Exploring the Impact of Disinformation on Diverse and Marginalized African Canadian Community

Page 1

KINGDOM ACTS FOUNDATION

2021

Exploring the Impact of Disinformation on Diverse and Marginalized African Canadian Community


Exploring the Impact of Disinformation on Diverse and Marginalized African Canadian Community

DR. GODWIN UDE, MBA, PhD Executive Director KINGDOM ACTS FOUNDATION 10704 CITY PKW SURREY BC., CANADA


A research report prepared by Kingdom Acts Foundation for the Government of Canada's Ministry of Canadian Heritage through the Digital Citizens Initiative / Digital Citizens Contribution Program. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: Many organizations and individuals helped to produce this report. I sincerely thank all who contributed in no small ways to make this project a success. All opinions and interpretations in this report are the opinions, interpretation, or perspectives of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any organizations or people being acknowledge here. The following people provided their valuable perspectives in the report:

Joshua D. Reichard, DPhil, PhD, EdS, CCS

Toks Fatimehin, MBA

President and CEO: Certified Clinical Sociologist

Organizational Change Mgt

President and CEO: Omega Graduate School

Lead - Window 10 Deployment & Cloud/

American Centre for Religion/Society Studies (ACRSS)

Exchange Transformation at Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Adebayo, Dada OTU, PhD Professor of Organizational Psychology

Eric Kazenga, PhD

Kwantlen Polytechnic University,

Hope Leadership Institute

Surrey, British Columbia, Canada.

Adjunct Associate Professor Nations University

Curtis D. McClane, DPhil Chief Student Success Officer (CSSO), Executive Team

Raphael Okoye, MSc

Director of Admissions & SEVIS, Professor of Leadership Studies

Business Analyst at EuroLine Windows Inc.

Omega Graduate School

Computational Biophysics Simon Fraser University, BC., Canada

Blessing Ude, M.Litt, DBS Family Life Educator

Cathie Hughes, Ph.D.

Director of Operations

Chief Academic Officer, Dean of Faculty

Kingdom Acts Foundation

Omega Graduate School

Sam Tecle, PhD Professor, University of Toronto at University of Toronto

Liban Abokor

This project has been made possible in part by the Government of Canada.

Non-profit Executive | Social Innovator | Philanthropy disruptor

Ce projet a été rendu possible en partie grâce au gouvernement du Canada

Foundation for Black Communities


Table of Contents Content

p.

Executive Summary/Abstract

5

Introduction

10

Summary of Recommendation

LITERATURE REVIEW

Disinformation against Canadian Communities Disinformation Media Outlets and Personalities

Disinformation among Ethnic Groups in Canada

Primary Findings

Sample Groups Political Affiliations

Where do African Canadians source their news?

9

12 12

14 16

20 20 22

Most trusted news sources

24

Disseminators of Fake News/Disinformation

28

Main Disinformation Media

26

The Perceived Rate of Encounter with Disinformation

30

Reported Implication of Disinformation

34

Awareness of where to report Disinformation

38

African Canadians’ Perceived level of Disinformation Perceived Widely Misinterpreted Information Capacities to recognize Disinformation

How frequently do the sampled survey populations verify information?

Secondary Findings

Looked-up-to Opinion Leaders

Popular Opinion Leaders by name

Reporting Cases of Disinformation

The popular organization responsible for countering Disinformation Annual Income distribution across the sample populations

32

36

40 42

44 44 46 48 50 52

Perceived levels of disinformation relative to other ethnic groups

54

Typical steps in checking news credibility

58

Views on possible measures to mitigate Disinformation against African Canadians 56

Discussion

Impacts of Disinformation Among the Marginalized African Canadians’ Communities

Key Disinformation Frameworks Countermeasure Protocols to Limit...

References Appendix

60 60 61

62

64 66


Abstract

(English)

This research reports a detailed, pragmatic account of

sampled African Canadian and sampled Asian Canadi-

the state and the impact of disinformation among the

an population, respectively, has no idea where to report

marginalized African Canadian community. Also, a com-

disinformation. Other key findings include:

parative analysis was conducted on Asian Canadians as a minority group for comparison. The inclusion of

i.

another independent variable (Asian Canadian) in the

Canadians

research design was required because this is original

encountering disinformation at least once a day. 83%

quantitative research seeking to explore and evaluate

of the sampled African Canadian population has no

several measurable dependent variables of a particular

idea where to report disinformation cases, while the

population. A comparative population (Asian Canadi-

same distribution among the sampled Asian Canadian

an) helped to evaluate the extent of the impacts of the

is 95%. About 54% of the sampled African Canadians

measured dependent variables. It offered more insights

are somewhat confident of recognizing disinformation

into the pan-Canadian impacts of disinformation across

cases, whereas 66% of the sampled Asian Canadian

the measured populations.

sample reported a similar confidence level in their

More than 50% of both the sampled African and

Asian

Canadians

reported

capacity to identify misinformation or disinformation. The report uses empirical results from a survey sampling 1,381 respondents from both the African- and Asian-

ii.

Canadian communities (African Canadian n=1131 while

main disseminators of disinformation, at 22% by the

Asian Canadian n=250). The survey questionnaire was

sampled African Canadians and 22% by the sampled

designed and distributed to the targeted population

Asian Canadian group. Facebook was identified as the

across all the provinces and territories of Canada

primary media of disinformation, as reported by 22% of

between September 15ths, 2020, to January 30th, 2021.

the sampled African Canadian group and 28% of the

Data from the surveys were gathered utilizing various

sampled Asian Canadian group.

Fake social media accounts were reported as the

African Canadian community leaders, African Media Organizations, and other research firms/partners. As

iii. 31% of the sampled African Canadian group claim to

part of knowledge mobilization research firms such

often verify information compared to 38% of the Asian

as Innovative Research, Insight West Research Group,

Canadian sample group.

various faculties from Oxford/Omega Graduate School, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, University of Toronto,

iv.

Simon Fraser University, and other research institutes

across the sampled African Canadian population

were consulted. Materials distributed to French-speaking

are Educators (15%), Journalists (14%), and Civil rights

participants were translated into French to meet the

leaders (12%). For the sampled Asian Canadian:

official language requirements.

Educators (15%), Journalists (14%), and Politicians (9%).

Survey results establish that disinformation negative-

About 26% of the sampled African Canadian group en-

ly impacts different socio-economic and socio-politi-

dorsed involving African Canadians in news curation,

cal contexts of the said sample groups. Most respond-

validation, and dissemination, as a measure to counter

ents lacked the knowledge and capacity to identify and

disinformation targeted at the marginalized and African

counter disinformation. Notably, 83% and 95% of the

Canadian community.

The top three most popular opinion leaders

5


However, the primary finding, and a significant outcome

educational

of this research report are that most African Canadians

African Canadians in information curation, validation,

in the sampled population are affiliated with three

and dissemination. Several algorithmic fake news/

main political parties. Findings indicate that 49% of

disinformation countering and reporting tools/applications

the sampled African Canadian group are affiliated

found at (https://smartedemocracy.org/interactive-tools/) have

with the Liberal Party of Canada, 12% were affiliated to

helped identify, report, and counter disinformation on

the Conservative Party of Canada, and 9% to the New

various online and offline platforms. The report reaffirms the

Democratic Party. The remaining 30% of the sampled

urgent need for the Canadian Government to formulate

African Canadian population either had no political

robust policies that will facilitate effective implementation

party affiliation or are affiliated to other political parties

of censorship mechanisms, especially on major digital

other than the main three.

platforms, with the primary aim of protecting vulnerable

The research report offers several recommendations

groups while upholding Canadian’s freedom of speech.

to increase resilience to disinformation, including

This research report is not yet publicly available!

6

workshops

and

the

involvement

of


Abstrait (Français) Cette recherche présente un compte rendu détaillé et prag-

plupart des répondants manquaient de connaissances et

matique de l’état et de l’impact de la désinformation par-

de capacités pour identifier et contrer la désinformation.

mi les communautés afro-canadiennes marginalisées. De

Notamment, 83% et 95% de la population afro-canadienne

plus, une analyse comparative a été menée sur les Cana-

échantillonnée et de la population canadienne asiatique

diens d’origine asiatique en tant que groupe minoritaire à

échantillonnée, respectivement, ne savent pas où déclarer

des fins de comparaison. L’inclusion d’une autre variable in-

la désinformation. Les autres résultats clés comprennent :

dépendante (Canadien d’origine asiatique) dans la conception de la recherche était nécessaire parce qu’il s’agit d’une

i. Plus de 50% des Afro-Canadiens et des Canadiens d’origine

recherche quantitative originale visant à explorer et à évalu-

asiatique échantillonnés ont déclaré avoir été confrontés

er plusieurs variables dépendantes mesurables d’une pop-

à de la désinformation au moins une fois par jour. 83% de

ulation particulière. Une population comparative (Canadien

la population afro-canadienne échantillonnée ne sait

d’origine asiatique) a aidé à évaluer l’étendue des impacts

pas où déclarer les cas de désinformation, alors que la

des variables dépendantes mesurées. Il offrait plus d’infor-

même répartition parmi les Canadiens d’origine asiatique

mations sur les effets pancanadiens de la désinformation

échantillonnée est de 95%. Environ 54% des Afro-Canadiens

sur les populations mesurées.

échantillonnés sont assez confiants de reconnaître les cas de désinformation, tandis que 66% de l’échantillon des Canadiens

Le rapport utilise les résultats empiriques d’une enquête

d’origine asiatique ont déclaré un niveau de confiance

portant sur 1 381 répondants des communautés afro-can-

similaire dans leur capacité à identifier la désinformation ou

adienne et asiatique-canadienne (Afro-Canadiens n = 1131

la désinformation.

tandis que Canadiens d’origine asiatique n = 250). Le questionnaire de l’enquête a été conçu et distribué à la popula-

ii.

tion ciblée de toutes les provinces et territoires du Canada

comme les principaux diffuseurs de désinformation, à 22% par

entre le 15 septembre 2020 et le 30 janvier 2021. Les données

les Afro-Canadiens de l’échantillon et à 22% par le groupe des

des enquêtes ont été recueillies à l’aide de divers dirigeants

Canadiens d’origine asiatique de l’échantillon. Facebook a été

communautaires afro-canadiens, d’organisations médi-

identifié comme le principal média de désinformation, tel que

atiques africaines et d’autres firmes de recherche / parte-

rapporté par 22% du groupe afro-canadien échantillonné et

naires. Dans le cadre de firmes de recherche sur la mobi-

28% du groupe canadien d’origine asiatique échantillonné.

Les faux comptes de médias sociaux ont été signalés

lisation des connaissances telles que Innovative Research, Insight West Research Group, diverses facultés d’Oxford /

iii.

Omega Graduate School, de la Kwantlen Polytechnic Univer-

vérifier souvent les informations comparativement à 38% du

sity, de l’Université de Toronto, de l’Université Simon Fraser et

groupe échantillon des Canadiens d’origine asiatique.

31% du groupe afro-canadien échantillonné affirment

d’autres instituts de recherche ont été consultées. Les documents distribués aux participants francophones ont été tra-

iv.

duits en français pour répondre aux exigences en matière de

la population afro-canadienne échantillonnée sont les

langue officielle.

éducateurs (15%), les journalistes (14%) et les leaders des

Les résultats de l’enquête établissent que la désinformation

droits civiques (12%). Pour les Canadiens d’origine asiatique

a un impact négatif sur différents contextes socio-économ-

de l’échantillon: éducateurs (15%), journalistes (14%) et

iques et sociopolitiques desdits groupes d’échantillons. La

politiciens (9%).

Les trois leaders d’opinion les plus populaires dans

7


Environ 26% du groupe afro-canadien échantillonné a approuvé l’implication des Afro-Canadiens dans la conservation, la validation et la diffusion des nouvelles, comme mesure de lutte contre la désinformation ciblant les communautés marginalisées et afro-canadiennes. Cependant, la principale constatation et un résultat significatif de ce rapport de recherche est que la plupart des Afro-Canadiens de la population échantillonnée sont affiliés à trois principaux partis politiques. Les résultats indiquent que 49% du groupe afro-canadien échantillonné sont affiliés au Parti libéral du Canada, 12% étaient affiliés au Parti conservateur du Canada et 9% au Nouveau Parti démocratique. Les 30% restants de la population afro-canadienne échantillonnée n’avaient aucune affiliation à un parti politique ou sont affiliés à d’autres partis politiques autres que les trois principaux. Le rapport de recherche propose plusieurs recommandations pour accroître la résilience à la désinformation, y compris des ateliers éducatifs et l’implication des Afro-Canadiens dans la conservation, la validation et la diffusion de l’information. Plusieurs outils / applications algorithmiques de lutte contre les fausses nouvelles / désinformation et de signalement disponibles sur (https://smartedemocracy.org/interactive-tools/) ont aidé à identifier, signaler et contrer la désinformation sur diverses plates-formes en ligne et hors ligne. Le rapport réaffirme le besoin urgent pour le gouvernement canadien de formuler des politiques solides qui faciliteront la mise en œuvre efficace des mécanismes de censure, en particulier sur les principales plateformes numériques, dans le but principal de protéger les groupes vulnérables tout en respectant la liberté d’expression des Canadiens. Ce rapport de recherche n’est pas encore accessible au public!

