Journal of International Social Affairs, Fall 2017

VOLUME 8, NO. 1

FALL 2016

The Journal of International Social Affairs A Patrick Henry College Publication

Issue No. 1 Conflict in the Middle East CONTENTS Nathaniel Mullins

Orphaned Sons: The History and Implications of the Anbar Awakening (pg. 1)

Olivia Bowers

Bahrain’s Unintended Consequences: How Crackdowns on Shiite Opposition Aid Iran’s Expansion Interests (pg. 11)

Michael Dingman

The Burden of Morality: The Socioeconomic Development of Refugees in the United States (pg. 17)

Lisa P. Mattackal

Review of Seeking Refuge: On the Shores of the Global Refugee Crisis (pg. 25)

from the Editor On behalf of the Journal of International Social Affairs, welcome to the Fall 2016 edition. This semester, the editorial staff is excited to present the Journal in a new format for this academic year. This year, all papers were contributed by students from several majors, and we welcome the opportunity to provide a platform for Patrick Henry College students to publish their research.

This past year has been an incredibly tumultuous one for the international community in both Western and non-Western countries. In light of current events, the Journal’s initial purpose is more timely than ever. In its first edition, the Journal sought to provide a publication that “raised critical questions about the role of Christian faith, Islamist ideology, Western secular values and programs, and traditional beliefs.” Each of the articles in this edition examines topics of critical international importance in the Middle East through this lens.

In our first article, Nathaniel Mullins describes the history and results of the Anbar Awakening and its potential as an anti-terrorism strategy against ISIS. Our second article, written by Olivia Bowers, examines the implications of Bahrain’s treatment of Shiite Muslims for Middle Eastern politics.

In the last paper, Michael Dingman examines one of the year’s most pressing issues-refugee resettlement-in his paper analyzing research on the socioeconomic development of refugees in the United States.

Finally, we examine various perspectives and strategies for refugee resettlement in a review of the book Seeking Refuge: On the Shores of the Global Refugee Crisis.

This journal would not be possible without the assistance of many. Special recognition is due to Associate Editor Victoria Cook, whose time and effort have been invaluable. Additionally, I would like to thank our faculty supervisor, Dr. Stephen Baskerville, for his support and guidance. We are very grateful to Dr. Frank Guliuzza and the Patrick Henry College Department of Academic Affairs for their assistance in producing the Journal.

As always, thank you for reading! It is my hope that you will find this edition of the journal informative and insightful.

Sincerely, Lisa Pauline Mattackal, Editor-in-Chief

Read not to contradict and confuse; nor to believe or to take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.

Francis Bacon

STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Associate Editor: Faculty Supervisor:

Lisa Pauline Mattackal Victoria Cook Dr. Stephen Baskerville

PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 (540) 338-1776 www.phc.edu

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

Orphaned Sons: The History and Implications of the Anbar Awakening

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n the seven decades since World War II, the United States’ foreign policy has tried to adjust to ever-changing circumstances. As it dealt with the Cold War, decolonization, and the rise of radical Islamic terror, the United States has often struggled to distinguish allies from enemies. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, terrorist insurgencies promptly rose in Sunni territories. As the United States initiated the surge, Sunni Iraq began to reject the terrorists they had so recently supported. In what is termed the Anbar Awakening, Sunni Muslims began to support the Coalition’s war against the group which would later become the Islamic State—Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Once again, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US was faced with a challenge: would the groups it supported in the Anbar Awakening return, trained and armed to fight against the US? The Anbar Awakening models ideal US foreign policy for defeating radical Islamic terrorism, and the ultimate failure of the Awakening portrays America’s greatest weaknesses in dealing with terrorism. This paper seeks to answer three questions. First, what was the Anbar Awakening? Second, can the Anbar Awakening be replicated elsewhere? Third, should the Anbar Awakening be replicated elsewhere? Examining the Awakening shows that it demonstrates a potential anti-terrorism method for the United States if it is willing to follow its strategy through to the end.

Historical Background The answer to the first of these questions requires an understanding of the modern history of Iraq. From its formation after World War I, Iraq was presented with serious sectarian problems. First, the country of Iraq is an artificial construct.

It started as three Ottoman Provinces forced together. Iraq cut through Kurdistan, creating a division between the Kurds and Arabs which would break into war throughout the 20th century.1 Secondly, the Hashimite rulers were Sunni, while Iraq is mostly Shiite. The difference in numbers is not insignificant, Shia Muslims form 60 to 65 percent of the population, while the Sunni form no more than 37 percent.2 The two groups are geographically separated, so there is a majority Sunni populace in three provinces in Eastern Iraq while the remainder of Iraq is majority Shia.3 When the Ba’ath party came to power, it gave advantages to the Sunnis,

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rather than the Shiite. Saddam Hussein, himself Sunni, in an effort to avoid conflict with Sunni tribes, gave them “lavish” economic patronage and used them for military support.4 This was one possible motivation for America’s support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war: Shiite Iran could export its state-religion most easily to Iraq, another Shiite majority country. Because Hussein supported the Sunnis rather than the Shiites, he formed an effective block to the expansion of Khomeini’s revolution. Thus, in order to advance American interests against Iran, the US supported the Iraqi government, encouraging the minority to wield power over the majority.

This historical background partially explains the insurgency that followed the United States’ initial victory after the surge in Iraq. After Hussein’s government fell, the US excluded former members of the Ba’ath party from government.

These individuals saw insurgency as their only way to return to power, and began the struggle against American forces.5 Shiite forces, in particular Mahdi’s Army, also struggled against US forces and the government which had been established in Iraq.6 However, due to the Ba’athists, the insurgency fell hardest in the Sunni territories of western Iraq.7 When Hussein lost power, the Sunnis suddenly lost the privileged status they had enjoyed for nearly a century. Moreover, they lost the patronage income formerly received from the government. Additionally, they felt their lack of power and feared the Iraqi government, which would naturally place power into the hands of the Shiite majority.8 All of these factors drove the Sunni insurgency that would eventually be counteracted by the Anbar Awakening.

