~·:~:()-iS"-l:ot ~:'~;y4-;-ci:d.- ~:::-~O-:Ls-not-- ~n--acc-c~?licc o~- t~e






-- :::l!st co::cluce

t~at t:~c

possi~lc 4lZG~"'~ssi"'!c ~':1j

act:"o::s of tr!~ U.S. i.-::pe::-'ialists ":a!"'l:L::c actio;:s ••••



1!Concernil1,[; sc-cclled. u.~:co:-;.c.::tio~a c.isc~~ssio:;s, JO:-!.:.:'50:l co~t:..,~;iictcd. hmself 1.."'1 .tr~ti:1~ to eA~l~in the co:-.t~:1t of his policy~: He said t~!at t!ie Ar.:cric2..~s ,-.·ould st.r.::l' in So:.rt~ . . Victnc:..':t c. ~ c....-:.~.Y' cost r:~d .!~hat the .1.f_~C~J..,Ca.:1S a:-e prCp2.!'L!g fo~ a 1c:1g c;:cl CG~t.inU.O';lS ';."~r. l~is is tte s::.-::.e f1S if Jox:'so::, o:"c.e:~~ the So~th Viet!lc:lesc ~(!ople to 120;' c.V".::1. t:,e~ ;·;e2.p0:-.5 ~::c. sm'l!"'O~d'::l'" to the A.~erica~s in order to 1~~:.\·e t~e so-ccl.lcd pcc.. ce thr~:, ":v~ld be enjo:. PtJd. L"'l thei~ lifet~-:~e: only' C:~S slav~s to t~e i~~~,t2..C.C~S <:::d. t=aito~s. ~h.~_.;"_~s~'~ ~ of .~h..c_ y .~-!­ ~uthoritics r tric~{ of ~r:~cc~~i"tio:!::2. c.isc';.ssic!!s ·,;!c'i.t.ld. be t~r~t the ;:..~~~ica!:s !!~~-c~~.~£~~.~o __~S;2~.?::~~~~~_i4~~s~~~-~~~~~~?~ ~Q ~§~_,.~~~_0§:~~?9..~d-~T'\~""",.t.;-.!. ~ c~"\!"'\,;

"'''''0''' "'r"'"



gives itself the right to "rage aggressive '·;ars. and SO~'f destr..:ction at a.."lY t'lo:nent a.'lc. a.'"lY plac.e in accor;!a..'1~e ;.'it?l its colo:rl.alist desi.:-es. tlIn fact" J oh.'"lson IS arg-.::::ents about peace discussiow I:o!lS'ti-r:ute a po' ;cy of b!'azc."1 ba::.di~!'y. -- That" 'is "';;-.i t~e' SQuth- Vietna::'..asa pEo.:-..le z:-e "not. alone m


·thc~:;"-h~tred-of-i::e ., . .... , '" t o oo_:::.z~ vee _atot.e::-

b~dits ar.d "t.!1eir dete~~""l~:) ~~'.~OT.1S as one, ~ ...vaal.:' " . .. . :1 • .. S ~ .... 'Pay lor crl.:::.es a.-:c..'{;trj ..:le ~;or..l..c:. peo:.LC , ....-

toO clu.di.;!:-" the U.S. 'Oeo-ole, ec cl.so c::.gr'Y at the.-:l. (Sevarcl. "ior;!s ir.aisti."lct) the Vi~t;:'<l.,,::ese 'OeoDl~ r.ave (;::..t~::w.tc-d t'heir strer;oi..h a.-,d. (?clea.rly realized) the extre::.e~y c;u.el r.atu:-e of U.S. i-::'Pericl.is:!, the ir.ter-..atio:'lal ge.-:cra:me. They ar~ rc~olvee! to :':CC? t::oj: t~:ord -- \·;e p~cf or to die t~~ to bcco::e slaves - a.Ild to fight to va.;~uish the U.S. b~dits.

IIJot.nson also, 1.'1 eA'"Olai:;i:li "'t:gr th~ .".."lerica~~_~e~t~~~~~c.,,_~~~~ted the legend that }:ortr.. Viet..,,:::: i."!.vades Sou:th Vieba"l a.'1d that Clrlria forces the Vi'et!1a.~ese-?io?:!.e-~ostruggle-a.;alr:st- ~he-:berfca:~s-:-- Th5i!l..~e",::i.'1~~~~e§.-t~.E!. tricl-:s of esceJ.a:S"icn a..~cCc.iscont;5:."1::a;;;i6!1-of'"·c6:::.b-:hgs of !~orth Viet:1a.":l~ ,dthout -ta!{'i..ng pe5 ns to hic.enis sEi$tCr-::S-cna~e-cir-forc5:~go~- ·co-.i~t::-:r and' China to • -. .t.';~.L ':~.::~-~~ -~-T-S'·--';,-:'';;~£'':''-e---':''·-:;---;~--·;;-·:z..-~ .;.--~-. . .--':~- ~~-;-~.:....:. --"'-·-~o7:n n~o..!:'. a •. e •. v ....... e 1;. • o,=~",=~ .L" _$ OOii..:..O~S .....a .......::~;".s':'-"~ •• "s Co.. e ... de~trul ~id contradicto~r


-- that the

Vietn~~eSe agg~ess a&a~~st


Viet.. t·~~t--££el\.~eric<ms are ll.;der attack although their COi:.'"ltr'".!~ 1..'1 \:hieh there is not one si:'.sle lioeration soldie:- J is separated -frc:n Vietna.~ b;.; a l·:hole ocean.


. 1:Ti>.e ~,2LSV ste..~..ly ":a.!'!lS

ina U.S. lr::.pa:-irilist.s that. i f they stub;,c:-::ly con-tin~e to step up axe. enla:-~c t.hei:- aggressive ....?r, 31l:lillio:l. Victn~.:~ese pe~plece:-ta~""Y . .;q1 not tole:-ate their c:-bes; t~C; blood cebts shocld be :paid iD:!'"by blood; a=.d. that the U.S. :i.'7.?e:-i~ist failure ,dll be e:rt.re::tely J . a.."1flrt"...."i'e 1!-;1 ~.:ill ha??e:l ~ithi...,. a sho:.--te:.-- period. of ti':le. At prese:::~, no .c.lJl:!!l:bz; ::-m>c of ~e U.S. i.':pe:-ialists ~d :10 reac~io::a:'Y "o:·:er i."l the ...:crld can. a:1clicrate their deteriorati.'"l5 c.eadlcc.~ situatio:1 i..."l Sontn Vietna.'l •••• FROt..'T

I:In vie-;:r of tee fact that t.he U.S. :L~pe:-icl.ists are rec?.lcssly (?e.-:barkir. -on .a :ne~·;r.:-n+tary- advc..'"lt1ll"Ou'S ste", t:.c );?LSV f!!:ds it necesst..:-y to asze:-t one

... ""~..

~ua:lll --


--s" O:.l"n 4: i'------

..;.~ .,_~ . . . __ - d ""~#"..,--.;. .:.. -,.+ .... -!;~-::-~-.:.....f"i""~+-~-,·.··.:-~·7..,,-·li···ri~1' ~ .....e U! .......=.i:)e c:...i.c.;...c:..~ .. S"c'•• C4 "'-"..... o.;.e"e4._~.c;;. .. _v.l ~O::l '0...... "._ .•0_ -;.. .w _ _ _

- •••





•• _ . . . . . . . .

.vJ.~tr:.c;;-:leS'L2~'t..~e.>. .!!fUcE. ~..:as .c~em:~y. stated ~

..... ,-.



the fro!lt I 5 five poi..'"1.t ~tate.":l.e:: T' 22. 't,,-c;" 'i';"e 50""''-> V"e...... <>.,.ese ""'d .... •)..e;~~-~ .:oo-ces "-e "-..~ ~c":"e"'''>'' O-:.... .. ~.<O~.h ';'___ !!:~:!~".!!::".:' __ -eo-Ie ~ _ :. _. _.~~~_~ .:_.~ _ C:":';'<-:,_.::..~ .. . ~ .~...:;~ mined never to lay·do:-m al":::s before ac!>.iev""!8 their basic goal of lnce-oe::-td.e!lce ~e.:noc;a£y~_peace,· a.."!d.-neu.t~ar£t7. So~th VIeb'"a.-:lese·· people' ai:e" det~:r::dried­ to ce21 thC!1deri.'i··blot.!s oil~o' t:ie heads of the U.S. as;ressors and thei.:hench::<en E.."ld ,-:iJ1. surely achieve fbal success ••.~!:.:p~~~ep~, 2:l_ ..negotia~~o~~. '-:l.th the U.S. :i-:::o;r"a' ists are useless i f the U.S. b"eriitists have not vet ~."-.t..-,,":-i""~'!, .:"~~ ~- .. ~~~ iT'; ~z-'=--:"-;'-l-_-~"-'c~-:-···--~·. · ,.:~:;- :':,,,";';':~~.... .:..-. --';4-·:';" . :;'" _ . J __ '1').11 ...... ",.:n .1._'-'.'- tiO ... ",•• ~_"' ....z: . . ""'-"- " •• e "'_ o",:)S a ••c. .. <::." e",_)._ .. ~..... c:.. ..... 04eC!.'.S belo::3ir.g-to t!:e.':!. "-:ftes,) -ff-i!i'e- i!:ie'i£a.;;cise t.rai~o~s· c·oriti.'"lu.e I ' "'el ',.. ~-' ·~"~--""·-"'-"···-";-·S·-;;;:';';:~;";';·:"',.;.:. ... ~~... , I t o m" c.O.in ~.c. o_ ... e_ ..!l.e u •• ...:..~",_).~s"s ...".." e Sou........~.l-, IT'; ~_e".!~_ese peop....e s sacred rig;1ts co:;,ce~ri~s i.~C:eticr.dence a..~d. de.::ocracv, if the r-::rs'Tl -- the uniou.e legit~~ate ~~w~esentative of 14 ~i6~ South~ie~n~~ese ~eo':)le-­ "rs";'o·t,-al1o:.;6cr' to' raise its. decisive voice, and it tne U.s. :i,,::pe;ia1.ists still ------ .-- -------_.- - . - -- .. - -_. •rezuse to stc~ a~- str~~es a~aL~st the r.o~he~n part of O~~ cO~ltry.V •••





NFLSV IESTATt'....5 PEACE COi!DITlm:S AG.ni:ST HILIT.l~'tY ESC..;uTION {O!l Se'Ote:aoer 29 Hanoi broadcast in English a stateuent re:leas:ed :on .S~.e.-..ber 25 by ~e PresidiL.'":l of the .Central Co;:;:rittee :oX -the J:?lSV .cmrde;;:;1ing e;panded U.S. al'ld South Vietna:ll.ese ~m.ilitaI7 "Opc..."Gt;rms .in Vietn~ 2nd reiterating the Front J s conditi'ems far a ,Serue.-:.cnt. of the coni"lict.l n •• .'l'here.fore~ the "Ol'esidi1.El of the NFLSV Ce:1tral Co:n.:ilittee de6ils it 'necessar,,, to decla!'e - soi~:v once af-ain t.hat. if t.he U.S. J..':1perrtll.s't.s refuse of. 't~v! · · t roo~s an::;. d'l.s:;la.'"l...'1~" . Soa..."'h V·l.el,ona;;l ;. ~o l-tJ. ..... ra~·: tnell' ·e .,:1el.r 1:1"'n·...· l. . . a!"'J oaseS:1.:1 but -continue to send ;aore trocms-iL.'d-b1.li1d ne~'l nITfiary bases~ reI'use-Lostop all ,·:ar acts bat contint!e to u;e B-52 r s and other aircraft and ar-ffiiery-tocarry out "ranton bo:..barci":!ents agairist the S~uth Vietn.::;:nese people ~ if they reius to stop us1."1g cne"!l.icals and-other lethal gases~ refuse to stop ·their bloody repression of u.'"l.~ed people's de~onstrations and definitively put an end to' their public execution or other acts of murder or prisoners of ,·tar ~ political detainees as well as d~-:.onstrators, iI they do not respect ~"1d ~plc~ent the 1954 Geneva agree;'lents on Vietn~ in the sun-it of ras'Jecting the ir.de-:)enc!ence and soverei ~i1f;vo.f-t!1eSoutnt1e~na::tese ne;nJ:"e, ar.d lea.;"i..~theIatter'aione-to settle their o...:n c- ~f~irs, if they persist .in their stubborness, there can be no contact nor lJoliticu solution l-rit!l the.-:l. It is In'Oossible to have conditioI leadi.'"lg to a re;U and glluoa::teed peace 1.'1 South Vietn~; as long as the South Vietn~ese ar-..;y and people have. not yet conplctely defeated the U.5. aggressors and co:.pletely liberated their country •••• 11



:msv ;sFOIfESI4Al.l :IN :'AJGTERS PARIS lYP in 'Eng"lish J.346z 20 Dec 65 E

. (Text) Algiers-A..路leading member of the South Vietn8l!l National Liberation Front, :Hu-jIlh Van "T8!l, said here today there is no question of negotiat:irl..g a :peace settle:lent in South VietnEm as long as it is occu:pied by the ArlericaTls. Huynh Van Tam, who expressed his faith LTl final victory, s~id his National Liberation Front now occupies four-fif~hs of Vietnam, containing 11 million out of 14 million inhabitants. . He said: All negotiation with the "Imperialists "Would be absolutely useless at this time as long as they nave not 'Withdrawn all their troop.s andall their war material and those of their satellites outside South Vietnam.

Referring to recent statements by U.S. Secret8-"7 of State Dean Rusk, Huynh Vlarned against fallacious AI:lerican. declarations of 'peace. All such declarations a1路.~ay5 had been f'ollo'\ved by a nev U.S. 'War effort, he said, he added that Vietnam had knOl-nl 3l days of "peaCe in 25 years of struggle.

Van Tam

claimed that in" one month, between 15 October and 15 November, the National Liberation Fron~ had destroyed more than half the number of planes and more than all the ene~ ~arL~S put out of action in the first nine-months of路 "the year.. 'He "las giv.i.ng a preS5 co:li'erence under the auspices of the Algerien Nationa1-Libe.i'atioIll'ront~ during the Algerian-Vietnar;ese Solidarity \{eek. . Huynh Van Tam.

Speaking of French President Charles De Gaulle, he said the l:IF'"LSV appreciated the realistic ,positions he adopted, he added: Our ~osition vis-a-vis France is very clear: We consider President De Gaulle's position on the South Vietn~se problem to be realistic~ Here, in Algiers, we have relations ~~th the French Embassy. }le do not consiqer France to be a satellite of the United States. He said he had never had discussions or official or unofficial meetings with representatives of President Johnson or of U.S. satellite coun~ries. He charged that Britain, though not the British people, (word indistinct) in the fo~efront of American satellites. It was followed by countries that sent ~rcenaries to Vietnam or helped the U.S. war effort: these'vere Australia, New Zeal~d, . !rha.iland, Japan, South Korea, !Iationalist China, and so forth, he said. '


20 Dec lS24z R~TIAC








11 JAN 0815Z AHD/GS


gO U T, H


3 February 1966 ~NFLSVrlItL"NOl' "RECOGNIZE U.N. DECISIONS '-"

'HanOi 'VNA J.:n.t.exDat:ionaJ. Service in English

1749 Gi<lT 2 February 1.966--B

(Text) Hanoi., 2 J'ebruary--The ~IFLSV today declared that the United Nations has no right to decide on problems of the South Vietnamese people and that it 'lill cc路nsider all decisions of the U.No Security Council on Vietnam as null and void. In a statement nade by' its Central Committee spokesman nnd released by South Vietnam LIBltRATION PRESS AGEI:rCY, the 1lFLSV said: - . According to ~-;estern reports, on 31 January, right after sending planes to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. authorit.ies requested a meeting of: the uorr. Security Council so that they could present a complete report on Vietnam and a resolution l-lhich ' might open the door to negotiations: This is an arrogant and perfidious move of the U.S. imperialists. By resuming its air raids against North Vietnam, after f:ailing in their peace ef:forts farce, the U.S. ill!pcrialists once again crudely challenged the Vietnamese people and all of peace-loving and justice-loving mankind. Yet, they try to gloss over their l.?-njust act by asking the convening of the U.N. Security Council, attempting to use this organization to spread their fallacious good 'i'Till fdr peace, slander the Government of the Democl'atic Republic of Vietnam, and distort the.just struggle for national sal\r.ation'of the South Vietnamese people in the servic,e of their schemes and acts of increasing and vddening the war. c~ During the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, to open the ,my for negotiation, . .' the U.S. imperialists continued to send reconnaissance planes to make repeated encroachments upon the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, sent 13,000 additional U.S.. troops to South Vietnam, increased raids and massacres, and conunitted many new crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

At the same time they used the U.S. Air Force for intensive bombings of the liberated areas of Laos, instigated the Thai and South Vietnamese puppet armies to launch repeated provocative attacks against the border areas of the Kingdom of cambodia, and made active prep'arations to increase and expand the ,;ar in Indochina. . All the'aforesaid acts of the U.S. imperialists have laid bare the essence of the so-called U.S. peace efforts and have been condemned by public opinion all over the ~~rld. Decidedly, the U.S. imperialists cannot use the U.N. Security Couu,cil to cover up the truth and justify their schemes and acts of aggression in South Vietnam, still less to negate the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and force them into submission. The }WLSV energetically cond~ns the U.S. imperialists' bo~bing of North Vietnam, intensification of the aggr~ssive 'Vmr in South Vietnam and Laos, and their attacY~ of provocation and sabotage ag~inst Ca~bodia. The U.S. ir.~erialists must bear full responsibility for' all the extremely~erious consequences arising'from their acts.

reso~utely exp~ses


~~\~ ~~

The h"FLSV before public opinion the perfidious the U.S. imperialists to hide under the iT .N. banner to intensify their war of aggression in' So~l Vietnam and sabotage the Democrati.c Republic of Vietnam. .


: 3. February 路~966


.路The. NF拢SV:s61ennilyde"clm:r:es ~ha:t tbe lJnited .Nations has no right at all to decide problems .of ".the South "Vietnamese -people. The :front l-lill consider all decisions of the U.li. Security Council on Vietnam as nuJl and void and as an act of encroaci1IIlent. on the principles of independence., sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam vlhich wer~ guaranteed by the 2954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. The only correct solution to :restore -peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. imperialists lIl'J.st l-Tithdrs"I'T all troops and weapons of the U.S. and its satellites from South Vietnam; dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietp~ese people settle by~hemselves their own internal affairs~



Should the U.S. imperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no vlaY be able to avoid cOmplete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarou and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to.


SOlJ"'lH ··VI.ETllAM


. ;

Liberation Radl0 (Cland~stine) in Vietr.2:lesc: to South Vi~tr.a!:l 0590 m'lT 20 July 1965--8 ("South V:ictnaI:lt:~:tional Liberation Fro.'lt /lrF'LSV/ Central C...=.lttee l'residil.O state::ent • .20·'~Uli) (Text) nn 17 July Proside~t Eo called on the co=patrlots and eo~batants throughout the country to step up' resolutely the resistan~e war a~aL~5t the U.S. toperialist a&3reSSOrs, to protect the north. to libe!"2te the. south, and to advance to;.l"ard the reu~ificaticn of' the co~ntry. President E:l s;;id: ~.For the sake of the fatherland I s· in?cper.eence ·and out of a sense of duty toward the peoples who are st~~S51ir.g a~ainst UrS; icpcr1alism. all of our people and co~bat~n:s are u.~ited and.of one ~in~, are not afraid of sacrifices and ha"rdships, and are cieterdned to ti£.~~ until co;!?let~ victorl.




Also on ~17 July •.President Ho o:-der",d pa;::tial:' mobil1zaticn in", the north in order to step up the resistance war. The !rFLSIl lo."arc1:; respor:es to tbc appeal of President Eo~ the 1eade:- of all the people, and regards:this appeal as a r~ficction of our pee.?lc 1 s stand, Will, and aspiratio:1s. The ilFLSV w2.::-.:11:; acclains this, ne.. ef'fc:rt of the northern peoplc~ in cont~ibution to the ~acred a:1ti-U o S. n~tional salvation str~ssl~ of the entire l)Cople. This is a t!'et.:e~dou5 encou::-2genent for the so~thcrn eor.:pat:-l:;ts on the anti-U oS. frontline·. The ?!FLS;; is deepl;,~ grateful to our no!'~.hern co::r>atriots for the ·unri's~rvcd sUilport" of the belolred north for South Vietnatl. • 'l'hecntire peo;;le an~· Liberation Arn'ld !oor:es in S:lu!;h Victna::i. are r·~sol\'ed to dC"'ote all .of the!::r ·t!r:t~rial and no!'zl strensth to fulfilling tt~!.l· cutj to the fathe:,lnnd: Defend t!v~ ·north. 11b~ratt: .~l':e:.:;ou~h., ~.nd l;e;.:.~ifs-~~~~ .. c~untt"~·" t.T!l~.s is· a saere~' c "_.: duty and a hier_ hO:1or. The s~uthern cor.:batants ar..d people, Wiho do not spare the!:blood. are resolved to f~lfi~l that duty at. any cost~· ,



~ne U~S. i~periaiists are plu~~ir.$ ~ore deepl~ into th~ cri~inal w~r.of agGression in Vietn.'n. After bei~ defea!ce. in their speci,d' i.'a:- .. tHey ha ... e. s(:r.~ .U.S. ar..d satc~l1tc troons ',to otcuP;i··Sbi.lth Viet::Z!.~ b:-azenly and have intensified 'a:-!d es~alated the lo."elr of destruction aS~1nst r;orth Viet:-:E.o. Th~:.r have ever:. attacked the Eano1.a:1d F.aipho:~S 2.:-eas. In Sout~\ Vietro::l. they have occupied n:.'lny cities an:! tcrrito!'ies of our :!'atl1crlar..d, used . all kinds of .;eapons to kill our people. ar..d ap~lied the scor~hed-ca:·th "bt:.rn all, ~:il1 all, destr~7 all II polic:r. T"ne;r have killed old as \lell as your..S pec>~le and r.en as well as -","o::!cn. in b~th the cities ar..d ruralare~s. \lol'se still, t!:.c:; .ba',-e killed 1r.r.oce:lt .chi!dren.

In lioz-th Viet:-:.a:l, they h<lve indiscrin:!.nately bo:i~"ed al'ld strafed hospitals, schools, factories, dikes, ar.d da::!s 1n·c~der to sc~ nourni~g al'ld destruction. and th~~~b7 to:'cc. our p~ople to su~,~it. In the wo:-ld~ they have professed the .... £.11 fc!' peace r..esotiatior.s to fool pu~llc opinion 2r.d c~r.ceal their extre::!ely ruthless. brazen, w~~or.seri~~, aSEr~ssh·~ [aces. But, ou:- pecple a::'c deter:'1ined not to st!b:lit, nor are they l~tti.'1S . the~s(:lves be tOoled by the U.S. ~perialists


- ..9 ~



~. ,

'. 'v:-: ...



SOUi:i VIE'!'liA~

.." "0;



tna:te:;e 'p~ople. \tho ha\"e lo~& n;lrtt:red a deep hatred

tor the U,S.

~&!;ressQrs.• ,are .r::sol·;ed !lot to tolel'ate thei:t or l i...e with thee unde!' the sa6.~ .s~. :Ri\"ers '~~7~n~ ana no~ta1r~ ~7 ~ear a~aYI but the oath of detercination net :to ':S!:!I'v:e :i!:S u.a.v.:es D.f the aZ:;!'esso!'.; t2!.:en years aSo still rc:::ains fresh in th~ ,~ ,tlinds :oX :thc South Y~!T.a::ese people. As conths 'and years go b"/, i t dll beco;:!e even nore resoUo."lding..~ne South Vietnnnese people, together with the people tr.rou~hout the coa"ltrY~'are :dete~i~d to r~E~t the ~n~r1cans \L"ltil eo~plete victo~J. even thouSh thc7 have ~~ tithttor 5, 10. or 20 yea:,s. or lonser. LU:e the pcvple throuzeout the cou-"ltry." the South Vietna~ese people ardently cherish peace. To our people~ peace ce~ns . that not a single U.S. aS~!'essor or cercena~i rewains on Vietnarr.ese solI to provoke war ar;a!ns t our people. This 1s the only ,\:ay to res tore peac~. As lonE> as the U.S. L~perialists c11~S to Ou~ co~trl, the South V1etr.a~~se will continue.to ti~~t them until independence and de:;toe:-acy lU"e achieved and peace is aceo!"d1nsly es tablished.

Respondin& to President EOIS app&al. the people and the Liberation Ar~ed Forces in S9uth Vietr.a::l are .deterr.:ined to strive to learn fro::1 the no:,thern people. to e::lulate one a.'1othQr it! scorinZ achi;:yenents L'1 all tield:., and to step \!p the national salvat,lon resistance ~:ar. The ~?t..:.the!'n 2:'Oy and. people a:>e deter::..1ned to i.larch to::-otard ul'&ently to annihila te a....d whittle doun Ea.n)" t!cr;: ro!'ces ot the U.S. and pup;:., t ar~y. and in the ir.r.ediate future to score. the sreatcsl; ..-ictories in all activities durin& .tho cUl'rent rainy .season. ..-.

- --:--""-


all difficulties and hard~nips to buileup tr.eir ro~ces in all fields. ent~usiastically'st~p up ~~e r.o\"'e~e:lt to join the liberation a.!':lY. 0:' ~:fer tree labor, Ot' Join shock youth tea •.~ in o!'d.'~r to ~cnt!'ib~t~ t\:l the victo:"'j. The sout::c:'n ar:'1Y a,,~ paoplc 8:'e dete:-;-.1ncd to llaintain a~dcx?a::d t~e liberated areas. to clinZ to their lar:.:! and houses. to strive tor an inc:,e~se in production, a.~d to foil the pacification plan ot the U.S. 8Sgressors a~~ their lackeys. : ~hc so\!th~rn a~n:

and people




~he southern u~ban'pacple arc determined to stren&then ar-d broaden uriiti. builc'up a stron~ tOl'ce. step t:p the struSgle al:ains t the:U.S. iraperialis ts and ti:eir lackeys to achi~ve nation?l and de=ocratic rishts and vital interests, obliterate the oppressive ~achiner7 risht' in the heart of ~~e cities. and be ready to take advan~age ot opport\L~it~cs to score &reat ach~eve~ents.

Our ar~ and people are victoriously tightinS azainst the U.S. itperial!sts ar4 ' their lackeys 2nd ~111 ee~t2inlj u!n eo~;lete vlctorj. The rcsist~n:c v.ar cr ou~ a~les and people is t3kir.~ hiS leaps ro~~ard • . ~r.e situation ~t ho~e and abroad ls very ravo~ahle tor us. O~~ a~~ and peo~le will certainly defeat the U.S. ~perialists, as they once defeated the Japanese fascists and the Pre~ch colonialists. Signed:

The !i:o'LSV Cent!'~l Co::"..':1ittee Pl"esid.it:~. Scuth Viet:-a~. 20 J\:ly




.... .









. ...

.. ...'.

