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14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

like’ to be the machine-that-depicts-persons. For a clear defence of this conception of androids see Cherry, 1991, pp. 11–25. For an alternative conception, in which the android is conceived as a sentient but ‘unnatural kind’, see Dick, 1968, passim. Descartes, 1968 [1641], p. 100. Descartes, 1980, p. 110. The significance of this split will become a central theme in my diagnosis of the threat of scepticism. In this paragraph the sceptic construes the split in terms derived from Evans, 1982, pp. 157–8. Descartes, 1980, p. 131. Descartes, 1980, p. 114. This argument connects to Bernard Williams’s treatment of Descartes’s attempt to argue that knowledge is possible (Williams, 1978, ch. 7). The final sentence is derived from Nagel (1986, p. 20), which is itself derived from Wittgenstein (PI, §302). McGinn, 1989, p. 4. The phrase ‘contours of a subjectivity’ is from McDowell, 1993, p. 222.

2 R E F RAM I N G S C E PTI C I S M I 1. See Austin, S&S, pp. 1–5. Austin’s statements of this view are quoted and examined in the next section. 2. Austin’s most sustained defence of this claim is at 1979, pp. 181–5. 3. See also 1979, p. 76 and p. 182. 4. For typically Austinian statements of this intention see, e.g., Austin, 1979, p. 181, and S&S, p. 5. 5. See G. E. Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXV, 1939; also ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Contemporary British Philosophy, 2nd series, ed. J. H. Muirhead, 1925. Both papers are in Moore, Philosophical Papers, 1959. 6. This follows the same movement of thought pursued by the sceptic. As we saw in the last chapter, the sceptic’s doubts are prompted by a recognition that he often hesitates and makes mistakes about the psychological states of Others. Austin’s typically roguish examples of cases in which he is inclined to hesitate include ‘the feelings of royalty, or fakirs, or bushmen or Wykehamists or simple eccentrics’ (OM, p. 104). 7. Austin stresses that, in general, recognition of a thing as the thing that it is is not something which can be done ‘by anybody you please’ (OM, p. 85). In the case of other people you have to be a certain kind of insider to see their behaviour as the display that it is. 8. It is worth noting that ‘Gleichschaltung’ has had, since the 1930s, an irreducibly political connotation and that, like ‘Führer’, is now rarely used. Metaphorised by Hitler, ‘Gleichschaltung’ was the watchword for the (forced) integration of various previously autonomous bodies under the control of the National Socialist Party (e.g. trade unions, the police, the civil service, the media). The word was subsequently appropriated and its meaning further displaced by anti-Nazis to refer to those who became intellectually integrated into the Party, particularly the intellectual elite (such as Heidegger). ‘Gleichschaltung’ has, and certainly had at the time Austin was writing, strong overtones of a mind-set which, in the name of purity, forges order by force. Austin’s deployment of this word in a philosophical context serves, as it were, as a monogram of his conviction that ‘simplifying’ ways of going on in philosophy are a species of shackled and shackling thinking. 9. See Austin, 1980, p. 151. 10. See Austin, 1979, p. 108, p. 280, p. 282. 11. This point is stressed by Austin at 1979, p. 284; see also ibid., pp. 283–4, fn. 2. Austin’s

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Glendinning, simon on being with others heidegger‚ derrida, wittgenstein  
Glendinning, simon on being with others heidegger‚ derrida, wittgenstein  
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