HASC Pentagon Papers Part V B4 Book II

Page 1

UNITED STATES

VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945 • 1967 •

v.B.4.

u.s.

INVOLV~1EI\'T

IN THE liAR - nrrERliAL OOCU1~~TS -

The Kennedy Ac.ministration:

January

19o1-NOveJnber 1963

BOOK II


V.:B.4.

u.s.

TIOOLVEMENT IN TUE liAR - ..

IN~PEF1IAL

:OOC-tJl.OO1TS

The Kennedy Administration: January 1961 - November 1963

Foreword This volume cont~s a collection of internal U.S. Government documents and position pallers regarding U.S. policy tmrn.rd Vietnam. The volume of materials for this period is so large as to preclude the inclusion in such a collection of more than a sample of the documents in the files. Those' ,classified materials that are included, however, ,{ere circulated at the highest levels of the ,Government and"-'either bore directly on the llrocess of policy fo~ation or vere decision-making instruments. The collection is organized chronologica.lly and devoted exclusively to the Kennedy years. A separate volume.covers the Johnson Administration. . BOOK I

:

roOK II:

January tbru Decen:ber 1961 January. 1962 thru October 1963 .


V.B.lt.. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN

Tim "TAR -- INTERIiAL DOCTJMENTS

The Kenne~ Administration:

January 1961 - November '1963' , -

Contents and Chronological List of Documents 1961

1J

General Lansdale reports on his January visit to Vietnam:, "The U,S. should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical conditioD and should treat it as a combat area of the cold 'war ••• If lie recommends strong support for Diem person~ ~s the best available South Vietnamese leader, and the prompt transfer of Ambassador Durbrow, whose relations with Diem ':are' poor. 'Memo for Secretary of Defense, 17 January

1961 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~...................

2.

3.

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EmbasS,y Saigon, is advised that Kennedy has approved CounterInsurgency Plan {prepared by previous Administration} calling for increasesin U.S, support for Vietnamese armed forces, contingent on reforms by Diem. State to Saigon . 1054, 3 February 1961. ~... •••••••• •••• ••••• .................

14 "

The President requests the SecDef to examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter guer~ rilla forces. NSAM 2, 3 February 1961 ••••••••••••• e,' ••• :". ~

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4. ,The Secretary of Defense is instructed to report his views on actions in the near future to launch, guerrilla operations in Viet Minh territory. NS.AM 28, 9 March 1961.......

5.

18

The JCS comment on the recommendations of Lt Gen Trapnell. In addition to the Trapnell recommendations, the JCS suggest that the U.S. provide Defense support :funds on the same basis ~or 170,000 forces as for 150,000; that the U.S. provide MAP support for the entire 68,OOO-man Civil Guard; and that the U.S. exploit these contributions to induce the GVN to 'accept the Counter Insurgency Plan. Memorandum reflects conflict of views between MAAG and Emb_assy in Saigon. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 228~6l, 11 April . 1961 •••• ........... ~ ••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••••••••••• . }.9' "

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Unsigned paper, apparently by Lansdale 1 propOses a. l?resi-" dential directive organizing a Task Force to come up with an approved plan of action in Vietnam. The goals of U.S. policy in Vietnam fall into three interrelated parts: ' (1) pacification~ (2) stabilization and (3) unit:ication of Vietnam under anti-communist government. Tasks are outlined in this memorandum to accomplish these three goals. Paper in Deputy Secretary of Defense Task Force file, 19 April ~96l ••••••••

22

1.

General Lansdale provides a detailed description of President Diem and his family apparently intended for Vice PreSident Johnson's use •. Lansdale first met Diem in Saigon in 1954~ "Here is our toughest ally ••• a 6o-year old bachelor who gave up romance with his childhood sweetheart ••• to devote his life to his country. JJ Lansdale Memorandum for' Deput,y Secretar,r of Defense, 25 April 1961.................·36

8.

In, view of the serious military deterioration within South Vietnam and in order to accomplish the U.S. objective of preventing communist domination ot: the South., this first . , draft of the Vietnam Task Forc~ report calls for a comprehensive political, economic and military program of U.S. support. Among other reconnnendations are an increase in MAAG and MAP and a visit by the Vice President in the near future. Task Force Drat:t "Program of Action, n 26 April

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1961 ................... •~ ...... .............................. _•.•••

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The effect ot: a political settlement in Laos iiOuld be (1) to, U.S. assistance in preventing a communist take-over. in SVN; and (2) to pennit an expansion of the VC ef.:fort in SVN olung to the greater possibilities for uninhibited in-, . filtration; and (3 ) give complete control to the North

~inhibit

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V:i etn.('lmel';p "t' the thr-ee p~,::::~es thmneh t.hp. Aom:uni.te Mt-)n1'l-'

tains. 1-7ith an exPanded training program in SVN, however, the GVN should be able to d.efend itself even in the event of a Laotian settlement. Second 'Draft "Laos Annex" to Task Force report, 28 April 1961................................

56

10. Attorney General Kenneoy asks the question f~fuere would be . the best place to stand and fight in SEA -- where to draw the . , line'l" Secretary McNamara thinks the best place to take a stand is in Thailand and SVN. General Decker thinks there is 'no good place to fight in SEA. State Department Memorandum of 'Conversation, 29 AI>ri1 1961••••••• e,• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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Secretary Rusk decides at this 'meeting at the Sta.te Depart-, . , ment that UWe should not place combat forces in SVN at this time. If Colonel Robert M. Levy 'Memorandum for Record; 5 Ma.y 1961~ •••••••••••••• ,. e'. '. •• •

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12.

Final Draft of the Task Force Report recommends sending U.S. Battle Groups and an Engineer Battalion for training purposes; the assignment of coastal patrol missions to CniCPACFLT; and the air surveillance and close-support role to CINCPACAF. It also recommends the Vice-Presidentia.l trip, a letter to Diem from Kennedy, increased }UlP and other assistance, and a general U.S. commitment to support of Diem. Final Draft Task Force Report "A Program of Action, It 6 May 1961. eo • • • • • • • • • • • • • '.' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13. OSD requests the JCS to review and stu(!y the military advisability of possible co:mmitment of U.S. forces to SVN.· -Deputy Secretary of Defense l-iemorandum for Chairman, JCS,

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May 1961 ........ e· . . . . . . . . . "• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ •

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President Kennedy provides Vice Pr~sident Johnson 1-1ith a personal letter to present to President Diem. Kennedy suggests that, in addition to actions in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, the U.S. is prepared to: (1) augment the personnel of'IIMG, {2} expand }fAAG's duties, (3)1 provide }OlAP support for the Civil 'Guard, and (4) provide suppor~ for the Vietnamese Junk Force. President Kennedy letter to Presill:ent Diem, 8 ~iay 1961..................... ~ •••••• ,•.•••

132

(I} the u.s. Objective is to prevent communist domination of SVN and to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, (2) the President directs f'ull examination of the . size and cOlllJ?Osition of forces which would be desirable in' the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet- ' nam, (3) finally, the President approves continuation of' the special Task Force on Vietnam.. The decisions of this NSAl·l are based on the report IIA Progra:m. of Action to Prevent Communist Domnation of swr.1l NSAM 52, 11 May 1961...

136

15. The President makes the ,f'ollowing decisions:

16.

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President Diem asserts that the recent developments in Laos emphasize the' grave Vietnamese concern for the security of·,· their country with its long and vulnerable frontiers. President Diem states that rfag a small nation we ,cannot hope: " to meet all of our defense needs alone ••• " and expresses . .confidence that the Vietnamese needs will be given consider-' ation in Washington. President Diem. letter to President Kennedy, 15 May 1961••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• .-... ..155 Lansdale summarizes information on the possible deployment of U.S. comba.t forces in W. He ref'ers to a conversation between Diem and Vice President Johnson on the subject.

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-Page . "!wiuch of the tbink:i:ng has been on stationing U.S. combat·. : . forces in the high, plateau ••• however, Oeneral Williams ,. · has witten a brief memorandum to me recommending such U~S. forces· to' be stationed on the coast .... II Lansdale'. '., . 'Memorandwn for. Deputy Secretary Gi~patric, l~ May 1961. ; •••

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The. Vice President reports on his mission to SEA.

Johnson feels, on the basis of his :Visi:t, that the situation 1n Laos . ~'. : has created doubt and concern about U. S. intentions throughout all of SEA. "No amount of success at Geneva can, of . ...• .. itsel.f, erase this. If It is Johnsonrs impression that his .mission arrested the decline of confidence 1n the U. S. "We didn't buy time -- we were given it. If these men I saw" · at your request were bankers, I would know -- without . bothering to ask -- that there would be no further exten~ sions of my note. It The fundamental decision required of the Q'.S. is whether we are to attempt a major eftort in . support of the forces of freedom in the area or "throw in , the towel. n Johnson recommends "we proceed with a clear, cut and strong program of action." Vice President Johnson 159 .. Memorandrimto President Kennedy, 23 M?y 1961 ••••••••• : ••••• ~

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19. PreSident Diem sends the U.S. a study on Vietnamese needs

r. the in.surgency situation in the South. Diem sug, gests that, in light of the current Situation, an addi-:. ' tional 100,000 men above the new force level of 170,000" Will be required t-o counter the threat o~communist domi:-,. nation. Diem recommends a considerab1e· expansion of the' U.S. Military- Advisory Group in SVN as an essential requ:i:re~_:. 1-" ment, and, finally, .Diem expresses hi.s mstrust of '. ., ...:. i '~. :._..:: Sihanouk's communist sympathies and antagonism, of SVN ~.' .,. . I· President Diem letter to President Kennedy, ~. June' 1961 •••• · 161 t .

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20. President Kennedy requests that the Secretary of Defense . "

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estimate require~ents and~~e recommendations with respect to the anticipated future U.S. needs. in the field of un. conventional warfare and paramilitary operations. NSAM,. 56,

28 June 1961•.••..•....•• ·...•.... -. •. ~ ..................... ..

21. · Lansdale relates a conversation between Vice President Tho ·and Colonel Black. In discussing the Staley MiSSion, Tho .concedes that it is impossible for the U.S. to provide ....BVN with piastres. The GVN feels ~ increase in piastre return per dollar would.· cause inflation and, in turn, ,an inevitable ·demand forvage increases. Tho further concedes that the . basic problem in ~VN is more political than economic. Tho's .:1mpression ot: the curr~nt situation in SWi is ,more pessimistiC

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Lansdaie J.rt:ln~r&'du." f~r ,Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 12 July 1961 ................... ; than that of the '.Americans.

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.22. Nr. rfi+liam P. :Bundy. forwards the joint action program proposed by the ~VN-US. Special Financial Group the ' Assistant Secretary of Defense. The report prepared by , Dr. Eugene Staley, Chairman of the Group, has been submitted to President ITgo Diem and President John F. Kennei:1y, , and includes the fiscal and economic implications of increasing the Vietnamese armed forces to 200,000 strength. The militazy portions) in addition to the requirements a.lrea.dy planned, would require approximately $42 million, during the 18-month period, July 61-December 62. Bundy " Memorandum to Gilpatric, 25 July 1961, (Staley Report -

to

attached) ............... _•.••.. ~ ......................... « ••• 0.

177

General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG-Vietnam, reviews the military situation and offers recommendations for continued' improvement of the situation in SVN to President Diem. A,"I1ong the recommendations made by NcGarr are: (1) that a national internal security council be established to prepare and . execute the Vietnamese National Counter Insurgency Plan; " (2) that effective border and coastal surveillance capa-' bilities be initiated; (3) that U.S. advisers be more effectively utilized by accompanying ABVN units on combat· operations; and (4) finally, that the reorganization of the military command structure and establishment of a single chain of command be implemented as recommended in the Counter Insurgency Plan. Aide-Memoire for President Diem, received Secreta,ry: of .Defense, 2 August 1961 •.•••••••••••' •• '

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The JCS do not believe ~hat an alternate force of 270,000 would, be required to enable the RVNAF to conduct counter-, insurgency operations and, concurrenLl,y, 'be prapm-cd to meet overt aggression.' They recommend that the strategic force objectives for VN remain at ~he 9 division level , (200,OOOj subject to further. assessment. JCS Memorandum for ,Secretary of Defense, JCSM 518-61, 3 August 1961••••••••••• The President approves the Staley recommendations and' decides that the U.S. will provide equipment and training assistance . for an increased RVNAF f'rom 170,000 to 200,000. It is hoped. that President Diem will get the maximum mileage in terms_ of internal political. support from this new commitroent, and" tha.t he Will involve more elements of' the non-communist ' political opposition in the civic actien program. NSAM 65~ August 6

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26. The ~iiuation in ~~orth c.r.d South VN is analyzed and the scope of the communist threat to SVN is estimated for the following year. The analysis concludes that the DRV is in thorough political control in North VN and trwhen Ho is no longer active, there 'Will probably be a struggle for power between the Moscow-oriented and the Peking-oriented elements of the Party." Dissatisfaction continues in South VN with Diem's leadership. The Army continues to be a major factor in future political developments in the South. The outlook is for a prolonged and difficult struggle between the VC insurgents and the GVN. mE 14.3/53-:-61, 15 August 1961•••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••.

21. The President approves the folloWing actions: (1) intensification of diplomatic efforts to achieve Souvanna's . agreement to the Paris proposals; (2) authorization to undertake conversations with SEATO allies on an e~large­ ment of the concept of SEATO Plan 5; and (3) an increas~ in U.S. advisors in Laos. NSAl~ 80, 29 August 19?1 ••••••••• 28.

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, JCS sends the. Secretary of Defense a draft memorandum I' for the President on military intervention in Laos. The JCS suggests that if the President decides that U.S. forces should be employed in Laos, that SEATO Plan 5 is the proper basic vehic}~ for the contemplated action. The" political objective of the intervention is to confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a military force of Asian and Western powers 'capable of stopping the c~~unist· advance. JCB Memorandum for Secretar,y of Defense, Jc~r'66l-61, 20 Septem~ne

ber, 1.961 •• ~ •••••••••••••••.••••.••••• o • • •

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29. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research assesses the crisis in South VN and analyzes the short tenn prospects. The stuuy .n:!(:og11izes tha.t co:r.m1l."'1if: t progress tOWB,:rii ; ts objective of overthrowing President Diem has been substantial. Since 1960, more than 6,500 civilians, officers, and military personnel have been killed or kidnapped.' Recent . U:S. support has raised Diemts political stature, but. there has been no conclusive reversal of deteriorating trends. . The security situation remains unimproved. However; the GovernmentSs comprehensive eIP, supported by U.S~ aid, is . beginning to show favorable results. Over the next year, . developments in Laos may have more influence on VN than any improvement in the Diem Government. Department of State Research Memorandum mE-I, 29 September 1961 •••••••••••• '••• 30~ .It is estimated that present armed, full-time

VC strength

is about.16,ooo, an increase of 12,000 since April of 1960,

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'. and of 4,000 in the

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past three month~. While only 10 ~ of this strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North VN, the remaining 8o-90~ includes remnants of the approxi-, mately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground, during the 1954-1955 regroupment and evacuation of Viet- : namese conmunist a~ units following the Indo-China War. Though some weapons and equipment have been inf'iltrated into SOuth VN, there has been no positive identification of Communist Bloc-manufactu.red military equipment in South VN. SNIE 53-2-61, 5 October 1961 ••••• ~.................... 31.

The JCS feel the time is now past when actions short of in- ' tervention by outside forces can reverse the rapidly: . worsening situation in Southeast Asia. They consider the, execution of SEA:r0 Plan 5, or a suitable variation there'of, . to be the milit~ry minimum commensurate with the situation. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM '704-61" 5 . October 1961 •• ~ 0 ••••••••••••••

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It is the opinion of the JCS that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of ent~ points along the whole South VN border" i. e. ; over several htmdred miles" is not feas~ble. Further, the alternative of using SEATO forces to cover sol:ely the 17th parallel is militarily un-' sound. "\>lhat is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout SEA, but rather a consolidated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken ••• n . A limited interim !course of action is provided herewith in the event SEATO Plan 5 is considered politically unacceptable. JCS'Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 716-61, 9 October '

1961 . ........................

lit • • • • • • • • • • ., • • "• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

"For what one man t S feel is 'Worth, mine -- based on very close touch with Indo-China in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards untU Diem took hold -- is that it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by , the Vietcong. 1f Bundy suggests that an early" hard-hitting 'Operation has a 70ra' 'chance of -success;. ,tiThe '-3ci' is- tha.t;. we would wind up like the French in 1954. j white men can I t win . this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I 'Would, myself, :, favor going in. If Bundy memorandum for Secretary 1-IcNamara,,' ' 10 October 1961 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••. 34.

29~

It is North ,scale to an

estimated that the Conmiunist Bloc would not commit ... . ' Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a largemilitary attack against South VN or Laos in response· assumed SEATO ,action to patrol the GVN coas't

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and secure the border involving about 25,000 men. Neutralist goverrunents in SEA would be most concerned at the increased tension and danger of general hostilities. Nationalist China would be elated with the SEATO action. SlITE 10-3-6, 10 October 1961 ••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••• ·

313

At a meeting with President Kennedy, the following actions were agreed upon: (1) the Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron toVN; (2) Gen~ eral f,iaxwell Taylor will leave for SVN on a Presidential mission; and (3) the State Department will pursue specific political actions, i.e., protest to the ICC on North VN support of the VC; table a lVhite Paper at the ml; and consult with our SEATO allies regarding support in VN. Gilpatric Memorandum for Record, 11 October 1961 ••••••••••••••

322

"With respect to training the Vietnamese Army for the 'wrong var r, it seems clear that ,in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control •. All of the Vietnamese Army successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition,in organized battalion strength ••• This change in the situation has not been fully " understood bymany U.S. officials. In this regard, there is some concern that,the Thompsonl{ission may tr,y to sell the J.ialayan concept ot' police control without making a suffi. ciently caret'ul evaluation of conditions in South Vietnam. rr ' JCS Memorandum for General Taylor, .CM-390-61, 12 October'

1961 •..••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••..•••.••••••

324

37. The PreSident requests that General Taylor proceed to

Saigon to appraise the situation in South Vietnam and to report his views on the· courses of action which the U.S. might take t~ avoid further deterioration in the situation and eventually to eliminate the threat to the independence of South Vietnam. President Kenn~dy letter to General Taylor, 13 October 1961 •••..•••••

327

The President directs the following actions be taken: (1) make preparations for the publication of the White Paper on North Vietnamese aggression; (2) develop plans for presentation of ' the VN case in the UN; (3) introduce the Jungle Jim Squadron into em for the purpose of training Vietnamese forces ~ He indicates that G~neral Taylor· should undertake a mission to Saigon. NSAM 104, 13 Oc"!,obeI'- 1961 ............ .

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39. It is the conclusion of the l)oD'GeneriJ. Cou.'lseithat'the ·proposed introduction of U.S" combat and logistiC forces into VN would constitute violations of Articles 16 and 17 of the

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Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in vri of July 20, 1954. Introduction of U.S. troops even for purposes of flood control wottld still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of VN.. If a decision is made to send U.S. troops into VN, the U.S. should justifY it on the ground of collective self-defense. "Nothing in the Gelle:va Accords should be read as abridging the inherent right of Vietnam and the United States to . take actions in collective .sell-defense. fI DoD General Counsel Memorangum for Mr. Hadyn Willi~s, 26 October 1961 ••

329

40 .... -General

Taylor summarizes the fundamental conclusions of <.::.> his group and his personal recommendations. Taylor con, cludes there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that , the U.S. is detennined to save SEA, and doubt that: Diem t s Dlethods can defeat the Conununist purposes and methods. Taylor recommends that the U.S.· Government join with the GVI'l in a massive joint effort as part of a total mobilization of GVN resources to cope with both the VC and the ravages of the flood. Specifically, the U.S. Govern- , ment will provide individual administrators, conduct a joint SltrVey of conditions in the provinces, assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over . the coastal waters,· ....:: and finally) offer to introduce into ,South V1i a military Task Force to operate under U.S. military control. General" Taylor telegram (cite BAGIOOOO5) for President Kennedy, .,

1 November 1961 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

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Taylor presents his reasons for recommending the introduc. tion of a U.S. military force into South Vietnam. III have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events ••• there can be no action so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and govern- . , ment of SVlf and to our other friends and allies in SEA as : the introduction of U.S. forces into SVN. fI Taylor suggests· -'-I that the strategic reserve of U.S. forces is seriously weak. . and that U.S. prestige would be more heavily engaged in· SVN by this action. HovTever, the size of the U.S. force introduced· need not be great to provide the mill tary pres-: ence nece~sar,y to produce the desired effect. General Taylor telegram (cite EAGIOQoo6) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 •.•..••.....•••...•••.•........•...... a,' • • ~. 337 0

.42.

The J'CS and Secretary J.lcNarnara do· not believe major units of U.S. forces should be'introduced in SVN unless the U.S. is willing to commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of SVlf to communism and to support t~is '.

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sible later action. They recommend that t~e U.S commit itself to this objective and support the recommendations of General Taylor toward its fulfillment. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 8 November 1961.:.... The head of the British Advisory Mission submits to Diem his pl~ for clearing the VC from the Delta. The central idea. is the creation of a network of "strategic hamlets" akin to those employed successfUl~ by Thompson in defeating the communist guerillas in Malaya. R.G.K. Thompson letter to .'. Diem, 11 November 1961 •••••••• >. ~ ••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••

44.

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Reversing the November 8 Defense recommendation for a commitment of sUbstantial U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam this November 11 Rusk-Mcrlamara memorandum to the President (perhaps prepared at Kennedyts specific direction) escalates> the rhetoric regarding U.S. interest in a free South Vietnam, but restricts.> the military recommendation: (a) employ only support forces now; (b) defer any decision to send "larger organized units ldth actual or potential direct mil ... itaJ.'Y missions." Whether Kennedy fully accepted the highblown statements of U.S. interest a..'l1d oommitment to the GVN is not kno~TIl. State/Defense Memorandum to the PreSident, 11 November 1961••• ; ••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••

359

The Joint Staff submits to the Chairman, JCS, briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Securit,r Action Memorandum resulting froni the Taylor Mission Report. The military actions indexed pertain to the use of significant and/or substantial U.S. forces, provision of increased airlift, provision of additional equipment a..'l1d U.S. personnel, proviSion of training and equipment for the Civil /'In __ ~ ,",""',-"".l.u.

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establishment and command structure. In connection with the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff consid,ersit militarily· > desirable to pre-position :forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation of U.S. Arrrry Fo>rces Pacific, with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units. >Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chair- >> man of the JCS; 14 November 1961 ••••••••••••••••••••••>•••• ~

46. Rusk instructs Ambassador Nolting to seek an immediate appointment with President Diem to inform him that President >Kennedy has decided that the Government of the U.S. is prepared to join the Government of VN in..a sharp~ increased joint effort to avoid further deterioration in the situation of S'nr. The joint effort require>s certain undertakings by

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. >j


, :

!

"i

"'

, I

both govermnents. On its part, the U.S. would immediatelysupport the GVN With increased airlift, additional equipment, U.S. personnel, expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and increased economic aid. Theo GVN, however, would have to initiate the following actions: (1) begin prompt legislative and a&ninistrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its resources; (2) give governmental wartinle agencies adequate authority to perform their functions effectively; and (3) overhaul the mill taz:y establisrul1ent and conunand ~tructure to crea.te an effective milit?-l'Y organization. "president Kennedy con:" templates an immediate strong affinnative reply to satisfactory letter along indicated lines from"President Diem, 'Which will simultaneously be made public. II Rusk NIACT 619 to Saigon, 15 November 1961................................

400

After" three days of talks in Saigon, Ambassador Galbraith feels there is scarcely Uthe slightest practical chance that the administrative and political refonus being pressed upon Diem will result in real change." Gailbraith sees a comparatively well equipped army of a ° quarter million men facing 15 to 18,000 lightly armed men •. " ••• there is no solution that does not involve a change of government ••• · to say there is no alternative (to Diem) is nonsense. U Ambassador Gailbraith Memorandum for the PreSident, 20 November 1961•••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

406

1t8. ."The Jfey and inescapable point then is the ineffectuality (abetted debatably by thG u..l1popularity) of the Diem Government. This is the strategic factor. Nor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that it is the inevitable posture of the A!';:lan mandarin. For one thinR. it isn't true, but were it so, the only possible con~iusion wottld beOthat there is no future for mandarins. The communists don f t favor " them." Gailbraith feels that it is politically naive to expect that Diem will reform either administratively or , politica.1.1y in any effective we:;{. '''However, having started on this hopeless game, we have no alternative but to play it out for a minimum time ••• since there is no chance of success we must do two things to protect our situation.' One is t.o make oclear that our commitment 'is to results and ~ot to promises ••• and"we can press hardest in the area of Army reform 'Where the needed changes are most specific and most urgent." It follows from Gailbraith's reasoning that the onlY solution must be to drop,Diem, and we should not be alarmed by the Arm:y- as an alternative •. Gailbraith New Delhi 9941 for President Kennedy, 21 Noyember 19616 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

xi

..

;

,

! ·0

I

-. 410


The U. S. is prepared to join the Vii Govel'!llllent ill a sha...-pl;y, increased joint effort to avoid a fUl~her deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation ofcel~ain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U. S. J based on recommendations of the Taylor Report. NSAM.lll, 22 November 1961••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••

50.

, 51.

Bundy comments on the command arrangements for

mends that General McGarr be elevated that a replacement be found. He also Lansdale back as Diem has requested. the Secretary of Defel!-se, 25 llovember

419

VN and recom-.

to the new position or recommends sending Bundy Memorandum for

1961 ................. ..

422/'

General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key advisors. Among the questions are: (1) what is the situation with regard to Diem as rc~orted by Ambassador Nolting; (2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem; (3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organization required to support the new program;' (4) what is our ' , ~lan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the . Was~ington end of this operation? Gene raJ. , Taylor Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 27 November 1961 ............ .

52. The P:.:esident approves U.S. participation, in.a selective and ' carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes c.nd proceeding thereafter to food denial. NSAl-1 115, 30 November

53.

I

1961 •••••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••• ; ••••••••••••••••••• .......

425

Mcnamara confirms to Rusk' the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military conunander in Vietnam will have the title nConnnander, U.. S. Military Assistance Forces Vietnam" and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretar,y of State, 18 December 1961.~ •••

,26 ..

Diem is apprehensive about givIng control authoXity to Big Minh as milital"'J field commander because of' his fear of' . " a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and b.~ has been so informed by the President, we must find a Wa:'f to reassure him about a coup. lilt is the basis for ldfil real reluctance to do what the Amf...ricans want him to de and this ba.sic point needs resolving.... what rea.1.ist5.c assurances can Ye give Diem that the action he fears won~t -ta.lee place?" ' Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 27 December 1961•••• ! ••••

xii


• •

1962

55. The

Chairman of the JCS sUmmarizes the current situation

in VN~ methods of VC operations, routesof infiltration and supply3 r:elative strengths~ and discusses U.S. military units in place or enroute to VN. JrThe objectives of the Diem Government in svr-l include not only survival against the co~nunists, but also improvement of the . national economy, enhancement of svrP s position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and pre~ervation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed to'..rard the achievement of these ob- . jectives suffer from the concentration of power in the hands of the President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a s~ clique headed by his eA~remely influential and powerful brother, Ugo Dinh Nhu. n Chainnan JCS Talking Paper for Briefing President Kennedy, .9 January 1962.............

I

I I

I

. Page

428 .

i

1

I!

[

t

. ,."

.

......

56. ~

.

The JCS agree that the basic issue of Dieml.s apprehen-· sion about a coup needs to be resolved. "1 don 't believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn It fully trust. rr JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-49l-62, 18 January

1962 ••••••••••••• ~ •••• _.•••••••••.••..••..•

0 ••••••••• •••' ••••

The PJ.'esident establishes a' Special 'Group (Counter Insur-.· gency), the functions of which are as follows: (1) to . insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency (nwars 'of liperation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional ~arfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, . equiprn.ent and doctrine 01 the u.s. arllled rorcGs Co..'1d ctner U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (4) to insure' the dev~J.opment of adequate programs aimed at preventing '., or defeating insurgency. NSA..~ 124, 18 January 1962 ••• ~ .....

58. State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietna.'1lese . armed forc:es to the 200,000 man level should be supported .. provided the following factors are considered: (1) that· U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities . continue to set valid tactical and strategic plw's; (2) the rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army .' to' absorb and train the additional men and the manpower . re sources of SVNJ (3) that the armed forces shoUld level" .. off at 200J 09.0 ~~ further' eff'orts s~~~~ be .devQted .to '. ~.

. .~~ ~;:~: ~.\.~ :.-'~ ..

.. f'

.'

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i

-

..

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xiii"

. •

,

~

.'

"':

440 "


.

.

.

strengthening the CivIl Guard and Eel,f-Defcn~c Corps; and (h) that our training programs for ARVf~ be based on the concept that the Vietnamese Anrry will start wllming when: it has the coniidence of the Vietnamese populace. U. Alexis Johnson 'lett~: to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962 •••••••••• e '

.

Secretary McNamara fonTards a JCS Memorandum to the President with the conunent 1 Ifr am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN. n The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with.~iemts-full cooperation and the effective employment gf SVN arm~d forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made to deploy suitable U.S. military- combat forces to 5VI'T sufficient to achieve desired objectives •. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 (JCSM-33-62, 13 January 1962,

attached) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••• •••••

60.

The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes, and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed. .'- ..... 455· emphases are desirable. NS.~·f 132, ~9 February 1962...... .. .... ,

61. The ;president approves training objectives for personnel who ~ have a role to play in counter insurgency programs as rlell as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objectives include the study of: the historicaJ. background of counter insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive insurgency, instruction in counter .' insurgency program pl~ing) specialized preparations for service in underdeveloped areas •. Tr.aining of foreign nationals will alse be iIlCluut:u. Iii the progrc9J.li. The rre3ident desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objectives. I\31\M 131, 13 March 1962 ........................... . _. - _... . 62. The President forwards a memorandum on the subject of VN from Ambassador Galbraith and requests Department cf Defense com.. ments. The Gailbraith Memorandum (4 April 62) asserts that the U. S. is backing a weak and ineffectual. government in SVN and that "there is a consequen:t danger that we shaJ.l replace' the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did. n Gailbraith urges ·that U.S. policy keep' open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other .countries and vIor ld opiil.?-9n in a settlement, and reduce our' cOu'1lllitment te: ,·the present leadership of GVN. In ~.

xiv

.-~


addition to recommended specific actions, Gailbraith suggests the U.So should resist e.D. steps to conunit American troops to combat action and dissociate i tsel:f' from programs which are directed at the villagers, such as the re ... settlement progrruns. White House Memorandum for Secretary Defense.7 7 April 1962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached) •••

oi'

.

-.

....

460

63.. The JCS' conunent on Ambassador Ga.lbrcith' s l>1emorandum to ~

President Kenne~. The JCS cite the Kenne~ letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem as a public ai'firmation of the intention 01' the U.S. Goverrunent to support Presi-.· dent Diem to 'Whatever extent necessa-~.to eliminate the VC threat. In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the pr~sent U. S. policy toward SVN as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion. If JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of De:fense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April

1962 ••••• oo.o.o0G • • • • • • ~ ••• o • • • • • • • • • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

64.

0 ••

ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith ~ s Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department. In a penciled note "Secre .. tary of Defense has talked to Ambassador'Galbraith and feels . no reply needed. Mr. Forres·tal informed this date that none 'WoUld be .sent." lSA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense,

14 April 1962 ••• o • • • • • • • • • • oo • • • • • o.o •• o9 • • • • • o • • o •• ~ • • • • • •

.

,

466

65. The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease-fire in Laos for action in t"lO major areas: (1) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. bac~­ up of that portion o:f northern Laos nest of the Mekong River; and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier 1-lith Thai, Vietnamese ~!" TJ .. 8," fo1"cp.s,. Kennedy indicates that he contemplates· keep- . ing U.S. forces in Thailand durl.llg the period of the negotiations by the three Princes and the early days of the ' government of national union. llSAM 157, 29 May 1962.~~ ••••• 467 .

I

! 66.' !nan eValuation of the first ih~ee months of systematic counter -insurgency, Hilsman of State r s DIR reports some prog- . ress and reason i'or modest optimism although acknovTledging . the great amount yet to be done~ State Department I1f.R Research Memorandum RFE-27, 18 June 1962 ••••••••••••••••• 00

The President approves assignments of. responsibilities in .. the development of U. S. and indigenous_ police ,paramili tary, and military resources to various agences as recoIll!llcnded by the Special·Group on Counter Insurgency. Deficiencies . revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 include: country. . ~

469, •

'.


internal defense plans, improvemen·t 'of personnel progra...·!l.sof agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orienta~ tion of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency personnel, support of covert paramilitary operations J increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities 2 . improvement of indieenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency. NSM4 162,

19

68.

J~e

i962 •••••••••••••••• o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ ••••

The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and.agencies concerned with' the internal defense of overseas areas ~hreatened by subversive insurgency. NSAM 182, 24 August 1962 •••••• e . . . . . . . . ..

69 •.

In a year~eridsumma.ry of the Vietnamese situation and prog. nosis, Hilsman (State :am) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration nas been decreased. GVlI control of the 'countryside, the Strategic Hamlet ~rogram notWithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department INR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 19610 ••••••••••••••••••••• ~. -.'

70.

-' 487 .

A National Intelligence Estimate states that ffConnnunist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S •. involvement, are 'causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty} although there 'are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have ·been grievously hurt. fl. The VC will continue to wage. So war of a.ttrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the North. On the basis of the last year r S progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible lito project the future course of the war wlLh &:J.i.Y (;oi"".:f:Lden~c. DecisiYe campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to. the war is in sight.!l NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South . II. Vietnam, -17 ·Apr-il ·1963·........... C> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . ..

"

522

71'•. :-THe'Pre-sYdent a~~~oves and directs certain act-iois 'out"lJ:nea.·:

in ~e Department of State Nemorandum of 17 June 1963, reI .. at1ve to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriora~.·. ting situation and from the British and the French before . initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedyasks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before' action directed against NVN. NSAM 249, 25 June 1963. •.• .

any

_72. ~~ .Pres:Identis briefed and W'o

on developments in Indonesia, "Laos..

.. Specifically, onsWi, discussions cover the- possibility

xvi

525


-Pap,e

of getting rid of the Nhus (the combined j~dgIlient v;~s that it would not be possible), pressure on Diem to take political actions, possible results of a coup, and the replacement of Ambassador Nolting Wit~ Ambassador Lodge. . Department of State Memorandwn of Conversation, 4 July

1963 ••••.•••••••••• ~ ................. ".......... ~ ........... ' .

..

526·

. '

73. A SpeciaJ: National Intelligence Estima.te evaluates the poli tical crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seck to conciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S-GVN relations have deteriorated as a fWlc, tion of Diemts distrust of UeS. Illatives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. 'presence in Vietnam. The Conununists have thus far not explOited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non-Conununist overthrow. A successor regime. with continued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the wa.r SNIE 53-2-63, IfThe Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• D

,

./ 529

74. In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Nhu from the govern.-nent, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alternatives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Nhu is not removed yfe will be pre~ pared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of interim brea.1td01m of the central government mechanism. State Department Message to Saigon 243, Stat~ to Lodge, 24 August ~963 ••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••

75. u.S. policy with

536

resp~ct

to a coup is defined ill JUore dcta.i~ for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. tIThe USG rTill support a coup which has good chance -~ .. of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces. Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans} but will not engage directly in joint coup plan-. ning. II Lodge is authorized to suspe:nd aid if he thinks i t ' " w.i.Il enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Department Message 272, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August -

:L963 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• -. • •••• ••

76.

Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach-to Diem about removing Nhu before going ahead with the coup. He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk

xvii

538· .


..

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feels that if accompanied by the threat of a real sanction -i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. support -- such an approach could be timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals to make their move and might, therefore, offer some promise o~ getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge J 29 August 1963 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• • • •• • ~ ••

71.

-

, Page'

·539

Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at. the State Department on the subject of SVN. The generals' plot having aborted, Rusk asks what in the situation Illead us to think well of a coup." Further) Rusk feels that it is unrealistic now ".to start off by saying that !fuu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk t s remarks. Hi1sman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (1) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese populationj (2) the effect on U.S. pro'grams e1sel/here in Asia of the current GWl policy against the Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of' Nhuj and (4) u.S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reservations about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem.. General Krulak rifemorandum for the Record, 31' August 1963 ••••••...•• ~ ................ ~ •••••••••.••.• ". ~

0.. ... . 540

78. Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no longer any prospect of' a coup,pres5ure must be appLied to Diem' to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particular Lodge is authorized to hqld up any aid program if he thinks such action ylill give him useful leverage 'in dealing with . Diem. CAP Message 63516, vlhite House to Lodge} 17 September·

.._".' :.119?"3.11

0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

79 • The President eA.1?lains to Lodge his urgent need

..

fo~ the . Mc~Iamara-Taylor assessment of the situation •.. '. . The Visit is !lOi.. designee. to 'be a ret::t):n~iliation with Diem, . rather he· expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of' the political crisis. State Department Message 431, The President to Lodge, 18 September

1963 ••

80.

It • • • • '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~ ••

iii •

~

•••••••••

I

~

Lodgers reply t~ the rlhite HOuse CAP Message 63516 indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be un- . productive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 54lt, Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 1963 •••••••••••••••••

-

. 81. President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending MclJamara. and Taylor to VN: "I am asking you to go because of' m:r

desire to have the.best possible on-the-spot appraisal.of

xviii

;48


the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the-Ve. 1I ~~ile the results from programs developed after Taylorls Mission in 1961 were heartening, the serious events in the South since ~ra.y 1963 have prompted the President to ask Mc~ramara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in svr-r is of the first importance ••• If PreSident Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September

.

;'

1903 .................................................

82. Pending McNamara's visit and the sub sequent

e.o • • • • • " • • • • •

revie~{ of policy,

Lodge is given the following interim guidance: ft(l) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Congo (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam.. (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement. tt State Department .Message 458, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 • • • • • • • • •

&

.. - . . . . . .

553

-I

: ..

i

I

-;

The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, while the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence .of the possibility of a successful coup ••• II The Report recommends against promoting a·coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure viII move Diem to the moderations and reforms we deSire, nevertheless, as the only course of action vith aDY prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sa~ctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity impolt program. The Jllission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for RVNAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel m~ bewithdra\ffl by the end of 1965. In conjunction with this program, the U.S. should announce plans to withdravl1, 000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963 ..:

84. Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy revie,., just completed, the "PreSident t-oday approved recommendation that· no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup_ If Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadershipll is e.uthorized, hO\fever. CAP 1>lessage 63560, to Lodge via CAS chan11el, 5.october .

1963.......................................................... -.

+

-

.

-

------

,.

xiX

574


The President approves the detailed military recommendations contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no announcement of the implementa.tion of the 1,OOO-man 1fith- . drawal plan be made._ NSAM 263" 11 Oct.ober 196300. _. _••••••

..

578

88. A Department of state Research Nemorandwn contends that the statistical indicators on the 1-Tar in Vietnam reveal Ilthat the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago. If The analysis augers the JCS 8l1d Rusk Bubsequently apologizes to 14cNamal'a. Department of State, INR Research Memorandum RFE-90, 22 October 1963 ••••••••••..••....••.••••

.579

89. loTith the coup plotting now far advanced 8l1d the U.S. clearly committed to the generals' attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington 1 s anxieties about the lack of detailed in.tornation on the generals' plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the military will create a government "rlth better potential for C::o:tl'iing on tua

'V;c;.r, c..~d.

bccG.uce i t

~·rcu1d

"

consti·b.rbe lJJ10Ue

meddling in Vietnamese ai'fairs. Embassy Saigon J.lessage 1964, Lodge to. McGeorge Bundy, 25 October 1963. ••••••• •••••

90. v7h:b.e thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indicates that short of th'farting a. coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590, . McGeorge Bundy" to Lodge) 25 October 1963 •••••••••.•••••••••

590 I


93. General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpretations of. a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October. He o~£ers an optimistic appraisaJ. of the trend of the war and sees the politicaJ. cri~is as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness.. MACV Message 2033, ~arkins to Taylor" 30 October 3.963 .......... 0 . . . . . .0" • • • •• • • • •• • • • •• • • •

95.

Taking note of the difference of opinion pn the advi.sability of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the vlhite House specifically infonns Lodge that he is to discourage the generals ~rom any a.ttempt that in his· judgement has a poor . . prospect of success. Lodge is given full authority f'or . country team actions in the event of' a coup; if he has left f'or vlashington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of . .. a coup, U.S. policy w:iJJ:be: (a) to reject appeals f'or direct intervention ~rom either sidej (b):.i!' the contest is . indecisive,. authorities may perform any actions agreed

y.S.

'.

.597


to by both sides; (c) in the event the coup f~ils) asylum mar be offered to. anyone to whom we have an obligationj but (d) once the coup has started~ it is in our interests.to see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79407, 30 October 19 63. -. .................................. "...

xxii

0 • • • •••

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..

.. 604


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to

b~

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situation

..aetion3

"t..j r:c ~.' Ot!r O!.l .,).VC3 •

'.

si~:ce

, .....

in

ill


fectivaly control the coJ.ored areas on this

Ch~l.. t.

tho Viet Conz have divided the

....:

,- cotmiry into two z::ajor geographical al"eas, '; and the li.=:.m'bo

nC'l~ ~, "" 'V

ro·.:~.

s~ctoj.~

th·~eotlth

\'lith heudque.r·ter3 northeast of

s"..·t 0. . .o·n 1 ~ ,,;,;. ...

into provinces which .~il1age3 J .

5.n

. "

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and h?>lnlcts

ar~ furthc~ it

subdivi6ed· into d1strictri J


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1"'Cf;,···L'·"'~!' 1 .. i.,,)a V __ ..,,_

,

to be a contlnu:tn:;

'for -viet Cong

fOX'C05~ pal"·'tioul~rly

in

l~~gion~u.

, I

prO~ler.l

units in tlhich

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;lC3S

"

k~f~ _.""*1

CC2-.:lunists :1n

1955~

or

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have, 51nce

b0~n :i."~Cl...u:i..teu

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,gg Six C-123 spray equipped aircraft for. support of de-

foliant operations have received diplomatic clearance to enter SVN. h. US Nav"Y' Mine Division :73 with a tender and five mine sweepers is operating from Tourane Harbor in conjunction with the Vietnamese Navy conducting maritime surveillance patrols south of the 17th parallel. i.

Air surveillance flights 30 miles seaward from the SVN

coast (i7th parallel) to ?O miles beyond the ~aracel Islands are conducted every other day by Seventh Fleet patrol

ai~craft.

In addition to deployment of organized US military units to SVN and. increased personnel strength for the MAAG, accelerated .

delivery of MAP equipment has already begun.

Nine additional

1-20 light observation aircraft are enroute 'to SVN for use by. the Vietnamese Air Force.. Also, 15 T-28c aircraft have been delivered to augment the Vietnamese

air-~'ound

support

until 30 T-28B (NOMAD) with a greater ordnance delivery capability could complete modification and be delivered to SVN, early in March. Department of the Army is also providing an addi tiona! 12 H-34 helicopters from active reimbur~able

Army

units to the USAF on a

basis for accelerated 1UU? delivery to the RVllAF

early in March.


On 1 Nov~mber 1901 the personnel strength of the military Assistance Adviso~

Group in Vietnam was 841, present strength is 1204 a!ld pro-

jected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 2394. The ,total personnel' strength ' of' US .units and elements, other than the MAAG, was 1442 as

of 2 January 1962 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 3182. The total US personnel in South Vietnam is now 2646 and proj ected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 5576. The

~G

is extending its advisory teams to battalion level within

the RVNAF MA Military

establi~bment

and beginning to participate more

has been accelerated and RVNAF military operations are increasing, the 14AAG training activities have been expanded. "This training includes operations, planning, logistics, intelligence, communications and electronics as they apply to each service wi thin the RVNAF.

They are

also accelerating the training of the Vietnamese' Civil Guard and

Sel~-

Defenst:! CUL路fllS. Shown. on the chart are the approved and funded c?nstruction projects in South Vietnam. a.

These include:

Improvement of' the Pleiku Airfield.

b. Improvements at Tan Son Nhut Airfield which include installatic'ls of: (1)

Pierced steel planking parking apron.

(2) POL hydrant system. (3) POL pipeline to Nha Be. (4)

Ammunit~on

..

storage facility

(5) Concrete parking apron

"

c,' An ail'crai't control and vTarning site at Tan Son l'lhut and one l' ,

. at

Da

Nang

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.•

a s:ml1 cliclue hcrided by his e:-:..

"~r!el!:lel"J :lnrlu;:l'lt1al al":d po~':o!'rul brothej:"s U;:.:o Din It''lu.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF ST/,FF'

..".

. ". .

~

..

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. ~ .•

:;.

CM-191-62

i. .

~":

.

.....

' .. JJ1N 1 ~ 1962

'

.ME:MORANDUM FOR GENERf.. L LANSDALE

. ~.lbjcct: Vietnamese Command Problem

1:

.,,,;:i,: ' As ,you point out in your melnorandum of 27 December 1961, ;/~/" it is quite clear that Diemts apprehension about a coup is the basis /-: ,-

for his reluctance to authorize his military field commander to implement the task fo:r:ce concept that was an important part of the over-all pla~ of. operations against the Viet Congo I fully agree that this basic issue needs to be resolved.• ! . .

2. You are wen aware that Chi~f 11AAG1 Vietnam, in a.ccordance .. with his assigned mission. has operated principally .as an adviser and trainer rather than as a commander. As such he has suggested <!.:r:d .. ' counseled1 dropping ideas which the Vietnamese could pick up and .' incorporate in their own plans. This method Ilsaved face tt for them, and has been the accepted method 01 overcoming simultaneously the inexperience and the pride of the Vietnamese officersl Now a strong case can be made for increase.d direct participation by US perso:l*el in the planning and supervision of Vietnamese counterinsulogency opera- . . ~ tioons. Inherent in such increased direct part.icipation should "be some' assuranc~ of US support for Die~ personally. Convincing Diem of this <. • • 'L• sem01" • TJ~s·reprcsentah'les . : personal.- suppor~ rtai"lams a pn ..clp ......1 t~$., c.r tne } in Vietnam. The increased US military stake in Vietpam should ,be of ! great assistance in this task. '

!

4

!

3. In my view, however l some of the decisions made durlflg the 16 Deceluber SecDef meeting at CI1,{CPAC Headquarters offer a greater hope for progress in Vietnam.. It was agreed that; while ~e shC"11d con ... tinue to press for acceptan~e of an·ove·r-all plan or ~oncept of 0r'erations l -- we must 'place irnmedic.>.te emp~1asis on smaller, more specific 1 and more 'rea.dily-accomplished operations. Such a technique is more likely to be a~ceptabie to Diern~ 'At the- same time.- successful small opera~ions will provide the impetus for larger scale offcnsiv.e operations. '

.. ,.


4. I dontt believe there is any finitc'answer to the questio~ you pose as to how wc con~incc Diem he m~st delegate authority to subordinates he doesn tt fully trust; VHi disc'l!-ssed this subJcct at considerable length at Mondayts (15 January, 1962) conference in Honolulu. The AmbassadorJ General McGarr and other top level officers of .the Embassy and MAAG recognize the nature of the problem and th~ importancc of reaching a. satisiactory solution thereto. If it was not for the heavy responsibilities you arc now assigned :vhich would prec~ude your going to Saigon, I believe tha.t one of the best ways to deal with 'this problem would be to implement the earlier recomm.enda.tion to send one 'Brigadier General ~n~dale out ~o Saigon to be personal adviser and,confidant to Diem.

0~£)

-'_

rA. {\. b.~~///~~

Q

'L. L .. LE11l\11TZER Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: Secretary McNamara 'Deputy Secretary Gilpatric " Admiral 'Heinz

..

"

:-lHl,<1··'::· , ~",.J... ,

": . . : :...=.. :; ~

".

, '. . I . ~-:-:- . ~,~ '. ' " - ' ,.. vopy .--••...:_ fJ f'..I." .:.. •...'\.: C·' opr es


-

.

TEE WHI'l'E HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 124 TO!

!he Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff . The Administrator, Agency for International Development TQe Director) United States' Information Agency _ The Military Representative of the President Director of Central Intelligence . Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

SUBJECT:

To assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and reSisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries, a Special Group (Counterinsurgency) is established conSisting of the following members: .... Military Representatives of the President, .Chairman The. Attorney General . . Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Deputy Secretary of Defense Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Central Intelligence Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs . . Administrator, Agency for International Development Director, United States. Information Age.ncy . On invitation: other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary The functions of the Special路 Group (C. I.) will be as follow~:

a.

To insure proper recognition throughout the U. So Governm~nt-that .subversive insurgency (ttwarsof liberationfl ) is a major路 form of Politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare. . I


-2--. b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.So Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by state, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. Particular atten,tion '~ill be paid the special training of personnel prior to assignment to MftJlGfs and to Embassy路staffs in countries where counter-insurgency problems exist or may arise. c. To keep under review the adequacy of U"S" resources to-deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression, making timely recommendation of measures to apply, increase or adjust these resources to meet anticipated _ requirements. d. - To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insllr:gency and indirect aggression in countries and regions . specifically assigned to the Special Group (C. Io) by-the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation. I

In performing the above fUnctions, the members of the Special Group (C.lo) will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country or . regional interdepartmental task forces (normally chai~ed by a State . Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established. The _Group will. confine itself to establishing broad lines of counter-insurgency policy, subject to my direction and decision as appropriate, insuring a coordi~ nated and unified approach to regional or country programs ,- and verifying progress in implementation ther.eof. It will also undertake promptly i!o make decisions on interdepartmental issues arising out of such progr~s. The critical are~ initially assigned to the Special Group (C. 10) pursuant to paragraph~ of this memorandum are set forth in the attached annex~

Attachment

443


M':rffiX TO NATIC~lAL SECURITY fiCTION NEt.fOR4.NDUM NO. 124

Hereby assign to the cognizance of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) the following countries: Laos South Viet-Nam Thailand.

