HASC Pentagon Papers Part V B1

Page 1

UNITED STATES · VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945 · 1967 V.B.l.. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR - DTER.tW:. COl·1MITlmlTS ~he Roosevelt Administration,

67-244 o-71-vo1. 7-16

1940-1945


V.B.l.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMEli"TS THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION, 1940. -. 1945 .

,

Foreword.

. .'

. This portion of the study consists of a collection of U.S. Government documents which set forth the ra:tionale of U.S. policy tOiYard Vietnam. The collection represents t1'ie . internal commitment of the U.S•. as expressed in classified documents circulated at the highest levels in the governm~t. The documents are organized chronologically within eaca Presidential administration. This volume covers the Roosevelt years, 1940-1945.

1


JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- JllTERN:AL COMMITMENTS

" The Roosevelt Administra.tion) 1940 - 1945 Contents and Chronoiogical List of Documents

1.

U.S. views on Japan's demands concerning French Indochina are . given to the French Embassy. :l-!emorandum by Mr. Dunn (Political . Adviser) to Under Secretary Welles, 6 August 1940••••••••••..••••

1

. 2. Welles instructs' Ambassador Grel{ to convey to the Japanese tha.t the U.S. was "seriously perturbed" over Japanese demands con- ~ cerning Indochina. W'elles 293 to Tokyo, 6 August 1940....... .....

3

1941

.

"-

.,;}":

3. Mr. Cecil Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State, reports on Secretary Hull's view of the Japanese occupation of Indochina• . The occupation was seen as a threat to trade routes of II supreme i!nportance to the United States." Secretary Hull also remarks to SUI!lner 'felles that "the Japanese are seeking to dominate militarily 'practicall'Y one-half the world •••• II and will continue "unless something happens to stop her." 11-10 memoranda by Mr. Cecil Gray, 24 and 25 July 19L~1.................................. 4 .

4.

President Roosevelt' -proposes to the Japanese Ambassador to neutralize Indochina, creating in effect an Asian "Switzerland. II Memorandum by. Sumner Welles of conversation between Roosevelt and the Japanese Amhassador,'24 July 1941••••••••••••••••••••••••

8

5. U.S. publicly declares that the agreement between France and Japan regarding Indochina was unjustified. State Department pres's release, 2 August ·1941••••••.•••••.••••••••••••••• ~

6.

11

u.s.

proposes to Japan that the two countries endeavor to con- " clude a mul+ilateral non-aggression pact C'.mong Britain; China" Japan, Netherlands, Russd.a, Thailand, and the United States which'tiOuld respect the territorial integrity of Indochina. . Cordell Hull to Ambassador Nomura (Japan) 1 26 November 1941•••••• . 13

.

7.

President Roose~elt expresses to Emperor Hirohito that continuance of the Japanese troop movements into Indochina is "unthinkable. n }'iessag~ from Roosevelt to H·irohito, 6,December 1941. ••• ~. 14

ii


,1942

8. u.s. assures France that she will, be restored to full ilidependence "in all the grea.tness and vastness" which she possessed . before the war in Europe and in her colonies oversea.s. Letter from Mr. l-Iurphy to General Giraud~ 2 November 1942. (9~her U.S. policy statements for 1942 are quoted in Document No. 11, page iv, tollowing) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••

16

.

9. There follows

series' of commuications concerning the use of Chinese troops in Indochina. The U.S. rejected the French protestations and.' contended that the problem was primarily military. (President Roosevelt's decision was influential . in the eventual Chinese occupation of Tonkin and their subsequent replacement by the French.} •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~.. 8..

8.

17

Expressions of concern over Chinese participation in the liberation of Indochina by the French COlIIIIli.ttee of National . Liberation. M. Henri Hoppenot memorandum to Mr. Adolph ; Berle, A~sistant Secretary of state, ,20 October 1943•••• ~

.1...

. b.

18

Mr. Berle expresses to the French. that it is a military

problem but privately expresses the fact that Chinese .' . intervention forces the issue of \olestern colonialism versus Eastern liberat ion as a policy. Memora.."ldum of' . Conversation by Mr. Berie, 21 October 1943•••••••••••••••••• c. Berle writes to Ed1~ard Stettinius, Under Secretary of state, that military matters must predominate because if the Chinese do not intervene, then the U.S. must reconquer Indochina single-handed and later police and protect .it against the Chinese. Memorandum by Berle to Stettinius, ~? ,-~.J ok~ ••.•••••.•••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••• . "0 - n,...."......... ~v~ ..~~ d. Mr'. John Carter Vincent, Assistaat Chief' of Far Eastern ..' :' Affairs, views' the .post-war status of Indochina as a matter of speculation but does not rule out the influence of the Chinese. lvlemorandum by Vincent to Berle, 2 November 1943... e.

f.

Stettinius recommends to the President -that the problem is primarily milltary. Memorandum. by Stettinius to President Roosevelt, 8 November 1943••••••••• ·••••• •.••••••••• . . President Roosevelt. defers jUdgment on Chinese. involvement and leaves the whole matter to the "d:lscretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as essentially a military . problem. 14:emorandum by President Roosevelt to stettinius, 9 Novem.ber 1943...............•.......•....•........•...•...

iii

20

...

~

21

21


g. The F:-ench o.f'fer So rene~'lcci e.~rcesion. of concern over the apparen't intent to use' Ch~n¢~e troops in Indochina and a . last minute warning of dire consequences to the Allied cause i f the Chinese w~re used. Letter from M. Hoppenot to Berle, 13 December·1943 •••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••• 10.

President Roosevelt conversation 'With Marshal stalin on the possibility of a trusteeship for Indochina which he had discussed with Chiang,Kai-sh~k.· Exfract from Tehran Conference,

. November 1943. ~ •...•....•.....••.....•........•. -. . . . •. . . . . . . •

28 ,

'

22

24.

Secretary Hull conveys British interest in U.S. policy on : French Indochina to Roosevelt with summaries ot stated U.S. and British positions. The U.S. had continuously promised to restore to France its independence and sovereignty over its territorial possessions. The British, on the other, hand, avoided guarantees 6f "French Empire II integrity but alluded to the "greatness of France" and the lack of Britisli designs onFrench territory, 14 January 1944••••••••••••••••'••••••••••• l ...

26

12. Roosevelt reiterates his opinion to the 'British that Indochina "should not go back to France and that he was supported by stalin and Chiang Kai-shek in this view. Memorandum. by Roosevelt to Secre1iary of state, 24 January 1944•••••••••••••.••

30

11.

13.

;j

stettinius seeks approval from. Roosevelt to assume that ,French armed forces or French nationals would be used in the liberation of Indochina without prejudicing the question of ultimate status. Memorandum -by Stettinius to Roosevelt, 17 February 194~

14. Views of

tee • • • • • • • • • • •

eo • • • • ,_ • • • • • •- .

"Prp.Ri.d~nt. 'RooMvelt. wi,th'l."E'B:!?P.C'T.

~ ••••••••••••••••••••••

to

~~ttine

l..lp

31

a

trusteeship for :rndochina and expressions of these views to the British are· summarized.' MemorandtDD. by Mr. Grew, "Far East .Affairs) 10 Ju.ly" 1944.0_ •.• ~ .••. '._ ••••.••••••••• · •••. • '•• • 32 15.

Cordell Hull'seeks a decision from Roosevelt on the French ',' role in the Far East military operations. The British had requested of Hull affirmative answers on the attachment or a French Mission to Mountbatten and the establishment of a Corps in India., Menorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 26 August

1944 ".'

eo

16. Roosevelt defers decision on French role in the Far East until after the Second Quebec Conference, 11-16 September 1944. }lIemorand\m1 by, Roosevelt to Hull, 28 August 1944•••• ~ • • • ••• • • • • • •

iv,

34

35


rr.

18.

·

Hull follows-up with a new request to R008f'!V~lt for decision with the information that. the British were going ahead with bringing a ~ench Mission into South East Asia Command (SEAe) and other activities to get them installed. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 10 October 1944•••••.• ~.....................

35

Secretary Hull requests Roosevelt's decision on rendering support to resistahce groups, both French and native, in Indochina. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 13 October 1944...

36

19. Rodsevelt decides that the U.S. "should do nothing in regard

20.

21.

to resistance groups or in any other wa:y in relation to Indochma," Memorandum by Roosevelt to Hull, 16 October 1944......

37

Anthony Eden's views on the question of trusteeship for Indochina. Memorandum by H. F. Mathews, Office of European Affa.irs, 2 NoYember 1944.·•••.••••••••• ~ •. . • . . •• •••• •• • •• • ••• • ••••

37'

Stettinius sUlIII!larizes recent developments in relation to Indochina for President Roosevelt. Among the points covered " was that the O.S.S.representative in SEAC reported that British, French, and Dutch strategy appeared to be to l-Tin back controi of Southeast Asia with U. S. resources but "foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy matters. II Memorandum by H~l to Roosevelt, 2 November 1944••• ~ ••• •••• ••••

38

22.' Roosevelt appears adamant in a four point reply to Secretary of State; it was to be made, clear that the U.S. had made' no final decisions on, and expected to be consulted by the British, Dutch and French with regard to any future of Southeast Asia. ltemorandum. by Roosevelt to Stettinius, 3 November 23. 24.

1944..... ., . .•• . • . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . • . . . . .

40

France expresses strong interest in partici:pating in re covery of Indochina. Caffrey 316 t~ Hull, 4 November 1944•••••••••••• ·.

40

British aide-1l1emoire covers proposals for the use of French forces in pre-operational activities in Indochina. Halifax letter to Stettinius, 23 November 1944•..••••••.••••• '..........

41

.25.· Stettinius informs Roosevelt of British impatience over lack of U.S. reply to aide-memoire; the British were concerned that the U. S. had not determined an Indochina policy and could hardly keep the French out in light of their increaslng·strength. Memorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt,

r'

.

27 December 19411.••.••• ~ .• •'. •• . . . • •• . • • ••• . . •• ••••. • . •. • • . • • •• ••

v

43


.. 26.

Stettinius notes Roosevel;t's r~fusal t~ get "mixed up in a:n.y military effort" in Indochina'~'-~with the rejoinder that action at this time was premature. Extract from Stettinius diary J 1 January 1945 •••• eoe • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •". :

45

27. Stettinius informs Halifax that Roosevelt did not agree with sending French agepts to Indochina. Memorandum of Conversation, Stettinius-Hal~fax, 2 January 1945.......................

46

28. Seeretary of liar Stimson replies to state Department query whether U.S. actions in Indochina were consistent with Roose. ve1t's instructions. stimson letter to Stettinius, 2 January

ig45 •••• ·• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~• •••••• ~.................

47

29. Harriman revieWs Soviet attitudes ("hostilitY-to colonial exploitation and domination of native peoples ,by foreign imperialismU ) and assesses intentions in Russian relations ("not to consent cheerfully to any further establishment of Western milltary and naval power in that area") regarding French colonialism. and the future of Ind.ochina. Harriman·:,. I (Moscow) lJ8 to Stettinius; 13 January 1945 •••••••••••••••• ; ••• 30.

Patrick J. Hurley reports on I~dochina situation; General Wedemeyer has maintained a Itnon-committaJ. policy vis-a-vis Indochina. 1I Hurley 177 to Stettinius, 6 February 1945.........

31.· Roosevelt discusses Indochina trusteeship with stalin at Yalta. Extract of Roosevelt-stalin Yalta Conversations, 8 February' 1911-5••• ~ • ••• • • • ~ o• •

••

••

••••

~

58

59

32. Hurley forwards a "note" from the French Provisional Govern.ment concerning de Gaulle's :position on Indochina. Hurley despatch 111 to Ste~tinius, 31 January 1945 (State Department

14 February 1945). ~~ •••••••••••••••••

o • • • • ".

33.

34.

••

••

•••

60

Caffrey reports Generai de Gaulle's distress over the lack of U. S. support to henchresistance in Indochina. "What are you driving at? •••We do not want to become Communist••••. I hope that you do not push us into it." Caffrey 1196 to Stettiilius, 13 l-Iarch 1945 •••-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

65

Stettiliius seeks Roosevelt's approval of a proposed statement to the effect that the U.S. ''Will do all it can to support resistance groups. II Memorandum by Stettinius for Roosevelt, 16 March 1945.......................................

66

iss~e the statement proposed by stettinius (on U.S. support of resistance groups) as "inadvisable. It Memorandum py Le~ to Hull, 17 ijarch 1945.....

68

35. Roosevelt declines· tc?

vi


.19.~.5 (Contd) -

36. Admiral

Leahy authorizes the liar Department to give General Wedemeyer approval to send whatever assistance "can be spared without interfering with the war effort" .to the French resistance forces in Indochina. MeJ:I.orendum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary Dunn, 19 March 191~5.........................

37'! u. S. assistance through 14th Air Force to French resistance in Indochina is approved provided such assistance does not inter.fere with planned operations. Paraphrase of Wedemeyer to Chennault message, 19 March 1945.............................

38.

stettinius relates u.s. policy to the French Ambassador on furnishing assistance to resistance groups in Indochina. Stettinius to Bonnet, 4 April 1945....••..•••••.••••••••••••"...

vii"

69

n 72


,

.

.

751G .9~/81. , '.. "., ' , . , .:. " '. >.': \'..

.."

"

\.

~.

" -

_ .THE ,\ADVISER' ON POI.ITICAL RELATIOrrS (D~~,iH") .1'0 THE, • . \ ' UlfnER SEcr.ErgAnY~OF-STATE

..

..

'.'

(\'IE~LE~)l

. \'1ashingtcm" August 6 ~ 1940.

......-....

"-' -

- _...... -

.. ...

..

....•

.

,.

.

Acting upon your instructions" I called on the French Ambassador this morning and gave him the oral reply tUlich you have formulated to the Ambassador's alde-memoire of August 6th, on the subject of the demands ,made ~ihe 'Japanese Government upon the French ' Government with regard to authorization to send troops across Indochina, to use the local air fields L~ Indochina" to station forces at the air fields for the purpose of assuring their security" and to send planes,munitions" and all necessary material through Indochin~ destj~ed to the Japanose Army. I 'told the French Ambassador that we have been 'doing and are doing everything possible within the framework'of our established policies to keep the situation· in the Far East stabilized; that "Ie have been progress1ve~ly taking various steps, the effect of which has been to exert economic.pressure on Japan; that our Fleet is now based on Ha\>laii, and that the course llhich \'1e have been following, as in~icated above, gives a clear indication of our intentions and activities for the future. I also raised with the Fr~nch Ambassador the ·!l'.1esi::i"n ~'!h~ther it. \'1ou'.d be pract:1.c~hlPo fol' the French to delay discussions- \';ith the Japanese '-lith respect to Indochina fora period. I furthermore told the Ambassador that the British P~massador had been informed of this matt~r by you in a most' strictly confidential manner and that if the British had any . .; observations or comments to make'we would transmit·, ~hem i~lladiately to the French Ambassador. . ( ': Count de Saint-Quentin stated that he felt that this reply to the French request for assist~nce and support in her n~gotia~ions with Japan would very .. '.

..

:

• .

..

'lTaken frow 1·1SS. for Foraiin Relations of' the United nof yet clearedfor .oUblicat!on.-.. .: ..... ' : ..... .. . . .... .. .....

states~ 19}~O;

~

...

','

.

.

61-244 o-71-vol.1-17

.-

..

.

~

..

.:.~

:

. .. ..,:.

1 "

:

,

'

.:.:',

,:

.. ~~.

.


.. ",

probably not b~ considered ,by~his Government as sufficient prospect for supp~rt to enable them to withstand the pressins demands madaby tlle Japanese Government for the establisP.1llent or certain I'ights in Indochina 1n additi.on.. to the economic demands-accompanyIng ths former. He said tnat he did not thinl:: it \'lould be practicable for the French Gover~~ent to delay the negotiations because the. Japanese had themselves stated at the time' of making the demands that if the French Government did .not, acquiesce 1n the granting of these rights, the Japanese Govern~erit had every intention of taking the necessary action to acquire them. He went on to say that in his opinion the phrase "\'11 thin the frame\'lork of our established policies", when associated \'1ith the. apparent reluctance of the American Government to consider the use of military force in the Far East at this particular time, to mean that 'the United states would not use military or naval force in support of . ; any position ,¡,hieh might be taken to resist the' Japanese attempted aggression on Indochina. The Ambassador" asked me to convey to you thus his construction of your oral reply conveyed to him t~rough me this morning and his fear that the French Government would~ under the indicated pressure of the Japanese Gover~~ent, be forced to accede to the demands set'forth in his " aide -memo1re • . ' .. . . .. . . ..

.

~ J M¡ms CLEfitENT DUNN ',."

.:

.

.'

, 2 . "

-'.


751G.g4/14a: Telegram

,

.

THE ACTIKG SECRETARY OF 'STATE TO TaE Ar~ASSADOR

. ' _.

"."."

..

It~ JAPAN (GRRt'l) 1

.' .

. , f!al'aphras!fJ .

