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Martha Claudia Carini

“On us [the management] is the responsibility to make the factory a fair place that cares for the justice of each one of its members, is supportive of the goodness of their family, is thoughtful of the future of their children and is participative of the life of the local communities, which will draw from our growth economic nourishment and incentive to social advancement” -Adriano Olivetti, Città dell’Uomo

Author: Martha Claudia Carini Supervisor: Dr. Mary Ann Steane Design Supervisors: Ingrid Schrรถder and Aram Mooradian MAUD: MPhil in Architecture and Urban Design Homerton College Department of Architecture, University of Cambridge Submitted: 26th May, 2017 A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MPhil in Architecture and Urban Design Examination, 2015-2017. Word Count: 12,904

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to extend my gratitude to Ingrid Schrรถder and Aram Mooradian for their invaluable guidance, commitment and enthusiasm for this proposal. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Mary Ann Steane for accepting me halfway through the run and for her irreplaceable advice and support. Special thanks are due to: Joel Shor (Google), Robert Harris (Twitter), Elizabeth Wheeler (Facebook), Rachel MacCratic (The Embassy Network), Flavio Borelli (Arcosanti) Thanks also go to Frances Muir, Sian Ricketts and Cameron Cavalier with whom I lived, worked and shared the most precious moments. I wish to thank Candida Fratazzi, Claudio Carini, Davide Carini and Giulio Carini. Nothing could have happened without their love. This thesis is for them.




THE BLURRING BOUNDARIES Production and Reproduction The Domestication of the Workplace The Portrait of the Modern Family


THE STAGNANT DWELLING Housing for the British Family British Millennials and the Unreachable ‘Life Milestones’


SHARING The Generation of Sharing The Rise of the Sharing Economy The Origins of Communal Living The Old: Communal Living in Soviet Russia The New: The Millennial Commune and The Forgotten Family Office Housing











The way in which western society has structured our everyday lives has altered significantly from one era to another. For instance, the commencement of the industrial revolution produced clear dichotomies between production and reproduction; thus, enforcing the division between work and home and the gender roles henceforth associated with them. However, today, with the onset of the information era, such dichotomies become unnecessary. The emergence of new forms of labour, primarily identified as immaterial labour, have caused the boundaries between ‘living’ and ‘working’ to become progressively blurred. As a result, work is no longer necessarily organized around the traditional 9 to 5 workday, but rather overspills into the individual’s private life, thus creating an amalgamation between production and reproduction. As Martino Tattara, co-founder of Dogma, indicates: “[C]ontemporary forms of labour involve the entire life of workers and their spectrum of social relationships. Not only work – but also life at large – is thus more mobile, precarious and not containable within rigid typologies” (Dogma, 2015, p.1). The evolution of productive labour from material commodities to knowledge-based services, which has been predominately driven by the information age, becomes architecturally visible with the ‘domestication’ of the work environment. That is to say, in constructed spaces traditionally designed specifically for either ‘work’ or ‘living,’ the two functions have tended to encroach upon each other and even to become identical. However, although our way of living is significantly changing, the architectural spaces we inhabit are nonetheless still constructed around the model of rigid typologies, according to which living and working are considered to be two distinct domains. What is more, the advent of the ‘sharing economy’ provides a fundamental opportunity for young men and women to attain gender equality and fully enter productive labour,

whilst still having the possibility of a family. However, if such equality is to materialize, the binary division of society into production and reproduction, and therefore the separation of work and home, needs to be reconsidered. In a re-evaluation of this kind, it is fundamental to understand the historical connotations attributed to the two functions described above, and how the current needs of workers and of their families are represented in either of these frames. This thesis will argue that a new paradigm of the dwelling and the workplace needs to be developed: one which supports rather than restricts the lives of workers and their families. The theoretical analysis conducted in the following chapters, will be the grounds for a new ‘work-live’ typology situated in London’s Tech City. The new mixed-use typology, which merges production and reproduction, ‘living’ and ‘working,’ is intended to sustain young workers and their families in the escalating complications of insurmountable housing prices, ambitious working hours, and long and tiring commuter journeys. The ‘worklive’ model is proposed as a replicable system which can be applied on sites of different sizes and configurations in cities around the world. Given the parameters of this inquiry, as just summarized, the thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter 1 will delineate the theoretical distinction between productive labour and reproductive labour and illustrate how both of these frames have come to be associated with opposing architectural realms. It will also familiarize the reader with the advent of immaterial labour; and it will explore how the requirements and expectations of work itself are intensifying as a result. The culmination of this process is the domestication of the work environment, which aims in facilitating ‘work-life balance’. However, an analysis of this domestication will demonstrate how the transformation of the economic market and therefore, the reshaping of societal and ar-


chitectural structures, are together hindering both women and men from raising families in a conducive environment. With the rise of the information era and, therefore, the onset of the sharing economy and immaterial labour, it is appealing to juxtapose the progressive design revolution of the office vs. the stationary design of the dwelling. While these two patterns, broadly speaking, apply to nearly all of western society, due to the locality of the proposed design project, Chapter 2 will focus on the implications of stagnant housing design standards in the UK, particularly in London. Furthermore, this chapter will analyse the compounded consequences that the London housing crisis and the development of an increasingly demanding work culture are having on the new millennial generation. Due to their economic difficulties, their ever-increasing concern for environmental issues, their changing consumer values and their innate understanding of technology, the new millennial generation is setting global cultural trends and altering society’s sharing behaviour. Therefore, Chapter 3 will investigate how the advent of the sharing economy has and is transforming our cities, our social behaviours and consequently our everyday lives, from the way we work to the way we live. In order to comprehend the ideals of sharing and communal living, historical and contemporary communal living schemes will be explored.




1. The Blurring Boundaries 1.1 Production and Reproduction

In her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt makes clear distinctions between the three fundamental activities of the human condition which constitute the vita activa: the sphere of labour, that of work, and that of action. For the purpose of this thesis her analytical differentiation of labour and work will be the focus. As she states: “Labour is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labour. The human condition of labour is life itself. Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species’ ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly different from all natural surrounds…[T]he human condition of work is worldliness.” (Arendt, 1958, p.7). She therefore identifies work as the production of long-lasting objects, such as, a pot, or a table, but also a mosaic or a building; whilst she considers labour to be the pure and ephemeral act of reproduction, which supports the mere existence of human beings: such as, cooking, cleaning, bearing and rearing children (Dogma, 2015). Arendt encloses reproductive labour within the private sphere of the house, and liberates productive work into the public sphere. At this point, it is helpful to introduce a basic theoretical distinction between productive labour and reproductive labour: the former is defined as the form of work which produces material commodities and therefore impacts the market economy directly. The latter, on the other hand, also known as domestic labour or affective labour, is a concept developed within Marxist feminist theory, after Friedrich Engels’s distinction between productive work and work aimed at


the production of human beings themselves. The term primarily acknowledges unpaid work preformed within the household and for the family. Although unvalued and unrewarded, such labour constitutes a significant invisible component of the economy. The application of these terms will become apparent in the following paragraph. Home is a given. When we speak about housing it seems that we are speaking about something that has always existed, that is unchangeable, that has always embodied the ‘natural’ way of life (Dogma, 2013). Housing is not simply the physical space we inhabit, and where we organize our biological functions of living, but the cradle of reproductive labour, the silent realm of the oikos (family). In order to propose a project which challenges the dominant domestic model of the single-family dwelling and which effectively blends productive labour and reproductive labour through the reconsideration of the house as an apparatus where form, economy and inhabitation unite, it is essential to understand the social relevance of the household, within the modern and contemporary economy. To do so successfully, it is indispensable to reassess the historical connotations that have been attributed to productive and reproductive labour: that is, the office and the home. Prior to the industrialization of western society, the house was acknowledged as the realm of both production and reproduction, and was entirely detached from the public sphere of the city (polis). As articulated in Oeconomica by Aristotle, the concept of economy referred to the organization of domestic space, housekeeping and the management of the household. As such, the house was a place of economy (oikos, house) and remained the principal locus for the reproduction of family life until the 18th century. However, with the start of industrialization the “economy as a managerial apparatus went beyond the house and invested in to the city in its entire-


ty” (Dogma, 2015, p.1). As a result, at least as far as the ‘economy’ was concerned, domestic space became progressively secondary to the workplace. While the causes of this shift were certainly the separation of productive and reproductive labour, its result was that domestic space (home) transformed into a place of refuge, a safe haven in which the inhabitants of the household or family could ‘recover’ from the strains and difficulties of the public sphere. (Hayden, 2002) This however, is mostly an ideological and symbolic way of viewing the house; as in reality the house (home) is the very core of production, since a family, a society, can be productive only if domestic life is maintained and reproduced. As Dolores Hayden has argued in her book The Grand Domestic Revolution, “Cooking food, caring for children, and clearing the house, tasks often thought of as ‘woman’s work’ to be performed without pay in domestic environments, have always been a major part in the world’s necessary labour” (Hayden, 1981, p.1). Although reproductive and affective labour have typically been unacknowledged, their social relevance within the modern and contemporary economy is immense. The house which supports the most basic human condition, such as the reproduction of the species and the protection of the family, is not only a refuge, but also a place of work. With the rise of capitalism, “labour [becomes] the fundamental asset of society and for this reason the city develops as a set of institutions (housing, hospitals, schools, universities) whose goal is to maintain and reproduce labour power. In this way, not only labouring activities but also life itself is put to work” (Dogma, 2015, p.2). Traditionally, domestic activities such as reproductive labour (washing, cleaning, cooking, etc.) and affective labour (child bearing, child rearing, nurturing, etc.), a role assigned to women in the history of western civilization, go regularly unacknowledged as they are ‘unproductive’

forms of labour which do not ‘visibly’ contribute to the market economy. This neglect, however, becomes more difficult to justify with the development of immaterial labour, where material commodities are no longer at the centre of production, but have been replaced with the production of knowledge, servicing, and affectivity, labour typically associated to the dwelling. The term immaterial labour, defined as the production of information and cultural commodities, is twofold. On the one hand, it refers to reproductive and affective labour, activities which have historically not be acknowledged as work. On the other hand, it outlines the current transition of the worker’s labour process, where the form of labour is no longer the materialization of commodities, but rather involves skills of cybernetic and computer control (Lazzarato, 1997). These intangible commodities, which have generally been representative of the domestic realm suggest that domestic space might become an epicentre of production, the oikos, again. The advent of immaterial labour, implemented by technology and the rise of the sharing economy, not only makes production pervasive, but it blurs the boundaries created during industrialization and the birth of the modern city between home and work. It therefore equally exposes the unacknowledged and forgotten productivity of the domestic realm whilst illustrating the rising domesticity of the workplace.