444 .


THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 26,

..

~962

Dear Mr. Gilpatric: I have received your letter of December 28 to the Secretary on the question of an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level. The matter was discussed with our Task Force while Ambassador Nolting was here on consultation •. In view of the gravity of the situation in Viet-Nam and of the importance of not interrupting the accelerated rate of our assistance. to Viet':Nam, we agree that an increase to about 200,000 should be supported provided the tollo~rlng factors are given careful consideration: " 1. That the U.S. military advisers and the Vietnamese authorities continue the joint effort to build up a set of valid tactical and " strategic plans. vIe suggest that the locus of this effort should be 1 in Viet-Nam in order to' obtain full Vietnamese cooperation and to meet the speed requirements of a guerrilla war where a large number of incidents are constantly occurring. We '-1Ould envisage strategic plans made in Saigon giving priority to" areas to oe cleared and held and settin~!orth general methods to be used. We believe these should be accomplished by numerous small tactical actions planned and executed: I by American and Vietnamese officers on the spot to meet "the local s1 tuation at the moment. i t

2. The ra.te of incrc<lsc to =.pprcximately 200,000 men should t~r-e into consideration:

a. The ab11ity of the army to absorb ·and train these men without unduly weakening its fighting ability. b. Viet-Nam

The Honorable Roswell', Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense. 445

.

,

Sec Def Cont. No.! '502


~2-

b. Viet-~raIi'. Iriust husb~Tld its li'.a."1pO\.J'e:::- resourc~s carefu,11y. . . ., ~ t . . . . -1' ,. 1~' t ~a.eJ.r '. . A.mn:mU!l nU:\loer -0;:' ra:.:lC\l. ClVl. ~:;.ns r.1U3'l. co C:. \t a

posts in o:::-der to at 1cast p~rtially satisfy the rising eA~ectations of Viet-NaLtls Cl.~l.zcns. 3.

That the a.:-med :forces

w~th tut~'e enph~sis Civil Guard end S~lf

that had been

to be

meht

devote~

Defense Corps.

to

best level

orr at

about 200,000' ~d enlarging the

stre~etnening Th~ir j.ob "Jould

be to h.old

r.-:-ou.~d

recover~j.

'.

to

:..


27 January 1962 HEMORANDUM fOR WE PRES IDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked that the attached memorandum, stating their views concerning the strategic importance¡ may be req~ired if the situation continues to deteriorate, be brought to your attention •. The memorandum requires no action by you at this time. J am not prepared to endorse the experience with-our present program in 'South Vietnam. .

Robert S. McNamara

cc:

Sec. Rusk

447


THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF· W....,sHING,.Ot-J

~5.

D.C.

JCSM-33-52 .'

.'

"

fl ~ JAN 1962 '.

.,

I \

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_.......

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lviEMO?J..i~DUM FOR 'TEE SECRETAR-i' OF DEFENSE . ~.

,.

\.

. ....

, ... ~\ . . ....:: , )

~,~:

'.

......

'.

Subject: The Stratezic • }.·iainlailQ (Uj

,

. -)

Ir:lport?,~ce

of the

Souti:ea5~

Asia.

"

(.. 1.' The United Stc>.tes has cle~.rly stated ~r.d de:nollstra.t'eC t~a!; one of its u'1.alte?J.?le u~.)jectivc5 is t~1e prevent:o:l of 501.1.t11 Yiet::2.t~ "fa.11"lag t 0 CO:'1'lm~St . . a~gressl.on ., • ..... ... 1 ,. ~ 1 a~::.a ~'1e SU05cque:-_.• 055 01 ".le "'em-:_..:'J ... • a. .• ~ ..~ er IJ., T. , O·h.;ectl.···e

c~ ... :. .'!.. '" s:a'" &. ~"'!'leSO't.!.,~.. ~ ..... !.:.;:..~!J!. ~ "

'r"-'a:""\l~~'d "'-.; .:. •• - . . . . .

'T'· ... e u. -.;1.: · 1'"j' ... ~. __ .. .... I.a.

(··.. e ... e;core ml''''''c be to t:::ll-e e'(-eG.'';.:.;o'· 1 J.; 1. ..... " -l'"' _t.._ ... _1" all _ a/'~~ol"_ __ .... !:t ., .. ~ , '.. . . S J' ,\,.' • ...... necessary LoO ueI2il. .. conlr~1U:!lS·, aggreS5!On 1-:1 OU~~1 'llei:n~.ln. .,.. 1!!~ irmnecliate .st!:at-egic import':':lce of So:.;tl,east Asia Ee3 in the political va,be t:rat ca~. accrue to 6e Free Viodd 1;1~rcugr~ a Sl.ccessful sta~d !n. t!1at arec_. Of equal importa~ce is ti1.e ps;'chological impact t!'1Ll.t a' firm position by th.e United Statcs v,rill have 0::. t~le countries of the world - bot!l free and co!'::m~unist. Con tc.e !leganve sic.e, c:- U:;.ited States politic;::!. and! or ~ilitari" v.ithdl'awal from t:~e 'Souti:east ASla:l area would have a!l adverse psychological i1'::lpact of even. greatel" proportio::~ a~d O:le IrOl":!. whic:l :;.<ecov~ry would be both difficult a:td costl)-. ,. v ....

-~...,

-.

1.~"J

~

.

{2.: It mt'lst be reco~nized the:.t the fall oi So;.!~"-l Yiet!.'l3.l':1 to ~

,

~

'

~

COmr.'lUl1!st control would mean the eve::t:'lal cO!!'lmu!ust dO~-:li,"!.?tio:a of all of the. Sou~east _&... s:'an mainland. Thel'e:s little dou~t ti1at .the '!lext m,3.jo.:.- target ·.v.ould be T:'l.a.~land.. Cadres are now 7;)eb.g establis:1.ecl in tl1G.t count:r~. ap.d, "la."1.d..refori-r-..H or f~c?:;~tal~~t.. ,.;.~., • . dictatorship!! pl~!s ma;r prove fe=t!.le exploita.tio:..~ fields fo= .f:le COt:''lmu~sts. T3ila::!Q is bordered":>}" a " p b.k" Bu=~a a:loa. a 'vacillati":lg Car.i.1~d:"a.1 eithe= of ,-<,·!u.cI1. will ~a5il;- fall u~cl.er CO:-_"l~l!::1i5t pr~SS;lre. ThC'.il~.:1d would ,:J~.10St certa.~r..ly t;1.e:l seek closer 2..cco:-~1mo-.iat~0::l w:t;\ t:.eSi~o-Sov:'et Bloc. SE...~TO would

., "

.

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.~'- " ... ...."" '.. 'r~"" .1~i, _,.....,r'n(·d "'I" ....."'.. cca.:.c '" e~slo. ... •. _ on_1" .... 1::.'... __ •• ;.1..* '.L.·l:10 ..;"'~: t ....·....• ';\ .. <l p l:OiJa J ' . coz:"mitmi.st drive would. thei.l be Iv;:ilny~ ,a!1d Sh'!.g:tp~re: While,tIle '11.,. 1 ' ...,,~le \Vl"11 t 0 f"19~!t 41.!1 dm.lg"1I. " ... •f-a vc "~10 b " ..g 'poop. 1e 01.• ~v:.a .•aya ..'i.~"'O aC~ll 9£ the United Kingdom·, ·tlle.country itself- \c:~o1.l1d be isolated and 'ha.rd pressed.' The cO:l~munis~ elemen~ .i:l, Singap;)re'is strong. Shor.t of direct !"..~ilit;;.l.'rr btervc:.tio:r by.t!ie Uni:ecl.Stace s-j' it is qi.\~stio:l.:l.;;'lc whether "Malaya and Sb.gap:>re could be pl'evc?'.;ed il'om evc!1tuall'r coming u:lder cor!:U!unlst domir..ation or con.trol. , •

c

. ". \.

4,'

~{lv!~ita·:; C·o~Sid.;ati"~S ••IT!~. API'O"&;':' CO;i~i":S a.~~ ~~. ~.

deta?~cd appl'Clis~l of t~'L~SC rnilitar~ consi.d~r.ation0

'.

a. Earl~' Eve~'t::uaHti.es - Loss of t:1.e .Sout:1east A.sian ~raitl!a~d \,"lodd have an. adverse ir:'l?act on our ~i!5.tar;i Ttr -and \'vould r-!arkadbr reduce our abilit'J'~' in lir."li;:ed , strate:0 1 . " . w~r by denyi!13 us air, land. a!'ld ,sea b'3.ses, by!orcing greater b.telligence ef£9rt \',rititlessar reso.lts, by, compli-; . ........ t· "t: • t 'd ... catulg T!ll.L1.t".r;r _l:1.e S 0:' cor!l!nl.t"n~ca.lvn ,a:lo. ;)Y i:.le l:ltrO UC!.lO:l. of more formidable e.cemy forces hl the a.rea. Air acces~ a!ld access to 5300I'!\iles of m2.inland cca.stH-n.e \'"ioultl be lost to us,' our Allies and neutral India w'!ttld be outflan..~cd, the last • .~, a. Unl ·te d K·lng d om r:u'1·" 1 • be Sl.gm.:.lcan:. ,-... a.rt" s t re!lS .... loll In A' s::.a WOU~(l elimillated with the loss of Sb.;a.pore a.~d 1-ialaya and US . milita.ry i~llltte:1.ce in. tha.~ 'a.rea, sho~t of war, would be di~ficult to e~ert •. . . . . • . 'b. Possible Event'.\alities - ot: equ2.'l ii:lportatice to t!~~ ir.."1mediate losses are the eve'r.tualities w~rl.ch could follow the · "_OSS O!~ tt ~ .... ... __ A"~:'!,~'l " ' m;t'~ ,'"~:'I.no.~,A'11 0 f t"!'l,e Tn.d oneslan' ' .!1'! ,:oC.,.to.!"!e:;lS~ e

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· archipelago could c~me ltnder the d.~~i:'lation and cO:ltrol " the USS~ a~d would ~econle a ccn;rcunist base posing a threa't .. ,a.gaulst Austrc.li~~ and Ne ..;.- Zealand. The Sh:.o-Soviet Bloc would · have co~trol of the eastern a.:c.ess to the In.dia:l Ocean'. Th.e Phil1p~i.nes at1d Japa:l.' could be pre~s'J.red to assume at best,~, a. neutratist role, thus elimina~ingtwo of our major bases o( . defense l-t\ the Vfestern Pacific. Cur lines of cle£et~3e the't'l 'would be pl!llecl. :'lOrt~l to Korea, C~dn~.wa arid Taiwan resulting in t 11e s!.tosecl.\c-,t overb:ci~~ of o~r 1; ... .,.5 of co-;mu'''l',-:ltio'.·s in a llrnited tsar ~ rndia r s abilitt: to renlain neutral would 'be':" . :\." . ~. ... . Jeoparc;,tzed and, as t.ne .DIoc :nee~s success, Its cO:tcurre:ltstepped-up activ'ities to moya into a::.d control Africa can. be . ' expected. . .

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- I!"&. conSl " deratl.cn . ..: ~l • "'" [:>.] 01"tne ... orm!'dao e' tnreat to trlc ~ ree 'Horld whic~"'!. ia rep::ese:!ted it! t~'le current actio!;.s ill Sout~ Vietnam, the . need for US a:;d GYN success i::t that area tar.not be overei;~phasized. In this cCt!!!lectio;l, reference is made to t~i.e s~~ff level d.ocumen.t . \. entitled ftSumr:lary~o£ S,.{ggested Courses of Action" prepared for .. General Taylor f,~r refe=e:-lce in. hisrr.is-sion to Soc.::'l Vietna:.n. 0:1.. 21'October 1901, tr:,is docume'l.lt circl~lated cOml~~en.ts ana. recolnmeildatioi.1S on 20 cour ses of actio:::J. that co!:.ld be tal,eli' in Sout~l Vie-cnam s110rt ot ti'U~ direct utilizatio:::J. of US c':::lrr_ba~ forces.; The .J~i::.t C:uafs' of Staff !j,otc t::'a~~ in. ~ecping wit:, the Pre s:.ae ilt , saecisi?'i,'l that we .1 .. . must advi5~a.r..C. s:.;,pport 50116 Viet:lam !>\.It :lot a.t tiu;; tim.e en~age ' unilatera.lly in combat" all of the courses of actioll.recorn.."'i"'.. enci.ed:.-· with iev'l' exce'p~io:ls !lc?.ve eithe:: been. imple!~e:1.ted or aut~1.orized. .

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. . Vietuames~ Go.vert"~.en.t ;..a3 speci£icall~' re<i1.:estcd assi;;ta.!lCe from t:"te U~ted. Stc?~es·. :

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r61 Rete ~c~..ce h; 'al:;o ::'v.:~de to the ag'reer:lcnt.Inade

betwc(::l. the .Go~eru..~lCa:.. of Vict':'~l.r;i. acd the U:t£~ed Stat~s m~ 4 DCCcGlb-er' 195,1' .. whc:ei:l. t~1e' Governmen1; of V:et:lan":. ,,:grecd .t~,take s~ve!·al.maj'?i ~":::', '

steps to i~cl.·caSe. its efficic!lCY.

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('7. I:!. response to P!'esidc::.t Dic:!1 f s :r~quest for a5sistai:!~e a:!.d t~'e '"'ovc::::·~rne~ts. m"';':'... F.l.Ot.\C';. m'2t.erials c.'"'.;;20--_ ... v .. .. ''''e';-.~;ce'~ ·-.·0 t.,~'e~:-:,.;·e''.';'~J.~ and advice ?~.r': be!.:'.; p~;ovid0cl to Squth Viet::.am. U. .rtortu.:-,.atel~~ I o\\r cO:-ltdbu:t:'o!l.S ~re ~()t b~j.a:$ properly e'l~p!.oyed by the' So-.:.th . ~. ..' -' ... '~1a.ve Viet:larnese OOl,.'er:ll~e::.t <lua' rna-Jor por!..lor..s 0.1.r t'!1e aoreer.~enl. 'either r:'.ot been carried. o,...t or arc beb;! delayed by Di~f~1.1.. ~","1I

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.t,......... . . t':!e d eC1S!On ... . . oe conl.~~il.e;.. pal'~lClpa:.ion.. III r.lal\:ln.g process.. To cate efforts r!~c..de 0"_ both t:!.e rail£tary a:'1d diplomatic level have failed to moth-ate Diem to agree to act for'thrig~1.tly on ol.~r advice 20:1.<1 properly t...ttilize the re':)o'..trces placed., at his disposal. He has bee:l 51o\~ to a·;cept t.~e pla.r:.s a~ld proposals of Admi~'a,l F'e~t . and Ge!!er~l ~icGarr 3.!'ld he has i:i man.:: bsta:lces disregarded t!1.e advice of A:n!Jas:iado~ ~olt:'ng. T:1e reason. for Dicmfs ne6at~ve ' reaction to proposals to save South Vie~'Cam whilei':.e maintains' a positive pvsit:'orl that it must be saved '~'lal' be found in CI~~cpAc'S 1--10"• .. c •. . . ., ara_~e_ r .. ,. - a " 0-" ; ..e'i~~,·';"-:l:.;..'t'l ~.. a-nQ.. ,~l.S .; ... appra_:>.. .1. nlS . .l . ,'.l,.c ....pr o-"!;..:..: 1.~1._:>_n3 _:L~_~,_~:.)_ • • t S concerm:1g . t"I1C JU • dt~men.t ' .,. ..l::.c.n--:.cma ,. . ~ 1 1_OJ'a.J,Y '" 0 f (lOIlO J 2.vl_lty a~c:.. his milita:ty leacler~. Recei!t intelligen.ce rep~rts cfcoup d letat plotting inYol-."ir-g se:!lor Vietnamese military o~£ical's and the possi,!)i1it~' that- high Vietnar.1ese officers 1!ave approached. US o£f~cia15 te:;.d to confir!!1 Diem's doubts concerning the loralty of . some of 11is reilit3.:Y leaders. .mus~

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9. In tIl:'..; regard J s11ou.lda su.ccessful cou.p oV'erturn Diem, '\va might disco ....er t!'l.at r:.~any of Dic.rn. '5 difficult ch.aracteris~ics are n....tional r.at~ler t!l2.:l perso:!.2.l. The Vie~:lamese are tough, " .t ~, ~"1 1• ... • T"ne~r t e!1:lCl.o!..!.S. ag~ a, 'pro~a, a::ta. e:<traoral:l.ar:. ':' se.-.4 COl~tc.ant. , rece"'lt political tr<?,ciition. is one oi the mu!.tiolicit,,· of pai-ties and groups ~~cli;.rl;."!.g toward conspi:-3.tori~~l ,~nd Y-iol.!~l.t methods. The <llsappea:-a:::cc Ot a stro~i.~ le<lde:: W~~;) ca~l da.!::'!.pe:! 2.:1d cO:ltrol tlle3e ...,-' - ",OU l'C. ·.'re_.!. l' ~:naa!'~ re"':er s::.o~'l . t 0 a: CO-.:lm~::.o~ .' . 1" 1 te!l0',eo-,,.!,e;> CL,. pv.:.!.tl.Cc,~ c~" ... a.o s 'explci~a~le bf the stro~~gly led ;l~;.d well disciplined. co~""~U!".i5tS. If . '.'W'e can •oe s~re c I,OS:ilg I" . • • t.. ' goes, ~"!.:.:; 5tre:lst.:l5 out Vla ca.n:r..ot ~e D lem _ _ oi 'sure of rei~~ed.... :'~·! ilis We?:~les5e3. Ac:--..ie ...e~":te~t of US obiecti~ ... e5' '\ • b -,.:-.-. l.a.. •• D· .... . ' " .,. ,. COtuQ ' e :l'!cre ~nClL .. '.ntnout. ' :er.c. .. ~ia.:l. W!t.:l n:r:l. ..L .t".. eretore J ;. -t'oc na d a C1e,~:::: t 0 ~. . . p!"epare d · ..!o. ~U:l ,J:..em.' . t:lal... 'e ...'le -or·..· Lt:!.t~eQ S t.;:tes,l3 ac.Q •

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10. In cO:ls!del'atio:~ of t:1C fo'!'cgc::~g, tile Job.t CEcls of S:a.ff ~~, '1·;-' • . , ·; ... ·-T ~,1: ...... .,.c ...~.r--~ ·,~.: (:.:.n . \ ...~-:.1... -to-J.. n,. . -....... , ~ -t ..· \. •. c_ ~ 1.5 a ___ '.o~_n ... ~_C~I. .... :..!:.l.f, d. ;:, ... ong appi-o~ch -to'Di<;;!!l 0:1 a Go;-e:-n.m:"::lt-to-Go-..-er::r:1.cnt level. If ...... e al"e to effectively assist So:!tC-: Vici:l.1m., we ::lUSt co.~vbce Dier:'l that (a) there is :".0 alterl1ative to 't~le establishme!~t of a sound basis upo .. whic~l both l'le 2.:i.d t~l~ U::i~i;d States Gc·v·e!:.1!'l~e:"!t ca!l . . ',ror!.;: a~~cl ~ (0) he ila3 a~ ur.]c••t requ:'re:n.::.;:~t· for aclxice, as well as aSslst,ulce" in milita17; poHtical C1!!(1 ecc:lomic mat.::cr.s. ,..... __ ev.".~ ....i,na:. b c 1;

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· •. ...t y, it •• "'t- ... 15 !'ecO~,-:1m.enC!.e(t -£l2.!. you propose 11• Acco:amg Presid.ent a::cl to the ~e<;retar1 of State t~1at: ~

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a. Upv~ his ret;Ul':l to Saigo~1 Ambassador i>(o!ti~g ~eet. with Presiden.t D:'em a:.1U advise hi.m that~ since ~~"le United States cO:lsiaers it essc:·l.tial a:-Lc. f~11clal!1e!ltal ti'l.at South Vietnam not fall to comrc!..U.n.ist forces:

.

(I) The Un.ited States is prepared a!~d ,,·d.lling to bolster ~Li$ re~ine a!1.c. di~c.o!J.rage internal f?ctions which may- seek to overt~lroVl :J.r.1.

(2} SU1:able '~i1itary' plans have been developed and jointly approved. Diem must per.a'..it l~is mHitarr .comr.lanaers to implencnt tl!ese approved pla:l's to defeat· . the Viet. Cor:.g~. (3) There ::lust be esta~lished an adequate basis for " . . 'a::l-.:. ~ " or,. r:-s •. and as 31stance . . the receplolon a tel" 1 ~za.t"!va IJ ac.Y!-ce .. "by- all ??propdate eCZl~l~ms of the Gy-N ." ~

(4-) T1:ere :nus: be ~o further procrastinatiO!1a (5! a

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fOt,:'ld l;.1'..po5sible to est?).)li.;h s'ach

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13. T.hr~e s:::.!ie~t factors ':..re of t:1e' greatest imp~rtance if t;,e cvcl:tual !ntroductio~l of US forces i.s roqul!'ed • . a • .Any war in the Sout:least Asia~: lvi3.i~lai'!cl \vill be a peninsula a:1d isl~l.:d-type of c~u~l?aign - a lnode warrc~rc in. ~"'11'C~1 -11·elc'n,:.--r - OC tl-.e ... ·-·0·· r'l'-.;.L:.t": _.&.l.::t ...... ..A.. - ........ d·. "';;'0 4 _._ ::t of _ t~,c .;.. '-' • .&._t.. ..... _06·S"''''te.:o \,0.:,. a;; have gah"led' a, wealth of e;..::p~ric~!ce al!d h: willcn \"'0 !lave excelled bOt!1 i-n VJ.:>dd. Vial' II an.d Koraa.

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b. Study of t~le prol'le!~ cle~".rly indicates t:1?t the 'commun:sts are lil-!lited in. t~le forces tile] cc.r.. sustab. :'!l war in. ti.1at area. because' of natural logistic aZ"~d tra:lspol'.tation problen'ls.

CC!lsid~r' t~1e recoL:'lmenclation provided

rOu. by JCSM-320-51 1 dated

10 May' 19011 ti1at a. cl.ec~s:'on be !':lade to deploy suitClble US forc~s to ?outh Viet:1a.r:t scificie::!t to acco~-:1plish the fOll0\vi!lg:

a. Pro\1de a ~-i5:ble dete:-re::t to poee:ltial North Vietnam. al-..d!or Chinese COr:l~1uci;;t actio::.;

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b. Release Viet:-.a.r::ese !Ol'cas Iro:n advanced a:1d static defen.se, p·js:tio:ls ;:0 i:'.3rm:'t th.eir f,.!ture cO~:r.:lit!'.-:.e!1.t to counte:-insur::!e"J.c· .... ... .. actio.!:;; . ~

. c. ,:-\ssist in tr2i::.ing tl'!.e Yiet~amese forces;

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e~ Indicate the !i!"~1'les5 of O!.1:: i..-lte:lt toal! Asia.~ !'.citiollS •

. For the JOi:::lt Chief:; of Staff: ,

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASIDNGTON

February 19~

, NATIONAL SECURITY 'ACTION

TO:

'. (SUBJECT:

MEMO~UM

1962

NO. 132

The Honorable Fowler Hamilton . .- The Administrator Agency for International Development

'" '

Support of Local Police Forces for Internal Security and Counter-Insurgency Purposes)

As you know, I desire the appropriate agencies of this Government to give utmost attention and emphasis to'programe deSigned . ,to counter Communist indirect aggression, which I regard as a grave threat during the 1960s. I have already written the Secretary of' Defense "to move to a ne",,, level of increased activity across the board" in the counter-insurgency field. ' :Police assistance programs,' including thol:ie UHll€:l' the ~cgi~ of your agency, are also a crucial eleIp.ent· in our response to this challe~ge. I understand that there has been some tendency toward de-emphasizing them under the new aid criteria developed by your' agency_ I recognize that such programs may seem marginal in terms of focusing our energies on those key sectors which will contribute most to sustained economic growth. But I regard them as justified on a different ·though related basis, i.e., that of contributing to internal security and resisting Communist-supported insurgency. I am further aware that police .programs, as a relatively minor facet of t~e functions of the aid agency, may have tended to receive little emphasis as a result. Therefore, I would like you to consider yarious ways and means of giving the police program. greater autonomy. within,'" AID, if this seems necessary in order to protect it from neglect.

455


L~ surn: I ~ho~ld like Al.!,) to r~view carefully its' l olc in t}l~ SUppOl't of local police forco!} lor bt~l"l"lal scc\l~ity' and COll..!ttcr-msur:;ency . pUl'POSC$, 2,n.d to recommeml to me thron~h the Speci21 Oro\.\2 (CO!.ll1terInsul'geltcy) '."",hat new or rC!lewed empbases at-e desh-able. o

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(sizr.eu} jOHN.. ~". KENNEDY

In.fonna.tic!l. CO!?1 to: . . The SecTctary of State

The Sec:retaxy of

Dc~ense

The AttOl.':ley Ge:lel"c.l

Director oi CC:'ltral IntclH3e:'lce Director, Uu::;:-e3u ot.the nuc:!at Dh~ecto~, PeZl-ce Corp;] Qcne~al 1~a;.:well D. T",ylolo

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THE WHITE HOUSE

P. y

'V1ASHINGTON March 13, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION mlORANDUM NO 131 0

TO:

The The 1he The The The The

Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Attorney General Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Central Intelligence Administrator, Agency for International Development Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT;

Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency

1. The P".cesident has approved the folJ.ovring training objectives for officer grade personnel of the depa~tments and agencies indicated above who may have a role to play in counter-insurgency programs as weli 'as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of devel~ping countries. a.

The Historical Background of Couneer-Insurgency

Personnel of all grades will be required to study the history of subversive insurgency movements, past and present, in order to familiarize themselves vrith the nature of the problems , and characteristics of Communist tactics and techniques as related to this particular aspect of Communist operations. This kind of background historical study will be offered throughout the school systems of the L路~s.f:'uu.si'ble departmcntf.i ~nd agen~ies > beginning at the junior level of instruction and carrying forw'ard to the senior level. b.

Study of.Departmental Tactics and Techniques to Counter Subversive Insurgency" . . . "-

i I

I i

i

:

Junior and middle grade officers will receive instruc-' tions in the' tactics and techniques of their particular departments which have an application in combating subversive insurgency: This level of instruction will be found in the schools of the Armed Services at the company/field officer level. In the case : of the Central Intelligence Agency, this kind of instruction will i be offered at appropriate training installatio~s. . The State '... Department will be responsible for organizing appropriate courses in this instructional area for its own officers and for xepresent~颅 tives of the Agency for Internatio~al Developmen~ and the United

457


.

.

.

S'l;ates Informa!ion Agency. Schools of tIlis category wjJj. make. availab1e spaci;S in agreed numbers for the cross-training of other U.S. ageneies with a counter-insurgency responsibility. . c.

Instmction in Counter-Insurgency Program Planning

Middle"grade and senior officers will be offered special training to p~e them for command, staff, country team and department~ positions 'involved in the planning and conduct of counter-insul"g='-llcy programs. At this level the students will be made aware ()t the possible contributions of all departments, and of" the need to combine the "departmental assets into effective programs. This t.~ of instruction '-rill be given at the Staff 'College- . War College lem in the Armed Services. The State Department will organize such eaurses as may be necessary at the Foreign Service Institute' for 路officials of State, Agency for International Development and United States Inf'om.ation Agency. All schools of this category will me available spaces in agreed numbers for the cross-training of other U.S. agencies with a counter- ~nsurgency responsibility... d.

Specialized Preparations for Service in Underdeveloped Areas

There is an unfUlfilled need to offer instruction on the entire rang of problems faced by the United States in dealing with develop~countries, including special area counterinsurgency prOblems, to middle and senior grade officers (both mili tary and civilian) -who are about to occupy important posts in' . underdeveloped countries. A school will accordingly be developed at the national level to meet this need,to teach general (including counter-insurg-.Acy) policy and doctrine with respect to under. developed are2S7 to of'fer studies on problems of the underdeveloped world keyed to areas to which the students are peing sent, and to engage in res~-!"ch .projects (tE'Rj e;np.d to improve the U.S. capability for guiding l1!!3erdevel.oped countries through the modernization barrier and for countering subversive insurgency. In addition, . this schoo] WOJiLd undertake to assist other more specialized U.S. Government institutions engaged in underdeveloped area problems (i.e., those conducted by the Foreign Service Institute, Agency . , . for Internatl-ooal Development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services, in~ng the Military Assistance Institute and the Central Intelligence p..gency) to develop 路curricula on the non- . technicalaspeets of" their courses or instruction. e.

Trai1!ing of' Foreign Nationals

It is in the interest of the Uni'te'd states to provide counter-insurgency training to selected foreign nationals, both in the United states and in their own countries.' The emphasis .

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R£CEIVEC1

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

o!-., t.,\.ic. APR 9.

15

April 1, 196Z

03

OFr S£C'( Of D£F£~SE

Dear Mr. Secretary: The President has asked me to transmit to you for your comments the enclosed memorandum on the subject of Viet-Nam to the President from Ambassador' J. K. Galbraith dated April 4, 1962. Sincerely,

- Michael V. Forrestal

End: Memo to Pres. from Amb. Galbraith

The Honorable

Robert S. McNamara . Secretary of De!e~se

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': Washington, D. c.

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From J "'. lr. Galbrai th

, DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

April

4~

1962'

l-lEt;ORANDUH FOR TH3 PRESIDENT

Subject:

Viet-Nam

,

,/

The following considerations influence ?ur thinking on Viet-

Nam:

r-- tr-;,:-' !

~'le have a gro\dng milita~ commitme~t. This could expand step by step :into a major, long-drav:n' out indecisive military " involvement. 2. We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual gover~足 ment and a leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return.

3. There is.c9nsequent danger we'shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.

4. The political effects of some of the measures l'mich pacifiea'\:,ion requires or is believed to require, including the concentration' of population, relocation .of villages, and the burning of old villages .. may be. damaging to those and especialJi to ;iesterners associated i'r.ith ' it.

' . /

.

5. We fear that at some point 'in the involvement there will be

a major poll.tical outburst about the ne\i Korea and the new '\-rar into which the Democrats as so often before have precipitated us. .

6.

It seems at least possible that the Soviets are not particu":' larly desirous of trouble in this part of the world and that our military reaction with the need to fall back on Chinese protection . may be causing concern in Hanoi. ' . .,

In the


-2In the light of the foregoine "Ie urge the follo\,dng:,

1. That it be our policy to keep open the door for political solution •. ~'re should, vlelcome as a solution any broadly based non~ , Communist government that is fFee from external interference. It should h~ve the requisites for internalla\'1 and order. \'le should not require'that.it be militarily identified ~~th the United States. 2. We shall find it useful in achieving this result if we seize any good opportunity to involve other countries and world opinion in settlement and its guarantee. This is a useful exposure and pressure on the Communist bloc countries and a useful antidote for the argument that this is a private ~l1erican military adventure.

'3. We should measurably reduce our commitment to the particular . present leadership of the government of South Viet-N~~. .

To accomplish the foregoing, we recommend the following steps':

s~ecific

1. In the next fortnight or so the ICC \·rill present a report which we are confidentially advised \-r.i.ll accuse North Viet-Nare. of subversion and the Government of ,Viet-Ham in conjunction mth the United states of not notifying the introduction of nlen and materiel , as prescribed by the Geneva accords. ~re, should respond by aski~ the co-chairmen to initiate steps to re-establish compliance with the Geneva accords. Pending specific recommendations~ which might- ' at some stage include a conference of signatories, we shouldde~and a. susnension of Viet Con~ activity and a~ree to a standstill on an introduction of men and materiel.

-

-

-

2. A(:litionally, Governor Harriman should be instructed to approach ,the Russians to express our concern about the increasing~ dangerous situation th~t the Viet Cong is forcing in Southeast Asia~ They should be told of our determination not to let the Viet Congo overthro\·( the present govern.'nent while at'the same tine to look. without relish on the dangers that this military build-up is causing ." in the area. The Soviets should be asked to ascertain whether Hanoi' can and mll call off the Viet Cong activity in.return for phasedAmerican lci.thdra..ral, liberalization in the, trade relations between the two parts of the cou.~tr.y and general and non-specific agreement . to talk·about reunification ~fter some period of tranquillity_ , . 3. Alternativel1,

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3. Alternatively, the Indians should be asked to make such an approach to Hanoi under the same terms of reference.

4.

It must be recognized that our long-run position cannot i. involve an unconditional co~uitment to Diem. Our support is to nonConununist and progressively democratic government not to individuals" We cannot ourselves replace Diem. But we ,should be clear in our mind that almost any non-Communist. change vrould probably be beneficial and this should be the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area.

In the Dleantime policy should continue to be guided by the following:

1. l'le should resist all steps \,jhich cOIIuuit American troops to combat action and impress upon all concerned the importance of keeping American forces out of actual combat conmitment. . 2. l're should disassociate ourselves from action, hOi-lever necessary, which seems to be directed at the villagers, such as the new concentration program. If the action is one that is peculiarly identified ,. with Americans. such as路 defoliation, it should not be-undertaken in .... . the absence of lOOst compelling reasons. Americans in their various _ . roles _should be 路as invisible as the situation permits.


THE JOINT CHIEFS OF' STAFF WASHINGTON 1.5. o.c.

APR 13

1"~ 33.

JCSM-Z82-62 .:~ ~.

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eFf'SEC"I OF DEFEtiSE ME¥ORANDU~

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

,

C~("r.r: - r.. . . 1 [" \ ...... -" ....1 .;1,. ! ....

Subject: US Policy Toward Vietnam (U)

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1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary , of Defense (ISA) dated 10 April 1962, requesting comments on a memo- , randum to the President by the Hono!;,able J e. K; Galbraith, US Ambassador 'to India.) wherein he propose.s changes to the present US policy toward Vietnam and thegovelonment of President Diem. ,

I

r

, ,Z. The burden of Ml·. Galbraith's proposals appears to be that present US policy to\,?ard Vietnam shoUld be .revised in order to s'eek a political solution to the problem of communist pen~tration in the area. The effect of these proposals is to put the United States in a position of initiating , 'negotiations \v:ith ,the conlmunists to seek disengagement from what is by now,a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in Sout~east Asia.

3. The President of the" Unit~d States and the Secretary of pefense both have recently and publicly affirmed the intention of the US Govern~ me!'lt to support the government of Pr~sident Diem and the people of South Vietnam. to lIJbatever, extent may be necessary to eliminate the Viet Cong threat. In his letter of, 14 De cember' 1961 to Pre sident, Diem, Preside~t Kennedy said: . .

,

"Your (P~esident Diem's) letter under line 5 wh;t.t our own information has convincingly 'shown -- that the campaign of force and ·terror now ,being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi.,. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and'to which they bound themselves in 1954. . ' .

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to

. "At that timc, the United Statcs, although not a party the Acconts, declal'cd that i~ would view any renewal of thc aggression in 'violation or the agreelnents with grave concern and as seriously threatening intcl'national peace and sccurity. We continue to maintain that view. 11

.

: .

UIn acco;rdance with that, declaration, and in respon"sc' to your request, we arc prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independc~cc. II . . .. 4. The vari~us measures approved for implementation by' the United States in. support of our objectives in South Vietnam have not yet been,." underway long enougl~ to demonstrate their full effectiveness.' Any reversal of US policy could have disastrous effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vi~tnam, but with the rest of our Asian and other allie s as well. ,

"

'" " 5. The problems raised by Mr. Galbraith with regard to our pl"eSent policy have been considered in. the coordinated development of that poUcy. The Join~ Chiefs of Staff are aware of the deficiencies of the present gov'crnment of South Vietnam •. Howev:el"J the President's policy of supporting the Diem. regime while applying pressure for reform appcars to be the only practicable alternative at this time. In this regard, the vie:ws¡ of the Joint Chiefs of .Staff as expressed in JCSM-33-6z' are reaffirme4.

j, 6. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the present US.: " policy toward South Vietnam, as announced by the P"resident, shoul:! he' pursued vigorously to a successful conchlsion. i I

For the Joint Chiefs of Star,!:

'R.tt~ L~

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Sta f

.

, .


R£Cr!r~~tP.TANl' SECRF:rAR'l O? D!::FENS=: • WA$~lNGTON 2~. o. C. •

.

1962 APR 16 09 14

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INTERNi."r10NALSS:CURrN Ai'FA~

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COVERntG :BRIEF

. !'he Secreta.rJ of Defense

i'O:

FR01<1:' .

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The Assistant Secretary of Derense elSA) (Sisnad) ,::~~::~ P.aydA, Wi~lia:;!~ ,

:'o~in~ A:::~lst~nt

Problem.:· To respond to the President r s request for your comments concerning Ambassador Ga.lbraith's m.e::::torandum on VietDaIil. ~ "

Discussion:

~

President's request for

.

co~ents

.

did not

specify that only Iililitary aspects should be treated. In view of the nature of J..!ilOassador'Ga.lbraith's memo" . : meaningr""ul. coz::.ent necessa.rily ranges beyond ,the , narrow military implications. HOi'iever~ the proposed coments com-orm. ,·r.ith Special H~tional Intelligence Estil;ate lio. 10-62, dated 2l Feb 62. ", '

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J.1r.'" Cottrell of t.~e De~I't!!lellt of state t.dvis,es that Ambassad.or Gelbre1th IS me::lorandU!il has •. not been referred to S~te for. fom3.l staffing ar.d ,', ec:;rr~nt. It!r. Harrir!an rega.:::ds· it as ~. private CO!l: , munic2.tion to the President from P..mba.ssadorC-albruth~ However, aninitia~d:reft of 'the attached memoran.dum. ., to ue President 'tva.s revieyed. by 10k. Cottrell e.Ild. his . , '. comments have been. considerad.,' ,, .::',:, '. " ,"

.'

EecO'l!!::!.end.a.tioa:

xoat you sie;l the enclosed I!lettorapa~. .

S~c:-·:t.:ir~


May 29. 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 157 TO:

The Secretary of State Jhe Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence Chai~n, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

Presidential Meeting on Laos, May 24, 1962

The President has approved the following Record of Actions for the subject meetings: . .

,

At at in in

the meeti ng on the s i tuat i on in Laos ,he 1din the Cab i net Room 4:30 p.m. today, the President requested contingency planning the' event of a breakdown of the cease fire in laos for action two major areas: (a) the investing and holding by Thai forces with U.S. backup of Sayabouri Province (being that portion of northern laos to the west of the Mekong River); and (b) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern fronti er \~ith Thai, Viet- ':' namese or U.S. forces.

In connection with the above contingency plans, the President . desired an estimate of the mil itary valu~ of the Nekong River in Sayabouri Provi.nce as a defensive barrier in relation to the cost' ~

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The President also asked that the above planning be undertaken • unilaterally by the United States without discussion at this time with the Thais or the lao.


- 2路-

The President also forces in Thailand and the early days long as they serve

indicated that he contemplated keeping U.S. during the period of the 3-Prince negotiations

of the government of national union, i.e. as a necessary purpose.

The Presid;nt observed that a cable would have to go in answer to Bangkok's 1844.

McGeorge Bundy


DEPARTMENT OF STATE 'tUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH . '

Rosoarch Mamorandum RFE-27~ June 18, 1962 TO..

• FE - Go'roi'nor

mOrr : DR

"!"

Th!rr~."'110~.·. , (.. u 1 -

Roger HllsUl2ll

SUBJECT: Progross

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R(lpor~

RAS !i...IlS1..!.' •

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Please do not remcvu

3. on South Vietnam

t:t'om

ROOll!

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SA-=:;

. . 7417

In this report, an o}..-:pa.'l1sion of an 6ro:'lier infornuU. paper, W~ , summarizo tho f:\ajor goals and accoIl1Plisn'1l6nts of the presont counter'insurgGncy effort 2.g~inst Communist armed rold subversive forces in tho .Republic of Vietnsa (South Vietnam) A briei assessment of the genoral situat~on is also lnclududo It should be emphasized, howover, that this report is not a complete appraisal; it does not, tor ox~ple, discuss Communist strongth, capabilities, and achiovom3nts in rocont months nor compcu'o theso \-lith those o:f the Viotn?Ji1.9sG Goverl'llllemt. It should also be noted that this roport does not fo11011 tho usual format of a Rosearch : l-Icmorandum. 0

I.

Wd.~T

/11m "IE TRYING TO DO?

1. D3viso m' int~grat6d Cllld system;ltio

military~political...economic

. strat~gic cou..'1torin.surgcney ooncep'c. ;!lld plan t·o eliminate tho Vietnrunose Communist. ~nod-sUb7trsivo fc~co, tno Viot Congo '

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.Do I~ontifY' the popul~~o with the· VietniMaso Goycrnment!s struggle against: . , the Vl.ct Cona'. . .' . . :. . . . _ . o~_

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(1) ~ldant ligo Dinh Diem approved a f:.-y.stematlo cou.~ter­ insurgency pl~"'l on lfurch 19, 1962, l'ihich oontains the bulk of the British }.~visory l.fission's (head~d by Ur.. ~.G.K. Thompson) rsccn:r.tendati.one and ,those saourity con~pts deva10ped by the US. 'lila counterinsurgency plan is to be Lmplementsd Lt) 10 Provinces arol.md Saigon in. the }Iekong Ri7er delta region (the so..called :-?Dalta Pacification Pla."l~;). Col. Hoang Va."'l Lao, a .i'orr~:r province chiaf. apparently regarded hi.ghly by Diem, is rssponsible:fcr exaclGl.ng t.he plan, opSl'ating ulldar the aut.r-.ority of ~rguyen Din.t~ Thuan~ Secretar7 of Sta"!je for tha P..ce~idancy, :t.7ld Ngo DiIh"'l N:."lU, Dio!1's bro~h~r cmd PI' incipal pv~it,ica.l adviser. . " (2) BOperatioll Su..n.rise 1t in Binh Duong provLllce just north of Saigon, favored b,..Di~:n for special tactical purP-:JSG3, conatitutas tha . "initial. af.l'ol·t in.a. ~'1atel1'..atic, provinco':'by-provinca pe.c5.£ication cfl.mpa1gn~. RO£;eration SuU!'issit iiJ he~ded by Brig. Gen." Van Than.1t Cao, the administ.!-a-"

tor of "the Southeastsrn hovincial Region. Three s'Gratagic hawJ.ets ha'l;e ' been constructed in Bizll'l Duong province as a rssu1t,~o.r this opara:tion and, ns of mid-}Iay 1962) mol'S tp~n 2,700 "persons had bean relocated in these" ha.'11lets.. (TrIO additional M.'!'.1ats are in the p1an."lulg or early construction . stage. ) They ar-e vsl1 defended and supported" by C1vic Actio~ tat-JUs living wi.th the paastlll~I7" .and assisting th~ in a variety of "'r"!ays. Reports"· tend to be optir.i~tic ae to the.u1tiIr.ate success of these ha.Tillats.

b.

Otba;., Pc.oiflcation Progr.a.llis

a,

1962, the second systematic 'operation to pacify a specific area l-i2.S stm'ted in. Rlu Yen p:,ovince ill cantr.u Vietr~J1l. It is kno~.;n as DOpal'ation 8.aa S-W'.1'lo;.r!} and is simUar to ItOparation" Sunrisa tt in method and objective~. On Ha.y

.

,

(l) Mora than ,80 strategic hamlets are to be constructed before the end ot1962; a largenurr~er are a1ra~qy 1n the pro~ess or tinal construction. . . .". ." , (2) As of }2y'18, 1962, there ~era more than 600 Civic Action persoll.Tlal in fhu Yen provir1ca formed into reore than 70 teams; anothe~ll " tea11l3 Yare ~ be 'fc;!'~ag l-lithin two weeks; ;As L'Il uOparat~on Sunrise", these tear.3 a3s!.s~ in tha cO!lst.ru·::t.ion 'cf s~ra.tfJgic h,a:nlets, o:-gmize goverr.:&ent serv~cesJ and help the l?ea~aJ.lts in a variety of way::s.


Strateg!.c VU~gas ~nd ![a.m1et!,

c. · .

. (1) The st·rategic village-hamlet concept has taken hold

. Within the Vietnarn.$3se Government and is now priority national policy •.

. (2) }resident Diem signed a decree on'Febru8-~ 3, 1962, creatlng a special nr.l'lterministerial Committee for Strategic Harnletslt to coordinate the progrCUll on a count-ry1dde basis. The coromittee is . officially cP~irad by its Secretar,r General, Sacret8-~ of state~o~. Interior But Van Luong, but actually operates under llgo DL~ Nhu.

-

.

.

(3) Estiw3tes on the number of strategic villages and hamlets vary. .As of Dacember 1961, the Vietnamese Dapartmant of Interior reportedly tabulated almost 800 such villages ~nd!haxlllats. ~ru:tl}.ough in · Febru&-y 1962 the US Embassy estinated that possibly thare ~l'ere only. . 150-200 such settlements scattered in mo~e ~~ half of Vietnam's 39 provinces, principally north of Saigon o In April 1962, the Secreta..7 of . State £01' Interior informed a US lofi.ssion L'1.ter-agency gl'cup, the lTovLllce Pacification CoMmittea, that there were 1,300 strategic hamlets aL~6ady . in place,. ':,' . . (4) On Ju."'lS 6, .1962, about 500 officials from all pro7inces completed a special training course on strategic villages and hamlats~ TrainL""lg .reportedly emphasized the Civic Action aspects of the strategic vlllage-h8.l"lllet program as well as the responsibilities of the officials' · involved. ,~ •. Civic l ..cticn

d.

CIlIa

. (1) The' Vistna~~se DSpa!"tment of Civic Action was

,

r$o!"g~ized

J;::n'll2.r'.{ 1962, creat-ing (t) a cen·~!'a.l Civic .J-ction S-9rvice in Saigon by eomhinin~ related and heretofore seuarate services within tha Department

in

.'

and ~(ii) -an integrated Civic .Action~ offica in each province and district.

-. (2) As. of Jan~7 1962, a Civic Action chiei' and deputy chief rap~rt~ci;ly had b,ean assigz:.ed to every province in Vietnam. ' . ,.

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(3) The C1vi~ Action teams working in strategic villages particularly in support o! nOperation Sunrise" alld !lOp9l'ation

.

and haroJ.et~, Sea ~r1a:uOW,ll are excellently oriented and are doing a good job •.

.

(4) tiSOH has established a cC!l!Iilittea to provide on a priority basis direct US assistance (~id to coordinate such assista.~ce) to' Civic Jlction operations t.~o~gh the relevan~ Vietnamese C~verrlffient agencies.

.

,.

.

. (5) The Vietnarn.sse Departmant of Defense is also organizing its oo.m Civic I.ction program. .

Internal Security and Police Sarvic~s' . .' (1) The Lr.!porta.'l~~e of t!ls' cO'.1Ilterinsurg:a~cY of tile rural interl'.3l sacur.i ty services is rei'lected in the US i!issicn f s r~colll.'llendation that the Civil G1la!'d be increassd to 90;'000 by IT.19:':l.O.t.id tne Sell Dafanss Corps to 80,000 by PI 1963.. . . , e.

role

..

..

. - -.- :. _. "',,,,,I.' ~

~


-, (2) As of the (j~d of Ap!'tl 1962s 89

otvil G:}.i.i.,::,d co!'!p:misa

o~ alb.os~ 12,000 }:ar3~ZlLal C'!.1i.d ~76 S·:;lf D3f'~~sa C-crp:s :c.tJ.utv:)ns or about 10 500 l)al'SOf.l.nel t~d bean t'rained o 'Y~03 goal is Tepcrt9dly t.o trai.n a tot..3.1 o! sor:!;) 49,(00 C1-;;1.1 G-,l.~d ~J!d 6q,COO Self Dafen~9 Corps pe:\'fO!l..llGl, by tha end of 1962• Viet<J2tl':.6S~ G"o"'Ia~mlant, \lith tho 11'31p of USCl1, ~9 tak~m s·ta:.os to ar..ond the po1.1:;,o ~:y':3:~i}El th-:> !''U:'31 ar>OiiS in "l1e~ of iJ!o gap creatad Lj t~ ~~~it~i~ation of the s~~uri~ svrvi~9B. AJD La s~9k­

. (3) The

ing t., hi:c-a 20 add!.t5.o!'k"\l polioa advisers rvr l"ural srs3.s. (The i:lousant ad";ie:o::''''! poli~u complt.-:n.sn't tn Vi$tn~.r.l is just OV<3l' 20 p'Jl"sor.l.ual t .;>t>ln~ " . . .l.n Ul"O;''Ul .... a:raa~o ~) n-.. 2 d~' ~h li.co DiGst of lil!lC!il op:::=a,.$ ..pa.l-. Ly Vu~.I. J..O~ ~.~o po progloa"!1 tei: ~'Y 1962 is S.$3o> Idllir..:n (or '"ilhteh US$203 million is fc~ CC!lJ1l~di.tieg), in add1.ticn to a.bout w.:>$4 reilH.cn in ul1.used aid.

