Issue 1 volume 1

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Introduction from the Editors We are extremely proud to be presenting the very first issue of Juncture, which comes as the culmination of almost 6 months working to build, from the ground up, this new platform to share ideas and stimulate debate. In August 2017 when the idea of the journal was in its infancy, that it would reach the place it has was simply a vision. It gives us great pleasure to see it becoming a reality. The journal developed off of our hopes to create an anthology where undergraduate work could be displayed, more widely read and more greatly appreciated. It has blossomed beyond our expectations. Alongside our faith that Juncture will still be continuing in ten years time, we are therefore asking ourselves what we might imagine that the journal could become. Ultimately, it will never be more than the sum of all those who contribute towards it however. From the work of the authors themselves, and all those who submitted work, to the dedicated student-led editorial board which act as its powerful motor, a special thanks goes out. This reaches over to the Politics Department itself and particularly to Dr Carl Death, Professor Francesca Gains and Dr Liam Shields, who provided their support, advice and faith when the journal was but an idea on paper - and a rather underdeveloped one at that. It is ideals, a drive to shape the world around us, and an indefatigable curiosity about that world, which spurs forward the ideas gathered together in this collection of essays. Like all else, the number of submissions we received exceeded expectations and we truly ended up having to set a very high bar in order to avoid having our first issue being triple the length that it already is! Undoubtedly this meant rejecting some quality pieces, but we hope you will find those we have included an excellent illustration of the talent, diversity, and most importantly of all, vivacious enthusiasm for social change, social criticism and progressive understanding, which is being inspired in a generation of students at the University of Manchester. Though the pieces are arranged thematically, our aim has been to not only include the very best work, but to represent a plurality of voices on a plurality of topics. We begin with a featured debate, presenting two opposing angles on the question of private education, where the contention that rising levels of social inequality are being entrenched through the existence of private schools is hard pressed (Rosie Latchford, pp.1-6), but in the opposing camp, it seems that democratic values themselves might necessitate the alternative to state education which private schools provide (Olivia Flett, pp.7-14). These same democratic values are later reflected upon against the increasing power wielded over politics by the economic and social elite (Sam Sayer, pp.29-36). One such


value is given a more in depth defence, our supposedly essential freedom of speech, which is coming under threat from various other developments (William Phillips, pp.22-28). Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to ask what the role of the state which governs our lives is with regards to its citizens' wellbeing (Anna-Maria KĂśhnke, pp.37-43). Yet, the recent rise in populism seen worldwide among those self-same citizens, exemplified in the case of the FPĂ– in Austria (Kathryn McNickle, pp.92-105) and the case of Brexit here in the UK (Riccardo Scroppo, pp.57-66), also brings us onto the question of how national identity, one of the driving forces behind populist rhetoric, is constructed and develops (Emma Schicker, pp.15-21). In this environment - where change, and opposition to that change, is rife - it is suitable not only to question the methods governments use to implement and construct policy (Chong Ka Yan, pp.50-56) but the nature of the relationships of rights which underpin the permissibility of social and political action (Matthew Perry, pp.44-49). Broadening our perspective to the international sphere, we also undergo a meta-theoretical analysis of the study of International Political Economy and its two divided traditions (James Parker, pp.120-150) and look at the problems of male bias present in those development policies which are supposed to represent the solution to certain global ills (Sophie Meagher, pp.67-79). Finally, our vital existence on this sphere is scrutinised, where pressing developments in the circumstances of human security are posited against its theoretical standpoints (Callum Higgins, pp.80-91) and research on the essential question of what causes and reproduces terrorism is examined, in the context of France particularly (Lioui Benahmou, pp.106-119). The resultant collection is a range of original perspectives on some of the most interesting and topical issues being discussed in lecture halls and seminar rooms at the University of Manchester, from both theoretical and practical standpoints. Yet, this overview will not do justice to the complexity of the arguments raised in the contributions: we invite you to explore the work of each author and offer your own thoughts and opinions online, together with your friends and in our upcoming events. Equally we'd love to hear your views, provide you with details of the contributors, and receive your own submission for our next issue (complete with the submission form available at our website). Once more a huge thank you goes out to all involved. We hope you enjoy reading. Sincerely, The Juncture Team www.junctureuom.co.uk juncture.editor@gmail.com


Contents Featured Debate: An argument for the Abolition of Private Schools using Rawls'

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Fair Equality of Opportunity Rosie Latchford Featured Debate: The option of Private Schooling as an Essential Component of

7-14

Democratic Society Olivia Flett The Issue of Active Construction in National Identity

15-21

Emma Schicker Defending Freedom of Speech

22-28

William Phillips Governance is inescapably in tension with Democracy

29-36

Sam Sayer Should the role of government be to maximise the overall well-being of its citizens?

37-43

Anna-Maria Köhnke Can individuals have Moral Rights in the absence of Legal Rights?

44-49

Matthew Perry Empirical Issues with the Conceptualisation of Policy-Making: Theory vs Reality

50-56

Chong Ka Yan What caused Brexit?

57-66

Riccardo Scroppo A Paradox in Development: The Presence of ‘Male Bias’ in Development Policies

67-79

that aim to empower women Sophie Meagher Individuals, States and the Politics of (In)Security Callum Higgins

80-91


The Rise in Electoral Support for Right-Wing Populism: The Case of the FPÖ

92-105

in Austria Kathryn McNickle What explains the recruitment of young males into terrorist networks in France :

106-119

A focus on Marginalisation and Identity Lioui Benhamou The Divided Self: A Defence of Dissensus in International Political Economy James Parker

Editorial Team Co-Founders Matthew Perry – Chief Editor Emma Schicker – Development Officer Board Members Vorlette Fakhri - Secretary Lioui Benhamou Olivia Flett Anna-Maria Köhnke Luke Land Toby Zambardino

120-150


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Featured Debate: An Argument for the Abolition of Private Schools using Rawls’ Fair Equality of Opportunity

Rosie Latchford, 2nd Year Essay BA Politics and Philosophy

Abstract: This paper attempts to address the issues of justice and fairness surrounding Private Schools. The debate is vital within politics, as the issues addressed in this paper have implications far wider than education itself. I will argue that private schools should be banned by using Rawls’ ‘fair equality of opportunity’. The basis of my argument is that fair equality of opportunity is just; private schools are incompatible with this principle and are therefore unjust, leading to the conclusion that private schools should be banned if we are to achieve a just society. I will justify the ways in which I reach the different premises in my argument throughout the essay. I rely on the rational assumption that a just society is something we want to achieve.

In this article I will argue that, relying on the assumption that state education was to be adequate and available to all, private schools should be banned. I will reach this conclusion by first discussing different types of equal opportunity, arguing we should support the idea of a fair equality of opportunity; because it is just. After showing why we should value this type of equality of opportunity, I will show how private schools are incompatible with being able to achieve it. This leads me to conclude they must be banned. In the final part of my essay, I will address possible objections to my line of argument and respond to defend it. In order to allow for clarity, my argument leading to the conclusion that private schools should be banned goes as follows: P1: What is 'Just' is something that everybody would mutually agree upon under the 'veil of ignorance'.


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P2: The concept of 'fair equality of opportunity' is just. P3: Private schools are not compatible with a belief in a fair equality of opportunity. C: Based on the assumption that we want a just society, private schools should be banned. Although my argument works on the assumption that we want a just society, I feel this is a rational assumption to make. During this article, I will argue that we should strive for a fair equality of opportunity in our society rather than a formal one, for it seems intuitively fairer or just. If we are to appeal to justice as reasoning to support the concept of fair equality of opportunity, which then allows us to conclude private schools must be banned as they do not support this, it must first be defined. The debate surrounding this is complex and impossible to answer during this short essay, however we can take a contractualist approach, as Rawls does, and claim that the principles of justice can be found ‘because they would be agreed upon in an initial situation of equality’1. By this, he is referring to what he calls the ‘Veil of ignorance’. This is a hypothetical idea in which it is imagined that no one knows anything about their own class, sex, race, natural abilities etc. We can assume that if everyone agrees upon something in this unbiased situation, we may call it just. As this is a hypothetical scenario, 'agreeing' here really means something that would be the rational choice to make, therefore we can assume that it would be agreed upon. In terms of the principle of equality of opportunity, we can assume that people would agree that this notion was just because they do not themselves know if they were from a poor class, what gender they were etc. They would be invested in and express a desire for a society where everybody has the potential to succeed. So, on the basis of justice we can argue that we want society to provide us with a fair equality of opportunity; I will discuss in more detail the fair equality of opportunity alongside other versions justifying it as the one that would be chosen under the ‘veil of ignorance’ and is therefore just below. In this section I will deal with the distinction between different types of equality of opportunity and show that we should value a fair equality of opportunity in our society because it is the way that will create the most just outcomes, and so can therefore be adopted as a just within itself. This will then allow me to argue that private schools should be banned on the basis that they are incompatible with this particular concept of equal opportunity, leading them to be unjust.

1

Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 19.


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There are 2 main branches of equality of opportunity; formal equality of opportunity and substantive. Formal equality of opportunity requires that opportunities such as jobs, education and resources are open to all. Each person is viewed as equal and judged based on their merits only. An example to demonstrate what would be acceptable under formal equality of opportunity; Bill and Lucy both began life with equal innate intelligence and ambition, however Bill’s parents were able to pay for his education which was as a consequence much better than Lucy’s so he was able to gain more qualifications whilst Lucy achieved much less. Upon application to University, the fact that Lucy was a woman was not deemed pertinent; they were both viewed as equals judged only upon their merit, in this case their educational qualifications. Bill has better qualifications and therefore achieved a place whilst Lucy failed to do so. This is formal equality of opportunity: they were judged only on their merit, though there may have been inequality influencing how this merit was obtained - we can see that the theory is not broad enough to take into account that Bill's social position increased his chances of success. We can further explore the failures in using only a formal equality of opportunity by considering Williams’s hypothetical ‘Warrior’ society2. In this situation, a caste society was imagined in which warriors enjoyed most of the wealth and power, and only sons of wealthy families were able to become warriors. The society then transitions to support a formal equality of opportunity, a meritocracy; anyone can now become a warrior judged only upon how strong they are. However, the rich are still dominant in the warrior class because they have better access to training; even if you are born with an innate talent because of your poor parents this talent cannot be cultivated. Instead, rather than simply allowing anyone to become a warrior it would perhaps be the case that for society to really achieve equality of opportunity, they need to give everyone the opportunity to cultivate their ‘warrior skill’ through initiatives like scholarships for the poorer in society. This is what we understand to be substantive equality of opportunity, which considers the wider chances of someone succeeding rather than simply focussing on merit alone. The substantive equality of opportunity theory I will be describing is Rawls’ ‘Fair Equality of Opportunity’3 4.This is said by Rawls to be achieved when any two individuals possessing the same innate talent and ambition have the same chances of success regardless of their background or demographic characteristics, be it class, sex, race or any other of what Rawls deems to be arbitrary factors5. If, returning to the example of Bill and Lucy, they both wanted to be an astrophysicist, they should both have an equal chance of succeeding in this ambition; Lucy’s poor 2

Williams, B. (1962), The Idea of Equality, London: Basil Blackwell, pp. 110-131. Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice. 4 Rawls, J. (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 5 Ibid, pp. 42-44. 3


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educational background shouldn’t have an effect on the outcome. We can begin to see how private schools are incompatible with this, as institutions whose existence undermines this principle. Now that I have shown that by using an appeal to justice I can support the claim that society should value a fair equality of opportunity, I will use this idea to support my ultimate argument that private schools should be banned because they are unjust. Before I go into this argument, for the purpose of this essay I shall assume private schools are elite schools that provide a higher standard of education for those that can afford them. Private schools go against a fair equality of opportunity and are therefore unjust because they firstly provide students who go there with an advantage based only on their parentage, with no consideration of merit or what each deserves (I will consider scholarships later but as they are the minority this statement is still essentially accurate). Secondly, they also negatively affect the state school system; leaving others at a disadvantage. The first way in which private schools unfairly advantage those that attend and disadvantage those that do not, is centred around the idea that education is a ‘positional good’6.No matter how much education you may have, its value is determined in relation to others who are competing in the job market with you. Because private schools bestow an advantage, due to a better quality of education, those that go there will have a better chance of success in the job/higher education market. We can see this happen in practice; whilst only 7% of the population are educated in private schools they make up 41% of the 2016 entrants into the University of Oxford. We cannot assume that private school pupils are simply much more innately intelligent. This must highlight, at least to a degree, that because of their parent’s ability to pay for their schooling, they had a better chance of success in being accepted into a world class university because their education was of a better 'positional' value than others. The second dimension in the way we might see private schools as incompatible with the idea of a fair equality of opportunity is the claim that the existence of private schools worsens the state school system. This occurs in 2 ways, the first being that private schools will filter the motivated, ambitious children out of mainstream schooling system by offering scholarships based on ability; second, children with wealthy and successful parents will be socialised into being more ambitious and motivated than their counterparts in state schools. The first problem, that scholarships given by private schools worsen state schools, occurs because of the detrimental effect it has on the non-privately schooled children because of the role the influence of peers plays on an individual’s education. Whilst it may seem intuitively irrational

6

Swift, A. (2004), “The Morality of School Choice”, Theory and Research in Education, 2:1, p.11


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to conclude that scholarships worsen inequality rather than help it, a common argument pro-private school theorist make, the argument is that having motivated, bright children alongside others will motivate them too. Because the private school system actively works to filter out the brighter state school children by virtue of their test results, this removes them from the state school system where they would have provided a positive academic influence on their peers. This leaves the state-schooled children at a disadvantage, lacking from a higher level of positive peer influence that would have been present had the private school’s scholarship system not taken the more motivated children away. Another way that state schools are undermined by a private education system is that the wealthier parents, who will often be the best educated themselves, do not have an investment of interest in the quality of their local state school system. This means that the parents of those in private school will be influential in that school to help maintain standards, and not involved in raising standards in state schools. We can see that the role private schools play does not create a fair equality of opportunity; the majority should not have to suffer to allow for the benefits of the 7% that attend private school; this is not justice in our conception of it. Under Rawls’ ‘Veil of ignorance’ it would not be rational to assume that everyone would agree upon the permissibility of private schools. In my final section, I shall address possible objections. One argument against adopting a fair equality of opportunity (which would be a rejection of my second premise making my conclusion unsound) is that it is too big a restriction of liberty. It could involve high levels of state control or interference in family life by governmental organisations, such as stopping parents reading bedtime stories to their children in order to prevent disadvantage to those with parents not keen to read to their children. However, on such an extreme level, we must remember fair equality of opportunity is a principle of justice; something that can be mutually agreed upon. Perhaps we could then say people will communally value the liberty to pursue special parental-child roles in certain ways; although reading a bedtime story may create inequalities, it is valuable to the parent-child relationship7. Whilst we may have shown that we can still value fair equality of opportunity but allow certain levels of inequality building activities to preserve important liberties, people may argue against it further; do parents not have the right to make a choice about their child's education if they value it? Would banning private schools violate their liberty unacceptably by taking away that choice? We can make a distinction between certain inequality building activities such as reading bedtime stories that are essential to a strong 7

Brighouse, H. and Swift, A. (2009), “Legitimate Parent Partiality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37, p.54


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parent-child relationship, and unessential ones. Sending your child to private school does not aid your relationship and prohibiting it will not damage it. However, we must recognise banning private schools will reduce a parent's liberty. For those that value education, it is not allowing them to follow their conception of the good; by investing in their child's education 8. Although we can agree that this may be the case, we have to question what we value in society and as mentioned earlier the ability to send your child to private school is not a vital right; perhaps we could as a society value fair equality of opportunity more. Parents who may value education may also not be able to pay for it, with only 7% of children going to private school we cannot assume that only these parents care about their children's education, meaning only a small number of people can even pursue the value of providing a good education by paying for it. So, although a small minority will have their liberty slightly restricted by banning private schools this is an acceptable sacrifice to prevent 93% of children becoming disadvantaged if we allowed the private school system to continue. During this article I have argued that private schools should be banned. I have reached this conclusion by first showing why we should value and support having a fair equality of opportunity in society; because it is just. I then showed the way in which private schools failed to allow for a fair equality of opportunity, they unfairly advantaged the students that go to them. Finally, I addressed some objections to my argument responding to them accordingly. After showing that a fair equality of opportunity is just, and showing private schools are not compatible with this, we can label them as unjust; and on this basis, we can say that they should be banned.

References Anderson, E. (2004), “Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to be a Hypocrite”, Theory and Research in Education, 2:2, pp.99-110. Brighouse, H. and Swift, A. (2009), “Legitimate Parental Partiality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37, pp.43–80. Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Swift, A. (2004), “The Morality of School Choice”, Theory and Research in Education, 2:1, pp.7-21. Williams, B. (1962), “The Idea of Equality”, in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Series II, London: Basil Blackwell, pp. 110–131. 8

Anderson, E. (2004), “Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to be a Hypocrite”, Theory and Research in Education, 2:2, p.104


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Featured Debate: The Option of Private Schooling as an Essential Component of a Democratic Society

Olivia Flett, 2nd Year Essay BA Politics, Philosophy and Economics

Abstract: In this paper, I make the claim that if state education was adequate and available to all, it would not be the case that private education should be banned. I argue that a ban would undermine the essence of democracy hence making it unwarranted. I explore two ways mainly in which a ban would undermine democracy, focusing firstly on how it undermines the fundamental democratic value of liberty, more specifically undermining the values of freedom of choice, parental partiality and autonomy. Secondly, I demonstrate how a ban on private schools would also undermine pluralism, a value I believe to be necessary, to a certain degree, for a functioning democracy. Next, I go on to examine contradicting theories which advocate a ban on private schools, demonstrating how these claims are unfounded before finally concluding that a ban would be unwarranted.

In this essay, I will argue that if state education was adequate and available to all, it would not be the case that private schools should be banned. I base this argument primarily on the grounds that such a ban would undermine the very essence of democracy, in several ways, and hence forbidding private schools is unwarranted. I will begin by expounding my justifications against the prohibition of private schools, demonstrating that they override arguments in support of a ban. I will first advance the claim that a ban would undermine freedom of choice, parental partiality and autonomy, and generally threaten the value of liberty, a fundamental democratic value. I will then put forth the claim that banning private schools would also threaten pluralism, which I take to be a fundamental democratic value too, thereby also undermining the essence of democracy in this way. I shall follow this by examining the arguments supporting a ban, typically put forward by egalitarians, and demonstrate that such arguments do not sufficiently justify the prohibition of private schools. I will conclude by reiterating my claim that private schools should not be banned.


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Arguments Against a Ban on Private Schools Firstly, forbidding private schools would damage the value of liberty, leading to an erosion of this fundamental democratic value and in turn undermining democracy itself. As Hargreaves suggests, “the essence of a libertarian […] democratic position [is] that the state should not deny choice to those who want it unless there are very powerful, reasonable and well documented grounds for doing so”.1 I therefore assume a fundamental and necessary connection between freedom of choice and the maintenance of a valuable democracy. I argue that in the specific case of whether to ban private schools, there are no such “powerful, reasonable and well-documented grounds”2 which outweigh the potential harm a ban would cause to freedom of choice and in turn the value of democracy. A ban would “deny choice",3 implying that parents would have no other true alternative other than enrolling their children in public-sector schooling. Freedom of choice necessarily entails at least two truly viable options between which a citizen can choose. In order to have freedom of choice, “we must be faced with choices where the different options are plausible or reasonable".4 Therefore, removing choice within the context of education clashes with the foundation of democracy and on this account, private schools should not be banned. Reducing choice in terms of schooling options would also signify that the state is imposing its particular “vision of the good life”.5 Yet, liberalism postulates that a democratic state should allow its members to freely pursue their respective individual autonomy. Raz suggests that “living autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy-supporting environment”6 such as a democratic state. For this to be achieved, members of a state should be allowed to live their life in accordance with their own authentic ideals, “free from external manipulation or coercion”.7 If a ban were implemented, children would be coerced into being educated in accordance with the views of the state; for a state to coerce its members’ in this way “is to show disrespect for their personal autonomy”. 8 There is therefore an uncomfortable clash between advocating a ban on private schools, which will lead to coercion into 1

Hargreaves, H. (1996), “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, Oxford Review of Education, 22:2, pp.133. 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Quong, J., (2010), Liberalism without Perfection, New York: Oxford University Press, p.48. 5 Ibid, p.17. 6 Raz, J. (1988), The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.369. 7 Ibid, p.373. 8 Brighouse, H. (2003), School Choice and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, p.37.


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attending public schooling, and the quest for autonomy and more generally, for liberty. This threatens democracy, and hence, banning private schools is unjustifiable in any society that commits itself to giving “priority to the achievement of individual autonomy”.9 Without individual autonomy, liberty would then be compromised and in turn so would the essence of democracy. If perhaps, there was another viable type of schooling, another choice besides the public-sector type, then one could potentially suggest the state is within its rights, yet by no means adequately justified, in banning the private-sector type. Do such options exist? Although homeschooling is widely practiced in many countries, I do not consider it to be a widely accessible nor feasible alternative on the grounds of impracticality due to many parents’ work commitments. Another alternative might be for parents to create a co-operative schooling scheme amongst themselves but governments would probably judge such “underground” schemes to be illegal. Moreover, both these alternatives would pose challenges for the state in ensuring certain educational criteria are met and a minimum curriculum is taught. In contrast, private schools are relatively easy for the state to supervise and regulate, within certain limits. I will now extend my argument for freedom of choice in schooling to the sphere of parental partiality by suggesting that to a significant extent, “liberty includes freedom from interference by the state over the parents' right to educate in ways they judge desirable or to spend money on their children's education”.10 Parental partiality is a form of freedom and within the context of education should be upheld. As Tooley proposes, “wanting to care for your children is a fundamental part of what it means to be human”.11 It is instinctive. Canvassed within the educational context, it consists of parents choosing the option which they believe offers the best educational investment for their child. Further, and I will go into more detail on this when assessing arguments in favour of a ban on private schooling, I suggest the parentchild relationship provides grounds for treating one’s own child differently, at the expense of others’ children. My final main claim is that prohibition of private schooling would vastly reduce diversity, and pluralism generally, within society as there would be a more limited scope of subject

9

Shields, L. (2015), “From Rawlsian autonomy to sufficient opportunity in education”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 14:1, p.53. 10 Hargreaves, H. (1996). “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, p.132 11 Tooley, J. (2008) “From Adam Swift to Adam Smith: How the ‘Invisible Hand’ Overcomes Middle Class Hypocrisy”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41:4, p.733.


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choices and educational activities within the schooling curriculum. Reduced schooling options would imply children - future citizens - would not have access to “curricular specialisation”;12 their education would lack “variations in educational philosophy or pedagogic preference” and “religious affiliation” .13 Without private schools, there would be a relative leveling down of society’s educational standards, given that most private schools generally offer greater curricular choice than state schools and alternative pedagogies. Banning them would compromise the development of a diverse range “of human talents”14 and negatively impact the variety of ideas within a society, hence weakening democracy. In order “to sustain democracy in pluralist societies”,15 I would assert that a certain degree of “diversity and choice needs to be positively stimulated”.16 A democratic state requires educational pluralism in order to maintain “a free and liberal society in the face of cultural, ideological, and religious differences”. 17 Arguments in Favour of a Ban on Private Schools Now let us examine the counter-arguments in favour of a ban. In response to my argument in the preceding paragraph, egalitarians could reply that opportunity for “such specialization and variations damages national cohesion”.18 They suggest that schools within a society must “have a similar student ability range, contain a social and ethnic mix, follow the same curriculum and offer the same opportunities” in order to “guarantee equality of opportunity to all its members irrespective of social background". 19 Yet I declare that the very “imposition of substantively democratic values contradicts the premise of a liberal pluralistic society: that there be no official orthodoxy".20 In a democratic, pluralistic state, “made up of people of diverse cultures and beliefs”,21 the best way to ensure social reproduction “of the set of values and beliefs that constitute the character of the society” from one generation to the next, is by allowing “subgroups to pursue their own understanding of educational aims, within bounds of reasonableness”. 22

12

Hargreaves, H. (1996). “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, p.138. Ibid, p.139. 14 Anderson, E. (2007). “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective”, Ethics, 117:4, p.615. 15 Hargreaves, H. (1996). “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, p.131. 16 Ibid 17 McConnell, M. (2002) “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served By Democratic Control Of Schooling”, Moral and Political Education, 43, p.88. 18 Hargreaves, H. (1996) “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, p.139. 19 Ibid, p.136. 20 McConnell, M. (2002) “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served By Democratic Control Of Schooling”, p.102. 21 Ibid, p.101. 22 Ibid 13


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Private schools create and foster educational pluralism and on this account, do “not pose the danger of civic fragmentation”.23 There is “something particularly dangerous about allowing democratic governments to control the formation of public opinion”.24 Limiting educational choices not only clashes with the ideals of democracy, namely pluralism, but exhibits insidious authoritarian undertones. I do accept the need for a basic common curriculum between schools, regulated by the state, in order to ensure an adequate level of academic education as well as sufficient civic education. However, schools should have the right to extend the scope of their teaching beyond this basic curriculum. This would provide opportunities for “cultivating conscience”25 and educational specialisation, thereby enriching human capital, stimulating greater plurality within a society and preserving the state’s democratic essence. Therefore, on this account, a ban on private schools is indefensible. To this I add another issue with egalitarian arguments. Most egalitarians assume that private schools are elite schools providing a higher standard of education for those that can afford them. However, such an assumption is fallacious. Many private schools exist to provide a different, or more specialised education rather than a higher standard of education per se. Some are faith based, some emphasise non-academic skills like music, drama or sport, whilst others offer remedial teaching for students struggling with the conventional academic curriculum. If you ban these types of private schools, you not only take away the parents educational choice for their child, you also deprive that child of an education that may be better suited to their needs and/or interests, thereby reducing their chances of living a fulfilled adult life. Next, in regards to freedom of choice, egalitarians purport that parental partiality should be restricted, possibly even dismissed, in order to foster equality and fairness; parents shouldn’t have the freedom to choose or influence the education of their children at the expense of others’ children. They suggest that the relative “harm” caused to another child should not be trumped by a parent’s justification for advantaging their own child. They also claim that when parents “make choices concerning their children’s education they are not making choices about how to live their own lives, but about how someone else will end up living his or her life”26 and as such, parents’ freedom is not hindered, therefore justifying a ban on private-schooling. However, I argue that such an approach is unreasonable. As Quong’s agent-relative prerogative theory suggests, “there is a justice-based rationale for allowing harm to befall a non-responsible 23

Rosenblum, N. (2003). “Separating the Siamese Twins, “Pluralism” and “School Choice””¨, in A. Wolfe (ed.), School Choice: The Moral Debate, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.92. 24 McConnell, M. (2002) “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served By Democratic Control Of Schooling”, p.134. 25 Rosenblum, N. (2003). “Separating the Siamese Twins, “Pluralism” and “School Choice””, p.93. 26 Brighouse, H. (2003). School Choice and Social Justice, p.38.


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threat”.27 Within the context of schooling, a parent could “permissibly impose the harm”28 on behalf of their child, this harm being a relative educational disadvantage to another child. This is justifiable on the basis that a parent’s “relationship with [their] child is more important than a stranger’s similar relationship”.29 It is therefore defensible to assume that “those with whom you share such relationships should, to a certain extent, be permitted to share in your agent-relative evaluative perspective"30 hence allowing for a degree of parental partiality in respect to educational choice. On this account, a ban would also not be justified. Lastly, I consider further potential merits of banning private schools, and the reasons why government would want to consider doing so. There may be a certain appeal to the idea that banning private schools would result in reduced inequality. Many egalitarians who focus on appeals to equality, fairness and meritocracy, claim that private schools “are a source of injustice within society” 31 which produce social inequality, and should therefore be banned. I would argue that this normative claim to justify abolishing private schools is badly premised; proponents of this view fall into a causal inversion wherein they believe that if x causes y then the absence of x will prevent y. Contextualised in our situation, the argument would go as follows: If private schools cause social inequality, then the absence of private schools (through prohibition) will prevent social inequality. This is a fallacy; social inequality will still exist within society regardless of whether private schools are prohibited or not. Social inequalities stem from many other dimensions of a society, not merely from variation in schooling backgrounds. Prohibiting private schools could perhaps even worsen overall social inequalities. For example, if parents are forced to send their children to public schools only, they may aim to advantage their children through other formative means. Tooley declares that “the more you equalise schooling, the more important family influence will become”.32 So long as there are positional goods to compete for, families will be concerned with providing their children with additional educational opportunities outside of schooling, such as learning another language or learning to play a musical 27

Quong, J. (2016), “Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10:4, p.823 Ibid 29 Ibid, p.824. 30 Ibid 31 Exley, S. and Suissa, J. (2013). “Private schools, choice and the ethical environment”, British Journal of Educational Studies, 61:3. p.345. 32 Tooley, J. (2003), “Why Harry Brighouse is Nearly Right About the Privatisation of Education”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37:3,p.438. 28


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instrument. Therefore, such arguments for a ban on private schools are not sound; a ban could arguably increase social inequality rather than curb it. I maintain that government is not mandated to curtail people's choices by banning private schools, nor is it government's role to impose a compulsory education system. Rather than attempting to reduce all citizens’ educational levels to a common denominator in the name of equality by banning private schools, a far more effective and less intrusive method to achieve the goal of curtailing private schools, if one does indeed believe that this would reduce a certain degree of inequality, would rather be to enhance the standard and breadth of curriculum scope of public education, thereby positioning public schooling as the preferred option. If the quality and variety of public education were to increase, parents’ willingness to pay for private schools will drop, and they will voluntarily choose to send their children to public schools. The market for education would then effectively be self-regulated, with no need for government to try justify intervention through coercive measures.

In conclusion, I reiterate my claim that if state schools were adequate and available to all, it would not be the case that private schools should be banned. I have shown that the democratic ideal of achieving equality whether it be of opportunity or of welfare, should not be allowed to take precedence over our commitment to the democratic value of liberty nor over our commitment to plurality in regards to educational choice. To do otherwise would lead to the erosion of the essence of democracy. “Equality is not the only value in our moral lexicon”;33 other values need to be considered. I confer that “not all such liberties ought to enjoy immunity from state intervention”, however “the mere fact that a social good” such as equality “would be achieved by abolishing them is not enough to justify their abolition”. 34 On these grounds, prohibiting private schools is unwarranted.

References Anderson, E. (2004), “Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to Be a Hypocrite”, Theory and Research in Education, 2, pp.99-110. 33

Tooley, J. (2008), “From Adam Swift to Adam Smith: How the ‘Invisible Hand’ Overcomes Middle Class Hypocrisy”, p.734. 34 Anderson, E. (2004), “Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to Be a Hypocrite”, p.109.


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Anderson, E. (2007), “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective”, Ethics, 117:4, pp.595-622. Brighouse, H. (2003), School Choice and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press Exley, S. and Suissa, J. (2013), “Private schools, choice and the ethical environment”, British Journal of Educational Studies, 61:3. pp. 345-362. Hargreaves, H. (1996), “Diversity and Choice in School Education: A Modified Libertarian Approach”, Oxford Review of Education, 22:2, pp.131-141. McConnell, M. (2002), “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served By Democratic Control Of Schooling”, Moral and Political Education, 43, pp.87-146. Quong, J. (2010), Liberalism without Perfection, New York: Oxford University Press Quong, J. (2016), “Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10:4, pp.815-829. Raz, J. (1988), The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press Rosenblum, N. (2003), “Separating the Siamese Twins, “Pluralism” and “School Choice”” in A. Wolfe (ed.), School Choice: The Moral Debate, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp.79-103. Shields, L. (2015), “From Rawlsian autonomy to sufficient opportunity in education”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 14:1, pp.53-66. Tooley, J. (2003), “Why Harry Brighouse is Nearly Right About the Privatisation of Education”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37:3, pp. 427–447.
 Tooley, J. (2008), “From Adam Swift to Adam Smith: How the ‘Invisible Hand’ Overcomes Middle Class Hypocrisy”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41:4, pp.727-741.


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Schicker, The Issue of Active Construction in National Identity

Questioning the Engagement of the State with regards to National Sentiments: the Issue of Active Construction in National Identity

Emma Schicker, 3rd Year Essay BA Politics, Philosophy and Economics

Abstract: Canovan1 expresses the current state of the world through a paradox: on one hand, discussions about the importance of ethnic identities are emerging as a backlash against liberal theories while on the other, the spread of globalization puts a strain on the conception that each nation should have its own state. This paradox leads to a debate between those who see national sentiments as a positive dynamic for both individuals and the society they find themselves in and those who see them as fundamentally in tension with universal impartiality. This paper questions the morality of encouraging or discouraging national sentiments and concludes that although national sentiments are morally desirable given the current state of the world, the constructed nature of national identity renders encouraging national sentiments undesirable.

Canovan expresses the current state of the world through a paradox: on one hand, discussions about the importance of ethnic identities are emerging as a backlash against liberal theories while on the other, the spreading of globalization puts strains on the conception that each nation should have its own state.2 This paradox leads to a debate between those who see national sentiments, loosely defined for now as love of one’s own country, as a positive dynamic for both individuals and the society they find themselves in and those who see them as fundamentally in tension with universal impartiality. To question national sentiments and whether they should be encouraged or discouraged entails questioning their morality and whether is it morally acceptable to translate love for one’s compatriots into a form of national preference. To do so with regards to a given state of the world, it must first be determined that they are not necessarily morally wrong.

1 2

Canovan, M. (2000), “Patriotism is not enough”, British Journal of Political Sciences, 30:3, p.416 Ibid


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I will argue that national sentiments should not be encouraged but merely be ignored or “benignly neglected”. First, I show that national sentiments are not necessarily morally wrong for a liberal account of morality. This allows me to move on to consider two interpretations of national sentiments as morally desirable with regards to the current state of the world and show that in both cases, encouraging national sentiments is not morally desirable. Section I National sentiments, either patriotism or nationalism, are mainly challenged by a liberal conception of morality which rejects their impartiality. A first step is therefore to show that they are not necessarily morally wrong and need not be rejected altogether. National sentiments are usually understood as a form of love or special concern for a limited unit. This unit may be defined as a nation characterised by an ethnicity and culture, nationalism or a polity, patriotism.3 Although patriotism is not necessarily tied to a nation, it will be used throughout this paper as a matter of comparison due to its similarities with nationalism. On a communitarian understanding of morality, the individual is understood as fundamentally embedded in a social context. An understanding of morality is a result of such context. MacIntyre hence conceives national sentiments as a form of loyalty towards a particular nation which is not only morally acceptable but a moral virtue. 4 It allows the individual to bond with one nation and develop as a moral agent; it is an essential component of the moral life of an individual. This contradicts with a liberal account of morality and the existence of moral principles accessible mainly through the use of reason, independent of a community. A liberal account of morality requires impartiality.5 As a result, Kateb attempts to show that national sentiments are wrong as love of a unit based on the exclusion and harm of non-compatriots.6 This presents a double criticism which Kateb does not distinguish: either the polity is illegitimate and founded on harm and exclusion, or its existence results in partiality and conflicts with equal benevolence. With regards to the first concern, I note that liberal accounts of morality do not consider the polity or nation as necessarily founded on moral abjections. Therefore if the partiality which results from national sentiments is morally acceptable, national sentiments do not necessarily conflict with liberal moral principles. Moreover 3

Ibid, p.415. MacIntyre, A. (2002), “Is Patriotism a virtue?”, In Patriotism by Igor Primoratz (ed.), Amherst: Humanity Books, pp.44-48. 5 Ibid, p.48. 6 Kateb, G. (2000), “Is Patriotism a mistake?”, Social Research, 67.4, p.917 4


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this partiality is not necessary for the existence of national sentiments. Klampfer argues that they can be limited by consideration of non-compatriots, such that it does not necessarily lead to exclusivity towards the harm of others.7 It is then possible to imagine love of one’s country as the recognition of the value of one's own culture while accepting the constraint of moral principles such as equal consideration regardless of national belonging. National sentiments can be right for a liberal conception of morality. Such conception of national sentiments might appear highly unlikely such that they mostly lead to irrational behaviours and disregard for equal benevolence. My aim here was merely to evoke this as a possibility in order to move onto a defence of national sentiments with regards to a given state of the world. Section II If national sentiments are not necessarily morally wrong, it might still be the case that they are morally desirable with regards to a given state of the world and encouraging them would be beneficial. I will consider two accounts of the moral desirability of national sentiments. The first argument for the moral desirability of national sentiments is given by Miller who considers them as enabling the state to function properly.8 By associating the nation and the state, national sentiments create a special bond between citizens and ensure a great involvement in national matters. Viroli offers a similar account with regards to patriotism, as a love of republican values with regards to universal principles.9 According to such accounts national sentiments are desirable as an incentive to be involved in political matters and democratic debates. This is especially useful if the current state of the world is interpreted as one of general disengagement in political issues, especially in western liberal democracies. Crouch refers to this disengagement as a state of post-democracy in which citizens become increasingly apathetic and the power shifts to the elite.10 In this case, encouraging national sentiments would foster involvement in democratic debates and counteract apathy. This could be done, for instance, through civic education and national celebrations, as long as universal moral principles are respected. A problem with this description though is that the value of national sentiments is instrumental. If one was truly worried about the negative consequences of national sentiments as partiality and special concern, there would be an incentive to attempt to involve citizens while bypassing the appeal to national sentiments. 7

Klampfer, F. (2000) “Does Membership in a Nation as Such Generate Any Special Duties?”, In Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict by Nenad Miščević (ed.), Chicago: Open Court, p.231 8 Miller, D. (1995), On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.88 9 Viroli, M. (2011), “Le patriotisme républicain”, In Républicanisme translated by Christopher Hamel, Lormont: Le Bord de l’Eau, pp.88-89 10 Crouch, C. (2004) Post-Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd


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A second argument in favour of the moral desirability adopts a communitarian perspective. Encouraging national sentiments is here understood as going further than ignoring them because they have a fundamental value which needs to be respected and protected. The current state of the world is here understood as an increased individualization: liberal political theories fail to recognise the individual as fundamentally embedded in a cultural framework.11 Further this framework is an essential component of the individual’s identity12 and its disregard provokes a loss of moral meaning and of conception of a good life. Kymlicka uses this understanding of embedded individuals to argue in favour of special status for national sentiments.13 Membership in a community is a primary good for human life and this membership must be protected by a special right. Consider Vorlette a member of the French nation. Belonging to the French nation is essential to Vorlette’s identity. The butter croissant is a fundamental instantiation of the identity of the French nation. This justifies the creation of a special right to ensure that Vorlette has access to croissants. Special rights are necessary to protect nations and ensure their subsistence especially against assimilation into a dominant nation.14 National sentiments are not only morally desirable in this view but are the expression of an essential bond, they should be encouraged and their importance recognised through special rights protecting the national identity. Therefore national sentiments could be morally desirable with regards to democratic engagement and political unity or as a primary access to moral meaning. More must be said though regarding the implications of encouraging them and whether this practice is desirable. Section III The moral desirability of national sentiments might lead to an argument in favour of encouraging them. As nations are not always represented by a political authority, it seems accurate for now to interpret the state as the actor in charge of fostering national sentiments. I will argue that this practice is undesirable even though national sentiments are limited to be made compatible with moral principles because it conflicts with the dynamism of nations and individual freedom.

