National Aeronautics and Space Administration
concerns, a more hazardous condition was not expected because water in the helmet behavior had been normalized. No further analysis was done on this ECFT leg—Root Cause was reached. Recommendation R-6: The ISS Program should ensure that all instances of free water and contamination in the EMU are documented and investigated, with corrective action taken, if appropriate.
Engineering Team did not understand the failure mode. ECFT-220.127.116.11.3
No one applied know ledge of the physics of w ater behavior in zero g to w ater coming from the PLSS vent loop ECFT-18.104.22.168.3.1
Figure 3-52 Cause under ECFT 22.214.171.124.3 ECFT-126.96.36.199.3 – Engineering Team did not understand the failure mode. (Intermediate Cause 17) Supporting Evidence: MIB learned through interviews and discussions with Engineering team members and flight controllers that, until this HVCC occurred, previous analysis of water in the helmet did not describe the outcome that was experienced during this mishap. ECFT-188.8.131.52.3.1 – No one applied knowledge of the physics of water behavior in zero-g to water coming from the PLSS vent loop. (Root Cause 4) Supporting Evidence: See ECFT-184.108.40.206.1.1.1
Published on Feb 27, 2014
Report of the NASA Mishap Investigation Board examining the high visibility close call event of July 16, 2013 when ESA astronaut Luca Parmit...