1.2 The Domestication of the Workplace The distinction between productive labour (for material commodities) and reproductive labour, occurred, as we have perhaps already implied, in the Industrial Revolution. This altered the way we live and work by trans-


ferring economy out of the home and into the factory or office. Furthermore, the information revolution is yet again altering social and architectural structures through shifts in the economic market. With the advent of the information revolution and immaterial labour, led by the technology and creative industry, the workspace is slowly mutating into a fusion of typologies (Newbery, 2015). Consequently, this is creating a nameless model which attempts to overlap production with reproduction; for the purpose of this thesis we will define this condition as the domestication of the workplace. Work “is no longer a linear process with defined outputs but a more complex set of activities centred on less tangible concepts such a collaboration and innovation” (WRK, 2016, p.26). Due to the changing form of labour, the office is no longer simply a designated area which tethers employees to one particular desk between the hours of nine to five, but rather a space that encourages collaboration, creativity and flexible working. Many companies are incentivizing flexible working schemes which give employees the flexibility to decide how long, where and when they work. These packages are primarily offered due to the belief that flexible working culture implements productivity and satisfaction (Kane cited in Newbery, 2015). However, this does not mean shorter working hours and more free time for employees – not by any means. As Richard Florida states in The Rise of the Creative Class, “the long trajectory of modern capitalism has involved the relentless extension of the working day across time and space – first through electricity and the electric light and now via the personal computer, the mobile phone, and the Internet” (Florida, 2012, p.105). This becomes extremely evident in the analysis of high-tech campuses such as Facebook, Google, Airbnb and etc., primary leaders in the information era and the development

Figure 01: Office Kitchen - Facebook Menlo Park Headquarters Figure 02: Interior ‘Streets’ - Facebook Menlo Park Headquarters


of immaterial labour, who are increasingly challenging the design of office space by domesticizing the work environment in order to distort the spatial and temporal boundaries of work (Dogma, 2015). “People spend more time at work than ever before, with the boundaries between the ‘work-life balance’ becoming more blurred. For some people, the office is becoming more of a home than home…from a gym, to the laundry, to a hairdresser. The definition of the workplace is changing” (Parker, 2013). (Figure 01) In fact, Silicon Valley’s campus-like-office parks successfully represent the new office ethos, a free-spirited, easy-going, blurred-boundaries, around-the-clock type of work. One can now consider the office a ‘home away from home’; because work is no longer where you go – it’s what you do. According to American economist and social scientist Richard Florida, what he calls the creative class is the driving force behind economic development in post-industrial cities and the exponential growth of technology companies. Thanks to its influence, the typical office culture and design has been utterly transformed. The domestication of the work environment through design is becoming progressively more common, as many companies presuppose that this will increase employee productivity and contentment (Marshall, 2016). The design of office space has not only been revolutionized in the tech sector, but is now influencing other prominent and competitive industries who are looking to emulate the tech model. Randy Howder, Gensler’s Technology Practice Leader , says “every client comes to us saying, ‘We’re not Facebook or Google, but we want to learn from what they’re doing” (Mays, 2016).1 Hence, as Richard Florida correctly observes, the creative class has now 1

Gensler is a well-known American design and architecture firm working with high-end clients, such as Facebook or Airbnb.


become the norm-setting class of our time (Florida, 2012). What is the zeitgeist of the 21st century tech office? What does the domestication of the workplace truly mean? While many may simplify it by presupposing it is the incorporation of domestic furniture, such as sofas, coffee machines, and a cushion for your dog, within a working context, it is far more complex than transforming the interior design of a space. (Figure 02) Technology companies have domesticized the workplace by introducing reproductive labour (washing, cleaning, cooking, exercising, sleeping, etc.), into the sphere of work. They have done so by providing countless employee benefits (all free), such as three meals a day, housecleaning, dry-cleaning, sleeping pods, etc. (Figure 03-04) Although the incorporation of reproductive labour, ‘office perks’, within the workplace signifies an institutionalization and therefore acknowledgment of domestic labour as a fundamental asset of production and the human condition, a triumph for the material feminist who associated domestic drudgery with the economic exploitation and gender discrimination of women, it nonetheless does not truly amalgamate productive labour with reproductive labour, as it does not encompass the family. As previously discussed, reproductive labour also entails procreation, thus child bearing and rearing. By excluding the act of reproduction, therefore children, the boundaries between work and home are not fully blurred. As Gerald Ledford, a senior research scientist at the Centre for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business, correctly reasons in analysing such changes: “…these benefits are not being offered out of largess. It’s done because organizations want employees to work 24/7. If you never have to leave to get your dry cleaning, to go to the gym, to eat or even go to bed, you can work

Figure 03: Sleeping/Rest Area - Google Office in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Figure 04: Conference Room in Airbnb Headquarters. The design of the office space was inspired by listed Airbnb apartments.


all the time” (Ledford cited in Tugend, 2014). In fact, most tech workers are unable to integrate work patterns with personal life; ensuring that the technology industry is largely constituted of young single individuals, rather than employees with families (Bort, 2015). The issues that the developing overwork culture can cause employees are relatively evident, however the significant impact it may have on the development of families and also on the emotional lives of children, and therefore the future of society, is often overlooked (Solley, 2015). It is certainly important to take into consideration the parental leave policies that have been implemented by the tech industries and by governments. However, these policies only facilitate parents in the newborn phase of childcare, therefore neglecting the subsequent years of parenting (Miller, 2015). If companies have the true intent of developing family friendly work environments, they should architecturally create workplaces which integrate both work and families in the medium term. However, this is not yet the case: “the culture is not necessarily friendly to families” admits Bret Taylor, former chief technology officer at Facebook and co-founder of Quip (Taylor cited in Miller, 2015).2 Long working hours in the tech industry, and now expanding into other fields, are no secret; Dustin Moskovitz, co-founder of Facebook Inc. openly admits that employees within the technology sector are expected to sustain workloads that are unsustainable for most people and many times lead to unhealthy lives (Moskovitz, 2015). Therefore, the presupposed credo that technology was to liberate us from work, has turned out to be a farce (Florida, 2012). While many companies have implement2

Founded in 2012, Quip is a servicing software which organizes information and files, thus facilitating productivity, collaboration and communication within a team.


ed well-meaning policies, such as ‘out of the office’ days e.g. bereavement leave, adoption leave, personal days, mental health days, etc., to support workers in completing their family obligations, they often fail to address the core issues of how people and organizations cooperate. Therefore, like the meditation and relaxation rooms, many of these policies go unused. This is often due to the fact that employees fear that absenting themselves from the office will have a negative impact on their compensation or advancement. Unfortunately, “our society is still compartmentalizing ‘work’ and ‘life,’ looking for a way to even the scales, when we should be rethinking the perspective that values time as the ultimate capital. In systems based on such a mind-set, success comes to those who seem to be working the hardest, because they are always accessible” (Geller, 2015). However, long working hours are actually unprofitable for companies. Many people believe that the nine to five work day is a compromise between capitalism and hedonism, but this is historically inaccurate. In reality, the 40hour work week is justified by Henry Ford’s profit-maximizing research, where he determined that company profit increased when employees were not overworked (Moskovitz, 2015). The integration of domestic elements within the office space may certainly facilitate career driven single individuals and their ‘work-life balance’, but have a detrimental effect on workers with families (Miller,2016).