11

Parekh, B. (2000), Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp.118-122 12 Abbey, R. (2006), “Charles Taylor: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity”, In Central Works of Philosophy, 5, by John Shand (ed.), Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, p.273 13 Brighouse, H. (1997), “Against Nationalism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26:1, p.393 14 Kymlicka, W. (1996), “Justice and Minority Rights”, In Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.116


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Nations are dynamic units which cannot fit into a defined framework. The problem of encouraging national sentiments is that it requires a definition of the nation itself. Miller notes that a nation is essentially subjectively identified by its members and although some objective criterion such as a set belief or a language may define it, it can only do so partially.15 Paradoxically if the state is to encourage national sentiments, it must be able to characterise the nation. Let us imagine a state which wants to encourage Mary’s British national sentiments. The state could try to identity which out of Mary’s preferences she associates with the British nation and encourage it specifically. For example out of her love of football and baked beans, she loves the latter because she considers it a part of her British identity. But if the state merely encourages her love for baked bean by making it available at a cheaper price, the action is inefficient: it does not directly tackle the association of the love as a national sentiment and relies on Mary to do the associating. One might argue that the state could be more inventive and instead of encouraging a defined version of the nation, it could promote national sentiments by asking individuals to define their own interpretation. The problem with this is that social cohesion is a result of common identity. Having a nation representing itself as a mosaic of interpretation with no common denominator, has no positive impact on social cohesion and might even be self-defeating with the undermining of a sense of belonging. As a result, the state is left with the option of encouraging national sentiment by influencing the image of the nation. The effective way for the state to foster Mary’s sentiment is to construct a narrative about the British nation around the consumption of baked beans for example. This active construction creates two problems. The first one regards the individual experience of the nation. The attachment to a nation might be natural and valuable to individuals but this does not entail that every individual shares the same attachment to one nation. Mary might identify as British when she eats baked beans while George feels most British eating crumpets. Both interpretations constitute the British nation and imposing an official public interpretation of the nation might entail homogenisation and the subsequent loss of individually valuable conceptions of the nation. An easy objection is that a common narrative is not exclusive and does not prevent individual experience of the nation. The state might put forward the history of the British nation as an empire while Mary feels attachment of the British nation not because it was an empire but because of baked beans. Both matters are not mutually exclusive. In response, I simply note that the more the nation is defined officially, the harder it is for this definition to adapt to the change in mentality and be criticised. This leads me to a second and stronger objection. The more the state focuses on encouraging national sentiments and builds a national narrative, the more strain it puts on

15

Miller, D. (1988), “The Ethical Significance of Nationality”, Ethics, 98:4, p.648


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individual freedom. This is especially the case with regards to habits and customs. Let us imagine a nation, A. The state wishes to encourage the feeling of belonging to A because it is seen as beneficial for the individual. It is identified that A is characterised by habit x. There are two degrees of action for the state: either it encourages a narrative of A as partially characterised by x or following Kymlicka’s ideas it creates a special right to x for A’s members. In both cases, it is more difficult for A’s members to disagree with x and not do it. Using this argument, Fourest opposed allowing Muslim girls to wear the veil in public schools in France on the basis of a right to indifference.16 According to this the state should consider each individual equally, regardless of their belonging, in order to give them the opportunity to interpret this belonging to the extent that they wish. This objection relies on the association of national sentiments with a culture. One may wish to argue with Viroli that national sentiments can be encouraged if they are directed at a polity and universal principles. To this I reply that either love of principles is encouraged in which case national sentiments are not involved; or love of the history of a nation with principles is encouraged, such as French republicanism and the Enlightenment principles behind the revolution, in which case the history becomes a culture and leads to similar problems. Having shown that encouraging national sentiments poses problem for the individual’s interpretation and freedom, I do not endorse those national sentiments need not be discouraged if made compatible with universal principles. It is assumed that the state can carry cultural significance but act so to minimise the importance of this culture and respect national minorities by being neutral towards them. This approach might be characterised as can be referred to as benign neglect of national sentiments.17

I have argued that national sentiments are not necessarily wrong for a liberal account of morality because they can be limited to suit universal principles. They might be encouraged for two reasons: to foster political unity and engagement or because membership in a nation is morally meaningful to individuals. Regardless though, the practice of encouraging national sentiments is undesirable as it homogenises the understanding of the nation at the cost of individual interpretation and reduces individual freedom to associate and act upon certain aspects of a nation. As a result, national sentiments should neither be encouraged nor discouraged.

16 17

Fourest, C. (2016), Le Génie de la laïcité : La laïcité n'est pas un glaive mais un bouclier, Paris : Grasset Brighouse, H. (1997), “Against Nationalism”, p. 365


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References Abbey, R. (2006), “Charles Taylor: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity”, In Central Works of Philosophy Volume 5 by John Shand (ed.), Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press Brighuse. H. (1997), “Against Nationalism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26:1, pp. 365-405 Canovan, M. (2000), “Patriotism is not enough”, British Journal of Political Science, 30:3, pp. 413-432 Crouch, C. (2004), Post-Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd. Fourest, C. (2016), Le Génie de la laïcité : La laïcité n'est pas un glaive mais un bouclier, Paris : Grasset Kateb, G. (2000), “Is Patriotism a mistake?”, Social Research, 67:4, pp.901-924 Klampfer, F. (2000), “Does Membership in a Nation as Such Generate Any Special Duties?”, In Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict by Nenad Miščević (ed.), Chicago: Open Court Kymlicka, W. (1996), “Justice and Minority Rights”, In Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press MacIntyre, A. (2002), “Is Patriotism a virtue?”, In Patriotism by Igor Primoratz (ed.), Amherst: Humanity Books, pp.43-58, Miller, D. (1988), The Ethical Significance of Nationality, Ethics, 98:4, pp. 647-662 Miller, D. (1995), On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press Parekh, B. (2000), Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Viroli, M. (2011), “Le patriotisme républicain”, In Républicanisme translated by Christopher Hamel, Lormont: Le Bord de l’Eau


Phillips, Defending Freedom of Speech

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Defending Freedom of Speech

William Phillips, 2nd Year Essay BA Politics and Modern History

Abstract: This paper assesses two key justifications for limiting freedom of speech. Firstly, through appeal to the importance of the truth which is seen as being denigrated by modern media platforms and the rise of ‘fake news’. Secondly, through the harm principle and the idea that hate speech is not a permissible form of expression. These arguments, whilst compelling, are found to be insufficient in defending restrictions on free speech. Ultimately, through appealing to ideas of autonomy, democracy and the dangers of government control over discourse, this essay adds to modern defences of free speech.

The recent rise of censorship across universities in the UK has stirred debate on the issue of freedom of speech. Furthermore, the novel development of “fake news” has led to concerns that unrestricted speech has led to an undermining of the truth. Contemporary political theorists are thus faced with the task of having to either justify restrictions on free expression or instead work towards a defence of unregulated freedom of speech.Two of these justifications will be explored in this essay and be shown to be insufficient for arguing that freedom of speech should be restricted. What follows is an exploration of the argument by John Stuart Mill that freedom of speech should be defended, as it will inevitably lead to the truth.1 Despite Mill’s assertion, it appears that in modern society the internet provides opportunities to spread misinformation; furthermore, debate is often dominated by vested interests in the media. Given this, restrictions may be necessary in ascertaining the truth. Secondly, this essay will also explore the ‘harm principle’ as another key argument for restricting free speech. Hate speech can often lead to negative consequences, such as the harming of other individuals, which outweigh any justification for unrestricted speech; a common argument currently used on university campuses.

1

Mill, J. S. (2001), On Liberty, Toronto: Batoche Books, p.19.


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Ultimately though, this essay will adopt a liberal position and argue that restrictions on free speech cannot be justified either by appealing to the truth, or by appealing to the harm principle. It will be argued instead that other forms of intervention, such as a promotion of minority voices or pursuing balance in the setting of society’s discourse, may be necessary in ascertaining the truth and overcoming the problems posed by the harm principle.

Mill famously argued that when free speech is restricted, there is a risk that the truth may not be discovered.2 This idea was ultimately based on his assertion that the best way for society to enhance collective knowledge and ascertain the truth, was to have as wide a range of views as possible.3 Such an argument from Mill was grounded in his analogy of a ‘marketplace of ideas’, that ultimately by allowing ideas to compete in a similar manner to economic free markets, the best ideas would win out through debate and consideration of arguments.4 Mill’s marketplace of ideas analogy seems an attractive proposition, particularly for liberals concerned with protecting free speech and individual expression, but also for those who favour consequentialist arguments by appealing to the truth. Essentially, if debate occurs between differing viewpoints, it would appear that the most theoretically sound and logically coherent ideas would likely win out. ‘Truth’ and indeed debate have arguably been enhanced by the advent of social media and the digital revolution, due to the far greater access to information for citizens across the world.5 The problem with such developments though have been that given the lack of filters and restrictions online, the truth can often be evaded and stories can be virtually fabricated; as Viner argues, this has led to the phenomenon of “fake news”.6 Indeed, the power that the media currently holds over both debate and in reaching the truth appears worrying. As Brison has highlighted, ‘the mass media are not only the main sources of information for most people, but also the selectors of what information we receive.’7 It is evident that at least within Britain’s

2

Ibid Ibid, p.22. 4 Waldron, J. (2012), The Harm in Hate Speech, London: Harvard University Press, p.156. 5 Viner, K. (2016), “How Technology Disrupted the Truth”, The Guardian (12th July 2016). 6 Ibid 7 Brison, S. J. (1998), “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech”, Ethics, 108:2, p.333. 3


Phillips, Defending Freedom of Speech

media industry, a dominance in large parts by groups such as DMG Media and News Corp has occurred. In the United States as well, the inordinate levels of wealth in elections mean that very often poor would-be candidates are deprived of a platform and influence.8 Essentially, because the voices which control discussion have been reduced, this poses a threat to Mill’s hypothesis that a wide a range of opinions will lead to ‘the truth’.

In order to combat this, Braddon-Mitchell and West argue that non-market mechanisms may be required in attaining ‘the truth’.9 It may well be the case that restrictions on the ability for media groups, individuals or organisations to spread misinformation or dominate discourse, need to be applied. If restrictions on free speech are to be granted by appealing to the truth though, various problems arise. Firstly is the practical issue of restricting misinformation; how would such restrictions work? It seems dangerous to allow any sort of governmental control over the distribution of information, largely for the reason that this places enormous power in the hands of the state over shaping discourse. Individuals’ knowledge would ultimately be formed within boundaries set by the state, which of course has worrying connotations with previous totalitarian regimes. Furthermore, it is evident that even if it is a benevolent government which is in control of the filtering of information, there is ultimately no guarantee that what is being filtered out is completely false. As Mill argues, by placing restrictions on free discussion, there is the risk that we may inadvertently dismiss information as false, even though it could contain some portion of truth.10 Ultimately, who will regulate those who are regulating information? It seems an unnecessary risk to allow government to restrict free speech in order to promote ‘the truth’.

Perhaps though, non-market intervention could come in another form. In order to overcome inequality in setting discourse and achieving real debate, we may turn to Scanlon’s suggestion that a degree of intervention by government is necessary ‘to ensure that means of expression are readily available through which individuals and small groups can make their views on political issues known’.11 This would ultimately 8

Dworkin, R. (2002), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, London: Harvard University Press, p.369. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and West, C. (2004), “What is Free Speech?”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12:4, p.442. 10 Mill, J. S. (2001), On Liberty, p.50. 11 Scanlon, T. (1972), “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1:2, p.223. 9

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result not in government necessarily restricting free speech, but rather, promoting weaker voices in order to achieve a fairer debate. Ultimately, if smaller groups are empowered, it could be ensured that discourse is not under control by one section of society.12 Rather than regulating the speech of others, intervention would enable a free marketplace of ideas. This is attractive to both liberals and utilitarians, as on the one hand government will not be in control of the flow of information, but also, it will be ensured that a wider range of views are considered; if we follow Mill’s logic, this should lead to the truth.13 We can thus conclude that perhaps rather than restricting free speech, we can instead promote a balance between various sections of society through funding independent media bodies such as the BBC in the United Kingdom. It appears that restrictions need not necessarily be placed on free speech, but some sort of intervention can be deemed necessary. This idea will also be later explored.

Another principle which can be appealed to for limiting free speech is the harm principle, whereby hate speech is often cited as an unacceptable form of free speech which needs to be censored. Jeremy Waldron offers arguably the most powerful defence of hate speech legislation, arguing that hate speech undermines a group’s social standing, thus it should be restricted.14 Liberal theorists seeking to defend unrestricted speech respond to this by appealing to the value of autonomy, stressing that censorship undermines the intrinsic importance of individual liberty and an individual’s right to free speech. Ed Baker provides a compelling case along these lines, arguing that individuals need to be able to reflect their views onto society otherwise they are merely absorbed by surrounding views.15 Essentially, an individual has an inalienable right to argue their opinion in a free society, as this is a manifestation of their autonomy. The problem with hate speech legislation and restricting unpalatable opinions then, lies in the fact that any constraints on individuals’ freedom of speech are inherently authoritarian and deny individuals the ability to express their autonomy. Waldron turns this argument on its head, arguing that those on the receiving end of hate speech often have their autonomy and liberty undermined.16 Hate speech can lead to a group or individual being 12

Ibid Mill, J. S. (2001), On Liberty, p.22 14 Waldron, J. (2012), The Harm in Hate Speech, pp.4-5. 15 Ibid, p.161. 16 Ibid, p.109. 13


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associated with negative connotations and undermine their ability to pursue their wants and desires; this is a serious infringement of liberty.17 Societal views may obstruct their possibility to get jobs, stand for public office or even have their opinions respected. In such a situation, it is worth considering the Millian principle set out by O’Rourke, that speech ‘should be punished when it leads to actions that invade the liberties of others’.18 Ultimately, if the liberty of a speaker appears to undermine the liberty of another group or individual then we have due cause to restrict the speaker’s right to free expression. This poses the liberal theorist with a serious problem, as the autonomy of the speaker must now be balanced with the autonomy of minority groups.

It appears in the first place that we would rightly side with minorities in the case of hate speech legislation, given our desire to promote equality and tolerance. The problem though with censorship and hate speech legislation is the dangerous precedent it sets. What body, if any, determines what is hate speech and how can this ever be truly censored from the public eye, given the freedom of the internet to post whatever one deems appropriate? This essentially takes us back to the initial problem set out under attempts to restrict freedom of speech by appealing to the truth. It opens the door to authoritarianism if the state is granted the power to silence dissent and control the flow of discourse. Hate speech legislation also appears to be in conflict with another important value, that of democracy. Dworkin argues that hate speech legislation and censorship laws ‘disfigure democracy’ on an intrinsic level, as through excluding certain individuals from expressing their opinions they are ultimately made ‘not equal in the argumentative competition for power’.19 It is a reasonable proposition that in free societies individuals should be given equal consideration of interests in the political sphere; the fact that some citizens would be deprived of such equal consideration if censorship were to be introduced appears to threaten the value of democracy.20 Ultimately, as Dworkin asserts, as soon as a citizen’s rights to expression are prohibited, society forfeits its ability to impose laws onto them as they have not been given an equal participation in constructing society’s discourse.21 In this sense, it is morally wrong to compel racists to obey a society in which they have no opportunity to influence the discourse. Thus, it appears morally impermissible to restrict free speech based on the harm principle. 17

Ibid, p.130. Riley, J. (2005), “J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression”, Utilitas, 17:2, p.157. 19 Dworkin, R. (2002), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, p.366. 20 Christiano, T. (2004), “The Authority of Democracy”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12:3, p.269. 21 Dworkin, R. (2002), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, p.366. 18

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It is clear then what the dilemma of free speech poses to liberal theorists; as a civilised society, we want to both secure the social standing of minority groups from being disparaged, whilst also not silencing dissidents and violating their autonomy and democratic rights. In order to overcome this, we may again turn to Scanlon’s suggestion that a degree of intervention by government is necessary in promoting weaker voices.22 In practice this could come in the form of either governmental or societal promotion of minority voices, through programmes such as affirmative action or indeed regular exhibitions of tolerance which can be used to simultaneously promote the autonomy of minority groups, but also combat attempts by hatespeakers to disparage them. This would result in promoting minorities and their ability to confront systemic or even singular incidents of racism, rather than necessarily restricting hate speech. As established before, on the one hand this premise ensures that individuals’ and groups’ rights to freedom of speech are not infringed upon, but also it protects minorities from being undermined by hateful speech in a democratic society. Furthermore, it appears consistent with Mill’s premise that debate leads to the truth. By enabling hate speakers to be presented with facts, evidence and morally justifiable arguments, ideas of intolerance and hatred are far more likely to be defeated. In this sense, Scanlon’s proposal is of vital importance for the liberal theorist. By avoiding restricting free speech, society prevents the prospect of government-filtered information, the autonomy and democratic rights of hate-speakers can remain intact, but most importantly, the social fabric of communities are upheld as the liberties of minority groups are promoted.

To conclude, this essay has explored two key arguments for restricting free speech, the appeal to the importance of truth and the harm principle. Both have been shown to be fundamental challenges to defenders of unrestricted speech, however, neither can overcome rebuttals by appeals to autonomy and democracy. Nor, as it has been shown, is state control over the distribution or restriction of information at all an attractive proposition. Ultimately, restrictions on free speech cannot be justified by appealing to the importance of the truth; nor can we justify regulation based on the harm principle. Instead, this essay has argued that fairer debate through the promotion of weaker, or minority voices should be pursued.

22

Scanlon, T. (1972), “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”, p.223.


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References Braddon-Mitchell, D. and West, C. (2004), “What is Free Speech?”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12:4, pp.437–460. Brison, S. J. (1998), “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech”, Ethics, 108:2, pp.312-339. Christiano, T. (2004), “The Authority of Democracy”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12:3, pp.266–290. Dworkin, R. (2002), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, London: Harvard University Press. Mill, J. S. (2001), On Liberty, Toronto: Batoche Books. Riley, J. (2005), “J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression”, Utilitas, 17:2, pp.147-179. Scanlon, T. (1972), “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1:2, pp.204-226. Viner, K. (2016), “How Technology Disrupted the Truth”, The Guardian (12 July 2016). Waldron, J. (2012), The Harm in Hate Speech, London: Harvard University Press.


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Governance is inescapably in tension with democracy

Sam Sayer,2nd Year Essay BA Philosophy, Politics and Economics Abstract: This article contends that governance is inescapably in tension with democracy. It does so through critical evaluation of three separate and popular camps which hold that governance improves democracy; the Libertarian, the Radical and the Republican camps. The article finds that none of these give sufficient weight to three tenets that broadly support democracy: equality, inclusivity and accountability. Thus the justifications of governance are rendered ineffective, on democratic grounds. Particular attention is paid to the tenet of accountability, as the lack thereof makes the tension between governance and democracy inescapable.

I argue that governance is inescapably in tension with democracy due to it threatening three principles that are central to democracy: equality, inclusivity, and accountability. Throughout, I will evaluate and refute claims made by scholars that governance is democracy-enhancing. I will conclude by demonstrating that the tension between governance and democracy is inescapable, by virtue of the inherent unaccountability of governance. I first define governance: ‘conceptualizations of governance focus on the multi-sector arrangements between public, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations that emerge to create public value’.1 This refers to networks of institutions, private and public, which cooperate in order to solve specific common (i.e. shared) problems, sometimes collectively wielding public authority. I also define democracy and emphasise the most relevant tenets as highlighted by Hazenberg.2 Democracy is ‘a method of group decision-making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making.’ 3 It contains three principles which I 1

Casey, C. (2016), “Nonprofit Organizations in Governance Arrangements: Adding Democratic Value to Community Reinvestment Act Agreements?”, Public Integrity, p.1 2 Hazenberg, H. (2015), “Is Governance Democratic?”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18, pp. 285-307 3 Christiano, T. (2015). “Democracy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


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believe are the most relevant with regard to this question; equality, inclusivity and accountability. I will refer to these throughout in order to assess whether they are endangered by governance. As tenets of democracy they will be reference points to democracy proper. I will now critically evaluate three camps, again outlined by Hazenburg, which argue that governance is beneficial for democracy. They are the Libertarian, Radical and Republican justifications for governance. Libertarian The Libertarian justification of governance could be said to be ‘based on the rationality of the “free market”’.4 This is because a kind of ‘laissez-faire’ logic is applied to the political sphere by Libertarians, who feel that a non-coercive approach to rule would be supremely valuable. In fact, ‘individual freedom as noninterference is the supreme value in society’.5 Thus, by doing away with coercive government in favour of a non-coercive network of institutions, Libertarians feel that democracy would be enhanced by governance as each individual would be free from interference (and freedom is an important aspect of democracy). It is important to note that the freedom Libertarians espouse is ‘negative liberty’, which holds that one ‘should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons’. 6 In criticism however, it is my view that negative liberty is less important than positive liberty where democracy is concerned. Positive liberty holds that ‘To be free, you must be self-determined, which is to say that you must be able to control your own destiny in your own interests’. 7 It seems to me that positive liberty is the type of liberty that protects the democratic tenets of inclusivity and equality, as it allows us to ‘control our own destiny in our own interests' 8, which supports these principles. This is because controlling our own destiny involves participating in decisions that may affect us, which is inclusive, and would necessarily have to be equal so as to ensure everyone has this freedom. On this basis I reiterate that negative liberty is less relevant to democracy. Thus I would argue that the libertarian justification misses the point of ‘freedom’ where democracy is concerned and this misunderstanding leads to the supporting of governance.

4

Zenger, C, and Martin, E.J. (2014). “Libertarianism and the Realities of Governance”, Global Virtue Ethics Review, p.146 5 Hazenberg, H. (2015), “Is Governance Democratic?”, Critical Review of International Socia; and Political Philosophy, p.292 6 Berlin, I. (1969), “Two Concepts of Liberty.”, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.2 7 Carter, I. (2016), “Positive and Negative Liberty”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 8 Ibid


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To summarise my criticism, the Libertarian camp supports governance on the grounds that it increases freedom; however, the kind of freedom it increases (negative) is actually less important to democracy than the kind of freedom it simultaneously diminishes (positive). This is the freedom to be selfdetermining, and governance diminishes this freedom by eroding the role of an elected state which has a monopoly on authority. As a result, governance cannot guarantee the same channels (free elections) that allow us to be self-determining. Therefore, I believe that the libertarian justification for governance fails to demonstrate that governance is not in tension with democracy, as it seems that, with governance, our rights to inclusivity and equality are endangered. I will now consider the radical justification for governance, and critically assess the arguments therein. Radical The radical justification for governance has its foundations in the desire to do away with the Westphalian state system. In the radical view, the contemporary state system perpetuates inequality and class warfare. As a result, radicals wish to break down borders and eradicate hierarchy- they feel that this would be good for democracy to the extent that people would be more equal if there was less of a ruler/ruled relationship in society. Governance is thus attractive to radicals as it necessarily changes this ‘vertical’ ruler/ruled relationship in favour of a horizontal, non-hierarchical system. Moreover, ‘The vagueness of governance makes the notion attractive for some radical democrats’.9 What I understand by this is that governance per se doesn’t guarantee any particular state of affairs - it seems malleable due to its informal nature. Thus, it seems that we could in theory structure governance in such a way that it would be good for democracy. As put forward by Dryzek, ‘It makes little sense to either condemn or praise networked governance from a democratic point of view - it all depends on the specific context’.10 This argument is compelling to the extent that governance does seem like it can be formed in many different ways, not all of them necessarily undemocratic. However, I would dispute this claim on two grounds: firstly, I would argue that governance cannot have the same degree of accountability as government, regardless of how it is set up. This is something I come back to later. Government is accountable to the voters by virtue of our electoral system, but as nonpublic firms aren’t directly accountable to voters in the same way that government is, it doesn’t seem that it 9

Hazenberg, H. (2015), “Is Governance Democratic?”, p.293. Dryzek, J. S. (2009), “Theories of the democratic state”, Location: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 148-149.

10


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is democratic for them to wield any public authority. Therefore, it seems that governance inherently lacks accountability, which is a central tenet of democracy. Secondly, governance is intrinsically undemocratic on the grounds that democracy embodies a process which cannot be captured with any formation of governance. In my view, it is the process of democracy which gives it its value - and changing the inputs of our decision-making process seriously calls into question the whole system with regards to how democratic it is. As written by Boedeltje, ‘Legitimacy on the input side depends on mechanisms that translate the ‘will of the people’ into political decisions’ 11 and there doesn’t seem to be a guarantee of any such mechanism where governance is concerned. This threatens the principle of inclusivity as there is no guarantee that the ‘will of the people’ will be taken into account, and even if the will of some people is taken into account (i.e. the Elite) there is no guarantee that even this will be inclusive. Therefore, I would argue that the radical justification also falls short of proving that governance isn’t in tension with democracy. While radicals argue that governance may prove to enhance democracy depending on how it is set up, I have argued that there is necessarily an erosion of our democracy. This is regardless of the particular formation of governance, because there is inevitably a lack of accountability where governance is concerned. Moreover, there is no guarantee that any decision-making process will be inclusive. In sum, it still seems that governance is inescapably in tension with democracy. I will now discuss the republican case for governance, and will attempt to demonstrate that it too is flawed. Republican The Republican justification for governance is largely based on a particular contempt for authoritarian rule. Republicans believe that governance would enhance democracy by virtue of it being more deliberative and less authoritarian than government, and they consider contestation and deliberation to be incredibly important to democracy. They hold in contempt the idea of the ruling class dominating the population, and as such seek to eliminate the possibility of this happening. In fact, Republicans desire ‘institutions that are broadly contestatory in character’12 to be the institutions that make political decisions. This is because they would ensure non-domination by creating impartial laws. Further, Republicans believe that governance is more in line with producing contestatory institutions than is government. I propose a metaphor which 11

Boedeltje, M. (2004), “Input and output legitimacy in interactive governance”, NIG Annual Work Conference Rotterdam, p.4 12 Pettit, P. (2004), “Depoliticizing democracy”, Ratio juris, p.61.


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demonstrates what kind of power Republicans want for the public, and which highlights the Republican affinity for contestatory and ‘editorial’ rule. This will illuminate why Republicans feel that governance is the route to improving democracy. As written by Pettit,13 editors have two types of control over authors which, in the view of Republicans, the population should in turn have over the rulers of our society in order to enhance democracy. The first is virtual control, which reminds the ‘authors’ (the rulers) that the ‘editor’ (the population) is within his rights to change anything that the authors wish to ‘publish’ (legislate). This would create impartial laws as people would always edit ones that discriminate them. The second is inhibitory control - this is like virtual control insofar as it is a kind of second-order control. In this case however, it leads to the authors self-censoring and tailoring their publications to the kind of publications that the editor is likely to approve of, to save hassle. This would ensure nondomination. It seems that these two types of control genuinely would improve democracy as they would ensure that legislation is in line with public opinion - this is because it would guarantee that rulers would only propose legislation that they know the whole public are likely to agree with. Moreover, republicans believe that in a system of governance these changes could actually take place and the people could indeed have these powers, thereby making governance democracy-enhancing. Pettit writes: ‘The bodies and officials responsible for hearing contestations— courts, tribunals, ombudsmen, and the like—will have to be distinct from the elected forums and personnel that gave rise to the laws and decrees that are being contested [if we are to have impartial laws].’14 This demonstrates just how governance would lead to more editorial power and thus impartial laws. In a system of governance, decision-making institutions are ‘depoliticised’ in the way described above which would allow for a more editorial system. To simplify, the Republican argument as I understand it is as follows: P1: Governance depoliticises institutions. P2: Depoliticising institutions leads to greater editorial rule, which ensures impartial laws. P3: Impartial laws would improve democracy. 13 14

Ibid, p.62 Ibid, pp. 62-63.


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---C1: Governance is good for democracy. I will now highlight why I think, contrary to the republican view, that governance is indeed in tension with democracy. This rests within premise 2 of the argument, which I criticise on the basis that depoliticising institutions per se has no guaranteed impact on how much power the population have to contest rules and thus ensure non-domination. I would argue in fact that depoliticising institutions could be said to further inequality and increase domination rather than the opposite. To take the example of current U.S. Supreme Court Justices, who are appointed independently of government, we can point out that every single one went to either Harvard or Yale Law School.15 Thus it is conceivable that depoliticising institutions could lead to elitism and, in some cases, has led to elitism. This is relevant as an objection to the Republican argument as it demonstrates that depoliticising institutions may not necessarily lead to greater editorial power on behalf of the people, which is in direct conflict with premise 2 of the Republican argument. Having highlighted this flaw in the Republican argument in general, I will now demonstrate how this flaw has wider implications for democracy. If it could be said that Republicanism leads to elitism, then this would endanger the democratic tenet of equality and if equality is endangered then democracy is eroded. What’s more, elitism is not conducive to inclusivity, as if only candidates from a certain pool are chosen for something then the process necessarily excludes certain others. Therefore, I would suggest that the republican argument fails to justify governance as being good for democracy. More generally, Republicanism conceivably leads to elitism which we can even be observed with empirical evidence - thus threatening the democratic tenets of equality and inclusivity. I would suggest that governance therefore is still in tension with democracy. Why governance is inescapably in tension with democracy I have demonstrated and summarised the shortcomings of all three camps which seek to justify governance. However, criticizing the Libertarian, Republican and Radical views is insufficient to demonstrate that there can be no way that governance doesn’t harm democracy; it only serves to prove that these three popular formulations are flawed. As such, I add a final argument highlighting a more profound

15

Brown, T. (2016), “Meet the Supremes: Who are the US Supreme Court justices?”, BBC News Magazine


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tension between governance and democracy, which tackles why governance will always be in tension with democracy. I justify this broader claim by affirming that democracy involves a legitimate process which governance can never quite capture. Without an electoral system there can be no formal accountability, and this I believe is where governance encounters a deep tension with democracy. The inherent lack of input legitimacy (electoral processes) with governance means that no formulation of it could ever be as accountable as government is, as ‘the primary political accountability mechanism is free and fair elections’.16 As suggested in my definition, accountability is central to democracy; thus my concluding remark would be that governance is inescapably in tension with democracy on the basis that it is inevitably unaccountable. Conclusion In this paper, I have summarised, evaluated and finally refuted three distinct philosophies which hold that governance isn’t in tension with democracy. The refutation of these arguments has been based upon their inability to take into account all three important aspects of democracy stipulated above; inclusivity, equality and accountability. Further, in order to tackle whether this relationship is in a sense inevitable, I have distilled democracy into one concept- input legitimacy- and found that it is necessarily incompatible with governance. Therefore, I would suggest conclusively that governance is in tension with democracy. References Bureau of International Information Programs (2015), “Government Accountability”, Principles of Democracy, U.S. Department of State, [Online] Available at: https://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/prinDemocracy/government_dem.html [Accessed: 1/11/16]. Berlin, I. (1969), “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boedeltje, M. (2004), “Input and output legitimacy in interactive governance”, NIG Annual Work Conference Rotterdam, No. NIG2-01. Brown, T. (2016), “Meet the Supremes: Who are the US Supreme Court justices?”, BBC News Magazine, [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33103973 [Accessed: 31/10/16].

16

Bureau of International Information Programs. (2015), “Government Accountability”, Principles of Democracy, U.S. Department of State


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Carter, I. (2016), "Positive and Negative Liberty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Zalta, E. N. (ed.), [Online] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ [Accessed: 28/10/16]. Casey, C. (2016), “Nonprofit Organizations in Governance Arrangements: Adding Democratic Value to Community Reinvestment Act Agreements?”, Public Integrity, vol. 18:3, pp. 290-307. Christiano, T. (2015), “Democracy” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E. N. (ed.), [Online] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy [Accessed: 28/10/16] Dryzek, J. S. (2009), Theories of the democratic state, Location: Palgrave Macmillan. Hazenberg, H. (2015), “Is Governance Democratic?”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18, pp. 285-307. Pettit, P. (2004), “Depoliticizing democracy”, Ratio juris, 17, pp. 52–65. Zenger, C. and Martin, E.J. (2014), “Libertarianism and the Realities of Governance”, Global Virtue Ethics Review, 7:1, pp. 146-182.


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Should the role of government be to maximise the overall well-being of its citizens?

Anna-Maria KĂśhnke, 2nd Year Essay BA Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Abstract: This essay argues that governments should not aim to maximise the well-being of their citizens. I start by briefly summarising the basis on which utilitarians claim that governments should maximise utility. Then I present my criticism of the idea of aggregating and maximising utility, dividing my argument in two parts: The first deals with the Rawlsian objection that by dismissing the separateness of individuals utilitarianism fails to treat human beings equally. The second part complements the first by looking at the social interrelations the individual lives in, arguing that maximising utility risks damaging these relations. I conclude that the government seeking to promote well-being will therefore have harmful consequences.

In this essay I will argue that governments should not aim to maximise the well-being of their citizens. I will start by briefly summarising the basis on which utilitarians claim that governments should maximise utility. Then I will present my criticism of the idea of aggregating and maximising utility, dividing my argument in two parts: The first deals with the Rawlsian objection that by dismissing the separateness of individuals utilitarianism fails to treat human beings equally. The second part complements the first by looking at the social interrelations the individual lives in, arguing that maximising utility risks damaging these relations. A major role of government is the distribution of scarce resources. It seems intuitive to attempt to make the most out of these resources. One of the primary appeals of utilitarianism is that it seems to entail concrete instructions as to how to treat people in a just way: We aim to maximise their utility. During history, several efforts have been made to define what is meant by utility (or well-being, to use more politically approachable language). Traditional views promoted the pursuit of certain mental states, such as happiness.1 These approaches have been criticised; later theorists have shifted the discussion towards

1

Driver, J. (2014), “The History of Utilitarianism�, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


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preference satisfaction.2 The most recent idea defines well-being as the satisfaction of informed preferences. While this approach is appealing from a governmental point of view – there are no concerns about people having the ‘wrong’ preferences that could lead to the society being unhealthy, immoral or self-destructive – it does not provide us with any actual instructions for calculating well-being. Since the theory does not tell us how to weigh, measure or define those rational preferences, it becomes meritless for our question as to whether the government should maximise them. Hence, the less vague approach of current preferences is a better starting point for our intuition about the role of government. If we define utility as preference satisfaction, 3 then morally right decisions become obvious: It is just to satisfy the most preferences possible with the resources we have. Utilitarianism, as a theory, is not concerned with to whom these preferences belong. 4 It assumes that we can compare different utilities belonging to different people and that, for instance, pain would count negatively in the equation;5 in most cases, utilitarians do not focus on whether we can actually calculate overall utility.