,US(;~i ,

,,L

(4) J.s of til~ G!ld or l·ra~" 1962, aiE;.~~t 2.8 mUliert of tha estilr..atGd 7 mtllicn. parsons of thB aga (If 18 ya~s or G;'::Jl" have bsen ' i.SS1!.3d identity C;}::d3o A~..a l"esult of. thi? sffvl"~;,J O"lO!' 21 OC{) mLU.tm:",Y dS~~l"t'vrs and 52 Vie~ Cons sgez!t:s hs.ve bean app~~h~J!ldgd a"1d ~hout 4,000 irl"G7.:tlaritics in tho pl"ovious idsn:titJ .:S!'d pZOCgr'Slil ha ...a b9al1 uncov-Jred. . 0

. (I) As of ti!$ end ,:,f 1-1,lY 1962, f:'..ors tnan

5.30 USa-Iudistribui·,d

ca!'tlT.li1i~s.t.ic.n rndks }\~d "ben!} i:nztaD.. ad l..'Il. vtl1agGs and otllo!' pls~9s in the p!"o·~·i!!cas of Gia !iinh$ J..Jl Xuy,~n, B:i.!l..n lil;,ng, Dl:t.:.:':l '~'1'J.Cn~h Kien G!.a:ng, Ki~" Phong, T-ay ni.1'1h J 2lld Pi"'l~oe T'.!j'. Sinc,a t..~.s !'ata 0: l."'l;jt~lat,ion 18 Il~~ abc'.+. 3C'O rs.d~c~ F$!' !l'..cntn, Srpo':3tB to haiTS [('.0'.:'9 th?!"1 l s 000 vrl1;;lgs radlos

,usmof

installed by t,.~a a.nd of July 1962. .Ar4oth!)!" 1,000 sai"s Cl:'a s~~9du1sd, to bs ins'~sl'~d sc.cn th3l'sattilr!J th1.B equi,pping mol'v th~.n2,roO -{11 1 agos -with radi:) co~1ro!d.cati~!! faci,1.i.ti9$. '

{2} The p~b11.o 13afs,ty- :'cla of vlll11g~ radios ~...as dI1Ir£!l$~rat9d on 1-fu:fch 20, 1962, ¥han a jokt nSGf!...Vi+3tr~;,.a;3G ri<.dio ir.~rt.<l11Qticn ta~ was attach.'"ad by Vlt ~ Cl~g g'.l.e.1'Til1as. T:.~;3 sacurit.j' va-oo:rt ongaged t.:"l'3 Vi'IJt ' Cong -whll9 t.r:3 t.\1~ pl"ocesd;)d to lmrta11 the -r...llaga radiG ,and t..~$n n·:rtifio.d

'di:::iil"ic~ hGaGq~sr5 a.lld r.Ga::bJ -nllig'3s'~ ~ ~ Ass1.stancsYiag' 'despstched' a;J.d .:. . ,

resulted in. an p~i.!.Sh of tha Vist Ccl"..g vill~'g~ \;hich had b~Gn alarted.

g. titUization. c£ US ...

_ _ ee

~s

tha-J

Y;Sl'il

fleeL'1g 'tc'"tr';l"d anothar

ASsl.st~noe

oa.~~

(1) M£ec-t.l"!:l utUl$a:tton a.'ld inte&'l"aticn cf US nOllamUitsrt s.ssLst..?.naili t.:> Vbtnam. •..."'?.s st.rengf.:!!f.l!lGd 07 AID a.ction in Hal'ch 1962 6st.s.blishh:g £irs;) s~coi1d$ S!.ld 'third p~ioritia;s en the b~sis of tho L~;!ad~t9 l..q.-act of aid p~cja(:t3 'on tha cou."ltarinsurgenc7 ef!ortg first priority prc-j-sct3 a~a th:,s:; -w:.th ilnpact durJ..l1g tha next 12 months, bclud..' ing, i'or ;,Xain1119~ Rural D3wlvp::rent, F'!.-61ie Safe"tey (espac~a1l7 l".:.dio sst:3), '. and l~a.31th Sur-:li:s3: s5c.,nd p~ic!'if;-.r P!·Qj9~t3. are thc3a ;:i"th i.1'..tpaet durL"lg

... 1~72


.,; s -

•

the next 1 to 3 years, including, for eXample; Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives and HighY1CY~ and Bridge Cons~ruction; ~nd t~ir~ ~ricri.ty projects are those with long-term economl.C and socaaJ.. slglll.fl.Cance. , . (2) Yne US }fissi.on has established a hu.mber of interagency groups, such as the Province Pacificati"On Committee, for the , . purpose of coordinating and expediting assista.l1ce to Vietnamese Government projects in rural. areas. (3) In anticipation of future needs, the US Mission 1s als? taking lIl9aSUl'es to stockpile ~ommodities (for example, pharIM.ceuticals, pesticides, barb l-lire, fence :posts, fertilizer, etc.) l1hich r~uld be re"; leased on . shortnoticc for inl!llediate" despatch to the, countryslde. ,

c....

. .

a. Aitho~h the bulk" of '~ho British AdviSOry Uission's recome:., mendations havo boen incorporated into tha IIDJlta l'acific~tion Plan, it the enabling pl"esident1.al. dec~ee omits th~ Hissionfs proposals on lIpl'Ompt payment of cOIDpunsation ÂŁor damage to properbJ or loss of life,u, on ltcomplete coordination or all civU and military action,t1 on a ~c1ear chain or command, It and on udirection and coordination of ths infom.ation services and pSY--l~ _units. ft _ .,' , " ' b. US and British officials in Vietnam have voiced serious con~ern (L) President Diem's delay'in approving the organizetiork~ and " " implEmonting machinery for the ItDeltal! plan and (li) a possible subo:rdL'l1a-' tioD of the UDeltatt plan to the stl.'ategic village-oomet prcgram~ It has been vary recently. reported, '~owe'Vel', that Prâ‚Ź)sid~nt Diem has approveJ 'a msr.ger of the tlDalta U and the strategic village-hamlet organizatior.a1 ; , machinery and has agreed to give the ,10 provinces spocified in the ilDaltat: plan iirstprlorlty, subject to modification as required by developments in the security situation. ' ,, " : ' ove~

! .

~

c. Although, the Viatnamssa Government is giving the stratr ~ic village-hamlet program high priority, there is reliable evidence that,the .. program suffers soriously from inadequate diracticn, coordination~ cJld ~terial assistance by ths central gov'~nmant and from. misundorstandi 11g among of'ficials.at tho provincial and locall(tvels. Province chi~fa .~avo tandedto, draw up unrealistically h~gh quotas (gen~ral1y in crdsl' to'please the authorities in Saigon), and the lack of,sufficiont resources provided by- the governmant at the local level h~s m:cert:2ln instances resultad 1..'1 poorly constructod and poorly defendad ssttl~m5nts CL~d in finanoial leviea on the peasant. 11oreover, the construction of th,sG -settlements has ~ot . !olloiied any particular pattern or pla.T} based en pr,iorit:i:es.. In his repo~t"d . recent merger of the "!\altaI! plan and tha stratogic vlllago-lw.m1et progra1'\t how~ver, rre3idcnt Diem ~.as_1ndicated .that priorities woUld be established: ,

..

"

".

473


6 r , . .i ...... .;., ... "

,;~.~'~i...

d. AltllOugh the mi.ssion

or 1;h~ Vi!)t.l}.;'U"1l03"

Depu-"C'tro,ant of

Oi vi~ totten' is bah".lg orientod incrsasingly t')'ll?.rd suppor1tl..!lg

s~ategic appe<.U's that thet'G is st.ill cClnsld~I'ahle

vil.1agag and. b~!n1{Jts, it emphasis on infoI'iP..ational a,-,.d intelligence activities. This h-3.3 reduced the 6,fle'.1tivenes9 of Civic Actiol1 o~jerat.ions and has been so!Jle~Jhat d~tl·i .. ~n~al t.:. the t~vorabld reputation built up L'll tha Ps.st by Civic Jt-;t.i,)n persoDnGl o The Civic Action DJ~ar~~~nt also suffers frem ~~ak. leadatship and L!t~rnil power riv?~rias. ~d ~~1.r )h.fotlSll Corps pertain to t~ctical u~i1izaticn wbich is disCiL~$~d below, undar B. Hol:l~Vel', tb.$!'e is al~o BO!t1-9 Cfc.~mtion as to ljhstha:r th~so 5c,rviees a'fl b~ing t.\"atnad and equi~~-5d ad3q~teli and ~s rapidly ..lS necessary.

e.

The pri.nci;sl pl·oble.'t$ of the Civil Gu.-ard

. f. Vill~ge radtcs l:ill suhst211tiilly l."li.:pI'ove th$j de!'ens6 of t.'le· countryside a.nd tha l"aactioll cap3.oility of th~ Viotns..Ti1dSe milit.~.Y and sacuri t>J toro53. &.,mver, no (JIfcit't h9.,s yat be~n mtida to in~rJv" radio com(1.l.ni:l~tions at tho }u.;ilst leval irh~e t.."1a b3:ttle "'lith th~ Viat COng is ac'tuaUy jcit''lod. . ' -

,

g. T'sio of t.ha principal lrosknessas in ,the of'fecti'l5 ~tiliza.tion of US aid ~a in~m.r£icbnt ~:horenasson the pa:rt of ~en·tr..u authoritios ill the Vi;-;tnameSd Go'7err.mant of th~ n3ed to astab1.i;sh proj~~t p!"lorities and tha ganeral L~ilit:r of th;)3e at..;horitiea to act quickly t'J d€l3~at¢h aid in support of projects in ths countryside. '1h$ di:strib'ltion of US a.id ClUfit be apprO'1ad in most Cases by l'.resid<:l!l1:. Di€.'ln pe:-soi!al1yJ frequently ra~'Ulting in delaya and in ad"il~nist.r.;l~ive bo!;'tle-I:soks. Horao'V~l', Diezn contiIr.les to exhibit consid~rable -sensitivity t.o attenpts by US officisls to distribut.s aid diractly to' thg countrysi.de ..rizout cles.:oance f!"vf:l t.~ ~~_.L

..,,: •• "

vJ.. ~

a..:.

-tJ". - .....:.':

.~

..... _.L

c\J ~ ",""l.: !M:~,U.!.I.

~

......... &... . jI_ .~UC~Ll\:..t.j',

~---

~\JJ..

_ .. _ : _ _ ~

..!.-t...._

_

U.h.d.1U,tJ..k.r.:,

ul.!U

_ ....... ___ ... Y :':;'4J!~!'~f''';~U

tJ'~

__ ....__... _.L \.J\.'Y~U:.o..u~l\::..!;J,lI r.~

.2. ... __ ... .;1

U~l.,Q"",

dOw1l a USOH proposal aLu~d at increasi:ng the i ..~a~t of US aid at the lo~al level by. est.ablishing a sps.::lal f~ld £Q!! diroct i'in~""lcing of pro'vlncial

p'L"ojacts.

1. ,.PrOOl"eas * 2 • a. !ir

~rort

_-

(1) FA.t~opter opc~:?tions h;lve decreased the reaction ti.~ and increased tha ~bilit.r or arIrrJ a&ld secu:ity units. (2) Dlll"ing 14ay 16n~3, 1962, Vict.na.'TI'Ss~ f.il' Force and us .. helicQpt..lr units I;t~'" .a~ le~st 347 svrti~,:s: ,!~6 (.eroS cf.fa."Ileiva sorties" 216 • - l~.p l. d ' ,..-~ + • "', -, , . . -. , S c.."I'" t\.01.1';1;.. ...... ulJ .l.j ~ll • ,,;:'00"03 ~nc: ::..l.,' 10:) n::':"·:1.G3 or .... ",c-o of s-;~ir· h l ' rOj

poUi.\(!~ ~~re ai!""':i.~~:?::1~ =~d 85 su!·ti~s" ·:l~;D

. tt'allur:g, end other Ml.S3J.ons.

,. -

ta!:

47t~

;i~ eVt~c~ti~~, ~b;a~ati.onl 0:.

-

.' .


.. 7 -" b o Ta.ctic;?l Utilization •

........

Qr

}xmy and S!Jcurity Forc2

p

.

.

,

_ (1) Tho Vtctna.'UtlSO A:rmy is gotting out and fight1.ng more than over bofore. During l·L.-uoch 20-28, 1962, tho armod forces launched more than 23 o'Oerations of at least company DiM throughout' th5 COlli"ltt-y. During April 12~1.!tly 3, 1962, :mora than 11 oporations riilro lalll"l.,hsd, eflch op!tration ving more than a b;lttaJ.ion; soma" of thSS3 operatioua continued beyond 1-131' 30

mvol

(2) J.r;;;'f{ units are oecoming lilOre conscioUs of thtl n~cossity of follol·ring through during attacks in ordor to prevont the Viet' C'-.,ng , from disengaging. .

", .

(3) Civll Gu3.rd and

sall D~fc~Cl

Corpa units apPn'ently , are being om:ployad incroasingly vlith. army Ut"lit-s. During A?ril 12...M~y 3, 1962, for' exa.'ilplo, Ci\'il GU3I'd and Sol! Dsfsnse Corp' tL'l'lits were combin9d 'With :JJ.'m:r U.I'litS in at l02a3t 3 oparat.iona., There havo also been reporta of Civil Guard 1.1nits rocoiving helicopter mrpport. (4) Thoro :\rei roports" of effoctive utilization of ~tillt)ri." bomba-rdrnont. In early l·I:ach 1962~ for CXiUl!pi.o, a corribin\)d A-cr.ry ranger; , Civil Gv~d, ~"ld'Solf D~fcnsa Corps fQrco c~g~ged th~ Viot Gong in lien lba province J.rtillory l.r""aS introd~c~ed only after tho Viot Cong ~l"t'terepted ".. to withdral'l, harassi.ng thoir escf.:pe routes ~d inflicting auh3talltial' 0

casualties. ~

"."

.,

"

I

(5) J.rmy r~~or uniiia arc bCling doployod in the highlands are;., recognizing t~9 cqucl. priority of thia area with the }I~kcng River dolta region whoro·;tho pacificatic.n program has b~en initiatad. J..3 of FcbrU3I'y 1962, th~ro wag

tsmy Ccrpg Arca;s.

2

total of 18 ranger companios in th., I and

:p:

" ,. ,

(6) It is

cst~tod that

scme 3,000-5,000 l:1'vntag21.:J.rd Jibes- . . nell haVE) beon recruit9d ~.nd ;re. being tr~J..~"'$d and a!'mod by th~ Vb~r~os" Anny against ths Viet Cong in ths highlillds are;.. In ~ddi.t!.vn, tharr are .' 'spmo irregular l'fontagn":l'd uni.ts. i .

20

Critiq~

"

. :

. ,

.

.'

a. ~spito th& il!creasL"'lg utilization of Civil Gu.!\rd and Self " ]bfomo Corps units jointly with e:nrr:r fcI'vos, tha formor conti."l110 to b~ employadexcessively on indep~nd3n.t offe!li3ivc mi;3sicns. ~o prinoipal . st:unb1ing block to th!l roctification of this problom is the prOvince j. ch:Loi' UJ'>...ior whoso authority tho socurity ~o!'vicos, op&rato. ' . ,".

..~

b. D35pUe tho 1ncr~asing deplop.ont of rangar units in th! hi.ghlands ~~a) thare is no evidence that t..~o~e ullit-s arc baL"lg ~~d to tJII:7 appre'~:LaQle d~grce for patrolli.!'..g·the Vietn=lt'103of.t.aO i'rcritier. . •

'l..

:

,

'. 475


.. 8 ... Tho principal dfJficioncy in tho utiliz';\tion of air "support' is not tQ.c·~ica1 'tut rath~r 15 'related to tha avail:lbU1.ty ~md roli~bUit1 or lntolligonco on thf) Viet Cong. ,: Co

'a. l-li1it:>.ry comra.andors in tha fi~ld ~a plilying a groater rolo than l.n tho p~~t in,the ;t.ctual formulation and €lJrocutioll of oporational . plans. For ox.1.~le, l!-nch of th~ pla.llning of "Operation SWJ.l'iSOll ctlld :- , tlOpel"atioll Soa 6:-.'"ll1l0·;1!t h<lG bgen cm-rlod out by Vie Gl1mn';7Sf! Army -di.vl.sion corr~"!.i1.dars. and thall.- staf'f~. . 0, ,'.:t O

,

.

b. 0.)1. Lac k>.tl baon d6l.~~~ied limitad but reil. au.thol'ity tor lt and for his l'ocont. and concurrc!lt ex~cutil)a c th3 ~DaJ.ta Pacification Y.lsm . responsibilities in ths stl"2.togic vil1ag~-h.qm1ot program •. Thore has belen limlted use of the ll:ltional Tntornal Sscurity Councll establishod in fucember 1961. ' C.1

d. ibo Dir6ctor of the Contral lntolligonca Org3.l1ization, Colonol l~~n Va..ll Y, has boan delegatod real-though limit--:>d authority both llith regard to his intelligonco responsibili tias and his concurro~t role as h~ad of tho regular poli~a services J tho, Natiol'.2.1 •• Suroto and tho l-Iunicipal. Polico. J, , .: ',' , I e. Th'!lre is ovLdenc~: thAt, th~ authority of certain cabinet I lIl;:illlUU;":'S h3.a b~~n inc!'~~:;od, not~bly S~or~t~.ry (If Stato for the J?residancy Thuan and S~cretary of State for ,Interior Luong. : f. The VIetnamese Govcl'w..ent MS also takon various mo2.sur~s °to improve I!7.0rUe CUilcng rank-and-filc milita.7 and securityparsonnsl In January 1962, tho fa."Illily allo'¥ranco l'ates for l::m.y 2nd Civil Gum-d ; priv.atos~ privates i'irat class, and corporals (as 1l~1l as the co~.b~{t p~ ratl3s for J.,rmy personno.l in thes~ ranks) were increasod, and JJ!r:ry conscript., bo' came ~ligiblo to roosivo a private 1 s pay after completing, four mont~, : rathor than one year in service; '.' •

2. Critious '.--.

0

i-

;:

..

lhoffectivenoss in adm!ni~tration at th~ national lev~l, in carry.1ng out tho contro~ tu..llctions ot t.l}e govorn.l'tlant, and in oxtending sorvlces to tho countrysid3 continue to r()pr~sent th~ Vietna."!'~so Govcrnmontts' . main t-ma..1mess. In large I:1easure, this is due to tho,limited authority -, Presld{lnt Diem delagates to hi.s ~ubordil"~tes •. Die.:..t coutinu3s to make '.

..

'.


~

9 ...

virtually til ma.jor dacislG~s and G1(on ma'ny mirtor ·cn~s~ to raIl" l:iU'goly • on his i.n:.'1or circlo 6f ~fi'icinl .,.nd ll.'I'lofficial advisors r~th~r th-?.ll on his cabinot ofi'J.cars and th~ 'i'or-mru ch-ar.nels of milital.'Y and civil comn;md .. in formulating: mId (lX~cuting policy, el.."'ld to interi'oro PGr5G'D~11y in pO'oly 'Md- ofte-ll nin~l' onorat!.cnll F~tt~so Dw~o-ntent "fit-hin tho gC·J"o!'nnl~nt buroaucracy ~nd th;::, mULtary esi:~blishmGnt w!.th theso ta~ti(;s by Diom ;md his liGutonants coos not appc~ to hava docra~s~d sub~t~ntia1ly during tho p~st yil?Xo Tho prospact:3 that l?iom may changs his m3thod of oporatior! arc not favorab1o. . \

.' .' -

... l .

Diem's froquont t.~~va2s t-o tho COi.111tk~~id~ may havo improved ~!ll<lV;hat tho popu1.~ i.I!la.g~ o£ tha contral g¢,;"~r:l.lJlon~. ThIrL-:g July..]hcembar 1961~ for 6Xat'1lplo, Diom mad\l 18 loloYin trip.s outsid~ &~igon . and visitod 19 diffcront provinces (9 in the c~ntral and nvrth~"'ll :pr¢v.i.21~t)8 and 10 in tho l-iGkong dolta provinces). .' , Qo

~o3idont

. .. Thoro is evidonco. that villagors are passing an inor~a3ing amo'l.mt or information on th9 Viot Gong to govern."'ll~nt orficia1.~.: 0:0,., striking c).-amplc is the Viot Cong att;.nk en an knrry post in JJi Ho·a in QJ.Iang Ngai provinco on .April 6~ 19629 (ThoViot Cong used abo\:.t 300 man, wall armGd y1ith roo.o111e8s rifles <iCld ma~ir..e gu.~so) As ~ r()sult o! ~., c~.rlisr r"~ning by' vUltl.gera of a possiblo attack, tho A;errv urti't 'rla3 Oll alert qmd, irhan tho ~.tta.ck ca.lt10, rspu13.sd tho Viot Cong with MrS.oU:3 1Qi:lS03 9' '

b.

-.

,

c. It ~ppo~s thtl.t. de~cct,icn:3 fr~m thg Viot C<:ng w_:ty bo 1n"-l'S~'Singo It has beon ost!r~tod that only :t'ro\md 4~:O Viot Cong s1:...'I"'l'ondorcd to gcvcr-~....

lnftnt :fc,!'~e.~ d'l... in~ ..... ·v

!l l' -

n-f ~h,\!'!A +'n~ i';,..,.:;¥. 1 oh.? -- 1 - of" ; - - ...._ - - _ .. ---- _.. _y Lt-f" ...... -

-~--:J"

nf' _ .. ... .~"'''".... __ TT~ __ ~

~._,

mULtary sourC.Cl!i mvc been repcr't;ing statistics on Viot Cong 1lUI'Tondot'a (in . a lrookly b~sb, and it is OJtilnated thi.t _dtlI'ing F~b!'\t~ 13""~\pl"tl3.0J Iil~!'~ than 207 Vlot Co:lg surr~'ld9redo (Th33e ~d other stati~tJic3 en ths Viot tong ;re derived from vm-ioua of.fi·~i~ Viotr.·amoso sources and l!luat 00 treated Hith caution. since tho Vietrul.l.ll C-evoIT~~nt ig prono to exagg$:;st~._ . the.'l1o) ! . '/ . .... 9

..

d. !'residant Diem signed a'decreo on ~c{Jmber 18, 1961 pro-;id... ing I(}r tho e~t~bliahm3nt of pro. . . inc.ial ccu...'lclls, ultimately to b~ ~eleated by popular ballot but for tho time being t-o be appcint~d by tb contr.jl go'Vol'nm~nt. (Youth l'opresantati VtlS on villago cOll.llcils have b.cen ei$~ted einco early 1961.) . _. _

P.14iku provin~e; ~om~ . 35!OOO ~~~2rd~ h2v~ boen r?settle~ from Viot Ccng-infostod tG relatlv~ly

.

B.

According to th, chiefs of Kont1.Ill and

SOvuro ~ca!S III tnaso ~wo provlnoes Sln~e Jmu;rry 1962 aa a rosult or c<>o!'dinl.ted m~~sures by Vietnan;,o5~ mllit3..!'y ~nd civllbn o.fficii!.s. Th~3e measuros h.ave been ..aim.ad at red\~~ing .th;':Viet C,ng S3 ~6cess to tr-ibil.

elements £cr rOc:'uit6, labor, !.ntcl.ligen~~J md supplies..

.


.. 10 -

2 • Critiouo '7,1 ..... ••

Q

a. D3SPit~ favorabla d-ovelopmonts, th'lre has beon no major braa..lc..th:rough in improving tha popular iP.l~g() of thfl governmont, pm-ticularly in the countryside. L'"l the short run., tho succoss of this offort 'Will d~pand l3rgaly' on tha degreo of physical s!lc~urity provided tho ' 'peas~try, but in the long run th~ kay to succ~ss yIUl be tho ability of' ths gove!'ll!l1~nt to 1.;211< tha thin line of meaningful and sustain~d assist2nca to th~ villagers irithout 1)b~ious efforts to dh'cct, rogiment, or control them.. . b. Thora is gro~rl.ng concern among Viat.na..t nes6 field personnel in K6~tn!r'j PlGik-u. and. oths!' proY~I!,cr:>that. tho Ylotn;t.-r.lcse Govern!i'~nt is not movi...~ i'ast enough to provide' adeqmte assier.9.1'1cs to tho :r-!ontae:na'l'd resettlelfi~nt Pl"ogr'&,."n lLl1d, as a result, tb..a.t tho Viot Cong ll".1ly succMd in subverting . . rosottl~!l'~rLt efforts.. A·~cordir~ to one report almost 70-,000 of a.ll estimated 105,000 Hontng.!l~d refugees have not' yet boen resottJ.ed. ' -....-.~

-.--

..

--'...:


-ll, ..

... -

'nI .. SUHH.:'\RY:....... I$SESSHE~?r ."

A. It is about three months since the current phaso of a major systamatic counterbsurgency' effort 'oogan in Viotn~;nj and too short a ti~~ ;:.0 (l:ql-!}ct ;my substantial lroakening of tho Commu""list position ..' l·!oreover l flnil victory is likely to tR.~e som~ yaa:rs, and to be brcught about· re(l~"~ by a steady erosion of Communist strongth th-9.n by ch."ama:tlr. mUit<,.z'Y SUCceSB~S. , . 'B: '!n. tho mUitary-socurity sac:tor, US, materiel, tr;l.ining, and advi.~a, supplomantGd by-tac:tical su.pport by US un1.ts) havo produced 9.1"1 L.IlPJ.?OY13mont i.11 arm'3d op~raticns ~gainst the Viet Gong.. US mllita.7 op~ra.tional

reports refloct improvod tactics, can bo

s~id

and

m~rs of cOIl:!lunicaticns a..'1d intolligonceo It ia te() o~ly to ~ay Cong guerrill:J.-torrorist onslat1.ght is being chsck~d, bu:t. it

effective use that tho Viet

that it is now

sr~rtenod ro~cticn ti~os,

m~!lting

mora cffoctive

I'CSiS~•.llCO

and

h:~"'iir~g ~

«'po "at.h inc.:roa.sod aggressiveness by tho Viotnmoso military and ,sc~t!l·it;y 1'orc05.' }bnetholoss, tha Via;'.i:.cong continue to' increase their ~.!'II!.od strength C1nd capability and, on balanca, to erc4e government tho countryside 0 '

auth~r.'ity

in

c.

There has not boon a. CCJS:ssponding i.mp~'ovement in other sQctcra of t·h~ totu COlll"ltsrL'"1si:rgency'effort. Serious problems rcmaill in tho civU and mUitmoy cOl1!:!!~nd st!''U.Cturas :l.nd L"'l th~ exorcise of cCreR?.nd re~!~vnB!'biJ.i:'yo

ccntLl1~33 to prefor personalized rule ~~ou~~a v~y sm~ll group of trust~d official' and unofficial advi3ers 2nd 'tradi"tio:ual lllath.,da in matt(l!,s ~focting don.estic polit.l,ca.1 opposition. Civll gC:1T6rn.'ll~nt o.ffe.~t1vo­ ~ss is a].so impsdod by short\),ge;3 in expt1X'icnced por~Gn"",ol:; p1:r-t.ieuJ.tu'ly at lOl·rsr lovols, .md aggravatod by co!'lf'uaicn {1,nd ·s}l5p~.~ic·n at most le"lela tho bU!'oau.cr~cy 0 l-!oro eff'Gctiva dil··~~M.on and cCQrd!.nation ~~d !'c~li;::ti.c

Diom

or

implcmentatic,n -QO

.L1..._ \-'1.1.01

":"-~ ~

#

n

".L1;J.L ..'<1"

aI'Q ~.~~.

noeded, for Elx~lo, ,fc:r such CI'ucitUly imp~I'·tJ..'1t r,:rogr~tl1l3

~.LCllI.,

_1....

t

•.

......

'"

:s I.!.t"i~ og ...c v !..W.ag~B tUltl

~

...

.n~e~~,

.. v~71c -".... ;'~C~l!jrl, ...

a.~a

4J

<L"Qd

gr~at&r_p:~~~oritymllSt

bo dologated to upp~~ cch~lon civil and mili~j . officials' in orda!' to lllrut6 bottor usa 'cf Viotne.ms:!:3 Gov\lrn11.~rrt reso. . t"fCeo o Simil~ly,' w; llo thar.e ~e encouraging aigns cf popuJ.:tr ~upp~!'t !or tho ~verDin~nt, ~'lero has boon no ~..ajor b:'es...lc-tr.rough in id~nt1i'yL'l1g the poople 'With tho struggle ag~in3t the Viot C-c:ng •

D.

~o

.

conclud3 thiLt:

,

.

10 there is no evidence to' suppozot cortZlin' illegations of st:bst:mti.a daterioration in tho :p~lit.ical and milit?ry situations L:. Vietn2.m; 2. on the contr.,.ry~ thsre is evidence" of heartening prClG!'GSil in bolstering t.ho fighting effectiyenes5 of tho milit~ and see~ityforeesi

1:·79


.. 12 -

.

3. hOl-revor., thoro is stDJ. much to bo dono in strongthening the

. overall cnpaci.ty of th~ Viotnamoso GoVtirni'nont to pursuo its total coulltcrinsu:::-gency oi'fort, na-t only in the military-socurity sector but p2l"ticul'lrly in the politic~-!ldministr~tivo s~ctor; . judg;n~nt on t11tim~te SU.CCQSS in the c2n'lpaign' against the cOmmunist Itu~tr of national llbaration li in Viot.nam is pr61nature; but

h. a

.S.

.

Ye

do thirJ( that the chances are good, pro\1..ded th~ro is contlnuViotnam3s~ C~vorn~ent along tho linas of its presont

ing progross by tho ~~~t~gy.

.


WAs~iINGTON

• June 19,

19o?

NA TIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 162 •

,.

.,

lr.

TO:

The Secretary of Stat:! The Secretary of Deflmse / The Attol·n.ey General . .. The Director or Cent:-a.l I!'l.telligcnce , The Director 1 United States' Information Agency ,

SUBJECT:

.

.

.

,Develo?ment oi U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilita.ry and MiEtary Resources

The President has approved,the follow:~g 'statement and proposed assignments of responsibiliti~s to various agencies as recommended by the Special Group (Co~nterinsurgeHcy'): . . ' . The study of U.S. and indigenou's parr::.milita't"y 't"esOUl"ces pursuant· to NSAM 56 reflects gratifying pr'og-r-e:ss in the development 'of adequate U.S. capability to support both 'the training and active operations of indigenous pa.~amilital·y forces. Certain deficienci~s ~ . ·howcver~ were clearly revealed. Th,; deiiciencies~ to wEich ali ~£forts and shortcomings to date are loelatedJ should be-the- basis; upon which internal defense requirements are established for eacft co!.!!!.try to b~ assisted. '

an

i

1.

~ountry

Internal Defense Plans

With or.e or two exceptions~ ,there e:a.S; no outline plans to unify .. and orchestrat"e U.S. internal d.efense: ?l"ogramsand..activities ; in £rieE.dly countrie? facing a threat 0: subversive insurgency, 6~ \v}!lch provide strategic guidance for ~Lssisting such countries t'o mai."l.tain intel"nal. security•. The Dep~.rtment of State has prepa~ed a list id.entifying the countries facing a threat of subversive in- .. sur'gency and will direct the formu!at:on of ou:tline plans for ' internal defe;tse (Coun.try rnte~nal D~;.·cr_se Plans) by the Countrt Team in each such couritl"Y which er..com?ass 'the total U. S. .. supported internal defense field •. ~hc;se pIa::s will include the' " .

..!;,

8".1.


2' -

".

militc.!:y: poHce~ intellige!1.cc ~~:1.d ~sy.::~~ologic~l rncasu:t"cs CO!np:::'lS!r..g a well rounded ic.tern.?l defense n1c.!~ ~:-:.d wiIi be cOl'!siste!:.t with. tr.e . '1'" • 1· .. · 1 ..3 • 1 n'n h?rv, eCO!'l.or:nc 1 PO lI.1Ca :?nl.:. soc.a m~2.SU~CS cons .. l:..U':!.!!!!' ~!le ,overall coun.try plan •. Such pla.~s sho ..:.!.ci. be completed and i:~ the hands of the Department of Stat~ by S~;ptember 1, 1962.1 available for review by the Snecia1 G::oup (Cour..:c::insurgency). From thatI • • .. on.. ; l'n "/~~~ prov; ·:0"';:' 0'; i'rSA M l?~· ~'nh ... • accord-nc'" a. C l .. .. .:.},." .... tl'rne Special Group will keep these country internal deien.se plans under .. periodic review~ and insura p::,,'ompt ::~~olt!.tion. of in-::erdepartmental problems arising in connection with t~:.eir implementation.

.

4'L'

~

2.

_~

~

t.,;;

••, .

.........

_.:,.,

--....

_

_ ~

..

.•

'"'

~"nprovernent of Perso:lnel

Progr::.:nsof Agencies Concerne4 with Uncon.ven.tional vr a::::arc

A study will be made by the Armed

F()~ces

'!one app-rop:date civil agencies concerned withuncon.ventiol~:.:.l warfare activities of h;ow to improve their personnel programs. Pa.rticular attention wib. 1:?e .dhected to t!?-e ~ollo.~ving:

{a} Personnel progra!nming f,)~ of:icers and men, inclu4ing establi.shment of career progra.~s \'!rlcn prptect the special skills and professi.n~al qualifications of personnel assigned to unconventic::..al warfare duties.

.

." . ' ~ . t .. ..~... ~ . f' . (b) Ab1"r"t" 1 Y 0 perr.orm e::.lclc:.i:!.Y In orelgn areas..:.n conditions of str~ss an.d dange:: for prolonged periods .. . .-

Mo:,ale fa:~tors such as fa! ..1::/ b.ousing~ tours of . dutya hardship allow2.n.ccs" .h.a:~a.rdous duty pay, special· rerognition such . as rewards..

tel

3.

•A..s

Orientation of Personnel

.

:

.

.

'Cart of the current effort to train r:l.:>re Dersonnel in the oroblem.s .. confronting underdeveloped societics 3 both civil and milita-:.-y agencies' of the Government will assig':lJ where feas~ble an.d subject to th.e. '. availability of iU:1.clS andpe~sohnell middle-grade and senior officers to ter.1porary cu.ty for orientation pt!=?osesb. selected countries cx. . .. ' 1 secu=ltY.proo . · 1c!:}s. perlencmg l:l::e=n.a .. .

482

~


4:

Deployment of Counterlnsurgi'!:lcy :~~rsonncl .

'".

:~: o.,,-t:. .. . ..

'In order ~o insure a timely de?loyment of qualified COtL.'"lt~rinsurie~~y specialists to ill\pending crisis areas~ CIA, and. AID \qUI take action 'to insure that adequate qua,1ifie(pe::-sor,nel with, pararnilitary skills are available. Periodic repor'ts of progr'ess to achieve this objective will be sUDmitted to .the Special Group '\Counterinsurgen~¥} by CL~ and AID. ;

.

.,r : •

s.

.

'Support o!-Cove::-t Pararnilita!"y Operations

.

. " :

More Special·fprces personnel will be assigned to sUPP9rt CIA: covert paramUitary operations where ~.cute insurgency 'situations . ex.ist. The D~partment of Defe:'lse has taken steps "to exped.ite these assign~~nts. In addition the Def-Cl.rtrnent, of Defense \vill increase its capability to fund. supportl and conduct wholly o!" partly covert 'paramilitary operations t:nder the criteria .0£ ' NS.~vr 57 which distinguishes responsit,ilit~es of the Departme!lf of Defense and CIA: ' . .' . ,

-Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavcwable, it may be assigne!.l to CIA, provi~ed that it is within norIr!al cap~bilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary op~ratic r:. wholly 0:- p~rtly ." ..,. '.. ~ . · . . reOUlres covert Wh len. Slg:ll!.lca:'l.: numbers ot ... . 'militarily trained perso:l~alJ ar.l0unts of military- .-:-' equipment which exceed r..o:-mal CL~.. -controlled stocks an.d/ or military ~xperi~!".ce of a kind and ievel peculiar to the Armed Se: .,:c~;. is pr,opedy the prima.ry respor.si~llity or th:! Dcparttnent o~ Defense with the CI:'- in a suppo-:ting .ro~e.

the

-

This coopera"tion will be intensified ar1c t..1,.e President .\vi11 be .. given periodic reports on the p::-ogress of t.~ese_ efforts.

6.

Increased Use of third Coun.~ry Personnel

.

:The Denartment of Defense~ in coliabo:-a-don vlith the Denart."'!'la:lt ... o~ State ~nd the C~n.tral I!ltellige!lce Ag.=ncy, w:l~ u..""lde:-take a. study '. .

to deter=nine' O:la selec~ive basis dle feasibility of t.'-le con.ce?t of ~he" increased use of third-co·un try ...ue:-so:mel in uaramilitary o'Oerado'~s. Part.icular atten.tion w~ll be given. to the following: .

.

..

:

.

•..

- ..

.


(a) The whole .range of ~his cor.~~Pt from the current .. limited use of Thai and Filipi~c technicians in Laos to '.. thc. creation of simply equipped regional forces for use in remote jungle. hill and dese::t ~ountry. Such forces '. would be composed of foreign v..)lu:lteers supported a:ld contr~lled by the U.• S. ..

.

(b) The feasibility of using thir.c!-country milita:y or paramilitary forces. to operate ·!nder their own or othe'r national auspices in cr~sis areas.

7•

"" · 0_(MO l _lnOrltles E xp1oltatlon 0

of

. ~n view the success which h~s r~sult::d fro::n CIA/US Army Special Forces efforts wit.lt triba.l g:-O\!)S in Sou.theast Asia, .continuing efforts will be mad.e to detel'::nine the rr..ost feasible method of achieving similar results in '?th~r critical areas. On a selective basis~ CIA and the De-oartn-.~nt of Defense will make . studies of s-oecific grouDs where there is reason to believe there exists an exploitable minority paramilitGory capability.

.

s.

.

_.

Im-orovement of ..

Indi~£\:;ncus -

Intelli!:!e:lce OrQ:anizations "

... co

Recent experience shows that most underdeveloped cQu~tr~s !'leed 1 more efficient intelligence coordinatio!"_ and dissemination SYS!e:ffiS! to counter subversive insurge~cy •. Therefo:-e, the CIA \vilT"ex?and . its present training and support efforts to achieve needed improve~ '-11_1""-."-- cc.. -... ..... _:_".... ~""M "''h:or T-I S ; ..... c v- ... - ..; .... _.;:.- ___ :...-. ,,"'hp,.. _;. •• __ ments l" n l"na-l"aenou' 1"nt.c::: agencies contl:'ib~te to this CL~ ·coordir..ated p~ogram. . Q"

~

~c~

.~_

9•. Research and Developme!'lt for Cou:r~erinsu::gency . - -- ... : . '" "'-

.

~

~':-....

.-

~".

-.

... ".- -..

The -Department of Defense a~d the Ce:r~tral Intelligence Agency will . carry in' thei~ research a.nd. developr:le:lt p:tograms a special sect:"ln devoted. to the requirements ~f counter:nsu-:-gency. T!l.e Special Group' (Coun:erinsurgency) will follow up on. this action and· receive reports iro!:l time to time with regard. to pro$ress in developing ,modern equipment suitable :0 meet·the require!':lents of counterinsurg e:lcy.

...

t fUI..


WASHlt>:"TON

August 24~ 1962.

.i

.

.

,

N}~ttroNAL

.SECURITY . ACTION MEMORANDUM KO.

TO:

182

The Secretary of State "rhe Secretary of Defense-0 - -The Attorney General ; The' Chairman I Joint Chiefs of Staf(' The Director of Central Intelligence' The _~dm.inist;o:ator ~ ...A..gency i~r L."te~national Development _," The Dire,ctor 1 U. S. lniorlnation Agency The Military Representative of the President

'.

,

SUBJECT:

,~

,

"

C?uri.terinsurgency Doctrine

The -PresiderJ.t has' approved the document entitled nu.S. OVer~s Internal Deiense POli cylll which sets i9rth a national counter- " ...l.n5urge~cy c.oct~lnv -lor ..- -the use of ~ U. S. departments 2r!.C!. aget!.cl':;s concerned with. the internal defense of overseas areas th:' eatened ~ by subversive insurgency 1 and has db:ected its pror.:lciga,!i9£; to serve as b~sic policy guidance to diplomatic mis~ionsi consular, person.."1el.l and mD.itary commanc's abroad; to government depart!!!e~ts a~d a!!.encies . . .?t,hom~; ?!"Ict to tEe ...gOVel"r4ment ed.ucational system. The addressees of tr..is NSAM will take ·action to insure ,that the policies set forth in the docu..-nant are reflected in departmental and agency operations and in such additio::lal instructions . .. · d ·· ... ana• gu!.c.ance as may b e ~e~Ull"e ,,0 assure un:..!o!'!':lll..Y or enol"t • They, \~~ll also i.~tiate t..~e formulation of th.e inter;z;,al doctrine; tactics; ~'"ld tec~"lioues to their own de'02.l"tment or . ..aoDrouriata - . agencYl based upon nu .S. Ov?rseas Deie:;J.se Policy. If These studies when completed will be :-eviewed by the Sp~cial Group (Glr.

... 4

-L

.

.'

,

L~8.5,

......~


..

- .. "

t

The' Dapart"l1.entcl Statei:1 consultation. with-the other acld.~assees of this memora!ldum is assigned the task of 1;eeping the IrU. S. Ov,erseas L"'lternal Defe~se Policy" up to c.ate a making such lr.,odii'ication as chcmges in policy or p::actical exp;:rience r.:o..ay ,. re4uire, e.nd publishing revised editions as necessa:y. ,I

!

.'

I

t.

t'f-x .IS~{ ~

. McGeorge Bu.'ldy

'.


of"

cr ••

~

.1' ::J 1':.00..1

-;.,-..... s• •..".:.-~:--.,"' 'v, \o-".,J

>\..,. .,.. '-'j

1Yl 7 '

OEPARTMENi OF STATE· tUREAU OF iNTEttlGENCE AND RESEARCH ' '. " ....

,

SUBJECT:

'rhe S1 tuatitm and

.

,

~hort-Term Prospec~s, in

South Vietn:-t:!*

'his apprnisal covers the Communint insurgency and the internal' political situation in South Vietnam during the past year and focus sea , particularly on the' direction and effectiveness, of' the Vietnamese-US counterinsurgency effort. It ~us prepared a contribution to the ' forthcoming NIE 53.62 1 Pr05pect~ in South Vietnam. "

as

"

&~.

•. ~ ..

ABSTRACT' . ,

"

President Ngo Dinh Diem und other leading Vietnamese I;ls well a's many US officials in South. Vietnam apparently believe that the tide is now turning in the struggle 8Bainst

Vietnamese Commulliut (Viet Cong) insurgericj and subversion. ~his degree of optimism is premlture.· At best, it uppears th9t the rate "of dcterlorstir;n has dec..elerated \lith improve .. - men,t" principally in~tbe security sector, reflecting substantially increased US assistance 3nd GVN-implementation. o~ a broad cou~terinsurgency program. " The GVN }'I.aa given ~ior1-ty 'to implementing 0, basic strategic conccyt i'euturing the strateg~c hamlet. and' sys·

tematic pucification programn. It hlS paid ,more attention : . to political, eeo"nomic, and llocial counterin&urgency measures! and their coordination with purely military measures. Vietm nese.· 1I11li tary and security forces -- now enlarged and of higher ;. quality .- are significantly more offensive-minded and their; counterguerrilla tacticnl co,mbilities are p,reatly.improved •. : Effc,ctiYe GV1'l control of the countryside ):lgs.,.been extended : slightly. In some areas "'here ~ecuri ty has imp~oved peasapt -! attitudes toward the government appear a1s9 to have improved; . ---~~-----,-~-~--~=---~- -~-:-=-~-:----:--------

*This report is based on infJrmation available through November 12, 1962. .. ,

..

~

1;·87

, ·-bd..,,,,,,

_.-

'


, As a re~ult, the Viet Conghas had to modify its , 'tactics and perhaps se,t back its timetable. But the "n:ltional liberation war" has not abated nor has the Viet Cong been yeakened. CD tbe contrary ~ the Viet Cong has, expanded the size and enhanced the ca~~b11ity and organization' of its guerriila force -- now est:jr.;"ted at about 23,000 in elite fighting per:;onnel, plus SOil!(~ 100,000 :irregulars and sympathlzers. It still controls about 20 percent of the ,villages and about 9 percent of the rural popuhtlon, :.tnd has varying degrees of influence among :m addi tion~ll lrt , percent, of the villap;es. Viet Cong control and communic:.1tion lines to the peasant h:lVe 'not been seriously 'I!e:'!kened and the guerrillas h~ve thus been able to m~int~in good intelligence and a hle~def,ree cf initiative, mobility, and: striking power. Viet Conr;'influence has almost certainly improved in urban areus not :)nly through subversion and terrorism but also because o~ its propaganda appeal to the incre~sing17 frustrat~d non-commun~st

anti-Diem

elemen~s.

The internal politicai situation is considerably ~ore 6.ifficult to assel:is. Diem has strengthened his control. ot'the bureaucracy and the military establishment. He: has , delegated a little more authority than in the past, and has become increasingly aware of the importance ,of the peasantry to the counterinsurgency effort. llevertheless, although there are fever reports or-discontent with Diem's leadershin . ~ithin offieial circles and tr~ civilian elite, tqere are sti3:l many ini(ications of' continuing serious concern~ . particularly ~ith Diem's direction of the counterinsurgency effort. There are also reports that important I!lili tory and civil officials continue i.o pa.l.'t.ic:i.pat~ in coup plots. Oppositioni~tsl critics, and dissent~rs outside the gavern~~nt appear to be increasingly susceptible to neutralist, pro-Cummun!,sf;, 'and yossibly anti-VS sentiments. They are apparently placing increased: reI lance on clapdestine

-

•

. !

,

activities. "'fhe .VIet Cong is obviously prepare.:! for a lone struggle' and can be expected to m~int3.in the present pace and diversit, of its insurgent-subvl!rsive effort. During the next month or :50, j t may step up its mil! tary effort in re5:lction to the growing , , ' , GVN-US respanse. ifu.noi can also ~e expected to 1ncrense its i efforts to l~fd tim'3tize its ttNational Front for the Liber:ltion '. . . . of South Vietnam" (i~?LSV) and. to prep~re further groundwork for a "liberation government n in South Vietmm. Or. preilent eVidence, the Communists ~l're l!Qt actively moving to~¡;D.rd neutr=?lization 01" . South VietIl:'kl1 in the I.?los pattern, I:llthoug~ they could seek to do 50 later. Elimin-!ti.oi., Poven sienific~mt reduction, of the Communist insurgency will" almost certainly require'several years. ~


In either case, a considerably greater effor~ by the GVN, as ~ell as continuing US assistsncc, is crucial. If there is continuing improvement in s~curity c~nditions, Diem sho~ld be able to alleviate concern and boost morale. within the , bureaucracy and the military establishment. But the. GVN 'Will. not be able to consolidate "its military successes into, perma~ent political gains and to evoke the positive support of the peasantry unless it gives more emphasis to'non-military aspects of the counterinsurgency program, intesrates the strategic hamlet program with an expanded systew~tic pacification program, "and appreciably modifies military tactics . (particularly those relating to large-unit actions and tactical use of airpo~:er and artillery). !'ailure to do so might increase militant opposition among-the peasants and their positive identification with the Viet Conga . I

A coup 路could occur at any ~i-:r.e > but ~lOuld be mere likely if the fight against the Communists goes b~dly, if the Viet Cpng launches a series of success~~ul and dramatic military operations, or if Vietnamese a~~1 casualties increase appreciably over a protracted period. The coup m.:>st likely to succeed would be one with non-Communist" leadership and s~pport, involving middle and top echelon mi~itary and civilian officials. For a time at least, the serious disruption of government leadership res1llting from a coup would probably halt and possibly reverse the momentum of the government's counterinsurge~cy e~fort. The role of the US can be extremely impC?!tant in restoring this momentum and in averting widespread fighting and a serious internal pOwer struggle. ~


'. TABLE OF COm-EN!' ~.

The llatm.-s of the Communist Thl'eat to South Vict."lalil. • • • • • •

1

. .

2

•• • • • • • •

3

f••. Strat!gy and Objectives. •

B. Viet

~ng

•• • •• • ••• ••

..

Organization and Capabilities • •

..

. • •

'1. Ganera1 .. • • • • • • •

..

.. • • • •

••

• • • •

5

Support • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

5

S\~ort

..

e

Politicat Capabilities

~

•• ••

e· ..

• • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • •

..

••

..

• • •• •

• • • • .. • • • • •

e

.

e

e

• • •

~

I

b. Tna Urban Sector • •

t

..

The Vietnalll Govern.'llent' s ColUlterinsur.gency Effort • • A.

Background~

· .. • • • · ..

• •

,.

Gradual Response. • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

. B. Formulatioll and Implem.entation

or Basic

3

6

6

a. The Communist Position in the Countryside •• " .. •

'TI.

3

•• • •

a. Local Support

h.

• •

,

3. Viet CopgLogistic

Erlarna~

it

.

2. lIuttorr strength and Effectiveness • •

. b.

..

Strategic Concopt..

8 10 10

10 11

2. ' Systematic l{ilitary-Political Paci!ication Operations..

12

c. l-IUita.y operations and Ef':r~ ctiveness. ' • • ••• • • • • • •

13

. ID. The Political Situation ••• .!

A.

0

. . . . . . . . ..

1. Political Attitudes

• • • • • •

11

... • ..... • • . . . . •

Backgro:und: Rapid Dltar ioration • • •

. B. The Current Situation •

• • • • • • •

15 15

• •••

or

It

• • • •

Diem and His F~y • • • • • • •

18

.