Insurgency

Seeing the chaos as the opportune moment to establish a caliphate, AQI moved into Iraq and worked alongside the insurgents. AQI stirred up steadily greater sectarian violence, aiming to destroy the coalition forces. Finally, it drove the country toward a sectarian civil war between 2006 and 2007. The provocative desecration of the prominent Shiite al-Askari mosque successfully propelled Iraq towards a sectarian civil war in 2006-2007. The ensuing wave of sectarian cleansing that swept through Iraq succeeded in further polarizing the Sunni and Shiite communities, advancing AQI’s goal of derailing the Coalition’s attempts to consolidate a functioning democratic state in the country.9 The situation in Iraq was so bad that in 2007 Professor Michael Waller claimed, “As of this writing, odds are even that the insurgents and terrorists could win in Iraq.”10 However, despite AQI’s apparent victory, it had already undermined its own cause in numerous ways.

AQI failed to realize that the insurgents in Iraq did not share their views on religion. Rather, the insurgents merely worked with AQI because “the enemy

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of my enemy is my friend.” Like the insurgents, AQI opposed the coalition. Yet, AQI imposed strict laws upon their allied Iraqi tribes. First, they attempted to forcibly marry local girls to AQI fighters, violating tribal customs that prohibited marrying outside the tribe.11 Second, they tried to impose their strict religious law on the areas they entered, refusing to compromise.12 Third, their proposed form of Islam — Salafism — is purist. This meant that AQI disagreed with the mysticism of Sufism, which has long been integrated into Sunnism. Thus, AQI opposed the shrines which came with Sufism and found itself at odds with local tribes. Fourth, AQI began to cut into the tribal pocketbooks. AQI began to take over smuggling to support itself, however this was typically the domain of tribes.13 Fifth, AQI asserted its authority in tribes, challenging the leadership.14 Sixth, AQI’s violence truly disgusted many tribal Sunnis.15 AQI’s violence was so excessive that they were even eventually reprimanded by Al Qaeda in a letter from Zawahiri.16 These violent tendencies pushed many Sunni’s away from the terror group. One story captures the emotions members of the Sunni tribes felt when they saw AQI’s violence: Fallujah … I remember the day [March 2007] that I got there. I think it was the secretary of the city council, his nephew … a 12-year old boy [who] was hit

by AQI right on the main street in Fallujah. Ran him over with a vehicle several times. Broke several, maybe all his bones. Then threw him on the door step of the secretary of the council’s house and shot him in front of everybody. … We couldn’t get there. Everybody got there too late. The populace knew who did it. They knew why they did it. … They had had it. That was it. They stopped. They stopped listening to AQI. They turned.

The final straw was in 2006, when AQI declared an Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), asserting their authority over the region.17 The Sunni tribal leaders realized that they could not win in the long run. The Western-backed coalition and the Shiite majority would exclude them from power if they remained insurgent. They also realized that AQI posed a long-term threat while the coalition intended to leave the region as soon as possible.18 Finally, tribes in the region of Anbar forged an alliance with one another against AQI in 2006. This alliance was the Anbar Awakening.19 The Awakening united with coalition forces against terrorism. AQI realized its mistake too late, despairingly claiming, “We helped them to unite against us.”20

The Awakening Although the Sunnis had recently been fighting against the Coalition, they

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began to fight against AQI. The Coalition provided economic incentives to join the fight against AQI, and worked to form tactical alliances with the various tribes.

By 2008, over 90,000 Sunnis had joined the organization, named the Sons of Iraq (SOI).21 The Sons of Iraq’s motives were not necessarily pure — many were in it for the money. Regardless, as they allied with the Coalition, successful aid to the Coalition became a status symbol—“letters of appreciation, on tattered pieces of paper and blurry from being copies of copies with the previous recipients names blanked out, were more valuable than money. A signed letter by the coalition, regardless of whether the words were level on the page, was a sought after status symbol.”22 The Western coalition also pragmatically expanded the SOI. Occasionally, one tribe would call American forces to aid in a fight against a rival tribe allied with AQI.23 Sometimes, the United States reminded the Sunnis that they were in the minority and needed to prove their place in the new nation.24 Sometimes the violence and presumption of AQI pushed tribes into the SOI.25 The motivations of the different tribes were diverse, but the results were drastic. This movement cost the coalition only $400 million dollars by 2009-a small amount, considering the overall financial burden of the occupation.26 During 2009, the US transferred members of the SOI to the Iraqi government.27 According to General Petraeus, the movement was worth the money: “These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved, have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.”28 In summary, the Anbar Awakening was the turning point in the war against the insurgency. Much of the success of the surge can be attributed to the Anbar Awakening.29 The assistance of locals in the war with AQI was invaluable.

Unfortunately, the US decided to follow a politically expedient course after the start of President Obama’s term in 2009. The US withdrew troops quickly from Iraq, abandoning its allies. The new Iraqi government did not trust the SOI.30 The US tried to force the Shiite government to reconcile with the Sunni military force. The US promised to integrate the SOI into the Iraqi government and armed forces, giving Sunnis a place in the new government. The Iraqi government made promises that it did not keep. Instead, as soon as America had withdrawn its troops, the government stopped paying the SOI it had hired, stopped hiring members of the SOI, carried out acts of violence on Sunnis, and arrested and framed leaders of the Anbar Awakening.31 SOI members were “banned by the government from carrying the weapons they considered necessary to protect themselves.”32 As the Sunnis began to feel oppressed, a door opened for AQI. America had promised to integrate the SOI and find them a place in the Iraqi government. Despite America’s promises, integration never occurred. After

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America withdrew from Iraq, it lost any means of forcing integration between the Sunnis and the Shia. The results of this failed integration were obvious. In 2009, Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh warned that AQI still posed a threat and that if the SOI were not integrated into the Security forces it would be a fatal mistake.33 It was. As the Sunnis felt oppressed, they welcomed AQI once again. AQI slaughtered the former SOI members as it assumed a new name — best known in The expansion of ISIS can English as ISIS.34 Many of the former only be defeated if local comSons of Iraq rejoined the same radical 35 munities fight against it. The forces they formerly rejected. This anAnbar Awakening achieved a swers the first question. What was the level of success that, if repeatAnbar Awakening? It was an uprising ed against ISIS, would likely of tribal Sunni opposition to Al Qaeda for a variety of reasons, which steadily be successful. came to be more aligned with Coalition Page 5 interests. In the end, it was abandoned by the United States and was destroyed or assimilated by ISIS.

Replicating The Awakening The second question is whether or not the Anbar Awakening can be replicated. Ultimately, the expansion of ISIS throughout Iraq and Syria can only be defeated if local communities fight against it. The Anbar Awakening achieved a level of success that, if repeated against ISIS, would likely be successful. However, there are two primary arguments against the possibility of raising another Anbar Awakening.