The first objection I want to raise to the idea of maximising utility is based on the idea of the separateness of individuals. According to Rawls, it goes against the definition of justice that 'the loss of freedom of some is made right by a greater good shared by others'.6 This is based on the philosophical position, shared in particular by Kant, that someone's personal liberties are inviolable. Because of these liberties, inherent in each individual, we cannot treat decisions made by a group of people through social cooperation the same way we treat decisions made by a single person. An individual can accept temporary disadvantages if it gives them advantages at a later point in time; this would be rational decision-making within a single life.7 Using the same principle across different people's lives, however, violates the liberties that are bound to each separate person's life. In this part I will show why this means that utilitarianism, since it does not acknowledge the separateness of individuals, fails to treat people equally. Maximising utility can require us to use very drastic means in specific situations. In order to show that certain means are never acceptable for the state to use, I want to introduce an example for when

2

Kymlicka, W. (2001), Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 14. Ibid, p. 16. 4 Ibid, p. 21. 5 Sidgwick, H. (2000), “Utilitarianism”, Utilitas, 12:3, p.256. 6 Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 25. 7 Ibid, p. 21. 3


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maximisation of utility, even though it seems intuitively right, is not a legitimate governmental act. In 2006, §14 (3) of the German Aviation Security Act was declared unconstitutional. 8 The article was supposed to give the legal basis for using armed forces to prevent a disaster directed against human lives, for example, shooting a hijacked aeroplane that will, with utmost probability, hit a building and kill a large number of civilians. Assuming there were about 50 innocent people on board the aeroplane, all of them would die when hitting the building. Additionally, 1000 office workers were in the targeted building, which was too large to be evacuated within the next minute. Intuitively, it seems the right thing to save 1000 people as opposed to letting 1050 people die; potentially, even the passengers on board the aeroplane would have this position. Why, then, did the constitutional court decide that the state was not allowed to do so? The court referred to the articles 2.2 and 1.1 of the constitution – the right to life and physical integrity, and the inviolability of human dignity. All 1050 people have these rights that cannot be taken away from them – under no circumstances is the government allowed to dismiss them. Terrorists act against the law in violating them when they are responsible for the death of 1050 people. By shooting the aeroplane the state would actively kill human beings, regardless of the rights these people have, to protect other human beings, necessitating a comparative judgement on who is worth protecting and who is not. Even if the people on board the aeroplane are doomed to die anyway – it makes a difference whether that death occurs by the terrorists or by the state. Sacrificing citizens is never an acceptable action for the state to take, no matter the purpose of it, because each individual has protected rights that cannot be outweighed by a larger utility (e.g. more survivors) – they are separate. The act of sacrifice dismisses these basic rights for the sake of a greater good and, hence, fails to treat people equally. Therefore, maximising the overall utility of the citizens would be inappropriate for the state in this case. A counter-argument raised by utilitarians is that the requirement of equal treatment of all citizens is given through equal consideration of their interests during the decision-making process. Assuming that each potential victim of the hijacking has survival as their primary interest, none of their lives is seen as more important to save than another; hence, there is a large amount of accumulated interest in shooting the aeroplane to save the office workers. Shooting the hijacked aeroplane would certainly not produce equal outcomes of governmental action, since the state kills some people but not others, but everyone’s interests count equally at the starting point of the process of maximising utility. Yet, by aggregating utility we 8

Bundesverfassungsgericht (2006), Headnotes to the Judgement of the First Senate of 15 February 2006.


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dismiss the liberties that are the natural rights of all human beings. As stated earlier, people can only make rational decisions about their own life; giving the majority the right to weigh up their advantages against the disadvantages of others deprives these others of their right to self-determination and therefore does not treat them equally. The outcomes for an individual’s life should not be ignored when thinking about equality. At this point, utilitarians in political responsibility could say that some restrictions could be enforced, for example constitutional protection of human dignity. They might not all support these restrictions in our aeroplane example but, in less drastic cases, they can surely promote a certain group of liberties that cannot be violated, not even for the purpose of maximising overall utility. However, this would misinterpret the actual problem with utilitarianism I aim to raise. My objection is not primarily directed at the potential unjust or at least unequal outcomes of utilitarianism: Maximising utility can be wrong even if, like in the aeroplane example, it does not make anyone worse off than not maximising utility – whether the 1000 office workers are saved or not, the plane passengers die anyway. The focus of our criticism should instead be the way of thinking applied by utilitarians. Imposing restrictions would make decision outcomes more secure, but it would misconceive the role that basic liberties play in society. Seeing basic rights as ‘restrictions’ to the maximisation of utility means seeing human dignity as a burden, an obstacle to maximising utility, and, therefore, as a by-product of society. We must consider whether we can agree to live in a society that does not see these rights as the main objective of social cooperation that they have often been identified as.9 The consequences that such an idea of man would have for society should change our minds in the discussion about whether to organise our society according to utilitarian principles.10

We have now examined that human beings are separate individuals, which is why we cannot aggregate utility between them. In the following part I will show that they are also not independently existing but living in a complex structure of social relations, a structure that utilitarianism endangers. To illustrate that separateness is not the same as independence, consider the following example: A well-known optical illusion is Rubin’s Vase, a picture of two faces and the space between them, in the shape of a vase. One can clearly distinguish between the ‘vase surface’ and the ‘faces surface’, they are separate from each other. However, one cannot change the shape of the vase without changing the shape of the faces. Both 9

E.g. Benedict Constant (1819), The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Moderns, p. 8. Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 153.

10


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figures depend on each other – if one takes the vase away, the faces disappear with it. Hence, we can establish that things can be separate while dependent on each other. The distinction between separateness and independence prevents this following argument from contradicting the first.

To understand why the act of maximising well-being could be damaging to social relations we need to think about the very basis of social cooperation first. Society is more than just the aggregation of separate individuals, shown by the fact that their decisions are grounded in different principles; they have to consider more sanctions for their behaviour than when they act in an entirely private sphere. Dahrendorf contributed to this discussion about social roles, expectations and sanctions, 11 showing that individuals make their behaviour dependent on interaction and social circumstances. They are not morally and emotionally independent of each other. There are various theories about why human beings interact with each other. The one most useful for our case is Social Exchange. According to George Caspar Homans, we interact with each other to enter a situation of exchange. We exchange commodities, ideas, emotions and various other things 12 – and we attempt to enter exchange relations that are expected to provide more than we personally gave, i.e. our benefits exceed our costs. Regardless of how balanced the exchange is, reciprocity is a both necessary and sufficient condition for functioning exchange. This sounds easy to accept for utilitarians. But let us look at what happens when we apply the principle of utility maximisation to a society based on social exchange: Those who are worse off under utilitarianism, i.e. those whose preference satisfaction is sacrificed for the greater good, have no incentive for social exchange anymore because they have no expectancy to ever gain from the relationship; as Homans would phrase it, their behaviour of cooperation will not be reinforced.13 They do not have any benefit from complying with the rules determined by the government. In practice, we can see people who have been neglected by the state and the society trying to find ways of compensation for their personal loss, for example, by becoming criminals and engaging in illegal markets as well as alternative authority structures or, sometimes, even by revolting. The role of government is to prevent this kind of deviant behaviour that imposes a threat on constructive social exchange, by increasing security, in form of guaranteed basic liberties for example, at the very bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy. 11

Dahrendorf, R. (2010), Homo Sociologicus: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 41. 12 Homans, G. C. (1958), “Social Behavior as Exchange”, American Journal for Sociology, 63:6, p. 597. 13 Ibid, p. 598.


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Homans himself raises another issue. Referring to data collected by Leon Festinger et al, he claims that "the more [someone] gets [of a value, e.g. utility], the less valuable any further unit of that value is to him, and the less often he will emit behaviour reinforced by it". 14 This refers to the factor of diminishing marginal utility. So far, I have only discussed how the worse-off will stop participating in exchange – but this economic concept shows how the better-off will be less likely to cooperate as well. This results in the basis of society being corroded from both sides. By allowing these drastic inequalities (not only in terms of material goods, but also in all other types of social exchange) utilitarianism disrupts healthy social interaction. A citizen who is supposed to be as autonomous and independent as possible in their decision-making could not flourish in a social environment like that, where they cannot rely on social exchange as an important resource. If one citizens’ interests are in their outcomes irrelevant, the relationship between the community and the state becomes arbitrary: Saying a citizen is just lucky in having the interests whose fulfilment maximises utility makes social protection impossible – what if one's interests change? Changing interests, however, cannot mean changing rights because rights organise which interests should be fulfilled. This means that unless a utilitarian thinks human beings do not have rights inherently by their existence, his or her argument is flawed. Social exchange within the framework of basic rights is valuable because it is the very basis of society, an end in itself. Consequently, protecting this social exchange instead of maximising overall utility should be the role of government. I want to emphasise how the two arguments of the separateness of individuals and the importance of maintaining healthy social interrelations complement each other by considering one final example: A group of people (A) enjoys torturing another group of people (B). One can argue that the utility A gains is not very likely to outweigh the utility that B would have if they lived free of torture. But imagine A would allow another group (C) to come and watch the torturing and, thereby, take part in the enjoyment. Then overall utility would rise proportionally with the size of group C, meaning that the act of torturing would become less evil. But this is not true. Torturing still violates the basic rights that we attribute to human beings in a way that cannot be outweighed by other people’s utility. It also still damages the social relations that enable us to live in a reliable social environment and preserve our autonomy. In conclusion it can be said that the role of government should not be to maximise the aggregated utility of its citizens. Even though, as a society, we face the problem of scarcity of resources, we cannot aggregate utility without dismissing the separateness of individuals and thereby accept harming their basic 14

Ibid, p. 599.


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rights. By maximising utility, the government would also endanger the very basis of society, assuming that human beings interact on grounds of social exchange. If there are people who lose their incentive to participate in exchange, a toxic environment is created that prohibits human beings from flourishing. Overall, it turns out that our decisions are guided by other moral values rather than overall utility, as seen in the torturing example. Hence, the approach of maximising well-being should be rejected and policies that protect social cooperation should be adopted instead.

References Bundesverfassungsgericht (2006), Headnotes to the Judgement of the First Senate of 15 February 2006, [Online], Available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2006/02/rs20060215_1b vr035705en.html [Accessed: 30/10/17]. Constant, B. (1819), The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Moderns, [Online] Available at: https://www.nationallibertyalliance.org/files/docs/Books/Constant%20%20The%20Liberty%20of%20the%20Ancients%20Compared%20with%20that%20of%20the%20Mode rns.pdf [Accessed: 30 October 2017]. Dahrendorf, R. (2010), Homo Sociologicus: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle, 17th edition, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Driver, J. (2014), ‘The History of Utilitarianism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E. N. (ed.), [Online] Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [Accessed: 10/02/18]. Homans, G. C. (1958), 'Social Behavior as Exchange', American Journal of Sociology, 63:6, pp. 597-606. Kymlicka, W. (2001), Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Revised edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Sidgwick, H. (2000), 'Utilitarianism', Utilitas, 12:3, pp. 253-260, [Online] Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/5920B534558AD8877C7AD7A4A31887EF/S0953820800002879a.pdf/utilitarianis m1.pdf [Accessed: 30/10/17].


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Can Individuals have Moral Rights in the Absence of Legal Rights? Matthew Perry, 3rd Year BA Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Abstract: The validity of my argument rests on two, reasonable, but controversial assumptions: 1) that objective moral truth exists and 2) that epistemic certainty of the truth is not obtainable. I claim that institutions of law are constructed to create objective consensus of moral rights. Given this, if law is said to be morally justified then how is it that moral and legal rights can be kept as distinct yet interrelated systems? I argue in favour of what I term a progressivist understanding of the relation between law and morality which explains that law remains distinct by acting as a conduit for our legal rights and protecting that which we have a high degree of epistemic certainty about. Moral knowledge grows over time and, as it does, the law is a stalwart defence of the truth of that knowledge, forbidding the repetition of past atrocities, from slavery, to the denigration of free speech.

I argue that individuals can have moral rights in the absence of authoritative legal interpretation and enforcement of these rights. Legal rights are distinct from moral rights, even if the two are also interdependent. Note that I interpret a “right� to mean an objective permission to perform an action (a liberty), or a claim against another that an action (not) be performed (a duty). 1 I begin by making two initial assumptions upon which the validity of my argument will rest. These are that: 1. Moral truth exists. 2. One cannot gain epistemic certainty of moral truth. Subsequently, I proceed through the following stages: 3. An authoritative legal interpretation of moral truth is required to enforce inter-subjective consensus of our moral rights. 4. Legal rights are, in such a system, justified by their protection of a high degree of moral certainty. 5. Moral rights exist as distinct from legal rights.

1

Waldron, J. (1984), "Introduction", In Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.6


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In arguing for the above I shall support what I term the progressivist understanding of the relation between morality and law, where law's function and justification is in the protection of moral certainty and thus the prevention of moral regress. 1.) & 2.)

Together, the above assumptions represent the position of Naturalistic Moral

Realism (NMR),2 which has at its centre the claim that moral facts are true (1), known through observation and theory testing. Yet, there is the possibility one might be proven wrong due to the limits on our access to the truth (2). These two claims present a problematic divide. Either one endorses the position that moral rights exist as a sensible way of understanding moral truth and therefore as distinct and separate from legal rights, or one supports the opposing view that moral and legal rights are equivalent. In the latter understanding, to assert that one has a moral right to X is to assert that X "ought to be a legal right". 3 I take issue with this understanding because it removes the force and content from claims that one has a right to X, while denying the moral truth of those claims. Imagine that on election day I am tied down and prevented from voting. If I complain that my right to vote is being violated then all I would be doing in this view is saying that I should have a legal right to vote; there is no truly moral demand that motivates having that right met. The truth in the claim that I have a (moral) right to vote is undermined if we say that I simply demand to have a legal right because the very force of that demand is nullified. I shall ultimately reject this understanding by advancing an argument for the former. In the first instance these two claims might appear to be something it is hard to merely assume. However, they are assumptions which many of us intuitively wield during our daily lives: when condemning something as wrong, we don't stop to consider whether things can be wrong. The majority of us intuitively believe that morality has a certain degree of objective meaning. What's more, we are often aware that we ourselves might be wrong in our initial convictions. If someone were to present us with enough reasoning opposing our view we might be convinced otherwise; we accept that our knowledge of moral facts is fallible, as it can be regarding much else. Nonetheless, I do not argue that simply because numerous people believe something it must be true: 1.) and 2.) remain assumptions here. The truth of these claims rests upon philosophical investigation, for which the reader can look to Miller for an overview. 4 Instead, I aim to show the pertinence of the position I take: if the claims are true, and many people are therefore right in intuitively believing them to be true, then the consequences of my argument will follow.

2

Loeb, D. (1998), "Moral Realism and The Argument from Disagreement", Philosophical Studies, 90:3, p.285 Feinberg, J. (1992), "In Defence of Moral Rights", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 12:2, p.162 4 Miller, A. (2013), Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press. 3


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If I am to advance the view that moral and legal rights are distinct from one another while

claiming 1.) and 2.), then moral rights must be derived from moral truth. Given that such truth does not have epistemic certainty according to NMR, one also cannot gain epistemic certainty of moral rights. It appears, therefore, that we approach a dilemma where moral statements we individually make might have a high chance of being wrong. This is a problem Kant was aware of: if X believes that Y has violated their rights in some way and enforces their subjective understanding of justice as a result, then it appears that X unilaterally (and unjustly) dominates Y.5 The degree to which X and Y can resolve their dispute independently and peacefully relies on our understanding of human nature, and the accuracy with which they can do so on how well they both interpret the objective moral truth. Regardless of both these facts though, I believe it is reasonable to claim that it is always better to create an authoritative legal interpretation to enforce an inter-subjective consensus of rights. The degree to which this claim can be reasonably justified depends on whether such a consensus will gain an objective level of certainty one cannot attain alone. Condorcet's Jury theorem is appealed to here. Initially, there is a 50:50 chance one party is right, in binary form: either X is right and Y is wrong, or X is wrong and Y is right. If additional impartial deliberators offer their opinion on the truth then we can attain a higher degree of certainty over who is actually right. 'The probability that the right outcome is supported by a majority of the jury is a (swiftly) increasing function of the size of the jury,' 6 and the level of certainty with which we can claim one person is right increases as we approach infinity. Crucially, we must (not unreasonably) assume that individuals vote sincerely in their decision over how to weight X and Y's claims, have full information, adequate cognitive capabilities and that they lack bias. There are some evident problems with this justification which I will briefly address. Firstly, it is not immediately clear that this process would apply to non-binary cases. The objective moral truth might be that neither X's claim nor Y's claim are correct and instead a mixture of their interpretations is true. In response to this, I note that given that additional deliberators might come forward with their own experiences and understandings of rights, they might be able to offer additional perspectives for consideration. This would bring new options to the table. Goodin and List have shown through statistical reasoning that Jury Theorem can hold even with this kind of plurality of options in non-binary form, as long as the size of the group is sufficiently large.7 Even with several interpretations of rights to arbitrate between, the "Jury" can still reach an inter-subjective consensus. Secondly, however, Jury Theorem rests on each individual being more likely to judge correctly than incorrectly. If each individual is more likely to judge 5

Kant, I. (1887) The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, Edinburgh: Clark, pp. 107-108. 6 List, C. and Goodin, R. E. (2001), "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem", The Journal of Political Philosophy, 9:3, p.283. 7 Ibid, p.286.


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incorrectly, then instead of approaching truth, where an increasingly large number of deliberators are introduced, we would approach falsehood. Why can, in the specific case of moral rights, the deliberators be considered reliable? The jury will properly wish for the right choice to be taken out of self interest. As this choice will form the basis for developing a legal right on which general decisions are made, they might imagine themselves in a similar circumstance in future. In this imagined future case they would wish to ensure their interests, and rights, are properly taken into account. This is convincing because deliberators need have little or no concern for the actual parties in the dispute: the formative nature of their decision will persuade them to try to choose correctly, based on their intuitive access to moral principles and rationally weighting competing claims. If the above holds then a system of legal rights should be instituted to help govern society through inter-subjective consensus. Such a consensus attains a higher degree of epistemic objective moral certainty than we can attain alone. 4.)

In holding that 3.) is true it subsequently follows that either legal rights overlap onto moral

rights as distinct yet interrelated systems, or that the legal rights actually are our moral rights collapsing into the "ought to be a legal right" position. In the following premise I provide an argument towards the first position. In supporting this, I will also 'assume from the start an intimate connection between law and morality'8 and thus, maintain that law must be morally justified in order to achieve legitimacy. To illustrate the problematic case posed by law as necessary to avoid unilateral domination (3), imagine that two states exist, A and B. Assume that it is true that people have an objective moral right not to be punished by death. In A the law asserts that people may be punished by death and in B it asserts that this is illegal. B interprets moral rights correctly – the law overlaps onto moral rights in a just way – and A fails to do so. I maintain that both legal systems are, overall, morally justified; contra the case where the majority of laws are blatantly immoral. Significantly, without moral justification, citizens have no moral reason to follow the law. However, if both A and B are morally justified then it seems that if X moves from A to B, X’s moral rights themselves change as the law changes. How can law be distinct from morality while also being morally justified, without collapsing into the "ought to be a legal right" position? This apparent contradiction is solved when asking why the law is morally justified. Overall, law tracks the history of moral development, grounding changes to its norms in a history of precedents. 9 Changes to the law occur where new precedents are set or principles/practices are found to be incoherent with one another. Hence, the moral justification for the law rests not necessarily on its exactitude in 8 9

Dworkin, R. (2011), Justice For Hedgehogs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p.404. Lamond, G. (2016), "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring Edition.


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correctly interpreting all moral rights, but on its ability to interpret them with high degrees of objective certainty. The conditions in A are morally justified due to overall protection of those things about which we have high moral certainty, permitting the existence of some (potentially immoral) laws about which we have low moral certainty. Why would the law function in such a way? My argument is that it does so to disallow moral regress. I term this position the progressivist understanding of law and morality. Arguably, any citizen may legitimately challenge any law on moral grounds. If X believes capital punishment to be wrong, she may challenge this right. The law will either withstand this challenge, strengthening its certainty that it has correctly interpreted the right of punishment, or it will be weakened, advancing a different interpretation of this right. Imagine that X’s move from A to B is a temporal one, where A and B represent the same state at different periods of time. X’s (assumed to be objective) moral right not to be punished by death does not change as time passes, but instead, through the process of contesting law's moral interpretation, the morality of this right is gradually enveloped into the category of things about which the law has a higher degree of certainty. Thus, the distinctiveness of law, morality and their roles becomes more apparent. However, one disputable question is how does the law not begin to interpret morality in a less rather than a more just way over time? Contra the example above, the state might (re-)institute the right to punish by death where it didn’t previously exist. If the law is to act as the foundation for a high degree of moral certainty, how exactly does it prevent moral regress? I hold that law aims to do this through ensuring legal coherence and consistent affirmation of our rights. That, for instance, someone could claim X has a right to own Y as a slave, is forbidden not only due to the claimed illegality of it, but due to the proven illegality: its profound incoherence with other laws and the confirmation of this through historical precedent (e.g. it negates the right to many freedoms and has consistently been proven to do so). If the state were to (re)affirm that people have a right to punish by death then it would have to do so by comparing this right against previous precedents and understanding it in the context of our other rights. Hence, by only permitting legal revisions to occur where coherence and consistency exist, the law disallows the (re)institution of those things it has constantly affirmed to be inconsistent with the rights it has a high degree of moral certainty about. By consequence, law should permit progress towards a deeper understanding of our moral rights, if genuinely reasonable consistency is actually sought as opposed to the appearance of this. If the latter is performed, then we might consider a function of the law's justificatory procedures to be improperly respected. Yet, what if legal systems have widely misinterpreted moral rights in the first instance? Such a question offers an abject possibility. Perhaps in questioning the right to punish by death one would discover that we should reject the contradicting rights we currently believe to be certain. I needn't eliminate this possibility for two reasons, however. Due to NMR individuals have no epistemic certainty. The claim 'we


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have the right to punish by death' has the least certainty when it is independently made. Certainty of its truth or falsehood only increases as it is considered, discussed and decided upon by an increasing number of people. Hence, it is not simply one but a considerable majority of people who will necessarily have to alter their view. On top of this, in 4.) the claim is not that the law has absolute certainty but only a high level of certainty (the lack of certainty is what permits cases of immoral law). The question does not therefore obstruct my conclusion. However, if such a paradigmatic shift were to occur it would have to achieve the feat of rejecting all preceding theory and observation while offering alternatives. The law, thus, provides a defence of moral rights by instituting a stringently malleable foundation. 5.)

It follows from the above argument that legal and moral rights are two distinct, if deeply

related, enterprises. X may permissibly follow the law in state A above while also legitimately challenging it. This distinctness provides grounding to believe in the independent existence of moral rights if assumptions 1.) and 2.) hold. Crucial to establishing this was, in propositions 3.) and 4.), the mapping out of an understanding of legal rights which firstly sees them as a necessary, inter-subjective conventions overlapping onto moral rights and secondly sees them as being crucial in protecting objective certainty of moral rights. I conclude that individuals can and do have moral rights in the absence of authoritative legal interpretation and enforcement of those rights.

References Dworkin, R. (2011), Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Feinberg, J. (1992), "In Defence of Moral Rights" Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 12:2, pp. 149-169. Kant, I. (1887), The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, Edinburgh: Clark. Lamond, G. (2016), "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring Edition. [Online] Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/legal-reas-prec/ [accessed: 27/10/17]. List, C. and Goodin, R. (2001), "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem", The Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 3, p.283. Loeb, D. (1998), "Moral Realism and The Argument from Disagreement", Philosophical Studies, 90:3, pp.281303. Miller, A. (2013), Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press. Waldron, J. (1984), "Introduction", In Waldron, J. (ed) Theories of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-20.


Chong Ka Yan, Issues with Policy Making

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Empirical Issues with the Conceptualisation of Policy-Making: Theory vs. Reality

Chong Ka Yan, 2nd Year Essay BSocSc Politics and International Relations

Abstract: When conceptualising policy-making, a model is often used “to provide a simplified representation of a specific object or process… as a guide to description; as a way to simplify and manage policy analysis by identifying the key features of a more complex entity”.1 This essay identifies two empirical issues with how policy-making is conceptualised in the rational model of decision-making, namely how the model has falsely assumed policy-making as a state-centric and staged process. The process should instead be theorised as state-centric relational and iterative. With the latter conceptions, policymaking in practice can therefore be improved by conducting broad consultations to gather expertise from a wide range of actors, and allowing deliberate pauses to reflect on new evidence and streamline policies.

When conceptualising policy-making, a model is often used “to provide a simplified representation of a specific object or process… as a guide to description; as a way to simplify and manage policy analysis by identifying the key features of a more complex entity”.2 In this paper, I identify two empirical issues with how policy-making is conceptualised in the rational model of decision-making, namely how the model has falsely assumed policy-making as a state-centric and staged process. Such process should instead be theorised as state-centric relational and iterative. With the latter conceptions, policy-making in practice can therefore be improved by conducting broad consultations to gather expertise from a wide range of actors, and allowing deliberate pauses to reflect on new evidences to streamline policies. This paper is divided into four sections. First, I discuss the two empirical issues of the rational model. Second, I suggest two alternative conceptualisations of policy-making. Third, based on the practical implications of alternative conceptualisations, I elucidate two suggestions on how policy-making can be improved. Lastly, I summarise

1 2

Cairney, P. (2012), Understanding Public Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 30. Ibid


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and reflect upon the arguments. Before proceeding to the arguments, it has to be noted that since policymaking is an act of decision-making, they are used interchangeably in this essay. The first empirical issue with the rational model is that it falsely conceptualises policy-making as a state-centric process, conceiving policy as a national choice in which the state is a unitary decision-maker.3 This state-centrism notion is also exemplified in the Eastonian “black box” model. In this model, the boundary of the political system is clearly demarcated, such that the political realm is separated from the societal and international environment.4 Yet in reality, instead of being a separate entity, the boundary of the political system is permeable to a plurality of actors in various dimensions, be they regionally or internationally. That said, these actors alongside the state play pivotal roles throughout the process of policy-making. The state-centric approach of the rational model is critiqued for being too narrow as it essentially “neglects the range of political variables which limits the extent of choice available in the light of the power of relevant vested interests”.5 This model assumes that the state is a monolith and has the ability to govern and formulate policies as it sees fit. However, as actors have different and sometimes conflicting interests, they constitute “the range of political variables” and impose constraints upon the state when it comes to decision-making. The state cannot simply disregard these interests, as doing so may threaten the legitimacy of those policies delineated and of the government as a whole. As a result, the decision-making process cannot be solely controlled by the state as the rational model implies. Instead, as interests of different actors have to be considered, actors may either hinder or catalyse the implementation of policies depending on their respective interests. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 has demonstrated how a network of organisations is able to influence decision-making. To justify why the Soviet Union chose to place ballistic missiles in Cuba, the rational model deems this as a decision made by the government alone, and as a valuemaximising means to achieve the ends of overcoming “the existing large margin of U.S. strategic superiority”.6 However, as Allison has argued, “Soviet force posture is determined by organisational factors such as the goals and procedures of existing military services”.7 For the organisational factors, they refer to “standard operating procedures” which are “determined predominantly by organisational routines, not government leaders’ directions”. 8 This historical watershed does not only illustrate how organisational 3

Allison, G. T. (1969), “Conceptual models and ‘the Cuban missile crisis”, American Political Science Review, 63:3, p. 694. 4 Parsons, W. (1995), Public policy: an introduction, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Press, p. 23. 5 Smith, G. and May, D. (1980), “The artificial debate between rationalist and incrementalist models of decision making”, Policy and Politics, 8:2, p. 148. 6 Allison, G. T. (1969), “Conceptual models and ‘the Cuban missile crisis”, p. 692. 7 Ibid, p. 703. 8 Ibid, p. 702.


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routines are inflexible and not prone to change, but also demonstrate that policies can be shaped in accordance to organisations’ routines and standard procedures, rather than governments’ decisions. As compared with the government, organisations and actors have the potential to exert as much, or even more, leverage on policy-making. Therefore, the rational model of policy-making misconstrues policymaking as a state-centric process, as policy-making in reality involves a panoply of actors and can be driven by organisational routines instead of government’s decisions. The second empirical issue with the rational model is that it mistakenly conceptualises policymaking as a staged process, in which the distinction between means and ends of a policy is obvious. Many authorities and governments discern this linear conception as an appropriate way of policy-making. The UK government is one example. In the Green Book, the HM Treasury defines the stages of a broad policy cycle as “rationale, objectives, appraisal, monitoring, evaluation and feedback”.9 This reflects a theorisation of policy-making as neatly following a set of procedures. Despite nuances among different interpretations of the rational model, they all broadly perceive policy-making as entailing the following phases: problem identification and defining, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. These phases require the policy-makers to be able to first identify what the policy aims to achieve, then choose the best policy alternative that helps attain the defined goal. Some may argue that since it is beyond the decision-makers’ capacities to identify and evaluate all possible policy alternatives, they cannot ascertain which alternative serves as the best means to achieve a goal. However, this argument has not dealt a significant blow to the rational model, as it does not illustrate the gist of the model’s weakness. Even conceding that such extensive search and evaluation of policy alternatives are available, the rational model is still problematic because such means-ends relationship is often blurry and capricious in policy-making. In reality, “policy problems and policy solutions frequently emerge together, rather than one following the other”.10 Means and ends are not as clear-cut as the rational model has implied, policy-making therefore cannot be perceived as a linear process. Means and ends often have to be adjusted accordingly when circumstances change. As new problems surface, tackling these problems may therefore become the new policy goal. In a bid to inculcate a stronger sense of national identity among citizens, the Hong Kong government announced an education reform in 2012. The reform introduced Moral and National Education (MNE) as a new compulsory subject for all primary and secondary school students. However, as the public perceived this reform as the Chinese government’s attempt to control the Hong Kong education system, “a sequence of events had been held, including a series of school boycotts, hunger strikes and mass demonstrations… 9

HM Treasury (2003), The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, London: TSO, p. 3. Hallsworth, M. (2011), “Policy-Making in the Real World”, Political Insight, 2:1, p. 11.

10


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Hong Kong citizens won their attempts at demanding the government to shelve the Curriculum Guide of MNE”. 11 This controversial education reform demonstrates the capricious nature of means and ends in policy-making. The means here shifted from implementing education reform to shelving its implementation, while the ends shifted from inculcating national identity to assuaging public dissent. As Lindblom has critiqued, “such a means-ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are agreed upon, are reconcilable, and are stable at the margin”.12 While the government values national identity, the public values a high degree of autonomy under One Country Two Systems. As a result, the means-ends relationship was volatile as reflected in this example of education reform in Hong Kong. Therefore, the rational model mistakenly assumes policy-making as a staged process, because the distinction between means and ends of a policy is often ambiguous. In the above paragraphs, I have elucidated the empirical issues of the rational model: it misconstrues policy-making as a state-centric and linear process. The process should instead be theorised as state-centric relational and iterative. Despite being a model of governance, the state-centric relational model is also applicable to policy-making, as governance essentially involves policy-making. Such a model entails a dual nature: while the state remains as the core actor, it has to develop partnerships with both state and nonstate actors.13 Although government’s decisions are of paramount salience, the involvement of a network of actors is also crucial for successful policy-making. Rather than being linear, policy-making should be deemed as iterative. According to Durose and Richardson, policy-making involves “iteration through experimentation and learning by doing”. 14 As new inputs and evidences surface, policy-makers have to respond by carrying out new rounds of evaluations, ensuring that the policies are updated and effective in tackling persistent and also new issues. In light of these alternative conceptualisations, policy-making in practice should be improved by conducting consultations and allowing deliberate pauses to gather or reflect on additional evidences. In fact, these practical implications align with a co-productive approach of policy making. This approach does not only draw on “a synergy of different contributions and expertise”, but also focus on “iteration through experimentation and learning by doing”.15 The following paragraphs will discuss the two suggestions on how to improve policy-making.

11

Cheng, W. and Ho, J. (2014), “Brainwashing or nurturing positive values: Competing voices in Hong Kong’s national education debate”, Journal of Pragmatics, 74, p. 12. 12 Lindblom, C. E. (1959), “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’”, Public Administration Review, 19:2, p. 83. 13 Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2009), Rethinking Governance, Cambridge: CUP. 14 Durose, C. and Richardson, L. (2016), Designing public policy for co-production: theory, practice and change, Bristol: The Policy Press, p. 47. 15 Durose, C. and Richardson, L. (2016), Designing public policy for co-production: theory, practice and change, p. 47.


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Policy-making should be improved by conducting broad consultations, involving both state and nonstate actors, so as to gather expertise related to the policy area. Policies are interdisciplinary, they seldom pertain to one specific aspect but straddle across a number of fields. It is therefore difficult for government officials who are responsible for policy-making to acquire thorough knowledge on all policy-related areas. When they are assigned to an area that they are not familiar with, this results in a mismatch between their expertise and the policy they are responsible for, or “asymmetries of expertise”. 16 For example, in the United Kingdom, the establishment of the Child Support Agency “was initially put in the hands of someone recruited from the voluntary sector who lacked any high-level management experience”.17 As policy-makers often do not acquire sufficient knowledge or experience regarding the policy fields they are assigned to, policies may thus fail to tackle the issue effectively. However, if policy-making involves broad consultations with both state and non-state actors, policy-makers can then collect information and suggestions from a wide range of stakeholders, therefore enriching their knowledge on the policy area. In the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, “organized labour, large firm management, and government” are involved to “provide training and increase the transparency in employment transitions”.18 This example demonstrates that policy-making does not only rely on the state, but also a number of actors with various expertise. The expertise of different actors is crucial in helping the policy-makers to delineate and deliver better policies. Therefore, policy-making should be improved by conducting broad consultations that involves both state and non-state actors.

Policy-making should also be improved by allowing deliberate pauses in order to gather or reflect on additional evidences so as to streamline policies. Additional evidences are crucial for continuous evaluation on the effectiveness of policies. As circumstances are ever-changing, new information provides insights on how policies should be adjusted respectively in response to changes. Unlike the rational model, this process is not staged, but iterative and gradual. Policy-makers have to go back and forth between the stages, evaluating and re-evaluating policy measures so as to ensure that the policies can tackle issues effectively at different times. If policy-makers are fixated on complying with the stages as mentioned in the rational model, the process then lacks flexibility and is less responsive to changes. Take China’s political reform as an example. The village elections were first “initiated in a village in Guangxi at the end of 1980, 16

King, A. and Crewe, I. (2013), The Blunders of our Governments, London: Oneworld, p. 375. King, A. and Crewe, I. (2013), The Blunders of our Governments, p. 376. 18 Fung, A. and Wright, E. O. (2001), “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance”, Politics and Society, 29:1, p. 7. 17


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and gradually extended to the villages all over the country”.19 As there were criticisms about the lack of regulation of “election steering committees”, the Organic Law of Village Committees has started to “include stipulations about how new, more circumscribed committees are to be organised” since 1998. 20 This political reform in China was not only gradual in nature, but also flexible to amendments in response to criticisms. It started by conducting small-scale policy trials, then evaluating their respective outcomes before planning the next phases of implementation. Only by formulating and implementing policies in an iterative and gradual way can there be room for amendments. Therefore, policy-making should be improved by allowing deliberate pauses so as to gather more evidences to streamline policies.

In the forgoing paragraphs, I have elucidated two empirical issues of how the rational model misconstrues policy-making as a state-centric and staged process. The process should instead be theorised as state-centric relational and iterative. With these improved conceptualisations, policy-making in practice can be improved by conducting broad consultations to gather expertise from a network of actors, and allowing deliberate pauses to reflect on new evidences to streamline policies. Issues regarding the rational model do not only entail problems with its conceptualisations on empirical grounds, but also on the normative level. A simultaneous investigation into the issues from both realms may be conducive to generating more rigorous and practical implications on how policy-making should be improved.

References Allison, G. T. (1969), “Conceptual models and ‘the Cuban missile crisis”, American Political Science Review, 63:3, pp. 689-718. Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2009), Rethinking Governance, Cambridge: CUP. Cairney, P. (2012), Understanding Public Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cheng, W. and Ho, J. (2014), “Brainwashing or nurturing positive values: Competing voices in Hong Kong’s national education debate”, Journal of Pragmatics, 74, pp. 1-14. Durose, C. and Richardson, L. (2016), Designing public policy for co-production: theory, practice and change, Bristol: The Policy Press.

19

Meng, X. and Zhang, L. (2011), “Democratic participation, fiscal reform and local governance: Empirical evidence on Chinese villages”, China Economic Review, 22:1, p. 89. 20 O’Brien, K. J. and Han, R. (2009), “Path to Democracy? Assessing village elections in China”, Journal of Contemporary China, 18:60, p. 363.


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Fung, A. and Wright, E. O. (2001), “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance”, Politics and Society, 29:1, pp. 5-41. Hallsworth, M. (2011), “Policy-Making in the Real World”, Political Insight, 2:1, pp. 10-12. HM Treasury (2003), The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, London: TSO. King, A. and Crewe, I. (2013), The Blunders of our Governments, London: Oneworld. Lindblom, C. E. (1959), “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’”, Public Administration Review, 19:2, pp. 79-88. Meng, X. and Zhang, L. (2011), “Democratic participation, fiscal reform and local governance: Empirical evidence on Chinese villages”, China Economic Review, 22:1, pp. 88-97. O’Brien, K. J. and Han, R. (2009), “Path to Democracy? Assessing village elections in China”, Journal of Contemporary China, 18:60, pp. 359-378. Parsons, W. (1995), Public policy: an introduction, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Press. Smith, G.and May, D. (1980), “The artificial debate between rationalist and incrementalist models of decision making”, Policy and Politics, 8:2, pp. 147-161.


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What caused Brexit?

Riccard Scroppo, 2nd Year Essay BSocSc Politics and International Relations

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the Brexit vote and its main drivers: sovereignty and immigration. Whilst initially admitting the influence of such factors in the referendum I eventually discard leavers’ claims. In doing so, with the support of EU reports, I point to the autonomy and benefits that the EU membership brought to Britain. This paper, hence, seeks to contribute to this debate by providing further discussion which could significantly help shape future policies.