1.3 The Portrait of the Modern Family According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term work-life balance means the separation of one’s time and efforts between productive and reproductive labour: i.e. work on the one hand, and on the other, family and leisure ac-




76% 67%


1973 1977 1981 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 Men


25> 26-35 36-45 46-55 55< 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36

Figure 05: Employment rates for men and women aged 16-64, 1971 to 2013, UK (ONS, 2013) Figure 06: Average hours of unpaid domestic labour done per week in each age category for men and women, 2015,UK (ONS, 2016)


tivities (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Thus, the combined term in itself, ‘work-life’, implies that the two components exist in separate spheres and are independent of each other. Furthermore, ‘balance’ entails that there is a compromise to be made (Geller, 2015). The fact that working parents often struggle both physically and mentally between their responsibilities within the workplace and within the family home is in itself problematic. This quandary particularly affects women who, for both physiological and social reasons, are more bound to child-bearing and nurturing (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013). Therefore, should working women and mothers have to decide between their career or their family? Is ‘balancing’ the only option society gives us? Or should young millennial women entertain the idea of oocyte cryopreservation? In 2015, tech companies such as: Apple and Facebook, introduced the additional benefit of oocyte cryopreservation for their female employees. Companies presumed that by offering this benefit women would be temporarily relieved of the impending pressure of child bearing, thus allowing them to “do the best work of their lives” (Apple In. cited from Tran, 2014). It is a known fact that a woman’s prime fertility window coincides with her prime career-advancement years (Weber, 2014). In fact, many debate that by offering oocyte cryopreservation companies are subliminally sending female employees the wrong message. Due to demanding work culture, increasing economic hardship, and unaffordable housing, parents and children are generally apart for most of the day. These factors not only accentuate the difficulties and strains of ‘worklife balance’, but also may affect employees’ work performance. Working parents who sustain long and tiring commuter journeys, are constantly hurried due to time constraints and are concerned for their children are less likely to be both fully dedicated and content at


work. As Geoffrey Godbey, a time-use expert at Penn State University, indicates: “Working [parents] with young children are the most time-scarce segment of society” (Godbey cited in The Economist, 2014). It has been statistically proven that children with present parents are more likely to reach their full potential (Hartley-Brewer, 2015). Inevitably, working parents who have facilitated access to their children and personal responsibilities, are far more likely to be both ‘productive’ and ‘content’ at work; thus, benefiting the development of their children, themselves, the employer and society at large. In response to these issues, programs such as Parenting in the Workplace Institute and Job Sharing have begun to emerge (James, 2017) (Barrow, 2017). Traditionally the nuclear family structure was constituted by a contract of labour, where women would conduct domestic and affective labour for the family in exchange for financial security provided by the man. This, however, is no longer the case. In inner-city London, the ‘traditional nuclear family’ structure has become almost a marginal group (Office for National Statistics, 2016). Various studies indicate that there is no longer such a thing as a typical family, rather the new norm in western society is a diverse family structure (Richardson, 2014). As Philip Cohen, a sociologist at the University of Maryland, indicates: “there hasn’t been the collapse of one dominant family structure and the rise of another. It’s really a fanning out into all kinds of family structures, different is the new norm” (Cohen cited in Keating, 2014). Although Cohen’s work principally reflects an American census, the UK social structure is not very different. Throughout this thesis, the term family will not identify with one family structure versus another, but rather incorporates all family structures with dependent children. Today, the number of employed working mothers has never been higher – accord-

ingly 67% of women are part of the British labour force (Office for National Statistics, 2013). (Figure 05) This is not to suggest that all women must be mothers, but that many of them are or would like to be, good mothers. However, although mothers have entered the labour market in ever increasing numbers, they constantly find themselves struggling between maintaining their families and their career. While this is an issue that principally affects working mothers, as women are still being affected by historical assumptions that reproductive labour is predominantly their responsibility, men too are now encountering this struggle. (Figure 06) In fact, proclamations such as the following now often apply to men as well: “If we put our careers first, we’re selfish. If we devote ourselves to children and care work, we’re lazy, or we’re spoiled. If we try to juggle both at once, we’re unable to give either our full attention….” Even so, some may still argue: “[F]amily life, for men, is not supposed to involve a surrendering of the self, as it is for women. Young men do not worry about how they will achieve a ‘work-life balance’, nor does the ‘life’ aspect of that equation translate to ‘partnership and childcare’”. Nevertheless, others consider such views outdated, especially in an era where the cost of living means that bringing up a family frequently depends on two pay-packets (Slaughter, 2012). Over the past five decades, feminist have fought ardently to alter their own role in society and therefore question assumptions (gender stereotypes) made about women. They have succeeded in many ways. However, if women are to successfully eradicate gender stereotypes within society, therefore truly reaching equality within the workplace and within the home, then they should also begin to question society’s assumptions and stereotypes about men. 3 3

In 2015, the UK introduced parental leave rights for its workers, thus allowing both parents to share childcare. However, the uptake of fathers tak-


Recently, publications, such as Sherly Sandberg’s LeanIn or Ivanka Trump’s Women Who Work: Rewriting the Rules for Success, have attempted to educate women on ‘how to strike a balance’ or ‘how to have it all’. Yet by labelling the difficulties of ‘work-life balance’ as a ‘woman’s issue’ they fundamentally ignore the evolving changes in outlook just cited, to maintain – and condone – the idea that men and women have different priorities as regards employment and caregiving. By putting too much emphasis on the ‘motherhood penalty’, society is unconsciously creating a ‘fatherhood penalty’: as society is still infected with the breadwinner and caregiver ideology. However, the socioeconomics of parenting are changing. The 2017 Modern Families Index- published by work-life charity Working Families and Bright Horizons, a nursery provider – indicates that although men are still paid better than women, many recognize that pushing for an ambitious career can result in not being available to their partners and children (Working Families, 2017). Such analysis suggests that ‘work-life balance’ can no longer be confined to women, but rather needs to be considered as an issue of both genders and of the family as whole. The reasonable explanation for “these profound changes are not, as commonly portrayed, signs of the reckless self-indulgence of a spoiled people. They are undergirded by powerful economic forces that are reshaping our society and our lives” (Florida, 2012, p.10). If the information era is to adjust the structure of everyday life successfully, socieing paternity leave is less than 5%. “When dads are asked why that is, they say it’s because they feel it will be frowned upon in their workplace, that people will assume that they’re not committed, and that it could blight their careers.” (Maria Miller MP cited in Doward, 2017) Interestingly, 50 % of the population has been dealing with this issue for decades. But the fact that young millennial fathers are being confronted with these issues could be the opportunity for a cultural revolution.

ty and architecture as a field need to correctly overlap production and reproduction. Personal responsibilities and work performance need to be valued equally, and it should be understood that one does not annul the other, but rather they reinforce one anotherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s goals (Slaughter, 2013). The achievement of the kind of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;work-life balanceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; sought by millennials can certainly be associated to the sphere of work; yet it is inevitably also influenced by the sphere of living, i.e. the home. Hence, if society is truly to sustain families within the workplace, should the spaces we inhabit be reconsidered?






2. The Stagnant Dwelling 2.1 Housing for the British Family


It is compelling to juxtapose the progressive design transformation of the office vs. the stagnant design of the dwelling; though new forms of labour and economic forces are reshaping our workplaces and how we organize our lives, the house has generally remained unaltered. Beyond simply offering refuge from the competitive world of production, the function of the house has always been to create a place where human beings can cohabit, reproduce and raise children. For this reason, the subject of the house is the family. The term family, which derives from the Latin word familia, meaning servile, has undoubtedly influenced the design and structure of the dwelling. The Latin word is cognate with famulus (‘servant’). The concept of ‘service’ is therefore engraved in the foundations of the house, thus resulting in each room acquiring a specialized function. (Dogma, 2013). The ‘bedroom’, the ‘bathroom’, the ‘living room’ and ‘the kitchen’ are all spaces which have strong functional identities and which require labour. According to Heidi Hartmann, a feminist economist, a good home life for a family of four demands about sixty hours of domestic work per week (Hartmann, 1993). Consequently, as our work environments are becoming progressively more time demanding, the rigid typology of the house becomes constraining for both men and women. As Dolores Hayden indicates: “Whether it is in a suburban, exurban, or inner-city neighbourhood, whether it is a split-level ranch house, a modern masterpiece of concrete and glass, or an old brick tenement, the house or apartment is almost invariably organized around the same set of spaces: kitchen, dining room, living room, bedrooms, garage, or parking area. These spaces require someone to undertake private cooking, cleaning, child care….” (Hayden, 1981, p.267). The conventional design of the dwelling has not yet adapted to contemporary society or to the understanding that domestic labour is no longer conducted full-time, but

London Housing Design Guide

Figure 07: Space Standards Study of Kitchen, Dining, Living and Bathroom (1-6 persons dwellings)

Space Standards Study


1-person 37 sq.m

1-bedroom, 2-persons 50 sq.m

2-bedroom, 3-persons 61 sq.m

2-bedroom, 4-persons 83 sq.m

3-bedroom, 5-persons 102 sq.m

4-bedroom, 6-persons 113 sq.m





has rather remained grounded in previous social assumptions (Matrix, 1984). (Figure 07) Therefore, the obsolete design of the dwelling prevents the successful amalgamation of production and reproduction, and as a result, impedes many young working families. Despite the fact that dwelling design is outmoded in most of western society, for the purpose of this thesis, the primary focus of the following section will be housing standards in the United Kingdom. In recent years, British political parties have striven to publicly appear as the protectors and promoters of families (Till, 2015). In 2015, the Labour Party’s Manifesto line read: “Britain only succeeds when working families succeed” (Labour Party, 2015). However, are politicians truly attempting to support families? And are British families succeeding? Throughout history, and particularly in the last century, governments have made several attempts to shape and alter standards in housing in order to assure Britons were supplied with adequate housing conditions. This can be observed in the numerous reports published, such as: The Tudor Walters Report of 1918, The Dudley Report in 1944, to the widely-known report Homes for Today and Tomorrow of 1961, and Housing the Family of 1974.123 However, the fundamental flaw of these publications, which hitherto have influenced the contemporary design of the dwelling, is that 1

The mandatory nature of housing standards was terminated by the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The latest Conservative government alleged that the elimination of housing standards would reduce the cost of housing and, generally, public spending.


Homes for Today and Tomorrow is frequently known as the Parker Morris Report. Parker Morris Committee was appointed as a subcommittee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG).