8


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The fourth industrial revolution focuses on the decentralization of socio-economic infrastructures, including information and data management. Canadians are currently active online more than ever and are increasingly becoming susceptible to disinformation. Fake news or disinformation has gained tremendous traction during the Covid-19 pandemic era. Unfortunately, many Canadians are susceptible to disinformation, misinformation and fake news. The diverse and marginalized African Canadian population have faced years of inequity trying to fit in as a minority group. The lack of content diversity on both local and national media outlets complicates the issue. Though there are empirical research reports on the levels of disinformation among different ethnic groups in Canada, the need to explore the impact of disinformation as a severe threat to Canada’s democracy still exists.

I Educating the vulnerable minority groups and the public on the dangers of disinformation

II Campaigns about

aimed

to

countering the

broad

educate

individuals

disinformation

should

portfolio

digital

should be the Canadian Government’s top

leverage

priority in its collaborative initiatives regarding

interactive fact-checking tools.

of

countering disinformation.

III

IV

Ensuring diversity and inclusion on disinformation

The Canadian Government needs to formulate

and fake-news countering campaigns while

policies that will penalize offenders for spreading

reinforcing information validation initiatives to

disinformation targeting vulnerable groups.

counter disinformation, targeting minority groups

V

VI

The Canadian Government should collaborate

Government collaboration with tech giants and

with tech giants such as Facebook and Twitter to

third-party media outlets in filtering algorithms,

establish censorship scope and procedures on

especially on digital platforms, will be a better

online posts.

alternative to censorship in the Canadian sociopolitical landscape. 9


Introduction With over 33 million active online Canadian users estimated by the end of the year 2020, Canada

faces a host of significant cybersecurity threats, including disinformation, which has caused much turmoil in the United States political landscape (Clement, 2020). Canadian’s online activities entail conducting business

established social, economic, and political policy

operations, searching for news, exchanging ideas on

objectives (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2019).

social platforms, and building social networks. Notably, with the growth of active online users in The host of online activities increases Canadians’

Canada projected to increase from 87.4% in 2020 to

susceptibility to one of the most dangerous threats to

88.3% in 2025 (Clement, 2020), disinformation is likely

the need for information, the individuals’ democratic

to mutate to damaging proportions if the Canadian

rights

Government does not act proactively today.

and

disinformation.

In

Canada,

as

it

is

worldwide, the terms ‘fake news’, ‘misinformation,’ and ‘propaganda’ are used interchangeably to mean the

Canada’s 2017 Election Modernization Act formed a

same as disinformation, even though the words are

significant foundation to protect the the integrity of

not synonymous in their literal context. Marwick and

the country’s electoral processes, but more needs to

Lewis (2017) contend that disinformation circulates

be done to combat propaganda politics and social

misleading, exaggerated, or false information.

engagements (Library of Congress Law, 2020).

Data and information have always been central to

The Canadian Government has also championed

decision-making, especially in today’s fourth industrial

initial measures, including the Christchurch Call

revolution. But, when information is manipulated

and Canada’s digital charter initiative, which aim at

and twisted to become rumours and propaganda,

protecting Canadians against toxic online extremism

one can only imagine the number of derailed

and online disinformation (Library of Congress Law, 2020).

decision-making processes bound to ensue as a result; probably, 33 million Canadians are likely to fall victim to disinformation. Recent reports confirm that disinformation is a severe threat in Canada. The impact of disinformation is notable in Canada’s socio-political

landscape

and

is

predominantly

evident in Canada’s recent cybersecurity events. The updated 2019 report published by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security demonstrates the imminent danger

disinformation

poses

on

the

Canadian

democratic processes (2019). According to the report, misleading or false information polarizes Canadians negatively 10

as

it

significantly

subverts

Canada’s


Still, the Government needs more specific optimized

However, apart from endorsing the Canadian digital

measures in protecting its citizens from disinformation

charter and the Christchurch Call initiative, just how

on all media platforms. The only conclusive way to

much the Government has done to protect the diverse

develop proactive policy measures to protect Cana-

and marginalized African Canadian communities

dians against disinformation is to understand the dis-

from disinformation is still unknown. There is barely any

information trail related to different ethnic groups.

source that adequately reports how disinformation has specifically impacted the diverse and marginalized

Ortiz et al. (2019) share essential insights regarding

African Canadian communities.

digital media platforms and technologies in giving voice to the marginalized groups in society. In Canada, the diverse and marginalized African Canadians, just like any other ethnic groups in Canada, in one way find a voice in digital technologies, and in other ways, find them critical, one among them, a significant source of information and news.

This report will assess data collected from the

diverse and marginalized African Canadians regarding disinformation and how it affects their decision-making and political affiliation. The

report will also reveal how the group possibly handles disinformation.

11


LITERATURE REVIEW Disinformation against Canadian Communities With the avenues for information dissemination to

communities. African-minority communities have also

people increasing due to advances in digital and

been victims of online fake news relating to Canada’s

information technologies, purveyors of disinformation

immigration system (Rogers, 2019).

have found it easier to bypass the existing safeguards of ‘factual accountability’ such as traditional media’s editorial scrutiny (Tsfati et al., 2020). According to an international public opinion poll in Canada, technological advances have resulted in approximately 90% of Canadians falling for misinformation and disinformation (Thompson, 2019). Disinformation has been widely used among and against the diverse and marginalized African Canadian communities. While disinformation is often associated with political topics, it can also have racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic motivations. Disinformation about health subjects is particularly prevalent among African-migrant communities. For example, Decoteau (2017) remarks that some Somalis living in North America have spread the misinformation that autism is a Western illness, thus discouraging health-seeking behaviour in their

12

The

poll

result

international

puts

average

Canada

above

misinformation

the

and

disinformation rate of 86% (Thompson, 2019).


Online communities have been quick to paint a misleading picture of refugees, Africans, and Middle Easterners as the country’s largest immigrant groups. For instance, in 2019, fake news to the effect that Malian soldiers had deserted training while in Canada quickly gained traction owing to minority-focused immigration fears. As Jiwani and Al-Rawi (2019) suggest, the spread of such false information attests to the prevalence of African Canadian communities’ association with harmful stereotypical tropes such as crime and chronic

economic

dependents.

Grambo

(2018)

notes that disinformation against minority groups is typical to achieve defamatory objectives. The use of defamatory disinformation, especially against African Canadian minorities, dehumanizes them by encouraging stereotypes.

13


Disinformation Media Outlets and Personalities Disinformation spreads through a combination of online, offline, formal, and informal platforms. The sources of disinformation are similar to the credible sources of information that people trust for their daily updates. With more Canadians increasingly using online platforms, the trend quickly changes to the democratization of data and fake news explosion (Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 2020). Disinformation media are diverse and of varied mechanisms.

Direct-to-online

sources

such

as

online newspaper domains spread disinformation by publishing inconsistent and unproven stories. For example, the National Observer identified multiple online publications with fake news on Canada, including the Toronto Sun and the Jerusalem Post (Emma & Orr, 2019).

Disinformation also emanates from and spreads through user-generated content on social media. Hackers can impersonate legitimate social media account holders and post damaging content (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2019).

14


The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (2019) also demonstrate that online users can create fake accounts and use them to disseminate propaganda. As Swire-Thompson and Lazer (2020) argue, social media sites such as Twitter and WhatsApp allow for creating and sharing content and group engagements to an unlimited number of people, making it difficult to mitigate against disinformation. While Fox ultimately addressed the misinformation through a subsequent tweet, the initial misinformed tweet had significantly more interactions than the corrected tweet (Wood, 2018). That illustrates the damaging implications of digital networks as grounds for disinformation. The

emergent

social

dynamics

resulting

from

new media have changed people’s perception of information and media coverage, making it easier for disinformation to spread quickly and efficiently. Notably, while disinformation is still shared through outlets and personalities, media changes relating to

For example, in the year 2017, Fox News wrongfully

the development of the internet and social media have

tweeted that one of the Quebec mosque shooting

increased media manipulation scope and impacts

perpetrators was of Moroccan descent instead of a

(Muqsith & Muzykant, 2019).

White male (Wood, 2018).

As more people continue migrating to online platforms, media organizations’ advertisement strategies shift online accordingly. Unfortunately, some online media organizations have incentivized the use of sensational false headlines to attract more readers and maintain a loyal customer base. With new media placing great emphasis on the internet and social media, traditional media organizations are increasingly contracting or moving away from local news coverage (Muqsith & Muzykant, 2019). The drastic change has encouraged the spread of disinformation through trading-up-the-chain. As Muqsith and Muzykant (2019) explain, this trend is implemented where false information is published in a publication with low verification and objectivity standards, such as a personal blog. As proved in a case reported by Emma and Orr (2019), incorrect information can be continuously picked up by larger media platforms with more robust standards until it ends up in the mainstream media.

15


Disinformation among Ethnic Groups in Canada Given that multiethnic countries are often characterized

Some scholars have debated that disinformation

by some degree of polarization, it is not surprising

can be ethnically focused when politicians and other

that disinformation often takes an ethnic inclination.

perpetrators seek to use targeted advertisements to

Gambo (2018) affirms that intricate and unique

micro-target specific groups.

psychological processes shape people’s analysis and disseminate information about other ethnic groups. Most individuals are typically more willing to seek the

According

to

Bayer

truth regarding disinformation when it touches on

advertisements

their ethnicity. In that context, disinformation, when

certain groups in some situations. While such trends

mixed with ethnic polarization, can lead to destructive

could be harmless when meted against the majority

outcomes such as violence and conflict.

population, they can be socially destructive when used

can

be

(2020),

micro-targeted

discriminatory

against

against ethnic minorities such as African Canadian Unlike many countries, Canada has taken steps to

communities.

prevent disinformation among ethnic groups during election cycles. Authorities released the draft of

Thus,

disinformation measures to lead up the 2019 campaign

advertising during elections did not constitute a total

(Samuel, 2019). Arguably, one of the most significant

ban on targeted political advertisements, it should be

provisions in the guideline relates to undertaking

effective in eliminating some discriminatory targeted

political advertisements online (Samuel, 2019).

disinformation and misinformation.

16

while

Canada’s

guidelines

on

political


The Rationale for the Study According to Kurtzleben, Danielle, writing for npr.org,

The updated 2019 report published by the Canadian

after the 2016 USA election, many feared that fake

Centre for Cyber Security demonstrates the imminent

news articles spread on Facebook swayed the election

danger

results. The article claims that many fake news

democratic processes (2019). According to the report,

purveyors aimed to help Trump win, and incidentally,

misleading or false information polarizes Canadians

that goal was achieved. It is worth noting that the

negatively as it significantly subverts Canada’s

African Americans had the most significant shift in the

established social, economic, and political policy

voting landscape that influenced the election result.

objectives (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2019).

The cause may be attributed to the massive

Hence, an empirical study to explore the impact of

disinformation

disinformation

against

the

opposing

candidate

disinformation

on

poses

on

marginalized

the

Canadian

African

Candian

targeted to the minority groups. There are fears that

community is not only necessary but time-sensitive

the same disinformation effects as witnessed in the

as Canada prepares itself for national election any

last two USA elections could be replicated in Canada’s

moment from now.

political environment if nothing is done to mitigate it. Disinformation

affects

the

political

landscape;

adversely, it also increases the disconnect between government

policies

and

the

implementations

among minority communities. Canada is committed to multiculturalism ideals through social equity, inclusion, diversity, tolerance and belonging. Unfortunately, the Government of Canada’s efforts are often lost in the mixed messaging and disinformation targeted to the minority groups, including the African Canadians. Therefore, exploring the impact of disinformation among marginalized minority groups in Canada will provide policymakers and the Canadian Government with the required data and findings necessary to understand and curb disinformation impacts.

17


Methodology Heritage,

Though the study was initially designed to explore

Government of Canada, this research study by the

the impact of disinformation on Marginalized African

Kingdom Acts Foundation was developed to Explore

Canadian communities, it became necessary to

the Impact of Disinformation on the Marginalized

include Asian Canadian to serve as a comparative

African Canadian Community.

population during the sampling.

Through

the

Ministry

of

Canadian

Report findings come from a combination of direct surveys conducted on African Canadians through

Both African and Asian Canadian surveyed are

various ethnic association leaders, African-themed

representative samples. Targets were set to ensure

media

not-for-profits

a proper reflection of important regional and

serving the African communities. Kingdom Acts

demographic distribution, and then weights were

Foundation also utilized the services of research

used to ensure an accurate reflection of the major

support

provinces. The survey methodology is discussed in

organizations

and

organizations

other

such

as

Insightwest,

Checkmarket and Innovative Research Groups to expand the scope and coverage of data gathering on the target population The surveys were conducted among adult African Canadian across all the provinces and territories of Canada with a completed survey number of n=1,131. Another survey was conducted on Asian Canadian with a completed number of surveys, n=250. Each survey was administered to a series of randomly selected samples from the target population. The samples have been weighted by age, gender, region,

ethnic/cultural

background,

and

other

demographic compositions of the overall Black and Asian Canadian populations. Hence, resulting in an overall representative national sample size of 1,381 Canadians with a representative national African Canadians sample size of 1,131 and an Asian Canadian sample size of 250.

18

further detail, starting on page 29 of this report.


Method: The online surveys were conducted using through the services of Insight West, Checkmarket and Innovative

Research

Group’s

national

research

panel with additional respondents from local African Community Associations, Media Groups and Not-forprofit organizations. Each survey was administered to a series of randomly selected samples from the panel.