• •, 4 ' 9




ViE?llAJ! ~-. '




(Zext) EC!noi."22 -At::&:.1s1;-~~ spc,~:eS::lan ot the CO=->:1!sslon tor Ey.;~r!lal R"l~.t;ic~ of the Sou:;n. Vietna..~ ~i.. tio:t'al Libcratio:'1 ~:-~.!1; (:iJlSV} issued a sta~c!:e:Lt on ., 19 Au.:;ust st.rcn~11 cond<:.-::t'li.n~ the so-·!ul!cd P'lOlC~ initiative of th~Ass:.::il!tion: or Southeast f..si~ (AS.q cC;':''ltries reZJ.r6nS.2 soluticn to the Vietna'l p:'",)bJ.~o. 'l'he statc;:tent ...cl~ascd b:r the SO!:1t:h Vie:r:.ao L!B=:?,A'rrO:i PRESS J.GE~:t;!~ s-aic: As 1s kno~ to eve~ybocJ' each t!~e 'th~ ·U~S. 1ope~1al~sts take a n~~ step in cr.~~ndin5 t~eir ~r o! a~sression in Ind~:hin~. pa~~icularlj in SOuth V!~~~~~ •. th~l state an~\: p~ace .fa.r::e in an. attc;:;p:; to cislead p;.zbHc opinio:'1 end ~iti5~te the lo.!:"ath -ot the Vietn.1l4es-e :~~~i~: -z~"C peofie in. the U:lited Sta.tes. and oth~r pcace-l:.vinr;; people 'or the ~o:,ld" In a ret.! ~~n:;hs~ the s!;a.t~:::~~.,~ ~;c.~t on .. the chl.e! \;a.r crioinals. JOZl:lSO;!. I1c!:a::.;.:-a. and thel.:, acco::pliees. }\(;.,;c iZttroc,uced int"o S~:.4th Vie~~an so~~ 10teeO c.'!cit.itj!'lil U.S. tl·cops.~ney are pri:pa~.:~[;· ·to inc:-ease th~ nu.::lbc:· ot U,S. troop;; in this area to 1:00.000, 5C1~.OCO •. ·o:,-·ev'::L nOl"e .'01 the end cf thisye:..r. B~si~e~. the,;' ha;:e pus~!.';l t!l~ir \:30:" c:scc.l~ ti":l ~.!1 :~~rth ·Vietn~.:l to a very d.:!!!~e:o:ls ce£~ec b:; cO::lbin~ st!'f;er-a.l

al'cas in



o~ H~noi

and H..1irh;):\s. "


st~~C~C:1t str"~.:;ly d~no;ln'!e:t


the\.i.l1!":D. U.S.





'1'0: c"n~ibuti:lz to th<: U.S. a~:;:-ess.!.';-e ~:J.:- i~ 'Viet:'.all A ·'~ile ,.."--"5 ... ).·... - .. _ ..."V\.:............ ·-·"'-..:~ s 1'0-"" ... ... " ir.';"''''''~'''''''''~'' r." :-IW':I.'" .... 'C _:a. ...... hi ......... -" .... •b~U";>'l'" .. - ..... __ J .• t,;~~~ ., ••:.,. .. &;t. ••··i w---.ⅈ: .. --r-'.~~ Q.\"",L _ , ..


ant! "J.~la;:sia

f~inted o~t t~Et

··n .......


-the ?hai rulinS


ei~cles~~~are ~oisily ea=p~:~~i~; fo~


of ~si~n ·cou:l.:~ie~ .. are a~t~3.11y thos~ ~~o h=l\",~ b·~e:l ='~f; ~ea!ousl)· the 2i:sressive U,S. plans in sO!4theast Asia. ·!'r.e;r r.avc not. ~:-.lt sen~ Tr.a!. r.a\"Y an~ ait" :o=-~!! tu".its to S~!.:th Viet!t!!:; t!) ta~:e' part i!1 the U&S. ~~r b~t a~so orre.. e\! all 01' Tnai1~:'&;: to th~ U.S. !:;I;::'ialists, tt::-:li.n~ !.hei" C~'.l:l~:-l !.'1~~ a h:..:~e U.S. ~ase ,of aSg:-~~si~n aoa!.~st Vic~~~~ and ~the.. eou:-.~:-ies in Inco:hina and sotl.the~s~ Asia" pc::cc



'l'he stat.2::lent CO:lti:ll~~d~ It is t;hus st.a~n: clear- t?lat the ..~SA peae~ lr~i!;'i~:'i,.·e is bat a:l~t::'cr p~Cice ra~~~ ~~ t!lC ty;~ al~~ad:r s~~.&e~ by t:t~ J~h:ls"::-D~~~ t?t.;.s;: cliG.ue ai,r:lcd at sc~':"i~: the U.S. sch~n.~s o~ \;a:- e.t.pa:lslon a!\d i.'\te~si;'ic.atio:,,, ab.?lr"!s~ t?:.e !l"''''''-:'' "'.•:., ". 1- ... t:';..:> ~S·:"\,. .t'\;~ -~~ ...A"t; ~"'''Ir'''':::.'' -~ .. -. '~l c'c"'•,. V-"e"~.a-:"s" ." • • • • lOP ~ 1'_10. r-- aO\·4 •• - 'vv ••.... _. !'>">":"l r- #,: ..•• "'-~ .. , :..s~... _~. • •• - r:. • :' s 1'0" 4 • settle=.ellt or hsia~ ;.:-;,bl~=ts b~" .~~ia:1s. bat in :"'aet it sc~\·es the c~~ss.i: !.t.S polic~- o~ us!r.z As!.a:!S t" !is~t ~Slc..!\S. Tila~ is \:~ sc·:c!"al Asi2!l C~,!:l~:-ies have 1

s .... "'_ ..-,,·., ....<1.

r. ... "'--'''''-''""' .. - ... \.


r"-J-'-·,,-t ..-·-f-

-)-.. "'.,-



. ...

Tel*! sta~e::'!!:l!· str;ssed: .. T":-.e :r?lSV o~:e c.&C!.ln ri':2r!'i~s its ic",:~"."abl-t: s~';!l:.!


tn~:':F S~

lo:\~ as the tJ.S_ ~pe:'icli~ts h'l':~ not reco~:\ize:! the S~...:th Vi~~:!.1::·23~ p.ao;:lets le~al f,..l." tr,... -.;.., ...,~, ..,..,"1 ..... _" - -" , ..'2_,: - ..... '-r--"'~, ":,..., ... ,, n ..·........ l'· · . Cio.. ... ",~ ...Gw " .. _' ......... 1 _~ ..~fl'~ .. "e ,'" so r -t.'-"" . ".-~ ...-"'.--... --. -....... ._.' 1 ..... _ ¥..J _ •• _ .U,~ .~_ ..... _ ....... _ ... _ ........


10:1& as -t.he:; ha.ve !".q~ e·:a.:::a~e': all !leS

satellite t~o.,~s a~~ U~a~~:13 ~~~:: S:'t:th l·n ... -",,, .... ...,. - -;--''';''"" • "~'s . ....._ w_ t:1;O. ...... _10 ... . . . . . ..• . . .~···e .a.. not rc.:c.:!l!.ze~ t.h~ ::~:"S·' as' tfle c:tly be:lt:i:-:~ . r~p~~:;·~:\~·l t !-~.. ~ 0: th!! S~;.:~h" 'lie :::~~~se . p'e~plc. 2.n1 so lC:1~ as t.~~y r.a\-e rl:l; l~~ t:.~ S=l~~~ ~.,"!~~~;!:::.~s~ ;I~~p~e s~~:le -:::'eir"" • .n _ .."'_""-. ••• . . ;\l ~r!" _ .... c-.. .... -:._-" c-!"- ..".,,_ ~."\......... ... ~,"_,_j ....; ..... • ......... ~ .."\... ~_ ":'1' "" __ ~:-..•..--'"v 6-."W_. -t\'""·"~n .._"" .... .... ~~ __ .... ............ ~n S't.~·." .. " ''''_''~~'''''_:>.'''' ___ .. ~ •••._~ ""_'_. con!'t:r~:.:e~ 0:"'" thr: S~:; t!1 '!;:-e--;::?:: iS3.t.:~ ;:':'11 ~e n:.tll a:-.. d \·olc. V';e"""~ ... .; ";s-a~-l""" _ '".;..t;... a .._ ... _ •.. _-. ... __ c..;:,,1' _ _ ~~ ... i~ V .. l _ _ _


... ~,.; ':'''5'''' ... _ _ . . .... ,,-. - .. ,J





~t,; :"l






22 .-Atlt;ust ~9G6






•• _


J.fter .reitcr.atin.r; t?:e Sou~h Vietinnese people t s dete:'::l!na-tioil' to 'car;:~: ·t:.roUi;!i.:··.. :to :the ·:end :the.it' :r.e:si:s±at.ce .a~inst. the U.S. a.:;:;res:;ion. to:' 1=latic.'lal sah-a!.ion. :the cstate-ceirl: :st:t'I!"S.::;:·';;;:: k:.71 p.co::c £:a1.:Cs of the U.S. aZG:"cssors a:;e tr..eir .satellites. j."lclmli;:\.£,; the ·s.:>-enll::d A::ian pea~e c:)~!'crcn':.: p:'o?ose': 0-; 'i'haillnd at U.S. instiGation. ~il1 end in 1~no~L~1ous.fail~r~ •• '


. ...... *-·L1'ber,,:UO!l. Radio {Clandt'ttineJ 1."1 Vletnanese to South 'Vietna;:: 050.0 Q~.~

19 -AU&us't 1966--s J

(Co~~dr.ta1'Y: . bTha troo?s ~"ld people of tTri-?hlcn l n~st strL~e ~ore s~ron~lY.­ unL'\tdrr~Pt~dly. ~'\i sp£ntancouslyn)




(Excerp~s) Q1.!anS Tri af..a Thua Thien are the tliO no:-t·h.~'::n::'Ost pro'/inces i-;inc close to the scu;h~rn slde or the ter::po!'ary oo:-cer. The U.S. ac&ressol"S a..'id the~ 'lackeys h~l.\'e a:te~1?tec! all ruthless :·.nd .i."lsi~io~z ~lo~s ~o t'i-a:tsr"r~ the T:l ..T!licn provi."1ce'~ i:'lt'o n!'l absolutei:r safe area ro~ tn~~. Asic.~ rrci."~ the police, ei';ii &~ards"~ 2.!"ld R<:'n~~r ro:·ces. the~: ha'le st:lt;lc:1ec the Pirs't In·fa.~;:-~ Dh'isic:l "1'''.-1 , ... ::'hl> "'~l.- ...rt'h-r ......, a'"'''"' i'n ,,~~~+-'l'C'" to v.t ~:.p . . . ... "t c,o. ..... _,,;. ... .... ;';·-·o"':.d ....:.:·;-,,-t ,.,1.: •• _ O.1.J< the,- 'O'!.1:) t(\ur U.S. N::!ri:1e battalions, <;L"lc. reccnti-;. ;h:'ee 't:> five air~'o:-ne ,in:! tiar1.'1a . . batta.lic.:is or the PU?#,ct :ar::jl S f;cne:'al ra~er"'e ;'i:,ich :-,:1,0 ~!:e:1 :'e&ularl:: 4:-: ·ceplo;;ed 1.-1 the Tri';':Lh.i~:1 theater "J~ ha~. A net.:o!'1-: of pos"ts dot t!-':e i.~ea fro:l Route 1 a:1d Ro~~te 9 to S.nLe:--p!'o'/inchl !'oads._ -i-!oZ'~o...cr. th~ a~s':-~sso!'s ha\e built special forces C20PS ~~~n?~d~d ~irectly by the A~~~!cans ~lc~~ the

10_.. .. . . _.. . .






c; . . . .

_ ":'




Yletha!lcsc-Laoti~n ~c:,2r~~.

in CO:1Jt:,l,cticn \d.th the dl1ta..~· ceas'..!l'Cs. the U.S. a.-:;~:-e~so:-s and tb~ir lazkejs .' have reSO:-tce to b:-ibe!'J ane fla tte:;:r to bu~ ott ~ht' people of 'i'ri-Thic!1. : :' partic!11a:-ly tho:;c ~:!O l i... e close to the C!~::\~r~a~ion iL"1~. iio~evel·. the ·'.',. 1n,~o!Jita}-·l·'" r"'eo.:>le of'_ /'\"".•....i.:":.. "'1-.1 "'n':"'" ;........to.,,« T·."' ,- - ; .... ,: ":"c ... _...:!.·i".n. "'''~-~'' ij- --6" 1".... tJ'. . . ·-ht of ~:.attackL'l':; the enc;:i:i, have b:-avely ~o.e:! 3!".ea:l ~o tl3.:;e pol1tl~al a!1d ~:-;::ed ~ 'n~ ~ ""JIt t~..... •. ".f..,~,", -~ ... .... ",.-... t.~_a -no::. &. .. ., .. -.. ..... suc_c~ses. , ,....:. ,·, .'": str u,sG--.. •. - s ...~ ,~_ ,,_... _ an d .2_c .. ,_r'_~u_ .. e~on <'......••v.~ c...a"",,c~ ttl... t"::. '/-arce!1t patrioas::l •• ::~e.p~oplE: and youth i:1 f.-"'~ hay::! risen to (<lee the C:-.Cr:.7 '\4





1Iw"'~ •





····\lith [0:""'·;a"''''''.. ~ • .. -,t -t":l~'o-" t"" d ..... o·w..y\; .... ~:. ... , .• .,) o!' ,.. s"r"-"""" "". .:;:Q_ ......... u fro"" ••••,.,,...,,,,,~ .l ...... -" ... ..'-- ,te-o.. :> .. ___ :.: the cne:::;' is cri::tes to a!';:ed o~cupa~icn of t:-.e R;:e b~::.adcastii~t: station. the_ · ;···r·"'sca··~>l~ . ""'C' or"~"{c"" o~·-!.-e'" ~ .." ~. ",-I ':: .c:.... :0._" ~ 0". . ";.,,,, ""~.\: U .. v '-eli \" _ . . ...4 .... • c:1_ ... e USC .... c:t.s u'1" ;t ve i .. ""...... . ' ::. deno:tst"'ticns to ce~a:1:! that th~ Ane!'ica:1s So h~:::c a:1:l tha: the 'n.i,m-?::; cl1qu~ ,'.~ be o':erth't'o....":l.. Fro::, to"'!1S a.'1c. nt:.'1icipalit{es to !'u:'ll azoeas. successi-.. e political struc;z;les have eru.pted t'o ':~lec:, the. bloo;!y ha:~ds the c:leny.·.· _~.:>

oIo"iI ......







.. ~


.,?: · -..-:...

. '


I ;he guer!'Hla ~;:.r!'a!:'e ~~hich has beer: ':izo!'ously dey~loped 1.'1 ';he ;::om,;abous

· .:~: areas as ~ell as !n ~e io~.:la.'1es a:1;! ccastal re~ic.:l has delh'e:-ed stt:!'.."lbS ~lot.;s

.::, 'to t}.'" ~":ld ., .. -' l."c·· ",,.,,, .~,.. L 1 su:,~c\Z:~e~1 . ~ :~". ..e ~·l,,--·fS ~& t,;_.; ... \.:- ~ •"1"""" ~.. ~:.c. ... ~ r.... 16~" s\!.e~r.!.!_as nave noy C!l j :.:.: encroached C:l :he C!'l~r..j.. r s te~rito~J and (c:-ced' hi=. to \:ithd:"a~~" trcrJ. so=e~ " 1 ~:~:.. posts such as tee" L .lo! OUtP05t i:1 ~este~!l Th~a '1hien, 2!'ld s~i~ed a~ 2!'td ~~.,: · ,::~ ~!lled do;:c:1S or keI'ica.:lS at :cu B:!! ea:::h !l~:lth. bu; ha'ie also re.:;ula:-l:r .>~:a.t_tac;.:~.! t?:.e \:!c~:e:! sclf-de!"en~e::;cn !!l. the su?~o::~ o! O\l:" ~o:;'.ilat.!"~ts li'/~S · :. . ,:.1.~ strates!:: ha::le:s. Ti:e tl.:~:-rillas 2n~ !"ccional troc;>s n2".i"e also lC\J..;:ch~~ .... :~:·suc~ess!."!? at~z.c:::s aSai.."1st Ro~te S ~nj aZCl!~st nilitarj CC!'l·..·~jS on the ~ l;a~:.:­ .:-:.- l!ue !~i!:;~;::l;;. ~.a~e ccst:"oyed b:-!:!~{:z, ~nd a~tac~\.c.:! ·ri!i:1ro~cc:.:t:nts cc=i!'l~ to :,,~p~i.~ the b:.-1c;:es ~:- rO:lcs. and t.-a·:~rei;ula:-l:: shelled ti:e e:1;:~:;' S ::lllita:-,:: su:'.::e:!to:- • ;.&. . .






Intervie"t'r uith : the -.VC :ol1"1innf.1e.\"~1b:"frik1.ev S1:rcm - 1n a 100




ocui: and .Tran~ Eaoi' Nam, ~NLF -re.pr:es·entative in Alcriers - . the o ! .)

follm-ling. points,\"ere .aeve,lopejj:: a.




. ..

. .. .

-Peace,'- According. to Tran, real peace can only come

to Viet-Kam when the U .8. slid its allies \,dthdra\~ all their troops and dismnntle their bases..

Until then the South

Vietnamese people'resolve 'never to give in • ~ Ceas.e.~j_re.




- 'rhe U.S. talks of peace and negotiations

but each. time 1t is prt-:paring to sen~ E01."e l-einfol·cemerits 'to


escalate the '\far. ,At the ,same time

rulers try to fool



world opinion'by b18ming,theVietnamese people for not negotiating. of


The U.S. j,s attempting to change its .,~ositi~ll on the battlefield to apositiol1 of strength at a

conference' table.

This is a move to cover U,S .. 'I;'leaknesses

and to hood",;oink U.S. public opi-nion. c.

of the. NLF.. .Political Ains ....-..


- To overtlu:m·; the disguised

colonial government; to form a coalition of :..


South Vietnamese' life and hold general elections; to





a progres'sive d~Ulocracy;,~ thi.s. unaligne~ .governrae~~t1.ld

. 215





'establish diplomatic relations "lith all governments. in the spirit of the Bandung Conference, and "}Quld accept aid from "

all countries; it' w'oulddesire to live in peace vlith its neighbors. d.


Unificat1.Ol"l of the

for gradual unification by the




zones .. ,It \'lOuld hold

same elections



Viet-Nams ..: The Front stands'

and negotiations bet\-ieen



with, this in ,mind, the

Organized general elections

are n~t possible as 10l1g as the U.S .. does not withclraH its



present electipn plan is a political bluff and

will 110~ be recognized by' the Libe~ation Front.


Prisoners - As long a s the U.S.. does not recognize

'.the ,Liberation Front) it, is not possible to. discuss the exchange ,

or release of prisoners.

f. ;


\'7iE.E. p•.~,.



Leaders of th~ Frorit


have "never'. met "7ith U.S. officia Is.

proposa 1 for mec·tings. now


lle consider any U.S.

a cover ~p for the· aggres sive' plans

of President Johnson and' his. intentions to hoomvink U.S. and

world ,opi'nion.


195 1t Geneva !\cc?rds - The essential spirit of the

195L} ._Gen·eva agreeme11ts. recognizes the, i~d'epel1dence) sovere~gnty ."



and ter.ri-toxial unity of 路Viet-Nam. l'1hile the NLF did not participate in tbe Accords and is not less the NLF is in agreement



by them, nevertbe-

the basic principles of the

Geneva Accords because they represent tbe just aspirations of the Vietnamese people. h.



Postscript - Tran Haoi Nam added at this pOint in

the interviel-r his thanks to those members of the intelligentsia, '\vorkers, students, and religious groups in the U.S. l'lho manifest and have manifested soliqarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

(UNCLASSIFIED) NBC News Huntley-Brinkley Report, 8/31 1945




14 Septem~er 1966

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 G~~ 13 September 1966-s

(Te>..-t) On 25 August, Australian jourl1..alist Burchett met with la,·rter Nguyen 1fu.u Tho, chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium, in a place in the liberated area of South Vietnam. During this meeting Australian journal~st Burchett intervie't-:ed Chair::Jan Nguyen.Huu Tho about the development of the war in South Vietnam and about the pOlicies and line of' the NFLSV, the only true leadel' of 14 million South Vietnamese people in the struggle against U.S. aggression. Here are the questions and anSlfers of this interview: . Question: Since the day the Americans started their military buildup in South Vietnam and escalated their air vmr of destruction to North Vietnam, have the basic combat objectives of the NFLSVbeen changed? AI1SrTer: Our unchanged combat objectives are: to completely defeat the aggressive war of the U.p. inq:>erialists; to overthrQi, the Saigon puppet authorities; to set un a ",ide and democratic national c~'\litioll government cOr:!!)osed of XeDl'esentatives of the peo-;)le from all strata, all nationalities, all reli~ions? all political~arties, and patriotic personalities; to restore the sacred national rights of the South Vietnamese people; to achieve independence and democracy; to improve the living conditions of ~he South Vi€tnatlese people; and to acbieye peace, neutl'ality, and national unification.

The intensification and widening of' the aggressive vmr by the U.S. imperialists has demonstrated that our previous assessment of the U.S. in~erialistst nat~re and plans is completely correct. Since nothing is more precious than independence and f'reedom, we feel it impcssible to detach ourselves from these bas~c combat objectives, no IJ1.atter hem savage the U.S. iI!!perialists' means of vl'ar are and no matter hOly cunning their political tricks are. All the people and armed forces in South Vietnam are determined to fight and fight strongly. Final victory ,dll surely be ours. Question: Is it true that the introduction of V.S. and satellite troops into South Vietnam has sp~unk the liberated areas and reduced their population? Answ'er: ]Iothing is farther from the truth. (?It is true that) in certain areas,~ at certain ti~es, tne U.S. imp~rialistshave occupied a sw~ll portion of' the liberated areas. But, generally speaking, we ha~e enlarged our areas and liberatec· an additional million people (?in very) important areas. I must add that although at present almost 4 million of our compatriots still live in disputed areas and areas under temporary control of. the enemy, the great majority of these people-including- officials,soldiers, and officers of' th''!i Saigon puppet authorities--are fed up \·rith the Americans and their lackeys and feel sympathy for and support the·; front. .~

Question: A number of people are of the opinion that neither the Americans nor thf . NFLSV will win militarily in South Vietnam. What do you, Chairman, think of this v£ew?


14 September 1966


Answer: These distorted opinions have usually been set forth by the Washinoaton .ruling .circles.so that they coUld 'present themselves in a favorable light by .restrLcting·the1rr.portance of our victories and ~~ everyone doubt our chances _of achieving ·coIl!.rilete ·victory.. In i'act~ "We have achieyed victory after victory in the 'struggle against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. We have defeated the "special war" strategy and cvel"\-Thelmecl the puppet troops ~'1ho have been organized, eqttipped, trained, and cO~dlnded by the Am~ricans. Rusb.ing in to participate directly in combat since mid-1965 by massively introducing their troops in South Vietnam--including the seasoned units of vrhich ]'icNamara has often boasted--the U.S. i~erialists have been unable to change the situation. On the contrary, they have suffered ignOminious defeats. The fact that the Pentagon is continuing to pour more troops into South Vi~tnam, raising the total strength to·300,OOO men, and is making preparations to sepd more reinforcement troops is eloquent proof that the South Vi.etnamese troops and people are vdnni~~, have the initiative on the battlefield, and are attacking continuoub_y It is necessary to recall that at one time McNamara promised to 1dthdra'tf U.S. troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. The ignominious failure of the 1965-66 dry season cd~ntel'offensive of the Americans, although the latter had carefully 1,~orked out the plan and (sev~ral1~ords indistinct) forces, proves that they have been po\-rerles~ in carrying out their plot aimed at recapturing the initia tive and changing the '-Tar situation..·· . Participating in glorious combat l.;i th their bare hands, our people have quickly built a firm, strong political and military force and are achie".ring increasingly important victories.. The Americans have the most pOt-:erful military and economic potentials in the i'lestern vrorld~ but \·re have the invincible po,";-er of the people t s vro.r and the creativeness vlhich is being developed to a high degree. rle are of the opinion that in a war, military po.1er is composed of n:any factors, the most decisive being the political and moral ones. Politically and morally vTe are absolutely stronger than the Americans. Our people across the. country are· carrying out the "ror without yielding before sacrifices and hardships, with the determination never to put dO\ffi their \ieapons so long as our combat objectives have not been reached. vTe are also stronger than the' Americans in other basic factors, such as strategy,

rear areas, war leadership, and ground forces; these are the factors that decide the final victory of. a war. Although they are strong materially and technically, the U.S. bandits have basic vleaknesses in the pOlitical, military, strategic,. and tactical fields. The factors of U.S. power are not limitless, partly due to their policy of dominating.the world, to the fact that they are undertaking an aggressive vmr in our territory (several words indistinct), and partly due to the fact that they are powerless in (several words indistinct) any portion of our territory (several words indistinct). On the contrary, their weaknesses are truly basic and unsurmountable. -







. Dur'i~lC tl!~ p!'ocess :o"f war ..(!~,,·e'1:op~nt-# t:mseb~lc l-:enkr;~~ses ha~'r: t>eco::;e !r.c::'~~;;~ni;l~1 o!:lviO:l~ ilr.e, p~e::ltr.(':~;;· :cm,~ \-:.lll Ximil1.:r l.eaa -th!: l.r;;!"ieans to an "l!m!.\'oid?lile (1-:['" .-t. '.i'h~ ",,'C1' treat vic: t.C'rics t.:!1lch ·"!e hav.c aC:.hic~cd sin=:f' the U.S. td,li ';;~ .. j ~u1:i.d;.Ar·. and e:;peciall:r c;urin~ the 1955-66 drs season, P:"O'lC t!lat tl':.co::-:,"icCill~ as ~~)l. as v:'act.ically t.:!: art' fully .,:11c to exter&:1ir.ate net' o~ly the 'puppet tr-oops. !-l.. t: also t.he t!Cost sc.,scned l.t~its of' ~he ·U.S. !,y.p~ditiomlry r)r~e;. Tole care fully a~!'S to r.,aintair, the initiati\'~ en t!1C battletield &!!!d th<: tetli?.J -::: C\1r attocks ar~1 -:-~I'C fully able to vi.ctor':>usl!' oP:'~$C tt.e U.S. N!nr·~=ce;:!cnt.s and Ililitadl:; defeat the U.S. 2&zr~Ssors l.a~d~:· at'!:! s1t\t~ltion. •





Q.ucst.io~: . In YO,ur C'IJl.tu.on. chai:'!:!t'r~ .. is thCI'C rotm a ~ossi~,·i! ity of cOClperat'ins t.:ith the e.ther p:>liticaJ, or~2nhations in South Viet-nma? !