On June 23rd, 2016 the United Kingdom voted out of the European Union with a majority (52%) supporting the ‘Leave’ side.1 Whilst many had foreseen the opposite result as polls erroneously predicted, on June 24th Britain officially embarked on its journey to 'take back control' 2 and officially become the first member to secede from the Union.3 In the meantime Brexit has become one of the most debated and fired-up topics currently circulating on the European and global stage.4 Indeed, this outcome has started the spark for secessionist sentiments in both Northern Ireland and Scotland which had largely voted to stay. 5 This situation, in turn, might threaten the very stability and integrity of the United Kingdom, now less ‘united’ than ever. 6

1

Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote", Applied Economics Letters, 1. 2 Vote Leave, (n.d.), "Why Vote Leave" 3 Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", Journal of European Public Policy, 23:9, p.1260; Ipsos MORI (2016), "Ipsos MORI EU Referendum Prediction Poll"; Richards, S. (2016), "Take back control – the slogan the left should make its own", The Guardian, December 19; Witte, G., Adam, K. and Balz, D. (2016), "In stunning decision, Britain votes to leave the E.U.", The Washington Post, June 24. 4 Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote" 5 Al Jazeera (2016), "Brexit: Scotland and N. Ireland reconsider ties to UK", Al Jazeera, June 24. 6 Ibid


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Especially after a financial downturn has hit the British currency and the outbreak of hate crimes towards immigrants.7 Many academics have focused their attention on individuating the root causes of such a shocking decision that totally revolutionized the status quo.8 In particular, of utmost relevance were the claims of the Leave campaign that saw an unfettered EU immigration and an allegedly shrunken national sovereignty as the main reasons to leave the 27.9 In this paper I shall further investigate the main reasons for Brexit. Drawing on several scholarly articles, I will argue that immigration and sovereignty fears were the main drivers and causes for Brexit.10 Nonetheless, I shall rebut the fallacious claims of the leave campaign by arguing that indeed immigration was beneficial for the UK and that sovereignty was not undermined. 11 In doing so this paper will be divided into two main sections: ‘not so bloody immigrants’ and ‘(un)restricted sovereignty’. I shall also provide empirical and statistical data as to support my claims. Not So Bloody Immigrants One of the cornerstones of the European Union, ever since 1992, is the freedom of movement of its people.12 This liberty, in turn, entails the free circulation of workers now able to settle everywhere in the 27(28) member states and with equal chances of employment as the locals. 13 However, this very freedom was seen by the ‘leavers’ as detrimental for their country and themselves and therefore needed to be restricted. 14 Immigrants were indeed stereotypically portrayed as 7

Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote", p.1; Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", p.1259. 8 Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote" 9 , S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", p.1260; Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote", p.1;Vote Leave, (n.d.) "Why Vote Leave". 10 Matti, J. and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote", p.1; Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent"; Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016) "On the Causes of Brexit", CESifo Working Paper, 6056. 11 Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?", LSE BLOG BREXIT; Gordon, M. (2016), "The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and beyond … .", King's Law Journal, 27:3, pp.333–43; Lusher, A. (2016), "EU Immigrants Help Create Jobs, Not Take Them, Study Claims", The Independent, June 20. 12 Marzocchi, O. (2017), "Free Movement Of Persons | EU Fact Sheets | European Parliament", European Parliament. 13 Ibid 14 Vote Leave, (n.d.) "Why Vote Leave"; Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent"; Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016) "On the Causes of Brexit".


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'stealing' jobs from the British people, to reduce the national wage average and to abuse UK benefits. 15 Exiting the EU sounded therefore a plausible solution to such problems. Particularly, it was the Leave Campaign to make this issue one of its major points during its campaign in the run up to the referendum. 16 Such allegations were directed especially at Eastern European immigrants (EU 10) who, thanks to the 2004 enlargement, were now part of the ‘EU citizens’.17 As Lord Ashcroft’s18 polls confirm, immigration was indeed the second major reason for Leavers (and hence the majority) to vote for Brexit. In fact, as the latter reads: 'One third (33%) said the main reason was that leaving 'offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders.'19 Most significantly, these sentiments were arguably motivated by the fact that in the year 2015 UK residents coming from the newly-incorporated Eastern European countries (EU8 & EU2) had outnumbered by nearly 300 thousand units the residents who were nationals of the much older 14 member states.20 With that being said, the former claims about EU immigration are totally unfounded. Indeed, as Dustmann and Frattini demonstrate with data for the 1995-2011 period, EEA immigrants 'are 7.8 percentage points less likely than natives to receive transfers or state benefits [compared to] non-EEA immigrants, who are [only] 1.3 percentage points less likely to be benefit recipients'. 21 Additionally, the abovementioned authors observe that 'non-EEA immigrants are slightly more likely and EEA immigrants less likely to live in social housing than natives'. 22 This holds true even if we take a narrower look at EU 10 immigrants. The latter group according to Dustmann and Frattini 23 is still less likely to receive social

15

Currie, S. (2016), "Reflecting on Brexit: migration myths and what comes next for EU migrants in the UK?", Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 38:3, p.337; Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016) "On the Causes of Brexit", p.9; Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?". 16 Vote Leave, (n.d.)"Why Vote Leave"; Currie, S. (2016), "Reflecting on Brexit: migration myths and what comes next for EU migrants in the UK?", p.337. 17 Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016) "On the Causes of Brexit", p.5. 18 Lord Ashcroft (2016), "How The United Kingdom Voted On Thursday... And Why". Lord Ashcroft Polls. 19 Ibid 20 White, N. (2016), "Population Of The UK By Country Of Birth And Nationality", Office for National Statistics, August 25. 21 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK", The Economic Journal, 124:580, F615. 22 Ibid, F616 23 Ibid


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housing than non-EEA households, which in turn have better chances than locals. These findings corroborate Currie’s24 arguments of a Union whose Court of Justice has severely restricted the instances in which welfare benefits are enlarged to internal immigrants in order to dismiss and curtail the arguments of a benefit tourism. Fiscal factors do also need to be taken into account. Here, Dustmann and Frattini25 observe that between 1995 and 2011 EEA immigrants to the UK positively contributed to British finances with a sum of money higher than £4 billion as opposed to their non-EEA counterparts who had negative contributions of nearly £120 billion. In particular, the relative contributions of immigrants from EU 10 countries are higher than those of natives other than being positive throughout this interval in net terms. 26 Moreover, by doing so immigrants also reduce natives’ expenses on public goods in addition to greatly benefitting the British economy.27 Ergo, these injections of capital, other than the expenditure on goods and services, suggest a rather different picture, one where EU immigrants actually create new occupations.28 Another point must be made for wages. In this field, scholarly contributions have dismissed the claim that immigrants allegedly cause national wage averages to plummet. 29 In particular, Dustmann, Frattini and Preston,30 by looking at Britain in the 1997-2005 interval of time, found out that immigrants have no adverse effect on wages. On the contrary, immigration even resulted as being responsible for a small increment in UK salaries31. These findings thoroughly dismantle Leavers’ arguments and shed light on the disinformation of the voters’ majority.

24

Currie, S. (2016), "Reflecting on Brexit: migration myths and what comes next for EU migrants in the UK?", pp.338-339. 25 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK", F617. 26 Ibid, F617-F618 27 Ibid, F624; Fenton, S. (2016), "The 9 Biggest Myths About EU Immigration Have Just Been Proven Wrong", The Independent, May 12. 28 Tetlow, G. (2016), "EU Migration — The Effects On UK Jobs And Wages", Financial Times, May 12. 29 Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. (2012), "The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages", The Review of Economic Studies, 80:1, pp.145–73; Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?". 30 Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. (2012)., "The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages", p.166. 31 Ibid; Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?".


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(Un)Restricted Sovereignty According to Lord Ashcroft32, the main reason why leavers voted this way on June 23 rd is to be found in their willingness to 'take back control' of British sovereignty. 33 In fact, as this source reports: 'Nearly half (49%) of leave voters said the biggest single reason for wanting to leave the EU was 'the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK''. 34 Arguably such concerns were linked to the sizable legislative power of the European Union which, via regulations and directives, binds member states to comply with its rulings.35 However, claims regarding national independence were also linked to strong anti-EU feelings that qualified the British people as the 'most Eurosceptic electorate in the EU'. 36 These sentiments cast substantial light on the strong national identity of UK citizens, as opposed to their feeble ‘Europeanness’. 37 Indeed, as Hooghe shows for the 1992-2016 period, British respondents have a significantly deeper sense of national belonging than a continental spirit. 38 Education and age were also pivotal in shaping voting preferences.39 Indeed, during the referendum having: 'an undergraduate degree reduce(d) the probability of voting Leave by about 10 percentage points, all other things being equal. Similarly, a 50 year old (was) 10 percentage points more likely to support Brexit compared to a 33 year old voter'.40 Furthermore, the aforementioned Eurosceptic tendencies were arguably heightened once the Leave Campaign pledged to increase social spending in case Britain left the EU. 41 With this in mind, voters saw it reasonable to opt out of the EU. The pooling of sovereignty at the supranational and European level is undeniable. 42 Indeed, 'cooperation among states at the supranational level was always at the heart of the European project' 43 and

32

Lord Ashcroft (2016), "How The United Kingdom Voted On Thursday... And Why". Vote Leave (n.d), "Why Vote Leave". 34 Lord Ashcroft (2016), "How The United Kingdom Voted On Thursday... And Why". 35 European Union (2017), "Regulations, Directives And Other Acts". 36 Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", p.1260. 37 Hooghe, L. (2017), "Brexit And The Revolt Against Transnationalism", Presented at the University of North Carolina, p.5. 38 Ibid 39 Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", p.1269. 40 Ibid, p.1269. 41 Vote Leave (n.d), "Why Vote Leave". 33


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the Single Market and the adoption of Qualified Majority Voting in many of its areas (QMV) are paramount examples of such interdependence. With that being said it must be noted, as Gordonpoints out,44 that there is a substantial difference between national and parliamentary sovereignty; they have been misunderstood as the same thing and this has further ignited the debate. In fact, the latter kind of constitutional autonomy has a symbolic relevance and centrality in the UK, rendering it a very fragile and delicate topic on which the public is not willing to give up. 45 To be specific, whilst parliamentary sovereignty concerns British constitutional law, national sovereignty refers to the relationship and participation of the UK in supranational groupings. 46 Hence, although national sovereignty seems to be conditioned by the EU membership, its parliamentary one can still be shielded and secured from international and continental influence and live alongside EU legislation. 47 In support of this last point there is the European Union Act 2011 which, 'sought not only to establish a series of direct democratic ‘locks’ on the transfer of further power or competence from the UK to the EU, but also to reaffirm in statute that the sovereignty of the UK Parliament was retained during membership of the Union'. 48 More specifically, this act provides the UK Parliament with significant tools to ensure its autonomy such as the power to call a referendum on EU treaties that seek centralization and grants the UK additional seats in the EP.49 Furthermore it is necessary to point out that the United Kingdom benefitted from a rather insulated position in the EU as it did not take part in either Schengen or in the Monetary Union which do actually entail a significant erosion of sovereignty for the participants. Moreover, as Miller reports, in 2014 only 13,2 % of EU obligations were implemented in the country since 1993.50 Although this number does not include the 119 regulations passed throughout this timeframe, 51 Dougan explains that, 'only 8 of

42

Gordon, M. (2016), "The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and Beyond … .", King's Law Journal, 27:3, pp.340-342. 43 Ibid, pp.340-341. 44 Gordon, M. (2016), "The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and beyond … .", p.335. 45 Ibid, p.341. 46 Ibid, p.335. 47 Ibid, p.336. 48 Ibid, p.333. 49 UK Parliament (n.d.), "European Union Act 2011". 50 Miller, V. (2015), "EU Obligations: UK Implementing Legislation Since 1993", UK Parliament. 51 Dougan, M. (2015), "Written Evidence - Professor Michael Dougan", Data UK Parliament; Coleman, C. (2016), "Reality Check: How Much UK Law Comes From The EU?", BBC News, June 8.


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those regulations were legislative – of which 5 were measures relating to the EU’s own budget and another 2 were amending measures […] The remaining 111 regulations were non-legislative acts'.52 In other words, only a very restricted amount of European acts impacted the UK’s legislative setup, whose formal independence was also strengthened by the aforementioned European Union Act 2011. Such figures shed substantial light on the actual and limited extent of EU intrusion in British domestic affairs. Lastly, the promise of NHS funding was not kept by the Leave campaign which was quick in judging it a mistake53. With that being said, findings ultimately suggest that the EU did not put that much of a strain on British sovereignty as the Leave Campaign portrayed it to do.

I have demonstrated throughout this paper that the two main claims of the Leave campaign, supported by the majority of voters, are essentially fallacious. I showed how the decision to leave the Union for immigration and sovereignty concerns appeared convincing at first sight. In fact, the mass migration from 2004 could be linked to fears of unemployment, lower wages and less benefits for locals.54 These allegations however proved to be totally inaccurate. In fact research demonstrated that EEA immigrants are less likely than both non-EEA and natives to claim benefits 55. Additionally, EU immigrants significantly contribute to the UK economy, to job creation and they also increase UK wages. 56 In a similar fashion, contentions regarding sovereignty seemed legitimate, as the EU binds its members with supranational regulations and laws. 57 Nonetheless, also these claims were spurious as the UK benefitted from more independence than its continental counterparts. Moreover, the UK had also ratified the Union Act 2011 which conferred significant powers to the Parliament as to limit EU centralization. 58 With regards to the regulations imposed by the European Union during 1993-2014 it must be noted that only 8 of them covered legislation whilst, in terms of EU laws, Britain has implemented just 13.2 % of its supranational 52

Dougan, M. (2015), "Written Evidence - Professor Michael Dougan", Data UK Parliament. Farand, C. (2017), "The Brexit White Paper Completely Contradicts A Key Argument For Brexit", The Independent, February 2. 54 Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016) "On the Causes of Brexit", p.9; White, N. (2016), "Population Of The UK By Country Of Birth And Nationality", Office for National Statistics, August 25; Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?". 55 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK", F615-F616. 56 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK"; Tetlow, G. (2016), "EU Migration — The Effects On UK Jobs And Wages"; Fenton, S. (2016), "The 9 Biggest Myths About EU Immigration Have Just Been Proven Wrong", The Independent, May 12; Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. (2012)., "The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages". 57 European Union (2017), "Regulations, Directives And Other Acts". 58 Gordon, M. (2016), "The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and Beyond … .", p.333. 53


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obligations.59 These findings ultimately dismiss the main arguments of the leavers and provide compelling evidence in support of the defeated Remain front.

References Al Jazeera. (2016), "Brexit: Scotland and N. Ireland reconsider ties to UK", Al Jazeera, June 24, [Online] Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/brexit-scotland-ireland-reconsider-ties-uk160624130431341.html [Accessed: 22/04/17]. Arnorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2016), "On the Causes of Brexit", CESifo Working Paper, No. 6056. Coleman, C. (2016), "Reality Check: How Much UK Law Comes From The EU?", BBC News, June 8, [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36473105 [Accessed: 17/04/17]. Currie, S. (2016), "Reflecting on Brexit: migration myths and what comes next for EU migrants in the UK?", Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 38:3, pp.337–42. Dougan, M. (2015), "Written Evidence - Professor Michael Dougan", Data UK Parliament, [Online] Available at: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasurycommittee/the-economic-and-financial-costs-and-benefits-of-uks-eu-membership/written/24249.html [Accessed: 17/04/17]. Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK", The Economic Journal, 124:580, F593-F643. Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. (2012), "The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages", The Review of Economic Studies, 80:1, pp.145–73. European Union (2017), "Regulations, Directives And Other Acts", [Online] Available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en [Accessed: 23/04/17]. Farand, C. (2017), "The Brexit White Paper Completely Contradicts A Key Argument For Brexit", The Independent, February 2, [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/brexit-white-paper-uk-parliament-remian-sovereign-eu-membership-referendum-campaignbrussels-article-a7559556.html [Accessed: 23/04/17]. Fenton, S. (2016), "The 9 Biggest Myths About EU Immigration Have Just Been Proven Wrong", The Independent, May 12, [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/euimmigration-has-no-negative-impact-on-british-wages-jobs-or-public-services-research-findsa7026796.html [Accessed: 18/04/17]. Gordon, M. (2016), "The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and Beyond …", King's Law Journal, 27:3, pp.333–43.

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Dougan, M. (2015), "Written Evidence - Professor Michael Dougan"; Miller, V. (2015), "EU Obligations: UK Implementing Legislation Since 1993".


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Hobolt, S. B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", Journal of European Public Policy, 23:9, pp.1259–77. Hooghe, L. (2017), "Brexit And The Revolt Against Transnationalism", Presented at the University of North Carolina. Ipsos MORI (2016), "Ipsos MORI EU Referendum Prediction Poll" [Online] Available at: https://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3752/Ipsos-MORI-EU-Referendum-PredictionPoll.aspx [Accessed: 22/04/17]. Lord Ashcroft (2016), "How The United Kingdom Voted On Thursday... And Why", Lord Ashcroft Polls, [Online] Available at: http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-andwhy/ [Accessed: 20/04/17]. Lusher, A. (2016), "EU Immigrants Help Create Jobs, Not Take Them, Study Claims", The Independent, June 20, [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendumimmigration-immigrants-jobs-brexit-remain-what-happens-unemployment-a7091566.html [Accessed: 23/04/17]. Marzocchi, O. (2017), "Free Movement Of Persons | EU Fact Sheets | European Parliament", European Parliament, [Online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html [Accessed: 23/04/17]. Matti, J, and Zhou, Y. (2016), "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote", Applied Economics Letters: 1–4. Miller, V. (2015), "EU Obligations: UK Implementing Legislation Since 1993", UK Parliament, [Online] Available at: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN07092#fullreport [Accessed: 20/04/17]. Petrongolo, B. (2016), "Do Immigrants Harm The Job Prospects Of UK-Born Workers?", LSE BLOG BREXIT, [Online] Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/10/19/do-immigrants-harm-the-jobprospects-of-uk-born-workers/ [Accessed: 23/04/17] Richards, S. (2016), "Take back control – the slogan the left should make its own", The Guardian, December 19, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/19/take-backcontrol-slogan-left-power-right-state-intervention [Accessed: 20/04/17]. Tetlow, G. (2016), "EU Migration — The Effects On UK Jobs And Wages", Financial Times, May 12, [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0deacb52-178b-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d [Accessed: 21/04/17]. UK Parliament (N.d.), "European Union Act 2011", [Online] Available at: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/europeanunion.html [Accessed: 21/04/17]. Vote Leave (N.d.), "Why Vote Leave", [Online] Available at: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html [Accessed: 23/04/17]. White, N. (2016), "Population Of The UK By Country Of Birth And Nationality", Office for National Statistics, August 25, [Online] Available at:


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https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigra tion/bulletins/ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/august2016 [Accessed: 21/04/17]. Witte, G., Adam, K. and Balz, D. (2016), "In stunning decision, Britain votes to leave the E.U.", The Washington Post, June 24, [Online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/britonshead-to-the-polls-for-historic-vote-on-eu/2016/06/23/0d466fb0-34a7-11e6-ab9d1da2b0f24f93_story.html?utm_term=.7b60a761715e [Accessed: 22/04/17].


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A Paradox in Development: The Presence of ‘Male Bias’ in Development Policies that Aim to Empower Women

Sophie Meagher, 3rd Year Essay BSocSc Politics and International Relations

Abstract: This paper examines the presence of male bias present in development policies that aim to empower women and reduce gender inequality. There are a lack of comprehensive studies on male bias in development policies specifically aimed at empowering woman; this paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. First to be discussed is the male bias that comes about as a result of the dominance of neoliberalism. This leads to the intrinsic value of gender equality being side-lined and social reproduction being undervalued. Secondly, is the male bias found in policies that promote the idea that women should lift themselves and their communities out of poverty. This places an unfairly high burden on women and ignores more significant drivers of gender inequality. It is concluded that a significant paradox exists, where policies designed to empower women contain an undeniable male bias.

Introduction In this paper I examine the male bias present in development policies that aim to empower women and reduce gender inequality. It is concluded that there is a significant problem of male bias in these development policies. Specific ways in which male bias is present in development and the implications of this bias are put forward. First to be discussed is the male bias that comes about as a result of the dominance of neoliberalism and the view that the best way to advance development is through the free market. This leads to two forms of male bias; firstly the fact that the intrinsic value of gender equality is often side-lined in favour of the economic value and secondly that social reproduction is undervalued. A second source of male bias in development is female empowerment policies which emphasise the idea that women should get themselves and their communities out of poverty. This leads to women having


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an unfairly high burden in development and means that more significant drivers of gender inequality, such as subordinating gender ideologies and the actions of powerful institutions, are often ignored. These two sources of male bias not only create different problems but they also work together to perpetuate the systematic oppression of women. I will point out the ties between the rise of neoliberalism and the prominence of the idea that women should lift themselves out of poverty. Definitions Development is a highly contested concept, its meaning alters depending on the context it is used in.1 Very broadly it is often taken to mean ‘the improvement of the situation of poor people’. 2 Situations can be improved in a number of ways; through economic growth, increased collective consumption, equal power distribution and adequate healthcare and education for all.3 I take this broad definition of development. Elson has defined bias as an ‘asymmetry that is ill-founded or unjustified’ and male bias as ‘a bias that operates in favour of men as a gender, and against women as a gender’.4 By this she means that male bias is present when differences in the treatment of men and women are unfairly favourable to men. Attempts in development to increase gender equality Gender inequality is something that is present is all societies. Kabeer summed this idea up stating that ‘gender inequality is structured into the organisation of social relations in society, as fundamentally as class is in capitalist societies, as race was in apartheid South Africa’.5 However there is work being done within development in an attempt to increase gender equality. The United Nations Decade for Women, beginning in 1976, saw the ‘acceptance of woman’s concerns as legitimate issues for national and international policy’.6 The third Millennium Development Goal is ‘to promote gender equality and

1

Rist, G. (2007), “Development as a Buzzword”, Development in Practice, 17:4-5, p.485. Hayter, T. (2005), “Secret diplomacy uncovered: Research on the World Bank in the 1960s and 1980s”, In U. Kothari (ed.) Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies, London: Zed Books, p.89. 3 Myrdal, G. (1974), “What is development?”, Journal of Economic Issues, 8:4, p.729. 4 Elson, D. (1991), Male Bias in the Development Process, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.3. 5 Kabeer, N. (2015), “Gender, poverty and inequality: a brief history of feminist contributions in the field of international development”, Gender and Development, 23:2, p.203. 6 Tinker, I. (1990), Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development, New York: Oxford University Press, p.4. 2


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empower women’.7 Significant steps are being made within development to achieve this and I will discuss examples of these policies. The increasing prevalence of development policies that aim to increase gender equality could be taken as a sign that the significance of male bias in development is decreasing. If policies aim to empower women then it should follow that they are in favour of women rather than ‘against women as a gender’.8 However when critically assessing specific policies that aim to empower women, along with their justifications and implications, a significant problem of male bias can be found. The fact that the problem of male bias persists even in development policies that aim to improve gender equality highlights how deep rooted and significant the problem is. I will solely addresses development policies that aim to promote gender equality. DEVELOPMENT AS CAPITALISM Male bias is a significant problem in development partly because development takes place within a capitalist system. The rise of neoliberalism and its subsequent hegemonic status has exacerbated this problem.9 Capitalism is dependent upon ‘the production of commodities produced through a system of circulation of capital that has profit seeking as its direct and socially accepted goal’. 10 In order to operate capitalism requires a ‘constantly expanding market’ meaning constant increases in output and efficiency. 11 The 1980s saw the rise of neoliberalism which can broadly be described as a capitalist ideology that champions ‘competitiveness, self-interest and decentralisation’12 along with the view that the free market is the ‘only possible way to regulate society’.13 Neoliberalism has had significant influence in development, the 1980s saw an increase in prominence of the school of thought that maintains a ‘deep belief in the powers of the market to solve the world’s development problems’.14 In other words it is through capitalism and economic growth that development will occur. This has often meant that in development ‘only those areas

7

UN (2000), The Millennium Development Goals [Online] Available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [Accessed: 01/05/17]. 8 Elson, D. (1991), Male Bias in the Development Process, p.3. 9 Harvey, D. (2007), A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York: Oxford University Press Inc, p.3. 10 Harvey, D. (2001), Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, New York: Routledge, p.312. 11 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1998), The Communist Manifesto, Cd-Rom, p.13. 12 Roy, R. and Steger, M. (2010), Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University Press Inc, p.12. 13 Berthoud, G. (1992), “Market”, In Sachs, W. (ed.) The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power, London: Zed Books, pp.70-71. 14 Ibid, p.70.


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which promise economic growth are considered’.15 Only valuing policies that will result in economic growth has produced a significant problem of male bias in development. I will discuss two examples of this male bias and the subsequent implications. Firstly it means the intrinsic value of gender equality is side-lined in favour of the instrumental value of gender equality, namely the positive effect it can have on the economy. Secondly it results in social reproduction, which is predominantly carried out by women, being undervalued. The intrinsic value of gender equality is side-lined in favour of the economic One way in which male bias is present in development is through the fact that the intrinsic value of gender equality is often side-lined in favour of the instrumental value, specifically the positive effect gender equality can have on the economy and therefore on development. This is due to the rise in the belief that the market can ‘solve the world’s development problems’.16 The idea that increased gender equality produces economic growth is known as the ‘business case’ for gender development. 17 This way of thinking began in the 1980s with the ‘efficiency approach’ to women in development. Note that this coincides with rise of neoliberalism and the domination of the view that capitalism and the free market is the only viable system. The key premise of the efficiency approach is that women are fifty percent of the population so getting more women into wage labour will increase economic growth.18 This has meant women are ‘increasingly being considered as a resource for globalizing capital’. 19 This is an example of male bias in development; female empowerment is not viewed as an end goal in itself. Often it is not enough that women should benefit from increased gender equality, the economy, and therefore men, must benefit too. There are many examples of economic reasons being used to promote the case for greater gender equality. Roberts20 gave the example of the World Bank’s 2012 World Development Report titled Gender Equality and Development, which mainly addressed the instrumental value of gender equality, in particular

15

Ibid, p.71. Ibid, p.70. 17 Roberts, A. (2015), “The Political Economy of ‘Transnational Business Feminism”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17:2. p.212. 18 Ibid, p.212. 19 Lingam, L. (2008), “Limits to empowerment. Women in microcredit programmes in India.”, In: Bakker, I. and Silvey, R. (eds.) Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of Social Reproduction, Oxfordshire: Routledge, p.72. 20 Roberts, “The Political Economy of ‘Transnational Business Feminism’”, p.212. 16


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looking at the economic advantages of Gender Equality. Chaaban and Cunningham’s

21

study, on behalf of

the World Bank, titled Measuring the Economic Gain of Investing in Girls, studied the cost to country’s economies that come about as a result of not investing enough in girls. This shows the significance of male bias in development as it suggests that improving gender equality is not deemed to be a strong enough justification in its own right. A paradigmatic example of a development project that emphasises the business case for gender equality is ‘transnational business feminism’ (TBF), TBF is described by Roberts as an ‘emerging politicoeconomic project’ primarily carried out by transnational social forces.22 TBF focuses on educating women and getting them into paid labour. It aims to link ‘certain feminist interests to the interests of global capitalism’.23 TBF emphasises the fact that increased gender equality will increase economic growth, rather than focusing on the intrinsic value of gender equality. An example of TBF is the Girl Effect Campaign, a development campaign launched in 2008 by the Nike Foundation in collaboration with the NoVo Foundation. The Girl Effect Campaign aims to help girls reach their ‘full potential’ in order to end the cycle of poverty.24 The language surrounding the campaign emphasises the economic rather than intrinsic value of gender equality. For example the Nike Foundation emphasises that investing in girls is a ‘high return investment’.25 An implication of this approach is that development programmes may not make significant steps to increase female empowerment. Moeller came to this conclusion after studying a Girl Effect programme in Brazil. The programme carried out free six month ‘Economic Empowerment’ programmes for young women. Moeller found that women could only graduate from the education programme if they completed a questionnaire at the beginning and end of the programme.26 If they refused they were given no credit for taking part in the six month project.27 This led Moeller to conclude that the women’s education was ‘not the end goal’.28 The end goal was to gather information, which explains why the programme was so insistent that the women completed the questionnaires. The Nike Foundation wanted to obtain this 21

Chaaban, J. and Cunningham, W. (2011), “Measuring the Economic Gain of Investing in Girls. The Girl Effect Dividend”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 22 Roberts, A. (2015), “The Political Economy of ‘Transnational Business Feminism”, p.212. 23 Ibid, p.211. 24 The Girl Effect. Our Purpose. [online]. Available at: http://www.girleffect.org/our-purpose/ [Accessed: 29/04/17]. 25 Moeller, K. (2013), “Proving “The Girl Effect”: Corporate knowledge production and educational intervention.”, International Journal of Educational Development, 33: 6. p.613. 26 Ibid, p.619. 27 Ibid 28 Ibid, p.620.


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information in order to ‘brand and disseminate it’29 in an attempt to form and strengthen partnerships with ‘bigger players’30 and ultimately to prove the ‘economic change resulting from its investment in adolescent girls’.31 Moeller argued that the fact the end goal of the programme was not to empower women meant that the programme was ineffective. An NGO leader, named Marcela, responsible for carrying out some of these ‘Economic Empowerment’ programmes said in an interview with Moeller in 2010 ‘the Nike Foundation may shine the light but that may not be where the issues are’.32 The Girl Effect programme in Brazil was potentially focusing on the wrong issues but as women’s empowerment was not the actual end goal of the programme, this did not particularly matter. This case study demonstrates that an over focus on the economic value of investing in girls results in policies that are not necessarily the most effective in promoting gender equality. Social reproduction is undervalued Alongside the failure to adequately realise the intrinsic value of gender inequality, the rise of neoliberalism has led to a further form of male bias in development. The dominance of neoliberalism often means that less value is given to social reproduction. This is a form of male bias as social reproduction is mainly undertaken by women so the fact it is often seen as less valuable is "against women". Social reproduction is defined as the ‘activities, behaviours, responsibilities, and relationships that ensure the daily and generational social, emotional, moral and physical reproduction of people’.33 Social reproduction is a ‘non-economic activity’ it cannot be exchanged and it does not produce profit.34 On the other hand wage labour has been commodified, it is something that can be exchanged and it has economic value. 35 Therefore in a neoliberal system that values economic growth and competitiveness, economic activities are often valued more highly than non-economic activities. Within development this neoliberal way of thinking has contributed towards an effort to get more women to be economically active and to undertake wage labour, using the justification that that gender equality will be increased if more women enter the labour force.36

29

Ibid Ibid 31 Ibid, p.613. 32 Ibid, p.620. 33 Bezanson, K. and Luxton, M. (2006), Social Reproduction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-Liberalism, Canada: McQuill-Queen’s Press, p.175. 34 Bakker, I. and Gill, S. (2003), Power, Production and Social Reproduction. Human In/security in the Global Political Economy, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 21. 35 Appadurai, A. (2005), "Definitions: Commodity and Commodification" In: M. Ertman. And J. Williams (eds.) Rethinking Commodification: Cases and Readings in Law and Culture, New York University Press, p. 35. 36 Ward, K. (1990), Women Workers and Global Restructuring, New York: Cornell University Press, p.4. 30


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This perpetuates the idea that social reproduction has less value and therefore women that are not economically active but play an important role in social reproduction, are in some way less valuable. Looking at a case study illustrates the emphasis placed on getting women into paid labour as a development strategy. Acharya37 looked at women in Nepal and the effect integration into the global economy has had on women. Economic liberalization began in Nepal in the 1980s and alongside this a number of development policies were introduced that aimed to improve female education and make women more economically active through microloans. Acharya concluded that these policies aimed to ‘reshape gender roles to fit the needs of the globalising economy and the new rhetoric of gender equality’. 38 This is a form of male bias as the form of gender equality being promoted is one that is in line with neoliberal ideals, rather than one that aims to empower women by valuing their role in social reproduction as well as wage labour. Moeller’s case study of a Girl Effect programme in Brazil that educated young women led her to draw this same conclusion. She argued that the programme potentially worsened power inequalities between genders as it perpetuated the idea that social reproduction was inequitable. 39 This undervaluation of social reproduction has significant implications for women. Feminist theorists have argued that women’s role in social reproduction should be emphasised rather than viewed as something holding women back.40 The fact that social reproduction is viewed as being less valuable than productive labour increases gender inequality as the value of the work done by many women is diminished, therefore the value of many women is diminished. This is not to say that policies that aim to economically empower women contain inherent male bias but to argue that the value of social reproduction needs to be emphasised alongside these policies. Development should promote the idea that women who engage in social reproduction rather than wage labour are just as valuable.

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Acharya, M. (2008), “Global integration of subsistence economies and women’s empowerment. An experience from Nepal ” In: I. Bakker. and R. Silvey (eds.) Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of Social Reproduction, Oxfordshire: Routledge, pp. 55-71. 38 Ibid, p.55. 39 Moeller, K. (2013), “Proving “The Girl Effect”: Corporate knowledge production and educational intervention.”, p.620. 40 Beneria, L., Berik, G. and Floro, M. (2016), Gender, Development and Globalization: Economics as If All People Mattered, New York: Routledge, p.13.


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ASYMMETRIC BURDENS There is male bias present in the discourse surrounding gender development. Elson explained bias as an ‘asymmetry that is ill founded or unjustified’.41 In development there is an unfair asymmetry in who is deemed to be responsible for solving gender inequality and poverty in general. There is often a focus on what women can do to escape poverty and oppression while focus is diverted away from more significant causes of poverty and inequality.42 This places an unfairly high burden on women and unfairly low burden on those who are primarily responsible for gender oppression and poverty, who are predominantly (particularly historically) male.43 This can be linked to the previous argument that the influence of neoliberalism has perpetuated the problem of gender inequality in development. Neoliberalism advocates ‘competitiveness and self-interest’ 44 this is in line with the discourse in development that women should lift themselves out of poverty. In this next section I will first addresses the focus on what women can do to lift themselves out of poverty. I will then looks at the fact development often ignores subordinating gender ideologies. Finally, this addresses the duplicity behind many powerful institutions efforts to empower women, which are often a way for them to evade blame for the role they have played in worsening poverty and gender inequality. An unfairly high burden is placed on women The idea that women should lift themselves out of poverty stems from the ‘capability approach’ which was created in its present form by Amartya Sen .45 The capability approach argues that people’s quality of life depends on to what extent they are able to ‘do valuable acts and reach valuable states of being’.46 According to the capability approach development policies should aim to enable people to overcome barriers that may have stopped them from achieving all that they can. The capability approach is consistent with the Western neoliberal viewpoint that self-interest, individual responsibility and freedom are of great importance.47 Therefore it is unsurprising that alongside the rise of neoliberalism we have also 41

Elson, D. (1991), Male Bias in the Development Process, p.3. Hickel, J. (2014), “’The Girl Effect’: liberalism, empowerment and the contradictions of development”, Third World Quarterly, 35: 8. p.1365. 43 Ibid, p.1355. 44 Roy, R. and Steger, M. (2010), Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction, p.12. 45 Ibid 46 Nussbaum, M. and Sen, A. (1993), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.30. 47 Hickel, J. (2014), “’The Girl Effect’: liberalism, empowerment and the contradictions of development”, p.1355. 42


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seen a rise in the prominence of the capability approach. A problem with this approach, however, is that it often results in an unfair distribution of burdens, in this case those unfair burdens falling on women. This shows the significance of the problem of male bias in development in that the policies are often "against women" by unfairly burdening them with not only freeing themselves but those around them from oppression and poverty. Rankin48 carried out a case study of microcredit programmes in Nepal to demonstrate the unfair burden than is often placed on women in development in this way. Microcredit involves giving small loans to citizens for them to invest in their small businesses. Many scholars and actors in the field of development have come to view microcredit as the solution to global poverty. 49 The start of the 1990s saw Nepal begin to promote microfinance. Rural development banks and NGOs were set up to offer loans to people living in rural areas who were unlikely to be granted loans by traditional banks.50 Microloans were more likely to be given to women as cultural stereotypes promote the idea that they are more likely to invest the money sensibly and spend their profits on their families and communities. Rankin observed that microcredit was an example of the shift in responsibility of increasing economic opportunities for the poor away from the state (in this case state owned banks) and onto poor women. These women were expected to use their loans to start successful business and lift themselves, their families and their communities out of poverty. The result of this ‘aggressive self-help’51 development approach is that a disproportionate burden is placed on women. Focus is diverted away from more significant causes of poverty Subordinating gender ideologies Alongside placing too much focus on what women can do, more significant causes of gender inequality and poverty are often not adequately addressed. For example not enough attention is paid to the negative effects bought about by ‘subordinating gender ideologies’. 52 This is the view present in many societies that women are in some way inferior and less capable. In all the case studies I have discussed (TBF, The Girl Effect and microcredit in Nepal) the emphasis was on educating women and making them economically active so they can empower themselves, rather than aiming to directly challenge the stereotypes that have led to and perpetuated the problem of gender inequality. This is an example of male 48

Rankin, K. (2001), “Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit and Rational Economic Women”, Economy and Society, 30:1, pp.18-32. 49 Ibid, p.18. 50 Ibid, p.19. 51 Ibid, p.18. 52 Ibid, p.32.