Weighting: Results for Canada are weighted by age, ethnic/cultural background, gender, political affiliation as well as many other demographic markers. These weights ensure that the overall sample’s composition reflects that of the actual population of Black Canadians according to 2016 Census data from Statistics Canada; to provide results that are intended to approximate a probability sample. Weighted and unweighted frequencies are reported in the tables on subsequent pages.

Margin of Error: This is a representative sample. However, since the online survey was not a random probability-based sample, a margin of error cannot be calculated. Statements about margins of sampling error or population estimates do not apply to most online panels.

19


Primary Findings Sample Groups Political Affiliations

Most African Canadians in the sampled population

Party of Canada, and 9% to the New Democratic Party.

were found to be affiliated with three main political

The remaining 30% of the sampled African Canadian

parties. Findings indicate that 49% of the sampled

population either had no political party affiliation or

African Canadian group are affiliated with the Liberal

are affiliated to other political parties other than the

Party of Canada, 12% were affiliated to the Conservative

main three (Check figure1 below).

Overall Political Party Affiliation across the Sampled African Canadian Age-Groups 4%

Don't know Other

2%

None

10% 12%

Prefer not to say 1%

BQ NDP

9%

GPC

3%

CPC

12% 49%

LPC 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Overall Politcal Party Affiliation across the Sampled African Canadian Age-Groups

Figure 1: African Canadians Political Party Affiliation 20

60%


Comparatively, 50% of the sampled Asian Canadian

the sampled Asian Canadian population group either

group claimed their allegiance to the Liberal Party

had no political party affiliation or had other political

of Canada, with 17% and 12% claiming their affiliation

party affiliation other than the main three (Check

to the Conservative Party of Canada and the New

figure 2 below).

Democratic Party, respectively. The remaining 21% of

Overall Political Party Affiliation Distribution across the sampled Asian Canadian age groups Don't know

14%

Other

2%

None

1%

Prefer not to say

0%

BQ

1%

NDP

12%

GPC

2%

CPC

17%

LPC

50% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Overall Political Party AffiliationDi stribution across the sampled Asi an Canadi an age groups Figure 2: Asian Canadians Political Party Affiliation

After the independent t-test of the political party

in both African- and Asian-Canadian groups, were

affiliation sample, the probability values show that the

all found to be greater than the 0.05 confidence level

political party affiliation across the age groups of both

value (see appendix 1 and 2). Thus, greater p-values

sample populations (African Canadians and Asian

show no statistically significant difference in political

Canadians) had no statistically significant difference

party affiliation distribution across all the sampled

across the sample demographics. Specifically, the

age-groups and demographics, both across the

P-values of means in each political party category,

African- and Asian-Canadian sample groups. 21


Where do African Canadians source their news? Canadians get their news and information from multiple

reported the local Canadian newspaper media as

sources. Survey results show that African Canadians

their primary source of information.

get information from five primary sources, including

At the same time, 8% claimed Facebook as their primary

the Internet search engine, local television broadcasts,

source of information, 7% claimed Instagram, while

local radio broadcast, information from the Canadian

another 8% claimed friends as their primary source

Government, and information from local newspaper

of information. The remaining 13% of the sampled

media.Notably, 17% of the sampled African Canadians

African Canadian population reported other sources,

reported the Internet search engine as their primary

including

source of information; 16% reported the local television

television broadcast, Tik Tok, Reddit, among other news

broadcast; 13% reported local radio broadcast; 10%

sources, as their primary sources of information (see

reported the local Canadian Government, and 8%

figure 3 below).

Youtube,

LinkedIn,

Twitter,

Overall Main source of Information across the sampled African Canadian Groups Digital News

0%

International TV Broadcast Companies…

0%

YouTube

0%

News apps

0%

Social Media

0%

My local community leaders

0%

Reddit

0%

Tik Tok

0%

Instagram

7%

Twitter

4%

LinkedIn

5%

Facebook

8%

Friends

8%

Family & Relatives

4%

My local government

10%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google,…

17%

Local Radio Broadcast News

13%

Local Television Broad cast News

16%

Local Newspapers

8% 0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10% 12% 14% 16% 18%

Overall Main source of Information across the sampled African Canadian Groups

Figure 3: African Canadians’ Main sources of information 22

International


On the other hand, survey results indicate that the

The remaining 8% are cumulatively distributed

sampled Asian Canadian populations’ primary

across the other sources of information, including

sources of information include the local television

Youtube, LinkedIn, Twitter, International television

broadcast, the Internet search engine, Facebook,

broadcast, Tik Tok, Reddit, among several other news

local newspaper media, and family and relatives.

sources that were not reported (see figure 4 below).

The respective overall percentages for African Canadians’ primary sources of information listed above are 42%, 27%, 10%, 9%, and 4%, respectively.

Overall Main Source of Information across the Sampled Asian Canadian groups Digital News

0%

International TV Broadcast Companies (BBC, CNN..)

0%

YouTube

0%

News apps

0%

Social Media

0%

My local community lead ers

0%

Reddit

1%

Tik Tok

0%

Instagram

0%

Twitter

3%

LinkedIn

1%

Facebook

10%

Friends

1%

Family & Relatives My local government

4% 0%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google, e.t.c.)

27%

Local Radio Broadcast News

1%

Local Television Broad cast News

42%

Local Newspapers

9% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Overall Main Source of Information across the Sampled Asian Canadian groups

Figure 4: Asian Canadians’ Main sources of information 23


Most trusted news sources As depicted in the survey results (figure 5 below), the

population trust international television networks; 11%

sampled African Canadians’ five most trusted sources

trust the Internet search engines; 8% trust social media;

of information include local television broadcast

6% trust the local radio broadcast media, while another

media, international television broadcast media,

6% trust the local newspaper media. The remaining

Internet search engines, social media, and local

26% of the sampled African Canadian population

newspaper and radio broadcast media. 29% of the

trust other sources of information not listed above,

sampled African Canadian population trusts the local

including the local Canadian Government, celebrities,

Canadian television broadcast networks the most.

family, friends, relatives, community leaders, YouTube

Twenty per cent of the sampled African Canadian

channels, among many other sources.

Overall Most Trusted Sources of Information across the Sampled African Canadian Groups Digital News Update

0%

News Podcasts

0%

Independent non-mainstream journalism

0%

Scholarly articles

0%

Don't kn ow

1%

Not interested in News

1%

Special interest blogs, online groups and…

2%

Youtube News Chann els

4%

Community Leaders

2%

Celebrities

1%

Social Media

8% Friends

3%

Family & Relatives

5%

My local government

1%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google e.t.c.)

11%

International TV News (e.g. CNN, Aljazeera, Global,…

20%

Local TV News (e.g. BNN Bloomberg, CBC, CTV)

29%

Local Radio Broadcast

6%

Local Newspapers

6% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Overall Most Trusted Sources of Information across the Sampled African Canadian Groups

Figure 5: African Canadians’ Most Trusted Sources of Information 24

35%


The sampled Asian Canadian population mostly trusts

media; 12% perceived the Internet search engines; 9%

the local television broadcast media, international

perceived local newspaper media, and 7% perceived

television broadcast media, Internet search engines,

social media in general as their most trusted source

local newspaper media, and social media, in general.

of information.

The survey results, shown in graph six (6) below,

The remaining 18% of the Asian Canadian sampled

suggest that 38% of the sampled Asian Canadian

population cumulatively trust other sources, including

population perceived the local television broadcast

the local Canadian Government, celebrities, family,

media as their most trusted source of information;

friends,

16%

channels, among many diverse sources.

perceived

international

television

broadcast

relatives,

community

leaders,

YouTube

Overall Most Trusted Sources of Information across the Sampled Asian Canadian Groups Digital News Update

0%

News Podcasts

0%

Independent non-mainstream journalism

0%

Scholarly articles

0%

Don't kn ow

1%

Not interested in News

1%

Special interest blogs, online groups and professional…

1%

Youtube News Chann els

3%

Community Leaders

1%

Celebrities

0%

Social Media

7% Friends

1%

Family & Relatives

3%

My local government

0%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google e.t.c.)

12%

International TV News (e.g. CNN, Aljazeera, Global,…

16%

Local TV News (e.g. BNN Bloomberg, CBC, CTV)

38%

Local Radio Broadcast

6%

Local Newspapers

9% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Overall Most Trusted Sources of Information across the Sampled Asian Canadian Groups

Figure 6: Asian Canadians’ Most Trusted Information Sources 25


Main Disinformation Media 24% of the sampled African Canadian population

age groups in the African Canadian community.

perceives that Facebook is the leading media of

An independent t-test done on the sample means

disinformation in Canada. Only 10% and 9% of the

of

sampled

that

disinformation in Canada shows no statistically

Instagram and Internet search engines are the main

significant difference in Asian Canadian population

media of disinformation, respectively. Figure 7 below

demographics who perceived Facebook, Instagram,

shows detailed perception distribution of the primary

and the Internet search engine as Canada’s primary

perceived disinformation media across the sampled

disinformation media (See appendix 14.1).

African

Canadian

group

believe

African

Canadian

responses

on

media

of

Overall African Canadians' main perceived Disinformation Media Outlets None

1%

Politicians

0%

Celebrities

2%

YouTube news channels

3%

Special interest blogs, online groups or professional… Tik Tok

2% 0%

The Local Commun ity Leaders

1%

Local radio broadcast news

1%

Whatsapp

1%

Don't kn ow Misinformed people

3% 0%

Social media in gen eral

0%

Blogs

0%

Instagram

10%

Twitter

10%

LinkedIn

2%

Facebook

24%

Friends

7%

Family & Relatives

5%

The Local Government

2%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google etc.)

9%

International TV News Broad cast

6%

Local TV News Broadcast

8%

Local Newspapers

4% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Overall African Canadians' main perceived Disinformation Media Ou tlets

Figure 7: African Canadians’ Perceived Main Disinformation Media Outlets 26

25%

30%


Comparatively, 28% of the sampled Asian Canadian

t-test done on the sample mean of Asian Canadian

group report Facebook as the primary media of

respondents who gave their perception of the leading

disinformation in Canada. Only 12% reported the

media of disinformation in Canada indicate no

Internet search engine, while 10% reported Twitter as

statistically significant difference in Asian Canadian

the main disinformation media outlet. Figure 8 shows

population demographics who perceived Facebook,

a detailed perception distribution of the perceived

the Internet search engine, and Twitter as Canada’s

disinformation media across the sampled age groups

leading disinformation media (Check appendix 4).

in the Asian Canadian community. An independent

Overall Asian Canadians' main perceived Disinformation Media Outlets None Politicians Celebrities

0% 0% 0%

YouTube news channels 0% Special interest blogs, online groups or professional… 0% Tik Tok 0% The Local Commun ity Leaders Local radio broadcast news Whatsapp Don't kn ow

3% 0% 1% 14%

Misinformed people

0%

Social media in gen eral Blogs

0% 2%

Instagram

7%

Twitter LinkedIn

10% 4%

Facebook

28%

Friends Family & Relatives

3% 2%

The Local Government

0%

Internet Search En gines (e.g. Bin g, Google etc.) International TV News Broad cast

12% 5%

Local TV News Broadcast

6%

Local Newspapers

3% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Overall Asian Canadians' main perceived Disinformation Media Outlets

Figure 8: Asian Canadians’ Perceived Main Disinformation Media 27


Disseminators of Fake News/Disinformation Survey results indicate that the African Canadian

disinformation; 15% perceive Facebook as the primary

sample population perceives fake social media

disseminator of disinformation, 14% identify bloggers,

accounts,

10% point at the politicians, and 9% observe YouTube

Facebook,

bloggers,

politicians,

and

YouTube channels as Canada’s top five disseminators

channels

as

main

of disinformation. Notably, 22% of the sampled African

The

Canadian population believes fake social media

disseminators, as demonstrated in figure 9 below.

remaining

30%

disinformation cumulatively

disseminators. notice

other

accounts as the main disseminators of fake news or

Overall African Canadians' main perceived Disseminators of Fake news/Disinformation International News Agencies

0%

Social Media in gen eral

0%

Ethnic Community leaders

0%

Extremist Groups

0%

News podcasts

0%

Twitter

0%

Don't kn ow

1%

Members of the Bloc Québ écois

2%

Members of the New Democratic Party

2%

Members of the Green Party of Canad a

1%

Members of the Conservative Party of Canada

3%

Members of the Liberal Party of Canada

2%

The Canadian government

2%

Local Digital Media

2%

Local Print Media

2%

Local Television Networks

3%

Celebrities

8%

Youtub e

9%

Facebook

15%

Fake social media accou nts

22%

Local Radio Broadcasters

2%

Bloggers

14%

Politicians

10% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Overall African Canadians' main perceived Disseminators of Fake news/Disinformation Figure 9: African Canadians’ Main Perceived Disseminators of Disinformation 28


Similarly,

22%

of

the

sampled

Asian

Canadian

disinformation

disseminator,

with

13%

identifying

population believes fake social media accounts

bloggers, 9% pointing out at YouTube, and 8% at

are the primary disseminator of disinformation. The

politicians. The remaining 32% of the sampled Asian

survey results also indicate that 16% of the sampled

Canadian population cumulatively perceive other

Asian Canadians perceive Facebook as the main

disseminators, as depicted in figure 10 below.

