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energyworld No 1 - May - June 2014


Issue No 1 May - June 2014 Price: 10 EURO






Publisher Apostolos Komnos Editor in Chief George Stouraitis Deputy Editor Emilia Damian Edition Advisor George Pavlopoulos Editors Emilia Damian Ada Gavrilescu Penelope Mitroulias Nikolay Jekov Kostas Voutsadakis Ian Becker Diana Medan Contributors Dimitrios Manolis Kostadin Sirleshtov Laurentiu Pachiu Yiannis Kelemenis Konstantina Soultati Atanas Georgiev Design A.L.L. Designers Art Director Anastasia Komnou Email:

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Editorial By the publisher

01 4


We live in a World of Energy. A world unable to move and survive without energy. Humanity is vitally addicted to energy. From the First Industrial Revolution to the current Information Revolution, which is once again transforming the chain of production and our lives, energy is the key to a modern world.

growing steadily and rapidly, as new pipelines are built and planned. Gas fields, possibly containing vast reserves, are being discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The traditional trade route between East and West is at the crossroads of the “Energy Game” in the 21st century.

Oil, gas, coal, nuclear reactors, renewables keep providing us – households and companies, the public and private sectors – with the energy and the power we need on a daily basis, without interruption. The energy wars of the past and those that, unfortunately, will break out in the future represent one of the biggest threats to our world – both in developed and developing countries.

EnergyWorld is a magazine “born” in the World of Energy. It belongs to this world and aims at serving this world: Energy company executives and their PR divisions, government authorities and institutions, foreign embassies, oil and gas institutes, international audit consultants, banks, law firms, PR and communication agencies, educational institutions, asset and wealth managers.

In this context, Southeastern Europe is becoming a key player in the World of Energy. Its geopolitical significance is

You are holding in your hands the first issue of a new and ambitious project. Its creators have deep roots in the world of

energy and strong ties with numerous companies in the energy sector. Already present in many countries of Southeastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece), through our magazines and web pages, we continue to build bridges with others (Serbia, Albania, Hungary, Cyprus). We have done our best to provide you with a magazine full of interesting essays, opinions, interviews and reportage, with all the information you might need. The valuable experience of the editor, of our journalists and associates, guarantee both validity and inspiration. Of course, we have much to learn from you, from the real players in the miraculous World of Energy. You are our real partners in this new effort! The fate of this magazine is in your hands!

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Oil&Gas Republished from Energy Digital

02 6


The skills shortage facing the oil and gas sector in the mid-tier 35-50 age range (those with approximately a 10+ years industry experience) is growing increasingly acute, to the point of crisis.

With global energy demand showing no signs of slowing down in coming decades, the demographic crunch point is looming larger than ever. How the industry got to this stage? What are the difficult challenges the skill shortage poses for the sector? What can be done? These are the questions that need to be answered.

How did we get here?

The story starts in the 1970s with the energy crisis, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) forced systematic increases in the price of oil, culminating in the inflation-adjusted record peak of $98 a barrel hit in 1980 (and only recently surpassed). As a consequence, economic activity in industrial countries slowed down, significantly reducing oil consumption (by 13 percent in the U.S., Europe, and Japan from 1979 to 1981). The high prices also spurred, for the first time, co-ordinated and effective energy conservation methods across the developed world. For example, the U.S. saw a mandated increase in CAFE, increasing the average gas mileage in U.S. car production; given that the U.S.

was still leading worldwide demand at this point, the move had a disproportionate impact on global consumption. The shift in the balance of supply and demand was further exacerbated by the removal of traditional barriers to production, for example Presidents Carter and Reagan removing market controls that limited supply, as well as the lowering of the U.S. Oil Windfall Profits Tax in 1981, further incentivizing producers. These and other contributing factors led to what has been termed the “1980s oil glut�; a serious surplus of crude oil. Prices accordingly went into free fall, with a six year long decline in oil prices culminating in a 46 per cent drop in 1986. The real 2004 dollar value of oil fell from an average of $78.2/barrel in 1981 to an average of $26.8/barrel in 1986. Such a prolonged slump combined with uncertainty as to future prospects for the industry understandably led to a change in behavior across the oil and gas sector. With profits plummeting and cost pressures looming, companies simply shut down their recruitment and training



World energy consumption will grow by 56 percent between 2010 and 2040, largely driven by non-OECD countries where it will soar 90 percent during the same period - U.S. Energy Information Administration

programs. Demand for such places also dried up, with skilled graduates looking elsewhere to build a future.

Where are we now?

As is clear to anyone who has been paying attention, the pendulum of supply and demand has firmly swung back in the other direction in the intervening years. The proliferation of low gas mileage SUVs (exempt from CAFE) along with the growth of light trucks and rising commuter times worldwide has increased petroleum demand against initial expectations. But of course the major factor driving demand is the rise of emerging economies, particularly China and, to a lesser extent, India. The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s recently released International Energy Outlook 2013 predicts world energy consumption will grow by 56 percent between 2010 and 2040, largely driven by non-OECD countries where it will soar 90 percent during the same period. The industry is now facing a prolonged boom, and difficult politics in major supplier countries such as Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria mean that prices are very sensitive on the upside (the oil price hit its record peak in July 2008 at $145/barrel). Yet the industry is still feeling the effects of the ’80s downturn due to the shutting off of training and recruitment, which has now translated into a severe skills shortage at the mid-tier level. The

gap is where the recruits-that-neverwere would be in their careers today: 35 to 50 years of age, with 10 or more years of experience. The shortage is being felt right across the breadth of the industry, from the back office to the drill bit. The numbers speak for themselves. The average age of oil and gas workers is astonishingly high, at 56. Almost half of the industry workforce is now over 45, and over half of experienced engineers within the industry will be eligible for retirement in the next 5 to 10 years. Recruitment at the lower levels is no longer a problem – the boom has seen to it that graduate programs at all the major businesses are oversubscribed – the problem is the gap. This is already a major headache for the sector, not just in the sense that getting good quality staff for new roles is increasingly difficult, but also in the sense that the dearth of talent is driving up wages, and fast. So far the sector has been able to muddle through by leaning on that upper layer of experienced workers: in many cases said employees are working well beyond retirement age. The nature of the industry means this has worked as a short term solution; skyrocketing profits have allowed businesses to absorb the heavy remuneration costs required, and job satisfaction is very high compared to other sectors, meaning that for the most part convincing old hands to work past


retirement is not an issue. But this is a short term solution: there is an obvious demographic limit to this stalling tactic, and the industry is fast approaching crunch point.

difficulty of wage disparity: for example, an Azeri worker, once qualified, will be able to get around four times the level of remuneration in the States as opposed to their home country.

According to PwC, the skills pipeline is a major concern for more than 60 percent of energy CEOs. Opito (the industry training body) and the Engineering Construction Industry Training Board report that over half of firms in the oil and gas sector see the skills shortage as their number one challenge.

Where do we go from here?

The problem is also no longer purely demographic. The rise of resource nationalism in developing countries (where a large portion of the future extraction lies) has added an additional dimension to the skills challenge. Understandably, governments in these jurisdictions are keen to ensure that newfound wealth from oil and gas makes its way, at least in part, to the domestic population. This has led to the proliferation of quotas for national workers in territories such as Azerbaijan and Brazil. For historical reasons, however, local talent pools are far more limited than those in developed countries, exacerbating the squeeze on skills. This is having a real dampening effect on exploration, with major companies in some cases having to give up plans to exploit assets post-investment, due to not being able to meet national quotas. Initiatives to train up local talent face the

Education in the form of training, shadowing programs, and fast-tracking promising recruits will obviously be a key component of the solution, but the difficulties here underline just how much of a challenge the skills shortage poses. Any major training initiative will bring with it substantial cost. Companies in the sector are reluctant to shell out the money to fast-track promising candidates to the mid-tier level due the commercial risk involved. Once trained up, it is all too easy for rivals (who then don’t themselves have the overheads associated with the training) to swoop in and snatch a worker away with the promise of a slightly larger remuneration package. In effect, the danger is that companies end up subsidizing the training costs for rival workforces. Companies can always ‘lock in’ such candidates to fixed periods of employment following the qualification, but such periods can’t be long enough to justify the costs without also falling foul of fair employment contract laws. No wonder then the reluctance for any individual companies to unilaterally embark on such an investment. The training and education portion of the

solution will need to be co-ordinated, multilateral – a joint effort from across the industry, which includes governments and national oil and gas organizations – but this is of course far easier said than done. And training programs cannot breach the gap alone. Keeping experienced engineers on past retirement is one thing, but the industry will need to go further and use this talent – while it still exists – in a mentoring, educative way to help fast-track promising candidates from below. Even then, another crucial component of the solution will have to involve the industry recruiting staff with the right skill sets sideways, from other, related sectors, such as construction, mining, engineering and so forth. There is big cultural barrier here; the oil and gas industry is used to sourcing talent entirely from within, and usually reluctant to depart from this tradition. But another factor that has contributed to the skills shortage in the past two decades is greater competition for talent from sectors requiring similar skill sets, such as nuclear and power infrastructure – so why not return the pressure? An important part of this process is also the need oil and gas companies have to partner with external specialists to leverage their wide, global network of contacts and high quality relationships across the industry if they want to find the right people for an ever-expanding number of roles.

Shale Gas Emilia Damian

03 10


US oil giant Chevron has obtained permits to drill two shale gas exploration wells in Vaslui County, in northeastern Romania.

US oil company Chevron won approval to drill two gas exploration wells in Puiesti, a commune in the county of Vaslui (in northeastern Romania), Chevron’s Country Manager in Romania, Tom Holst, announced at the middle of April.

one for Chevron in Vaslui County. The oil company has been awarded environmental permits for drilling works in three areas in Vaslui: Popeni A1 (Gagesti), Silistea 1A (Pungesti) and Paltinis A1 (Bacesti).

The approval was issued by the Vaslui County Council (CJ Vaslui), in compliance with the legislation in force, according to the leader of the Council.

On December 31st 2013, the members of the local council in Puiesti voted in favor of holding a referendum proposing to ban shale gas exploration and exploitation works in the area, with the decision being subsequently brought before an administrative court by the Vaslui Prefect’s Office. The Environmental Protection Agency in Vaslui organized a debate on shale gas exploitation in the periphery of Puiesti, where Chevron wanted to start drilling, but the debate was interrupted by people who were voicing their concerns about Chevron’s plans. The debate was attended by the locals, local authorities, as well as green activists from several Romanian cities.

“As in the case of Pungesti, all legal requirements were met as regards the approval of the facilities and drilling works for the Puiesti exploration well. We did nothing else but legally respond to a request filed by a commercial company planning to carry out an activity and meeting the criteria imposed by the law,” CJ Vaslui President Dumitru Buzatu said. The Environmental Protection Agency (APM) in Vaslui issued, in early 2014, a new environmental agreement for Chevron, for shale gas exploration in a block in Puiesti.

Other three concessions

The concession in Puiesti is the fourth

Government support

Shale gas exploration is strongly supported by the Romanian Government. Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta said at the middle of April, speaking of


the protests over the planned shale gas exploration and drilling, that if Romania does not have locally produced gas, it must take it from Russia. “There have been several protests against shale gas and I think this is a topic we must discuss very seriously. So, if we do not have locally produced natural gas, where will we take it from? From Russia. In the current circumstances, I think that every protest must have a purpose and I think that any serious discussion on any topic is useful”, Ponta said. He stressed he is taking the talk about the shale gas ‘very seriously’.

Local support

Yet, the support of the Government is not enough. Companies willing to explore shale gas cannot succeed without local support, said Environment Minister, Attila Korodi. The companies interested in exploring shale gas in Romania must understand that they can succeed only if the local communities stand next to them, he said. “For all things related to the exploration of possible shale gas reserves, hydraulic fracturing is prohibited. The environmental authorizations issued so far state clearly that fracking is conducted mostly in laboratories. That means 4 to 5 years before Romania gets a national map of reserves. I want to add a comment on exploration. It is not up to the Ministry of Environment, but it is about the companies’ behavior”, Korodi added. “I don’t think that these companies will

be able to manage this issue without local support. I don’t think the actions in southern Transylvania, in the Sibiu area [central Romania], where companies that intended to explore trespassed on private land, are normal. That is unacceptable and immoral. These companies should understand that irrespectively of the permits issued at local or central level, they can succeed in Romania only if local communities stand next to them. Otherwise, the companies will not stand a real chance to reach the reserves,” Korodi warned.

“If we do not have locally produced natural gas, where will we take it from? From Russia” – Victor Ponta, Romanian Prime Minister According to Environment Minister, the authorities must guarantee that any industrial activity, including the exploration and exploitation of shale gas, complies with the Romanian and European laws, and he asserted his impartiality on this matter. “Otherwise they have no chances, because no Government can endorse it, and this has been demonstrated over

time,” Korodi said.

Great potential

According to data, Romania currently has shale gas reserves amounting to 1,444 billion cubic meters, ranking third among European countries, next to Poland (4,190 billion cubic meters) and France (3,879 billion cubic meters). As regards the recoverable reserves of oil shale, Romania ranks sixth, with 300 million barrels. The Constanta County (southeastern Romania) Environmental Protection Agency has issued in May 2013 the decision of the stage classification for the Chevron Romania Exploration and Production Company in the peripheries of Costinesti and Vama Veche, including the seismic prospecting of resources. The Vaslui County (eastern Romania) Environmental Protection Agency also informed on July 19th 2013 that it had issued environmental permits for three projects owned by Chevron Romania Exploration and Production Company concerning the works of land management and drilling at the rigs of Popeni 1A in Gagesti, Silistea 1A in Pungesti, and Paltinis 1A in Bacesti. Chevron has concessions for prospecting shale gas in three basins of Romania, stretching on 270,000 hectares (Costinesti and Vama Veche in Constanta County and Barlad in Vaslui County).

Geopolitics of energy George Pavlopoulos

04 12


There is no doubt that the current crisis between Western countries and Russia is one of the most serious in the PostCold War Era. The brutal change of power in Kiev where the pro-western forces prevailed, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the sanctions imposed by the EU and the US against Moscow, the exclusion of Russia from the G-8 (although not permanent), the presence of tens of thousands of Russian troops near the eastern borders of Ukraine and the reinforcement of NATO military units in Poland, in Romania and the Baltic countries and, of course, the threats exchanged between the two sides – all of this constitutes, of course, a source of concern. But from this point up to the outburst of an energy (and trade) war between Europe and Russia, the distance is way too long…


Are we heading towards an energy war between Europe and Russia, because of Ukraine? What would be the consequences of such a war for the two sides? And which is the role of the United States in this conflict? These are the three main questions that should be answered before we draw any conclusions about the current crisis – “the new Cold War”, according to some analysts and politicians, mainly in Europe and the US. And we are obliged to do it “in cold blood”, based on real facts and figures, without losing the way because of the screams that serve specific political interests. Keeping that in mind, the answer that should be given to the first question is a straight “NO”. Europeans and Russians have much more to lose than to gain in case of an energy (and trade, of course) war between them. The explanation is quite simple: Gas from Russia accounted for almost 32 percent and oil for about 35 percent of the bloc’s imports in 2010, according to EU data. Some countries, mostly those belonging to the former “Soviet Bloc” in Central and Eastern Europe, rely almost totally on Russia, in terms of energy. Even Germany’s energy dependence on Moscow is very high: the country sources 36 percent of its natural gas imports and 39 percent of its oil imports from Russian energy suppliers. In exchange, Europeans contribute billions of euros and dollars to the Russian budget which, undoubtedly, are indispensable, especially in times of economic turbulence. Europe’s

oil and gas import bills rose to more than 400 billion euros ($551 billion) in 2012, representing about 3.1 percent of the region’s gross domestic product, according to EU data. Thus, a large proportion of this money goes to the Russians, feeding their treasury and, of course, Kremlin alliances. According to the German research and consultancy firm Energy Comment, in 2012 natural gas sales earned Russia an estimated 68 billion dollars (50 billion euros) in total, while oil sales brought in 290 billion dollars (211 billion euros). That means that natural gas contributes around 5 percent to the Russian national budget, while the profits from the export of oil make up around half of Russian government revenue. In other words, an energy war would endanger the energy security of Europe (since it is not easy to differentiate energy sources) and, at the same time, would deteriorate the economic situation in Russia, which is a developing country in desperate need of foreign exchange. And this is where we come to the last question. Why are the Americans (seemingly) pressing the EU to adopt harder economic sanctions? One explanation is that Americans value Russia more for its geopolitical significance than financially. Thus, the pressures are practically on the safe side, as any effective sanctions will not affect in any way the US as much as the European countries. Furthermore, we must admit that the measures announced so far

do not constitute a serious blow to the Russians. All these show, to be more specific, that Barack Obama has been demonstrating political realism, resisting the pressures of “hawks” in Washington, some of whom don’t hesitate to propose the use of military force against Russia! Some analysts insist that the main purpose of the US is not to provoke an energy war, but to drive Europeans towards an alternative “energy portfolio” and the reduction of their energy dependence on Russia. Besides, this is a target already set by the European Commission and the European Council, and some tend to believe that the Americans are now able to help their partners achieving this goal sooner. The key to that is the “shale gas revolution”, which is helping the US become energy independent, but also gives them the ability to export shale gas to other countries, including Europe. However, there is no doubt that any change in terms of energy policy can’t be implemented from one day to the other, since it takes time to build a new model and a new “energy portfolio”. Furthermore, none of the options presented today (liquefied shale gas imports from the US or the development of other forms of energy, such as renewables) offers those clear advantages that would make Europeans abandon unanimously and without a second thought their cooperation with the Russians. It seems that, eventually, most member states share the same opinion with Olli Rehn, regarding the


Energy policy changes cannot be implemented from one day to the other, since it takes time to build a new model and a new “energy portfolio”

sanctions against Russia. “As regards sanctions, no sensible European would want to see economic sanctions. To the extent, indeed, that Russia does not escalate tension, then we can avoid additional measures,” Rehn told journalists on the sidelines of a Eurogroup meeting in Athens, in April. A statement illustrating clearly once again that most Europeans vehemently oppose the scenarios of an energy, trade and economic war with Moscow. Indeed, there are already signs that the tension is gradually de-escalating, even if it takes some time for this to be reflected officially. Let’s hope there will be no unpleasant surprises in the meantime…

Is South Stream in danger?

“Talks about pipelines such as South Stream will be delayed,” EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger told reporters on March 10, 2014. Does this really mean that the construction of the pipeline – the “twin” of the Nord Stream to be completed by 2018, with a capacity of about 60 bcm of gas per year – will freeze? The answer to this question is also negative – at least for the time being.

As a matter of fact, in the same statement, the German Commissioner was careful not to cultivate aggressive options in Brussels. “It would be wrong to question the economic ties that have been built over decades. They are important for the economy and jobs, in Europe and Russia,” he added, when asked to elaborate on the current crisis and proper responses. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, a close associate of Putin and Gazprom for nearly a decade, has every reason to feel satisfied with the job he has done up to now. After all, the situation at this level is also difficult to change suddenly, as it is already known that the Nabucco pipeline project, which was intended to rival South Stream, has essentially collapsed. Contrary to that, the project that has been advancing is the construction of the much smaller, in terms of capacity, TAP pipeline, which will carry annually just 10 bcm of Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey, Greece and Albania.

Geopolitics of energy Ada Gavrilescu


ROMANIA AS A SUPPLIER OF ENERGY SECURITY The AGRI LNG Project is described, according to its official page, as having “the potential of becoming an important instrument for ensuring EU energy security on the long term, corresponding to the dual diversification goal – for both supply sources and transit routes”.

This project involves the transport of natural gas from Azerbaijan, through pipelines, to the Black Sea Coast of Georgia, its subsequent liquefaction and transport with special tankers across the Black Sea, where the LNG will return to gas state at the terminal in Constanta, fed once again into pipelines and transported further to European consumers. AGRI is the first LNG Project to be developed in the Black Sea, for the transport of natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The project gives the countries of the region the opportunity to secure supply and diversify imports, so as to reduce their dependence on individual suppliers, by diversifying both supply sources and delivery channels. The Southern Gas Corridor, designed as a direct link between Europe and the largest natural gas deposit in the world, plays a central role in achieving the European strategy objectives to ensure competitiveness and security of gas supply. The Azerbaijan-GeorgiaRomania-Hungary Interconnector (AGRI) was designed as an integral part of the Southern Gas Corridor, providing the shortest direct route for the transport of

Caspian gas to European markets. Indeed, AGRI is expected to transport liquefied Azeri gas from Georgia, across the Black Sea, to a LNG terminal to be built on the Romanian Black Sea Coast. From that point, the gas will be pumped through the Romanian natural gas transmission system to Hungary, through the Interconnector between Romania and Hungary (Arad – Szeged) to be transported further to the European market.

A €6 bln project

The project is developed by AGRI LNG Co., formed by Romgaz, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, and MVM. The capacity of the Interconnector is expected to be 7 billion cubic meters (250 billion cubic feet) of natural gas per year, of which 2 billion cubic meters (71 billion cubic feet) will cover consumption in Romania. The project is expected to cost 4-6 billion euros. In this context, the managing director of AGRI LNG Project Company, Mitica Savu, said in a specialized conference



that Romania, as a member state of the European Union, acts as a supplier of energy security in the region and beyond, playing an active role in helping achieve EU energy goals.