,

~~~.

'

6~

l'Tashll1gton J hUgust 1 p.m.

1940

~

293. ne~'1S agencies have carried repnrts that J.a1)2n has made secret; demands on France regarding F::,"e:.ch Indochina. As I'eported~ thase demands mc ludo l'!gilt on part of ,Japan to move armed roz-ces of Jtipan t hrough , that French pos ses afo-i , 't:le right of armed forces ot Japan to use air bases at cert atn poit.lta ther·a~ etc. ~'he stat'ements g1.ven by the 'S'ecr~tary or state to . the press on .~pril 17 and l!ay l~~ 1940~ set forth th1.l3. G<"'lernment I s 'belief that (l) Lnt er-ventdon in the domestic affairs of the N~the~lands Easb Ind1~sJ or (2) any alteration~ by ot.hez than peaceful pz-oce ssee J in their status quo' ",~uld be projudicial t:, t;l~ oause of securj.ty ~ s'ra611i~;-and peace i~ the ent Lre Pacifi.c area, ~vt just 1n the .regron 1n ~uestiol1. Also > 1~h€·!"e wa~ set forth tnc observation of the Government of the United stai;es that th~ belief restated in the p:::'~ced~ng serrsonce was ba~ed on a doctrine 'of univ~rsal applic~tion and that it 1s'a doctrine unequivocally supported by thi3 Governrr~nt. The same b~liaf and the same observation natul'f:lly apply to Fl"e:lch Indochi.na like~'i.t~:E.:. This Gover~l~nt is seriously per-tur~ed~ th?re~o~aJ over the '~ '.. h -i;' -_ _ --,tI.!1'l"::a1"r , _.. _ 0._._- ..._v._ J.'~ ,.,~

of

C!

_

.

l".::.n,,',,~o~1 J;''''. "'-"""

"h:,\ ""'•• " r."

"'' ' 0. ~._"""

~nv< .."' • ....,.,...-

mov. , .6 ..

+-

,,;> ....,.

.."

<: ~.

Japan has Blade to the ii'rench autnord t~e3.

If no O~je~tion is percei ved , 1 t i~ ~y desire that .. ~' at your early conveirrenc e you call upon' t;;~ Minister· for Foraign Arfa1~3 and th~t you ~xp~e~s tc ~1m~ as ._~ und~r instl"'l.~ctiG~ i'rCf:1 your Go-..rern::-.ent and along the liL~1s above indicated" the concern tel i.~ by ube \j',)vern-' ment' of the Unite:i states regarding the r~p'.)rtt3d .' developments .. j

.

.. -

.

~

.

1Asorin'+..ed _n 1 . .~. Or!:Lgn . 1 R' l 'ced •.,,"_ ~~~te·s·• e ... av~i ons Cl.~ ~l '" 1? Ui1.... 'J~panJ 1931-1941,' voT:-YI: -'oP:-289-290-:- --- .---- -

'.

.

I

,

. 3

..

.

'

...


...... J.WAN

£FFOR~S }'OU AOm-;EW:NT. WITH ....

\

.

\

In a telcphonn conversation thisafternoon with \l~'irst Secratary l'! thi! Chinese E~b:lssy on a routine matter, :Mr. T.sui repeated sub-:.• :Hi;~U)· the same question asked by !lIre Liu. l\:£y l'Cl>IJ' was tho :..::::~ 35 gi"'en to Ml:. Liu. After some hesitation and speaking ill t":;illt:C: ~rr. Tsui said that the ElUbnss~- was Wl".Y much concerned ,....er these - l'CIJOl"tS. Ho said that the Central Government felt t:'.IL ••• r~tlllg Yun [Chairman of Yunna» Province) ••• might be l::m1.'\:ted to besubjected to great Japanese preSSUl'e. • • • . ih~ foregoing situation would seem to be an additlonal reason fOl' __ t:.e laking of strong action in the event of the Japanese oceupntion ~·i th~ Fr~nch eo1ony. :t~_4}l)I1

P. WJ4-"t

.'!fl;i(,ran~!lm,

&1 lJ1'. OeciZ lY. Gray, A8sistal~t to the Sec-retal'V _

01 State

.

.. [WASJiINGTO~,] July 24. 191=1. In a telephone conversation with .Acting Secretary Welles at 12: 30 r'. 10. on July 23, there was considerable discussion about the Fill' E::$tern situation. Tho Secretary spoke of the latest venture of .f.!l~:m towardaequiring basesin Indochina in the fnce of the fact tl1at Japan was not threatened by, any nation on the globe•. This south'\". ard mO\"etnent, he said, stemmed from a. policy of force and conf:~lt~t. Hereferred to the friend3hip of Dllrlnu 41 and Hitler and of the "!\'hu~nts ill the French Government '\\'110 were in fn"or of turning all }"ranee orer to Hitler. '. The Secrciar,r said that, of course. our own Govemment would i:3 utmost to Cl1'l7 out any understanding that mig1lt be arrived at with Japan, and that Japan was not in danger ill the South Sea area, Hence tlmt country must be 'bent on conquest, ill which case :·~:nc futuroJapanese Government would take the finnl steps toward c!'iillillo.tion of that entire region. . ._ .. 'there foUom an eschange of vie'vs as to what Mr. WeUes should •.:~. to tll~ Japanese .Ambassaclor Intel' in the afternoon when he kep~ .:.~ aPl>ojntmentwith Mr. 'Yelles.~: . The Secretaty'sgeneral idea was tlUlt if the J apanese ,A,mbnssadol' ~~t·;:nptcd to e:tplain away the Indochina move by saying tlmt it had !"':::l brought about by peaceful means, then such "peaceful means" - .-.~; ere completely contrary to the spirit of the discussions between the . "l:ited St~tes.and Japanese Gcvernments looking toward a. friendly

do

. .,.t

..

M:n. Frllnto& DarloD, French )!Ioister tor Foreign .!.tratrs nnd '-lee Presi,~.;: th~ CoullCil ot ~IiDisters n-ic~ Premier). . . ,. • ~.:~ ::let::o::a:tdum b)" the Actin; Secretary ot State, July 23, 19-!1, Foreion

·.1'....:.111.., J3p:u1.1931-19-U. Tot. It, p.~.

.

. .. '., ...- ..

.. 4 .

".-

.


settlement in the Pacific. The United States Geremmcnt, Mr. Bull

said, corld only be drlven to the conclusion that our discussions for D. friendly settlement had been wiped out by the Indochina development, Tlla Seel'etary said that if \VO waited until 110 camehome to tell Ambns5~dol' Nomura the foregoing, then it would come too Into as a. warning to Japan. lYe must let them sec the seriousness of the stell tlle)" have taken and l~t them know that such constitutes an unfriemlhact because it helps Hitler to conquer Britain. The Secretary said tht{'t . if 1\"0 did not tell the Ambassador all this, he would not. sit down with Aclmiml Nomura when he came back to Wnsllingtoll. It 'Would be a farce to do so. . TI\ere followed quite a bit ~f discussion about counter measures on the part of-the United States, with Mr, Welles explaining what the British proposed to do, ",1\3t our Army and Navy boards favored, what the President favored) et cetera, and) as I understood it) the Secl'ctary left tho decision 011 these questions to the judgment of

thoseon the ground,

.

.... Secretary Hull then came back to the subject of l'Ir. Welles' forthcoming talk with .A.c1mir~1 Nomura, and he said that :Mr. Wellâ‚Ź.'3 might begin the conversation by speaking to Admil'al No!nm'a. caneeming a readjustment of the. United States position vis-a.-vis Japan scmewhat as follows: There is a profound belief everywhere, in view of many reports from man)" sources, tlmt the J apanese movement into Indochina has two probable purposes, or at least two possibilities this Government cannot ignore: (1) if this Government is to be safe, it is bound to assume thnt this act constitutes definite notice of the launching of 1\ policy of force and conquest on the part of the J apnnese Government; (2) this Government) in the interest of its own '&lfetj' and in tI\S light of all Japanese utterances and acts, must assume that by its actions and preparations Japan may be tntdng one more vitnl and next to the final step in occupying all the South Sea area. Such a stntem~llt. to the. Ambassador would lay the basis for our own future acts and would let the Japanese understand fully our

position. .

..

It was agreed.behreen the Secretary and ~rr_ Welles that there ,r:\s discussions fol' a friendly settlement with the Japanese unless the Japnnese policies are to coincide witll their professicns. We could get any kind of an agreement from the Briti::t~ and other governments looking to the safeguarding of Japanese lc~i­ timate Literests so that there is no real basis for Japanese elaims of being threatened or in danger. It was agreed between the Secretary and Mr. Welles that somethina must be said to the' press along the lines of the foregoing parao .

.no use to pursue

our

_-_.. ...._- ----

--~.- -~.-..:..- ....

_~

.~

.. ..:~

.


i':fgr<\~llS.M

'rhis would be for 'tIlO .p~trpose of making a. record about the real significance of tho J apanesemovement and Iikewise to acquaint the public with the fact that we knew what '....:\5 going on. j)Ir. 'Velles then read to the Secretary a. draft of n statement prepared by the Fill' Eastem Division. The Secretary made specific comment :as follows: make clear tho fact that the occupation of Indochina b;y Jnp:\n possibly means 0110 further important step to seizing control of the South Sen. area, including trade routes of supreme importance . to tho United States controlling such products as 'rubber, till and other commodities. This was of vital concern to tho United States. The Secreblry said that if we did not bring out this point om' people will not understand the significance of this movement into Indochina. 'rhe Secretary mentioned another point to be stressed: there is no theory on which Indochina could be flooded with armed forces, aircraft, et cetera, for the defense of Japan. The only alternative is that this venture into Indochina 1111.s a close relation to the South Sea. area and its value for offense against that area. The Secretary closed bysuggestlng that Mr. Welles make clear to Admiral Nomura that we are re'lcly and desirous of going forward with our discussions should circumstnnces permit, and that if an agreement were reached between our two countries, it would safeguard Japan far more securely than taking oyer Indochina.' He said ÂŁor }fro 'VeUes to ask the "A.mbl1ssador to send this to his Government.

.0. W.

, '140.0011 P. \V./421

GRAY

.'

Memorandum. by.Mr. OecillV. Gray, Assistant to the 8etrretary .. 01 State [W .ASlIDiGTO~, July 25, 194:1.] EXCERPTS FRO)I S:::cr~~T"Rl:" HULL'S RE)L\RKS L'f TELEPlIO~-E Co~VER. S~T!~~ WITH .A c::T,(X(: ~t::r.RE1"ARY WELLES ON JULY 25,1941 We havehad conversations for several months with the Ambassador . and his associates covering this matter completely and we couldn't" have offered more assurence to Japan for her entire satisfaction from . every standpoint than we did in those discussions. I told him (the ..~mbassndor) repeatedly that if this matte!" prcgreseed I espected to get a similar agreement with tho British, the Dutch,"et cetera, We have followed that Ull as the Indochina phase developed. You will remember we first considered sending a cable of inquiry to Japan nbo..lt tho Lidoehina matter, Then we sent Hamilton to see the.AmAFor press release Issued by the Department ol State on July 2-1 1941 see Foreign Re:atlo1ls, J'n,Ilnn, 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 313.' :.."

.. '

.. -'-., .,.- .._. .:.......

.'

6

.... __

....

_.


-....... c ,

FOREIGN

RELATION~,

..

\

.... .

19 H, VOLUME IV ~

...

""

...

. bassador when I didn't see him here to go over the whole situation. Then wesent Hamilton agninto sea his two associates for the purpose of keeping alive the 'whole situation th:l.t we had under discussion, Then finally, be/oloe they got to a face-saving stage, alter it W:lS ap¡ parent Ihat Ules were prep:\ringthe Indochina move, this'was followed up by a flnal step of summing up fo1' the record the pros and cons and making fl. flnal appeal to the Japs before it was too Iate, Tb.t • is the record we made. I think it ought all to be kept in mind. It is a fact that, in justice to the Administration, tho Government and the State Department; as the Chinese-Japanese difllcnltles developed, we not only expressed opposition and condemnation at appropriate times, but we gradually took steps of retaliation, I need not mention all the steps. 'When the question of oil became most seriously considered for the fh:st time, there was not n long period between that point and the point when Japan and tho Ncther1:lnds proceeded with their trade negotiations, whichinvolvedoil and raised the whole oil question. Now, in those circumstances, not with' tI10 iden of appeasing Japan ourselres, but merely to deal practically with an intemational situation that had become acute, so far as oil was concemed, in connection with those negotiations, and which was elead)" to remain acute until those negotiations were concluded, we rested our position before those negotiaticns had ended. The J apnnese Government through its Ambassador came to us with a. proposal for a. peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area, including the question of oil and evel'Jilung else, and I have had, as you know, . seventeen conferences with him. There is a strong so-called peace 'group in Japan back of him (tho Ambassador). Naturally, it; would havebeenutterly impracticalfor us to havefollowed a purclyappeasement policy when everyconsicleration wouldprevent us from putting on embargoes and penaltiesand retaliatlon during these negotintions. Mv iudC!1nent is that tllp. StlltA U,?nnl'tmpnt !lnd tl~~ Gf)Y~rmn~nt shC'1,,!!'! n~t ;ai"ioo much on¡ this J npanes~ question. The first thing we h"110\)we will run into n. storm. It is so delicate and there are so many angles to it. I am sure Japan is gOillg on unless something happens to stop her. This -i~ a world movement, . The J apanese are seeking to dominate militarily practically one-half the world and .apply the barbarous methods thnt they are applying to Chino. and-that }Iiti~r 'is applying in Europe, and if tlley have tReir way, they will carr:" out what tllel" are saying of their right to be supreme in tllat11:\1f of tho world, by which they mean military suprem:.cy with methods of arbitrary, selfish dominntlon and the Hitler method of piracy and naval controlof the seas. and commerce, At any rate, I just want ron to keep tb:lt in mind. o

o'

.

..'


711..94/e177 .

\ I

!

At the rC'quest of the Japur.ese A:1bassaeor, tr.e President rec~ived. the .A1ubass.gdor for an off.- the-record conference in the Oval ,Room at the t':hite l~ollse at fiY~ o'clock th-:'s a.fte~noo!l. At the Presirlent 's request J Ac-.ti.ra1 Stark and I ~'Tere present • •

.

. .

The Presiden.t then lTent on to say teat t~lis netr move by ,T~p~n _in Indochina creased an exceedj.ngl~i serious prob'lem for the United States.fe seia that, as I had s~ated to the (.~jassador yesterday, insofar as assuring itself' tr.at it could o~tain foodstuffs and raw mterials fl'O!l1 Inclochina" Japan, of course, had it ~eacLed an agreementvith the United States along the terms o~ t~e discussio~s be• r :tween Secretary null and the A~~essador, would h~~e beer. afforded ~ar greater assurances of o~taining such sl::.pplies than any ot!!.er nation,) More than that" the ~es~dent said, the cost of a~y military occu~ation 1s tremencl.o!J.s and. tr.e occupation itself is'not conductive to the production by civilians in occl~~ed countries of fOO~-suP?lies and 'ra~ materials o! the character requir~d by Jap~n. EO-d Japan undertaken to obtain the supplies she requi~ed from Ineoer-ina in a peaceful va~, she not only vould have obtained lar3er quantities of such supplies, but would have ,obtained the~ vith cor~lete security and wittout the draining expense ot a military occupation. Ftll'thermore, from the ~litary stand~oint, the President 'said, surely the Ja~anese Governmentcould not have i~ reality the slightest be~1er that China" Great Britain, the Netherlands or t!le United states had an~1' territorial designs on Indochina nor 'uere, in the slightest' degree 1?l'ovidillZ e..ny .real ~pxeats of agar~ssion a~3.inst Japan. This'Govern~ent, conse~uent~y, could only assume teat the' occupatdon ot Indochina 't,ia,S b'eins under-taken by Japan for the ~~rp~se of further'offense and this crcat~d a situation :Yhich necesso.rily l:itlSt give the United States tIle J::ost serious disquite. The President said tr.at he had'been rollo~:inz in con~lete detail

the ccnversatdons uhich had 'been progressinG bettreen Secretar-! Bull and the A!:!bassad.or and that he ~las confic.ent that the ArJ.~assador vTould . . , agree that ~he policies not under~a~en in Indochina by tte Jepcnese Gover:1.1itent vere cor:~letel}- opposed. to the prin.ciples and t~e letter of the proposed agreer:tent ~'lhich ~hCld. been under discussion.

.

'. ~

~_._--

. lAs printed in Fo!.e~gn Re~at:'r'.ns ~ t:lelJnited states: Japan,

1931-191;,1, -.... .... -.-

vo1-. tt, PP. 521.. 530. J

»

• 4o'. •

8


"11 I • 9"&+,1')1"" c.. • I

,. f' ",011 ,... "e

,.•

.

"

\,

\.

At this point the ;i.lbassador took out of his 'pocket t"t-l0 sheets of "notes ~'1hich he hod prepared and asked the President's permission to ref.er to them in order to make a statonent of his Clovernment 1s position.'

..

.

0

' .

. ' In tr.is exposition'the J:mbassador covered exactly the same ground which l}e had covered in his conversation "n. th me last night.·, The only-points of difference Here that a~ the outset of the conversation, the i~bassador verJ clearly and emphatically stated, that the move by Japan into Indochina was scmet..lting ~hich he perso~illy deplored and l,rl.t~ l ~e personally l-l~S not in agreenenb, .

. .. '

omich

eo .

. The President then sc?id that he had a proposal to make to the /.mba ssador l-lhich had occurred to him just before the i'Jn~~ssador ~ad come in and l-lhich he had not had time to talk OVf:r \-lith me before, maldrig hi~ proposal to the JJnbassa~or. . . The President said thr.>t it might be too late for him to make this proposal but he felt that no matter hOl" late the hour might bel he still wished to seize every possible opporburd ty of preventing the C?reation of a situation bGt'!llCen Japan a.'I'ld the United StCltes "ihi~h could only give rise to serious mistmdcrstandings bct~~cn the t"ro peoples•. The Pres.tdent stated that if the Japanese Government \-iOuld refrain from occupying Indochina l·n. tho its military and naval forces, orJ had such steps actually been conmenced, if the J~panese Government 'trould wi. thdrat-I such forces, the Prosident could assure the Japanose Governmant that he \oIould do everything lorl.thin his p0l-ler to obtainf.t'om t.~e ·Governments 01' Ctli.~aJ Great Britain, the ~ietherlands, and of course the United s~tcs itself a binding and sol~~ declaration, provided Japan liould undertake the same commitment l to regard Indochina as a neutralized country in the sane way in which St·r.i.tzerlnnd· had up to nO~l been regarded by the po...r ers as a neutralized country. He stated. that tl'.! s l-:ould imply th ct none of the powers concerned llOUld undertake my milital"fl act of aggression against Indochina and would remain in control of the' terri tory and WJuld not be confronted with. attempts to dislodge trom on the part ot de Gaullist or Free French agents or forces. " '

. .~".-.:::--;

.... c ,

-.-

. ....

',,'

. :

'

.

.• :.. .

'.- :',

'.

9."

0

o

"

-...

.

'. ..

.

.. :.:-

.. .. .

. ,..'". "","

."

,-

...

.

--

.


,'......... .•..

-." " ..•.

7ll.9L/2l77 Con't. l

."\

.. "

..: . _ .

thE:s~ stE::PS '-j~re. ~~kcn~" th~ Pl'esidcnt S~i~,,' J"pan "-todd. b~' ," givenIt' solem end bind'ine. proof tl1t!t no other po\~er had CffiY.' hos~le I designs upon Indoc~dna and tlwt Japan IDuld be e.frorded t.he fullest and if'recst opportun!.ty of assurdng herself of the source of food supp~es . and other ral-l ~att";ri~.ls in Indochina ~·:r.ichshe lras seeklng to secure._,