19

2. . Diem .ad the Bl.U'saucr.acy '. • • • •

~

•• •• • • •

...

3. Diem's Position in the Count!yside • • • • • • • • • • • · h. Diem'.s Position in Urban Ce!ltors • • • • • •.' • .' • • • • '. .

! -

, 20

21


~r.2.

J;V. EconomiQ Trends • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • ••••• ,_ ••

v.

Outlook • • • • • • •

. . . .. ••••

A.

Commun~st

B.

GV1i Counterinsurgency Rfi'ort •• • •

c.

Tho US Role • • • • • • • • •

• • • •

. . . . e, . . .

.....

22

·24

•••

'24 I

•• •• •• • • • • •

26

Actions. • • • • • • • •••••

••••• •• •••• •• •

D. Political Situation • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••

29


I. THE N.,\TUiill OF' THB ccr·iHillrrST -THRE!\T TO SOUTH VIET.N:~.H "CPa-....... . .,..:I.l

q

-

~

.

The Communist tbreat to the Republic of Viotnam (South -Vietnam) consists or t.ires inte:'related -elements. 1'Iithin Scluth Vietnam, but- u."'lder . tile direction of tha ~mocratic Republic of Vietnam (rRV), an eA~ding campaign of g'•.u?,rrilla 1·Jarf2.ro and terroris:n end an intensive political pS]cholc."j;-~a1 sub1!e!'siQn eff()!';;' ara C.:\l'l~ied out bY' all epparatus com.'llonly knOl'kJ. as<:>ths Viet Ccng~* loft behind by the rev after it \li thdrei1 most of its mUit.ary i'c:rces to the north i11 1954 and_ since reinforced by local recruitment a..nd infllt,l"ation frcm tbe mvo E...q;erna1.ly, the mv holds over South Viet-na.:! the tacJ.t tht'eat of invas~on by the. nmnerically ~uperior NOI'th Viet,p..atl!9BS mlli:tary forcea o In part. beCau.3s t.he C--ovel"i!Jllsni"' ~f' the Republic of Vietnam (GVH) "focussed

its dei'ensa efforis too much upon the Implicit exterll.al threat and too lit·tle 'l.rpon tha int.ernal tl:: -;mt3 not conly 'Has _it unable to counter effectively the davelcping C-::mre.v.nist mOV6ment but also its authori.t-.i and internal stability in the ps-.ek.d fl"c,m lata 1959 untll early 1962 --:~.:',,! increasingly l-,Taakenad by Viet Cong insU!'g~nt and subyt:Jrsive aetivltieso Since the e~,l'ly part of 1962 however~ the rate of deterioration appsars to have decelerated-as a .re3U1t of sdbst~ntiaLly increased US assistance to South Vietn~~ and expanding Cfvn inrplemer.(t~s.tion of its broad lllili.tro;y=politiccl. cO'Q'llterinsurgency pl'ogl'arl\~ Tua apparent mprovem.snt. is prL"1cipally in the sec1.l.I'ity s6ctor, but l-llth so£.a rcsu1tl3.nt. ef.fscts on the political situatioDo Hany US advisa2"s in Evu~'l Viet·na.lii3 as \<iell as President Ugo _DiOO Diem end other top GVNoftL~iels~ ~a r:~ra optimistic and b31isve t~at the deteriorating trs21da in er.fe~t have been checked and that '~he tide is nC,T being turned in favor of tha qV110 \{qathsr t.~is cptimism 1s justified may lieU be determined by devi)lcpmen"b.:s d1.l!'ing the next .ferT mon~lts ..

492


·

A.

Strategw- and Objectives

In South Vietnam, the Communists are clearly embarked on a "national liberation war" of insurgency and subversion from within rather on .overt ageression. It is probably the Communist vie'\i that this strategy ; greatly reduces the risk of direct US military intervention and, at the ! sal'Ile time, provides good prospects of success at relatively little cost • .! In addition, it permits the Communist Bloc to claim continued adherence to t.he 1954 Geneva Agreements. This strategy- was most recently reaffirmed by the Third National Congress or the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi in September 1960 and the Moscow conference of all Communist parties he~d the following November and December. The immediate Camnunist objectives.are t~demoralize the South Vietnamese public and the military and security forces, weaken and eventually supplant goverTh~ent authority in the countrysi~, a~d discredit and ultimately precipitate the overthrow of President Diem's government. Simultaneously, the C~nists are attempting to gai~ broad popular support for their effort, including the creation of a. lIunited front" with non-Communist elements, and graduallfto strengthen and transfornl their guerrilla forces into regular forces capable of undertaking a general offensive. The DRV is the implementing agency for Communist activity in South Vietnam. It exercises close control over the Viet Cong guerrillas and over the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" (NFLSV), the political instrument of the Viet Cong. HmTever, while Hanoi is probab;ty allovled considerable freedom .of action, ~loscow and Peiping probably would have overriding influence over any major decision critically affecting the situation in South Vietnam, as for example, international negotiations on South Vietn~~, cessation of Communist guerrilla. operations, and escalation to converrtional vrarfare or overt introduction of North Vietnamese army units. In any event, important Corronunist policies for South Vietnam are probably coordinated with Moscmr and Peiping and the latter scrutinize developments in South Vietna,11 carefully with an eye to their mm interests. Both Moscow and Peiping also i'Ul'W.;:)!l styong ~~o:pa.gr:...'1.fu::. f:l.lppcrt for the Commnni ~t effort in South Vietnam. and, in addition, the USSR carries on supporting diplomacy, largely in its capacity as a Geneva Conference Co-chairmano There is little evidence of material support of the Viet Cong guerrillas by MOSCOYT or Peiping • ..

~--~-."",,~.-

.

,

There are no apparent major poli~y~differences between Hanoi~ Moscow, . and Peiping regarding South Vietnam. During the first six months of 1962,. it appeared that Moscow differed somevThat with Peiping's and Hanoi r s propaganda for an" international con~erence to settle the South Vietnam situation; this difference presumably continues to exist although little has been said by the Bloc on a conference since mid-1962. There also may be underlying intra-Bloc dif~erences on the subject of neutralization of South Vietnam or reunificatipn. In any eyent~ even though Moscow might prefer neutralization, all would work to communize a neutral South Vietnam if one vTere established. Moscow' has also generally exerted a restraining influence over Communist willingness to take risks.

493


;..... .,J ')

... ~

'

.

'

The s~· hlcrease or the us military presence .in Sout.lz. Vietnanl and the events of r~cant montha in ~'lOS apparently haw not iro~kol1ed Co:n.'ilunist . rosolv(l to t~ko oval' South VictuaL'ilo Hm'TOirOl", thsso events have clearly , caused some modification of Viet Gong guerrilla. t~ctic,g and l!lay have caused t}l.s Comrnunists' to revise their timetable 'N9verthel~ss, thl) Con11lUnists probably continuo to IO,ok prlma-rUy to the long run in South Viet-nDlit and to r.er.1aPl confidont of, eventucl victol'yo' , 0

,

.

Bo V1:.:t Co.EfLOrg!~E~~!l and C~p';bgi~ies . ..... . . . 19 . G9n~ralo _ Avallablo intelligence indicates that two parallal ;.

structures • ~Uita!'y and political) exis1i at all organizatiol".al levels of the Viet fung apparatus in South v~~tnamo At t.'tie top of the organization a!'G tl~ bodios, t:I1Q Uambo Regional Corr.mi·~tsa (laC) and tha Interzone V RegionEl Committeo (1\mG)~ equal in status and each apparently rosponsible du'sc'hly to P.anoio Tae, 'It.'1C directs a.."1d is rosponsible for all operations in tho south~rn provinces, or roughly tho former Cochinchina rogion~ r:hila the l'~G directs and is re3ponsible for al-l cparations in the central and northorn provlllces o These coF.~ittees consist of s$voral staffs responsible . for military cmd political activities,,· Tae organization of the tl'ro regional. comittces ap~2.:rs to be duplicated aItiyng in~ermediate and IO'Hor level COrrl;lltttees r,espollsible :for op6rations at t.h.o irJter-provincial (iee·." ~ea cover-ing more tMll ono province), provincial, d~strict, and villft.ga levels. 'Infc~mation is not'avai1able on the size of t-he political component of the Viet Cong aPPal'atu,s, bu't it !lust be assumed that tho regular and irregular guerrilla forcos also serve as penetration, espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and terrorist agents o .

.

"

, ·Viet Gong capantllties have increased considorably during the past three ye?.rs o In 1959 a relatively s.'rlla1l but effective mUitary-political apparatus operating largely in the Hekong RbTer delta provinces, the Viet (1_...,._ f_. _ _ _,_'to., .. . . ___ , ___ . . .... ,. .. " ... V'V'''0 .................,""'" o"'V;j..! OU1. ...v c:-. J.v...·~!l.J..UGI.IJ,.CI J.V.l.'vU U,:JIj"C!.l>!..ug l1Iu'oagHoU'\i 't.!l8 countryside and evan in It'.any urban centers, including Saigon, the capital. In addition to increasing its n~~erica1 strength, the Viet Oong has significa.ntly imp~·Qv.3d its military and political organf.z~tion and its tactical, 'ueapons, and subvel'sive capabilities ~ , . \...:"'Iooa"'<l

_: ___

_

...._... _

J:-_~_!

~.

'2. N.~i.!-<'!y S~ren~~Ff££ctive!!:3~. Colmnunist assets for guarrllla action l..."l South Viet.."l2.:1t are considerable~· In spite of an apparently L'lcraas- ,. ing casualty rats, Viet Cong lErd .. core personnol has gro~m from 2.11 estimated . 4,coo in ~~pril 1960 to about 23,000 L71 October 1962. These -forces are distributed pr incipally in tho southern provincas the former Cochinchina r~gion 'Hhic..i} includos the l-iekong River delta are./ and 'Fihers most of the ,. . ~l.~t~g occ~s: Th~~ arc t-Tell",trained and wall-arL1od (utilizLig such . !.e_pons . as ~lgh ... machlns=>{5I}.!l3 and zoortars and evon 57 !i".i.1\.recouless rif:1.es). :no lL~i~s into ~hich the3S forces are org~izod ranga up to battalion and lIlclude the kay personnel. infUtrated frc!ll llirth Vl.otno...7ll" ·These units in

.. .

'..


-,4 ... ' ,...fo:"o"v ... ~ vv "",~...~·J . ",~~·h~+ ..... +l. ... "', 't"v .J..fo;<,:,,..,.J.b'" n'nT""":lts or" the Viet Gong fOl~ce and . ... b· .. .., ,,(,) ........ - •.• ....,.. o:pe!'C'.t.o at the interprovincial, pl'oV'inc1.E'.l, er·d d..lst:d.ct levol.s. "<'i'hare n.lS been hard evtdsn(:e that the Viet Cong has yet formed rsgiIile."'ltaJ.size units or that they have an a.llti.c-~ircZ'<1ft cap2.bility, other than the small arms i:hich thO! are using u~th increasing effectiveness against holLcoptcrs.

v..-.~

U;. "'''''' ,""v

\1.1"''''

'-1,.1.. ....

no

,In addit.lon to this elite force," tho Viet Cong h:lS an auxL1.ia-ry , arr.'.sd forco roughly cstirklted at lOQ,OOO a..Tld distributed throughout the country Tnis force operates essentially at the villago arid h~~et levels and consists largely of part=time or fu1..1 ...time armed cadres and syr!!pathizers. Its functions exe probably v<?.ried, ,but .thers is considerable E)vic10nCe that it SOl'ves as a local defense forcs, pr-OVtd'3S l·.)gisti.c Sl.lppcrt (food and int..slligenco J for exa."T1pls) $ and coflstit.utes tha reserve from llhich personnel are ch.'a1m as roplaceaonts for ths elits ,force or to help activata nair units. T'ne au.xili~a'ies ~pp(;ar to be pa:t't.ie.lly trained ~.nd p<lrtially armed, fro ... quently u:tilizing nothing mere tha.l'l spoa:rs, scir.li.tal'S, a.l'ld a vari.e·Cy of small. UElapol1s manufactured in hOTU-9 ,,;orl:shops or "arms factories. n H01'1sver, these limit.ed capabilities appm<ently are pz.rtly offset by tho abiltty of , the am:iliaries, I!l2ny of whom cannot e<;siiy be ic1cnt.i.fiod by the GV~r, to pass 'themselves off as i!h~ocent peasantso 0

~ relying on small~\L~it actions and tactics of s~~rise, constant . movement, concen"tiratiofl for a·ttacks ~.nd dispersal upon r1lthdra:\'ial, tho Viet ~<lng guerrillas have achieved considorable effGctivenesso ~'hey ambush, carry aut company-size attacks agaL"1,;;t army and security- UllttS~ ~'"ld have the capability to str-iko in battalion force agaL'1st several targets simult.~eouslyo. According to official GV11 s"'Gatistics~ ,the Vie'~ Gong since 1960 cas kUlec1 mora than 9~$OO and r:OUi1dad at least 13~3CO r.tilttary and security personneL In addition, the mm estimatsB tha'~ a-'" least 8$ 700 local officials CL'lld civUians have baen assassinated or kidna.pped sines 19000* . :Ln9

Viet Cong

appe~.rs

t-o be 'fTellGo>l.n.fcrmed partictua't'ly on the plans

"'1 tli'1a~ movement;S 0_' gOVei'l'I..,ilent forces ,sent on large countergu.el"rlllG. oporations. Norcl.a is probabJ V also good and deS6l:tions or defc~tic!'!s to the GV1T :forces although reportedly mcrsas,ing, are rela.tively fe"i-To In racent months '

hmIayer, shortage.s

.~f food and the, increased aggressiveness-of' GVn foice:s .;"', .~"

. ~ *The statiSilcs on- Viet Cong' aiici-tvu casualtic~ inconrolote ~d not entirely reliC>.ble partly because -: b.' GVn probabiy underst~tes its Ollll casualties and overst.ates thosa o£ the Vist Ccng.. Since the latter P2l"t. of 19~1, c3s'\.1al't'.r estimates have improved l.9.rg~ly becsuss of the inc:reased US presence ~ South Vietnam o Dssp! te re5srv,ations regarding their accurac-.f, tha3~ £5.guzoss aI'$ helpful as one indicator of the n-l.agnitude of th~ fighting in South Vis·tnam o

are


are believed to haY6 lldvorsoly effeclicd the morale and capabUityof ~ome Viet Cong forces in the centr2J. p!'ov~ces. . .... ' · ... ·2........> ..:,' ":..-

.

-

3. Viet Cong Logistic •

SUP~

..o:s~~

.

.

I.ocal SUD'Oort. The Viet Cong relics principally on local resources to sust;InTt~tOpel'ations. Both tho Ch2.r:;cter of this support nI:d the ;l!:,~ns by whi.ch it is UCCluil'Gd vary con~iderably, It is obtained vohmt:!rily, by propagtu'1ca and promises of mater ial or political benefit, by threats and intimidation, and fwilly by outright force. It includes, among other things, personnel, arJil.s, .rood, f~ds, and intelligence. a.

Most of the Viet Cong guerrillas and agents are recl"'uited locally, with a large percentage coming from the youth. Host of their weapons are either ca1)turod 01' stolen from GVN military and security forces, are manu... fa:ctlu'od in hona 'YTorkshops or I!arm factories U in Viot Cong concentration areas, or 21~e activated from stocks cached since tho end of the Indochina war. A. considerable portion of Viet Cong funds apparently co;r~s fl·Or.l fess levied on buses and other means of transportation, from taxes on tho . rioalthy and on business enterprises (such as rubber plantations), and from ransoms paid for persons kidnapped. The Vi.et Cong 1s ent.irely dependent upon the local populace and t.lro countr-ys ide for food 'Hhich is obtained thl~ough purchase, pilferage, capture of stocks, taxation (in the forrll or ?:,lce), and even actl1?l cultiYation of crops by sp,pathizol's c-.nd p~t-tim8 guerrillas. Finally, t.lra ability of Viet Cong guerrillas and agents to disperses regroup, and indeed retain their presence int~ct, even after .GVU mill. tary cloaring operations havo been completed, is considsrably enhanced by the concealment afforded them, voluntarily or otheruise, by the 10ca1. pop\i~ation" .....

In addition, t.~e Viet Gong guerriL1as p.nn ~ub~~rsiYc ~~~~t~ raly ne3\i.ly on tha villagers for L'lformation .rola supplemen:.. ':'.:: ,:)1' intelligenca gained from espionage and from penetration of GVNmilitary ar~ civilian services. Intelligence st!pplied "btJ tm villagers is largely of a tactical nature and deals~ for exa.i1plo, rn.th the location and movanent of: local GVN milit~ ~d security forces and the defenses of L~dividua1 al~ and secl.U'ity posts, villages J and b.m1et5. . .b. ~erl'";~~O The Viet Gong insurgent-subversive movement in South Vl.et.l'l~"'"ll is directed, inspil"'ed~. and organized by the rev. Logistical suppo:rt :from Ihrth Vietnarn, h01...ever, appears to be lir.lited, and exlstin'" .. evidence indicates that there is no large-sc~e infiltration of msn a:ndo equip;r,ent.. On the other hand, L""lfiltration cl.most cortaL"lly occurs on a sporadic if not contL~uing basis and apparently increases from time to time as "''as probably the case dUl'ing Nay and Juno 1962. . ~ • • Infiltrators are believed to consist largely of well-trained ca,dres ~(~i1:t~ personnel, keypolittcal and subvor:sive agents T technici~~s, and . cour~ers) rat..'lor than- units. Eowever ~ in recent D'.o!lths t·here have been

'.

'.


.... 6 t"ro reliable reports confirming th~ infiltration of t1'JO Viet Cong. group: _ (200 ~nd hoo rllan rospectively) from sOlrbhern 1,805, Thera. is consldarabJ.? _ evidonce that infiltrators in general are largoly South V~etnamese (Coch~­ chinose and lumamitss), regrouped ~d retrained in lbrth Viotn~ since the end o.f tho Indochina liar C'Jld f.:!..railiar -uith the people and terra~n- of SQuth Vietna.'l1. They carry in their m-Jn 1-:capons and) in sonte instances, a limited amoWlt of acidHional small and even l~rga i-:e.lpOns, tochnica1 equipment, modical sU'ODlies end rlmds. Th:3 infiltratol's apparently are hdistr1.buted .... , d among existing Viet Gong units, thus increasing the number of ar -cora. personnel and thereby the capability of these units, or become the nuclc~ of now units. Since the latter part of 1960, the principal infiltration routos have been throucrh t·he c.orridor of southern Laos cont.rolled by Laotian and <> }k>:rth Vietnamese COEillunist forces. F.o..:ever 9 lnfil trtltion continues through eastern C~ilbodia, acrc.ss t.hs Domilitarized Zone at ths 17th parallel, and by -junk landings along South Vistn~~!s long coastline. In addition, Viet Cong guerl~i11as are belioved t.o use the border areas of. both southern Laos, and eastal'n Caniliodta t~ a limitod extent for safa haven purposes 'dUl'ing ~heir hit ..and~:run attacks or ,rhen pursued by GVN fcirces~ . ·1

Tho Ccml1llmist Position . a. ---..-.-..-.... cr__in_ the . Cou.rrtl'yside.. Thera have long l beon Il".aJor gaps in et.!' kllO~'llcdge of rUl'al condl tlons in South Viet-nam. In Vie"¥T of the oVCirriding irr:portancetlP-t the Viet C<mg attaches to the cou.n:tryside in its strategy, these g~p3 have nOl-r assulned critical proportions. ; J~though Om." }::no1'rledge of ru..-:;a1 conditions is LmPY'OVii1g, principally because of tho substanti~~ly increased US presence L~ South Vietnam, ~ asseS5~ent ot Cow~unist political strength outside urban areas remains!questionable: ~d at best tontatlYao ~~~.-:'I>

Too Viet C-ong app~ars to have had considerable success in reducing or, suppla.~ting govt:Z'n:mcnt. auth,rity ~ "tl)~ Cou.?}tryside. By the latter p~t of ~961, US o.ffici2~s es~i.iIat$d t.hat probablYlilore than ona half of the _ entl.I'e rural rogion south and sO'J.th;;ast of Saigon1 as ;lell as saveral aroas just to the north ar~ in the central. and northe;rn provinces ,rare under : effec~ive V~et ~ng contr~l hy night, with tha govern.lilent g~nera1lY cap:<le of malntaullng l.~S auth(j!,l.~ only by day,. Hany other areas 'Were under \a:ryiDg degreQs or Vlet C-ong l.nfluence~ _ , . . Accor~~ng to a more recent az:d apparently more refined study, US i __ . off~C~als eSI.1~"".ated in mid=-1962 tha~ of South Vietna.'jl7s seme 2~500 villagos -

t-.~lCh ?ontain around 85 percent of

ths total population,' 20 percent wero 0 ' . " S:foctlvaly controlled by the Viet Gong. Although thn Viet Cong-controlled Villages were inhabittld by an esttrr.atsd 9 ptr,:ollt of tho rural popu1c.~ton,

... •


7 ... tho tottJ. area !'cprase~1bd by th3se vil1.t!.gs.-; <i>lOClllp-l~d;tld n ml~h largor

proIN"!'i:,ion of t.lE cOU:."1t.ryside. In cpnt.ra?t.~ tb!) GVN ¢:fc~i:.iv~lY ce;ntrolltld ~l)otrf.j b? PSl"con.t of ti:~ vlll~ge POpult'l.tiC'll; ~nd 33 pCTcsnt tho.), V~~g6SJ largely locat<)d, hOH0Vel' j ill t.h~ anv irc:na of [i'1,).jer· t<.:ifn3 ~-;.d r-r.'~Yl me loa!. ca'oit.,ls a.'Ild in the moro heavily p~\pu1at.~d a;rf.'B.a alc~g r.1~\1.n J.inss ,d~' c;'w.lilnl~ati<)no In ths rC:llaillL"1g La p~r~ent, (If: tha vm:~ee~ ~d hh ?ro:~~mt of t!l~ 'Village pcpulation, neit1;.9l' the GVJI nor- the Vi~~~ C.~l!g oxe~?Cl.'!:ec. ef:;ective cc-!}.trol~. evon though GVN il)nU9~CS s~GE':')d gY·s<?ts!'· L"'l ~st ,·f

,.f

thesSG vlllbgss.o ~B accelerated G'll'1 cOU:lltorlnsln"g~n\;y ofi~r-t3 pl?lnci:,r}illy fhs trtl"at-sgi{j 'b.!:.:mlot pl"cgl.~.an and tho in~rGas'-ng ~egro~31vt1no~~ of the mL1.i.tary . a!ld sS~\ll"iv,{ forces, rO}::Ca:'t,edly has enle.rgod sc·r,::;rwhat tho m:urb01" of villagso c:n.d pna3ants l.'.nder o:ffactiva cGn-t,:r;(.~lQ r~1;"f)-;B~s tIl1$! 1n:::.'1"'·'.'O= tl~nt h"?S:; 1'l!'em~]"'.[1.b1y c.:;c::;ri'~d })!'ll1.d.pe11y in ::..·!'e~3 fCl~;;\tl~!.."'ly c:Cl1t~zt6d by thG.

Gvn

GVlf :.:md tha Viet (~ng since tile l'll!'~~ area a..';2d rc-:p1}1MG s~tirr2ts~ l\S u..'ldar effGcttvG Viet C~mg co.rtrol has been redllced 1'7 ~lily 17 vU1~\g~~~ l'~i til e lX11)u1.!3.tion or 150s ceo ..

P.e:rt,ly by th~ fhee!l strength of its pl'c.sen.~9 tha .J'r'olcZ".@ed abzsu.'G6 ~~f ;stro~g .,govern:;'1~nt mlllt&7 ·th~ ··V'let (:ong h~s .pesn able t{J tranSfornl ~Otl6 :i."i!:."al pc.~rt.;.-ons of the Ga l.fau l1enins1.'la, the Siia,"!\;;-.r Pln~:n8 ."

-

oo:~ ..- ..~

and p~t::!:y b~c.:.!. .:t~~L) cf e.r:.d sS~'!!'tlty iO:f~G9, aro.sa;:; '$u.,;,h a;? . QC>

e53 J~!:::,tl" and cru....:c.r~'!""~

the Irhteh

highlands Lll ths nort.h c= LlltO ,f.lajor concsn~..ratrCll C'l" b~l1tj' a!?(~Ml a:,-e. d~g~.l'cu..31y closs to b~~c~i:ng nlib';;.~ated~ ;"":'S:'i3 o 1~~re3 tha Vi.~t '~tjg :r;a~ \~lr~;tt:~)~j a fr-ca hsnd L'l levyj.ng and ~oll·3cti..:g "!t.~Sll~ GirGot~.:r.g .tha cultivation of rlC":o ~l:d ·ci:·liJ3t> farm. pr-Cil:lil~~t.35 ro!Q ccn~:.rc,11ing csil" d18~1bu:t1.qn$ ~jrc,p2g~dlzing the popuJ.ac:e~ (:or.t3cl"ipttng c~fk-t)s.9 and even ~~tting t:p oVm:'t 1>'.)litical org;miza+:iGns and p""'~visicna1 locrJ. gqY(ll~n:'lSnt, un! t13 0

~'1-~' J;~11t!.ca.1 c~p~bU1.ty a.'1d stl'sngt.h of the Vl-3t C()llg in th9 CCu.""1i:-:::ysid5 is inextri~ably aS~JCi~t9d 'Hith a<"1d .s~c'!I.gly dST;enee!!t: t::!:'.N'l its :i;!l1ita.."'y- presence .and p01{Sr. T!!e threat c:t' th~ "UJ;~ ef tot'cs s a d~-ncni3trat·gd by the hi8h rate of assas~lr.;3.'t.ions and kld:~~ii!.ngs ct lcca1 .

ci'i'icial·s and OVen ordinary peasr.nts, is a cont·irluaJ.. r~1~m~~'1" of tr.s· ponalty ,·f nonr;copurat:tc·n filth the lc·:;al VLat. C'cngo }~,.!'eov6T. by :S~·t;~9~S'" f'ul ml..litarj' c.p~raticm.3 against t.hs GVli; tho ViQt Cong is abl~ to d ...!.~ngh>ato I,t·s o'tlJ)erlC>1:,lty ~md lb d~tsr-r.J.ir.at·ion and cfoD.ity t~ l~~i"tl-ai:no In tm?l'l, th-s political apst;rs of 1;r,f1 peasant co... ~ieso':' hia n'f;dit1cn:1l ~.!d IY;sI'r-1db1a ~.' i l' s;;nS~1i~V ~,y. ELd atts.c:,r.~n't to lo~al, '\"111ag9] ~.nd lnd>3~d tarrlly m.att$'s !>nd hi=-;.' ..... """",''7''·:11 ~~-""e-'''''-- ·ol' ......,.J ....- .. , "-'"'" Ii· t . ~. " •• .;...u.;... CI.:l-.o,.: """"'~ J..a.= \.:.Lv!..:;.u. 1JJ.' evan l".::;g.~naJ. .. 1:<3"J53 and cl~yalol"J ... !.:Jllts ha: f;'..;1dn hiLl l)!'cne to saek au acc(;r,:.'r!c-da:tkn w!. th yb,at-a.Sl" £o~cej;#· .. fieGm1J for fu9 li10ir.ant c.a1)~bla ci ()x~ct;;~- na ""~~\..... '»H'\l" ... "b Q_'a:JJ:,.J~ ~"'JO J

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loce~ CCl1dit!.N13, thC""j" havc~ fo~ (}XP..:;}l:,le$ pur'~ha3~d r<\Uwl? than sotZod rico and food f1tufls in many casoll j have' t.e.xod the. "!P1oalt,hy 1-d.th effoctive publicity~ a.nd r6pcrtodly avon dlsu-lpu.,tod l~J).d to ~t~:llasJ paasantso EvEn thair ter-X'vi:'ist :lets £7'cr.;. tiL!;!) to .. tll:l~ ha':6 1:.~~m ;.g~i.n:st h::.:!'sh, d1.s1ikod$ (;r cct'r'Upt offie:i=also Those e.ets moe hsld m.rt a;3 pr'cai' of tho Viet C-Qrig~8 e.biU:ty to imr,·rc7e' tha paas.:lt\t~s coc.nc·rllic .a~d ~~litii:::al 10·1i. Their c:ppeal is cl'lhar.ccd by tha re;':3~!it~ s basio dtstl"u~t Gt gvv~rr.!1i!allt o.ffictcl.'s $ngt:m.de!·C)d p~t-ly by that-r exceB~lvo 2.nd r.:21'~h aplomontr-rt.1.on

of gcvst'Th1!ent progl'aIJl.5 and by- tha avsragu Viat.n.mos~ bu:"'a;'u:"'Tat~s belie! ~t hs eoo3 flot ':ssr-va but i!! ·~o be ~eryod by thG pocpl~ co • 'Viet C¢,.g 1'1'op3ganda. to ths }m.?santSl the:roro~~~ in both posi.tive , .end n$ga~.>i.veo It extol;> Viot Cong whiovements arld J?!;~l?.9' credits tho C<kCmun.ist f~,~ccs undoI' E" chi Hirili 'tilth exp:cllmg '~hQ Fl'Sllch f:r"!1 ViGtn.alll a.lld ;k~l!l?bl& too ncrtll ~Z'a~ c;f 0i9ra',g:n ccntZ'~.l~ 1I .hclcbl a1lt 6fl(vn~'!Jl~ and politic.:ll in::1~1(!$::.:ont2l, cl~rj;di).s{ GTIT cap;::.b!ltt.i.GcS 9 ~ pornt:E to th.;) G:i>:;;6ss1vo 1 . OPJi1"8:33lVO i alld ~~n'1.1pb Cr.!-2:'Cl~-t:i!' c1' Gill1 dQr:J~d:3 'and r~~c,tic~s$ es for i3y.n.l £plo, mUJ,ta..7 cOIl3e:rlpt!.c;u El.nd i'cz'cad labor in the ct'Mti(ill e:£ ,rtl>~·tegit}llulilllotso .Viet C<:ng T2'opaga."1de. also s)'"J}loits the Vio-mmil8Sa p6!:~:l:":lt~s credulity and

anilaisti.¢ bel!e~3;t ep:''Zladir,g bi'l.al"re stories 1n~ndad to It-r,<J.t p~'Cular

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As reflected by ~~dio Hanoi .....hich ::l150 l'cl"'lYs NFLSV st3temc·nts; thc pararr.ount Viet Cone 1)rOp3gand~ theme is the dict~tori<ll family rulc imposed by the Diem govcrnment and its subservicnce to US "foreign imperialist intervention It which are combining to "oppress II cnd "murder II the South Vietnamese people and block reunification. This Viet Cone propagan-.h 'campaign, coupled 'With recent poE tic~l developments in Lr'lOS (which some COI!lmtl.'list propaganda h:ls implied provides an acceptable model for "settlerr.ent If of the South Vietnamese conflict) and with Diem 1 s persistent reluctance to tolerate any apprecb.ble non-Co!TiTIlunist opposition, has alreaey contributed to an increase in neutralist sent iment among urban .. circles. l4oreover, some oppOSitionists, includin3 a fey leaders of the once"po',lerful Cao Dai and lIoa Hao religious sects, are reportedly cooperating 'With the Viet Cong to the point of being com~itt~d to participating .in an eventual Communist-led anti-Diem coup attempt •.

. Viet Cong capabilities for leading a succes~ful coup are limited) however. Its o~~ forces, even if combined with any remnant armed bands of tbe Cao Dai and Eoa Hao religious sects, do not ap~ear ·st'CO~lg imough to overtp'yo;': the govern;;nt by military means. Nor is there any ~vidence th9.t the Viet Cong has any support in the. middle or to"? levels of the QVH bureaucracy or its military and security establishments. AI though the' Viet Cong might well be able to exploit the confusion and instability resulting from Diem r S ovel"thrO'.-l, it· does not yet have the ties with the non-Communist opposition to Diem that would enable it to lead a successful coup. There is no r~liab1e·evidence of Viet Cong penetra~ion of the , middle or top echelons of the GVlI bureaucracy and defense E'ste.blishment. There is believed to be penetration of the lower echelons, and it is clear that the GVN security and intelligence services do· not nO'..1 haVe the ~~p~oil! tv to ?~'event S'.l(!h penet!'8.ti"on: A GVN noli t:P. j nt.~l"rop.:a tio'u renort in early i96~_revealedthat ther~ w~s a large Viet Cong subve;sive .,network in the Saigon post office and that an emplOyee of tne post office was possibly' using ,the telegraphic system for clandestine comm~nicatj~n . with ~lort'h Vietnam. ' .

The Viet tong has also progressiv~ly improved its terroris~ capability in Saigon and other urban centers. ~bere have been increasing repor~~ that the Viet Cong has enlarged its terrorist corps in Saigon and th:.G the princiI-al targets of these attaCks are to be Americans. Evidence of thIs capability is the increasing number of grenade bombings in Saigon. For example~ there vere three bombing incidents against PJilericans in May.1962 and thTee bombing incidents in connection with Independen~e Day celebrations· on October 26,. 1962. '

500


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In contrast to,the rapld acceloration' of the Core.il\.Ulist u:stu-gent md subversive effort th.9 GVN response :Jli1tll thlsyeal~ 'Was grauuru. ~Uld relatively uncC1ordinat.ad and gemrally did not roflect tha sellse of . 'm-geney- acknonledged by VictnD..ilElSe officials thOr.ls~lvoso It 'Has T.:et untU tlw o~.r1y part of 19Q1 tru.t a comprc)snsiva coun·berillsurgenc-.r plan ,-iSS , are-1m U'o, 'l-;i t.~ tho. help of US officials, tmd sovoral montlls elapsed bef.ore genaral'" umle:nontatlon b~gano l-!,reo'V"C'...r', the GVU leadorshlp continued to viou tho sltuatio21 as one c!'eat~d 2r>..d supported Im."goly by Elxbormu. forces with lit-tIe popular appaal and S~~11 thsir -problem as ossentially a military O~lO l'equit'ing overriding et:pbasis on pUl"oly mUi t~'y l'i'.aaSl.1res. . • Even tl18se allitar-y li1~aSUl"c3-3 l'~;"~V6l"', "rOl"S liaakonsd principa.lly by . the Gwt lende:rshipi s raluct.a!~~e-, to '},b!U1don st~tic' dofense ccncop"tis and perm1tmora offensive nctions, for ~hlch 'it had suf.~iciont £oroos -~;a reluctance that reflected both fear of overt L~V aggression and intei~al political consldol"ationso In addition, the GVU nU1.t~.r-y and SGcurity -£~ces themselves, dssp1to thair e~er'isnce in co:nbaoJlit.ing guel"'~il1as during the Indochina b~ and thereaftSl', vera Ln~d9qt~t$ly traL,ad, equippad~ :and organized to "rr,sga a sust~lnsd and large-scalo counterguan'illa ef.fol·t.

'T".ae turnblg period in the GVl1 responso occurred in Into 1961 and ear~ 1962 a..71d I'ssrutad largD~· £l:'om 51.1bstan'tially inexoased U3 aid, r-opeatsd US reaffirmations otpol!tical support for Fresidant tiem, ~,d p-~'sista.llt lB rBCC1i;i1enda~:lo!}s, lncludii1g 'bP..osa developed by spaci~l U3 mi.ssions to Sout.h VletnC4i-:lo J..cc.ordingly the GVN has divorsiiiod ito resTmnse by givt.ng inc!'e~sing 'ei:!phasi~ to ,political cOl.mteril1SUrgency meaSi"!-res.. It. has 1-mprovod the coordina:hio'l1 of t.1!:3SIJ !!'92Sl!!'e~ '!·rith purely l\1Uita:..t><,,1 operations, giv0n ,prio:d'bj to impler.-.an:&ing a basic strategic concePt for elini..'1ating tha insU!'gant3~ Significantly increasod the c014'1torguer-rllla t-act! ~al capabllity of its l'JUitary and security services, and departed appreciably non 'static defense concepts, thm-cby grea.tlyai,ding: ,~~adav6lcpmant of incrsnsingly offenslve~mtnd~d and aograssive milit~~ end sacur-i~/ forces. By tha e:?.rly part of 1962, the GVU had ba2'U!l to act upon the recognition tJls>.t the crisis. situation in South Vlet...l1?r.lol:1aS an ' 1.nterl'..al and political proble:n, requ.irlng 1~ge1y political meaSUl'es to eliminate C-o!mnunist appaal~ suppor.t, 2.11d control a.ilOng the paasants. Do Formulation and

I.Tll'l?1~:!!9nt.a~ic'n

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Strat.~.g1.c

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. J.s~ a result or p~rsist-ent lJ-S l'e~o:r;mendations~ ths G\"7l h.;,s. 'devaloped a basic s~ategic concept for the ~lementatlon of its diverse cQuoterinsu:~o~cy It.SMlZaSo Th9 t}J'O principal features of this conoept tbS' . str~~egl~ h~~et program and a.closely integrated ~~d.coordinated military~ ]>?ll.ttcal apprcach dir,ect!ld t01-~d isolating .the ~Viet Conp' ar..d re!7ainine,centrol of the C014'ltrysida on a systematic·, area-by-area ta§is 0 _ 0

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- 11 1. Strategic Hamlet PrograJn. The strategic hruplet program embodies principall.y the recommendations of the British Advisory Mission, headed by R.G.K. Thompson, a key figure in the campaign against Communist insurgency in Malaya. It also reflects US innovations and the experience and concep'cs developed 'by the GVN in similar earlier projects. Briefly, the program involves regrouping hamlets into fortified and more readily defendable settlements and undertaking in these settlements political, social, and economic measures designed to weed out Viet Cong agents and sympathizers, reestablish and implZove local government administration, improye the general popular image of the GVN,. and increase the peasantry's identification '\-lith the government f s fight against the Viet Cone. The program is initia~ed in relatively secure areas and is then expanded into less secure areas. The majority of the hamlets provide most of their min resources, although the US is supplying some of the equipment and necessary .construction materials and it is expected that this aid will increase substantially •

. The strategic hamlet program is now priority national policy. President Diem has created a special interministerial committee to implement and coordinate the program on a countrywide basis. The committee is headed by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nl1u, and delegates its responsibilities 'to regional connnittees under ea.ch of the army division conunanders. Increa.sing e:forts have been made to regularize the procedure for implementing the program, educate the responsible.local officials and the peasants on procedures and objectives, speed up the distribution o~ US material assistance, and train the necessary specialized personnel. The GVN has reported that, . as of mid-October 1962, more than 3,000 strategic hamlets had been completed and more than another 2,000 were under construction; more than one-half of these are in the southern provinces, including the Mekong River delta area. :L'he completed strl1.tegic hamlets vary widely in the quality of their physical defenses, the effectiveness of the defense, internal security, and administrative systems, and the degree to vThich necessary political, social, and economic measures have been implemented. Among the most effectively organized hamlets are those in areas where integrated and systematic military-polit~cal pacification operations have been undertaken, such as uOperation Sunrise" in BiIh'l Duong province and ftbperation .sea S"Iallowlf in . Phu Yen province. In these a..'1d other hamlets, fortifications and the defense ~orces are adequate for repulsing guerrilla attacks, radio communication has been provided, hamlet administr~tive officials have been elected or selected by the inhabitants rather than appointed by the vill.age or district chiefs, and Civic Action teawB have been active in improving the health, educational, and general living standards o~ the people. In many other hamlets, how'ever, fortifications are extremely inadequate or virtually nonexistent, defense forces are greatly under-strength and inadequately armed, there are no radio communications or Civic Action teams, and hamlet official's continue to'be appointed. Moreover, despite improving peasant ~orale in many ham. lets, particularly as the benefits of security against Viet Cong intimidation and 502


• ~

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. taxation bacoma evldan.t, there are contillui.ng r6pOl.. t~ that GV1t 6fficLiJ..s have cxactod too h~avily f~om local rosourcos ~nd p~vo not co:pansatod t.hs p02.sants fo~ tl1!3 r.latc,ri~l ~d labor requirod to bulld the hnrilots, th-lt tho pOC1Santis ~bilit;y to Cm'n a J..ivil:lg has docl5-nod b0c:ms~ of tho tw.e h~ is rti;:plired to spend on cOllstruct.ion, ruld th;;~t the govern.mont rv:\s boon w.ore cor~corned "'i.t~ controlling tho ha:.'!llat popu1~.tion t~.n 'Wit..'lt providing services ~nd improving living qondition~~. .

It is still too ca1~ly for accurato ovaltkl.tion ot th~ stratogio . ~.:alot prograT!1o {h ba1D.llce~ the progra.m ~pp3tU"~ succosoful ald pro~D.bly }l..as contl'1ibuted to the reported sligh'~ increase in 1:.ho nu:ifuol' of parsons and vUlagos tha.t havu CCIDD tmder ei'i'octh'» gOVtt!'lli:tDllt controlo T'ne fact that tha s'~rategic hOEftuts have becon1s eo !l1.ajor ta,rgct for Viet Cong c>xmod . aMi~cks is in its~lf an. indicator or tile ir.:por~nca of the progrc.m to tho GVl'Ps count·cri1l3u:rgoncy effort) Lt' not a measuro of its success.. lIost of th~. deficioncies of th3 st.r~tt)gic hC'.:,,1ot prog!'ctTIl. ~~!,poar to be t..l}a rosult of implOli1!)nta"M.oll at""ld~.to soma o:dont" at'e to be oxpoctod dUl')..ng t:h..q early stagaso l·r.~ny province( and dis-~!'ict chiefs continua to bo rolatively; U!1i.n£ormod or ccr!fuacd OlS 1:-0 procedut'o end cbjnctivos or moo qvorzcralous tn _ their 2.ttonrpt, to iEpr-.sss thoir superior3 ~i.d thus hav() ostablishod u..7lI'calist~c . goals J!ol"sovcr, soma GVN leaders, includLTlg President Dlo.;u and 1igo DiI:u'l Jiliu, tend to placo cXilggOl'a·tod iTh.",:!,ortal1ce on the program, vim-ling it almost -as a .imivo~8a1 p~cDa to tho Co!i::.nunis·!i insurgcnc-.r rnthor thn.."ll as liloroly a li192.St"ll~,j for (rl2.tting ofr tJlo Viet Cong .from- th;" po~s~ntryo /I..ccordlngly, tho stl'ntcgic ha.'!O.ot -pl"Cgl?~ll r.ns llot been ofi'octivoly in·tcgrated filth th~ bnsic mllS:t.z,ry""poltbical pnc3.ficatioll effort to elimill~rt0 tho Vlot Cong gl'cdually -. end s.7stemat5..cilly~ princ~.p~J1y bacatlsa of th9 much re.oro rapid ir.1plcm~mt.:'.tion ~f the stratagi.; k::J.ct Pl"og1?~11lo J~ a r:es1.:u.t, the u9cessar-y busis fo!' th~ .. cont~u~z dafonso of tho strat~gic hm.llo-ts. does not. orlst in mfxrr/.of -tho 2'.!'cas l:mra th~y hl\""tJ boon os·~t'l>li.shsdo 0

2. ~t9~a~ic }[Utt::-:r--:{=Political Pacificati.on Ooorattons.

Jt..fter conside:r~1:(t.e·crafaY;<l.i.crWltfi-th$ ad'VICeOi tMBRtGllAdvfsory Hission and ~ ~fi'icia1s~ 'we (illXl h-2S. davalcped th:3 general outlines of an integrated Illilltary:-poll.tlCal a~roat;h for pacifying tho COU1'ltry on a syste1:'.atic) gradual, d ~rovmce ..byo:p!'cVl1lC? basis o Ths approach involves large-scale and contl.nu:ng mUi'k<ry c~-9l"at2.o!!s to clear and hold a given province. As the _pro:l.nce is clea:red, strategi.c h~rua'(;3 are established with Civic lotion -tea.":ls . Iil?vJ.ng into the he!" €Its to direct construction and he~ es~blish achiniDtr' _ t~~e! inforE.atic~al, health3 educational, seem-tty, alld· other services. J:na P~cn.l964~;p:~s:?8nt Dlel aPP!'07ed a ~Ihlta Pacification Pl2.n,". calling_ £01" _tne paci!lvavlon of.ll provinces around Saigon and in the lfakong River delta ~sa and emoodyL"1g r.:ost. of tha racoTIin9ndations of the British l:dviso ... }L~ss1on ~nd. otr.:ar security concepts developed by the US., In A~ust 1~2 the GiJ1'l aivldad t,he country into tom> pricrity areas for plIL'poses of ·pacLfi .. -

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-.13 ... Implament~tton of tho intograted

}b.rch 1962

~pp=oich hogan in wd sillce then foUl' operations have boen initiatsd~ tlOpi3ratlon

pacificattcn

~tiseU ~ Birh~ D~ng prov~o (and portions of surround~g provincos), t.lOporat ion &la ~~:.illo,;.j:! in Phu Ye..71 pro'ih:~a, ~Op6r,\ tien I.o-t 1 s Goli in.

Bmi. Dinb..nrovlllce and liOperatton ROY..11 Phoonix1l in QU3ng :Ng:d. prOVIDee .. Flam for anoth~r ~perat16ri in ViIoJl Long province, IIOperaticm l'Iest \'lind~ It a:l'O boing dralill up.. In addition to continuing mLlitil:ry opsratiol'l.s, over lC:o strategic hx:llots, the great Ii~jority in Phu Yen provil"l~S~ }l..ai."6 *oady bOeIl coIlstl"Ucted and moro than an additiona11~OOO hamlet·s a.ro planned for coopletion bymido 1963 or Shortly thsreafter .. 5:ha ros-ults of tho 5'/st(matic~ int'3gI'Ltt-ed mllit~.l'y..,p~litica1. p:"cifica... tion epproach aro cncouraging o Ib"\-lSVEl", its limited application to rolativoly feu provil'lcos lms not yet appreciably altored t.b.o bal~{;l!): bet;~m$n the gO~'ol"n~ lri.ant &..i"ld the Viet Cong in the counb1"YSid.ao l{ol~eC"l(1.t', thsro i~ evic1$2!~e t.~at, th3 Gvn has tome doubt as .to the f'cBsibUity of +1115 ~ppl"'ca~h. aB th9 princip?l. basis of its count~=dnSUl'gorlCy cffc.l".1G.. Fer 6xanrplo, in addLt.ion to the h3<:rgy reliance on the stre.tegic ham.let pro~-ram, there ;(t'o rcpc t~ th3.t l-~esLd~nt Dic...')\ feols t..'1at his mUit21"Y forces nOil havG sl).fficient rrtl·eng!;.h ro-.i.d c~pa'2 bi.11.tj'" to rtlako quick, largo=r;cale mUita:~:y strjJ:es simult:mecu31y in and bal1ind vm-ious areas of Vio;t Cong corLceritl'ation nith the hope ax disp()i."~L'1g and ulti.1P.atsly isolating tho guorrilla !orces into smill and oa;slly ()limin~tod p~ckot.s. .

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Op:ll'ations ~nd nffoctivonass . rrrrr -:r - . ..'t'«-~ rQlIo

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Tna GVn milit~ ~-:l~ s~ourity

have significantly ste11pod 'up part.icularly j sJ..nco tho early part of 1962. L'"l lm'ga me2su:;>a~ this 11.13 bsen tha diroct rosult of US agrosITlunt to s1.\pport a substantial inc!'ease in the si~a or the tii;1i milit<l!'y and soc~ity establi.shmontso Si.n~a tha latt01" part o£ 1961, t.'le GVlI has increa:7.ad its military fO!'C93 t!'c·m abc.ut lto-ooO to ' .around 200,000 mld its security £crces, t.1:te CivU Gl!?rd and 331£ D3i'~l,ko .Corpsr.!ro~ just o:cr 90;C'OO to alr.:.ost 155)0000 Thi~ h$,S eZl~blad th~ cwn ~o sal1~:fy lts requlrcli,snts for dctendlng transportation !a.~i.liti~s and r."hat I t cons~ders key are<ls, including the 17th pa!'illel~ l;r;"U$ it atte.m.pt'S· to sael: out and clininat9 the Viet Co:!g.. Du:dng th~ paried O-:te:b:jr 1-25 for c~~le, tho G:1Imilitary a.~d securityforees la~'~hed 19 l~ga o~£ensiv~ op.i3ra\i~ons, lnvolvlng u."lits with· equhralDnt strength5 rang~g i'I'l';Im tyO ~attal:ons.to saver~~ regimonts, in addition t¢ sm~=unit or£6~~i~~ a~ions and del.ensl.va engagc17'.antso fOl"C6a

tJ:air offensive opar-a'bions against t..'le Viet C-ong lnsurgant.s

I

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~a t genernl effectivc~ess cf'"UVll milit~:r'v o7lera"ticns ha!" "l!'o ~~'"""'o""'od as a ro<'ul fIT· d t Di . .. r ~ 1 n,;}' J: 6Sl an ?!iliS apparent increasing ,arm'~na~g t.llrlt ht).~t re..,.,Y ~::. hlS mllit2.L7 ostabl~sh.'!'..sn~ t-o f('.rLlrua:t-o and ox~cut') military stlat,,¥Y. ~d plans.. In clcso coopcrat~cn with US milita~ advisers GVN m::nrl CClT::llanders ; . .~. a·+ ..:.,.. "'r"": p-:>...,' Ioi ... l·...,-+ • 2 ~ '. 'in 1 dlvlslcn . i . ' . and their suoo"'d - ..... y"'':' co. v ....... \.I " .,;- .. 111 C7 .s..T.!ore!1~g Y In ·ormul.:ltlLg.and eXJcuting offensive mission3 ~gafu~lt +.h; Vi.et C~ng.

