National Aeronautics and Space Administration
respect to the water in his helmet. EV1 recognized the fact that water pooling in the helmet was not a nominal behavior of the EMU and participated in the questioning of EV2 about the source. The EVA 23 crew concurred with the ground team’s initial recommendation to continue the EVA since they believed the source of the water was not increasing. Prior to getting a direct visual on EV2, EV1 only had the information coming to him via the loop communications and his own experience with the behavior of the EMU. By GMT 12:51 (10 minutes after first call of water), EV1 had a direct visual of EV2s face and saw water pooling on the side of EV2’s head. At this time, EV2 also expressed concern about the quantity of water in his helmet and, within minutes, the decision was made to terminate the EVA. The terminate decision is a less rapid response than an “abort” call and EV1 concurred with the decision to terminate. EV1 was concerned about EV2’s condition as he watched EV2 navigate towards the airlock and started suspecting that the condition of EV2 with respect to the water in his helmet was more severe than first believed. EVA 23 Crew did not immediately recognize the severity of the event ECFT-3.1
FCT focused on the drink bag as the source of the w ater.
Crew Member Training did not include this failure mode.
Critical Information w as not communicated betw een Crew and Ground Team ECFT-3.1.3
Airflow Contamination Procedure did not address the failure mode. ECFT-3.1.4
EV2 did not have the experinence base to recognize the severity of the situation. ECFT-3.1.5
Figure 3-47 Direct Intermediate Causes and Contributing Factor Under ECFT-3.1 Figure 3-48 expands the causes under ECFT 3.1.1 Team focused on the drink bag as the source of the water.
Published on Feb 27, 2014
Report of the NASA Mishap Investigation Board examining the high visibility close call event of July 16, 2013 when ESA astronaut Luca Parmit...