Overall Asian Canadians' main perceived Disseminators of Fake news/Disinformation International News Agencies

0%

Social Media in gen eral

0%

Ethnic Community leaders

0%

Extremist Groups

0%

News podcasts

0%

Twitter

0%

Don't kn ow

1%

Members of the Bloc Québ écois

3%

Members of the New Democratic Party

2%

Members of the Green Party of Canada

2%

Members of the Conservative Party of Canada

1%

Members of the Liberal Party of Canada

4%

The Canadian government

2%

Local Digital Media

3%

Local Print Media

3%

Local Television Networks

3%

Celebrities

7%

Youtub e

9%

Facebook

16%

Fake social media accou nts

22%

Local Radio Broadcasters

2%

Bloggers

13%

Politicians

8% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Overall Asian Canadians' main perceived Disseminators of Fake news/Disinformation Figure 10: Asian Canadians’ Main Perceived Disseminators of Disinformation 29


The Perceived Rate of Encounter with Disinformation Survey results reveal that 29% of the sampled

An independent t-test on the mean response of the

African Canadian population claim to encounter

perceived rate of encounter with disinformation

disinformation cases at least once every week; 28%

across the sampled African Canadian age groups

profess at least once every day; 26% claim they never

indicates no statistically significant difference of the

or rarely experience disinformation; 16% claim to

means across the sample group demographics (see

encounter at least once in a month while only 2% claim

appendix 5).

not to know about their encounter with disinformation (see figure 11 below).

Overall African Canadians' perceived frequency of encounter with Disinformation

2% 16% 26% At least once a month 29% 28%

At least once in a week At least Everyday Rarely or never Don't know

Figure 11: African Canadians’ perceived frequency of disinformation 30


Comparatively, 27% of the sampled Asian Canadian

An independent t-test on the mean response of the

population claim to encounter disinformation cases

perceived rate of encounter with disinformation across

at least once every day; 26% claim at least once

the sampled Asian Canadian age groups indicates no

every week; 25% affirm they never or rarely encounter

statistically significant difference of the means across

disinformation; 16% assert to experience at least once

the sample group demographics (see appendix 6).

in a month while 7% claim not to know about their encounter with disinformation (see figure 12 below).

Overall Asian Canadians' perceived frequency of encounter with Disinformation

7%

16%

25%

26%

27%

At least once a month

At least once in a week

At least Everyday

Rarely or never

Don 't know

Figure 12: Asian Canadians’ perceived frequency of disinformation 31


African Canadians’ Perceived level of Disinformation 35% of the sampled African Canadians insist that

of disinformation (see the distribution on figure 13

their perceived level of disinformation is not any

below). An independent t-test on the mean responses

different to other ethnic groups; 26% agree that the

of the perceived level of disinformation among the

level of disinformation among African Canadian is

African Canadian population across the sampled

relatively bad; 16% claim it is fairly bad; 10% suggest

African Canadian age groups indicates no statistically

it is not that bad; 9% argue that it is not bad at all

significant difference of the means across the sample

while 5% are not aware of African Canadians’ level

group demographics (see appendix 7).

Overall African Canadians' Perceived level of Disinformation among the African Canadian Population, Relative to other Ethnic Groups 5% Not any different from other ethnic groups

10%

35%

9%

Relatively Bad

Relatively very bad

Not bad at all 16%

Not that bad

Don't know 26%

Figure 13: African Canadians’ perception on their level of disinformation 32


Similarly, the survey results indicate that 33% of the

all (see the detailed distribution on figure 14 below).

sampled Asian Canadian population has no idea

An independent t-test on the mean responses of

of African Canadians’ level of disinformation; 22%

the perceived level of disinformation among the

argued that African Canadians’ level of disinformation

African Canadian population across the sampled

is relatively bad; 15% claim it is not that bad; 14%

Asian Canadian age groups indicates no statistically

argue it may not be any different than other ethnic

significant difference of the means across the sample

groups; 11% say it is relatively bad while 5% of the

group demographics (see appendix 8).

sampled Asian Canadians posit that it is not bad at

Overall Asian Canadians' Perceived level of Disinformation among the African Canadian Population, Relative to other Ethnic Groups

Not any different from other ethnic groups

14%

Relatively Bad

33%

Relatively very bad 22%

Not bad at all Not that bad

15%

11%

Don't know

5%

Figure 14: Asian Canadians’ perception on African Canadian level of disinformation 33


Reported Implication of Disinformation The survey gathered that disinformation affects both

wrong candidate in an election year. The remaining

African Canadians and Asian Canadians in multiple

7% of the sample population cumulatively believe

ways. 37% of the sampled African Canadians claimed

that disinformation has either not affected them or

that disinformation made them develop biased views

has affected their decision-making in other ways

towards Canadian political parties. Moreover,

20%

as demonstrated in figure 15 below. An independent

agreed that disinformation made them think they were

t-test on the mean responses of the perceived impact

marginalized during a political exercise like elections;

of disinformation on decision-making among the

14% claimed that disinformation made them vote for

African Canadian population across the sampled

the wrong candidate in an election year; 12% asserted

age

that disinformation made them hate a good leader

differences in the means across the sample group

while 11% of the sampled African Canadians stated

demographics (see appendix 9).

groups

revealed

no

statistically

that disinformation made them campaign for the

Overall 18. African Canadians' perception of how Disinformation affects their Decision making Made me propagate misi nformati on

0%

Affected my safety

0%

Made me more alert; research more and skeptical

1%

Made me stop caring about news

0%

None/not affected

4%

Do not know who to trust again

0%

It makes enemies out of friends based on lack of informat ion and educational capacity

0%

Made you campaign for the wrong candidate in an electi on year

11%

Made you think you are marginaliz ed in political exerci ses: el ections

20%

Made you vote for the wrong candidate in an election exercise

14% 37%

Made you develop biased views towards a poli tical party Made you hate a good leader

12% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Overall 18. African Canadi ans' percepti on of how Disinformation affects their Decision making

Figure 15: African Canadians’ perceived disinformation impact on decision making 34

significant


Results also report that 33% of the sampled Asian

an election year. The remaining 2% of the sample

Canadians claimed that disinformation made them

population cumulatively believe that disinformation

develop biased views towards Canadian political

has either not affected them or has affected their

parties. On the same note, of the sampled Asian

decision-making in other ways as demonstrated

Canadian population, 23% agreed that disinformation

in figure 16 below. An independent t-test on the

made them think they were marginalized in a

mean responses of the perceived impact of

political activity like elections; 19% contended that

disinformation

disinformation made them hate a good leader; 12%

sampled Asian Canadian population age groups

claimed that disinformation made them vote for the

indicates no statistically significant differences of

wrong candidate in an election year; while 11% of the

the means across the sample group demographics

sampled Asian Canadian stated that disinformation

(see appendix 10).

on

decision-making

among

the

made them campaign for the wrong candidate in

Overall Asian Canadians' perception of how Disinformation affects their Decision making Made me propagate misinformation

0%

Af fected my safety

0%

Made me more alert; research more and skeptical

1%

Made me stop caring about n ews

0%

None/ not affected

1%

Do n ot know who to trust again

0%

It makes enemies out of friends based on lack of in formation and education al capacity

0%

Made you campaign f or the wrong c andid ate in an election year

11%

Made you think you are margin alized in political exercises: elections

23%

Made you vote for the wrong candidate in an election exercise

12%

Made you develop biased views towards a political party

33%

Made you hate a good leader

19% 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Overall Asian Canadians' perception of how Disinf ormation affects their Decision making

Figure 16: Asian Canadians’ perceived disinformation impact on decision making 35


Perceived Widely Misinterpreted Information The top four kinds of information that the survey results

outlets. Eighteen percent of the benchmark sampled Asian

reveal as widely misrepresented due to respondents’

Canadian population claimed that media outlets widely

perception include political information, government

misrepresent information about politics. 14% and 13% of

information, health information, and information about

the sample Asian Canadian population also perceive

ethnic groups. 12% of the sampled African Canadian

information about ethnic groups and information about

population perceived information about politics as

the Government as widely distorted by media outlets,

widely misrepresented by media outlets; 12% perceived

respectively. Graphs 17 and 18 exhibit the distribution of

government information as distorted, while another 12% of

the sampled African Canadian and Asian Canadian

the sampled African Canadian also perceive information

populations’ perceptions regarding the kind of information

about ethnic groups as extensively altered by media

widely misrepresented by Canadian media outlets.

Overall African Canadians' perception of information widely misinterpreted by News Outlets

12%

12%

12%

10%

10%

10%

10%

12% 9%

9%

8%

8% 6% 6% 4%

3%

2% 0%

0%

0%

0%

Information about everything

Celebrity News

No idea

Religious Information

0% Sports News

Entertainment news

Government information

Information about crime

Information about ethnic groups

Health inf ormation

Information about Stoc k Markets

Information ab out social beh aviors

Information ab out tech nology

Information ab out politics

Advertisements

Overall African Canadians' perception of in formation widely misinterpreted by News Outlets

Figure 17: African Canadians’ perception of information widely misinterpreted 36


In fo In rm A d fo In v r at fo m io er ti rm at n s io at ab e m n In io a en o n fo ab b ou ut rm ts p ou tt ol at it ec ts io ic n h no s ab oci a lo In ou l fo t S beh g y rm t a oc H vi at or ea k io s M l th n a ab rk in o e fo In ut r m ts fo et rm at hn io at G ic n io ov gr n er ou ab nm ps ou en tc ti ri m En nf te or e rt m ai a In nm tio fo n en rm tn at Sp ew io n or s ab ts ou N ew te s ve r yt Ce h le in br g it y N ew R el s ig N io o us id ea In fo rm at io n

Overall Asian Canadians' perception of information widely misinterpreted by News Outlets

20%

10%

5%

0% 18%

15%

7% 10%

5% 14%

5% 13% 12%

7% 8% 2%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Overall 19.2 Asian Canadians' perception of information widely misinterpreted by News Outlets

Figure 18: Asian Canadians’ perception of information widely misinterpreted

37


Awareness of where to report disinformation A significant percentage (83% and 95%) of the sampled

sampled Asian Canadian population claimed to be aware

African Canadian population and Asian Canadian

of where to report disinformation cases. Figures 19 and 20

population, respectively, reported that they are not aware

depict the distribution of both African Canadian and Asian

of any proper place to report disinformation cases. Only

Canadian knowledge of where to report disinformation.

17% of the sampled African Canadian population and 5% of

Figure 19: Whether the Sampled African Canadian Group knows where to Report Disinformation 38


Figure 20: Whether the Sampled Asian Canadian Group knows where to Report disinformation. 39


Capacities to recognize disinformation When probed about their perceived capacity to recognize

be somewhat confident about their capacity to recognize

disinformation, 54% of the sampled African Canadians

disinformation cases; 18% of the same population claim

population reported to be somewhat confident about their

not to be very confident about their capacities; 14% affirms

ability to identify disinformation; 31% of the sample population

they are very confident, while only 2% claim not confident

claim to be very confident about their capacity; 10% report

at all with their ability to recognize disinformation. Figures

not very confident while 4% claim not at all confident with

21 and 22 demonstrate the distribution of African Canadian

their abilities to recognize disinformation. Comparatively,

and Asian Canadians’ perceived capacities to recognize

66% of the sampled Asian Canadian population claim to

disinformation.

Overall African Canadians' perceived Capacity to recognize Disinformation

4% 10% 31%

Not at all Confident Very Confident

54%

Somewhat Confident Not Very Confident

Figure 21: African Canadians’ perceived capacity to recognize disinformation 40


Overall Asian Canadians' perceived Capacity to recognize Disinformation

2% 18%

14% Not at all Confident Very Confident Somewhat Confident 66%

Not Very Confident

Figure 22: Asian Canadians’ perceived capacity to recognize disinformation 41


How frequently do the sampled survey populations verify information? The survey results revealed that 31% of the sampled African

groups). An independent t-test comparing the means of

Canadian population claim to verify information often;

responses regarding their rate of information verification

26% assured that they always verify all information; 24%

reveals no statistically significant difference across the

sometimes; 13% rarely; 5% claim to never verify information

sample population’s mean responses on their perceived

while only 1% of the sample African Canadian population

rate of information verification except for the 5% who

claimed not to know about their perceived rate of

claimed never to verify the information for disinformation

information verification (see figure 23 below for the full

(check appendix 11for independent t-test results).

distribution across the sampled African Canadian age

Overall African Canadians' perceived frequency of Information Verification 31%

35%

26%

30% 25% 20%

24% 13%

15% 10% 5% 0%

5%

ow kn

fte n D

So m

et im

es

on

’t

O

er N ev

R

Al w

ay s

ar el y

1%

Figure 23: How often African Canadians verify information. 42

Overall Af rican Canadians' perceived frequency of Information Verification


The survey results also reveal that 38% of the sampled

t-test comparing the means of responses regarding Asian

Asian Canadian population claim to verify information

Canadians’ rate of information verification reveals no

often; 19% claimed that they always verify all information;

statistically significant difference across the sample Asian

22% sometimes; 10% rarely; 8% never verify information while

Canadian population’s mean responses on their perceived

only 3% of the sample Asian Canadian population claimed

rate of information verification (check appendix 12 for

not to know about their perceived rate of information

independent t-test results).

verification (see figure 24 below for the distribution across the sampled Asian Canadian age groups). An independent

Overall Asian Canadians' perceived frequency of Information Verification

38%

40% 35% 30% 25% 20%

22% 19%

Overall Asian Canadians' perceived frequency of Information Verification

15% 10% 10%

8%

5% 0%

3%

Always Sometimes

Rarely

Never

Often

Don’t know

Figure 24: How often Asian Canadians verify information. 43


Secondary Findings Looked-up-to Opinion Leaders 15% of the sampled African Canadian population look

of the sample African Canadian population either

up to educators for opinions; 14% of the same sample

do no look up to any community personality, or they

population look up to journalists; 12% look up to civil

look up to other community personalities, including

rights leaders, while 10% look up to religious leaders.

radio presenters, athletes, technocrats, social media

Only 8% of the sampled African Canadian population

influencers, politicians, entrepreneurs, among other

turned to politicians, with another 8% looking up to

figures (figure 25 shows the overall perception across

community leaders for opinions. The remaining 33%

the African Canadian group).