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}!o\leVOr~ it ST}p~1al'~~ that ~lclllC s \rUlingnes3 to del~g;;:.t9· ~?-t~ re.:~ws i?llit.y , is dua partly to his appolntment o£ dlvislc-n COT:!LI.~uxl eI'8 l,n~'I1\ he b&lio16s to be lc·"a1 to him. and his famt.lyo This reliance es::ant~aJ.1y c·n ~olC·llel0 dil'CIC~ the fighting roLl1fc,l'coS con·tinuin~ reports tha't J?lsm, antI Uzo ,Dirili. lfuu stUI mtstl'ust most of' the gener~~3 and even havs dot!.ot!:l as to . theb? lill11-tar-y con~GtencaQ In aTI]' e·q-emt., Dtem tlnd !fuu continue to j;,l:zy • domin.ani; H,lss in the dewelc-pm3nt of genera.l mUit..xry strat-eg,r and Illl!3t aftf,rcr/6 pl;a!ls for maje;I' op.eratio:z:.3 2."ld i'rccll:antly 101Ul 1nitiata C·l' Iilodlfl

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them"

.'

As 'a I'ssu..1t ·{.f the subsbntial increaso in U.s milit£'.I'"".f aastst£lnce

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.. alid accelera.ted trainlr-z progra:7!S by 'US nij.it>?J.'j" personnsl in S:,uth Vi.et.ll~\I!lJ '\!ho 'llo~r nUF:bel' a.lmost ll,OOO" the mm miltt..:ll'Y and security i'cr-ces h~\\'e rapidly dav.olcped. cCllsid~l'ablo counterguorI'illa ca~~;'lityo '.Fn.~l2:e fm.:ce8 .. 'r..re fmb,;rtd.1.':!ttally'battar ar7I.3d )"lith l':ea.pOl13 and aquipit9nt suitabl0 to ·cOUl1tEf.-:gue:r-rllla lr~"fareo Tllay 2.'t'e nO~'T hb.bushing and pat.:fol1ing rt!(il'~ th;z".n ever- 1:lcfvl"'~' are engagi.."lg the Viet Cong incr6~singly in small. unit a.~tipn~, a.'ld are follo,'11.11g tbr'ough thail" attacks in ordar to keap tl:e Viot Cc-llg Item dj.simg~gjllg 0 P.rob~l>ly ct g-t-eate:!' i:rr.?·~'tance" houe'ltcr" is the cO~1;;;i.d8r-ably ir.J;f,!'cvod t.goiiieru. r.:.ohllity of the G~U i'ol"caso .. These forces are n'-)1! !',ble . .' "to a'trike m.;,l"s quicrJ-y rold in g'.fcatier stl'eng~h than ever beiora chrdrJg . , defensive". relief~ or o.ffsl1sive opara.tiolls~ The single nlOst itll}.'Jort.!....nt reason fcc.' this eccolerated tacrbical m.obility is tho increasing utilk"3ation of air pC·lTor, p:C"inoipaJ.1y US haU.ooptm· support. ·J.ithough batt.er In~oJ.1tg911~e alld C01T:'il.14,icati0I!;s~ p~tS.ctum·li th3 installation of l"adios in I!l::,~t villagos, and

improvements in the tactical organizat.ion of the GVn military 6stabliaw;mtJ h-!lVS

aloo contribu.ted sLgniij,c2ntly.

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~be lJ:l.pr-ovement- in GVlT tac·tical intelligence is dua partly tv admL~~· inist.rattve at!d (;l·em"iz~:t.ton~l T.'Bf.orms b1.tt p!'!n'!ip~ly to the ~'.!~zs;;:; of': . 'US· cfficic>J.s· in impressing tho' So;uth Viet."'lZ.:ll9Se l1l-th the DocesBl ty for more effactiv? Interrvgation of Viet Cong· pl'isol'l$rs a..l'ld t-o t.he apps-"t'ent. i.!i'~!'s5;3a in .the ril.ll!.rlg1'1ess ot the pea.~ants, at least in al'sas r,hat'e seem-i-f.;] h~3 1 ~:V6d! .. to .i~Grr.1.~n the Viet Cong •. On balance, hOiiever, GilN lntsll1g...nce ccn",lrJ.ue:::> cf " trained P"'''':O'''l"l''!'"'l ;. . ~f ti to be sGrlcusly wea.kened ,..,.. UJ the shorteaa 0 ..... j 1n:.s. ec . ve p:risQn~r interr-oga-tion tecrJlliquss, oVerlclpping reElporL~lbi,11ti3B ~Jl.'C'ng several agencies :!nd interagency l'i v.alries, a.'I1d the ccntinui.n~ 1'61', ... t.anc~ of. ths ~aas?'ntry to inform on the Viet Cong tor i'ea-r of :t>6})1"!.;;-J., . . .par-tl.c:u.lat'~Y' III tn·secure areas or ~iliare the GVN presence is 1'eg.;l.\"dsd aa . tempor.ary _, ",V£ __i;!

1136p!.te this !mprcvem~nt in countsrguorrilla tacti.es GVN milit~) forcs" c:ntinue to rely Ii!ora on ~ro:'ge cperations or· Clearin~ sr.--eep3 than "" E.:nrll1",um.t e:::ploy and Sal£ .,7 T"l-ter.li:l.... ..;.'" C:orp"....... ... • ,..,.' ~ actions" d . Civll.·.Gn~d • u..?l11..··3 ex;;s's<» Slv~..:y

m l.n spandont offensive missions) and durin., 12_t'ge olJ~""a'hi.(-.n"1 dsplCY ~. conba"t units i partictil.arlv ar-tille:?'U". a:n' d "i""~o"'r."''''' • -.. • to~" > i " ' . . . ....l. a -;.cordl.r!g con::~m .1CT.i.U ta~tical T.:s:hocts.. J..,'3 a result, the C1."I11 Guard. :!.n,d Sslf llit . snss C'=:('"03 ,- , ~\t"e inc\,'''''r ....' lllg h e~vy casu.sl Has and Viet C::ng gU91'tilla,s \JO;>"

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genorally have adv~co Y.IlO"rl1edge GVlf oper~tions, espaci..?J.1y 1-:hen ro.. tillol)' or air power is used to Ilsoftan Upll tho enomy, ro1d are able to dispersll or avoid engagcment o

T'no- increased 11S su.pport and presence, the groZlter role play~d by GV}l mi~i.tary ofiiciD.ls in IOI1l1ulating and directt..·1g rullitary operatJ.ons, and more successes, against the Viet ~ng than ever beforo h~ve aH)arolltl~ improvod rilorale among members of the middlo nnd upper echelons of the (Nil lllilitz:r3' es-tnbliJh.'l1cnt. The st!~t9 of' mOl'~.lo a.t the lOirer level, hOi:~ver, is mora dj.fficul t to de~ennins Desar-hioHsj partic'lll~rly runong. racrul.ts end r-eeclled resorv1.sts_ e.'Ope~ to be run..lling very high for a m.de variety of roasons and soma GVn affic icl.s continue to claim serious di.fficlllty in m~)(~ting co~scription quota-s,. I>.tt" ingthe first seven months of 1962, for' exnmple, a total of 17,287 personnal uel'S dropped f1'o:l1 tho rosters of the- llXPly j Navy, Airforce t Civil Guard, and Self DJfense Corps ".s doserters 01' as personnol absent l.z-i.thout official leave. On tho othor hand, some C!'N officit:.ls h~va recently cla imed that voluntary candidatos have for tho fl.1.'st time OV61'silhscl'ibed the quota at the 2.rmy officDr's -training school at Thu Due._ 0

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TIm POLITIC!ili SI'l'Q4.TION ,., ...... :

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Ba.ckgx.oU11dt R~'Old D3t·artoration

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During 1960 and 1961, ,tha internil political situ.:ttion in South Vietnam det~ior-ated rapidly, breaking the'relative stubilityand generru. surfaco cal1il th3t had prevailed since President Diem consolidated his authority in 1955...56~ Criticism of Diem increased substantially t.1-U'o1.1ghout ill sectors of Viet'll~ese society but rlaS mO:i."e urgently articu1~:'(,ed within the - govOl'nment ~d bureaucl~ncy, including the armed forces ~ A -Hide r~ge of civilian {I.nd militCl.ry officials, including Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and other It.9mbers of the cabinet; priva.te1y ql1R:::t.!.oned Diem!~ h~ndli"1g of the internal S9CUl"i.ty problem and his ability to rally and lead the people against the Viet Cone during what they regarded as the most critical period- since the .nd of the Indochina li2.r. Their concern with the Com.-nunist threat, however, was aJL~ost inseparably entwined with an accu~ulation of __ grieVances principally over Diem!s fallure to delegat.e responsibility the exce~siva pOtier exercised by Diem's fa'-'llUy) ruld the usa of sacre'li sec:n·ity services and semicovert political,organizationa to scrutiniZe the attitudes of the bureaucracy. : - Open deprecation of Diem also incre~sad- sharply ~~on~ intellect~\ls pro.re~sionals) and dis€::untled ex-politici~Jls. in 1lrb~ ~'..rea;J particularly' ~ Sal-gon, the focal pol.nt of non...Comunist poli tical opposition to Diem Slllce 1.9>6, and to a lesser extent Cl;:nong labora.J'ld business elements.

They repeatedly 2lld, on occasion, vociferously demanded that Diem liberalize and ref?l'lI1 his govcrIl!r.ant, lift restrictions on civU liber;ties, eliminate corrupt~on in govern~6nt, and permit an opposition to operate. These da~ands

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.. 16,.ier8 5UUp01-ted, as in the p;st, by a dispartot€ group of a..'1ti-Dicm, Viotn~'l1esc expatri~tes in Paris rlho havo long advocated Diem' s re~val. .' .',' '-!, "', ;

Ur~Gst also increased among the pes santry principally bocause of the govcrn.'ncntl s inability to ~ssure 2.dcquate protection irom ~la Viet ~ng . but p~tly because of the cumulative reaction. to ~hS ~xcessl:.~e~y arb-ltr3rY and severe bohavior of loce~ secm'ity ~d admini:r(;ratl.ve offlCl;?ls. Possibly underlying this unrest also lIas the cbar;tcter. of the GVW s econo:lll.c davelopr.!3nt :letivities which, however l~ited, 'Wero oTl.antad mora to~ial"d developing an urb~ industrial base t..lJan to(lard improving the eConOr.llC lot of the ppasant.

Vietn2Jil3Sa confidence in the Diem govarment was obviously seriollsly shaken and morale i1ithin the buroaucracy, particul~trly ths mL1it..1l"y estab .. lish~Emt) declined gl'oatly" In 1,bvember 1960 a small group of Illidcl10 level parat.roop officers staged n 11e~~'-3uccessful coup. in Snigon. A.lthough tho, abol'tive coup obviously made Diera take serious stock of. the prospects for political SUl'vi val, it uso s'trengthaned his confidoncE) in the correctness . of his political vlmis and increased hi.s suspicion of many of his subordi.-·, nates and the oppositionists outsids th9 government. I.

D.lring thi3 period ru.so, Diem! s vieu of US poliCies torTard South \mderwent considerable cl~'Ulge •. For the first time since he consolidatod his position, Diem appe~xed to question seriously US politic~~ support , of his leadership ~nd US com:n.itmsnts to defond Sout.h Vietnam fl'om Ccmnmnist encroach.:":t9nt. His appt>rent concern, although p~l'tly renecting his disagree .. ll'.ont 'Hith US ~ctions. in Laos J was due l~gely to 'earltol' persistent US representatiol1s on' internal issues "rThich he regarded as pressing him unduly . to reform mld liberalize his regime. This ~oncal'n 'Has further aggl'avatedby his belief J p~.l"tly instillod by members of his family, that the US l-W.5 in some iray involved in the abortiva coup. Vietn~Jll

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...1-... ..1:c a nU!uuer 0f msOlSurcs to strengthen his controls over the bureaucr~cyo flo and lIlYO Dinh Ilhu made it .p~blicly ~,d privat91y cle:u' th:l.t fu.ture coup attc=n.pts ~ even public" . c:rl.tlC!.~":! of the 6ovorl1~ant."lou1d be dealt ,\-lith sevorely. Tha Can Lao . tho' go\rernmen"(jfs semlcovert p-:>lit.ioal control organization alld'ths7ecret ." police jIera ordel'ed to llI.aL"ltain close surveillance over eri. tics Hithin the burC~UCl''''~ mld the nUitary es"tablisment and over t.l:a oppositionists .. outs:-do ~a gove:ll:'1l~nt, :md officials 'l'iere l!pporontly instructed t}-l..at . . pa~~lng ~?ralt~on to or oven ~vin& sooialrelations with A~ericans'n\)Uld 1e~Ci to se~l.OUS consaquences.. J..s a result, there tras a sharp decline in . t?EJ ~er~tof~a large n~ber of reports on coup plotting and criticism of . Diem rula his i'mnlly~ ·In the meantima, Diem reportodly orgrolized a- counter-' coup ~OU~ front ~1!ong the rwst loyal I119:nbers of the C-an Lao the bur. ~ .~ ~~ ~::e ~~it~y and ..~9curity- ssrvicas o OstenSibly toiL~ss tho:U~~~~Y' ~ r;illl!.gnao.)s ~:ilLorm the govarlE'..9nt, ha l~tar reorganized his cabinet . tfaKh~g tha opportulll.ty to remove cabinet of,ficials he belioved to be criti~al o 15 l€ad~shlp.. . -.. . n~;n"

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. D..u::ing tho la.st half' of 1961, ·the pol~t.i.ca1 s:tuatLon .beca.'1lo soms'What less disturbed desp1.te the continuing rapid del;srioratl.on or sectr!'1.ty conc~it10ns 0 The pr~dominant !actorin this deyelopment l·ras. external: . . strong US public F2nifestations or support £oroDte~, includLng the Vl.Slts ·of. Vice President Jol'.nson and C-en~ral 1·ro11ell Taylor, an? t~~ substO.lltial increase in US assistance to South Viatnamo Other contrl.bu~~g factor~ ~ore the slightly greater participation that Diem now appeared to permLt his lilllitary advisers in the conduct of the fight.ing, the favorable , pSychological effect o~ the midcU? and ~ol'l'e: m~ita:y echelcns of a ~ew l~rgc offensive oparatl.ons, and DLem's :nitl.atl.on 01 somg mo?cst pol~tlc~ rofol'ms. HOi-level', the~'e ~las no conclns lye l'evm"sal of detel'l.oratl.n? t:-enCis as l'?t\S made clearly evident l-:hen Diem! s p-31acG "\-TaS bombed by tliO GVN al.rforce pilots in Fcbru~~'y·1962. . 0

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The,...,.-c: Current Sltuation -

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Tbo political situation in South Vl.atn~.m is nO't~ probably mol'S complex .and mora difficuJ.t t-o 2Dalyze than at allY time since 19540 On the one hand, . the sensa that political reform is urgently needed appears to have subsided signific~~tly, at least onrthe surface, and indeed a relative calm se~ms again to have descended over- the bureaucracy. There r.. .3.S been a sig"nificant decline in reports or serious discontent, an~ oicriticism by GV119f£ioi21s of DLem i s leadership and his family. Reports of the concern of officia1.s 1-lith i.nefficioncy, corruptioJl} ru1d mora.le in the government have l).keidse _ declined signific~lltly since the early pc-.rt of 1962, as have reports on coup plottL~go So~e US officials believe that morale within the bureaucracy and the tlilitary servicos has improved appreciably, largely because of the improved capabilities of the armed for-ces and several large successful . operations against the Viet Cc118; that sorae heretofore strong o:pposi~i.onlsts are nOli seoking to identify themselves rIith the goverr. Dlent ~md ~ontl'ibute positively to the vlaT' effort; 2...Yl.d that peasant loyalty is shifting toward . ~he .government, particula-rly in :areas where .the governm9nt is making its fresence increasiI1.gly felt~ Finally! Diem ~n<\ his p:::>incipal lteuttluan"lis .1V.1yt3 very recently shoi-Jn considerable confidenco and optimism that the tide has been turned ag~inst the Viet Congo and have even stated that a gen9r~~ offensive is about to be lau.71chad. o

'0'

~ the other hand~ the indicators of serious internal'politiCal

his~bi11ty remain, hm'iever dL":l.inished in appa:rent intensity and ~e as .

vaJ':-e? as the indicators of politic~ stability.

There are ;aports f'rom

offl.Clals from various levels of the ad:i1inistration includina Vice President· T'no and G~merals L\long VC!.Il z.tinh and Le Vun Kim~ that Dietl continues to run the ,r:ar hLIllsal.f or t}1.roug~. his L"'l11e~ circle of confidants, that corruption wi ~l~Ul the g~'\iB:nmentJI.con ul.nu:s . unaoated (as evident in the recent national . . 1o~ta~ sc~naaJ)1 th7~ there 4S no pOiiticalcon~olidation of military success~s ~galnst .the y~9t :o~g ~ the ~ou."ltr-yside, that indiscriminate bO!llQing ~ !he countryside lS i'~... :ll1g l.P.n?cent or wavering peasants ton-ard the Viet ng, and that coup plo-ctmg persJ-sts and Ol1J.y the fear of Co!iIl1unis·t

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explo1.tatl.on and the bo1tef th,."t t..~e US l-lould·not tole~ate a cou~ keep it from materlalizing o As recontly as late Oct.ober 1962, Gan~ Ton That Dinh, 'commandoI' of J-J.'my Corps II and genel.'ally considered ono ot the ~ost loyal aJ.thoueh opportunistic of Diem's genol'als, stated that he "n~s hl.?hly dissatisfied \-lith tho -regim~ j that Diem and Uhu tolerate corl'uptlon in ' high places, :md that he "Tas planning to precipitate a coup in early Februc:u'y 1963.

1. Poiltic:u Atti.tudes of Diem ~.nd 11is F!lmi~J[. Diem rold his family remain tirmly convincsd Of"'tli'e l1isdOiii~o1: their political outlook and o£ their method of governing their country Thoy are b~sicilly impatient 11ith democratic procasses~ T'nsy consider democr<lCY a useful goal but its mothods they reg.'lI'd ~s "Tasteful and as d?.ngerous to political stability and public safety in a country such 2.5 South Vietnamo They contend there'lore tJlat the Vietnamese people, i-lith their national. survival at stako" must s\mmit to a collective di$cipline mlttl they d~velop a greater national conscl.otlsnoss and a better sense of civic l'6sponsibili ty. 1'inile vlilling to rule 'Within the frv.met-iork of constitutional and repr,esentative government, they are firm in their oonyictions that government is effecti.ve and dynamic. only \-Then its po~rer is closoly held and exercised, by a sll\.all J highly , dedicated, a.nd uncolnpro:nising element at the yery top through Do. machinery £o'tU'ldcd more on personal rolo.tionships and lOyCl.lty tha::l on form~l or institutional chains of com.ile.nd~ \'i'hare representatiYe government and ' ~ivil liberties ccme in conflict with the ,highly centr~lized ~uthority: the latter generally prevails~ Finally, Diem and his f:tmily continue to b'elieve strongly, ~most fanaticilly, th~t tliei:r leadership is crucial if not indispensable to the survival or their country in the present cr isis • 0

Some slight modific~tbm have 510\'11y appeared in those attitudes dur lllg the past ye~rJ partly because, Diem and his family are increasingly 'arlaI'e that the Communist threat to South Vietnuln is largely internal :md partly because of the magnitude and cO!nplexi tv of the US assist~ce ~rogrcan and its increaSing orientation t¢~ard the· needs of tho count.~side. l-.ore ~an e;er bofore, they have been IT'v:tde. al-.'3.re that government Dust not only b: sel,ved out m~~t also ~erve, that the peas~nt mld his :!ctive participa-, t:Ol) ra.ther than nis pasSlve obedience may lolall be crucial for :final . Vlctory over the Viet ~ng.9 and th~t a little more sharing of po~-rer at . the top rlould probably unprove ad'lll!listrati~e efficiency rather than la~td to their ouster. •'

At t~e 'sarna t~e, bouever, Diem and especially Nhu ha~EI gone t~, gre;!.t lengtns to convmce US officials that this has ru.l-;ays been their bas~c approil.ch to goverll:"'Uant ~d to elaborate oil "lhat it moans for the ,pea.::;ant o Nhu ~as repeatedly st~tedthat the s'GI'ategic hallllet progl'21'11 ~rt~~le, w~~l cre~ta ~ ~ocial, economtc, and political revolution' . e c~untrysLda, wnich will uproot vostad economic inte~ests ~p!ian{ aamocracy and efficiant ruld bensvolsnt adlllinistrcttlon the 00 evel" ~d r;tise the peasant to a nely' social st .. Th·· i· ~~~. ore s no

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-19·however, eithaX' in recElut; davalcpmants or in the records of P2St porformrol~ ox- , - lI.nC9, p~ticul~ly lfrlu1s, th:l.t such a-6 thtlir real objectivos , ... ........ :,;. .... poctilttons 0 . .. .: .. '

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Probably the most siguUicant cmngo is in Dial'll s atti~u~ to;mrd tho USo He h?s aJ!P~.rcntly b0como s\fust~~i."ti...~lly pal'Du=.dad t14,;u US defel139 cor.mitraen'ts to South Victnnm moo 1'irms despi. te his continuod di13;lgl'oemant .,1th tho US on .the L~oti~ll problom.. His earlier sucpicions thD.t ths US \J~S looking fOl' &\ successor in South Viatnnm {llld that tho US l-1~S implicated ill the abortive 19£0 coup have been considerably relievod. On tr..a oth9r h-md Diem hns re~inod firm against :J.U;f US pressure on r.atters th~t he !n-l;e:prots as vitru. to his mm fU"'ld his govol'n.Tll9nt l s best intorosto Qlld is convinced thr~.t in the fLl'l.'ll. mU'~ysis he Crul Mve ~bsolu-te con.t'idsnce only in hir~solf and in his f2.l-nUyo

Dlem. p!'ob~bly h~s sOIilOl'rhat st.roDf,rt.hened For GX\l.!i1plo, he has reol'g~ntzcd n numb'e.L' of his ngoncies, hns r~~ved a n~!~cr of critioal and potanti~Jly disloy'Cl. off'lcicl!.l <l...'I'1d by vsrious Iilt:J:mS n!:lutrcl.izod the iuflu0n~e of D0Tile Oth3!'S, such as Vice P.rosident T'.r..o D:l1d Gen. Duong Va.n Uinh, a71d h~G ~ti!pl"ov~d his ~e~ns of sm:'voil1~nce of the b'lTeancracy through ouch teclmiquas a.s tho . cret):'"ion in tho milit!U.¥ cst.~blish;llcnt of D._ system 01' "politicru. COntl1lssro:s lt }:nOWl1 as the Po1.itic~l \-lelf'~o Div).s ion He has :'!.ttemptsd to reinfol'co furthsl' his con-trol of tho lllilit::.ry astabli$h.rnont by the appoint{.~9nt of persomlly loyal' co101101s as division coIiiiilandars, SOilla of llhom h3ve d.amonst.J.~a.t0d from tinw to tl'rile th<lt t.hay r6g~d tr-..eir rosponsibility as prinCipally to Diera r~th.:3r tlmn to thair corpn eorr;:n.andal'B On br'~Mca, hom)ver, it tiPp9<.U.'S t}l~t thagenara.l efficiency of the administro:tion h~s improved sligh"Gly, p~tly bocauso of tb :>.ppoint.'Ilan-t of lI!Ol"e competent offie ~-u.s to SSVGr.:.Q keY' pooitions, p~t1y bsc~use of soma increase in t."Ia autbori t.y delegated by- Dicn, ~.nd pz.rtJ.y becausa of the ' , 20

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for the Prosidency Kg~$n Dl!L~ Thtk~ appears to be ~xercising greater author~~ t?~n be~orej.as is S~cretZl'Y of St~ta for Interior Bui V~n Luong l~ho, like tne heaa of now CentrCll Intelligence Or-ganization, Col. . l.guyan Van Y, co..nd Secre'ljn.."'Y of State for ~-blic Haalth Tran Din.'l Th; is ' ~long the nQ)'ily-~ppo in~e~.l. ~'>l~. more com~9tent, members of Die~ I s ento~aga in Saigon. .a.t, Dleml" s l1111l1.Gvl. ye, the l:ational Assembly recently passed ~ :r...endllent to t.ie. constitution en:lbling it to call upon members of Diem's , " _' cabl.net to give te3timony on pending legisl~tiono·

"?O

lliem :tUso has bs come incre~.singly ai'ro..r~ of the noed to ronveand accelerate ~ralning. p:,ogr~~ for his -ci-vll ser_vic~ ~nd has boen some11hat Eo:e ~selactlva in hls appolntment of middle echelon o£ficials and province chle;~. As a res;ut of tho increased nutWer of US advisers J P;uoticu1m-ly :It tnlS lovel of t1l3 governr~nt, some 'o~ thasa offici?.1s have alec; ShOnll a

,

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- 20

~

SOilleHhat grea.tor lIi.11ineness to act on their O'tl."Il initiative and to.. . atte;npt to improve t.hctil' gcn~r:U. fJffectivoness in such matters ~s llllll.tary pl~.nlling c:ld operations J infort~~tion <md pr~pC!,ganda, int~lligencaJ·:n? . Civic J..etion. l!'inally, ther~ ha.s been gl."e~ vor c~nsu.l~o.tlon ~d COOI dlnatien of ~ctivities b9t~1;jen GV}f and US orfi~i:llS III ~lgon lYhl:~ in ttU"n has tended to redlJ.ca dul{\YS in the i'onmll.at.ion' mld l.I11plcmant<:\vlon of

policios. .. Neverthsless, pcu.ticipa.tton by tho centr~l elomants of the administration in Saigon in the formulation and direction. of p~licies, as \:011 as inl.tiatl.vo and constructive criticism upuard from lts nlLd~a and.lo'\~ar . echolons, continue to be restricted seriously, Diem and hls :ram~ly C?ntlnue to operate the goyarnment la!'gely on th~ basis of person..-u. relatJ_onshlps r"'tr..3r than tln'ou!J'h the reO'lllar or formal channels of cor.!ltand. !. They ....have co bi t" remained st~adi'~st agail'lst FJ..ny US pressure to broaden goverth"!l.em;, pCU-'t./L e pa >.on at the tap, and have bsoh keenly alert and highly sensitive to the posslbil5.ty that the role' of U3 adviser~ in the field or at ·t.hs middle ~.a lO'uer ochelons the adli'linistratiion !ftsy l·maken their a.uthority ou.tside Saigon. 0

of

j~ Dlemts Position ill the Cotmtr-ysidso 1,lioT:l has never had r;id0Spl'~ad popu1~.r ~d=Sll-ppor~nduihig -fiTs period of greatest 2.cm.Gvemont,

1955-58

0

J$ tJ.ust$:'e and disciplined urtrovert, he is incapable of denw.gog~

uary and ha~ n9V~ made a gl"~at effol~t· ...- to the axtsnh that Pl"il~~.. Sihanouk of Carnboc1ia. and .Ho Chi Ninh of North Vietna.l1l., tor OY2Jii.plo" havo dona so ..- to inspire a.~ong th9 Sou:i.ih Vietnamese people a· nationaJ. conscioun ... noss' cen?...!'ed a.Tld rooulded arotmd him porsonally 'Y]hile he has enacted 1il9ast~es t:!1at rave helped tl1..s peasants ~ he has not attempted to identify . ! himself irrlil.r-...:ately w1.th the peasants. Relatively fei-T peasants have ovel' : seen Dic:a or heard him..speak, and there ara probably many others who are not a,.mre ·that he is head of the ;;tl'l-"Jrn.'i".9nto For thl3 gre?-t llajori"ty of peasants, the dist.rict chlei' is probably the highest govel"ment official 1'1ith "lr~m i there has been a.~v notable degree of contacta 0

:

Dle~ imdoubtedly has become

increasUigly a~a:re of the S9~ ious naed~ to ·ir.lprova tr~ public image of himself, his family, and h~s' goV"ern,nent" ! H: nO'f travels ~~ensively in '"he countryside, a.lld his manner of talking· r?-ti; the peasa."lt has become mora relaxed and s~athetic than bafora,; 0U:lllg the last half of 1961, for eXample, Diem li'.ade ·18 knoimtrips outside Saigon and visited ~9 provinces, 9 in the central and northern parts of ~'~a country ar...c1 l? in tho south.. Both .Diem and liliu have from tilil9 to tires .att:ndod the lllE.uguration of :olatively sl!'.all rural projectso flith US .: aS~lS~3n~a, the GVJI is e~~andLng'its intorw4tion and Civic Action pro~ams at.tha ~~~g? level and.has become more conscious of the need to conduct . t~ese aC~~:ltles along lL~es understood and appreciated ~ the peasant. I Fl~a1ly, 'liners ar~ reports that a nu.'l!bar of the 'Villages 'and hamlets' l-lhlCh_:ava been glven ar-ms have resisted the Viet Cong, instead. of sur-·. rende.l.l.Dg their 'Weapons a.s sorag GV}I ~fi'icia1s had e:xpsctad. t.'1!ey l.1>u1d do • I

•. . ,..

r-~.

Jt

01.1


21 .,. Thal"e SO(ft"tS to 1:.lC3 SCr:lS fealiI'l.g ~1l0ng G'VlI and us officials opC1~3.ting ~rt t.l}e local level tt~t ths pc-pula')." e.ppe<ll of 2..'ld st:pi,:,ort fOl' Dlcr.l and his ,~o~v·G~n.'fiGllt in tba couzr~.ryaic!a is L":1proving~ pa:rttcU'ial'ly in' areas rlhel'e ;ecUl>ity has irtlp.-ovcd C'Jld t..~:a g"vs!'ri:na~t~3 pouer is lncl"'c":'5l..")g.. rb~m'lel', they t-n>.:rn ~t:"~inst &.l'J.y \lndi.!s CptiillL:;;!!'1, pa'i:"t.icularly since thrrs belie?"e sClcial • °1"l1Jary sucoesses, and e~vnonico edvalces al"C sUll not. keBpmg pa·:a 'Wl.-tl.1 %11)_ and tJ:!.at the ·'Oo9it.i.v~ i(1s::l'tii'ic~ti(m of the peasentr-r.r 'Ylith t.he gOVDl"nlrlen"t is still a 10n.g lrayoff. llliUo over it lCO~OOO ~§:!~~:~ or mount~in tribgspeoF~e hailo fled Viet Cong-ccntr'olled al.~ea.~ c:md ~a being t!;r:1pc·rarily housed ancl f(jd by the Gv"1i, thah' £ligh'jj appat'entJ.y lres due p:d.ncip.3.l1y to Viet Ccmg eXC!6sses and -the genel~aJ. intsn3ificatio!l {·f the .fighting in the higril.8lds l'atnC!:r tll~~ to CJXs.y positiv~ :lr,gasUt'os t.~ke:!l by fu·3 GV1~ to 2.pf.aa.l to the tl">ibe:spaople. T.he e}..~ensiva use' of al"tiJ.1vl"Y a<-;d :lEl:.;.'"ial bc:!!ib~"t'd­ ·r~e.nt and o\~ae!' apl'?.!'0:ltly 6):C02Si ve and indi'scrtTOllnat.c Tit'le3i.U'eS by GVN . • . +. 1mUit~.f ~d g"sC1.il~:Lty fGrces -tn ~tv$:np'Jl.ng ..·0 e 1";~ l.mJ...'1~b~..a .;.~ WJ.0 Vl.G'I. 1"'I..>\..vg P.avo U1'1d!)ubtedly killed msny il:'~t·:ce:r.;!;. ·P~~:.:ls.mts and li1.2.do m.~ Ot.h~T.'3 ~.ore lii.11i~g than baf'or~i to cc<:pel'ate ~lith iha Viet C:mg, pru.~tictll::'.:;.o1y i':1 al'e<l3 lrhera the gOY'srnment has conducted oxtensivd milita?j'" op~ratxon":;, b"p.t. has faLlod tv £01101: L"'9 by providin.g U-!El m9ati;l for pel'nUUlent sectr::'i ty I o

'.

0

Di~m.' s Positic-n hl U!."b~.n C6nt~rs .. - Dier.l us legHimar.:y as SOtrth VietnaT(/s' nitioT~n~~y--:6e~"a:£-b;St, a \Tague snd im~l"c-on:"\.1 conc9pt . in the country-side. I':;· is S0l'ioi1:31y qU.3sticned, ho.rsver, ~r:lOng ·r~.l:W . eler.lents of tna urban society, princip?1Jy anlcng professio;l~l,.s, L.'1t.3JJ.o~!t'..":~ls, and i'O:rIu~l~ pvltticians ill S~i.gon. <:f.s in t.hs ro~~n~ past, this quast.5.oni..l1g largely eontiirmes to· taka. the fo:rm of aissent at'ld pri7ilts critici~m r.:!t~i.~':''' than openly cr.fg~nized oppositiollo "Jithbl this OdUcc1ted t.e.9 politically . sansiti va S9ctC.l" of tho Viet!!.'lli;JS~ society:1 th:')1'o is a ilids y'-.l""ia-GJ of pol~tie.:'"'.1. s:'311tli!:-37lt=:, Lncl1.1ding varying dogt'coa .cf· Viiltmi.;.'3~o !lE.tiC'nalis.n, n9utLra1is'ii!, cOi!;[l,t1miz-a, pro-US ~.11d anti-US, ·&"1cX-,p:::oo""Fr-6nch <:<lid :'~:ltie.F"!<,moh" ~'he COiiif:!~n theE;l';s araong tha~e c~~~t.i~,",3 2..'1d aeti-;ra OPU(li!'3Zlts of Ltc..'ll cmr;jume t.o be related to his s.r::;tem &!It r!a."Il."ler of l'\11a ~ --

h.

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This roltltive surface silenco mi::;ht be rc.g~mied as an' ihdic:!. tor of improvonml1t in Dleltl'S ]>Os!.tio.:n uith tho urbt.n public if it 110ira not for tho 1ncroa!ling numt'Jr of report!; of clp.ndostillO acti"v:i ties by 11 S '. : non.,c.')n~.1luntst critics end cp!)onont.so . F<.lctionru. leadors of SUCl.'1 old and . once ir.r90rt~\11'li poll tical groups as fuo ~ !ip~3, ~lld tho }~ationalist , Pm'ty of .Viotna'il (Vl:QDD) rcpo!'tedly ar-e stlsking ,rays ,to get thoir meliibers secretly instaUod in the govermento' (Thol~e 1s ()v!.a~nce of some collusion bati'10:m elcmt:'.nts of ono or· thtlss grOt1Jls and ths tlTO pilots 1]00 bombod Dicmts p:U2.CO in February 19620) . other· opposition olom~nts, including factions of ths Cao D:ai roligious s~ct ~"1d th~ ,1Ioa fJ.c.o Soc1..-u. D;;mocratic Pa:rt.y, are rc:portedlypl"cparing ple.:ns for a futura COUp, oithor in cooperation \'lit.h ot.hor non=Com.t!lu.~isJIi groups or \-lith.tho Viot Cong. Italso app$~lrs th~t cxpat:d.at.o (fi'OUpS in Franco!j such as the fumocl".?tic Party of Vietnam, are nttsmpting to exp~-(.1 the5.!' coyert acti'''lt~o3 in Sligon. l·!.llile it appe~B tha~ Diam. ll!!S not i.mprovod hi3 st~lldL"1g tl.nlong lU'ban grouiX3, tho!'o i.s no ovidonca t-hat. -c.lle ~~ti",Diem illt.E:lllcct'l1:'U.-elit.$ aleman'is in Saigon h~'ve bocn ~blo t-o oveX'co~~ t~all' c~.ronic di.suul ty c.nd s.ectari:mism or to inzri1a.sll their very sru.:"\ll. £ollo~lings. Q~ the othar hand, Diemts persIsting disdain of most of thcsa o·ppositio:ll.8tS and his refusal to bring . into the gov~r-mont oven &O!1l8 of theil" loast l'Opl~()hons1blo ·r.lsr.1bers havo iont~ibuted to a grOi'1i.ng n3l1:tJ(r.lut z.lJntUt10nt amo~3 th~ and, by forCing many of thSDl undor cov.w, n..~ve t:'.ada ii;. 'erw',emoly dif.ficult to cst,imate their rcal stl"ength ro~d di~r-llptiV'e potent. iaL'Ill ~ddi tion to t.ia groHing appoal ot n~u'liralish1 among t.llom, their pl~o",lJS ol'icntation filay ci.so be rapidly doclin5.ng. IV.. ...or< ECOXO}ITC j,'REm:s ............ rze ........

Thera bas becn lUitle: f.r£lationa.;y pl~et.sura ~n Sout.~ Viotnam. as yat~

h~ve baUD stable and tho monoy supply has been nearlyconstarlt for C"iC!' ::. :r~~. Ii'or (!xp..mple; ft.n Aug-ust J.962. total Ii!tJJ1&J"J sw,""uly made un of

Prices

.

dt'li1lalid d~po'3~ ts L"1 t.~o ban..'l(s and cmn:enc..-y· in Circulation, ;.35' only fr~ction.a1.1 y above i!..nt 1t hnd boen in H!ll'cl1 1961... Fur'thor,. pricos have been

.. 'genorally st~blo at"1d the C(jS'~ of l.iiring in th~ citlos has risen only very slo~ly•. ·, ' .

~I!) stab ili ty in mon!;:; supply C'.nd prices that ~3 bvon such a markad feat:;~ o~ ~o Vi?t::rues~.econo~ has bao~ ~~e ~iroct rcs~lit of very co~­

sorv......_ve i~'.l pollcl.us \ll:ch respect t~ p!'lces l~ges and .fiscal manatrement·,· So -, onC1 ~ - th~ ilttl r,' 4 , ') • <;>~" , f... e.:.lalJ6 prohl'~ ~~tl.Ln ,South Viot!1m,t lias reconstruction .4" i.o .. ~ the l'c3tora·tion of. pl~odu~tio!l t.o p:rc-1!ol"1.d 1-:3.1' n lovels it r'!S' posslble to obt::dn ~'Ubskntia1 increases in output at rclo.ti ~i co;t,", end con!.lerVD.tl.vC; p.rico-1.."'ago ad fiscal ~<31ici6$ l1~l'O not ~l"J.' usaful buv aJ.,so to SOl:l'.,e extent nece~sa:ry.· J..lthough Gill policios l.~v'" b""eY con .i:I.n. . "'....··ativo in n~ tu:r t~ 1.J,;;J, '" v n more . • , e . 1l~"l b'a3 really required (i'Ol"ox"'i"llplo budgat . sUl'pluses from 1954 to 1959 amounted to a to' tal o¥' 2 1 hl·U· l' ' l...i .. , )' t\-,,,,..... h k t . . J. • .-.. on ~ as'&ors . • 1n'~-r ~ aUvo c~ thho specter of inflation from adding yet. W'lother clement ~f . S\iau it~ ro t a Sccl)a.. . . , Q

,-ci..

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co

23 ....

Tl'ro encou..:;e;ging (.kwQlop;l"..ez>.t.~ ~..ava c)cCU!:'I'cd l.n th~ e'~Nlomic fiold in Sou·th Vietnnm ill the la~t se'leI'a.l T::.r..:uth;')o Fh"'l.i"(,i til;) f\anond Flvo~Ycar Plan 1-TaS cndc!"'Dcd by th::l Nat.ion.~l :s~;,mb17 in J~;.:t a.-:;;,"l arJP~cr{ad by .P:resic1en~~ Dicmo 'In·:!; P1{~a Cill8 ict].' thCl iIT!{f;st!ftC~'!~ :~f h5 bi.llion piasters over tn~ p()!'iod 1962 1.966 ~~d GT:i?!"!S5l.£:s3 tho c1cs\·..;;lG'·y~~!jnt ((t agl"'im:u:ture, public ·Ho~'ks,.~.l"}1 imxLwtt). . o OJl :1i:~:!Z- 30 -th~ }I.J,t.ic:lil.l i~~sm;llJly apPl'o,Priated an iv.it.i4 102 billion p!w~~:rr8 to :r.ill~~1~:6 t~1o ptni>tej;' co~ta of sevoral proj!lci.~3~}r.t.i~1'.!.0 ·Of".:qi{;~l in tho' ~gri.(n,ittU!';?~ S(:'o1:.o:;:. i~~' 0

I

.1

Second, PJ.. . c~ic18!r·G Dlt~m} in his stc~o of the mrtion; ro.~s5age to t.he tI:l.tio:1fti .!:Di:>G.llbly en C:~tobJr 1, ()r.~phe5iz(d th~t. <lgricultraoo is tho Qcor~omic base of ['-.oilth Viot-l'!;)!l £!'ld must. h?:m pr'ia:~t~~ in d01!clopman~~e lb 2~SO said th!).·t priv~'~e inv(!otment mu;:rh bo 6nccm'''tg.~d and pl~ovid-)d "tho·rD.t!.on:tic for dei'icit financing by.pointing out that a 4ovvlop5...:"1g 11~tlon nor-m~lly . oXl')sri.encos a budgot.::rr'i d::;1.'ici'!;o Dlem rofer-red to th~ llocessity of raisllig th~ living st3.11d~'ds of tha ru1"al popul~tiC:l1[ nnd 5?id t,h::.t tho prosont gu..:U~roltesd tlinintEl \iage" \-,(,to.d be l"'e,..cxo.Tf'J.lled becauso of the riso in the cost of living" fJ.th~\ugh m~i\suras t.o implcm~nt n:::vl economic policies may not be 'pro:::entod to "",h~ li?ticlnru. 11.ssm:l?>1:r ml'Gil 1.t-3 no::....-t regu1<lI' sassion in Ap.rn 1963~ Dienl~8 s'catcm:mts i.ndic;~te a naw al·mronsss tllat the· trcnd of d(Jcludllg h1.~cma ~~~ng tha lowes't lneons fft'Olip3 m1!~lt hfl Y>l;Iv~rs'1(L . Tais m'i~'Grl:;;;;::S is t:nc.:Our.agillg but~ unl{)as t.he 2.dditiQI::2.1 in~om.~ ge!!er~ted by corieit fin~cl1!g i:: l<ll"gaJ.y dil'El~t.iJd to the ccU!:ct:.ry.side clld to the lOl-i3r inCO!li.:l uy.b~'1 g:t·Cit::.:9~, t.he price r-isesresulting from. doficit .financing 'Fill lP.:~rely llidon ths income gi.p rillicn ~lTeady ~xi~ts ~nd f1.wther alienate : the peas§llts from th~ GVUo' ~~~reover, th~ .udditicl1ll incom.~ m.ust be 'dir~ct~d' ~ the rural al"C25 in such a W:ly as to enCOUI'ag6 agricultural' prou'\1~tio!lo S·c.~bl$ and at~~etive pz-ices for farm products a!'O the best and P&'n.e.ps only I~-6<l.nS to ~ccompl1;sh t.i.iso ~

Vitl~. COl'lg ~ctiviti.e~ in SOl.!"~h Viet.'l~l1 can b3 oXD~cted to hava a : de~es:ing' e;ffcct on agricult~1al production, :aJ. though- tho nsjor . det~J?mUl;ln'h3 'Will ()o;!tirlu3 to b;) prict)~ tl!~ \,j~;rt,h..,r~ ~"ld 41gric-\l.1:h'm:"al tClch-'

n~q~:n~J ,includL~g the U3:' pi fc!'t.llizer, a.~d ir.l:Pl"Cv~d s6~do Th33e latter ll'O 10s3 importarrt ~fith rDSp\}ct to ru.bber prodllctioll' lfal.ch provld.;)s SOUGh Vi~tn~t s lo.'l:'z;)st sll"~lo ....v.r~· VY'Q'1"'t t:t. .,.,.. t;.,"" 01' _'l.~ , fh t" A ..... S:~ ..". ;..--al> :n'C.!: 1U'5ou.gh ".ugU3'~ 196~ rubea!' pr-odu::tion ,on majol". plantat.ions declined .. .r;{ SOl:1:') 2, ,90 tn.3t,zcic ~C~3 ~s corrrp~:."!'cd to 1;9610' .A fungus .d~S~3~i!l o£fccting fc:.'!I.:ors hO:'1~VD~ ~

-::;:::l

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.• '-'''1 • I !'f _~

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:'-. '-';

- 24 the rubber trees u'aa poo.·titUly responsiblo for tho do?lIlw, but an . impol'tant additional ca.usa lTaS clandostino tapping by tho Viot Gong and . : goneral insocurity- l-ihicll'intcrfored lvith legitimate tapping on tho estates : Mld extonsion of ths planted 2.rea. Also, the govormont l s \U"gont finanola1 noeds m'isin3 from tho emergency haw~ pl~ovont.od it fJinco.19Co- .from malting mything moro thc.n t.oken p~!)nt.s in support of i-t:l rubbor ·.i.~oplan~ing p:rogl~am. Givan tho vulnerabUity of t~ estates, thero is littlo prospoct for em irapro'Vomcnt in the rubber situation u.ntU socurity ir.lprovos

' .

genGr~1· '

~.

.

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.

It can also bo Gxpectod th-"t Viot Gong .berassf;lsnt llill continua to intozai'ol'Q tlith tha transport SYStcr;1, espaciill.y tho railr,?ads. The rasu:':Iption ,of. night passonger operations be~veen Saigoll and lIua on Sap·telflber. 15 lras npparontly not basad on 8!Y improvement in aocurl ty but on tho hop~ th..at tha ViGt Gong would not 'sabot~go traina carrying passengers. ~he l'osttription T:l~~y havc') also been due to the facti that additio:n:ll l~<:rvonuos ~.)~e 'Utgou·tly nead~d in Vie1-1 of t.ho 10 million piastOl' montluy deficit on . l.'aUllay operat.iolls. If Pi-'eStdvnt moml s statements on Octob~r l' aro follouod by the nacossary rllaasuros to stiml1J.ats dovelopm~nt of tha· ~.g!"icult1.U'a1 sGc'bor in South Vio'Q:laIll, u11ie11 accounts for tha omploymant of BO;S of thl popul~tion, ulpol..tant stops ~iill havo boon taken not only tQ provido tho PC\lsanti'Y . \lith tho lil.cr~iv<!.tion to side with tho govern.",;\ont but ru.so to dil'oct economic thvclopm~nt along th·, linos Illost prorilisil'lg for tho acono.aic t:l.1.turo of South Viotnan~ ·l:tlis will be particu1?l'ly the cnso if th9 GVNc S .oconom.ic . diftrclollm.ant progr2Iil also omph2.sizss industries utilizing domGstlcclly . Pl"Odt1~od l'a"l m!lt~iats, particularly agricultural onos as utlll llS those ".). :PI:OVl' d ' :'I. ' "CJl~1I 10 ll1i:;~t suustitu~~s but ~J:>e basod 80101y 011 importod ra~l ~~t$rlt!ls.·' ..

. . . In S~Ol··~, U:t6 G"iH is SnOI'ling a new awaron~ssoi tho noco?sity o.r'.·. du·ocul.?6 i~s att~ntion to progl"am.s lillich' 1'1i11 diroctly bonefit tho l'l.."rru. poPulatl.on: It h~s not as yet put into effect :m;r concrete lcaasuros to

e~~ out rls pro&:,am. .Its actions ~ :t}IS noxt six lilonths to a· year will 1hdlcata h01-! deep l.ts ne'YT...found conVl.etion J.::~ .. . ..

V. OUl'LOOK··

A.

Coi.!ntunlst Actions . ,

":a

UWZid

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- 25 (. ./,1.. Wla

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. Act.s ox '

t,... ~oQ.l"!:1'" 'n.::t s{·y. _.u_ 0... tag ic ha"illsts I>

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t~.' i.'(}j? iSii!$

p;:.l'tic-..tlal 1y 4

. a-)" <:tJ.'n~t' ,.,.... "'... ;~ c...~.:._~} """· "~d sabot~ue .. part.icular1:r of. trains 'and i!;9~l't~jlt ~ l~.hU. ~::tallations,' l'i\ay wsll increase to unprecedemted prcpc:ticms ~'l an effort to tie do.m litore GVt'i Iililitary a:\d securit.y forces ~d t!lUS l'cllEil:e the pressm'e against tha Viet. Collg'J ' , -C,J

u.,.1"

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...