First, the United States did try to train rebel fighters against ISIS in Syria. Despite funding comparable to the SOI, the Pentagon only ended up training “four or five.” This number is dwarfed by the 90,000 fighters who joined the Anbar Awakening. 36 Clearly this well-funded policy was a failure. However, instead of working with tribes as happened in Iraq, the US was overly cautious. They did not accept recommended fighters and carried out an intense vetting processes.37 The failure of US efforts in Syria is because of the means taken by the US government, not the impossibility of the goal.

The second argument against replicating Anbar is the loss of trust in the US. The US promised the SOI a place in the Iraqi government. However, the failure to fulfill this promise has left many distrustful of the US. 38 If America hopes to build another movement, it must build up trust in its word. The actions of President Obama have given little indication that this will happen —from the

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lack of response to Russia’s incursions in Ukraine to the abandoned “red line” in Syria, it appears that the US has lost the will to uphold its promises.

However, the US initiated the Anbar Awakening. Special forces planted the seeds in Anbar which grew into the awakening.39 American funds also denied AQI allies by providing an alternate form of employment.40 Furthermore, the US pragmatically acted on every motive it could find to divide the terrorists from allied Sunnis. It effectively built up the Awakening and undermined AQI. If the US employs pragmatic tactics to divide terrorists from the masses of their supporters, then a repeat of the Anbar Awakening may be possible.

Risks of a second awakening Even if another Awakening is possible, it is not necessarily wise. Certainly, the Anbar Awakening helped the United States in myriad ways—it saved lives, equipment, and money during the War in Iraq. However, other alliances that undermined US interests also came with short term benefits. Would the Sons of Iraq have simply joined a long list of other allies which turned against the US? The Iraqi government believed so. They feared the SOI, seeing it as an armed group of ex-militants who would be dangerous as soon as the US turned its back. Accordingly, the Iraqi government was reluctant to integrate the SOI. Since the Iraqi government was Shiite and the SOI were Sunni, the sectarianism prevented true cohesion.

There is some truth to the Iraqi government’s claims. Many of the Sons of Iraq had once joined with the terrorists against the Coalition.41 In the long run, they may have opposed the US again. However, it appears that there was a genuine transformation occurring within the tribes. They seem to have found AQI’s violence genuinely repugnant. Certainly, pragmatism and money often brought them into the American camp, but they also opposed AQI’s brutality. They became a part of the Coalition, and they were proud of what they were able to contribute.

In the end, the SOI were not only denied the opportunity to prove their long term reliability, but were given incentives to turn against their government. President Maliki of Iraq oppressed the Sunnis, limiting their rights. The Sons of Iraq would likely not have turned against their allies if they had remained employed and allowed freedom. That many were real enemies of AQI seems evident from ISIS’s slaughter of the former SOI and denunciation of former members of the group.42 Iraqi oppression turned allies into enemies.43 It was not US training which caused former members of the SOI to join ISIS, but American abandonment.

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Conclusion In conclusion, the US may have found an effective anti-terror policy.

They managed to nearly eradicate AQI before America withdrew. The Anbar Awakening shows an ideal model for United States foreign policy in dealing with insurgents —bringing the locals into alliance through monetary, tribal, and pragmatic incentives. America ought to separate terrorists from their allies by driving a wedge between the two groups, emphasizing the terror wrought by groups such as AQI and pointing to their power-hungry rhetoric. The Awakening demonstrates that tribal alliances with terrorist groups are often uneasy at best. However, not only does the Awakening model US foreign policy at its best, it also shows US foreign policy at its worst. American politicians, driven by political expediency, effectively abandoned their allies. Political expediency meant that the US did not remain in Iraq long enough to complete its success. The United States must learn to maintain its promises. American politicians must not act based on political expediency, but must instead be willing to see their endeavors through to the end.

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References 1. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 434.

2. “The World Factbook: Iraq,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 27, 2016, 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (accessed May 3, 2016).

4. Yaroslav Trofimov, “After Minority Rule, Iraq’s Sunnis Refuse Minority Role,” Wall Street Jounal, April 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqs-sunnis-dont-accept-minority-role-1428571127 (May 2, 2016).

5. Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival Vol. 50, no. 2 (April 2008): 73-74, http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/USNatSecandForeignPol/Long,%20Anbar%20Awakening.pdf (May 3, 2016).

6. James P. Pfiffner, “US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army,” 7. Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 1 (February 2010): 76, 8. http://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA%20Orders,%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf (accessed May2, 2016).

9. Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Evolution of Iraq Strategy,” Brookings Institute Press, December, 2008. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ papers/2008/12/iraq-biddle/12_iraq_biddle.pdf (accessed May 2, 2016).

10. Biddle, Hanlon, and Pollack, “The Evolution of Iraq Strategy.”

11. Phillips, 73.

12. Phillips, 74.

13. J. Waller, Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War (Washington: The Institute of World Politics Press, 2007), 138.

14. Greg Bruno, “Finding a Place for the ‘Sons of Iraq,’” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/finding-place-sons-iraq/p16088#p1 (accessed May 3, 2016).

15. Phillips, 73.

16. Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Policy Council Vol. 18, no. 1 (Spring 2011), http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-itsrise-and-fall (accessed May 2, 2016).

17. Phillips, 73.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 18. Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, “How the “Sons of Iraq” Stabilized Iraq,” Middle East Quarte ly (Fall 2010):3, http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/2788.pdf (accessed May 2, 2016).

19. “Zawahiri’s Letter To Zarqawi (English Translation),” Combatting Terrorism Center. https:// www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf (accessed May 3, 2016).

20. Phillips, 74.

21. Wilbanks and Karsh, 59.

22. Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall.”

23. Phillips, 64.

24. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress (March 2009): 30, http://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_March_2009. pdf (accessed May 3, 2016).

25. Wilbanks and Karsh, 67.

26. Ibid, 60.

27. Ibid, 63.

28. Phillips, 75.

29. Wilbanks and Karsh, 67.

30. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress (September 2009): 23, http://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_March_2009. pdf (accessed May 3, 2016).

31. Wilbanks and Karsh , 68.

32. Dale Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad: The Third Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq 2007-2008, Dale Andrade (Washington: Center of Military History, 2010), 239-240.

33. Ibid., 214.

34. Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall.”