“We must take into consideration the fact that the energy strategy is formulated taking into account the changes happening worldwide.” “We must take into consideration the fact that the energy strategy is formulated taking into account the changes happening worldwide. There is a need for more diversified gas supply sources for the EU countries and a more diversified access to the

gas resources in the Caspian Sea area. The main objective of the EU’s energy policy is to promote Union’s energy security, given that EU member states’ dependence on hydrocarbon imports is on the rise,” said the managing director of AGRI LNG Project Company. Within the same context, were discussed several issues regarding the situation of energy security in the region. “2014 is a favorable year for developing the Romanian - Azeri economic relations, with the focus being on energy. Our partnership will be reinforced in the years to come, but we should bear in mind that, at this moment, the geopolitical situation is not as stable as it should be. SOCAR has invested 50 million euros in Romania’s retail network and will continue to do so”, SOCAR Romania Managing Director Hamza Karimov said at the same conference.

Launched in 2010

As for energy cooperation, the representatives of the Azeri Parliament and the representatives of the two countries’ business communities

exchanged opinions about the implementation phase of the AzerbaijanGeorgia-Romania-Hungary Interconnector (AGRI), a project that turns to good account the shortest route between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

“2014 is a favorable year for developing the Romanian - Azeri economic relations, with the focus being on energy.” “Romania supports the integrated cooperation and the construction of safe energy transport corridors. Romania has the possibility of becoming an energy hub. The Caspian Sea Basin hosts the world’s third biggest oil deposit. The opening of the TAP (the Trans Adriatic Pipeline - editor’s note) southern corridor is a victory for Europe. AGRI remains the main project enabling Romania to have


access to the Caspian Sea reserves,” Mitica Savu also said. The AGRI project was launched in 2010, through a memorandum signed in Bucharest between Romania, Azerbaijan and Georgia, joined later on by Hungary. “We reached the final phase of the feasibility study, which takes into account three separate scenarios regarding the gas volumes to be brought from Azerbaijan and Romania. Under these scenarios, the quantities are 2 billion cubic meters per year, 5 billion cubic meters per year and 8 billion cubic meters per year. The feasibility study is to be completed and made public by early May 2014,” according to the managing director of AGRI LNG Project Company. This June, Romania and Azerbaijan will celebrate 23 years of diplomatic relations. A very important event was the signing of the Declaration on Establishing a Strategic Partnership, with emphasis on the energy sector, in September 2009. The Plan of Action for the implementation of the Strategic Partnership was signed during the official visit of Romanian President Traian Basescu to Azerbaijan (April 18-19, 2011). The shareholders of AGRI LNG Project Company are Romgaz Medias (Romania), SOCAR (Azerbaijan), Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation GOGC (Georgia) and Magyar Villamos Muvek - MVM (Hungary).

The Technical Code

As Romania plans to build a LNG terminal in Constanta (southeast Romania, on the Black Sea Coast) in the frame of the Azerbaijan-GeorgiaRomania Interconnector (AGRI) project, the Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE) has drawn up the technical code for liquefied natural gas (LNG), setting up the minimum technical requirements for LNG, and defining the state authorities having authority and competence in this field. “The minimum technical requirements for the import, unloading, regasification of the LNG, including the auxiliary services and temporary storage facilities necessary for the regasification process, and the subsequent delivery to the transmission system are based on European and international norms and standards,” states an order of ANRE’s president that approves the technical code for LNG. LNG is used to secure natural gas supply to the end users, to match the seasonal, daily and hourly variations in consumption with the available gas sources, to permanently ensure the physical balance of the national gas transmission system, and to carry out other market operations.

Independent operator

“ANRE sets up and approves the methodology for calculating access tariffs to the LNG terminal. Access tariffs enable making the necessary investments in LNG terminals, in order to guarantee their feasibility,” the order mentions.

The operator of the LNG terminal, part of a vertically integrated market economic operator, must be independent at least in terms of its legal form, of its organization and decision-making process from other activities not connected to the transmission, the distribution, and the storage of natural gas.

“Romania supports the integrated cooperation and the construction of safe energy transport corridors. Romania has the possibility of becoming an energy hub.” The operator of the terminal shall submit to ANRE the investment plan for the next five years, to be approved by the Authority. The operator shall also apply nondiscriminatory policies for the users of the terminal, and justifiably deny access of third parties to the LNG terminal, in compliance with the Law.

Oil & Gas Dimitrios E. Manolis*

06 18


Mr Dimitrios Manolis, Director of Natural Gas International Activities, represented DEPA (the public natural gas supply corporation of Greece) to the “3rd Energy Symposium”, conducted in Cyprus with subject “The contribution of Cyprus to the new European energy strategy” and analyzed the progress and benefits of the planned East Mediterranean Pipeline (EastMed). According to Mr. Manolis, the main objective of DEPA is taking the lead in the wider Balkan region, as well as the development of infrastructure that characterize the most developed markets of Southeastern Europe.

Ensuring competitive, affordable and secure energy supplies is at the heart of the European Union’s energy strategy. Greece is absolutely committed to contributing to this goal both on a national and regional level. Actions required are basically focused in three directions: First, the EU’s internal market needs to be completed in order to ensure that it functions efficiently, flexibly and is competitive, integrated and fluid, providing a solid foundation for electricity and gas to flow where it is needed. The 3rd Energy package is fundamental to this and Greece was one of the very first Member States to have incorporated its principles into its national legislation. Second the EU’s climate policies which are setting the path towards the transition to a lower carbon economy are also geared to enhancing security of supply primarily by reducing energy demand, thereby minimizing the risks inherent in imported energy as well as by promoting renewable energy by exploiting indigenous natural resources. Significant progress has already been achieved and the energy intensity of

the EU economy has reduced by 24% between 1995 and 2011 whilst the improvement by industry was about 30%. Looking ahead, the Commission’s thought-provoking proposals for a 2030 Framework are apt and facilitate the task of defining the proper balance between the need to sustain the transition to a low carbon economy and its macroeconomic effects on growth, competitiveness and employment. According to the Commission’s scenarios we could manage to reduce demand by 9% in 2030, compared to 2010 levels. But over and above the 2030 proposals, fulfilling our goals also requires diversification of sources and routes. Therefore, the third field of action concerns the need to further diversify sources of gas supply by opening new gas corridors, and in offering alternatives to Member States dependent on a single source of oil or gas supply. In this respect the selection of TAP and the decision to develop TANAP in order to open the Southern Corridor is a major breakthrough. However the 10 bcm which will initially be transported to


Europe via TAP accounts for about 2% of the EU’s annual gas needs. Therefore the momentum on diversification needs to be maintained. Diversification entails promoting relations with third countries but also encouraging indigenous production. In this respect, the discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute a major opportunity for Europe and harnessing these newly found resources is developing into a major EU goal and this region has been incorporated into the Southern Corridor strategy. DEPA is committed to supporting Greek and European efforts to further expanding the Southern Gas Corridor in order to increase the diversification of supplies in particular in South-East Europe and to achieve the medium-term political target to import about 10% of European demand from diversified sources. The company is doing this by promoting appropriately designed infrastructure and indeed 3 of its projects, namely the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), the Aegean LNG terminal, the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline as well as the Interconnector Greece–Italy (IGI), which will all potentially serve the South Eastern Europe, and which will be referred to in greater detail below, have been labeled as Projects of Common Interest. But it is significant to note that in the process, DEPA is also committed to promoting the principles of the internal market regionally, in support of Greece’s external energy policy by fostering especially, the development of market conditions in

S.E.Europe which characterize the more liquid and competitive markets of North Western Europe. The background to this strategy is the continued increase in dependence. Despite the drop in demand for natural gas in Europe due to the economic recession, the European Commission estimates that Europe’s dependence on external sources is set to increase and the continent will need to urgently find new sources. Regarding gas import dependency according to the International Energy Agency is expected to rise from 60% to more than 80% in the EU by 2035. Moreover rising global demand energy at global scale and insufficient competition in EU energy markets has maintained high commodity prices. In 2012, Europe’s oil and gas import bill amounted to more than E400 billion representing some 3.1 % of EU GDP compared to around E180 billion on average in the period 1990-2011. This increases the EU’s vulnerability to supply and energy price shocks. South Eastern European region is particularly vulnerable as it is dependent to a high degree on a single source and has a lot of catching up to do in order to bridge the gap with NW Europe. This makes this region especially attractive for producers, given that apart from its need to diversify it is also a growing market and DEPA’s projects are focused on supplying the S.E. European market.

Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria The IGB consists of a 32”, 182km

cross country pipeline linking Komotini in Greece, and Stara Zagora in Bulgaria. Approx. 31 km of the route is in Greece while 151 km is to be located in Bulgaria. Its initial capacity is planned for up to 3 bcm/y. By virtue of a compressor station however, its capacity may be upgraded to 5 bcm/y.

The Southeastern European region is particularly vulnerable as it depends largely on a single source and has a lot of catching up to do in order to bridge the gap with NW Europe The project is being promoted ICGB AD. This is company incorporated under Bulgarian law for the purpose of developing, designing, financing, building and operating the IGB pipeline. ICGB AD is 50% owned by Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) EAD and 50% by IGI Poseidon SA (a company equally controlled by DEPA SA and Edison SpA).

Mr Dimitrios Manolis during his speech at the “3rd Energy Symposium” in Cyprus.


Both the Greek and Bulgarian Governments have recognized IGB as a project of national importance since it will strongly impact the SEE East European market. The reason for the IGB’s importance lies in the fact that it is ideally located to carry gas from the existing (Revythousa) as well as the planned (Aegean LNG) regasification terminals in Greece. In addition, the fact that it will be functioning in reverse flow significantly enhances the region’s energy security. Its regional significance has been reaffirmed by European institutions which are stead-fast in their support. The IGB is well advanced. The Final Investment Decision (FID) is scheduled to be taken within the third quarter of 2014. Furthermore, DEPA and Edison are ready to finance the project on a full equity basis, independently of the possibility to secure a project finance scheme. Following the FID decision, the construction is scheduled to last for 14 months and the first gas is scheduled for 2016. In other words the IGB may function and begin to supply markets with diversified gas well before the official opening of the Southern Corridor which is scheduled with the completion of TAP in 2019.

The Aegean LNG terminal

Promoting LNG supplies is one of the key tenets of the EU’s strategy for more diversification. While today only 20 %

of Europe’s gas supplies are transported through shipping, the EU is now encouraging investments in LNG a means to boost liquidity. DEPA is supporting this strategy with the promotion of the Aegean Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) LNG which is designed with a maximum capacity to send out 5 bcma fom Greece to SEE. Even more than Revythousa, this project is ideally located to facilitate the SEE region’s access to more LNG capacities. Working in conjunction with the IGB, it has the potential to make a real contribution to the market’s integration and development. The IGB/ Aegean LNG system constitutes a single EU entry point through which multiple countries may be served and of course it can create synergies with other infrastructures, notably with existing as well as planned interconnectors being planned in the region. In this respect, the Aegean LNG is the closest and least expensive route to the Greek, SEE and Turkish markets and therefore particularly interesting to producers who may be increasingly interested in this region as a way of diversifying their export options in addition to supplying the Asian market. The project’s technical feasibility has already been established through a thorough feasibility study. The Environmental and Social Impact Study (EIA) has been awarded in September last year and the relevant work is progressing. The project could enter in operation by 2016.


The Eastern Mediterranean pipeline consists of an offshore pipeline stretching from Eastern Mediterranean sources to Cyprus (150km)an offshore pipeline to Crete Island (630km), an offshore pipeline from Crete Island to Peloponnese (405km), an onshore pipeline crossing Peloponnese (260km) and an onshore pipeline crossing West Greece (220km), till Thesprotia towards Italy, through IGI-Poseidon pipeline. The Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline is technically feasible. This has been conclusively demonstrated in the pre-feasibility study carried out by J P Kenny (Wood Group Kenny today) as well as by a study which has been conducted by M.I.T.. Moreover, with the support of the Greek Government, DEPA has recently launched an international tender for the Feasibility Study with the restricted procedure. Given the project’s PCI status, the study would be eligible for funing from the Connecting Europe Facility. Such a study is also consistent with the Commission’s expressed opinion that all options to transport gas from Eastern Mediterranean to the Union should be kept open and be considered and assessed both from an energy security point of view and from the point of view of their relative economic costs and benefits. The pipeline option is particularly promising. After all, supply via pipeline, especially when it is associated with a premium market, such as the European


IGI Poseidon, as a multisource project, would allow Italy and the rest of Europe to import natural gas from the Middle East as well as the Eastern Mediterranean region

market, is traditionally the most secure way of marketing natural Gas, permitting long term contracts of 20-25 years, thereby securing the viability of the investment on the entire value chain even before the final investment decision, as proven by the Shah Deniz II consortium standards. Moreover, there are excellent prospects for the pipeline’s economics to be improved, given the evolution of technology in the production materials for pipes which may allow for an increased capacity from 8 to 10 or 12 bcm per year. By developing this project, DEPA is at the forefront of efforts in Europe to capitalize on the new discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean. This source is extremely important in view of the relative limitations of other prospects for diversification at the moment including the continuing uncertainties for shale gas in Europe and preliminary stage of exploration for

other indigenous hydrocarbon sources in Europe. Indeed together with fields in Azerbaijan, such as Absheron, the gas in Eastern Mediterranean is by and large the most promising. This explains why the European Commission has been emphasizing the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline, since it will provide a new source of supply for Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean as well as a new route connecting EU states, in addition to the existing route via Turkey for gas from the Caspian. Regarding the pipeline, the next steps include the establishment of a Joint Working Group consisting of initially DEPA and entities that are involved in the exploitation of gas in the Levantine Basin that will develop the pipeline and optimize the monetization options.

Interconnector Greece Italy DEPA is promoting and has been


participating in the development of the IGI through the off-shore IGI Poseidon. The Greece-Italy Interconnector will begin from Thesprotia coast in Greece and will make a landfall in Otranto in the Apulia region of Italy. The 800 km long pipeline consists of an onshore pipeline of 600 km, and a 200 km offshore pipeline crossing the Ionian Sea, reaches a maximum depth of 1,380m. IGI Poseidon is designated as an EU priority project and has secured 100 million euros in Community funds through the E.E.P.R. (European Energy Programme for Recovery). It is an extremely developed project having obtained all its environmental and regulatory licenses.

markets. In this respect, DEPA’s contract with SD2, concluded with competitive prices has been a milestone and is an example of the growing trend in Europe for contracts which are not exclusively based on oil-indexation. In addition DEPA successfully concluded a renegotiation of its long term contract with Gazprom which also reflects market developments. Together these are developments which will surely promote more gas to gas competition in Greece and the region.

In order to benefit from the advantages of a competitive and liquid market which prevail in NW Europe, S.E Europe needs to urgently develop infrastructure to increase market integration and deliver diverse supplies of natural gas.

One of the EU’s and Greece’s major priorities is to ensure that Central and Eastern Europe can enjoy the benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor. This has become increasingly important following the selection of TAP as it is imperative that the countries which were part of Nabucco’s route are not excluded from the possibilities of greater diversification. In this respect synergies between TAP, the IGB and interconnectors between Bulgaria-Serbia, Bulgaria-Rumania and onwards to Hungary could significantly contribute to this objective. Efforts should be focused on maximizing such potential with due attention to overcome the existing bottlenecks in the region.

The opening of the Southern Corridor is fundamental to enhancing security of supply and in the process will promote the liberalization of these regional

Greece is poised to contribute towards the further liberalization and strengthening of the energy supply of Central and South Eastern Europe’s

IGI Poseidon, as a multisource project, would allow Italy and the rest of Europe to import natural gas from the Middle East as well as the Eastern Mediterranean region and significantly also functions in reverse flow.

gas markets. Indeed Greece is making progress into becoming a pricing hub, by virtue of having the most diversified gas portfolio in the region and its increasingly liberalized market. Moreover its connection to the Italian market and beyond to other liquid North-Western European markets, which is being made possible by TAP, will also be instrumental for the development of the gas market in Greece. Via Greece other markets in the region will be able to have access to diversified sources but also competitively hub-priced gas. This is the rationale behind DEPA’s projects which in the process of being developed are also enabling the company to assume a leading position in the broader region. But above all DEPA’s projects are contributing to maximizing the potential of Greece as an increasingly important transit and pricing hub for the broader region. A lot still needs to be done. However developing projects is not an end in it self. Just like energy policy a process is involved which contributes a stronger economy ensuring affordable and competitive prices for consumers and industry alike.

* Dimitrios E. Manolis is International Projects Deputy Head of DEPA

Oil & Gas Penelope Mitroulias


MAKING GREECE AN IMPORTANT ENERGY HUB The emergence of Greece as a transit hub, for the transport of energy resources from the Caspian and Southeastern Mediterranean Seas to European markets, is a matter of central policy choice for the Greek government. Actually, this choice is not new. Several times in the past, by supporting different pipeline and interconnection projects, successive Greek governments have tried to turn Greece into an energy hub. The results so far have been rather limited, staying far away of the impressive plans announced each time. At this stage, however, recent developments encourage optimism that in the long term the goal of turning Greece into an energy transit hub is possible to be achieved.

The most important energy interconnection project in Greece is the TAP pipeline: a pipeline that will bring natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Italy through Greece. TAP, which was chosen by the consortium operating the Shah Deniz gas field (formed by BP, Statoil, Total, Socar) to carry Caspian gas to European markets, is a project with a budget of E1.5bn. TAP will have to “climb” to a height of almost two thousand meters on the mountains of Albania and “plunge” to depths of 820 meters below the surface of the Adriatic Sea, having already crossed Thrace and Macedonia, to supply Europe with gas from the Shah Deniz II gas field, from 2019 onwards. The Greek section of the pipeline is 543km long and starts from the Turkish-Greek borders to reach the Greek-Albanian borders. In Greece, TAP, which will have an initial capacity of 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year expandable to 20 bcm, will be underground throughout its entire length. According to the plans, the pipeline will start at Kipoi of Evros (where it will be

interconnected with the TANAP pipeline) and leave the Greek territory at the area of Dipotamia (Kastoria). Then, the pipeline will cross Albania and the Adriatic Sea, to reach the coast of southern Italy, near San Foca (Lecce). It is estimated that in Albania the pipeline will run 205 km, in the Adriatic 110 km and in Italy just five. The benefit of the TAP gas pipeline for the Greek state during its lifespan is estimated at E1.2bn, without including the value-added that will arise and which amounts to E18bn. The pipeline is set to supply with gas a number of countries in Southeastern Europe (such as Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Croatia). Meanwhile, TAP’s landfall in Italy, the third largest gas market in Europe, provides multiple opportunities for further transport of Caspian natural gas to Germany, France, the UK, Switzerland and Austria.

The IGB gas pipeline

The springboard for the supply of



SE Europe with natural gas from the Caspian Sea through the TAP pipeline was the agreement signed between the Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG (TAP) and Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB Pipeline) for establishing an interconnection point in Greece. The project will enable Bulgaria -and possibly later on Romania and Hungaryto gain, for the first time, access to an alternative gas supplier, other than Russia’s Gazprom, given that the TAP pipeline will be constructed to carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe. The Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation signed by TAP and IGB aims at establishing the technical cooperation needed in order to further develop strategic infrastructure in the region, focusing in particular on establishing a point where the two pipelines will interconnect, near Komotini. The IGB pipeline, not only connects Greece and Bulgaria, but it is also an important project for the completion of the so-called “Southern Corridor”, a key pillar of the European strategy for energy security through the diversification of Europe’s gas supply sources and routes. Athens and Sofia have recognized the pipeline as a project of national importance and public interest, while the European Commission has included IGB in its proposal to the European Parliament on the Projects of Common Interest. The project has already received the green light in order to be co-funded with E45mn under the

EEPR programme (Εuropean Energy Programme for Recovery).

in the selection process for the pipeline that would carry Azeri gas to Europe.

The Greek-Bulgarian pipeline is currently at the stage of the implementation study, the decisions approving the environmental conditions for both the Greek and Bulgarian sections of the project have been issued and most technical and licensing procedures are near completion.

Eventually, IGB will work with the TAP pipeline chosen by the Azeris.

Europe is an attractive target market for gas producers because, although it seems to be saturated, is still in urgent need to find diversified sources and supply routes The shareholders of IGB are «Poseidon» (a 50/50 joint venture of DEPA, Edison and Bulgaria’s BEH), with 50 percent, and Bulgarian Energy Holding with the remaining 50 percent. This is the project that was initially planned as part of the ITGI pipeline (Turkey-Greece-Italy), to be rejected later on by the Shah Deniz consortium,

IGB will have a length of about 182 km, a 32-inch diameter and a capacity of up to 5 bcm of gas per year (after being upgraded), and will start from the area of Komotini to end in Stara Zagora in Bulgaria. From there, there are plans for expansion in Romania and Hungary, through interconnections with existing grids.

The East Med gas pipeline

The Greek side will try to answer the questions “where” and “how” will the natural gas from the Levantine basin be exported, especially the natural gas of Cyprus, by planning a pipeline to Crete, the Peloponnese and thereon to Thesprotia, to meet the TAP pipeline and reach Italy. This is the extremely ambitious and costly project of the East Med pipeline that will link the eastern Mediterranean Region to Europe. East Med is considered to be a technically feasible project, according to the preliminary feasibility study carried out by JP Kenny (now Wood Group Kenny), and the MIT study which was completed on behalf of the Cypriot authorities in August 2013. DEPA has even launched an international tender for the feasibility study of the project and the results of this tender are expected soon. Recall that for this study, as a PCI, it is possible to secure funding from the Connecting Europe Facility.


DEPA’s future plans also include setting up a common working group, which will initially consist of DEPA and actors involved in the exploitation of the natural gas of the Levantine Basin, aiming at the development of the project and the optimization of the opportunities for gas exports, as well as for conducting targeted and detailed market research for analyzing the potential for gas sales to Europe.