It was expected that all councils and many private houses were to conform to housing standards set by the Central Housing Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG).


they standardized the act of living, and therefore profoundly misunderstood the dynamics of the family and everyday needs of men and women (The Architectural Press, 1999). As adequately described by Matrix: “people and activities [were] packaged in a standardized format where they [bore] little resemblance to human beings. Mr. and Mrs. Average and their children [became] mere emblems in plan and elevation” (Matrix, 1984, p.84). This observation can visibly be comprehended in the time and activities chart in Housing the Family (MTP Construction, 1974). (Figure 08) Despite the fact that Housing the Family has become obsolete, as formerly stated, the activities and spaces depicted within it are identical to those which form houses today: kitchen, bedroom, living room, etc. An updated version of the chart, which portrays a ‘typical’ family of today, itself demonstrates the fundamental discrepancy in the design of contemporary housing. (Figure 09) Yet, it is important to differentiate and accredit some success to housing guide standards, particularly, Homes for Today and Tomorrow, which unlike others, set out to understand how people were living in the 1970s, rather than simply complying with pre-existing stereotypes (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1961). “It proposed a new way of setting housing standards by outlining design problems rather than providing ‘standard’ plans, as earlier housing manuals had, and was intended to free architects from stereotyped planning” (Matrix, 1984). The Parker Morris Committee principally emphasized the amount of space individual families needed rather than the architectural layout of housing (Hatherley, 2014). The report “is not about rooms so much as about the activities that people want to pursue in their homes,” it acknowledged the various new forms of leisure triggered by, as termed in the report, “new affluence” (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1961). However, al-

The Young Family - 1974

(Parents and three children: a boy of school age (7) and girls (3 and 1)


In the early morning rush, instant hot water and warmth are needed.


Breakfast has to be served quickly, the oldest child gets ready for school and the other children are looked after as they wake up.


Father and school child are off. Mother gives the other children their food and has something herself. A place where food can be eaten near the work area is useful.


Mother puts the baby in the pram and the toddler plays outside. The toddler wanders in and out of the house. Mother needs to be able to see the children easily while she works


Coming back from the shopping loaded up, Mother needs space to put away the groceries and the pram. Enough elbow room is needed to take off the childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s outdoor clothes , and somewhere convenient to put them.


When the children play indoors Mother needs to be able to see them from the kitchen, but they should be away from the kitchen equipment and not under her feet.


During the week, family dinners need to be quick. The dining space should be conveniently reached from the work centre.


The baby needs a place to where it is quiet to sleep. The toddler needs a place to play, where toys and other playthings can be concentrated, so the housewife does not need to worry about tidying up.


Figure 08: Times and Activities Chart Housing the Family


The living room must remain tidy for adult visitors, while the children of both families play within sight but not too close to the teacups.


Watching T.V. is a major family activity, so the children come into the living roomto watch.


Some people like watching T.V. while they are eating their evening meal, so space for a low table is needed.


People do not always want to watch T.V. when it is on, and therefore need a place to sit away from it. The children need quiet when they are being settled down to sleep.


Whe Father makes or repairs something, he needs to be out of Motherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s way in the kitchen and where he will not disturb sleeping children.


Sometimes visitors are being entertained while a child is watching his/her favorite T.V. programme.


Mother may want to talk to visitors while she is preparing some snacks for them.


The parents need to sleep near their young children, so that they can attend to them easily.



The Young Family - 2017

(Parents and three children: a boy of school age (7) and girls (3 and 1)


In the early morning rush, both parents and children prepare themselves for work/school day.


The entire family has a quick breakfast together, before they rush out of the house for their day.


Either Mother or Father take children to nursery and school: they then both go to work.


The house remains empty.


The house remains empty.


The house remains empty.


The house remains empty.


The house remains empty.


The house remains empty.


Figure 09: Times and Activities Chart By Author


The children and their caregiver return home from their school day.


The children watch T.V. in the living room, while the caregiver bathes the baby.


The caregiver prepares dinner for the children. Father comes home from work.


The youngest two children are put to bed, while the oldest prepares himself. The caregiver goes home, while Father prepares dinner for himself and Mother.


Father relaxes in the living room while waiting Mother to return home from work. The children are all sound asleep.


Father and Mother have dinner in the kitchen together.


Mother and Father unwind infront of the T.V. The living room is a far distance away from the childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s room.


The entire family is asleep.



Under 20





40 and over

Live births per 1,000 women in age group

175 125 100 75 25 0










Average housing cost to net income ration 1994-1995 to 2014-2015, by tenure




25 20



5 0











Figure 10: Age-specific fertility rates, 1984 to 2014, UK (ONS,2014) Figure 11: Affordability and tenure, 1994 - 2014, London, UK (Resolution Foundation, 2016)



though, today there is a growing discrepancy between the escalating price of housing with the declining number of square meters per home, to be discussed further below, housing standards should no longer be focusing exclusively on minimum space standards, but rather attempting, like the Parker Morris Report, to understand how the evolution of housing needs to occur with the current changing economy, and therefore how people do actually live and work. Unfortunately, the proposed reinstatement of housing standards in the UK, published in March 2015 by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), ignores the primary difficulties of British families and young workers, but rather simply focusing on space standards (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015). It is indisputable that housing standards should be reinstated, nevertheless, the issue of affordability and the ‘work-life’ issues that families endure everyday will not simply be resolved by returning to concepts of the past and by creating design norms for unaffordable larger homes. The young man or woman, mother or father, who spends his or her majority of time in the workplace, does not necessarily need a larger home as this only increases the amount of domestic labour required within the household. Rather, to resolve the housing crisis and allow families the affordable and functional housing they deserve, governments need to consider how the lives of men and women are changing due to the new forms of labour and how these developing lifestyles can create a new living typology for families.

2.2 British Millennials and the Unreachable Life Milestones It is indisputable that the traditional family in the UK is in decline, as Spencer


Thompson of IPPR, a London think-tank, states: “the two-parent, male-breadwinner family is basically extinct” (Thompson cited in The Economist, 2013). Although this is a triumph for society, it has nonetheless had an effect on birth-rates and family sizes in the UK. In fact, the average age of motherhood in the UK, the highest in the world, together with Germany, has now reached 30 (Peacock and Donnelly, 2014).4 (Figure 10) This is not to say that all individuals must have children, but rather that their career choices should not affect whether they do or they don’t. Although the situation may not appear alarming, due to overpopulation, prolonged lifespans and advancements in fertility technology, it is fundamental to acknowledge that there is a direct correlation between the average age of motherhood, length of her education, employment, number of children and even her acquisition of a house (Chalabi, 2014). The analysis of the Office of National Statistics data demonstrates that as the average number of children in a family has decreased the number of years a woman spends in school has increased, and vice versa (ONS,2014). These numbers support the notion that women, and inevitably also men, find it increasingly harder to access high-level professional careers whilst having a family. As a result, many young women feel pressured to choose between motherhood or their career (Slaughter, 2012). As Lotte Bailyn, Professor of Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management, states: [demanding work culture] has a real social consequence because those are the same years that are optimal for starting a family and that affects not only women but also men” (Prof. Bailyn cited in Clayton, 2014). Unfortunately, these numbers are only bound to increase, as the millennial generation, the predominant workforce 4

Data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) demonstrate that 20% of women reach their mid-forties without children, i.e. there are now more than twice the number of women in this position than in the previous generation.


Average housing cost to net income ration 1994-1995 to 2014-2015, by age

35 30 25

25> 25-34 35-44







5 0

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Figure 12: Generational affordability, 1994 to 2014, UK (Resolution Foundation, 2016)



Thousands 400

300 200 100 0











Million 7 6.75 6.5 6.25 6 5.75 5.5 5.25











Figure 13: Multi-family households, 1996 to 2014, UK (ONS, 2015) Figure 14: Young adults living with parents, 1997 to 2015, UK (ONS,2015)


of the information era, is currently battling to achieve the independence that will allow them to combine a fulfilling personal life with their career goals (Goldman Sachs, 2015). Today, young men and women, not only struggle with sustaining a ‘work-life balance’, but also struggle with the cost of living. (Figure 11) In fact, the drop-in birth-rate within the UK is not only due to demanding work culture, but also to soaring housing prices. Although the number of UK families with dependent children has remained constant till today, the vast number of single millennials or millennials unable to afford children is something to take note of, as this will inevitably affect future demographics and the economy (Cosslett, 2015). With a stagnant economy, demanding work culture and housing prices increasing far more rapidly than incomes, access to housing for the millennial generation has become far more restricted than it was for the previous generation. (Figure 12) In many locations, particularly London, property prices and rents must be significantly below the current market level if they are to be accessible to households on average income (Bowie, 2017). Discussion of the housing crisis has largely focused on affordability and the growing discrepancy between the escalating price of housing with the declining average size of dwellings in recent times. However, the extensive effects of the housing crisis beyond costs and ownership are often overlooked. As Campbell Robb, Shelter’s chief executive, indicates: “our ever-growing housing crisis means millions of young people are being left behind – unable to reach many of the crucial life milestones that were taken for granted by the generations who came before’s heart-breaking to see so many young people still living in a housing limbo, facing a frustrating lifetime of instability where they feel unable to move forward with their lives.” In fact, according to financial services London Victoria, the UK’s housing crisis has become


so severe that first time home owners are 38 years old, on average; and this number is expected to have risen to 41 by 2015 (Stone, 2016). While family living has received longterm ideological support in political terms, it is de facto challenged by the recent transformation in work patterns linked to – and indeed dictated by – the information era. Many young adults have attempted to overcome the difficulties of housing in London, either by renting, or sharing living expenses in multi-family households. (Figure 13) The current domestic landscape reveals a growing gap between the millennial generation’s efforts in starting new forms of cohabitation, discussed further in the following chapter, and the accepted cliché of the traditional family dwelling. However, recently published Office of National Statistics (ONS) data highlights the impact that late entry or non-entry into the housing market is having on the millennial generation, with many still living with their parents and postponing ‘life milestones’ in the process (Bowie, 2017). (Figure 14) For this reason alone, housing ought to be reconceived. However, if we are to truly propose a successful design scheme which amalgamates the office and the home, for young millennials, we must understand how their social aspirations are impacted by the socio-economic patterns of contemporary society.