35. Ibid.

36. Wilbanks and Karsh, 70.

37. Abigail Hauslohner, “In Baghdad, middle-class Sunnis say they prefer militants to Maliki,” Washington Post, July 12, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-baghdad-middle-class-sunnis-say-they-prefer-militants-to-maliki/2014/07/11/fa0b66a7-1b09-409a-a5ed-ab580bc93a4a_story.html (accessed May 3, 2016).

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39. Spencer Ackerman, “US has trained only ‘four or five’ Syrian fighters against Isis, top general testifies,” The Guardian, September 16, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/16/ us-military-syrian-isis-fighters (accessed May 3, 2016).

40. Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” New York Times, October. 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/ world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html (accessed May 3, 2016).

41. Philip Dermer, “The ‘Sons of Iraq,’ Abandoned by their American Allies,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/philip-dermer-the-sons-of-iraq-abandoned-by-their-american-allies-1404253303 (accessed May 3, 2016).

42. Andrade, 212.

43. Wilbanks and Karsh, 67.

44. Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall.”

45. Wilbanks and Karsh, 62.

46. Dermer, “The ‘Sons of Iraq,’ Abandoned by their American Allies.”

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Bahrain’s Unintended Consequences How Crackdowns on Shiite Opposition Aid Iran’s Expansion Interests

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ahrain’s proximity to Iran and its sectarian structure – a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni minority – makes it an appealing target for Iranian intervention and influence. The 70 percent Shiite majority in the country alone has resulted in political unrest with Bahrain and continues to pose a threat to the stability of the Gulf state in light of Iran’s interest in the region. Both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain continue to fuel Sunni-Shia divides. This has concerning implications for America’s foreign policy interests in the region. The actions of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have provided Iran with both incentive and opportunity to expand its proxy interests in the Middle East.

Shiite Uprising During the 2011 Shiite uprising in Bahrain, Iran’s Shiite government sought to upset the sectarian balance within Eastern Arabia. Saudi Arabia responded with military intervention in an attempt to maintain Sunni-control in Bahrain. Backing from Riyadh encouraged the Bahraini government in a series of crackdowns in response to the country’s Shiite opposition. Starting in February 2011, thousands of largely Shiite protesters held anti-government protests in Pearl Square.1 The next month, Saudi Arabia led a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deployment within the joint Peninsula Shield Force to provide support to the Sunni-majority government in Bahrain and a state of emergency was imposed for three months.

The Bahraini government instigated talks with Shiite opposition in order to reconcile the two groups. The talks included the more moderate factions of the Shiite opposition. However, the primary opposition bloc, Al Wefaq stated that the dialogue was not serious and continued occupancy attempts in Pearl Square for several months.2 Eventually, the Bahraini suspended talks with the opposition blocs in early 2014. In October, Al Wefaq was banned from participation for three months. The election in November 2014 was boycotted by Al Wefaq, which led to the majority of parliamentary seats going to pro-Sunni candidates. The boycott was a result of Manama’s redrawing of electoral districts, resulting in a map that Al Wefaq believed favored the Sunni factions. During 2014, the connections between Shiite parties and Tehran became more prominent and frequent. By 2015, the Bahrain government had uncovered multiple plots which allegedly linked back to the Is-

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lamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quad Force. These plots largely targeted Bahraini security forces and typically involved small arms and homemade explosives.

In some cases, military-grade explosives, were also discovered.3 Between the months of March – April 2015, Bahraini officials arrested several suspects for smuggling explosives and planning attacks against the Sunni-majority. During June 2015, the U.S. lifted its ban on security assistance to Bahrain which was implemented after Bahrain’s crackdowns in 2011. During the month of July 2015, Saray Wa’ad Allah claimed responsibility for an attack on policemen traveling in a bus in Sitra. This attack utilized remote detonation, high explosives and uniform shrapnel. It was well-planned and executed with a higher level of sophistication than past attacks conducted by Shiite opposition. The Bahraini government accused Iran of backing the new group. In November, five Bahrainis were convicted of conspiring with members of Iran’s IRGC for the purpose of carrying out attacks on public structures and banks. Additional suspects were accused of connections to “terror elements in Iran” and arrested during this time.

Tensions increased in May 2016 when Bahraini authorities extended the sentence of Sheikh Ali Salman, the head of Al Wefaq on the charges of inciting political violence. The following month, authorities suspended the Al Wefaq Islamic Society, detained human rights advocate Nabeel Rajab and revoked Shiite Cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim’s citizenship. Qassim was accused of utilizing religious sentiment to achieve political gain and illegally sending fund to Iraq and Iran. During this time, Bahrain began the process of naturalizing Sunni Syrian refugees, increasing the Sunni- sympathetic population of the country.4

Relations with Iran These events have undermined the already tenuous relations between Iran and Bahrain, encouraging Iran to incite opposition in Bahrain. Currently, Bahrain allows Iranians to conduct business in its territory, refuses to give permission for its territory to be used for attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and does not publicly criticize Iran. Generally, however, Bahrain takes a more aggressive platform towards Iran than other Gulf states. Sunni- authorities have accused Iran of inciting Shiite opposition in Bahrain and attempting terrorist attacks and subversion. The U.S. State Department’s April 2014 report confirmed Iran’s attempts to funnel weapons to Shiite opposition groups in Bahrain.

Bahrain publicly supports Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the government has expressed concern over how America’s nuclear agreement with Iran may increase Tehran’s influence on the Shiite opposition and reduce the U.S.’s commitment to Manama’s security. Iran and Shiite allies responded with reprisals against the Bahraini administration. Islamic Revolutionary

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Guard Corps Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani stated that “the Bahraini administration is ‘miscalculating the extent of public fury’ in a movement that is a red line whose crossing will set fire to Bahrain and the entire region, and leave people with no other option but armed resistance.”5 He continued saying, “Al Khalifa will pay the price of such an action whose endpoint will be nothing but annihilation of this tyrannical regime.6” It is highly possible that factions in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will continue to capitalize on opportunities for political assertion and influence in Bahrain.