01.::' lmchanzed policy has c:l\:aj'S ~ecn to achieve a l~rbe der.r=e ::.' national at earr;;ing OlJt t:...e resist.ance acninst tr,e U.S. aZc;resso!'~ Zl~·.~ tor l:<:t.iC::'~! s~h'af:i::-n. 'i'han!<s to t.;is C01':'Cct pCllic~·. W1 t,a'/C succeeded ir. ~uildi~Z Cl na t!.:>!l:ll t:ni 'C~o front ~as~d on a sour,d fOl:nc!a tio!': al':d hav!;-:; .; large tlc;:;!:lel'.:-hip. J'IJ:tl't froa r'at!'ioti'! politic;:1 partics~ reliGiOUS CIne: nation,!l !~:'!)·~;P.I. and 1nci!'l;l<1uals \I!',O have joi:li.~d the fI'ont. t:c ,ha\'c sUCCCCdNl in ccopeNtinL; ;dth c\;::er !,;I~,!'iotic p::lit.ical and l;eli(Jous ot't;cl!',izations and.it,diV'ieuals. On this basis. u;,Hy


to!: !:.<:ve sco!'~cl i;l'Ca t .... ic tol'ic:; •


.. At. P!'CsNlt. the U.S, tl'')OPS arc: cirect1z' pa;:.'t1cip?tj!~& on a Im'se sc"lc in the 2r;Gl1l(:~si\"c \:4:t" i:l. :;outb Victn~p..~ tl1l?::l~..linr; 'U~e~I·rCO:' 0'.,;1' co·.n:t.r], \(sinS. extre~ely r-"!, .. ~rucl t::can:: of ~a!" to tl·~:iS2Cre our c~:tp:1t.riots. :u,!j co:x:littir:& e;:tltc"r.lcl:r barb~:'v\ls ....;) l"i:ie:.>. 'l'h(: trai t:>rs ?;'C'.J:-,cn Van ~hi(:u 2nd iieuyer. Ce..o :::; have fully obc-:te:d ;~crica:;, r'~crs O\f,d t.<o\'C sclcJ r,'! tiV!:~l SOVC1'Cier,t;r fp':' 11.5, dollars ',ne! '1~:,!;'C;lS, 1hvcrt.t:cles:>. arJal~t. fl"v:l a si.tll1 &:'ct:? or r~~c ti~nn!'ics e~pende:lt Oli ~tc At".!·~lec:!:s. all oi!:er Viet!lar.:{:se c'!!'~ p.:1t!'iots ~ho tcel (;r::at lr:eigl1ation to..:<!rd the U.S.· azgt'cssOl'S and their hc~c::r.len. 'i'!:e!'C'tol'c, we can say th?t t.1:cre is a p~ssi:... ilitS of c~1argine our eooperation \litnotter o:'&.:.ni?ati~ns. forces, 2r,d kdi\"iduals in South Vietnau. l'c~<.rdless of their pl'evio~s .activities. Quc:;tion: It- tr.!s. do :Iou pean nIl tz~e pco;.le \:ho had pr:rtic ipatcd in the Dil'_~ Dict'l &O"er·l:r.•~nt.. a!ld ti':c zo ... ern",ents that succc;;c!ee it?



Ye~. Itc~a!'dles$ or their past activit.i-es, p;)litieal ter-.de:ncics and v1c~s. or thelr (i~ti~':;:"1it:r or rcU£;lon. Ct'c:'!, Io.'crds i!~dist1net) C':irr:cd at the follo~:inb ob.jccti;;es: opposition t.o the ~ar or tl:c A...c:-lc.-.ns <md t::cir tenc::'::c!'l, rcstcrat10n or natior.al so\·crci~~ty, 2chie\·c::-~e;,t of ce;~!ocratie :rccecr~~ cess!!tio!~ ot the U.S. intcl"·.. c!~tior.i~~ a:,~d C\r;':;rcssh'e policy, aehic\'(-,",~!1t ot peace anrl ne~;tralit:.r in South Vie~:~:a:l. a::d it.t!Jro\'ci:i~:l.t or ti:e livins; cO:1dit.ion.s of t:-,e people. ~tt the s tre:lE;t~ or the li?ISV yoli tical ar:.d. >:tilit2.:'7 fo!'ccs ~:.!11 certainly be the decisive !'i!cto!, tOl' victory.

Q,ues tion: Cl:airr;;a:1. too thc Sc>uth Vi~tr.!:::;


:;ou. let \:s


the 1:0::01 tions for. a pli tier.l solt!ticn




'. Anst-tc!·:


'Fot' nan:; r,onths the Joimso!l


n·~·.c!' st~r-!-,!!d tl."~1>ct­

:it}& :a't':lutthc so-.callc::i lIc:.esirc for peace" ~nd t!'le u!lco!'1dit.io:1al rl{!~.:·~,iati,on :Pl~QPO'S!il. 'S.'i10'S(! .honi':!:.r-llf:e \:ords. ho;:e~e:,. 2r" l.n full cO!'1tradictio~l to t1le ·U.S •.Go-::.cr.n~.lent·l.s C!'inl-:·sJ. acts.. At th.f: v{:":;{ tin:; ~~cn the Pri::;idc:'l.!: ot t,h~ "Il_"t:!o.( ~t,.!:",s "'t1d .. ~s ~" ......".&,-.". ,,~ 8'·<0·· .. ··4-t,. ... •4";_ ............ ~.~~ t~e 5 GM· ........ 1'~AU......t..., ·•.. t· IJ _ .. u .... so. , ..... .......... ... vO_.J .... _• •. ., ,...,.111».... ... U•• t'xpa:;ds th(' ClSSl'i:ssive .:al' in Sotlth Vietn,ln a~l ~onti.!mes to c:·calatc the bO!:1')in"'s "-!>;ns" ·:·,.··~1 ... r~e'···~'" i!-",-l\in-~o" ..... 5 t~e V··""n~-",c·l. .;on ·CC"o ..." · ~"~_io. "'tV~ c.. .. ... .;. y .. lt+ .. ~. .:~"" .... ';';'\.-_~'" \·.;: . . "". ... -:...t.....~,::_::.:.::.::.::.L•n~o"'.:.:_,_~';..~~ Us ~0!'1dj,t5;~ t:!1_~-..£"ms t·h,d: it \:an~s us to Sl.:!'l'o:!-iel'. But th~ dcter;lination of ow· pNplc and the J:PJ.SV to N~stO:'Q thr, saeri:d n3tiol;~1 so·.. c!'ej~nt:.: and to lib~l'at.e thc .c~~ntl'Y is unsh"J:alll~. i:e are ready to flSht. to the en:i, ali..hcuch l:c l:i.ll h,wc to fir,ht fo':' 10 o!.' 20 ~'ears 0::' lO~3el' ~!"1d \!5.11 have to' face ' J.nnu::J~1'al11c cha~ lcnecs, .,nd l:e: l:i11 fisht untn· tb~ tC!'l'itOl'ics iZ1h.critcd fl'or:! oiU' anccsto:'s are J.ib~J'at:cd trC::l the U.S. aSG1'csSO't's t yoke. _~






a war sit1!atio!1 to!' 20







can recc",st;l'Uc{: th;!).r countl'Y. ind(:pc:dcnc~ and dCi:tocracy.

for pence so that

on the basis






people a:'Q caGer But PC:1CC tlUst be ac:tlc,v...ed


U.S. ir.:pC!!'iali5ts are 1:'Nadc:'s in South Vict:l;:O. Ij'he U.S. itl;)e:'.iCllists ha... e tl'ar:"l'led \:rtciel'toot the basic natiC'nal sc'Vc:'c1enty or Sottt;h Vidn:lf.l. ';i':'le:'ctv!'e thc eO:l~itions ror- a ~c·~mine P!:<lC-C in Sc·uth Viet.:la:l and, at the sa:.l~ t).T:!~, tor a sluGlc and co;,'rcct:. ~C\l utio:'} to the South Vietna!:l pl'"blC'::t e:l!1 o:ll.r .sc:


---------------------_. . ..



l--~·heJ~ncl.:.:tcr>.nLl'l..m;.L.t'~~:rl thfUl.:;;r..~~siyc \:~!:.J~t!~:h ~ie~E~E:~th(~!.:.~~. tr~.Q!~;-~~~_.!£.~r;p.£~~~!}~.... b':l~!.~__?r ~'!'Y.;j..;:. sat~21 it~s rro~!l...s(.)'~.h_ Vie!-.:·~~::\LJ!..!'"~:1 ~l:s­ r.H1:1~1f; all U.S.:....t!ilitary basc5, in Sou~h Vict:-.a::l.


2--Tht' J.J:l·:>l'ic.:nr. m~~t rcs?cct the (·hntio::;,.l) ri.5h~s oi' the So~tth Vieh:a~f.?3e "-.. ...

---_._-----------------_ ------_ _-_._-------------is, i:!.;ie.:)e;:~t:ncc. 'i'~:1o'·rac:l" PC4:C!!'" r~~.j n;}~ltr,~lit.j·. ~the S,nt~rt~11

PCOplC:i th;1t;

pr,.blc;,s of So"th Victn::·j;\ l;• .tst: be .solvc·d by the S,mth Vic:tn~m,:;~ PC-O?!c t!i::.-.!sclves ald \:1'::-..)\"- fl)I"c:!~n intcr\'cntio:1. RCi.1.'1it5.catio:l of Vic!;na::l r.ms!; b~ <!g.ti{:~'L.!!l b',' t.!l~ _E.?l?2c _~t both ZO!~CSy


i!t. ;;lldJl:;Y~~~_~~$"- \':oiC£!...flL<"'-'1;·_O.9.UUS:<tL~~~ tl~ i on




tL§..£ul h Vic!;:,:"!::••

Qucr.t.ion: Chai!';.•an. can you tell us t:H~ res\llts of the tact tha!. the :':\ct'icans have \lSCC: t10dcrn r.le~ns ot \!al' such as B-52 bO:lbcrs and (fell l:O!'.:!S indis~inct)? J.nS}I~": Reso:.'tin.:; to ba:-l.arOU5 J.•eans o! \:al' su:::h as :3-52 bO::l!:e!'s, toxic gas, an:! poisoaous ehc~icals. and to, ~ sc:orchcd-ct.rth !.o1iej" of kill all ~!"!d destroy ar.:! b\t:'n eyer- :,!.hini;, the U.S. ir,1pcl'ialists \:;mt to opprer.s O\t:' peo,l~ and fN'CC' us to 5 UJ"l'C:-•.jC~·. B~lt those l:leans of war.. c:m cmly e:1!l:.nce O\l!, eo~!patriotst

ir':.1ienatio!l at tile

2.C&!'~sso!~s,an:l fUl1th!:1'

stl"c::nz;thcn the!:"

detcr::;i:o.?t;.on to fiC:'1t bravely u!.tH final victor~', in defianc~ ot all dii';.'icultics. The usc of a str2te-Sic ail' [o't'ce (':£01' tactic?l t1tU'?osc:s) is a last reso..t in the ~:ar and pr::Nes the co~fusion of th(; aseresso:'si it will not. t,rin,;

the::. thc expected. N·:ail ts, as Jott can sec.




Har.oi V!:A Intcl"na l.:'on;ll S::l'v!.c.~ in E:.1glish 1710 m·lT 1 S~p 67 B , Har:.ci--Follo'<linS is th~ full te::.t of th~ poli .. ieal pr::>;:,ar.1 or the Sc'..;th Vietr.";:l :jatio~al Fror.::' ;!'c·:- I.,iba.:-ati(.·r:, ad''>r'!s;i oy an e:-~';!:'aol'Ji:",a:'!I CO:l:;:-css of the r t"al Co"·· .. ,."...... ~~ ", .. ....~-~ .. t ..~." ..,, ..- ~;~... '-r-"'a' -"b A···us"~ ,.... ,;t.... "!.:"I r,:',,, d~<:" __~.. '" .0.,,, ...... ,......... IIJ~I ",~ Ce ••• .. ...... .. .• -- pro~r~~ .u COIoh" w;:;s -- - .. "' F:'..) "'''' In.:.ted to Victnar.te:;~ and foreigr. r.,~ss:::i.en··at a nc'!S confe:-~nce hera today by lie;t1:rCr. Van T!cn. head of t:~e r~FLSV per!.!. ~ ~epr~sentation in liorti.l Vietl1.i!:.l:




,.' ·~o-a~ 4'.,.. L~b ~nto b"'~-_no 191':.0 ...): t',".e Sout~,_ ','_.............. ... \. ..... ~,... .,.-.,. ~iCiO .. t,.;.:, ...L F"'or:+ _ ..... .\";' .. ..__ ..~at· •"or:• c-c;r....''''y.. _.....0 with its lO-point PNt;:'<l::l air;ed at unitir:.s the e ..tir~· peo9!.e a:;ai:'l.st the U.S. ~l:lpe:'!al:!sts a~,;! the:'!' lc.cl:e:,'s. Sir.~e t;~en, the Fz-ont has c.c:liove.i 2 b!'Nl:i I.:!",ior. of t..~e ';al:'io''';'s S::ctiCllS of th.c p;)o?le, th~ politici.l parties. o:-g~:;1zatio::-:s # naticr.al1 ti~:: !'eli.:iottS cC:!lw-'::11ties J and p~t!'it)t::tc t'e!"sc·n.alities wi:h ~. v!~~; to Jointl:; ri~htine aZai:!5t U .. S .. I




salvatiO!!. It.has successfully cor.$c::'idat~:! its b2.se an~::t t:~e b!'cad oasses of the peuple; at the S<lr.le tiro;;. i t has aC;1ic;;ed joint a~ti,jn ... i~h oa~y political and ~'elisicus fo;oces ar.d :.:o~ (.'ve:- oiiny industrialists an:l traders, nar.y 0 fficial:: <t:.:i fU!1ctionaries of t:1.e rt:p;:et ad:'.::f:;is ';ra tiol::. and r.;a::j' officers ar.;i, I:l:;m of .t:1C puppet ari:11.

T:le Fro:.t has co~sta:.tly en.1o!fcd w;,:(..lehea:-ted er.t;v~~>a5er:l.;n*; ar.d assistan:e fror.! our' • cOr.ipa t.:-io ts in t:,e north ar.d abroad It has also e!'~joyed ever str.oni;'!:- appro\'~l an:! suppo~t 1'r;")[\ the peoples o! h~iShborir.S Co!!:Jocdi(', and Lo;.:;. fron t!4e p~t;?l~s of tile social~st. nathmalist, and ether coun-:!'ie~ in t::e \-lo:-1d.' incll.!di~b p:-c.~rassi·;~, people in the Ur.i ted Sta tes. 0

Under the leadcz-sh!p of the rU~LSV. ou;, people in the s01.l~h have gone fro::t vict, ..~· to victory. The prestige of t:le FI'(l.-~ has beer:. unceJsith,;l: ~nhanced at hooe a:-:c. abroad. The South Vietnar.. Natior.al Frvnt :'{~:- Liberati.)n has ',;oo:::e the sole gen:.l!:1e r'Jpre~entative



herOic South



Thesc great ~chi~vet:!.ents have proved that the line and polic:; of the front are correc.t, and that t~c strength 0'1' ou:- people!s u~ity and strusgle is i:wi::cible. At p:-esent. despite heav~ defeats, the,U.S. iop~~ialists are still unwilling to give up t'1eir agg:-essi ve desig!ls ag~ir.st Vietnat).. 'l'::ey a:-e s teppir.Z up the war, tra:::plir.g

upon t~e south~ 2n~ ~.~t~ns1f::inn t.hn """'~""':.::60!" "-~~ "~,,!""l ~n""":" .. ()~ ~~ .. ~ cO~lntr~~A. ~~~~ r.o"-strcus cri::1.as Clf the U.S. ir::!lerialists. hOU~tler. have onl:; se!'ved to deep;!l our pe:)ple:5 hatred and inc:'ease thei:- i:ldo.:u.table wi.!::'. Tile people or" South Viet::a::l , regardle::s of socia:' standir.z. and even ~ nu:l~er or persons in the p;,.p~et arr:.y a~d adninistration. have seen throuc;h' the tr~e featt:res of t!1e U.S. 'inperialists a~d t~ei:­ lackeys. hate then, and want to cont~ibute to the st~ussle azainst U.S. asgrcssion. fo~ national salvatiun. "

t~e ;:1~ttle of our enti:-e people united to:' the fight to wipe out ~~e enc~J a~d sava the ccunt~y been So strons as now. O~r people are -in a victorious, init:.iativc.· and ctl'ensive PoSiti"n. The U.S. inpe:a1alis';:: and the lackeys have oeen ir:creasinbly drive~ into paSSivity and enba~rassoent; they arc in an iopasse and are. sustaining defeats.

nc ..er before in our nation1s histo=,y" has


sou'I'n VIETJ:;,.r.•

. 5 Septe~bc:.· 1967

• ~t :~!:s :t::l~tU!·c.

':"n ~~ spirit o£ dc\'clopi!':t:; the ro!'~cr !J~£l'~t::t) ~:~(. f!FL3'j h':.~ ~:,:::·::~d ~ro~rai:l \-!:tll a Vi~~'l to fu:,,:'he~ bro~"':~nir;£ the bl(.;c cf C!·'::i"~t !".L-;i~:'la! un:'':!l. cn--!c·..tr~ci~ a~j stir.4ul~tin: the entire p!:oplc to rus!l tC!·~:t.·~rd. l"(;~Ql'l·~'l t:.: fi.:;:lt t2:1C .clctc~: :h~ U..5 . .:;~~"!~~.!iSO':~. and to i;uild an independent. d~r,"\;rati c. !Je':.ccful. o~r:.. :.~.:.s


n~ut !'o.l, ~n.d P.!'os'~C!'O"i:>






Entire People, FiCht the U.S. ACGressors. Save the Country,

l--D:.lri!'lL; I: ,000 years of ~heir history, the Viel:r.ar.ese people have united and fou.:h'; ar;ainst fore:'cn invasion to preserve their indepe~dence and frccdo::, E',er si!':.ce our cou!!~ry \.'as conqu~red by the F:'cnch colonialists. our people h~v~ !'OloSh~ unrer.:it";i:--r;ly 1:'Jr "hei:- liberation. In 191;5. our ·people freD north to south rose up, S!!cccssf:..ll.l c~:':'icd ou~ the Au[;ust revolution, seized political pot-zer 1:rcr.: :;he Jap~nese r:lilitarists and their l~ckeys. and founded the D~r.locrati~ Republic of V~etrzr.:. }:~;C~

thC' F!'c!'lch CCI!oniaHsts car.e


p~o;;l(~ he!'o1.cally .!'/me::t l'or r,early

to invade our coun;l'Y once a.:;ain. cur'e:;.tire

nine ye:c.:!'s, brou,sht our

sacr~d resis~<'llce ~o ttl£'

ere ... ,; Vlctol'Y of' Dien Bien Phu. s!:!<lshinS the atEressivc scher.:~s of ar.d ~,he intc:,ventiem.st policy of the U.S. inperialists.


French cO!0::ialists

'i'ile indepcndar..cc. ~cvel'\eil:n~::. unity I and territorial intcc~i~Y ci' Vietnan were fO:'T:!;;.lly reco£llized by the 1951• Geneva ccnfcr;;n::e. Sir.ce ttlen. OUr' co!::p:L~iots i~ Sou:;h Viet~ar.1 to£cther ...;ith the people all CVt~r the coun~:·y. sh::>uld have been 1i vi.n~ in peace end buildin!:' a free .. nd happy l:!.fe. Hc~. . ever, the U.S. ir.;pcl':'alists b,"/e sabota.;:cd t~e Geneva. acrcer.C!17s. ousted the French colonia!is~s, se~ up in South Vi~~:r.a::: an extrcr.:el~' Cl~UC!· puppet rc[:ir.~c. and t!"ied to tu!"n the sO'.lthern part Ol~ Victn::.r.: in~.o a n~ocolony and a 1:l~li';al'y. base in a~ att.::::p!; ';0 prolo!1~ the partlti0r. of our count!'y, conquer the whole of Victna:=l. and ir.:posc their dcnina;ion throui:hou~' Indochina and Southc~st Asia.

The U, S. ir.:pcrialists have shrun:: fror.l no cruel r.:c:;hod to car:':; cut t:;('i1' da!,~: d~sicn, D2fc •• ted in theil' special W;;11', they have switched to a local .:ar, usinr. eVe!' half a oillion U.S. and satcll.ite t:'oops. alone with n;~re than h31f 3 r.:illion puppet soldiers, fer a.::.:::ressicn a~3:illst South VletnaI:l. At the sar.lC t:.me. the:.: have und.·~!'t"'ken a \:~r (iest!'uc·tion 3cail1st the northern part of: cur cou:.try They l~ave also s:epped up ~heir special .:0.1' in ~os and carried out continu:ll ;>rovocation:. air.:cd at wreckinc the independence and ncut.:'ality of: Cur.bodia.


T:1e U. S. ir.:~C"!'ialists are daily causin5 untold s'.lfferinGs and r.:::n.::,ni!:.:; to our car.1p:!tr:'ots thrcu.:hCJu~· the country'! The~" have !'eso~tcd to all l~:nds or r.odcrn war r.:~ans

a!':d ~!eapo.!':s. i~~cludir.::; zt:.ratct;ic aircraft, napaln bcr.;bs. to;:ic cher.::cals. and poison [Zll:; to i..!l!:S<lc!'e eu!' fellow countryr.:2n. T!~ey hav~ launched rcpca:ed cpe!'C!tions, ar:ain und aca:.n c;.!r:epinc r.:all~· areas. carl'~'inc cut the k~ll all, bU;'n all, d.:stroy aU poli~y to raze \'i113':;CS and l:ar.:lets to the cround. They have herded the pc·pul";;ion, z;ra:::ocd la~d, a:.d set up a nonanls land and fascist-type.concen:;ra!;ion c:J.nps dubbed :;trateCic har.:lctc, prcsperity zones. resettler.:·:mt a!'eas, and so on. In the nor~h, the:r have ~/ar~tc:-Ll:: bor.:bcd and strafed streets, villa&es. industrial ccn:ers, and h~Llv:'ly p~pul .. tcd ~r!:a:;. They h;:.ve even struck at dikes. darns, schools, hcspitals, chUrches, .:tld pa~odas. O;;vicu:;ly the U. S. ir.1pcriali,:;ts are the r.ost ruthless aCl;Nssors in hi stcn'y. the of the 19511 OcneV<l aErec::tcnts, the sa!::o-;;eurs cf the peace Cl:ld secv.rit.:r of th!: P~Q"'!(!:; in I~dochir..a, S~uthoast Asi-a. a~d the \-lorld--thc cnel::Y nu~bcr one of: cur pC:vr;l(! c:.:nd of- l::~u~:ind, :;~!,c;.:;"ur:;


S Ot:Ti! '11 ETf!f.l:

O";'C:~ the.p~!rt :fCi-!

~'C!t .t;~Cj· r~vc

l.::e:-ican ar..:!

:leal's. '!.he U.S



t:l:ceasinsly cla::ior 7d abo:.lt pea{:e pcocpl.e.


c~):"'.ti::!,;al1:r esc21~te~






<ittc:::pt to fOCll t;;c


~'1~c ::=:icon pt:ppet adr.linist1'ation has ~o:id out So:.;th Viek.ar.: to tho:: U.S. i:::pe::'i<llist:::. It ha~ opp;'cszed .::nd e:-:ploi. ted o~r s01.:th~r;:: ,~o:::patl"iots in.:!n e:.:t!'e:::c:l:i :'l;tillcss ~:~']. It h~s fo::cec. Snuth Vietna:;;. YO;Jth ir:to the 'a:,:n~' to serve the t:r.ited sttltc~ in ::-.ass>:.crir.c.; 0,:::' fcllo~; co~r.trYr.len. Ir. a dem'3&ogic bic. it has also c':;;;gec the :""t'ce of ~:o:':t.ine; ot:t a co~stitution and holdinz electicr~. It is only a clique of traitors. an in!;tru;;;ent for' the U.S. ir.:perialists to enslave the SO'.lth viet.~:l:::ese people, pr?lo~& the' partition of our co ... ntry anq further the U.S. liar "f agr;ressiol1. ~'

2--?hc U,S. au:;r~~so!'s a;;.d thei~ lacl:eys thiz~r they can ir:ti:::ida tc 0:;:- people b~t tte' use of fo:'ce ar..d Ilcceive them by means of tri<.~::s. E-..:t they a::'e S:'!)ssly mis ta?en. O~::' people def~n:itely ~:ill never submit to force, !';eve::, let the~:selve~ be deceived! B:'i::Gir''':; int.o play our r.<l tio:: I s tradition of t:r:daunted::ess. 0:;:> 31 mill io:: c o;.'pa t~'iots 1'1'0;;: th~ sOt:th to the north have resolt:.tel~Y stooj up ar.:l u:.i ted as one l'l:l.n to tiGht aC<:ir.s t the t: .S. agSl'essors and save the CQl:ntry. 0:, the frontline·of the 1'atherland: ou:-- sout:1crn !'c1:iO:1 C01,.;r:tl':;..,cn h,tl,'e over the ~ast yC::-!!'S ~ho'..m r..<lrvclcJ;s herois;.:, Irl'espectlv(! Qf ,"~e, se;" political tcr:.::enc'ies. rcliGio~s beliefs. o!:a r.o r.;:J.tter .:he~!l~l':th'<!y live in tl:e :;,l::iil:S 0:' ir. :::o.:.l:tair. ul'e:\~. our people of all stra l~ ~nd <.:11 n~tion<l).ities !~"ve !"<;::;ohltely rl)..~!:ht. sno·.:!ce:- to shc\llci~!" to l1!:lera te the ~ou t11, dcfer.d t:-,(" ::(l~' th, and pl")cecd t'Y.i:lrd the reul:ificat.ion of the ~ a t:1c!'land,


!:::l:CC 19~9-19GO, QUI'

co;.:pntricts in the Sn-.:th V:.C:!tn,:;;:·.c::;e co·.ll:k~·:;ic.e h.we carried'

C:.lt. Sl.~ccp.r.~.!vC:J fl,.!t;J t.::.~.?OU~ t:pri~inf;s, dest,t"()!-~ed i.l SC!"i,C's \)f" co::CC::t!'2t:,)~ ca.:.:pz p!'.::::perit:; zo::C!; of th~ i::1p~ri::il i:, t" 2.r.':' tilt' p;;ppt o.dt'ini~ t:'a tio!: ~nti



libera ted v.Jst rt:ral 2.l'eas. Ou~' al':1ed fo:'ccs and pe(.'plo! thon ::'t:sheu :-Cl;-t~;:,<rc, des -:!")~'ed thous:::.r:ds of strateGic h3l:'.lets. libe~at;ee ttillions Q1.' pco~le. ar.d defeated the U.S. s't'ccia1 \Jar., S:ncc 1965> althOUGh the U.S, a&gressors h;:,ve b!'()...~ht in hur.c!:'ecs of tho:.::;a:::!s of U. S. e;~pcdi tl o:-,ary troops for d il'ect <issress io!":. c:.:;~ins t SO:lth Victr:ar.:, 0,::' ar;::cd 1'orccs ~nd pc:oplc ho.ve repea tedly ,:0:-. bib v ic tor:l cs, st::~shcd t.:o s co ces s1." e U.S. dry-se~scn ~ tra teGic counteroffensives. defeated eve:- ::. ;;:i11 ion ener.:J troops='- 1;.S. , puppet, and satellite. Thc 1 iterated are~s have continuo\:sly expa:1d<.>d anc no:: r.:ol:e t:t) fo~r-f~tths of t::c South Vietr,c-:;} te::-::-itory \lith t't-l0-thil'ds of its population. In .thC'::;e Hbc!'ated ":'e::::::. U n:3. tional '~r.d dCl'locratic peuer i;: ta:~ing. zhape a,;d a ne,'l life is bloss o!air.[;. In acldi ticn to big mili tar] victories. \ole h:lVe al~o :'e"c:-ded i:::p.)Z't"or.t s'..:ccesses in the political, econo:Jic, cultural. and diplor.:atic fields. I:-. tho belov~d northern pa~t of the fatherlar.d, our 17 r.:illicn cO::lp:;triots <1re he!'oic:;.ll~ de1'c atir-e t.he t.S. iT.l'perialist's uar of c1estructior.. r.:aint::i;.~nc :lr.C lloc:;ti:,S pro.:h:.:tic!;. ar.d ~;holchcnricdly encour~ging and helpinS the cause c~ li:'c!'atin[; the sOt:th, t!lt.:s f\;lfining'the obliG<ltio:ls of tbe creat rear. to.,:a:-d the cre:;t front. Ir. the Tt!orld, the people!: of the soc:! :..i.st. ll.otlor.al1zt, and other cour.tries, includir.{; the p!'oerescive people in the tinited S ta te:;, arc stern:!:,' ccr.der.:ninS tbe U.S. i~pe!'·iall:::t' S U<lr of ~i:[;rcssion, and :!rc &1V1n;:: their apprcif~l. !:upport, <:l:d a5sis t=:nce to our pccple l :; stri.iCCle :lgainst U.S. 2imrcssion a:ld for nn.tio;1al :;alvatio:l.