3. Sharing 3.1 The Generation of Sharing


The Millennial generation (also known as generation Y, born between 1981 and 1997) forms the largest cohort in the UK to emerge since the baby boom generation (Hope, 2016). Millennials, coined as ‘generation rent’ or the ‘cheapest generation’, hold different values to their predecessors; in that they have postponed or eliminated life milestones, due to economic difficulty. In comparison to prior generations millennials are not consumers of material commodities, but rather of experiences (Halzack, 2016). As a generation that came of age after the 2008 financial crisis and which has grown in a time of rapid change, they have “a set of priorities and expectations sharply different from previous generations” (Goldman Sachs, 2015). Buying a car or a home is no longer a certainty, nor a desire for many. With their innate understanding of technology, their ever-increasing concern for environmental issues, and their changing consumer value – from physical commodities to life experiences – millennials are the generation of sharing (Schneider, 2012). As a matter of fact, some argue that these millennial consumption inclinations may mark an extreme generational shift and a profound transformation within the economy; as it already has (Thompson and Weissmann, 2012). Known to tend toward minimalist lifestyles and disownership, these young people are now setting global cultural trends. Millennials are exceptionally “active in and receptive to mediate sharing”, especially in cities such as London (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015, p.30). In fact, according to a report published by Centre for Cities, today city centres in the UK today, particularly London, are witnessing an ‘urban renaissance’ (Thomas, Serwicka and Swinney, 2015). This circumstance can be strongly correlated to millennials or the creative class – young, highly educated, mobile individuals – departing suburban life in order to live in inner cities. Today, these young people are keen to live in places with high walk-

ability, good nurseries and primary schools and the option of sharing public spaces, e.g. parks, squares, and transportation (Flint, 2014). As a result, in the last decade, the number of 22 to 29-year-olds living in the large city centres of the UK has tripled (Sedghi, 2015). In recent years, sharing behaviours have significantly changed. Initiated from cyberspace, the custom has now transferred to urban space in many places around the world. Indeed, studies, such as the 2013 survey conducted by the research firm Latitude, have demonstrated that 65% of UK residence share various commodities, such as: cars, clothes, living space, etc. Moreover, the study confirmed that individuals who share information or media online also share offline, validating the idea that people, in this case millennials, who are in touch with social media are more likely to share in the physical world (Latitude, 2013). Although sharing behaviour surveys typically portray a growing individualism within society as more homes are occupied by single people. A clear and relevant example is the City of London which has 56% of its households being occupied by single individuals – followed by Kensington and Chelsea (37%), Westminster (45%) and Camden (41%) (Office for National Statistics, 2014). They nonetheless reveal a curving tendency to sharing. For instance, in The Great Sharing Economy: A Report into Sharing Across the UK, Rachel Griffiths discovers that “over half of the UK would love to find a way of being able to share their time and resources within their local community…between one and three people would be willing to share their garden with someone else locally.” Furthermore, “When it comes to personal views on sharing, 81% of those in the UK say it makes us feel happy and 75% say that we feel better about ourselves when we share our time and possessions” (Griffiths, 2011). However, the truly fundamental insight here is: “It’s the 2534 year olds who feel the best about sharing”


– millennials (Griffiths, 2011). Clearly millennials are embracing collaborative consumption, also known as the sharing economy.

3.2 The Rise of the Sharing Economy With the advent of the information era access to the Internet has become an expectation if not a necessity on a global level, and has made possible the developing economic market of collaborative consumption, widely known as the sharing economy. A clear consensus on the definition of the sharing economy has not yet reached (Sundararajan, 2017). Yet extensive analysis on the literature on this topic implicates that the sharing economy is constructed as a high-tech phenomenon which can be subdivided into three categories. First, technology is a facilitator for the sharing economy; second, as already considered, online collaborative consumption inspires offline sharing behaviour; and third the ideologies of the sharing economy can be seen as deriving from the world of high-tech start-ups (Nicholas, 2013). Nevertheless, the understanding of collaborative consumption and the implications this has for any individual’s everyday life is not easy. Thus, this thesis will begin its analysis by taking into consideration the definition implicit in one influential book which surfaced with the emergence of the sharing economy – Rachel Botsman and Roo Roger’s What’s Mine Is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (2010). Throughout the book, the authors attempt to define a general shift in consumption which occurred between the transition of one century to the next. They determined that the 20th century was predominately demarcated by ‘hyper consumption, whilst the 21st century will notably be the century of ‘collaborative consumption’. Collaborative consumption will no

longer be defined, as hyper consumption had been, by credit, advertising and ownership, but rather will be expressed by reputation, community and shared access (Sundararajan, 2017). As identified by Botsman and Roger: “The Collaboration at the heart of Collaborative Consumption may be local and faceto-face, or it may use the Internet to connect, combine, form groups, and find something or someone to create ‘many-to-many’ peerto-peer interactions. Simply put, people are sharing again with their community – be it an office, a neighbourhood, an apartment building, a school, or a Facebook network”. It is noteworthy that although the sharing economy has developed as an economic model since the turn of the century, the idea and element of sharing is not new. People and communities outside of cities have been sharing for centuries (Maycotte, 2015). What is new, however, is the amalgamation of technology with sharing and the enhancement it has enabled of sharing behaviours within cities. This can be directly attributed to the development of sharing services such as: Airbnb, Uber, BlaBlaCar, EatWith, etc. The transformation of digital goods markets by enterprise has transformed society’s norms on ownership significantly and greatly impacted the needs and expectations of millennials (Sundararajan, 2017). As a result today young people possess fewer objects than prior generations. As already implied, this is not only due to the technological compression of objects, i.e. electronic photo albums vs. physical photographic albums: but also to the fact that objects are no longer necessarily bought, but borrowed. The benefits of changing norms of ownership are reasonably evident: i.e. a car-sharing automobile replaces five private automobiles (Maak, 2015). Although initiated “primarily by digital factors, many sharing behaviours will be sustained over time by ethical and social rather than technological considerations” (Sundararajan, 2017, p.44).


Today, it is indisputable that the future of humanity is urban (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015). Currently, 54% of the world’s population is living in cities; it is expected that by 2045 the population within cities will grow by 1.5 times (The World Bank, 2017). Yet as indicated by McLaren and Agyeman in their book Sharing Cities: A Case for Truly Smart and Sustainable Cities: “traditional forms of sharing have been undermined in modern cities by social fragmentation and commercialization” (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015, pg.4). However, with the arrival of the sharing economy our cities and consequently our everyday lives are changing, from the way we work to the way we live. Cities where this is principally occurring are: New York, San Francisco and London (the capital of the European sharing economy) (Davidson, 2015). City residents are now accustomed to the philosophies of sharing, i.e. car sharing and co-working spaces; yet in many aspects, city dwelling is still being ‘cemented’ into outof-date 20th century arrangements (Gapper, 2014). Sharing can be more than a ‘temporary’ arrangement; it can also offer solidarity and long-term conditions encouraged by community. Consequently, young millennials who are, as previously stated, struggling with both demanding work culture and housing costs, are now extending their sharing philosophies beyond general services and into communal living arrangements. Yet in what way could new sharing behaviours imply a transformation of the family ‘home’? In order to understand the implications of communal living arrangements and the potential they hold for a new ‘work-live’ typology within the city, it is worth taking a closer look at historic communal living.

Figure 15: Plan of Charles Fourier’s Phalanstère (1829)


3.3 The Origins of Communal Living Communal living is hardly a departure from tradition, but rather returns to past customs; as for most of human history, people have been hunter-gatherers and have shared tasks by living together. Throughout history, individuals who lived in communal groups depended on one another for food, childcare and protection. Although living arrangements have altered and shifted throughout history, the concepts of private ownership, the nuclear family, the division of labour by gender and the single-family dwelling have originated relatively recently (Strauss, 2016). In fact, the first examples of modern communal living – defined as any form of housing cooperative in which people who are not blood related live together- appeared in the early 19th century “when the ‘whole house’ gradually dissolved and the home for the nuclear family became the prevailing form of habitation” (Maak, 2015, pg. 140). As observed by Walter Benjamin, the private individual has only been identifiable since a clear opposition was created between the dwelling and the workplace. Until this moment, the home was certainly not considered a private inhabitation for the nuclear family, but rather was a multi-family space that ac¬commodated all forms of life, from domestic labour to productive labour. The private and public dichotomy did not exist. The single-family dwelling, an early 19th century model which developed due to the formation of industrial labour, was not eagerly supported by the working class; as workers preferred to live as part of an extended family, thus permitting individuals to support one another in childcare, illness and economic stability (Maak, 2015.) In the 20th century two basic arrangements of collective housing developed: apartment sharing communities for people with financial difficulties and experimental utopian forms of cohabitation which intended to dis-


mantle the rigid principles of the dominant nuclear family dwelling. Stereotypically, communal living arrangements are not regarded highly: people generally presuppose that communal living entails dirty plates, filthy toilets, hair in the sink drain and neglected communal areas (Maak, 2015). However, although communal living can be challenging at times, the compensation of community and solidarity can be immensely gratifying. In order to comprehend why many 20th century communal living models failed, and at the same time comprehend the potential ideals whose transcription to contemporary communal housing would be beneficial, past communal housing proposals are worth analysis. A primary response to the development of the private dwelling and the nuclear family is French socialist theorist Charles Fourier’s phalanstère in 1829. 1 The phalanstère, a counter model to the single-family dwelling designed in the early 19th century, was proposed as a utopian communal housing complex for 500-2000 residents including communal dining halls, a library and a central childcare facility whose provision enabled women to work outside the home (Moses, 1984). (Figure 15) Fourier profoundly believed that the traditional dwelling limited families and oppressed women, as they were expected to conduct labour within the house and within the workplace. The ultimate objective of the phalanstère was to eliminate the perception that work was a duty and detached from ‘life’, thus allowing the inhabitants not only to be happier, but also more productive. For this to materialize, Fourier suggested that the individual’s day be subdivided into 1.5 hour slots: the working day would therefore become diversified, i.e. less mundane, making work more stimulating. As a result, the de1

Phalanstère, a term developed by Fourier, originates from the French word phalange (deriving from the ancient Greek word meaning basic military unit) with the French word monastère (monastery).