The Impact of Saudi Influence The presence of Saudi Arabia further complicates these policies, as Bahrain’s policy towards Iran is heavily influenced by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia remains Tehran’s primary geopolitical threat. Riyadh’s backing has emboldened the Bahraini government in the years since, recently culminating in a series of harsh crackdowns against the country’s Shiite opposition.7 Manama’s crackdown strategy could create another opportunity for Tehran to excite sectarian unrest in the Persian Gulf. In attempts to counter Iran’s influence, Saudi Arabia began expanding its strategy to increase Sunni-friendly governments in the Gulf. Under Riyadh’s leadership, the Gulf Cooperation Council has created alliances with smaller allies, including Bahrain. Media outlets within the Gulf and Bahrain Given its lauded history as an have framed the recent security anti-imperialistic state, Iran is and political suppression measures positioned to distinguish itself as necessary components to “fight as a free from external influextremism” and “restore unity and ence. .. This is an ideal platsocial cohesion” to an unstable Bahform for instilling pro-Iranian rain. Saudi Arabia is positioned to sympathy and support within provide reinforcements to Manama, Shia communities. in the case of harsh backlash from the Shiite opposition. Iran’s execuPage 14 tion of prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, shows the ability and will Riyadh has to further mobilize Shiite opposition groups throughout the Gulf. If Iran proves successful, tensions are likely to escalate throughout the entire region. These tensions are likely to spread beyond Bahrain to Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well.

Shiite sympathies for Iran are likely due to the efforts of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to isolate the Shiite opposition groups. In the past, Bahrain has prohibited

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all protests from any other opposition group besides Al-Wefaq. These protests have largely only been allowed Shiite dominated areas, further separating the protesters from the rest of the Bahrain.8 Saudi Arabia, in the past, has isolated the Shiite community in its Eastern Provinces. Policies prevent the Shiite from holding positions of honor in the government and authorities do not tolerate opposition-led uprisings.9 Writer Laurence Louër, observed that “the impossibility for these movements to exist at home as legitimate organizations made Iran their natural territorial sanctuary, and apparently, the Islamic Republic their natural protector.”10 In Bahrain, authorities have revoked over 100 citizens of their citizenship and mandated exodus from the country because of any distant relations with Iran or “Iranian origins”.11 A large percentage of these Bahraini’s identify as Shia.12

Iranian Expansion Given its lauded history as an anti-imperialistic state, Iran is positioned to distinguish itself as a free from external influence. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, including Bahrain, have relied on the U.S. for security and support since Iraq’ invasion of Kuwait in 1990.13 This can potentially appeal to Shia communities within states with Sunni-controlled governments. This creates an opportunity for Iran to expand its proxy efforts. The execution of Sheikh Nimr alNimr provide opportunity to Iran to expand its influence and interests. Both conservative officials, Supreme Leader Khamenei and reformist activists, Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif have rhetorically framed Iran’s foreign policy cause as “aiding the oppressed.” This is an ideal platform for instilling pro-Iranian sympathy and support within Shia communities. Additionally, the anti-imperialistic ideology of the Iranian Shia complements Sunni crackdowns and isolation efforts in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Domestically, Iranian maintains a base of support for its expanding influence. The language of Iranian officials and the press can appeal to inspirational concepts which Shia communities follow. The U.S. does not actively support these communities in the Gulf. It is easy for Iran to present itself as the counter actor to American-backed Gulf states seen as culturally anti-Shia.

Conclusion In conclusion, Saudi Arabia continues to increase the amounts of arrests and interrogations of Shia from the Eastern Province accused of spying for Iran. This has only served to further incite unrest.14 Crackdown in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia can certainly serve to encourage the Shia to deepen relations and connections with Iran for the purpose of support, funding, and political influence. The Saudi

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government does not display any intention to eliminate Riyadh’s isolation and crackdown policies.15 The United States should be concerned that its close allies Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are fueling political sectarian unrest. Iranian influence will probably only expand and grow within the Gulf states as more Shia are alienated and isolated. Painted as “Iranian proxies”, Shia are more likely to seek out greater Iranian support. Without mechanisms for change within their country, Shia communities will turn to Iran as the advocate best suited to advance their cause. Iran is the clear choice for Shia in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

If the U.S. ignores Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s strategy towards the Shia opposition, Iran will capitalize on the opportunity. Currently, Iran can position itself as the patron and ally of these communities. If Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s policies towards the Shia are considered independent of their connection to Iran, the countries’ officials may lessen Iran’s opportunity for expansion. However, the current policies of isolation and political exclusion in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia provide Iran with ample opportunity to expand its proxy interests in the Middle East and incite unrest.

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References 1. Stratfor. “A Bahraini Crackdown Invites Iranian Meddling.” Stratfor (June 23, 2016). https:// www.stratfor.com/analysis/bahraini-crackdown-invites-iranian-meddling?0=ip_login_no_ cache%3D469f8a0bb51d5e2ac5bc63759ecbdc6d 2. Ibid 3. Ibid.

4. Stratfor. “A Bahraini Crackdown Invites Iranian Meddling.”

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Reza Aslan, “Bahrain’s Fake Sectarian War,” Foreign Affairs, June 30, 2013 ,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bahrain/2013-06-30/bahrains-fake-sectarian-war 9. Frederic Wehrey, The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.)

10. Laurence Louer, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2008).

11. Natasha Bowler, “When Bahrain Says You’re Not Bahraini Anymore,” Foreign Policy. August 18, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/18/when-bahrain-says-youre-not-bahraini-anymore/.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. “Saudi Arabia puts Shia on trial for spying for Iran,” BBC, February 22, 2016,http://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-35630193.

15. Ibid.

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The Burden of Morality: The Socioeconomic Development of Refugees in the United States

The history of the United States has often been strongly influenced by refugees. Albert Einstein, known for his many accomplishments, was a refugee.

Enrico Fermi, inventor of the nuclear reactor, was a refugee. Many of the immigrants who came to the United States during the 19th and early 20th centuries were what could now be classified as refugees. Even the Puritans who founded some of the United States’ first colonies were religious refugees. The history of the United States has been one of refugees as it has been one of immigrants. However, not all of these refugees have been as industrious as the Puritans, or as brilliant as Einstein or Fermi. These refugees do not contribute to the extent that these individuals did, and they may pose more of a burden due to the costs of hosting them overtaking their actual contribution to the community. Do refugees impose a socioeconomic burden on their host country, the United States in particular?

The best way to test this is to compare the socioeconomic achievements of refugees to economic immigrants. With the assumption that economic immigrants are socioeconomically beneficial, they serve as a suitable baseline for determining whether refugees are socioeconomically beneficial or not. The question then becomes: is hosting refugees socioeconomically beneficial to the United States?

There are three possible answers to this question. The first is that hosting refugees is not socioeconomically beneficial to the United States. This possibility is realized if refugees clearly do not match or surpass the overall contributions (the sum of their earnings, hours worked, and overall integration with society) of economic immigrants. The second is that hosting refugees is socioeconomically beneficial to the United States, which occurs if refugees clearly match or surpass the overall contributions of economic immigrants. The third is that there is no conclusive answer. This possibility is realized if there is too much conflicting data, or the question itself is flawed.

