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I N T RO D U CT I O N 1. The notion of ‘bald naturalism’ is John McDowell’s name for the philosophical ‘opt out’ which conceives of human life as fully explicable in the terms of natural science (McDowell, 1994b, p. 67). 1 T H E T H R E AT O F S C E P T I C I S M 1. See, e.g., BB, pp. 4–6. 2. All page references to Being and Time in this book are to the pagination of the German edition, as indicated in the margins of the Macquarrie and Robinson translation. 3. Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 5 4. The argument that follows is indebted to many philosophers, especially, although in different ways, to Descartes, Kant, Wittgenstein, Gareth Evans and Marie McGinn. In order to maintain the intimacy of a first-personal narration, indebtedness will, for the most part, be indicated in notes rather than direct quotation. NB: none of the notes should be thought of as provided by the sceptic. They are, as it were, my ‘editorial’ annotations on the sceptic’s text. 5. This schema derives from Wittgenstein (BB, p. 66). 6. The existence of animals (and human infants) clearly introduces a sort of disorder into the sceptics categories. However, the sceptic does not stop to reflect on this limitation. Later we will see that this oversight is not accidental. 7. Wittgenstein, NB, p. 80. 8. Evans, 1982, p. 220. 9. Frege’s lovely line: ‘Someone can have sympathy for me but still my pain always belongs to me and his sympathy to him. He does not have my pain and I do not have his sympathy’ (Frege, 1967, p. 28). 10. In the following argument the sceptic presents what is, in fact, a solipsistic misreading of Wittgenstein’s reductio at PI, §293. 11. This paragraph includes a modified version of an argument from P. M. S. Hacker (1986, p. 220) and fragments of PI §294 and PI §283. 12. This conception of the Sceptical Predicament is indebted to Marie McGinn’s reading of scepticism (1989, pp. 1–13). I come back to McGinn’s account in the next section of this chapter. 13. The sceptic imagines an android as a machine which is programmed to represent or depict a (real) human being in a manner analogous to the way an actor represents or depicts a (fictional) character in a play. Of course, the sceptic assumes that there is ‘nothing that it is


Glendinning, simon on being with others heidegger‚ derrida, wittgenstein  
Glendinning, simon on being with others heidegger‚ derrida, wittgenstein