Figure 16-21 (from top left): Familistère - Guise, Kibbutzim, Avtozavod Soviet Communal Block - Nizhny Novgorod, Olivetti worker’s houses Ivrea, Sven Markelius Kollektivhuset - Stockholm, Unite d’Habitation Marseille


sign of the phalanstère represented Fourier’s rhythmic sequence of time through the space of the rues galeries, corridors which corresponded to urban streets. These interiorized streets “permit[ted] an efficient transition from one realm into another and offer[ed] the possibility of encounter and exchange” (Dogma, 2015, p.3). Inspired by Fourier’s phalanstère, which unfortunately was never built, many other community proposals developed. These included: Jean-Baptiste André Godin’s familistère in 1865; the Kibbutzim in 1909; collective housing in the USSR in the 1920s; Adriano Olivetti’s Città dell’Uomo (Ivrea) in 1933; Sven Markelius Kollektivhuset in 1935; and Le Corbusier’s celebrated Unité d’Habitation in 1952.2345 (Figure 16-21) Every one of these projects was founded on the assumption that it was unreasonable to expect women both to conduct productive labour and to attend to reproductive labour at the same time. It was recognized implicitly, moreover, that such projects should not “exploit female labour to the limit, both in production and in the home” (Teige, 1932, p.173). Thus, all these projects, whether simply theorized or real2

Jean-Baptiste André Godin was a wealthy French industrialist who owned a highly lucrative oven factory. He is generally known today for realization of a utopian community.

3 The Kibbutz, established in 1909, is a form of collective living in Isreal which is traditionally based on argiculture. Gender equality within the community has conventionally been one of the fundamental concepts of the kibbutz. 4

Adriano Olivetti was a well-known Italian engineer, politician and industrialist. The workers of the Olivetti were offered homes, child support, meals, libraries, medical support, and sport facilities. The Olivetti Factory is primarily known as the manufacturer of typewriters, calculators and computers.


Invented mainly by architect Sven Markelius, kollektivhus (collective house in Swedish) with collective services, was first, considered to be a logical expression of modernization, and second, it was perceived as a tool which would enable women to combine housework and paid employment.


ized, wholly or partially, attempted to abolish the concept of ‘work-life balance’ as their founders and proponents believed single family dwelling increased gender inequality within the labour market and within the home.

3.4 The Old: Communal Living in Soviet Russia With the emergence of the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917, the new socialist regime announced that both men and women were to live and work together as equal citizens. For the Soviets, the home was to be industrialized just as the workplace had been; or else productive and reproductive labour (the family) would deteriorate and effectively harm the economy of the state. However, according to the Soviets, for this to successfully materialize the traditional social constructs of gender labour roles had to be abolished, thus, resulting in the re-elaboration of the traditional family structure and the single-family dwelling. Ultimately, the new socialist regime proposed to blur the boundaries between production and reproduction, thus creating a new everyday way of life (novyi byt) for its citizens: indeed, a way of life which would result in the formation of a new and viable model both for the individual and collective family structures (Attwood, 2010). While early Soviet theorists initiated an intellectual foundation of the transformation of everyday life and the creation of the socialist family, the architectural response to the questions of Soviet domesticity, i.e. in the form of communal living, would arrive later with the commencement of the first Five-Year Plan (1928) (Crawford, 2015). Communal housing (dom-kommuna), was designed in such a way as to encourage collective collaboration between its inhabitants, thus, invoking the prin-

Figure 22: Narkomfin Communal House: Interior (Pare, 1995)


Figure 23: Narkomfin Communal House: Exterior (Spinelli and Melikova, 2014) Figure 24: Narkomfin Communal House: Facade (Spinelli and Melikova, 2014)


Figure 25: Narkomfin Communal House: Apartment Figure 26: Narkomfin Communal House: Hair Salon Figure 27: Narkomfin Communal House: Added Makeshift Kitchen (Spinelli and Melikova, 2014)


ciple that the social well-being of the community was placed above individual interests and that of the nuclear family (Atwood, 2010). As Svetlana Boym indicates, communal housing was meant to “radically reconstruct the individual bourgeois quarters…subverting the structure of the bourgeois family and instituting the relationships of proletarian comradeship” (Boym, 1994, p.128). State organized competitions urged architects to redesign the urban environment in compliance with socialist ideals; architects were instructed to eradicate the oppressive ‘family hearth’ and introduce communal facilities such as dining halls, laundry services, reading rooms, clubs, crèches and kindergartens (Gradov referenced in Crawford, 2015). (Figure 22) Although certain proposals, had more services than others, the communal kitchen was a non-negotiable component of all designs. As “the individual kitchen was the symbolic space of the nuclear family” it should therefore be abolished from all communal housing kitchens (Boym, 1994). Customarily, housing blocks which were designed and constructed by the state would be given to factories or enterprises to be used as housing for their workers (Atwood, 2010). The workplace and the dwelling were to become one and the same. Factory kitchens would prepare meals, central mechanical laundries would wash and mend clothes, children would be taught in public institutions and central heating would be accessible to everyone (Hayden, 1984). It was presupposed that housing with collective services would permit women to fully integrate and dedicate themselves to the industrial production of the state, thus allowing both men and women to share the pros and cons of industrialization. One of the most prominent shared living complexes which was fully constructed and briefly inhabited, was the Narkomfin Communal House. (Figure 23) Today, in the shadows of Stalin’s Seven Sister skyscrapers in Moscow, sit a trio of forgotten yellow concrete


buildings, which once represented the utopian dreams of a young Soviet state. (Figure 24) The Narkomfin Communal House was commissioned in 1928 by the first Commissar of Finance, Nikolai Miliutin. The housing block, planned and designed by architects Moisei Ginzburg and Ignaty Milinis, was proposed for the staff of the Ministry of Finance (Royal Academy of the Arts, 2011, p.168). The building was to represent the new physical and ideological ideal of home; it was “a laboratory for social and architectural experimentation to transform the byt of the ideal socialist citizen” (Cathcart-Keays, 2015). Composed as four individual units, the building complex consisted of: an accommodation block with 42 dwelling units, many of which consisted of sleeping area, study and a shower; a communal block which contained a sports hall, communal dining hall, kitchen and reading room; a laundry block situated in between the other two buildings; and a block, which unfortunately was never built, for the education of resident children. (Figure 25) The architects intended the building complex to be ‘transitional,’ thus, accommodating traditional nuclear families and those who had already accustomed themselves to socialist communal living. However, the real intent of the proposal was to persuade traditional nuclear families to transform to the new novyi byt. Ginzburg and Milinis understood that the architecture of Narkomfin could “stimulate but not dictate” the activities of the masses, nevertheless they hoped it could harness the transition into a “socially superior mode of life” (Ginzburg cited in Cathcart-Keays, 2015). (Figure 26) Regrettably, by the time Narkomfin had been completed in 1932, the revolutionary concepts of communal living and feminist values had easily been jettisoned (Royal Academy of the Arts, 2011). As formerly stated, for the Soviet regime, a key aspect of the development of the novyi byt and the egalitarian socialist society was not only the elimination of domestic drudgery,

Figure 28: The Embassy San Francisco: Living Room Figure 29: The Embassy San Francisco: The Family


resolved through serviced housing, but also, the dismantlement of the traditional nuclear family. The socialist family comprehended the surrender of responsibilities for child rearing by both parents (Kollontai, 1920). The resolution to this issue was the implementation of communal childcare; which possibly became one of the most controversial characteristics of the Soviets novyi byt. Various speculations were contrived on how children should be educated and whether they should maintain any contact with their parents. For some, children were to live separately from adults, whilst others believed that the responsibility of children should be ‘shared’ (Boym, 1994). However, although, the ideologies of Soviet theorists demonstrated a progressive understanding of society and the needs of workers, the misinterpretation of technological advancements on the one hand, and of the biological bonds between parents and their children on the other, to failure. Unfortunately, the USSR’s years of economic growth and sexual freedom terminated by the mid 1930s; “Russia was economically backward…the poverty of the Revolution meant that the socialized functions of the family – the communal nurseries, restaurants, laundries – were drained of resources or simply disappeared” (German, 1980, p.3). As a result, residents of Narkomfin installed makeshift kitchens within their living units. (Figure 27) Essentially, the flaws of this and other communal living schemes are obvious: life is systematically rationalized. In an attempt to create a free and egalitarian society, the design generates a counter reaction to the solution. “There are hardly any nooks that one can retreat to and that offer a degree of privacy and comfort; no really attractive place of open hospitality tempting one to enter the micro public space of the house” (Maak,2015, p.142). Nevertheless, the Soviet philosophy of collective housing can certainly contribute to the contemporary debate about today’s changing family structures


and the dwellings we inhabit within cities. Conceivably, with the technological advancements in the information era, the development of a new economic model, i.e. the sharing economy, and the gradual blurring of boundaries between production and reproduction, it can be argued that communist ideologies have mutated into the digital socialism of the sharing economy. Although digital socialism shares some of the same roots as Russian socialism, it is different in scope and character. It is socialism without the state, it functions in the field of culture and economics, and is not influenced by government, or at least not openly. Digital socialism (and the sharing economy) primarily developed in response to the global financial crisis of 2008, and like its predecessor, proposes to replace the chaos of the free market with collective ownership. However, unlike Russian socialism, this modern form of socialism now runs off a borderless internet: “instead of gathering on collective farms, we gather in collective worlds. Instead of state factories, we have desktop factories connected to virtual co-ops. Instead of sharing drill bits, picks, and shovels, we share apps, scripts, and APIs. Instead of faceless politburos, we have faceless meritocracies, where the only thing that matters is getting things done. Instead of national production, we have peer production. Instead of government rations and subsidies, we have a bounty of free goods” (Kelly, 2009). Yet, whether the sharing economy is creating “an interesting middle ground between capitalism and socialism” (Sundararajan, 2017) or is actually “leading to the total commercialization of life” is an issue that is currently being highly debated by economist and sociologist globally (Han, 2015).