The project will enable Bulgaria -and possibly later on Romania and Hungary- to gain, for the first time, access to an alternative gas supplier, other than Russia’s Gazprom, given that the TAP pipeline will be constructed to carry Azeri gas to Europe The arguments put forward by those who argue that East Med is a technically feasible and financially viable project that will link Europe with the new

gas sources of the Southeastern Mediterranean Sea are as follows: • The price that Europe pays for its long-term supply with gas through a pipeline amounts to 11 dollars per MMBTU, while the cost of transport according to the data of the preliminary feasibility study is at 4 dollars per MMBTU, which ensures a revenue for producers of about 7 dollars per MMBTU. If the feasibility study confirms the above level of cost for the transport from source to Italy, the solution provided by this pipeline will be one of the most competitive for the Eastern Mediterranean gas. • The global LNG market, and even more the Asian LNG market, is expected to lose its attractiveness, as from 2020 onwards a large number of new sources (eg Australia, East Africa, West Canada, US etc.) will supply on priority basis the Asian LNG market with significant quantities of gas, taking advantage of their proximity to the market. Subsequently, LNG prices are expected to drop significantly worldwide. • Europe is an attractive target market for gas producers because, although it seems to be saturated, is still in urgent need to find diversified sources and supply routes. • The supply of natural gas through pipeline, especially when coupled with a premium market like the European, is traditionally the safest way for the commercial marketing of natural gas, allowing for long-term sale and transport contracts of 20-25 years, a fact ensuring both the sustainability of the exploration investment and pipeline’s viability, before even taking

the investment decision, as in the case of the Shah Deniz II consortium. • The participation of the gas consuming countries in the shareholder structure of the partnership that will develop and operate the pipeline, will act as a “safety valve” and will provide additional security for the immediate sale of the gas. • East Med has EU’s support and has been included in the Projects of Common Interest, because it meets all diversification criteria (different suppliersource-route), which ensures preferential access to EU funding mechanisms, as well as easier environmental and regulatory permits. Moreover, the European Commission does not miss a chance to underline how important is the East Med pipeline, given that this pipeline will provide Europe with a new supply source -the Eastern Mediterranean Region-, inviting at the same time DEPA to present to the European Commission any new information that will arise from Feasibility Study. • Furthermore, East Med’s finances may improve further with the technological progress in the field of pipe production materials, which could allow an increase in pipeline’s capacity from 8 to 10 or even 12 bcm per year, generating significant economies of scale and thus enhancing the financial dynamics of the project.

Geopolitics of energy - EU Republication from Reuters

08 26


The discovery of natural gas around Cyprus could spur international efforts to resolve a long-standing division of the island and promote the smooth development of an alternative energy supply source to Russia, said President Nikos Anastasiades. But he added that it was too early to speak of tangible progress in recently relaunched peace talks on the ethnically split island. Deep differences persisted between rival Greek and Turkish Cypriots that have defied the efforts of diplomats and politicians over four decades.


Almost one trillion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas has already been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean Levant Basin, enough to supply Europe with gas for over two years. Anastasiades said that the discovery and the potential prosperity it could bring to countries in the region brought the need for peace into sharper focus.

Alternative suppliers

“It is important for Europe and the United States”, he told in an interview on Wednesday. “Europe will never stop needing Russian gas but there can be alternative supply sources”, Anastasiades said. European states have become wary of heavy dependence on Russian energy since Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s Black Sea Crimea peninsula last month. Russia provides around one third of the European Union’s oil and gas. But division of the island and competing territorial claims could complicate development of the new fields, which extend also towards Israel. Turkey, which backs the breakaway northern Cyprus territory, disputes Cyprus’s rights to a swathe of sea to the island’s south and southeast that are rich in gas reserves. It has on a number of occasions sent warships to the area. Cyprus says the waters are part of its own offshore area, where it has awarded research concessions to France’s Total TOTF.PA, U.S. company Noble Energy Inc NBL.N and South Korea’s Kogas 036460.KS.

International players

Two senior U.S. State Department

officials have visited the island over the past two months, lending support to Anastasiades’s call for “bold” confidence building measures. That includes the Turkish military relinquishing control of a now fenced-in seaside ghost resort whose Greek Cypriot residents fled in 1974, and operating a Turkish Cypriot seaport under EU supervision to facilitate direct exports to the bloc.

is the fact that we are back in a dialogue, with a framework which we must all focus on, so that negotiations do not deviate from that framework”.

“There is a lot of interest by international players and Europe. I hope that at some point we could be in a position to make a relevant announcement but it’s premature to say anything for certain”, Anastasiades said. Anastasiades said that confidence building measures could go a long way in restoring faith in the process among a public jaded with peace initiatives that have come and gone over the decades.

“There is a gap in our positions, a gap in the positions of the Turkish side and even more so from the European acquis”, Anastasiades said, referring to EU rules and regulations. He said that any impression given by Turkish Cypriot negotiators that the sides were at a bargaining stage were ‘false’. “I’m not saying this to accuse anyone, or to enter a blame game... I wish it were like that, but we are not there”.

Political talks

Cyprus has been divided since the Turkish invasion in 1974, but the seeds of division were sown much earlier, when a power-sharing Greek-Turkish Cypriot administration crumbled in 1963, just three years after independence from Britain. Many Turkish Cypriots withdrew into enclaves, and a U.N. peacekeeping force, deployed in 1964, is one of the world’s longest serving worldwide. Only Turkey recognizes northern Cyprus as a legitimate state. Four decades on, the troops sent in by Ankara have not left, frustrating Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, where Greek Cypriots represent the entire island.

“People are tired, disappointed from a non-solution”, said Anastasiades, a conservative whose presidential building in Cyprus’s ethnically-split capital still carries shrapnel damage from an abortive coup by Greek Cypriot militants in 1974, triggering a Turkish invasion days later. Anastasiades, who oversees peace talks in his capacity as Greek Cypriot leader, restarted negotiations with Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu in February. “At this point the initial positions of the sides are being submitted, so it would not be possible to expect any so-called progress”, said Anastasiades. “Progress

Eroglu and Anastasiades agreed in February to relaunch peace talks on the basis of an agreed agenda, calling for the creation of a partnership under a federal umbrella in tune with EU standards.

Geopolitics of energy - EU George Lakkotrypis*

09 28


The place of our country in the new energy strategy for Europe is now significantly upgraded, as Cyprus has already submitted, in the frame of the relevant Regulation of the European Parliament, three Projects of Common Interest which have been successfully included in the first list of the so-called PCIs. These are the Israel-Cyprus-Greece electricity link, the feasibility study by the Public Gas Corporation of Greece for a gas pipeline between Cyprus, Greece and the Levantine Basin and, finally, the project for the construction of LNG storage and export facilities in Cyprus.

In light of the recent statement on the confirmed natural gas quantities in Block 12 of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the expected new discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, it is certain that natural gas will, in the near future, enter the country’s energy balance and contribute to the growth and prosperity of the island. For this, major infrastructure projects need to be undertaken in Cyprus, while transporting the offshore reserves to the island through a pipeline and constructing a plant to produce Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for re-exports constitute a strategic choice for our government. At the same time, Cyprus, following the decisions of the European Council and the Council of Energy Ministers, supports the view that it is necessary to install all the necessary energy infrastructures that will ensure energy efficiency for the European Union and end the energy isolation of all EU Member States. Moreover, Cyprus, as part of the Eastern Mediterranean Region, aspires to become the alternative energy source for meeting the energy demands of the European Union.

In the European countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), energy consumption is expected to increase exponentially. More specifically, analysis of the current data and the market forecasts of the International Energy Agency show a scenario that could be outlined as follows: • Europe’s gas demand is expected to grow from the current level of 558 billion cubic meters per annum to 720 billion cubic meters per annum in 2020. • At the same time, gas production in Europe is expected to decline, from the current level of 330 billion cubic meters per annum to about 250 billion cubic meters per annum in 2020. • Today, Europe mostly depends on imports from Russia (for about 150 billion cubic meters per annum) and Algeria (for about 60 billion cubic meters per annum). This means that Europe’s dependence on gas imports will continue to rise, from 45 percent of its requirements at present to approximately 65 percent by 2020. Therefore, the role that the Cypriot –and, more generally, the Eastern Mediterranean- natural gas has

Mr George Lakkotrypis, Minister of Energy of the Republic of Cyprus


to play in ensuring Europe’s energy supplies is clear. The Eastern Mediterranean Region is now facing significant and historic, I would say, prospects in the energy sector. Among others, these regard the recent discoveries of large quantities of natural gas in the Levantine basin, which create new opportunities and give new impetus to the role of the Eastern Mediterranean Region in all energy developments and, in particular, in the adoption of EU’s future energy policy after 2020. At the same time, there are opportunities due to the increasing integration of renewable energy sources, mainly based on solar energy, into the electricity generation systems in the region. It is therefore important for the region to be able to develop an efficient and integrated energy strategy, taking into account these challenges and prospects. Such a strategy should aim, first of all, at promoting the regional oil and gas industry that will also stimulate the long-term economic growth of the region and, then, at ensuring a sustainable production of clean energy. At the same time we believe that the place of our country in the new energy strategy for Europe is now significantly upgraded, as Cyprus has already submitted, in the frame of the relevant Regulation of the European Parliament, three Projects of Common Interest which have been successfully included in the first list of the so-called PCIs. These are the Israel-Cyprus-Greece electricity

link, the feasibility study by the Public Gas Corporation of Greece for a gas pipeline between Cyprus, Greece and the Levantine Basin and, finally, the project for the construction of LNG storage and export facilities in Cyprus.

Today, there is an ongoing process of negotiation between the Government and the licensees in Block 12 for the completion of the Governmental Agreement on the Gas Liquefaction Terminal at Vassiliko.

The two projects concerning the natural gas were submitted as part of the Southern Gas Corridor, while efforts are focused on securing funding for the studies of all three projects under the Connecting Europe Facility. At the same time, of course, there have been efforts also for the construction of the internal gas transmission grid, which we consider to be an important infrastructure project for Cyprus.

With regard to the key provisions of the Governmental Agreement, the Cabinet has taken a number of decisions for guiding the Negotiating Group on the participation of Cyprus in the Terminal, the structure and operating model, on how to promote and sell gas etc.

The Eastern Mediterranean Region is facing significant and historic prospects in the energy sector. Among others, these regard the recent discoveries of large quantities of natural gas in the Levantine basin

However, the main challenge facing the Ministry of Energy and the licensed companies is to find the additional quantities of natural gas that will make the Terminal competitive. Therefore, the exploration programs of all licensees are currently underway with several thousand km of 2D and 3D seismic data in order to properly prepare for the launch of new exploratory wells. Our goal is to launch new drilling in the second half of 2014 undertaken by Noble Energy and ENI/Kogas and in 2015 by Total. At the same time, of course, with the offshore activities within our EEZ, it has already been drawn a preliminary master plan for the area of Vassiliko, which takes into account the existing facilities and the proposed activities in the area, giving primary focus on the Gas Liquefaction Terminal. Moreover, the Government has recently


The contribution of natural gas in the energy balance of Cyprus is expected to yield multiple economic and environmental benefits, contributing positively to the necessary improvement of energy supply security

appointed new boards for both the Natural Gas Public Company, the gas operator for the domestic market, and Cyprus National Hydrocarbons Company. The last one is the company which, together with the newly established Hydrocarbons Service in the Ministry of Energy, will be the spearhead for hydrocarbon trading and the supervision and management of the related infrastructures. The contribution of natural gas in the energy balance of Cyprus is expected to yield multiple economic and environmental benefits, contributing positively to the necessary improvement of energy supply security, the diversification of the energy balance of the country and, at the same time, the reduction of noxious emissions in the atmosphere. At the same time, I am sure that the cooperation between Eastern Mediterranean countries at regional level is of paramount importance to Cyprus

and the EU, not only in relation to energy matters, but in general to take advantage of the opportunities created today in the areas of Commerce, Services and for attracting new investments.

* George Lakkotrypis is Minister of Energy of the Republic of Cyprus. This article is part of his speech at the 3rd Energy Symposium, held in Nicosia on 28/ 3/2014.

Oil & Gas Nikolay Jekov


WHERE ARE THE INTERCONNECTORS FOR THE LOVE OF GAS? For more than ten years Bulgaria has been trying, without success, to diversify its gas supplies, which makes it an easy prey each time there is a dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Now there are several available options, but these will not change fundamentally the situation in the medium term. The only chance for Bulgaria to succeed in its efforts would be the construction of the Aegean LNG floating terminal which could be done in about three years. To do this however, a number of countries in the region should join efforts, because no LNG supplier will consider the markets of Bulgaria or Greece alone as a good business case.

Where are the interconnectors? This is the question that pops up in Bulgaria every time there is a crisis in RussianUkrainian relations. Bulgaria depends heavily on the Russian natural gas which comes through Ukraine’s and Romania’s pipeline networks. Less than 10 percent of the gas consumed in Bulgaria is locally produced and there are no alternative routes that could be used in practice to supply it. Although annual gas consumption is minimal compared to other countries - only 2.7 bcm in 2012, even sunny Greece consumes twice as much-, the importance of natural gas comes from its use in the central heating systems of several big cities, which account for 38 percent of annual gas consumption providing heating to 15.6 percent of Bulgarian households. he interconnectors in Bulgaria are important not only for the country’s energy independence. A wider network will open up gas flows from LNG terminals in Turkey and Greece to Romania and Serbia. In the medium and longer term, using the Bulgarian gas transmission grid, the Trans-Adriatic

Pipeline (that will carry Caspian gas) and offshore deposits in the Mediterranean Sea will provide a boost for energy diversification in Southern and Central Europe. The prospects of massive reserves of natural gas in the Bulgarian and Romanian economic zones in the Black Sea is another reason Bulgaria should step up its efforts to build more links to the neighboring countries. At the same time the challenges that South Stream faces, as a result of the escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine that led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, give a new urgent meaning to the interconnectors. South Stream was the only short-term hope for Bulgaria to diversify if not its suppliers, at least the routes.

How long does it take to build a pipeline There hasn’t been a government in Bulgaria that missed the opportunity to blame the previous one for the absence of alternative supplies, making Bulgaria vulnerable to Russian-Ukrainian relations. The end result now is grim. In case of suspension of natural gas



deliveries from Russia, Bulgaria has reserves for approximately two months during the summer period, according to government’s official data. If transit gas pipelines dry completely, there is a possibility to reverse the flow and receive gas from Greece. During the gas crisis of 2009 for example, some gas came this way, delivered by Gazprom Export. But its cost was twice as much the standard Gazprom price to Bulgaria. Now there are contracts for up to 3 mn m3 daily deliveries from Greece in case of emergency. The first attempts to negotiate alternative gas supplies began in 2006. Georgi Parvanov, Bulgaria’s president at the time, made a tour in Central Asia to look for alternative supplies of natural gas. Mr. Parvanov was promised billions of cubic meters from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that would have been supplied through the promising then Nabucco pipeline (connecting Azerbaijan with Austria via Turkey and Bulgaria). However nothing seriously happened because most of this energy diplomacy was geared towards convincing Gazprom that Bulgaria could diversify its supplies relatively soon. At the time, the Russian company had been pressuring Bulgaria for a new long-term supply contract that would have brought the price of Russian natural gas up to market levels (Bulgaria has received various price reductions in the previous 20 years). And then, 2009 came with a new dispute between Russia and Ukraine which froze

almost all gas flows to Bulgaria. Several months later, Bulgarian Energy Holding, Greek DEPA and Italian Edison signed a memorandum for the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB). Talks with Serbia, Romania and Turkey about similar projects were launched as well.

The issue of the interconnectors is a topic of major public outcry in Bulgaria, but most experts agree that they can’t solve the problems of Bulgaria’s gas dependency in the short and medium term The hectic activity however soon faded away. Even if the interconnector with Greece were build, by that time the only possible source of gas was the LNG terminal in Revithoussa. LNG was far more expensive than Gazprom’s gas and no one in Bulgaria would take the responsibility to buy it in exchange for the chimerical goal (as most thought) of energy security. In addition, Gazprom’s policy to force its

clients to sign agreements for higher quantities of gas than needed prevents any alternative deliveries. Every time there is a possibility of alternative supplies, Gazprom threatens to apply the take-or-pay clause in the contracts with its clients. And finally, when it became clear that the interconnectors would not be built so soon and that the emergency EU financing could not be absorbed, Bulgaria and its partners started dragging their feet. For two years the government of GERB (2009-2013) was renegotiating the shareholder agreement for the IGB, between Bulgarian Energy Holding, DEPA and Edison, to ensure that Bulgaria would have a 50% ownership in the pipeline. Then it turned out that the environmental assessment lasts for a whole year and concerns emerged that the new route could tempt Gazprom to use it for the transit supplies to Greece and to save some transit fees (because the route is shorter). Later on, Bulgaria focused its attention on Nabucco and South Stream projects and there were no spare resources to spend on alternative projects. The only project that was moving along, albeit at a snail’s pace, was the gas interconnector between Bulgaria and Romania (the BRI, a project run by Bulgaria’s Bulgartransgaz and Romania’s Transgas). But even this project has been several years late and now a collapse of the tunnel below Danube has postponed the completion of the pipeline by another six months.


The promising connection with Turkey is still dragging on. The Marmaris LNG terminal is only 150 km from the Bulgarian border and has free capacity. For several years however, focus had been on Nabucco on one hand and, on the other hand, Turkey itself was not very much interested (LNG could be supplied sporadically to Bulgaria and the connection might not make a business case). Then the Turkish government was trying to find a local partner. It is believed to be EgeGaz, the owner of which has close ties with the Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz and owns the LNG terminal in Aliaga. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Bulgarian government last March. Based on previous experiences though, this cannot be taken as a good indication on the time the interconnector will actually become operational. For the time being, Bulgaria’s only connection is with Greece, through the existing transit pipeline (which could supply in reverse mode up to 0.5 bcm annually). The problem is that 76 percent of Greece’s own supplies come from Gazprom. In the event of a gas supply interruption, Greece will not have the

required quantities to export to Bulgaria. The connection with Romania will not fundamentally change the situation either. For technical reasons, Bulgaria could receive up to 0.5 bcm annually (if an additional compressor station is built in Romania, then the supply could rise to 3 bcm). Romania depends on Russian gas marginally (only 20 percent come from Russia), but it prefers to discourage exports in order to keep its internal prices lower (they are 30 percent lower than those in neighboring Bulgaria). Bulgaria could in theory use the Romanian gas links with Hungary, but this possibility has never been even tested.

Pipelines are routes, not suppliers The issue of the interconnectors is a topic of major public outcry in Bulgaria, but most experts agree that they can’t solve the problems of Bulgaria’s gas dependency in the short and medium term. The reality is that there are no alternative gas supplies. Bulgaria has tested several times the waters in Qatar and Algeria for supplies of LNG, but the answers haven’t been very encouraging. Bulgaria is a very small market to have big suppliers

risking meddling in Gazprom’s sphere of influence. It should not be forgotten that the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, the so-called Gas OPEC, is based in Qatar, thus there should be a bigger beef available for them. That is why one of the promising ideas for a new LNG terminal closer to the Bulgarian boarder is dragging its feet as well. The talks have been going on for several years (there is a preliminary agreement since 2011 between BEH and DEPA), but there is no real progress with the so-called Aegean LNG floating terminal (similar in concept with the KN LNG terminal in Lithuania). To succeed in a project like that, there is a need for a bigger coalition of the willing gas consumers, not only in the region, but in Central Europe as well. Only the combined consumer power of countries like Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria might make a difference. The progress on the so-called North-South Corridor however a still fledgling. But this is the direction where the main efforts should be concentrated.

Geopolitics of energy Angelos Siopis*

11 34


The recent “Crimea Crisis” pointed out the significance of geopolitical crises which tend to increase the potential risk for international investors. Although the geopolitical events are difficult to predict, they are a fact for many emerging countries, especially for Eastern-European and Asian countries.

Over the past years, European Union and United States seek for energy independency over Russian. The EU relies on Russia for about a third of its oil and gas, whilst 40 percent of that gas is shipped through Ukraine. United States has sparked a new urgency in the European Union to find energy supplies outside Russian state-owned gas corporation, Gazprom. In 2012, Gazprom was responsible for 34 percent of the European Union’s natural gas imports. The volatility in emerging markets’ bonds and equities was increased when Russian troops moved into Crimea. Emerging markets such as Russian, may be vulnerable to capital outflows due to the Fed’s recent decision to start tapering the $85billion bond’s purchasing program, which led investors to draw capital back into developed countries. As a result, emerging market currencies and asset prices strongly depressed. Sanctions imposed by the U.S., E.U. and other Western countries after the Russian annexation of Crimea primarily focused on individuals, but also affected the Russian economy in general. In particular, corporate entities

such as banks, whose owners are among those sanctioned, were also hit. According to the state-owned bank VTB Capital, the Russian economy will shrink over 2014 as uncertainty hurts spending, hits markets and puts a doubt on foreign investments. Rating agency Standard & Poor’s reduced its outlook to negative from stable, citing “heightened geopolitical risk” and the prospect of further sanctions from the U.S. and EU. Fears of Russia’s possible economic isolation because of the political crisis and the annexation of Crimea, have been causing investors to pull out their funds from the Russian-corporate bonds and domestic stock exchange market. As a result of the increased “country risk”, since the beginning of the crisis until the 13th of March, Russian 10 years rubledenominated government bonds set to extend declines that have made them the world’s worst performers. Yields climbed 130bps to a record 9.57% while the yield on the government’s 2042 dollar bonds climbed from 5.67% to 6.49%. The extra yield on 30 years Russia’s dollar debt over Treasuries increased 70 basis points, Bloomberg shows.