The hypothesis of this paper is that hosting refugees is socioeconomically beneficial to the United States.

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Literature Review The evidence this paper will use to consider the hypothesis will primarily come from four studies.

“Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States” by Kalena E. Cortes used a cohort longitudinal study of a group of refugees and a group of economic immigrants who arrived in the United States from 1975-1980.

This study found that by 1980 the refugee population was behind the immigrant population in terms of hours worked and overall earnings. However, by 1990 the refugee population surpassed the immigrant population in both categories.

This paper will use this study to look at the key differences between refugees and economic immigrants, and how this affects their relative economic impacts on the United States.

“Benefit or Burden? Social Capital, Gender, and the Economic Adaptation of Refugees” by Ryan Allen uses a mixed-methods approach to determine the how well refugees are able to assimilate into their host community and become productive members thereof. Specifically, the study tests whether “sponsorship” by a member of the community increases the earnings and productivity of newcomers to that community. The study also has interesting findings regarding how a refugee’s ability to speak English influences their initial integration into the workforce, and how sponsorship negatively effects the earnings of female refugees due to societal ties and “duties.” The study also notes differences between refugees who are fresh arrivals and refugees who have relocated to a certain area after already having been inside the United States. This paper will use this study to further triangulate the factors affecting the speed with which refugees integrate and contribute to their communities at large.

“Employment Retention, Area of Origin, and Type of Social Support among Refugees in the Chicago Area” by Lorraine Majka and Brendan Mullan examines the effects of country of origin and help programs for refugees on their ability to gain employment. The self-stated purpose of the study is to look further than the first job a refugee gets, as many studies hold that a refugee getting a job at all represents an end to their employment problems, and the starting point for their economic contribution. However, longitudinal studies are needed to see exactly how refugees integrate into their new communities. Another stated purpose is to fulfill the need for studies that include groups from multiple parts of the world (specifically Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America) rather than holding one group as a representative sample. The reason for this is that region of origin has a large effect on how successful one is in gaining and retaining employment. For example, Eastern European refugees are more

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successful than their Southeast Asian counterparts. This paper will use this study to look at the intersection between region of origin and other demographic data, to examine whether trends of contribution hold true within an acceptable margin for all refugees.

Occupational Adjustment of Refugees: the Vietnamese in the United States�

by Barry N. Stein specifically focuses on Vietnamese refugees and their integration into American society. It also compares them across time periods and regions of origin, specifically comparing Vietnamese refugees with European refugees from 1933-1945, Hungarian refugees from 1956, Cuban refugees from 19591973, as well as a group of Vietnamese immigrants that arrived in 1970. Particularly, the study focuses on how quickly the refugees in question can end their dependency on sponsors, family, friends, or government programs. This paper will use this study to further examine how employment is a critical factor in how refugees integrate into society, and how successful this makes them as productive members of the community.

Research and Analysis .First, one should examine the demographic differences between refugees and economic immigrants, and how this affects each groups integration into society. The primary difference between refugees and economic immigrants is the circumstances of their departure from their home country. Refugees are fleeing persecution, war, famine, or other major societal ills, while immigrants come to a country seeking economic gain. Refugees often have nowhere to return, while economic immigrants often do. If not, they often send part of their earnings back to family members in their mother country, and thus have an anchor in that country. One of the most natural inferences from this distinction is that refugees are much more invested in their host country. In many ways, their host country becomes their new home, as they have nowhere else to go. Economic immigrants, on the other hand, usually have at least some ties to their home country, and are not as invested in their host country.

Refugees are also a more representative sample of their home country than immigrants. Economic immigrants tend to be poor, have little education, and be working-age men and women. Refugees can range in age from infants to elderly individuals, are about seven percent more likely to be educated, and are often more skilled than immigrants. Refugees are also much more likely to learn English. After 11 years of residence in the United States, refugees are 13 percent less likely to have a low English-speaking ability than economic immigrants.1 The disparity of one’s commitment to making one’s host country his or her home is shown in the propensity of refugees to have become citizens after 11 years of res-

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idence at a rate of 63 percent, as opposed to 39 percent of economic immigrants.

In terms of economic productivity, after 10 years of residence refugees have an income of 20 percent more annually than economic immigrants, despite earning less than economic immigrants upon arrival. Since refugees earn, on average, 17 percent less than economic immigrants when they first arrive (due to arriving in the United States with minimal resources and having to find any job as quickly as possible rather than finding a job that suits their individual skill sets), this is an increase of 37 percent over a decade relative to economic immigrants.2 Also worth noting is that the migratory nature of economic immigrants makes them less productive. Refugees who move to a community and stay there earn more than those who move from community to community looking for work. Staying in a community means that one can network with locals, learn local customs, become familiar with a particular labor market, develop relationships with employers, and integrate into the community at large. These factors contribute not only to an increased likelihood of employment, but also to an increased likelihood of getting a better job than a migrant worker.3 The fundamental differences between refugees and economic immigrants lend themselves to the conclusion that refugees are much more beneficial to society, both in terms of societal integration and in terms of economic benefit.

Cortes holds that learning English helps increase hours worked and relative pay. Improvement in English skills roughly translates to three percent more hours worked annually and a seven percent gain in earnings for male refugees.4 Allen contradicts this, stating that “the ability to speak English and educational attainment were not statistically significant predictors in any of the models for male refugees.” Allen asserts that age, work experience, and country of origin were the only statistically significant factors. Additionally, Allen found that whether a particular refugee originally arrived in the community in question and whether or not the individual was sponsored.5 However, one must note that Allen’s study is not a longitudinal study, whereas Cortes’ study is longitudinal. This means that Cortes is studying the employment individuals find themselves in after they are stable, allowing them to seek employment befitting their skill sets with the added benefit of more time in the United States to learn local customs, meet local people, integrate into the community, and learn English. Allen, on the other hand, is largely studying refugees who are looking for their first jobs, so that they may become independent.