Figure 30: East and West Facades of The Collective Old Oak Portraying Uses



The mixed-use development contains: 223 units of co-living apartments, 214 serviced apartments, 592 m2 GIA of incubator office space, 332m2 GIA of restaurant space, 237m2 of amenity space, 501m2 of communal kitchens, 106m2 of guest lounge and 144m2 of landscaped roof terrace. (PLP, 2015)





Premium Ensuite Two Bed Ensuite Studio Bed Ensuite Premium One Bed - Serviced Apartment One Bed - Serviced Apartment Two Bed - Serviced Apartment Deluxe One Bed - Serviced Apartment Three Bed - Serviced Apartment Lounge Serviced Apartments Amenity/ Communal Kitchen Entrance/ Public Space The Collective Restorante Open Public Space Back of House Serviced Apartments


3.5 The New: The Millennial Commune and The Forgotten Family When allied to the leadership of the creative class the rise of the sharing economy has now come to symbolise the sharing of possessions; from our cars (Uber), to our work environments (WeWork), to our dwellings (new live-work developments such as The Collective Old Oak Common, discussed below). Urban co-living schemes, initially established by young millennial entrepreneurs combatting skyrocketing property prices in the San Francisco Bay Area, are now expanding to many metropolitan cities. These new cooperatives attempt to dismantle the ideology of the autonomous private living unit, and embrace the philosophies of the sharing economy. As a result, many are designed following the principle of equal private spaces organized in relation to shared collective areas. The following section will focus in detail on two present-day co-living associations, which represent the two principle forms of contemporary communal living within cities. Firstly, the Embassy Network, a small independent community, in San Francisco’s Lower Haight District and secondly, The Collective Old Oak Common, a fully-fledged business enterprise, in London’s emergent ‘tech hub’ Stratford.6 The leading community of the Embassy Network, the Embassy San Francisco (SF), “is an experiment in creating a home built around purpose, intention, and exploration” (Embassy SF, 2013).7 The community, 6

The two co-living schemes have been chosen due to the author’s cohabitation in The Embassy SF during her fieldwork and The Collective Old Oak close proximity to the site, thus following relatively similar socio-economic factors and planning policies.


The Embassy Network, established in San Francisco in 2010, is a collection of nine co-living communities around the world, which question and challenge the concept of the single family-dwelling and cherish the philosophy of sharing and living together.


housed in a 19th century Victorian mansion, is composed of 10 private or shared bedrooms and organized around a series of communal spaces. (Figure 28) The Embassy SF is one of many intentional communities constituted of 20 to 30-years old technocrats in the Bay Area, who are reinventing the Californian communes of the 1960s (Marikar, 2013).8 However, unlike the communes of the 1960s, these intentional communities are not based on political ideals, but rather on the liberation of past dogmas and the endurance of skyrocketing property prices. The residents of the Embassy SF are millennial entrepreneurs seeking a permanent home whilst embracing the values of the sharing economy and consequently of communal living. Thus, they prefer shared groceries, ‘family’ dinners and group activities over personal space. As Jessy Kate Schingler, founder of the Embassy Network, states: “co-living isn’t a sacrifice – it’s an upgrade. In fact, having this over-thetop mansion is helpful because it sends that message” (Schingler cit. from Bowles, 2013). In the San Francisco Bay Area, the majority of the population is constituted of young single technocrats; yet the vast amount of housing is constructed as single-family units. Therefore, collective housing, such as the Embassy SF, provides a successful social alternative (Turner, 2006). Yet, neighbours are not always eager to have communal living associations within the neighbourhood. Thus, due to the reactions of neighbours and the original vision of uniting families and transforming a hyper-individualistic society into a cooperative one; in 2016, the residents of the Embassy SF have welcomed their first family within the Embassy Network. (Figure 29) There have been several recent examples of joint building ventures in Europe, such as the 8

The Embassy SF is an intentional community of 13 permanent residents with 6 available bedsits for passing short term guests. The residents, although no blood related, consider themselves ‘family’.

Figure 31-34: (From Top Left) The Collective Old Oak South Facade, The Collective Old Oak North Facade, Amenity Space, Communal Kitchen


R50 Baugruppen in Berlin or the Yokohama Apartments in Japan, which do not entirely neglect the family-based household. However, like the Embassy Network these co-living schemes are still constructed around the ideals that domestic labour is physically separated from productive labour. Thus, although their design structure facilitates ‘work-life balance’ through the support of a multi-family structure, it does not eliminate it. In contrast to the Embassy SF which is established as an independent intentional community and organized as a family economy, The Collective Stratford is a fully-fledged co-living business enterprise which considers housing as a service and attempts to fully amalgamate working with living. The project reflects the concepts of the sharing economy, linked above to socialist ideals, and understands the current social necessities of young millennials. The first of its kind and the largest co-living community in the world, The Collective Stratford was designed by PLP Architecture and inaugurated in 2015; the development is situated in the London Borough of Newham. (Figure 30) The Collective aims to ‘redesign the world around our generation’, and therefore has designed a development which directly responds to the needs of early-mid careers Londoners (The Collective, n.d.). The basic concept behind the scheme is to use land more efficiently and to construct for the needs of today, thus abolishing the self-contained apartment and proposing new living alternatives which can facilitate the ‘work-life balance’. The Collective Stratford fully embraces the services of the sharing economy to liberate workers from the drudgery of domestic labour. Therefore, the private elements of the dwelling are reduced in size, whilst communal areas, generally serviced, are amplified to allow inhabitants to socialize and dine together. (Figure 31-34) The planning approval and later building of the Collective Stratford is a progressive indication that Local Authorities are slowly al-


tering their rigid policies of mono-functional buildings and separation of production from reproduction, home from work. However, like other millennial communes, the development is designed for the single individual and ignores the idea that serviced homes could be beneficial for families and their development. Families are not yet inserted within the intentional communities of technocrats, as there is a preconceived social division between single individual and the nuclear family. Although the traditional dwelling, hypothetically constructed for the nuclear family, is the key driving force behind the majority of new housing schemes, the design of the new forms of living for the single individual is also fundamental. At the same time the misconception that the past needs of the family are the same as those of today must be addressed. Families, parents, mothers and fathers now have the same needs and lack of time for domestic labour as temporary dwellers, freelance workers and single individuals; therefore, housing must be conceived to accommodate the new social transformations that are unavoidably effecting all workers. While Governments are right to consider the success of the United Kingdom as based on the success of British families, they should also respond to the social transformations which are occurring and develop new forms of housing to sustain the millennial generation and the formation of families.

3.6 Office Housing The current social transformation which is occurring in many European cities, and particularly in large metropoli such as London, is hardly reflected in housing policies. This is principally due to the way financing models impact the building industry when allied to the

Figure 35: The Hatton Gardens Conservation Area

Hatton Gardens Conservation Area Listed Buildings Site Location

Figure 36: Exploded Axonometric of the Saffron Hill NCP, EC1N

7th and 8th Floor - Office Space Basement to 6th Floor - Car Space Basement to 6th Floor Split Level - Car Space


Figure 37: What Could ‘Work-Live’ Look Like?

Company Campus

Boarding House

When you first thought about living opposite your office you had your doubts…but after living here for a few months you can’t imagine a better life for yourself. You have the perfect balance between work and home, private and public, and are part of a friendly communal household who is always there to support you. You are no longer tied down to domestic labour, as bills, washing, cleaning and all the other domestic chores that you once dreaded about are shared. You know feel liberated and your desk. You are a monk of the 21st century. can dedicate yourself fully to you work during working hours and to yourself and family in This isn’t forever, just until you your leisure time. For you sharing is a luxury, need the help! not a compromise!