Source: Bloomberg, April 2014

Credit default swap rates on Russian five years corporate bonds reached their highest level since June 2012. Many individual bonds issues of the most important Russian corporate entities such as Gazprom, VTB Bank, Evraz, Russian Railways RZD, were dramatically enhanced. The ruble’s 7.57% percent slump against the US Dollar this year is the worst performance among emerging-market currencies, tracked by Bloomberg, after Argentina’s peso. The ruble weakened slightly, outlining the significance of currency risk, as a vital part of overall risk that investors face. Hence, Russian Central Bank was forced to hike its key lending rate to 7 percent from 5.5 percent due to an increased risk for financial stability and inflation. Micex, Russia’s stock market index slumped 13.5%, falling to its lowest level since May 2012 ,while the dollardenominated RTS index lost almost 15%, reaching its lowest since September 2009. In the same framework, most of the Russian individual stocks demonstrated significant losses. Naturalgas producer Novatek, partly owned

by sanctioned Gennady Timchenko, Gazprom, Russia’s most liquid stock and Sberbank, the country’s largest lender and a benchmark for the banking sector, suffered the biggest loss since the beginning of the crisis.

The recent “Crimea Crisis” teaches investors that country risk can reduce the expected return on an investment To conclude, country risk refers to the economic, political and business risks that are unique to a specific country, and that might result in unexpected investment losses. The recent “Crimea Crisis” teaches investors that country risk can reduce the expected return on an investment and must be taken very seriously into consideration whenever investing abroad. However,

investors often neglect an important step in the process of international investing, the risk management. At a minimum, a well-diversified portfolio can help reduce individual country risk. Even in a more concentrated portfolio, investments should be allocated among several countries and regions to maximize benefits from diversification and minimization of risks. Thus, investors should have a good understanding of all sources of investment risks such as country, credit and currency risks. Measuring a country’s risk can be a tricky process. In very broad terms, risk management requires an very good understanding of relevant risks, an assessment of their relative priority and a rigorous approach to their control, monitoring and managing. Thus, a crucial point for investors is that they should trust and rely on risk management professionals’ work and experience.

*Angelos Siopis is Head of Research Department, HellasFin

Oil & Gas Kostadin Sirleshtov

12 36


I will certainly never forget the January 2009 gas crisis, which lasted just a few days. It was certainly cold and the Bulgarian industry was suffering as a result of the fact that ‘technically’ we had enough reserves in the Chiren gas storage facility, but the obsolete equipment there could not deliver enough quantities to the market.


Nevertheless my best memories are from a gas conference that I attended just a few weeks after this unfortunate event and where being the only Bulgarian around made me feel like the white elephant in the room. Everybody was just wondering how on earth Bulgaria did not do much to diversify and strengthen its gas supplies and storage capacities... Many would argue that a period of 5 years might not be enough to turn the wheels in another direction and they might have a point. Indeed, for a period of time after the January 2009 crisis there were several positive developments in Bulgaria, with the most important ones being: - the increased public awareness of the quasi-total gas supply dependence is definitely there; probably not to the extent that many of us would like to see, but for those who remember the lack of any debate prior to 2009, it is still quite a step forward; - both the Government and the Parliament adopted in June 2011 the Bulgarian Energy Strategy until 2020, which called for further focus on the domestic production of natural gas, including the shale gas potential of the country; - following the changes to the Underground Resources Act from December 2010, the Ministry of Economy and Energy became a “one stop shop” for investments in underground resources, which immediately resulted in a tripling of the income of the Bulgarian state and streamlining of the investment process;

- the work on the gas interconnectors with neighboring countries like Romania, Greece and Turkey was initiated, and especially the Romanian project is close to its final completion; - three new production concessions offshore the Black Sea were signed in the period (2010-2013) and a new exploration permit was granted in 2012 to the biggest investors’ team Bulgaria has seen so far in its oil & gas history (OMV, Total and Repsol); - Bulgargaz has committed to 1 billion m3/year from Shah Deniz II starting from 2018-2019; etc.

Bulgaria will very soon be the only European country with a shale gas ban and a practical ban on onshore exploration and production activities But before I start sounding like a political campaigner, let us ask ourselves what will happen if, for one reason or the other, the 2009 scenario happens again today? The chances for that are high, as I see it, so the answer to my question

looks even more alarming: What will happen today is pretty much what happened in 2009 - local production of 10% of the gas demand; no modern gas storage facility; no alternative for the supply; no onshore production... So, naturally, the next step is to ask ourselves: “What’s wrong? Did we learn our lessons?” For sure the public awareness is there, but in the period following June 2011 the reasonable professional, political and legal knowledge and voice were outscreamed by the ‘streets’. As a result, Bulgaria will very soon be the only European country with a shale gas ban and a practical ban on onshore exploration and production activities. And this is all based on an illegitimate parliamentary decision from January 2012, whose main reason was to keep in power the Government that did the most for the gas sector in Bulgaria and which Government ironically went down due to... street protests (this time against electricity prices). Definitely there were also a few lessons learned from the fact that the Bulgarian energy sector was operating without any strategy from 2006 to 2011. Immediately upon adopting the long-awaited strategy in 2011 (which was supposed to apply until 2020) they started to... disregard it and, furthermore, to draft a new one. So in less than 24 months we will soon have a new energy strategy, with a horizon and destiny that will most likely follow the same path.


The Romanian near-complete interconnector seems to be unfit for any real commercial use and the Greek and Turkish interconnectors will take many years to be completed...

The “one stop shop”, which started with such a rush in 2010-2011, is now pretty much closed. There are no any new oil & gas tenders announced for a year now. Two of the offshore tenders were terminated (to all fairness the reasons for the termination were the impossibleto-meet criteria put forward for good reasons, but with fatal results by the previous Government). The extensions to the existing exploration agreements are not given for no legal reasons. Despite of having such rights, Government has never considered starting any tender for new blocks based on its own initiative, as if Bulgaria is after a sustainable development of its gas resources. The Romanian near-complete interconnector seems to be unfit for any real commercial use and the Greek and Turkish interconnectors will take many years to be completed... If we even assume that there is a big gas discovery in the Bulgarian part of the Black Sea made tomorrow, bringing this gas to the market will take 2-6 years. This somehow does not explain the reason why there were huge delays in signing the recent gas production concession agreements, which resulted in the delay of production for years and

in shifting the investment focus of the limited number of interested players. Furthermore, our state of dependency does not explain the relaxed and indifferent approach to the only feasible new gas storage facility, which could start operations tomorrow based only on private investments. But before I start resembling these eternal critics who go against both the domestic production and the expensive imports of gas, both against shale gas exploration and the gas storage facilities (many of whom are most vocal in their “opinion-making” loudness in Bulgaria), let me suggest the immediate next steps, as I see these: 1. Immediate licensing of the Galata gas storage facility, which will triple the domestic gas storage with no public investment; 2. Real focus on the extension of the Chiren gas storage facility combined with immediate steps for modernizing the existing infrastructures and capabilities; 3. Practical support to all investors in exploration and production – immediate licensing and extension upon fulfillment of the conditions under the law; priority approval of their working plans and financial support in terms of decrease


This “paperworkheavy” approach, “politically-correctbut-no-result” attitude to the issues, which were outlined during the 2009 crisis, is the main reason why if the same or even a bigger crisis comes our way, the result will be practically the same

of concession payments in case of greater production; 4. Immediate re-tendering for the Teres and Sveta Marina blocks offshore the Black Sea with reasonable conditions for investors; 5. Immediate start of the tenders for the onshore blocks, which are illegally held back for various reasons, including the assumptions that beneath them there is a “shale bomb” (?! -we should be indeed praying for this to be the case). 6. Re-focus from strategy-thinking into strategic thinking and abandoning the illegal amendments to the National Energy Strategy, which was approved by both the Parliament and the Government in 2011 for 9 years ahead. This “paperwork-heavy” approach, “politically-correct-but-no-result” attitude to the issues, which were outlined during the 2009 crisis, is indeed the main reason why if the same or even a bigger crisis comes our way, the result for us will be practically the same despite of the “efforts” made mainly on paper.

7. Structuring and implementation of Greece-Turkey interconnectors and utilizing the existing pipeline system between Romania and Bulgaria for Bulgaria’s practical access to Romania’s local production and gas coming from Hungary. 8. Involvement of Bulgaria in the regional LNG initiatives, starting from neighboring countries like Greece. 9. Reasonable, with all respect to the environmental concerns, abandonment of the “shale gas ban”, which was imposed illegitimately by a Decision of the Parliament in 2012. 10. Last but certainly not least, remembering what happened not too far away, in 2009, and acting accordingly. And whether the lessons of 2009 have been learned, I hope we don’t see in practice any time soon.

Overview Emilia Damian

13 40


The Romanian Government decided to freeze electricity and gas prices for industrial consumers to keep the competitive advantage of products made in Romania.

Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta announced at the beginning of April that keeping energy prices stable is a crucial competitiveness factor in Romania. He added that the Government passed a decision to support renewable energy quotas through subsidies so that both household and industrial electricity prices will continue to drop. Ponta said that the European Commission will publish a regulation and guidance to allow EU member states to secure price reduction schemes for industrial consumers that will reduce renewable energy costs by 85 percent. “As to natural gas prices, household gas prices will rise 2 percent as of April 1st. On the other hand, users in the free market, based on documents to be passed by the Government, will pay the reference prices as of January 1st, 2014, and this way we secure constant gas prices for industrial and nonhousehold users, capable of ensuring competitiveness,” said Ponta.

Higher than EU prices

Prior to this decision, industry

associations had announced that they would cut about 500,000 jobs and close all factories in Romania this year, if the roadmap to gas market deregulation went on. At present, industry accounts for 32 percent of the nation’s GDP. Such a move would cost 6 billion euros and Romania would sink, once more, into recession. This is because gas prices would rise 143 percent in the next two years, according to a study conducted by Deloitte. Natural gas prices in the Romanian market will be aligned with import prices when deregulation is actually over, but the prices Romania pays to import gas are higher than those in European markets, says the General Manager of ArcelorMittal Romania, Bruno Ribo. According to him, other European markets had found alternative import sources before deregulating their gas market. “Two years are not enough to deregulate the market for industrial consumers. The period of time given for deregulating household energy market was six years,” he added.


When asked whether he thought that the industry should also be given a six-year deregulation period, Ribo answered affirmatively. “Energy and gas prices lead to a decrease in competitive advantage. Even with energy-efficiency investments, the negative impact cannot be offset. There are solutions, which are implemented legally in most EU countries, and the components of the energy-related costs should be applied to everyone. That has to be supported by authorities. Tomorrow it will be too late,” said Mr. Ribo.

The market is not ready

The gas market in Romania is not ready for full deregulation in the industrial consumer segment this summer, because there is neither a gas exchange nor market mechanisms for price setting, said Eric Stab, General Manager of GDF Suez Energy Romania (former Distrigaz Sud). “For household consumers, this year’s price increases will be modest; what concerns us is the industrial consumer segment, where authorities want to complete deregulation six months earlier than agreed with the IMF, by June 30, instead of December 31st, 2014,” Stab said. According to Eric Stab, this will affect approximately 170,000 gas consumers, who, as of July 1st, will no longer pay regulated prices, and will have to buy gas from the competitive market.

Gas prices fall

After Government’s decision, the end price of natural gas for the clients of GDF Suez dropped 2 percent since April 1st, following the decrease in distribution tariffs, said the President of the Romanian National Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE) Niculae Havrilet. GDF Suez Romania is a distributor and supplier of natural gas for regulated customers in the southern part of Romania, the operation area of the former Distrigaz Sud Company, privatized in 2005. GDF Suez’s services cover 17 counties and Bucharest, with more than 1.4 million customers.

“Two years are not enough to deregulate the market for industrial consumers. The period of time given for deregulating household energy market was six years” – Bruno Ribo, CEO ArcelorMittal Romania

On the other hand, the price will go up by 1.7 percent for the clients of E.ON Energie Romania, the natural gas supplier for the 2.8 million customers in the northern part of the country, following the acquisition of Distrigaz Nord. These evolutions follow the changes brought by ANRE to distribution tariffs for the third regulation period of 2014 - 2018. Distribution tariffs are different for each gas distributor in Romania, depending on their specific costs. Romania has agreed with the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission to fully liberalize its gas market for household consumers before December 31st, 2018. For industrial consumers, the schedule for the liberalization of the market provides for complete liberalization before December 31st, 2014. The electricity and natural gas law stipulates, however, the possibility to have this deadline delayed by one year.

The Deloitte report is not realistic

The Deloitte report, according to which gas prices in Romania would soar 140 percent in the next 2 years, does not reflect the reality, as it refers to the price of gas produced domestically, and not the final prices, ANRE president also said. He explained that while the price of domestically produced gas rose, imported gas prices went down. “The Deloitte report throws big figures on the market, for instance the 140 percent


The gas market in Romania is not ready for full deregulation in the industrial consumer segment this summer, because there is neither a gas exchange nor market mechanisms for price setting” ― Eric Stab, CEO GDF Suez Energy Romania

gas price increase. It does not say that we have the final price in view and that they are talking about the domestic production price. Even if domestic production gas prices go up, we noted a decline in imported gas consumption and in imported gas prices to 400 dollars on average for the consumers benefitting from regulated prices and even more for the industrial consumers. This resulted in us paying 1.3 billion dollars less for imported gas”, Havrilet pointed out. He also said that freezing the price in the coming 14 years was not possible, because Romania would exhaust its gas resources in 12 years. “This so-called report would have been correct if it had not imposed unrealistic proposals, for instance freezing the domestic production gas price for 14 years. Existing deposits can be used in the next 12 yeas, therefore in 14 years we would not have had gas,” the ANRE official underlined. Moreover, Romania benefited from

several derogations allowed for by the European Commission with regard to gas market liberalization. “They did not take into account that Romania is a European country and compelled to transpose the European directives, nor that we have already obtained derogations. We were supposed to liberalize the market in 2007. In 2009, other EU directives provided market liberalization in 2011, therefore we had all these time limits, making the Government’s negotiation with the financial institutions difficult and hard to implement,” the ANRE president also said. Havrilet added that suspending the liberalization timeframe could only be possible for the regulated market, that is for about 15 percent of the total gas market.

Oil & Gas Ian Becker


DEREGULATION CAN LEAD TO LOWER PRICES IN ROMANIA The common perception in Romania is that the liberalization of the gas market will only bring higher gas prices to the consumer. This may in fact be an incorrect assumption.

In July 2012 Romania passed the new gas law that also provided for a schedule to deregulate gas prices in the country. Up until this date Romania was paying around 46Ron/Mwh (roughly $140/1,000m3) to its own local producers while at the same time paying as much as $500/1,000m3 to import gas from Russia to make up for the inability to meet consumption from its own resources. The consumer would then pay a price based on the weighted average price on import volumes at the import price and domestic volumes produced at the regulated domestic price. Up until 2012 Romania was importing as much as 30% of its needs. Romania could not influence the price it paid for imported gas so it needed to push down the price it paid to its own producers to keep an artificially low price in Romania thereby creating a benefit to the consumer. Why would Romania then allow prices to liberalise if, as is the commonly held view, it would hurt consumers? The main justification given is that Romania had no choice. It was imposed on Romania by the EU and IMF. The EU has

directives that gas prices must be market based as opposed to being made incountry. Romania had resisted following the rules and the EU had declared that Romania was in breach and must remedy this breach. From an EU perspective artificially depressing prices creates a subsidy that unfairly provides Romanian industrial companies an unfair and artificial advantage against its fellow Europeans. From an IMF perspective these regulated prices creates distortions in the economy that in the long run are not helpful for growing the economy. As the reason for deregulating the gas market appears to be simply imposed from the outside it has the perception that it must have a negative impact on the country, through higher prices, otherwise Romania would have simply deregulated on its own. Going back to the fact that the Romanian consumer was paying a weighted average price of import and domestic it seemed the only way to keep prices to the consumer low was to suppress domestic producer prices as imported prices cannot be manipulated. Clearly, however, another way to reduce prices



to the consumer would be to increase domestic production and/or also lower consumption as, either way, the amount imported would then be less. As imported prices have historically been 3 times the domestic producer’s prices then less imported gas translates directly into lower consumer prices. The main impact of this policy to suppress domestic producer prices, however, was to do just the opposite. Domestic producers were discouraged from producing while at the same time consumers were encouraged to be wasteful and consume more. If this were to continue domestic production would continue its steady decline while imports would have to rise. Overtime imported gas would continue to increase as a percentage of consumption until such point that theoretically, at the limit, the weighted average price would be all based on the expensive import price. In the long run Romanian consumers would be the real losers and Gazprom would be the undisputed beneficiary. This is not just a theoretical argument. Romania domestic gas production has had a slow and steady decline from 1985 to

Gazprom, realising that Romania may be in a period of increasing investment in domestic production, may try to reduce the import price Romania pays in order to try and retain market share the present day. As a result Romania went from being self-sufficient in gas to relying each year on greater volumes of gas from Russia peaking to 30% in 2008 just before the financial crash. If it were not for the hit to the economy during the downturn the trend for more

imports would be increasing and likely will be increasing once the economy rebounds unless something is done to correct the situation. Putting price aside, it should also be mentioned here that importing gas versus producing domestic gas has other significant disadvantages. Domestic gas production creates employment in the country, provides a requirement for local suppliers and service companies and provides royalties and taxes to the government. Imported gas is simply an economic burden to the country. Now let’s review what has actually happened since the schedule to liberalise gas prices in Romania has been implemented starting with the first increase in December 2012 followed by domestic price increases each quarter up to April 2014. In fact it would appear that weighted average prices have in fact decreased instead of increased even as domestic prices paid for domestic production have slowly increased in line with the liberalization schedule. How could this be? It appears


that the imports has actually decreased and, at the same time, the import price has also had a slight decrease. Both of these have helped bring down the weighted price to consumers even though domestic producer’s regulated price has increased.

With a promised liberalised gas market, domestic gas explorers and producers are returning to spend money in Romania So to date the weighted average price appears to have decreased rather than increased with increasing domestic deregulated prices. It could be argued that this may be just a little bit of luck and is not sustainable. What does the future hold? Here are 2 factors to be considered that would argue that consumer prices, even going forward, may not increase but could remain the same or, in fact, decline with liberalisation…… Firstly with a promised liberalised gas market, domestic gas explorers and producers are returning to spend money in Romania. The impact will be to increase domestic production thereby decreasing expensive imported gas

and creating gas to gas competition in Romania. This is particularly true for the much promised and high potential but costly offshore gas and even possibly shale gas developments. These gas developments will not be sanctioned for development with a low made-inRomania gas price (regulated). Offshore developers (and shale gas developers) however are much more willing to take market price risk on gas prices where they would not be so willing to move forward on a regulated price even though the gas prices they receive may in fact end up being much the same. Here is an example. Gas was deregulated in the US. With increasing demand, lower conventional production and increasing imports (Canadian and LNG) the gas price shot up four fold from $2/ mcf in the 90s to $8/mcf in 2005 (that is still low compared to Russian import gas into Romania which hit $14/mcf). Domestic producers began developing their shale gas reserves and, with the increase in reserves added (even without necessarily having increased dramatically the production), gas prices collapsed to almost $2/mcf (which is around $70/100m3 or half the historic regulated price in Romania). In the case of the US, gas prices over time were dramatically reduced even to the point that they are now substantially below Romania’s low regulated prices. Romania may not need to repeat the price spike to the same extent that the US experienced due to the fact that Romania is now in a better position to exploit its resources (Offshore and

Shale) than the US was back in the 90s when there was not believed to be any potential resources available (Shale gas as a development concept was unproven). Secondly, Gazprom, realising that Romania may be in a period of increasing investment in domestic production, will be incentivized to reduce the import price Romania pays in order to try and retain market share by discouraging all these new investments in Romania. This lower import price will then feedback into the liberalised market price as the import price will be one of the key bench marks in setting the liberalised market price. On the assertions presented here, in the end, deregulation could result in lower, not higher, gas prices for Romanian consumers as a result of increased domestic gas production. One thing is very clear however, unless Romania encourages realising the great potential of its own domestic production, prices have nowhere to go but up.

Oil & Gas Penelope Mitroulia

15 46


“Could Greece be Europe’s new oil, gas zone?” asked a few months ago, in an extensive feature article on the developments in Greece’s hydrocarbons sector, European Gas Daily, a report published by Platts, the leading global provider of energy and metals information.

The question of course is difficult to be answered with a simple “yes” or “no”, but the fact that Platts chose to devote a feature article to Greek hydrocarbon exploration efforts shows that Greece has gained a place on the world map of oil and gas exploration. This year, 2014, is considered crucial for the future of oil and gas exploration and exploitation efforts in Greece, as the work that has been made since 2011 has formed the framework for the development of Greece’s mineral wealth and now we expect tangible results from the initiation of exploratory drilling by private companies. Recently, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras talked about potential public revenue of about E150bn in thirty years, if the strong indications for hydrocarbon deposits in the regions of Epirus and Ionian Sea prove correct. “Our country”, said Mr. Samaras, “can and will have significant energy resources for the internal market and for broader European planning, which will result to Greece’s geopolitical upgrade.”