5 September 1967



.Facts have clearly shm-m. that the more the UoS. imperialists obdurately intensii'y and expa.l1d their 1\'ar of aggression against our country, the more they sustain . 'bitter 'defeats and are driven into isolation; on the other hand, our people win greater victories and get more friends. 3--The most dangerous enemies of our people at present are the U.So imperialist aggressors and their lackeys--the traitorous puppet administration. The tasks and objectives of the South Vietna~ese national salvation are nm-7 as follows: To unite defeat the U.S. imperialist's war ,of aggression, administration, establish a broad national union and build an independent, peacefuJ,., neutral, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the

people i~ the struggle for the entire people,' resolutely overthrow their lackey puppet and democratic a~~inistration prosperous South Vietnam, and fatherland.

The fOl'ce that guarantees the fulfill.l'!lent {)f the above task of fighting . against U.S. aggression and saving the country is our great national union. The NFLSV constantly stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religions comr.-.unities, all p~triotic personalities, all individuals, and all patriotic and progressive forces, irrespective of political'tendencies, in order to struggle together against: the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, 'ITest back our sacred national rights, and build up the country. The NFLSV is prepared to invite an~ "lelcome all patriotic forces and individuals who oppose the U.S. aggressors to join its ranks, and to shoulder together the' COlmnon duties. It proposes that any force which, for one reason or another, does _not adhere to its ranks, ta}:e joint action against the common enemy--thc U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. The UFLSV pledges itself to strive, shoulder to shoulder ,rith the Vietnam fatherland front, to fulfill gloriously the con~on task of fighting against U.S. aggression to liberate the south, aefend the north, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. vlliile fighting for their sacred national rights, the people of South Vietnam actively acconplish their internationalist duty. Their resist~~ce war against U.S. aggression is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle ~f the people all over the "I-lorld. TheNFLSV ll.l1.dertakes to stand ,rithin the united bloc of the Indochinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys,路 to defend to fight against-the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to 4efend the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, a~d Laos. The NFLSV pledges to take an active 'part in the common struggle of the world's people against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism, for peace, national.independence, democracy; and social progress. 225

, 5 September 1967 4--The cruel U.S. aggressors are trampling upon our:homel-mido' 'lIe., tbe lJeople o~ South Vietn~, must stand up to make revolution. and'i'lage .:a ~]iJ.E'1iS :w..er l'1ith a ,view to annihilating them, driving them out of our bor.~,:ana 'Ylr.i:rli:ng baek national independence a~d sovereignty. Having experienced over 20 years of war, our southern 'c~triots ~agerlywant to live in peace and rebuild our "jar-devastated country.. J3u.t -the U",S.. iIkJ)erialists . have trampled underfoot this legitimate aspiration. That:'is 'why our people have to fight against them ,to win peace i~ independence. Nothing 'ism.ore precious than independence and freedom. Only when real independence is secured can we have genuine peace!


SOUTiI 'lI5':lit.I·l

d~tC:'iJ!.O'lcd ~~



r::'C:.t and :0 defeat the U.S. a&&::-c::


and t:lci:' la<;!:cys.

So !~:1C

::0.: end t:leir U:l:- of .:.:.:..:;:ac!}sion" !;ithdi~~~1 all U.S. :ln1 ~~tolli~e ~!.'oops r'-'O::1 ou:' COU:ltl~Y ~ and let. the SO~l:!: Vietr,S!.lc:;C pc:,pl~ sc~tlc ~hcn~e''''''~ 41'" .. ..,...viliO_ "''''r."' " ... ,.- r.~"!)l~ w _ v ."" 1 atfai ........... .. ,;;)..,.1. S... •· ..... V~;t"'!'>.., lIi···l0 .... "0 ...... ··-0 ~n .. "'-r" ..... :J .....,n, 1l!1l rcsol:.ttoly tiC!'lt on 1,mt:'l to~al vietol,:!. ~;le S::>\tth Vietr.~u~se p~:>ple 1s the '-:'~


iC'i,~:.'i.:11iz::; d~




lii)cr3 tio:l uar is a lon.;:; o~



11atd one,



.. _ _ :"

it is su:-e to

""~ .... ....



poople 1'oly J:1<linlJ :m tIlei:- Oi·1n torces; at thn sm:le ti!lc assi~tancc of the tJorld l s peoples.


d~fea'; ';}~~

U.S. aSGNS:;O:':O and


lacl.cys, our



in Vi¢tOl'=!. tile~'


stri'/c to uin


s:'':!lpa'::h;:, Z1JpPOZ't, <lnd


.- _ .... ~

do not ::;pal'c


sZlcrit... t:c. Tl':.c;:r cmthu:;.::.astlcall:r contl'i~tlte r.lnflp~ucr. r.a;;crial :'eso~l'CE.'S I and ';alent to tha nati;mal liccrati~\n Wil:" in the spirit of doins CiTc.':;.thi:lt:; f(\l' viet»:.'j·, 'i.'he iiPLSV unde::-takes to d;;vclop the Liberation A:'l:'Icd Fo:-ces co•.lp:'ls il~t; .the Ilain fOl'CO u ..~::!;s. t:1e .:i.'cGional tr..... :>ps .. and-:he oiHtja a:1d &t.:e::-rilla uni:Os, v.it!~ t~a am ot: pron:)!;in~ p.:oplc'r, ua;', eon1:)!nill[; &l~e:,rilla lIitl-: rec\da::- ua .... i'al·c, ~/i~i:'!l; ot.:l; a::; t1ar.~r livo O:;C:1Y fOl'N~S cs po:.sibl CJ crushin::; the encilY'::; \sill ~o:- aCGre~:;ionJ and \linnin~ ~hl~ f:,1e! ViC:Ol"~;. r~"'''nt...~t~dCl'~a::e":Lt~ !mild and devel:)}.' tht' p;)l1 t'lzal forces or, the ::la:;::;:;5•• P:-;;:l.)t(! :::11: nov~;:i~~l:: of' pC':!i:ica.l' st::-uCE1~. and ('~m:lir.e a~'::l~d st!'I;:;:;le >li::::1 ;,ol1tical :.-;tr1.4~Gl~ u!"1d tJGi::'atior. an:)tlS (!ne;:l~1 troo,s~ ~hl1S rO:'r.l:.~e- th~·c~ cC:l\."e:.~cir.[; ;r~(--5s t"



~ha .!"l~!r.l;.

1:;1dc:'~:H:C::; ';0 cnc:'I\;:'acc all s~r::\ta 01' t!1c po!i~lrttion in t!':.: ~otms and l'ural :;till u"dc~ 0:10:::". ~o:lt:!'ol ·c!') unitt: ail\! s~ru~le in evcl"':"" po:,sl!:Jl·,:- l"O~:.~ ';.~1 b~c~d: tIle srlp '"}!' th~ tt. S •. n~c:"'c::;!lor~ ~nd t:l~::':''' lael;cys; C~3t r":t the Phl.!!JrlC (=~=t:.:t!'a~iJ!'l3) c. L~d 5 -';::-u t.(:,;.t~ h;:nl~-:~, dC;:'3:1~~ dCt1o'!r~:~ i.e free!'!o::J=>.. r..z:.:· i ~~a 1 s ovel"'f~ i;;nt::: a :'d a iJe~ tcr lit1l~. Op!~l'se ~:1;J p::~~z3~:'l!Gin; of troops 3.~d r"rcibl~ !ajol'" d~art.; ::;;!....t:,;.,;lt' a;3inl:. ccs 1,,'-1 ::':J[, .md a;1p!'~vcd c1.:lt ur,', and oa;:,,'!ll .t;):,v<l::,d. tozc:;her vi til the ~::.tj r'.:' p!!cpla J<.

'1':1C tJFLSV ~:·~a$




cnc:l~.. l

s ~l~l£


~ciz~ p~li~iea!


F:"'O:lt 1.:nd~:'ta!ccs to Cr.COU1"a[;C all :;trata or pc~:>l~ in ~h.e l:!)i:'!."~t,:(!i ~l:"'~~t; 'to 11!1~.tC cl~sel:r t.o bu.ild :h~ people l :; :'.:lr-tl4h1n.g;.~~~r't.3:;st.~· ..!. tl"'


t!·J~ :.~··!.1C !::.1.:lC#


~C:!:C·/c S~;\!!' ~)~~·stC!l

a local

~tio!la.l de=:1~1.!ratic ~d;Jinis~~ation,

~:) :;~=-t\·~~ ~!-.. ~:=' ilr~~C~t!

;':'l:":Z.uec ~;!d t;Sh~ ~~it"::;t U. S~ aCG:-~5;ji:>{':. J.~d \li~:':. Cl to~d :;c~':,lc::i~nt or the acraria:~ q::c!l~io:.:;

ro~ ~~

:~ bti~2c ~asc l2~eas~




t~e f]~'~ ~C~:l=!'"ly

:.;!.~~: C';·~~l;~!-:~

::':. ·.:u:... t~,;

'Ji- t:l~ l!:',,'~atcc o~c~:;" to ros!:c~ t!~(\ 'pe~plc'~ to;:-c:!!: F:·~h ~ ~'i~:: ;~. ~ ..:;:tp:!. !.~: to::- t!!C ~:'o"'"!~ 1 i n~ and ca~"=,::-i!~ .t!'le :"'es!~ ~Z1ncc u.1:" ~hi"OU:;~l t.} .





T::~ pcop l~

a~ Ind~pc:ld~:1t



.. Dcr.:jc~~::,'~ic


Pca.c~r-ul ..



P:'o~P~:'''Ci.:S ~JU.~~l





;Jf Vic:;nam a::'e to defeat t:1C U. S. a,cSl'o:;::;.):'z c:'cl ::'acl:c:rs. 3.'1C t:> <:4e:.. oto theil' c!C:!t and l~in to build 3. poEticc:.l ::;:r::tca ':.;l;~ ~,~a::;~.tcc" tho :'nacp~t:u~ncc ~nd ::()",c::-ci&n::," of the :"..&tio!'l ar:.t!. tha ;:"ccd~::l ~n~ tlc:.ppi·l~::;Z ..;,i' ;:!C pC:J!Jlc; ;:,. !lcal the uoune::of'ua:', to liquidate tilL' :iocial evils left over b:,- ~:lt! U.S. p::rJpet rCC:;lC. to :-e:';Ol'C co.-al lire <lnd build an :!.ndcpcnd(m':.. d\!::10>'::-il':.ic. pc~,:-cl\;'l, r.cut:"-.:. 1 und Pl~O:;,JC~ou: S::;u~h Victnar:1.

'1':. :lc;lic'''c th-::::c objective:;. the: lJFLSV 1a]:o dOll:l the followinG conc:..'ctc policies: -~-- ...






.., .1--'1'0 ~chi~ve a broad :md pro,eressivc Get:locratic :-egi.!:!e:. '.To'alJ6l.i::h .thcdisl;u!..So.d cl)lmrl.2l. regime esta.bl1shed by the t.S. icper1a]ists !.n S:):;.t.~ Victro::l. ,to :ov.erthr"oH -:the ptUJPet<:!Cl:;l.nistrntion. hirelin& of the t:r.i ted st:l t:3:;. r.ot to rcco[;ni.::::e the p'U?pet national :lsse::101y r5.GGE'd 'Up by the O.S. it>perj.tllists arld their l~c::£:ys ,to abol:'sh thp. CO:'lstitution and. &11 2!ltinational ,md ~nti-de:.:oer:lttc laus enacted by the U.S. itlperialists a~ld ttle pl.1ppet Cldtdnistration.

To hold free ter..er·al elcctior.s. t., elect the national asser.bly in ~ really 'e:.locrati~ \:ay in accordance \lith the pl"ineip~e of uni:vel~sal. equal, di'rect suffraGe and zccre~ ballot. Tnis )~aUonal assenbly ';~nl be the 5~ate bo;1y uith -"" the hichest <H:thQrity;' - .....- . . - - - - - - . " ... _..q: in ~~'::th ¥i.)tnap. It ~:ill ~;or~,- out a de:::Clcrat1c constitution ~lhieh i'...lly eJ:lbod!es the !:lo:;!t l''Unda::enial 6l:d !:lost eaeF.:r aspirati'.Ins of; all s~cia.l str<lta ir. Sou~h Vit:tr,,~r. and £;U:1rOlr:.tea thE! esto'!Jli.s!1:::ept of :! broad. prob~essi'./e, cew~cratic ::tate str,uct:'U!'~: To £;uara.ntec the i:-':''>;1.::11 ty of the deputies to "';he n:.t1onal Qsset::blY. T:> ~ct. up :l r.o.tior2.l '.1nir.m c.emocratic &o.erJl:::~nt including t:1E:: r.:ost reprc=sentative pet·zor.s a:::on.:;thp v;lr:~ous social strata, n<:ti,o~~lities. rel~io...:; co::.::n,mities. patriotic ~nd dei:ltlcr::.;.:·~e p:lrties, p~tril)tle perso~lities. and forces uhich have cont!'ibutcd to the ca'Us~ .)f national liberation. 70 p!'oclai::l <lr.d cr.forcG b!'o:td cCr.1ocratic freQdor.lS--frcedon. of speech. freedo::: of the press ::r,d pl.:i:>lication. trce<!or. of asser.ti.:·l:;. t.rade unio:~ f:oecdol:1. t!'eedo::l v! &sso:iation, 'frceao::: to forn pol:itical parties, rreedo:.l of cr~ed, freed or.:. to CC;.lOl:strate. . '1'0 Gu~ra~tee to ~ll citizcr~ ir.viol~bility of th~ h~~ar. person, rreedo~ of ~esi~ence :md lcC:Gi~. ~ecrecy of cQ::.-respondcnce, freeclo... of :::ovencnt. frecao::: to uor!: .:r.d rest, , r.nd l.hc ~~i6ht, to ~ tudy. 'i'o


equality betueen r.mn



and eql.£lity


the vario.:s natior.alities.

To set free ~1l persons detained by. the U.S. ir.1perialists .. rod the puppet :::dz::lnistrati,op on account ot their patriotic cctivitics. T~ C:iz~olve the 'concentration

and their

ca:::ps :et ~p in 211 forns by the U.S. imperialists


I,ll these people \:ho have had to see:; asyl\~. abroad becriuse of the U.S. and puppet reei~e. have the !'igh.t to return to the country to sc:'Ve the tatherlZind. To =everely punish the diehard cruel agents of the U.S. imperialists. 2--To lnald un ir.d~pendent nnd ::;elf-suppo!'tinc econony. to ::'m~roV'c the oeople's livi::e ccr.e.itio::::. To abolish the policy of economic enslavcllent and nonopoly of the U.S. i:r.p(;rialists. To co!".fiscate the property of the ·U.S. inporialisi.s and their c!ieMrd cruel c:l£c:.ts and turn it into s ta te proparty. To build all ir.depe~ent "rod ::;c::'f-::'Uppcrtiq; cconony. To rapidly heal the \-/o1.lr.d::; of l;ar. to res to:'c and ;;:evelop ./ the ocono::;.] ::0 as to t.lU~~e the people ri'ch ar.d the country po:rcrful. To ~ll'otect thc r!e;ht to cr.:ncr:~ip of the !.:eans of production and other property of the citizens uncleI' the l:l~:s of the state. '':0 rc:::to:,~ ~nd

develop ogricultuI':ll production. fish rearing, c:lr.d ,.:r ores try.


To improve for:ainc, nn1r.:al ht.:sb,u:dry.

~ne Si;.l<;C 10:111 cncourac;e the peasants to l.L.'ll:c a!1d h~lr- on!: ~ncthc;r In bCQstlr:£

pr"du;!'CiO:l. gran~ the~ Ipans a.t '10* inter.es't for th~ p.lrc!".a~(: o~ bu!'Talces. o;<-:n, .far;:1i.:1.& implements. agrIcultural zr.acllines. seeds, fer!.ll jzers, etc, help tIle:: ce'/elcp . ..irr..ication \:~.ks. and appl.y advanced tcch.'liqtlCs in aer!cul"ure. To suarantee outlets ~eor .a.Er.ictiltural. 'prod-ucts •.

To restore and develop industry. small ind\:stries and handicrafts. To buarantee to the l-!orkers and employees the right take pal't L'l the ma!'lage::e!:.t of ente:-pr:ises.


~he state

wi1.1 encourase the cap~talists in industry and trade to help de.elop i~dustry,

small industries a!'ld nand1.crafts. To enforce ;.'eedo::1 ~f enterprise to the be!let'!t of nation-building and the people 15 welfare; to apply a custo:::s policy designed to;;· encourage and protec·.:home-produet!on. To restore and develop cO:::::lu:lications and t!'ar.sport. To encourage and step up economic exchanses bet.:een tO~!iS <!!1d country, llet:r:ee:'l the plains and the mountain areas. To give due conSideration to the inte::,C"sts of the small traders and pe·t t!/· shop:':eepers. To set up a ~tate baru~. To build' an independe:lt currency. To apply a fair and rationalta:r. policy. The s~ate ~111 adopt a poli.cY of Grantinc; loans at low interest to encourage p!'oductlon. a:'lc. \o:il1 prohlb.it usu:,y. To develop econol:l1c relations with th(' north;, the :;\';0 zones \-:1Jl help ea~h other so that VIetnam's econo~y.rnay prosper rapidly. J.n accol'dance with 'vne front's policy of neutrality and on the prInciple of equality. tlutual benefit and respect for the indep~:ld"mce gnd sO'/el'clgnty of the Victnanese nation, trild~ cith all co~t;!'ies w111 bf. eXpilr.d,=d, ani t:co!'l~mic a:1d tedmical asslstance frot.l 'l'orei~!\ COu."1tl'ie:;·~1111 _be. 3!ccepted:-!,.~&ardlcss . of political and social :;y::;te:1s.

3--'j'o cn'l.ct. the land pol~c:l. ~o ca!'!'y Otlt:tr.~! s10S<1'1 "La!1d ~o ~flC Tiller." 'b .::o!1f::'~­ c~t:e th·;- la.1QS of the U. S~ itiper1alists ~nd .tne c!i~n~rd crt:cl lar.dlot'ds--!'i'l-:li!' ladwJ~ To al~c·t t!!OS~ lands ~o la~dJess 0: lan~l-poo!' p:-:Clsa:-t..s . • To co:u'h'r.t and PNtc~t. the o,:nersl .. lp of t·he lands allotted t.o peasant.s by the :-e\'o: •• tion. The state will ne~otiate the purchase of'l3~d fro~ landlo!'as whc possess la~d \.:p~ard of' a certain amount,: varying ~1th the situation i:: e~ch locality, It \lill aJ.!.ot tr.ese lands ~o la:1dless or land-pocr peasants .. The !".~cipie~ts uill receive the lands' . free ot' charr,;eo and will ::.ot be bound by ~ny·condit:!.on k~atsoo;ver. In areas t.:hel'c tho required !;ond:!.tions for land ref'orntdo ne':: ;ret. oot ... -1n. land-rent reduc~1on .:ill be car,ried out.

To entrust the lands bclonginS to abse::tei: landlordst;:· peas.1:lts for cultivatk·· ~n::l enJoy::tent of the produce. Adequate steps will be taken on this subjec~ at a lat.·; st3~e in consldc!'ation of the political att_,-ude of ~ach la:ldlord. To allc.<: land1:;"" . t:> ofter lal:d to the Liberation Peasants Assoc1at:lo::; tl:~ state will allot these la:}(.. ;;0 landless or land-poer peasants. To encourags t~p ~.-,,-~ ~~ ·.,~ ....:t .. 'i.;:q ~rons or rrui'C-trec plantations to keep their farms :oin.;. To r.cspect. the le:itir.mte ri[;:lt to ownership of1 and b:- the c!1urches, '.')agodas. end n-lly sees of religious sects. To carrY'" .• ' out a fair and r~tlonal redistribution of comm~~al lands, To guarantee the legitl::t3te rieht to o1o:ncrship of' reclaimed lands to those 1o:ho re~la~ them. Those compatriots who have been forced into strategic hamlets, or concentration ca::tps in any other form, will be free retu:'n to the1l' for::ter vill~Ges.



or toO c!1.\nz;e ab')c,;;s a~,d t-:r.o !;l!)h ·~o i1~ 0:: livillt. t.r.l'=:'e, 1,illl?:lJC:-; rlfcognitlon of their "~:l1~r$l;.:'p of t.hc- l-::nds ~nd ptt,e!" P!'CPt>!'"Y~ilic:l'h~"e z-esul .. ec! from 'their la~o!', a:~d ..:1:'1 be hli:lp(,c;. tc co:-~t.in~~ '~f1!':!:':--i.i ::t:eir 111!ir.~ i:l t!1e sa::..:; place; 'those "M ~:!si':. Co r:,!T;I-lrn to r·heir :l&ti'Je pll:,ci;s ... i.ll 21sl:' l'eceive help. l-:;.e

hav~ bi~#:'l: c(,;np~lleo. ~o e~'acuate


build a naticnal Qp.::tocra1:l.c ClJlt~e and· education, :0 de."elc~ Sci~:1ce a!1C ~('ch::ol?g:l, t.o promo';."! l'ubliC heal {·i-I. '::0 fisht .against the A:::erican-t:rp~ e:,slavi!1(; and dep:-av.;·;l_ CU!~u.:·c and cduc<at.l.cn n<.>.! aaversely at'fec:;il'.g our people IS f1n~. lcne;·s:.and!r.g c:til~i.:.:'(il trCltj!r.!O!!s. '10 pv:1J.d a r:ar.:!.onal democratic cult;lJre and educat10:1, >;0 de':cloc sci(~~~E: a!'u tech~l;):og;r ir. sr:rd.c~ of' natlo1~al constru~t;io!l and defe::sl;!, '1'0 eJu:::.i~e l;h", ;,ec:;l~: . i~: tt:c " !c:~a::lC's!:? :1!i-C ion IS trad!..t.1on oj' s~ri..'sgle against foreign in-:as.!o;1 a:.d its ~wl'oic lllstOl'Y'. 1'0 pr...~se:,ve a!"ld. develop the firl.e oultur~ ond sood custt'lr,$_ ar.d r.a::li1:s . 01' our na'tion-. TL' raise the people's cllltU!'al sta~loaL'ds: to liquldacp 1l1iter2cy. to pro~ote cO:'1plcr.el!'C2:-Y education, 1:0 op!m. n~~;.: ge!'ler<ll t:duc;. '; ion schools, t~l£her 1.,a:onii'Z ~"t.ablisr.ncnts. and vocationa! schools. 1'0 !la~e an all.ou: effo!'t to l;l'aln a:1U fost<;Z' <l cont.i.ng"nt o~ sclcntH'!c uorkers, te~hniciaas, ~mc. s~1l1ed ~orkers. 'l'v tlSC ::he V:.ei;:!a::;!:!:;e la:-ii;l.l.:li;e a3 th~ te3"h1ns J:led!",,:: in h1giu>r leu~!1ins ~sta!)llsh:;;.~n~$. '1'0 reduce schoof f't!E!S 1'01' pupils and studen l,:;. To c~e::<pt poor pupil:; ~nd S" 1.:dent.s t'!"om school fees, or &ran~ them scho'..a·rships. ~o rcfor.l!l the systC'm of' exa:ainat.!.Olis.


'The S:;clte .:ill r;iye !:"el'Y possitle tu:lp t·o t.hose youth and. cilildren ':l1o ~i&Ve !'~:-,de!'ea servi~p.~ t.o ~he i'itiht at;cn..."ls ,. U. S. aggres:: 10:1 ar.d fOI' nat lO~l:1} sah'a~ hm. t.o ~tle eh.il'll'el1 born in:.o 'tnt- l'a::t:.l it'S t-:ho have z'endc:'ec se;,viees to tru~' re'H.htt ten. at:,j' te. other oilt.s~andln3 youl.:J'lS so i'S to 'enable tltfo::\ 'Co stud~ anti d;;ovc1.op tl\t'il" -capa i _'::,! Hies. Every ::it:'ze!! is fl'ce to caz-ry out, sc1tmt!fic ana t.~cil:;.olc6lcal research. to ":'r:d~tl.::;t..! :i.!1 ll<:cl'ary cl:-ld art~S~.ic cr~ation. and to p~:,~iclpate h oeMr cult,ural act!"l.tles .. ~o en~ou!'<il;e the intel:cctuals \:riteps. a:ot,1sts. anti scie:n:ist5 and to :if1~t,)rd thp.::I. the requ!.rod conditions for- rcsE'arch work, -crea~ioi1> and invent:i.or. in the seI'vice 01' the fath':I'la:1d a:l:i the plwple. . To afford opporl:unlt ies to tnCls~ cult~\ral war-ke!':;. ~n'iter~ and art.ists 1.1ho have bee:\ persec1..lt~d by the U, S. imper::.al ists and th')i;- laciCt~ys for th<::ir :p.r'~rlotic ect.i "lties. '1'0 develop heal;;h service and tne :r..ovc::tent for- hYGi~ne a:.d p~cph:rla~ls. To atl:end to the peopl~fs healti1. '110 cCllt!'ol epidemics.. ~:) do a\.;ay ~it.h da.!l.:ero~<s di:.oast:s left ove:- by tile II. S. and puppet regi:;;~. To '~!!'1elop t:he t:l(.>-.re~en.. fot' !l!!;{~icai i.l'aii'}!nS and sports. To ti.evclop cultural !'dat:lo:-:s ;.:jt,n the nOl'l;!:; cnr; !a,o 20',0:; .:il1 r;t!lp each ot:h~!' t» 1'1:1 1st: ttlP. ocoul~ '::> educst io:\<.1 ie ....el a:-:ti i;!'!c (dc'Itllopr.lc!l:') ot'.qual::.fieci people . . '1'0 pro::lott! cu~t~l'ai l'elaiio:'lS \-l3th 'rOrei&!l eountt'ies on the bt4l.>i.s of equality and t:!.1..tual benefit. .