Hlnoi ca.'Il also be expected to ccntinue to infllt·l"ate per-sonnal 2nd material into'Sou'Gh Vietn511 and has tho;) capability to step up inn~tr>atiol1, as the sii:il;atiorl "lax'rants" ·rlith relatively 1ititle dalJge:.~ of de-taction a.l1d no great difficulty. 'f.c.~ IR\HS capabnit-;r is furthel' {lnh~"lced by the natm'e of the bo~der terrain and the li;a!:~ed border-control c;~:?3.bilitias of the South Viatnarilese s Lao t and Ce.mbod im} govcr·I,,'1l:mts. Jhm"J'lt~l" 3 becausa of tacticr.l and st.~atogie ldlLtary and political c0ns.id:~ratio:'1'3, Hanoi ui11 Pl.'ODci)ly continue to inftlt1'ate o].e1n~n:ts prim!ll"ily iro;r. the poo~ of l'eg.r'ou1X:d Souiih Vietnaii1>rJSG 1'.;rth!;~l· vh..~'1 from. the Vie'br.!2JQ:;so Communist forces· in L:loS 1l".ost o.f whom ~"e believed to be liorth Vi.~t.nC'..m3~a Ol' Ton.ldnese# ' ·It is entb:ely possible that tha Viet COl1.g \-li11 sta~ 'Up its Al'msd d'Ul"'ing the n'3Y:t month e:r so 'uitl!- t.he t:\clv~mt o.f ihe c'lr-y seaso:!, in the beliei' t.'h3tJ ·iu~·th~ milik.i:3;o escalatio~ is ne~e5s~.ry 1.1'1 ('l"dsr to CvlJI!tsr the gro;61lg resp~nse and effoct.iveness of th~ GVi~ :.eo~\'\.~ez a~d US' suppor'co T'na!.·e a~e a d?.a:' of indicators t·hat SiIppOl~'G this ex.:.:~act~tio~:· nU'i19rO\lS em>liar intelligun::a rep~'ts or Viet Gong l"agr-oup~~Tlt and consolidation 01' forcesj a sl.ight increase in the ntG'ilbar clf arm~:1d incid~nts c1ur Ll1g ~oughly the las'G ~reek of October; and t1'1(1 Vis-(j Cong battalion ..sizs at'l:;acks in the X'lckvng River delta a"e,,~ in lats OC·tot-<!l' 2nd e~.rly Ny\'emb~r' 1962, the fir.,t since c.T:.u.y 1962. Further military escalsticl'i. dw:'ing t.llS nax'v S6ve!'al Ii1O!lths ni.ght involve t..'-le .fOt'IoUltion cf.' l"egiJnsntcl. .. si.zeunitsa ~ .,....clud· . \., <>'t;:r:a.nSlO!>rr.a:..~Oll o~ SOIllS gu.erl'l ' - 1la u:'''l.tts. :i.nt.o CO!lvc.~ltional . ' .... ". l!"'!gf' '(;;~a h . tUl1.t.S l-1r(:.!l .e~rne!' \reapon.s; selected and simultaneo'O.s large .att.?"cks ~e'.iinst one or Ll01"a targe·ts, including mUi"tal'Y ll'lstaD.ations a!Y.i to!-r~s; 3s.tab1.ishtlent ""~' ~~lll)."...,. 0} od "',. ':I ~ ~ _...... '7' .1. ./.\• • •. • ,-'.l.. -'a"y ,"",'a...s .LU '::OU!;ll 'i l.e ...nail; ..:..'!e Cl:'sa-::'lcn of r6SS:'Ve ba:3es Ul CO:rL'll1Dl.st~hald areas. L: scuthe!'n Laos Jo and in~"'e~<'.:>"~ :"'!'';l-h>a':'':cn' .~ ,. i --- co ....... '" .LO,-", ...._ u. 1.I'&'.l, paruct~m- y. 1£ Co!:!!nll.l1ist for-cas in southern Laos oan tlro'r!'d~ ad3,..~tel '>1 ...., r,· • ""l~'- t· . ( It does not ~ij~">::>"" . '-1. . P~~ot~:jI"..!.l ..... \1 O. w.-,a l.c'n rou"tes. l;~"'ly th ..... • J. bCiJ........:lgW..1l. -1. • c-. _. . :ns~sc ~lon y. the Inte:rnat ional Cv~vrcl Ccllt"nissicr. in i.eos l.;nl sariousl . Y l.i11...oede Co~;:'7l.st ir;t'llt:ationo) hcmaver 1 F.anoi 11i11 probably not'res . to overt ~llJ.tary lllVaSl.t:m. 0 . ~op3re.tiol,!:3

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Cong al'ld --ill st'.,.· i ' __ " . Iit . 1'h~ Viet . . Hanol- p"'ob:!bly ~.. tl " ..'0 up S £n1I lc!\.nlily their P?n leal :na propaganda activlties o . Inside South Viet~'1l Viet··Co . aas make .l.I'1c:r sd efforts to penetr-ate the' stratec.>l ~ h.,rl\~6t~· a-d "'...~ ng . 'Wl.... SeC1II:'1+',. til . . . . . . 1:../. .... C Q,J.,.:t]' • ..." :nv..s, recoup lts PS".{chological-ic.sse.s with tre ?-0nt~-""!:>""a a.lld Ul gensral subVert th~ CNfi's ei'fort to lor;'" tl' ..'" t· :.....~:::;;;- ~, . . , ...... ..s ·s upP",,!' of thQ peasan-ts.

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.'

In urban al,'eas, t.h9 Viet Cong wD.l l'sly on ter'l'oX'i~m to dcmorruJ.ze ~he

c1tiZ6nt"Y <?lld on incro!'lsed pj:op~g;!.nda a..'"ld r.ubVl:1l"sion ~-o 1113P~"O ~.ntl.'" . Diom (iC'ii10ns·;:,rat.iom:; cmd coup l)lots, enooUI-.:lgo nsutl"~lSt sEmtament, ;Uld$

_"1 (!"~ n ...·,p·tlo-t for i tc;•S1u..llit.:3d fj,~optn t.n.ctlCS among non-Co:mmunll3t • • in gm.'ler..u.:1 t.>"J.. .. l.' r J. ... OPPo~l:/oiol'l:ts/('3 l!lld yO'J.t'h and It.bo:c> gl~ou~so

Otl-tslc1e South Viotn~.r.!, R1:coi '\-1)11 p!'cbtl.bly incl'e~so itsJ diplorr.atic and p rolx '.gGnda efforts to gain support p:.U:'ticl.ll~,l"ly t.ilong neu v):z,l n~tiollS for th~ n}r2·tio!lit F.tont for th~ Ll.Ds!'ation. of e'Ou-~h Viotn:'J1ln (nVLBV) " It m~y h?V'6 SOil$ success i.11 establishi.ng t!l'rrlofficialt1 l"EilaJGions bot1i€ten tho UJ'l..S'V [).,:l1d J.~otbn rod C?l!J.Dodi«'u le~.(brs$ in g<';.in;'ng s"t.1.pport for tho \Tft'rr.;..-r ""'0"'0VJ_t e~""l~!"<'osa lilinol'it1es in Lac:,;;... Carliliodin; and Tb.i1a..'ld, and It!:.u\..l'V 4'U ..... -.... . . in P~!·D1.1.~dillg p!'o~i1ir.'z;nt Vietm:!">l<:lS$ exp?:::,:d.ates in lil.'Otn:;o to St!ppol~t a ch:"J.n!78 of goV'er:Gfuont in South Viet!!!":.tl~ In additiol1 to ~dvocating tha raul1i:tic~'i;j,on of Vj.e·~n~uil, }r.~n';)i n,nd -'d19 ~y~YJSV c~m be o:~oct9d to contbluC 1","I"o·,; . . ,." .. .,..Q" ... .,'~~1·:'1~··}. J..~C'''' thn 11~'·1t.i".;."}1; zo:tic·n of S·:ruth. Vie'tmua o Et.11;CVor ,.. 't;he ~ ;. ;"~Z>'-""~ ~~ \oJ\,.:·l.. :::-..... .:.. ...... ----- ....... - .. cx.:.~'1·ii· 'c,o lThich nsutrru.iz;l'~ion is emp:Ji2sized 11111 c18pond on thQ cow.se of tl1S t:?.r in &n:rth Vi(3im~m ~~!c1 the degree to uhich ths c:n;,ccpt is i'ou!"'1.d to .' ~ppst:l to the eleiil'Jnts in ruld ou.tsid:zJ Sou1;h ViOt-U?J":l, ~s lwll as on de\'elop ... e:mt$ ir.!. the B}_oo it-self'o '(:....! ...

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T.oe pattern of' avants rel!'.ting to th0 croat ion end davelop:nent of the IlF1S"v.1 a$ f;~ll :!:J thl3 p~::j"a:r.~l'.i of CC',nil1u\lW t I}(ll ~:!iic::U. t~cts.ca mld . st.r~:tegy '_"i1 siran.n> situ~tt9r.lS in o"the!' COUllt,l"ies in the P2.G·~,~~~-;idtr.:ates thr...t r:~noi and tho Viot. Col~~r ox's Pl"E:p:u-'ll1g t.bs groUll(t;ork fOl" tranafcl"nl.!rliicn of' the llli1.5v mto ~ shado11 or '!J.ibel"u·Gion govc:rr.:1!'J13t!:l in Sou·th V5.o·Gr>...a.!il o !Io.·reval" ,. H; is e:r:'lil"Dr.lely difficu1.t to p!'edlc'!:. lib!!? 'tJhsther, or under \ihat condit,loll~ i:..'1is lIn1 occur. Ib.nol might find it poll:i:.ic~lly ~dv..:;nt:.:.geous to cro~;l;o a sh~dou gov·er-r.rllent ,;nee!' c. .rlY one of tho follo':iLl1g cir'ci~:n;;;t~'1~a3g chli"ing n par-lod of -lnt5:;;:'1l~ political C"rlsi!3 in Sct'(th Viema.':l follolrL"'lg a _ ... ___ ._.t:•.~...'" Ut.4·W''-''~V\).l. u.J..

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n serios of l7:!!.jor ar.d d!,2I;!.::.tic Viet C-or;g D1Ll.it:i..:."7 sti.~C0SZ0S; ch.td::'!.g ~ period of sOl'ious rnilita..""Y cr diplom.atic l"oversss for th!3. US i.11 t·he F~> Thst; or .~"t ~ "tine l;nan severnl neutralist cOtl.;"iii!'io~ h~d gi VOll l!.Ssurm1CO;!) of diplor~tic rocognition of a ne~T flgovea:msntn 1.71 South 'lis"tr..,.?-'il. o Unde!' tJ:ny circu.mst:.ncas, hOi-leVel', tiLe decision l-rould. bs conzi.cbrably infJ.umcsd by 1-!osco:r t'.lld Poi.ping ~.nd t.he il' est.im;l'ce of tho ganar21 lntel"nation..:!J. .

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D-:.lriJ!~ t~le r.lin.:t yO~fL', tho GVi:i prob:.lbly 1-Tn]. nO'G be ~.blG t.o hatt cvrt'Ll>latsly" th1 ds~,,~:~"io!'~ting seCD.t'itiY t.rends ~ l(~t :llonc roverso tha ti.de eg~ins·t

"thtJ Vhrt Cv:'lg~ u:..lless S~j.gon signific~tly 2.CcDJ.~l"atss Ct.'1d imp::'ov5S its I'eS1X:ll,S$ to th-ii in:;l1"t"gen~yo L:;on?. oth::' ~hings!i t.~:~ gOY-;.l:,On:,:en·t l:ad~~ s}'\J.p l,u:::rc. glva l1r.:il!h &!=,6~rt:::r (;:llpha:<":l.B to po.l.l.tl.c31, soc)..?l, aud eCOl~onn.·~ r.tOflSm'OS L.i SU.PPOi"t of itzrmilita'Y Op'3r!1'~i.(;n3, r.~~ke a But;strL"'l'i;i111 ]y gt'e.~tBl" effQr'h to in"tag.r<.;to "'~h;:.. Sb.'<lt,~~3).C hf:\.T.':lst prcgl"t'11 Lito :;. contin:uJ..ng syst€,m.-:ltic \. "L"'~ 1·..·{l..,?O~.;·Q i+.·~ c ... ·:~~..!:"'··'P'i'~·l~·J..'~ "I"I:l ~-"c-l: _. . !""'7"'~ef'l~ •• -J-'_·~\u··l.,,. ..... ,t..4._,...__ __ """r...... v ..~_.... ..... u.:> P:">",,t f'~c"":'';. . . (".~'" ('''"yo.......V, _~.J-!-.,..

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r.nd

t110 Vi.0t G~ng CC111 be) cq~ct$d t ..') stop u.p i ~'.'" offol"'W ng~J.n3t the progrc\!:l ~u:('iwg fui) Il~X'G y.::~~. f,\"Q:::h f~,iJ_lll"t3 t-:iU ~DO g:"a~i:·ly l'0Stii:'ict. : th~ r:.bi]j:~'.r of thtl GVn to '-;·~<:l.ke!l Viot G..:!1G! ct'.·G;:~bil;~tic:;, to CC.'12bl; ~]~+_",' -i'(;3 C'Rn r.!ill. . i'.~ . ...y Sl1.C!t~E·SS3S into pOr!i~2.nant politic:;;J,. g:li.r:Sg r,mi eV(1~:6a ,. 1 i t. ~ fjal.,·tjlCtl t.:i~..... y <iluOl!,5 :UEJ P:;::S?llts, t..he ne'2!cied gl'er.ftel' SOll;;a of :::tJ.?~ in the g,,.~~~r':ilE(tr~:3 fvri1:'J2G~. l'r~d8~do tl"'G cbj1i·}in,'~+.i(\n r:.f# C>~"i~~ ~"J'Io~~.-..-, -.. ~ .... , .• ;..~ .O)J .:{La exts1131v$ 'l"Ci6 of ~ll'Omlel" tmd 'crot) destru~t,l.· I".n l\"'~,-,"','·'<"!'" c·,1'e f, ,'"!y· ...; ..,..1;. . . . "'"..., "'d II;;)_]" 'Hs}J. cC'nt-!'ibuto to tho de'l.;)lof:::~3nt oJ: lililitant QPp~tsi1.iioll ~no!!O' the . o~s "..1.., • ~ ,.. • " .... ".~. 't'th . .:;> • p ,,;;t. ';3,!v':' C:~'l POS1"!;1-":::: J._c.~n\,.ou 1.CC ~;~cn i--l.l.:n '_$ viet Gong Si11C'3

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~.;n.l ~J.l;:~5t cor.lG:!.l.nly CN!tin1.l0 to pross for incl'oasod 8id and ... ~.,~n ~cl"""':"""':~ ::,(,~,Jll!ri:; o.nv- US P<1"O~3u::es uuon him. to dclog~'GO a.ppl·oci~bly \"4~w.J.-\. ~ .~Ji1oi~e r.u\ib:c-iJGY to his c{l.bl.!lat. :.rid TilUttn.:ry ~dvisol's or 1.0 oX'p~'1d t.hl ' pol):~ical b~.GO ot htG gO\Tu1.",il:"l!'j!r;j to :J.r~ sj.enific::l1'(;o::;.:tont~ Horoovol-, ",mile 131Gn

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.to. • n'.LOi,l ~1"'r' 1u.s • o.~ '1/!10 ~CrvlY3.\'.:tC:J (/.I.. I..\:) ;;~(\YJ.S·S:r3 In 't,c:) COunl.>l'Y~:tctO, f'~"i1nV 'ui11 cO~1":.:,inuQ to lil:'.5.~ri:.t\ll:. ~ closo r!?,tch OYer these ~.ctivitio3 in ,~tho ~:C.0l'C3t~> of pro·tccM..r:g th9ii; ~~utho:d;-';:,-!, at t·h:) loc2~ levol" Illom. ai"1d

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lX;l,.t.),C\1J.~1<>ly l~'1u !I'.')."! :;\leo ror,uin c:-;::t-r'6nely l"!1].'1.1.(':bnt to r.ccop·c possiblG U3 Pl~oposnJ..s cU.:root3d tom~.'d £U!'tho:r L":rG~&e..-..t!oll of tho E;"I.iX'~~t:lgic }1...~.In10~1i ." .,".... ,. ., t d '\.. t ,- 13 an'. sy~:rti(jr.!.:nj:l.c po.m.).J.Co.:..>107.l prcgT~::;W cor CiU'OCij(:Cl 'OV~ 31):.)5 ·O.1)vlV_ -yd ru:hO):).l'lE -::'ho Pl'~3011'~ bcl~.nC3 b:;rli'!i'J~:n CI;;')h:l.siD on p1.u·oly JI1ili t:'.r:r J;lOast.'TCS t-o dO.f03t i;ho Viot C:)ng and Cl~h<1sis 0i:1 poU.tic2.1, soci~J., and ozonomic me aS1!r.' 0 f3 •

Di.cr:!. pl~ob=,:bly st.ill has smr.:} lir..gGrh~,g ~unp)"Cl.Ojl of .Iclle extent of . US confiuonco lJl ru:2d support oJ: his le~d~rship" In -tho evont ot <mother coup {!tt,,::!P'G, Dlc!Il l~(!uld G:-'.pnc·(j cid~ck and s'~~Ct!1g :n~ii'ost.:lt.ion3 of U3 _.-.'. ....•.\I ,,~H,I ......••UtL,LU ..... J,·C::;;;:'.!·U .." ,,"'., .." t>tJ~.lN./.· ( •.!!U (.\U~c.!li,;U 01.. . .:St~vJl l:1~lli.iOS~"'1t,io:ns ~s dc.mons-c:ratillg l~ck of US conficivnce"

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I'h ;,.,-:; l?lt)1"O dif.ficult no;:? t.h'?n at <!.r:y tim:) 3inco tho Cl"isi::: 5..11 Sou-t;h Viotnam. b8g.:... . ~1 ill lat,.:; 1959 to ost·!J.'.:?i;<J !'{::n;tol:V t ..~a :olo::1011t.:; th3t. ll'(llitd bo li!Ost likely '>11) }".:c>ccipttr:t:7 :? CCI~r) ::d tf:i':!p"ts' ',,1-1') }n·cilipcct3 fo~ the sU'Jcess of a Couli ifb'{;!;1111j·:;j Ox "cr!::: cffcc~GS o:r t:-:'D/"..ll au ~3,::'f;C~!1;·t. e:n ill~..i·.:n.":nDJ. st,nbiJ_it~ .2nd on .tli!l('} Ci)1ri!~iol·ins·(rt'goncy cffor'~ i ~;5~1i' D~.'(!'ing th~ P,1.:lt yu<J:J: c.Y; sv) 1 til:.... V- 01-.- . Crqr.t h',"-;('c''':''d l'>'~''<l ::>'u;lH'~r +.... "'~~'l"'+'''' ' I C"""~~ ~""'d \,,:,. <.> -U";'-L"'il.'UI,,,,')·h>, ~, -J IPfl ._u .......... uv.... v~1.'" 'i..w.1 miglrt attoi:iy".:J to do SO" Ib;,..i';:\vc~" i.he VL:;-t (4)!~g pr'c:b:lbly l:ouJ.d not b5 ab13 to ct:J.'l'Y (1;1.. t. a succossful cot;p, ['.nd "th-3 odd:3 tha'~ i"t eOlud .g~il."l ccn~ol of n s\lcc:os~fr:.l couI.),· a1thci.!gh SO:olOi"ih:J.·t bsttor 'hhzm 1::~t. ycro.: ~ &l:ppo,ur to 0

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st;rongthen t.~o p:r:;·;.:(!.· of tJ:.3 nili.t.~.r'Y 0 Th~ Od::13 a1)?~:U' .:'.~out. oves: botl·rlJon lrlC~t by' 0:> Ii'" H:;-'r'v l)~f P":'voidtHl'G Tho. m ..th .u,. ... .. y J\Tl)~'~ _ . .Ci;' ... .,; Vtcc , . th,!) a gO ~''';''7':;''''1\.l,in tho l~ttCl!:' c~z·), p1::tying ~~ m~jol· if not '(,h:) prc~lor.lim_l.lt r010 bshi~d tho SCOYr:w.. 0:.1 th~ O:lO h.:md.1 t,h; ldJJ:t.Xl'Y i!1i.eM, (;OnCl12do that a milit".I'y..l~d· goV~;).:·l!mo~lt vJo'Lltd bo b:ytt01: .nhlc to l;l2.int~iil ll!2'tioH:D. ll.'lU;y and int$rn~~l poli.ti.c:\J. cohin:icn .·):!d, r:;Dr.'':~ ir:tport~~r\ily, to cO!ldt1Ct a. d~terr.lil1od and cf"flJc·ti vv (;;'>.T;;;).~igl1 :.:.g.:;:UK:,G t,h,:> Vio'~ Cong 0:.1, tho other hwd, thcrj laiglrt com.:ludo -C,;l::."G Tho, liho ~.rJ?3."('ontly h'13 b:,cn OIl good terI:.lS '-li.th soma 01' th~ pros:.mt t.~p mjJj:0:~:(,y loaders, j·:o'l.'J.c1 n~rii dis.lg!'oo •• 'h r.l~::l1:Cl:::' 01n ., •• , " ;O.[;.llv "'., oX. ~ga ........ ; ~.~ t"'u'" ITi ~Gh.1·~ht1lr Vl.01~S CI~l v.3 Cc.'nm.1.'3·C,:Utg "\i;1:) .;;... • '" Ccrr:nmnists fu!d th,')."\i his c011:r~U~uHol;!,'..1 t:;·ncc0;3~).011 !·;o~.lld lcg~izo i:.he cba!.!go in go,:n)r':t~:321t; an.d p03sibly aV-:\l.,·t ~_ S'J~j.Ollfi pOU0l' strugglo,. (JiltJ,1oueh j)j.(!~i.tf~ bl'o·th'3l's, nm ('.ad C~m3 'HouJ,d p?.'{)b::-.hly a.lso bo l'cT:10\rcd by a coup, if I,10nl 113ft t.n:) tCO).18 £"01' otlwr roo.son.:; hio b:;:'oth~):rs !i1ig~lt ~,.~~

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to 1;6t~rJl I'.:I~1 poli:l:.ic.!?J. pO;:'~~l''')

Xn :m.y

OV'$nti,

a gO~lo:eEr.~nt led

by th:) milit~'_17, l~' Tho; 0:--; by i;!.iW ot.h::::t~ ci vili~1 ap~)x'o'lod by tha Inil;. t~.f lJould pl'ob~'!.Jly m.:>_iilt~d.u So·~!th Vi,{yGn2.;u's pro-US ol~iollt.<:'.tion ..

l"estl'/j 1

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t.ha lW'1Ci.'l]·:i!3n"l;~ s co'tL'ltt:r·in~1.1.:rgOT!CY eil'ol'ts h.:>.d :-.c:hiovod ltou...ld pl'obc:~bly b~ lk:lt:Jd ~d possibly roy(;:rsed, at 1~::;.5t fo!' a "vin:'J" Hol'o()vc}", t..lla COll..'fu.sio::\ ;?~ld STIf3pic ion tt'tt'!ll'!d:Lng t.n:) d5.s:cr:p"tiJ.on 110tud p::.'ovido the not,

Cong gu.o~~:rl1.1as tm OPpO:rtllf'lit.y to strc~1.:;'thon 'l::h:::1l" pJsi.tioll )..11 th':) cou:ntry-

sida and e:i,jtzck SO::!.3 inst-:,J.l","t,ions L"1 l~'::,gt) iOl'CO, but, th')y ",ouJ.d prob.::bly fail if 'they ~;:(,t0r,!ptod to s8izo conta.'ol of tho gO\--Ol'l1."l!.Jll-G o


1964 FEB [5

11 07

NUJ';\i3~R

53-63

.' (Supcrsocbs NIE 14.3/53-61)

Subm?11iuJ by the .'

DIRECTO~

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred it: by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE .L\s indica:,::. .., o'(crf::af

17 APRIL 1963

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PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIET1\]AJ\A

'... 'THE, PROBLEM

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, To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam) with. special emphasis upon the mmtary and political factors most likely to affect the count~rinsurgency e f f o r t . > .o..

. ,CONCLUSIONS

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A. We believe that Communist p~qgl:.~~!5 has been blU1~t~d and. ' .that the situation is improvi~g, Stre"ngthened South Vietnamese ' capabilities and effectiv;;;'0.csS, and particularly VS involVement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indicat'ions tha-Cthe Communists. have been grievously hurt, (Pc,ras, 27-28) . . B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of , attrition, hoping for some break' in the situation which will lead victory. They evidently p.ope that a combinat'ion of'lnilitary pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable' circumstances either' for delivering a coup de grace or for a po-, litical settlement which 路~vm t;nable them to continue the struggie 9n more favorable ter:1K;. -rYe believe it unlikely, especially in . view of the open US corc.mitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce . ;. acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south in an effort to win ~ quick victory_ (Paras, 29-31) ,

to

'C. Assuming no gr~at i.nc~路ease in extei'nal support' to the Viet

':'. Cong, changes and improvements which have 'occurred during' ' the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contaip.~d militarily and that further progress c~m be made in expanding '~e ai'ea of government control and ili creating greateJ.路 security . in the countryside. Ho\vevcr. 'we do not believe that it is pos~ .

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... '. sible at this time to project the future course" of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have .yet to be fou~ht and 'no quick and easy end to the ,val' is in sight. Despite South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains ~~agil~" (Par~. 32) " "D. rievelopmel~ts during the last year or two also show s~me ' promise of resolving the p~li~~c~~,..2~~~~.1:.1~~~~~~,}J~~t!C~~!.!L!.h:.~~ .' 1 of insecurity in the countryside l upon which the insurgency路 . "' ~~~ f~cl~ ---i-Io\vever,' the-'govermnellt;s cai;a~ity elnbark i.1P0l1~ the broader measures required to translate military success into lasting political stability is q~estio!1able. (Paras. 33-35)

'to'


. THE, WHITE HOUSE I

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WASH"NGTON . . •

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NATION~...L SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO: 249 " . .

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:The Secr~tary of State '.. . ::. <. . The'Secretary of Def'ens.e/ . . . .. '.'. .:".{ :'. ~he Director, Central Intelligence Agency ...~. The Chairm~n, Joint Chiefs ot S t a f f ' . ". .

- ..' TO: ~ ': " .. •

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'.' June 25,' " 1963 .

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SUBJECT: Laos Planning

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1. At a meeting on ,Ju..."e 19, 1963 the' President cons~dered the . Memol"2.r.dum addressed tv hini ::"vfu tl~~ 'Departmcl'it" Q£'State dated.' June 17, 1963 (IlMemorandumiJ). . . ...... : . . ..' •

of

. 2. The President approved Ph~se 1 th.e plan outlined in the Memo- . randum' and authorized that thesteps outlined therein might be taken . at such. tim.e and ill. such ~anner as the' appropriate ofiicials concerne:d'" 'h~di' .. %Illg .. I. recl..

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The Pres-ide~t directed the Departmen.t ~f State to' consult with the ~ren.ch and British before initiating any action u ...,.der . the Memorandum.' He wished to obtain ~heir suggestions' for Cl:ction in Laos in .light of th~ deteriorating situation there. . ~ '. . . . . "1 '3.

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.. ', 4.. The Presid~nt 'approved Phase ..2 'of the Memorandum for planning purpos·es. but directed ~hat none' Gle ~te.fJ~ ·vi.ltlir~ed iu Ph;::.cc 2 be'i .' put into final execution until after further eo'nsultation with him. .' j ' •.•.

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1 ··5. The President directed that the steps described in Phase 3 or .tr 'e Memo:-andtun be further refined and reviewed;' and' he asked that.th,,! . 'question be e>..-plcred Vlhe~her ad.C!itional U~ S.· action,s ~hould.be take~. in Laos before any action, be direct.ed against North Vietnam: ." . ;. ".~-

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!ur:l.i~hed:

Governo:, Harriman .' Genera111cKee Mr. Colby general Clay:

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DEPARTMEi-..'T OF SfATE

FOR TEE RECORD

suar:::c-r:

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Situatioo in South Viel-l:ram

.. The President Mr. Ball M.r. Harriman Mr. }'[~G~or<Je Blmdy Mr. Inlsma.:.'1 . Mr. Forrestal

p.:mfCIPAMTS:

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The President was briefed O!l deve1opm~nts in Indonesia, LaGs and Viet-Name The pO:'ticn en Viet-:Nam follows: .

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A joint agr~t::aent was sii)led o~ June 16 in whjdl the GOVC;1'11..1l1ent r.1d . the Buc:dhist3 f five c!:?ma7J.Gs. Th~ Budcihists and tile Goverill11':1~t then worked .. ;.! ..t . . . , l .. on I.(!e ~un,~r"-i. arr2.!l:]~menl.s lor tos;el.!l;r

....

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Lilt: OO!lZ3 WIlO o!.u·neu

so that incidents could be avoided. Tne funeral ca-:!le oli without trouble/ I

Si!lce tilen there hav~ b~en rumm.'s cir~ulnting in SCi.i;On. that the: Goveril- . Inent does no: intend ~ liva u;; to tIla a·Jre~rnent. Thes~ rumol."S wer~ q!~Cti credence by a.'"l .articl~ ap;,?caring in t.~e Eng'1ish 12.:l~ua;a "'rices!! of vi t-N~m; : VtrhiC!l is d,Jnlinatec! by tile I,nl!.l.'3. The al. t!c!e cO!ltaL."1~d a vall9d at~ck. on t.'1e us and on the Buddhists. Th~re was a. si.vJ~estion that the Monk who burnad himself to CCC\.t~l was d:.-uc:;::ed and a orovocatlve challenGe to the Buddhis :; that• if no fU!·t.~er ~emonstl.-atic!lS occurred 0;:1 July 2, tillS Wt;uld amount to an . admission bv th~ B1.~C:@ists til3.t they, were satiziiec with the Govcrn::le..,:t's •• (,.,...' .. '"' ' • .... ..' t· .' .. "'. -' . t' . • acuo::!.. .1 1.~a i'"'rCSIC:eI!", L7J.le;:I.~c:. CiU~S lOllS on I.ne PCSS!OlULj" OI QIUg;1..T10', C Willen lu'o Eilsrno.n replied t1.P.t rdi·~ious fervor 't'12.S 2...'1 z.dec:uate e:~~la.na.tion. ) .

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At this !?ol.'1t'there 't=!2.S a discussion of t.~~ possibility' of cetting rid'of the 1-ilitls in '\.1111i:=11 the c~mbi'!"l:;cl j1.!d:~·:ncnt \'!as that it \:Iould not be pOSSible.,

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-2COIltL~ing the bri~fi~g,

1ft. Iiilsman said that the Buddhists cc.ntained an activist cler'1en.t trhich ll.:."1doubtedly fa;:,Jored fu~rcasing demands as well 9.$ charnin:-r tIle Govel'mnel1t \"lith dr(l::;"(j!!.~! its f:;8t. There was thl;S an el~~ant of truth in Diem J~i vie~ that tile Buddhists might push tt':.eir demands so far as' to f ·nlS ' '·'1' "·1 ma.::e l~ In.eVltao~c. ...

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DurL'rlg thesg events tha US had put c::tremely haav! pressur~ on Dier.a to taka politiccl a~tl~ns. l"'!Ost recontly we had l!r;"ed Dicr.J to 1'Jakc a slx~ech which ·wi.,uld 11lcluGc Ct.'ll10ll1Cements that he intended to meet with Bu.ddhist .' leaders., cermit Bu~:hi5t charylail1s ill the a!'mv ~nd so on. If Die:L.'1 did !lot L1f'.ke

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. suc.h a speedl ,m.d tfu:re Ti!~re iurtl1Gr demon.sL1·atlons~ the US t',ould be c0mpelled •DubHclv _ to disnisocl!lte its~lf• from the GVn's Buddhist Dolic"lT. _ J 1.Jir. Hi1 srnan renorted that Diem~d r~ceiv0d this aryproa~h with ijj!'lat sect-fled to b,e excessive politeness but had said 11e w;uld consider n1:.I\in:] such , .. s!,cech. ""c.!r

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attempts oVer the n~t fcur mont.:.'!s. be successful is irG~ssiole to say.

·11 b·e coup. l)l.em ow t'nere \'7L, or not ~ny or these att~mpts' win

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Vlhel~er

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:Mr. Hilsm!!n said that evaryone a.}reed ~"1a.t the chances of chaos ill the Vl2ke. of c. cou.p ase considerc,bly less thEm they w:=rG a year ~.;~o. .An

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forces a.nd the Viet Cong has been pursued' t,1l"oughcut lie Buddhist crisis i . t n0licecl} ,.... 1e ,,..,w.. \VlLnOU _~-\lp.. i

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At this pOi~A. i.:ir. Forrestal reported on G2nercl. Krulak's Vi0i.7S tl!a.t, even if th• e1S .., .... .:\ - \7er~ ... C!:3..0:: ... in -~!'Il ...... '":0'1 .. I. l!te militf~ry units L~ t.~e field would conUml; to ccr.iront the Comrafu'tists. -~

1. :h". . lTilsmEn went iJn to s~.y thatJ..7~bassador l{oltina believes tll2.t the· most li!{ely result of a cca:) at~em~t that SU-:ce$d~d in killu10 Diem ucs civil ,\-ia!". _ _ J L'll~at he Li.ou:.:ht .civil wa: was 1&".· Hilsl::12.n disa(1r~d wiL~ this view slk:htl~,. not the most lU:ely result. but that it.w·as cer~airly a possible reSult• ~

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c!isustrously low point i!l rdc!tions between Diem ~.nd cttrsclv~s that exlstod ~:hen 1~2!l~as!;().dor Nolt~g took over. 1-.:!r. Hilsmr:.!l pointed out the ps~son.~.l . sacrific~3 that Amo2SSado!' Holting- nud been forced to make during this . • d I ~ t}·t ;'1. t ~., 1 • b • t . d perlO' I 2.!lCl .1S ';;reSlU011 S2.!Cl 1.!1a ne !lOp~C! a way cell.a a Iouna o,COmmC!l !fmbass~dor U0ltL."'lq publicly ~iJ as to m~l{~ clear the iin~ job he had done and .. . .. . l. • t' 1- b • - - . -,:.... •. - Urlat fie 110pca a.1l ~ppro,rla;.a POSl ion ceu Cl ~ IOmlQ ...01' nll'!l In 'I'; asmn~~on . so that h~ could ~ive hi.s ~children a suitable hOl~e in the years immediately ~i.ead.· • ..l

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The President's decision was to de13~i?t-~ the authority. to cecide on the ti:rninr;. of Ambassador HoUin·:'s return to the l!ssistant SecretalY for Far ..

l!:asteri.l·j\~vail·s; that 1\mbassuQo~ Ledge should revort to Viashin::,toi'l no l~.ter.· than Jttly 15 so that he could t~.kc the CQlmlel'1l:stn·0Cl1cy Course s'iL,ultanccl.u:l1 WiUl th~ normal b:ri<~ii!ns for an ar102.Ssador: and that Ambassa.dor Leckie sl!ould arrive in SD.i:~O;l as soon as possible followi.:."lg completIoll of b.1.0 CI Course on .August H. A:,ratl:~·er;.lo:nts ~lere :made for i1rdbassac1or Nolt~"1\! to s:ae the l>.£'esident at 4:CO p. m. O!l t.1011d~.y, July 8. . • ~

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. 10 July 1963

'C!\SE fILE" COP'{ . .RETUrU-'~ TO Dl/\SC-l i

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SPECll\1.

. NATIOj~I-\L INTELUG~NCE ESTI~A/\TE

'. NUMBER 53-2-63

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Concurred in by fJUl As

indica~ed

oveifaaf

10 JUL'C1963

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD. .'

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TI-IE Slrut\TION IN~ so~-n-I VI ETNt\N\

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SCOPE NOTE

.. ' .. IDE 53-:63, "Prospects in South Vietnam/' dated 17 April 1963 was particulatly concerned with the progress of the counterin- .': . surgency effort,' and with the military and political factors most· likely to affect t~lat effort. The primary purpose of the present SNIE is to examili.e the implications of recent developments in South Vietnaln for the stability of the country, the viapility of the . ..Diemregh~le, and its relationship • .. . with the US. CONCLUSIONS A. The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnanl has highlighted and intensified a widespread and longstanding dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and its style of goyermnent. If-as is likely-" Diem f~ils to carry out truly and promptly the commitments he '.' has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chances of a coup or assassination attempts against him will become better than even.. (Paras. 4/ 14) . , .

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B. The Dienl regime's underlying uneasinesS' about the extent of the US involvement in South Vietnam has been sharpened by the Buddhist affair and the firm line ~akel1 by the US. This attitude will aL"l1ost certainly pel'~isL and further pi'i;S3urc to ' . the.US. presence. in the country is likely.' (Paras. 10-12). .. reduce " . C. Thus far, the Buddhist issue has not been effectively ploited by the Communists, nor does it appear to have had any " appreciable effect on the counterinsurgency effort. We do not ... . think Diem is likely to be overthrown' by a Communist coup.. , Nor do we think the Communists would necessarily profit if he· .. were overthrown by some combination of his non-Communist' ..• opponents. A non-Communist successor regime might be. ini- . tially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continiled . . stlppor~ from the US, could provide reasonably effective leader-, ship for the government and the war effort. (Paras. 7, 15-17) : ...

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DISCUSSION

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'1. INTRODUCTION ... . '" . . 1..The two chief problems which have faced the Government of South" ' Vietnam (GVN) since its birth ill 1954 have been: (a) to forge the ~ institutions and loyalties necessary to Vietnam's survival as an, iIide- " pendent nation, and (b) to counter the menace Qf Hanoi's subversive', , . ruid aggressive designs-pursued since 1960 by a campaign of, wide- ' spread guerrilla warfare. In attempting to cope with these problems, , the GVN has been hampered by its lack of confidence in and its inability' ,to engage the understanding and support of a considerable portion of · the Vietn~mese people-including large segments of the educated classes and Lhe peasantry. In recent weeks these inadequacies and tensions in the South Vietnamese body politic have been fUl'the~ revealed. ' , and intensified. .. '

II. THE' BUDDHIST AFFAIR

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2. President Diem, his family, and a lal~ge proportion of the top Jeaders of the regime are ,Roman Catholics, in a population that is 70. .", :to 80 percent Buddhist. The regime has clearly accorded preferential . treatment to Catholics in its employment practices and has favored the, '.' Catholic Church. But there have been no legal restrIctions on religious freedom and. untU recently, most Buddhists appeared passive in their, :. response the privileged institutional position occupied by tQe Catholic .' , Church. There have, however. been various administrative discrimi- ,". nations against the Buddhists, though these may ~ave resulted as' much '.<' . from thoughtlessness or misplaced zeal qn the p:u't of minor officials .. ' . as from conscious GVN policy_ These have obviously created an under:' ., current of resentment, as is evidenced by the extent and intensity of the " recent outbreaks.

to

3. In. April 1963, the GVN ordered its pl:ovincial officials to enforce '. a longstanding but gel1ei'ally ignored edict regulating the public display,': '. , of religious flags. AJ5 it happened, this order was issued just prior to . Buddha's birthday (8 May). a major Buddhist festival, arid just after · Papal flags had been prominently flown during a series of officially "encouraged celcb{ations commemorating the 25th anniversary of the·.···· ordinatJon of Ngo dinh Thuc. Diem's brothel'r the Archbishop of Hue. A protest demonstration developed in Hue on 8 May, which \Vas dispersed by fire from a Civil Guard unit. In the ensuing melee . ~' several persons. were killed, ~cluding some children.. 1-'he 'GVN has " ,blamed the deaths 011 Viet Cong terrorists despite evidence to the ,,' · contl·ary•. and its subsequent stiff·necked handling of this incid~nt·: and its aftermath has sparked a national ~dsis, The Buddhists, hith- . 'i

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• erto disorganized and nonprotcsting. have shown" considerable cohesion and force-enough to elicit a set of "compromise" agreements -from President Diem on 16 June. Moreovcr, the fact that" the Buddhist leaders have been able to challcnge th~ government openly without evoking serious government retaliation has presumably given them . conSiderable' confldence. . _. . t

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·4. For the moment, the Buddhist movement remains under the effcc- .. tive control of moderate bonzes who have refused to accept support from or countenance cooperation with any of Diem's political' . opponents. Communist or non-Communist. and appear to be trying to Insure that the Buddhists live up to their pait of the bargain~ This " leadersl1ip gave the GVN a period of grace (which expired about the end Qf June) in whieh to sliow that it was mo~ing in good faith to carry ou~ its ulldC:l"takings. failing which protests Vlould resume, So far. there have been no furthm' demonstrations. but the Buddhist leadership

is clearly restive.

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5. Despite Buddhist l'estl'aint in the political exploitation of the affair, it has obvious political overtones. It has - apparently aroused widespread popuiar indignation and could well become a focal point of general disaffection with the Diem government. It provides an issue' on which most of Diem's non-Communist opponents (even -including . som~ Catholics) can.find common ground of agreement. There is con'siderablc evidence that the issue itself and. even more, the Diem family's . handling of it to date has occasioned restiveness at virtually all levels of the GVN's military and civil establishments. both of whose lower and middle echelons are largely staffed by Buddhists. In some cases, . civil sel'Vants seem to have ignored or. tempered GVN instructions, sl1pel'iors have on occasion evadea their aSSigned task 'Ofpl'opoullding' the official GVN line to their subordinates, and information on impending government actions has obviously leaked to Buddhist leaders. . In ·any case, recent developments are causing many aVN oHicials to re- ~ examine theirrelatlons with and the Hmitsof their loyalty to the Diem. . regi.me;· there is accumulating evidence of serious disaffection and coup plotting in high military and civilian circles, . 6. The Buddhist affair appears to have given corisiderabl~ heal't to the various non-Communist political opposition splinter groups in and .' out of South Vietnam. Tl}ere also appears to be a growing feeling' ,among former supporters of the regime that Diem's position may have : been pel'mancntly and dangerously impaired. Thus far, however, we ., have no evidence that the diverse opposition groups have been able j' to form hew or effective alliances with one another', ! 7., The' Buddhist issue would appear t"o be an obvious \yindfall fbf .. : the Communists~ but so far there is no evidence that ~hey have been.

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able to exploit it. effectively. The{ rnay have penetrated the Buddhist clergy to some extcnt, but arc not presently exerting any discernible 'influcnce, despite the suggestions to the contrary in GVN pronouncements. To date tlie Buddhist crisis does not al)pear to have had any appreciable efiect on the continuing counterinsurgency effort, though the mora1e. and efficiency of the GVN's military and civil forces are ' ~~cly to be impaired if the issue is p r o l o n g e d . , 8. The Buddhist crisis has also hurt the GVN internationally, with potentially important effects upon the future success of US policy. towards southeast Asia. Protests are growing in other predominantly ," • Buddhist' countries, with the implication that US action could help ~ resolve the crisis. Cambodia and Ceylon have made l'epresenbtions , to the UN am! more 'may -be forthcoming. In other countries, includ- . ing the US, the crisis has given new stimulus to criticism .of US policy on the grounds that the US is supporting an oppressive and unrepl'e;' sentative regime. 9. The future co~rsc of the Buddhist aff~ir will be largely detel1uillCd by the GVN's actions in the near term. It is likely that the issues' reccntly raised can be resolved if the GVN executes its portion of the negotiated bargain. However, politically ,sophisticated segments of South Vietnamese society, Buddhists included, are mindful of D~em's · past practice of often using negotiations as a stall for time and of. making promises in order to weather an immediate crisis. The real danger ill the present situation is that Diem niay be tempted to employ such tactics wliich have served him well in the past but could prove disastrous if essayed this time. If demonstrations should be l'esumed, they would probably assume an increasingly political cast, and less- . ~oderate Buddhist leadership would be likely to come to the fOl·e. Public: order would be threatened. In particular, we cannot be sure . how various al'my or pOlice units would react if ordered to fire on demon- • stratiol1s headed by Buddliist bonzes.

III. THE ::FfECT OF RECENT DEVElOPMENTS ON US·GVN RELATIONS '10. The GVN has always shown some 'concern over thc'implications~·;..,

of US involvement in South Vietnamese afIairs and from time to. time

has felt moved to restrict US activities and presence in South Vietnam. · This attitudc springs partly from legitimate. if hypersensitive, COnCel'll " for ~he appearance as well as the fact of Vietnam's reccntly acquired sovereignty_ To a considerable degree, however, it springs irom the Diem government's suspicion of US intentions tow2.rd it, and from its · belief that the extensive US pr~:sence is setting in motion political forces which could eventually threaten Diem's political primacy. .

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11. The Buddhist affairs erupted at one of these periods of GVN sensitivity, "and the strain has been aggravated ?y subsequent events, The·

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GVN's initial hal;dling of the issue gave the'US 'ground [or serious embarrassment and concern which, in turn, produced a succession of !Ol'Ceful US demarches. '1'he Diem family has, bitterly re&el1ted these US 8.ctiollS and may well fccl that the Buddhist protests were, at least indirectly due to the US presence. Undel:the cir~umstancesJ fUl'ther pr~· . . sux:e ~o ~'educc that presence is likely. '. ' ,

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A key role in this regard will be played by Diem's brother, Ngo dinh Nhu. He has always been Diem's chicf political'lieutenant, but the years since 1954 have witnessed a steady accretion of 1:.TI1u's pcrsoilal power and authority-an accretion due partly to CirC,l.lIllstance and Pl'imarilyto deliberate effort 011 Nhu's part. Nhu has poEtical ambitioll$ , of his own and almost certainly envisages himself as his brother's successor. For a vaHety .of l'easons, Nhu has long privately viewed the : .US with some hostility and suspicion. American criticism of the GVN, bas especially initated Nhu, for he is aware that he and his wife are often its primary targets. Above aU, Nhu almost certainly doubts whether the support which the US has given to his brother would be transfel'l'ecl to him. ' ,

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13. In the negotiations with the Buddhists. Nhu urged his brother to take a firm line and is, by his o\vnstatement. wholly out of sympathY' . with the concessions made. On the basis of past performance, \\~ think it unlikely that he will help to implement the settlement; his influence . on, Diem will be rather in the direction of delaying and hedging 011 commitments, a tendency to which Diem himself is already disposed. . This. will be the more likely since !iot only the Nhus and Diem. but ' also llis brothers Archbishop Thttc and Ngo dinh Can, the political boss .1 of the centl'al provinces, obviously continue to doubt the legitimacy of l Buddhist complaints and to underestimate the intenSity of the Cl"i3!s. I-.. •

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IV. THE OUTLOOK

14. If the Diem government moves effectively to fu~r-n its 16 June t, commitments,much of the resentment aroused by the Buddhist can·' . troversy i:Ould be allayed. However, even jf relations between the GVN ! and the Buddhists are smoothed over, the general discontent with tnt . , Diem regime which the crisis has exacerbated and brought to the fore: is likely to persist. FurtherJ if-as is probable-the regime is dilatory.; . inept. a;nd insincere in handling Buddhist matters, there will probably'· be renewfd demonstrations, and South' Vietnam will probably remail:. in 'a stale of domestic political 'tension. Under these circumstances,:'" the chances of a non-Communist assassination or coup attempt against, Diem wilf be better than even. We cannot e."'\c1ude the· possibility an attC!Dpted Communist coup, but a Communist attempt will hav~· . appreciably less likelihood of success so long as tne majority of the . government's opponents ,and critics r~main-as they ar~ now-alel'~ to the Communist peril. .

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15. Thc chances of a non-Communist coup-and of its success-would becoillc greatcr in the event rencwed GVN/Buddhist confrontation shollld lead to largc-scalc' demonstrations in Saigolf. More or l{:ss pl'olo~~ed riot and general disorder would probably result-·;:ith the security forces . confused over which side .to support. Under· such circumstances, a sIllalI group, particularly one ,vith prior contingency' plans for such an eventuality, might prove able to topplc the government. Conversely, a continued or resumed truce between thc GVN and thc Buddhists would serve to reduce the likelihood of such an oycrthrow. .. .

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16. Any attempt to remove Diem will almost certainly be directed against Nhu as well, but. should Nhu survh'e Diem, we are virtually certain that he would attempt to gain power-in the first instance prob-' ably by manipulating the constitutional m·achil1ery. We do not believe that Nhu's bid would succeed, despite the personal political base he has sought to build through the Republican Youth (of wllich he is the. overt, uniformed head). the strategic hamlet program (whose directing Intel'ministerial Committee he chairs) J and in' tIle al1ny. He and his wife have become too much the living symbols of all that is disliked in. the present regime for Nhu's personal political power to long outlive his brother. . There might be a struggle with no little violence1 but enough of the army would almost certainly move to take charge of the situation• . either rallying behind thc constitutional successor to install Vice President Tho or backing another non-Comnlunist.civilleader or a military . junta. .

...•

i7. A non-Communist successor regime might prove no more effective than Diem in fighting the Viet Cong; indeed at "least initially it might.

well prove considerably less cffective, and the counteripsu~gel1cy effort would probably be temporarily. disrupted. However, there is a reasonably large pool of under-utilized but experienced and trained manpower not onlywithill the mmtary and civilian sectors of the present government but also, to some extent, outside. The:se elements, given continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective leadership for t~e g~vernmell~ an~ the war effo~·t. •


STATE 243

REF! '-c1i.s·-265"·:'--TAB"'E=<·-~·state 316; 320 & 329 TAB B

STATE TO LODGE

It is now clear that whether military proposed martial law or whether ~~u tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its imposition to smash pagodas with police and Tung's Special Forces loyal to him, thus placing 'onus on military in eyes of world and Vietnamese people. Also clear that Nhu has maneuvered "himself into commanding. position.

us

C-()vel'Imlent cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu· s Diem. must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and ~eplace them. with best military and political personalities available. hands.

If, in spite itt all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved. We now believe immediate action must be taken to prevent Nhu -from 'consolidating Dis position further. Therefore, unless you-in consultation with Harkins pereeive overriding objections you are authorized to proceed along follow~ng lines: (1)

First, we must press on appropriate levels of GW following line: (a) USG cannot accept actio~s against Buddhists taken by miu and his collaborators under eover martial law. (b) Pro~ dramatic actions redress situation must be taken, including repeal of decree 10, release of arrested monks, " nuns" etc. . _ (2) We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVNmilitarily and economically unless above steps are ~~en immediately which we recognize requires removal of lraus from the scene. Ve wish give Diem reasonable opportU+'1ity to remove Nhus, but it he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer suppOrt Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown_ central governmeIIt mechanism.-

(3) We recognize tha"necessityof removing taint on military for pagoda raids and placing blame squarely on Jiliu. You are authorized to have such statements mad.; in Saigop as you consider desirable to achieve this objective. We are prepared to take same line here and to have Voice of America make " statement along lines contained in next numbered telegram whenever you givethe word, .preferahly as soon as possible. Concurrently, nth above, Ambassador and country team should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might" bring about Diem I s replacement if this should become necessary,; Assume you ~1l consult with General Harkins re any precautions necessary protect American personnel during crisis period._ You will understand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed ,instructions as to how this operation should proceed, but you will also know . .. . we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to 'achieve our objectives.