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bias in development as it facilitates the idea that male dominance should not be directly challenged by development institutions but instead women should free themselves from oppression. Failing to address the issue of subordinating gender ideologies not only puts an unfair burden on women but can also makes development programmes less effective. A development policy may focus on helping women to lift themselves out of poverty and oppression but in many cases they are severely constrained from doing this by persistently subordinating gender ideologies. As development often ignores these ideologies gender oppression persists, limiting the capability of women to improve the situation of themselves and their communities. Rankin’s53 case study illustrates how not addressing subordinating gender ideologies can reduce the effectiveness of female empowerment development programmes. Due to the structure of Nepalese society even if it is the women that receive the microloan it is the men who tend to control how it is spent and who are in control of the profits.

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This significantly limits the extent to which women can be empowered.

Rankin concluded that the key barrier to female empowerment was not that women lacked money to invest but it was in fact the ‘persistence of subordinating gender ideologies’. 55 This demonstrates the constraints to development that come about as a result of male bias. Powerful institutions and the ‘duplicity of development’ In development there is often not enough responsibility placed on actors that have played a role in upholding gender oppression and poverty. This is a form of male bias, it is an unjustified asymmetry; the burden of having to increase gender equality should be distributed, at least to some extent, according to who has contributed to the problem. In development this is often not the case. Powerful actors, who are able to control the discourse surrounding gender and development are able to shift responsibility away from themselves, a process which Hickel has called the ‘duplicity of development’.56 Hickel has provided certain examples of development programmes through which ‘the onus of responsibility has been shifted from the institutions that have caused underdevelopment to its victims’.57 Kristoff and WuDunn’s The Half the Sky Movement which uses Facebook and mobile phone games to 53

Ibid, pp.18-34. Ibid, p.32. 55 Ibid 56 Hickel, J. (2014), “’The Girl Effect’: liberalism, empowerment and the contradictions of development”, p.1366. 57 Ibid 54


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educate women on issues such as safe birthing techniques and to promote microcredit, has received substantial financial backing from the Goldman Sachs Foundation.58 However Goldman Sachs played a significant role in causing the 2008 financial crash, an event that disproportionately harmed women in the Global South. It is duplicitous for Goldman Sachs to promote the idea that women can lift themselves out of poverty through education and increased economic activity, when they have caused ‘much more harm than its Half the Sky campaign can ever hope to compensate for’.59 A further example Hickel has provided is the actions of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID has claimed that greater gender equality in the form of ‘boosting women’s participation in the labour force’ will help to ‘reduce poverty and promote growth’. 60 USAID has argued that if more women can receive wage labour and have access to loans, countries in the Global South could see their GDP expand by 2% and agricultural output could increase by up to 4%, helping to reduce malnutrition. However at the same time USAID policies, which often put the interests of corporations over small scale farmers, have worsened hunger.61 For example, since the 1980s USAID has pushed Egyptian farmers into growing crops that can be exported rather than staple foods. This was beneficial to large landowners but harmed poorer farm labourers, many of whom lost their jobs or had their wages cut. This also resulted in rising food prices, which was a major factor in starting the 2011 uprising. 62 The fact that USAIDs policies burden women with solving the problem of hunger when they have played a part in causing the problem in the first place is incredibly ‘contradictory and even disingenuous’. 63 This is an example of male bias as powerful institutions are able to use their influence to shift the responsibility away from themselves and onto women. This is clearly and disproportionately "against women". Conclusion In conclusion, male bias has been show to be a significant problem in development policies that aim to empower women. The neoliberal view that development should occur through the free market and economic growth means that the intrinsic value of gender equality is often not recognised. Policies that appear to be aimed at empowering women are in fact aimed at promoting economic growth. The work carried out by many women, social reproduction, is undervalued and waged work is seen as more 58

Ibid, p.1362. Ibid, p.1366. 60 Ibid, p.1361. 61 Ibid, p.1366. 62 Ibid 63 Ibid, p.1367. 59


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important. Furthermore women are expected to play a large role in getting themselves and others out of poverty and oppression, while the role of subordinating gender ideologies and powerful institutions is sidelined. Neoliberalism advocates self-interest and competitiveness and so plays a significant role in creating and enforcing these expectations. Therefore neoliberal discourses and the capability approach work together to perpetuate gender inequality in development. An important point to be made is that I have only focused on development aimed at improving gender equality. The fact that there was still a significant presence of male bias in policies that are specifically aimed at improving gender equality and therefore reducing male bias, might signal the pervasiveness of male bias in development and society as a whole. The findings clearly highlight that more radical and widespread action is needed if we want to make real steps towards empowering women and eliminating gender inequality.

References Acharya, M. (2008), “Global integration of subsistence economies and women’s empowerment. An experience from Nepal”. In Bakker, I. and Silvey, R. (eds.) Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of Social Reproduction, Oxfordshire: Routledge. Appadurai, A. (2005), "Definitions: Commodity and Commodification", In Ertman, M. and Williams, J. (eds.) Rethinking Commodification: Cases and Readings in Law and Culture, New York: New York University Press. Bakker, I. and Gill, S. (2003), Power, Production and Social Reproduction. Human In/security in the Global Political Economy, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Beneria, L., Günseli, B. and Floro, M. (2016), Gender, Development and Globalization: Economics as If All People Mattered, New York: Routledge. Berthoud, G., (1992) “Market”. In Sacs, W. (ed.) The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power, London: Zed Books. Bezanson, K. and Luxton, M. (2006), Social Reproduction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-Liberalism, Canada: McQuill-Queen’s Press. Chaaban, J. and Cunningham, W. (2011), “Measuring the Economic Gain of Investing in Girls. The Girl Effect Dividend”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Elson, D. (1991), Male Bias in the Development Process, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Harvey, D. (2001), Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, New York: Routledge. Harvey, D. (2007), A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York: Oxford University Press Inc. Hayter, T. (2005), “Secret diplomacy uncovered: research on the World Bank in the 1960s and 1980s”, In Kothari, U. (ed.) Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies, London: Zed Books.


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Hickel, J. (2014), “’The Girl Effect’: liberalism, empowerment and the contradictions of development”, Third World Quarterly, 35: 8, pp.1355-1373. Kabeer, N. (2015), “Gender, poverty and inequality: a brief history of feminist contributions in the field of international development”, Gender and Development, 23:2. Lingam, L. (2008), “Limits to empowerment. Women in microcredit programmes in India.” In Bakker, I. and Silvey, R. (eds.) Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of Social Reproduction, Oxfordshire: Routledge. Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1998), The Communist Manifesto, Cd-Rom. Moeller, K. (2013), “Proving “The Girl Effect”: Corporate knowledge production and educational intervention”, International Journal of Educational Development, 33: 6, pp. 612-621. Myrdal, G. (1974), “What is development?”, Journal of Economic Issues, 8:4. Nussbaum, M. and Sen, A., (1993), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rankin, K. (2001), “Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit and Rational Economic Women”, Economy and Society, 30:1, pp.18-32. Rist, G. (2007), “Development as a Buzzword”, Development in Practice, 17:4-5. Roberts, A. (2015), "The Political Economy of “Transnational Business Feminism”" International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17:2, p.209-231. Roy, R. and Steger, M. (2010), Neoliberalism: A very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University Press Inc. The Girl Effect (2017), Our Purpose, [Online] Available at: http://www.girleffect.org/our-purpose/ [Accessed: 29/04/17]. Tinker, I. (1990), Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development, New York: Oxford University Press. UN (2000), The Millennium Development Goals, [Online] Available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [Accessed: 01/05/17]. Ward, K. (1990), Women Workers and Global Restructuring, New York: Cornell University Press.


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Individuals, states and the politics of (in)security Callum Higgins, 2ndYear Essay BA Economics

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of developments in the concepts of warfare and statehood. Consequently, there has been an evolution in our conception of security, prompting debate about which approach offers the most persuasive account of security in the modern context. One of the most important concepts to emerge from the postCold War period was human security. The human security approach holds that the referent object of security should be the individual rather than the state, thus challenging state-centric, Cold War era approaches to security. The central argument of this essay is that human security is the most persuasive approach to thinking about modern-day security issues. However, it will also be argued that despite being the most convincing approach in theory, there have been significant problems with its practical application which have diminished its viability in the eyes of the world.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of developments in our understanding of the concepts of both warfare and statehood. Consequently, our conception of security has also seen a corresponding evolution, which has lead to debate about which approach to security offers the most persuasive account in the modern context. One of the most important notions to emerge from the postCold War period was that of human security, which holds that the referent object of security should be the individual rather than the state, thus challenging the assumptions of orthodox, state-centric approaches. Human security can be defined both narrowly, to refer to armed conflict and direct loss of life, and broadly, encompassing peripheral issues such as economic or social security. A narrow definition of human security will be used throughout, as this definition more appropriately fits the context of the essay. The central argument of this essay is that human security is the most persuasive approach to thinking about modern-day security issues. However, it will also be argued that despite being the most convincing approach in theory, there have been significant problems with its practical application which have diminished its viability in the eyes of the world. To start, the relevance of the referent object of human security to the contemporary context will be contrasted with that of the traditional, state-centric approach. The debate will then consider a challenge to human security from the Aberystwyth school which charges the approach with being too


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uncritical. Next, this critique will be responded to from a human security perspective, arguing that its conservative nature does not reduce its persuasiveness as it has enabled the approach to influence policies which have vastly changed the global state system. To aid this argument, there will be a discussion of the implications of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) for the concept of statehood. The essay will then finish by addressing what has become the central problem of the human security approach; the practical application of its principles. Here it will be argued that it is the privileging of liberalism as the key to security in the current practice of intervention which has lead to its failure and the subsequent loss of credibility the approach has suffered. This will be illustrated through an analysis of humanitarian intervention and the effects that the outcomes of intervention missions have had on the perceived viability of human security. It could be argued that human security offers a more persuasive approach to security than orthodox, state-centric thought because the modern world has outgrown the assumptions of traditional views of security. The persuasive strength which the orthodox approach seems to have commanded in the past may therefore have been lost. The underlying presumption of orthodox thought is that the territorial, military security of a state ensures the security of its population. This view was established during the Cold War, when the main security issues facing states concerned the nuclear capabilities of either of the two superpowers. Due to the context within which it was conceived, it is implied that the most important security threats to states, and in turn their populations, would originate from outside the state itself. However, since the 1990s, this assumption has been challenged by the emergence of wars which do not fit with this narrative of inter-state conflict. In her book, ‘New and Old Wars’, Mary Kaldor points out that the developments in warfare which have occurred since the end of the Cold War constitute a new type of war.1 She uses examples from the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Bosnia to highlight the increase in complex, and often culturally-informed, intra-state wars since that period. It is worth noting that although Kaldor uses examples from the 1990s to illustrate her point, intra-state conflict is not necessarily a new phenomenon; one only has to look as far as Nazi Germany to see perhaps the greatest example of intra-state conflict in recent history. Nevertheless, intra-state warfare now warrants more attention due to improvements in information technology, which allows news to travel instantly across the globe, resulting in their apparent proliferation in recent years. These new wars could be said to offer a convincing challenge to traditional security thought, which focuses solely on securing populations against external threats, as there is no acknowledgement that threats can also originate from within the state itself. Indeed, states in which there is internal conflict may well be ‘secure’ in terms of external threats such as foreign occupation, leading 1

Kaldor, M. (2010), "New & Old wars", Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.


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orthodox commentators to believe the populations of these states to be secure. However, these intra-state conflicts and civil wars often mean that, despite the security of state borders, people can live in brutal conditions and frequently face threats from groups within the state or even from the state itself. The populations of these states are therefore clearly experiencing insecurity, suggesting that orthodox approaches present a superficial view of security which cannot account for the complexity of modern warfare. The civil wars mentioned by Kaldor have shown that many states cannot, and should not, be viewed as one homogeneous group of people who share the same interests and have common enemies, as is implied by the traditional approach to security. This disunity between the different groups within states suggests that the reification of the state, which is so fundamental to traditional security thinking, may no longer be appropriate in the modern warfare environment. For this reason, it can be argued that given the complexity of modern warfare, the human security approach provides a more accurate view of security than statecentric approaches, which inherently mask the insecurity which may be experienced within states. On the other hand, some would argue that human security also fails to provide a convincing account because it is too uncritical. According to proponents of the Aberystwyth school, the structures and institutions concerned with security should be fundamentally contested and there should be more of an effort to question the status quo.2 In other words, human security is unconvincing as the approach fails to challenge the legitimacy of states and the state system as a whole. Both the human security approach and the Aberystwyth school use the individual as the primary referent object, but diverge ontologically in their respective views of the meaning of true security. While human security favours a more top-down, statebased definition, the Aberystwyth school proposes that only the complete emancipation of the individual is equal to true security. Ken Booth, for example, states that ‘security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security’. 3 Here Booth reveals the Marxist roots of the Aberystwyth school, alluding to the argument that the state system limits the potential to achieve true security due to its reliance on unequal power relations. The approach therefore encompasses an inherent suspicion of the state, which they believe can be one of the main sources of insecurity for citizens. 4 One would find it difficult to discredit this belief in many cases; the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia provide convincing examples of the massive extent to which states can produce insecurity for their populations. Indeed, some research suggests that around 262 million people were killed by their own government in the

2

Newman, E. (2010), "Critical human security studies", Review of International Studies, 36, pp. 87-88. Booth, K. (1991), "Security and Emancipation", Review of International Studies, 17, p. 319. 4 Newman, E. (2010), "Critical human security studies", p. 87. 3


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twentieth century alone.5 Human security, according to this view, can reinforce these oppressive power structures through its willingness to work within the parameters of the state system, thus maintaining and reproducing insecurity.6 It can therefore be argued that the approach does not provide a convincing account of security because the approach itself contributes to insecurity through its advocacy of the state system. The challenge from the Aberystwyth school is a robust one supported by many convincing realworld examples. Nevertheless, I would contend that the albeit rather conservative nature of the human security approach actually increases its persuasiveness rather than diminishing it. The willingness of the approach to work with the status quo - instead of against it - has enabled it to maintain its relevance to the policy world. The approach has been able to have a real effect on the security of individuals through the taking of incremental steps towards achieving security in the real world.7 This, contrastingly, is as opposed to normative approaches such as the Aberystwyth school which prefer to focus on academic theorising on complex and, some would say, unrealistic Marxian ideals of emancipation. The human security approach has also been able to have a practical influence on the evolution of the global state system, which is more than can be said for the Aberystwyth school. For example, the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle emerged during the 2005 UN World Summit and means that states have a duty to provide security to their populations in order to maintain the legitimacy of their sovereignty. When they cannot, or will not, the international community takes on that obligation.8 In other words, the international community now has a responsibility to prioritise human security over state security in some circumstances when they are in opposition.9 This can be seen as a clear adoption of human security values, and arguably constitutes the most important evolution of the Westphalian state system in recent history. The significance of this normative shift is also compounded by the fact that it has formed what is now a mainstream mode of thought; the consensus which has been reached in the UN around the R2P principle is a testament to this. For the first time, there is a consensus which has been built around four events - genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes - which are thought to warrant an international response. For example, the intervention in Libya in 2011 was framed using the R2P principle, with international action deemed to be justifiable due to Gaddafi threatening the mass murder of pro-democracy activists. This was argued to amount to a crime against humanity, though there are, of course, questions about the strength of this argument and

5

Bellamy, A. J. (2013), "The Responsibility to Protect", In Williams, P. D. (ed), Security Studies: An Introduction, London: Routledge, p. 423 6 Newman, E. (2010), "Critical human security studies", p. 88. 7 Ibid, p. 89. 8 Bellamy, A. J. (2013), "The Responsibility to Protect", p. 423. 9 Ibid


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subsequently about the justness of the intervention. It would be interesting to be able to discern the extent to which the pro-democracy orientation of these activists factored into the argument. In any case, the international community favoured the protection of individuals over the protection of state sovereignty. This alone can be said to be a significant development of the Westphalian state system, which rests on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and on the assumption that states are the best guardians of human security. 10 However, the adoption of R2P by the international community suggests that this assumption is no longer taken for granted. What makes the change significant to an even larger extent is that it does not limit intervention to so-called ‘failed’ states. The intervention in Libya, for instance, is arguably the most significant use of R2P as it was the first time the Security Council had authorised the use of force for human protection against the wishes of a functioning state.11 This example shows that under the R2P principle, the sovereignty of not only ‘failed states’, but also of functioning states, can now be suspended by external bodies if it is not being used in the interests of the population. The R2P could therefore be argued to represent a very significant evolution of the Westphalian state system and in this respect, it may be unfair to argue that human security is uncritical even if it is rather conservative. In fact, it is the conser vatism of the approach which provides it with relevance in policy circles and allows it to influence events happening in the real world. Contrastingly, the policy influence of the Aberystwyth school - that is, its contribution to the empirical protection of the lives of real people - could be said to be either elusive, negligible or nonexistent. The human security approach can therefore be argued to be highly persuasive as it has informed a development in the theoretical discourse surrounding security at the UN-level, resulting in the change in the primary referent object from state to individual through the R2P principle. This has provided the greatest challenge to the global state system in recent history and, in doing so, has fulfilled the aims of the Aberystwyth school to more of an extent than the Aberystwyth school itself has been able. Thus far, it has been argued that human security offers the most persuasive approach to security when compared to the Aberystwyth and orthodox approaches. However, while human security may be the most persuasive, the approach still suffers significant operational problems which must be overcome if it is to maintain credibility. It could be argued that the way in which the international community has gone about intervening in countries has served to damage the reputation of the human security approach. While the practice of intervention has undergone several developments since its first uses in the early 1990s, the continued mediocrity of results has diminished the extent to which the approach is seen as empirically 10

Bellamy, A. J. (2013), "The Responsibility to Protect". Brockmeier, S., Stuenkel, O. and Tourinho, M. (2016) “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection”, Global Society, 30, p. 113. 11


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persuasive. It is worth noting, however, that this does not necessarily mean that other approaches are more persuasive, as they each have their own practical problems. The following paragraphs will problematise two incarnations of humanitarian intervention, arguing that the level of confidence placed in the exportability of liberalism has caused many interventions to be ineffective, fail outright or even increase insecurity. It will be therefore be argued that this is not an inherent fault of human security, rather it is a problem with the way in which the international community has gone about acting on its principles. The argument therefore subscribes to what David Chandler calls the ‘ideas-based critique’, which argues that the West has structured their interventions around the ideals of its own history.12 The first incarnation of humanitarian intervention, as we know it today at least, came about during the peace-building missions of the early 1990s in places such as Angola, Cambodia and Liberia. The early approach was focused on getting international forces in and out of the country as quickly as possible.13 There is clearly some merit to this mode of thought; prolonged occupation could flare tensions with the locals, decreasing stability and security. However, the international community also tended to hold quick elections in these states, who have little to no prior history of democracy, and then leave with the belief that these missions had been an automatic success as a result of elections being held. This proved to be a misguided assumption. In Angola, for example, the elections only catalysed violence. In Cambodia and Liberia, elections yielded superficial democratisation and a quick return to authoritarianism. 14 These examples suggest that it is not elections, or liberalism for that matter, which guarantee the security of the population. By privileging liberal ideals as the protectors of human security, the international community showed a distinct lack of cultural awareness by overlooking the historical differences between Western and nonWestern countries. As Yuen Khong argues, the human security movement grew out of the history and circumstances of Western states, where institutional and social structures have developed alongside democracy.15 This explains the tendency of practices informed by the human security approach to adopt rather deterministic assumptions on the positive consequences of liberalism, their view being based on their own experience. Early intervention missions were therefore attempts to export this developed, ready-made model of liberalism into non-Western countries, with the expectation that it would immediately guarantee security. This idealistic view of the ostensible universality of liberalism can be argued to have been one of the

12

Chandler, D. (2011), "The Uncritical Critique of Liberal Peace", Review of International Studies, 36, Special Issue: Evaluating Global Orders, p.139. 13 Paris, R. (2009), The dilemmas of Statebuilding, p.55. 14 Ibid, p.55-56. 15 Hampson, F. O. (2013), "Human Security" in Williams, P. D. (ed), Security Studies: An Introduction, p. 236.


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main problems with human security in practice during the troubled initial interventions of the early 1990s which have served to discredit the approach. The failures of this approach prompted a change to the strategy pursued by the international community. The next development meant that intervention took on the mantra of ‘no exit without strategy’.16 Intervening forces would not hold elections immediately, but would attempt to build a state through establishing the institutions and frameworks which accommodate liberalism. In other words, it sought to establish deeper roots of liberalism in these states in the hope that this would bring about stability. This change to their approach appears to show an acknowledgement by the UN’s of the short-comings of their previous strategy. The previous approach to intervention was focused on leaving the smallest footprint possible on the assumption that holding elections, and introducing liberal principles, would immediately result in security and stability. However, rather than the new approach being informed by an admission that the liberalism did not necessarily equal security, it was actually based on exporting more liberalism into these states. One could therefore argue that the latter incarnation of intervention was the next mistake in its development and also contributed to bringing human security into the disrepute in which it finds itself today. The occupation of Iraq, for example, has proved to be one of the biggest blows to the perceived viability of the human security approach to emerge as a result of this development for at least two separate reasons. Firstly, the prolonged occupation of Iraq - based on the ‘no exit without an exit strategy’ policy lead to the move being labelled as a disguised form of liberal cultural neo-imperialism17. Some have argued that this is an exaggeration, based on the perceived lack of a benefit to so-called imperialists18. This can be argued to be true to an extent - the imperialists of the past, such as the British or French colonialists, have at least sought some kind of direct benefit for themselves. However, it could also be argued that the stated aim of the US intervention - to bring ‘freedom’ and democracy to an oppressed population19 - revealed their intention to impose their own liberal culture on that of another state, which surely amounts to cultural imperialism by definition. While this may not have resulted in a direct benefit to the alleged imperialists, the spreading of liberalism can hardly be seen as something which would have been a hindrance to them, especially considering the post-9/11 political terrain. Whatever the motives and aims of interventions may have been, humanitarian intervention has now been linked to colonialism and, as Roland Paris notes, an 16

Paris, R. (2010), "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", p. 342. Newman, E. (2010), "Critical human security studies", p. 88. 18 Paris, R. (2010), "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", p. 353. 19 Ibid, p. 347. 17


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anti-colonial ethic shapes the modern political environment.20 This link can therefore be said to have lead to the approach being dismissed as a guise for neo-imperialism based on the potential for the R2P principle to be abused by powerful states, damaging the perception of the human security approach.21 This potential for the misuse of the human security principles encompassed in the R2P has therefore decreased the extent to which the approach is viewed as a viable approach to achieving true human security. Secondly, it can be argued that the intervention in Iraq has actually increased global insecurity, which has in turn served to discredit human security as an approach. The apparent potential of the human security approach to increase insecurity seems like an inherent contradiction. Some have argued that intervention has done more good than it has done harm.22 However, on the contrary, I would contend that interventions can be argued to have directly increased global insecurity on at least two different levels. At the regional level, intervention has made the populations of Iraq and the surrounding states more insecure by tearing down their political and social institutions and attempting to install liberal frameworks in naturally non-liberal environments. However on a global level, intervention has also helped make the world more insecure as a whole in both the short-term and the long-term. In the short-term, the invasion of Iraq has promoted extremism, leading Tony Blair, clearly an important proponent of the war, to admit that the Iraq war created the Islamic State.23 Modern information technology and social media have allowed foreign extremist groups to radicalise those susceptible to their influence and encourage them to retaliate through terror. For example, ISIS claimed that the 2017 London Bridge attack, which killed seven and injured many more, was revenge for RAF air strikes in Iraq and Syria.24 This development in the globalisation of terror means that the effects of the Iraq war take on a more global character as insecurity is not only increased in the Middle East, but also in the Western states. Furthermore, terrorism, a more direct effect of intervention, has subsequently created more indirect increases in insecurity, such as retaliations to terror attacks by non-state actors. For example, police in Manchester and London recorded a fivefold increase in Islamophobic hate crime after the Manchester attacks.25 Similarly, Tommy Robinson referred to the Finsbury Park mosque

20

Ibid, p. 354 Bellamy, A. J. (2013), "The Responsibility to Protect", p. 425. 22 Paris, R. (2010), "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", p. 338. 23 Chulov, M. (2015), "Tony Blair is right: without the Iraq war there would be no Islamic State", The Guardian. 24 Forster, K. (2017), "London Terror Attack: ISIS Supporters Claim Atrocity Was Revenge For RAF "Love From Manchester" Air Strike", The Independent. 25 Travis, A. (2017), "Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Surges After Manchester And London Bridge Attacks", The Guardian. 21


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attack as a ‘revenge attack’.26 Insecurity has therefore been increased not only for non-Islamic Westerners the perceived ‘victims’ of terrorism - but also for Western Muslims, who some perceive as the perpetrators of terrorism. The overall failure of humanitarian intervention has therefore increased global insecurity in the short-term in both a direct and an indirect sense. In the long-term, and perhaps more importantly, the outcome of the Iraq war has damaged the reputation of humanitarian intervention, and consequently of the human security approach. This has lead some politicians and states to become very reluctant to intervene in human security issues in order to distance themselves from the practice. Thus in future, should intervention actually be needed, states may make far less convincing efforts to save lives for fear of the political backlash. This is arguably the case with the stance of the Obama administration on the conflict in Syria and their preference for indirect intervention by supporting local militias. Similarly, in the UK, David Cameron said that the failure of the Iraq war had ‘poisoned the well’ of public opinion when he was defeated in Parliament on military intervention in Syria in 2013.27 The extent to which military intervention in Syria was necessary or just is of course highly debatable, yet regardless of this debate, the case shows that there is little political will for any Iraq-style military intervention. Thus, as a result of the failure of the Iraq war, intervention may not be viewed in the future as a politically viable option even if it were actually necessary at some point. This means that states may fail to act in future cases where intervention could save lives as a result of the negative public sentiment shaped by the Iraq failure. Furthermore, the alternative strategies which are favoured over direct intervention may create further insecurity in the long-term. For example, the proxy warfare model partly pursued by the Obama administration arguably builds the foundations of the terrorist organisations of the future by providing disunited and uncontrollable groups with training, weapons, and perhaps confidence. In this sense, the poor reputation of intervention may not only constrain the ability of states to pursue lifesaving efforts in future, but may even lead to the pursuit of strategies which serve to actively increase future insecurity. The methodology of intervention has thus increased insecurity in the world in the near and distant future on both a regional and on a global level. This, in turn, has undermined the perceived ability of human security to achieve its primary goal which is, intuitively, achieving security for all human beings. Human security is therefore largely considered not to be a persuasive approach as a result of the outcomes of practices that it has informed.

26

Molloy, M. (2017), "Former EDL Leader Tommy Robinson Condemned Over Finsbury Park Mosque Comments", The Telegraph. 27 Grice, A. (2013), “David Cameron’s plans for military action in Syria shot down in dramatic Commons vote”, The Independent.


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These intervention missions have resulted in an increase in global insecurity and a link being established between human security and neo-imperialism. Both of these have greatly damaged the reputation of human security, meaning that it is no longer being viewed as a credible approach to achieving security. However, the disrepute in which human security finds itself in can be said not to be based on an inherent flaw within the approach. Rather, it has been argued that what has been damaging is the way in which intervention has been based on an idealistic privileging of liberalism as the guarantor of security. The interventions may have been well intentioned but paternalistic ventures or, more sceptically, they may have been tools of ‘outright power politics’.28 Whatever the motives of international actors, there is one saving grace for the human security approach which emerges out of its now sullied reputation. The practice, and subsequent failure, of various interventions has fostered an anti-colonial ethic which will shape the context in which peace operations will take place in the future. A pessimist might argue that this spells the end for human security, given its links with neo-imperalism. However, an optimist might argue that human security has always been an approach which maintains policy relevance and will therefore evolve in order to fit with this new anti-colonial norm. Indeed, the first and second strategies of intervention pursued by the international community were changed as a result of their failures. There seems no reason that the current intervention strategy cannot be updated to more closely adhere to these anti-colonial values. Intervention strategies so far have grossly overlooked important situational factors such as the cultural relativism and ‘derivative’ nature of the concept of security.29 However, there is now vast literature and rigorous debate on the problems of past interventions. This discussion, it could be argued, could be the first step to finding new and improved methods of intervening when necessary in a way which will not cause so much harm. In spite of its drawbacks, the positive influence of the human security approach in the long-term has come from its contribution to the R2P, which has essentially legalised intervention in order to protect human life in international law in extreme circumstances. This has resulted in vast changes to the state system which have been informed by the approach. For this reason, human security can be argued to be the most persuasive approach to security as it has had a long-term impact on the potential for saving lives, an achievement which has actually been made possible by its conservative nature. However, while it may be the most persuasive, the approach can still be said to run into significant and image-damaging problems when it has been put into practice by mostly Western powers. These problems, specifically related to the Western perception of liberalism, must be addressed if the approach is to move forward and regain its credibility in the eyes of the world. 28

Newman, E. (2010), "Critical human security studies", Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, p. 88 Bilgin, P. (2013), "Critical theory", p. 90, in Williams, P. D. (ed), Security Studies: An Introduction, London: Routledge. 29


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The human security approach clearly suffers from some significant setbacks in terms of its practical application in humanitarian intervention, the effects of which have actually increased insecurity in some cases. Nevertheless, it can be argued that it is the ideological privileging of liberalism as a guarantee of security, and not the inherent faults of human security, which have caused the failure of many intervention missions. As a result, the approach can still be argued to offer the most persuasive account of security in the modern context. The use of the individual as the referent object of security gives the approach a relevance to contemporary issues which traditional approaches fail to achieve. Other approaches, such as the Aberystwyth school, also use the individual as the referent object and charge the human security approach with being too uncritical of the state system. However, the relative conservatism of the human security approach has enabled it to inform a global evolution in the concepts of statehood and sovereignty through the incorporation of the R2P principle into international political discourse.

References Bellamy, A. J. (2013), ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in Paul D. Williams (ed) Security Studies: An Introduction, London: Routledge. Bilgin, P. (2013), ‘Critical theory’ in Paul D. Williams (ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction Booth, K. (1991), ‘Security and Emancipation’ Review of International Studies, 17, p. 313-326 Brockmeier, S., Stuenkel, O. & Tourinho, M. (2016) ‘The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection’, Global Society, 30, p. 113-133 Chulov, M. (2015), Tony Blair is right: without the Iraq war there would be no Islamic State. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/25/tony-blair-is-right-withoutthe-iraq-war-there-would-be-no-isis [Accessed 8 May 2017]. Chandler, D. (2011), 'The Uncritical Critique of Liberal Peace', Review of International Studies, 36, Special Issue: Evaluating Global Orders, pp.137-155. Forster, K. (2017), "London Terror Attack: Isis Supporters Claim Atrocity Was Revenge For RAF 'Love From Manchester' Air Strike". The Independent. [online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-terror-attack-isis-supporters-claimrevenge-raf-love-from-manchester-air-strike-bomb-borough-a7773231.html [Accessed 31 Jan. 2018] Grice, A. (2013), ‘David Cameron's plans for military action in Syria shot down in dramatic Commons vote’. The Independent. [online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameronsplans-for-military-action-in-syria-shot-down-in-dramatic-commons-vote-8788612.html [Accessed 27 Jan. 2018]. Kaldor, M. (2010), “New & Old Wars”, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.


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Molloy, M. (2017), "Former EDL Leader Tommy Robinson Condemned Over Finsbury Park Mosque Comments". The Telegraph. [online] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/former-edl-leader-tommy-robinson-condemnedfinsbury-park-mosque/ [Accessed 31 Jan. 2018] Newman, E. (2010) ‘Critical human security studies’ Review of International Studies, 36: 77-94. Osler Hampson, Fen. (2013) ‘Human Security’ in Paul D. Williams (ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction Paris, R (2010), ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’ Review of International Studies, 36: 337- 365. Paris, R. (2010), The dilemmas of statebuilding. 1st ed. London: Routledge. Travis, A. (2017), "Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Surges After Manchester And London Bridge Attacks". The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jun/20/anti-muslim-hatesurges-after-manchester-and-london-bridge-attacks.


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The Rise in Electoral Support for Right-Wing Populism: The Case of the FPÖ in Austria

Kathryn McNickle, 2nd Year Essay BA, Politics and Modern History

Abstract: This research project studies the reasons behind the rise in electoral support for populist parties and politicians in established democracies. It uses the case study of the FPÖ in Austria since 2007, when they left government, up to the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections, when the FPÖ candidate Nobert Hofer reached the second-round ballot. The project asks whether concerns about immigration and maintenance of Austrian culture have contributed to the rise of the FPÖ. It looks at both supply and demand factors, examining both the Austrian population and the FPÖ. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, it finds that it is likely that the FPÖ’s rise in support was at least partly due to Austrians’ worries about immigration and even more so, about the defence and maintenance of their culture. Knowing what contributes to populist support may help provide a solution to preventing its excesses.

The rise of right-wing populism is widespread in the twenty-first century. It is an important area of research, as if we are interested in restraining political extremism or preventing it becoming more radical or even violent, we must understand it. In Western Europe, the phenomenon seems especially prominent, with numerous right-wing populist parties on the verge of power. This seems at odds with most of the preceding decades. We must therefore ask what explains the rise in electoral support for populist parties and politicians in established democracies. To do this, I will consider the case-study of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in recent years. After examining the existing literature, this article shall ask whether concerns about immigration and maintenance of Austrian culture have contributed to the rise of the FPÖ. I will then briefly justify my methodological approach and choice of data sources, before analysing these and presenting my preliminary findings. These suggest that the FPÖ rise has been aided by Austrians’ worries about immigration and, even more so, preserving Austrian culture.


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Literature Review The existing literature surrounding the rise in right-wing populism in Western Europe is broad. The approaches can be roughly divided into supply-side and demand-side theories, although there are some outliers. Several supply-side hypothesises appear in the literature. Marcel Lubbers et al, after a comparative study, find that favourable supply-side factors, such as charismatic party leaders and a wellorganised party are the central factor in right-wing populist parties’ success. They also find that demandside factors, such as higher levels of non-EU immigration, contribute. However, they do not consider all of the demand-side factors, missing out important issues such as protest voting. 1 In contrast, Matthijs Rooduijn et al address protest voting and alienation directly in their case-study of the Netherlands, arguing that previous work, such as that of Cas Mudde, overemphasises the role of political discontent.2 Instead, they suggest that such discontent is caused by populist parties themselves and argue that the most important reason for supporting a populist party is agreeing with their policies on substantive issues, particularly immigration. This illustrates the link between supply and demand side factors; they must both exist for success. However, their study may not be generalizable and investigates voting intentions, rather than actual behaviour.3 In his case study of the FPÖ, Reinhard Heinsich finds that as well as major structural issues in Austrian democracy, several supply side issues helped their rise, particularly their outsider role, their emphasis on Austrian culture and the personal role of Jörg Haider. However, much of the article is centred on Haider, which does not explain their current success since he left the party in 2005.4 Roger Eatwell, after a study of the ten main supply and demand side arguments, argues that increased legitimacy of extremism, growing personal efficacy and a lack of system trust lead to the rise of such parties. He argues supply side factors are essential to create the necessary conditions for right-wing 1

Lubbers, M. et al. (2002), “Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 41:3, pp.345-378. 2 Rooduijn, M. et al. (2016), “Expressing or Fuelling Discontent? The Relationship Between Populist-Voting and Political Discontent”, Electoral Studies, 43:32-40; Mudde, C. (2004), “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39: 4, pp.542–563. 3 Rooduijn, M. et al. (2016), “Expressing or Fuelling Discontent? The Relationship Between Populist-Voting and Political Discontent”. 4 Heinisch, R. (2008), “Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism”, In Albertazzi, D and McDonnell, D. (eds) Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67-83.


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populist parties to succeed. However, there is little research of his own in this article and he relies mostly on the work of others.5 Similarly to Eatwell’s emphasis on legitimacy, Aurelien Mondon argues that in France, the Front National has much to owe to its ‘Sarkoist legitimisation’, by which mainstream politicians began to adopt right-wing discourses, helping make the original right-wing populist parties acceptable.6 Demand-side theories are more prominent in the literature. Daniel Oesch conducted a comparative study of workers’ support for right-wing populist parties. Oesch argues that in Austria and Switzerland, populist support was due to concerns about the cultural, and to a lesser extent, economic, implications of immigration; in Belgium, France and Norway, protest voting matters more. However, he uses the 2003 European Social Survey, conducted when the FPÖ were in government, which may have affected his findings in Austria.7 Van der Brug and Meindert Fennema, in their comparative article of European countries, disagree that protest voting has any real role, arguing instead that the central factor is that the left-right divide has weakened among voters. They suggest attitudes to immigration are also important, yet the European Social Survey of 2004 that they use does not include a question on immigration. They also argue against Hans-Georg Betz’s ‘losers of modernity’ thesis.8 Betz’s argument, according to Stephen Immerfell, was that the shift from industrial to post-industrial capitalism has caused social fragmentation. Immigrants became easy targets because they represent social upheaval and unwelcome competition, leading to a rise in support for right-wing populist parties.9 In contrast, Van der Brug and Fennema suggest successful populist parties gain support from across society, not just those ‘left behind’ by globalisation. 10 Julian Aichholzer et al, in a case study of Austria, find that support for the FPÖ is due to voters’ position on a new political division, based on views on immigration, as well as European integration and

5

Eatwell, R. (2003), “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right”, In Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg”, RightWing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, pp. 47-73. 6 Mondon, A. (2014), “The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?”, Modern & Contemporary France, 22:13, pp.301-320. 7 Oesch, D. (2008), “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland”, International Political Science Review 29:3, pp.249-373. 8 Van der Brug, W. and Fennema, M. (2009), “The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union”, Journal of European Integration, 31:5 pp. 589-608; Immerfell, S. (1996), “Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System”, West European Politics 19: 2, pp. 410-415. 9 Immerfell, S. (1996), “Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System”. 10 Van der Brug, W. and Fennema, M. (2009), “The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union”.