5--?o gua:,anhee the rights a!!d ca:::cr to t.he iivelihood of .·iol'li:ct's. 'la!)orer$. and c::'vil sc:".anl;S, To P!'O!lu1cat.e labor If:cisla~i-:.n. To :put into pract:ice the:: e!i;ht-noU!' \-:o:-!=ir.c do]. To pro'/l\le tor a reSir.>e of :oest a::lQ recreation. To set up a !'at 10::a1 ~:lste::l of waee:: a:1d b::muses f'Ol' Increasec productivity, '1'0 imp'ove tne li.... 1=:£; and .:ork:lne conditions or' the 'lorkers. laborers, ar.d civil servants. To apply a policy of' adequate remunerat.lon tor apprentices. To provide jobs to the ~:or!cers and thp poor pc-ople in the towns. To make_ ev.ery effort to do al~ay "lith l.:nemplo:;ment:. To put into' practice a policy on social security to care for and assist workers, laborers, and civil servants in ca~e of di~ease. incapacitation. old age, or retirement. To ioprove livln~ condItions in working people's residential quarters. "





:1i:'\it -'::lC ::!C:l.t.ii1: 01' i;or;:crs and la;;'orc:-s. to stt-.!.c;l:.- ·p:"oi!:'bit


~na l.t...'1jtts~i~~i~d. s~c:;i:1~


d::;ductcd f:-;,:::

0:"1 l1or;:cr:> ..

CCr.!2)1'':sir.c tho :ulin ::C'~cc tt.~its.JI :hc re~l:c:1al ~~OO!J5, a~ci ~h!: %!lili~i2 a:':c tl~erri:!.:=l:-­

the chi lc:-c:n of ~hc ~c~plc ~ t?\~d arc l;(\unc!~es31;: 10:;31 ~~ t~o in-:C~~:i~3 or tM :....a~hcrl::n:d t.nd t!le ;'C..)!'~ e .. Clr.d arc c.u~~··-bounj ';0 l.'if~h~ shou1dc:- ~o s~loa!c.~!~ ::ith t=!C cn-:il~c !Jc(::)le i;O !i~::!r;J.-:,~ !:l"C 3cu~1!. cc!cnd :11a :"'ath~r!al'ld. t .. nr: ~a~:e an a~:ive .;;';n~!'i-


lIith.a V!.Ct: to stcpp~n: lJ'p pc~~le~ \;::;.:"*~ d~i'lea~ti:l~ '";h!! U.. S: :lnci. :;:'-inCilX.: ~11~ tl.[;ht aca!.n:;j-: U.,.S. a~::;rcss:'on~ tcr ~~~io1";;a~. s~lv~::. ~ic!1. to total v!.c~or!~.. To str\lnz:t!·!en t!lf" 'C:it!c~l tlor:: t:i~l! a ;r:"e~l ~:l!!.~ncin~ th~ p~t!'".i.Oti5fu ~lnd dc:crn!11(:ticll to flr;llt "nd ~o ~·lin 0:'" t.:1C L..!;·t)!"a::!~n r...>:. . \!o:; i crJl:lncinr; ~l'tC s·)nsc ot d:!lc':~l!ll~, ~nd ccntinuou31y tir:htcr..~~~ ~he .f !ish t;~~\~!..u :"clation:i l)(!~'t;cen tn~ arr.:~~ nl:.d ~llC POpi..l.!.~~ior.~ t':cfr rlG!lt. :":l: satclJi!;v, tt!'ld


1il~p;:·Q:' ~~OOpSf'


!:o the :::o.r:~"rs ~ tc.· cat:e:- fer di sa!J!ca. arr.l~"::l~n, to rct·:a!'J. the c:.nd cor:p:::.t~iots trhc. !:a~:c all Qu~sta!id.i!lC r~cc!'\i in t!~a ficht Clbai. ...st U"S. :l:.:..::,~s~ic!! Clnd' foT' ~'~ltion(ll s~l \ra:':i on. T:1C t:lvil~:; P~O;ll,: arc t:~'3 ;cf\\! to, a:ld conJ~=a~tl~·_::~::~. if! t;llnd the r.~r.lc~:,"-c;!"'·:;h~ r.~r~y'!".s •..-hv tc!anrt'd to ~hQ L!b~!"Cl!;10r:. h!·~~;l

7 --To

3110ll c:r~ti tl1d~


J--To c~.:n~izc ::;ocic~] _1'eli"1~. 70 t:'v~ r~liet· to :!1c CO!:l~~t ri,:)ts--vi~tiz:!s cf :he u«~ of C:Cr:r,:!s55.on un!eaZ~lad ~y the U. S .. itlpCl'ial:: s~·s r!lld '!;he !>u;;,c~ rc~it:ic.. T'J u~tcnc. :;0 o!'?h::ns. c ld .to!~:s. ~n;i i nv ... l!.d p~cple. o.::n =.nd ~o th{: ra!::' 2ic~ of pu,~ct t.!":::y::al"'! :;:i 11£,!Q .in ;;.~~ion ~ H~O :tr~ poo:'" ~n~ f c!.~::'C!·f~. To help t!lOSC pe(\pJ~ cri"..en t:o do.spc!"i:.tion b~~ ~;lc U.S. l!:lpcr:::l.is~:> 1l!'ld ::hc'::" l~~J:~~-~. to l'cbuilcl t:1Cll" lives and ~e:,v~ th~ fa!;!;crl~r..<.l ~r.c! t!l~ ~copla .

t12,n and ::t)::an, ;0 pro!;~~~ r.10~11·::!·S a:!c -A.'h:..:.:!l....:: '~c r;o.::~ ut.!::o~t c!;~on:ion to rais':'rl: t~11l poli'Cic~l, cultural J a::d vocational s:::;luarG~ ~ t:c::t~n in a t:!:~!lC!" t'i!::.inc: t-;~.th· :rtc!.r ~r.!.ts i~ tt,c st.ru:~lc Z:~:!.i!!5t U. s. a~:~~~siJ:~ :.:1 ::--'!'o

~u~ :'ll!;O prac~icc cqua:it~· be:t-:~cn

to:" l1~~::'on~l 5L:.l"'l~t5..on. 'l'c develop t;h~ Vi~:na~c5c t-!o~cnts t:,'~d!tions 01'· hel"ois::!. 't~!d~u!'}::"d:l~SS, loy::.l-;;y. nnd aptitude si'!.ouldct" c"Jc.:'y rcS?Onsibi1it~·. \1or.:cn arc ~qi:::':



po!iticall:r~ (:1~~!1o!'~ricnlly; ctlltura!ly,2~~d

. -l'·,cc!vc \lor~:c.:':; art~~

~hc :;~1l:lC sr.l~~r:l

4'.:-:.d ci v.!!



socially. t'loncn WilO do th~ sa=e ~ictl all other rit.:h;s as ~l~!l. 110:.1(-:: conths r...at~!'ni~y lca..,c t-litll full pay b~l\)l'C ~U1l'!


enjoy ~t·~o



ar~d e:!jo~"









~)~:~ i!!!;o p:..~c.ticc a PQli!::.' of' rlcti.vcly helpinc p(:r:"c~~:'a:; p~'~~:;::!:,~tc pP0cr~~s=-v~ r~r':"i4:.C~ and raI:~!Y rc.::ulC!tions.. To prc;~,;~ct th~ ri~ht!; ~r

~vi15 brou~ht


\!Or.iC!1' S

~y ~ht:'




U.. S~

~;-:l C:i[;ni~y.

;0--70 strc:;ct!~Ql! unf::!'~ to pl"acticc equality an:! w:.:.:.ua!. ,:.s::;i~~r:.r..ce Cl.Vor.G nCl~!c~~.. :!:'~i!;,;. To Clboli3h all sy:;:cr.s an~ ?olicics applied ;::''' th~ if.l,c!~l~liS;!j ar:d t.h~i:r lac~:-:,:.'~ i'li.t!-:. ~ yir:~.; to e:'vi.C!i::C. opp=-es~in~J and c:.:plcitinG t;le var':'ous !:::..:;io::~li=ics.· ':'0 cp;~:;~ disc!'~.r.lin:;,~ior:. ancr.,:: rl.nc fo~cibl0 a.s~'!.nil~t~ion of tl!e n~·~io!1nliti·~s. To .j;:'t,,-c,;!.:.,;) :~~ ::'cn£;-~ta.u:i1.1;:; t~ac.::l on of unit:; and z:u.tual assistan::c ar.:chC ~hc varia:.:c ~~Z"c.:c:,::~: !i.::.~:'on::!!~tics IJit:1 :-. ;·:'c~·j to dQr~!1dln.G and bu.:.ldir.C the: cc:..:nt:-;.... All r.:;.::.on'!:i~:cs n~~ cqu:;! in ~ichts ~nc oblications.

'?o inplcn·:!r:t the- :.It;r(1.~''ian policy t.:ith ret;ard ;0 t'!ino!~:t:r pc<:.sar:t$.. To cn~ou~~:::c: ClI!: he ~p t~:ctl settle doun in fixed re3:!.d~!1~e::; ~ to ir.1p~·o\'e t:!Cl!' lands, ~o dcv~lop c~c~~:;!::· a!1G C~ltl,l~·~~, to rai!>c thcj~ livin:: s,:a:1(ia~ds so as keep <~!>!"C2.s: of: ~ht) Genera.: lcvc-l.


In :hc a~cas inof the local af!'~i!'s by the conccr'fic:d ~!.nc;-it::{ it3~1f' . biC cor.:n~nitics of' a. sp~cf'f:c ~! !':crlty and ~:hc~c t.he rC::J.ui~cd ccndi~ion~ ~utcno!::ous =ones uil1 be c::rtablishcc v:it;1ir. in~c;-e!1d~n~ ~fid f:'"tC!c Victn::.o.~


hacitcd ~xj.st



frccdol:l of' c:'ccd, to achieve l.m:'t.:,' ::.r.t1 cq:::.lity a::;.onc thg d::.ff.:::,::!1.;; cor4nu..."itics. To fi~h: acain!3:' all r::c:n~u\'e:,~s and :ric::s of ::·llC ir~~)e!"':.ali:3ts <:.nd !:hcir lacl:cys wi1e usc a nt4r.:bcr or pc!'son:; 1..mael' the clca;~ 01' reliGion to ep"o~Q o-.t~· pco;:>lc f s stru.:;;:;lc <l[<!in::;t \I. S. a[cress.ion an:!" for national sah'at ien. to set.: :'SSC!1~ t ,,,,;.-.v"l''''' and ar.:"-r a':l'f"'~-"''' ·'C·· .. ,c., ""1U n"n ~r.':[.;ous cor'..,un"·'-".':..w. .. ·'<" :'r. 4 ... .1,;:' lo.\": ... ·o,,1';evC''''" ':.._. .,;,,) ""', ................. _ ...... C .. _".lv _ -t...: ... ........ S '011 to h<l:'n the count I'~', the people, and the :'eliGion. To respect frccdol:l of cl'ccd ~:::.! \-:o:·ahip. To preserve p:-.. £:otlas, churches, holy s~.cs, tct1plcs. All rclicions a:-Q cq'.:cr.! ~r.~ nO!1~ is ~o be cii.sc..rir.:in:'. ted aG~ihs t " to' achieve U!1! t~. Ci~~nc ~clic\"~:,"s of ':a:--:'C:15 l'c::'i,sicn:: imd be:"ccn b~lievcrs and the en:;i!'.; natio!1 fa:' ~hc s:::.:·~c of the str-.:::clc aca:nst U,S. aco'cssic)!1 and their lacl=c:;s to defend .md bUild the country. 11--To




O ...




.. 41.o~J.





12--t~clccr.l~ ;upp~t

lcr.:'c:~c:{, ~r..c! c.!l,o~e t~~c

officcrz and r.lcn and puppet ofi'icials bacl= to the just cause, S:lC~': Cil:C ~ hur.~!'l~ tl"catncnt to r(!llic~ arn:;r.~n and ~!"i50~O!"::;-of-;Za!·," 'io

U. s.


and the puppet administra:io:: r 5





to s~r\te the U,S. aCG~cssors acain~~ the fath,crlan.:l and I:r.ssa~rc the people. Tc sevc:-cJy p1.lni5h ~hc dicharu thu;;s ~ctinG as cificicnt a~cn!..s of :he: U~S. :'r.-l,~~::..li5;S. ?o ~ffo,~ cond~tion~ for puppet orricc~s a!1a puppet officials to cc~e back to the ju~~ cau::c and Join the people's fi~h~ acainst U.S. aCGression to ~avc a!1d build ;hc




ir:d :V\.. icl1.1=:ls I ~rll~ps I O!.' u~i t:; of t:1~ ;:uPPt! t ~ri:!:'~ ;!r.d :;C::;:ir.. i:: t=.':J ti ~):'"L ~;ho rc!·iIo~C~ sc::-\"i~·e5 t.o -the C:lt:SC ~ fici'ltins ag~ir-5t \:~S~ ~~~('::~:itJi: ro:~ : . =!ti~:;C11 ~aJ"./~tio::" .. ~~ J O~ .re~!:::,:·cec .~=:d ..cnt~usted l!ith ~esp~nsible jobs c T:-~05C: ·.~~O ~~!.~p~thizc: ~:it;1 :!::~ ~':.;.!l?O~... t th~ stt'~::::r;lc a:;:<il"st U.S. agcressio:l tor r:=tio~1:l1 s;;.l.... :;tior:. :;;:- those ,l!~:) rcf:.:~'l ,':1) c~l'ry o''':'!; o~'i!e:,s of the Cd ted S ',;"tez ar.d P\!Pp:ats to h:.~r.l the p~oplc ~l:"ll ~a1:e th~ir ~:lO': ~~



indivicu::rlz. gro!.:ps I O~ t'!ni tz 1.:110 h:tvc bro::en ~1.:~:; rr~:1 the ~'Uppct c;!"r.:~:o ar..d apply to jcin the Licerc: ti or. k';::od P.':'ces £.:!~ i'ishtir.e "'C:lir.s t the r!"'..itr:~ s tD tos to ~~ve the country Q:'C t!clcc:lcd nne el~Joy cqt:::l tr.ez t=e!;t~ R~[;:lrc.i!"-b :;ho3a ~.. :!..a.'-la_~ or Ur.l .... S ,:.no n~vc 0"0' e"" a."!'\ '" ~-o ;"~'\~ p"pn~+ ~'\, "'\1 . . ,... ,'!'\... r.wM "" ~c"~'"",;?"1~ ~-~~.: i:::'O='V . . .:._ ".c..o.~..... ::1 .... .a.: ~ ;00.-....... 1.. .. c; "".:..,J~. " ....~ r!sc:: aGninst the U.S. 2.gGrcs50~s to save the co-..;ntry s the fro:::: ~t~r.ds re~d!! to joi~ .~ctic!~ ::ith the::: in the fiG!"lt ~i;ainst the U.S. a~r,l"e!lso:,s C~: :\ :;:':s!.s 0:' cqu3.1ity. t',:.1.t-:;al rcsp~ct. "r.C: as~ista~cc. ~o as' together to prot€~t tl~e. ~€crle al1.jlib~rate t:1C f'athc:,land. Tl10::C



.-'. . ...







..... ...,

......... ..:

'i'i~ose f;,:nctio::arics of the p~ppct adoinist::-ati.)!: t:!'l.,) .'ol1.. n~;::~:' t.) sC::"':e t:'e co:.:nt!'J am! t!'l.C pc:cple in the state1:~C',chinc after the l:..be::-ativ!, o:~ South V:Ctl:~!.~ !:ill Cl1JCY c~1;sl trc~t::cl~t. Those in the Pt:pp~t ~r-::~~ ar.c :11'.' p:~ppct ~C.:.:i:1ist~41tic:~ at: a1"~;;;: level ;.;11.0 11~ve f'o::-,-'littcc cri=~s ~G~~~~t th~ peopl~! OGt ~~C no".; sincc:scl:." :"eile~~a!"!t tlill bC' p:1rdol:ed, 'L,ese llho rcde::::: t!1~i:' cri:::e:: by :::er i. tor-io::s t~cec:: ::ill l:e :'1J,,~:·.;!eJ o.cco:'diq:;~::: . C::~t::rcd officc~s ar.d ':C!l. of t:H~ p;..:ppe t :l:'n::r :!ill c~jo:r h::::lo,:-:i ta:-io.n trc=:t:.:crl1.: fll:d clc::1ency.:

'I':lOSC i!'~ tllt~ U.. S~ I,:"ny ~r6d it~ s~t.eJl:.te ar'~i~5 ~;ho ~;.:'O~S ')l:e:" tf; ·th~ pe~plct~ si~~ Gi~071 .::ind trentr:cr;t and h~lpci! tli !'~turn !;o thc"::';- f(;::ril~c~ :;:':~!1 cC::\;1.::'·,)::~ pa:-,.;it. C~~:;'L!~ed ~.S4 D.r.d So.t~llit(l trt)l.)ps :ill be t:'e.2..tc:: ,'s capt~rcd p~ppc: ~ro ..)~!."i.

't:ill be



To \~clc,,:::e the ;Jr!triotisn of O\t'ersc~s V::"etncr.ese ar:c hjCh1:r vc:luc ~l! thei: a co::trib~:­ tio;::s t{) ti:~ :"~!jist~nce to U.S ~ ,iGc.rassion fo: ::ntic!"';.al ~r.1VD.tif)~ of the pco~lC'. 70 'P:'otcc t the !'ig!ltS ~r.d ir.Lcl'cS t:: of overse~s "ictr::H::C!:C, To h~] p those O'le:'scus V :.c1.:n~~c£c \:ho uith to rct~rn to take p:lrt ir. the :n:ildin~ of the cOl.!r.tr~·. ,

14--'!'c p!'otnct the lebitin~te riGhts 2nc intf'rcsts I)f fo:'e:t;n rCEicc:rts ir. S:)~:th \rict::at.~~ Tc '!:c!co;:c those forci~r:. re5icer~t~ l:ho hav~ c('r:tri1:.t.:.t~d t:~) th:! ~.rictr.::nase p~Cr;(·I;: l~~::; i~ t£!::.cc t~ U cS ~ ~g5I·eszion fo!' natiO!"t.al salva tiC!1. A'll ~~~cicn re~i~ents ~:.~ ~ ::;'; :n !:ou~h Vi~t~:~r.l wu:t rC5pect the indcpender:ce ~!.~ sO't!e~~ic~ty ,.r ':!':ct::at'.l 4:1~d OJc:: .~ .. !at; o~ the n~tio::al acr.:oc!'"::ltic ~c~inistra.tioll . i:~tcrQS:~ of ~ll "forcig~ residents ::ho CO !"!ot co~pe:,atc :!it!l t~:c [ .. S~ iI:ipc:-i~l:~~;'~ :md t:il~ir hC!1:::hr.:eh iro opposinZ the Vietllc::;cS~ people a::d vho do r..ot harn the


~r..C ~ovc~ciGnt:t..


~:etn::m •.

?o gi\pe


cOl:zicCl"(ltio:1 to the

riCht:; ~!:d intc!'csts of those .foreign residents ~:ho han~ directly 0::' i::directl:r supported the Victn<l::icsc people's re=istance to U.S. aGGression for no.tio:::!.l s<lh·~tio;1.




To !"e~ol~::cl!" ('?p:):;c tu":~ aboJ...:ls!'t all p~:' i c ies of tne 1:. z. ir..:;~:·la:4. ir.:~ ant! t!4t!!!" a:'!:tet! at ~::~:l:ne ~:,..:.,e'·:-6. ·tlet.~:u~n ";hf' V::.etn~·,,~cs(. . P~:::>~:"'t.'" <l~-4tL C"·;l.'1e~c :~!- !": •.!,,~~.: •


. 7lp.~·::d:le:;('! ...:i ti::er.r.'h5.. ? Tc, p;.'!:isr.. th.: Cl.~~~~ a;:~!lt. '; ar.d sec :-et aten.:: 5 ut i::.;;:e:-ia~i5!;S a:ld t:"c S(J~t!l Vi'!t:!a."l P:l~!'e: a:!~ini~.t rati on.



Pe .... cetul Reun:':.·,.cat.i.on of the I-'at!1erla:lc VietnaJ;l i.s one. R~:1:1iricat~_:)n

:l~S: 'i'!l~


T:1.e 'liGt.!1anesc !,E'!o;,)le

a~e on~~

of thE! co ..:rn:I'!Y'Io is the sacrad

!!o fo!"(;e can \.!i·/1C(:



o~r entir~


policy. vf tho 1;FL3V consists of t!1e fo11o\;int;:

I--The~·rct:~:!.~!.cati~r:. ~r cc:a!1~ 0:1 :·:1C :"~i:lcir.le

usinC iire5:;ure

Vietnan ~lill be rcali=ce. ste;> b~1' tltep a:l~ t~rv~ch ~~~cefL·l of ne~oti". tior. hc~~:e~n t!~e tt-:o ::ones ~·:i~::out eithc:!" _!:ide

a~:l.in5~ ·th~

othCl" a:-1d


rorei.~:1 in~e!"rerencc.

2-- 'Ec~ldi~:;

t.h~ ..... iricnti~!l or th~ CO;lntr~" 7 the ~eo~lQ in ~oth :!O:1e~ ~:ill ca!i:c Joir~! to _or;;:;:;c ~:::!"ci;:;:-: i:lvasion and cte!'e::d t;lc !"atr..erland ~:l:i at thc~ sa::l~ ti:--:e ~:1,:c.:~·I.to'r -;0 c.::::a!1::: ~co!~":.:ic. a~d c~:l tU'ral. e:,:cha:1J:€'~.. ~l~ pco;:lc in both c:c:o:e5 ar~ free to e::c!~::l:;::;e lc::;tcr~, to ;;0 f'ror.! O:lC ZO:le to another, a:!:1 to choose their ~la::(' c~ror~s

of residence.

':':lC -!:!~SV ~r:::-l~cs

SU2. I:antecs the



a' f'c~t?!Crl :~~lic:"



peact- a!1c n·..~~~ralit~.. , a fOl"'ei[::! pol icy ::::icf. ar.C tC::":'itori:ll ir~t~critJ'" ::r th.e

sovernj~n';:~", ~Tlit!~.


I--To establish diO'lol:1atic relo.tions \:ith all cn:':l1tries rc~ar~lcss of thcir social and t"vll!' leal s;..'stC:1 O:l the ~rinciple ~ f ::tutu,!l res :;ect for each ctl-;cr' S i:~tie;1~~ccn:~ !;ovc:seir;nt;!-, and tcr!'': torjal ir:t.e~rit:t.t t.:ithol!t infrincc»ent up::n c~ch cthc~, ~·:it::out ::'r:tcrtl'!"c:'lce into eO-ch ot::C:,1 s i::tcl'nal affairs. te r-ritorj·. c~uality. r.lutual tc::e fits, ~!'lC r-c:lccf:.:l co~::j.:;te;,:ce. To <10011s:1 an ur.c:;t.:al t!"eatics t:hic;1 thc :>upp;:: n.~:1in!.~t rat iO:l has c i~ncC: t:it1, the t.!:1i ·;e<~ States ~r a!l~.~ otl~e:, co~n~:.'::-. T:> 1"~~ p~~t :.he ccc~1v:Jic an~ cul~:!:'.ll i~~terezts of tho~e co~~;~ies l1~lich :;;.;::.~a~hi.;:e ~:it;1, sur:>=>r: or ~-~~::.:;: tha 5t1~J::l('! n~~ai.nst U",S. 'li:ure:1sio:1 to:, ::;&,ti:Jnal ;:a:v,,1.t:on ~f t'hc Vlc!:r:~.:-::~.3~ ~cj:;lc - ~To ~ccc~';.!; tcch~ical and cconooic ~ss~~~ta!1c£! fro:l a.n~· ~Q~:n~ ~;~ l.#i;;hc:.::. ;ol~ ~:'c::.l eo::\.:it tons at tac:'lc\l.. To Joi~ r.o :::ilit:l~:: al1ia~ec" to aecc :)t !~C :::!.1 i t=-.r:; r;e r.3o~::c·l ~r .,1.·1"'·,.. ..•• ·~~~c,.."'....... ..··ol..... '~n c v~. ..... ntr'es 0".... SO"":" "eI'I'<~or" \i ~"'''t; ~.g..w ~ .~_~Io _ "'""'.... V~""'l"'" ..t;,,:.., . . ~,'., .a..w 'I'. t




2--To :itrcn:;thc!'l i'r:'c:;.clly relations t-!ith all co~ntries l:hich s~r::~,~tr.iz~ t-.·i:?:, S~P!)Jl..t. ~r a:.:;i::;t thc st!'uu:;:c ac;ainst U.S. a::CI'cssio!'l for r.a.::io~a:!. 5al\'o.ti\)~ of t!lC Victna::l.c::;e ~coftlc. To strer.;;then rola.tic:!s of ~ooc.· ncichbori:ccc ~:ith Ca::lb~dia and L-:lo:;. To t;nccasine1j' consolic.late solica:oity and o:;tual a.ssista::cc oct\!ccn the pco~lcz of thE' Indochinese countries "it!) a vie~: to defendinG their l-espec';i'''c inf:cpenderice. :;ovcreicnt~·. nne! ..te!'ritorial inteGrity <lGainst the Cl[;cressivc and t::lrpro·/oc.atior. polic:; of the U. S. i::tperialists and their henclmen.


-. nati'J!'C'.j· 1 iber-,tior- mt )lOo,M.e:1t of H.e' peoples in ;\s:', .. ! r~!.c ... ::mt! Latin ;'I~,er.j.'::~. :l.r,aip.st 1t:1pe!'l.2~isr.t and ~lc. ar·1 n~irI ec-lo~1ialisr.l. ;,etivci'i support i:~c -stl.'~l~le of the j\cer1c~.n. pec~lE ar;e:l.rst the t:.':'. l~peria:!is~s' ....ar of 2Gel'c::;s:'.on :1.11 Vici;!l3::. Act ivcly SIJpport the S1;rUGg; e f or peace I Q"!!:lOCrc.i::i. s!'.d social pro~resf: :in aE cu~.tr.t!'ies in the .r:'F!.e.