. The !in~bassador then r~i~eratEd c.:>ncisely and quite c1eerly l-lhat the Presidalt had suggesbed, He then made some statement llhich "!as not quite clear to ~'1e effect tl~t. S11Ch ~ st€P \l'Ould be ...· eri difficl.llt . at· this time on account of the face-sZlving element involved on tho part or Japan and th~t only ~ very great stnte:sman l-:ould reverse a policy at t.l}is time..

. . .• . • ,

.

..

',

The l.mbassador said that he would immediat~ly report l~s' conversation to his Oovermna.'lt in Tokyo. He seemed to be V6r'"{ l1ll1ch impressed t~th what trs president had sai.d but I did not gathor from his. reactiClns that he ...-as in any sense optimistic as to the result. 1

.

.

SC~e-g

...

W@1ey

'.

. -"

. . ..

• 1

....

'.

,.

.

~'.

-.

'.

:.

-

\

.

.',

...

",

.

.

: ,. .. . -.

...... :,.

-

"

'.':'

.. ..

.

'

.

....

:

'. "

.. : ",~:~. ",;". .. 'v,

... '.'

.....

:

.

.

-' ..•..:.: .: -:.;

....._------

..

.

..

.

"

, ,,'~-.'

.

.~

.-.....,'

..

,"

,"-

eO.

',':

..

.. .-.,

~

.

"

'.

".:

",

~. ,'.

',. .

,.0:':. ." .... ~ . ",

:

~~.. ':.,~.

.

-: ...

"-".

,'.

-,

.

'".

.

,

.

....

..

-

..

. ...• \

..

.

" . . t:orth the' Presiden~i:s propo~al' ~s '.

.......

..:~:<.. ~~'; .•~. . : ..... '

':-". .

..,

AUgus~

8.

,"

..

~

..•..~:

10'~'

-

....

:.1

,. " : " '" ".: .~ ,

..

", '

'';

:

.

- ' : '." .:

..

.... ,: ..': ',~ :. . ,

.. . ...;... . -"

..

"

'"

....

; " 4",.' ••.• :'

.'

:,

.

1~ ::f'ormal .

.

.

docucent s~tting pN:rc!'~~ to-the- Japanese Ambassador on .

..

....::. ' ,.'

~.

'.

.

-. .'...

.

.

. . . ...

.

...... . ....... ... .

;.

:


PP.ESS RELEl~SE ISSUro BY THE DEPi.R'l'HEHT

19411"

',' .

< .

~

"

,

OF

ST.".TE ON JmOUST 2" '.. """ . .. ." -,

~

..

0

The :..cting Secret::!ry of St:'!te" ·toil'. Sumner ,-rellcs, issued the follold.ng st:!tcm~nt on l.ug\lst 2 in reply ·to inquiries frofd the press concerning the coogrcomcnt entered into bctt-1een the French ~md J2pancse Goverlll1".ml ts regm'(tlng Fr~nch Indochina: .

• tIThe hmch Govarnrr.ent at Vichy has given repeated 'assnmncoa to the C-ovClnn~nt of the United St~tes t~ t it llOUld not cccpcrsbe ~r.i.th the l.xis powers beyond the obligations imposed on it by the armistice" and ·that it l:ould defend the territory under its coOntrol rgBinst 2J1Y aggressi ve action on the parb of tht I'd powers~ "This Government has no,,! zeced,ved inrorlll~tiori of the terms of the agreement bet10Jeen the French and J~anese Governments covering the so_call€od 'cor..nlon def'enee t of French Indochina. ' In effect" this agreement virtually turns over to Japa~ an . • import5n~ part of the French Ewpire. ' ., ." ftEffort has 'been made to justify thi s agreement, on the

ground,that Japnnese 'assistance' is needed because of some menace. to the territorial int.egrity of.Fre:nch Indochina by other posers, The Governmant of. the United states is unable to accept this explanation.. /.s I st~t€d on July 24.. th~re is no question of aYJ.y threat to French Indochina~ unless it lies in , the expansionist aiI:1s of the J~panese GovernmG"Lt ll . "The tumir.g ovcor of bases for military op erations and

at territoriel rights under pretext of Ico!l1.l1lon· defense! to

a pOl-IeI' whose territorial aspirations are apparent, here presents a .si tuatio11 i'lhich has a dir~ct -bea . . Lng upon ~'le vital problem of American security. For reasons which arc beyond the scope of any knotm agreem~"1t" France has now decided to perl-:U. t t:oreign troops to entor en integral pert of its Empire.. to OCC\lPY bases there m, snd to prepare operations ~i. thin French terri torJ lo.hich may b 0 directed against other peoples friendly to the people oof France • .

,

",

:..

,

.-

.. , . .. -'

o· ."

... ..

-.

"

-..

------~_ -,

,

..

.- -r.-:... " ." .lItnl.:.a.:~e. .... ~~encn

. ..

," :~

"

'." "

".

.

"

••

.... :

..

-

... ...•.. .. .~:..': . ,...... ~~.". :.

- • • :.

.. ->.

'."

" , : ..

"• •

.",

.,

.,

.•.... ;

..

.;"

: : : ' . ' . . . . . ,':.

-..

. . . '1 . " ." . . . .". ' As printeddin For~!gn Re,l~ti_~!l!! ~r th~ trI!~!=.~ $~.!!-otes: J.~:g,'4'~." 1931-1941, voi., II) pp., 320-321, For earlier ste.teuents on this subject)' see Dapa~t~e~t.'s jlress R,eleas·~s. ~:r Sep~: 4 and 23.. 194.0~. tel. 440 to Vic:::,' o~ Se:p~ 9, 1940, (I:ct'lnclttded. ~-

., .

cere).'

11 ....... ,

.'

and

~

.


The .i'l·.;ncA GCY~l'nacnt' at ~1chY has repeatedly declC'.red determination to resist all encroachments upon the :., . sovcreign~r of its terri~or.ies~ Roweverl.~he German end Italian forces availed themselves o~ certain facili~es in Syrie. to cer£:/on opel'ations direc·ted against the B:'it1sh" the French Govel·n:"':l.ent, althouzh this lTJ.S "a plain encro.ech.ment 011 territory und.er Frenc~1 control" did not resist. ~t when t~e'~riti~h lL~dertook defense operations in the territory of Syria, the French Government di~ resist. ....

~ts

"Undel· these circumstances, this Government is impelled toquestiOl1 l{het~'1er the French Government at Vich~· in fact proposes to raainta£n its declcred policy to pre"s'erve for the ~ench people t~le territories 'both at home and abroad .which have lone; been under French sovel·eig~ty. "This Government, r.ti~dful 0'£ ,its traditional friend-

ship for F"£ence, has deepl~' s~'!:lpath~zed with the desire of . the Frenc~ people to maintain their terri~ories and to preserve t!'l.em intact. In its relations vith the French· '. Govern.'l1el1t at Vichy and vith the lccal Fl authorities in French territories J the Un:'ted states will be gove:'ned . by the·~ifest effectiveness .with which those authorities . endeavor to protect these territories from domination aa"1d control by those pO"t·Ters which are seeking to extend their rule by 'force and conquest" or by the threat thereot. II 4ench

."

... .. '


"'

'"

~

.

DOCtmaIT lUJ.IDFn m THE SECRET1.RY OF ST1.TE TO THE : !J'm;~S.;DOR (UOHtiRA) O~l t!OVE1BER 26~ 19411

Tentative ~~drathout Commitment.

si»:..NESE

..

W:~SHL\lGTON, November

26, 1941. ,

Outline of Proposed Basis For I..greement Bct't-leen The United States J,nd Japan .

"

SECTION II STEPS TO BE Tl~KFN BY THE GOVEm,1NENT OF THE UNITED STiTES fJID BY THE GOVElU'IHENT OF Ji:.P1Jl-.

.

.

.

,

. The Government of the United States and the Government ot J~pan propose to take steps as follo'toJs:

1. The Government ot the United Stetcs and the Govermnent of Jnpan vill.endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact anong the British Em;>ire, Chi~a, J2.pan, the lletherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States, Both Govornm~nts ~rl.ll endeavor to conclude among the i:JIB rican, British~ Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thm. Governments an agreencn t \olhereundcr each ot the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should deve'Iop a. threat to the territorial integrity vf I~dochinc, to cntc~ into i~~~diate con~)'t~t.i.on ~nth a view to taking such measures as Inny be deemed necessary and advisable to meet . the threat in question•. Such agreement ~lould provi4e- Also that each of the Governments pal'ty to the agreement would not seck or 'accept preferential tr~atmeni in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and "lould use its influence to obtain tor each ot the . :.. ' signatories equ,Cllity ot· treatment "in tr~de and corenerce "lith Fren~h Indochina. . . . ,.'

. 2.

and

3. The G")verllIilcnt of 'Jap an 't-lill "zi. thdrail all militaryJ naval, air torces from China and trom Indochina.

po~ice

.

. .

'.

• '

.

I ~a;,an,

'"

...

.

,- , .

.

-

.

e.

•• .... '

..

"

',"\ ' ..

.

As TJrinted in Fort:! en Relations of the U:l5.ted St.~tes:· 1932:,-1941, vo;l. II; .pp. 76'0-770:-' , '-. . ,

,

....

~

0 _~

f

..... :._.13 __ .

-

..

~.

'

..

..

'


.. PRESIDEliT ROOsEVELT TO

.'

ID:!P~~tOR HIRORITO. OF JAPAHI

-!UftSHJ.I:GTOU7 . - December 6,

..

~

.

.

.

191101 •

..

ilore tW)n a year ago Your Hajesty's Government concluded an agrecilent nth the Vichl Government by 'toIhich five 01" six thousand J~panese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Illdo~ .China tor the protection of Japanese troops vhich vere operating . against China further north. And this Spring and Slu:nner the Vichy Government permitted f\\rther Japanese military forces to enter into' Southern French Indo-China for the cOt!!non defense of French IndoChina. I think I am correct; ill saying that no attack has been made' upon Indo-China.. nor that any has been contcIT[)iated. . During the past· fe'l veeks it has become cle~ to the lTorld that. Japanese mili ~ary.. naval and air forces have been sent to Southe:r~ Indo-China in such large nurabers. as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concertration in Indo-China is not defe..'lsive in its character. Because these continuing concentrations in Ingo.Ch~n~have reached such large proportions and becanse they extend nou to the . southeas~ and the south~lest corners of that Peninsula l it is only reasonable that the- people of the Philippines l of the hundreds of !sland~ of tn-e· Eist !ndi~s.l (>r!-!~la~l'e. and of Thailand itself ere asking themselves vhether these forces ot Japan are pr~paring or intendins to ltake attack in one or more of. these many directions.

..'.

I. am. sure that Your Majesty vTill understand. th~t the' fear of

. all' these peoples ise. legititlate fear in as much as it in-volves thei'r peace and their national existence. I am sure tha.t YoUr l-~jesty will . understand vlly the people of the United States in such large l1UMbers look askenee at the establishn:ent of mlitary, naval and air' bases manned ande~uipped so greatly as to constitute. armed forces capable of measUres of offense •. .

- lAs

printed

'

.

..

'-

. . -..... -.4

.,'

~'FO?:~ig~ Rela.tions ,of

the United states:

• Japan)" 1931-l911-1~ vol. XI. pp. 784-786. -. 14::·' •

I

."

..

,


';'\

It is clear that. a conti.nuance of such a situation is! unthiRkable. . '. \ I, None of the :ps:o!)!es l1hom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or perrr.snently on a keg ot dynamite.

1. thougilt on the part of tr.e Udtted States

There is absoluteel] no of invading !nao-China if every,Ja~anese'so~dieror sailor vere to be vithdr&tiU therefro~.

F..JlAliICLIN路 D. ROOSEVELT

..

l~.路


740.0011 European tolar 1939/?~1~61 , -- .... _......

to General -Henri Giraud - - - _::.=..=.:..=

-

. November 2, 1942 The General: Referring to the declaration made on several occasions ~y President ,Roosevelt; and the obligations already undertaken by the ,American GovernIJlent as l'lell as by ti:e Bri ir,-sh aover;(\.lnent~ I' am able to assure you thatl;he rsstoration of France to full independence, in all the greatness and' vastness which it possessed before the war ih Europe as well as oversea$1 is one or the war aims of the United Nations. .' .', -

r¡

.

,

It is tho~oughly understood that French sovereignty will be re-established as soon as possible throgghout all' the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over'which flew the French flag in 1939 •

.

The Govern~ent of the United States considers ~ the French nation as an ally and will treat it as SUCh. .

.-."

"

-' . May I add further that in 'case or military operations in French¡territo~y {whether in Metropolitan France or in the COloniesj in all inst~nces where . French collaboration cay be found, ~he American authorities will not intervene in any way in those affairs which ar~ solely within ~he province of tie . , national administration or which have to do \"lith the _ -exercise or French sovereignty. .

16


CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED ENTRY OF CHINESE 'l'ROOPS INTO INDOCHINA TO CO~IBAT JAPANESE

FORCES IN' THA'f COLONY 1 'UO,OOllPo:c:ille wu/3~31

2'M lrashington Delegatio1t 01 the French OO1nmittee 01 National Libcl'aUo·1/. to the Depai·tment 01State 2 [Translation]

'V

ASliISG'rO~;

.

October 20) 1943.

. 1tIEllOr.A~DUy.

According to certain information which has come to the knowledge..I, 0.£ tho Committee of National Liberation, Allied plans of operation;', in the F.u· East would, in the near future, include the start of opera.·. , tions against tho frontiers of Indo-Chinn, operations entrusted tq', Chinese troops. . The Wasllington Delegation of the Comiliittee has alrea.dy bad occasion to call the Department of Stnte'& attention to the absolute- , importance to tho Allied cause of associating the competent French .• authorities with the detailing of Allied war plans in the Fa.r East)' especially when their execution involves French Indo-China. The &forem~ntione(l authorities possess, in this field) document.."tion and experience which can DC of the greatest use to the .tUlied High COpl. mand. '1'he 1'010 which France has traditionally played in the Far East, the importanhinterests whichshe has. there) the dispQsitioos nlrea.dy taken by the Algiers Committee to participate when the time comes in the struggle for the liberation of Indo-China, are all)as many ~ . .l! t'I!' _I· .... .. ,.. .. mora) reasons ...vi an ilat:c~i...e .1! h:lltu .l"U·UC1p1LUOn 111 mter-auiec, Councils w110r6 the general strategy of the United Nations in the:Far ' East is determined. As concerns th~ project of Il. Chinese offensive against Indo-China, the Algiers Committee-if the information which has reached it 01,1 . this subject.is correct-must rery seriously draw the attention of the American. Government to the great danger whichits realization would present. I

1,.-

T:t

,

.....

&Colltilllied from Forei!ll& Relations. lri42, ChIll:!, pp. 149-160. . Handed on October 21 to the .-\ssistant Sec!'etnry of State (EerIe) b1 H:!D\i Hoppen~ Delegate of the F1"ellch C01llmittee of Xatlonal LiberatIon. I

...

~

17


A Chinese attack against Tonkin woiild have the immediate effeet of causing the whole Indo-Chinese population to rise against tho ,Allies. , FOl" the Anuamitas, theChinese, who IHlV'o so frequently inthe past invaded and ravaced their frontier regions, represent the hereditary o , enemy, Far from greeting them as liberators, the local population would Impede their advance by every means ill t11Cil' power. i\Iorc over, the population and the French troops, Wl10 would take the side 6f the, Allies if it were French, American and British forces which were coming to their help, might very 'Well react. against an attack by the Chinese, whose true Intentlons could easily be confused by enemy propaganda, The position which a Chinese attack apparently will cause civilian and military French Indo-Chinese to take will in the future bedifficult to modify and the consequences or such a mistake run the risk of weiglling heavily upon the development of the campaign. The French Committee of National Libemtion believes, therefore, that it is of the highest Importance to set aside 3. project which, far from serving Allied interests, runs the risI~ of causing the greatest harm, The Committee, Iikc...vise, equally belieres that,. as concerns military operatlons whose theatre would be French territory, it is Imperatlrc to ask tho Alliesthat no decision should be taken without cur previous agreement. 4

1(0.0011 PaclBc:W3r/l::i31

Me11/,oranamll, of Oom:er$atio)'l" 'by the A.S.~;8tant Secretar!l of State . ,. (Bel'le) [WASnt~GTON)]

October 21, 1943. lI. lIoppenot camein to see me at his request, He handed me the _£..t. .. ~'I.. ... : I _ " ",,__' ... _S,",,.l..: JJUiJ",UV.44C.U\.U04U""J ..

U&,,,,a~J.U::...l

.. l.. ,..I.... " ....l"I4-'t. ..."" "''t.. ... 1;'

"£."""'.

~""""'~~

uu.~"

\tu,,", ..1.·

\..

'T......: ..._~ll"t __

\-4 .."'.,4 ",,'c.\\lJ.UUU.I.

'-luau·

'mitteeunderstands tluit Chinese operations will presentlyopen ng.\inst. ' the Japanese withln the frontiers of Indochina. This ga.ve great. eoncem to the Committee of Xational Liberation•.If Chinese troops attacked there, plainly there would not be any support from the French, since the Chinese had always claimed interest there, and it was not unlikely tIlnt. the French troops would defend against a . Chinese attack. ' . I asked whether this matter had already been brought to the attention of the C:liefs of Stall. M. Hoppcnot said it had, through General , . ·SuprtJ. .'.

18


/'

..

.

Bethouart, I thanked him. for the information and said that the matter presented was J,)l'imal'ily lor iuilitl\ry consideration. , A[OOLF] A. B[l::~LE]) Jr-..

NOTJ:: But it is not only for military consideration. This brings us squarely up to the problem of whether, ill the Far East~ we nrc reestablishing the western colonial empires 01' whether we are lettiug the Enst liberate itself if it can do so. I feel that the matter should be discussed ou no high level ,....ith the President for his decision. I . do not know that we need to settle matters with the French Commit. tee in Algicl'S. If the Chinese can do anything against the Japanese in French Indochina to the general advantage of the war, I have dillkulty in seeing WIlY \YC should stop them. •c\.[DoLr] A. R[Em.E]) JR. '140.0011 p:tclac Wllr/3531

Memt)'}'anclu1il, 'by the Assistant Secl'etaJ'Y 01 State (Berle) to the U'1I.derBccretal'11 oj State (Stettinitls) , (W_\SIII'!\G'ro~,] October 22, 1943. Mr. S'l'E1'TI~'"Ius: In connection with the application of the Fl'encll Committee of National Liberation for membership on thePacific Wal" Council, it is of interest tlt~\t the representative of the Committee yesterday presented us with a request that we do not permit tho Chinese to take part in operations against the Japanese troopswhich are presently occupying Indo-China. The Committee observed .that if British and...American troops accomplished the reconquest this would be quite all l'ight; but the French, and particularly those in .Indo-China) considered the Chinese as their hereditary enemies (erb/efnde); if tlley took part in the liberation of Indo-China, probably they would claim new ten-itory. '. 'l'he French wouldpush this view in the Pacific War Council. Tlus wuu1\.l 'p1'utmt1y 'L~ ,~i.ippui:te\.l hi tll~ TIdtisll urul t111~ Dutch, T1ii& would present us) for all practical purposes, witl\ the task of reconquering Indo-Obina almost single-handed (since the British interest .stops with Burma).for the sole purpose Gf returning Indo-Ohim, to France. France is unlikely to be able to maintain herself in control -of, or protect, that province for a good while j so that 'We should hn.ve the added job of policing and protecting it against the Chineseas weU as the Japanese in the interest of the French Colonial Empire. It strikes.me that this fact should be called to the attention of the President end also of the Joint Chiefs of Sto.ff." I think we should ~ Mr. Stettinluil repliec} to ~rr. Cf>rle: "I agree " . ltb1ou that the matter of French represeutation ()!6 tile Pacific War Couucil lind also thetr

.' IOn October

,

....

__

-:._- _._---. --_ .. - •

. ...

. .19

,

.

...

~

~.,-

.-.

...

~.~.~--~

,"

..

.


...

.

PROPOSl·:O CAMPAIGN. IN , , IN)OCHCNA .

"

.,

,

answer the Fl'ench Committee that thele representndon will receive cOllsicleratiol', but thnt militury factors, must predominate in the