Overall perceived opinion leaders across the Sampled African Canadian group None

1%

Critical Thin kers

0% 7%

Technocrats or Professionals

10%

Religious Leaders

8%

Community leaders 6%

Entrepreneu rs 4%

Athletes

Overall perceived opinion leaders across the Sampled Af rican Canadian group

6%

Radio Presenters

14%

Journalists 8%

Politicians

15%

Edu cators 12%

Civil Rights Leaders 5%

Social Media Influencers

4%

Bloggers 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Figure 25: African Canadians’ Opinion Leaders 44


Correlatively, 15% of the sampled Asian Canadian look

the remaining sampled Asian Canadian population

up to educators; 14% look up to journalists; 12% look up

cumulatively look up other community personality

to technocrats for opinions; 9% look up to politicians,

figures, besides those, or they do not look up to anyone

while another 9% look up to community leaders. 41% of

for opinions (see figure 26 for the overall distribution).

Overall perception across the sampled Asian Canadian group 0%

None

0%

Critical Thinkers

12%

Technocrats or… 6%

Religious Leaders

9%

Community leaders 5%

Entrepreneurs

4%

Athletes

6%

Radio Presenters

14%

Journalists

Overall perception across the sampled Asian Canadian group

9%

Politicians

15%

Educators Civil Rights Leaders

7%

Social Media Influencers

7% 4%

Bloggers 0%

5%

10%

15%

Figure 26: Asian Canadians’ Opinion Leaders 45


Popular Opinion Leaders by name 41% of the sampled African Canadian population

leaders. In comparison, 12% of the same sample

believes that Justin Trudeau is their popular opinion

population affirms religious leaders as their opinion

leader. Another 15% of the sampled African Canadian

leaders. Figure 27 shows the popular opinion leaders

population endorsed the Obamas as their opinion

across the sampled African Canadian demographics.

Overall Popular opinion leader by name 2% 0% 2% 1% 4% 2%

Lebron James Don Lemon Martin Lurther King Nicole Wallace Jagmeet Singh Lisa Laflamme O'TOOLE Doug ford John Tory Minister Louis Farakan Chris Hall Paul Arcand chris Cuomo Elon Musk Religious Leaders The Obamas(Barack… Wendy Williams

2% 4% 1% 1% 1% 3%

Overall Popular opinion leader by name

3% 1% 12% 15% 1% 41%

Justin Trudeau Journalists Oprah Winfrey

2% 2% 0%

10%

20% 30% 40% 50%

Figure 27: African Canadians’ popular opinion leaders by name 46


62% of the sampled Asian Canadian population looks

do not have an opinion leader or cumulatively look up

up to Justin Trudeau as their popular opinion leader,

to other opinion leaders, including the Obamas, Oprah

while 17% look up to religious leaders. The remaining

Winfrey, and Doug Ford and Jagmeet Singh, among

21% of the sampled Asian Canadian population either

different famous personalities (see figure 28 below).

Overall popular opinion leaders by name, across the sample group 0%

Lebron James

3%

Don Lemon Martin Lurther King

0%

Nicole Wallace

0% 3%

Jagmeet Singh Lisa Laflamme

0%

O'TOOLE

0% 3%

Doug ford John Tory

0%

Minister Louis Farakan

0%

Chris Hall

0%

Paul Arcand

0%

chris Cuomo

0%

Overall popular opinion leaders by name, across the sample group

3%

Elon Musk

17%

Religious Leaders The Obamas(Barack…

3% 0%

Wendy Williams

62%

Justin Trudeau 0%

Journalists

3%

Oprah Winfrey 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Figure 28: Asian Canadians’ popular opinion leaders by name 47


Reporting Cases of Disinformation The top five organizations that the sampled African

authorities to report disinformation cases; 25% claim

Canadian population perceives to have the capacity

respective news broadcast agencies; 20% claim

to manage disinformation include social media teams,

Facebook teams; 15% claim online police portals, while

respective news agencies like BBC and CNN, Facebook

5% claim online fact-checking organizations. Figure 29

team, online police portals, and online fact-checking

below depicts the full distribution across the African

organizations. 27% of the sampled African Canadian

Canadian demographics.

population claim social media teams as the central

Overall perception regarding organizations to report disinformation CRTC

2%

Canadian Internet Registration Authority

2%

Police/Online Police Portal

15%

factcheck.org

5%

Social media teams

27%

Government

Overall perception regarding organizations to report disinformation

4%

Facebook Team

20%

BBC/CNN/News Agency Networks

25% 0%

10%

20%

30%

Figure 29: African Canadians’ perception of organization to report disinformation. 48


50% of the Asian Canadian population believes

Television

and

Telecommunications

Commission

social media teams as the proper authority to report

(CRTC), while another 25% perceive the respective

disinformation cases. 25% think that disinformation

news broadcast networks as the authorities to report

cases ought to be reported to the Canadian Radio-

disinformation (see figure 30 below).

Overall perception regarding organizations to report disinformation CRTC

25%

Canadian Internet Registration Authority

0%

Police/Online Police Portal

0%

factcheck.org

0%

Social media teams

50%

Government

0%

Facebook Team

0%

BBC/CNN/News Agency Networks

Overall perception regarding organizations to report disinformation

25% 0%

20%

40%

60%

Figure 30: Asian Canadians’ perception of organization to report disinformation. 49


The popular organization responsible for countering Disinformation 14% of the sampled African Canadian population

sampled African Canadian population believes that

believe that the Canadian Radio-Television and

the local television administrators are responsible for

Telecommunications

is

countering disinformation, while 11% of the population

while

still perceives the prime minister’s office as responsible.

another 14% of the sample population tag the

Figure 31 below shows the perception distribution

responsibility to Facebook administrators. 12% of the

across the sampled African Canadian population.

responsible

for

Commission

countering

(CRTC)

disinformation,

Overall view on who should counter disinformation cases

0%

Social media influencers International news…

0% 0%

None

3%

Don't know CGTN

0%

Individuals

1%

Youtubers

0%

The Canadian…

2% 14%

Canadian Radio-… 4%

Industry Canada (ICRST)

Overall view on who should counter disinformation cases

9%

Twitter Administrators 5%

LinkedIn Administrators

7%

Bloggers

8%

Politicians

11%

The Canadian Prime…

10%

Instagram…

14%

Facebook Administrators

12%

Local Television… 0%

5%

10%

15%

Figure 31: African Canadians’ views on who is responsible for countering disinformation 50


25% of the sampled Asian Canadian population does

the Canadian Government; 9% tag to Facebook

not know who or which organization is responsible

administrators

for

that

Canadian population tags the responsibility to Twitter

disinformation cases ought to be reported to the

administrators (check figure 32 below for the full

Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications

distribution).

countering

disinformation;

20%

affirm

while

8%

of

the

sampled

Asian

Commission (CRTC); 17% tag the responsibility to

Overall view on who should counter disinformation cases

0%

Social media influencers International news…

0% 2%

None

25%

Don't know CGTN

0%

Individuals

0%

Youtubers

0% 17%

The Canadian…

20%

Canadian Radio-…

Overall view on who should counter disinformation cases

1%

Industry Canada (ICRST)

8%

Twitter Administrators 1%

LinkedIn Administrators Bloggers

5%

Politicians

4%

The Canadian Prime…

0%

Instagram…

1%

Facebook… Local Television… 0%

9% 6% 10%

20%

30%

Figure 32: Asian Canadians’ views on who is responsible for countering disinformation 51


Annual Income distribution across the sample populations 20% of the sampled African Canadians reported an

and C$ 100, 000. The remaining 6% of the sampled

annual income of between C$ 40, 001 and C$ 60, 000;

African Canadian population preferred not to state

17% between C$ 20,001 and C$ 40, 000; 15% above

their income categories or did not know their annual

C$ 100,000; 15% between C$ 60, 001 and C$ 80, 000;

income (see figure 33).

13% below C$ 20, 000 while 14% between C$ 80, 001

Overall African Canadian annual income distribution across the sample group Prefer not to say

5%

Don’t know

0%

C$ 80, 001- C$ 100, 000

14%

C$ 60, 001- C$ 80, 000

15%

C$ 40, 001- C$ 60, 000

20%

C$ 20,001- C$ 40, 000

Overall African Canadian annual income distribution across the sample group

17%

Below C$ 20, 000

13%

Above C$ 100, 000

15% 0%

5%

10% 15% 20% 25%

Figure 33: African Canadians’ overall annual income distribution across the sample group 52


Comparatively, 21% of the sampled Asian Canadians

and C$ 100, 000 (See figure 34 below). The remaining 9%

reported an annual income of between C$ 40, 001 and

of the sampled Asian Canadian population preferred

C$ 60, 000; 15% between C$ 20,001 and C$ 40, 000; 15%

not to state their income categories or did not know

above C$ 100,000; 16% between C$ 60, 001 and C$ 80,

their annual income.

000; 8% below C$ 20,000 while 16% between C$ 80, 001

Overall Asian Canadian annual income distribution across the sample group Prefer not to say

8%

Don’t know

1%

C$ 80, 001- C$ 100, 000

16%

C$ 60, 001- C$ 80, 000

16%

C$ 40, 001- C$ 60, 000

21%

C$ 20,001- C$ 40, 000

Overall Asian Canadian annual income distribution across the sample group

15%

Below C$ 20, 000

8%

Above C$ 100, 000

15% 0%

10%

20%

30%

Figure 34: Asian Canadians’ overall annual income distribution across the sample group 53


Perceived levels of disinformation relative to other ethnic groups Our data on perceived levels of disinformation

inequality, and the racism experienced in Canada,

relative to other ethnic groups suggest that 42% of

while 12% believe the distinction is because of biased

the sampled African Canadian population claims the

opinions and stereotypes. Figure 35 below highlights

same level of disinformation across Canadian ethnic

the overall distribution of other reasons the sampled

groups because they believe everyone gets the same

African

information. 32% suggest that the disparity in the

perceived disparities in disinformation levels across

level of disinformation is because of discrimination,

the sampled African Canadian group.

Canadian

population

provided

for

their

Overall African Canadians' perceptive reason for their level of disinformation

4%

3%

3% The same level of disinformation across ethnic groups because information is for all

5%

12%

42%

The level of discrimination, inequalities, and racism experienced by African Canadians Biased opinion/stereotypes

Little fact-checking and relying on relatives for news validation

32%

More news ab out African-Canadians, which increases chances of disinformation

Figure 35: African Canadians’ perceptive reason for their level of disinformation 54


On the other hand, 21% of the sampled Asian

disinformation across ethnic groups in Canada. Only

Canadian population believes there is no disparity in

10% argue that biased opinions and stereotypes are the

disinformation levels across ethnic groups because

reason for the discrepancy. Figure 36 below highlights

every ethnic group accesses the same news and

the distribution of other reasons the sampled Asian

information. 60% of the sampled Asian Canadian

Canadian population provided for their perceived

population claims that discrimination, inequality, and

disparities in disinformation levels across the Asian

racism are the reasons for the disparity in the levels of

Canadian ethnic group.

Overall Asian Canadians' perceptive reasons for African Canadians' level of disinformation

4%

2% 2%

2%

21%

10%

The same level of disinformation across ethnic groups because in formation is for all The level of discrimination, in equalities, and racism experienced by African Canadians Biased opinion/stereotypes

Little fact-checking and relying on relatives for news validation More news about AfricanCanadians, which in creases chances of disinformation 60%

Ignorance and lack of education on disinformation

Figure 36: Asian Canadians’ perceptive reasons for African Canadians’ level of disinformation 55


Views on possible measures to mitigate Disinformation against African Canadians Regarding suggestions to help fight disinformation

disinformation among the African Canadian population.

and fake news in Canada, 26% of the sampled African

The third most significant suggestion is from 18% of

Canadian population believe that involving African

the sampled African Canadians, who suggest that

Canadians in new validation processes will help

educating the people about disinformation is critical

counter disinformation among the African Canadian

in fighting disinformation among African Canadians.

population. 23% of the sampled African Canadian

Figure 37 below demonstrates the distribution of other

population believes that individual initiatives in fact-

suggestion across the sampled African Canadian

checking and news validation are central in fighting

demographics.