.st:pp~rt t>t~

l;--,~cti\lc::y S:-!,q~51e to !,!"n,t!'itlu.t:e t.~ t114 s=r:teC:.'.a!'d:U-.f of ~;)l'ld peace, opp~se the ':oC1J.icosp. a!'ld ~t;s,:e5sive iept3ri,a ....ists l!ea(l~d by IJ ,S. 1;;:p~~·l.a1isn Der:ar,d Lite dissoltlti(m 'l1' "the a':;Gt'es~ i;rf: m11 !tar:,- 1:20':5 >}r;.a f or.-etC:'!. l:il ~ it~rr bases o~ j.!::per~a::' is-.:. Unr.e;lsihS} j' c!>nsol irla~~ a~d develop re:ntit',r.".s w::':.h i~tC!matiop..a1 c.er;.c·cr;;.~ic o.l'~anj ?~tit)ns a!~-::! t.:1e pcopi.es 01' all count!'i:::~ ir.c.l.ll'hng th-a l\oe:-:"'!an pe?p:'e _ ~~ct hoel:; cc;·! .. ril>~te t ,~, t:~!': co:r<~".)lid~tl.Ol1 .me. delfe~ C'!,L~~':lt '::If "i~f'! WVT" 1 C pe :::>le: s fr::nt lr' ~Pft::·ri; of Vletn,a:;:.


tr.e 1L.S.

it!pe:"j.a..~1st aCSJ;"e~~:).rff_







!>tl'!l6~1~ aga .... n!':~ !! l1Gz'·ef;s.i(;~ll f'J~ n~t"iO:-lai :;di'lati~" 0: ~",r people is art a}:t.re!~elJ !:a~d ~ut ...~l.c':-t"uS ~a~s~' !t.cro~erns. r~.)t ~!11y t;,he c.esti~!y of ~ ..;r pe~pjc at

an ;;. :l"

pr/!~c:lt ~::1(i


w!,n arc

PI'O<;N:SS. O:lst


!:1 st

rutu!'~ .G~~,e1'<i~io:-.s 1Ju~

:;1;n.<~;.;l.Ln[: fo~ p~a<!t;!.



ill Oi)l"C

aj S::l t!:e




aCf!or:r:lis:t t~at [;10ril)'..\5 clo&ely and bl'oad!,!"





pf'q:.!.es in tl-.e anI"! sccl.a:

:mr ;Jeop:e. al.ready •....'lited·.

r:~'LI':V Ysr:T!l~~ wE-le"r.tes al;. po~,it;lC;-\~ part:!..es.~ c.a$~ ol·~a!·.lzatior,s.t a·la pC'.t...r·:c)t.ic a:lc prCl~l'(;5SiY~ per::.)nn.!itip.r. V::O !:·~~)acly '.'all:.·. ;.:i'.;~ir, ar,d 'o~tside Ll!e fro'lt in al'del' to ct>fe ... t t;:)!;e t:lt:-::' t·:.e \i, S. <1:;Zl'el'sol's and ~!',ej r !'It:uci~::l(!r.


=jl!~e St,l~..4BGle

!,';)r n2ti,,~!al sa;<\. ~tjo;i tJr·~~r.pe~'ple is ~ just C3i.!SC. ·O.u" pcopJ c t,~!rO:l:;~lo~t. ~.;~?! C .):tr: try :\:--~ r):' 4):!e r::in.~ to ri(;~t 3rt::: dt!:'''~t t!lC ~. s. a~Gl·t:ssors tl!l-:l tt!ei'l' !1CtlC!it;.e!1.. 'rhe s~·pp.a~h:" '" St.l~p·jl·~.. , n ..!d ans i:;,:,~nc~ .):- t~.~·~ 9~·~·pli;· ~f the scc:.a!jst COi.I:~trie:-J t!!£ ::.:,,~.a:l., ;.rric~.:I; a:lc! la!.in .;,:1cricc:n C')ll:lt.ril;s, a:"::!. peace1 O'i lrJ[, , just.iCI:~lc.vinf Pt'opl!- a"!.; :;-..e:,·t;be toOl'ld .. ir;.('''~· :~:le the pl'0Sl'es.;>1. ... t; ;:'~tOp!1! 1:1 tl!e United StaLen. are a)ecvoinc Ct't/per ll.'lrl :;tl"o:;Gcr da:: o:.·.·daj· :'~e ar~ \-d..1l 1t\S ~~(~ will surely wia c()!,:1ple.tc -.rict.o"y. aesiobt



ir:> ':1a;;ter hO\-J frenzied.; brutel; ('J1)'uratc,; nne per!'llliolls the U.S. ir.1~'~l'1<11ist5 0,,;; ".:le. they will inev5.tal'ly r.:ee+. \o'H.h bitler faHtoI'e 1n their cri14:iJ~al SCilel:!es.

In t::e supr-cne inter~~ts of :;!1e fa i ;Her13nQ, le~ o~r eat.ire pe09J(' in S:>'..\t!' V'iet;~la;:: . :;trcr'.::,t.l:en t::eir 1501 i~a1·ity. I:lHlirJ:t5 as o:~e. ,mti rllf>~ forw:ard :,:~otllder to s:::);:lde:" i'~ tl~ ir.:pett:.s o~· ,)u" Victories to cor;l~::.e!.e.i y clei'eat. t1l€ U.:,. a,-~::l'e~s:)l's a~d ti:ei~ s~,o~e ac~i!li!)~':-at~o:l, an.c. to~ether "li;h O~ ncr:.. :,!!:!!':} Co:"lpi\t.r!ots ;'(.\ f'ulfilj ~;·.e Zrea.. and Clorio:.ls ':rl-:.tse of Ubel'l1~i!lG the ~:)utt~; del'~r.dil1G t.he :iot,ttl, oar!..! Pl'.J,~~~ul:·';



pe?ceful I'cunificat.io.l 01" the father-land.

7he ii?LSV pled.:;es t,) be ahlay:; ..m.t'th~- of the confiai'mc:e o)f our cOr.Jpatr .l:>i:S 3:";': 01:1' f!'ie:lcs or; the five cO:li;ir.ell~s. 7!le Vietnar.!cse pf!oplf: Y~:l su:-ely !le victorious: ?11e l] :: .. a~srC!::.sol"s ar:.d t~.eiI· he:lcil;:!en ~'i1j" cel'!:~inl;; be de!'e'a~cd: 7i,c !,:PL~\' proGra~ to!' liberation ir-; s~"e !;o ~at.erlali?!:! Pi::::::;tcl'S sud cor.lpatriot.s ~hl·.J~'Sl.out SouT.h Vi~!:na~. under t:,e Glorious bar.nr.:r of the HPLSV. r.larch for\lard herojcally! .


Subject Hanoi Attitude on Bombing, 10 September

1967 .•••••.•••••••..••••••• 236 {.


Chronology of Viet Peace Efforts December 1966-February 1967 .........

The Ashmore Letter to Ho Chi


¥~nh -


1967 .•••..••••.•• ; ••••.•••••••• 238



Publication of Aslun.ore 'Peace . Feeler Attempts: .

New York Tines ••••.•• -....



• • • - ; -• • · : - • • • • • •


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Washington Post ........................ a

.. • • • • •


• • • • • •

• • • • • •.• .. • • • • •

?39 24~

'Comparison of AshI!lore-rnJ Letters (by lieu York Times)..............


State Department Denial of Ashmore Charges (1TY Times Account)......

245 .

Te~ of state Department Cpmment on Ashmore Episode ••••••••...•••••


State Departt=lent Press ConfereI).ce Held by WilliamP. Bundy on Ashmore Episode •••••• ~ •••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••



sur.a'l~, Se;.t.l0,1967· , ••• !!3 '





'~ike a Time Bomb' By lIllrl'CY lIarder In focusing on the racial \\~aihh:..to:: P,,;;t Stat! \\~rl!er . Nprth Yi~inam is growing 1 .. Schocnbru-n, 'who' was in rioting ill Amer:ean cities 2S a more unyirldin" about peace: North Yiet.n:im for :lin~ da~::S'1 major p!I!S in ~orth Yietnam's, rd~ted hIS experIences m, fa\'or Dong in an Aug. 31, talks, rather. than mor~ fiC~l' I l~angkok on Thursday. They I ,speech said: "This struggle is bic. as Amerle31, bomomgs m' 'were broadcast last night! like a time bomb at the heart l t~l1"ify, according to diplolll~t·· (ABC Te!c\·.ision·s "Sec,e;' tOi ! or tllt;; u.s, capitalist society." ic reports reaching Washin;· b~ rebl'o:!dr2st here at. 1 p.m.; • Dong \,'as reported byl t today on Channel 7).' . i Schocnbrun to ha\'~ scoffed at . on. , .' Pham Yan Don: was des·. ithe Sept. 3 DTcsidential elec· This. rising moo(1 of ~mtan'l cribed as "planning for an] Ilion in South \'"ic~n3nl in !he C\· in 1Ia:101 was one reason: ~\merican im';lsion" and ex·llsame vein as ha\'c Xorth VII~t· • ,\:11y Secretary or State Dean I P(.'Ctill~ the aerial dC¥a5tation : nam's puhlic statclll{'nts ,;eQm. l{usk Ort' F~·ida~.•. deliberatelyl of Hanoi. in" it as "low comedy. But A~t'rican analy~ts pt'Hc\'c .the • 'downgraded prospects for ne- rfel~al'e(l to ri;ht all electioil s('riOltFly discomrlte~ !,:otiations. , ,,'. "lIe bc!ic\'cs:' S;Jid Se110\:n·· Hanoi. Thcy n,1te th<!t th~ proAll accounts 'coming out of brun, "th;;t in a last a~t or dcs·l gram or the' Xati?!!:11 I,loera· Hanoi, througl1 public and pd. p"eratiIJIl we arc ~oin~ to wip!': tion 'Front, the polhlc:al arm ~r vate channels, ~!1ow that the' out H,uwi. , .. He is prepared;. the ,'jetcong guerrillas m to fight on ill the mountair.si South \·ietnam. has been rc· .oCficir.n~· rlisscmii:::ted "iew or, .for as lo!!;,! as it can Nssibl~1 \'isd to l'kd;e a "rean)' demothe W;Jr. from there is pre·' take." . 'I :craUe" election. ' The Premh'r was reported At the Texas' White House; cisely thc rcvcl"se of the om·. cial \:er~ion in Wa,hlrlt,'ton. '. reluctant ('yen to taL'>' about Iyestc.'da~·, pr~.s. s~crctary Xortlt Vietnam contends. the possibility of p!:'aee -rliSCllS· George Chnstlan s;lId the and what is more, pt'rhaps h(.'·, sions. "He is, I think:~ saitl j Presidi?nt "is aw~re" of rc· lieves, that time and strategy Schoenhntn. "totally a h3wk,"j ports that South yi~tnam h~s are 011 its side for outlastill~' • D('spite the he:l\'y American. advised Great Bnta;n tha~ It bombil1g of Xorrh Vietnam! means to appro:.eh Xorth the United States. , . Schoen burn, like other \·~i· nam soon with an oriel' or ~., rremicr Is Quotetl tors, said he could detect "no feet peac(' talks that would m· 1n an interview in H..:Inoi e.idencc or f:tligue" among elude the XLF.Vietcong.. ' . last week with Korth Viet.! the pearle but only resiliency Secr('tary Rusk on Friday namcse Premier Pham Van I -stren;thened, not weakened, "Said thc Cnited St:tl'S "WO?ld Dong b;' Ameriran' newsman I by the cscalatinz air war. welcome some basts on w~lch David Schoenbrun. the Pre" .,' Pham Van Dong was quoted 'there could be a general re· :mier was quoted as saying: ' there could be a general rec· "Asior pr::ace talks ••. the' as saying: • onciliation am'1Eg the peC?ple initiative is up to the United '''We ha.e one overriding' ble basis." But he said "~hatl States. You havc to stop bomb problem only, and that is how doesn't mean that the NLF jng us 'unconditionally. l! ~'OU; to exist and how to s1:nive, has a status: as a gO\'ernmentl want pcace talks, they ran f(ll and our wbole' . country is .••. or that it should be givcnl lo\\" but, • : there will ,.1' fln . I a veto on thc possibility of • 'pulling Xorth Vietnam and reciprodty. Thc:-c wi!1 he 1"._ geared 10 this. ' "You Americans havc' othe!' South Vietnam apart milita· bargainir:g, There- \'."il1 b~ M, . blackmail. and w(' wHlnot Jlay " problems. You have racial rily." ransoOm to pirates." . : problems. 'You havc world' A leaclin~ House ·Republi· can, )leldn R. Laird (R-)\'is.), As for the subject of taL1(s, according to other reports re.' • commitments. ,\,ietnam is only' said in Chica!;o on ThurSdaYI layed to '''-a5hington, Hanoi lone or your problems. )la"ybe night that: "It's increasingly maintains there is essentially !••...ou havc C "ot a' .million-maybe evident that thl' Administra· \' 'only one rcal topic: Withdraw·, 1 you hase got 2 millio.n-Amer- tior. is prc$sin~ Sai;;on to nC' al of Unitt'd States fcrces ieans who arc. de\'ot:n~ tl lcm' •.lrotiate directly with the Viet· cong." Laird uid "they {the.1 £room Vietnam. I selves seriously. {ull ~ime to IXU') h;m~ the pcwer in Southl the Yictnamese war. "e M\'e. lVlctnam at the prescnt time I 16 million. So we outnumber. a.nd ~!lSl take part in n.:-;;oti.a·l















you 8 to

1.'.~ .. ' ..... ;", •. _, ' : ~l:ns., ' ?~n

. '" •. ~:

--~---, ------~

~r. Rob::-rts Wa$~!~.:O:1. ?Cl~ S~1!r l"::!ti:

By Chab;crs

Toe r~cord i~dic3tes that ti':c Ash!'ll:lrc·Daggs peaee criu:-f ran afoul of a change in Amerie?ll I,olit)' wl".1ch ('I~­ c,!~rcd at the moment they were invoh'cd in Vietnam di· plomacy. This is tile Tecord, as far e 1'.;' it is now known, or I·~~·tinent r\"cnts: m:c. 4. 1:';:;5-Po:ar.d ret.orted to the l:nited S~:t~(,s


:: rt :\0;':11 YiNnam w:;s pre· ~ ~·: .. d t~ ; ....



&! nl~:l

to 'rar-

J;1i:rt an American

- : ,:'.:~e::!~tiYe and to do so ,:•.:!.!~:.j~~ rl~;!!i!:idin:; c~ a prec.,:,::~~i(':1 a~l e:td to the .A;~i:·rk:!!l b (j:n bin g o! the

Ar:.crie;,r, officials subse, that in· ~('iJC:~("!;:nt c!lreks showed t:.:Z, to PC a Polish vjew, not t!l~t or Xurth \"i('ln~:n. Drc. 13·1':'--:\ mer i can pl:.,,(:; ,2:<1 ni'='~' IbIl':li. Po, k,;1,i l~!::-r F:\::lely blamed tite: ra:as 1u:· cI!cling chanr~5 ·,r a nl€'l'tinr,. Af~~:- the.aics l-I::r.Ji b.:--,;a!l to ~trt'';S thl! d~;n::ml that bOl:lbill:,': mu,t C('3S~ lmCJna!!ion:lly bcrore ther/) co~\ld be t3!:'S. Dec. :::G,Jan. G, lSG.-Harrison S:l1!sbur~· of thc Xew York 'rimc~ crc;.tt'd a furo!" wHh dis!):;.tzilc-s from Ihnol picturin~ ci\·;Il:m dc~tr\lc, tic.'n from the American rai(!s. O:n~i31s here said 'lI;:noi had lct Salisbury in as part of a camplir,n to force' an cn!l to the bomb· 'ing. Ashmo,(' and B~g~~ arrh'cd in Hanoi the day Salisbury l~rl Jan. 12 - Ashmore and Bacigs met Ho Chi :'I!nh who stre~sed an md to the bomb, ing Ashmo~e M\\' writes that "we had not 'bro:Jciht b:lckt' frorr. this int{'f\'iew "any hard proposal" from Ho "b;:yond the rc:tcrallon c! his unq:llllificd commitc~:(.';!n'.· cO:ltclld~d


nist 'side to bdng about an uncollQi:lo:1::! and pc-rm:ln· mcnt to enter into n(!;oHa· F·eb. 4-,,\ s 11 m 0 r e and ent cessation of the bO:l1bing tions" if the U,S. haited the B:;.;:zs met 31. the Srateo De' o! Xor~h Vietnam' without ' par:mcnt Witil t:ndcrsecn:born bin!!, :m:' cO:Te5pO!ldin~ milit2ry Ashmore reported to S:ate tan- Xic1101as d...B. :Katzen· action on thek side, in exDco;;,rtmenl ofikials that he bach and ot!H:r to? officials eh:lnge io. t'~z possi!JlJ:ty 2nd B~~gs fcJt that uIIo but n"t including Secretary of t:t!:.s - tah;~ whicil are seemed I>l"Cp:::"ed to co:,sLcer De:m Rusk. thus [:ir formk~s and with· a SiJi.'cific p,ot>::lsol b3:cd on .\ let1£'. from Ashmore to out cont(-llt." a formula or mut:Jal de- Ho \\'<lS drarted with A5Si3t· . Rusk a'lso d!stin~uished escalation" of the ii::hting. ant Sccret.:ry \\"illiam P. between a "pause in the Early Jar.l!3ry to early BU!!GY, who,,:; area include.; bo:nbing (here he see~lcd to }-cbruary - The l' nit e d Vicrna.t.. a.; the chief de' indicate he wO~i!d 2:;r::e to a States secce'th· ~ent fOUl" p:lrtr.:ental drartsm:m, p~t~sa in exchang~ for t:ll~5) memoranda t~ Hanoi deThe key scntt'nce in the 2nd a hp~rn:allen~ CCS$~· ~crib!ng" ofiida!s 'SlY. p05~i.. lct!ct" stat;:a that f·st"nfor tien:' roi:- the l:;ttcr to tlll:e b!c f!lctncd3 or de~sc.l!;\:ion. officials" at State ··(;:~pri:ssed place, he s31d, "we must· • These m<:~s;;;;cs. yet' to be c;>inio!l that so;m: reciprocal know the 1IliH:ary consemade public' were ha:uit'ci rt's!raint" \\" a s necessary qu('nccs." The 1.".S., ~e s3id, by all Amc-ricii.n embassy of· along with a halt to the cannot stO? ti:~ bo.~lbing iici:li in :lIo;cQW to a Xorlh bO;l1bl!Jg and an end to the without rec:i;'l!'o~it" for that \"ictnarl1cs(- r~l)rcscnt~ti;~e. influx: of ..~!nerican tt"OOllS would b~ "closin,;: of! OneJan, 2. - Jhnoi's nl:ln in if taU::; were to 12~e ll!al!e. hali of the \~.;". while the 110$(,0','" g:;,;~ a rej)ly to the ret.. 5-The c:afL lc~t('r . rest of it goes 0:1 full force." America!! official. Later the was delh'cred to Ashmore lot In short. nusk \~';;'S surIacSt"te D~~artm:;t d~scrib~d }'ulbright"s hoasc. Ashmo:e the rc:>lv as "a d i a t rib c m:.i:ec it that ~::t"!'lIovn, Tht: , ing the ccntr.11 point of the agai:lst tht' t'l!:!cd Sta~es." letter did not sp<'ciiy the Prc~iJcr,t's ieaer to Ho, the J:lIl. 28-Xo,.h \"ietllantC-so! "rctip!"oc:;l re,tr"int'· aI, CO:1te:lts or \\'l!!ch ,,:crc not Foreign :\'1inb:~r X guy e n ti!ou;h the Prt's:dent"s l~;ttcr mad~ pubIlc U;ltH Hanoi D~IY Trinh i:l an i!,tc~ ... i~;':' c~ tnr<.-c d:!j"s c2l"l!~r had broadc2$t H ~I::!'ch 21. wnll Austr:,!la:; Com:m::u:;t si1~dficd an cnd to :\o,t11 reI., 10 - Ho s<,id he reo joul'Il:lIH Wi!ir.:-d llu!"c:lt':t \"ict:tamese hlfiltration into ceived the J011!16011 letter on said t!J:lt ..it is oni. aiter the South. this day. Asil:-:!o:e assumes the ut:coll~!i:io:l:ll crs;::tiun In .adcli':on. 0:1 tile cay it arri\'d bcro~e h;s own of V,S. bO!l1;,i!l:; and all (1-'('0.' 2) the ..\d:llini.ltration l;;:ttrJ" witil tnt 'lc~s specific other acts ci w~r against th~ s:tid the Prcs!dcnti~l letter reque~t on the point or DIn- (Xorth Vietnam) that was draited, :.it". JO;1I150n reciprocity. tll('r~ could b~ talks between told a press cOll!erel'ee that Durin; th:s pertod, J:'eb.the Dl:\' and the U.S." "just almost any step" v;ould l~eb. 2-Presid£'nt Joilns~n b~ a suitable l'c.l;>on;c frum 3- B. there wss II p.ause in preplrcd a .lettrr to lIo In Ha!:oi. He aI~o h:.j said tint. the bombln;: O\'cr' the 'ret which he to":,, tip the ~ur- "we would be glad to e:.:.!' hoHd3Y in "idn;.m. including a rrc~ic!cnUally ordered d.ett intcr~'icW p~:.~ts: ~rr. / }llure ~ny reciprocal act!'):!," Johnson s3,d he \\oulu cr· SometIme betw~en f'co, 2 short exten~ion. :.0' del" a ces:::ltion of bo:nbin;" and 9 the offici:;l American , n·b. IS-Ho ill a letter to and al~o halt ';!urtnec aU:i- terms were hardened. Pope Paul \'1 assailed the mentation 0: U.S. forces in Feb. 8 - So de: Premier.' U.S. He {'oup!,:.:! an uncon·. Sauth.'"ietnam as soon as I Ait'xei Kosygin, who. wa:;. in ! ditional end to the bombing am a~sured til:.t infiltration Lond.ln Fe~. 6·13, sa:d at it I with the withdr~wal' or into South ,\"ietnam by land press conr~rcnce tflat the i American forces and the and' ,ea h'tS ;;t\)~ped." Tilesi;' Trinh inten'le\~· with Burreco,;:nitiQ!! of th~ Xational "acts or rcstra:nt," he :;.:.id. chett "'boils do"'n" to 3ar· , I.iberation FrOl:t. the politi"would make pos,ible sr· in:; that if the t:.S. uncoa-I cal arm or the Vietcong. In rio'ls p r i \',4 t e Ci5CUssiol1S." ,ditlonally sto;lP~d th~ bomb- i Washillgton :n;s was taken This letter, hcwe\'er, w;;s not ing'. "then it w,,::ld bc puS' as a repl~' to th~ President. turned o...er t() Hanoi's man sib!.:" to open talks. Kosygin 1 Resumption or the bombing in lIo5cow until Feb. 8 r,nd thus pub 1 i c 1y ehan.;:{'d was orJered. the dt'lay has nenr b~ci1 ex· Trinh's crut"i21 \~'ord "coulu" r·cb. IS-Ho replied to the plained:.. ~ intO.:'woulct" }{~ W;!S ne~'ct' Presiden~ in wu.ds similar , '. ~'- .-. " ' contradktcd by 112noi OfL to th!: Pope. "A little later," writes Ash m or e, he and this. Furtht:nnorc, Kosygil. B:tggs received a reply to passed the v;ord to Washthe Ashmore letter saying ington, which h?tl inquired thc-re did not seem to be as to \y!Jen talks would beany point to til<>i,l' making a gin, that they could start in second vi;;il to Hanoi. three or fou!" w"e~s. Feb. 9 - Se:-Cfetary Rusk, at a prc.'.~ confl':cnce which had bt'C'n :mnoun~"d by the Wh:te House, Slid that "[or somt' t!r.!e r.(:~'" then' b;!s D!:ell c..-:cl!::lt a sy,.~cmatic



~;Hnn ... j'!"n

hot th....

r"."\t\"l1')"I.1t ..


, '.



'· A§}ilTI{tl~e'§ •

... - .



• FollOtf.il!g leUer




text of the,

1ll1.rrlf S. Mi1l:10rC to

Prcsidefit Ho Chi }Iil!iL: ' -


Dear !\Ir. President:

Mr. William Baggs and 1- - have m2de a full report to appropriate officials of the United St1lt('s Government on - -, our r~cent conve;saUon with you in Hanoi. Ambas::ador

'Luis Quintanilla/ h~s conlmunicated his ,-iews to the U_S. -, Amb:l.ss~do.. in )Iexico City_-

"The State D('p::rtmcnt ha's · ~xprcs,;cd itself as most grateful for your thoughtCul approach to the possibility' of -an ultimate scttl£'Jr.cnt of the bostilities bct\':ccn the United · States' and the Dcmocratic Republic of Victnam. In our sc\·cr..l discussions' 'With senior otlicials of the : State Dcpartment they tJvk ',occasion to reiterate points, ,we belicvc arc aIrcady known to you. 'I'hey emphasized that · the U.S. remains pretlared for ~secl'ct discussio:ls at any time, '\\itbout condWon5, and that such di~CUSSlon3 m!:ht cover the who1e range of topicS rele"ant to a peaceful scttlement. · They rei~erated that the Geneva _A.ccords might be the framewotk for a peaceful so-

lution. , : They expressed pariicular ,interest in !-'our suggestion to us that private talks could begin pro\'ided the U.S. stopped bombing your country, and ceased introdUcing additional U,S. troops into Vie~nam. Th~y expressed the o;>inion that : . some reciprocal restraint to , indIcate that neither- side· intended to use the occasion of the talks fo:- military· advantage would ,p:O\'ide tangible evidence OL the good .faith of , ,n parties in the pros~(-cts for :a ne~otiated settlement. ,

In -the light of these con.

cerns, they expressed gre«t

interest in any clarification or , 'this point that you mi.;ht wish to provide thruugh a commul1ication to us. " , ,- Speaking no\"; whol]'" for • oursel\'es, we b~licn~ tile ess~~ti~I :on,dition for prodllctnc .alks IS an arran"(.'nlcnt lmdt't" which ncithe;' side , stands to gain military advant~g~ during the period Q.f nego, tlatlOn. '1'0 :l~hi(.'\'e this end it ,may be that preliminary sccret disc:usslcns' .....ould be l1c-Ipful to determine the out-line of a possible pC;lceful 6ettl(,fflent. ~ . • . As we sec it, these are prac. tical considerations that havc notbing to do with questions of "fa~e." There is no dOUbt

In Our minds that the American GO\'crnment genuinely seeks peace. As pri\'ate citi2~S, our sole concern is in facilitating a ci~cussion that will brill,;! aU matters at issue to official consideration. It is ,in this sense that we cOn\'ev thcse comments, and invite any rc~!ly you may wish to 'make, which' of course. we Would report to our Go\'ern~ent, in complete di~.cretion. , May I take this occasion to renew our thanks for the eo u r teo u s and considerate treatment we receh'cd in }lalloi throu;;hout our "hit and ior the honor of om' most useful cO:lxersaHon with you. ; 1£ you feel that iurtller personal com'crsation with :;\lr. Baggs and me is in order we would, of course, return to }lanoi at your com-enience. HARRY S. ASH:\IORE


'n;i<>ht 'be 'a"~iscfu! 'ch~rincl we (nern't want to jtQpard!ze it."