decision. Fr:mkly, I doubt. if we could defend before the Congress llo Tel'Y considerable expenditure of Amerlcan lives for the sole purpose of kcc})ing Indo-Chluu in French, as against Chinese or Indo-Chinese, hands, • • • . . ' . : .. ..

.A[DOL1'] ...4,.. B[ERL'E], In. 140.0011I'aelli.c: W:1rJ$531

MemoraTU]UI1& by the .t1ssista·nt OM;;lol the Division oi FaJ··Eastel'n Affairs (Vincent) to t.~e .AsJz·~tane Secl'e~ary 01 State (Berlep [WASHINOTO~,]

November 2,19!3. MR, BF.r:I.E: W'e have tend with keen interest your memorandum of couversation with :Ml'. Hoppenot and his alde-mcm021'c, and concur in the opinion expressed in YOUl' note. . There is at the bottom of page 1 of tho aldc-mCm02J'C the following statement which 'We feel should not pass without commeut: "Pour l'Annamite, Ies Chinois, qui ont si frequemment dans le passe envahi et ravage Jeuzs regions frontieres, reprdsentent l'cnnemi hercditairc." This statement is grossly misleading) if not actul.llly false. In 1879 the Anna mitessought, military aielfrom China to drive out the French. It was Cllirut's weakness, not Annamite dislike or fear of China, that· permitted the French to remain, Recurrent waves of Annamite nationalism hare Iooked to Chinese nationalism for inspiration and guidance, pnrticolarly since' 1920. Today there is undcrstcod to be in southern China a group of .A.nnalliites which advocates independence for Indochina and seeks Chinese support. It is our belief that the ."uw.amites, by aad large, hare fur tl1i:? Chinese .. feding of fdt:u.~miie:,:) and cultural affinity.' " The Chinese Govermnent's attitude regarding the post-war status of Indochu~ has been cautious, Officials of the Government have disclaimed territorlnl ambitions but n\ey have at times intimated that Chino. would desire all arrangement which assured access to the sea from Ywm~n Province U\r011gl\ Tonkin to Haiphong, Independence for Indochina is included in the Chinese Government's general advocr.cy of self-government for eastern peoples. request tbat tl:.~ Chinese be nsked Dot to conduct mtlltary operations within Indo-China should berefe"l'el1 both to the Presldent nnd to the JolDt Chiet;]

.

~S~~·.

• Inltinled by tlIe Chief ot the D~vision ot f'ar Eastern Affairs (Ballantine),

20


j'Oltl::1GN lU;l..o\'l'lONS, 19013, CIUNA

'l'he.post-war status 'ofJtl'cuch Inc10phina is n matter of speculation: , return to France; international control; and even British control, It is our belief that the .Anmunites are fundamentally capable of selfgoverlIDlent and tllat it should be the objective of any post-war administration to train Ann:lmites to resume the responslbilltles of selfgovemmcnt, This objective might be achieved by n continuation of French admlnistmtion for tL definitely limited perlod or by international.\dministrntion. There would seem tobe 110 reasonable basis fOl' . Britislladminlstmtion. In any event, the Chinese Govemmentshould beconsulted and its views given full consideratlon in regard to plans f01' the future of Indochina. . .

.. " .

"."

.,-10.0011 PatUle\Vllr/M31

Nemora7U1u11I. by tlta ActingSecretary a/State toP'I'&idcnt Roose'I1ell November 8,19-:13. M. Henri Hoppenot; the Dclcgt\te of the French Committee of ,National Liberation, has left with the State Department a communication, 3 copy of wMcll in translatien is attached hereto,' giving th~ reasons ll.-hy, in the opinion of the Committee, it would be 8. mistaketo entL'ust to Chinese troops the In.unching of milit.'\l¡Y OP01'llt.iOnS against .Indo-China. The main reason adreneed is that tile Chinese are the hereditary enemies of the .~,nmullites and that en attack by the Chinese would therefore be resistedby tho localpopulation as well ~ . by French troops. It is our belief t11t\t this presentation of the C8S& , involves allegations not in accord with the ft\cts, and that the AnMmitea, by and large, have for tile ClUl\~"'O a feeling of friendliness nnd cultural afainity. '.. . '' The pro})lem t.o which these. representations relates seems primal'ilY" to be a JUilitary problem for the Joint Chiefs of Sb1f. 'We understand tb& it has nll'cady been bl'ought to the attention of that body by GenOra1 Bethouart, Chief of the French Military :Mi$ion. ' , : . ::... ' . EowAltD R. S~ms, Ja. .

.. :.

. WASmNG'ION,

.

.

'

~. :..:~ ...

.

"'0,0011 Pacilc W l l r / 3 : i 8 ' l ' ,':

.... . ~

. ..

.:". ~ '. :.".......;. <:>.

. '.'

... :.

'.

; ~:

'.l~ :,..:.:~ ~ / :

M6'IM'I'antlum by P'I'eaident Roose'IJelt to tAs .Acting Becretar!lofBtaU . . . . .... "

. 'AaI",.• .

...;.-.;

.

. -.:..

.:

"

..

, ".

21 .

.


.0

.,

PBOPOSED CA.."UPA!GN IN INDOCHL.':A ' \

.

.~.

The wholematter shouldbeleft to tho discretlon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to thl\CommandingOfficers ill the area, This is essentially amilital'y problem,

0 •• :

•••

T40.0011 Pllcillc WCl'/:JS3ll

.,T1&8 Delegat(J 01 the French. Oommit~ec 01 J.Yatio1w,l Liberation (Hoppe/lot) to tile ~lssi~tant Secreta',,!! 01 Stat8 (Berle) o

[Tr4nslntlon]

No, 759 WASllI~GTON, December 18, '1943. DEAR ~bt, BERLT.: I have already had occasion to speak to you of .

of

the interest which the French Committee National Liberation would attach to beingassociated in the inter-Allied deliberatlons concerning the conduct of the '\\":1.1' in the Fal' East, particularly when it is a matter of operationswhich may inrclre Indochina. I l'efer particul:ll'ly to the aiae-memoirc which I transmitted to )'on on this subject October 21, and which contemplated on the onehand the entrance of a representative of the Committee into the Pacific Council, and on the other hand the apprehensions caused nt Algiers by r.. proposed , Chinese oft'ensh-e against thofrontier of Indochina. . . , .M. Mnssigli has just requested- me to .l'ecall this question again to yoUr high attention. 1.'he cooperation of tho French staff with the Allied staffs ill the Far East has as n matter of fact entered into l\ new phase foUo,ring . the sending to Delhi, with the accord of the British War Office, of a French military mission commanded by Gcner:t,t Blaizot. This new fact seems to make it more desirable that l:\ parallel eellaboratlon should be established at lVasllingtoll, by the association of a French representative ill the deliberations of the Pacific Council of which delegates of all the Powers participating in tho war etrol't llgains~ Japan are members.' . ' We have learned, moreover, that tho proposed Chinese opereticns on the frontier of Indochinahave not been abandoned and thnt irregular Chinese troops,staffed by Amerlcan'officers, ate said to be trained at the present time for this purpose near the said frontier. The Chinese elements ill question are precisely the ones whoso incurslons and pillaging have frequently created, in the course of recent decades, a state of Insecurity and trouble in thnt region, and their reappearance on Jndocbines» t~rritory, even with the corrective of l\ stnffof .American officers, would aggravatefurther the repercussions 01 anv Chinese action on those frontiers, I~nowing personally the mellt~lity both of the French of Indochina and of tIle natire populations ofthe Union,

22


" . t¡

','

}"OltEIGN RELA'l'lONS, 1043, -CHINA

"

I am convincecl tlmt notlling could-mere seriously hinder their cooperation 'with tIle .Allies than for tho liberation of Indochina to appeal' to be entrusted, even prcvisionnlly, to Chinese formadons ",Mell,"in the prescl\~ case, 'Would appear to them not only as tlle advance guard ,of the hereditary enemy of Annnm and Tonkin, but as tho direct descendants of tho bands of pirates and Jolly Rogel'S who have so ,long caused the thrent of their exactions to weigh upon tl105B regions. Just as American 01' English troops would be welcomed as allies and . Iiberators, so ""0 run tho risk of seeing French and natlves react strongly against the use of thCS3 Chinese elements. I do not believe that a. more serious political and psychological fault could be committed andI take the liberty to beg you to call this point agt\in to. the very serious attention of tho competent nuthoritles," , , . .Plense accept [etc.] lIENr.I HOl"l'E...'fO'l' • On January 3, 10-!4.1Ir, Berte wrote Y. HOPl)Cnot thnt the contents of hia letter bad been transmitted to approprIate authorities ot tile, Go-rerDmeot.

........ ",:

.

:23,'


"

',.

Extract from Mzmorandum or Cor~!ersation .. between P~e$ident Rooeeve1t and Marshal Stalin, . " . lfovember 28, 1943, 3 p.m. l . "~~RSHAL STALIN expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they

should not be entitled to shara in any or the benefits· of' the peace" rn viel'l of their past record of .col, 1abora tion ~li th Gerinany.• THE PHESIDENT snid that r·1r. Ch\t!'chill \"as or the opinion that France \'lould be very qUickly reconstructed as a strong natior.\) but he did not person- .. ally share this view since he felt that many years or honest labor would be necessary before France would be re~established. He said the first necessity for the FranchI not only for the Government· but the people as \trell, nas ·to·. become honest citizens. . '

J.1ARSHAL STALIN agreed and "lent -on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indo-China, for example" to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent· . events in ~le Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan~ in his opinion" that in addition to military missions; it was necessary to fight the Japanese in.the political. sphere as well~ partioularly in view of the fact ·that the Japanese .had granted the lea.st nOtT}.inal independence to certain.colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indo-China and that the Frenc}} must· pay for their criminal collaboration '-lith Germany. '. .

.

." .

1

Handbook or" Far

.

'

..~ . 0'·

Easter~

:.

.

..

I

" .

.

.

Conference Discussions (Historical Division Reaearch Project .No. 62"November 1949)" Secret." . . pp•. D16-D17 .. Top . "'24

..

~"

." '.

, .

"

.


THE ?HESIDENT said he \'laS l6~l1n agreement .,,'1th Narshal Stalin and r-emarked that after 100 years :Of French :r.~ttlQ ill Indo路-China, the lr.habi tants l'/ere worse off than they had been Defore. He said that Chiang Kai She!: had told him China had no designs on Indo-China but the people of Indo-China were not yet ready for independence J to, \'lhich he had replied 'that tlhen the United States acquired the Philippines, the' inhabitants "I:ere net ready for mdependence which would be granted without qualification upon the end or the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai Shek the possi- . bility or a system of trusteeship for Indo-Cbina which \'TOUld have the taatc of prepar-Ing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 3? years. .. v1ew~

}~~SHAL

STALIN completely agreed with this . .J


DISCUSSIONS REGARDIXG THE FUTURE STATUS OF FRENCH INDOCHL."lA axn FRENCH PARTICIPATIOX IN ITS LIBERATION .FRO}! J.APAl.'tESE OCCUPATION

Memo1'anamn

oy the Secretary of State to Presiilent Roos6velt ZO

'V~\Sm~GTOx"January 14, 1944:. Last week in a. conversation Z1 which I had with the British Ambassador 11e stated thl1;t, according to information from his Foreign Office, yon had spoken rather definitely during your recent trip of your ·views concerning the future of French Indo-China. According to Lord Halifax information you 11uc1 expressed the opinion that Indo-China should be taken nw~l.Y fro~n the French and administered by an international trusteeship," He wondered whether this repre.sented your final conclusions and attached importance to thG matter in view of the fact that reports of your alleged conversations would undoubtedly get back to the French. I informed the Ambassado» that I did not know whether you had come to nlly final conclusions on the subject and addedthat, in my judgment,you and ~{r. Churchill would find it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately, and per. haps finally at somefuture stage. II Copy of memorandum obtnined from the Franldln D. Roose\"eit Library. Hyde Park. N.Y. • , . " AFor extract of memorandum" ot this eenrersatlon, dated Jannary 3. 19H. see Foreign Relatio1Z8. The Conferences fit Calro llnd Tehran, 1943, p. SM. »A memoraadam of July 21, 10-:13, obtained froUl the Frankliu D. Roose~elt . Librarv at Hyde Park. N,Y,. records 11 statement by President Rooscrelt in the thirQ··thlrd meeting of the Pacific 'War Council that Indochina should be placed onder a trusteeship until it was ready for Independence.


• .;-:

zOllEIGN RELATWX5, 1944,

·As of possible interest to you I

'VOLU~n:

m

~ enclosing two brief memoranda

citing the more important public statements or commitments by ourselves and the British with regard to the future of French territory after the ""ar. .. .

...........' :.i .

C[OlIDELL] H[ULL]

•10 -.

.

[Enclosu~

1] .: :.:.. " . JA1>t-UAltY 7,1944.

· • • :'

..

.

~ "

""

.

.

".

• U~'"1TED STA'l"1:$ POSITIOS

'Y"Im

RESP1:CT TO

Fnsxcn TERRITORY A"FTER

.

. . . .", . .... .. . .. TREW..ut

.; During the past three YC(l!S there have been n juunber of public pronouncements, as well as unpublished statements, by the President, the Secretary of State, and other high ranking offlcials of this Government regarding the future of French territory after the .war. The' most important of these pronouncements and statements are set fOl·th below. " 1. In a statement issued on August 2, 1941, concerning the agree~ent entered into between the French and Japtmese Governments regarding French Tndochinn, the Secretary of State said: 2S "This Govemment, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French peo}lle to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In tts relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which. are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof." (Department of State Press Release N'o. 374)

2. In a letter to 1tlarsb;d petnin. in December, 1941,t' President Roosevelt stated that so long as "French sovereign.control remains in reality purely Fre:v.ch" the American Government has no desire to see '. existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or any of the . French colonies "pass to the control of any other nation". 3. A State Department press release of March. 2, 1942 2S (No. 85) relative to the situation in New Caledonia, included the following words: . .

"Th~ policy of the Government

of the

United States "as regards

~nce and French t~rrit{)ry has been based upon the maintenance of

; • For coItlPlete te:tt of statement, see Dep3rtment of St3te BUlleliH, AuguSt 2. 19n, p. sr. . .. a For t~"t of letter of December 27, 19oU, sec ForeiglJ R61ali&n" .1941, voL n• • Po 205. . . _ . . • Department of State Bulletil~,lrnrch1,1942, p. 2OS. .' '.

~...

::.

0'

.,. '.

"~

. ," a"."

-:.

". -

-.'

,'-

,.

.

..

..:.:._--~-:,_. ~ ~ ..... :.._.~.;;' :': . .

27 .

"

.... -

-

,

."~

..

' . '"

..J


".-

or

the int~~ity France and of the French empire nnd of the eventual restoration of the complete Independence-of all French territories," T~o above statementwasqualifiedby the following

words:

''In its relations with the local French authorities ill French territories the United States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect their territories from domination and control by the common ., .. . ' . ''.. enemv," .. . 4. In n note of April 13, 1942,=6 to the French Ambassadorat Wash-' ington, relative to tho establishing of all American consular estab-: lishment at Brazzaville, the Acting SecretarJ of State s..'1.id:· ... "The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territory of France and over French possessions overseas. The Government of the United States fervcntl)- hopes that it mav see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory."

'.'

5. At his press conferenee on :May 21, 1942, in reply to an inquiry . as to whether the' United States considered itself bound to the restoration of the whole French Empire after the war, the Secretary of State said that this question had not arisen, .. " 6. In an unpublished letter of Xovember 2, 1942, to General Giraud, thePresident's Personal Representative, ~fr. ~.Iurphy, wrote:

"It is thol"Ougbly understood that French sovereignty will be reestablishedas soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial,over whichflew the French flag in 1930." 1. The landing of American forces in North Africa. on November 8; 19-!2,zr was the occasion for n. number of assurances to the French ' people regarding .Ame~ict111 motives- .Among them' were the follow~g.: . . . In his message to ~Iarshall'etain2S the President said:

"I need'not tell you t11:,\t' the ultimate and greater aim is the liber-~-' . tion of France and its empire from the Axis yoke," . ., The President's messcge> to Admircl Esteva, Resident General at Tunis) concluded with these "Words: .... ".' . . . "I know that I may count on your understanding of "American friendship fo':" France and American determination to liberate the French empire from the domination of its oppressors."

.

.

• POi'ei!J" Relctton«, 1942••01. n. p. 561. Ir For correspondence concerning the landings of

liP. 4-"9-432,'

f.

. .

.."

'.

."

".

,,_... : ' .. ~

~o\"ember 8, 1&;2,

• -Department of State Blllleti1~, No.ember 14, 1942, pp. 904,

,-!.b~d., p. ~os. :

.. :": ."~" >.....

..

,,' .•

9~. ""

~ .: .

. : •.••

,

."

28

.

see ibid.,

.


.- ...-... :..

'"':

.

!:'OUEIGN R):;LA'rlOS~, . . . .

..

~

~ 94.4,

'

: .. "

.

November 8 ~G the Presi. " " . ., ,... ..., ", .

In his broadcast to the French people

den~ said:

VOLUME III

\

\

". -

.

OIl

.

"\Va assure you that once the menace of Germany .and Italy is removed from )'?ll, we shall quit. )'our territory at once.", " 8. Tho preamble of the unpublished Clark-Darlan Agreement of November 22,1942,31 contains the following words: : . "It has been agreed b¥ all French elements concerned and United -States military nuthoritlt's that French forces will aid and SUPPOlt the forces of tho United States and their allies to ~el from the soil . . of Africa the common enemy, to liberate Franca and.iestore.integrally . the French Empire." ." '

(Enclosure 21

.'.,.

JANUARY. '1, . ,

..., '. ,

-'

.

. BRITIS1I POSI"l'IOS' Wl'l'1[ RESP.Ecr TO FEEseR TlIEWAlt'

1944.

TER.arroRY Arn:R .

Prime Minister Churchill has more than once expressed the clesire to see France, inclucling Alsace-Lorraine, restored, and both ~rr. Churchill and :Mr. Belen S% have repeatedly denied any territorial ambitions on the part of Great Britain with respect to the French Empire. . 1. On June 10, 1941, the Prime Minister assured the House of Commons ~~ that

· ' "We have no territorial designs in Syria or any"hcre else in French territory".;' . . . ' . ....

