State 27
the concept of state in its contemporary form always, practically and functionally, actively or passively, to be understood as a kind of limiting or coercive force for us here? One is immediately reminded of Marx’s critique of Hegel in which Marx insists that it is not the physical characteristics of the human being that make the human being a human being, but his or her social quality. So too here, we could say that what defines the state is not its physical characteristics - for example, its apparatus, the police, etc. - but its social quality, its limiting force, the act of violence, if you will.... But, then, what do we mean by violence here? It is key to note that from all of Critchley’s examples of injustice or wrong, the state has one defining feature: The state always - actively or passively - exists to limit, assault, or compromise not only the rights, but - by extension the agency or self-determination of a class of people. Similarly for Carl Schmitt, whilst the ultimate political act consists in the public disposal of human life, the very existence of the internal order of the state always functions, more or less, to prohibit the emergence of other autonomous political entities. Consistent with Badiou’s more general definition of the state, therefore a state which, by definition, seeks to limit the possibility that something new might occur in excess of the state - violence can be thought of more generally as the limitation imposed upon the subjective capacities of human beings, as an assault not so much against their physical characteristics (although, in the final instance, the state, in all the forms considered thus far, always reserves this right), but against their social quality. Subsequently, if we are to proceed on the understanding that the essence or kernel of what the state “is” is