But he Slid tlJ'! btcst expan-

sion of the war indicated that "whatever kind of cI1:mnel we b:!d is lio use now" ~i!d that

:the State Depart.'\1cni ?>Ii": Ash'more also accused the Presi· 'dent of ···crude· duplicity" and ; ·thE; .Administr~tio~· of ~"dou!Jle



. Ashmore, Editor; Who Met \'lith Ho C!:i rAinhJ Says

. • William P. Bundy; Assistantj Secretary of, State for East l 'Asian Affi~r5. sa!d Lie St~te De-


Efforts Were Undercut "

.TWO ,~~T:~RS A~ ISSUE/'

One From the White Housel S21d to Ha\'e Conflicted \'!Hh Intermediary's };y HEDRICK SMITH S~~·:!ll

!:: Th~ !:(~ ~.(O;~ ~l::-rs

\\'ASHl:\GTm-r, Sept. 17-Thel ('ditn: :md v:rite., H?rry S. Asn.( n:o:e, rep,:irtd.tc~:lY that he re: Ly,,;J a p~.?=c b:d to Ho ChI :'iinh on b"lmlf of the State D~'I

' prtmcnt kst Feb:uarj. But ~Ir. Ashmore dnrgrd th:lt President. Jo!m~on til·~n "df~cti\'ely and' ""-11" C~"cc'''d'' ••. .'~. &......." sccr~t! ' .. " "-I. ...





.1 'ltl'-'I'·,~ ~\I.,.I;;

... "n t'''co:n 1.',.:, s,,~-I'''''' ~ .. i'~.·.IO"' 6_ prO'l):-;,. .. l""cto t'l'e "0"'1 .,!'I •• t~ _Lt.. l





Pres:dcnt. . Mr. As!:mo:-e slid his Ietterl bad b<,,;n mit,ten in re~pon~e to, It "concili:!tory"'conYersat:ou he had naG with Uo Chi Minh inl Hanoi last J?nuilrv. He acld~dl that Mr. Joh~son's letter, set. ting forth "most stringent", A.'l1erican terms for: p:!ace'r ,reached Hanoi befure the meso . sage that M:.Ashmore had beenII

. authorized to send. • ., . 'Duplicity' Charged


•. Ho Chi }orinh, in a letter to ~Mr. Johns~il d:!tt'd Feb. '15-1 .'which became pubHc lastl ·M?.rcn 21-rejected Mr. JOhn. 'son's' demands. ',As a Conse. ~ ,\Ir .. 1, ,..~ h_$ ~ "n"'·. "quenc<:, N •• ~'s .• mo." ll._l . cated. th~ secret S.ate Department



, I re.'

•ech,ed a. n~gath'c response, from Hanoi. .• :: Mr. Ash:nore. formt'r c:.ccu-, :tive edito:" of The Arkan~asl :(jaz:ue, is now e:(ecllti~e vice,' ~sldcnl (if L;e Center for the,


. ,udy of D~n:ocr.ltic rnstitu-, : tions at Santa .Barbaia. Calif. ;-OHe s::id Presidl'nt Johnson's let.) ::te, h:tcl con~radicted the te.ms . 'o( fuel, message approyed .~y



:partmenl "had d:scuss:ons wi~hi . Mr. Ashmore and. ~!r. Ba:$g:'j: 2S we would with any Amen- • 'can who has talked with lead- ! ers in Hanoi." : But he refused to co:nme:~t, on Mr. Ashmo:e's reported, peace app.u:?ch or his charge, .that tliel President's inten·en· 'tion had upset the effort.

. v:inte;'.

: at~i}' c~~cir:~tor~~"~ •


Mr. Ashmore told of . peace approach in a 15.000. : :word articie, "The Public Rela'tions of Peace," printed in Cen.ter Magazine, a new bimonthly : publication of his org~nization. :, The peace approach, he re~ ported, was an outgrowth of a, ·:'trip he took t'J Hanoi lasl Jan~ uary with William O. B3gg5, • e:iitor of The :-.tiami News. 1"hcvt ~ 'ar:ived in Hanoi Jan. 6, ha~ ~l '-pr.lvate two:~o?r ,onVerSltlOn : With Ho Chi •.1mh Jan. 12, left ,"Hanoi


on Jan. 14. and reported,I

,to the State Department on' · Jan. 18. " In a telephor,e intcn'iew to. : day, Mr, Ashmore said he had

· rcfrained from discIos:ng the : episode until now because :,thctight that 2S long as we


• ...



. .

I the



• , ' . " ... '



a formula of mutull cc·cs··

gan, :-Ir. AS!1nl0re v;rnt Oil •• In his 2rticlc. ~.rr_ AS!Jmore says he t;l~n rlraftrd. in col· j laoo.J.tloa wit!l 1'.f:". Bundy, cart-fully word"d }.:-Ut': of a ·.v "~ ..... .•" a half. , . It w::s , sent.I P.."'''' to 'Hanoi reb. 5 tir,ou;,l ? pre., .• dc.l:mne ' 1 In· • viomly cst~hhsae Cambodia., . Mr. A~hmore S:lys the Jetter:

The State D:p~rtment has preViOU5!y di!closcd that the United States Em!lassy in Moscow made fi\'e cont;lcts with ,"NOrUl Vietnamese diplomats in : :Janu:l:}'. culminating wit~ the ""delivery of Prc;:.ident Johnson's


. Ho seemed prep:trcd to con· .c;ld~r a. sr·~dfic proposal ~ased

cahtion," :-':r. Ashn~Ne. added. ,"Ho Il:lc! l!nd:!r$~ccd tnat we · would r~:;ort our con\"~·r5?tion • to L'ie Sht~ D;:p?ri:!:l~!it .and • exoected 50::1::: r?S;OIl.;e. smce • he' hld mad·~ arran~?:1~crrts to : have an)' .furt:ler mcss::ge 5~nt , rlirccth" to ).im." • ' • In th:: tcb;,!lonc In tervle''''', ~tr. A~hmore recaJ!ed that Ho :Chi Minh n:;d ins!sted on a halt in American ho",-blng .o~ Nor-h ~Vl"'tn:t::l as a TC'l.t!!S;ta fori peace taj~s. Ho Ci~i r.!in!t a!so indlcateJ th?t H:l:l~l wCould like to seel :1 h:l!t in the stca~y build·un or Amedc:m fo~ces m South \Tj,,:n:.m b~forc tlli:s be-

,this over the phone." ;~' Oth~r officills, withe!!! con· "fimling the repc;rt, recalled tha; 'last winter was a time of complic?ted con!:tcts \'."lJh Hai1Ql.

meeting in Lon::!on.



said tllat dur• : ing the CCl:ttacts with North • Vict!!arnes~ I~adcr5 he ana ~rr. · B~g~5 fot:d Eo Chi 1'.i:n!l and 'o'hr.·r ""''''I)~ ofFc~rs uddi\"er-

Intensive Efforts t-eC:llled "Any comment must awa:t a careful studV' of ~Ir, Ashmore's :story," ~Ir. Bundy said. "1 can:not commcnt on something like

...: Early in Fcbl'uary, the United States was a!.;o communicating 'with Hanoi through' Prime Minister Wilso:t of Britain and Premier Alcks~i N. Kosygin of 'the Soviet Union, who were




: 'letter.

t.~cre was no 10'l~e .. any point i:l ke?pin~ s~cret tile un:;uc· cessful maneul'cnng of last


appcared to r"d::ce

conditi0:15 for a bIt In bomb· in.. 2:;kin~~" for 5:l~e It, bmo"" ". of •

rcc iprnc.!l ,:)t


y r1an5)1.


.In pub!ic statements, admm..

istra!iml o~ficb.ls w~re cemnnd· in'".,.a "fi'cinfGcal r:::duction" of .• b the flg!J~mz y ...ra:lO!. . . Key paS5azes of th~ Asilmore <{.-

letter, as t('po:t('d in the article,

were as fo!lows: ': Key sections of t!~!! letter, as reported in the a:-tIc!e, referred to the cfiorts of ~Ir, Ashmore and Mr. B:lt:gs as fol!o\~:s: " . "rn our ~se\"eral discussions ,vith senior officials of the State Depnrtment••ti:cy c;np~a· sized that the U. S. renl:uns preDared for secret discussions at anv time, without 'conditlons, and that s:lch c!iscuss!Ons might cover the whole ranz~ of topics rcleY<!r.t to a pcaceful settlement. They reite~at{'d that the Geneva, accords might be the framework for a peaceful

solutioil, • "They e:.:pressej particular interest in yo!!r sug,5c.;tion. tO I

us th::t prh'ate talks c':mld OC-j "in proyld(!d that U.S. stopped; o bo:nbi::g. your . CO l::! •,I!" •• an dI .-,eased mtroductn!; aodlilonal U.S. tr?ops into Vic~n2nl. They,1

exp'ress~~ the-OPi}1i~~,~~t' ~omef

- ;.

''} ~~;'1his prop~sal to -~o~ i~i ~~ G~;~r~.n;:~t· ~f - s~ufu;i~~~~ his hand \~'i;h~~;~deq~tet rcclproc~l resu:amt:t? m~lcatclnow willi a sp~cific Sense oflvie~am could promr;t1y nc~oti'lo?portunitY to const:!t with hisj

th:t Felther ~!~e m.cpdc:d .:~Iurgcncy arising from tile im. ate an extension of the Tet'own people' a:ld the Na:iOil211 us_. tne occaSIO.l of tae tal~I' • "". h t·.. ._ . It , " 0 'Lib .' F ~...I for military ad\'anta-'~ would,m.men. n.\ •• :rear o,!..a::> lDl ruc... . ..' era.!on !on•• or Vletcon~., providetangib:e evide~ce of theIV!:!tnam~ .If you are able tOj Mr. ~s~~?!'e s arLlcle com· The bOr.1b~"lg pluse. part of: 'good faith of aU parties in the,accept tl1l5 ~:,)po~al I see nO,ments: ~tolhaz:t Budy and thcjTet. b~g::.n I A.M. Feb. S. Itl prospects for a ncgotiated'r;~:iJ!1 why It cOlll~ not takc;oth:rs :';;10 hlO?i'e~. over o:.:rjFeb. 12. b.ut Prc$id~nt ,Johnson settlement." • le.fect at the el:d o. til;! n~widratt Ie.ter h:l~ lr:slsLed ~hat It'ext~r.ded It about ..0 hours to _ Presidcnt Joh:lson's letter to ,year. or Tet, hohd~ys. Tne pro-jwo:lld b:: a m:$ta",~ ..to tie }:nyl'a::O!d; embarrassing l?re;n:er d"t"d Feb ? "·~slpos.·tl I have mloe woald be'IPropo~.!l to t ..e 1e.. bOlnD!r.g Kosvgm. who h:d been In Lon-, l 1'o Chi'• 1~'inh t ... . " " 1,,~,~tJtr s'r "(··~"""d .• '''t''.. ~: \,. ,.ld ....... :d '.. .... .' ~ lQlr.g. .' relay.~d •••• thro""h til" • -Unit"d ....·::-.. • e..~.;.:... l'f }ourIP_ .~v> 5!'~I''' .. ,,,, ...... 5 .0.., t.,_ m'l on o.er toe .. et per.oa "t-.: El'l~"~:Y':> I'll "'lwo _ 0:" ·to nuhtary alt~!:o;mes and ~hose terpreted by Ho as an effort to to arrange p~ace tal~s. - ,I .!)c •• . ~ . . St ... ~" • v~:"'.:t North Vietnam~se dip!o;nats. --' President Chi ~.!inh said he Ie<>~i ...~,: l'residcnt Johnson's lett~i' on Feb. 10. Mr. Ashmo:tl charged that tl!c PrcsicI,~ntial m~s5:!ge contr~d!ct~c! the Ash..'nore·B:tgg5 mess:t::;e In several imPOl tant r~:;;pects f-na tllUS ZEulliiied it. He l!otcd that tll~ Presidential letter -did . not mention 'the Genen accords 25 3. baSis for ncgot!~tioli'. ~ the otl}er meso sage had. . He also notctj that the Presi~ .- ----dent had - ofic.~d to stop tile bO:l!oing and Ule Amcric?_'1 troc? build·up in South Yiet· nam, but to do 50 - only ruter rcco:h'in:; assurznces t!l:.t l,o:th Vi::t.'1:,ml~se infiltration into South Vietnam llad ce:!.sed• • . Mr. Ashmo!'tl referred to this passage from the Johnson letter: - "I am prepared to order a 'cessation of bombing against your country and the stopj)ing of further augmentation of U.S. forces. in South Vietnsm as soon as I am assured Liat infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stoppetl. -These acts of. restraint on both sides would. I oel1e\'e, make it possible for us to cClnduct seri'.QUS arid private C!iscus~Qns .!eading toward an early peace. :. Mr. Ashmore maint.'!ined that ;·the Presidcn ti:al lettcr, was I timed to put a "time squl!eze" on Hanoi; an asp~ct that had carefully been avoided in the • draftiag of tlle.Asilmore·Baggs message. He referred to this







. Aslnll.erC Says F~cler to IIanoi CJ \1'as r\lillifiecl By Murrey lfarder Wash!ll;tO:1 l'03t Stat! Wrlle:

A prominent £ 0 r mer newspaper editor charged yesterday that the Johnson Administration joined in and then "effectivelv and brutally cancelled" a ·previ. ously undisclosed pea c e overture to Hanoi last Feb· ruary. The disclosure plus acclIsati0!13 of "double-dealing" and

an "almost total absence of (,andor" on the p~rt of Presi~~'llt Johnson and the State · Dcp.ll'lment were made by Harry S. Asholore, executive ,jce president of the Center fOl' the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara Calif.' • Ashmore visited Hanoi in Janu:lry.. He oortra,ed the PresIdent, and bi' inil;lication, Seere!ary of State Dean Rusk .. :IS nullifying .3 secret "con: .....: dli~tory" letter to Hanoi that t. her Stat{' DC'partment offi. -. :.als join~d Ashmore in draftmg, by sending a presidential letter setting tougher terms lor peace talks. The conditions COl" haItin" the Amcr:ican hombin'" North Vietnam to produ;e gotiations arc still at the center ot current national and international debate. · White House Pre:;s' SecrE' tary Geor~e ChrisUan said Ja~~ nig~t. that h~ was unla~ millar wltn Ashmore's account or the letter hc cited. Seerc. ta,ry Rusk said he had not talked with Ashmore or his associat:s and thus felt it inapprOI>r1ate to get into the matt~r now, a spokesman said. ~ther officials had no imme.


dlate comment.

· Ashm~re. CO!'merly the Pul. Itzer PrIze.winning editor 01 . the Arkansas Gazette or Little I~ock, Ark., ..met . with .Xorth Victnamese President Ho Chi: Minh in Hanoi lasl Jan, 12. With' Ashmore were \\"illiam I 'C. Baggs, editor of the :Miami (Fla.) Xews and also a direc( 'r or the Santa Barbara Cen· ......CT. and Luis Quintanilla, for· mer ?Ie:dcan Ambassador to the United States. . .. ....i



-'-", - -. -.-- .. -" '- .. cal gesture of recluced military actio:! by H,moi. crih<;d at the time only as an "But lIr. Baggs and I," Ash· ciCol't to solicit Korth Viet. more said. "could orfer our nam's attendance at an unom· cial peace com'ocation spon. judgment that the tonc of tbe . sored by the California·based conn~rsation had b~en deliber~cnter at Gene,a, last ]'lay. ateh- conciliatory and that Ho . Ashmore. in a lengthv arti· see~ed prepared to consider a." cle written for his or';aniza·. specific proposal based on a . tion's Center ~ragazin; said the trip was underlakc~ with 1 formula of mutual dc·cscala-. . se7r~~ rc~ogn!tion. by the Ad.' tion. nnms.ratlOn tnat It also mi"ht. ·'lioreo\'cr. no real risk was . " open up a useful chan!lelCo of;t entailed in finding out communication with the Korth! whether this was so. Ho had ,. Vietl}aznese." understood that we would report our com'ersation to the' Ncwslnan Departs , State Department and had ... At the Statf.' Department, he. I made arran;ements to ha,'c said, "we were asked to l:ecol any response sent directly to' th~ trip secret as long as l>oss~ . him." .. ble ••• " They entered II:moi 'Scl1iz\)i(l Quality' on Jan. 6, the day that Hard.! Ashmore and Baggs then l son Salisbury of The Ncw' York. 'l'imes was departing on ~ left ,rashington. Ashmore saidl "our dealin~s ";ith the Depart-I the International Contr')i meni had begun to take on 3; Commission plane that carried pronounced schizoid quam}·... them to North Vietnam from Baggs, he· said, h;'ld done: Cambodia, and the news or the some confidential diplom3tic: Ashmore - Baggs - Quinani1ia errand3 for the late President; visit became kno ...:n. Kennrd,· in the Caribbean, They saw' President Ho for and "was on fairly intimate about two hours on Jan. 12. terms with a good many" top By the time Ashmore and: State Departmcnt offici31s. Baggs r£'turned to Los A:l:;e!es i Ashmore dcseribed himself on Jan. 15, Ashmore wrote, the I as "encumbercd by identificaSalisbury articles about ci,il. 1 tion with tht' eclipsed Adlai ian casualties c:lllsed by bomb·l Sten:nson wing of the Demo-I ing Korth YiNnam had "creat·· eratic Party and by a long pered a national furore," with a . sonal association with thei "concerted effort" in Washing· Johnson Ad~lini$tration's It'~~­ ton "to di~cr.cdit :.Ir. Salisbury ing bctc nom:, (Sen.) J. '~11· • _ ." .~shmore said "our re· liam Fulbright." Added Ashports were a complete ,·indica· mor(', "Finally, we represented tion 'or lrr. Salisbury," but be the Center, 3n uncom'entional, and Baggs a\'oidcd an:. com· and thereiorc automatically nlent about their. attempts to 'suspect, institution," open private communications Ashmore wrote that "we w:th Hanoi. soon be~an to feel that we "At the State Department's were confronted by two dis: request," said Ashmore, he tinct State Departments." and Baggs "managed to hide out for thrce days after our re·· "One, which 0 b v i 0 U S 1Y'1 regar~ed us with profound disturn. and to meet secretlv in Washin~ton with the De~art.' trust, aoparently was headed ment's top cchcloll." by Secretary Rusk," said Ash-! " !more "who' ne,er saw us or Dellartmcntai Briefings 'othe;wise acknowtedged our, "The briefings (at State) presence. went on intermittently .Ior a "The other (State) Deil3rt. day and a half." said Ashmore, ment," said Ashmore, "which and covered the co!!.ersation· appeare:d'to be seriously inter· 1 with Ho in great detail. e3ted in negotiations with "We had not brou~ht back~ Hanoi included Under any hard proposal from Ho; Secretary :Xicholas deB .. Kat'j Chi :'1inh," Ashmore contln.' zenbach,' A\'ercll Harl'lman'l ued, "beyond the reiteration of the elder statesman.. who his unqtialified commitment to speaks with the authority'&£. al enter into negotiations if the personal repre3en~ati\'e of the;"" United. State" halted the President and Assistant Sce.' bOJ?1bing Of. XQrth' Yietn:lm; retary wimam. Bundy, who. is T~lS could not on its face be immediately In charge of sald to rncc~ l,be st~t('d Ameri. . Sou.heast Asian Affairs." . ~an requirement of a rccipro. ..... .




Their ri;eetin~s \¥ith Korth Vietnamese kaders were cies·



' l

, '.

In\itatiOnS r.e~~i"d

I t




',The composition of a pa:;e-, , J "J and.a·hal! letter, to be sent .' At the St::-te Department's; 0 \. e r Aslunor~'s signature, :requcst, sa:d .:\shmore, he and: "consumed most of a Saturday 'BO!ggS rej('cted invitations to ~ afternoon:' he said. "It was e:fify b:!fQrc either Senate or; allowed to simmer o\-ernight, ' ic committees, and to stay~ was reconsidered without our I"'" of the news as much as ~ pre3ence at an upper,c:ehelon possible during "t.J:1c next few meeting on-Sund~yafter. weeks, while our repor~: pre·: noon,", said Ashmore,:and"the ~sumably bounced back, and final" version \~'as' delh:cred ,in 'forth b~twcen the two (State) a plain manila envelope to·the Departments." ~residence of S':fi_ .Fulbright, .' Finally, he said, Sen_ Ful- il ., 'brigh,t expressed surprise; where lIr.Baggs and.1 baa"r when he asked Baggs if they; gone for luncheon." , ,had reported their cOn\'ersa,' "I mailed it myself that . Hon WiUl 110 to President afternoon, Feb. :5." said Ashpohnson personally, and \';asl,more, "under the perhaps pro· ,told no, }'ulbrigIlt raised thatl:p!l~tic p05tmar;~ of the John i\\'ith thc President at a White," Foster Dulles International mouse function. said Ashmore. .Airport By prior arrange. ":;,:ld tlu~reby pinked the nerve; ment, the letter 'was- to be " . mailed to Cambodia b}" regu!:',:,: activates the president'sl'- lar mail and ~~;\\"~rded froIllI ~.'''';;'''' ~t1S reflex," there to HanoL .. , A~~n;ore related that th.e I Ashmore said: .. , President saId be though! 1tl "The key passages l!l oUfi un ...:!se to see Ashmore and! letter (to Ho) read: . • S:;ggs personally and st~rtl ." 'In o~r scve~al, dlScusslonsi speculatio!l, but wanted }~l-i wltll. semor offiCials of thel bri«}·t "to be absolutely sahs.! State Depdrlment ••. they; !ied that we were being taken; em?hasizcd that the U.S. r.e·1 se,;o;,;s!y and treated prOpel-oj mal~s prepared ~~r sccr~t dlS'j ly." The President, Ashmorc, CUSSI~~S at any .Ime, w1tho~t said sU<r"'eslcd that the Sena-r !conditIons. and that such dIs,. tor ~it at the next session; ~ cussions ml.;~t cover the whOlei at the St3te Dcpartm{'nt. 'Iran:;:e or tOPICS relc,,'3?t to 3, . "The Pl'<.'sidcllt'S jnt('l'\·cn· :pcacelul,~ettlement. Tncy rc-I i .'," Ashmore continued, .~ro' i iter~tcd that. the Gene\~a AC-, \... 'd a mc{'tin· t with the Dc·:. corQS (of l~~ and 1902 on, ~a;tmcnrs upper hicrarch~:,ISouthcast Asia) might be the', (minus Secretary ~usk)," _a~d "J i!'amework for a peaceful solu: . Fulbri~ht, "plus a sllr: nt :\h~~e. b o n , . House obscT\'cr as wl~ne:.s. ! .. 'They expressed particular, Ashmore said last nl;;ht that. interest in your su;;:gestion tO I they met in Under Secretary ,I us that prh-ate talks could! Kalzenbach's oUice on thcl~ begin provided the U.S. stop-I Dlorning and' afternoon ora: ped bombing your country,; •Feb_ 4. The principals !h~re,~ and ceased introducing addi•. he said, also included W~lham: tienal U.s. troop~ into Viet·: Bundy and Harriman: ~ nam. They expressed the opin, "When Sen. FulbrIght. had Iion that some' reciprocal re:finished" outlin.ing his \"1ews,: straint to indicate that neither Ashmore wrote, "and th: air-! side intended to use the occa.: .conditioning h a d. w!l1S~C~ i sion of the talks for !'lilitary; awa y the last "t~aee" Of, br~m lad\'antage would provIde tan.; ~tp~e. the. decl~!on ,:~!,s_ ,tak~~ gi~le evidence Of. ~h~ good to dispatch a reply to Ho Chl faIth or aU partIe:.. m the Minh. _.ft prospects fo;, a neg,otl3ted set· In it, Ashmore, it was agreed,: ~lement • . • . " that B3ggs and he "would ex,f, ,The key phrase here wasj pre~ the Department's .lew ~-the call for "reciprocal reo; that it might be .possible ,to!:straint," S(lUr~C$ on ~ile .Ashj suspend the bomblllg a~d morc-Baggs s!~c ~r tm~ Issue. itiate negotiation3, wnnout str~sscd .13~t mzht. T~esel specific conc~ss:ons beyond ani sources sa:d It was emPhaslled ,agreement that ne~ther s:de l in the discussions in ~hc Stat~ ;would use the occaSIon to' im'· Dcpa:-tmcnt that thIS tet:ml'pro\'e its miIibry position." l·no!o~y,~\'OUld Iea~·~.~i?en ~a~y "The letter also was to sug· t' ~ . ,[ gest that )1r. Baggs and I ~p Ion:;, .\:lthout setting out, return to Hanoi Cor IU •• ! ....:I~pgcl:le demand for what, : '-:informa! discussions, ori ciprocal e ;:~r::e? .~~eqt:at~."re_1 that arran"'cmcnts could bC side's min t.am" on eIther. made to Phase us out if it I ary actions. ..' were desired that the m a t t e r , . proceed directh" to the official. level." '.; ,I









I l

I l!



: r '.

· I

Said Ashnl0re: "This conciliatory reeler was effectively and brutally can· ,celled before thi!re was any chance to determine what reo sponS2 Hanoi might have made. ',Cessation fQr lIoli~a.r "On :F.eh. 14, .aner a temporary cessation 01 the bombing for the Tet bolidl\Y (in Vietnam) ,and an ostentatious twoday ,extension beyond the orig· inaih.· announced termination, ,the --aerial attack on .North · Vietnam was resumed ·and eSo,


:,calated." But it was not until aner·; ward that ..l,.sh:norc and Baggs learned, apl>arent!~" when the I rest of the world did, that a. pl'esidentialletter considerably different than the one they collaborated on, was written even before theirs was, on Feo.


.2. .



