National Aeronautics and Space Administration
To reinforce the independence of safety and recognize the unique criticality of EVA in the safety community, consider altering the ISS CSO’s office to more closely mirror that of the ISS Chief Engineer’s Office by creating a deputy CSO for EVA position to more closely work with the EVA safety community and help integrate them into the ISS Program and aid the CSO’s and Program Manager’s understanding of EVA risks in the context of the ISS Program.
Provide additional EVA training and integration activities to the MER Safety Officer position training syllabus.
JSC Safety and Mission Assurance should institute a training program for all of its EVA personnel that includes a subset of MOD EVA task and EVA systems training flows to gain the requisite training on EVA hardware and tasks it is being used on. This training should be supplemented by observing EMU vacuum chamber runs, NBL runs, hardware reviews, and ground testing both at SGT and UTAS Windsor Locks and studying the EMU Requirements Evolution document should be mandatory.
JSC Safety and Mission Assurance should routinely advocate for and lead the periodic review of FMEA/CILs and Hazard reports and be intimately familiar with their content.
ISS Program should augment, at least temporarily, MOD EVA personnel to allow the existing backlog of work to be completed in a fairly short order by bringing on, through rotational opportunities, personnel that can provide valuable technical assistance that will not add to the training and certification burden already faced by the organization.
ISS Program should provide additional long term resources to augment current EVA community staffing to support the coming increased frequency of ISS maintenance and contingency EVAs.
The ISS Program must define The Roles and Responsibilities of the MER and the FCT to a level whereby each position (FCT and MER) on either side clearly understands their role and the role of their counterparts and mutual expectations must be established and agreed to. As part of this effort, the Program needs to reinforce the understanding that it is the FCT that is authorized to accept risk on behalf of the Program in real-time operations requiring best engineering judgment.
The ISS Program must establish a protocol whereby whenever conflicts arise between the MER and FCT concerning roles and responsibilities or one party’s performance during a particular event, the appropriate management from each side must meet to discuss the conflict and revise the roles and responsibilities or expectations accordingly.
Published on Feb 27, 2014
Report of the NASA Mishap Investigation Board examining the high visibility close call event of July 16, 2013 when ESA astronaut Luca Parmit...