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Needless to say we have held knowledge of this' telegram to 'mininiatrf' essential people and assume you will take similar precautions to prevent

premature leaks.

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STATE 272

(RF.F:

Saigon 375-- TAB B)

STATE TO LODGE AND HARKINS

路1. Highest level meeting noon today reviewed your 375 and reaffirmed basic course. Specific decisions follow: 2. In response to your recommendation, General Harkins is hereby authorized to repeat to such Generals as you indicate the messages previouslY transmitted by CAS officers. He should stress that the USG supports the movement to eliminate the Nhus from the government, but' that before, arriving at specific understandings with-the C-enerals, General Harkins must know who are involved, resources available to them and overall plan for coup. The' USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S armed forces. Harkins should state that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup 'Planners and to review plans, but will not engage . ' .. directly in jOint coup-planning. . , . '. ' 0

. 3. Question of last approach' to Diem remains undecided and separate personal' message from Secretary to you develops our concern and asks your comment.路

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4. On movement of U.S. forces, we -do not expect to make a.ny annou.ncementor - leak at present and believe that any later decision, to public'ize' such movements should be closely connected to developing events on your side. We cannot of course prevent unauthorized disclosures' or' speculation, but we will in any event knock down any reports of evacuation., ' 5. You are hereby authorized to announce' suspension of aid through Diem government at a time and under conditions of your choice. In deciding ,upon' the use of this authority, you should consider importance of timing and ' managing announcement so as to minimize appearance of collusion with Generals and also to minimize danger of unpredictable and disruptive reaction by existing government. We also assume that you will not in fact use this authority unless you think it essential, and we see it as 'possible that Harkins' approach a.nd increasing process of cooperation may provide assurance Generals desire. Our own view is that it will be best to hold this authority for use in close conjunction wjth coup, and not for. present encouragement of Generals, but decision is yours. ' .....: .

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- (BEF: Saigon 375 - TAB B)

29 Aug 1963

STATE TO LODGE

Deeply appreciate your 375 which was a most helpful clarification. We 'fully understand enormous stakes at issue and the heavy responsibilities Which you and Harkins will be carrying in the days ahead and we want to do everything possible from our end to help. . ' . PurPose of this message is to explore further question of possible attempt to separate Diem and the Nhus. In your telegram you appear to treat Diem and the Nhus as a single package whereas we had indicated earlier to the Generals ,:, that if the Nhus were removed the question of retaining Diem would be up to them. My own personal assessment is (and this is not an instruction) that .. the Nhus are by all odds the greater part of the problem in Vietnam, internally, internationally and for American public opi.nfon. Perhaps it is inconceivable that the Nhus could be removed without taking Diem with them or without Diem's abandoning his post. In any event, I would appreciate your comment on whether any distinction can or should be drawn as between Diem and Counsellor and ,Madame Nhu. The only point on which you and General Harkins have different views路 is' whether an attempt should be made with Diem to eliminate the Nhus and presumably路 take other steps to consolidate the country behind a winning effort against the Viet Cong. My own hunch, based in part on the report of Kattenburg's :' conversations with Diem'is that such an approach could not succeed if it- were .. cast purely in terms of persuasion. Unless such a talk included a real sanction; such as a threatened withdra~Tal of our support,. it is unlikely that it would be taken compietely seriously by a man who may feel that we are inescapably committed to an anti-Communist Vietnam. But if a sanction were used in such a conversation, there would be a high risk that this would be taken by Diem as a Sign that action against him and the Naus was imminent and he might as a minimum move against the Generals or even take some quite fantastic action such as calling on North Vietnam for assistance in eXpelling the Americans. It occurs to me, therefore, that if such an approach were to be made it might properlya1vait the time when others were ready to move immediately to路. constitute a new government.. I f this be so, the question then arises as to whether an approach to insist lIpon th: expulsion of the Nhus路 should come .from .Americans rather than from the Generals themselves.' This might be the means by which the Generals could indicate that they were prepared to distinguish . between Diem and the Naus. In any event, were the Generals to take this :. action it would tend to protect succeeding Vietnam administrations from the. charge of being wholly American puppets subjected to Whatever. anti-American sentiment is inheren.t in so complex a situation.

'.~

I would be glad to have your further thoughts on these points as w!Ul as . your views on whether further talks with Diem are contemplated to cQntinue your opening discussions with him. You will have 'received formal instructions on other matters through other messages. Good luck. . .

539


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tha StatQ D\}pa.rttt:er~t. 110iJ .... 1963; ~ubjcct: "Vietnam ,

'The Vic:~ Presid~'nt Secreta ~y RSlSk Socr~tary McNamara Mr. GUpatric" ~lr. Bundy Gent.:Tal Taylor ! . f-,1-r. MIl~%,ow

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1. Sccrot"ry Rusk ~tatcd thc:lt. in Ms ju(18~r~'lent. \'70 wt:re b21~k to wh"re ,'Ute were ab9ut Vi cdntfDd:~y of lURt weet-c, :md thh: c;c.u'c~ hin~ to go back to the ori~inal problem ano 2~k what' in the situation l~d us to thilUt \';fall of n coup_ r{uHng out hc.tro::d of tIle Nhu.s. he 'oaid. tbere would a~pea2' to 08 t~lre9 t~lin;l~: ,i I,

2. Tho thtngs th~i: U",e NhtlS had don~ or suppor~Il~~ whi~~ tcndt)d to upset"the GVN ir,tul'n4111y. ' '. '.

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h. The things that Lhey had dono which l:~d .an ad~erG:.l e:c. tcrnd cf!ect. ' ;.

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:)sl;od ii we :lhcald not pick \1!> ,l· r..'Abtissador, " LOt"lBC'G ~flggcstlon lil ~iQ messaze o! today (~~tbon "391) nod dct~!'~:. ' mblc what !1t.P'p9 a1'e ri!~lntred to re-gi:"d llcHd<1rit1 in SOl,,!h Vj.ct.a~m .' £iuch ttW bnp~ovemcnt in co..~d.i.t.i(}na concerllin;z otur.!!'!nto tmd l)ud- " '. dhh~ts and the p065lbtc :1c~:>rt\lre.:){ M:\Qamc Nl&~l •.. H<? G:d.t~ thc,t ""0' r.h~ul,l d.::tc:,ml~O' whht at1d\t\ona,1 IO'2;U;U:,"s ai-a nt':.~~~d 10 -iraprove •

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the international situation - such as problems affecting Cambodia and to improve the Vietnamese position wherein public opinion is concerned. He then said that he is reluctant to start off by saying now that Nhu has to go; that it is unrealistic.' .

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3.

Mr. McNamara stated that he favored the above proposals of

the Secretary of State, 't-rith one additional step - that is to establish quickly anq. firmly our line of communication between Lodge, HarJ:cins and the GVN. He pointed out that at the moment our channels of communication are essentially broken and that they should be reinstituted at all costs •

. 4. Mr.

Rusk idded that we must do our best not to permit Diem

to decapitate his military command in light of its obviously adverse effect on the prosecution or the war. At this point he asked if anyone present had any doubt in his mind but that the coup was off.

5. Mr. Kattenburg said that he had some remaining doubt; that we have not yet sent the generals a strong enough message; that .the . . BOA statement regarding the withdrawal of aid was most important, " . . but that we repudiated it too soon. He stated further that the ~oup' should take note of the fact that General Harkins did not ca:rry out .. his instructions vrith respect to communication with the generals. . Mr. Rusk interrupted Kattenburg to state that, to the contrary, he believed Harkins I conduct was exactly correct in light of the initiaJ.·· response which he received from General Kheim (they were referring to Harkins' report in MACV 1583) •

. 6. .Mr. Hilsman commented that, in his View, the generals are . not now going to move unless they are pressed by a revolt from below. In this connection Ambassador Nolting warned that in the uncoordinated Vietnamese structure anything can happen, and that while an organized successful coup is out, there might be small fl~rieg by i~~pon~;~l e dissidents at .any time. .

7. l-!r. Hilsman undertook to present four basic factors which bear directl;- on the problem confronting the U.8 now. They are, in his view: 0

a:-

The mood of the people, particularly the middle level Officers·, non-commissioned officers and middle level bureaucrats, who are most restive. Mr. McNamara interrupted to


state that he bad seen no evidence of this and General Taylor commented that he had seen none either, but 'would l:.i:.~~to see such evidence as Hilsman could produce. Mr. KattenbUrg commented that the middle level officers and bureaucrats. are uniformly critical of t~:le government, to which Mr. McNam"8.ra : commented that if this is indeed the- fact we should know about it. b. The second basic factor, as outlined by Hilsman, was'· what ef'fect will be felt on our programs 'elsewhere in Asia if", we acquiesc~ to a strong Nhu-dominated government. In this' .," connection, he reported that there is a Korea~ study now underway on just how much repression the United States will tolerate' before pulling out her aid. Mr. McNamara stated that he had' . not seen this study and would be anxious to have it. ,.

c. The third basic factor is Mr. Nhu, his personality- and his policy. HUsman recalled that Nhu has once already launched an effort aimed at withdrawal of our province advisors and" stated that he is sure he is in conversation with the French.: He gave, as supporting evidence, th~ content of an intercepted' . message, ·which Mr. Bundy asked to see. Ambassador Nolting expressed the opinion that Nhu will not make a deal with Ho Chi . Minh on Ho 1 s terms. d. The :fourth point is the matter of U..S. and· world opinion,: Hilsman stated that this problem was moving to a political and. diplomatic plane. Part of the· 'problem, he said, is the press,;. which concludes incorrectly that we have the ability to change' ._ the things in Vietnam of which they' are critical. ·To this : ..... Mr. Murrow added that this problem of' press condemnation ." " is now worldwide. .

8.

Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as' last Thursday ~t.

was the belief of Ambassador Lodge that,. it we'undertake to Iiva ~.~ . with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every ~treet corner;' .. and its transparent negotiations with puppet bonzes, we are going to .... " be ,thro'W'n out of the country in six months. He stated that at this. ::'~ juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out ' , honorably. He went on ·to say that, having been acquainted with DieD:l . for ten years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg's view that Diem' ...' will get very little support· from the military and, as time goes on, -, he will get less and less support and the. country will go steadily. ttOwn.

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9. General Taylor asked what Kattenburg meant "When he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied, that in from 'six months to a 'year" as the people see we are losing' the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave. Ambassador Nolting expressed g~neral disagreement. with Mr. Kattenburg. He said that the unfavorable activity which motivated Kattenburg~s remarks was confined to the city and, while city support, ' of Diem is doubtless less now, it is not greatly so. He said that it is improper to overlook the fact that we have done a tremendous job toward winning the Vietnam war, working with this same imperfect, annoying government. 10. Mr. Kattenburg added that there is one new factor - the population, which was in high hopes of expelling the Nhus after the VOA announcement regarding cessation of aid; now, under the heel of Nhu f s -military repression, they woulCJ. quickly lose heart. ' li. Secretary Rusk commented that Kattenburg's recital was largely"_ 'speculative; that it would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things - that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup. Mr. McNamara expressed' agreement with this view.

12. Mr •. Rusk then' said that we should present questions to Lodge '. which fall within these parameters •. He added that he believes we have good proof that we have been winning the war, particularly the contrast between the first six months of 1962 and the first six months of 1963.- " He then asked the Vice President if he had- any contribution to make. ' . 13. The Vice President stated that he agreed with Secretary Rusk's conclusions completely; that he had great reservations himself with, respect to a coup, particularly so because he had never really seen a ,

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a political vie'\<1pOint, it would be a disaster. to pullout; that we should ~top playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN, and that we should once again go about winning the war. He', , ., stated that after our communications with them are g~nuinely reestab--, lished, it may be necessary for someone to talk rough to them - . , ,'-~', perhaps General Taylor. He said further that he had been greatly, impressed with Ambassador Nolting's views and agreed with Mr. Mc..l\famara f s conclusions.


14.

General Taylor raised the question of whether we should change the disposition of the forces which had been set in motion as . a result of the crisis. It was agreed that there should be no change in the existing disposition for the time being.

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V. H. KRULAK路 Major General, USMC.


CAP 63516 mITE HOUSE TO LODGE

(REF:

Saigon 523 - TAB B) _17 September 1963

1. Highest level meeting today has approvea broad outline of an action proposals' program designed to obtain from GVN, if possible, reforms and changes in .personnel n~cessaTY to maintain support of Vietnamese and' US opinion in war against Viet Cong•. This cable reports this program and our thinking for your comment'before a final decision. Your comment requested soonest. 2. We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future; therefore,_ as your most recent messages suggest; we must.


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for the present ap?ly such pressures as are available to secure 'wha.tever ... modest improvements on the scene may be possible. - We thiIik it likely tha.t such improvements can make a difI'eren<:e, at l.east in the short run. Such a course, moreover, is consistent with more drastic effort as and when means become a.vailable, and we will be in touch on other ~hannels on this ,problem.'

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3.

We share view in your 523 that best available reinforcement to your bargaining positio~ in this interim period is clear evidence that all U.S. a.ssistance is gr~~ted only on your say-so •. Separate telegram discusses ' details of this problem, but in this message we specifically authorize you to apply any controls you think helpful for this purpose. You are authorized to delay any delivery of supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is in U.S.' interest, bearing in mind that it is not our current policy to cut off aid, entirely. In other words, we share your view that i~_will be helpful for GVN to understand that your personal approval is a necessary part of all U.S. assistance. We think it may be particularly desirable for you to use this authority in limiting or rerouting any and all forms of assistance and support which now go to or through Nhu or individuals like TUng who are a.ssociated with him. This authorization specifically includes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you are authorized to set those in,train or hold them up further in your discretion. We leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of privacy or publicity you wish to give to this process. , -

.4. Subject to your comment and amendment our own list of possible helpful action by goverIment runs as follows in approximate order of importa.11.ce: A. Clear the air -- Diem should get everyone back to work and get them to focus on winning the war. He should be broadminded and compassionate in his attitude toward those who have, for understandable reasons, , found it difficult under recent circumstances fully to support him •. A real spirit of reconciliation could work wonders on the people he leads; a punitive, harsh Or autocratic attitude could only lead to further resistance. B. Buddhists and stUdents -- Let them' out and leave them unmolested. This more than anythi~g else would demonstrate the return of a better day and the refocusing on the main job at hand, the war. C. ?ress: '.ine press should be allowed full latiiuae of expression. Diem will be criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the, domestic and foreign press at tliis time would bring praise for his leader.. ilip in due course. While tendentious reporting is irritating, suppression of news leads to much more serious trouble.',·. ' , , ;~ . D. Secret and combat police -- Confine its role to operations against the' va and abandon operations against non-Communist opposition groups , thereby indicating clearly that a period of reconciliation and political stability has returned. ' ' E. Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove targets of popula:r ' discontent. F. Elections -- These should be held, should be tree, and should' be widely observed. ' .G •. Assembly -- Assembly should be convoked soon after the elections. The government should submit Its policies to it and should receive its confidence. A.."l assembly resolution would be most useful ,for externalimage purposes. H. Party Can Lao party should not be covert,' Or semi- covert but a broad association ,of supporters engaged-in a. common, winning cause. _w


This could perhaps be best accomplished by dis~anding the party 'and starting afresh. . . I •. Repeal or .mitable amendment Decree 10. J. RehabilitaUon by ARVN of pagodas. ' K. E::;tl:!.blishruell~ of l,rinistry of Religio,us Affairs. L. Liberation of passport issuances and c'l:ll'rencY' restrictions enabling all to leal'e who wish to. . M. Acceptance of Buddhist Inquiry Mission" from World Federation to repo:r.~ true facts of situation to world. "'}¥"' . 5. You may wish to aad or subtract from the above list, but need to set _, psychological tone and image is :paramount. Diem has taken positive actions ' in past of greater or less scope than those listed, but they have had little practical political effect since they were carried out in such a way as to make them hollow' or., even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martiallaw already nominally lifted, A'S5e~bly elections scheduled,' and puppet bonzes established).

6. Specific rrrefoms" are apt to ha1fe little impact without dramatic, symbolic move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real.. As practical matter we share your view that this can best be achieved by some visible reduction in , . influence of Nhus, who are symbol to disaffected of all that they dislike in ' GVN. This we think would require Nb.us departure from Saigon and preferably Vietnam at least for extended vacation. We recognize the strongpossihility that these and other pressures may not produce this ,result, but we are convinced , that it is necessary to try 0 .

7. In Washington, in this phase, we vTOuld plan to maintain, ::, pos'b.1re of disapproval of rece.at GW actions, but we would not expect to make public' our specific requests of Diem. Your comment on public aspects of this phase is particularly needled.

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8. We note your relnctance to continue dialogue 'l'd, th Diem until you have more to say, but we continue to believe that discussions with him are at a minimum. ' an important source of intelligence and may conceivably be a means of exerting some persuasive effecl even in his present state of mind. If you believe that full control of U. S. assistance provides you with means of resuming dialogue,we hope you will do so. We ourselves can see much virtue in effort to, reason'.: even with an unreasollable man whEm he is on ?- collision course. ,We repeat i .. h"TaT.c:: - ... _ - - - , tT~"'"

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9. Meanwhile, there is increaSing concern-here with strictly military aspects of the problem, b -th in terms of actual, progress of operations and of need to,' make effective case nth COIlgress for continued prosecution of the effort •..To " . meet these needs, President has decided to send Secretary of Defense and General Taylor to Vietnam, arriving early next week. It will be emphasized here that it 'is a military mission and that all political decisions are beillg handled through you as Pr.esident's Senior Representative. " 10. We repeat that political program outlined above awaits your comment before final decision. President particularly emphasizes that it is fully open' to . your criticism and amandment. It is obviously an interm plan and further decisiop.s may ~ecome necessary very soon.

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STATE 431

18 September 1963 FROM THE PRESIDE1lT TO LODGE

I appreciate your prompt comment and I quite understand the problem you see in visit of McNamara and Taylor. At the same time my need for this visit is very great indeed, and I believe we can work out an arrangement which takes care of you:r basic concerns. Will you let me have your comment on the foilowing, as soon as possible: 1. We can make it clear here, and McNamara and Taylor can make it ,clear in Saigon to the GVN, that this visit is not designed to bring comfort to Diem. My own thought is that in any visit McNamara makes to Diem he will want to speak same home truths on the military conse~ences of the ,current difficulties, and also to make it clear that the United states Government is not open to oriental divisive tactics. 2. We-can readily set up this visit as one which" you and I have decided on together, or even one which is sent in response to your own concern about winning the war in the current situation. For example, we could announce ,-that the purpose of the mission is to consider with you the practical ways and means of C8LTTying out my announced policy that we will support activities which will further the war effort in South Vietnam and avoid supporting activities which do not. Th~ whole cast of the visit will be that of military consUltation with you on the execution of the policy which you and I have determined. ,

, 3. As our last message said, my own central concern in sending this mission is to ma.'l(e sure that my senior military advisors are equipped with a solid onthe-spot understanding of the situation, as a basis both for their participation in our councils here, and for the Administrations accounting to the Congress on this critically important contest with the Communists. Having grown up in an Ambassador's house, I amwell trained in the importance of protecting the effectiveness of the man on-the-spot, and I want to handle this particulp,r visit in a way which contributes to and does not detract from your own : responsibilities. But in the tough weeks which I see ahead, I just do not see any substitute for the ammunition I will get from an on-the-spot and au'thoritat"ive military appraisal. " ) 4. I do not think I can delay announcement of the MCl1"amara missio!l beyond Saturday, and I will be grateful for a further prompt comment on this message so that we can be firmly together on the best possible handling of the announcement and of the mission itself.

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Septer~bar 21; 1963

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,)I'.tEMOR&~DUM

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FOR THE SECRET.A.RY OF DEFENSZ ;::~:

It may be useful to pu.t on papa:.' ou~ unde;:.-stanCing of ti1.e purpose of·your visit to Sou.th Vi;;:~a:-!l.. I a:n' asI-:f:i.g you to go. 'because of my desire to r.ave tha best possibl~ on-t.~e .. SDot anvrais:al cf the mil~ta!"u'J i...~d 'Oc:.l"amilita.::y effo:i:t • defeat the Vie.: Con~. The p.:og=al-rl cevelcpcd ~tel." , Gen2rcl. Taylo~rs lnissio~ and cc:.::~i~d fc~w;;:.::c! u::tder you:: close supe:cvision. ha.s b:coug~t haa.l·ter.i~g ;~su.lts) at least until recently. The eVe4~tS in South Vie-::nam since May have :l0\-:1 !"aise~ serious questions both a~~ut ihe p:-esent p!"ospects fOl- success against the Viet Gong " a

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t.1.e country. !t is in this con~ext t'ha-;: ! n.ow n~ed. ycur' a'O"Orcisal of ,:he situation. If the -orc-z:o..osls in you~ .... . judsment is not h0geful~ I would like yo-.:.:: views on w11at e '" b~ ..."._v ;.,~ So''''''!., - se G"v"'''''''''''''' .... -.,#"" \;; ~--:-~"" ... ""'y "" \,-v.. V:~ -·n"'-'" .... v ""'-_•••• "" .... .. t 2.C~; ""n .,......u ap.d wnat steps,* 0\1= Gcvel"nwent shculc. tz.!.;:e to lead the Viet.'"l2.r:::lese, to that action.

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.' Ambassador Lodge h;;:.s joined hea.:·t:ly i::.'1 sa:,~)?ol·ti:l.g tris missio!l and I will rely on you both fOl" tIle c1cs~st exchange of views. It is obviocs 'thz.t the ov.::~all !,o1iticz~l sii'Uati9::'l ~:l.:! the ulilita.:-y and pa::.·ar.1ilita::y e::fo:·t a:.-e clc.s~ly inter.,' ;l • connec ..aCl In. a 11 .... so=ts or. ways, ;;::,,,:,"~!l e:.:ecu...; ......ng yoo.:.:: ... - s"'o-sib';li-hr ':0'· ~.:t::'_c...:.~c.... -~~"'--~ .~ ... 1 01" ... ~~ ~':';t~·· ..... "'"''"'\.;': ..... ~y ,.c; .l-' .. " - ... -"I .... ..~.'" ....;. ........ _ .. y a~~ ~.v. ........ ! .....l' .;.. .... .:...L.~.:.._, -"'c~'~""'" ""'··. . . ""c~·~'}..." ... you 'IT.:11 C"'-S~"'" ··~·-l·l'l' :..,I.;......,..... I \;:"'-l-'w'" ",__ .c.;,,, vJ__ v._ J ""n.r.1-,.. ~'"""',"='·~·'-c.·o~ •• • Lodge on. :-elatad ~olitical a:ld social questio:J.s. I will also, e4-pac!: you to e:-cami:l6 \vith _A..mb2.s~a.eo:: Lodge ways and' ,mea.."1s c: fashiOning all £onns of ou.r assistance South' .I.

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L'"l my judgment tiie. ~~esfion of the progress of the-. co~test: in South Viet:lam is of the first h!:'lpo!'tance arid in executing , this mission'you should tal,e as much time as i~' necessa::y . . f.or' ? thorough~xaminC!.tion both in. Saigon ~d in the .field. .

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. STATE 1~581 22 Sc!>temb~r

1963

"Jn1crstc.."l1 C!.ccirc i'or G\t1.c.~nc~ c:<r.-~es5cd your 511. ·Pcndi~ furth~r revic"" of iJitu~tion e:,.. Pl"c:::oi1cn't ~;l1.ich ,rill rollo~:, ~..our con'3ultctiori tdth Hc~:e.::1~l·t'!. ~m(l Tc.ylo!'" l:~ \:'10h to ~i;-e you f'ollo,;,lnc intc!,im et}.id::.."lcn.:

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StCtC5 int.e:-:u.s to cont:tm't~ it:l effori;s· ·to- ·cssist· the :people in their ctrur;glc ".Gc.in:1·:~ the Viet CO!l~.

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Vietm:t!~se

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2. Recent events h~vc 'Out in q'J.ection the p055ibility of success in these cfforts unl~ss there cn be i.."1'l:9orten.t~ irnprovE:r.cntG in the goverr.!;1cnt of So~th Victna':l • It is the l?olicy of the United Stc.t~:1 to brinB cbou:c sl.lch improv:cents. Ft:.rther s~~cific Gtlid~hce o~ you!' r.:cctln~ liith Dier:t beinG c.cvclptid. here and lilll be subject further eO!lsult:..:tion \lith YOll. In cny cyent the President believes object of this ncctin~ should be to increase your e.uthority and lcvere·ec 'otith Diem gover}'l-'-::'~!lt. In !lleo.nt5.rr.e CAP 63516 still rc:pre~cnts t-:~.Ohin[;tolll s current thinkinG on specifics. A tlossible Presidenticl letter to Diem is in l'rcp~rRtion end li-lll be fOr"'ll-ardcd. . ; for your co~~ents before a decision· on delivery.

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THR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE W.ASm~TGTON •

2 October 1963

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;MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Subject: Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam Your memorandum of 21 September 1963 directed that General Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related pol~tical and' social questions~ You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be taken by the ' South Vietnam Government and 'ihat st~ps our Government should take to lea~ the Vietnamese to that action •• ' ' Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA) and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits to key' operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S. officials in llll major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the GVN and third countries. We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt. The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted. I.

CONCLUSIONS.AND RECOMMENDA1'IONS

A.

Conclusions.

1. The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. " 2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon(and perhaps elsewhere -in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming , increasingly un:popular~.. - . -.:. :--:' .. ~ 3. There is no solid evidence of the possibility of 'a.' suc'ces'sf'ui - . _. coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility. , 4 •..Although some, and perhaps increasing number, of GVN military'; officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are more, hostile " to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least for the near future: they will continue to perform their military duties. 5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a return to more '~ . moderate methods of' control and administration, unlikely though it may" , be, would substantially mitigate the political crisis.

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,6. It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will.move Diem and Nhu toward moderation.. Indeed, 'Pressures may inctease their, obduracy. But unless such pressures are exel'teu, they a.rt! almost" certa.in to continue past patterns of behavior. B. . "

Recommendations • We recommend

~hat:

General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas . (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1954, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as: 1.

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to. the Delta (IV Corps). b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the Field an average of 20 days, out of 30 and static missions are ended. ". c. EmphaSis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.' d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength. e. The training and arming of hamlet militia at an accelerated rate, especially in the Delia. . f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and'action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced. , 2. A progra~ be established to train Vietnamese .50 that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried ou~ by . Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by tha~ time. 3. In accordance with the ~rogram to train progressively Vietnamese ;'0 .;.\S~,,'-'.... ... lr.:. olfer ''':'J.·L • .l.'V \I ~_ u ..... tIT

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in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S.,· military personnel by the end of 1963. 'This action should be explained" in low key as ~n initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort. 4. The following actions be: taken to impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program. . . ", . . '. I

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a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential : significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964 military budget should be brought home to the top military officers in . working level contacts between USOM an~ ~~CV and the Joint General Staff.; up to now we have stated $95 million may be used by the' . Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity import'progr~ for 1164. Henceforth we could make clear that this is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by the Congress . and because of executive policy.

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b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the.Saigon~ Cholon waterworks and Saigon Electric PQW~:C Pl'oject. Wa snould. state clear~ that we are doing so a~ a matt~r of policy. c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units, now under Colonel Tung's control '(mostly held in or near the Saigon area ~or political reasons) will be cut off unless these units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint General Staf~ and transferred to the field. . . d. Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem. Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should also seek to maintain contacts wnere these are needed to push forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S. disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should work'with the Diem government but not support it.* As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be closelY'watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize that we would have to decide in 2 - 4 months' ,whether to move to more drastic action or try to carryon with Diem even if he had not taken significant steps. . 5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in. government. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears. 6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam and constitute the SUbstance of the government position to be' presented both in Congressional testimony and in public statements. a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States. security. For this re~son, we adhere to the overriding objectiye of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing·the Viet "ong ~nsurgenc·y·"''''' pI'U' .-. .. -- ____ .:1..,,_ In •• ...... -,,~""'-~ ..... .;",.. +,,",0 "'... ........ LIl'p ....J..:/ dol:> lI U .:;,.:;,.LU .... c. \. JJ;J .t'.l:'.... "' ...........0 insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security fo~ces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. ~litary forces.} We believe the U.S. part of the task can:be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date which we . are ta.king as the time obj ective. of our cOll.l1terinsurgency programs. ~ b. The military program. in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle. c. 'The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. It has not yet Significantly affected the military effort, but could' do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward vaa_

*Mr. Colby believes that the official "correct" reiationship should.g e supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal relationships with individuals in the GVN, a.pproved by the Ambassador, where persuaSion could be fruitful without derogation of "the official U.S. posture·~. •

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,support f~r the government. Although we are deeply .concerned by re~r~ssive nractices, effective performance in the conduct-ot the" w~; shotud be the determining factor in Otlr relations with the GVN. d. The U.. S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring, about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to 'the war effort. We will use these ~eans as required to assure an effective military program. II.

MILITARY SITUATION AND TRENDS A.

The Standards of Measure.

The test of the military situation is whether the GVN is succeeding in widening its area of effective control of the population and the countryside. This is difficult to measure, and car~ot be stated simply in'terms of the number of stragetic hamlets built or the number of roads that can now be trav~lled without escort. Nor can the overall situation be gauged solely in terms of the extent of GVN offensive action, relative weapon losses and defections~ VC strength figures, or other measures of military performance. All of these factors are important and must be taken into . account; however, a great deal of judgment is required in their interpretation. ,

We have looked at these factors carefully, but we have also given great ~leight to the evidence' of the men on the spot -- the U. S. military advisors and the USOM field representatives -- as to whether government control is in fact extending and becoming more 'accepted and solid in the various areas. We have been greatly impressed with the variation of' the situation from area to area and ,from province to provbce; there is a ~ different war in each area and province, and an example can be found somewhere to support a:ny attitude toward the state of the counterinsurgency" campaign. Our task ha.s been to observ:-e the situation as broadly as pos?ible to avoid gi ~_ng exaggerated importance to a.ny single angle of observati?n.

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B. Overall Progress.

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With allowance f'or all uncertainties, it is our firm conclusion: hat the GVN military program has made great progress in the last year and ~ half, and that this progress has continued at a fairly steady rate in the past six months even through the period of greatest political unrest in ", Saigon. The tactics and techniques employed by the Vietnamese under U 3. monitorship are SOUa.'ld and give promise of ultimate victory., . Specifically, progress is most clear in the northern areas (I and II Corps); especially noteworthy work has been done in key coastal provin~es . where VC strength once threatened to cut the country i~ half but has now : been substantially reduced. 'In the central area and the highlands (III , Corps), progress has been steady though slower, and the si tu.ation remq,ins difficult in the provinces to the west and north of ,Saigon itself. , "

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Throughout the northern two-thirds of the country the strategic hamlet program has matured effectively and freedom of ruraf movement has grown steadily. ' The Delta remains the toughest area of all, and now requires top priority in both GVN and U.S. efforts. Approximately 40% of the people live there; the area is rich and has traditionally resisted central authority; it is the center of Viet Cong strength -- over one-third of the "hard core" are found there; and the maritime nature of,the terrain renders it much the most diffic~t region to pacifY. A first step has just been taken by the move of a third division to ., the Delta, but fu:rther major actions are needed. They include priority decisions by the GVN in the use of its resources, the consolidation , rather than further spread of strategic hamlets in many areas, the . elimination of many fixed outposts, better hamlet defenses and more trained hamlet militia. Regular army units should be reserved for use in mobile actions and for clear and hold operations in support of the strategic hamlet program. Though there are unresolved problems in several key provinces close to Saigon, as well as in the southernmost parts where the VC are strongly established, it is clear that the Delta situation has generally improved over the past year, even with the limited resources allocated to it. Despite recent evidences of greater VC effort and better weapons, the Delta campaign ca.~ continue to go forward if the essential priority is assigned to ,Delta requirements.

c.

Military Indicators.

From a more strictly military standpoint, it should be noted'that this overall progress is being achieved against a Viet Cong effort that has not yet been seriously reduced in the aggregate, and that is putting up a formidable fight notably in the Delta and key provinces near Saigon. The military indicators are mixed, reflecting greate~ and more effective GVN effort but also the continued toughness of the fight.

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been characterized by reports of greater Viet Cong activity, countryYlide, coupled with evidence of improved weaponry in their hands. Some U.S. advisors, as well as some Vietnamese, view this increased activity as a logical reaction to the steadily growing strategic hamlet program, which they believe is progressively separating the Viet Cong from the rural population and from their sources of food and reinforcements.-. _ Others view it as a delayed effort to capitalize upon the political trouble. All agree that it reflects a continuing capability for offensive .action. Re~ent d~yR

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D. The Stra.tegic Hamlet Program. I

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In this generally favorable milltary picture, two main factors have . been the strategic hamlet program and the effectiveness of the U.S. advisory and support effort. We found unanimous agreement that the stra.tegic hamlet program:ls sound in concept, and generally effective in execution although it has been overextended in some areas or the Delta. The teamwork of U.S. military -. men and civilians is generally excellent, and on the GVN side a number of , 'the province chiefs who handled the program poorly in it's initial phases have been replaced by men who appear to-have a better gra&p of the central . ·0

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purpose of the progratlt·--·'"'to-~bri1'tg peeple'Under clear GVN controL, in a . way that really solidifies their support of their government and opposition to the VC. The economic and civic action element of the program (schools medicine, fertilizer, etc.) has been carried forward on the U.S. side with cOl1siderable effectiveness, but has necessarily lagged behind the physical completion of hamlets and in insecure areas has made little progress. Without"this element, coupled with effective hamlet defense measures, what are called Itstrategic hamlets ll may be only nominally under GVN control. We were particularly struck by some evidence that a ~~etfs readiness to defend itself often bears a direct relation to whether the Province Chief~ with U.S. help, has managed to make a convincing start in civic action. . E.

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The U.S. Military Advisory and Support Effort.

We may all be proud of the effectiveness of the U.S. military advisory and support effort. With few exceptions, U.S. advisors report excellent relations with their Vietn~~ese counterparts, whom they characterize as . proud and willing soldiers. The stiffening and exemplary effect of U.S. behavior and attitudes has had an impact which is not confined to the war effort, but which extends deeply into the whole Vietnamese way of doing things. The U.S. advisory effort, however, cannot assure ultimate success. This is a Vietnamese war and the country and the war must, in the end, be run solely by the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their initiative if we leave our advisors in place beyond the time they are really needed. In some areas reductions in the U. S. ". effort and transfer of U.S. responsibilities to the Vietnamese can now 'be carried out without material impairment of the total war effort. As a start, we believe that a' reduction of about 1000 U.S. personnel (for which plans have been in preparation since the spring) can be carried out before the end of 1963. No further reductions should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become firm. . F.

Conclusion.

Acknovlledging the progress achieved to date, there still remains the question of when the final military victory can be attained. If, by victory,· we mean the reduction of the insurgency to something little .more than sporadic banditry in outlying districts, it is the view of the vast· majority of military commanders consulted that success may. be achieved in the I, II and III Corps area by the end of CY 1964. Victory in the '. IV C9rps will take longer -- at least well into 1965. These estimates' " necessarily assume that the political situation does not significantly impede the effort. III.

ECONOMIC SITUATION Al"'ID TRENDS

. The current economic situation in SouthVietnrun is, in the main, .. satisfactory. The internal price level is reasonably stable. Commercial. inventories are high and national bank reserves of foreign exchange stand at approximately $].60 million which equals approximately 11 to 12 months. -. Imports at current rate ($240 million impor.ts less $75 to $80 million exports). The effective rate of exchange of the piastre" to the dollar is wi thin the range of reasonable economic value ~ ._-.....:._._-. .

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Trends are difficul:t .. w" iteeuetf"blit thMlts111ess community was optimistic before the present crises. Rice exports for the current calendar year are projected at approximately $80 million against $8.75 . million last year. Totai exports are anticipated at $70 million-as against $55 million last yea~. Bank~ng circles point to one bearish factor in the export picture. Rubber, which represents more than half in value of all exports, faces a situation of declining world market prices ~nd some plantations may curtail operations in the next year. On the domestic side South Vietnam is almost self-sufficient in cotton testiles and is on its way to satisfying its ovm fertilizer and cement requirements by 1966. At the beginning of ,the current year , banking circies noted a healthy increase in local investments in small ' enterprises which reflects, in their judgment an increase of confidence in the ~lture that is unusual for recent years. The prospects for next year, under normal Circumstances, appear reasonably good. If the Government encourages diversification in agriculture, exports of such products together with the increasing availability of rice should offset the decline in foreign exchange earnings from rubber. The proj ected GVN budget for CY 1964- totals P27 billion: tax revenues are estimated at Pll billion, leaving an internal budget deficit of P16 billion. External resources (resulting from U.S. operations but requiring also use of foreign exchange reserves) are estimated to generate an additional P9.5 billion, leaving a p6.5 billion estimated deficit. This deficit might be somewhat reduced by additional tax revenues. To meet the remaining deficit" borrowings from the National Bank would still be ' required With a resulting increase in the money s~pply. Tne money supply has been increasing rather sharply in the last nine months, although the inflationary effect has been dampened by the recent arrival of large shipments under USOW s COID..TIlodity import program. This has been accompanied by an increase in import licensing brOl~ht about ,principa~ by the GVNt s' adoption at the beginning of this year of an open general licensing system for certain manufactured goods such as 路1trucks, automobiles, fabricated steel and some industrial raw materials~' The b~~s estimate that the open general licensing system will result ip a $10 million increase in GV!~-financed imPorts in CY 1963. I

In short, while the general economic situation is good" the prospects .'

.for holdil'l.g the line on inflation and the balance of payments do not a~pea+ bright for CY 1964 unless the GVN can be persuaded 'to impose severe re ':traints. Effect of the Political Crisis on the Economic Situation. At the pre-sent time the current political problems have not had significant effect on the internal economic situation. 'French banking , sources report a slight increase in the rate of 'Withdrawals from pr:ivate Vietna'ltese ba!l..k deposits over the last two months; but this increase .has only been on the order of Ito 2 percent. ,/" Commercial inventory stocks seem to be increasi~, but this can be , explained by the recent increase in arrivals of foreign gooQ.s. In any case prices have remained stable with exception of a slight increase in the cost of cement:l automobiles and. certa~n ind~strial equipment. .

,.


.~-~"""""'""".

The value ~i thepi~~t;~' lias-fallen 1010 on the Hong Kong market in the last month. Virtually no abnormal flight of capital has yet been observed in banking circles. The most apparent effect of the crisis of the past several weeks is' a slowdown in investment decisions, both in industry and in the limited capital market. Inventors and industrialists are worried about a reduction in U.S. aid. They are aware of the suspension in the issuances of procurement authorizations and are therefore concerned about the availability of imported raw materials and spare parts. Since the Saigon business community has lived through some violent times before this, they have not路reacted to events with as much panic as might have been expected. If the U.S. should long suspend import . commitments, however, it should be apparent that the private sector of the economy will react in an inflationary manner. .


. IV.

POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS" .

Although our observations of the political situa~ion were . . necessarily less extensive than of the military picture, they were ample to confirm that the existing situation is one of high tension. We reviewed the situation carefUlly with the relevant U.S. officials and were also impre~sed by frank interviews with GVN officials an~ with third country representatives. In essence, discontent with the Diem/Nhu regime, which had been widespread just below the surface during recent years, has now become a seething problem. The Buddhist and student crises have precipitated these discontents and given them specific issues. But the problem . goes deeply into the personalties, objectiv~s, and methods of oper~tion of Diem ~~d Nhu over a long period. The evidence appears overwhelming that Diem and Nhu operate in close collaboration, and that each needs the other. They undoubtedly regard themselves as carrying out asocial and political revolution for the good of their country, using all means -- including the strategic hamlet program -- to build up a secure base .of political strength" in the rural areas. At the same time, the positive and educative sides of their. actions, aimed primarily at the countryside, but with extensive countr,y- . wide educational efforts ap well, have been increasingly matched by negative and repressive 'measures of control against the urban population. The urban elite or "Establishment ll -~ which,includes intellectuals, civilian officials at all levels, and a high proportion of military officers -- has never been trusted by Diem and Nhu.¡ Always sensitive to signs of opposition -- with some justification from events in 1954-55' and the attempted coups of 1960 and 1962 -- the regime has turne~ in- ., creasingly to police methods, particularly secret arre sts, that have' almost all the bad effects of .outright totalitarianism even though a good deal of freedom to criticize still remains. .

.

Concurrently, the palace has always manipulated and controlled the' government structure to ensure its own control. The degree. to which centralized cor~~ro1 and intervention have been carried, and the often quixotic nature of its use, have had,a steadily growing adverse effect 'on efficiency and morale. Both' of these adverse characteristics of the regime, and the. resentment of. them, focus more and more on Nhu~ Not mere~y is he ~ the hatchet man, but his statements on "personalism" and his building up-with Madame Nhu of a wide personal apparatus have smacked more and more of outright totalitarianism. A further distrubing feature of Nliu is his flirtation with the idea of negotia.ting with North Vietnam, '•.


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:"hu's role and, scope' of nction have increasc4, and he ::i:JY well the desi~!ns imputed to hir.l of 5ucc~cdinC hi=; ~rothe!' in C\.:c . COUt'!;c. Diem is still quite a long way irCM bein~'<l fij;urcncuc, i1nd 'his, per::;onal prestin~ in the country hilS .survivcc! rcr.. 1rka!>ly" . \0:011. ~ But Diem do~s depend h~avily on Nhu, their central ideas' arc very" ~ close if not i~entical~ and it would be rer..lrkable. if Diem dro??cd t ~!'.e:. ~ • • • ! ,'inu .rot.l a ' CO.1lmiln\.l~ng posl.tJ.on. .

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Until th~ Buddhist and stuciqnt crrses, it was probably true tha~ the alienation be:tHccn Diet.l and -:he c~:'~c '.las more a miltter of ~GsicallJ . <iivcr-cent views or the. riGht social st~~uct'ure and of Diem and mn~ IS '. hanc!linz of: individuals in the r;OVCri1Ii\·:!n't than it was a matter of re~c­ .:tion to repressions. Howpvcr, the crises'have now broucht the're?ression~ J.so d:irectly into the lives of'm;my of the cli"Cc tha't more orderly :':'.~'th~s t !whicn ~ie~t ?reviously have k~p~ the loyal~y of 'the needed Q~O~~~ 0= 'i tulcnt .. nmv 'Qrobablv cGnnot do vo\,zi ~hout c1 con'l!r.cin rrt,) ~(:p!'e:! oz rcstc' w • : r a ..... 10:'1 • ., ,r.lore ord c!'1y mel.uot.$ ... ~.1 anc' a' or.. pcrso'..., .• a_ sccur.t......y. v...(: -I. bOU, . . restoration. of personal'security cut diametrically across 'the craifi , of Die:r,'s and ~s?ecially }:hu's vim.: of \>lhat is necessary ~o maintain' , their pOtlcr ana move 'iovrard ·their idea of scoial revoluti.:iri. 1:

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Thus, th~ disc~~t~nt '~~ thE: elite''':'- reflected' ,chiefly ii'. 'the . . I progressive loss of ~.es~cnsible men - .. has nO\.z reached t,ne point where, ,.Iit·is uncer~~in thatDie~ ~an k~ep or enlist enoueh t~len't to run'the ! war. the' loss of ·sur.h me'n as Hau and 'i'uyc~~ and the d'eepl!f <1isi:u:~ec.' .' ~ at-:~;:"c.E_~_~Ls,\.lc1La.-cI!.l.!~ial-"f-if!ure "as' Thu~n. are ,the strongest evidences ';.o~ the' seriousness of the situation,

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Tnis is not.~o discount groups other than the elite. Howav~r, '~he Buddhists and studen~s canno~ in themselves either thr~ater. the • . ...... . .. _. . , • ·.11 'ree~~e or dO, more than rccus l.SSU~s -- cI.~ ':lIvul;(l 0": COUi.-S~ "t.. ay sc.~cus ...:; ~

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lCC:;;:'ige'the regiwe's ~tanding in the U.S. and else~lherc, with un!.~hibite~" . i ?ress railc'dons tha:t ccntribute firrther to, the' persecution co:nplex. . ' . that c1riv~s !)i~:a and. ~!hu. ~nto repression. .The Dusi:iess cc.-:lmuni;:y is ~ ~ passive fa':!tor only, Urban labor is simply trying to. hold its ~osi-' ;". tiO:l a be:':lg anti-~agime but not the point of be ina an inde?endent~ . sourca 0: ~~ouble •. The rural peasantry appear little affect~d even by. the .Bcc.db.is~ issue'. If these groups can be. kept I even in an .ac~uies-' " cent s~ate the war cou~d go fOt:'wazod., . , •..

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As ..,at1:ers'stand, political ,tension the. ~rban centers ,is so . high 'tbat i~ could boil ove~ at any time ~nto anothe:- c:"cle of rio~s a' .... rep.... essions, and r~siEna.tions. This ten$ion would d:is~??ear, in a very: ~, s~o:'~ ti~e if ~nu were re~oved. ~hether it. could be r~duced to acce,t~ ~ able propo~tio:\s by. 'r.~asures sho:,'t' o.r. this is a very doui:>'tful ,uestion" ' . .-•.•:~.&.:.:::-1.•• ~.~- ..•.. :....... '~ . /. t.i: .~.. :";.'. "

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bu;: 11: is clear that such m~t\surC$ ,,:ould havl) to include both it.ore ' modcrat~ centrol met~ods and a better govornment'clir.at~ par~icularly •• , • •J:01." C.lVl.l~n 0 f'='-al ' .. lCl s.',.

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So far this has not significantly·affected ¢ountry~idc o~cratiori~, · in any. area. U,S, p~rsonnel in th~ fi~ld testified that a f~w officer ~or civilian 'counterparts showed co~ccrn over tho"Buddhbt and studer,'C ·:'.issue~, but not tQ the extent. as yet» of materially Clffectinz t~eir • • Goine ;:hcir jobs. ''t''ne rural popul~ tion hilS been alr..ost untot:chcd. " " The ~ce of GVN operations vldS shi1 ..~ply cut for a short period <li: th~ · end Au~ust by transfers of cniLs and general uncertainty, but has now largely renewed ,its previous intensity. The Delta ~articul~rly " nas been so concerned with the W~~ ~ha~ i~has beer. vrrtu<llly ~naffcctcd~

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..... "Basically D' the' unifyinZ factors er.ibodicd in 't~.e r.a~:-cd of, ~he' o.iili..ary fo"(' CO;;i.1\urlisi.\ re;;:ain vr;ry sha::'p. ,This hatred r-.::al and ~erva$ive." I~ t"('onscencs d~~estic policieS in the minds of mos~ officars •

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However, 'there: a:::-e dis'turbinc elem~:ri:s' tha'~ could' cOc.nge this · picture gr~a~ly·pnless the ~olit!c«l t~nsion~an be rect:ceG. ~ertain hien officers have been r~eavily ?~eoccu?ied' wit~ coup ?o5sib::':!.~::'eS. " ··rhose.~ho have.had relatlvcs dir~ctly involved in the regimc'~ ~e?reSSions :. are dec?ly distur~cd though'not necessarily r~2dy to <lct agains.:: Dicm.*· . ReSeil~i.:ent 0= lib\.! exists', in top m::'l!tary circles and' proba!:>ly 'to SCi.1c· • 'ex-:en-: at middle 1eve:ls. The fact that the greut bulk of :;;ilitcr:l I -.' •• • . C' • . 'c b ( • 1 ,",' !orrlCcl"S -- anQ,?~ov~nce nlefs -- COffie .ro~ ur an are~s s~m? Y ~c- I • !cause of educa-i~ona.l ;:~~uirtements in 'r.,a·uy, cases,) ~learly does o?e;-~ U? . . ",;~r.e 7ossibili..~y 05. pro~ress-iv.;; loss' of ~orale and ef£ectivenes~. 'as ,'.' ,." :'\.:ell as". coup' particip~tion ,: 'if' the regime does no",· Geasc ,,its o,??ressions . .~ag;;inst B'uddr.ists, .stu5iants, ,and real or sup-posed Op?osi'l;ion individuals~'

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On the' civilian 6fficiC!i side, ~hich, is :;effo~tt 'the reaction to.~h~ regime's actions has been

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, *A s?ecl.r~c exam~le of this is the Cc:muandant of, the I'1arine" CO:-I>S in:: . :+< .. SaigoOl. His hrother~ along with mny other' relatives. of military, .~! ~:, , officers an<! cabi;:et' l:ieroers, was picked up -i~ the student rO\lndu?$. ~,~, , of early S~?ter..be~. , Some were to:-tu"('cd, and -- a~ in the case of the· ':-: Co;:.-:a~Ga:ltts brother" --"released o:'lly after intcrces~,;ion. Ho~~v~r •.: ,tbe,'~ Ce=.-:aOlGant shows no "inclination to take action' against the • Dico:\. 4lovcrn~ :.

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In s\!;::nar:r::'~hc political "".;cnsion has not y:~t significantly , .aff~ct~c ~rozress in tnefield, no~ docs it scc~ likely to have , ~ajor effects in the near future. Beyond·~hat~ however. the ?rog~. ---nosis,must,~e considered uncertain if political tensioa persists or ::lounts.