. "Later (on, March 21, 1967) it was rc\'ealed in Hanoi, and confirmed in Washi!lgton, thatl · the President, unde. date of · Feb. 2, ha~ already disp:;tch:d I : an offsettmg message, said I : Ashmore, "to He Chi lfinh, !over his own :signature. "This was transmitted (rom: Moscow on Feb. S, the day the bombing was .su!>pended and receh'ed in Hanoi on Feb. 10. It '\'a5 certain!:; in Ho's hands when ours a1'rin~d." That letter Irom the Presi. dent, Ashmore contended, "set


iorth " . . the most


demands yet made for


assurance that Hanoi would halt infiltration of troops to the South. The uncompromising tone or the pre~idential message thoroughly dispo5ed oC the careful te~pering we


,fly.specking sessIons" in the!claimcrs c()nsi~ted of no more State Department., than as;;uran~c tbat those he The k~y 1:m:u:lge in the: addressing" at least, were President's m~sa;;e was: !SlnC~~;lY seekmg a settle· , "1 am prepared to order a men • . II ' " cessation of bombin" a"ainst' Ashmore said the crcdlbtl· your country and the"sto~ping; ity gap .• '. ma~ be lc~s a case 01 further au "mentation or oe dellbcra.e dissembling than ',Uniteii ,States l~rc.cs ,iIi South: of pet\'a~h'e ignorance ~r ulH· 'Vietnam ,as .snon :as] ,am'~,lm3tc polIcy that goe~ ng,!tt to suredthat infiltration .into Ith: top of, theCabmet. lie South 'Yietna-mb\' land andI S3!d: " sea has stopped,"': "A President who insists . on keeping his options open E:dcndmg Truc,e as long as possible. and per· , President Johnson a1so'to1djsonaIIy re\'cal!;'!g his choic~sJ :Ho that the proposal "would! lea\-es e"cn hIS own most ex· ,be greatly strengthened ifla1tcd ass?ciatcs cmharrassing. your military. authorities and ily, mute m ':,egard to large aC· those of the Government of:fau's for whIch they are nom·. South. "'ietnam eou!~ promptly inaUy responsible," , negotiate an extensIon of the,'Charves 'Do~tble.Dcalin"" Tet almar Ne\.... Year holidar) .. . ". truce," then under way, .Ash~\ore sa~d that tl;e:res~ Hanoi, however, always, had dent ha.~ tak('~ a .pm""pon.. adamantly refused any nego, apP!o:ch to' letnGm _to t:y uations with the re"ime in to, ~Cl. out of ~outhea:.t ASla Saigon, .. wltnout appc~rmg ~?, have sur· A h 'd th ' ''''''11' fered a maJor mwtary and . ,nS ~ore 531 a. ..1 l~mlPolitical defeat." He said "tbe Bund~ and the others \>hOI'dOUb!e'de-alin" to which Wil.', -labo~ed ,_o\~er our dra~t letter liam B:!g~s ;nd I were subhad ,msl:.te... t~at It \\ould be ject~d" reflects alternate prcsi. a Mistake to he a~y proposaljdentlal responses to military t~ the !et bombmg ,~ause'ipre;;silre and the unpopularity :smce thiS \~ould be mter'lor the war. preted by Ho as an efCort to. '..' ,force his hand w'th • d.l The AdministratIOn. A~h. i , lOU. a e I more char&ed, set 'out "lo dISq~ate ~pportun1ty to consult,' credit" the unofficial conC~r. \nth hiS own people and the ." ' G ' 1 L'b t' I enc, 0;1 peaec held rn ,('net a NLF" (:-; t' '. ' a ! ~ ~ a "era IOn I in ~ray entitled "Pacem in Er~ont. the pOht:cal 2~m or the/Terris II," ' , \ :etcong gucmUas In Southj The intensified AmeriC'an Vletnam,) '. lbombin<t of the Hanoi,Haj. "Under date Of .. Frb, 14," pilong ;rea in April. he said, ,Ashmore charged, .:\lr: John, led to Xorth Yietn:ulJ's refusal ~son got from Ho Chi ?hnh thejto attend the conference, un~ sharp, negaU"e reply he must,' derminin<f the concept of the .have expected," . orin-jnal ~llrcrenre objccth'c. "Ours came a little 1ater,"1 Xshmore ·said the State De. said A~hmore, "the simple, un"partment scnt a young dip!o-. exceptionable statement that mat Frank Sie\'erts to Gethere did not seem to be anj' nc..'~ in line ,dth its '''success. point in Messrs.•-\5hnwre and iul effort to imolant in the Baggs e~min: back .to HanoilAmerican media' the notion at that time. .that the Com"ocation was de"'Necessarily SubjecU,'c' !liberatclY" ~nd suspiciO~slY , Ashmore said he could only,loade~ .. aoal~st the Umted. offer a "necessarily subjec,!State:>,,: '. u\'e" account of "what actu,; PresJOent Johnson, In lus ally went on in the uppel"~ea!,ings with "the :-\~~riC'an' 'reaches of the Administration,,;lnte,Iectual commumty, .-\5b· to. account for the dh'erse let.t mo~e charged, "mad; ~~e 'ters. . ,:tac:lcal error of conCusIng hiS ; "From bC"innin!l to end (,f:critics with his enemles." Ash· our dealings with the Depart.:I mere sal'0 'h • a t"preach"mg conment:' he char"'ed. "there \\'as~sensus," the Pre5ident "had an almost tot~1 absence _ or: made it imposslole or attain· candor on the official side," Iment by cons~ant resort to the ". _ • We never aof a 5.ltis.'kind oC crude duplicity that factory answer," .. he said,! buys time but destroys con· ~'\\'hcthcr the Adnlinistration! fide nee." , was really wmin~ to ne6otiate! "What the Administration 'I' a "compromise settIemcnJ in! despcra~cly needs," sa:d AshVietnam or was committed to. more, u JS the support or men ta ~i1itary \'ic~ory," 1of intellectual caparity ar.J W,hen FulbrIght, at one oI:nl<>ral pa$sion. but these arc ,the State Department m~ct.'qu~mics primari!y. associated inss,' "bluntly stated his \'iew;wIth those L~'ndon Johnson , that t11c_ ~~~t~r, ~\~~e, c,a~~,~1 n~ l~r24i t~I~~tcs,'"




i I



jC;h~~;;~~dAsh~nore Lett~rs:t~ Hanoi Compared" :: ·;ol~~\;:j~.. is:~ ~om~ari;on 'orlbIc ~vidcncc of the good faithlgreatly 'stre~gtl;enc:l if' YQ~lrlV;hcre contacts' have ;l~cady hi"hIi"h~ ~r a lett~r b,,- Prcsi-~of all parti~s in the prospects,military authorities and thos~loccurrcd. They could meet in d;~t JoJ:nson to President Ho:for ~ ne~t~nted ~~tt!er;:t;!1t." . lof t.~e Go~ement of South Viet·· some oi:~er counu:", such as Chi Minh of North Vietnam I, PRr.SIDr.NT,lOhNSON, Ihe[c~na::t could p·ompt!v ne"o:jateh~urrna.' You m1\' have otherb 8 d I • b :'15 onc "o'ld w:).v to Q\'ercome' .. ' . co I ' .. -• •' , sent Fc. • an a c.ter, }' ithis r~bl"'n [of communicaJan ('''tension of the ret truce."i arran~~mcn,s or SltC? In mmd, Hllrry the edltor':t, ~ d'In!i "'R ros.!and " t RS. b Ashmore. 5 ! Ion] Pd'·' an t9 TilO\'efo.•war ...... As;z"OR"': • ,1\. • z:. re'''-'' .... - a .' I' I 'vo"ld .... lr\' _ to r."'et"'()"~ •. ~.,~Y~rcs~~nt Johnson wrote: lsearcb_ for. a peaceful scttle-;sible agreement to the .r.ew·su~gest!on~," _, . : ! "I am prepared to order a, ment: 1 hat IS for us to arrange ,:year's truce in Vietnahl, ~m. ASH~IORr.. s letter pro!('~ss:ttlon of bombing agai!lstlfor d,:-cct ~~I.::s ~et..,:c:n t~ustc~I' MR. ASH~.iORE: "Ti:ey [lheiPoscd nO specitic mee~ing place, :your country and the s~oppm~;r7pre=>entatl~cs In a s.cu.e.. se. State Department officlalsJ re~1 PRESIDENT JOH~SO~: "If . of further augmentation ofltI~g a~~ ,a\.ay from tbe .,la.~e'iterated that the Geneva ac-\vou have any tnougnts about U~iled States forces in soutblo. 'pU~.lCI~~' S~ch talks s~ou,c cords might be the !ramework:ille acti~n~ I propos~. it would VIetnam as s(lon as I am as'lno, ~.. u:>~d as a propagandE' for a neaceful solutIon." I~ mO$t Important that I resaTed tl1at infiltration in SouthlcxcrclSe. but sr~ould b~ a s~rl- PRESIDE.'iT JOHNSON didl'crive them as 50011 as possiVietnam by land and by s2ar OUS effort to find ~ \'Iork2~le not mentiun the Gene\':1 gree- b!e." :~ , . bs sto9Pcd. _ . 12!ld .~lutually accep.able SOlt!- ments of 1954 as a poSSibk!' MR. r\SH~IO:l'E: "In the light "Tnese ad$ of res!ratnt· on tIpn, ' -' • . framework. of these CO!1C('rns, tney [the lOth sides would, I believe, ?liR, ASHMqR~:, :rhey[Statc PRESIDE~"T JOHNSO~: "As:Statc Dt.'partmcnt offichls] exul!ke it possib!e for us t~ con'lr:cpartm~:lt offl~ta,sJ, cmpha- to'the site of the bihte~31 d!s-Iprcs~ed great. intere~t in any tuct ~rio::5 and private chscus- Slz~d that the Umted States ~e- cl!sslons I propose, there a:c clarmcatlcn of this poid {;!bol.l~ lions leading toward an carlYlmal~S prc,ared fO,r secrc,t dls- several possibiHtIes. We cou!d.!mutll:;l restraints] that yoa >eace," , CUSSlO?S at any tm~e. wltho,ut'for eXi\mple. have our rco:-e-'might wish to p:-o\"id~ tnrm!:;h MR. ASm.!O~E wro~e: "TheYICOnditiOns. and that such d,s-Isentati\'cs mee: in Moscow!a ccomml!l'!icatio:} to '\1$," binb oWcials of the Sta.te De, cussio:1s mi~ht co\'er t:1t' whole. ' la;hn~ntJ cxprcss~d p:!.ticular.rangc of topics ,relative to a , nterest in your sugzestion to!pcaccfu[ s'!t\.Iement:' " ' lS that p:-i\'ate talk." could 'PRESIDENT JOHNSON: ~ "in proviut>d the United States,nl:lke this r:-oposal to you now rtopped bombing you. country,with a sp~cific sense of urand ceased introducing addi- [gency arising from the i!!~i. tional United States troo~s intolnent . new ,yell' holidays In Vietnam. '{hey expressed' tl-teIIVietn:mi. If you are able to acopinion tnat some'tedprocal re- cept this proposal I see no straint'to indicate that neither reason why it could not. take side intended to use the ccca- effect at t!le end of the sian of the tal!ts for militarylyear, or Tet•. holidays. The proadvantage would pro'.ide tangi-!posal I have made would be.






, . : In addition,

A.··.. \~IUl




1 - .. ,. - ... ..... , ....-


t'akin~-ili:eCtis:-:::!:-:U~·:I~~', a-rcport~7 asked ....

• •





1\' Ash" u 'If til.:: AdministratIon had b~en 1.1r.' more, mr., "!\trin"in" ah...... th" t" • . ~ +" . . . , ' 0 men, S:tl ....~,~.e was no In- • Mr. Bundy reclied, "Absolutely 'C'



" ,..

consistency" between the Go\'· ~'not." '. .. ernmel'l-drafted mess;lga sent~. The Go\'crnmcnt's chagrin to .Hanoi on Feb. 5 t.'lrough Mr. '. Q\'er the disclosure of.the Ash• . Ashmore <!nd a letter U13t ~ m~re'Baggs. p~ace .efio:t w~s p 'dent;J' t H .. evldent bo.h In .r,!r, Bundy s sent, TOO lhi'~S~ I: ih :'~ll'.sOhn th comments and in a statement C In . thr~l.!g • e .....,sca.v ;;. issued· by the State Dep:1rtcbannel on}',::>. S. r'.il".Asnmore . ment. The statement ended had contended that tile Pre.>i· : with the obsen'ation that the Rejects Ashmore Contcn~ion' cent's Jetter CO:1tr~dicted toe" disclc:~urc "will. not reassure at · future pri...a~e gh'en him and thus "ciice- : HanOI That White House Letter tone · I d b t 1! I d" ,. peace contacts would remaIn Ive 'I an ru a'J cane:'! ~ : secret. . .. , to Hanoi Stiffened Temls .. his efforts. . .~' . Mr. :Sundy also spoke of "un. Mr. Ashmore. retched by '. d~rta~ings" from ~ir. Ashmorcl .. ". • :and Mr. Elg~S that they "wouldi ~elephone late today, sr:ld the . -.".:.:..:...:..:~:....:;.:.=...::=..:.....==:------Text of the S!a!e Do:parlmel1t .'Go,cmmcnt's argunlent not pub!ish" d~tails of thcir,'tion. the North. Vietnamese statcm'Zllt is Oit i'ag(! 24. :~'docsn't add up \'erY well." effort.' . I le~der l\"as "deli~eratcly con· iVIp 'shmore dis"lo""'d the.cil:atory"· and. ,"seemed ~re· : "My .... iew is that the two l~t· ~ ..' • I ,. ~ .•• ~~... Iparl'd to cons!cer a speCIfic Ey !-lWPJCI{ SullT}! ~tcrs are m~?nsl$tent 10•• tone peace apprcach in a 15,OOO'jpr~posnl based em a fOrr.lu!a ofl S:'!'-"'~:~ The Z;!:r Y-'f< "riCl., ;and con:ent. he added. Any- \Vord articIi! in Center M3,l;a-j nu..!tu" 1 de-escalation" of the \':ASm~?TO~.' ~ept. 18-:- .one can .figure it out:. they're zil.e, a new bimunthly publica·jfighting., Th~ Administration today de· ,both avtulable. now. Tne tom~ tion of the Center for th·~· Studsl The State D~partment, while n;~d ch:!rg<'s that president 'of ours is (;uite cO:1cilb.tors. of D~r:iocratic In5ti~utions iiljconccding that the two m~n Johnson had "effectively and . 'Inc tone of the President's .is S:lllta Barbara, C:llif.. ~tr" }.s~·lh3.d reported a "conciliatory . . • . more is executi\,:... \'lce preS~it~ne" in their Hanoi c~n:crsa. b:t:tally" s:lbot?-zcd a peace ap- : quite haT;;h." ,. C'l to Hanoi throu"h pd"'h P "d" t's f.oter to dent of the ,'cen~.r . and M",tlons, a~:ierted' that tuelr reo p.oa I , Q.. re:ol ~n . .I:~. B3ggs one of Its d:recwrs. ports. dictated to the GO\'crn. vate cl1annc.s. . ':Hanot was p\lbhshcQ In The, In his artide, !.1•. Ashmorc:mcr.c on Jan. IS. "did not indi.! Tr.e State i);:pa:-tment ,:e:t: .J:'ew York Tin!cs !ast ~!arch 22. said they we~t to R,!~oi to 2r-jcate any give" in Hanoi's terms. to el:tb:>rate lengths to rt,;pl)' . and Mr. Ashmore s today. range for Nort.i \l~tnam'!~cl "In this conversation Ho to the charge by the editor and : If the ~;05COW contacts were participJtion :n tl~e cO;'l\,oca'jnad insisted that there 'COUld writer Harry S. Ashmore. Mr.. so "it?~. Mr. Ashmore' ":~ke~: t!on Pacem in ,'c,ri,3 II: : 'I':o.rl~rbe no tal~:s b~twi'cn the l.!'.S.! Asblon: wrote YC$terdny that ,"why did they send o~r Ic~.el? ,forum on peace. It .\\a" belnc):md Hanoi unless thc bombmg b" •. •... d a a Go\'e:nnlent·~p· "They were under no com·! :~rra~ge~ by the ccn.cr to op~nl··wcre stopped, and al$o .unlcs"s. .... .- ac,_..s, Fcb. ilu!son," he added. "TheY' could In ~••ay In Geneva. • the U. S. stop;'lcd all r~ilito:."ce. lroyed l!ltermedl?ry !ast :ha\"e Slid to us: 'Thank you Mr. Ashmore \\Tot~ that O:l,r.1cnts during the period of the '- .1lary only to be un(.crc~. b) . ....ery much, gCl'Itbmen. If you're Jar.. 12, hand i-!r. UJggs nlct'l ta1ks," the State DcpOlrtmcnt the rrc3idcnt, who har"ened ;.e,er back in' Hanoi, s.end us a Presidcnt Ho Chi Minh and said. . \' Ame.ican terms. '. .;psstcard.> Tn~tt ,:.\·ould ha\'c that, in a two·hour com'ersa-I Contradicting the Ashmore The controversy has arisen, cl05~d the m a t t e r . . ·YCI!>1tJIr.,r'IIt;'-C'i'I!>vt:~, .....tC out of a trio to Hanoi list Jan.~: Mr. ~undy, who. w~ onc of ~Government statemer.~ went on A~h d Mr. Ashmorc's princIpal Gov· . 6 to l'i by Mr. - n1o.e ~~ -ernment contacts last winter, ~to say, COHo was reported to be William. c.. Baggs, edl.ordismissed as nonsense·Mr. Ash· :adamant aSa:nst a~}' rcdproc:i1 of 'rhe Miami News, They morc's assertion that his role ;l11ilitar/ restraint by Northl brou~ht back reports of a "con· •bad been unde~mined by c~n[Vietnam." . ' .. ., ciliatory" conversation with ':filets b~tw~en. "two State ~ '.' Mr. Bundy reported that .at President Ho Chi Minh and :partmel!t~" - one ~ si1llpathctlc ~the time, Government offici;:1s' . S.~o De '''to conCIliatory er.or.s and the were later gwen. a .....e - :' other tal:i:1g a hard line toward ;saw "nothing hopeful" in L~e partment me~sage to send to :~}Ianoi. '. ;Asl1more.Haggs efforts but felt Hanoi. .' ~~ ·"Ashmore understandably .that it should not be neglected. Dundy m\"es Account . ·'felt his own channd w~s !t , : ' YC1U ba\'e to go on prOb.t . . . ~the center of the stage: Mr. William P. Bundy, ASSistant -Bundy said. "!twas not." .. ing," be explained•. Secretary of St3.te for Far East· :. Mr. Bundy said the Adminis· : On Feb. 4, Mr. Ashmore and, ern Affairs, confirmed today :tration had been concentrating Mr. Baggs were called to the that tJIC Ashmore peace e!fort ,on. its ;xchal'~~es in ~r:5co\d: 'State Department to mect with top officials includin:: Mr, had tak~n place but he s,lId at 'wl:!ch North 'Ictnam.dl;,close : ne~...s conference : last March 21. He ~ald he was, Bundy and Cnder :.Secretary . a crow.t,;d~d ... • . .,~'sim!J!v astounded' that Mr" . . that 'Mr. Ascmore's. \'~rs;.on ~f :Ashmo!"c, in his pub!islled ac. Nicholas deB. Katzenbacb,.~~'~~ tile c\'ent:,; was "m!sleacmg. . CO\l:1t of 'last winter's maneu· ,Senator J, W. Fulbright, chair~ "<i. Tne burden 0: his argument. \'ering, had failad to "consider" 'man of the Foreign R",tations • Committee. was also present. Vias that the Ashmore e f ro:'ts the impact 0 f tJ11: "'1 .' OSCO\ll con· " , had been "subsit'Jary" to a far. bets. .......... more ?ctive, imp~rt~t.and di- ~. Not 'Stringing Along' .......... . reet official contact with ~ In ar. hour·lorrg news brief· / ; North Vietnamese represcnta· :ing. unusuaill detailed for a r "'\,cs In l.ioscow in January ~ "subject. so d,;hcat,~ as. pea,ce ail' ....... d·earl'.. Fcbru"..v. ~pr(jlchc.5, ~~r•.. Bundy s~':Id Mr. ""'. .oJ - J . . •• ' : Ashmore and :'Ill'. Rl!~gs had . : not at· the timp. been ~ told 'of : the l.loscow eHorts. It WOUld • ha\'c been "veri unwise" to !'disclosc them to private dtit,ZCllS, Mr. Bundy added... .' , ... _ .• . .,hi;..:,


' ..,










i:Tex(of State Depal~ttnent COl111nent '.



on PeaCB Fe~le~: I

J·n!!:!,-'. the POS'ltl'on of +1. - ! "'1e United Statcs Government'on key issues relatin6 to peace was discussed at some length. so that Baggs and AS!I.nore could Tepresent ,it accl,ll"ate- . 1.y in Hanoi.

;lOre ..danOI. .In these Moscow js a matter of public record.' ';' 't'lASHINGTON, Sept. 18. . 'I . . tl f t ' t t contacts, w!thout at an'! time It rested· on. and w.:s of' ....... 0, oWing IS :e ex 01 a s a e• .lImt issu(!d by the Sta.te Dcproducing any useful reo course read by Hanoi in re· lation to, the various propartmcilt today regarding a sponse. .:. . posals that had been con· . ~ hTCPdort td'lQt !,ri!as!dcllt Johnson . . 16] ~ a Wl ermme .a peace a~ . , veyed in the ?ios.;o\\, channel. r pro:::c1t to Nortit,Victl;am: 7':11 Toward the end of Jaf!U- There was no ch1ngc of basic ;~ , \Ve have had a number -of J."J ·r ary. l'.Iessrs. Baggs and Ash· position whatc·..er bet\vct:a , inqumes concerning news Oil~Dcc. 23. Baggs visited more returned to W~.shing- Feb. 5 and Feb. S, but Presi:. storics published today, based the department just prior to ton ar•..i expr~sscd to the de- dent Johnson's letter did ino . on an article by Mr. J-Iarry tile departure of the three- partmc:lt the strong hope dude a specific action pro· ~ Ashmore in a publication mail group on Dec. 28. At that. they could be gh'en a pos:!.l that speaks fer itself. - f tlIe Centcr f or the that meeting. the basic un-, meS5a2e for transmiss:on. to as does ti~c tone of his com· ~. 0 ~ - S d f ,"" t' I • . Hanoi. The department dc- municatio:l. . : ' ttl Y ·0 ...... mocra IC ,n5tl· de.standing of the United cided that. while Ule dir~ct [8] t'· tutions (C.S.D.I.).· . States Government liosltlon ... . ,. . Th f • • th • c..annaI· In ,\loseow was cru· ~. e ac.s concermr.g e was reaffir.ned, and it was cial and must at all costs be As atr~ady noted, Hanoi \ c!ep:u-tment"s conttlcts with fu.':·~"r ao"-."'!!d t!lt.",_~. ':!_'o"ES d It . would he use-" h"d not r'~p"-d"'a· I'n ""'J .,"'" ,-,,¥ ~~ ~ preserve. t,;., v.l ~ Messrs. ;\sllmore and Ba!::gs and Ash":10re would report iul to send a more general useful ":'Joy to th~ vari~ty of [William C. B:!~gs, e(.itor of • connd!!ntiall~l what ti1CY we.e messaze ,thro~gh r.lessrs. sugg~sti()M con'~:..ed in the Th~ l\1ia:-ni News1 are as abl'· to PI·C.l.-•• up l'n H_~."'ol.· B19~5 an d As.lmore, I ,>"Ie and .I' v .. • which 1\IC"~Q·\' l ~ .. I' c!..an~el·l··s I ••• " • \..>v • " ;,' follows: [I) . -.. ' [4] would be consistent with the apparently IInal resp~nse. w:!s . important meS-2"es b:>j:,,, rellcct~d on Feb. 13, In 2. ~ . During the slimmer of Messrs. Baggs and Asn~ exchanged in i.loscow. ~ 'i~ letter by Presig~nt Ho !O, !. 'HlGG, 1lr. William B:t~gs told more visited Hanoi fronl view of .this channel (ofwhicll·~·Pope Paul VI. 1ms letter, In. to Jan· 14u' Tsh~Y then Ba'ggs-Ashmore were_ una-; the words o~, on~ press ac-. l' the cepartment th~t CS.D.I. Jan. 6 d :. \";as planning a major con. returne to t1le .• and on ware) tltere was some ques.; coun~ ~odalr, coupled an un·. ; fwmce in May of 1957 in Jan. 18 dictated for ·tne de- tion as ~o the. further utility: . ~onql:~on:lI cnd y} ~l~ ~omb, Gcne,'a. to follow up on the p~rtment a full, ar:d ~o;'lnd~n. of dctalled Informal com.' mg \: Ith the \'.lth"r,n~aI of "'first Pacem in Terris meet- tlcular a com er:.atlon With nluni~ations . 1 Ahlcnc:m forces and the rec·. : ing JlCld in New York in Pr!!siden~.~:~.~n Jan.. :2••In ·It ~ec;ncd clear from thc ogni.tion of t~l;: Nat:o'.lal til;:' J'eiinlary of lSG5. Mr. Ba~gs thIS con\..,.",_,IO:1, Ho h.,d Ill- account "i""n by iI'e"sr' cratlO:l FrOIl~ On Feb. 1:>, • disc:Joscd to us efforts that sisted that there co::!d be Ba"r-s andoAshmvr~ thla~ t~l.,'!lr· Presid~nt II') repli~d formally 'cen th.~ tr S . , . , , , , , •• + tl . -I t 'm SIn: . 1 'l~ :. the center \':as mal:ing to no t·,\1.-5 '., .•. •b"t· ~ ~. ..~ \.i... channel of commtl'l:cation .0 la PreSll.en "r • invite North Vietnam to at- ~nd H~nol unless. the bO.-:i:l- had been established wi'h term~. At the ~:mle tIme, · ,tcnd. and the dep:!rtment reo m~ werc stop;:~d. d 1ess ( the primary purpose ot e~- HanOI broke off tnc. MoscoW' ,~spondcd sympathetically to ~I~o ~~e U.S. stopp~d ,2.1 rlC'-, changes conccrning North ch:mncl. . the ide:t of the confercnce l~l~r~t~le&ts ~~:mo Jr.e p~ Vietn~:nese attenda~ce at th~ [Jl . .' !. 'and to these efforts. 'Iht'se rIo to'd te ?'b"s, ? was Mav c{l:1ference. Nevcrt!le. ' Hanoi's attitu(!e rcmabed . :, initial contacts were with te~o~ e ,,~ ,,: ~2.m~'!t less, BaZ£;s and AS;1ffiore s:lid negative throu~:lout. Th~ l:-. they co:.:ld send any mes-, Bag~s.Ashmore efforts "".. re . : Mr. George Ball and Mr. Wil2 ...amst ~~) rc.;clp;o~~1 •: Earn BU:Jdy. The President t~LY restramt by N~{~;V le,: I ,sa~cs for Hanoi t!1rol!gh the necessarilv hanMed by the .. and Secrct.~ry Rusl; were in· n,am. Th; r:cord .. o~s n:~ l regubr mail to a North Viet- department with an eye to • formed, and Mr. Ball was snow tll_t I.e soliCIted a.. na;r,esc •representative in the direct and then·confiden~. directed to handla contacts U. S. Govern:l1ent response to \ Pnomp~nh, wllo' in turn tial ch:!nnd that existed con· :: with Mr. B:lS~s on behalf of these rc~arks. " ;..' . would relay it to a North currently to Hanoi••The lat.;. the United States Govern. [5] , L Vietnamese official Who had te. appearc!d to ba by f:tr tl!e :' 'Dlent . " Concurrently, prior to Jan. been the pdncip'JoI cont:!ct of more reliable and secure -. [2] . 18, on U.S. initiative and Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore m;::thod of ascertaining Ha· ...... In •mid - November and without an}" connection to ~ntt Hanoi. ihtc noi's views., . :j:;,. ~ again in early D~ccmber. Mr. the Baggs.Ashmore actions, e cr now pl1 IS C( y. r. '. [10}· ~" Baggs was jOined by Mr, U.s. GO\'ernment repres~nta-