Overall African Canadians' suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation

The government setting policies and penalties against disinformation

7%

Educating the people on disinformation

18%

Individuals learning to be skeptical about news and information

12%

Facebook filtering fake news

3%

Involving AfricanCanadians in news validation

26%

Individuals fact-checking and checking the validity of sources

Overall African Canadians' suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation

23%

Doing individual research to confirm information

11% 0%

10%

20%

30%

Figure 37: African Canadians’ suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation 56


On the other hand, 24% of the sampled Asian

sampled Asian Canadian people involving more Asian

Canadian population suggests that the involvement

Canadians in news and information validation will

of the Canadian Government in setting up policies

help fight disinformation among the Asian Canadian

and penalties against disinformation is essential

communities. Figure 38 below shows the distribution of

in countering disinformation. Another 24% of the

other suggestions across the sampled Asian Canadian

sampled Asian Canadian population thinks that

demographics.

educating Canadians about disinformation will help fight disinformation across ethnic groups. 21% of the

Overall Asian Canadians' suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation

The government setting policies and penalties against…

24%

Educating the people on disinformation

24%

Individuals learning to be skeptical about news and information

12%

Facebook filtering fake news

Overall Asian Canadians' suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation

3%

Involving AsianCanadians in news validation

21%

Individuals factchecking and checking the validity… Doing individual research to confirm information

15%

0%

0%

10%

20%

30%

Figure 38: Asian Canadians’ suggestions on strategies to counter disinformation 57


Typical steps in checking news credibility When asked about the typical steps required to check

another 17% approve of confirming the source of a story

for the news credibility, 25% of the sampled African

as a common step in checking news credibility. Figure

Canadians approve ‘checking for other sources

39 below exhibits the distribution of other suggestions

that report the same news or story’ as a common

by the sampled African Canadian demographics,

step for confirming information credibility. 17% agree

which are perceived as common steps for checking

‘confirming evidence against other sources while

news credibility.

Overall African Canadians' common steps in checking information credibility

1%

Don't know Incomplete… Checking with… Using the ‘SPOT…

4% 5% 4%

Confirming…

17%

Confirm the…

17% 11%

Checking the date… Doing a reverse…

4% 25%

Checking for… 11%

Examine if the… 0%

Overall African Canadians' common steps in checking information credibility

10%

20%

30%

Figure 39: African Canadians’ common steps in checking information credibility 58


At the same time, 33% of the sampled Asian

a common step in checking news credibility. Figure 40

Canadians approve ‘checking for other sources that

below exhibits the distribution of other suggestions by

report the same news or story’ as a common step

the sampled Asian Canadian demographics, which

for confirming information credibility. 14% approve

are perceived as common steps for checking news

‘confirming evidence against other sources while 17%

credibility.

approve confirming the source of a story or news as

Overall Asian Canadians' common steps in checking information credibility

6%

Don't know 0%

Incomplete response Checking with family and friends

11%

Using the ‘SPOT Fake News Online’ mind… Confirming evidence against other sources

4% 14%

Confirm the source of the story or news Checking the date of publication of the…

17% 2%

Doing a reverse image search Checking for other sources that report… Examine if the story or news is …

Overall Asian Canadians' common steps in checking information credibility

4% 33% 9%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

Figure 40: Asian Canadians’ common steps in checking information credibility 59


Discussion Impacts of Disinformation Among the Marginalized African Canadians’ Communities The survey results paint a worrisome picture of the

participative populace. After all, democracy promises

state of disinformation among minority ethnic groups,

inclusivity by obeying the majority’s will while being

including African- and Asian-Canadian communities.

mindful of the minority’s rights and needs. Nonetheless,

The African Canadian population, whose economic

when everyday citizens have to put significant effort

status

is

towards discerning political information’s truthfulness,

significantly affected by disinformation, as revealed by

people’s natural response is to shun politics altogether

the survey results.

(Butcher, 2019). Often, as the degrees of confusion and

ranges

from

low-

to

middle-income,

doubt increase among the populace, the likelihood of The explosion of disinformation in recent years

future political participation also diminishes.

has eroded people’s confidence in the internet’s democracy-supporting

capabilities.

According

to

This notion is partly proven by recent studies

Butcher (2019), disinformation’s’ destructive impact was

investigating voter turnout patterns in multicultural

evident in the 2016 election cycle, where disinformation

Canadian cities such as Toronto, showing that the

shaped elections in one-and-a-half dozen countries

proportion of apparent minorities in each region is

during that election cycle. Butcher (2019) points out

inversely correlated to voters’ turnout (Morgan, 2018)

that disinformation has mainly grown popular facets in the political class. It provides a convenient means through which they can introduce extremist thought while undermining rational thought. That is particularly true, as indicated by the survey results. More than two-thirds of the sampled population

.

admitted that disinformation derailed their political perception, whether in their views towards the political

Therefore, it becomes imperative for the Canadian

parties, political leaders, or election processes. African

Government to step up on curbing disinformation,

Canadians and Asian Canadians both have confirmed

especially as the survey has uncontrollably thrived on

falling victim to disinformation in political exercises and

the Internet domain and in traditional media outlets.

contexts. Therefore, attempts to spread disinformation against African Canadian communities are harmful

The marginalized and the African Canadian communities’

to democracy as they prevent informed debate that

source most of their information from the internet and

goes over all Canadians’ needs and demands.

social media sources, as affirmed by survey results, which render them vulnerable to deceptive threats

The

undermines

unregulated by government authorities. Government

democracy by encouraging political apathy. Even in

regulation of social media outlets and digital information

developed democracies such as Canada, political

consumption is necessary for countering disinformation

systems’ continued success is highly dependent on a

on digital sources.

60

spread

of

disinformation

also


Key Disinformation Frameworks Even when done in a petty manner, disinformation

spreading

disinformation

can be especially obstructing to minorities such

Canadian

as African Canadian communities. Grambo (2018)

domestic players against immigration’s perceived

further clarifies that the socially destructive nature

vices (Johnson, 2019; Emma & Orr, 2019).

communities

are

against

African

international

and

of disinformation on minorities makes it almost impossible for the information marketplace to

The same is supported by the survey results, which

correct on its own.

place fake social media accounts at the top spot in spreading disinformation. In that context, the

Such disinformation is challenging to contain owing

nature of deceptive behavior has been a lot more

to several novel traits that define online media

varied as inauthentic behavior against African

relative to traditional media. Indeed, disinformation

Canadian groups in a coordinated and non-

is characteristically resilient and can sustainably

coordinated manner (Johnson, 2019; Emma & Orr,

compete with truthful news in society.

2019). Ultimately, the Canadian Government has sought to contain disinformation by regulating the

Consequently, following digital media platforms’

nature of political content posted online (Samuel,

characteristic nature, disinformation targeting

2019).

African

Canadian

communities

can

continue

gaining social traction long after the corrective

African Canadians and Asian Canadians alike

account has been provided. Additionally, the

look up to both political and religious leaders for

harder it is to contain and correct disinformation,

opinions. The Canadian Government regulating

the more severe are the social consequences

online content, especially on social media accounts

(Grambo, 2018).

like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, will be significant in curbing disinformation, as

In that case, the Internet environment presents

it directly impacts democracy and freedom of

more problematic social platforms to subject to

information.

corrective action; it is more socially destructive. Survey results reveal that most African- and The ABC framework provides a mechanism against

Asian-Canadians are not confident in identifying

which disinformation can be understood and

disinformation independently. The results also

analyzed to determine its influence (Alaphilippe,

paint a grim picture of the lack of well-established

2020). The ABC disinformation framework denotes

institutions to manage disinformation cases as

an

perceived by both the sampled African Canadians

abbreviation

‘Actors,’

deceptive

representing

harmful

and Asian Canadians. In that context, the Canadian

‘Content’ (Francois, 2020). The three variables may

Government ought to breach the existing gap

vary in scope depending on the disinformation

by enacting policy measures and strengthening

situation; they are widely recognized as prevalent

institutions in countering disinformation, both on

in most viral deception circumstances. Available

the internet and in traditional media outlets.

information

reveals

‘Behaviors,’

manipulative

that

and

manipulative

actors 61


Countermeasure Protocols to Limit and If Possible, Eliminate Online Disinformation Among African Canadians The attack on the Quebec mosque in 2017 made it

though most of them are not sure of their capacities

increasingly apparent among Canadian citizens

to identify disinformation. The finding infers a major

and lawmakers that the country was highly exposed

gap on citizens’ sensitization about disinformation.

to disinformation. Indeed, in the days that followed, there was a lot of false information spread about the

The Canadian Government should put up aggressive

individuals involved (Roudik, 2019).

education campaigns that will sensitize both the minority groups and the mainstream public on

In

response

to

the

tragic

incident,

Canadian

countering disinformation. Most importantly diversity

legislators sought assurances from companies such

in education as well as information validation

as Google and Facebook that the companies would

initiatives will effectively be the initial steps in

be proactive in preventing false news dissemination

countering

in Canada (Roudik, 2019). Despite the initial steps of

highlights a host of digital, interactive fact-checking in

approaching tech giants, no additional or legislative

multiple languages including English, French, Serbian,

framework has been developed or proposed to

Greek, Finnish, and Slovenian (SMARTeD, n.d).

disinformation.

Smartedemocracy.org

combat disinformation beyond laws that touch on defamation and libel (Roudik, 2019).

The interactive tools are in different languages for easy usability by natives. Some English interactive

The Canadian Government should be conclusive

fact-checking tools like ‘Informable,’ ‘Botometer,’

in formulating policies that impose penalties and

‘Fakey,’ and ‘Hoaxy’ are user-friendly fact-checking

punishment on disinformation on sensitive subject

tools in the form of game applications that users can

matters specifically targeting vulnerable groups. That

easily navigate to validate news and information.

will be effective if the Government takes a collaborative

Campaigns aimed at educating individuals about

approach bringing all stakeholders together.

countering disinformation should leverage on the wide portfolio of digital interactive fact-checking tools

The

collaborative

approach

should

begin

at

as reported by smartedemocracy.org. Empowering

grassroots. Educating the vulnerable groups and

individuals

to

embrace

personal

fact-checking

including them in news validation positions are the

habits would be an effective countermeasure against

two main measures against disinformation recurrent

disinformation targeting minority groups.

both across the sampled African Canadian and Asian Canadian populations. The Canadian Government

Frameworks used to combat disinformation online

should

sensitization

vary significantly in complexity and scope. Stray (2019)

campaigns since most of the sample population

argues that six simple strategies relating to refutation,

reported to have no idea of where to report cases of

manipulation

disinformation.

alternative narratives, regulations touching on speech,

embark

on

disinformation

of

filter

algorithms,

propagating

exposing the falsehood, and full-on censorship The survey results reveal that both African Canadians

should be applied. On one hand, refutation involves

and

simply denying the truthfulness of disinformation and

Asian

Canadians

frequently

encounter

disinformation; either on a daily or weekly basis, even 62

is widely used by individuals in authority positions.


On the other hand, propagating an alternative narrative takes it further by providing the truthful account as a denial. Similarly, regulations that touch on free speech can prevent disinformation by reducing the amount of information offered online. For example, a nation that maintains authoritarian control can reduce disinformation by censoring posts and information relating to specific subjects (Kyza et al., 2020). Consequently, implementing speech regulation could prove complicated in Canada as the democratic Government would not want to appear authoritarian. Notably, the manipulation of filter algorithms provides authorities with subtle form of censorship that limits the spread of information of some nature without becoming immediately apparent to social media users. This can be a possible measure the Canadian Government can explore against disinformation on digital outlets.

Educating African Canadians on How to Use Anti-disinformation Tools. African Canadians face challenges related to systemic

These stakeholders will serve as channels through

racism, discrimination among many other socio-

which Government policies can be communicated

economic inequalities. It is incumbent upon the

effectively on disinformation censoring, and training

Canadian Government to enact proactive measures

on how to use the various and easily accessible Anti-

against disinformation to empower the minority groups.

disinformation tools found in SmarteDemocracy.org

Protecting African Canadians against disinformation at

Government policies and programming targeted

the base root level is empowering the entire Canadian

to the African Canadian communities must factor

population by extension. The leadership of various

in

local African Canadian communities, religious leaders,

Canadian

formal

African-themed

validation, processing, and disinformation reporting.

journalists and media persons, social media influencers,

The Canadian Government’s collaborative stance

civil rights leaders and African Canadian-based not-

with tech giants, traditional media outlets and other

for-profit organizations will be incorporated into the

stakeholders will ultimately dictate the effectiveness of

collaborative network of stakeholders in this space.

the proposed measures against disinformation.

and

informal

educators,

the

outlined

unique

communities

challenges face

during

the

African

information

63


References Alaphilippe, A. (2020). Adding a ‘D’ to the ABC disinformation framework. Brookings: TechStream. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/adding-a-d-to-the-abcdisinformation-framework/ Bayer, J. (2020). Double harm to voters: Data-driven micro-targeting and democratic public discourse. Internet Policy Review, 9(1), 1-17. Butcher, P. (2019). Disinformation and Democracy: The Home Front in the Information War. European Policy Center. Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, (2019). 2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process. Government of Canada, Retrieved on 22nd Jan 2021 from https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/canadian-context-0 Clement, J. (2020). Canada Online usage Penetration 2015-2025. Statista.com. Retrieved on 22nd Jan 2021 from https://www.statista.com/statistics/373936/canada-online-penetration/ Decoteau, C. L. (2017). The “Western disease”: Autism and Somali parents’ embodied health movements. Social Science & Medicine, 177, 169-176. Emma, M. & Orr, C. (2019). International media spread two fake stories about Canadian immigration. It’s weird, but don’t panic. The National Observer. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2019/09/05/ news/international-media-spread-two-fake-stories-about-canadian-immigration-its-weird François, C. (2020). Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC. A working paper of the Transatlantic High Level Working Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of Expression. Grambo, K. (2018). Fake News and Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Minorities: A Precarious Quest for Truth. U. Pa. J. Const. L., 21, 1299. Jiwani, Y., & Al-Rawi, A. (2019). Intersecting violence: Representations of Somali youth in the Canadian press. Journalism, 1464884919825503. Kurtzleben, Danielle, (April 11, 2018)Did Fake News On Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We Know. Retrieved on 22nd March 2021, from: https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-fake-news-in-the-2016-election Kyza, E. A., Varda, C., Panos, D., Karageorgiou, M., Komendantova-Amann, N., Coppolino Perfumi, S., ... & Hosseini, A. S. (2020). Combating misinformation online: re-imagining social media for policy-making. Internet Policy Review, 9(4), 1-24. Library of Congress Law. (2020). Government response to disinformation on social media platforms: Canada. Law.gov, Retrieved on 23rd Jan 2021 from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/socialmedia-disinformation/canada.php, last updated 30th Dec 2020. 64