According to estimates, the recoverable hydrocarbon reserves in Western Greece exceed 2.3 billion barrels and government revenues will come from taxes and royalties, while at the initiative of the Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate Change Yiannis Maniatis the relevant legislation provides that any proceeds will go to the insurance system of the country, through the Generation Solidarity Fund. At this point, it should be noted that state revenues are estimated at 50 percent of earnings per barrel of oil extracted after subtracting from the selling price, as an expense, a percentage of 40 percent. For example, at a price of $100 per barrel, earnings are estimated at $60, of which the public will take $30, while the remaining $30 will go to the exploration company. The drilling equipment in the western Gulf of Patras, in Katakolon and in the mountainous region north of Ioannina, are expected to start working soon, by the two joint ventures that won the contract after a bidding process that lasted almost two years and which are:


• For Ioannina, Energean Oil and Gas (the company operating the Prinos oil field) in partnership with Canada’s Petra Petroleum (acquired by Taurus) and USbased Shlumberger. • For the western Gulf of Patras, Greek Petroleum together with Italy’s Edison and Melrose, a British company acquired by Ireland’s Petroceltic. • For Katakolon, where the relevant bidding procedure presented many problems and delays, the joint venture formed by Energean Oil & Gas - Trajan Oil & Gas - Shlumberger. It is worth noting that in the western Gulf of Patras and in Ioannina, there had been exploration surveys also in the past, but they stopped before completion. The geological structures detected by the seismic surveys in the Gulf of Patras give indications of recoverable oil reserves of 200 million barrels. A previous drilling undertaken by US-based Triton was never completed as the company abandoned the project for its own business reasons. North of Ioannina, the mountainous area is considered to be interesting

but difficult, and will require costly explorations to a depth of over 4,000 meters. Initial estimates put the recoverable reserves at 50-80 million barrels of oil. The proximity to Albania, where deposits have been found, combined with the technological advances have rekindled interest in the region, compared to the first survey that had been carried out more than ten years ago. In Katakolon, an area which has been of interest to the oil industry even before the Second World War, DEP SA, the Public Oil Corporation at the time, made some exploratory drills in 1982 and discovered deposits with recoverable reserves of 3 million barrels of oil at a depth of 2,400 to 2,600 meters. At the time, though, this particular deposit was considered to be “unprofitable” because of its great depth, the price of crude oil at that time, and its high content of H2S and CO2. Now, however, current technology permits exploitation at a lower cost and a sideways drilling from the shore, which among other things will reduce the environmental impact, is being considered.

Current technology enables exploitation at a lower cost and a sideways drilling from the shore, which will reduce the environmental impact, is being considered Apart from these three areas, however, there has been progress also on the second phase of the efforts to explore deposits and attract research investments in the areas of the Ionian Sea and south of Crete. Following a bidding procedure, Norway’s PGS carried out extensive seismic surveys in both areas and a bidding procedure for granting exploration and exploitation


A Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment study is carried out, covering the entire area where the operational plan is to be implemented, in order to identify vulnerable areas, as well as the main parameters and the conditions for the protection of the environment

licenses is expected to be announced by the end of the first half of the year, at least for the Ionian. The surveys carried out by PGS covered an area of 220,000 km2. The phase of data acquisition (12,000 km of seismic lines) began in October 2012 and was completed in February 2013, followed by data processing which was completed in January 2014 and data interpretation which is expected to be finished in May, in order to issue the invitations for the bidding procedures. Data bundles cover three areas: • The northern area of the Ionian Sea, the so-called “Pre-Apulian Zone”, which is an extension of the carbonate zone of the southern Adriatic Sea. • The southern area around the deposit of Katakolon, belonging to the “Ionian Zone” and resembling onshore deposits in Albania. • The area south of Crete, with the first two-dimensional (2D) seabed imaging data for the Mediterranean Ridge and Messinian evaporites. For this region, a full interpretation of the seismic surveys will be required, because it

does not constitute a geologic continuity of other geological structures where hydrocarbons have been found. The distance from Egypt is large enough to allow any correlation. In all this effort, one thing of major importance is the data room with the data collected. This is the “National Library of Hydrocarbons”, according to Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. This “library” has seismic data for lines of 30,000 kilometers. The data from the data room of the Ministry of Environment, Energy & Climate Change, named «Greece MegaProject», is available to oil companies, while similar databases operate in London, Houston and Oslo. The «Greece MegaProject» includes 12,500 km of new seismic lines, 9,000 km of reprocessed existing lines and 9,000 km of additional lines configured to be combined with all other data. The international promotion of Greece on the oil market is considered to be an integral part of the organization of the Concession Round both at the stage of preparation, where all ongoing


activities and schedules are presented, together with the institutional, regulatory and financial frameworks that govern license granting processes, and after the announcement of the Concession Round. At the same time, a Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment study is carried out, covering the entire area where the operational plan is to be implemented, in order to identify vulnerable areas, as well as the main parameters and the conditions for the protection of the environment. The declaration for the official round of concessions is scheduled to be sent for publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in June. Now, with regard to the original question - whether Greece could be Europe’s new oil and gas zone-, European Gas Daily’s feature article notes that although it is too early to see whether Greece could become an energy exporter, or even whether it will be able to meet its own internal needs in hydrocarbons, the new data combined with new technology and the strong desire for energy security

mean that Greece could make its dream, to create a sizable oil and gas industry of its own, come true. In the same article, Mr. Frank Servadei of Scotland’s Petroceltic, the company that cooperates with Greek Petroleum and Italy’s Edison in the western Gulf of Patras, expressed the view that Greece will become the new Norway, thinking that the Greek oil and gas industry will focus more on the domestic market than exports. “A useful analogy would be with Israel, where the discovery of hydrocarbons has become the key to country’s energy security. I believe the same will happen with Greece,” he said. Mr. Mathios Rigas, CEO of Energean Oil & Gas, the company that operates the Prinos oil field, stressed that the decision of the government to give priority to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons is very positive and definitely will lead to discoveries, the size of which we will learn much later. In my view, he added, the day that

Greece will be able to have energy self- sufficiency is still far. To arrive to the point to produce 400,000 barrels a day, a quantity that will allow the country to cover its own needs and to export, Greece will have to find a giant oil reserve of about 500 million barrels of recoverable reserves, or 15 fields equivalent to that of Prinos, which should be discovered and developed simultaneously and replenished by new sources as the old ones will gradually get depleted,” said Mr. Rigas.

Oil & Gas Ada Gavrilescu

16 50


Fuel prices in Romania are now among the highest in the European Union, after the Romanian Government decided to raise the fuel excise tax starting from April 1st.

Gasoline and diesel fuel prices have gone up, following Government’s decision to introduce a new fuel excise tax of 7 euro cents per liter. From now on, excise duties will be as follows: EUR 491.19/1,000 liters of leaded gasoline, EUR 429.59/1,000 liters of unleaded gasoline, EUR 400.395/1,000 liters of diesel fuel, and EUR 445.91/1,000 liters of kerosene used as motor fuel. The estimated increase in car fuel prices is around 7 or 8 percent, namely c.40 bani/liter. However, road carrier companies will be less affected by this increase, as the Government will give road carriers back 4 out of the 7 cents on a quarterly basis and upon proof of fuel purchase. The legislative act regulating this system has been approved in April.

More Political Disputes

President Traian Basescu continues to disagree with the increase in excise duties, characterizing it, in a letter to the head of Government and then in a statement at the Cotroceni Palace, as abusive and unnecessary for the economy. In reply, Prime Minister

Victor Ponta said that this measure brings money to public coffers and eliminates tax evasion. One day before April 1st, President Traian Basescu sent a new letter to Prime Minister Victor Ponta, asking him not to introduce the 7 cents fuel excise tax on April 1st. “I see you have not changed your mind and that you are still willing to put a new fiscal burden on the people of Romania at any cost. I urge you once again not to raise the fuel excise tax as of April 1st, 2014, given the major negative side-effects such a measure could have on the economy and the people of Romania,” writes President Traian Basescu in his open letter to Prime Minister Ponta. According to President Traian Basescu, “the compensatory budgetary alternative to raising the 7 cents excise tax was presented when the 2014 State Budget Law was approved; this measure is unjustified if the Government’s interest is to generate sustainable economic growth, since the budget has the necessary resources to compensate for it.” “Back then, I suggested several


alternative measures. Mr. Prime Minister, I urge you to improve budget revenue collection. Such an improvement will save Romanians from having to pay new fees and taxes like this increased fuel excise tax,” the President argues in his letter.

Immediate effects

Furthermore, Traian Basescu shows that two of the immediate effects of this measure, on both economy and population, will be lower consumption levels and higher prices. The head of state notes that his persistence in relinquishing the excise tax is related to an analysis on this year’s budget. According to the President, the Government announced a partial compensation for this excise tax increase (by more than half) applicable to road carriers, which will be funded through the state budget. “There is still a risk, as road carriers themselves have pointed out, that a high percentage of current refuels on Romanian territory will flee abroad, leading to decreased consumption levels and a negative impact on the state budget,” he says. Moreover, Traian Basescu claims the

Minister Delegate for Agriculture has announced that the excise tax increase will be offset through subsidies on increased costs from state budget funds. Consequently, considering that partial or total compensatory measures were found in the road carrier and agricultural sectors, the only group of consumers who will not be receiving state budget funds to mitigate the effects of the tax increase are the citizens of Romania. President Traian Basescu had sent a previous letter to PM Victor Ponta on March 25th, asking him to take back the announced increase in fuel excise tax levels, because the measure would put too much unnecessary pressure on both consumers and the economy.

Budget agreed with IMF

In return, Prime Minister Ponta said that the budget agreed with the International Monetary Fund and approved by the Parliament cannot be modified, unless we disregard international institutions and Romania’s stability. “Today the IMF Board will cast a vote on the new Letter of Intent and we can

only plan together to keep Romania on the current track, namely, with a budget approved by Parliament and also agreed by the European Commission and the IMF, with economic growth, with precautionary measures”, Prime Minister said.

“There is still a risk that a high percentage of current refuels on Romanian territory will flee abroad” – Traian Basescu, President of Romania When asked if he read the letter sent by President Traian Basescu, whereby the head of state urged him to take back the additional 7 cent excise per fuel liter, Victor Ponta said: “Who sent it? No. This is exactly what I referred to when I said


“The CNADNR budget for motorways and the co-funding for projects benefitting from European funds will be done not only this year, but in the years to come from the revenues that this excise tax is estimated to generate” – Victor Ponta, Prime Minister

that the IMF Board would cast its vote today on the budget agreed with them and approved by the Romanian Parliament”. “Therefore, we cannot modify the budget, unless we say that we are no longer interested in international institutions, we are no longer interested in Romania’s stability, that we are interested in the EPP’s electoral advance. And the fact is that in 2009 -I believe Mr. Basescu was running then, directly, not through intermediaries as he is now-, we took all kinds of measures or we delayed the necessary measures. As long as I am Prime Minister, and I am convinced that I also have the support of the Central Bank and the Parliament in this respect, we will not repeat the mistake of 2009 and we will no longer allow these populist outbreaks, surprisingly coming from people who say they belong to the Right Wing. I, a Social Democrat, came to the position of drawing their attention to put an end to this kind of declarations”, Victor Ponta said. “The idea is as follows. We certainly have money for pensions and salaries, we have the necessary buffer for a long period of time, but any modification of the budget in a negative direction, in the sense that we take an amount of money or that we no longer collect an amount which we were supposed to collect, must be covered from some source. We have an established budget and before anyone makes any proposals, even Mr. Basescu, they must say where we can get that money from”, Prime Minister also said.

When asked where the excise money would go to, the Prime Minister replied: “All amounts collected by the Romanian State go to the state budget and from the state budget they are allotted to programs. The CNADNR (Romanian National Company for Motorways and National Roads) budget for motorways and the co-funding for projects benefitting from European funds will be done not only this year, but in the years to come from the revenues that this excise tax is estimated to generate”. Furthermore, the head of Government showed that it was necessary for Romania. “If we want to have in this country, not this year, in 2014, but in the years to come, infrastructure allowing me not to have a seven-hour drive from Cluj to Bucharest, but a four-hour one, not to pay 40 percent more for car parts than people in other western countries, not to have so many accidents and so many dead because of the trucks crossing villages and communes, we must invest this money in the years to come”, Victor Ponta added. According to Mr. Ponta, the excise on fuels will bring annual revenues to the state budget worth 2.4 billion lei, the equivalent of 600 million Euros. The Prime Minister maintains the idea that some of the money will go to co-funding infrastructure development projects, approved by the European Union.

Electricity Nikolay Jekov*

17 54


The Bulgarian electricity system is heading for a crash landing, a course drawn by years of populist masseurs and wrong investment and policy decisions. In the next few months, the Bulgarian government and energy firms will have to find a way to cover a tariff deficit of E500mn, i.e. a quarter of the entire electricity market.

For about a year and a half the Bulgarian energy system has been in constant crisis. Most energy companies face serious challenges, some of them exist like zombies and there is real risk that mutual indebtedness will lead several companies to bankruptcy. This is the result of years of wrong investment decisions, a populist drive to keep electricity prices down, poorly designed energy policies and government and regulator responses, which not only did not solve the accumulated problems, but also muddled them further. In short, Bulgaria became a basket case for failure in energy policies.

Squeeze them

In the current episode (which certainly won’t be the last) of the entangling crisis, the national regulator, SCEWR (State Commission for Energy and Water Regulation), threatens to take away the licenses of electricity distribution companies (EDCs) - CEZ, EVN and Energo-pro (the decision will be taken in early May). The SCEWR accuses EDCs of illegally offsetting payments from the National Electric Company (NEK) to settle its alleged debts to them

amounting to E160mn. The debts were piled up in 2012-2013 as a result of lack of funds in NEK accounts to pay for the preferential tariffs of the electricity produced by renewable energy sources (RES). The money for the preferential tariffs is supposed to come from a special fee imposed on all consumers. However, in 2012 SCEWR decided not to increase the said fee sufficiently enough in order to keep prices down. Thus EDCs were forced by the regulator to pay themselves for most of the green energy for a year. And next year, this time in order to reduce prices, the State Commission “forgot” to compensate them. This particular episode describes in a nutshell very well the management of the energy sector in Bulgaria. But the reality is even grimmer.

The zombie bite

The state-owned National Electricity Company - the wholesale supplier for the regulated segment of the electricity market and the backbone of the whole electricity system- has about E1.5bn short term liabilities with annual sales



of only 1.4bn. As a result, it already has about E500mn of unpaid bills to the energy producers. As a consequence, the latter are unable to pay for the coal (with the miners threatening with strikes twice already), the energy traders or the maintenance companies. The chain of mutual indebtedness is so long, that nobody has ever tried to calculate the overall pile of debts.

Last year NEK was saved with emergency loans from its parent company, Bulgarian Energy Holding, but they only covered some short term debts without fundamentally changing the situation Last year NEK was saved with emergency loans from its parent company, Bulgarian Energy Holding, but they only covered some short term debts without fundamentally changing the situation. NEK is still a walking dead company.

This zombie trance is the result of a deadly bite by several consecutive governments which exploited the stateowned company for their multi-billion pet projects and populist decisions.

as a partner in such a complicated project. Later on, leaked documents revealed that RWE was angry at NEK for negotiating behind its back with Atomstroyexport.

In 2005, a decision was taken to restart the suspended project for the Nuclear Power Plant at Belene. In the following year, Atomstroyexport won the tender to build two 1000 MW units with overnight price of E3.93bn. At the beginning everything looked rosy, even though most independent experts warned that the demand forecasts were inflated and that there would be no market for the Belene NPP (something the current electricity market in the region proves). Germany’s RWE became minority shareholder under conditions which were very good for NEK. However, just three years after the commencement of the project things went south and in 2010 Atomstroyexport estimated that the cost of the project had already climbed to E6.1bn (a whopping 55% increase).

Instead of halting the project immediately in late 2009 after the strategic partner left, the next government of GERB dragged it until the beginning of 2012. This caused serious financial loses for NEK – the company paid close to E500mn during this period for a project that had no chances to be carried out. These costs were further exacerbated with the Tsankov Kamak HPP project chaos. It turned out to be four times more expensive than the initial estimates and had a four-year delay in construction. As a result, NEK was forced to use its working capital to pay for the construction. The losses from both projects were covered with direct government support (up to E200mn in 2008 and 2009).

The first signal for the things to come was the deterioration of NEK’s financial situation in 2008 as a result of the need to pay its loans for the Belene NPP and the Tsankov Kamak Hydro Power Plant, a project initiated a year earlier. Then, a drop in electricity prices by approximately 30 percent because of the economic crisis seriously hurt NEK revenues. And in the end, RWE decided to pull out of the Belene NPP – a decision partly due to its own worsening financial situation, partly because it concluded that NEK could not be trusted

After a very brief moment of improved financial results in 2010 (because it stopped paying Atomstroyexport for the Belene NPP), NEK showed suspiciously good operating profits. They turned out to be artificial, because the company began delaying payments to electricity producers. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance, desperate to fill the budget gaps, sucked all those artificial profits from the energy companies leaving them in dire financial situation.

The triply critical year of 2012 The renewable energy boom went to


full explosion in early 2012. In the first few months of the year, there were 800 MW of new photovoltaic (PV) capacity installed, increasing six times the already installed 125 MW of PVs. Later on, another 100 MW were added and as of the beginning of 2013 Bulgaria had 1030 MW of installed PV capacity. In addition, there are 680 MW of wind turbines and 193 MW of small hydro-plants.

plants) was due to several factors. First and foremost, it was the very liberal legislation on the renewable energy. Basically everybody who had the will (not even the money) could have built a PV installation. Grid companies were obliged to connect anyone who met the technical requirements and the 20-25 year purchasing power guarantees made banks ready to fuel the boom.

As a result, the cost of green energy skyrocketed. The forecast for 2012-2013 was E177mn, while the real costs of the preferential tariffs are close to E409mn. For the period 2013-2014 the cost is about E486mn.

The boom of the RES was due to several factors. First and foremost, it was the very liberal legislation on renewable energy

NEK was supposed to buy all the expensive green energy and be compensated afterwards and the process naturally created a financial gap of E70mn only for the period of 20112012. At the same time, the costs of Power Purchasing Agreements with AES Galabovo TPP (it started its operations at the end of 2011) and ContourGlobal Maritsa East 3 TPP began to mount. And on top of that, NEK was forced by law to buy the electricity produced by central heating and industrial power cogeneration plants. This combined triple pressure, created by the state and the regulator, delivered the final blow to NEK and its debts began to grow fast.

The green boom

The boom of the RES (photovoltaics, wind turbines, small hydro and biomass

The spark came from the hungry investors who flooded Bulgaria after the domestic real estate crush and the closing of the Spanish and Czech markets for new PV investments. Moreover, the State Commission on Energy and Water Regulation turned out to be highly incompetent (so incompetent that many see it as a sign of possible undue influences on its decisions) and slept away the dramatic fall in the prices of PV components. In July 2011, SCEWR reduced the feed-in tariffs (by law there were fixed for a year)

by 35 percent. But as for example only in March-April 2012 PV panels were only 60 percent of the price taken as a target in the previous year, investors rushed in. Now, the so-called deficits, caused by the lack of funds to cover the preferential tariffs of renewable energy producers and central heating cogeneration units, and the PPAs with some power plants amount from E200mn, if you ask SCEWR officials, to E500mn if you ask independent experts. To put this in context, this amount represents a quarter of the annual sales on the electricity market in Bulgaria. Or in order to be covered, the prices need to go up by 25 percent. The issue of price hikes is a taboo in the current Socialist-led government. Instead, the government tries to squeeze everybody in the energy system – NEK, EDCs, or the energy producers (a 20 percent fee on solar and wind producers was imposed at the end of last year), while increasing prices of the locally produced coal (because there are eight thousand miners ready to strike and vote). This is a trajectory that will lead to inevitable crash - sooner rather than later.

* Nikolay Jekov is energy observer in Bulgaria. You can reach him at nikolay.

Legal insight Laurentiu Pachiu*

18 58


The main Romanian legal act that regulates the activities related to the hydrocarbons sector (oil and gas) is Law No. 238 of 7 June 2004, published with the Official Gazette of Romania No. 535 of 15 June 2004 (hereinafter “Petroleum Law�) and Government Resolution No. 2075 of 24 November 2004, approving the implementation rules of the Petroleum Law. In the meaning of the Petroleum Law, petroleum stands both for oil and gas.

The competent authority responsible in the oil sector is NAMR (as defined under question 2.1 above), organised as a specialised body of the central public administration, with legal personality, subordinated to the Government. NAMR is mainly entitled to: (i) manage the petroleum resources of the state; (ii) conclude petroleum agreements in the name of the Romanian State; (iii) supervise and verify the petroleum production in order to compute the royalties due by the title holders of petroleum agreements; and (iv) monitor the implementation of the measures set to protect the areas affected by petroleum operations. The main piece of legislation regulating the gas development is the Electric Energy and Natural Gas Law No. 123 of 10 July 2012. According to the Romanian Constitution and the secondary legislation, all natural gas reserves are exclusive property of the Romanian State and their development is granted to private investors by means of concessions, following public bid call procedures.

At the administrative level, the main competent authority in the natural gas sector is the NAMR, authorised to apply the legal provisions regulating the natural gas development activities, such as, to organise the public bid calls for the award of concessions in the natural gas sector and the issuance of production licences. Complementary to the attributions of the NAMR, there is a second public authority, the RERA (Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority), with the role of issuing the secondary legislation applicable in the natural gas sector, such as the issuance of licences and authorisations, including those required for the development of natural gas, the drafting of technical requirements related to natural gas development activities or the organisation, coordination and supervision of the gas market.

From the State to the investors Considering that oil and natural gas represent State-owned mineral resources (in situ), the rights related to the development of such resources are transferred to Romanian or foreign


Laurentiu Pachiu Who is Who legal entities, following public tendering procedures by means of establishing a concession right of the investor over the State-owned resource. The concession right in a given exploration and/or exploitation block (perimeter) is granted based on a standardised form of contract named “petroleum agreement” (Rom.: “acord petrolier”). Such agreements have standard provisions, being part of the tendering documentation, and are concluded between the NAMR, as representative of the State, and the private legal entity or group of companies, who have the required know-how, technical capabilities and financial means for performing such activities, and that are the winners of the public tendering. The concession right includes the right to perform the exploration and/ or exploitation and production activities within the area comprised in the given block (perimeter), allowing the investor to sell the production, having the obligation to pay to the State budget an annual production revenue (royalty). Depending on the rights to be granted

to the investors, the following types of petroleum agreements may be concluded for the development of oil and natural gas resources: (i) petroleum agreements for exploration-developmentproduction; (ii) petroleum agreements for development-production; and (iii) petroleum agreements for production.