and subsequently, on November 10, 1942, he said:~" "Fo~ ourselves we'have no wish but to see France free and strong, with her emph'e gathered round her and with Alsace-Lerraine re-, stored. We covet no French ti!"tTitory. We have no a~uisitive de: signs or ambitions in North Africa or any other part of tlie world," · . These commitments, ~lowe\"er, are not Interpreted by the British " . · Government as including :lny guarantee of particular frontiers or of the integrity of the French Empire. The British Foreign Secre-, tary, in a letter to the AmeriCtln Ambassador on November 16. 1942.3$

stated:-·· , ' · . "You will see that we hare taken care t-o o.void guaranteeing the integritl of the French Empire and haTe concentrated. upon assert-" in~ our mtention to restore 'the independence and Fatness of France' ana denyin~ any desire to anne3: French territory' • '. .. .-. '".

<~'"'

• Departm~ut of StateBlIlletin, N'ot"ember 14,19:12, p. am. ~ :." • Foreign RelatiollB, lW2. voL n, p. 453. . .'. . a Anthony Eden. British Secretary ot St:lte for Foreign Mairs. - Parlialnfmtary Debate" Bouse of Commons. 5th series. voL 372, coL 151. II For enUre text of speech, see the London Time" November 11. 1942, Po &. -Not printed. ....' . . ' . :,.J .'....... . .. : . ~.. ~ '."~. :" . .. .. :'. :.~': .. ...... . ... ".

.

~

"

.

.

,

,.'

.. .

:"

....

..

•••

'

~.

oJ'

••

..

..

. ">"::-

'

... . "

I

.

.•..

~

..

..

_. - .. _.

29

'••r- •

.

:. .


-. j)£ucll earlier, in connection with his note of Augnst 7, :19{0,to General de.Gaulle, lIfr. Churchill, in an unpublished letter of. the same date, lind said; '

res-

.' "I think :t necessary t~ put on ~(,COl'<l that the cspression cf~n 'toration of the independence and greatness of France' has no precise relation to territorlal frontiers, ",Ve have not been able to guarantee such frontiers in respect of :lny nation now actlng with us, but, of ,course, weshall do our best." . .

. 2. Like the United States, the British Government has made

It.

'nwnoor of commitments relative' to the maintenance of French sovereignty in North Africa, and on :Mardi 17, 19431 the Lord Privy Seal stated in the House of Lords 3S that . "North .Afr~ca is French territory";

and

.

.

"The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying power toward the local authority of an

occupied region".

..

,

'.'

.': .

. Nef!Wrmulum oy Pl'e~dent Roosevelt to the Sec1·etarl/ 01 State Sf January. 24, 1944. I'saw lhIifax.Iast Week and told him quite frankly that it was 'perfectly true that I had) for Oller a year, expressed the opinion tllat Indo-China should not go back to France but that it shoulcl be a.dministered by an intemationel trusteeship. France has had the conntry-thirty million inhabitants for nen.rly one hundred years, and the people are worse off tlian they were at the beginning. . . As a matter of interest, I am wholeteartedly supported in this'view ,by yeneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek 39 and by Marsllal Stalin.3a I see .no reason to piay in with tlia British Fo.l'~igu OWl,;" ill this matter, The only reason they seem to oppose it is that'they fear the effect it . :would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They ha.ve never liked the-idea trusteeship because it is, in some instances, 'aimed at future independence. This is true in th~ C3Se of Indo-China. Each casemust, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case.of Indo.China. is perfectly clear. Fr-ance has milked it for one hundred yeaTS. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that. . : , .. .

.

[WASRI!\GTON,]

of

F[RA.....~] D•.R[OOSE\"ELT] ", ·See Parl"amelltanJ De'llates, House of Lords, 5th'se:-ies, vol. 126, coL 131• ., Copy obtained from the· Franklin D. Roose'\"elt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. . _ • President of the ~ationnl Go.ernment of China and Supreme A.1Ued Com· -manderof tbe Chinn Theater. . . ' -Chairman of the Council of.People·s Commissnr3 of the Soviet Union.

...

-.

. ..- - . '.

.

30

:~


.

-

. .-

.... .: .:

::-:~

.... !.":~.~i-";' .. ..

~.

••

"

m

FOREIGN .REL.\TION5J 19-14J VOLUME

8510.01148

.....

_

.

.:. Me-m.qra~·um bV the Under 8ecl'eta)y oiStat8 (8tettiniWJ) to . PTegide-ll.t R008e1JeU . . -

".

-,

.'

1

.0_.:::

"., •

. . . .

. .. : .... . . . . . OVASm~GTO~,] February 1i, 1944. The Civil Affairs Division of tho 'Val' Department has indicated its desire to proceed at once with civil affairs planning for IndoChina and before doing 50 has requested political guidance from the State Department, . A number of important decisions depend upon whether Fl'ellcb .troops are to be used in the military operations to regain control of Indo-China, and whether French nationals are to be used in civil adminlstration and planning. There is ample evidence that the French hope to be consulted and to pla.y 8. part indl'iving the J~pa.: n~ from tluit ar6.'\. . Subject to your approval, the State Department will proceed on the a.ssumption that French armed forces will be employed to at . . least some extent in the military operations, and that in the administration of Indo-China. it will be desirable to employ French nationals who havean intimate knowledge of the country and its problems. We would assume further tllat the useof French forces or civilians would be without prejudice to the question of the ultimate status of French . Indo-China and would be related solely to problems direcUy con.J'ooted with and flowin!r fromnesslble militarv operations. . .rr : •.. EDW.w> R. S~-XU5t Ja. . ....

.....

~'

~

:-:"

-

._--~--

.

~ ~"

..

_---_ ....

..

.. .

".,".

:

..

. '31

.. ........ -

•.

e

:"

t

.----:.:.-..~ :. ':.•.. :" .:J


851G .01/7-IO!t'-t. .. .. -

-

-

."

_

.. "'... ........

.....

",_.

\

-'_.

---~.

-

\ I

I

E~~ EAS~~illi

DIVISION OE'

tFFAlttS July 10~ 1944

. FE .

l:r. Grew

Subject:

Views or the'tresident with hespect to Indochina

,•

On i;Iarch 27, 19l~3 President £ioosevelt, Secretary or St·ate Hull, the iti,:sht Honorable Anthony Lden" Eri tish Aalbas sador Lord Halifax, IttI'. Stl:'en.::; of the Bri tish Foreign Office, Ambassador ',;-inant" Under Secretary ".~e11es, and l~r. Earry Hopkins held' a uenersl conference at the . '"ihi te Iiouse. In the course of the discussion the ireside~t s~ested that trusteeship be set up for Indochina. ~r. ~en indicntec that he W2S favorably imprassed vli.th t~is proposal.

1944

6ecretary of State Hull and the British Ambaseador L1rd Ealifax held a conversation at th~ ij~p:J rt'1'lent in l~h 1.ch tha r;,"i ti.!=l h Ar:1bA1=lsador l'erna~ked that info~mstion had come to him from his Foreibn 0ftice thet in a conversation ~ith the Turks" Eoyptians and perhsi,js others cur i~g 1::is recent trip .tc the l!eg r :'ast, the President spoke rather definitely about what purport~d to be his views to the effect tL~t .Indochina should be . ta.!:en a'.~/oj fro,:i the .,F'rencb ~ntl· put unde r an international trusteeship, etc. 'j;he Ambs.ssac1or said th;;.. t of course he hsa heard the .t'resident make l'emarks like· this during the p~ s t yes.lI or more but tn:;. t the~ues tion of whether the Presiclentl~.uttert.nces represent ri~a1 conclusions . becomes On Januat·y;,

.

.... ..•.

. " ' , ":

_._-....... ..

"

t··

".

.

~

.

. . 32

"

.

_.. _.--:---;

_._-----_ -"'-'.~

.

-

~

.

I

-

i

'


become s importr.nt in vie\"; 01' the :rae t tlla t i t \',0 uld soon ;3et back to the Ii'ranch, etc. l:r. hull sc Id the;t Le knew no more about the .me t te i- than the AlilJ:3.ss~dol' and had only he s.rd the j;'resident make these remarks occa sf ona L'ly just about as tr..e _"mbasscdo~ t.ed heard him make them. lie added thB.t in l.is juJ e:;iile.nt, II the .t" nes Ide nt and ~.ir. Churchf, 11' would find it desirEble to t!;ll~ this ma t te r ovel" fully deliberately end perhaps finc.lly at some ru . . ture. stsoe. i. In a meuorc.ndum fOl' tl-:e il'6sident of J~nt~ary 14 Mr. Eull reported his co~versation ~ith tee British Ambass~~or a!ld as~ed if the ~residentts o~inion, previously expre s sed , ~hat Indochina should be tel-:en ar;s.y from the French and £dmlniste~ed by an internation~l trusteeship, i-epne s en ted his 1'inal conc Lus l ona on the mat ter , 'llhe ~ecrete.r-y s ta ted that te had Inr ormed the British Ambass~do; that he diq root l<no~ w~ether the ;~esi­ dent hsd come to any fin;?l cor.. clusion on the SUbject. On February 17, 194L!.~ in a' memonsndum for the f ~:'resl­ dent froril the Under 5ec:-e tiil'Y J on the subjec t of Civil' Affairs problems in Indochina, the str~terilent t;es. made thetllSubject to YOUl' ap.:,)!'ovsl, the State Depar-tment; will proceed on the a e euapt ton that F'rench al'med fo~ces vlill be employed to at least rorr.e extent in the military operations~ and that in the edministrgtion of Indochina it Yl111 be de!:;lrc.ble to employ ,I."rench nat LonaLe 1;'ho have an intimate 1-~0~·.;led6e of the country ..u1d its problems~" .Acroes the fa.ce Qf the document the iresident, in l"eaffirmation 01· bis previol.u:ly expressed opinion, wrote: UNo . }i'rench help in !r.!Jo~hina -:-- country on trusteeship." . n' ,,0 l-'~l" ...... u.~"

. Li

.

, , - . -, •

,.:,....

-,.

an a memonancum the Under ~ecret~ry mentioned t:"~ r'resident's reception of the memor&ndum of February l7'above referred to and stated th.:tt the. II iresic'lent .expreased the vierJ that no French troops wha tever should be used in operstions :. there LindochinY... fIe feels the opera tlons should be . J_~10-Amel;lcan '.:;1 th irite~n&tional trus taeship i'ollowirl6." On

~tebrusr-y ~J,

J.)44-,

[Ura! tee: by K. ;. Landon; ".

-

:.' "'"

.

.

-. i :

"'-.

.

. ...

.

_.. ' __ ...... ..::..:

'.

.~.-._.

•;

--

:~:.

-- .... ":

. __ .:- ....... ..;..-'

0 ••••

!

'-'--"-;---'~---:-'-"-":.

·33 .:

67-244o-71-voL 1-18

w.

·l~itlaled.by J. . ..

..

..

4..

!"

-~

... •

.

B~


f

. . 851G.OO/8-:!&H

".

,-.

,"

.. '

..

J/emmanlum 7;!J fAa Sec1Jtarv o/State ~o President Roosevelt

. -: . .. {WASnL'\"O'ro~,JAugust 2G, 19U• .. ,,: Thel'~ is attached herewith a copy of an aide-memo-iTe·'" left ,vith ~e Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in milito.ry operations in the Fo.rEast, with particular reference to French ·Indo-China. " . .. The .AmbilSSador stated that the question is of considerable urgency · owing to Yr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points befol-ethe latter leaves London on Tuesday, August:. 29. The two ·.specific questions on which ~Ir. Eden desires to give an affirllltltive answera.re; (1) Tile attachment'to the ·South.East _t\.sia. Command Hel1dquar- . , .... ters of a French )1ilitary ~1iS5ion under General Blaizot, o.nd·· • ~ot printed. but tor subs~nce, see Secreta17 Hull's memorandllDl .of October 10, p. '175. . .. .

~.:

, ,

I

I

....

.,_.. .

'.

:0'

-----_._---_. -_

,

--

-_

0

_. ;--.-.-

-


... (2) The establishment in India of ~ c'Corps I~ger d'Intcrvention" which apparently has already been established at Algiers•

.Although tll sse suggestions are ostensibly military in character) they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decisionwe can. so inform Lord Halifax, C[ORDnL] H[uu.] 8:S1G.OU./S-~SU

.

.

,

MemoraMu-m, by President Roosevelt to the Seal'eta?'!! of State .

.

.

August 28) 1944. In regard to your memorandum of .otugust 26th on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China) I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Qucbe.c.n .' '. . . . WASHISGTOS,

The same thing applies to the Aide-Mbnoi1'8 covering the French Committee's proposals, ~2 It should be remembered that in relation to (IV) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China. ".

.F[:RA.YKLI~] D. R[OOSEVELT] . '

851G.OO/s:.~6i"

'. ' . .

:".. ,

.. .-

: . ::;.

Memoro:rvlu:m' by tIle Se<rretary of State to Pres-idem.t Roose11elt -,

[\VASHINGTOS,] October 10, 1044.

FitENClI PARTIClP.:\TION IX LmER.-\.TIoy OF I~DOCHIYJ.

,

.

OnA.ugust 26, 19~.l: I sent you n. melnorandnm with a. copy of 3British aide-memoii'e dated August 25 stating that the French had c._;t.;.".~,·.l. _ ,'~'.... ...~U.I:Ol~CiU. .JJh"!:)l1 U.l.J~J.V~ <.1..1 ~J.; •

_

.

.:}

(a) Sending fl. French l\Iilirory i.\Iission under General Blaizot to 'be attached to SEAC 43 headquarters; ... (0) ~ending to In~lia a. light intervention force for later use ~ lndochina.· .. • (1) S.endms-, later on, Do ]french expeditionary force to participate m the Iiberation of I n c l o c h m f l . ; " · .: (d) Participatlon by the French ih planning the W3.r against

J'l1tJan; . ' . . . le) Partielpation by the French in planning political warfare in

the Far East..

. . ..

.'.

. .. .'. . . "

.:

• Documentation on the Second Quebec Conference. September 11-16, 19-14.

'Js scheduled for publleatton in a subsequent volume of Fore;!}," Relations. u

For subst3C.ce of French proposati. see Secretary null's memorandum ot '" .

-<>etober to, infra.. CI

South East Asia. Command.

..

.... .. ,

~

... ~

'

- -...

,....

.

35 ..


-. " .. :.. lott,. "OLUMS . ill

-

"

'.. _

FOREIG.~ nELATIO~'"S,

'.

.'

.The Briti~ requested .c\merican ~ll~",helico on th~'firstt~o points

by .August 20. You informed me ornlIy that you planned to discuss the Fl'ench prcposals \rith the British Prime ~liJlister at Quebec;

accordinglyno reply has been mnde to the British aiJe--mem(Jire;-' TheConsul at Colombo has reported that on October 4: it wasleamed from an unimpeachable source that tllO British plan to bling a. French lIission lIMer General Blnizot to SEAC headquarters in the inunecti-., . ate future; thnt full ecllaboratlon is to be given the Frenell lIission which will participate officially in activities of the SEAC; th:Lt as Americanagreement has not been obtained, tll~ Mission will be estensl, bly unofficial and will be housed at first in a. hotel;' that as soon as the ' concurrenC'6 of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to move the ,1Iissioll into permanent quarters; that Frepcll parachutists are continuing to be trained by the British in groups of four or five for 'clandestine activitiesill Indochina.. ',' . . .As you willl-eC~Il, the Bl'itisb proposed in'their aide-memoi1'6 that. all details of French p'olitical warfare relatlng' to Indochina. should be Do matter for arrangement between SEAC and the French :Uilltnry Mission, altllough, acecrding' to the la.test information in the Depart. . ,ment, Indochina is in the China theater and not in the SEAC theater, '.·..Will you inform me whether tIle reported sending of this Mission . is in accordance with My understan(ling which n'ia.y hare been reached with Mr. Churchill'on the Frenell requests together with an Indica, ' . tion of wlaether you desire the Department to take any action1 ..': '::..~'. ;.;>.... :..: '.. '' .. ~,.:' ..... ,": C(ORDELL] H[lJLL]

and

''-''.

,. ~iG~UiiO:'~OH

. '.' .

'.' ," ,:'.

:

....... .

0/ State to Prend61lt ROOBtfUel1

". J/emDJ'tlIIIlum"y th, Secretary .

. -

"

.

. ..

'

':'- ::~, '.:. ~'. '" .....::. [WASHL~GTO~,] October 13,19-W. ' A letter has been;eceived from Geneml Donovan, Director of the ' Office of Strategic S~rvicea,asking the views of the State Department . em the foUowing contemplated operations: .' . "The staf of the Theater Commander the OBI" theater has ~ under consideration opel'l\tional plans involving the fumishing of .supplies andequipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated tbat . these operations will be under AmeriCllll command although there will be collaboration with the French." . .., '

for

:.'. In amplification of the foregoi~g, it was e3:pl~ned omlly that the . proposed sssistanee would be to resist·allce groups within Indocllina; .,that the proposed collaboration would be with tlus French M"tlitary . .. :&fission at Cllungltingj'tllat such coIIa.boration would not prevent . . . '. .

.,<:.,~c~ Burma. I~~ .. '. ... .

::.'

".

".

"

.

.;.

.

'.. ..... .'

•.

-;

:

.' ......

'".

.

~

"':~:'::::":'~':':\' ~.:,~:)\~';:.:.~j::.,>. .> . - .,

.-

~

.

,;

..

~...'

.. ".

-

" '.. '. ':':~'<.~:.': _:'~::.:';~.::.";;:~" .:; ;..: ,:.;.:?.. (;~. ':,~':;\',~.~:(:,~<. ,"

...'' ~, ~ . ~ ')Y7:i;': : . ..• :;:' : ;;-,·:2:::.·,;.·~.:'~:· . '. .

,..

...

.

.

. .. '. '. .

.:

. ~.

'"

":': ~

"

'....

~

. r"

...

::

':'. '.-.

,;,.:,:.,.

, .:'. .

::. 'v.; ~ .• ...:- -- ._:.:. .... - .,',~~.--: __

".',

....

'-~~-~:~ .. _-'.'- .

.

.


. FRA..'iCE .....

~

·assistance to all resistance groups whether French or native, but that ·withou& such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively to assist resistance gl'OUPS. among the French milit:u'Y forces in Inclo• china, and that this would result in retarding resistance efforts. Subject to your approval, the Department. will reply to General · Donovan t~:\t it has no objection to furnishing supplies and equip.ment to resistance groups, both French and native, actually within Jndoehina, nor to American collaboration with the French :Military Mission at Chungking or other Frenchofflcers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operations 'in Indochina for the defeat of Japan•.

C[OllDELL] H[ULLI 8~lG.OO/lo-16U .'

Memomrulu-nlt oy President Roosevelt to theSectetaryofState .

-

.

October 16, 194-!. · " In regard to this Indochina matter, it is my judgment. on this date that we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any otller way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to me . a little later when things are a little clearer. . WASmXGTO;',

..

.... ....

-

F[JUNKLt~]

..

"

8~lG.Ol/11-2U

Yemo1'anaU'11lt

D. R[OOS~VELT] .

.

oy tM Deputy Director 01 tM Office

.

Ajfm,78

of EU1·opea-lf;.

(Mattltews)~

[WASmKGTON,] November 2, 19-H~

.

· . According to Ambassado» Winnnt.'~ -IS recollection, Indochina was. · dealt with only briefly at the White House conversation on :\!arch 27, ·

...

1948 ~~d k other conversatiens with M!". Eden!T . In the ],!.'!rc!l 2'T

conversation the question of trusteeship was discussed at some length; ·lIr. Eden advocating the advantages of national rather than inter· national administratipn, Thera was considerable inconclusive discussion as to the degree to which governments other than U1e onehaving sovereignty or administrative responsibility f01' a particular area might properly intervene in matters involving the administration o~ tile area or its relations with other areas. Mr. Eden emphasized . · • Addrt.'SSed to the D~puty Director ot the Office ot Far Eastern Affolirs (Ballantine) and to the Chier of the Di\"lsion or Southwest Pacific .!f&irs. . ()fofrat).

.

.

.. American Ambnss:ldor in the United Kingdom. . • ForcorrespondeIlce ro!g-.lrding tbe.rlslt ot ::\fr. Eden to Washington, )farch 1230,1943, see Foreigj.d~ezatiolls.ll»3.ret, TIT. pp.1 Jr. ..... $S-i-1S3-~O

'

_." _

_.~

'::_4

_..__

37

..


m

FOREIGN RELATIO~S~ 19.u~ VOLUME

,..