You are constantly on the move, from one meeting to the next and your work seems never ending. You think back to the home you had dreamed about, and realize you either had to opt out of your career or opt out of being a present parent. I-t doesn’t matter if you need a few extra hours to finish the presentation for tomorrow with your colleagues, there is a community there to support you. Dinner has been made, your clothes have been washed and your kids are sound asleep in an alcove right next to


Cooperative Living

You look to your right and to your left and see people working. You think back to when you used to work alone in your isolated home… now even though you and your neighbours do very different jobs you work together. You are motivated by them. Your new cohousing community is built on solidarity!

political and legislative issues that impede the development of novel residential architecture. Domestic architecture has remained at a halt and accepted the cliché of the traditional family dwelling, thus limiting the dwelling options of millennial urban dwellers (Maak, 2015). The design thesis to which these arguments have led is for an incubator building containing both co-living and co-working spaces, intended to host young technocrats – with start-ups – and their families for a limited length of time. The premise is that by providing early-career millennials with affordable office space and housing, whilst being able to jump start their career and not delay life milestones: such as child bearing and rearing. To implement the aforementioned design scheme and evade skyrocketing property prices in London, the project will be owned by a venture capitalist. In the scenario envisaged inhabitants will have the possibility of procuring low cost co-working and co-living space in London’s Tech City in exchange for a 2% equity slice of their business. The site for the proposed ‘work-live’ prototype currently houses the vacant building of the National Car Park in Saffron Hill, London; comprised within the London Borough of Camden. (Figure 35-36) The obsolete infrastructure, which was built during an era of Fordism, has now proven inadequate to meet the needs of a post-industrial society. Therefore, the vacant lot is an opportunity for architecture to challenge the future social organization of life: the blurring boundaries of productive and reproductive labour. The proposal, which will be informed by the theoretical analysis conducted throughout this study, will be developed from the generic building layout of the office plan. As valued by Rem Koolhaas in his essay Typical Plan, the conventional office plan is a “zero-degree architecture, stripped of all traces of uniqueness and specificity” thus, allowing the design of the new ‘work-live’ typology to embody what


Marx considered the most generic ability of the human being: the potential to produce (Koolhaas, 2002, p.335). To amalgamate office space with housing, is not only an opportunity to diminish costs and use limited city land more efficiently, but also the “possibility of giving tangible and spatial form to the contemporary condition of labour in which work, domestic labour, socialization, rest and exchange are understood no longer as separate spheres but as part of the same productive system” (Dogma, 2016). Altering, and therefore successfully designing in response to, the historical and social perceptions of how we inhabit and work within space, is not straightforward. In fact, the outcomes could be several: production and reproduction, work and home, public and private can be combined to various extents. (Figure 37) The defining principle of the new typology will be to embody all aspects of life; thus, containing compact living units, ample work space, communal kitchens where inhabitants will have the opportunity to dine together and a nursery only a few steps away. However, as past precedents of collective housing have demonstrated, it is important not to over-rationalize the act of ‘living’. The buildings we inhabit should no longer be limited to a series of rigidly separated spaces, but rather a sequence of spaces where ‘labour’ and ‘work’, public and private, office and home can be negotiated by the inhabitants.






The socio-economic transformation predominantly occurring within cities has been brought about by the advent of the sharing economy and immaterial labour. This presents a fundamental opportunity for urban planners, designers, and local officials to construct adequate edifices, which harmonize both with the personal aspirations of young millennials and with the socio-economic patterns of contemporary society. However, if this is to occur, three ideas need to be simultaneously borne in mind. First, the technocrats who are intent on the ‘domestication’ of the workplace, and currently aim to facilitate employees’ ‘worklife balance’ but also to increase productivity and contentment, should no longer be preoccupied only with the needs of the individual employee through office perks. But rather they should acknowledge, in both architectural and social terms, that for genuine ‘work-life balance’ and equality to occur within the workplace, employees’ personal responsibilities towards their families need to be valued just as much as their work performances. It is indisputable that if employees have peace of mind regarding the well-being of their children, they are far more likely to be both ‘productive’ and ‘content’ at work. As Anne-Marie Slaughter rightly states: “If family comes first, work does not come second: life comes together” (Slaughter, 2013). Thus, if companies have the true desire to develop family-friendly work environments, and so to support their employees, they should deliver work environments that incorporate both production and reproduction. Second, the evolving demanding work culture and the increasing costs and design of the traditional single-family dwelling currently impede young millennials in reaching crucial ‘life milestones’. Even though the workplace, forms of labour and the social organizations of life are all gradually being transformed, the dwelling generally remained unaltered.

Therefore, if Britain’s millennials are to have access to the affordable and functional housing they deserve, urban planners, designers, and local officials all need to consider how the spaces we inhabit can ‘fit’ the social needs and behaviours of the information age. The detrimental effect this economic transformation is having on the life choices of the millennial generation, principally because city dwelling is still ‘cemented’ into 20th century arrangements, generates an exceptional opportunity for the radical reinvention of the concept of housing. Thus, what is needed is not only the rejection of the notion that the traditional family dwelling, separated into specialized functions, is the only appropriate way of living, but also the creative and sensitive formulation of alternative models. Third, the information era, technology and the sharing economy are transforming our consumer values, social patterns and behaviours. Sharing is no longer perceived as a sacrifice or necessarily a ‘temporary’ arrangement, but rather a condition which offers and encourages solidarity and community. As a result, production and reproduction, work and home should no longer be contained within rigid typologies and seen as two distinct domains. The advent of immaterial labour, which has made production all-pervading, has indefinitely blurred the boundaries between work and home. Thus, the absolute division of these architectural realms, implemented during the Industrial Revolution and the birth of the modern city, has now become limiting and obsolete in the 21st century. Now, more than ever before, production and reproduction, work and home are fused together, despite cultural pressures to separate them. Thus, this thesis suggests that in light of an increasingly mobile and shared life, in which individuals are constantly torn by their productive and reproductive responsibilities, a new typology for ‘living’ and ‘working’ that promotes the sharing of facilities and elimi-


nates redundant domestic space, can challenge the traditional structures we inhabit.



Cover Pages Image Introduction: Text Altered by Author (2017). Without the Reunification of Production and Reproduction the Family Ceases to Exist. Source: The British Pavilion - Venice Biennale 2016 (2016). [photo]. Image Chapter 1: The British Pavilion - Venice Biennale 2016 (2016). Closing the Front Door Has Become Symbolic. [photo]. Image Chapter 2: The British Pavilion - Venice Biennale 2016 (2016). In All Statistical Probability You Will Never Own a Home. [photo]. Image Chapter 3: The British Pavilion - Venice Biennale 2016 (2016). There is an Alternative to the Mortgage. [photo]. Image Chapter 4: The British Pavilion - Venice Biennale 2016 (2016). Wealth Is Not Ownership but It’s Time to Enjoy the World. [photo].

Illustrations Figure 01: Sanidad, J. (2016). Office Kitchen - Facebook Menlo Park Headquarters. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 02: Sanidad, J. (2017). Interior ‘Streets’ - Facebook Menlo Park Headquarters. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 03: Halkin, M. (2016). Sleeping/Rest Area - Google Office in Cambridge, MA.. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 04: Huffpost (2013). Conference Room in Airbnb Headquarters. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 05: Author (2017). Employment rates for men and women aged 16-63. [graph] Source: Office of National Statistics (2013). Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 06: Author (2017). Average hours of unpaid domestic labour. [graph] Office of National Statistics (2016).  Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017].


Figure 07: London Housing Design Guide (2010). Space Standards Study. [diagram] Available at: pdf [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 08: Department of the Environment - Housing The Family (1974). Times and Activities Chart. [diagram]. Figure 09: Author (2017). Times and Activities Chart 2017. [diagram]. Figure 10: Author (2017). Age specific fertility rate. [graph] Source: Office of National Statistics (2014).  Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 11: Author (2017). Affordability and tenure, 1994-2014. [graph] Source: Resolution Foundation (2016).  Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 12: Author (2017). Generation affordability. [graph] Source: Resolution Foundation (2016).  Available at: The-Housing-Headwind.pdf [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 13: Author (2017). Multi-family households, 1996-2014. [graph] Source: Office of National Statistics (2015).  Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 14: Author (2017). Young adults living with parents, 1997 to 2015. [graph] Source: Office of National Statistics (2015).  Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 15: Dogma (2015). Plan of Charles Fourier’s Phalanstère (1982). [drawing] Available at: living%20and%20working_intro.pdf [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figures 16: Unknown (n.d.). Familistère. [photo] Available at: media/W1siZiIsInVwbG9hZHMvcGxhY2VfaW1hZ2VzLzBhNWM4ZjM0NTg1NGZjYTk5M18xMjY3MjUzOTEyM185MTdhYjVjN2IwX28uanBnIl0sWyJwIiwidGh1bWIiLCJ4MzkwPiJdLFsicCIsImNvbnZlcnQiLCItcXVhbGl0eSA5MSAtYXV0by1vcmllbnQiXV0 [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 17: Centre for Social Independence (2014). Kibbutzim. [photo] Available at: https://cisr. ru/en/news/we-want-to-break-free-wishes-and-needs-in-the-kibbutz-new-economy/ [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 18: Rogalev, E. (2014). Avtozavod Soviet Communal Block. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017].


Figure 19: Mattuzzi, F. (2012). Olivetti worker’s houses. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 20: Unknown (n.d.). Kollektivhuset. [photo] Available at: https://s-media-cache-ak0. [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 21: Uncube Magazine (n.d.). Unite d’Habitation. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 22: Pare, R. (1995). Narkomfin Communal House: Interior. [photo]. Figure 23: Spinelli, L. (2014). Narkomfin Communal House: Exterior. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 24: Spinelli, L. (2014). Narkomfin Communal House: Facade. [photo] Available at: http:// [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 25: Spinelli, L. (2014). Narkomfin Communal House: Apartment. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 26: Spinelli, L. (2014). Narkomfin Communal House: Hair Salon. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 27: Spinelli, L. (2014). Narkomfin Communal House: Added Makeshift Kitchen. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 28: Author (2017). The Embassy San Francisco: Living Room. [photo]. Figure 29: Author (2017). The Embassy San Francisco: The Family. [photo]. Figure 30: Author (2017). East and West Facade of The Collective - Uses. [diagram]. Figure 31: The Collective (2015). The Collective Old Oak Common North Facade. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 32: The Collective (2015). The Collective Old Oak Common South Facade. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 33: The Collective (2015). The Collective Old Oak Common- Amenity Space. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017]. Figure 34: The Collective (2015). The Collective Old Oak Common Communal Kitchen. [photo] Available at: [Accessed 24 May 2017].


Figure 35: Author (2017). The Hatton Gardens Conservation Area. [drawing]. Figure 36: Author (2017). NCP Diagram. [diagram]. Figure 37: Author (2017). Matrix: What could work-live look like? [drawing].


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The Reproductive Office - The Architecture of The Sharing Economy  
The Reproductive Office - The Architecture of The Sharing Economy