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September 1988
The Michigan Review
13
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Books in Review
1999: Victory Without War 1999: Victory Without War
Richard Nixon Hardcover, $19.95 Simon and Schuster 336 pp.
by Marc Selinger Former President Richard Nixon's seventh book, 1999: Victory Without War advocates two popularly supported foreign policy goals: 1) Preventing a nuclear war with the Soviet Union; and, 2) Encouraging, throughout the world, the growth of political freedom while limiting the spread of repressive, Soviet-inspired communism. Based on these premises and drawing from his lengthy experience in politics, Nixon develops a basic foreign policy handbook concentrating on how the United States should evaluate and deal with the Soviet Union. Nixon has a less-than-romantic view of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Although the Soviet leader has received much positive attention in the Western press for his attempts to reform the Soviet system, Nixon asserts that Gorbachev is not the freedom-loving democrat he would have the American people believe:
role. But as Nixon explains, and as the Soviet leader himself indicated during the conference, Gorbachev is not planning to end the one-party system. The recent, brutal repressi-on of the Democratic Union, an opposition group, testifies to Gorbachev's true intentions. Recognizing that as long as the Communist Party controls the Soviet Union the two superpowers will remain ideological adversaries, Nixon cogently explains why the United States, a promoter of self-determination, and the Soviet Union, an opponent of self-determination, cannot become friends:
Nations differ from one another in basic ways - political traditons, historical experience, motivating ideology-that often breed conflict. Clashing interests - the fact that we do understand one another-lead to dispUles and ultimately to wars. Only when countries have accepted the existence of conflict and sought to manage it through a balance of power have enduring periods of general peace resulted.
Deterrence is the fIrst part of this conflict-management effort Although the American nuclear arsenal is currently adequate to deter the Soviets from attacking the United States or its allies, Nixon believes the United States mustcontinue to modernize its nuclear weaponry. "Advances in technology," he says, "could in the coming decades create the possibility of a successful surgical attack against all of our nuclear forces that would leave the United States without the ability to retaliate." Nixon offers a convincing explanaThis statement raises a point that few serition as to why a build-up in offensive ous political observers would deny. However, when Nixon contends that the Soviet forces and development of the Strategic Union will, if its reforms succeed, become Defense Initiative (SDI) should be integral an even greater threat to the United States parts of this modernization drive. His adthan it is now, he speaks at odds with man y vocacy of building an SDI system to propoliticians, including President Ronald tect U.S. nuclear forces rather than the Reagan, who believe that a freer and more entire population properly recognizes this open Soviet Union will make the world nation's technological and economic consafer. Although Nixon may be a little parastraints and the need to deter the Soviets by noid in fearing the results of glasnost and increasing the difficulty of launching a successful first strike. However, Nixon perestroika, his warning that the United States should remain cautious in it'! reladocs not adequately address the oftentions with the Soviet Union is one worth raised suggestion that fear of destoying all heeding. human life due to nuclear fallout and/or Nixon's statements about the Communuclear winter would deter the Soviet, nist Party's influence are worth noting as from attacking even antiquated U.S. nuwell. Those who watched this summer's clear forces. He also does not indicate Communist Party conference in Moscow whether a sufficient number of offensive may fed that Gorbachev' s proposal to give, WC<lpons could be built, giYen budgc.tary more power to local governments repreconstraints, and docs not discuss the idea of sents a major change ;io the, Party's basic, placing MX missiles in rail g~UTisons or
Regardless ofthe refinements he {Gorhachev] has introduced into Moscow's public-relations techniques, he has preserved the long-term objective of pushing for global predominance. But he is the rust Soviet leader who has faced up to the fact that the Soviet Unum suffers from fundamental internal problems that threaten its status as a superpower.
how the B-1 and Stealth bombers should fIgure into U.S. nuclear strategy. Despite ignoring these crucial details, Nixon's general deterrence strategy is sound. Negotiation forms the second part of the conflict-management strategy. Nixon skillfully explains why and how the next president should negotiate with Gorbachev. Nixon's present objective - to seek cuts in the Soviets' first-strike weapons and their superior conventional forces in Europe - could prove to be very effective. He is not alone in arguing that the INF treaty and the START agreement, which envisions a 50% bilateral reduction in strategic weapons, would actually increase U.S. vulnerability. However, invalidating the INF treaty at this point may embarass the United States and possibly damage the NATO alliance, something which Nixon does not address. Nixon' s general negotiating strategy is sound, but some of his advice on negotiations reflects his being out of office for 14 years. Along with deterrence and negotiation comes competition. According to Nixon, the United States must be willing to use military force when necessary to defend its "vital interests," which include Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and the Persian Gulf, as well as most of its "critical interests," such as South Korea, which, if it fell to Soviet expansionism, would make Japan more vulnerable. Although protecting "peripheral interests" - Nixon uses the country of Mali as an example - may be desirable, military force should not be used since what happens in those countries does not directly affect the United States or its allies. While foreign policy experts, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, would not learn much from reading about this trichotomy of interests, it could be yseful to college students and others who are just beginning to study geopolitical strategy. Nixon offers a number of specific ways in which to compete with the Soviets. For instance, he suggests that the United States expand Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty-type activities, a rarely discussed but potentially fruitful way of connecting people in Soviet-dominated countries with the West. He also explains each foreign policy option which should be considered by the next president: economic aid, which could be linked to the promotion of free enterprise in the Third World; military aid, especially to "freedom fighters"; military power - here, Nixon digresses into a ycry partisan attack on the War Powers Act and covert operations. Nixon discusses , how the next prc~ident .can "Finland.izc"
Eastern Europe - a noble but perhaps unrealistic proposition given the hard-line nature of most of these countries' leaders - and keep Western Europe united. The next president, he contends, must ~lso resist any protectionist movement in Congress which could jeopardize the United States' friendship with Japan or its improving relations with China, Recognizing that an expansion of Japan's military would make China and other Asian countries uneasy, Nixon wisely encourages Japan to increase its economic aid. Japan appears to be listening, as evidenced by its promise this summer to increase its economic hid program by $50 billion over five years. Nixon also explains how the United States can compete with the Soviets in the Third World. The United States. he believes, should generally support noncommunist Third World countries, even though they may not become democratic in the short term. "A communist dictatorship," he says, "allows some freedoms; a communist dictatorship allows none. A noncommunist regime allows some opposition and consequently creates the chance for peaceful change; a communist regime allows no opposition." Nixon fails to discuss the Reagan administration's decision to deny aid to noncommunist rebels fighting against the Marxist government of Mozambique. However, one of his insights - that anti-apartheid activists usually ignore the fact that blacks in most African countries face greater repression than South African blacks - deserves attention. 1999, although somewhat lacking in detail, can provide the voting public with enough foreign policy background to make a fairly educated electoral decision this November. Nixon advises his audience to select the presidential candidate most likely to apply skepticism andcircumspeclion in dealing with the Soviets. 1999 is easy to read, since it has no confusing foreign policy or military jargon, and Nixon's personal anecdotes make it enjoyable and educational. Discovering at the end of the book that Nixon had a team of researchers to help him write the book was somewhat disappointing. Nevertheless, Nixon's 1999 should be read by foreign policy amateurs or anyone interested in knowing how the next president should conduct foreign policy.
Marc Selinger i~ a junior in politicul science and tilt' editor-in-chief of the Re-
riew.