. the belief tb,a.t the goal for small colonial' areas should be economic, . social, and political advancement and an autonomous status rather than independence, which would subject them to both economic and military dangers, . ' ': TIlE) Amb.'\ssador does not recall that thequestion of restoring 11\(10· china. in full sovereignty in France 'Was discussed at the time but , expressed theopinion that tho French will be highly sensitiveabout the restoration of all parts of their colonial empire to the #atu8 1/110 ani« .and that the British Government "ill firmly support the French position ill view of its desire for the closest possiblarelatlous with Francs. H. FREEi)UN }!ATrHEWS ,

,

'140,0011 P.\V,J11-2-1'

Mem01VlM11.m .

.: .

..

oy the Under Secreta1,,!! of State

(Stetti11iu8) to

President Roosevelt.

"

[WASIIING'ION,] •

,'0

November 2, 1944.

IXDOCHlxA.

·-0

..

. In order that you may be kept full)- informed on developments in "ftlation to Indochina, there has been prepared the memorandum at'!tachcd hereto. ' , .. EDWARD R. STETrINlUS, JR. -. .

'~.

.: ' ,:'": f\VAS:fIING'IOY,]

".'~'

:

~o\"ember 2, 1944:.

RECE~T DEVEJA)l'J(E~"TS IN RELA.TION'IO I:NDOCB:OfA.

,

"

.

'The following ,are recent developments in relation to Indochina: Colombo ·'11113 reported tllat: .. . , . . . n\1." ,.,_~.:_t.. ~Ale A~ 'L~A.1~"A_"~_~ A~ C!"C' " rot '1. __ -r-"A~"_.:J ... a.t.._ . ....utl .s» ~.. .::o~ " ~"""'\'.L" ~ v... v ~~ .1-' u ~ u. I.V ""10 . British Chiefs of Stiff in London against the inclusion of Indochina :in the theatre under the new United States Army Commanding Gen.ernlin China, urging that Indochina be included in the SEAC theatre. " ... ' The French Mil~tary ~li5sion,wl1ich is large, has arrived in Ceylon "and has received American approval and is nowrecognized openlyand ,,officially- apparentl;)", General Blaiaot bas not yet arrived. Baron . :de Langlade 'Who parachuted into Indochina some weeks ago with .' a letter of introduction from de G:n1l1e is also ill Ceylon. He spent ,.twenty-fourhours with French Army officers in Indochina, and stated, upon his return that a basis for a French resistance movement exists ,"

".

• Seat of the .!m~rlcan Consulate in C~YI~~.,

.. . ~

." .

'.

"'-.'

.- ..

.

.. . '.

:

.' .

"

.:

"

...

....

"

"

"

. ' ...... ~--.-.-e-

-7-.:.__.'---'_.-.-.;'~'·_·:;.:....T38· "

:•.•. -r:

""':,". : '.: . ~ .. . : ", '~c':, .;.~::

..

. ".

~ ....:

......

'

.


"

"

-

'...-~ ·there, but. reportcclly declined to 5.'l.y more until Bbizot's o.rrh·n.l. Blaizot, :t. Lieutenant General, was formerly Chief of St,\f[ in Indochina. He is 0. "colonial"general. . ,.-\ltho~tgh SEAC was advised speciflenlly th:l.t only military, and ·not political, questions might be discussed with the French Mission, politicalquestions :tre ill. fact under discussion. . ' . . The British SOE·' which is actlrely engaged in undercover op·erations in Indochina has recently received orders from the Foreign · Office tll:lt they should have nothing to do with any .\.nll.amite or other native organlzations in-Indochiua, but are to devote their ~JIorts to . . , . , the Fl'Cuch. The Ol\'~ 30 representative at New Delhi has receivedindicationthat the British wish O'VI activities directedat the native populations ill Thailand and Indochina be eliminated so as not'to stir up native re·sistance to the Japanese and so incite the Japanese to sendmoretroops into those areas, Colombo states tll3.t it is apparent SOE desires severely to restrict ~1 operationsin the SE.AC theatre and to give SOE preeminence .01', failing that, to establish combined SOE-O~S operations. . ' · British propaganda agencies <11'6 emphasizing the recent. appeal by the French War ~Iinistry for recruits to participate in the campaign. .for l~beratiol\. of Indochina on the ground that news of any French militari efforts to recover Indo~hina would encourage the. French in Indochina. 0"\\"'1 has so ftlr refrained from mentioning the French appe3.I or other phases of Freuch preparations for military participa-' tion fearing the udverse effect on the native populations in Indochina. and elsewhere in the Far East on the restoration of the status • ~ 411.te wbieh such p~para.tions would , appet\r to imply. OWl has specificall)' requested Stnte Department guidance on United States' policy in this regard, and have been advised to be silent on the subject despite the anticipated Britisli brcadcasts, . ., " , . General Donovan has submitted to the Secretary of Sta.te a. report from the ass representative in SEAC reading in pa.~: ''There can be little doubt tha.t the British. and ~tch have arrived' at an a;z-eement with regard to the future of Southeast A.si:t., and now it .would. appear that the French .are being brought into the pic. ture.•• '.~'- It would appear that the strategy of the British, Dutch and Fl'Emch is to win back and control Southeast _4\si:l" making the fullest use possible of AmeriCi\n resources, but foreclosing the Ameri.., .cansfromallY voice in policy matters." ' . . , : '" .. . .

.

\

ass

.

...... . . '. ..

.

".,

,-'

. .... . . , ........ "

....•... ~..•..•.. ,~

'. Secret Ope1'4tions E3:ecutlve. ." ;;>. . .: .:'',. • omee of \Var InformntloD. .' , ....' .":...' ~', . :-'. ( II om~ of Strategic Services. . . - ." ;:~:'. ';',•..'.:.:.( .,'.' .:-; " D Omls$ion J:adic:lted In the original memorandum.' ; ., . , ,,' .; " .

" .',

'.

. '

'-

.....

'

"

: '

.....~~ ..

"

..'~"

. '

........ . .......

~~.

..•...

'.

-:

'0, . . . . .

....,.

..


..

".

140.0011 P.\\"./11-3H

. .

..

"

·NemOralulum oy President Roos~1.;eit 'to tAe U~cler Secreta;:! 'of ~tat~ . . • (8tett~nius) . . . .." ."

'YASHINGTO~,

• ..

• t -:

.

November 3, 19;1.:'!'

. I have yours of November second, enclosing memorandum on re.cent developmc>uts in relation to Indo-China, I wish you would make

' .

ftcl~~:

1. \Ve must not, give American appl'o.. .·nl. to any French military . mission, as it nppears we have dono ill the first sentence of the first ·paragraph• .2. Referring to the third paragraph, itmnst be made clear to all our people in the Far East thnt they can make no decisions on political . questions with the French mission or anyone else, · 3. 'Va have made no final decisions on the future of Indo-Ohina. This should be made clear. . 4. In the final paragraph it is stated the British and Dutch 11l1.Ve .arrived at an agreement in regard to the future of Southeast Asia ·and are about to bring the French into the picture. It should be made clear to all our people that, the United States expects to be consulted with regard to any future of Southeast Asia, I have 110 objection to this being made clear to the British, the Dutch or the French• . F[lUNKLIN]

D.

R(OOSE\'ELT]

.. , . .. ~

"

851G.01/11-4U: Tele;rlllll

.

.

. TM Aftwassador in France (Oal!e,y) .to theSecretary of State'. . . . " . . PARIS) November!, 1944--1 p. m. ..

, ." . ..,

,

. . . [Receh"ed 2 :37 'p. m.] ., 316. ReEmbs 279, November 1, 4 [8] p. m.SS Chau\'el 54 remarked yesterc1ny that France ~3 most desirous of participating to the greatest pl)s-~il,l~ fO.:thmt its capacity permits in the recovery of Indochina (he recalled that littleless than ll. division has been'training at two points in North .Africa for service in the Pacific). He added that there is a. token detachment of a couple of thousand men already in India, )!oreover, he said'recruiting has been active and training has nlrendy .commenced in metropolitan France for a. French expeditionary force to the Pacific. It is hoped that these forces may e.. . entually amount to two normal divisions. Personnel is to be drawn from the regular .-anny and the FFI; ss the whole force is to be under the command of General Blaizot (Corps d'.Armee) who recently arri.. . ed in India.

'

..

.

".,

.

.'

• "'l••.

,

"J ..... ",'

r.

-_

..

'.~

....

e

I'

:.'

... .

:

. '. -'

-". ..

~ e-

..4 .. : ....

".

-.

;.

',

~:.~.

-:., .,"..


, , . •,•..

FRA..~CE

,,~

to

General Blnizot has been instructed to' report Ln'd LOllis Mount-batten.s, .... . : " ' AdYel'ting to France's primary .lnterest in Indochina, Ohauvel made the point that the French Government is interested not only in a. French force ill. Indi..a but also would be interested in French units to be included in forces which might strike from the Philippines to- ' . ward Indochina if such plans were on foot. (lunny , . ... .t • '140.0&11

P.W./11-~3!4

.'

,

The British Ambassador (HaZila~) to the Under Secreta1'Y olState , (Stettini1.ls) " lVASnXXGTON, No\~enlber 23,1944.

-,

'My D£"\R ED: I send you herewith an .Aicle-J.1Iemoi,·e concerning proposals for the use of the French in pre-operational aetivities in Indo-China. ' This is a. matter which :Momitbntten and all of us have very~uch ' at heart. Until we have the all-clear from your side he cannot efIec· tively em'ry out sabotage etc. activities which. he is satiSfied should contribute "cry considerably to his task. You will see that the matter is urgent and I would be grateful if , you could let us have a ,-el'j- early reply, ' ., V. sin[cerely,] " ' 'HALIFAX -.".

,

..

..:

,

..

[Annes:)

, ',. :,.'. The British Em.bass!I to the Department of State . : '. ' AmE-~IhJ:Olf.& . , ,I. In AU!!1.1st last His Maiestv's Government invited. the concur" renee of the-Uni~ed States G~vehmentin the following proposals: (1) The establislunent of D. French milib.ry mission with the South East Asia Command. TlUs would fllCilitate the work of the Secret Operations Executive dud of the Office of Strategic Services and , would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters W!liell may be required later, The function of the mission would be primarily to deal with matters concerning French Indo China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would, thet'efore, be much on the samebesis as tile Dutch and Chinese missions atteched to the South East Asia. Command. '. ' (2) The establishment in India of a c:Corps'Uger d'Intervention'" composed at the start of 500 men and designed to operate ~clusively 'in Indo China on Japanese lines of communication. The activities of .I

"

' O .

';

~'''''.

••

• SupremeA1lled Commander,Southeast Asi3. Command. ~.'

.

-,

.

"

,; ,

...

,

.

.'.

. •..

-. -:.

~

41,

'. .

'.

.. ... : -; '

,'

.

..

"

",'."


_0• • _

.,;,

••

FOREIGN RELATIOXS, 19·14, . ' .

. . ', oJ'

,

"·CJ..mIE Dr

, this bOdy would correspond to those- of the American and British Secret Opcl'ntional organizations·lmd its establishment could be without ]?rejudice to the widerquestion of from whatsources French forces partlcip~tinO' in the.F.al' ~ast~lloulcl be eql~ppcd. .. ~. , (3) FrenCh Plutlclpnholl in the plnnmllg of pohtlcnl wnl-fo.Te m tho Far East. T1lis would be 3. matter for armngem.ent between the South East Asitl.· Command and the French :\Iilitn1.1· Mission. . '.' .

2. The United States CIliefs of ShIff, from 0. milih\i-y point of view cenourred with these proposals except thnt theJ' believe that Fl'ellcl\ , participation in the planning of political wadare should be restricted to 'the area. of the South East Asia Command, No flUther action could be taken by them ill this matte1.' as it was understood that tl\e

.

President had expressed the desire first to discuss the question of French Indo Chini\ orally with the Prime :Minister. '. .. . 3. The United States Chiefs of .Staff took cecasion to point out that in their view, French Indo China was part, not of South East Asia C-ommand, but of the China Thel.\tl-e and was an Americ3.n sphere of strategic rosponsibility, They recognised that an oral understanding had been come to between A.mllinl! Monntbatten and the Genernlissimoby which both Commanders would be free to attack Thailand and French Indo Chinn, and boundaries between tlle two .. Th~tres would be decided at an appropriate time in the ligllt of progress made by the two forces. , 4•.This agreement was recognised by the Genemlissimo after 8E:tTAn:tr as applying to preoperntionn.l activities, It has howerer D&ver been formall;)' confinnecl by the Combined Chiefs of Statio 5. No furtber steps could be tabu in obtaining the n~ry app~vaI by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals ouUined iri paragraph 1 of this aitle~llimoil'e until the President and the.Prime _ Minister had had an -opportunity to discuss them.· It wasanticipa.ted .. .that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Confel'8nce, but - in fact the subject W~ never raised, Consequently no further prog. ress has been made in this matter which is becomine inereasinl!'lv

--0-'. ..' .'6. Adm~Mountbnttenis strongly of the opinion tll~t. useful ~lld ftPO'lUlt.

'

.

-

-

-'

-

-

-

-

. important work on irregular lines could inunedio.tely be don& in: French Indo ChiD.a.. The Frenell .!.nuy and Civil Sel','ice are unquestionably anxious to t.'\b part in tIle liberation of the COWltlj from the Japanese and constitute virtuall)' a well-ol'ganisedo.lld nadl~made M:lquis,U The secret organisationS operating from South East Asia. Command have nlnde contact with these elements. . :. . .' . . ~

.. ,CCode word fo~ the ~l~o Coufe~ee of Dee~~. lt43; for co~lldcn~ OIl Ws Conference. see FOt'eigA ReZ'JlioJ"~ The Conferenc:el It Cairo and Tehran. ItH3., . . . .. -)'reach uaclerlroud to:ee. . ,.J"

....

.. -.

:"

~'

.

. ",'

'

.....

.

.

. "

. »,

..:."

.

...

,.

.:

,

.. ':,-

...

...

.

..... :.

<:

. ':,- " ....; ~:.•~.: .~ r:

)"

'

.. . .. .

.. ,"",:

"

: ..... :~:~ .:. ~'.' ,"',,:

.".

-. ... ::.

." .'~ .~

::' ', -. .

'"

--"·--'.~4r~·

-

~;'/"

:

-

",

~.

.

"."...

':... ,,":.,..... .: ';

... "

...

'

~.,


--

.

"

.

: ': FRA.."'\CE .. \ ..v

,'

and are now in regular communication. with tll.<~m. All that Is-necessary to eA-p1oit. tile situation is the presence in South East Asia Command of the neeessery French personnel from ,,110m alone tho French

in French Indo Chinn will take the direction necessary to produce the action required. .' ,.. . . . . 1. Admiral Mountb'Uttell. has pointed out that French Indo China. constitutes an area of vitnl importance to the operation of his Co~-. mand since it lies on the J~pnllesc land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Mala.;rt\. Irregular activities therefore' on the lines ennso.ged in the proposals which are the. subject of this aiae-memoirs . are for him ll. matter of urgency. ' I,. . , . .; 8. His Ma.jesty's Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the , United States Government will concur as to the desirability and urgency of pushing' on with the irregular operations outlined above and will take such action as will make possible the issue of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (a) confirming the oral understanding already existing between the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten, and (b) upproving' the program set out in the opening pamgraph of this aide-memoire. Such action would in no v,'ay prejudice the question of the ultimate settlement of the boundary between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Comm..·Uld, which, by the ·"nreement between Admiral J\Iountbatten and the Generalissimo, is a.t present left open, nor the wider question of the participatfon of . regular French armedforces in the Far Eastern War. ,- .. WASm:NGTOo.~, 22 November, 1944. 8$lG.Ol/12-2TC4

M61M1'tI:ndum '6y ehe Sem'eeary oj8tate to President

R00881Jele

[WAS~IYQ'l'ON,]

December 27,1944. With reference to the. British aldeJlnemoire of November 22, requesting approval of the Frent!h l\'Iilit...u-y ~!ission: to the Southet\S~ Asia. CommlUld and French militt"ty participation in tlle liberation of Indochina, a proposed reply to which 'Was sent to you with a memorandum on December 11,· the Bntish are obviously perturbed about the situa.tion. ' On December S Lord Halifax called nt his request and stressed to . methe importance of a prompt reply.eo •. . Ambassador Wino.nt has now reported tllat Mr. Bennett, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, has expreSsed :his cone ,rn tha.t the United States apparently ~l1S not. yet de.

• Memorandum not printed: proposed repl,y Dot found In Depnrtment ftles. • Mem~randUDl br. the SecretlU'1 of State of this conversation not prln~d.

. '

.

'

":

.. -,'. -

...


FOREIG~ RELATIONS; 1944 J VOLU.ME'III

"1ermilled upon;its policy towards I~tlochinl\. :Mr. Bennett. stated that , 'itwould be difficult to deny FloenclL perticip..aticn in the liberation of Indochina in ligllt of the-increasing s~rength of the French Government. ill world r.tfnirs, and that unless n policy to be followedtoward Indochina is mut.ulI.lly agreed between our two Governments, circumstances may arise at any moment which will place our two Governments in' a ,"ery awkward situation. Althougl1 Mr. Bennett was -exprcssmg his personal views only, Mr. 'Winant stated his belief that the Foreign Office generally shares these views. In a conversation yesterday Lord Hulifax ngain referred to the importance which his Government attaches to a prompt decision on the questions raised in his aiae-memoir8. .. .: .. . . : EDWARD R. STE'rl"INIUS, Jr.

o

~.

#'

••

~

.,..

-"

'44:.


.. l1egardi..'16 the Fronch saboteurs f01; Indo..china., to servo undOl' the President replied to Secretary Stottinius on Janurir'J 1 (191~5)': . . ". " .

}o!out~blJ.tten,

.

"

.

I still do not '-?!tnt to get nixed up in o.ny Indo-Chino. decision. It is C\. mtter for postucr.-·· ••• I do not ~ant "to got nixed' up ill u't'ly Dilite.l'y effort to\·1t'.rd tho liberation of Indo-China froe the JD.'Dc.-uloso.- You' can tell }ItUif~"( that I nndo·this very cleer to l·{r. Churcliill. Fran both the t!:ilitD.1'Y and civil. point of ViO~l, action at this tinl is: . ~cnatwro. .

lc 0FI in J.D.

•. .,45'.


-.

CEPARTM~NT

Memcrancfum J•at

~'.

..

\.

OF STAn:

01 Ccl1YI:rsc:flcn

".

#.

..

\'-

\

"

. '.

!:- .... .:1-15

....... ......

PA.cn1CIPAI\'1'S:

-. ~-'.

~

.

CCPIESTd:

..

.f

:'"

..........

'--:.. ; . ," t.

,"

-',

..

...

~

'.

-.-

' ..

'

.:\,

.. '

Jl

.

..

I

.. ,-'"

. ..

.I II I

II i

.. .-

i ,

.

.' .. .

I,


..

:, .

."

.

".

:

"

.

"

... 'lbe French have co.--=im1eated thdr' plans to 1012 t~ divisions .to~ Far Eastem se.~ce to the Co:Ql>ir.cd Ohiefs of Start who are no" cotlSiderlng the rat.t.er•. 5:l1e U.S. Chiets of Statt are awa.-e of the President's hat-ructions. . '."

.,' "

.

"."

"

"

''''. "

"

. .:

~

: ..

.

""

..

."

",

.......

~

...

..

~

.


.

--

. - .. --.,. ...- _........

.

....

....~

-

"

The ..lm1JfI,~,'l(td(J7' Ill. CMlla (llurley) f~ tll~' Sec;'efm'!J of Strife CU'(;XCi'IXG, February 6,

104:»-21)' m..

. .. [Recer",c,12: 25 1" m,l Iii. ReF-mIls ltG, .JnulIm:r 2G,:1 p,1l1,11 (1) Follo"'ing is substance of "Xctt 1,rintNl.

. ' .

iutr11·ie.w of Febrnary 2 between Fl;cn('h :\filitlU'Y Att:\cM and G.£n.:. . eml W~!r~t::...\,=hi4..!i!Ji!~l~J)\ls..nlltl"pdzeLllUc...tO-t:eporlto...St:\.t0_ ·T.t. (;1'11••\lIl('rt C. W'C'ClpUlC'~'('r, China .'1'1It':ltN', -.-- .

"'.

('U1I1lIl:n"lfUlIg

Gl'llcrnl "f Uniti'Cl St.\tC'1O ForcCfl• . "

'.