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functioning of the political system.11 This is similar to Van der Brug and Fennema’s argument concerning the decline of the left-right divide.12 This is also supported by Jason E. Kehrberg, who suggests right-wing populist voters hold significantly different attitudes to immigration, culture and populism. 13 In addition, Aichholzer et al suggest right-wing populism has gained support among socio-economic groups formerly associated with social democracy.14 There are also several important debates that fall outside this supply and demand divide. Mudde rejects the normal-pathology thesis that suggests populism is an anomaly and argues that, since the early 1990s, populism is a regular feature of Western European democracies.15 Geoffrey Harris controversially argued a ‘continuity thesis’ in 1994, according to Immerfell’s review article.16 This suggests that the populist right has developed from early-twentieth century fascism. However, Immerfell disagrees, as most right-wing populist parties today support democracy.17 An interesting non-academic argument from the think-tank Demos is that social media allows young people to transfer online support for ideas into active support in the ‘real world’ for right-wing populist parties.18 This literature prompts me to question if fears over immigration and cultural identity really do contribute to the rise of right-wing populist parties, as these factors seem popular in the literature. I also find Oesch’s distinction between the Alpine countries and others interesting and question whether it is still the case.19 This leads to my question of whether concerns about immigration and maintenance of Austrian culture have contributed to the rise of the FPÖ. These two areas seem linked; immigration may cause indigenous peoples to worry the country will lose its cultural identity. As seen above, supply and demand factors cannot be completely separated. Thus, I will examine both, looking at voters’ interests, as well as how the FPÖ addresses them. 11

Aichholzer, J. et al. (2014), “How had Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria”, West European Politics, 37:1, pp.113-137. 12 Van der Brug, W. and Fennema, M. (2009), “The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union”. 13 Kehrberg, J. E. (2015), “The Demand Side of Support for Radical Right Parties”, Comparative European Politics, 13, pp. 553-576. 14 Aichholzer, J. et al. (2014), “How had Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria”. 15 Mudde, C. (2004), “The Populist Zeitgeist”. 16 Immerfell, S. (1996), “Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System”. 17 Ibid 18 Jamie Bartlett et al (2011), The New Face of Digital Populism, London: Demos. 19 Oesch, D. (2008), “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland”.


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Methodology I will conduct a case study of Austria’s FPÖ since 2007, when they left government. 20 The FPÖ stands out as an unusual case, due to their previous holding of power, the role of culture in Austria suggested in the literature and their electoral success in the first round of the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections, despite their eventual defeat.21 I have chosen this timescale as it allows me to study the reasons behind their rise from their unsuccessful elections in 2006, that led to them leaving government in 2007, up to their popularity in 2016.22 I will use three main data sources; the 2011 party programme of the FPÖ (the most recent), the Eurobarometer data series from April 2007 to May 2016 and a translation of an interview with the FPÖ Presidential candidate Norbert Hofer, recorded on the 12th May 2016.23 Data Analysis I analysed the 2011 party programme of the FPÖ both quantitatively and qualitatively. I conducted content analysis, measuring the frequency of common words in the programme. This quantitative analysis provides an objective reading of the key themes of the programme. This prevented me paying more attention to those sections that highlighted immigration or culture. In a larger scale study, I would have compared this content analysis with similar analysis of FPÖ documents over time to see if their focus has shifted and if so, what relationship this had with their electoral support (FPÖ, 2011).24 I counted the frequency of words and phrases that were prominent or linked to major policy throughout the programme, excluding the title and preamble. Thus, Austrian and freedom were never counted in the context of the party name. Table 1 shows the data I captured, ordered from most frequent words to least frequent. Immigration does not feature highly, with the words immigration and immigrants 20

BBC (2007), Austrian rivals in coalition deal. Heinisch, R. (2008), “Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism”, Oesch, D. (2008), “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland”; BBC (2016a), Austria election: Far-right tops first round of presidential vote. 22 BBC (2006), Victory for Austrian Opposition; BBC (2016a), Austria election: Far-right tops first round of presidential vote; BBC (2016b), Austria far-right candidate Norbert Hofer defeated in presidential poll. 23 FPÖ (2011), “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), as resolved by the Party Conference of the Freedom Party of Austria on 18 June 2011 in Graz”; Eurobarometer Series (2016); Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 5/12/2016 24 FPÖ (2011), “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), as resolved by the Party Conference of the Freedom Party of Austria on 18 June 2011 in Graz”. 21


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Word/Phrase

Frequency

Austria/Austrian Freedom Culture/Cultures/Culturally Citizens Security Society Health Homeland Economy/Economic European Law Autonomy/Autonomous Community Solidarity Family Education/Educational German Traditions Neutral/Neutrality Liberal History Immigration/Immigrants Sovereign/Sovereignty Language Prosperity Christianity

45 37 30 20 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 10 10 10 10 9 7 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2

Table 1

Word/Phrase

Frequency

Austria/Austrian Freedom Culture/Cultures/Culturally Citizens Society Homeland Community Solidarity German Traditions History Language Christianity

45 37 30 20 15 13 10 10 7 5 4 3 2

Table 2


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together only appearing three times. However, words linked to Austrian culture and community are common. I have highlighted the most obvious of these in Table 2.25 There are limitations to this type of content analysis. I chose which words to count and although I attempted to be objective, it is possible that I missed out some important words. I also counted some words together, such as Austria and Austrian, to make the data easier to analyse, as the words are clearly linked, but this could be too simplistic. Nevertheless, this content analysis illustrates how the FPÖ emphasised the culture of Austria in their party programme of 2011, yet suggests that immigration was not so prominent.26 However, content analysis does not show the meaning behind the words and the message the FPÖ were trying to convey. Thus, I used discourse analysis to study the semiotics of the programme. In a larger scale project, I would have analysed the whole document. However, I analysed only the section on ‘Homeland, Identity and Environment’, as this was the section most relevant to my research question. In the first paragraphs, there appears to be an emphasis on a shared ancestry in Austria, with terms such as ‘forefathers’ and homeland. There is an implication that this homeland belongs to those of German descent and some minorities, such as Slovenians and the Roma. This suggests that Austria is not and cannot be the home of immigrants from further afield.27 This is made more explicit in the following paragraphs. Although showing support for the principle of asylum, the programme states that ‘Those entering Austria from a safe third country should apply for asylum there’. This suggests that the FPÖ would act against Austria taking in significant numbers of refugees, although it was published before the current refugee crisis. The programme then states ‘Austria is not a country of immigration’. This implies that there exists a divide between ‘countries of immigration’ and others and states may choose between these two categories. They advocate a pro-natal policy as an alternative to immigration, which suggests that they wanted a racially homogenous country. They also state that ‘immigrants who are already integrated…should be given the right to stay’. This suggests those immigrants in Austria who are not integrated should be expelled and no further immigrants should be admitted, unless they speak German and ‘have set down cultural roots’. This latter phrase suggests immigrants should adopt Austrian culture, rather than creating a multicultural Austria. 28

25

Ibid Ibid 27 Ibid 28 Ibid 26


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The next paragraphs focus on European culture and religion. The programme claims that ‘Europe was decisively shaped by Christianity, influenced by Judaism and other non-Christian religious communities’. There is an obvious omission of Islam, despite its importance in Europe throughout history. This thereby suggests there is something ‘non-European’ about Islam. They go on to say they will protect European values against ‘fanaticism and extremism’, which implies Islamic fundamentalists. They heavily emphasis the separation of church and state and the freedom ‘to not be exposed to religious doctrines’. This would suggest that they advocate cultural Christianity, rather than a truly religious interpretation. 29 The final paragraph focuses on the environment. They advocate environmental protection as it is ‘a basis for our existence in our homeland’. This suggests that they view the ‘homeland’ not just as an abstract notion, but a physical entity that requires care.30 From my qualitative analysis of this section of the FPÖ’s programme, it seems that Austrian culture and concerns about immigration feature highly in the FPÖ’s priorities.31 However, I only examined that section and in any discourse analysis, the attitude of the researcher affects their reading of the data. My analysis of the Eurobarometer was wholly quantitative, as the quantitative nature of the data meant any deeper analysis would be difficult. It was a descriptive analysis, as this is not a large enough research project to complete significant statistical analysis. Otherwise, I would have analysed whether a correlation existed between polling data for the FPÖ and the Eurobarometer data on immigration. Instead, I have described the trend of how much of a concern immigration is to Austrians. It is reasonable to assume most of those putting immigration as a top concern do so because they want it reduced. I used the data from each Eurobarometer series from April 2007 to May 2016, which are Eurobarometer 67 to 85. I then produced a graph illustrating how concerned Austrians were with immigration, shown in Figure 1. 32 The graph shows a clear rise in worries about immigration amongst the Austrian public from 2013, with a decrease in 2016. It peaked in May 2015, with 56% of Austrians surveyed stating immigration as one of the two most important issues facing Austria.33

29

Ibid Ibid 31 Ibid 32 Eurobarometer Series (2016). 33 Ibid 30


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Percentage of Austrians Naming Immigration as One of the Two Most Important Issues Facing Austria 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Date Eurobarometer Data Taken

Figure 1 This trend occurred as the FPÖ grew in popularity. However, it should be noted Hofer’s campaign took place in 2016, when concerns about immigration fell slightly amongst Austrians. Nevertheless, it does seem that worries about immigration rose as the same time as the FPÖ regained popularity. Although this does not imply causation, it would suggest there is a relationship between such worries and support for the FPÖ. I have used discourse analysis in analysing the Hofer interview. The interview discusses a broad range of issues surrounding the election. I have chosen to analyse the sections discussing Hofer and the FPÖ’s policy stances and attitudes, rather than electoral strategies and challenges. Although these strategies could be an important part of the FPÖ’s success, they are not as relevant to this research project.34 The first section focuses on how Hofer wants to present Austria to the world. Hofer uses phrases such as ‘self-awareness’ and ‘strength’ to suggest that he, and by extension, the FPÖ, would want Austria

34

Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview.


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to be independent and that it should prioritise its own interests. He links this with the ‘industry delegation’, suggesting that such realist international politics have beneficial economic results.35 After a section on electoral strategies and challenges, Hofer rejects the suggestion that he is an extreme-right candidate. He describes himself as a conservative and peaceful politician. This signals that one can only be extreme-right if one is violent, meaning Hofer and the FPÖ cannot be extreme. He also references his father’s role in the FPÖ. This links the FPÖ with family values. 36 Next, the interviewer asks why Hofer did not attend the last Festival of Joy, which celebrates the Nazi withdrawal from Austria, leading to a discussion on World War II. Hofer argues that as well as a day of joy, there should be reflection on those who died due to the war. This suggests he would like to see the kind of patriotic remembrance of the dead seen in Britain and the U.S. 37 Hofer is then questioned about his membership of a student fraternity that designates Germany, rather than Austria, as their ‘fatherland’. Hofer says he is ‘a patriot of Austria’ and it is his fatherland. He suggests that the fraternity has been unfairly labelled as holding extreme views. During this defence, he says that ‘no matter where in life you are…always put the people first’. This explicitly populist line also has anti-immigration and nationalistic signallers. His earlier emphasis on Austria suggests that ‘the people’ here means Austrians. Hofer suggests Austria is part of the ‘German cultural sphere’, but is ‘its own nation’. This would suggest he sees a link with Germany, but is not a German nationalist in terms of advocating reunification.38 They then discuss the prohibition law, which makes it illegal for ‘denying Nazi crimes or speaking favorably [sic] about Nazis’. Hofer claims that ‘it is normal to hate Jews in the areas that the new immigrants come from’. This is a suggestion that the ‘new immigrants’, as the norm, are Middle-Eastern and Muslim and signals that they, as a group, hold discriminatory views. Hofer argues Austrians know this is unacceptable, signalling a cultural divide between Austrians and new Middle-Eastern immigrants. He states ‘there is a dangerous mood among the people of Austria and immigrants’. This suggests that Austrians

35

Ibid Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 36


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should feel threatened by immigration. He claims ‘They have built up a new mood when they came to this country’.39 The repeated use of ‘they’ effectively creates an ‘Other’ in Muslim immigrants. 40 Hofer is then questioned on the role of the President. After a discussion on comments made by Hofer opponent, the Green Party’s candidate Alexander van der Bellen, Hofer says suggestions to merge the role of President and Chancellor are necessary. This signals to voters he does not want to hoard power and supports democracy, a useful electoral tactic.41 The interview ends with Hofer being asked if he expects to be successful. He states that ‘the voters must decide’, again suggesting that he values democracy. However, he also says he is ‘very hopeful’, signalling he is positive about his chances of winning the presidency.42 Like the party programme Hofer’s interview suggests that worries about culture feature prominently in the FPÖ’s policies, with references to the differences between Austrian culture and the rest and a strong current of patriotism throughout. However, there are also clearly concerns about immigration and perhaps if he was asked directly about immigration, it would be more clear what role it played in the FPÖ’s success.43 A limitation to this analysis is that I could find no information on the interviewer, Paul Tesarek, in English.44 This means I may have missed some understanding of the relationship between interviewer and interviewee. For this analysis, I have tried to assume they have a neutral opinion of each, which is unlikely. Overall, my research’s preliminary findings suggest that it is likely that concerns about immigration and maintenance of Austrian culture have contributed to the rise of the FPÖ. It suggests cultural worries are perhaps more important, but further understanding of how fears over cultural protection may lead to anti-immigration beliefs is needed. On the demand-side, support for the FPÖ seems to have risen with concern about immigration, although further research is needed to see if this correlates. On the supply-side,

39

Ibid Said, E. (2003), Orientalism, 25th Anniversary edition, London: Penguin Classics; Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 41 Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 42 Ibid 43 FPÖ (2011), “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), as resolved by the Party Conference of the Freedom Party of Austria on 18 June 2011 in Graz”; Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 44 Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 40


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the FPÖ and its Presidential candidate, Hofer, emphasise both immigration and even more so, Austrian culture. Conclusion In conclusion, my research project has made some attempt at answering what explains the rise in electoral support for populist parties and politicians in established democracies through a case-study of the rise of the FPÖ in Austria. I did so through a mixed method approach, using an array of data sources. My research design centred around the question of whether concerns about immigration and maintenance of Austrian culture have contributed to the rise of the FPÖ. It looked at both supply and demand factors, studying how the FPÖ attracts support by highlighting these issues and the levels of concern amongst Austrians about immigration. My preliminary findings suggest that immigration has played a role in the growth in support for the FPÖ, but cultural fears are more significant. This is particularly evident on the supply-side, with the FPÖ drawing more attention to culture. The strengths of my research project stem from the mixed-method approach. The rise of the FPÖ involves the whole country of Austria, both its supporters and others, and thus large-N, quantitative data is important to see broad trends across the population. However, this alone does not give in-depth reasons for why people choose to support the FPÖ and thus I used qualitative data to explore the message of the FPÖ. In a larger study, I would have conducted qualitative research with their supporters. This mixed-method approach allows for balanced research. Weaknesses in my project include the language barrier, which meant that I could not access all the available documents. I also did not investigate the Austrian population’s attitude to their culture, in the same way that I did with immigration through the Eurobarometer. My discourse analyses were also undoubtedly affected by my own worldview. Further research needs conducted to investigate the relationship between immigration and worries over losing a country’s culture. Comparative research would be useful to see if my preliminary findings can be generalised across other European populist parties. Overall, my research project suggests that the FPÖ, an Austrian populist right-wing party, have enjoyed increasing success due to concerns about Austrian cultural identity and, to a slightly lesser extent, immigration.


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References Aichholzer, J. et al. (2014), “How had Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria”, West European Politics, 37:1, pp. 113-137. Bartlett, J. et al. (2011), The New Face of Digital Populism, London: Demos. BBC (2006), Victory for Austrian Opposition, [Online] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5396060.stm [Accessed: 19/12/16]. BBC (2007), Austrian rivals in coalition deal, [Online] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6242505.stm [Accessed: 19/12/16]. BBC (2016a), Austria election: Far-right tops first round of presidential vote, [Online] Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36124256 [Accessed: 19/12/16]. BBC (2016b), Austria far-right candidate Norbert Hofer defeated in presidential poll, [Online] Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe38202669 [Accessed: 09/12/16]. Eatwell, R. (2003), “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right”, In Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, pp. 47-73. Eurobarometer Series. (2016), [Online] Available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index #p=1&instruments=STANDARD&surveyKy=2130 [Accessed: 09/12/2016]. FPÖ. (2011), “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), as resolved by the Party Conference of the Freedom Party of Austria on 18 June 2011 in Graz” (English), [Online] Available at https://www.fpoe.at/themen/parteiprogramm/ [Accessed: 08/12/2016]. Hay, C. (2011), “Political Ontology”, In R.E. Goodin, The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), [Online] Available at http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.00 1.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-023 [Accessed: 28/12/16]. Heinisch, R. (2008), “Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism”, In Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67-83. Immerfall, S. (1996), “Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System”, West European Politics, 19:2, pp. 410-415. Kehrberg, J. E. (2015), “The Demand Side of Support for Radical Right Parties”, Comparative European Politics, 13, pp. 553-576. Lubbers, M. et al. (2002), “Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 41:3, pp. 345-378. Mondon, A. (2014), “The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?”, Modern & Contemporary France, 22:13, pp. 301-320. Mudde, C. (2004), “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition 39:4, pp. 542–563.


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Oesch, D. (2008), “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland”, International Political Science Review, 29:3, pp. 249-373. Rooduijn, M. et al. (2016), “Expressing or Fuelling Discontent? The Relationship Between Populist-Voting and Political Discontent”, Electoral Studies, 43, pp. 32-40. Said, E. (2003), Orientalism, 25th Anniversary edition, London: Penguin Classics. Van der Brug, W. and Fennema, M. (2009), “The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union”, Journal of European Integration 31:5, pp. 589-608. Xu, A. (2016), [English subtitles] Norbert Hofer (FPÖ) interview. 5/12/2016 [Online] Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3d1BltNfsl8 [Accessed: 19/12/2016].


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Explaining the recruitment of young males into terrorist networks in France: A focus on marginalisation and identity

Lioui Benhamou, 3rdYear BSocSc Politics and International Relations

Abstract: The purpose of this research report is to explain and analyse the reasons for the recruitment of young males into terrorist organisations. I identify the issues of marginalisation and of identity as important factors in the recruitment of young French jihadists. This research produces results based upon the 2014 European Social Survey in France, interviews collected by David Thomson in his book “Les Français Jihadistes” 1, and the 15th issue of the propaganda magazine of Daesh, “Dabiq”. The aim is to show that young people are more likely to feel marginalised in France and that this is one of the reasons that make certain young males join terrorist groups. I conclude my research by finding that marginalisation and a need for a sense of belonging to a group do explain why some young males are recruited into terrorist organisations.

Introduction The number of terrorist attacks has increased in recent years.2 Those terrorist plots in Western democracies stoked debates about national security and how to counter terrorism.3 But one of the most striking aspects of recent terrorist events in Western Europe is that they are increasingly committed by home-grown terrorists.4 We can assume almost instinctively that these young males feel like they do not belong to their country, as they often target civilians of their own country. This suggests that their need for an identity plays a role in their recruitment. The focus on France is explained by the fact that European

1

Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes, Paris: Les Arènes. Global Terrorism Data (2016) [Online]. 3 Lahav, G. and Arie Pr. (2016), "14 Immigrant integration, political radicalization and terrorism in Europe: some preliminary insights from the early millennium (2000–2010)", Handbook on Migration and Social Policy, 265, pp 265-6. 4 AIVD (2006), Violent Jihad in the Netherlands – Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, General Intelligence and Security Service in the Netherlands (AIVD) [Online]. 2


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Jihadism began there.5 Focusing on the country in which it started makes it supposedly easier to identify the trends that are responsible for the recruitment of young males. What appears significant to know if we want to understand such a phenomenon is the reason for the recruitment of young males into terrorist organisations. By knowing the causes of recruitment we can effectively start to prevent it, by adopting the right counter-terrorist policies that are shaped by our understanding of how terrorism works.6 That is why this topic of terrorist motivation is important to study. If we adopt the belief that all terrorists are simply mad, it forces us to adopt misguided policies that "can needlessly prolong campaigns of violence"7 – such views have a powerful impact on government policy.8 Instead, we should study the phenomenon of terrorism with no "preconceived notion of their essence" 9 to be as objective as possible. In order to study the reasons that explain the recruitment of young males into terrorist groups, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debates. Then I will explain why I have decided to focus on marginalisation and identity as a reason of recruitment. In order to explore this idea, I will use several sources to analyse if there is a part of the French population that is inclined to feel marginalised, and whether this marginalisation is a necessary condition for being recruited. My analysis will focus on two hypotheses, the first one being that "Young people are more inclined to feel marginalised in France". The second hypothesis is that "Marginalisation and a need for an identity is a factor that is necessary to facilitate the recruitment of young males into terrorist groups in France". Young males who are recruited into terrorist groups are looking for a sense of belonging, which explains why they join a terrorist group even if their condition in France is acceptable.

5

Khosrokhavar, F. (2016), "The new European Jihadism and its avatars", Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society–J-RaT, 2:2, p 1. 6 Abrahms, M. (2008), "What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy," International Security, 32:4, p78. 7 Silke, A. (1998), "Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research." Psychology, Crime and Law, 4:1, p.52. 8 Silke, A.. (2008), "Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of jihadi radicalization", European journal of criminology, 5:1, p.103. 9 Sageman, M. (2008), Leaderless jihad:Terror networks in the twenty-first century, University of Pennsylvania Press, p.15.


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Literature Review Consensus: not a single reason, but many. The current study of the reasons that make someone become a terrorist has "no clear delineation".10 Indeed, this lack of a strong consensus can be explained by the heterogeneity of terrorist motives and behaviours.11 However, recent studies and research about terrorism find some ground to agree on, for instance that trying to understand terrorism only by looking at personality traits and psychological trouble is insufficient. 12 While some research argues that paranoid and narcissistic pathology exists for some terrorists.13 This is not an observation we can apply to every one of them.14 Thus, not all terrorists have the same pathways to becoming recruited.15 It is commonly argued that recruitment of young males is due to multiple causes, 16 rather than claiming that all individuals are identifiable by some common personality traits or psychological features.17 In fact, most researchers now agree with the statement that "terrorists are essentially normal individuals"18 and that there is not a single uniform mentality of terrorists.19 This idea is confirmed by some researchers who interviewed terrorists.20

10

Sageman, M. (2014), "The stagnation in terrorism research", Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 26:4, p.566. Victoroff, J. (2005), "The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches", Journal of Conflict resolution, 49:1, p.4. 12 Horgan, J. (2014), "The Psychology of Terrorism. Revised and updated second edition", New York: Routledge, p70. 13 Johnson, P. W. and Theodore B. F. (1992), "Personality types and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives", Forensic Reports, pp.293-303. 14 Silke, A. (1998), "Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research", p.53. 15 Horgan, J. (2014), "The Psychology of Terrorism. Revised and updated second edition", p 87. 16 Crelinsten, R. D. (1987), "Terrorism as political communication: The relationship between the controller and the controlled", Contemporary research on terrorism, p5-6. 17 LaFree, G. and Ackerman, G. (2009), "The empirical study of terrorism: Social and legal research", Annual Review of Law and Social Science, p 349. 18 Silke, A. (1998), "Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research", p 53. 19 Tilly, C. (2005), "Terror as strategy and relational process", International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46:1-2, p.21. 20 Post, J., Ehud S. and Denny, L. (2003), "The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists", Terrorism and political Violence, 15:1, p.177. 11


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It is also consensus that there is no evidence for the simplistic explanation that economic deprivation and a lack of education is a sufficient reason for terrorist recruitment.21 Some scholars argue that economic reasons can play a role for terrorists in poor countries;22 this reason is not valid in case of home-grown terrorists, as many young males who join terrorist groups are not necessarily the poorest of the country they are born in.23 These young males are engaged in a political process and devote time and energy to it; hence, they tend to be in the educated and politicised section of the population.24 This observation is backed up by many scholars and their research.25 This means that the characterisation of terrorists as necessarily economically deprived must be considered insufficient, if not irrelevant. Debate: Socio-political gain or social organisation? One of the main debates is concerned with what terrorists want to achieve. Crenshaw argues young males join a terrorist group to achieve certain political goals, based on the "calculation of the benefit [...] to be gained from an action".26 This conception sees terrorism as a rational choice against a more powerful enemy and produces a framework to analyse terrorism.27 Other scholars such as Abrahms challenge this model and argue that the terrorists’ priority is not to achieve a political goal but to "perpetuate their existence" as a group. 28 Those who see terrorism as a form of social organisation claim that, on the individual level, a quest for personal meaning and significance can be one of the reasons for joining a terrorist group.29

21

Krueger, A. B. (2008), What Makes a Terrorist, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp 1-3. Stern, J. (2000), "Pakistan's Jihad culture", Foreign Affairs, pp 121-122. 23 Khosrokhavar, F. (2016), "The new European Jihadism and its avatars", p 8-9. 24 Lee, A. (2011), "Who becomes a terrorist?: Poverty, education, and the origins of political violence." World Politics, 63:2, pp 203-204. 25 Krueger, A. B. and MaleÄ?kovĂĄ, J. (2003), "Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?", Journal of Economic perspectives, 17:4, pp.119-144; Sageman, M. (2004), Understanding terror networks, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press; Silke, A. (2008), "Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of jihadi radicalization". 26 Crenshaw, M. (1987), "Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches", The Journal of strategic studies, 10: 4 p.14. 27 Dugan, L., LaFree, G. and Piquero, A. R. (2005), "Testing a rational choice model of airline hijackings", International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, pp.340361. 28 Abrahms, M. (2008), "What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy", International Security, 32:4, p 96. 29 Kruglanski, A. W., and Fishman, S. (2009), "Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis", Social Issues and Policy Review, 3:1, p.9. 22


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A discussion on jihadists’ motives emerged from this broad debate. Bartlett and Miller found that the shared goal of the people they studied was social engagement rather than violent political action.30 Meanwhile, other scholars argue in favour of the instrumental approach, whose main assumption is that "terrorism is a deliberate choice by a political actor".31 The key difference here is that the first side of the debate assumes the process of radicalisation includes a social aspect and is due to reasons such as a perceived war on a group, moral outrage when facing an injustice, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization by an existing network.32 The role of identity and marginalisation While scholars agree that young males are the social group which is the most likely to use violence33, the reasons that explain their recruitment into terrorist organisations are, as outlined, debated. Still, there is one more reason emerging that seems to be interesting to investigate for this case: the need for revenge after having lived with some degree of marginalisation.34 A feeling of injustice and unfairness is argued to be the first step towards terrorism.35 Even if, like in the case of so-called Islamist terrorism, other reasons – such as a distorted understanding of religion – play a role, marginalisation is undeniably one of the main factors.36 This marginalisation, present in Europe, opens the door to potential self-recruitment into terrorist groups. 37 Borum proposes a simple four stage model to understand how the feeling of marginalisation can evolve into radicalisation, with grievance as the first step, injustice as the second, target attribution as the third and distancing/devaluation at the end.38 The case of France and the young males there who join terrorist groups seem to be in accordance with this trend. At an age where ideals of

30

Bartlett, J. and Miller, C. (2012), "The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent radicalization", Terrorism and Political Violence, 24:1, pp.1-21. 31 Crenshaw, M. (1987), "Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches", The Journal of strategic studies, 10:4, p 13. 32 Sageman, M. (2008), Leaderless jihad:Terror networks in the twenty-first century, pp 71-88. 33 Farrington, D. P. (2003), "Developmental and life‐course criminology: Key theoretical and empirical issues‐the 2002 Sutherland Award address", Criminology, 41:2, p 221-225. 34 Silke, A. (2008), "Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of jihadi radicalization", p 113. 35 Moghaddam, F. M. (2005), "The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration", American Psychologist, 60:2, p 163-164. 36 Spataro, A. (2008), "Why do people become terrorists? A prosecutor's experiences", Journal of International Criminal Justice, 6:3, p 507-524. 37 Speckhard, A. and Akhmedova, K. (2005), "Talking to terrorists", Journal of Psychohistory, 33:2, p 19. 38 Borum, R. (2011), "Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of conceptual models and empirical research", Journal of Strategic Security, 4:4, p 39.


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childhood are replaced, the jihadist offer attracts young males who did not find new ideals in their society.39 Becoming part of a collective identity allows them to overcome previous limitations due to their individual identity.40 Data Collection In order to test and examine the hypotheses, I will analyse results from different sources: the European Social Survey of 2014 of France, the book by David Thomson, Les Français Jihadistes.41 and the 15th issue of a propaganda magazine produced by Daesh, Dabiq. The quantitative data, the survey, is based on an individual unit of analysis. The sample size consists of 1889 French people. To make sure that the sample corresponds to the population, to reduce sampling error and nonresponse bias, it was decided to weigh the sample with the design weight "PSPWGHT" as recommended by the European Social Survey.42 As I want to study the phenomenon of marginalisation depending on the age of the respondents, I have recoded the variables to make the data easier to read. I have decided to recode the variable "Qualification of the impact of immigrants on the quality of life of the country", which is a scale variable from 0 to 10, into a variable with intervals called "Qualification group". The values from 0 to 3 now cover "Feel that they make the country worse", the values from 4 to 6 cover "Mixed feeling", and 7 to 10 cover "Feel that they make the country better". As for the age groups, I have recoded the variable "age of respondents" into "recoded age". I formed the groups "Young people", "Adults", "Middle aged" and "Old people", which respectively correspond to the age groups of 15 to 25, 26 to 45, 46 to 65 and +66. These transformations were made because I want to find out whether one group of age tends to have negative views about the other. If there is strong evidence that this is the case, we have proof that a phenomenon of marginalisation exists and that it tends to concern that group against which these views are held. If we accept this reasoning, then the data has the potential to make a claim about whether marginalisation exists in France.

39

Benslama, F. (2016), "The subjective impact of the jihadist offer", Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society–J-RaT, 2: 2, pp 78-9. 40 Castano, E. and Dechesne, M. (2005), "On defeating death: Group reification and social identification as immortality strategies", European review of social psychology, 16:1, p 233. 41 Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes. 42 European Social Survey, (2014) Weighting European Social Survey Data [Online], p 2-3.


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The main advantage of using a social survey is that it is representative of the population and can be used to test a hypothesis43. Thus, by using the European social survey done in France in 2014 I aim to find out primarily whether a phenomenon of marginalisation exits in France, and if it concerns one age group more than another. I want to make predictions about the French population and hope to find a significant difference between how young and old people see each other. A certain awareness of the survey conditions is needed: because the participants answer in a formal context, the way in which they respond might be affected44. In our case, for example, people could give a reply which is higher on the scale than they truly feel. Furthermore, age is probably not the only variable worth of interest, as social reality is multivariate, but to simplify the analysis a bivariate approach has to be used.45 That is why some qualitative data is needed. One on the main advantages of using qualitative data is that it can study some phenomena which cannot be studied with quantitative data alone. It can give information about how a phenomenon is locally constituted.46 Thus, the lack of in-depth explanation within quantitative data is compensated for. To analyse our interviews, I will use an analytic induction method. Because there is no fixed method for analysing interviews,47 I choose one which makes sense to use in this case. An analytic induction is the iterative process for testing hypotheses. I test the hypotheses person by person and acknowledge that they might need to be reformulated if there is negative evidence.48 Analytical induction is useful when we need to test "necessary and jointly sufficient conditions".49 This is what I aim to do by testing if marginalisation is a necessary condition for the recruitment of young males. This approach is appropriate because it allows us to provide a rich description of the different ways in which one phenomenon can occur.50 Of course, reality is

43

Bryman, A. (1998), Quantity and Quality in Social Research, London: Unwin Hyman, p 11-12. Fielding, N. G., and Fielding, J. L. (1986), Linking data: the articulation of qualitative and quantitative methods in social research, p 21. 45 Kellstedt, P. M. and Guy D. W. (2013), The fundamentals of political science research, Cambridge University Press, p 52. 46 Silverman, D. (2006), Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk,Text and Interaction, SAGE, p 43. 47 Alshenqeeti, H. (2014), "Interviewing as a data collection method: A critical review", English Linguistics Research, 3:1, p 41. 48 Fairweather, J. and Tiffany R. (2012), "Clarifying a basis for qualitative generalization using approaches that identify shared culture", Qualitative Research, 12:4, p 476. 49 Hammersley, M. (2012), "Troubling theory in case study research", Higher education research & development, 31:3, p 401. 50 Kvale, S. (1994), "Ten standard objections to qualitative research interviews", Journal of phenomenological psychology, 25:2, p 160. 44


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complex; hence, this is not a perfect solution. The hypotheses would have to be tested on every single terrorist to make sure that they are always valid.51 If, at the end of the analysis, all young males interviewed talk about something that we can relate to a feeling of marginalisation, then we will have strong evidence and reasons to believe that the hypotheses are right. All the interviews were recorded, anonymised, but not transcribed in a professional way, as the interviewer is not a scholar but a journalist. In total, there are recordings of twelve young males being interviewed. One of the main advantages of using unstructured interviews is that it gives “a valuable method for exploring the construction and negotiation of meanings in a natural setting�.52 In other words, it will allow us to see how young males who were recruited understand and express their stories. Another advantage linked to this topic is that only one percent of research reports have used interviews to provide data on jihadi extremism;53 thus, this is an excellent way to complement already existing research. There are, however, some limitations to using these interviews. Sageman draws our attention to the danger of "self-proclaimed media experts who conduct their own research"54 because it frames explanations of terrorism for the public, and the interviewers as well as the interviewees are not trained to analyse trends. But we can assume that we can overcome this challenge, as long as I focus only on the interviews and not the interpretation done by the author. Finally, I will analyse a document produced by a terrorist network. The magazine Daqib is produced by Daesh and is read by young French jihadists online. The issue used is in English, but the same magazine with the same articles is available in French. I want to see if this type of propaganda material can reflect our main issue, which is the need for identity after a feeling of marginalisation. I have decided to use a word cloud analysis in order to capture the results. That is because a word cloud quickly displays and summarises content55 and allows researchers to visualise unstructured text, making it easier to interpret it.56 To do this I 51

Hammersley, M. (2012), "Troubling theory in case study research", Higher education research & development 31:3, p 399. 52 Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morison, (2007), K. Research Methods in Education (6th ed), London: Routledge, p 29. 53 Silke, A. (2008), "Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of jihadi radicalization", p.101. 54 Sageman, M. (2014), "The stagnation in terrorism research", p 566. 55 Cidell, J. (2010), "Content clouds as exploratory qualitative data analysis", Area, 42:4, (2010), p.514. 56 ViĂŠgas, F. B. and Wattenberg, M. (2008), "Timelines tag clouds and the case for vernacular visualization", interactions, 15:4, p 49-52.


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used the website Wordle to generate a word cloud. Because I used a propaganda source, it is to be noted that these types of sources are "generally ignorant and sophomoric".57 However, this problem can be overcome by looking at a word cloud analysis because I am not considering the propagandistic arguments made, but merely the themes used. Thus, this is a useful method to investigate whether terrorist propaganda is using the themes we are looking into to appeal to the people terrorists recruit. Data Analysis These results are in accordance with our expectation that young people are more likely to be victims of marginalisation than to be the actor who creates it. First of all, it is visible, based on the Chi-Square significance test, that there is indeed an association between age and judgment of the impact of immigrants on the country’s quality of life (67.671 p<0.05), and thus between age and the association of negative value with different lifestyles and groups. In fact, the association is strong: As age increases, the level of positive views on immigrants tend to decrease. While one third (35,6 %) of old people feel that immigrants make the country worse, only about fifteen percent of young people (15,8 %) feel the same way. It is also interesting to note that, for each age group, the majority tends to have mixed feelings about the impact of immigrants on the quality of life of the country. This shows that most people might not associate immigrants with a major difference in the quality of life, either good or bad. The main result shown by this table is that the older the people are, the more they tend to associate immigrants with a strong decrease of the quality of life of their country. Thus, these results prove that there is an association between age and the view that there is a negative impact of immigration on the quality of life. The observation of this feeling helps us to deduce that there is a phenomenon of marginalisation in France. As there is a part of the population that believes that some people decreases the quality of life, some other people are the target of this feeling. This on its own does not prove that marginalisation exists in France, but it proves that one of its major conditions does. After seeing that there is, indeed, a feeling of discomfort among the French population in general, I want to see if this very broad aspect plays a role in the recruitment of young males. Indeed, while quantitative data can show that there is a part of the population which is more likely to be marginalised; only qualitative data can show if that marginalisation actually plays a role in the recruitment of young males.

57

Sageman, M. (2014), "The stagnation in terrorism research", Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 26:4, p 570.


