/
16
was certainly exploited to the utmost by rival political and guerrilla groups, and the KKE never managed to rid . If 0 f"Its mter-war I egacy.-17 ltse The dilemmas for the leadership of EAMIELAS grew still greater during the critical year 1943, firstly when the resistance movement was forced to deal with the terrorist activities of the pro-Bulgarian paramilitary bands in Central and, above all, Western Macedonia (and especially ofthe nightmarish Ohrana organisation), and, latterly, when EAM/ELAS was invited by Tito (through his special emissary Svetovar VukmanovicTempo) to become part of a joint Balkan resistance headquarters. To begin With, EAM reacted negatively to the Yugoslav 'invitation'. On the one hand, the cooperation proposed was tantamount to placing the EAMIELAS organisations in the general area of Macedonia under Yugoslav command. On the other, it would lead to the overt intervention of Yugoslav partisans in purely domestic Greek affairs. In both cases, the ultimate aim of the Yugoslavs seemed to be the usurpation of the Slav-speaking Greek population. Nonetheless, EAM was eventually compelled to accept co-operation, at least, with Yugoslav and Albanian guerrilla groups in the border areas. But this agreement proved to be fatal, for as early as late 1943 it paved the way for the formation of a particular Slav-Macedonian organisation, SNOF. EAM hastened to break up SNOF early in 1944, but the events which ensued - especially after the declaration founding the Federative People's Republic of 'Macedonia' (2 August 1944) led it inevitably into a vicious circle of co-operation and simultaneous covert rivalry with the Yugoslavs and their autonomist collaborators. 18 This development had an impact on the fate of Macedonia during the following five years. During the Civil War, of course, the whole of Greece suffered, as much in the south as in the north. But once again it was Macedonia which enjoyed the unenviable privilege of being the principal battlefield in the bloody conflict between the 'Democratic Army' and the government forces, especially during the dramatic final act of the Greek national tragedy (1946-1949).39 For that reason, the price which Macedonia paid in human lives and material destmction was also heavier than that of other parts ofGreece. 40 The fact that the Civil War focused on Macedonia affected the attitude of the Greek population as a whole towards the 'Democratic Army' and the KKE. The conflict between the two sides did not simply take the form of an ideological confrontation between 'bourgeois democracy' and 'Bolshevism': it was also 'patriotic defence against the enemies ofthe nation'. For that reason, although the KKE was aware of the gravity of the accusations levelled at it by the government camp during the propaganda war between the two sides it was ' effectively unable to react. 41 Even the measures of suppression which were adopted during that relentless war
JOANNIS K. HASSIOTIS
(such as the notorious Resolution C) were designed on the criterion of the threat to the northern provinces. In brief, the 'Democratic Army' and the KKE were regarded as jointly responsible not only for the secessionist activity developing along the country's northern borders but also for the aggressive designs of Greece's northern neighbours on Macedonia. 42 Given this inheritance, it is easy to see why the traumatic post-Civil War situation lasted longer in Macedonia than elsewhere. Some of the consequences of the War lingered into the early 1970s, if not even down to the present day.
The Contemporflry Era in Perspechive The destmctive vicissitudes of Macedonian history during the previous decade made reconstmction essential, first and foremost, in ever! sphere, whether economic, social and ideologicaL 4 But reconstmction had to take place on the basis of the new situation which war, occupation and civil war had brought about. 44 As it turned out, for some decades after the end of the Civil War much of the rural population which had gathered voluntarily or under pressure in the large urban centres (and particularly in Thessaloniki) as 'rebel-stricken' was unwilling to return to the villages. As a result of this distorted urbanization, the late 1940s and early 1950s saw a sharp rise in the building ofmakeshift and generally tasteless apartment blocks (in most cases on a quid pro quo system), a drop in agricultural production and a shift towards emigration. 45 The pre-war industrial infrastructure which as we have seen had begun to be created after the First World War was amost completely destroyed. However, the Greek governments centred their efforts on the already hypertrophic Athens and Piraeus area, which for quite some time had a constraining effect on the prospects for industrial production in Macedonia. However, the early 1960s saw a true economic lift-offin northern Greece, bringing per capita income in Macedonia up to the national average. The industrial production ofMacedonia over the same period was equally impressive, and it caused at least some areas - around Thessaloniki, Kozani and Kavala - to grow into exemplary industrial zones. Throughout the period after liberation, the urban centres of Macedonia, and Thessaloniki in particular, had contributed much to the renewal of political life in Greece. This could probably be attributed to the generally innovative nature of the cultural performance of Macedonia, as reflected in its intellectual and literary production, and also, on some occasions, to its achievements in science and the arts. These activities, and the variety of factors which influenced them, were connected with the more general position occupied by Macedonia in the history of the wider area, both under the Turks and in the period after liberation. 46 However, they were also influenced by the unique role which, for