Laurentiu Pachiu, the Managing Partner and founder of Pachiu & Associates, heads the PPP, Litigation and Finance Practice Groups within the firm.

The right to perform exploration and/or production operations is granted by the NAMR under the petroleum agreement, thus representing the authorisation to develop such kinds of activities. Moreover, prior to commencing the relevant activities, several additional permits, authorisations and endorsements are required from several authorities, such as the RERA or the Environmental Agency.

He has 18 years’ experience in the legal business environment. He started his career with a top United States-based law firm in Bucharest and eventually developed his own practice. Laurentiu has been assisting and representing foreign and Romanian blue-chip corporate clients in a wide range of matters related to Romanian and international law pertaining to mergers and acquisitions, privatizations, project financing and banking, capital markets, tax and offshore structures, as well as real estate, commercial and corporate law in general.

The title holders of petroleum agreements have also the obligation to perform a minimum exploration programme, expressly provided for under the petroleum agreements.

He is a graduate of Bucharest University School of Law and a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As regards the terms of the petroleum agreement, these are mainly established by law and are only to a limited extend

Laurentiu is fluent in Romanian, German and English and conversant in French.


The gas storage activity is governed by the Electric Energy and Natural Gas Law. Together with gas transportation, distribution and transit activities, gas storage falls under the regulated segment of the natural gas market.

negotiable. The petroleum agreements for the concession of development and/or production of oil and natural gas reserves are concluded for a period of maximum thirty (30) years, with a potential extension of up to fifteen (15) years. The State has the right to collect royalty following oil and natural gas development. In case of oil production activities, the royalty level varies between 3.5 per cent and 13.5 per cent, computed in respect of the gross production extracted. The level of royalty is influenced by the production capacity of each oil field. The same is applicable in respect of natural gas production activities. However, the maximum natural gas royalty is of 13 per cent. Further on, the Romanian State collects a 10 per cent royalty computed in respect of the gross income obtained following the performance of oil and natural gas

transportation and transit activities and a 3 per cent royalty computed for the gross income obtained following the natural gas underground storage activity. The Petroleum Law establishes the necessity of drafting, by the licence holder, of an abandonment plan in respect of the physical structures used in the production of petroleum, consisting of a complex technical, economic, social and environmental documentation, justifying the closing of the petroleum well and providing for the necessary actions to ensure the financing and the effective fulfilment of the measures for cessation of activity. The abandonment plan shall be endorsed by the NAMR. The gas storage activity is governed by the Electric Energy and Natural Gas Law. Together with gas transportation, distribution and transit activities, gas storage falls under the regulated


segment of the natural gas market. Pachiu & Associates is a leading Romanian business law firm, with a special focus on the energy sector. Bound by excellence, our purpose is to offer prompt, effective and personalized solutions to all legal matters that our domestic and international clients, regardless of their size, are confronted with in Romania. Our exclusive membership with the Associated European Energy Consultants, an international network for leading energy law and consultancy firms across the European continent, enables us to share global energy knowledge and expertise. We deliver our services in English, German, French, Italian and Spanish with the same ease that we do in Romanian. We may be of assistance worldwide through our membership with certain regional and global legal networks, as well as based on our long term collaboration with a Magic Circle firm and many other reputable law firms located in business centers around the world.

In order to perform gas storage activities, any legal entity, domestic or foreign, has to be duly licensed by the RERA. All technical installations used in gas storage activities have to be approved in advance by the RERA and other relevant involved authorities. The gas storage activity is subject to a regulated tariff, established by the RERA.

Pipelines and storage facilities

The activities of oil and natural gas transportation and storage activities represent services of national public interest and are considered strategic activities. Therefore, both the oil and the natural gas transportation pipelines, and the natural gas storage facilities are public property.

The right to use the land in order to construct oil or natural gas transportation pipelines or associated infrastructure shall be acquired by the following means: • purchasing the land and, if applicable, the buildings located on such land, at the price agreed by seller and buyer; • swap of land, accompanied by the reconstruction of the buildings on the newly granted land, if any, at the expense of the holder benefiting from the released land, in compliance with the parties’ agreement; • leasing the land for a determined period, based on lease agreements; • concession of land from the State; and • concluding a partnership agreement between the owner of the land and the title holder of the petroleum agreement.

The law provides that the activity of oil and gas transportation may be subject to concession by the Romanian State. At this moment, the only entity holding a natural gas transportation licence (concession) is Transgaz, a joint-stock company, where the Romanian State is the owner of 58.5 per cent of its share capital.

Nevertheless, in case the infrastructural work for the development of the oil or natural gas pipelines is declared to be of public interest, the Government and county councils or the Bucharest Municipality Local Council are entitled to expropriate the necessary land.

In the oil sector, the oil transportation infrastructure is operated exclusively by Conpet SA, a State-controlled joint-stock company, the only entity holding an oil transportation licence.

*Laurentiu Pachiu is the Managing Partner and founder of Pachiu & Associates.

Legal insight Yannis Kelemenis and Konstantina Soultati, Kelemenis & Co.

19 62


In the last couple of years the Greek natural gas market has been under continuous structural, legal and regulatory changes following the adoption of the 3rd Energy Package rules (by Statute 4001/2011) and the recent privatisation of DESFA, the Greek network operator (TSO). Market rules have been thoroughly amended to reflect the market liberalization process and the measures introduced by the network codes and the Commission’s implementing acts pursuant to the 3rd Energy Package.

1. Establishment of an entry/exit tariff system and introduction of a Virtual Trading Point Access to the Greek natural gas transmission network (the so-called NNGS) is provided through an entry/exit system. This entry/exit system came recently into operation following the second revision of the Network Code in December 2013 [Decision of the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) no 526/2013] and the entry into force of the new network tariffs on 1.2.2013 (Decision of RAE no 722/2012), which are issued after the Tariffs Regulation of RAE (Decision no 594/2012).

The entry/exit system follows Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and introduces the rule that tariffs are not dependent on the transport route. Crucially, the revised Network Code facilitates trading within the entry/exit system through a “Virtual Nomination Point” (VNP). Users can thus offtake gas from the VNP, even if they have not booked capacity at an “Interconnection Point” (IP). But balancing of the NNGS is not yet in full conformity with the EU acquis which opts for a market-based balancing regime.

The Greek Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (YPEKA) has recently issued a roadmap of the next steps required to reform the Greek natural gas market, so that Greece can take full advantage of the adoption of TAP as the south corridor. According to the roadmap, the VNP should serve as a virtual gas hub, which is currently not the case. Trading within the VNP is, in fact, very limited in Greece as there are no gas hub services facilitating the trade nor is it possible for intra-day transactions to take place (within-theday re-nominations are not allowed). It is open to discussion whether the TSO will be the hub operator, but a timeline has already been set for RAE (in cooperation with the TSO) to study the rules of access to the hub. A new balancing regime is to be proposed by RAE by the second half of 2015.

2. Congestion management procedures

The revised Network Code implemented the congestion management procedures of Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, as amended by Commission Decision No 2012/490/EU of 24.8.2012


(the so-called CMP Guidelines). Greece has opted not to adopt as yet the firm day-ahead Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI) mechanism provided by the CMP Guidelines. The procedures which have already been introduced pursuant to the Guidelines are: (a) The oversubscription and buy-back of capacity The scheme serves as a tool to limit contractual congestion by the TSO when offering capacity in excess of the actual technical capacity (on the presumption that not all of the reserved capacity will actually be used by system users). The novelty of the Greek Network Code is that oversubscription is also allowed on the exit-points (i.e. not strictly at IPs, as provided by the Guidelines). This is because, according to the Network Code, the aggregated amount of the capacity reserved by system users at IPs should be equal to the aggregated amount of the capacity reserved at the exit-points (whether virtual or not). The LNG terminal’s point of connection to the system (the so-called entry point Aghia Triada) is excluded from the above scheme (as well as from the exit/entry

system in general). (b) Surrender of contracted capacity Under this mechanism the TSO accepts any surrender of contracted capacity by a network user. In accordance with the CMP Guidelines, the network user retains its rights and obligations resulting from the initially allocated capacity until the surrendered capacity is reallocated by the TSO. The Greek Network Code (Article 20AΓ) does not specify that the reallocation will be deemed to be met only after all available capacity has been allocated. It is further not explicitly provided that the initial capacity holder cannot make additional profit from surrendering the initial capacity. These rules are provided in the CMP Guidelines and should thus be considered directly applicable, although it is yet to be established whether this will be so in practice. (c) Long-term UIOLI mechanism Before its second revision the Greek Network Code had already introduced a long-term UIOLI mechanism. According to this regime the TSO would release unused capacity if (i) there is request

for capacity reservation by another user and the capacity available is not enough to meet this request and (ii) the network user uses less than 80% of the reserved capacity for a period of twelve consecutive months.

In the last couple of years the Greek natural gas market has been under continuous structural, legal and regulatory changes following the adoption of the 3rd Energy Package rules Crucially, article 18 of the Greek Network Code, which allowed for significant flexibility to the long-term network users when amending their reserved capacity,


As regards the overall market design, most of the end-customers are still captives. This is because Greece has been granted with certain derogations under the first and second gas directives

was repealed. According to RAE, this facilitates the non-discriminatory access of third parties to the NNGS.

3. Backhaul services

Following an agreement with the Bulgarian TSO and in accordance with Article 21 of the CAM-NC (Regulation (EC) No 984/2013), the Greek Network Code now provides for the offer of virtual backhaul capacity to network users. The virtual backhaul capacity is offered upon transmission agreements for a minimum term of one day or for integral multiples of such term under a 95% maximum possibility of interruption.

4. Interruptible services

In compliance with the European regulatory framework, new services/ capacity contracts were recently introduced. Articles 20B and 20Γ of the Network Code now prescribe that the TSO offers interruptible capacity services for the day-ahead under the condition that all the capacity has been allocated at an entry/exit point of the system. The services are provided by the TSO following the conclusion of new contracts for the provision of

interruptible services.

5. Other reforms

In the last couple of years the Greek natural gas market has been under continuous structural, legal and regulatory changes following the adoption of the 3rd Energy Package rules (by Statute 4001/2011) and the recent privatisation of DESFA, the Greek network operator (TSO). Market rules have been thoroughly amended to reflect the market liberalization process and the measures introduced by the network codes and the Commission’s implementing acts pursuant to the 3rd Energy Package. To this end, the following measures that were recently adopted are of some note: To facilitate third-party access to the transmission system on a nondiscriminatory basis, a Register of “Potential Users” was established under Article 8A of the Greek Network Code. Any potential network user must submit the supporting documentation for the conclusion of an agreement with the TSO at least twenty days before the agreement is to be signed-off by the parties. This is intended to facilitate the

The Kelemenis & Co. law firm is well known for its leading energy practice, which is well-versed in both transactional and regulatory work. Legal 500 (2014) ranks the practice in the top-tier. It is headed by name partner Dr. Kelemenis and has built a strong reputation not only in Greece, but also in the wider region of southeast Europe, where it has been hevily involved in energy regulation and liberalization. The practice is well-versed into both transactional and regulatory work and combines industry know-how with cutting-edge capabilities. The Greek Transmission and Market Operators, General Electric, the Greek Public Gas Corporation, Chevron, Endesa, Veolia, Sunpower and Statkraft are just some of the major energy clients Kelemenis & Co. advises on an on-going basis for energy regulatory and commercial work. At the regulatory front, the firm has a strong track record of advising numerous regulatory bodies and organisations, such as the Energy Community Secretariat, the regulators of Greece (RAE), FYR Macedonia (ERC) and Egypt (EgyptERA), and the governments of Romania, Moldova, FYR Macedonia and Albania. In 2011 Kelemenis & Co. was chosen by the Greek government to draft the new primary law on implementing the 3rd Energy Package in Greece.

Dr Yannis Kelemenis is the managing partner of Kelemenis & Co. Law Firm.

Mrs Konstantina Soultati heads the firm’s Regulated Markets Group.

conclusion of agreements of one-day term and it is an interim measure that RAE eventually wishes to substitute with a “click and book model”, under which TSO services will be rendered under “Master-Agreements” between the TSO and the network users.

• Inside those territories, the electricity producers (excluding CHP producers), large customers, non-household customers supplied with natural gas for the purposes of using it as a fuel for propellant use, and the already operating EPAs for the quantities of natural gas they require in excess of the quantities specified in their supply agreement with DEPA (following the contract’s expiry, these EPAs shall become fully eligible customers); and

As regards the overall market design, most of the end-customers are still captives. This is because Greece has been granted with certain derogations under the first and second gas directives. Consequently, pursuant to article 82 of Statute 4001/2011, only the following customers are eligible to select their supplier: • All customers outside the geographic territories of the already operating and the future EPAs (i.e. regional natural gas companies). Already existing EPAs are joint ventures of DEPA (the former Greek incumbent) and other gas companies which have been granted exclusivity rights under concession agreements over household and other customers with a consumption of no more than 100,000 MWh/pa, as calculated on the average consumption of a period of 24 months (customers with a consumption above this threshold are considered to be “large customers”), situated within their allocated territories (corresponding to the areas of Attica, Thessaly and Thessaloniki). DEPA is the exclusive supplier of customers situated within the territories of future EPAs;

• Future EPAs. According to the roadmap of the Greek Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (YPEKA), Greece will further open up its gas market to competition and all customers will acquire the eligibility status by no later than July 2017. As an interim measure, Statute 4254/2014 already provides that customers that have met the criterion of eligibility as large customers by 31 December 2012 shall remain eligible until 31 December 2015.


General interest

20 66


It’s better than your imagination. It’s faster than your thoughts. With its low-slung silhouette and sleek lines the BMW i8 hybrid sports car makes every other vehicle on the road look obsolete; and when the scissor doors open and hover above the roof, only gravity keeps it from racing the moon…

The i8 isn’t a typical BMW, except for the kidney grill homage, but the emotional appeal of its aerodynamically optimized body design paves the way for an engagingly dynamic and futuristically efficient take on the company’s hallmark driving pleasure. The vehicle, which is being launched in the U.S. this spring at a retail price of $135,700, was conceived from the outset as a sustainable plug-in hybrid, a concept that created a challenge for the engineers and designers to not only maintain performance levels for a BMW, but to surpass them. And with the i8 able to go from 0 to 60 in 4.4 seconds and get 94 miles per gallon, BMW i is now leading the pack in the sustainable hybrid sports car market. “We are known for making ultimate driving machines and it was really a technical exercisefor us to use all our engineering competence to show what the most efficient sports car performance could deliver,” said José Guerrero, product manager for BMW i. “That is really the concept with the i8.”

Efficient & profitable

The BMW Group launched Efficient Dynamics over a decade ago with the aim of significantly enhancing the performance characteristics and efficiency of every new model. Efficient Dynamics incorporates both the evolution of existing technology and the use of revolutionary new drive system concepts. With its intelligent drive system management, the BMW i8 strikes the balance between dynamic ability and efficiency in a variety of driving situations. The output of the engine and electric motor, the capacity of the highvoltage battery, intelligent energy management and the vehicle’s overall weight are tailored to form a precisely composed package that defines the unique character of the plug-in hybrid sports car.

Innovative & modern

The architecture and design of the i8 highlight its innovation. Clean, minimalist lines and homogeneous surfaces defined by a small number of precise edges and function-focused details underline the structure of overlapping and interlocking surfaces. This layering principle allows


aerodynamic forms to be wrapped up in a progressively styled package.

module and Drive module accentuating the dynamic appearance of the i8.

The compact construction distinguishing both the electric motor and combustion engine allows the front and rear sections of the car to be particularly low-slung and thus accentuate the car’s dynamically stretched flanks; and the scissor-type doors, which open forward and upwards like wings, add extra intrigue to the design.

“From the get go, we picked an architecture that led to the vehicle dynamics of a BMW, yet we chose a whole new way of designing the vehicle from an architecture stand point, it’s like the body frame design of the old, yet with the most innovative materials used, which is carbon fiber and aluminum,” Guerrero said.

“Our project managers said they wanted the i8 to be ‘like the dream car posters of the future. So if you had a dream car calendar, what would those cars look like in the future?’ And I said, ‘you know what, let’s design that,’ and what car wouldn’t be a dream car without these scissor doors,” Guerrero said.

The definition of sustainability

The other key component to the vehicle is the innovative LifeDrive architecture, which opens up an exceptional degree of freedom for BMW i design. The central element of the Life module is the carbon-fiber-reinforced plastic (CFRP) passenger cell. The Life module is fixed to the aluminum Drive module, which houses all the drive and chassis technology. This distinctive two-way split is reflected on both the outside and the inside of the car by the visible layering and intertwining of different surfaces, with three-dimensional and flowing transitions between the Life

“We saw this shift in customer perception, yes they can pay for more gas, money is not an issue as far as paying for gasoline and so on, but now there’s a shift into putting their money in where their values are,” Guerrero said.

In the past few years BMW saw consumers’ thinking shift regarding environmentally friendly purchasing decisions. The consumers’ values started changing as sustainability and energy efficiency became more important to them.

That is why it was important to maximize the vehicle’s driving performance and miles per gallon – and the EPA estimates are at 94 miles per gallon for the i8. In addition, as part of the development of BMW i cars, sustainability targets are established and then pursued with the

same vigor as cost, weight or quality objectives. This all-embracing approach is reflected both in the selection of materials and in the construction and manufacturing processes, which differ substantially from conventional manufacturing methods in the automotive industry. “The passenger compartment is made entirely out of carbon fiber, which is very energy intensive to create. So for us, we took a look at the most energy intensive process and we found a location where it could be made with 100 percent sustainable power,” Guerrero said. The energy used to manufacture the carbon fiber at Moses Lake in Germany is provided exclusively by locally sourced renewable hydro-electric power, which means it is 100 percent CO2-free. Highly resource-efficient processes have also been put in place for the other stages of production for BMW i brand cars. The result is a reduction of around 50 percent in energy consumption compared with the already highly economical average figures across the BMW Group’s production network and a drop in water consumption of roughly 70 percent. For example, the energy required for production of BMW i cars at the Leipzig plant comes exclusively from wind power. This was the first time


“We are known for making ultimate driving machines and it was really a technical exercise for us to use all our engineering competence to show what the most efficient sports car performance could deliver” ― José Guerrero, product manager for BMW i

that wind turbines had been installed at an automotive manufacturing plant in Germany to provide a direct supply of power to its production halls.

High performance

The BMW eDrive drive system technology, a compact, highly turbocharged 1.5-liter gasoline engine with TwinPower Turbo technology and intelligent energy management all come together to create the i8. The three-cylinder combustion engine in the i8 develops 170 kW/231 horsepower and drives the rear wheels, while the 96 kW/131 horsepower electric motor draws its energy from a lithium-ion battery, which can be charged from a conventional 110 volt power outlet as well as a 220 volt electric vehicle charger, and sends its power to the front axle. “This is really how we were able to get the efficiency and the incredible power output with this car,” Guerrero said. “It’s producing 231 horsepower and 236 pound-feet of torque.”

The electric motor gives an instantaneous response from the front end that is torque filling, which is completely seamless to the driver, who does not feel the front end and the back end working, it’s just a smooth transition with no dip or bumps in the drive. It’s all seamlessly done, and feels like one drive train, but actually there are two power trains in the car, a rear engine, and an all electric front engine. “It’s something really unprecedented in the industry because the only other car out there to tell you the truth that is getting close to our efficiency numbers is the Porsche 918, and that sells for $845,000,” Guerrero said. “This is why our dealers are so exited, and people are really excited about this car, because there is no real other product out there that is ready to hit the masses and deliver this type of efficiency.” The i8 will roll out to dealer showrooms on the West Coast this spring and then be available throughout the U.S. this summer.