Marwick, A., & Lewis, R. (2017). Media manipulation and disinformation online. New York: Data & Society Research Institute. Morgan, D. (2018). Analysis: Toronto election campaign highlights flaws in system. Rabble. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://rabble.ca/news/2018/10/analysis-toronto-election-campaignhighlights-flaws-system Muqsith, M. A., & Muzykant, V. L. (2019). Effect Fake News for Democracy. Jurnal Cita Hukum, 7(3), 307-318. Ortiz, J., Young, A., Myers, M., Carbaugh, D., Bedeley, R. T., Chughtai, H., ... & Wigdor, A. (2019). Giving voice to the voiceless: The use of digital technologies by marginalized groups. Roudik, P. (2019). Initiatives to Counter Fake News in Selected Countries. Washington, D.C.: Legal Reports of the Law Library of Congress. Samuel, A. (2019). To Predict the Role of Fake News in 2020, Look to Canada. JSTOR Daily. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://daily.jstor.org/to-predict-the-role-of-fake-news-in-2020-look-to-canada/ SMARTeD (n.d). Interactive tools. Smartedemocracy.org. Retrieved 16 March, 2021 from https://smartedemocracy.org/interactive-tools/ Smidi, A., & Shahin, S. (2017). Social media and social Mobilization in the Middle East: A survey of research on the Arab spring. India Quarterly, 73(2), 196-209. Stray, J. (2019, May). Institutional Counter-disinformation Strategies in a Networked Democracy. In Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (pp. 1020-1025) Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2020). Public health and online misinformation: challenges and recommendations. Annual Review of Public Health, 41, 433-451.. Thompson, E. (2019). Poll finds 90% of Canadians have fallen for fake newsPoll finds 90% of Canadians have fallen for fake news. CBC News. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fake-news-facebook-twitter-poll-1.5169916 Tsfati, Y., Boomgaarden, H. G., Strömbäck, J., Vliegenthart, R., Damstra, A., & Lindgren, E. (2020). Causes and consequences of mainstream media dissemination of fake news: literature review and synthesis. Annals of the International Communication Association, 44(2), 157-173. Wood, L. (2018). Oh, Canada, don’t be smug. Fake news is a real and present threat. The National Observer. Retrieved 25 Jan. 2021 from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/12/14/opinion /oh-canada-dont-be-smug-fake-news-real-and-present-threat 65


Appendix Appendix 1 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances

F

Equal variances assumed

LPC

CPC

GPC NDP BQ None Other Don’t know

66

2.449

Sig.

0.162

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.024

0.881

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.485

0.262

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.686

0.096

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.352

0.572

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

9.612

0.017

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

4.355

0.075

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

9.833

0.016

t-test for Equality of Means

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std. Error Difference

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-0.972

7

0.363

-17.000

17.486

-58.347

24.347

-1.018

6.892

0.343

-17.000

16.693

-56.599

22.599

1.053

7

0.327

4.450

4.224

-5.538

14.438

1.058

6.661

0.327

4.450

4.207

-5.603

14.503

-0.745

7

0.480

-1.500

2.012

-6.259

3.259

-0.778

6.936

0.462

-1.500

1.928

-6.067

3.067

-0.576

7

0.583

-4.200

7.291

-21.439

13.039

-0.648

4.328

0.550

-4.200

6.481

-21.670

13.270

0.646

7

0.539

0.450

0.697

-1.197

2.097

0.615

5.026

0.565

0.450

0.732

-1.429

2.329

-0.463

7

0.657

-3.700

7.993

-22.600

15.200

-0.520

4.396

0.628

-3.700

7.117

-22.778

15.378

0.072

7

0.945

0.050

0.697

-1.597

1.697

0.079

5.364

0.940

0.050

0.634

-1.548

1.648

-1.065

7

0.322

-3.050

2.864

-9.821

3.721

-1.181

4.943

0.291

-3.050

2.582

-9.712

3.612


Appendix 2 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test

for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

LPC CPC GPC NDP BQ Prefer not to say None Other Don’t know

Equal variances assumed

8.565

Sig.

0.014

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.259

0.286

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.964

0.072

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

23.274

0.001

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

2.417

0.148

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

7.404

0.020

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.955

0.349

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.101

0.756

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

2.107

0.175

t

df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

Mean

Difference

Std. Error

Difference

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-1.723

11

0.113

-5.810

3.372

-13.232

1.613

-1.654

7.840

0.138

-5.810

3.513

-13.939

2.320

-0.266

11

0.795

-0.405

1.524

-3.759

2.950

-0.274

10.524

0.789

-0.405

1.477

-3.675

2.865

-1.484

11

0.166

-0.690

0.465

-1.714

0.333

-1.386

5.897

0.216

-0.690

0.498

-1.915

0.534

-0.948

11

0.364

-1.952

2.060

-6.486

2.581

-0.879

5.478

0.416

-1.952

2.222

-7.517

3.612

-0.767

11

0.459

-0.190

0.248

-0.737

0.356

-0.748

9.055

0.473

-0.190

0.255

-0.766

0.385

-1.088

11

0.300

-0.167

0.153

-0.504

0.170

-1.000

5.000

0.363

-0.167

0.167

-0.595

0.262

0.472

11

0.646

0.119

0.252

-0.436

0.674

0.479

10.999

0.641

0.119

0.249

-0.428

0.666

0.253

11

0.805

0.095

0.377

-0.734

0.925

0.244

8.403

0.813

0.095

0.390

-0.796

0.987

-1.398

11

0.190

-1.714

1.226

-4.413

0.984

-1.446

10.372

0.178

-1.714

1.186

-4.343

0.914

67


Appendix 3 Part 1 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Equal variances assumed Local Newspapers

Equal variances assumed

cast

Equal variances not assumed

International TV News

Equal variances assumed

Broadcast

Equal variances not assumed

Internet Search

Equal variances assumed

Google etc.) The Local Government

Equal variances not assumed

Twitter

Instagram

Blogs

0.085

1.315

0.894

0.776

0.272

0.710

0.415

Equal variances not assumed

atives

LinkedIn

68

Equal variances assumed

Family & Rel-

Facebook

0.018

Equal variances not assumed

Equal variances assumed

Friends

0.038

Equal variances not assumed

Local TV News Broad-

Engines (e.g. Bing,

5.358

Sig.

Equal variances assumed

6.791

3.275

0.022

0.094

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

2.412

0.144

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.543

0.236

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

5.164

0.041

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

2.799

0.118

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

18.200

0.001

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Differ-

Differ-

ence

ence

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-0.925

13

0.372

-2.357

2.547

-7.860

3.145

-0.880

7.846

0.405

-2.357

2.679

-8.555

3.841

-0.620

13

0.546

-2.304

3.717

-10.334

5.727

-0.623

12.944

0.544

-2.304

3.696

-10.293

5.686

-0.631

13

0.539

-1.732

2.745

-7.663

4.198

-0.626

12.158

0.543

-1.732

2.769

-7.756

4.292

-1.091

13

0.295

-4.071

3.731

-12.132

3.990

-1.066

10.674

0.310

-4.071

3.821

-12.513

4.370

-0.921

13

0.374

-1.071

1.164

-3.585

1.442

-0.899

10.603

0.389

-1.071

1.192

-3.708

1.565

-1.470

13

0.165

-3.375

2.296

-8.335

1.585

-1.415

9.116

0.190

-3.375

2.385

-8.760

2.010

-1.128

13

0.280

-3.893

3.452

-11.351

3.565

-1.079

8.488

0.310

-3.893

3.607

-12.128

4.343

-1.075

13

0.302

-11.589

10.776

-34.870

11.692

-1.039

9.530

0.324

-11.589

11.151

-36.603

13.424

-0.182

13

0.859

-0.214

1.179

-2.761

2.332

-0.176

10.017

0.863

-0.214

1.214

-2.919

2.491

-0.783

13

0.448

-4.500

5.749

-16.920

7.920

-0.741

7.485

0.481

-4.500

6.069

-18.665

9.665

-1.148

13

0.271

-6.946

6.049

-20.014

6.121

-1.093

7.941

0.306

-6.946

6.355

-21.620

7.727

1.422

13

0.179

0.250

0.176

-0.130

0.630

1.528

7.000

0.170

0.250

0.164

-0.137

0.637


Appendix 3 Part 2 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Social media in

Equal variances assumed

general

Equal variances not assumed

Misinformed people

Don’t know

Whatsapp

Local radio broadcast news The Local Community Leaders

Tik Tok Special interest blogs, online groups or professional associations YouTube news channels

Celebrities

Politicians

None

Equal variances assumed

0.720

4.719

Sig.

0.412

0.049

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.076

0.319

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.488

0.497

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

7.054

0.020

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.001

0.978

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

6.656

0.023

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

5.631

0.034

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

8.377

0.013

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.006

0.941

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.011

0.333

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

49.544

0.000

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Differ-

Differ-

ence

ence

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

0.270

13

0.791

0.089

0.331

-0.625

0.803

0.278

12.148

0.786

0.089

0.321

-0.610

0.788

0.931

13

0.369

0.125

0.134

-0.165

0.415

1.000

7.000

0.351

0.125

0.125

-0.171

0.421

-1.765

13

0.101

-3.464

1.963

-7.704

0.776

-1.690

8.509

0.127

-3.464

2.050

-8.143

1.215

-0.442

13

0.666

-0.214

0.485

-1.263

0.834

-0.430

10.374

0.676

-0.214

0.498

-1.319

0.891

-1.314

13

0.211

-0.607

0.462

-1.605

0.391

-1.245

7.517

0.250

-0.607

0.488

-1.744

0.530

-1.386

13

0.189

-0.625

0.451

-1.599

0.349

-1.357

11.007

0.202

-0.625

0.460

-1.638

0.388

-1.075

13

0.302

-0.143

0.133

-0.430

0.144

-1.000

6.000

0.356

-0.143

0.143

-0.492

0.207

-0.499

13

0.626

-0.571

1.146

-3.047

1.904

-0.485

10.304

0.638

-0.571

1.177

-3.184

2.041

-1.103

13

0.290

-2.804

2.542

-8.295

2.688

-1.048

7.769

0.326

-2.804

2.675

-9.005

3.398

-0.253

13

0.804

-0.339

1.341

-3.237

2.558

-0.249

11.595

0.808

-0.339

1.361

-3.317

2.638

0.486

13

0.635

0.107

0.220

-0.369

0.583

0.493

12.956

0.630

0.107

0.217

-0.362

0.577

2.325

13

0.037

0.875

0.376

0.062

1.688

2.497

7.000

0.041

0.875

0.350

0.046

1.704

69


Appendix 4 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Local News-

Equal variances assumed

papers

Equal variances not assumed

Local TV

Equal variances assumed

News Broadcast International TV News Broadcast Internet Search

Engines (e.g.

5.568

0.000

Sig.

0.040

1.000

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.357

0.563

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

2.368

0.155

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-1.838

10

0.096

-0.833

0.453

-1.844

0.177

-1.838

7.564

0.105

-0.833

0.453

-1.889

0.223

0.262

10

0.799

0.167

0.637

-1.252

1.586

0.262

9.850

0.799

0.167

0.637

-1.255

1.589

0.000

10

1.000

0.000

0.775

-1.726

1.726

0.000

9.000

1.000

0.000

0.775

-1.752

1.752

-0.732

10

0.481

-1.000

1.366

-4.044

2.044

Bing, Google

Equal variances not assumed

-0.732

7.538

0.486

-1.000

1.366

-4.184

2.184

Family &

Equal variances assumed

0.000

10

1.000

0.000

0.316

-0.705

0.705

Relatives

Equal variances not assumed

0.000

10.000

1.000

0.000

0.316

-0.705

0.705

-1.482

10

0.169

-1.000

0.675

-2.504

0.504

-1.482

5.647

0.192

-1.000

0.675

-2.677

0.677

-1.176

10

0.267

-3.833

3.260

-11.097

3.430

-1.176

7.153

0.277

-3.833

3.260

-11.509

3.842

1.464

10

0.174

0.500

0.342

-0.261

1.261

1.464

5.000

0.203

0.500

0.342

-0.378

1.378

0.183

10

0.858

0.167

0.910

-1.861

2.194

0.183

9.635

0.858

0.167

0.910

-1.871

2.204

-1.441

10

0.180

-2.333

1.619

-5.941

1.275

-1.441

5.172

0.207

-2.333

1.619

-6.455

1.788

-0.934

10

0.372

-1.167

1.249

-3.951

1.617

-0.934

9.705

0.373

-1.167

1.249

-3.962

1.629

-1.342

10

0.209

-0.500

0.373

-1.330

0.330

-1.342

8.853

0.213

-0.500

0.373

-1.345

0.345

etc.)