Departmeut: .Tllp'\1l~ are new ;,\ssi}:l'ning 1\ more exilcting and arro- . glmt "ole in Indoehlnu 'when' tbey l\r~ eoncenrmting stronger ·f01'CCS. Should they demnnd rh:lt French troops disarm und disbaud, those ,,'110 elm will disperse into hills ,,-hCl'C they will continue to c01~dn('t lnl(lN'~I'OllUd and ~ne\'il1I1 aeriviries, hut some units may be> compelled -to retire to Yunnan. In such event, the)' would \lI'~p.nrly require medical 1\n<1 eommunierrious equipment, .HI.' expressed special concern Ol'N' the uttitude of the Chinese toward those troops who In ighr be forced O'"P.l' the frontier into (,him\ nnd ~l\~~t'Sted th:\~ :1, competent. member of the French mission now with General Tlatmtten be despntdle<l to rhungkiuA' as Unison oOirel' nt .\mel'icIUl headquarters here.

(~)

~~ll~!!~g,.~1.!~~l'.'~~~~~~~:'!."·~JI:\1'.onnd

Consonant. with

State

\

Dep:\l't.mN\tS:..gS~'9.~~l JY~"~k~!~l'~~Lt.:!'1'lCl~1s he hl~_~inhlillCtl non-

eorumlttul policy "is-u-l'is Indochiua. In this pal'cicul~ll- iii.;i~\JiceliC· stiites·li·(dliro!;lIil~l·]t')'l'li;,l)" )fifitlli,\· .\ttt\l'M rhut situation l:\.tter descrihed \\"11Si)i'oij'lbi~~:ei1=i~~~~~"~;·to-ie~idcrs of French nnd Amel:r. em Gorennnents :md.rhl~t it would have to be dealt with by competent:

o'

Ilighcl' . nnthoriries, This Entbus.~' has consistenrly advised the Froudl here that polie,}' on Indochina must criginate in 'Ynshingtol\ - :111<1 Paris, not in Clmngking, ~!!~~:~!._s_tl\,~~~_tlll\t ~~id\....l\J'9:'!ol!!!lt:~.rlb:..ful'uislti,1\;r vuluuble.iuforuration to his _hen.clqlll\.!~e~'~, and' Htl\.\ir Force and \\"ouJ111i,I,~ ~1.1.i:i,tQJ~_c:_outill\1~L o.

4

-

.:.:-_....-----.-••----.- -' - .. ~--.-..........

~~

-

......

...

_ _ 0 _"_. _ _ • __

-:]'

:---=--_......

:...

°

11'CRJ.E1."-


.. ,

..-

... -.....

.

YALTA CONFEREUCE

Extract from Memorandum of Conversation between President P.cosevelt and 'Marshal Stalin, Livadia Palace, February 8, 1945, 3:45 p.m. l

a.. ·

'mE PRESIDENT then said be also had in min'd trusteeshi~ for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve or this idea as they \'rished to give it back to the French since they teared the intplicat10ns or a trusteeship a.s it might

arte.ct Burraa.

.

r~RSHAL STALIN remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Inci:)china" .. 'end it lias not his opinion that Britain \-las a i sure country -to protect th:is area.. He' added that he thought Indochina \·las a very important area.

.

.

. !HE. PRESIDENT said that the Indochinese

were· people or small stature, like the Javanes~ and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that ,Frf:lnce had done nothing to improve the natives .' since she had the colony • He said that General ; de Gaulle had asked for ships' to transpor't. French '. ~."

forces to Indochina.

.

Il{RSHAL STALIN inquired where de Gaulle was ~!nZ to eet.the t~oop~. ' .

.

· . .'T.HE PRESIDENT replied that de Gaulle said he

was goinS to find the troops when the President could find tHe ships, but the' President added that up to the uresent he had been Unable. to find the ships. . . . •

..

. -.

. .' ?

.

~,,:

:.

.~

'

.

It~endboOk or Fa~ Eastern Conference Discus· sions II (Histor1c31 Division Rese3rch Project No.' 62,. ·.November 1949), pp.. E24-E25 ~ top secret.." '" .

. ' .. . :.' ."~":'<. . ,.""',~:.:~ :. . . . ,:.: ..'<': '.

::.

.;..

::~ ~ ; ~ ~ ;:.~ ..

: -.

..

.:'

~ '.I'

.:':" • .: . •

~.... '.:~:- ,: ~ . '.' .. ~:"

""

~._~;::.•. ~. -.

.

~

4.:.:

~

::• .::.:,'.'

~:

~ ~.

:..:•........... ._

'

~.

: .... .' .'. : . "

,'"

'.

~.

'

..

"

.' .

..

-' ,'-

'. ::., .: ~J~~=.~~=.~;, :;~~ .... ~~~ . "-. ... .:..

:«,.,:.;'"

:.;:~ ,>.~.


Tv' r:::

.. ... \. '~o// ...

~._._ ~~"(~_'. .r-:

\ v . ... '.: :-:-.

.

'"

~- DEP~\~MEN; .OF Si~TE' /. . .-;: ... ' . v'i '. s..~, ;.......... - . ~. •.

. DIVISION' ~F EUROPEAN AFFkiRs '., . ." I l l · · .

\ -i

u .. ""

;~:"'~ {;' r:Fe bruarv 14 ~~"l945 Mr~ Culber:t"son ~~ I ::-u ~ ~ j~;'-;"v . . Mr. Hlck~rson \" 0., ~.~E?, Hrcj(~~soN ...• . Mr. D~~n . -,'.;-..:.~'.~.~ ".:..... ' -: l;;/,·f;:. .: .. . '" - :.,.." ~ \ .'

-; .

.•

""~~":':':::

,

..

i

-

;-'-

-~~~

'j' ._.' -,

With re rer-ence to the attached despatch from Chungking, I fear that there Is a lump in the General's mashed .potatoes. ,I father that he speaks his mind to the representatives of the "imperialistic . powers" and then announces that he 1s not responsible for our policy. All in all it strikes me'as a rather extraordinary performanc~~ .

., ;

• :

••: : •••••• '''::~.. 'M;"

0; ,....

....... -'.: ,..:.~~. -=.~., .... :: ,"':': :' ".~


_..

......,~ ........:_

-... :

.. _..-'"

• .• _ '_'~'

__•. _..

- .y._ -

'.:.~~lio. :li~·-··-:'Subject:

.

".' -.,.

'. " ,:B;~-I,;'; 'e'"

t.~'

.'

0 ....

we >.... U')_.

r

"

"

:

0-'

...

• -".

-::"J;I-= 6hl:,-.?,,1~.:

' ••

:-..

~~ t..... '," ~>":"'.~

;

.... :. .'t....·~H ~z...I2~..t-a~ y:... '; :i::=;:;·I\7';,r~~~;~\.:

1'0 ~ /;'(7-._- . "'/-1 f...,' ""~ ...·:;::~a~ ~6

'.~''''

...

,~.

'<;. -,:....

nv

'.;J•• '

.I'·l'· =.~ ..s~. -:"w':.:z"~· . f - I ;

~~;";::.

• ~.l

The._ onwaol-e. -- Th '. .... t ary e :;>.ecre . . ' i' -hi V : ~r.e:s

. I'''''') . " .7'·. " ...... .". 1\-{""' ...._.,..-: .::,"I'~:':'. ::,:".:

~~"'t :r---fr1'1~' I ...--~~;.. .:

AI !.I-

:.IL~~~~~--1/.:5:':'l -#'

0"",

ng~on.

~~S1l-fl< .:. ~: ~

.

, .. : . . ' "

fO""

~:;.

. . , . . \ .. '

. '.':. "" ".: ./~\:;'''' ',. .. ~""'of.':--.. . ., ....:....' .' !~I .' . '. ~ : .... .~.\ '....: .: ,::::-:"~. :;. . :'.:~, .\'::'. '.~ .~~~}..:~}~~~. '.~ :J.

'>r~i:·· ~: WL.~C 1.1 t:

-' • •

~

t

~.. ~........ . ..,../1-

1',· \

".

i ,.'

,":I

I'"

.... ,

:.

~,"-~

."

1 .;,

1""'1-oo-'}: '-:ri: ..~,~ ..r~j:'"If:" ~. /i:t';;" ..' .,' ! J"joJe~I?"l.bh(:t.p·~ ,I.~. ;;.~< . ~·tr-·,~~w.~ v/K7)\ '; '.' . ,. :

"1)_

~~, ,

.

Ioovt C

yo,

.... • ~ .... Pcr..

.

e..-~'~

.~.. "..(,.l."l"" ',.: ' . • ~'" ,1 Posi€.1on of French I'rovlsional.Gover~~i:.t~I~~.~<:ir

,1

,"... '-.- ..

-

ChUDBking. Ch1na Januarj' 3:1., 19~5 :

~

..-

"

!

'.

.

.

~

', ....... ~ .>.. ;..•., :.:'~ :<.: -; " s: . > ,--=-_.: _.'.' ." ~':\ ~f C:'···~,.i- :" .' .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I

.

'.:, .

t.':... ~ I;.

~ :t:7':~" , ..-....... ~ :~.. ~?./. . .' . t • . "! ~--:~ ... ~."1""'.---; ~~-:.-.-.s. ,",., ~··: '; :::~···t... . .~ ~ ~.~ state,. "'';''''::i .,,!.- • .:-J;.i ~,y~. •.•. .. .• " . ' , . : , - " ." ~ ... ~.~",,", .... ""~:'.' . ,~ .v, . D. C. ".:' .~~'~':' ,':':::' '~::"'~'.:... I"',' ,,~. ~

.::,,: .' <;..; (+?;~~·~;··;.:f~~U~;;;.":;:;:i:~!: T' .

'~.J.!r. A.chilles Clarac, Counselor of ,the French 'Ernbassy'i'; . ca1led on Counselor- Atcheson on January 26, 1945 and handed. . him the enclosed IInote" in French with Enzlish translation; wh1ch he reques ted be forwarded to the American Government.: :1'h.e note appears to be self-explanatory. lIIr.• Atcheson made: no comment to 1;11'. Clarac in 'rega~d to. itsco~tents., .', '. (.:, . '

. . ,

.,'".'

.'

.

':

,...:...

I

..',

I 8m forwarding the note \'11thout ta1:ing any other action pending instructions trom the Department in r~gard to policy \to\lard Indoch~na. So far as I am personally· concerned, ,1 i have let 'the diplomatic representatives. o~ the so-called ; imperialistic goverru:1ents with interas·ts in southeast Asia i knO\'! that I am personally opposed to imperial1sr:1 but that t I am not making· the policy of the United States on tha~ •..:_. , R1l1)je~t.. I h~~e re=:lrkod to 'tho: ~~ tha UnltGd 3tiLtt:~ 1::1 ~" . ~ . committed to the propos! tion tha.t goverznllents should derive .....~·:,:_"·....T thei!" just powers from the consent of the governed. I have ' "::said that I personally adhere to the principles or the Atll:l.nti"c .: Charter i/hich .provides that \7e shall IIrespect the r1:ght of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will ."j live". I have '~ommented that French imperialism and French . .'monopolies in Indochina seem to me 'to be in conflict with thC"S8 . principles. HO~/ever, I have e.'llphasized, as indicated above,,~ b:i . ;'. that I am per:3onally not making the policy of my Govermnent~ l:'J .. " I have accordingly sUBgested to the French that they should 0 t:z; . look to Washington and Paris and not to us here ~or c1ar11'icr~~ob :::,.:;:o~ ~erica's policy in regard to Indochina.;: .... , ;. . f~ . '. ". .. . -' .. . '. In connection with my' opinion on this SUbject. I refer., '.. ; " also to the speeches made eQrly in the war by Prime Minister, , Churchill" Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt which indii ; : cato clear],,. the principles o~ liberty for which. we are .;; . . ,: fighting •. ":rh~~e pr:nCipl~::s._a~~-!!!~ set~ut d~f.1nitel" 1~ 1(..=-"' ~ the Atlantic Charte•• ~',~ :-r..:j;, ." .. ' I .. ..;":: ..: ;.. ~.~ ;,,;·f\1:t1.1'~~~ .:.: ' . :'.~~-' ~:::. bi.~.. .:~ ':2::",":"::~" '."'. . " >'_:. .~.......

ft

..

':""

.'

.

'

"

>·: r ''.: . '.;: :.''-;:' .: .' .



. (Enclo~ureto'Des ~tch..No.lll·::d~ted 'Zenuer 1 fron·the Amgrican Embassy, Chunv.kinS t China • ....

..

!

....

..

-.

..'"..... GOUVERtlEt,!ENT PROVISOIRE 'DE .LA REPUBLIQ,UE FRANCAISE. ' . . e: ' . .; h •... ~· -," .... :.;;, AMBASSADE D~FRANCE· EN CHINE·..: ~~ ,:•.': ;•• ~ '.' . >~·;?~·:··;:·":··;'i_"..<' '.' . ::':' "~';.~., :.~> .:,:.:~.':.::;: .~i.:·~:'::~,::·~·,~·:·: ~'::"'

• •

"'.~

.'.

0.

. No. • .... ~ ~ ;..•••'..

.,<

.;~ ,'. ..:.:.::.

• •

.. -;}..

• • •

!

~

_ " ' ,

"

( : .:

,< 'l'chongking,

Le 20th Jaill.iar, 194.5 ...

-... : : T~e political position t.aken e, by: the ?!"ovls1.onal.,!..: ,\ -:~~'.' Government of..the F~ench Republic r.egarding Indochina ·ls. .: plain. A few sentences wl11 be sutf'icle'nt to. make it olear•. ::::';"

r : .:.

"!J"~'

.... .r :

':'.' .~·f~.·, ':\' '~,:'.',:.: . :;.~'.>.?' ~<~~~:;~,,:>

... ";":':'.;'.~':'"

First, France cannot admit any:discusslon about. the ' principle of her est'abli~hment in Indochina.' , Her. pre'sence .' founded on agreements consistent. with international law and established on the ~ense task carried~ou~ by her for the sake 01' the .Indochinese population has never been disputed by any Power. The occupation of IndQchina bY' the Japanese: has not changed anything in that state of things. This ' occupation is nothing but a \'far incident s1niilar to the. .". invasion by the Japanese forces of' Malaya, of' the Netherlands East Indies and Burma. The activity of the underground. movement, the formation ot the expeditionary forces that W8 . are ready to send to the Far East, ·are a clear .proof ot . . the .energy with "lhich France intends to take. part 1n the .'~ liberation ot those of ber territories that l)ave been :'.'~: momentarily torn away from her. by the enemy.. ..:..: ,': .>:.:'.. ,: . . .

,

".

1J'l\-I .., e ........

~

.

..' . . .. "

l\o"n'" - v _ .0' "", .... eD" J

; ,

'

. ".

"''''a "Ii'-..o",,,,,l\ ' f I " V " • ..,.........

~.

.':

'.

:.

-:

.

'.

.:

I!."WC""''''0"" v ••+. ..., ,......., • ...,...........

-..

. ~"' ..:." ..

'

~- :";.'~ ~:

O· J:I~"D,"D,"cil .... J! .... v ....

ell . . -.......,

to consider with its allies all the measures that mal be taken to insure security and peace for the future in the " Paci1'~c area; .it expects that its participation in those <~ .. measures will 'be the one it is entitled to get owing to" . : - .•... the 'importance of French interests in the Far East. ~~ ..., " '. ,""," ".

";... ::.

....

......~.:. i··

.

.

. Furthermore, the French' Government has alread7 fixed' " :,t the Brazzaville conf'erence the principles of the policr . ··it means to'follo\v in its overseas possessions. Accordinglr' . it \'lill set up togethex- \'lith the populations concerned· thestatuv of 'Indochina on a basis that \vill secure tor the Union a satisfactory- autonomy within the frame Of the : French Empif'e. Besides, Indochina will be granted an . . .. ·eoonomic regime that· will enable her to profit \'11dsll bY'. ' .. the advantages of international competition. .Such decisions, havlng.nointernatlonal character, com~ within the competenoe , ot the French Government on11. Thoroughly' aware of the 'importance ot the principles at stake in the present .llar. France will not shrink f'rom her responsibilities. . I

','

.

,

...

'.

'

••


.~.

*'

.......~

'.

......

.

".

:.....

For the time bei ng, hO"/evert France t S eeneeen in the Far East ~s mainly military. As early as June-1943. '. the French Committee 'ot National Liberation made it known to its al11es that it considered that zone as one where 'it would be extremely desirable for all the interested parties ., to set up a thorough military oollaboration. On the 4th ' " 9t October 1943, it decided to tom an Expsdltlonary Force that would take part in western Pacific operations and in the liberation ot Indochina. In the meanwhile the French , Governcent has established in Indochina itself a network of .' connections with the French and Indochinese underground. By this act·ion, the ef'ticaci ty of which. has been proved by the Frenoh Forces or the Interior in France. it will' . ',support tbe assault of' the torces. att~c~ing from without . . a~' help them in their task in a wa~ that can be decisive •.

. .. . '

t:;'

. 'The !rench.Government has iritor~ed:Washln8ton'a~d ~.

..

.'

.

.'

'.

~

'".

London 01' all the' mea~ures it has taken in that respect. It· asked several tim&s that the Expeditionary Forcas should ) be sent on the spot end used to, the best; but the answer s . ! ",as that the decision belonged to President Roosevelt and . : the' Combine4 Chiefs ot Staff. This acreement has not yet . been givep.. ~Yet, the French Gover11I!lent· is. prepared to have . . its expeditionary torces used on.the .~erlcan as well as . ,on the British tmatre.ot·operations •. Considering there-.,:·.J .·tore. the part France is entitled to ask and ready to take :.\in. the military operations in the Pacific, it would be "':',' .:~ ;advisable' that she should be admitted to the Pacitic ,Jar:',';., . iCouncU .and. particularly t.O the .Sub-Conmi1it~e:responsibJ,~:·~. ;., for. t~e o!»eration'S. 1n~olving ~~rench Indochl~a.l. ~:=:';". .. ~ ..:.:....', ~;;

·k~ i;~:!: ·l.'~ .~. ~., "~~~ .' ~ '.~,' ·~ · ~; ~.: :~.~:~t ', -. ': ...':.: .~.:·.:~J~~:~::~·:,:~"~\:·:}d:;~.::;fi~~J~~;:;:~;_~~~j.··_S·~:}"i~·

. 64·


T,.Q.UOU

l",",:s.-l:;.&:': '1~"l:ralll

: ,

. T~ Amlul8JSildol' ;n Ft'ffJICO (£'aQn'!J) to tits Recrt.lm·!J ol ..~tot'J

.

.

. '

. .,

1100, G~l\CI'a1 de GI\ulle 1':

-

P.,ltI~, Mlu-eh 1:1, lQ.!a.:-,. p.m., [Ueceivcc.1111\rcb l.f-l: 2:11)' Il\.} . l\:o;ke<l me to come to sec hhn at G. lIef

ttt Ull't'r",'bo[ollill loWllc-h QII"tomllltUt, Sl)Oko in "fl'X qulet, nffahlt', 'fl'iemUJo: f,ulbion, but this Is ,,"hilt· be s:lid:' "W'e l,,\\'e l-erei\,,('(l word tlmt oin' troops srill fightin~ in Indocbint\ b:\'"e tl))Jlt'j,u~.:l.id-to..yo1U'.mmt~u'r\uthoJ. iti.es..ill. ~Cbi.n.ll :\1\(1 rhe Jiritish lllilitnry t\uthOl'ities in n\ll:l~l'\;' We..bJlJ~~h~~umtd tb;\t ' · t~)' 1:t"1l1i~Jl111t~ under iush'u('lioll,~. nO,l\id could.he sel't.[~] 1'he1. ",eloe gi\,(~l\ to nnderstaud tbnr the Uriti.sh simi)},}' followed onr lead. lIe Sllicln1sG that several e-xpe<liticlUu')' fOl'Ces f01' Indochina l\nd . been 111t'pm'C<1: Some' hoops were in X011.h· .\fl'ien, some in seuehen Fmnce and some ill lI:\(lu~'S<".l.I', and the Ul'itish had pl'qmised to trnnsllOrt theln but· ar the l;lst' minute they WC1'C Jriven to l111Clcl'Shuu{ t1mt owingto Amerieau insistence the,)' couldnot trt\US1)011' them, HIS ·o~l'\'ed: '"This ,,:ol'l'ies me a gl'e~tt. deal f01' ebvious rensoas and it · comes ~\t t\ pluticmh\l"l)' inopportune r.i~ic, ...\ s Itoldlli. Hopkins~' '" QGt>Il. "b:lrlt'l' ell' GlUdlt>, ZIt'll(]

I

. 1a Dar!')"

...HBI,lklullo :-;ll(oCiltl.\~l'tnJlt til l"rl'l'lclf'tlt Rn~\,e.lt.

. when he ,,",\S here, we <10 I~Ot lllldersti\l\<l ~'OU1' polie)'. ""ll11t lll'GyOU; dril"ing llt? Do you want· us to become) fOl' example, one of the fedel1\ted st~\tes uuder the Russiau ll.e~is l The Russians are acl\?tlllelllg apace as ;}'Ol1 well knew, "1,on Ge1'U1lmy nllls tbey will be \\1)on lIS. It the public here comes to realiaethat youare n~\inst lIS in Indochina . there will 1» tel'l'ifie disappoinnnent t\llCll\ubo<1y knows to whllt'that. ·will lend. W'e <10 uor ",nnt. to become Commun ist; we do not ,,"luit· to . fail iuto the Russlan orbit, but I hope that you do not push usinto it." He t·hen went on'te &1)" t111\t diffic."nlries were beillgcl-eated too in re-. ~n'd to the llromi~d an1\U\ment-diffieulties he could not understand unless tlu\t were p,u't; of Om'l)oliC'}' too, I told him I hadbeen givel\ .." n'"1,,,"C: "lC1 .',,,,i- the "'"1T\''''''''''' was .,.,.i";",,.. "I'\'~1''';~.3 . ., ., ···0··"A'''G""·..,\0 .. . , J,:'* :" 11\ 1\1ly-c,'eiit, I sllKlt Iwoulc.I telcgl'll)}P\t-oii<£"tC):""'t\shingtoll al. .. .,..---. .thl\t Ite fwd said. "..... . ' .' . . .. ' . "'W

..-~

iII

:....

_

•••••• _ ' "

-

,.-.:~

_

-,~,

..

",

.. _;'._:... _.

-~;~

.". ' : '

.

.. _---:.,~..-."_.- ::::-~ ... ....

-:-. __

.Cu'J:D1' . ..........

.. .: .

~

'


·D!..r.~.£i'Iil~~~'l· OF' ST.'.'IE

..

~',ashlnG

ton

'March 16,'

1945

have been received from the Frovlslonal.

Subject:

Inao-China •.'

..

Co~nunlcations

or

Government

the ~'rench'r.iepublic asking for:

g~oups

(1) tssistfnce tor the resistance fighting the Japtnese in Indo-China. .

now

.

'

(2) Conclusion ot a civil affairs a~reement coverinG possible future operations i~ Indo-Chin~.

.

. These memoN~.nda have been referred to the Joint j Chiefs ot Staff in order to obtain their. views concerninG. the military aspects of ths problems, end I shall conmlunicate \'l1th :fou further on the subject upon receipt ot the Joint Chiefs' reply. .

Attached here\1J1 til is the text 'of a rec'en't tele3ram' trom nmbassedor Cattery descr~bing his conversation \~th General c1e Gaulle on the SUbject ot Indo-China, From this telegram ~nd de Geullets speech of March ~, it appears that this Government may be made to ap~ear·respon­ slble tor th~ \'1eaknees 01' the resistance to Japen in . . Indo-China. The British may 11ke~~se be expected to encourege .this view. It ee eas to me that VIi thout prejudicing iri· 8DJ \'Is:" .our posl tlon reGarding the future or . . Indo-Chin:. ~& can comb~.~ thi:! t~end. by makin~ public OUX,desire to rendel' such assistance as may be warranted by . the circumstances end by the pl~ns to '::hich Vie are already. committed in tpe Pacific area, To this end I attach a . draft of a sU3~ested statement tor publication, subject ·to your &pprovol, by the ~tate Depe.rtr,~ent, . . .. . .

.

'.

. '..~

"

.. ' ,.' ./s/ E',' it. Stettlnlus, J~~ ", . "i;nc'_o'';'ures.-· .. '. . ..... " " .' 1. Progosed St£\tement,. . "': . ' .: ',.. ... 2. COI:y.ot tele3N!1l\. _ '. .• . : '. ' . : '.. .... ' .. ' trom Atlbc.ss&.Qor· Caffery) tnot' It:1cluded here] • '.

.,

,',

_

'tl;lI

......

'. of' • ' . . '

-,

"';:

~.'

. ' , .•

..

"..

. :.:, -:---- __ ....:.:

/

••

'

• •••

. ~ • .~. ..

",.,• • :

",-...rt.

.... ::.

,.~