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In order to check this, I am going to look at the people interviewed by Thomson.58 If they all express, to some extent, marginalisation and a need for an identity, I can consider the hypothesis to be true. Researchers need to be aware of the mentioned problem raised by Crenshaw, which is that terrorists might be unlikely to produce a clear and accurate reconstruction of their motives 59 because they are not objective. But even if they are not always able to identify their main motivation, they do not lack explanations60 and, thus, these interviews will allow us to see and understand what terrorists count as an explanation for their behaviour. Souleymane told Thomson : "It has an impact on you [to see French people on jihadist videos]. A guy who grew up like you, he lived the same thing as you. We have the same culture, we were born in France, we grew up in France. [...] If it is young people like me who go there, then me, I have no excuse."61 Interestingly, Souleymane cared that French people joined the group before he did; he wanted to know that others had similar experiences to him and that he was not alone. This comfort found in the idea of being not alone is also shared by Yassine, who said: "Before [finding other jihadists on a Facebook page] I was alone. [...] The more we look at videos of brothers who call for coming, the more we want to go there." 62 Thus, some terrorists explain that stopping the feeling of being alone is an important part of their recruitment. As Alexandre puts it: "Basically, it starts to form a community and that is what interested me."63 Most of them were either alone or on the margin of the population before joining the group. MickĂŤal defines himself before his recruitment as a "rebel teen, closed within himself"64 and Guillaume as a "thug".65 Abu Selyan said that because no one could give him the answers he wanted he started to be alone and not mixing with other people. Abu Ahmed acknowledges that the internet is a place where all these "rebels,

58

Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes. Crenshaw, M. (1998), "Questions to Be Answered, Research to be done, Knowledge to Be Applied", in Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, p 248. 60 Sageman, M. (2008), Leaderless jihad:Terror networks in the twenty-first century, p 76. 61 Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes, p 51-52. 62 Ibid, p 94. 63 Ibid, p 169. 64 Ibid, p 117. 65 Ibid, p 106. 59


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people against the system"66 can organise themselves. As Eric said, there is the goal to avoid bearing the injustices,67 which was one of the reasons Sageman mentioned, too.68 Abu Tasnim talked about how Bin Laden is like a father figure to him: "I really feel love for him. It really touches me when people insult him, [...] I have to answer as I can." 69 The figure of the father is important, as marginalisation can also mean a disconnection with the family – these young males look for an identity and an authority that makes them feel part of something. Wilson's story echoes this idea explicitly when he says: "When my father went to church, I was rather stealing cars. From time to time, he caught me and I went to church with him, but otherwise I never went." 70 Thus, these individuals escape their previous situation, in which they feel alone and marginalised, by forming a group. Abu Nai'ïm explains that doing the jihad is "not a way to die without bringing something to the Oumma [the Muslim community]."71 They feel the need to build a group, in opposition of the other group that they feel disregarded by. Abu Musab explains that for him "Humiliation is constant. Be it in the media which stigmatises Islam, in the look of people in the street, or at work – you don't feel comfortable."72 What we have seen is that all young males interviewed felt to some extent that their identity is either not respected or recognised and that they liked the idea of sharing an identity. As our hypothesis is that a feeling of marginalisation and a need for an identity is found in all interviewees to some degree, we can observe that the data gives strong evidence in favour of it. Finally, I will consider the propaganda material by Daesh to see the role that themes like marginalisation and identity play for recruitment. The propaganda created by Daesh uses a lot of words to define themselves or ‘the others’. Unsurprisingly, words such as "Allah", "Muhammad", "Islam", and "Lord" are used a lot, because of the religion-based ideology of the group. However, Daesh also uses many words to define themselves as a group, and to define others – they make use of dichotomies. 66

The words "Muslim", "soldiers", and "mujahidin"

Ibid, p 147. Ibid, p 175. 68 Sageman, M. (2008), Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century, p 71-73. 69 Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes, p 136. 70 Ibid, p 164. 71 Ibid, p 183. 72 Ibid, p 172. 67


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are present, but so are the words "Jesus", "Christians", "Jews" and "Disbelievers". This means that groups and their identities are very present in the rhetoric of this terrorist group, and that they want people who read them to identify themselves with the jihadist identity, as opposed to other ones. We can see that not only the use of religious terms is prominent in propaganda, but that there is, furthermore, a need to define a group identity. Hence, we can deduce from word cloud analysis that the sense of identity is very strong in this terrorist network and is used to recruit the young males who read it. Conclusion In order to expand further research and to confirm the relevance of my results it would be necessary to access more data of terrorists’ motives, for instance by conducting more interviews, especially to analyse the process from being marginalised to becoming deeply convinced by a terrorist ideology. I intended to show that young males in France who join terrorist groups experience some level of marginalisation, and that this marginalisation plays a role in their recruitment. According to the data I have assessed, marginalisation and identity both play an important part. Marginalisation and a search for identity appear to be a necessary condition, but of course they are not the only parameters that play a role. Appendix The original extract of Thomson's book, in French, used and translated in the research: https://docs.google.com/document/d/11Kfj9yc6b5hCSxB8zcU_uKMokFgPQ2Q_E6_3WdF7rI4/edit?u sp=sharing

References Abrahms, M. (2008), "What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy", International Security, 32:4, pp.78-105. AIVD (2006), "Violent Jihad in the Netherlands – Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, General Intelligence and Security Service in the Netherlands (AIVD)", [Online] Available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/50.pdf [Accessed 18th December 2016]. Akhmedova, K. and Speckhard, A. (2005), "Talking to terrorists. Journal of Psychohistory", 33:2, [Online] Available at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/36376608/Talking_to_Terrorists.pdf?AWSAccess KeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1483820475&Signature=jn4rFs7lHm%2FjdiJ%2BZ23u USM4GBY%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTalking_to_Terrorists.pdf [Accessed 15th December 2016].


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Alshenqeeti, H. (2014), "Interviewing as a Data Collection Method: A Critical Review", English Linguistics Research, 3:1, pp.39-45. Bartlett, J. and Miller, C. (2012), "The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and nonviolent radicalization", Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 24:1, pp.1-21. Benslama, F. (2016), "The subjective impact of the jihadist offer", Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society – J-RaT 2(2) pp.75-85. Borum, R. (2011), "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research", Perspectives on Radicalization and Involvement in Terrorism 4(4), pp.37-62. Bryman, A. (1988), Quantity and Quality in Social Research. London: Unwin Hyman. Castano, E. and Dechesne, M. (2005), "On defeating death: Group reification and social identification as strategies for transcendence", European Review of Social Psychology, 16, pp.221– 255. Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morison, K. (2007), Research Methods in Education (6th ed.), London: Routledge. Crelinsten R. D. (1987), "Terrorism as political communication: the relationship between the controller and the controlled", in Wilkinson, P. and Stewart, A. M. (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, pp.3–23. Crenshaw, M. (1987), "Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches", The Journal of strategic studies, 10(4), pp.13-31. Crenshaw, M. (1998), "Questions to Be Answered, Research to be done, Knowledge to Be Applied", in Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, pp.247-260. Denny, M., Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E. (2003), "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists", Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1) pp 171-184. Dugan L., LaFree G., Piquero A.R. (2005), "Testing a Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings", In: Kantor P. et al. (eds) Intelligence and Security Informatics. ISI 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3495. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer. European Social Survey (2014), ESS Round 7 [Online] Available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS7FR&c=FR&y=2014 [Accessed 9th December 2016]. European Social Survey (2014), Weighting European Social Survey Data [Online] Available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf [Accessed 11th December 2016]. Farrington, D. P. (2003), "Developmental and life‐course criminology: Key theoretical and empirical issues‐the 2002 Sutherland Award address", Criminology, 41:2, pp.221-225. Feilding, N. G. And Feilding, J. L. (1986), Linking Data, London: Sage. Global Terrorism Data (2016), [Online] Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=regions&search=Western%20europe [Accessed 28th December].


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Hammersley, M. (2012), "Troubling theory in case study research", Higher Education Research & Development, 31:3, 393-405. Horgan, J. (2014), The psychology of terrorism. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. Johnson, P. W. and Feldmann, T. B. (1992), "Personality types and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives", Forensic Reports, 5, pp.293-303. LaFree, G., & Ackerman, G. (2009), The empirical study of terrorism: Social and legal research. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5:1, pp.247-374. Lahav, G. and Perliger, A. (2016), "Immigrant integration, political radicalization and terrorism in Europe: some preliminary insights from the early millennium (2000-2010)" in Freeman, G. P. and Mirilovic, N. (eds) Cheltenham Handbook on Migration and Social Policy, UK: Edward Elgar, pp.265-290. Kellstedt, P. M. and Whitten, G. D. (2013), The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 2nd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khosrokhavar, F. (2016), "The new European Jihadism and its avatars", Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society–J-RaT, 2:2, pp.1-29. Krueger, A. B. (2007), What Makes a Terrorist, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003), "Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17:4, pp.119-144. Kruglanski, A. W., & Fishman, S. (2009), "Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis", Social Issues and Policy Review, 3:1, pp.1-44. Kvale, S. (1994), "Ten standard Objections to Qualitative Research Interviews", Journal of Phenomenological Pschology, 25:2, pp.147-173. Lee, A. (2011), "Who Becomes a Terrorist?: Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence", World Politics, 63:2, pp.203-245. Moghaddam, F. M. (2005), "The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration", American Psychologist, 60:2. Sageman, M. (2004), Understanding terror networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sageman, M. (2008), Leaderless jihad:Terrorist networks in the 21st century, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sageman, M. (2014), "The stagnation in terrorism research", Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 26:4, pp.565-580. Silke, A. (1998), "Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research", Psychology, Crime and Law, 4:1, pp.51-69. Silke, A. (2008), "Holy warriors exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization", European journal of criminology, 5:1, pp.99-123. Silverman, D. (2006), Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk,Text and Interaction, 3rd Edition, London: Sage. Spataro, A. (2008), "Why Do People Become Terrorists? A Prosecutor's Experiences", Journal of International Criminal Justice, 6:3, pp.507-524.


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Stern, J. (2000), "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", Foreign Affairs, 79:6, pp.115-126. Thomson, D. (2014), Les français Jihadistes, Paris: Les Arènes. Tilly, C. (2005), "Terror as strategy and relational process", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46:1-2, pp.11-32. Victoroff, J. (2005), "The mind of the terrorist. A review and critique of psychological approaches", Journal of Conflict resolution, 49:1, pp.3-42.


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The Divided Self: A Defence of Dissensus in International Political Economy

James Parker, 3rdYear Essay BA Politics and Modern History

Abstract: The ubiquitous classification of International Political Economy (IPE) into ‘British’ and ‘American’ ‘schools’ was popularised by Benjamin Cohen in 2007. Much like that between the analytical and continental strands of philosophy, the central dispute of this dialectic has often been superficially presented as primarily methodological. Debate has, unsurprisingly, availed no resolution. My primary objectives are fivefold: Disputing the boundaries of the imagined tradition (1), I foreground the power relations inherent in any such construction (2) and reconceptualise IPE as being divided between Postpositivist and Positivist, Heterodox and Orthodox, positions, thus illustrating the unreality of the Hegelian Syntheses (3). I next contextualise this debate within the broader debates in economics, international relations and philosophy (4) and, ultimately, defend a reflective dissensus within IPE (5). I conclude that monocultures are both undesirable and impossible; only a reflective dissensus can enable IPE to stake its claims to extensive ontology. Monoculture, or post-positive disengagement with IPE, serves to surrender IPE to a liberal-quantitative hegemony, which would undermine the potential of the field.

‘There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says "Morning, boys. How's the water?" And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes "What the hell is water?”’.

David Foster Wallace.1

My ontological object is the field of IPE itself, more specifically the contention that IPE has distinct geographically divided ‘schools’ that define its character; whereas other social science fields supposedly do

1

Wallace, D. (2009), This IsWater: Some Thoughts, Delivered on a Significant Occasion, about Living a Compassionate Life, New York: Little Brown Book Group, p.78.


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not. My article is structured as a deductive overview of the divisions and current state of the field of IPE couched in a problematisation of Cohen’s schools, and the debates it spawned. I focus on Cohen’s division because it catalysed much of the recent scholarship, including special editions of both Review of International Political Economy (RIPE) and New Political Economy (NPE), having more than any other ossified into IPE scholarship. At the heart of Cohens division is a ‘methodological competition between two ‘geographical heartlands’, Cohen’s American and the British 'schools’. 2 ‘[the American school] has come to resemble nothing so much as the methodology of neoclassical economics, [based on] positivism [and] formal modelling’, in which ‘knowledge is best accumulated through an appeal to objective observation and systematic testing’. 3 At core Cohen suggests that the American school possesses two guiding heuristic principles, rationalism and empiricism. 4 Whereas the British school by contrast is defined largely in opposition the American school, far more eclectic, critical, and passionate practitioners are possessive of an ‘oppositional frame of mind’. 5 The British school in Cohen’s view never forgets to ask the ‘Very Big Questions’ yet ‘may be fairly criticised for its less rigorous approach to theory building and testing, which makes generalisations difficult and accumulation of knowledge virtually impossible’. 6 In summary Cohen holds, ‘The American school is rationalist, practical, and prizes objectivity above all. […] The British school by contrast, is interpretive, sceptical about rational choice, and rejects a positivist epistemology’. 7 I explicitly avoid asserting the superiority of one ‘school’, this has been done many times, and has unsurprisingly achieved little resolution since this recent dialectic began, with Craig Murphy and Douglas Nelson’s 2001 work and more controversially Cohen’s 2007 article. 8 Mine is ultimately an immanent 2

Higgott, R. and Watson, M. (2008), “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe: Professor Cohen's Transatlantic Voyage in IPE”, Review of International Political Economy, 15: 1, p.13. 3 Cohen, B. (2007), “The Transatlantic Divide: Why are American and British IPE so Different?”, Review of International Political Economy, 14:2, 206, p.198. 4 Cohen, B. (2009), “The Multiple Traditions of American IPE” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge, p.23. 5 Cohen, ‘The Transatlantic Divide’, p.14. 6 Cohen, B. (2008), International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, Oxford: Princeton University Press, p.16. 7 Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus”, p.231. 8 Murphy, C. and Douglas, N. (2001), “International Political Economy a Tale of Two Heterodoxies”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3:3; Cohen, ‘The Transatlantic Divide’; Prominent examples of such zero-sum adversarial supremacy arguments include for the American School, include: David Lake, (2009), “TRIPs Across the Atlantic: Theory and Epistemology in IPE”, Review of International Political Economy 16:1 pp.4757. And for the British school, including: Ronen Palan (2011), “The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: IPE in Light of the Crisis 2007/8” in Nicola Phillips and Catherine Weaver (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge; Weaver, “IPE’s Split Brain”.


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critique. Indeed, much of the article’s purpose is influenced by Penny Griffin’s suggestion that one cannot write an objective account of the field or offer entirely dispassionate objective solutions opposed to Nicola Phillips’ and Catherine Weaver’s contention that any such division can be ‘benign’.9 This is not to embrace radical subjectivity, nor to reject every facet of Cohen’s or any division a priori. As discussed in Section One elements of Cohen’s characterisation are tautology, particularly his assessment of major US journals. 10 Equally, as Ronan Palan and Angus Cameron illustrate the ‘British school’ or heterodox IPE is pervaded by failings.11 Epistemologically, in order to philosophically transcend adversarial debates between the ‘schools’, I utilise elements of Poststructural critique.12 Poststructuralism offers a theoretically challenging perspective to the possibility of ‘objective pursuit of cumulative knowledge’ rarefied by the many IPE practitioners, whilst avoiding fetishisation of itself in the sense of purporting to produce absolute truth; 13 enabling us to position the very discipline of IPE as our operative ontological object. Methodologically I utilise historicised cross-discipline philosophical discussion, to foreground the ubiquitous failure of IPE scholars to locate the debate within a broader context, in doing so scholars tacitly ‘black box’ often foundational debates. 14 In order to evidence the expansion of Orthodoxy I adopt a quantitative approach in Section Three. Our discussion may initially appear insignificant or esoteric, divorced from IPE in praxis, indeed this view proliferates within the literature, scholars often refer to this debate as ‘navel gazing’; a self-fulfilling prophecy creating division, or suggesting that scholars should simply ‘get on’ with what is implied to be ‘real’ work. 15 I dispute these contentions. At the core of my objection is an understanding of Cohen’s distinction (or any such prescriptive typography) as a form of ‘truth production’, not inherently valuable but made so through the way in which (re)constructions and acceptance of such divisions distribute disciplinary

9

Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (2011), “Introduction: Debating the Divide: Reflections on the Past Present and Future of International Political Economy.” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, p.3; Griffin, P. (2011), “Poststructuralism in/and IPE” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 10 Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus”, p.235. 11 Palan, R. and Cameron, A. (2009), “Empiricism and Objectivity: Reflexive Theory and Construction in a Complex World” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge, pp.122-123. 12 Griffin, “Poststructuralism in/ and IPE”, p.44. 13 de Goede, M. (2006), “Introduction: International Political Economy and the Promise of Poststructuralism” in de Goede, M. (ed.) International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p.21. 14 Latour, B. (1999), Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, London: Harvard University Press, p.70. 15 Helleiner, E. (2011), “Division and Dialogue in Anglo-American IPE: A Reluctant Canadian View” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, p.178; McNamara (2009), “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1; Lake, “TRIPs Across the Atlantic: Theory and Epistemology in IPE”, p.47.


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power.16 In this view, dialectics over the nature of the field are extremely important. The creation of any monoculture or orthodox ontological consensus would be hugely significant in terms of what research is legitimised. One needs only to look toward Economics and IR. 17 Furthermore, while the British school may be removed from policy, the American IPE certainly is not. 18 Section One addresses the nature of the debate, attempting to foreground and ‘denaturalise’ foundational priori assumptions made in Cohen’s schools, in order to deduce where the significant divisions lie.19 Section Two focuses on the implications of tacit or explicit acceptance of prescriptive academic divisions in the same vein as Cohen’s. Section Three illustrates the current narrowing of the field, the methods by which this is achieved, and the intrinsic problems of monocultures. Section Four discusses possible solutions to the current quagmire, arguing that synthesis is both impossible and undesirable. I conclude, that dissensus is imperative given IPE’s unique scope and potential to challenge conventional rarefied boundaries of IR and economics; to surrender this field to a ‘quantitative-liberalism’ would be disastrous.20 Section I 'Yeah well, that’s just your opinion man.'

Jeffrey "The Dude" Lebowski.21

There are two ways in which we can assess Cohen’s division; practically as representing objective reality, and as a form of truth production. Firstly, do the schools reflect ‘reality’? In analysing the degree to which Cohen’s division reflects reality I focus on his geographic contentions and the intellectual history of the field which underpin Cohen’s schools. In terms of geography, Cohen has recently sought to distance himself from his prescriptive earlier understanding of ‘academic nationalism’ to one that focuses on ill16

de Goede, “Introduction”, p.7. Smith, S. (1996), “Positivism and Beyond” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Tenth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Schmidt, B. (2008), “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism”, Millennium, 36:2, pp.105-114; Wade, R. (2009), “Beware What You Wish for: Lessons for International Political Economy from the Transformation of Economics”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1, pp.106-121. 18 Murphy, C. (2011), “Do the Left Out Matter?” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge. 19 Peterson, S. (2006), “Getting Real: The Necessity of Critical Poststructuralism in Global Political Economy.” in de Goede, M. (ed.) International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p.135. 20 McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE.”, p.73; Wade, “Beware What You Wish for”, p.107. 21 “The Big Lebowski, "Yeah, Well, that's Just, like,Your Opinion Man”,YouTube. 17


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defined ‘intellectual cultures’. Yet the question still remains does a British American division become apparent along the lines proposed by Cohen, do ‘Yanks and Brits, by and large see the word differently’? 22 Upon superficial analysis the answer is, yes. Daniel Maliniak and Michael Tierney, utilising analysis predicated on data from the TRIP 12 surveys of more than eleven thousand American IR scholars, appear to offer a strong case that IPE is indeed dominated by scholars who self-define as following a positivist liberal ontology, suggesting the existence of a chronic transatlantic division confirmative to Cohen’s description. 23 However, Richard Higgott and Matthew Watson characterise Cohen’s schools as ‘caricature[s]’, in the sense that Cohen exaggerates the degree to which trends of limited scope conform to his definitions of the schools.24 There appears to be a consensus among scholars that the dozen journals analysed by Maliniak and Tierney accurately reflect the ‘zenith’ of IPE in America, which in turn does indeed largely seem to resemble Cohen’s characterisation of American IPE’s its methodology and ontology. Randall Germain’s demographic analysis of the academic contributors to the ‘dirty dozen’ journals, reveals them to be almost entirely composed of Harvard educated IR disciplined scholars, highlighting the degree to which structural factors have stunted practical pluralism in American academia. 25 What becomes clear is that the homogeneity implied by Cohen’s ‘stylized generalization’ is underpinned by the apartheid in American IPE academia. 26 Kathleen McNamara has demonstrated that the vast majority of American IPE which is published in less well known journals and particularly books by Cornell and Princeton University presses, defies Cohen’s American paradigm. 27 However, returning to Maliniak and Tierney, whilst initially convincing, the impact of their analysis is problematised by limitations in their data, including most significantly: the hierarchic nature of their data; an isolated focus on the most notable IPE journals undermining the degree to which results reflect the entirety of IPE as a field; Maliniak and Tierney’s data’s emphasis on the TRIP 12; and the lack of nuance with which reporting units responses were recorded. These

22

Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide”, pp.30-34; Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus”, p.234; van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, Bruff, I. and Ryner, M. (2011) “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives: Moving Beyond the Debate on the ‘British School’” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, pp.215-222. 23 Maliniak, D. and Tierney, M. (2009), “The American School of IPE”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1 pp.6-33. 24 Higgott and Watson. “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.15. 25 Randall, G. (2009), “The “American” School of IPE? A Dissenting View”, Review of International Political Economy, 16: 1, p.100. 26 Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide: A Rejoinder.”, p.31. 27 McNamara (2009), “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”, pp.72-84; Kirshner, J. (2011), “The Second Crisis in IPE Theory”, in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, p.207.


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limitations serve to place excess emphasis on status quo ontologies and practices.28 The exclusions of the complexity and plurality of these scholars’ ontologies and methodologies is inherent to the binary means of data collection utilised by Maliniak and Tierney, suggesting that they practiced a greater range of ontologies and methodologies than were published in the TRIP 12. There have also been more general criticisms of Cohen’s geographic dichotomy, Mark Blyth proposes the existence of schools (particularly beyond the Anglosphere) not captivated by Cohen’s binary dichotomy. 29 John Ravenhill exemplifies a more forceful rejection of Cohen’s schema, fundamentally undermining Cohen’s definition (or lack) of British IPE and providing an extensive list of well-known scholars anomalous to Cohen’s distinction.30 Such a conclusion suggests that the geographic typologies of Cohen are far more disputed and tenuous than his rhetoric certitude implies. Turning briefly toward possibly the worst excess of Cohen’s ‘intellectual history’, the history aspect, extremely narrow and tied to an IR centric aberration of IPE’s past, understood as arising from ‘bridges between international economics and IR’.31 Cohen’s history is terminally shackled to his myopic ‘magnificent seven’, his intellectual history implies that the intellectual tradition of IPE before was a tabula rasa so dispersed and insufficient that 1970 amounts to the ‘year zero’.32 The practical purpose of this main narrative is belied by Cohen’s schizophrenic parallel history in which he recognises the limits of his larger narrative: recognising the existence of Political Economy before formalisation; recognising the lack of existing historic consensus; and the lack of historic precedent or his schools.33 The purpose of Cohen’s primary narrative is that such certainty provides him with the legitimacy of the objective historian, present his solution as natural and necessary. 34 Cohen’s narrative is destabilised by the histories offered by Ravenhill, Robert Cox, Lucian Ashworth, Germain, and John Hobson, who despite stridently disparate focuses and methodologies, develop a narrative extending before 1970, including IPE’s Marxist and Realist past, IPE’s conceptualisation far beyond the bounds of IR, 28

McNamara (2009), “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”, pp.72-84; Germain, “The “American” School of IPE? A Dissenting View”, pp.95-105. 29 Blyth, M. (2009), “Torn Between Two Lovers? Caught in the Middle of British and American IPE”, New Political Economy, 14:3, pp.329-336. 30 Ravenhill, J. (2008), “In Search of the Missing Middle”, Review of International Political Economy, 15:1, pp.18-29. 31 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, p.11. 32 Clift, B. and Rosamond, B. (2009) “Lineages of a British International Political Economy” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge; Worth, O. (2011), “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 33 Cohen, International Political Economy, p.17; p.42; p.16; pp.4-5. 34 Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus: From Denial to Acceptance”, p.239; Cammack, P. (2011), “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.155-61.


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and a plethora of ‘magnificent’ practitioners.35 Cohen’s response to earlier versions of related charges of historical redaction or malfeasance was to retort that any narrative is an inherently subjective simplification and that therefore no one account can include the ‘cacophony’, Cohen further asserts his critics ‘risk losing sight of the forest for the trees’.36 However, in concurrence with Anna Leander I perceive such a description of the field as being per se problematic, especially given Cohen’s claims to objectivity and pluralism.37 For new scholars such a view serves to: malign the legitimate role ‘C’ritical ontologies including Marxism, Feminism, and Neo-Gramscians, discouraging theoretical innovation; and ironically preventing the accumulation of knowledge which Cohen elsewhere contends the British school critically lacks. 38 In the face of considerable opposition, Cohen has progressively through several articles moved from denial toward reticent acceptance regarding the objectivity of some of his claims, particularly the totality of his national borders and the completeness of his intellectual history. 39 Nevertheless, in his most recent reiteration of his position Cohen has largely retained the broad narrative of his original conceptualisation of IPE’s intellectual development and structure of the school.40 If Cohen’s schema is, in the words of Susan Strange (on a different matter), ‘woolly thinking’ in that it does not reflect reality and is thus his subjective opinion, Jeff Lebowski would no doubt suggest then, it does not matter. However, this is not to suggest, as Pauly does, that the field is gradually coalescing, quite the opposite, as the sheer weight and ferocity of response to Cohen attest that something far more significant than a ‘nerve’ or simple methodological debate has foregrounded.41 Significant cleavages have 35

Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle” pp.18-29; Cox, R. (2011), "The “British School” in the Global Context", in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, pp.119-132; Ashworth, L. (2011), “Missing Voices: Critical IPE, Disciplinary History and H.N. Brailsford’s Analysis of the Capitalist International Anarchy” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.9-26; Randall, G. (2011), “New Marxism and the Problem of Subjectivity: Towards a Critical and Historical International Political Economy”, in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Hobson, J. (2013), “Part 1 – Revealing the Eurocentric Foundations of IPE: A Critical Historiography of the Discipline from the Classical to the Modern Era”, Review of International Political Economy, 20:5, pp.1024-1054; Hobson, J. (2013), “Part 2 – Reconstructing the non-Eurocentric Foundations of IPE: From Eurocentric ‘Open Economy Politics’ to Inter-Civilizational Political Economy.” Review of International Political Economy, 20:5, pp. 1055-1081. 36 Cohen, International Political Economy, p.31. 37 Leander, A. (2009), “Why we Need Multiple Stories about the Global Political Economy”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:2, pp.321-328. 38 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, p.16. 39 Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide: A Rejoinder.”; Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, pp.174-177. 40 Cohen. “Toward a New Consensus”, p.233. 41 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”, p.21; Pauly, L. (2011), “The Gift of Scepticism and the Future of IPE.” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future,


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been uncovered, although these are far older and significantly deeper than Cohen’s shallow intellectual history (and many of the rejoinders) imply. Several critiques of Cohen’s division, such as Blyth with his Asian schools, and Ravenhill, have in praxis focused on rather granular mythological disputes over the definitions of the schools.42 Ravenhill and his missing middle, through a focus on the ontological and epistemological gulf between practitioners of the same ‘school’ seemingly incongruent to his typography, has provided a structurally destabilising critique of Cohen’s narrative.43 Such ontological and epistemological divisions are obviously existent; there have been ontological divisions from the very beginning of IPE as an academic field and indeed before.44 In 1984 Rodger Tooze recognised great variety in IPE as a nascent academic field; Liberal, World Systems, Structuralism, Mercantilism, Marxism. Such critiques often find themselves among strange bedfellows, the relative diverse assessments of IPE proffered by Ravenhill, Palan, Tooze and McNamara, Finnemore and Farrell, and Pauley.45 Recognising these more profound ontological divisions is relatively uncontroversial, to some extent these are accounted for within Cohen’s schema, though largely confined to the ‘British’ school. 46 Despite dramatic variations in their response to Cohen, he and these critics are unified in reconstructing the schools as a tangible division or at least in being in some sense indicative of the precedent ontological, methodological, and ideological debates, such reproduction however obscures normative disputes of contention. Higgott and Watson’s critique of Cohen is among the most sophisticated and aligned to my own assessment, yet they ultimately reject the primacy of any one normative debate across IPE, whereas I argue that IPE is divided along a major cleavage. 47 This division is best unveiled through problematising the philosophical base of the much-lauded Babel Tower of synthesis, or as it is often euphemistically referred to as ‘bridge-building’. Committing a kind of ‘denaturalisation’ Cohen presents IPE as being inherently, acutely, and unusually divided among social sciences, in a manner that must be remedied by synthesis; Jason Sharman

London: Routledge, p.214; Phillips and Weaver, “Introduction: Debating the Divide: Reflections on the Past Present and Future of International Political Economy”. 42 Blyth, M. (2009), “Introduction: International Political Economy as a Global Conversation”, in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge, p.11; Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle.” 43 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”. 44 Cox, ‘The “British School” in the Global Context’, pp.119-132. 45 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”; Tooze, R. (1984), “Perspectives and Theory: A Consumers’ Guide” in Strange, S. (ed.) Paths to International Political Economy, London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.1-22; McNamara (2009), “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”, pp.72-84; Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus”. 46 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, pp.44-66. 47 Higgott, and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”.


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uses the term ‘reconciliation’.48 However, IPE was never a Pangea to unify.49 Indeed many of the key points of contention in transatlantic debates and supposed differences in methodology were identified and critiqued by Strange in 1970, including: the failures of ‘hard’ rationality, game theory’s mechanical pronouncements, and the use of national, international, political, and economic as tangible boundaries. 50 Furthermore, if we expand the focus of our intellectual history to related fields of Social Science the myopic nature of Cohen’s foundations, alongside many of his critics, becomes evident. Turning toward for instance the fourth ‘Great Debate’ in IR, Brian Schmidt characterises this dispute in IR along much the same lines as the contemporaneous debate in IPE in which superficial claims to superior ontologies belie substantive debate ‘between positivism and postpositivism, or between rationalism and reflectivism’. 51Owen Worth elaborates on the minoring of such a debate in IPE suggesting that the major divisions in IPE are ‘the result of differences between American and British approaches to social science in general’. 52 Dorothy Ross suggests this division has underpinned the entire history of social science which forms a narrative of intractable conflict between a deeper interpretive model and a ‘desire to achieve universalist abstraction and quantitative methodologies’. 53 Neither are these disputes archaic holdouts, staunchly confined to the Methodenstreit era or indeed contemporary IR and Economics. Turning toward the emerging field of Security Risk Analysis in political science. One may observe an emergent discipline structurally comparative with IPE, featuring its cross-discipline roots and an extensive ontological scope, that exhibits incipient divisions largely mirroring those in IPE. Karen Petersen illustrates a nascent scholarship divided between an analytical economised orthodoxy and critical emancipatory heterodoxy.54 One of the few scholars in the RIPE and NPE special editions, despite being wedded to the school’s paradigm to recognise the presence these persistent Social Science disputes in the context of IPE, is Palan. The expression of this historic social science division between positivism and postpositivism, in the context of IPE is expressed in divisions between those Orthodox scholars who practice a ‘quantitative-liberalism’, what Jonathan Kirshner also characterised as HIM: Hyper-rationalism, Individualism, and Materialism

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Sharman, J. (2011), “Mantra, Bridges, and Benchmarks: Assessing the Future of IPE” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, p.199. 49 Tooze, “Perspectives and Theory: A Consumers’ Guide.”; Cox, “The “British School” in the Global Context”. 50 Strange, S. (1970), “International Economics and International Politics: A Case of Mutual Neglect”, International Affairs, 46:2, p.307. 51 Schmidt, “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism.”, p.107. 52 Worth, “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School”, p.130. 53 Ross, D. (1991), The Origins of American Social Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.473. 54 Karen, P. (2011), “Risk Analysis – A field within Security Studies?”, European Journal of International Relations, 18:4.


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monoculture.55 Distinguished from the Orthodoxy in that it can be ‘broadly understood as a collection of ontologies unified by cross-discipline use of philosophy, combining empirical and interpretive social science, unified at core by commitment to ‘emancipatory purpose’.56 In order to illustrate and clarify this dichotomy, I compare four articles and an edited collection of essays united by a shared purpose of deducing the causes and lessons arising from the Financial Crisis of 2007/8. Daniel Drezner, using rational choice institutional models of governance defends the paradigms and financial orthodoxy that he suggests predicated and managed the financial crisis 2007/8. 57 David Leblang and Sonal Pandya argue for increased orthodox economisation of IPE as a lesson from the crisis.58 Finally tuning toward Politics in the New Hard Times edited by Miles Kahler and David Lake, the contributors, despite the variations in areas of study, are largely united by a focus on traditional empiricist and micro economics and the underpinning rational choice model, alongside hard separation between political and economic factors in mechanism and solutions to the crisis.59 Typical of Heterodox approaches is McNally’s focus on the crisis and lessons for global fiancé and the left through a historic cross discipline analysis, and Peter Burnham’s Marxist based criticism of orthodox common sense managerial understandings of 2007.60 The fundamental difference between these texts is not the obvious methodological appendages fetishised by Cohen, or even the ontological and epistemological divisions between liberalism, neo-realism, Marxism, IR centrists which Germain focuses on.61 The core of this division is situated firmly at the meta-theoretical structural level, it is a staunch adversarial gulf between orthodox and heterodox ‘conception[s] of the reality to which they each appeal [is] fundamentally different 55

Kirshner, “The Second Crisis in IPE Theory”, p.204; Wade, R. “Beware What You Wish for”, p.107; For an enhanced understanding of the academic development of ideas in IPE see, for the Orthodox tradition: Cooley, A. (2009), “Contested Contracts: Rationalist Theories of Institutions in American IPE” in Blyth, M. (ed) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge; and for the Heterodox tradition: Clift and Rosamond, “Lineages of a British International Political Economy”. 56 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”; Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (2011), “Conclusion: IPE and the International Political Economy? IPE or the International Political Economy”, in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.172; "The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives: Moving Beyond the Debate on the ‘British School’.” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge 57 Drezner, D. (2014), “The System Worked Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession World”, Politics, 66:1. 58 Leblang, D. and Pandya, S. (2009), “The Financial Crisis of 2007: Our Waterloo or Take a Chance on IPE?”, International Interactions, 35: 4, pp.430-435. 59 Lake, D. and Kahler, M. (2013), ‘Politics in the New Hard Times: The Great Recession in Comparative Perspective’, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, New York: Cornell University Press. 60 McNally, D. (2009), “From Financial Crisis to World-Slump: Accumulation, Financialisaton, and the Global Slowdown”, Historical Materialism, 17:2; Burnham, P. (2010), “Class, Capital and Crisis: A Return to Fundamentals”, Political Studies Review, 8:1. 61 Germain, “The “American” School of IPE? A Dissenting View”, p.104.


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and incommensurate’. 62 Cohen has retracted his suggestion that British IPE is per se uncommitted to empiricism, arguing that he was referring to an absence of quantitative methodological commitment. 63 What Cohen’s statement illustrates however is how chained to foundational assumptions of the Orthodoxy his division is, even his retraction is in effect a reformulation of his initial assertions, empirical advantage is a priori afforded to the preeminent quantitative methods of the Orthodoxy. This illustrates the incommensurate foundational theoretical assumptions by which Heterodox intrinsically questions the role and purpose of theory, rejecting absolute claims to truth. Recognition of this foundation is what enables Higgott and Watson alongside Palan and Cameron to emancipate themselves from Cohen’s term of engagement arguing that Heterodox perspectives are empirical by their own metric. The recognition of Orthodox and Heterodox as the operative IPE division, necessitates two a posteriori axioms: firstly such a recognition problematises Cohen’s claims to objectivity of the rationalist positivism as in actuality constituting what Robert Gilpin described as a ‘philosophical position’;

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and secondly proves the

correctness of Ian Bruff’s approach which gives primacy to Ontological claims as logically foundational: ‘[ontological claims are] ‘foundational’ in the sense that they provide conditions of intelligibility for those [subsequent] claims.’65 This Orthodox-Heterodox binary does not, however, mirror the British-American dichotomy as Cohen constructs it, this is particularly true for the British school. I am sceptical of Worth’s assertion that the British school and ‘C’ritical theory are so fundamentally different, I also dispute Apeldoorn’s definition of heterodox as reduced solely to being critical.66 Both Worth and Apeldoorn’s are correct that Cohen conflates critical and ‘C’ritical in his reductive assertions that ‘most versions of critical theory converge on a revisionist critique of modern capitalism’, and at the core of the British school is a ‘heretical disposition’.67 Critical IPE more often associated with heterodox or non-American journals, is typified by criticism of the existing world order. Typical examples include; André Broome, Alexandra Homolar, and Matthias Kranke’s Bad Science, and Henry Wai-Chung’s the Rise of East Asia.68 Whereas ‘C’ritical IPE distinguishes itself from 62

Palan and Cameron. “Empiricism and Objectivity”, p.124. Cohen, International Political Economy, p.32. 64 Robert Gilpin quoted in van Apeldoorn et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives’”, p.216. 65 Jackson, in Bruff, “Overcoming the State/Market Dichotomy”, p.82. 66 Van Apeldoorn et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives”. 67 Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide” p.214. 68 Wai-Chung, H. (2009), “The Rise of East Asia: An Emerging Challenge to the Study of International Political Economy”, in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge; Broome, A., Homolar, A. and Kranke, M. (2017), “Bad Science: International Organizations and the Indirect Power of Global Benchmarking”, European Journal of International Relations. 1: 26, pp.897–907. Several influential examples of critical IPE can be found among the 63


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critical (of the current status quo) scholarship which can be seen as situated in both orthodox or heterodox traditions, in that it focuses upon ‘the principles of critique […] and the dissection of critical and practical knowledge’ ‘unified at core by commitment to ‘emancipatory purpose’.69 Section II 'The disciplines characterise, classify, specialise; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchise individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate.'