EUROPE Balkan & Black Sea Petroleum Association 2 Hristo Belchev Str., 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria Tel.: 00359 2 986 06 85 Email: DG Energy-European Comission DM 2403/73 Rue J.-A. Demot 24, 1040, Brussels, Belgium Tel.: +32 229 92460 Email: EWEA 80, Rue d’Arlon, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel.: +32 2 213 1811 Email: 70

International Energy Agency (IEA) 9, rue de la Fédération, Paris Cedex 15, 75739 Paris-France Tel.: +33 1 40 57 65 00, Fax: +33 1 40 57 65 09 Email: IRENA - International Renewable Energy Agency CI Tower, Khalidiyah (32nd) Street Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Tel.: +971 2 4179000 IRENA Innovation Technology Centre Robert-Schuman-Platz 3, 53175 Bonn, Germany Tel.: +49 (0) 228 391 79085 World Energy Council Regency House, 1-4 Warweek Street, 5th floor London, W1B 5LT, United Kingdom Tel.: +44 (0) 207734 5996 World Wind Energy Association 5, Charles-de-Gaulle-Str., 53113 Bonn, Germany Tel.: +49 228 369 40 80

BULGARIA 01. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS Ministry of Economy and Energy 8, Slavyanska Str., Sofia 1052 Tel.: +359 2 9407001, +359 2 940 7545 Email: DKEVR 8-10 Dondukov Blvd., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 988 8730, +359 2 9359 621 Email: Sustainable Energy Development Agency 37 Ekzarh Yosiph Str., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 915 4012 Email: Nuclear Regulatory Agency 69 Shipchenski prokhod Blvd, 1574 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 9406-800 Email: Parliament Energy Commission 1 Knyaz Alexander I Sq., Sofia Tel.: +359 2 939 39 Email:

2. NON GOVERNMENTAL Publics N7, Stefan Karadja Str., Entrance A, floor 5, Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 879436756 Email: Energy Management Institute 5 Lege Str. 1st Floor, Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 2 980 07 03, +359 2 950 62 10 Email: Bulgarian Camber of Commerce and Industry 9 Iskar Str., Sofia 1058 Tel.: +359 2 987 78 26, +359 2 8117 445 Email: BSK 16-20 Alabin Str., Sofia 1000 Tel.: + 359 2 980 03 03, +359 2 932 09 28 Email: KRIB 8 Han Asparuh Str., 1463 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 981 9169

AEC Kozlodui 3321 Kozlodui Tel.: +359 973 7 2020 Email: Dalkia 5 Janosh Huniadi Blvd, PO Box 26, Varna Tel.: +359 889311218 Email: Energo-pro 258 Vladislav Varnenchik Blvd, Varna Towers, Tower G, 9009 Varna Tel.: +359 52 660876 Email: EVN 37 Hristo G. Danov Str., 4000 Plovdiv Tel.: +359 700 1 7777 Email: CEZ 140 G.S. Rakovski Str., Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 070010010 Email:

Bulatom 10 Vihren Str., 1618 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 439 03 02 Email:

Contour Global ContourGlobal Maritsa East 3 TPP, Mednikarovo, Stara Zagora 6294 Tel.: +359-42-663-251 Email:

Bulgarian Photovoltaic Association 42 Vitosha Blvd., Floor 2, App. 3, 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 44 222 28 Email:

AES AES Maritza Iztok 1, 72 Lyuben Karavelov Str., Sofia Tel.: +359 42 901 634 Email:

Bulgarian Wind Energy Association 7 Paris Str., 5th Floor, Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 2 4833820 Email:

Toplophikacia Bourgas Lozovo District, North Industrial Zone, Heating Plant, 8000 Bourgass Tel.: +359 56 87 11 11 Email:

Association of Producers of Ecological Energy 310 Vladislav Varnenchik Blvd., 9009 Varna Tel.: + 359 52 750 550 Email:

03. ENERGY COMPANIES Bulgarian Energy Holding 16 Vesalec Str., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 926 38 00 Email: National Electricity Company 5 Vesalec Str., 1040 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 9263 636, +359 2 986 56 06 Email: ESO Triaditsa District, 105 Gotse Delchev Blvd., 1404 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 96-96-802 Email: TPP Martza Iztok 2 6265 Kovachevo village, Stara Zagora district Tel.: +359 42 66 20 14, +359 42 66 29 19 Email:

TEC Bobov Dol Golyamo Selo vilage, 2600 Bulgaria Tel.: +359 701 50531 Toplophikacia Pleven 128 Eastern Industrial Zone, 5800 Pleven Tel.: +359 64 895 288 Toplophikacia Rousse TEC Iztok Str., 7009 Rousse Tel.: +359 82 883311 Email:

Toplophikacia Sliven 23 Stephan Karadja, 8800 Sliven Tel.: +359 44 622 722 Email:

Lukoil 42, Todor Alexandrov Blvd, 1303 Bulgaria Tel.: +359 2 91 74 316 Email:

Chimcomplect 205, Al. Stamboliyski, Blvd., 1309 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 822 34 60 Email:

Brikel EAD Stara Zagora region, 6280 Galabovi Tel.: +359 8122000

Petrol 43, Cherni Vrah Blvd, 1407 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 4960 300


TEC Sviloza EAD 51 Krastio Sarafov Str., 1 floor, ap 1, 1421 Sofia Tel.: +359 42 615615 Email:

OMV Bulgaria 1, Sofiiski Geroi Str., Sofia 1612 Tel.: +359 2 93 29710 Email:

04. RENEWABLES E.Mirolio EAD Industrial Zone, 8800 Sliven Tel.: +359 44612418 Email: SolarPro Holding 7 Sheinovo str., 1504 Sofia Email: Smart Group 35 N.Y.Vapcarov Str,. Floor3, ap. 3A, 1407 Sofia Tel.: +359 884 369000, +90 532 566 2753 Email:

05. GAS & OIL Bulgargas 47 Petar Parchevich Str., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 935 89 44, +359 2 935 89 88 Email: Bulgartransgas POB 3, Housing estate ”Ljulin-2”, 66 Pancho Vladigerov Blvd, Sofia 1336 Tel.: + 359 /2/ 939 63 00 Email: Overgaz 5 Philip Kutev Str., 1407 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 428 2000 Email: Citigas Bulgaria EAD 4 Adam Mitskevich Str. Tel.: +359 2 925 9495 Email: Melrose Resources Bulgaria 32 Marko Balabanov, 9000 Varna Tel.: +359 52 699 556 Email: Direct Petrolium Bulgaria/TransAtlantic 16 Arh. J. Milanov str., 1164 Sofia Tel.: +3592 963 3244 Email: Chevron Bulgaria Exploration & Production EOOD 10 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1000 Tel.: +3592 890 1801 DEXIA BULGARIA 9160 Devnya Industrial Zone Tel.: +359 887077077 Email:

Shell Bulgaria 48, Sitniakovo Blvd, Serdica Office, 8 floor, 1505 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 960 1752 Email: Toplivo 2, Solunska Str., Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 2 9333 570 Email:

06. MAINTENANCE Energoremont Holding 34 Totleben Blvd., 1606 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 8133577 Email: Centralna Energoremontna Baza 1 Lokomotiv Str., 1220 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 8105 454 Email: Atomenergoremont Kozloduy NPP site, 3321 Kozloduy Tel.: +359 973 80018 Email: Enemona 20 Kosta Lulchev Str., Sofia 1113 Tel.: +359 2 80 54 850 Email: Energoremont – Galabovo 6280 Galabovo Tel.: +359 418 62086 Email: Risk Enegenering 10 Vihren Str., Sofia 1618 Tel.: +359 2 8089 702

OET 38, Bokar Blvd, 1404 Sofia Tel.: + 359 2 854 81 38, +359 894 777846 Email: DANS 120D, Simeonovsko Shose Blvd, 1700 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 42 100 10 EFG 10, Vihren Str., Pavlovo distr., Sofia Tel.: + 359 2 892 88 08 Email: Energy MT 8, Bacho Kiro, 1000 Sofia Email:

08. LAW FIRMS Batkov&Assocs. 48, Alabin Str., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 9335611 Email: CMS Cameron McKenna 14, Tzar Osvoboditel Blvd, 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 897860421 Email: Wolf Theiss 29, Atanas Dukov Str., Rainbow Centre, Sofia 1407 Tel.: +359 2 86 13 700 Email: Vladimirov&Kiskinov 43, Gen. Eduard Totleben Blvd, Fl.1, At.1, Sofia Tel.: +359 888 15 34 12, + 359 2 988 18 28 Email: Tocheva&Mandajieva 26, Stoyan Mihaylovski Str., fl. 5, 1164 Sofia Tel.: +359 888584000 Email: BALMS 2, General Totleben Str., floor 4 1606 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 411 0004 Email:

09. PR AMI Communications 135 B, G.S.Rakovski Str., floor 2, Sofia 1000 Tel.: +359 2 989 5115 Email: D&D 54, W. Gladstone Str., 1000 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 866 98 99 Email:


Ikona 43, Nishava Str., Sofia 1680 Tel.: +359 2 958 30 Email: MARKETOR 3A, Nikolay Haytov Str., ESTE Office Building, fl. 1, office 15, 1113 Sofia Tel.: +359 2 423 07 97 Email:


Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority Griva Digeni Avenue 81-83 , IAKOVIDI Building, 3rd Floor, 1080 NICOSIA Tel.: +357 22 666363 Email: Cyprus Transmission System Operator of Electrical Energy Evangelistrias 68, CY-2057 Strovolos Tel.: +357 22 611 611 Email: Cyprus Organisation for Storage and Management of Oil Stocks (COSMOS) 27, Heracleous Str., 2nd floor, Office 203, 2040 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 81 81 00 Email: Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Cyprus Energy Sector 6, Andreas Araouzos Str., CY-1421, Nicosia Tel.: +357 22867100 Email: Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus Presidential Palace, 1400 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 867400 Email: Natural Gas Public Company (DEFA) 13, Limassol Avenue, Demetra Tower, 4th floor, 2112 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 761 761 Email: Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry 38, Grivas Dhigenis Ave. & 3 Deligiorgis Str., Tel.: +357 22 889800 Email: Commission for the Protection of Competition (C.P.C) of the Republic of Cyprus 53, Strovolos Ave., 2018 Strovolos, Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 606600

03. INSTITUTIONS Cyprus Institute of Energy 2 Agapinoros & 3 Arch. Makariou, Megaro IRIS, 1st Floor, 1076 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 606060 Email:

04. AUDIT COMPANIES PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 3 Artemidos Avenue, Artemidos Tower, 7th & 8th Floors, CY-6020 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 555 000 C.O. Cyprus Opportunity Energy Public Company Limited 13 Karaiskakis Str., Limassol 3601 Tel.: +357 25 800441 Email:

05. LAW FIRMS Kyprianidis, Nicolaou & Associates 48, Themistoklis Dervis Avenue, Office 401, 1066 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 756585 Email: Christos M. Triantafyllidis 2 Evagorou Str., Irini Megaron, 3rd floor, Office 31-33, 1521 Nicosia

06. CONSULTANTS Consultancy Services for Selecting a Natural Gas Supplier and Concluding Commercial Agreements Consortium Denton Wilde Sapte LLP “Frontier Economics Ltd, 1 Fleet Place” London EC4M 7WS UK Engineering Consultancy Services for the Development of a Gas Pipeline Network “Gas Natural Fenosa Engineering, S.L.U.” “Parque Empresarial La Finca 28223, Pozuelo de Alarcon” “Madrid, Spain” ANETEL Larnaca District Development Agency 2 Ag. Lazarou Str., 7040 Voroklini Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 815280 Email: NICOLAS ARISTODEMOU 5A, Afxentiou Str., 2ndFloor, CY-1309, Nicosia Email: Cba Conquest Business Advisors 176, Athalassis Avenue, CY2025 Strovolos, Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 820800 Email:


Envitech Ltd 9 Antonis Papadopoulos Str., Paralimni Tel.: +357 23 743440 Email:

Electricity Authority of Cyprus 11 Amfipoleos Str., 2025 Strovolos, 1399 Lefkosia Tel.: +357-22 20 10 00 Email:

Hiteco Ltd 33 Aigyptou Str., 3087 Limassol Tel.: +357 25 870634 Email:

Value Creation Consulting Ltd 13A, Iras Street, 1061 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 100206 Email:

07. OIL & GAS COMPANIES Employers & Industrialists Federation 2 Acropoleos Ave. & Glafkou Str., 1511 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 66 51 02 Email: PETROLINA 1 Kilkis Str., 6015 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 848000 Email: Lukoil Cyprus Ltd 11 Limassol Ave., 5th Floor, 2112 Aglanja, Nicosia Tel.: +357 70001000 Email: Exxonmobil Cyprus Inc 6 Ag. Prokopiou Str., Eggomi, Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 393101 Hellenic Petroleum Cyprus Ltd 3, Ellispontou Str., 2015 Strovolos Tel.: +357 22 477000 PPT Aviation Services Ltd 1 Kilkis Str., 6015 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 620885 BP Eastern Mediterranean Ltd Dekhelia Rd, 6301 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 812849 Email: Intergaz Ltd Dhekelia Rd, 6303 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 821 666 Email: Synergas Dhekelia Rd, 6303 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 635286 A.M.K. EcoLeaf Ltd - ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 15 Dodekanisou Str., Anthoupoli, Nicosia 2302 Tel.: +357 22 720670 Email: Lanitis Green Energy Group Ltd 107B Nicou Pattichi Str., 3070 Limassol Tel.: +357 25 822314

08. ELECTRICITY FALCON ELECTRICITY POWER 135 Omonoias Ave, 8th floor, 3045 Limassol Tel.: +357 25 028560 Email:

09. CENTRAL HEATING LAKO 241 Protaras Avenue, 5311 Paralimni Tel.: +357 23 821939 Eail: A.N.T. METALLOFABRICA LTD 6 RODIONOS K. RIGA, Ag. Athanasios INDUSTRIAL ESTATE Tel.: +357 25 724820 Email: Narkissos Aircon Corner Makarious Ave. & Theodorou Potamianou

Public Gas Corporation S.A. (DEPA) 92 Marinou Antipa Ave., 141 21 Heraklion Tel: +30 210 2701000, Fax: +30 210 2701010 Email: Hellenic Transmission System Operator (DESMIE) 72 Kastoros Str., 185 45 Piraeus Tel.: +30 210-9466700, Fax: +30 210-9466766 Email: Independent Power Transmission Operator (ADMIE) 89 Dyrrachiou Str., 104 43 Athens Tel.: +30 210-5192281, Fax: +30 210-5192504 Email: Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator S.A. (DESFA) 357-359 Messogion Ave., 152 31 Chalandri Tel.: +30 210 6501200, Fax: +30 210-6749504 Email:

PANARIS & ASSOCIATES ELECTROTHERM LTD 42 Gregoris Afxentiou Str., Ayios Dometios, Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 783090 Email:

Greek Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) Patriarxou Grigoriou & Neapoleos, P.O Box 60092, 153 10 Agia Paraskevi Tel.: +30 210-6506700 , Fax: +30 210-6506748 Email:

iClima Ltd Office 1D, 16 August Str., 1040 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 43 43 43 Email:

Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator S.A. (DEDDIE) 20 Perraivou & 5 Kallirrois Str., 117 43 Athens Tel.: +30 210-9281698, Fax: +30 210-9281698 Email:

Build Shield 8 Oidipodos Str., 6058 Larnaca Tel.: +357 24 102 830 Email: Aristides S. Air Control Services ltd 1, 28th October Avenue, Block C, Office 208, 2414 Egkomi Tel.: +357 22 444660 Email: Terza Solar Power 22 Archiepiskopou Kyprianou Str. Tel.: +357 24 664532 Email: /

Centre for Renewable Energy Sources and Saving (KAPE) 19th km Marathonos Ave, 19009 Pikermi Tel.: +30 210-6603300, Fax: +30 210-6603301 Email: Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) 132 Pireos Str., 118 54 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3727400, Fax: +30 210-3255460 Email: National Observatory of Athens Lofos Nymphon, PO Box 20048, 118 10 Thissio Tel.: +30 210-3490000 Email:

MTV WATER SERVICES 146 Vasileos Kon/nou, Shop 1,2 Tsirio, Limassol 3080 Tel.: +357 25 389155 Email:

Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 11 Tsami Karatasou Str., 117 42 Athens Tel.: +30 210-9211200, Fax: +30 210-9228130 Email:

CHR SKARPARIS LTD 22 Mixalakopoulou Str., 1685 Nicosia Tel.: +357 22 764308 Email:


GREECE 01. GOVERNMENT Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (YPEKA) 17 Amaliados Str., 115 23 Athens Tel.: +30 213 1515000, Fax: +30 210 6447608 Email:

Hellenic Copper Institute 252 Pireos Str., 177 78 Tavros Tel.: +30 210-4898298, Fax: +30 210-4898298 Email:

03. FEDERATIONS - UNIONS Federation of Hellenic Recycling & Energy Recovery Industries 57 Ethnikis Antistaseos Str., 152 31 Halandri Tel.: +30 210-6931 011, Fax: +30 210-6931012 Email: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEB) 5 Xenofontos Str., 105 57 Athens Tel.: +30 211 5006000, Fax: +30 210 3222929 Email:

04. ASSOCIATIONS Hellenic Association for the Cogeneration of Heat and Power 7 Ioustinianou Str., 114 73 Athens Tel.: +30 210 8219118, Fax: +30 210-8821917 Email: Hellenic Association of Independent Power Producers Email: Hellenic Association of Photovoltaic Energy Producers (SPEF) 3 Dimokratias Str., 151 21 Pefki Tel.: +30 210-6854035, Fax: +30 210-6854035 Email: Hellenic Association of Photovoltaic Investors (PASYF) 1 Archimdous Str., Nea Alikarnassos 716 01 Iraklio Creta Tel./Fax: +30 2821-078409 Email: Hellenic Biofuels & Biomass Association (SBIBE) 4 Ioanni Tsalouchidis Str., 542 48 Thessaloniki Tel.: +30 2310 330501, Fax: +30 2310 330502 Email: Hellenic Petroleum Marketing Companies Association 46 Ionos Dragoumi Str., 115 28 Athens Tel.: +30 210 7291050, Fax: +30 210-7245172 Email: Hellenic Small Hydropower Association (HSHA) 23 Agias Lavras Str., 141 21 Iraklio Tel.: +30 210-2811917, Fax: +30 210-2837372 Email: Hellenic Union of Industries Consumers of Energy (UNICEN) 57 Ethnikis Antistaseos Str., 152 31 Halandri Tel.: +30 210-6861489, Fax: +30 210-6283496 Email:

Institute of Energy For South-East Europe (IENE) 3 Alex. Soutsou Str., 106 71 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3628457, Fax: +30 210-3646144 Email:

Hellenic Wind Energy Association (HWEA) ELETAEN 306 Leoforos kifissias Str, 1st Floor, 152 32 Athens Tel.: +30 210-8081755, Fax: +30 210-8081755 Email:

Operator of Electricity Market S.A. 72 Kastoros Str., 185 45 Piraeus Tel.: +30 211-880700, Fax: +30 211-8806766 Email:

Greek Association of RES Electricity Producers 85 Mesogion Str., 115 26 Athens Tel.: +30 210- 6968418, Fax: +30 210-6968031 Email:


Greek Biomass Association (HELLABIOM) 150 Andrea Papandreou Avenue, 165 61 Glifada Tel.: +30 210 9652031, Fax: +30 210-9652081 Email:

05. ELECTRICITY Elpedison Energy 8-10 Sorou Str., Building C, 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 211-2117400, Fax: +30 210-3441255 Email:


Elpedison Power 8-10 Sorou Str., Building C, 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-3441130, Fax: +30 210-3441199 Email: Heron S.A. 85 Mesogion Ave., 115 26 Athens Tel.: +30 213-0333000, Fax: +30 210-6968690 Email: M&M Gas Patroklou 5-7 Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-68777300, Fax: +30 210-6877400 Email: Protergia SA. 8 Artemidos Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-3448300, Fax: +30 210-3448471 Email: Public Power Corporation S.A. (DEH) 30 Halkokondili Str., 104 32 Athens Tel.: +30 210-5230301, Fax: +30 210-5237727 Email:

06. FUELS Aegean S.A. 10 Akti Kondili Str., 185 45 Piraeus Tel.: +30 210-4586000, Fax: +30 210-4586241 Email: Avinoil S.A. 12A Herodou Attikou Str., 151 24 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-8093500, Fax: +30 210-8093555 Email: BP Elliniki S.A. Petroleum 26 Kiphissias Av. & 2 Paradissou Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6887777, Fax: +30 210-6887697 Email: Coral S.A. 12A Herodou Attikou Str., 151 24 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-9476000, Fax: +30 210-9476500 Email: Coral Gas (Hellas) 26-28 G. Averof Str., 142 32 Perissos Tel.: +30 210-9491000, Fax: +30 210-9407987 Email: Cyclon Hellas S.A. 124 Megaridos Avenue, 193 00 Aspropyrgos Tel.: +30 210-8093900, Fax: +30 210-8093999 Email:

Eko AEBE 8 Chimaras Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-7705.201, Fax: +30 210-7705847 Email:

M&M Gas Patroklou 5-7 Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-68777300, Fax: +30 210-6877400 Email:

Elinoil S.A. 33 Pigon Str., 145 64 Kifissia Tel.: +30 210-6241500, Fax: +30 210-6241509 Email:

Prometheus Gas 209 Kifissias Avenue, 151 24 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6141106, Fax: +30 210-6140371 Email:

Eteka S.A. 142 Dimokratias Avenue, 188 63 Perama Tel.: +30 210-4022401, Fax: +30 210-4415879 Email:

Protergia SA. 8 Artemidos Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-3448300, Fax: +30 210-3448471 Email:

Hellenic Fuels S.A. 8_ Chimaras Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6887111, Fax: +30 210-6887100 Email:

Public Gas Corporation S.A. (DEPA) 92, Marinou Antipa Ave., 141 21 Heraklion Tel.: +30 210-2701000, Fax: +30 210-2701010 Email:

Hellenic Petroleum Group (ELPE) 8A Chimarras Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6302000, Fax: +30 210-6302510 Email:

Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG Greece, Branch Athens Tower, 21st Floor, 2-4, Messogion Avenue 115 27 Athens Tel.: +30 210-7454613, Fax: +30 210-7454300 Email:

Mamidoil-Jetoil S.A. 27 Evrota & Kiphissou Str., 145 64 Kifissia Tel.: +30 210-8763100, Fax: +30 210-8055850 Email: Motor Oil Gas S.A. 12A Herodou Attikou Str., 151 24 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-8094000, Fax: +30 210-8094444 Email: Revoil S.A. 5 Kapodistriou Str., 166 72 Vari Tel.: +30 210 8976000, Fax: +30 210 8972137 Email:

07. OIL & GAS Copelouzos Group 209 Kifissias Avenue, 151 24 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6141106-115, Fax: +30 210-6140371-2 Email: Energean Oil & Gas 32, Kifissias Ave. Atrina Center, 17th floor 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-8174200, Fax: +30 210-8174299 Email: EPA Attikis 31-33 Athinon & Sp. Patsi Str., 104 47 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3406000, Fax: +30 210-3406001 Email: EPA Thessalias 219 Farsalon Str., 413 35 Larissa Tel.: +30 2410-582300, Fax: +30 2410-582323 Email: EPA Thessalonikis 256 Monastiriou Str & 7 Glinou Str, 546 28 Thessaloniki Tel.: +30 2310-584000, Fax: +30 2310-500577 Email:

08. RENEWABLE RESOURSES ABB 13th klm National Road Athinon-Lamias 144 52 Metamorfosi Tel.: +30 210-2891500, Fax: +30 210-2891599 Email: Big Solar 100 Nato Avenue, 193 00 Aspropyrgos Tel.: +30 210-5509090, Fax: +30 210-5594559 Email: Biosar Energy Aktor-Ellaktor 25 Ermou Str., 145 64 Kifissia Tel.: +30 210-8185200, Fax: +30 210-8185201 Email: EDF EN Hellas 120 Vas. Sofias Avenue, 115 26 Athens Tel.: +30 210-6462079, Fax: +30 210-6431420 Email: Enteka 2 Tichis Str., 152 33 Chalandri Tel.: +30 210-6816803, Fax: +30 210-6816460 Email: Gamesa 9 Adrianiou Str., 115 25 Athens Tel.: +30 210-6753300, Fax: +30 210-6753305 Email: Mechatron 226 Kifissias Avenue, 152 31 Chalandri Tel.: +30 210-6899314, Fax: +30 210-6899314 PPC Renewables S.A. 3 Kapodistriou Str., 153 43 Ag. Paraskevi Tel.: +30 211-2118000, Fax: +30 211-2118089 Email: Rokas Renewables S.A. 3 Rizareiou Str., 152 33 Halandri Tel.: +30 210-8774100, Fax: +30 210-8774111 Email:

Schneider Electric Greece 19th klm National Road Athinon-Lamias 146 71 Nea Erithrea Tel.: +30 210-6295200, Fax: +30 210-6295210 Email: Silcio 38-40 Kapodistriou Avenue, 151 23 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-6848506, Fax: +30 210-6838215 Email: SMA Solar Technology AG 102 V.Tsitsani Str., 166 75 Glifada Tel.: +30 210-9856660, Fax: +30 210-9856670 Email: Solar Cells Hellas 64 Kifissias Avenue & Premetis Str., 151 25 Marousi Tel.: +30 210-9595159, Fax: +30 210-9537618 Email: Terna Energy S.A. 85 Messogion Avenue, 115 26 Athens Tel.: +30 210-6968300, Fax: +30 210-6968096 Email:

09. LAW FIRMS Kelemenis & Co. Law Firm 5 Tsakalof Str., Melathron Centre, 106 73 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3612800, Fax: +30 210-3612820 Email: Metaxas Law 154 Asklipiou Str., 114 71 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3390748, Fax: +30 210-3390749 Email: Rokas International Law Firm 25 & 25A Boukourestiou Str., 106 71 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3616816, Fax: +30 210-3615425 Email:,

10. CONSULTANTS Asprofos Engineering S.A. 284 El. Venizelou Ave., 176 75 Kallithea Tel.: +30 210-9491600, Fax: +30 210-9191610 Email: Consolidated Contractors Company 62B Kifissias Avenue, PO Box 61092, 151 10 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-6182000, Fax: +30 210-6199224 Email:

Embassy of Boulgaria 33A Stratigou Kallari Str., 154 52 P. Psychiko Tel.: +30 210-6748105, Fax: +30 210-6748130 Email: Embassy of Cyprus 16 Irodotou Str., 106 75 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3734800, Fax: +30 210-7258886 Email: Embassy of United States Of America 91 Vas. Sofias Ave., 101 60 Athens Tel.: +30 210-7212951, Fax: +30 210-7212951 Email: Embassy of the Russian Federation 28 Nikiforou Lytra Str., 154 52 P. Psychiko Tel.: +30 210-6725235, Fax: +30 210-6749708 Email: Embassy of France 7 Vas. Sofias Ave., 106 71 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3391000, Fax: +30 210-3391009 Email: Embassy of Ucraine 2 Stephanou Delta Str., 152 37 Filothei Tel.: +30 210-6800230, Fax: +30 210-6854154 Email:

12. CHAMBERS American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce 109-111 Messoghion Ave., 115 26 Athens Tel.: +30 210-6993559, Fax: +30 210-6985686 Email: Greek-German Chamber 10-12 Dorileou Str., 115 21 Athens Tel.: +30 210-6419000, Fax: +30 210-6445175 Email: Union of Hellenic Chambers 6 Akadimias Str., 106 71 Athens Tel.: +30 210-3387104, Fax: +30 210-3622320 Email:

13. HEAVY INDUSTRY Mytilineos Group 5-7 Patroklou Str., 151 25 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-6877300, Fax: +30 210-6877400 Email:


Hellenic Halyvourgia 86A Othonos & Kokkota Str., 145 61 Kifissia Tel.: +30 210-6283400, Fax: +30 210-8015614 Email:

Embassy of Israel 1 Marathonodromon Str., 154 52 P. Psychiko Tel.: +30 210-6705500, Fax: +30 210-6705555 Email:

Allouminion Ellados 8 Artemidos Str., 151 25 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-3693000, Fax: +30 210-3693108 Email:

Embassy of Germany 3 Karaoli & Dimitriou Str., 106 75 Athens Tel.: +30 210-7285111, Fax: +30 210-7285335

Metka Group 8 Artemidos Str., 151 25 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-2709200, Fax: +30 210-2759528 Email:

Embassy of Romania 7 Emmanouil Benaki Str., 154 52 P. Psychiko Tel.: +30 210-6728875, Fax: +30 210-6728883 Email:

Elemka 8 Artemidos Str., 151 25 Maroussi Tel.: +30 210-8117000, Fax: +30 210-8117070 Email:

ROMANIA 01. GOVERNMENT ANAR-National Agency Romanian Water 6 Edgar Quinet Street, 010018, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 312 2174 Email: ANRE-National Energy Regulator 3 Constantin Nacu Street, 020995, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 327 8174 Email: Competition Council Romania 1 Piata Presei Libere, building D1, 013701, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 318 1198 Email: Constanta County Council 51 Tomis Avenue, 900725, Constanta Tel.: +4 0241 488 404 Email: Environment Protection Agency Constanta 23 Unirii Street, Constanta Tel.: +4 024 154 6596 Email: Mayor of Corbu 38 Principala Street, Corbu, Constanta County Tel.: +4 024 176 5100 Email: National Agency for Mineral Resources 36-38 Mendeleev Str., 010366, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 313 2204 Email: Nuclear Agency & Radioactive Waste 21-25 Mendeleev Str., 010362, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 316 8001 Email: Romanian Government 1 Victoriei Square, 011791, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 314 3400 Email: Romanian Ministry of Economy 152 Victoriei Avenue, 010096, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 202 5426 Email:


Romanian Ministry of Environment and Climate Changes 12 Libertatii Avenue, Sector 5, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 408 9500 Email: Romanian Ministry of Regional Development 17 Apolodor Street, North side, Sector 5, Bucharest Tel.: +4 037 211 1409 Email:



ACUE-Association of Energy Utilities Companies 54B Nordului Road, 1st floor, ap.2, 014104, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 230 3265 Email: AFEER-The Association of Electricity Suppliers in Romania 7-9 Tudor Stefan Street, 1st floor, ap 2, 011655, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 230 6031 Email: APER-Romanian Energy Policy Association 13 13 Septembrie Road, 050711, Sector 5, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 411 9829 Email: CNR-CME-Romanian National Comitee of World Energy Council 1-3 Lacul Tei Avenue, 020371, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 211 4155 Email: CRE-Romanian Energy Center 16-18 Hristo Botev Avenue, 030236, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 5741 Email: EURISC Romania 82-84 Mihai Eminescu Street, B entrance, ap. 19, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 212 2102 Email: Foreign Investors Council Romania 11 Ion Campineanu Street, 3rd floor, Sector 1, 010031, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 222 1931 Email: Greenpeace CEE Romania 18 Ing. Vasile Cristescu Street, 021985, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 435 5743 Email:

Petroleum Club of Romania 38 Dragos Voda Street, ap. 1, 020747, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 102 0605 Email:

InterAgro 1-3 Verii Street, 011971, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 210 3700 Email:

Romania Energy Center 319 Calarasilor Road, 030622, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 432 8737 Email:

Monsson Group Romania 158 Mamaia Avenue, 900534, Constanta Tel.: +4 0241 550 353 Email:

Romania Photovoltaic Industry Association 58-60 Gheorghe Polizu Street, Sector 1, Bucharest Email: Romanian Association of Biomass and Biogas (ARBIO) 37 Putul lui Zamfir Street, 4th floor, 011684, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 308 6271 Email: Romanian Black Sea Titleholders Association 169A Floreasca Road, building A, office 2099, Sector 1, Bucharest Romanian Electricity Suppliers Association 7-9 Tudor Stefan Street, ap. 2, 011655, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 230 6031 Email: Romanian Wind Power Association 17 C.A. Rosetti Street, office 216, Sector 2, Bucharest Email:

03. ENERGY COMPANIES CEZ Romania 2B Ion Ionescu de la Brad Street, 1st floor, 013813, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel: +4 021 269 2566 Email:

Nuclearelectrica S.A. 65 Polona Street, 010505, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 203 8200 Email: Renovatio Trading S.R.L. 55 Primaverii Avenue, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 318 2010 Email: Termoelectrica S.A. 1-3 Lacul Tei Avenue, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 7305 Email: Transelectrica 2-4 Olteni Street, 030786, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 5822 Email: Verbund Romania 31-33 Carol Avenue, Bucharest Tel.: +43 (0)50313-53744 Email: Vestas Romania 11-15 Tipografilor Street, Building B3, 013714, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 403 3099 Email:

04. OIL & GAS

E.ON Romania 12 Justitiei Street, 540069, Targu Mures, Mures County Tel.: +4 0265 200 366 Email:

Chevron Romania Exploration and Production 3-5 Presei Libere Square, City Gate South Tower, 013702, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 207 6110

Electrica Furnizare S.A. 1A Stefan cel Mare Road, 011736, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 208 5999 Email:

Exxon Mobil Romania 169A Floreasca Road, building A, 014472, Sector 1, Bucharest

Enel Romania 127 Giurgiului Road, 04066, Sector 4, Bucharest GDF SUEZ Energy Romania 4-6 Marasesti Avenue, 040254, Sector 4, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 301 2000

Institute for Studies and Hydropower - ISPH SA 293 Vitan Road, 031293, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 314 7270 Email:

General Electric Romania 169A Floreasca Street, 014472, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0372 074 517 Email:

ISPE-Institute for Energetical Studies and Design 1-3 Lacul Tei Avenue, 20371, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 210 1095 Email:

Hidroelectrica S.A. 15-17 Ion Mihalache Avenue, 011171, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 2500 Email:

Gas Plus 75-77 Buzesti Street, 7th floor, rooms 52-53, 011013, Bucharest Email: GSP-Petroleum Services Group 97 Pipera - Tunari Street, 077190, Voluntari, IIfov County Tel.: +4 0372 080 243 Email: Lukoil Romania 6 Elena Vacarescu Street, 020271, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 227 2106 Email: MOL Romania 4-6 Daniel Danielopolu Avenue, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 204 8500

OMV Petrom 22 Coralilor Street, Petrom City, 013329, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 402 2201 Email:

Romanian National Coal Company S.A. 2 Timisoara Street, 332015, Petrosani, Hunedoara County Tel.: +4 0254 506 100 Email:

Petro Ventures 11 Ion Campineanu Street, 8.01 space, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0721 936 235


Petroceltic Ireland 3 Ermil Pangratti Street, ap. 4, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +353 1 421 8300 Email: Petrolexportimport SA 72 Unirii Avenue, building J3C, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 318 8459 Email: Petromar Constanta Harbour, Berth 34, 900900, Constanta Tel.: +4 0241 555 255 Email: PETROTEL - LUKOIL S.A. 235 Mihai Bravu Street, Ploiesti, Prahova County Tel.: +4 0244 504 000 Email: Romgaz S.A. 4 Constantin Motas Square, 551130, Medias, Sibiu County Tel.: +4 0269 201 020 Email: Rompetrol 3-5 Presei Libere Square, City Gate Building, Northern Tower, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 0800 Email: Sterling Midia Resources 11-13 Andrei Muresanu Street, 011841, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 231 3256 Email: Upetrom Group Romania 97 Pipera-Tunari Street, 077190, Voluntari, Ilfov County Tel.: +4 021 308 0200 Email:

05. GAS DISTRIBUTION Distrigaz Sud Retele S.R.L. 4-6 Marasesti Avenue, 040254, Sector 4, Bucharest Transgaz 1 Constantin Motas Square, 551130 Medias, Sibiu County Tel.: +4 0269 803 333 Email:

06. COAL Oltenia Energetical Complex 5 Alexandru Ioan Cuza Str., Targu Jiu, Gorj County Tel.: +4 0253 205 401 Email:

ABB S.R.L. 169A Floreasca Road, building A1, 014459, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0372 158 200 Adrem Invest 20A Aleea Alexandru, 011823, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 233 5920 Alstom Romania 63-69 Iacob Felix Street, Premium Plaza building, 12 floor, 011033, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 306 9500 Ansaldo Nucleare SPA - Romania 65 Dacia Avenue, ap. 2, 010405, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 211 3991 Email: CONDMAG S.A. 52 Avram Iancu Street, 500075, Brasov Tel.: +4 0268 414 954 Email: Egnatia Rom 65 Sf. Maria Street, 011495, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 208 2934 Email: Energheia Group Romania SRL 34 IC Bratianu Avenue, 6th floor, ap.16, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 432 9031 Email:

Siemens Romania 24 Preciziei Street, West Gate Park, Building H3, 062204, Sector 6, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 629 6400 Email: Smart Solar 30 A. S. Puskin Street, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: + 4 0758 110 110 TIAB S.A. 17 Pictor Verona Street, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 302 1230 Email:

08. LAW FIRMS Biris Goran 77 Emanoil Porumbaru Street, 011424, Sector 1,Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 260 0710 Email: Bostina si asociatii 70 Jean Louis Calderon Street, 020039, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 319 4466 Email: Bulboaca si Asociatii 31 Vasile Lascar Street, 020492, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 408 8900 Email: Clifford Chance Badea 28-30 Academiei Street, 010016, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 666 6100 Email: places/europe/romania.html# Dentons 28C C. Budisteanu Str., 010775, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 312 4950 Email:

ICME ECAB SA 42 Drumul intre Tarlale Street, 032982, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 209 0111 Email:

DLA Piper 89-97 Grigore Alexandrescu Street, East Wing, 1st Floor, 010624, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0372 155 800 Email:

Luxten 76 Parang Street, 012328, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 668 8819 Email:

IK Rokas&Partners 45 Polona Street, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 411 7405 Email:

RIG Service SA 18 Marc Aureliu Street, nr. 18, 900744, Constanta Tel.: +4 0241 586 406 Email: Romenergo 242-246 Floreasca Road, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 233 0771 Email: Schneider Electric Romania 11 Dinu Vintila Street, Euro Tower, 1st floor, 021101, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 203 0606 Email:


Kinstellar Romania 8-10 Nicolae Iorga Str., 010434, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 307 1619 Email:

Romanian Academy 125 Victoriei Road, 010071, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 212 8651 Email:

Musat & Associates 43 Aviatorilor Avenue, 011853, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 202 5900 Email:

Valahia University 18-20 Unirii Avenue, 130082, Targoviste, Dambovita County Tel.: +4 0245 206 101 Email:

NNDKP 1A Bucharest-Ploiesti Road, Entrance A, 013681, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 201 1200 Email:


Pachiu & Associates 75-77 Buzesti Street, 011013, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 312 1008 Email: PeliFilip 169A Calea Floreasca Road, Building B, 014459, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 527 2000 Email:

10. PR COMPANIES Action Pr 35 Alexandru Constantinescu Str., 1st floor, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 224 2270 Email: Aegis Media Central Services (AMCS) 11 Grigore Mora Street, 011885,Sector 1, Bucharest Email: AMICOM 39 Louis Pasteur Street, 050534, Sector 5, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 228 4437

Popovici, Nitu & Associates 239 Dorobanti Road, 010567, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 317 7919 Email:

Centrade Saatchi & Saatchi 133 Serban Voda Street, building D+E, 040205, Sector 4, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 730 0600 Email:

RTPR Allen&Overy 15 Charles de Gaulle Square, nr. 15, 011857, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 405 7777 Email:

GMP PR 4 Teodor Stefanescu Street, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 212 1992 Email:

Schoenherr & Associates 30 Dacia Avenue, 010413, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 319 6790 Email: Serban&Musneci Associates 54 Mircea Zorileanu Str., Sector 1, 012056, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 222 4478 Email: Tuca Zbarcea & Associates 4-8 Nicolae Titulescu Avenue, America House, West Wing, 011141, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 204 8890 Email: Voicu si Filipescu 26-28 Stirbei Voda Street, etaj 5, 010113, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 314 0200 Email: Wolf Theiss 58-60 Gheorghe Polizu Street, 011062, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 308 8100 Email:

GolinHarris 17 Ceasornicului Str., 014111, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 301 0051 Email: Grayling PR 9 Maltopol Street, 011047, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 335 5547 Email: Media Investment 3 Praga Street, 011801, Sector 1, Bucharest Email: www. +4 021 206 2200 OMD 55 Floreasca Road, Grand Offices Building, 014453, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 222 1091 Email: Pi2 31 Primaverii Avenue, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 232 0325 Email:


Premium PR 23 Eroilor Sanitari Avenue, 050471, Sector 5, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 411 0152 Email:

Oil&Gas University Ploiesti 39 Bucuresti Avenue, 100680, Ploiesti, Prahova County Tel.: +4 0244 573 171 Email:

The Group 3 Praga Street, 011801, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 206 2200 Email:

Total PR 68 Basarabia Avenue, 4th floor, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 437 0110 Email: V+O Communication 40 Hristache Pitarul Street, 011626, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 231 9195 Email:

11. EMBASSIES Canadian Embassy in Romania 1-3 Tuberozelor Street, 011411, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 307 5000 Email: United Arab Emirates Embassy in Romania 4 Modrogan Alley, 011826, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 231 7676 Email: USA Embassy in Romania 4-6 Dr. Liviu Librescu Street, 015118, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 200 3300 Email:

12. BANKS Banca Romaneasca 11 Dinu Vintila Street, Euro Tower Building, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 305 9000 Email: Erste Group Banca Comerciala Romana 5 Regina Elisabeta Avenue, 030016, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 407 4200 Email: ING Bank Romania 48 Iancu de Hunedoara Avenue, 011745, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 222 1600 Email: International Finance Corporation (IFC) 31 Vasile Lascar Street, UTI building, 020491, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 201 0311 Email: Piraeus Bank Romania 34-36 Carol I Avenue, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 303 6969 Email: Raiffeisen Bank S.A. 246C Calea Floreasca Road, Sky Tower, 014476, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 306 3002 Email: Romanian International Bank 67 Unirii Avenue, Building G2A, Section 1 & 2, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 318 9515 Email:

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 56-60 Iancu de Hunedoara Avenue, Metropolis Center, West Wing, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 202 7100 The European Investment Bank (EIB) 31 Vasile Lascar Street, 020492, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 208 6400 Email:

13. INVESTORS Capital Partners 56 Dacia Avenue, 010407, Sector 2, Bucharest Tel.: +4 031 225 1000 Email: Enterprise Investors 36 Stirbei Boda Street, Domus Center, 010113, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 314 6685 Email: Maison Economique - Ubifrance- Roumanie 11 Nicolae Lorga Street, 010432, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 305 6780 Email:

14. AUDIT Deloitte Romania 4-8 Nicolae Titulescu Road, Est entrance, 0111141, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 222 1661 Ernst & Young 63-69 lacob Felix Street, Premium Plaza, 011033, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 402 4000 Email: KPMG 69-71 Bucharest-Ploiesti Road, Victoria Business Park DN1, 013685, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0372 377 800 Email:

15. FUEL AND LUBRICANTS ENI Romania S.R.L. 169A Floreasca Road, Building A, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 0316 206 300

16. CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE Bucharest Chamber of Commerce and Industry CCIB 2 Octavian Goga Avenue, 030982, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 319 0114 Email: Constanta Chamber of Commerce 185A Alex. Lapusneanu Avenue, 900457, Constanta Tel.: +4 024 161 9854 Email: Romania-France Chamber of Commerce 21 Poet Andrei Muresanu Str., 011841, Sector 1, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 317 1062 Email:

17. IMF International Monetary Fund 7 Halelor Street, 030118, Sector 3, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 311 5833 Email:

18. ENERGY TRADERS Freepoint Commodities 157-197 Buckingham Palace Road, SW1W 9SP, LONDON, UK Tel.: +44 (0)203 262 6000 Email: Grivco SA 1B Garlei Street, Grivco Building, 013721, Bucharest Tel.: +4 021 301 9700 Email:

SERBIA 01. AUTHORITIES Ministry of Energy and Mining 22-26, Nemanjina Str., 11000 Belgrade Email: Provincial Secretariat for Energy and Mineral Resources of AP Vojvodina 16, Mihaila Pupina Bld, 21 000 Novi Sad Email:

02. ENERGY COMPANIES Petroleum Industry of Serbia) 12, Narodnog fronta, 21000 Novi Sad Email: HIP Petrohemija 82, Spoljnostarcevacka, 26000 Pancevo Email: Srbijagas 12, Narodnog fronta, Novi Sad, Srbija 21000 Email:

03. RENEWABLES Serbian wind energy association (SEWEA) 6, Dure Jaksica, 11000 Beograd Continental Wind Partners d.o.o. Serbia 23, Resavska Str., 11000 Belgrade Email: Energowind 3, Oslobodenja Bld, 26300 Vrsac Email: MK-Fintel Wind 115 e, Mihaila Pupina Bld, 11070 Belgrade Email:

04. LAW FIRMS CMS Reich-RoHrwig Hainz 3, Cincar Jankova, 11000 Belgrade Tel.: +381 11 3208900 Email: Karanovic/Nikolic 23, Resavska, 11000 Belgrade Tel.: +381 11 3094200 Email:


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