FREEDOM TO USE THE SEAS: INDIA’S MARITIME MILITARY STRATEGY
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT MARITIME HISTORY
Sustainability and Reach
Democratic countries rarely choose the timing of wars. They are, therefore, reactive and even if the duration of actual hostilities is short, navies remain at sea for a considerable duration of time, both before and after.
Democratic countries rarely choose the timing of wars. They are consequently reactive. Even if the duration of actual hostilities is short, navies remain at sea for a considerable duration of time, both before and after. Ships with machinery that require major maintenance at intervals of less than 60 days x 24 hours (1440 hrs) are a liability regardless of their weapon capabilities. Acquisition criteria, therefore, are being corrected in our staff requirements. The Navy will need ships with long 'sea-legs' duly supported by logistics support ships. The alternative is to acquire large number of short-legged ships and programme quicker Operational Turn Rounds, but this is a more costly and risky proposition. The tanker to warship ratio was inadequate in 1971. With two fleets and larger areas of interest a much higher ratio would be beneficial. Submarine Campaign Joint Planning and Amphibious Assault
An opportunity for conduct of an outflanking amphibious assault was missed in 1971. When undertaken, it was done without adequate preparation and assets, thus limiting the overall effect in the outcome of the conflict. It must be reiterated that amphibious operations merit attention as such capabilities enhance options and opportunities that exists in the many IOR scenarios of interest to us.
Knowledge in this area was largely undeveloped in 1971. There is a vast difference between merely deploying submarines and conducting a campaign. With conventional submarines, the number of boats on actual patrol can rarely exceed 60% of the force level. Their use in future wars must be part of an all arms strategy that synergises aerial surveillance, airto-surface interdiction and mining. Support papers for a submarine campaign would aid the overall effectiveness of these assets.
Investments in Maritime Domain Awareness versus Ordnance Delivery Platforms
The Navy entered the war with only five Alize aircraft, which were the main source of maritime domain awareness. The ratios of investments in surveillance versus weapon-delivery platforms had an adverse impact on the conduct of maritime operations. While any platform with its captive air reconnaissance capability Amphibious operations merit will eventually find targets on its own on which to unload ordnance, other platforms can effect attention as such capabilities encounters only if directed by the maritime domain enhance options and opportuawareness infrastructure. A natural outcome of the nities that exists in the many conflict resulted in enhanced investment on maritime IOR scenarios of interest to us. domain awareness capability. 18
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