~~~'.:.:1..:........-.--:. ..

.','

;

_

..' .r:',

I .

......-...... ~ .. _

66

. '

........ .4

....

..

.:

:..

~

. ....

~

,' •


;).J.'\0')·,........... J; 'oJ\ •• ..u

~

C'

.;,t

'11"• ~ 4iii"•• ~,"" '~'N'l' •

Govat'mr.en~

' . The action of .the Je.pal1ese in tel.'.1.. in3 ~\'ia:r ·the veil v4 th wl"'-ich it for so lon~ &ttempteG to cloak its domlr.~tion or Indo-Chlna is a direct consequence of the ever-mountin~ pressu~e nhich our a~s are epplyin~ to tl~ Japanase ~rnplre. It is & link in the chair. ot evants which Q~~an sO'disastrously in the summer or 1941 ~itr. the Fr~nco-Japanese 8~reement tor the "comr.ion defense u of Indo-Chtns. It is clenI' that this latest step in the J~pa4asa pro~rrm will in t~e 'lonJ run prove to be of no avail. . \

The ?rovisl one), GO\'el'nment or the French hepubllc has requested ar~ad ~~s!st:nce for those who a~e resisting the Ja!la.nese forces in Ir.oo-Chlns. In accordence wi th i ts con~tant desire t o aid ell those who are v,,! lling to talco up arma asalnst our coruaon enemies, this Govern~ment will do all it can to be of assistance in the pre~ent situation,. consistent ~~i th iJlans to \'jlich it is already committed anti ~ith t~e operations nou takin~ pIece in the Pacific4 It goes ~~thout sayin3 that ~ll this countrj's available resources are bein~ d~voted to the defsat or 'our enemies ~nd they.will oontl%lUe to be em~loyed in the m9nne~ best calculated to has ten their cio',:n1'ell.

I

:

'-0

•.••


851G.OO/S-1745

.. ,.

-...

. "-

.. '"

.- ...

'.- ........ -.

..... - .... - ......_ . _ _ ••• ..: ••• -

......

'

..••

'

··t.'.rI·irt:"· .. I.n .L1I

"i':,)':'".• "

• . ... n..~

1:.:.

. I· .. :

.'

··•

~

"~-'

'

.

..

'

'U·("'-,

.

~

".

..

'.

,,"

.

.

.'

Secretery of State

."

. . '

.

~he President is

statement.

t£s .

.

"

By direction of the ~resldent, the~e 1s . returned herewith ~ecretary of 5tate ~emorandum ot 16 }.tarch, subjec t Indo-China, \'hlch includes a pro-posed statement on the Japanese action in Indo-China. 1nad~y~s~ble.et

. : '~

.: Ida'rch 17. 1945'

;.

~e

'

'

',',

..

. ... . . '..

..

.

...

_

on '" v!::a

;

.

..

X~~!hln3ton

I

. I

..

' " ,

...'.... - _ ........ • .. ·_··~ ...1I

.....

.

..

-

~resent

.

,

•»

.

ot 'the opinion th~t It 1s time to Is~us ~he ~r~posed .~

·/s/.

~i111am D. Leahy

..


'oIl'.ool1 r,W./3-1fH:i

. MelllOI'Olldl.lm, 0; (!olu·~i·1!flf.io,,~ 1J!/

.:

.

.

the-:ifR.Y·/:.,7liiif Rwetmy oj Stat~·~ .

(Dunn) .

'.

.

.

:\£lu'Oh 19, 19·15. Yest~\"(lny nrtel1loon (~l1ncll\r)'lll)ol1t six o'c1O<"k the Fl'el1ch .Am-. ba.SSl.letOI~ called me hy telephone and asked. whether he could come " to sea me, I imm(\llillte:l~' otrN'ecl to go to the Emhlu,~~" which. be accepted, "'hen I arrived there he informed me thut under in.sh"lle~· . tions from his Government, A<lmil"lll Fl"nl\l'eL~:t\s.j:~\lciug_u1>J\:it.I\.. Admit..,] Leuhv lG the followimr ....matter, . . _•. .

.

t

~

_

[W'.\SItlXG'1'o:\,.]

• • • _ _ ~.w

_~._._.

• A(lUl, WUUllU\ D. J.Clllty. Clli~! ot Shaft to tile C(llUlUl\1Il1er in eWet of the Am')' I\m1 Xl""', .

He said the Fom't(,PlltlL.:\.h:.Fol·Ce..af...the..JIui.te..«.l...stU.tfS-fOl.'C~. in £.!linaJ~~~tl?l:!!l~~J~I\(I~~tI'.!l~t!ln l'E'-cHly to ~.I'l\llSl)Ot-t supplies nnd numi-•.. tions to units of. the French forces in Tl\clo-(,hin:l·whit'1l"·were·'l'CSist~ 11~\1~9~ition of total control over Iudc-China by the .Tl\lll\Ucse, this impcsitiou having; been recently in:ut::l11'l\tecl by the JI\lllmesc forces in Indo-China, He 5:iier tfle French Govemment had direct reports from the resistanee fortes in Indo-China to the effect· t·bl\t if tlle~' were granted assistence they would he able to make a good showing ll:t<\lnst. the -Iapanese CffOl'f. to take over the wholeeountlj". He said that his Govenunent requested that l\\lthol'iziltion ~ gh-en by the United States Chiefs of Smft' to send these supplies fOl" '~t\l,<n~-fl\e·"F'ren~i·i';tli·l\t~:\ciulil~'fJ4;;ell:\l"(l was making this request: of, Admiml T~!.t.ll:.u.\lid he asked the Stolte Department to-make n. simillll' ·l'eCll'l~t. of the President for uuthorizatlcn for United Stntes C\ssistallce to these resistance forces. .

-lni·tlle

"el'y

:\rl'.l\rcq~.!.__~~&ijsh~l1..l~~.i~i.1YI\l:,..t~l~l~ll.Q~l.lt~! IJ1~..1l!t!U~~ ~1g.1~-$~~' that.•..:\dmiml ~..e uard had made the above 'l'equ~st to .A.d~im.1. Leahy and tlulL,Aclmjl"l.\l J.~n!)j·.Jm.~1_1~1)tl.10l"iz.~d.JJI.e-lY'.nr ~l?~t ~.~.I1~~J~tJ~ ..s~l~d i'l. .in~~I~~ .. to .~enel'"l ~l'~edellle~·er..~iv.illg . him.,. nutbol'it)' to send whatever ussistunce could be spared without. HIe Will' eilort of the .\.mCl'iCI\ll. and Cnmese rorees, ~rl'Cl~)' ~lid he \\:'2!!~~~·~~~!.~~.(:<?llY. of the uuthorizatlou which

• 111iel·ll·I'lI1l.!· with

!It-.

was liemg sent to (1:.!.\.~:'lUr.~ll·mt'yCl', for our iufonuation, I am ~~ss ~1~i's matter II little further \\"~th .\(l~

t\sldug' :\h·. Jjohlell H to

u Clmtlel' 10:. Hul\tl'\\••\2l...;tl'lhlut to tlill ~'l'rl'hlry (,t St;\tE'.

miml T"'~!!ILt'l!'\ it. has OCC\ll'l'~<1 to me that it might be well fo\' this nij'ltll'tlUt'llt to be in u position to inforui the French .AmblISSildol·

here of the action which 1\:15 been taken in response to his request and alsoto inform .\mhnss:ulol· ('aWet',}' in Paris ill order that he lllily know. the latesr developments ill. this SltUi\tioJ\. .' ......JAXl-:S CU.3r&."OT D'(j~~ ~

....

'

..

6


''':,,:'

,

....

,~~

:~." '.,

'

."

....

.

.

....... -

,

~,

.

'

.

-_.. ..'. '

t'

..

, e '

. : '.

. ,. ',

.

",

'

"

'~"".", . . "

1/

:

...

'•

I

• J'.

.... ..

01

,

01

.

~

{i)

.' ; '

'

..

.,

,

.

'.

. : ..•. ,

"

,

.

,

.......... ... ....

,:.',

'

..

'~

.... . ,,; .

.

""

, t,

','

,'.

.'0'

I'..

,

.';

.....

'

'."

~,

.'.',

.:.

, ';

0

~

-,

,

. :.. ,~.~.:: :.

I ••

,!,,-:' '- ~... "

("" ::,: :, :'~

,'.

.'

"



·HO.OI\~ t

N\,,e.t:HO

Tile kJ'e!my of Sfll~r/;;t1iA1'~j~~i'c1t":J.fI;~~.~}'ifQ/""tl1oJI~t~t),' ,

'

Tho ~"('rehll',y of Stuto presents his compliments to His Excellency the ,Ambt\s.l. ~t<lOl· of rhe Fl'NWb. Rl·pub1i<.' nnd acknowledges the receipt ' of the Emku;.:;~·'jo: note- Xo, :lO:l of )Ial'rh 12, 1045 en the mutter of the Jupunese ~UP:ll ion French Indo-China. 'file GOtetllllU'nt of the t~nit\)d States hils ~i,'ell most carefuland., SJ'lll}lllthettr cousldemtlou to the suhjc(·t. mutter of the'eommuuieation of the Prorisionnl OO\"l!'I'I\lUl'nt· of the French Uepublie"., It has also glveu ronsidN'lltionto :111 uvuilable information in regard to l'ceeut events in Iado-Chinu, The deep COUCCl'iIOf the Provislonnl Govern-. ment in l'(,~""I'(l to the sltuarion isfn 11)' appreciated, W'ith l'e~l'(l to the request that the Government of the rnitc(l States intel'\"en~ Tit-h theCombined Chiefs of Statr to the end tluit Allied . ~'l'S ~:..;~~ t!!.I..J:~I:'t~\,j)l.ftii:!t~"J.J.IJ"J!ll~(lil!t!'_~~~':'..~<;tnn('e to the French resisrauee in llulo·(,hin:a, it is MINl thur thissuhj~(;ns llh'\,:I(1)r h~f2.1'e t l~('.m)!hJ.!ll'tl CI.t~·tlLQf.. t=:tj\ If ill. tJI~. fm'm. il·'. ~~.J~~ !.N' from Geneml (lc St. Didler and there llC('Ol'llill:.rl~' :Ippl'ill':'\ to 11l~C)-llla::.;onJ9J:_ful'.tl\C.l' ·))1\·:':il'lIh1tJ.qJ..1..0f..tllC-UllUh·.' .ro I he .Cmllhiul.!(LCltiC'fs .of.St.I~!r· by the "GO\'el1llUl'ut of the Uulred SInh's nt this rime, · .' . :' 'Yith l'~.ll\l to the Sl1:.r~i.\stion that Ih" .\l\ll'!'irllJl .\11' Fol'c(,~ ,lUll . . tmnl>s.bllSl'tl in Chinn lurervene in fnvor of the French Forces in IndoChinn,th~&'l'l'('tlll')' of ~ti\tl' is ~l:Hl to confirm the iuformiltion :!h"en the ..\ mbn..~\(lnr 01':\11,)' S;O,lUl' days il~() thut the .\mpi"i'·ll1l "\.h:..Eor~.!. in Chiun. ha\"C nlreadv assisted the French Forces in Indo-Chiua and .h..l!~"C!.!!tt'J).·p.irhnri~~"i:f~~· .the p'i'ese'llf, in ald of the French, to under- . take 0llN'ations l\l:llinst" the "TllL>lln~ic in Indo-China, provided auell action does not intcl'fN'e with opemtions planned elsewhere. The resources ofthe .\llie<1..Forces in the ~~l\l'l~:lst in men, munitions, and ~E.m'!~ti9n l'UilSr.-Le·coi·lcliini,itccr 01\ 'aiul employed in llttniuiug om' main objeNh"t>S, and the .\mbilssmlOl' will therefore l'elldily .appreeiate that no commitment can he given with regard to the amount, , 01' clUIl'llder of amy ussistuuce which mil)" be provided, However, in. npHl'e~intion of the lmportunee and Ul'~encl' which the French P1~ visio\ll\I rlO\"ei'nlUent attnches to ·tbis question, immediate steps uro being taken to ascertain whether nn)' fUl'tbcl' assistanee can be glven from the (\iuil Theurerto t he resistanee gl'OU1)$ in Indo-China without jeopl\1'(Uznag the 0,"c1'-1111 war elrOl't in ether areas, The Secretary of . ..; Srute will be lH\}lPJ to keep the ...ullhl\S$ldol' informed of any fUl1:bel" . . de\"elopmeut.o; ill that l'egm'Cl.· " '.' , . ·W.\Sl1I:\cn"<lx) ...\ pl'i14, 19-15, " . _ - - - -.- ..•.•v • • ••• , ••

or

I

. '...,- ...• _. - -.. _.._... ....

~

~

_-

r-

-

.. .•. ,

"

. "

.:

4 . ·••

. .. '

......

"

".\

.

.

:

'.

.;

.

....

,'.

.

.

".;'

":'

..

.

-,'

";

....

. .. ',' -.".'

"

-"',

..

.;

.

~

.

.....

..

'

12· '

..

.


Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.