Michel Foucault.70

This section is structured as an inductive discussion, to summarise Section One, if Cohen’s division is ignorant of important normative divisions, geographically tenuous, historically illiterate, and a ‘welltrodden path’ having been discussed at least as early as 1985, why analyse Cohen and the resultant dialectic? 71

The simplest answer is that while such analysis could theoretically be applied to any narrative of the field,

Cohen’s is unique because it attempts to transcend such division, and catalyse uniquely wide debate and adoption. Section Two focuses on these claims to objectivity, unpacking the implications of scholars accepting Cohen’s discourse, which I suggest, in agreement with Higgott and Watson, inherently reproduces the very narrowing he purports to oppose.72 In illustrating the dangers of accepting any division of the field, I focus on three key processes which are intrinsic to any prescriptive academic division: silences and exclusions, othering, and appropriation. One of the starkest examples of the inherent exclusion of even passive accidence to Cohen’s division, originates with Cox.73 Cox benignly accepts Cohen’s division as not only reflecting a broad (if negative) reality, but as an embodiment of his own problem solving and critical theory distinction. In an article somewhat lost in

contributions to the excellent, Louise Amoore, Jacqueline Best, Paul Langley, and Leonard Seabrooke, (2010), Cultural Political Economy: RIPE Series in Global Political Economy. 1st Edition, London: Routledge. 69 Worth, “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School”, p.131; Stuart, Bruff, Macartney, “Conclusion.”, p.172. 70 Foucault, M. (1991 [1975]), Discipline and Punishment:The Birth of the Prison, London: Penguin. 71 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”, p.19; for earlier examples of the transatlantic debate, see: Ole Waever (1998), “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations”, International Organization, 52:4; and Jaakko Holsti, (1985), The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 72 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History; Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, pp.15-16. 73 Cox, “The “’British School’ in the Global Context”.


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esoteric history, Cox appears blind to the implications of acquiescence to Cohen’s division. The main danger of the debate is not as McNamara simplistically suggests that the debate constructs deeper division (although it well might), the real issue is that it constructs an implicit ‘regime of truth’ that, in replicating the argument and distinctions, even if one is seeking to adjust them, scholars sustain implicit hierarchies and silences.74 Acceptance of such assumptions can also be more veiled often those who refer to this debate as ‘navel gazing’, serve to tacitly support acceptance of the status quo as it is described by Cohen. Cohen himself recognises that on some level, his construction is artificial and includes a hierarchy ‘each of the distinguished contributors accepts the reality of something that might be described as the British school [implicitly also of course the American school] (emphasis added by author)’. 75 These implications are expressed as processes which implicitly privilege certain conceptions and knowledge. ‘Epistemological roots of British IPE are constructed outside the boundaries of his presentation of what it means to be a valid subject field in the first place’.76 Ultimately, Cohen’s division or any scholars’ school or division reflects the ‘material conditions’ in the creation of this distinction and his own subjective assessment of the field. Thus, Cohen’s narrative by its acceptance is an expression of the power of the dominant IPE narrative. 77 If one engages with the school dichotomy such a ‘stabilisation’ discourse of IPE ‘schools’ serves the interests of the positivist liberal orthodoxy of IPE, through ‘othering’, which, by allowing the orthodoxy to (re)produce a sovereign voice privileged above other conceptions, becomes able to inform on universal truths and define objective common sense methodologically, 78 excluding the problems of subjectivity. Cohen exemplifies such a process of theoretical ‘black boxing’ suggesting British IPE could benefit from ‘more rigorous methodologies’, and ‘a little less ambition’.79 Here black boxing allows Cohen’s assumption and theoretical foundations to go unquestioned, his reasoning alone becomes the arbiter of truth. Orthodoxies which marginalise and exclude without agreed foundational stability, require an ‘other’ to legitimise and stabilise them; British and American IPE’s ‘dichotomous relationship’ constitutes this. 80 Who would want to be a wavy hippy practitioner of intentionally critical unscientific loony British Critical enquiries, when one could be among the US school, utilising ‘deductive methodologies and parsimonious reasoning’ part of the universal truth seeking and scientific, serious ‘American school’.81 From the outset, then, there is a process of 'othering' taking place in which the epistemological roots and ontological 74

Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”. Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. 76 Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.7. 77 Peterson, “Getting Real”, p.120. 78 Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.7; Peterson, “Getting Real”, p.122. 79 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, p.70; Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide,” p.217. 80 Smith, “Positivism and Beyond” p.16. 81 Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide”, p.200. 75


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concerns of ‘British’ IPE are constructed outside the boundaries of accepted productive progress and method.82 The next process by which narratives like Cohen’s division present an issue, is through appropriation. Cohen argues that his inclusion of Cox and Strange serves to prevent his history from being entirely partisan, however, his appropriation of such scholars constitutes ‘neutralisation’ or ‘domestication’ of ‘C’ritical theory.83 Randall Germain sees this recognition of both sides’ ‘value added aspect’ as superior to David Lake’s outright contention of the superiority of ‘American’ methods’. 84 Catherine Weaver, Blyth, and Cohen, by patronisingly judging British IPE as ‘better at problem posing than solving’, are able to ask the abstract Really Big Questions but not much more;85 this represents a far more pernicious trend. If ‘defining common sense is the ultimate act of political power’ then defining the value of heterodox IPE by these orthodox scholars is the ultimate form of domination.86 ‘C’ritical theories are reduced to their utility as an orthodox means rather than an end in themselves, Cox and Strange are reinterpreted and positioned wrongly as representing all ‘C’ritical theory. Robert Keohane’s treatment of feminism(s) is a particularly obvious example of such a process.87 Other examples, notably Layna Mosley and David Singer's 2011 work, have proliferated as the Orthodoxy tries to account for its failure to predict the 2007/8 crisis. 88 The apotheosis of this trend in appropriation and exclusion is Peter Katzenstein and Stephen Nelson’s contribution to the 20 th anniversary edition of RIPE.89 Whilst critical of the failures of neoclassical economic modelling, Katzenstein and Nelson like Mosley and Singer comprehensively fail to engage with the many recognised supposedly British school who predicted the crash. Such as Burnham or Strange’s Mad Money and Casino Capitalism, this despite being located in the ‘flagship’ journal of British IPE.90 82

Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.7. Cammack, “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE”, p.161. 84 Germain, “The “American” School of IPE? A Dissenting View”, p.83; Lake, “TRIPs Across the Atlantic: Theory and Epistemology in IPE”, pp.55-56. 85 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, p.166. 86 Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, p.13. 87 Keohane, R. (1989), “International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint”, Millennium 18:2. 88 Mosley, L. and Singer, D. (2011) “The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Opportunities for International Political Economy” in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, pp.223-230. For more information on this debate see, Palan, “The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: IPE in Light of the Crisis 2007/8”. 89 Nelson, D. and Katzenstein, P. (2013), “Reading the Right Signals and Reading the Signals Right: IPE and the Financial Crisis of 2008”, Review of International Political Economy, 20:5. 90 Strange, S. (1986), Casino Capitalism, Oxford: Blackwell; Strange, S. (1998), Mad Money, Manchester: Manchester University Press; Burnham, P. (2001), “Marx, International Political Economy and Globalisation”, Capital and Class, 25:3. 83


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Section III 'Orthodoxy means not thinking not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness.'

George Orwell.91

Cohen’s division and my antecedent observations suggest that academic narrowing has largely been confined to the ‘top’ American journals, an unsurprising conclusion, given the high degree of hierarchy and ‘astonishing concentration of disciplinary power’ exhibited by such journals and arguably American Political Science broadly.92 However, the aforementioned exclusions by Katzenstein and Nelson in RIPE, suggests narrowing has been more widespread, a trend which increasingly appears to imitate Richard Ashley’s conceptualisation of Orthodox IR as being ‘nomadic […] committed to nothing other than an abstract and mobile will to territorialise’.93 Developing the question posed by Phillips I attempt to make a modest effort toward assessing the degree to which Maliniak and Tierney’s conclusions and mine, regarding the narrowing of the ‘zenith’ of IPE academia has been and is being experienced in the UK.94 Obvious examples include ‘creeping economisation’ and the UK Research Assessment Exercise, which have disseminated broadly across IPE. I argue such developments should not be regarded as a benign, or natural, as a whiggish Cohen suggests. 95 Such trends represent the unchecked proliferation of a hierarchical liberal orthodoxy which serves to marginalise ‘C’ritical engagement. Such narrowing appears to have been a subtle, often underrecognised characteristic of geographically British IPE since at least the mid-1990s. To evidence my controversial thesis, I examine the most high profile (I assert this on the basis of Impact Factor; RIPE had an average Impact factor of 2.64 over the last decade, and 3.452 in 2016) exponent journal of the ‘British school’, the Review of International Political Economy.96 I utilise quantitative, qualitative, and discursive analysis

91

Orwell, G. (1998 [1949]), 1984. Germain, “The “American” School of IPE? A Dissenting View”, p.83; Phillips, N. (2009), “The Slow Death of Pluralism”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1, p.92. 93 Ashley, R. (1996), “The Achievements of Post-Structuralism”, in Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.25. 94 Phillips, “The Slow Death of Pluralism”, p.79. 95 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”, p.25. 96 “Review of International Political Economy (Rev Int Polit Econ)”, Research Gate, Last modified January 1, 2018; “Review of International Political Economy 2016 Impact Factor”, Taylor & Francis Online, Last modified January 1, 2016. 92


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of differences between the 20th anniversary editorial goals statement and the original 1994 editorial goals statement of RIPE.97 Beginning with rhetoric analysis, I compare the 1994 and 2013 editorial statement and editorial board membership composition. At its foundation RIPE’s goals were a rejection of post-cold war liberal orthodoxy, a ‘general relaxation in methodologies’, inevitably ‘“multidisciplinary” in scope and “interdisciplinary” in spirit’, ‘escaping the confines of IR’. 98 Have the current (as of 2013) editors, then, stayed true to this lofty original vision? Certainly they pay considerable lip service to pluralism, ‘IPE scholar[s] recognizes that there is no one ‘right’ way of doing IPE’ further going on to assert ‘no single theoretical perspective offers exclusive purchase on reality’. 99 Yet this, tempered with ‘asking in abstract terms which perspective is ‘right’, is not very enlightening’, such statements are functionally similar to Keohane’s desire to priori exclude meta-theoretical debate. 100 More troubling and evocative of Cohen’s narrow curation of what in the field is valuable, are Juliet Johnson et al’s insistence on tackling ‘real-world’ problems ‘that matter’ and their proposed heuristic schema of ‘Pragmatic IPE’, both resolutely belie an inherent contradiction of their fatuous claims to embrace pluralism. 101 Johnson et al oppose the a priori exclusion of ontologies, pragmatic IPE legitimises exclusion on the basis of what ‘insights’ each perspective has to offer on specific issues that ‘can withstand informed criticism’. 102 As we saw in Cohen’s definition and criticism of the ‘British’ schools on the basis of an identical conceit, any such assessment is necessarily presupposed by the editor’s own conception of legitimate insights, how this would differ from outright exclusion in practice is vague at best. Can quantitative analysis change our minds (re)presenting the pluralism of RIPE? The anniversary edition includes a defensive piece by Weaver and Sharman indexing nearly all articles featured in RIPE over the course of a decade, 2000-2010.103 Weaver and Sharman, contend RIPE is more representative of global IPE scholarship featuring more authors from more places and more ontologies than American TRIP 97

Johnson, J., Mügge, D., Seabrooke, L., Woll, C., Grabel, I. and Gallagher, K. (2013), “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”, Review of International Political Economy, 20:5; RIPE Editors, “Editorial: Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy”, Review of International Political Economy, 1:1, (1994). 98 RIPE Editors, “Editorial: Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy”, p.2, p.12. 99 Johnson, et al, “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”, p.1011, p.1014. 100 Keohane, R. (2009), “The Old IPE and the New.” Review of International Political Economy, 16:1 101 Johnson, et al, “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”. 102 Johnson et al, “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”, p.1016. 103 Weaver and Sharman (2013), “RIPE, the American School and Diversity in Global IPE,” Review of International Political Economy 20:5.


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journals, although ‘[RIPE is not] the epitome of ‘British IPE’, […] postpositivism, normative inquiry […] sympathy for Marxist and critical theory’.104 Firstly, Sharman and Weaver fail to analyse over the longue durée using articles from 2000-2010, or present data chronologically to view change. It is broadly recognised that the narrowing of American IPE began in the mid-1990s with graduate education.105 Therefore, Sharman and Weaver begin their data collection around the time we may infer this tradition crossed the Atlantic, 19942000 was probably the most diverse and 2010-2013 likely the least diverse, both are crucially excluded. Sharman and Weaver also fail to compare developments before and in the wake of changes to the editorial composition of journals, which my later discussion of editorial power suggests, has probably had a significant effect. We begin to see from this observation a common criticism of positivism. Sheer numbers alone may be indicative of something, but without theoretical alignment such data can be interpreted in whichever way the subjective viewer desires. Here one begins to see the major exclusion of ‘C’ritical perspectives, it is telling that the only two articles in the 20th anniversary edition, not indistinguishable from the average issue of International Organisation, are John Hobson’s histories. However, what is most notable is that again Hobson’s works are critical rather than ‘C’ritical, leading us to a bigger question, whilst Weaver may assert RIPE to be more representative, what we have to ask is, what is being represented? Weaver conflates British academics with the ‘British school’ and assumes scholars’ nationalities reflect the imagined schools which in turn reflect practice, succumbing to simplistic ‘academic nationalism’. 106 In my quantitative analysis of the 1994 and 2013 editorials, the editorial entirely excludes Marxism and contains only one mention of Gramscian engagement:107 as a passing reference to another work. Conversely the 1994 editorial has six mentions of Marxism and two of Gramscian scholarship. Here RIPE excludes ‘C’ritical engagement of the kind often mentioned in definitions of the British school, but somehow seemingly vacant in journals. This change also illustrates, returning to Michel Foucault’s quotation, the role of whatever typologies we utilise to formalise academic boundaries, in assuring homogenisation, foundation and dominance of one narrative. Phillips and Weaver attribute this to the market dependent graduate education, and this is fairly convincing.108 However, such reasons obfuscates the intentionality of gate-keeping practices. The evolution of RIPE between 1994 and 2013 suggests considerable editorial intentionality. The 104

Ibid, pp.1089-1090. Keohane, “The Old IPE and the New”; Katzenstein, P. (2009), “Mid-Atlantic: Sitting on the Knife's Sharp Edge”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1; McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”. 106 van Apeldoorn et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives”. 107 Johnson et al, “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”. 108 Weaver, “IPE’s Split Brain”, pp.145-147; Phillips, “The Slow Death of Pluralism”, p.90. 105


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environment engendered by new editorial boards can operate in a far more sophisticated way than simply censoring submissions, Weaver concedes that self-selection by authors may play a role in shaping submissions.109 Yet Phillips convincingly asserts a much stronger yet unquantifiable effect, editors create the environment into which scholars elect to submit, just as Cohen shapes what is a valid and productive work in his schema. Authors sensing an unwelcoming or restrictive environment simply don’t attempt to be published falling into Phillips category of ‘non-submission’.110 It is worth noting the only real defence of ‘C’ritical engagement in the British volume of New Political Economy was excluded from the issue and only released in the essay collection, Debating the Divide.111 Blyth, in considering himself a British scholar, using Cohen’s division reduces heterodox and ‘C’ritical works to his own relatively liberal economised work. Blyth’s glib insistence at how easily he gets works published in the US is an example of wilful ignorance of gate-keeping, those not published, therefore, are justifiably not because they must be bad. Blyth may find International Organisation a conducive atmosphere, but it seems unlikely that Spike Peterson would. In conclusion, I agree with Jason Sharman that many of the orthodox protestations to being an open range constitute a ‘naive self-portrait’, intentionally ignoring hierarchies and gate-keeping.112 But is this developing top end orthodox monoculture an issue? I concur with McNamara that monocultures are intrinsically unhealthy, black boxing often fundamental complexity. 113 The failure of monocultures is explicitly expressed in economics and IR. Robert Wade offers convincing evidence that the monoculture of economics has been a fundamental liability to the field since the 1980s in silencing debate, relying on traditional models and making reflex self-examination almost impossible.114 Economics has been critically unprepared for change, innovation, and broader system theory beyond rigid neoclassical models. For an example of pluralism’s success, whilst not uncontroversial, we may look at IR after the narrowing in the post-cold-war world. Steve Smith’s assessment of IR was bleak, tied to liberalism and crucially having its academic goal and analytical issues restrained by positivist monoculture.115 Geoffrey Underhill has attacked ‘C’ritical IPE for ‘template theorising’, however, as Strange demonstrated, entrenched theorising resistant

109

Weaver, “IPE’s Split Brain”, pp.144-145. Phillips, “The Slow Death of Pluralism”, p.76. 111 van Apeldoorn et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives”; Phillips and Weaver, “Introduction: Debating the Divide: Reflections on the Past Present and Future of International Political Economy”. 112 Sharman, “Mantra, Bridges, and Benchmarks: Assessing the Future of IPE”, p.202. 113 McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”. 114 Wade, “Beware What You Wish for”. 115 Schmidt, “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism”; Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, p.11. 110


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to empiricism is a trait of monocultures rather than ‘C’ritical theory.116 Smith views the IR field to have been turned around by postpositivist pluralism, free to question ‘basic assumptions about the field’.117 The failures of monoculture are visible in the failure of orthodox IPE, Palan highlights the failure of orthodoxy to predict, as heterodox IPE did, the 2007/8 Great Recession.118 Indeed, many orthodox scholars accept this failure and call for a generally less methodologically restrictive IPE. 119 However, these failures persist. Murphy highlights the persistently nebulous treatment afforded to the issue of inequality by the American practitioners of IPE, derived from the prioritising of classical liberalism's conceptions of political goals and economic questions.120 The narrowing of these research areas displays how narrowing has left some scholars ‘ill-equipped’ to study IPE, binding them to the dominant, myopic and orthodox focus of IR, neoclassical economics, liberalism, ahistorical theory, and relativist economised understanding of human agency. 121 Kirshner expands this focus, highlighting the monoculture’s role in alienating individual talent and stifling innovation.122 Ultimately there is little historical precedent to suggests that, if left unchallenged, the top end monoculture will desist from the ‘shackling’ of IPE to IR.123 Such a conclusion also problematises Cox’s suggestion that ‘their purposes are different, but not necessarily opposed’. While in some tenuous sense that may be true meta-theoretically, the nomadic tendency of the monocultural orthodoxy certainly means that they most often exhibit an adversarial relationship.124 The significance in the continuation of this trend is explored more thoroughly in Section Four.

116

Underhill, G. (2009), “Political Economy, the `US School', and the Manifest Destiny of Everyone Else.” New Political Economy, 14:3, p.347; Strange, S. (1994), “Wake up Krasner! The World Has Changed”, Review of International Political Economy, 1:2 117 Smith, S. (2007), “Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Fourth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.67. 118 Palan, “The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: IPE in Light of the Crisis 2007/8”. 119 Katzenstein, “Mid-Atlantic: Sitting on the Knife's Sharp Edge”; Keohane, “The Old IPE and the New”; Phillips, N. (2009), “The Slow Death of Pluralism”, Review of International Political Economy, 16:1. 120 Murphy, “Do the Left Out Matter?”. 121 Shields, et al., “Conclusion: IPE and the International Political Economy? IPE or the International Political Economy”, p.171. 122 Kirshner, “The Second Crisis in IPE Theory”. 123 Smith, “Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory”, p.65. 124 Cox, ‘The “British School” in the Global Context’.


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Section IV 'The Golden Rule: He who has the gold, makes the rules.'

Frank Armitage.125

Section Four of my discussion adopts a philosophical tone regarding what constitutes progress in the social sciences and what the goal(s) and potential of IPE are. Cox’s problem solving and critical theory distinctions, despite recent criticism that its ubiquitous use has resulted in it being ‘overworked’, again become a useful analytical tool in understanding the implications of proposed ‘solutions’ to the divisions in IPE.126 Orthodox contributions and, even those by heterodox scholars who accept the schools model like Sharman, tend to offer little beyond problem solving, vague, even polemic insistences that there is a possibility/necessity of Hegelian synthesis.127 Solutions can be corralled into three loose intellectual genus: Synthetic, Reconstructive, and Analytical Eclecticism. 128 Synthetic solutions encapsulate both the suggestion that there exists or can be constructed, a unified ontological approach between heterodox and orthodox IPE, even Ravenhill broadly critical of Cohen and Orthodox practices, searching for his elusive missing middle, reproduces this assumption. Synthesis is often euphemised as ‘bridge building’, and is often couched in language of mutual appreciation: ‘None of this is meant to suggest that one of the two schools is somehow “better” or “worse”’.129 ‘The British tradition […] while noble in intent [stops sort of offering solutions that are] politically viable’. 130 Sharman is correct that one ‘cannot take the protestations of tolerance and

125

“They Live: ‘The Golden Rule.’”YouTube. Last modified January 1, 2018. Cox, R. (1981), “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium, 10: 2, pp.128-129; Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.12. 127 Sharman, “Mantra, Bridges, and Benchmarks: Assessing the Future of IPE”, p.201. 128 This is not to suggest that these categorisations are absolute or exhaustive rather I simply attempt to capture the unifying threads which possess the majority solutions to this debate, for an example of solutions anomalous to my typology, see: Philip Cerny (2009), “Bridging the Transatlantic Divide: Toward a Structural Approach to International Political Economy” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge; ‘critical empiricism’ as expressed by Palan and Angus, “Empiricism and Objectivity”, p.124; Huw Macartney and Stuart Shields (2011), “Space, The Latest Frontier? A Scalar-Relational Approach to Critical IPE”, in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (2009), “Everyday International Political Economy.” ” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge. 129 Cohen, “The Transatlantic Divide”, p.216. 130 Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”, p.27; Weaver, “IPE’s Split Brain”, p.148. 126


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commitments to pluralism […] at face value’.131 Indeed, despite vulgar homages to plurality, these solutions all construct a common sense where, without a shared metric by which to assess, measure, and collate, social science cannot progress. Such reasoning serves to black box discussions as to the intrinsic value of dialectics, and a priori assumes the necessity of monocultures; synthesis is projected as a means and a selfjustifying goal.132 In turn reconstructive resolutions, whilst avowing the theoretic albatross of the far more ambitious Synthetic approaches merely shift the ground: Johnson et al’s pragmatic IPE; Blyth’s conceptualisation of East Asian schools; Cohen’s focus on a Canadian school, Germain’s construction of a differing Canadian school, and Higgott and Watson’s Everyday IPE. 133 Such reconstructions fail to addresses more substantive criticism or philosophical concerns. Reconstructions suffer from the same acute failures and homogenising tendencies discussed in Sections One and Two in the context of Cohen’s schools. Additionally, Synthetic and Reconstructive approaches are necessarily undermined by what Richard Higgott and Matthew Watson suggest is the fatal flaw of Cohen’s division, that claims to external objectivity in narratives are belied by privileging of solutions, which invariably include apparently axiomatic moves far closer to his own normative commitments.134 More innovative, but just as flawed, is Katzenstein, Weaver, and Farell and Finnemore’s ‘analytically eclectic’ approach which offers the attractive possibility of side-stepping meta-theoretical debates or isolating such debates from methodological debates.135 This approach fails to offer resolution, as Bastiaan Apeldoorn et al suggest, merely shifting normative debate to the criteria by which we select worthy problems rather than the initial heuristic criterion. 136 To conclude, if we accept Cohen’s division as an expression of systemic domination, scholars like Blyth Lake, Phillips, and Cohen who construct prescriptive divisions appear far more cynical. As Worth suggests these constructions represent a means to ‘construct new forms of orthodoxy’ or a functional continuation of the status quo veiled in inconsequential lip service

131

Sharman, “Mantra, Bridges, and Benchmarks: Assessing the Future of IPE”, p.202. Bruff, “Overcoming the State/Market Dichotomy”. 133 Johnson et al, “The Future of International Political Economy: Introduction to the 20th Anniversary Issue of RIPE”; Blyth, “Torn Between Two Lovers?”; Cohen, “Toward a New Consensus”; Germain, R. (2009), “Of Margins, Traditions, and Engagements a Brief Disciplinary History of IPE in Canada”, in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge; Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”. 134 Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.7. 135 Katzenstein, “Mid-Atlantic: Sitting on the Knife's Sharp Edge”, p.114; Weaver, “IPE’s Split Brain”; Farell, H. and Finnemore, M. (2011), “Ontology, Methodology, and Causation in the American Schools of International Political Economy”, in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge. 136 van Apeldoorn et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives”. 132


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toward consensual mutual appreciation. 137 All these intellectual strands, despite frequently expressing critiques of Cohen and the often considerable conceptual gulfs between proponents, are nevertheless united in promulgating solutions that serve to tacitly or expressly (re)construct schools as tangible distinctions and truth producers, rather than abstract delineations of location and thought. Nor however do heterodox scholars necessarily offer stabilised resolution. Indeed, Paul Cammack’s quixotic solution leads me to a point of partial agreement with Cohen. 138 ‘C’ritical IPE may be more plural than orthodox conceptions; both Blyth and Cohen allude to this in their contradictory assertion of an orthodox heterodoxy at conferences.139 However, Cohen is correct that such heterodox solutions have the potential to (re)produce restrictively homogenised echo chamber monocultures. In calling for the effective division of Orthodox and ‘C’ritical IPE Cammack constructs an ideal field more orthodox than existing IPE and strongly challenges Apeldoorn’s complacent suggestion that heterodox IPE is by its nature plural.140 Neither are such calls unique to Cammack; Spike Peterson and Georgina Waylen advocate for overt or effective disassociation from the broader field, a prospect at best begetting a pyric Faustian, victory. 141 Equally practical forces impeded the implementation of some heterodox solutions. Bruff’s call for holistic reformation of the field is philosophically compelling, yet Phillips, McNamara, and Farrell and Finnemore illustrate that Cammack’s criticism is correct. 142 Bruff’s prescription for holistic plural study seems likely to be shattered on the rocks of academic gate-keeping practicalities, particularly in the US: changes to graduate education and graduate employment requisites, the developing monoculture of US and UK journals. 143 Murphey also highlights the exclusionary role of the traditional left right divide in impeding the induction of heterodox (often leftist) authors into the zenith of IPE. The limitations of Heterodox solutions, however, does not make disengagement imperative; it makes robust engagement necessary if we are to preserve the potential of IPE to emancipatory theory. 137

Worth, “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School”, p.130. Cammack, P. (2011), “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE”, in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.149-168. 139 Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, p.173; Blyth “Torn Between Two Lovers? Caught in the Middle of British and American IPE”, pp.331-333. 140 van Apeldoorn, et al, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives: Moving Beyond the Debate on the ‘British School’”. 141 Peterson, S. (2005), “How (the Meaning of) Gender Matters in Political Economy” New Political Economy, 10:4; Waylen, G. (2006), “You still don’t Understand: Why Troubled Engagements Continue between Feminists and (Critical) IPE”, Review of International Studies, 32:1. 142 Bruff, “Overcoming the State/Market Dichotomy”, pp.80-82. 143 McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE”; Farell and Finnemore, “Ontology, Methodology, and Causation in the American Schools of International Political Economy”, pp.55-58; Murphy, “Do the Left Out Matter?”, pp.160-163; Cammack, “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE”. 138


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A stable viable comprehensive solution begins with rejection of orthodox synthesis and bridgebuilding, a normative shift from problem solving to analytical theory, which concurrently recognises the dangers of separation, and the benefit of dissensus. As close as possible an emulation of Strange’s ‘open range’,144 in which IPE is better seen as a ‘hosting metaphor’. 145 Orthodox and Heterodox divisions by their nature cannot and, as we have seen should not be ‘reconciled’ or even ‘inch ever closer’.146. The divisions are founded on deeply antagonistic and contradictory meta-theoretical understanding of the philosophy of Social Science. Thomas Kuhn's notion of competing paradigms of thought therefore cannot be applied in the sense one comes to dominate, nor can a Hegelian synthesis of opposites arise. The divisions are a result of nuanced even ideological divisions, not thesis and anti-thesis or restricted to limited methodological debates.147 Positivism, cannot blur with emancipatory postpositivism; a foundational ontology cannot blur with meta-theoretical pluralism. Such a basis is far more fundamental than the nebulous suggestion of scholars including Underhill, that such disputes not be remedied by calls to a ‘shared European heritage’, and ‘ongoing transatlantic traffic’.148 New emphasis on conceptions of progression in plural cultures offers to conceptualise scientific advancement in a value relative schema, offering emancipation from the Kuhnian absolutism, including: Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave’s a ‘scientific research programme’, and Roy Bhaskar’s notion of ‘scientific realism’. 149 Even if an open range was a naïve self-portrait, as Sharman suggests, it is a worthy evocative ideal. 150 Finally, it must be recognised that every narrative of the field features exclusions, but through acceptance of dissensus less emphasis can be placed on these narratives, which scholars must accept as a product of subjectivity, not universalised objective truth. 151 In order to avoid co-optation by orthodoxy, this must be a dynamic, reflexive heterodoxy, confident in its own unique perspective but, with space for reflexivity, resistant to the pitfalls Palan and Cameron identify and the myopia expressed by Cammack.152 144

Strange, S. (1984), “What About International Relations”, in Strange, S. (ed) Paths to International Political Economy, London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.196-7. 145 Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.10. 146 Higgott and Watson, “All at Sea in a Barbed Wire Canoe”, p.5. 147 Kuhn, T. (2012 [1962]), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Fourth Edition, London: University of Chicago Press. 148 Underhill, “Political Economy, the `US School', and the Manifest Destiny of Everyone Else”, p.158. 149 Lakatos, I and Musgrave, A. (1970), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-3; Bhaskar, R. (1978), “On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism”, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 8:1, pp.1–5. 150 Weaver and Sharman, “RIPE, the American School and Diversity in Global IPE”, p.1091. 151 Tooze, “Perspectives and Theory: A Consumers’ Guide”, p.18. 152 Cameron, A. and Palan, R. (1999), “The Imagined Economy: Mapping Transformations in the Contemporary State”, Millennium, 28:2, pp.267-288; Cammack, “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE”; Palan and Cameron, “Empiricism and Objectivity”.


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Dissensus can only arise stably from the Heterodox meta-theoretical basis. Helge Hveem and Kranke have suggested that Heterodox scholars have also been guilty of exclusions, and hierarchy.153 If such accusations as Kranke conceptualises them, of a ‘C’ritical orthodoxy an ‘extra-parliamentary oppositional force’ are founded, we may suggest Heterodox IPE and Orthodox are of equal basis for constructing dissensus as they both have exclusionary tendencies. 154 What Hveem and Kranke misunderstand and is made clear in Stuart Shields et al’s reply to Kranke’s parallel criticism. Heterodox IPE is more than competition for primacy between neo-Gramscian, Cultural scholars, and Marxists. Ontologies may individually indulge in exclusion and construct internal orthodoxies, something we have touched on in regards to Cammack’s solution. Rather, dissensus encapsulates the meta-theoretical potential of Heterodox to sustain ‘prompt dialogue between perspectives, provoke debate within perspectives, without pre-empting (or even desiring) the necessity for consensus as a neat endpoint’. 155 Such plural dialogue and criticism is predicated on Heterodox IPE’s lack of a foundational ontology; this is where Apeldoorn’s claims that heterodox is inherently more pluralist is plausible.156 Indeed Kranke himself recognises the pluralist power of dissensus in his conciliatory rejoinder: ‘A genuinely pluralist stance reflects a willingness to see all disciplinary divisions as temporary constructions’ and ‘exclusively ‘orthodox’ (I)PE mindset would serve to undermine a pluralist spirit’.157 Dissensus therefore must arise from a heterodoxy, in order for it be able to reflexively question its own meta-theoretical commitments. Finally, in order to secure a stable dissensus we must assess the inevitability of trans-paradigm dialogue. Such dialogue for Heterodox IPE risks becoming an ‘upside down hegemony’.158 If dialogue does ‘not have to obliterate difference’, this can only be practiced when scholars define their work independently of external utility and policy influence.159 Heterodox practitioners must define their value in the intrinsic value of ‘C’ritical work which ought not to ‘wax and wane in accordance with how it is received elsewhere, [but] its own dynamics and development’. 160 Critical scholars cannot act

153

Hveem, H. (2011), “Pluralist IPE: A View from Outside the ‘Schools’”, in Phillips, N. and Weaver, C. (eds) International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future, London: Routledge, pp.174-175. 154 Kranke, M. (2014), “Which ‘C’ Are You Talking About? Critical Meets Cultural IPE”, Millennium, 42:3. 155 Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (2015), “Response to Kranke Review Article: Critical International Political Economy and the Importance of Dissensus”, Millennium, 43:2. 156 Van Apeldoorn, “The Richness and Diversity of the Critical IPE Perspectives”, pp.220-221. 157 Kranke, M. (2015), “Of Gardens and Gates in (International) Political Economy: A Rejoinder”, Millennium 43:2. 158 Palma, J. (2009), “Why did the Latin American Critical Tradition in the Social Sciences become Practically Extinct?” in Blyth, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge International Handbooks, London: Routledge. 159 Leander, “Why we Need Multiple Stories about the Global Political Economy”, p.325; Murphy, “Do the Left Out Matter?”, pp.166-167. 160 Sharman, “Mantra, Bridges, and Benchmarks: Assessing the Future of IPE”, p.202.


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as Ravenhill characterises UK IR specialists; ‘the royal corgis in snapping at the heels of the US aristocrats, [yet are] treated with regal disdain’.161 Conclusion 'How do you expect to communicate with the ocean, when you can’t even understand one another?'

Stanisław Lem.162

In conclusion, Cohen’s location and definition of a division in IPE is erroneous, rather than schools, the most tangible divisions are between positivist and postpositivist, orthodox and heterodox. However, Cohen’s model, through its tacit and explicit adoption, has become more than just one scholar’s subjective assessment of the discipline; through its representations and (re)creation it has become a means of truth production, (re)creating and naturalising the narrowing transatlantic orthodoxy, preventing dissensus, and ‘put[ting] critical thinking in its place – in a closed black box’.163 I concur with Worth that, not only is synthesis impossible, such synthetic solutions operate as a faux middle ground obliterating pluralism and particularly ‘C’ritical elements; the thin conciliatory edge of a nomadic orthodoxy. 164 The impetus for my conclusion, and a succinct microcosm of the current debate is derived from the review of Shields et al by Kranke. 165 Such disputes illustrate the fundamentally circular nature of adversarial debates, indefinitely privileging one conception over another, arguing over roles in hierarchy. Whilst Cammack is correct, the practical realities of gate-keeping will probably make Bruff’s call for holistic Lutheran like reforms about as effective as they were for Luther.166 This, however, does not make disengagement imperative, indeed it makes robust engagement necessary if we are to preserve the potential of IPE to emancipatory theory. 167 For emancipation from the circular debate, the colonising nomad of orthodoxy, and the oppressive failures of monocultures, scholars need to abandon conventional Kuhnian problem-solving solutions, 161

Ravenhill, “In Search of the Missing Middle”, p.19. Lem, S. (2016[1970]), Solaris, Main edition, London: Faber and Faber, p.56. 163 Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (2011), “Introduction: ‘Critical’ and ‘International Political Economy.” in Shields, S., Bruff, I. and Macartney, H. (eds) Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.3. 164 Worth, “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School”. 165 Kranke, M. (2014), “Which ‘C’ Are You Talking About? Critical Meets Cultural IPE”, Millennium, 42:3. 166 Cammack, “Knowledge Versus Power in the Field of IPE”; Bruff, “Overcoming the State/Market Dichotomy”. 167 Germain, “New Marxism and the Problem of Subjectivity”. 162


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learning from IR and Economics. ‘C’ritical scholars must define themselves not on the basis of utility and policy influence, but the intrinsic value of ‘C’ritical work. In order to avoid narrowing and co-optation by orthodoxy, this must be a dynamic reflexive dissensus, heterodox approaches must exude confidence in their own unique perspective and analytical rigour, combining Comstock’s emancipatory empirical praxis and Michael Burawoy’s reflex normative theory.168 IPE as a whole then must stay reflexive and engaged. Some form of dissensus offers the most stable means to achieve this goal, even if the best way we can realistically hope to achieve it is through broad acceptance of Strange’s open range. To abandon IPE to orthodoxy would not only betray the unique potential of IPE, but confine the field and ‘C’ritical perspective to irrelevance.169 Even if none of this is implemented into IPE I would hope, ending as I began with Cohen, that ‘[students of sociology of knowledge and intellectual history] should find the case of IPE instructive’. 170

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