The reason for the seeming unimportance of education and the ability to speak English is that when refugees first arrive they enter the same pool of unskilled labor, thus negating any advantages they would have in the job market in their desperation to find a job quickly.6 As Cortes shows, however, as time goes on and refugees stabilize their socioeconomic position, they are able to find the prop-

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er jobs that correspond to their prior education, experience, and ability to speak English. These factors, while not important in the initial job search, pay off as time goes on. The kinds of jobs that refugees initially take are similar to those that many economic immigrants take, namely unskilled labor positions such as in agriculture or manufacturing. Performing well in these positions does not require a mastery of English, simply a basic knowledge of how to perform a specific task.7 Country of origin plays a role in the ability of immigrants to integrate into the economy. Refugees from Somalia and Sudan earn about 25 percent less then refugees from Eastern Europe, most likely due to Eastern Europe’s higher level of development giving refugees who originate from there an easier transition into the American workforce and American society at large.8 Sponsorship by someone of a similar ethnic group, however, has different effects depending on whether the refugee in question is male or female. Loosely defined, sponsorship is best understood as a sort of mentorship dynamic, where an existing member of a community takes it upon his or herself to assist newcomers in the refugee community with acclimatizing to their new society and to the job market. While sponsorship has a positive effect on male earnings, it has a negative effect on female earnings.9 This is likely due to gender roles defined by the societies which the refugees Allen studies came from. The sponsorship of females in a society that emphasizes females as homemakers will result in sponsors helping males find work, and advising females to stay home. Facially, this certainly has adverse economic effects, but for this phenomenon to be taken into account fully, more research on the subject is needed.

Job retention also varies by country of origin. Eastern European and Southeast Asian refugees are more likely to retain employment long-term than refugees from all other areas studied.10 Refugees, particularly females, are more likely to retain jobs the longer they have been a part of a particular community.

Females with dependents are also less likely to take long term jobs or retain a job.

Societal support also greatly benefits a refugee’s ability to attain and retain a job.

Government involvement in a refugee’s assimilation into American communities greatly speeds up the process as opposed to “self-help” programs. Additionally, more developed areas of the world provide a smoother transition into American society. Thus, across the board, European refugees find the most success in the United States.11 Employment in and of itself is a critical factor in a refugee’s ability to integrate into society at large. Refugees often arrive in the United States dejected, having lost everything, including their home. Getting a job in their new home restores a sense of pride, not only in terms of the individual, but also in terms of community. A refugee no longer feels as if they are a burden if they are actively contributing to the community at large. Furthermore, they become invested in

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their new home, which strengthens their desire to meet local people, learn local customs, learn how to better speak English, and build their home in their new community.12 Economic success greatly increases a refugee’s desire to assimilate, rather than remain an outsider. Those who have the least contact with society at large (the unemployed) are those who learn the least English and are less likely to adopt their new home as their own. Highly skilled refugees in particular have little problems with integrating into society once they find jobs that Over time refugees tend to utilize their skills and education. reach equilibrium between These individuals often acclimatize very quickly.13 However, the hightheir former occupations and est increase in job quality is usually their new occupations, alfor the lowest skilled of refugees, though the transition can be as many find even the most menial difficult for some. jobs in the United States to be a step up from their former occupations.

Page 22 This further reinforces their desire to integrate into their new society.

The problem lies with white-collar workers who cannot integrate at the same level due to their lack of ability to speak English or lack of understanding of cultural norms. Occupations that require networking are also extremely difficult to attain, as refugees are newcomers to the job market. Over time refugees tend to reach equilibrium between their former occupations and their new occupations, although the transition can be difficult for some.14

Conclusion

Given the research provided by the studies examined, the hypothesis is correct for two reasons. First, the statistics provided that compare economic immigrants to refugees show a clear superiority on the part of the refugees in regards to both economic factors and societal integrations. Second, the fundamental differences between economic immigrants and refugees show a clear advantage in terms of societal integration on the part of the refugees.

Refugees show more success in economic matters as they work more hours and earn more money after ten years of residency, despite starting out with fewer resources than economic immigrants. Refugees are more educated, and learn English at a faster rate. Both of these factors directly impact their ability to be economically productive members of society. Whereas economic immigrants are almost all low-skilled migratory workers, refugees represent all levels of so-

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ciety, from doctors and engineers to farmers and factory workers. Over time, refugees occupy jobs that are more suited to their qualifications, and their economic contributions skyrocket as a result. Refugees also retain jobs at a higher rate, as they are much more likely to stay with the same job in the same community and contribute in a more consistent manner.

In terms of integrating into the United States as a whole, refugees clearly have the upper hand over economic immigrants. Economic immigrants are primarily in the country for economic gain. Much of the time this consists of sending money back to family members in one’s homeland. Refugees, on the other hand, have nowhere else to go. They are much more willing to invest in the country that has become their de facto homeland. Over 20 percent more refugees become citizens within 11 years of residence, and refugees are 13 percent less likely to have a poor grasp of the English language. The age range of refugees is also indicative. In essence refugee communities are a microcosm of the communities of their home country. They stand in stark contrast to the working age migratory economic immigrants. These are communities of people ranging from infants to the elderly, seeking to make a home, not simply seeking to make money to send home. Refugees have nothing to go back to, and as such, they integrate into communities at a higher rate than economic immigrants. The motivation of refugees is to find a home. The motivation of economic immigrants is to make money. This fundamental difference is the underlying reason why refugees are more societally beneficial than economic immigrants.

Refugees consistently outperform economic immigrants in both social and economic matters. Refugees integrate into their communities and become citizens of the United States at a much higher rate than economic immigrants. In addition, despite starting at a disadvantage to economic immigrants, after staying in the country for a decade refugees greatly outperform economic immigrants due to their superior education, willingness to learn English, and their non-migratory nature. Refugees understand the importance of having a home, and they are much more willing and able to build one in the United States than economic immigrants. They have much more of a sense of ownership and investment in their new communities, and that makes them more willing to truly be a part of their new country. Their success is why refugees are not a burden to the United States, but rather a greater economic benefit than those who come to the United States explicitly for economic reasons. Because refugees socioeconomically outperform economic immigrants, the hypothesis is correct. Rather than viewing refugees as a burden which the United States must accept because of altruistic beliefs, society should view refugees as who they are. Just like the ancestors of many Americans, refugees come to America to rebuild their lives, and hopefully give back to the country that becomes their new home.

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References 1. Kalena E. Cortes, “Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 86, no. 2 (2004): 465-80. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3211641.

2. Ryan Allen, “Benefit or Burden? Social Capital, Gender, and the Economic Adaptation of Refugees.” International Migration Review, 43(2) (Summer 2009): 332 365. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20681708.