: ' VI,

OVE~\Lt

EVALUATlON

From the above analysis I;: is cl~ul' th<lt ;:he sih:a;:ion rc~uirc:s a co~stant cffo~t by the U.S. ~o ob~ain a reduc;:ior., of poli1:icul te~sions and improved ?erfor~nce by the Vict~awcse Govcrnhocn;:. ~c ca~»ot say • , •.. c::ssurancc ~m~~~ • ...hcr t;)e . . er:ort - - . aGa!Ji~ . t tl.,Ie V'l';~ Cong Wl~,., ,., .• - • ..., . \O:J.\: i.:_ .. .i..ji;a .. ~ ...y .. -. ..... \.. . 1" 1 . , . . -- ~o~s ~ :alL In ~ne eJsenca or ~)or po lt~ca ~~?rove~cnts. ~o~evc~. ~~

scer.l clear, that after ,ar.o~her ?crioe of repressive &c1:ion ?:-c.s::a5s "Say" be recuced ane ind-acd reversed. Althour;h the ;>resen;: ii\cr.H~r"~I;;;: .:"\igi':.t'.,: • , ' b ly CO~i:~~ue .• . .c~ ".. O·~e~~~u~lns, . . concc~va ~o carry tr.e e.~ort rorwara even~. 'II

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U.S. L"£v!;RAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE '1)I.EX

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U.S. personnel. in Saigon mighi: ado?t an at~itudeof coolness ;:o~ard . V·J.etr.a~ese counterparts, ma~nt~lnl.ng • .• ~r.e::.~ onl y ' tnose co~tacts anu.., • . • .,a:r;-.c nec,essary f l ' . . COitl::'i.l:."Ilcatl.on~ ~'""•• ::.cn or" tne aCtl!a_ CO;'.QUC't 0:-- o?crat:.o.,s ., in th.a field. '1'0 so:n? GXi:ent this is the attitude already a<i,o?";ed ~y 'tha , i~~ass2do:- hii::sel=:I but it, could be extended to the civilian and mili... ; ~ta~y a&encie~ located in Saigon. The' effect of such ac~ion would be largely psychological. . ,.::", ~ ~

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'i'03~tber, USOY.'s. Co..:.lodity Import' Pr1>gram (CI?) and" the ?L l;SO "'.. ~rogra:-' account fo:" '!l'lt;;:ccn 60 aild}g ??t:cent of imports into Viu,tna.""i\. . . ,Tne co.-:;>r.i ttie~t 0:: funds \.mac'r:-tne ~C!? :1ClS boen s'us?cn(fca,~ .' CI?~· .

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USOH ass!s;:a:;c~ 'to the Coroat ?o.lica and' oSQ!-! ane. US:S '. ,:~ assistanc~ tc -:::e"Di~ector,G~ne:,al of .:;:~format.ion .and 'tb\~ ARY.!: ?sy;:ar~ . : :: :'?rogra."il·cc~ic. be suspe~ded·., .. Tnese pro~(:cts invo~ve 0: ri:lla.tivc::r s;;.al.l'.-·:

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· ,·l.n 0\:.:," cor.::;~~nt y, mc?~l.n3 l.t nlain to, Diem and others tr.a t the " · ·;.~c= contim':ution of liIi1i:t~'!";' aid i.s' ccnc.itioncd U~O:l tho Vic'tn,:-.;!\c:c~ : ,':.,. Gvve:-:~:;.;nt; cicr.ionstra:t~ne Ct.' ~ati?fac"tor!t'lcv~l of ·~roZX'c:;s to~'ard .defeat·

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O~viocsly) clear c"d exp~ici~ U.S. suo~ort co~ld '~ake a sreat' .' d!fi'ere~ce to the chances a ~CU?' Ho,,!~:"'~:-,. at the present ti~e ~e ;, , lack a cl~ar picture of what acce~teble i~cividuals oigat De hroug~t to '.' -;:'e poi?t of actio:l,'or ~lnot ki:-.d· of go,ve:-:liant r:-.i,ghi: e:!:;:'ge.' 't;e,there-' 'fore r..ecd an in~erisive ciance'stipe effort): unde~' the Airbassador's

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directioh. 7 . 'to esta.blish neccs:;::.r~· c'Ontacts to ~llc\" U.S. to .cor:.- • tinuously appraise coup prospect:;!

It and when we have a better picture, tile choice will still remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would trigger it) or to riskU~S& prestige and having the U.S. hand ~how with a coup group which appeared likely to tie a better alternative government. Any regime that lIas identified from the outset as a U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam and'in significant areas of the world, including other underdeveloped nations where the U.S. bas a maj or role.

In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an intensive basis. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POIJCIES

IX.

Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and military objectives: 1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and a-t:. tempt to obtain the necessary improvements through :gel'suasion from a posture of flreconciliation." This'would not mean any expression of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but Simply that' we would go back in practice to business as usual. 2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct tr relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold further actions in the commodity import progra~, and making clear our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy is letting the present impression stand t~at the U.S. would not be averse to a char~e of Government -- although we would not take any immediate action~ to initiate a (,nnn, • • "J: •

3. Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking military officers. This policy might involve more extended suspensions of aid '. and sharp denounciations of the regime's actions so timed as to fit' with coup prospects and plannip~. . Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows: 1.

Reconciliation.

We believe that this course of action would be ineffective from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would also . greatly increase our difficulties in justifyillg the present U.S. support effort both.to the Congress and generally to significant third nations. We are most unlikely, after recent events, to get Diem to make the .' ne~~s~~y' changes; on the contrary, he would almost certainly regard .

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our reconciliation as an 'evidence tha.t- the U. S. would sit still roi-,' just ab'out anything he di~~.," The result wouln pt'obably be not only,: a continuation of the des::tructive elements in the Regime I s policies' but a return to larger s~ale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they were necessary. The result would probably be sharp deterioration in themilit~y situation in a fairly shor~ period.' 2.

Selective' Pres sures .

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: , We'have e~~ned numerous possibilities of applying pressures to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our ' policies. The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals the double ...edgednature of its effects. Any long term reduction of aid cannot but h~ve an eventual adverse effect on the military,' campaign since both the ~litary and the economic programs have been consciously designed an&;justified in terms of their contribution to the war effort. Rence', 'iifunediate reductions must be selected carefully and be left'in effect onl~:for short periods. We be:liev.~, that the present level of pressures is catlsing, ,and will cause, Diea someic:oncern, \ihile at the same time not sign~fj1- ' cantly impairing the'inilitary effort. We are not hopeful tha.t, this· . level (or indeed anJ level) of pressure will actually induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely. However, there is a,better ~~ance that Diem will at ~east be deterred from resuming large scale oppressions.

At the

~ time, there are varIous factors that set a

time limit to pursuing t is course of action in its present form~ ! Within 2-4 months we hav~tto make critical decisions with the GVN aQout : its 1964 ·budget and our e~onomic support level. In addition,. there is '.1 a significant and growing~ossibility that even the present limited actions in the economic fi~ld -- more for psychological than for eco... . .I . nomic reasons -- would start a wave of speculation and inflation that . would be difficult to control or bring back into proper shape. As to it", when we would reverse our present course, the resumption of the full program of economic and military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government. ~

As a. founa~tion for the development of our long-term 1, economic, and military aid'programs, we believe it ma.y be possible to, develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed schedl ~e. The extent to which 'such objectives a.re met, in conjunction with an ·1 evalua.tion of the regime's political performa..rlce, would determine the : level of aid for the following period. .

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St:,:".t:t:;tic;; ~ds

iJ.'his· report reviet/s the mOl'e sig'!i~ca.nt statistics on the Co:n.-r.U1list

insurgency in South Vietrzm as indicators of si;'uation since July 1963. '

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10S~es J ana d.efections n!!.s beG!! d01-r~!1-~rd ~d:.ile the nu."T;t~!' of ... 0.' ~vv .....•... a.·c···., ""nd o·:··n' "'_ ........ ~nc~~"'1"lt-~ ~.,s ~".1'\ t- '" COT\O' --a .,-,.. t;o..L_l_ .r...;J 4;"..... y _ .... _~\,;._ • ...,~.&._ ..... "-~- U~)"·':'!>'~ .:. ... -_~. Y';e'"

Co~pari50n

"lith ear):i~r paricds S1J.s;ests tr.at tt,:e rdJ:itary position of the ~OVern::le!lt or V:i..et~am '&t~y ~'!li! 1"Je,en set back to the point i:t occupied S!.:~ ~or:.tl1s .to e. y~~r 2,gO. 'Tc~se trends coincide in ti1!?e ·..;j:t11 the sb.~rp dcte!:'ior~tio~ of the ! '"' ... ·c"l .... ,<\'':!l 1".\0 A. t'ne'S... .,,-, 'Tr ··'·1·· ~ ~·· ......··.:-t l'0l·Jov). '"" S:!"",U'-~J.o:.. !i.e t' lme, e.e!l 1n~L 0"""........... 1.# ••;: -, ..,:;',!!, ... ~ ! -{~. S ~. -uo_ .... "'nrl- t~ne "-v ",.;.'".. ""'c.~{n··,:~ :::o"\Te"f';':'~ :0.':'1.... C"','; - {C'! "'O:'·~ -: .... ,.;> \..~.:. ~ ~"'---'" iJ., • .;.... _v....';S .~ vp_v.,. .. .... \Ill ........ the Di·:..~ reglr~e viould r~Ve beell un~ble to c:.intai~ tc.e fe:\'or~=!.ble· trends of previous perioas in the face'of the ac~elerated Viet: Cong effort. I,;.L

...

0'

_ ... ::' ...

Incicators - ......_....---------------

'Stat~stics ~s

.'

Statistics, in eene~al, a~e or.ly partial end not enti~ely sati~racto~y ~r;ai(~~.tor5 of prozrass in tha tot3.1 cc'Unteri!:.=>u....ge:ncy ei'i'o:'t in Soutil Viet!!!:.~. * ~·i.c::.Iy, so~ st.~tistic~ ~r~

incc:!.llletc) as for e:~::'!'l!lle J t~!03a l~~letir~~ to Viet Ct:'('~ at"t:;cl:=s s.g~in.~"t st:-:ateSic r;;:.~'e"~s end de5~1't.i.ons 1ri~~in the 3c'~ .. h ,'tt..... ,.. ..·,·~:. ... •....r~· .. ··eCu.r-~~v " ' f s ~!·.:::"\"~S. "" .... ~ ~ e'''' :.:.etw;'!;4U..\..~::t e "4.--':'\#G..l,.. c;;.!!\l ~ :::5eCO!luJ • ..!. s\.<=-\#!.s~:!. ,.~ ... ., ~~e acquir~d l~~g~ly if ~ot e~~i~aly fro~ oZricial Scuth Viat~~~~~~ sov~ces. As .. ~ '1 {a·"'·Y ...·'SoL. . " - - - _v - - V"1 to 50~e de~ree ~t ~h;; effcrts of t~~ ~~itcd St~te~ s

,,&....-:;.. • • •

!""'I

:.----

...

'. t:;~ S~~ci:~l Assistc.~!lt ·~o· "'.........

7'-.:.-....:.~ ..... . -,....:., .... t" _.~~;,;.J.

~.:

":. ....~ ..... !""··. . . ~":'ao~c·-:f' =0:" Co•..~~?"+ ... vc_ .. -:"'\o.w.... '-- J

0';" "'~-?:o.~""'e.~ _ .1J __ <;;_... .;t~ 2.~a. C,.::':

';jas ..,:.

?::':.i\:=·.~~·· p~:.~::.s~.:,~~ CCt.:.~:c.!';.~ 'tli~ ::~::t

, -

..

'.

_._.-

.. _.-.


- 2 •

Third, there are several other important indicators which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to handle statistically. These include: morale and efficiency within the bureaucracy and the armed services, the degree of locally acquired or volunteered intelligence, popular attitudes toward the Viet Cong and the government,. and the status and impact of the government's political, social, and economic activities in support of the strategic hamlet program. Nonetheless, statistics touch on some significant . aspects of the military situation and provide a guide at least to trends in the fighting. Viet Cong

Inciden~s

statistics shew that t.he Viet Cong have accelerated their military ~d subversive effort since July 1963. From January 1962 until July 1963, the total number of Viet Cong armed attacks, as well as all other incidents (sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda), droppeQ. consistently. HOvlever, since July of this year, total incidents and armed attacks have increased appreciably. If the present trend continues through the end of this year, total incidents "ifill exceed by more than 10% the level for the period July-December 1962. Large Viet Cong attacks (company-size or larger) have also increased appreciably since July of this year, and, if the trend continues, could exceed by almost 30% the level for July-December

'1962.

In addition, the Viet Cong during the ;last half of 1963 have shown increased daring, plan..rling, and coordination in their attacks. This has been evidenced by an attack against a United States helicopter base, and by' simultaneous actions against two or more strategic hamlets and even against two district capitals. Until this period, towns had not been attached since September 1961, when the capital of Phuoc Thanh province "las raided by a large Viet Cong force. Casualties Although the Viet Cong have incurred relatively heavy losses during some of their more daring recent attacks, their overall casualties since . July of this yea:r have not been correspondingly high. . If the accelerated Viet Cong effort and losses suffered are maintained at present levels during the rest of this year, casualties will remain ~bout 1010 below the level in July-December 1962, the peak period in Viet Cong casualties last year. In contrast, casualties among the South Vietnamese military and security forces since July of this year are increasing and, at the pr~sent rate, could exceed by about 20% the level for the preceding six-month period. This would raise the total casualties for 1963 by some 30% above the 196r and 1962 levels. Indeed, the ratio of Viet Cong to South Vietnamese forces killed and captured dropped from five-to-one for the last half of 1962 to three-to-one for the period July-September 18, 1963. This ratio would be still less favorable to the government if casualties among such


-

")'

-,

.

I

paramili tary groups as 'th~" village militia and l;fontagnard scouts were • taken into account. Casualty sta.tistics on these groups are not complete", and are not shown in this report. During the period August-September 18,' ... 1963, however, their casualties exceeded 500 as compared with th~ combined total of' more 'than 2,300 casualties among the krmyJ Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps for the sam~r period. ' vleapons Losses During 1962, weapons losses among both the Viet Cong and government increased progressively,'although government losses were somewhat greater than those of the Viet Congo The inqrease continued during January-April 1963, but losses on both sides were about even. However, during 14ay-August, Viet Cong weapons losses dropped by more than l~, while losses among government forces increased by about 15%. If the trend noted during the last three weeks of September should .continue throughout the year, the Viet Cong "lill lose almost 7cY1a fewer weapons than the government. Moreover, a large number of the Viet Cong weapons lost are of the home-made variety while the great bulk of' government weapons losses a+e of, standard or modern-type pieces. ' ~orces

Defections and Desertions Viet Cong military defections increased progressively durir~ 1963 until. June, dropping from a high of 414 in May to a low of 107 for about the first • three weeks of Septewber. (These Viet Cong are usually members of the insurgent armed forces, although only a small percentage are believed to be . hard-core cadres. They generally defect to South Vietnamese military forces, who interrogate and screen them and aetermine their disposition.) .. In addition to the military defectors, some 13,700 persons ltrallied" to the governmen~fromApril through August 1963 under a national surrender and amnesty campaign. This cam-paign, knO\ifl as "Chieu Hoi, If was officially inaugux'ated on April 19. The South Vietnamese goverpJnent regards the bulk of these as Viet Congo United States officials, who dO,not screen these statistics, believe the vast majority to be refugees and persons who, for one reason or another, have left areas controlled or formerly controlled by the Viet Congo Many of them, however, may well have assisted tb~'Viet Cong in some rlay voluntarily or under dures's. The number -of IIChieu Beilt returnees increased progressively from April 19 to June 1963, when a high of about 3,200 vTas reached. By August, returnees dropped to a low of about 1,600. Complete statistics are not yet available for September. Until June 1963, statistics on South Vi~tnamese desertions includ~ all military and security personnel who.had been absent from duty without official leave for any reason or for any iength of time. Moreover ,there was apparently no ~ttempt to adjust these all-inclusive statistics to , a..cco~t for persons who had returned to duty. Including "awols,'~ ,the. 1962 ". m~nthl~average of d~serters ~~s :7i of the combined strength of the·military~ ,

"

I 4

_. _______ .: ___ ..: - -

...

'

.

._.~t

" ';":, .'s8i


..'

.....

_.1~

....

'

.-

Concli.:sio::.3

------------..----

..

..

. •

'"

.' .

',.#

..... ...... --

On the bs.si~ or av~.ile.ble s·c::!;~istical tre~d3; there r.:ppeC'.;:- to (t..?ve ·.b,ean e.. ,n'\.~~er of s:.~~n::.fica::lt and 1."~fayo ..~z.bl~ c~..:..n:.::es -in t}-"" mil'; .'_ . . . " • _ .~ - - - - tar'" "J V':e;'''''''~'si''''ce ·";ulv 0'" +h'~S ,,~"'.,.. ej, __ ..... y _ . ',f;" ___ So";-;:' """"&..I.':' ,,1.';".;" ...!v:'_.. • • • ·(na."",o;i __ '-" ..... _ , ~"':"I'h;.~"y ¥' ..._ "''':"' _ _ S .ftt,:':'':'';on _", ' " t·.n ....... i~::~C~.;..O·,.. .... ':':o .... _..:t -in +'n" ~ ·,...::."'0··· ... s·'~·,,··::o.'~·' ... ~~.:. +},"" "l~' i-i'e,"'v 'OO-~""~C"" _.1\.... _ ",.\1 ... ~ _ l.tlW'-L... ". -,:, _,,;:' - " ~o'w~" lI ...... ,., V •• _ttl .. ,j_"'_ ... 0 " of the Vietn:ll~ Go\"c::nrr.ent r:~y c.ava reyert~~ to' the point it l'zd ::e~ched si:, t.c~:.~~?'.s to eo year :;:.go. l'!hile it is difficult ·~o relate pl'ecise11 cause a:ld effect -"c"'~ "~Y"""'S'" c~-"'~-·es .f tn<> tr·:..,.·._..l..two .. ' ...... "'r" "n Sou""'4.1. .... ". 'fie~"\''''' ••....40.!._ :..J.O:r. ...o ... ttl Si~\··,J_··O!l w;_"'':''';'':' : • ;.. .....:::..:.••) f".J

..,

.;.

¥'"-~

~

'V

.:..

""

Q..~

~

\;_

"'he{"l" c'\"-N''''.3---'~~ ~+-v ...._ o .. ........ _"' ••":0:: c... ..

0 w

,I'

~.":,,,!,::It. ...... 1._ 'T·11~::.n • • -_ . . . .~~f:\ . . .~ ¥\"~·~:"-~c~' ;:',-, _ _ 1#_ ~._

CO¥ _ _

.. - - ' "

_~

s-\~""~';''':O~I _~~ ... _ _ . . 1o:~s .,..

;:~:·::Ar;o"'t";,",,':'~'; ...~t; _ _ _ e:::.c.. ... ...

must be: co;:sider.:Ci as ;:;:."a tb~::l coi~ciae::::.tel.· 'At -;;~c sa!:".e tin:e J ave=l . .:-ith.:r:.t the B~;~~;!cist c;. . ~.s~s 2.!1~ the mo::e sa:-ious ~olitical difficul ties fol1o~~1i.~: i:-:" its ','aka J it is p~55fole tI!:.t tee Diehl gova!'~,:ent v:oi.:lo: h.<i. ....e been 1L.1aola to 1S.intain the i'a':o=c:ble ti.;:~ds of .*'nrecec.ini,--~l·iod.s in." the face ot the aCCelerated Viat ConE effort si~~e July 19~3.


r.. Jan. June

.'

4~.

~962

, ,1..

-

::.' 2. f'

:!>:'.

"VII -.:. t

i

156

6,036

(total),

j

1963,

July 1-

(and

%

Sept. 18, 1963*

-,

"/0 ot' previous . period

8,595 (-18%)

6,847 (-20%)

3,777

55%'

(-1~)

1,941 (-20%),

1,061

55~

63 (-40%)

72 (+14$)

34

47~

17;338 (+26%)

. '~3,944 ( ..20%)

6,425

46%

6,846 (+13%)

8,056 (+1Sofo)

4,220

'5~

2,441

i'

'

.

. ~

-

Jan.April 1962

May -

Sept. Dec.

Jan.-

Aug. 1962

1962

1963

, 1,202,

1,526

1,806

1,9~7

,1,703 (-ll"/o) 335 (20%)

~:l777

1,884

1,534

1,974

2,260 (+15%) 644 (28%)

1,178

1,307 (+10$) 107 (8%)

Apri~

May -

.

Aug. 1963 (and %ot' cha.nge)

...

Th:r1)., Sept. 18, '1963 (and 10 ot' • previous period)

!

';!;;'" ~.

~

i

.;.

•.

.. r:

),

3,024

4. : GVN ·Ca,sua.lties

j

',&:', -i •••

Viet Cong a.rmed Atta.cks (total)

%

Jan. 1June 30,

ot' chan~e~Loj.'chaMe)

.

'I' . ,

:

Dec. 30, 1962 (and

. 3. , Viet Cong Casua.l.ties (tota.l) , 13,755

:..~"

.)

July 1- ,

30,

' ~0,1'')1

~arger

. IL, Ii

ComPany-size and

;, "": :

,

Viet Cong Incidents (totaJ.) "

STATISTICAL TRENDS, 1962-~963

,.

. ..

5~

Viet Cong Weapons Losses, GVN Weapons Losses

6.

Vie~

cong Det'ections** .

1962 Total:

~,956

.

*Although only 4~ of this period has elapsed, the statistics in this column are already 4$%-55% 'otthe to~a1.t'igures t'or the previous six-month period, as 'shown in the last column • . ** This exclude;s "Chieu Hoi" returnees which ha.ve totalled 13,664 through August 1963 but which . ' have declined sharp~Y'since July 1963. ..


~

II.

o CONDE1fSED FIGUR:1S all HILITARY AC'l'IVI'l'Y FRO:·! JANUI\RY .'. -, " . . 1, 1962....

.

1. ... ,Viet . Con~-Initiated Incidents.

. --' ~

.-

..

549 " ... :' 21'0_

.

Ma.r. Apr. - j~.

500

··20

588

27 27

1~91

"

'

528 "

,

38

4J~8

',23 - ..12

378

10,

3b2,

July • Aug.

. -Sept. Oct._ Nov • .

.

..

'

..

. . .•...

Sabota8e

.0

"" 839 . 613 " 660 ..

'180

736.

__,8,875

.

1,825

290

423 192 '

1,961 1;933 '

251 222 223 233 .

1 ,825 '

0

. -1,4'(7

1,564

1,61l2

182

189

166

llt4

'1,375 1',357

132

1,311

18~"'

101 2 ,060.-

670

251

220

1k6 178

624 583 614

Incidents , 1,1,60

158

735 885

Prop

210

154157

892

0

.....

137

01,021• '

219

or'

Total Terrorism

8 9

384

.

,..;;.-

fi'

14

421

Dec.

.-

10.

391 419 "

. .'. J

,.~.

'.*

(Company -~ izo and larger)

Attacks

,VAY

.

Lar&e-Scale . Attacks Total

Jan. Feb.

.

. ..•

1z3l~~

,

,

.-l'The,se figures closely parallel year-end figu-res furni~hcd ,bJ~ cm·lljSt,~\CV.

-.

'1963

252

Ja.n.

Feb.

:

10

14

195·

}~r.

31~4

. 11

Apr.

383

12

l~y

Aug.

Sep. 18

Total

.

652 _ . 698 ,569'

3,003

-ll

613

loS'

. "5,361 "

.- . ,

2.

131 J.V)

15)

150' : 142

93 . 101

80

183:"

93 :' 115,

"

186 113

842

10;624

Casuaities*~

ow,

. Jan:- 1952

, ARVt{ - ArmY of ," . Vietnam. CG -, Ci:vil~ Guard

fJl".A 116 -' 221

16

SDC -"Self-Defense 'r.- Co:z:Ps. . :;. 107 i #,

..

,

12

91

'151~

.. " ..

--v '603

9

119,

69

~A

12

3!~1.

It9

433 653

13

351 . 407 319

410

June July

..

41n

.

108. "

11~6'

Cap/Miss.

Total

, Viet Cong

KIA

i'ota1 . .. .

. 8 : ,~"", - , 43 "',.' ", ' .... . '.

65

0

299 .4:. "475 ....lI6' . .

• •

, -.890

... ,

-:.

1,,294

,.

t

?I23=-9~O~.

'

..

.\-


. J? .. I -

~.

.

. 2.

'.

.

GVN ' . \HI\. Cap/l·1iss.

-' February 1962 .... --~...,.-...

.......-.-

ARVN'.. Army of Vietnam 72 CG • Civil Guard ,.68 Self~lJerense

'SDC -

,

16

.-266

'

....

"

•• -i: •• ·r=

~

9lt.

lOll-

'loS • 'in5

.-

.

-

222

.

'

.

··

.

..

SDC

.. . ,

,

........ -........... -....... •

.. . ..

...

~.

......

.

~

-.-

~

0-

.!..

-

415

292

.

':.

-'" .;.

~

91

133 186

13 . 19

4 ·,150 ---:-" .. .29 ., ~

:- ..

--_ ....

-- .......

-,

.. ." .. ~-.:..::....;,...-..

- .- .

.

613':

7:("

.

.. • i

. 86 165 62 " 149 ,- .. 230-. 372

-

13 '

, -46:' :. ,

153 ;"

2~632

230, . 296

,

489

413

441 . , 2,I 520 ,-

264 761

.<

-,---

1,015 _1,666

251

.L .

,

'.

..

ARVN : .• ;. .,~ .' CG "...... .

,

-i

<

[totals ~ July 1962

:I ..

..

...

'

ARVN , 00. 'SDC . . -, . '.

Totals

.2,303

509

Totals J:une 1962

'SDC " ,"

-.-~

... ..:.

..

'

2,530

. -.

--"--: 1,070 _ 1,596 .

.. . . ',90' ..

.

1,'456 551 523

, . :~ .... .b2 , ' IIi 0-. 131 - ,154 '. 197 215

CG

.

-

i 66- . 84

i!l6

1,,814

353

. .

140

.

---

:

- o"'5

:~ 295

523

'

28 2'(

Totals

ARVN

1, 205 316 .

. 737

~·ARVN

00.

668

..

April '1962 ---:----""---

'c;DC '.

-- -

'

sua

.

- 75

. 97 · 219 160 223

-.

..

..

'

.

ARYl{ , CG

.

,"

..

I

",'

ic6

..

?larch 1962 -----:;...-

, ·7 42,

.-

Totals

Total

~----

11tl

1~

Corps

Total

Casualties (continued)

-

.-

,

,"

_.--;

...-!

.. '/'

. - ,I

.. .

'.,

2,510.


, . ..... ..8':' ... .... Viet Cong

2,Casua1ties (continued) ' .- ....... -.....:.:.'

". .:....

'ARVN 'CG •

KIA.

. ~jIA'

67 -

lJ~9

'.

sept. 1962

, Total

15 46

t.

77

· 63

1,066

,2

.. 358

Total

238

, .-

ARV11

cG

66 72

Total

,523 . '1,048·

)

15 71

..

,

834

311~

. .. .

.

'

92

1,,336'

SDe

268

Total

618 ,".

...

. · 78 .... ' . •.. _-._.--:

~

,~~

. Tota.l

.'

.

; 153

532,

.

990

" .12',882'

.... , -

....... . .

. 1153-

.•<... -': .~ .....:~~".f .• : : .... .oe<: .......

,

1,982

.. 432 '. .152 "

.

I- '; \p

..

-

t'·",

,.

2, 203

289

~1;158 4,,235 .

595.

n' ..

.~~ ~~~-~_~.i:? ~ ;;.~~'~';7'.·." '... 5B6 '

+

.'

••

-

5,,700 '.31,09; *...

,

"

I

86

• . 1"

463

J'

21

.

. 2,,95:

....

.

10 ,12

t

2,911

- .

~ _~.~ ~.~.:~_. ~: ..•.. ~ ~'. : ..'~....::~_~. ~ _.~. _.~• ttr

.

368 561

'.

621. .;.~. .. ~." ~- ... :---." 9~.: '.. ~.; .... :~ ...~ 1,463 .'1,754 ••

.

-

#

-217 -. , .' '32~~ :., '.

_

,

.175

"

",0:.83

2~626

373

283

'. :'T~tai~J '1962 '4 /41i .... , 7~i95 ~,'1,210 _ARV1( '. . 00' SOO '

.

~

,232, " 118 : .. ' .

, Jan .. ~1963·

, - --.

.•

.

.....

.

.

-

1,967 286

--' ' 788

~.

1962

,

. "

?~h

6

1;J~5

ro

'

'

'

-. ARWT

---

-

203'

64

i'1h .

410

..

317

- 59·

233

-272 .

.5DC .

669

2 3

619 .

}Iov. 1962

'!_._. -

150 616

.' 239

365 ,

.'

59

J.42

63 225 ---'

. SDC

,

560

"

·ARVlr CG

~

218 .. 288

2

54

61l6· "

pee.

,

Total

· 3

31I~

• 419

1962

. ..

231 . 101

. 1.6 248

SDC

pet.

626

. _.125'

-

.

- '.

371

':ARVN 00'

.

307~.

: ~.

Total

-

, Cap/i..i.ss.

.170

103 201.

SOO

qVN

"'.'

e.

#

,

'.,

'.' .. . -318:"'379' •. 2,4;:


I

'.' 9," ." -2." Casualties (continued)'

'

i '

f

GVi{

'

".:

Feb. 19b3

r.... •

,\.

-

'KIA

,81

"j

,

',~otal'

••• t

'379

-

. . 174

• . ...

192

91

; ' 5:-;9 . 21~O 68l. -90 1/ lffi'o

.'. 99 89

r sOO' I·; Total'

.

," .389

Total' ,

. .. .... ••

'.

.

"

'~tal

-'

64l

...

1,251'

.....

.

232

-. ' . '

' ..."

.:.

:

"\.

1~

. 14

, ' '150 ' .

218

..;

.-:• • -

,'*

.,:, 419' ":l86,~,:".::

'

b35.~. "

11124

151

2

,

'~7

'

405

211 ,,86

448

. .......... :. . -:

'.

. '.

.. I

'2c6: lUb-'.,'

.

.

..

.

336.

S4

2 / 611,

',.

...

:

.....".

221 '

381

.'

,

..:"

83,251

. -

,

335

'

i.,.. ~;., ','- ';'~':'<,"-='.' ,:_. • ''';;;:'',~'-.:;:',.;''':,:'. .:~.'-~.,_.

~."

101

'

,

151 .. '.. 519":'

..

.• ,

~IO< ••• ' •

...

4

313

.'

r;9I8 372

.- • • , ...... '.

:'.~ . . .

',.'

'l~

. 310"

,

677

352, ',' 877 '

l/07l ",~~..~

92' ,.:

ARVN

OJ, , SDC

-

,. 253

23 51 '

,', .. 68. .

' " Sept. 18, 1963 .

,..'

:,:

ARVtf,

..

.

" 357

82

476

BOO

"

6

198 391

s~

'.

.'.

.

'J

ARVN

'.-00

,205

~

;,'(S

-~

2

158·

772 : ·90

.

" •

i

'256'

358

~Ol

!

,;. :

,

,36~

,',

!

:\

'

.'

15 13 68

1/41~3'

I 2~0l~:

.

(, ,

;

.June 19~3

: j ~"'QVil' '

'

~~l~

Total

.{ ,,

.

BW

-;'06

! r,

!

5l

. 352 136 " 390'

I

223

i ~' • fotal, ~ l , ~.. .'. ; , 1!ey 1903

385 431 511 1/ 321

--ssr:be

* •

SOO •

.

.

~

286

. -:-;uv

Total ...

. April "1963 JlJMI-LeG

i i;

,

'15 ',.. 30& 4 161 259. 11

AiM! }tttch 1953 "

co .soo

...

. .s. •• ....,

,

6

,

139 10 ,293'66 bSl) -8"2

, ' 1,210

SDO;: '' , I

:

224,'-

82

ARm

co

" viet Cong,

.

2;059': " .

i

'

'.

, , : ' • ' .': ':. "'

.

i"{2-' 1,190 , 1,24~--m ,W _~,b1~ 'l(j4b '1".343 l,lCST ~6.·' l4';3Th,gz529'3.528 ~~3b9.," iC"T"nese figUres do not include CiVN c<!s\1;1.1tics for otha:- p.:,"~ltilitary forces" vhl.ch are inco~~lcte but~hich 1nAuSlmt and Sopte~ber 1953 totalled 51l~

Total .:a1s, 1963'* , .

'

.......... ~ .

".

'.

".'

W3'

. : - _ . , _ . . ,-

- ... -----

.,--_.

-

.'


- lO .. •

.

. ; .. - .... '

... . -

,

1,526

1,8c6 "

4,531f

'.

:

lt51 ....

683 ·399

Februar.1

253

791

.468

. Apri:.

463" . 580 663

564

J.~y

. 394

Jur: Jt .y

3711371

gt~st

~ ~r;.

18

. /~ 554

.. 335

644

3,95.5

4,,878

~otal

'.

1~67

361'

Z.~rch

A,

,.

.1,,202

~963 January' .

-" GVN

. ..

.

,.

Jan. .: Apr'~ . }'lay .. AUZ. Sept ... Dec. 'Xotal ..

-~

Conp;.... ~.

.Viet '1962

..

.

...

. '*l,fany. VO v!eapons lost are of the" homelrlsd:e variety ~

: 4.

,-1962

1,956 "

-1963 168 245

Ja.nuary

February

394

Y.a.rch April ~ ll;;ty

.371

June July

394-

·414 Sc8 191

Auzust ~ept.

,18

107

Tota.l,· .

:;o ..... \>

...

:~. ~" ' 4~This .amnesty

does not include tldei'cct.crz uco:nin6" "in under'

proq;r~~~

...

~.;"

. . •

... -.- .. . . .. ,.: ....: ..:.:.•

.. .'

;.

.......

I

4!o~ _ _ _ " ' _ ' - - - : - _ '_ _ _ _ •• __ . _ : :•• ~ _ _ _~•• _ _

-

.

".'

-i_... ~~ ______ ~ ______.~~.·~f.~'~.:~_.

.'. ,'. '~~'. ~: . 5'88'

:_: ,,;. .

....

,,'

.. - .

....

t~

';Chieu

'4

noit~~ or

f


.• "

•.

..

. !t

'-

, , , lIT. •. DRSEf<Tlorrs IN .THE SO'U'TII V.IE~·!Af.3SE NThlfAlt{ PJf!) S£OURITz' SERVICES'xI

,

~

"

.,.

.-

-

.

'.

I

Total

.'

...

PerCCl)t of ·Combined. . Strength of. RVNAF 1 Civil Gu.:trd, Sc~:t Dei'cnsc Cm'Ps~r.A-'"

,~

..... 2,486 . .1,565 3,278

1,553

Jal?-V.ary

Fepruary

1,OQ2

2

Y.a.rch April

,no .

1,424, 1,057 '1,638

I~Y'

June Jqly .. Al.lzust ., . Scptem.oer· October Noveruber December

Tota.l

.

Civil G~~rd . and Self Defense Co;ps . .. ...

Date

" ?-9b2 -. '

.

--..--..

. 2,691 2,1~01

2,"{98

'1,997

2,852 2,972' 1,898 2;272.

2,1 05 . 1,269 ,1,5 05

2,558

1,711

2,ll~7

.. 1,270 . 1BJ721

1l,203

29,924

.8 .5

1.0

.8 .7 .8 .8 .8 .5

.6 .7 .6

Average: .. 7

'.

.

723

,

656

Yarch April

!

853 999 877

l'~y

'June July August'

1,811~

865

. January Februsry

.

..

1,389' 2;260 2,018

1,41n 21 289 . 2 z501,

"""'"

83\!

6,4~9

'; .7 , .5 .

2,87~

2,122 2,916

2,165

~~

2,679

:

.15, 87;T.,

.7

3,164'

'.7 .8

2,318 . 2,975

.6

3,331 .

.7. 'n .v

.22,376,

Average:,

.7

• *Fro:n JanU3.ty 1962 through l·~y 1903, the above statistics inclua~ in adq,ition" . : - to. deGerters all· other persons vho he.ve been 2.bsent lrithout official leave' C:a~:ol") ..fore.ny length of ti~ or for any reason.' The stc.tistic~ bve. not been adjusted to take into a.ccount tbo~e persons lIDO l'eturned to duty. : . '. . .Fro:.1. Jun~ th:!:-ou~h }l.uzust 1903,j:r.e st~tistics con:;ist cntir~ly of dC':;i~rte!'s • ·a.nd exclude ltaiTols/r but still h~ve not been adju.sted to e.CCOU!lt for ratUl·~cs. T*Ar:ilY, Kev-y"

l-1~rine5,

and Airforce •. " , _. ~-*;':"From 'Ja:l\.;::rY thrOUGh D.;cerr.ocr 1962" the co~bined strength. of th~se· services· .: 'intre~s~d "from 315,451,. to 390,220. :r~rotl J~l1t::l:ry throu~h Au~st.1953" tr~ .' ~cr~rt..sc ·VdS fro:a 392 .11~60 to 4.d. ","'99. ': .... .' .

. ,.

.'

~:

~-.

----_•. <_ .••~.------ •.. ~-.--

.'

t

"'"

.

. . - ... '~---- .••. - - .. ~< • • • • • • "

589,'


SAI(:ON '1964, 25 Oct. 63' ...

FROM LODGE

r j

~

'ro McG.

I

BUNDY

' . 1. I appreciate the concern expressed by you in ref. a relative to the Gen. Don/Conein relationship, and also the present lack of firm intelligence on the details of the generalts plot. I hope that ref. b will assist in clearing up some of the doubts relative to general's plans, and I am hopeful that the detailed plans promised for two days before the coup attempt will clear up any remaining doubts. ' 2. CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have persor~lly approved each meeting between Gen. Don and Conein who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly. vlhile I share your concern about the continued'involvement of Conein in this matter, a suitable substitute for Conein as the principal contact is not presently available. Conein, as you know, is a friend of some eighteen y~ars' standing with Gen. Don, and General Don has expressed extreme' ,reluctance to deal with anyone else. I do not believe the involvement of . another Americ~~ in close contact with the generals would be productive. ' We are, however, considering the feasibility of a plan for the introduction of an additional officer as a cut-outbehreen Conein and a designee,'of Gen. Don for cOl!lIllunication purpol?es only. This officer is complete1y " un~itting of any details of past or present coup activities and wi11 remain ·so • . 3. With Teference to Gen. Harkins' comment to Gen. Don which Don reports to have, referred to a presidential directive and the proposal ·for a meeting with me, this may have served the useful purpose of allaying the General's fears as to our interest. If this were a provocation, the GVN' could have assumed and.manufactured any variations of the same theme. As a precautionary measure, hO\olever, I of course refused to see Gen. Don. As to the lack of information as to General Don r s real . backing, and the lack of evidence that any real capabilities for action have been developed, ref. b provides only part of the answer. I feel' sure that the reluctance of the generals to provide the U. S. 'oTith full details of their plans at this time, is a reflection of their own sense of security and a 1ack of confidence that in the large American community present in Saigon their plans will not be prematurely revealed. , 4; The best evidence available to the Embassy, which I grant you is not as complete as we would like it, is.that Gen. Don and the other genera1s involved with him are seriously attempting to effect a change in the government. I do not believe that this is a provocation by , Ngo Dinh Nhu, although we shall continue to assess the planning as well ,a.s possible. In the event that the coup aborts, or in the, event that Nhu has mastermined'a provocation, I believe that our involvement to date through Conein is still within the realm. of plausible denial. CAS j,.s

k.

:,.....

,

_'.

.~.

. -.


,

.' "

~

.

perfectly prepared to ~yc,'mc elisavow Ccn~il: a<any ti~e',it, m~y se:-'t':: the natio:lal intercst. . ..... ' ,' . ~ . .. '~l-o"""'" ...... .,.!\ ... \.0 "c~• I'n v~_ ,..~S " '5 • I we ~ ••~\; YO"l" .... r,,~.t';';··I""';n(T·I·''''st-··~-:0'''5 ..'"'......... .1. ......_ -0':> •• .:. ~ .... I....< cc_.1.<:<. ..... . Washington 74228. It,ls vital that we ncit!-~..::::, th...va:-t·a COt~9 nor that \";!~ c... . are even In a pOsl."lon wnere we co no'.: :~:lO~J W.~z.:. 1$ go!.~~~ Oi~. 6. We should not thwart a COt'P Ie'i two rc~scns. :?i::-st, it s~c!"::::; at least an 'even bet that the next gov~l'mne:!t wou!cl not b~:lcilc 2.1'ld stumble as much a.s,the prescnt one has. Scco:!""~cly, it is c:..:trcn1ely unwis~ in the lo~g range Im: us to pou,r cole wa:er on attempts .:1: a coup, particularly when thcy- ar~ just in th~i:l: beginning st'~gcs •. \\T. :.3'hould rcmc~ber that thl~ is the only way in which the people in. Vietnam ca~'l. possibly get a char;ge of governrn,ent. Wnenever' '.'Ie' tl-J.\"~'::: attempts at a coup~ as we have dO:l.e in th.e past, .we arc incm:ring vC"::'f long lasting resentments. we are ass~":llri.g an l!~d\.1..~ res]o!lsi~ility f::.:: keeping tlie incumbents 4"'l.· ~fficeJ ancl in gCll(;r~l are setting Ol1.:rse!V~3 . in juclg:n.~nt over the affairs of Vietna!!l. Merely::o !(cep in tou.ch with. . this situation and a. policy merely limite,5. :;0 Il not thwar:i:n:g H arc .COtu·S\!S both of '\vh!ch entail some risks but thes~ ~re lesser risks t!-:.c.::,cither. " thwarting all coups while th~y- are'stiEbc~n o~· our not bein6 In:':o::mec ,.ci what is happening. All the aboveis tot2.l!.~!,c.istb,c~ from not \-:ic:.r~ting ,~ U.s. mili~ry ac'!.vlsol"S to b'e distracted. by !'n2..tter·J 'lJhich ar'c not 'in .' , . . . . . . . ,-... .. . "'. ~ .. tnelr dOmal:l 2 'Wli:A \"lh1C.'l 1 hcart~ly agrC3. Bt:.t .ObVlCUS1Y i:!:lS COCS r..o:: .,. a po..;.cy t· ," . .. . -. conJ. lCt W:H:n. 0:::.. no~.. t'nwari;:.ng'. J.n. .JG.cglng' prO?O::l~::" cot:pSJ WC . ..,;a_ . . .. . .,. !:lust cons~c.e~ tc.e ellect on tr-.e w::.r,e.::~c::t~ Cert~lnly So ~U.CC;;;SSlO:l o:q .....~.;~g~t...~ ~,.. couyro f' 'I c~t'1 .. .;.n.~ -...~-t· :"'''~ ~ • .:..'t ..:,.', ... s .LO_ _ n\;,.. G ove_ ..... 4 OJ.: V7';~L~"'!;","","", ... I:'''.~",-~._ .•~'\/0 -'t1'" .uC!,.1. ••• e .,.. __..~~_ e VJl"n, 1.,.lC \.T'''-:'''M P'~(";"T Tt Tnn.::t ~: C':r\ 'h~ ~"'!t';"" +""~+- ,!..... .. \.r.~ t~~ 5 1~ ~·i :,._·'-:.... -r .. ·.,. ~-1 ,.l. .• ""'_ _ 9'f'~""_ "*_ ... """4"'t,~':~~.,,", ... :.:Jt.;c._ J..Llt-t.::.=.._t.:.;..c.;,.. v,ith, alreacy by the· inconl?etence of t?.;.e .?res~nt governr.::l.~nt . and th.e ' ; , uproar '\'<Jhich this has caused. '.. . . : : ': ". . ; . .1"·~·" . . "..' .• ' t ".. .... ... . .... 7 • Gen. Don. 5 lnt.C!l:.lon, ...0 !lave no. =~ 19lOUS: CllSCpm1n2.;.lon In ?-. . future government is comn!enclable an.d I applaud his' desi::.~a not. to be:' !ta vassa.l" of the U.S. But ... I .do n.et thir..k hlsu'romise '. .... . ora c.cI:1ocr"ati~ el'ection is realistic. This, cOtl.'1try s~m.?ly i~not- r"ca.dy iO,r that proc ,~i.:.:,·a. ,I would ad.d t'\.... o·oth~r l'eqUir~ments. ' First l ' that there be no w:lolc'sa!e purges ofpe:rson~el in tne.governr-1.cnt. Individuals who \'!a":e particlilarly . reprehensible coule be'dealt with later 'by the regular legal ?::oc'ess. Then'" I would be impractical, but, I ah} thinking' of a governI:1en~ . .;:; hich 'might' ". in.~lude Tn Quang and whiCh certainly shodd in·clude. me:-~. of the stat~re - of Mr. Buu; the 1<,-po= lead~r. " .. ~ .~.~ , t: _. I,' ". ,~ ~ •. Copy to Gen.. Har!&s:'" . .",;' ': j. ," ' ~

.

."".,

:"t.

~

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.

'"

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.~,...

.. :"I.

I;; ..

'4 •• ;1. . . .

<I",

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _

v.~""

v_'"'_~~_.

.

' . ' ,

,

T

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,

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FRo}t:

-. ....

.... .

,'

." "

.

.. . ~

. "

.

...~. ~

.'

..

.' '

,.

-~Te\.'ill cor.ti!lue t9 be grateful "for ~l ad~..iticna1 ::iri.for'.!!ation giving increadcd clarity to'prcs~ects ot action by Don or cthcrs,'~~d \ole look forward::O discussing ~·r.l.th you .the ~:hole questic:1 cf COl"'~t:-ol er.(~

Ct...t-

out on your retU!'!l, all-lays ass<.::!nins tha't one of·t~eue D-:Dt~~'s dce.'3 r.ot turn out to be 'real. \ore arc particularly conc"~rn::!i c.~jout r£.z2.i'\.1. ·t!iat a:~t. c.:' ---J!lul co;,rf', .. ' n40, "~~"l" ':. ~ ~~ "'.z ",~..:. _~ __ ¥;_"""*.t.,:.-_ """": ·b un... ucC,;v:;,:. _.vl~e~r ca!:;;:..:.1.U. Y if..:;; .:;.VO;..:v, CUIce", en~,;..,S-=.,.<: .. I." .'!.t....:.... e 'Is-id ;:;.~~ 01.U' door ~"';y ~u.blic· opinio!} aL-::ost everY'·Ther~. • ~:-.~r;:-:o-::~,· i·rhile sharillg your vie~T tha.t \fe should not be in positio!! of tt-u-rar-i:;i!:g cO:~:!l, .... . l> ...: -=::;;;.tld like to r..av~ o:ption of jud.g:i.r.g and. iiari.1ing en any,pla.l1;1·lith pocr li;~:::;~cts of success. . lore recognize that, -'"his is a large. order, bu-', P"".:.'esident W"d.l1;;S you to k.."'lO"tf of our concern: . '.


.

CAS 79~07, 30 Oct 163 .

FROM BUNDY TO LODGE

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063. leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para.) and on one or two ~esser matters easily clarified. 2. We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no pOvler . to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop.. it~ We believe that ·on this same basis you should take .. action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success.' \tle have not considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly reject that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe .that our own position should be on' as firm ground as possible, . hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above. , 3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high propsect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better. In such a communication you should use the \'1eight of U. S. best advice and· . explicitY.reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generalts interpretation of U.S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives. . 4. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assesment of prospects, and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange ~atest assessments on this topic. . 5.. To clarify our intent, paragrapl} 7 of' our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires ~.S follm·rs: . ' a. vIhile you are in Saigon you will be Chief of Country Team in all. circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it \'1i11 help to have Harkins f"c.lly informed at all stages and to use a.dvice from both him and. Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and. assessment. We continue to ·be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alienment of forces and level of determi~ nation among generals. .. b. tJb.en you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be Chief o~ the Country Team. Our or'y modification of existing procedures is that in"this circumstance T,re wisl all':': 'ruction to Canein to be conducted in .immedia:te consultation vlith HarkiI'ls and Lli th so that all three· krbw what is sold in Conein. Any disagreement arr. JUg the three on such instruction should be r~porteg.to Washington and held for our resolution, when time permits. c. If you have left ana a coup OCC'l. ~, we believe that emergency .si~uai;ion requires, pending your return, that d rection of country team be vested ~nmost senio~ off~cer with··expcriE'~e 0: military decisions, and the' officer in our view, is Harkins. \'Ie. do r'.t).... I.;el 1 that this 'switch in final ' ,. '. responsibility shC!~ld be publicized i~. ~, . md Harkins will of course .', be guided in basic 'posture by our in:.,' which follow in paragraph 6~ ... . .:. . ", &

..

"

-

~

~

~

-.-.-.~- ~.-. "


<f

,

"

"

4

we dO not believa tr~t this~switcltwill have the effect suggested i~ yo~ parag;l"a.ph 8~· ,,6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U.S"; ... , posture· in the event of', a coup. . . . a. U.S. a.uthorities will reject appeals for direct intervention . from either side, and U.S.-controlled aircraft and other resources 'will not be committed between the battle lines'or in support of either Side, without authorization, from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, U.S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any ac~s agreeable to both sides, such as removal . .01' key personalties or relay of information. ·In such actions, however, U.s. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or. appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of' coup. '. . c. In the event of imminent '.or actual failure of coup, U.S. authorities may afford asylum in their discreiion to those to whom there is any eXpress or implied obligation of this sort. 1>1e believe hOi>lever that in such a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if lJeed arise~. ' _ d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in-the interest of the U.S. Government that . it should succeed. 7. We have your message about return to 1-Tashington and we suggest that all public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of .your departure. We -are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out· of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided-we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

, 605"