Friends

Facebook

LinkedIn

Twitter

Instagram

Don’t know The Local Community Leaders

70

Equal variances assumed

6.310

0.031

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

12.250

0.006

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

16.000

0.003

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.938

0.356

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

6.541

0.028

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

0.000

1.000

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

0.328

0.580


Appendix 5 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

At least once a month At least once in a week

Equal variances assumed

0.063

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.116

0.103

Equal variances not assumed

At least

Equal variances assumed

Everyday

Equal variances not assumed

Rarely or

Equal variances assumed

never

Equal variances not assumed

Don’t know

4.196

Sig.

Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

0.457

6.374

0.169

0.512

0.027

0.688

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-1.113

12

0.288

-7.143

6.419

-21.128

6.842

-1.113

8.692

0.296

-7.143

6.419

-21.741

7.456

-0.966

12

0.353

-13.429

13.906

-43.728

16.871

-0.966

8.152

0.362

-13.429

13.906

-45.393

18.536

-0.058

12

0.955

-0.714

12.350

-27.622

26.193

-0.058

11.016

0.955

-0.714

12.350

-27.891

26.462

-1.885

12

0.084

-11.286

5.986

-24.329

1.757

-1.885

7.990

0.096

-11.286

5.986

-25.093

2.522

-0.171

12

0.867

-0.143

0.833

-1.958

1.672

-0.171

11.927

0.867

-0.143

0.833

-1.959

1.673

71


Appendix 6 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances Sig. F

Sig.

t

df

(2-tailed)

Equal variances

At least once

assumed

a month

Equal variances

2.093

0.176

not assumed Equal variances

At least once

assumed

in a week

Equal variances

3.562

0.086

not assumed Equal variances

At least Every-

assumed

day

Equal variances

20.035

0.001

not assumed Equal variances

Rarely or

assumed

never

Equal variances

1.244

0.289

not assumed Equal variances

Don’t know

assumed Equal variances not assumed

72

0.315

0.586

95% Confidence Mean Di-

Std. Error

fference

Difference

Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-1.369

11

0.198

-2.214

1.617

-5.773

1.345

-1.328

8.657

0.218

-2.214

1.667

-6.008

1.580

-1.141

11

0.278

-2.381

2.087

-6.974

2.212

-1.089

7.374

0.311

-2.381

2.187

-7.500

2.738

-1.068

11

0.308

-2.714

2.541

-8.307

2.878

-1.016

7.124

0.343

-2.714

2.672

-9.010

3.581

-1.608

11

0.136

-2.976

1.850

-7.049

1.097

-1.558

8.561

0.155

-2.976

1.910

-7.331

1.379

-0.230

11

0.823

-0.214

0.933

-2.268

1.839

-0.228

10.299

0.824

-0.214

0.940

-2.301

1.872


Appendix 7 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Not any different from other ethnic groups

Equal variances assumed

0.002

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances as-

Relatively Bad

14.106

Sig.

sumed

0.173

0.685

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances as-

Relatively very

sumed

bad

Equal variances not

4.735

0.049

assumed Equal variances as-

Not bad at all

sumed

0.585

0.458

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances as-

Not that bad

sumed

0.512

0.487

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances as-

Don’t know

sumed Equal variances not assumed

8.157

0.013

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Differ-

Differ-

ence

ence

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-1.422

13

0.179

-15.893

11.178

-40.042

8.256

-1.350

7.696

0.215

-15.893

11.774

-43.232

11.446

-0.828

13

0.422

-6.554

7.913

-23.648

10.540

-0.807

10.421

0.438

-6.554

8.122

-24.551

11.444

-1.386

13

0.189

-9.429

6.802

-24.124

5.267

-1.319

7.929

0.224

-9.429

7.148

-25.937

7.079

-0.422

13

0.680

-1.643

3.891

-10.049

6.764

-0.416

11.691

0.685

-1.643

3.946

-10.265

6.979

-0.321

13

0.753

-1.339

4.173

-10.355

7.677

-0.314

11.044

0.759

-1.339

4.259

-10.709

8.030

-1.463

13

0.167

-3.839

2.625

-9.509

1.831

-1.376

6.851

0.212

-3.839

2.791

-10.467

2.789

73


Appendix 8 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Not any different from other ethnic groups

Equal variances assumed

Equal variances assumed

Bad

Equal variances not assumed

Relatively very

Equal variances assumed

bad

Equal variances not assumed

Not that bad Don’t know

74

0.792

Equal variances not assumed

Relatively

Not bad at all

0.073

Sig.

Equal variances assumed

3.807

1.939

0.007

0.077

0.191

0.934

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.816

0.077

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

0.036

0.853

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-1.525

11

0.156

-1.690

1.109

-4.131

0.750

-1.485

8.986

0.172

-1.690

1.138

-4.266

0.885

-0.920

11

0.377

-2.405

2.612

-8.155

3.345

-0.861

5.997

0.422

-2.405

2.793

-9.240

4.431

-1.344

11

0.206

-1.762

1.311

-4.647

1.123

-1.303

8.606

0.226

-1.762

1.352

-4.842

1.318

-0.258

11

0.801

-0.167

0.646

-1.589

1.255

-0.258

10.652

0.802

-0.167

0.647

-1.596

1.262

-1.241

11

0.240

-2.048

1.650

-5.679

1.584

-1.193

7.962

0.267

-2.048

1.716

-6.008

1.913

-0.842

11

0.418

-2.310

2.745

-8.350

3.731

-0.838

10.484

0.421

-2.310

2.757

-8.414

3.795


Appendix 9 Part 1 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Made you hate a good leader

Equal variances assumed

sumed Equal variances assumed

biased views towards

Equal variances not as-

a political party

sumed

Made you vote for the

Equal variances assumed

wrong candidate in an

Equal variances not as-

election exercise

sumed

Made you think you are

Equal variances assumed

marginalized in politi-

Equal variances not as-

cal exercises: elections

sumed

Made you campaign

Equal variances assumed

for the wrong canyear It makes enemies out of friends based on lack of information and educational capacity Do not know who to trust again

2.146

0.575

0.400

0.139

0.167

0.462

0.538

0.716

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

4.719

0.049

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.560

0.234

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

None/not affected

0.374

Equal variances not as-

Made you develop

didate in an election

0.849

Sig.

Equal variances not assumed

0.683

0.423

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-0.891

13

0.389

-4.714

5.289

-16.140

6.711

-0.873

11.000

0.401

-4.714

5.399

-16.598

7.170

-0.778

13

0.451

-9.964

12.812

-37.643

17.715

-0.747

8.887

0.474

-9.964

13.337

-40.193

20.264

-0.508

13

0.620

-2.786

5.487

-14.641

9.069

-0.497

11.012

0.629

-2.786

5.602

-15.113

9.542

-0.661

13

0.520

-4.357

6.595

-18.605

9.890

-0.648

11.074

0.530

-4.357

6.728

-19.154

10.440

-0.284

13

0.781

-1.125

3.959

-9.679

7.429

-0.280

11.750

0.784

-1.125

4.012

-9.888

7.638

0.931

13

0.369

0.125

0.134

-0.165

0.415

1.000

7.000

0.351

0.125

0.125

-0.171

0.421

-0.694

13

0.500

-0.179

0.257

-0.735

0.377

-0.687

12.021

0.505

-0.179

0.260

-0.745

0.388

-0.595

13

0.562

-0.875

1.470

-4.051

2.301

-0.586

11.514

0.569

-0.875

1.493

-4.144

2.394

75


Appendix 9 Part 2 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Made me stop caring about news

Equal variances assumed

0.153

Equal variances not assumed

Made me more alert;

Equal variances assumed

research more and

Equal variances not as-

skeptical

sumed Equal variances assumed

Affected my safety

2.308

Sig.

0.004

4.719

0.949

0.049

Equal variances not assumed

Made me propagate misinformation

76

Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

6.656

0.023

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-0.738

13

0.474

-0.161

0.218

-0.631

0.310

-0.721

10.821

0.486

-0.161

0.223

-0.652

0.331

-0.226

13

0.825

-0.125

0.554

-1.321

1.071

-0.228

12.992

0.823

-0.125

0.549

-1.311

1.061

0.931

13

0.369

0.125

0.134

-0.165

0.415

1.000

7.000

0.351

0.125

0.125

-0.171

0.421

-1.075

13

0.302

-0.429

0.399

-1.290

0.433

-1.000

6.000

0.356

-0.429

0.429

-1.477

0.620


Appendix 10 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Made you hate a good leader

Equal variances assumed

assumed Equal variances assumed

biased views towards

Equal variances not

a political party

assumed

Made you vote for the

Equal variances assumed

wrong candidate in

Equal variances not

an election exercise

assumed

Made you think you

Equal variances assumed

political exercises: elections Made you campaign for the wrong candidate in an election year

2.572

0.048

3.764

0.137

0.831

0.078

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.922

0.073

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

None/not affected

0.874

Equal variances not

Made you develop

are marginalized in

0.026

Sig.

0.048

0.831

Equal variances not assumed

Made me stop caring about news

Equal variances assumed

4.874

0.049

Equal variances not assumed

Made me more alert;

Equal variances assumed

research more and

Equal variances not

skeptical

assumed

22.564

0.001

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Differ-

Differ-

ence

ence

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower

Upper

-0.439

11

0.669

-0.738

1.682

-4.440

2.964

-0.437

10.445

0.671

-0.738

1.691

-4.484

3.008

-1.956

11

0.076

-5.048

2.581

-10.729

0.633

-1.865

7.330

0.103

-5.048

2.707

-11.390

1.295

-0.777

11

0.453

-0.833

1.072

-3.193

1.526

-0.764

9.663

0.463

-0.833

1.091

-3.275

1.608

-1.339

11

0.208

-2.738

2.044

-7.238

1.762

-1.278

7.363

0.240

-2.738

2.143

-7.755

2.279

-0.270

11

0.792

-0.357

1.325

-3.273

2.558

-0.259

7.941

0.802

-0.357

1.378

-3.539

2.825

-0.109

11

0.915

-0.024

0.218

-0.504

0.456

-0.108

10.378

0.916

-0.024

0.220

-0.511

0.463

0.920

11

0.377

0.143

0.155

-0.199

0.485

1.000

6.000

0.356

0.143

0.143

-0.207

0.492

1.425

11

0.182

0.286

0.200

-0.156

0.727

1.549

6.000

0.172

0.286

0.184

-0.166

0.737

77


Appendix 11 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Always Sometimes Rarely Never Often Don’t know

78

Equal variances assumed

0.740

Sig.

0.405

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

5.673

0.033

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.716

0.076

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

1.922

0.189

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed

3.831

0.072

Equal variances not assumed Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

0.205

0.658

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std.

95% Confidence

Error

Interval of the

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-0.500

13

0.625

-5.214

10.424

-27.734

17.305

-0.491

11.119

0.633

-5.214

10.630

-28.580

18.152

-1.733

13

0.107

-12.411

7.163

-27.886

3.064

-1.656

8.335

0.135

-12.411

7.496

-29.577

4.755

-1.287

13

0.221

-5.304

4.122

-14.208

3.601

-1.230

8.342

0.252

-5.304

4.313

-15.179

4.572

-2.907

13

0.012

-3.464

1.192

-6.039

-0.890

-2.762

7.787

0.025

-3.464

1.254

-6.370

-0.559

-0.976

13

0.347

-13.286

13.619

-42.707

16.136

-0.926

7.683

0.383

-13.286

14.347

-46.609

20.038

-0.160

13

0.876

-0.071

0.447

-1.038

0.895

-0.162

12.995

0.874

-0.071

0.442

-1.027

0.884


Appendix 12 Independent Samples Test Levene’s Test for Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means

Variances

F

Equal variances assumed

Always

4.363

Sig.

0.061

Equal variances not assumed

Sometimes

Equal variances assumed

0.049

0.830

Equal variances not assumed

Rarely

Equal variances assumed

0.040

0.845

Equal variances not assumed

Never

Equal variances assumed

0.051

0.826

Equal variances not assumed

Often

Equal variances assumed

10.694

0.007

Equal variances not assumed

Don’t know

Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed

0.060

0.811

t

df

Mean

Std.

95% Confidence

Sig.

Differ-

Error

Interval of the

(2-tailed)

ence

Differ-

Difference

ence

Lower

Upper

-0.977

11

0.350

-1.714

1.755

-5.576

2.148

-0.942

8.205

0.373

-1.714

1.819

-5.892

2.463

-0.388

11

0.705

-0.738

1.902

-4.924

3.448

-0.391

10.931

0.703

-0.738

1.888

-4.896

3.420

-1.097

11

0.296

-0.952

0.868

-2.862

0.958

-1.103

10.879

0.294

-0.952

0.863

-2.855

0.950

-1.420

11

0.183

-1.333

0.939

-3.400

0.733

-1.427

10.870

0.182

-1.333

0.934

-3.393

0.726

-1.587

11

0.141

-5.738

3.615

-13.696

2.220

-1.481

5.857

0.190

-5.738

3.874

-15.275

3.799

-0.535

11

0.604

-0.238

0.445

-1.218

0.742

-0.533

10.555

0.605

-0.238

0.447

-1.226

0.750

79




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