3. Kalena E. Cortes, “Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States.” 475.

4. Ibid.

5. Kalena E. Cortes, “Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States.” 476.

6. Ryan Allen, “Benefit or Burden? Social Capital, Gender, and the Economic Adaptation of Refugees,” 340.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ryan Allen, “Benefit or Burden? Social Capital, Gender, and the Economic Adaptation of Refugees,” 346.

10. Lorraine Majka and Brendan Mullan. “Employment Retention, Area of Origin and Type of Social Support among Refugees in the Chicago Area.” The International Migration Review 26, no. 3 (1992): 899-926. doi:10.2307/2546969.

11. Ibid.

12. Barry N. Stein, “Occupational Adjustment of Refugees: The Vietnamese in the United States.”

The International Migration Review 13, no. 1 (1979): 25-45. doi:10.2307/2545270.

13. Ibid.

14. Barry N. Stein, “Occupational Adjustment of Refugees: The Vietnamese in the United States,” 915.

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Review of Seeking Refuge: On the Shores of the Global Refugee Crisis

F

rom the image of an infant’s body lying on a European beach to the deadly attack at Ohio State by a Somalian refugee, the mass exodus of refugees from the Middle East and Africa has become one of the most tragically iconic issues of the past year. The balance between accepting impoverished refugees and maintaining security has become a volatile political issue. Some argue that the only moral responsibility imaginable is to accept all refugees, while others call for completely closed borders to prevent radical Islamic terrorists from entering Western nations. The question of how many refugees, if any, Western nations should accept and resettle has catalyzed Western politics. Leaders like Angela Merkel and Barack Obama have faced political backlash for their decision to admit thousands of refugees into their countries.1 The stark political and social divisions on the issue has caused gridlock in many nations on the issue while the crisis worsens. Both sides accuse the other of moral deficiencies. Lacking from the discussion are rational, yet compassionate voices that honestly address concerns on both sides of the aisle.

Despite grave concerns, openly resettling refugees in the West is not only morally imperative but practically beneficial for Western nations according to Stephen Bauman, Matthew Soerens, and Issam Smier. In their book Seeking Refuge: On the Shores of the Global Refugee Crisis, they examine the refugee question specifically in light of the Church’s role in response. Primarily, the authors argue that the issue is one of the most significant geopolitical issues of the modern era and that any response and discussion cannot be simplistic.

While “refugees” are often referred to as a homogeneous entity, the authors point out the refugees admitted to the United States come from a wide range of cultural and religious backgrounds. Many flee not only violence but also targeted religious persecution. More than 35 percent of Iraqi refugees resettled in America were Christians.2 Over 70 percent of refugees from Burma are persecuted religious minorities, and similar trends are seen in the diaspora from countries like Somalia and Syria.3 Fears about national security are legitimate, especially in nations that have suffered radicalized terror attacks. However, statistically, the authors point out that terrorist attacks by refugees are anomalies. 4 Further, radical terror attacks in the last few years have been committed by people radicalized within Western countries.5 Additionally, refugees undergo a vetting period of 18 to 36 months

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before they are cleared for resettlement.6 The authors would argue that the statistical improbability of a terrorist entering the West via a refugee camps does not outweigh the moral responsibility to admit displaced persons.

The authors also argue that the extensive restrictions and vetting process of the refugee program are effective, and the greater threat is posed by people within Western countries radicalized by outside forces.7 They also raise the concern that a refusal to admit any refugees could only confirm ISIS narratives about the inherent incompatibility of Islam and Western democracy. 8 There is also While the idea of admitting the potential for reciprocal actions refugees on a large scale is, to from predominantly Islamic counsome, the correct moral optries. In January 2016, Moroccan tion, the resettlement process Islamic leaders issued a declaration is not so simple ...

Activism asking Muslims to respect the rights cannot be limited to words of minority religions such as Chrisalone. tianity.9 The authors tie Western tolerance to reciprocity for Westerners Page 26 and Christians in Muslim-majority nations.

Refugees also go through an extensive resettlement program, which the book explains in detail. This includes additional security checks, medical screenings, and the role of resettlement agencies which defray the cost to the government. People have understandable concerns over the possibility of inadvertently admitting terrorists. Yet, the authors explain that it would be far easier for a potential radical to enter the United States on a tourist or work visa rather than refugee channels. The book does not address potential issues faced by European nations, who do not have the advantage of the United State’s distance to implement restrictive vetting processes.

Bauman and Soerens also examine the economic potential of refugees. Statistically, most refugees are able to assimilate into Western society and contribute to the economy, contrary to the common misconception that refugees subsist on welfare and siphon jobs from Americans.

While the idea of admitting refugees on a large scale is, to some, the correct moral option, the resettlement process is not so simple. Refugees often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, language difficulties, isolation, and a lack of communal support. 10 The authors describe in detail the role that individuals and communities must play in the resettlement process. While these strategies are universally applicable, the authors narrow their focus to the role of the American church in aiding the resettlement process. They firmly express that it is not enough for Westerners to advocate for resettlement, but to aid refugees. Political advoca-

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cy, financial contributions, time, education, and community building. Activism cannot be limited to words alone.

The book explains that the influx of refugees from Muslim nations presents an invaluable opportunity for people, especially Christians, to interact with those of different faiths. The majority of refugees fleeing terrorist groups like ISIS are primarily from nations that otherwise are fairly hostile to Christianity, either politically or culturally. When these refugees are resettled in Western democracies, it provides an opportunity for cross cultural communication that would otherwise be impossible. Partnerships between the people of faith, the government, and private organizations will not only help refugees assimilate, but improve the ability of Western communities to communicate across cultures.

Seeking Refuge is a thought-provoking book that provides an understandable, informed perspective. Without falling into moralistic hyperbole, Seeking Refuge is clear about its moral and political stance. Regardless of one’s own conclusions, the book provides practical suggestions for interactions with resettled refugees, and a clearer look at this often muddled yet critical issue.

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References 1. Pawel Swidlicki. “Is Merkel Paying the Price for the Refugee Crisis,” CNN. September. 5, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/03/opinions/refugee-crisis-germans-merkel-fatigue-swidlicki/.

2. Stephen Bauman, Matthew Soerens, and Issan Smeir, Seeking Refuge: On the Shores of the Global Refugee Crisis,(Chicago: Moody Publishers) 39.

3. Ibid., 59.

4. Ibid., 76.

5. Ibid., 77.

6. Ibid., 79.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 81.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 151.

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