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Syria Defence and Security Report Q2 2012 Published: April 2012

No. of Pages: 76

Price: US$1175

The first two months of 2012 has seen the internal unrest that erupted in Syria in 2011 steadily worsen, as popular uprisings against several incumbent rulers swept across the North African and Mediterranean region. What initially resembled a peaceful uprising against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has deteriorated into an open, violent insurrection. Determined opposition against Assad’s regime has taken route in the country, particularly in and around Syria’s third-largest city of Homs. Assad has followed two distinct approaches. On one hand, he has invited monitors from the Arab League to visit the country and record the internal situation. Allied to this approach has been the occasional offer of concessions to the opposition, regarding political reform. Assad’s other approach has been to deploy his armed forces in an increasingly brutal crackdown against the opposition. This has the corresponding effect of deepening the distrust of the opposition as regards offers of concessions. However, while in Libya, Egypt and Syria popular opposition against local leaders sharply gathered momentum in 2011, Assad may for the time being be able to withstand such a wave of popular discontent. Syria’s population is a mix of ethnicities and religious persuasions. Minority groups in the country seem to have, so far, remained either on the sidelines, or broadly supportive of Assad fearing the emerging political dominance of a Sunni Muslim theocracy and potential victimisation should his regime fall. Diplomatically, for now, Assad can count on support from Russia, China and Iran. Russia and China have used their veto in the UN Security Council to block a resolution calling for Assad’s removal. The relationship that Damascus enjoys with Moscow and Tehran may provide it with some short-term support. Russia can use its veto as a diplomatic roadblock at the UN General Assembly to prevent military action being authorised by the international body with a view to ending Assad’s repression of the opposition. That said, while a UN Resolution provides an important legal legitimization of the use of force, it is not a prerequisite, and any military action that would almost certainly involve NATO, significant Alliance members, the US or indeed all three of these actors, could potentially begin without UN approval. Nevertheless, this brings political risks as recent events in Iraq and Kosovo have shown. For the time being, Assad is banking that Russian support can provide him with a carte blanche at home as regards crushing the opposition. However, should the violence continue, or should Assad heighten the tempo and scope of his military operations against the opposition, this could have the paradoxical effect of increasingly isolating his government on the international stage. Put simply, Moscow may come to the conclusion that its support of Assad may become more trouble than it is worth, if this violence worsens.

Defence Industry in Syria Table Of contents Executive Summary SWOT Analysis Syria Security SWOT Syria Defence Industry SWOT Syria Political SWOT Syria Economic SWOT Syria Business Environment SWOT


Global Political Outlook Landmark Political Events Looming In 2012 Global Flashpoints: Eurozone, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Korean Peninsula Table: Election Timetable, 2012 United States Russia China Wild Cards To Watch Middle East Security Overview The Middle East In A Global Context Challenges And Threats To Stability And Security Regional Power Dynamics Nuclear Proliferation External Powers Scenarios For The Middle East Security Risk Analysis BMI’s Security Ratings Table: Middle East And Africa Defence And Security Ratings Table: Middle East And North Africa State Vulnerability To Terrorism Index Political Overview Domestic Politics Foreign Affairs Russian-Chinese UN Veto To Exacerbate Conflict Domestic Security Overview External Security Situation Armed Forces And Government Spending Armed Forces International Deployments Weapons Of Mass Destruction Market Overview Imports Exports Procurement Trends And Developments Industry Forecast Scenario Armed Forces Table: Syria’s Armed Forces, 2000-2008 (’000 personnel, unless otherwise stated) Table: Syria’s Available Manpower For Military Services, 2008-2016 (aged 16-49, unless otherwise stated) Defence Expenditure Table: Syria’s Government Defence Expenditure, 2009-2016 Table: Syria’s Defence Expenditure Scenario – Changing % Of GDP, 2008-2016 (US$mn) Defence Trade Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario Macroeconomic Outlook Table: Syria – GDP By Expenditure Breakdown In US$ Terms, 2008-2016 (US$bn, unless otherwise stated) Country Snapshot: Syria Demographic Data Section 1: Population Table: Demographic Indicators, 2005-2030 Table: Rural/Urban Breakdown, 2005-2030 Section 2: Education And Healthcare Table: Education, 2002-2005 Table: Vital Statistics, 2005-2030 Section 3: Labour Market And Spending Power Table: Employment Indicators, 1999-2003 Table: Consumer Expenditure, 2000-2012 (US$)


Methodology How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts Defence Industry Sources


Syria Defence and Security Report Q2 2012