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Tools of The Trade Guerrilla â€ 7
Calibre : 7,62mm NATO (7.62x51) Action: select-fire or semi-auto only Length: 1100 mm Barrel length: 533 mm Weight: 4.45 kg empty Magazine capacity: 20 rounds Rate of fire: 650-700 rounds per minute Guerrilla â€ 9
Calibre: .30-06 (7.62x63 mm) Action: Gas operated, rotating bolt Overall length: 1103 mm Barrel length: 610 mm Weight: 4.32 kg Feeding: clip-fed only magazine, 8 rounds Guerrilla â€ 11
Calibre: .30 US Carbine (7.62x33 mm) Action: Gas operated, rotating bolt Overall length: 904 mm Barrel length: 458 mm Weight: 2.36 kg without magazine Magazine capacity: 15 or 30 rounds Guerrilla â€ 13
Calibre: 7.62x39 mm Action: Gas operated, rotating bolt with 2 lugs Overall length: 870 mm Barrel length: 415 mm Weight: 4,3 kg Magazine capacity: 30 rounds Cyclic rate of fire: 600 rounds per minute Guerrilla â€ 15
Calibre: 40 mm launcher; 40, 70 & 105mm warheads Type: recoilless launch & rocket booster Overall length: 650 mm Weight: 6.3 kg unloaded, with telescope sight Effective range: 200-500 meters Guerrilla â€ 17
Calibre: 50mm Type: Double Action Only manually selective Chamber: 9x19mm Luger / Parabellum Weight unloaded: 870 g Barrel length: 120 mm Capacity: 15 rounds Guerrilla â€ 19
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These are home made devices
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Ready for a r e
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Origins of guerrilla warfare The term Guerrilla Fighter was coined in 1808 by the people of Spain. As a community they resisted Napoleon’s attempts at conquest during the Peninsular War by embarking on a campaign of persistent, small-scale attacks. The direct translation into English is “little war”. Despite "guerrilla" being coined in the 17thC. Guerrilla armies have, it seems, always been with us. From the nomadic rebels who brought down the Roman empire to the jihadists who triggered America’s “global war on terror”, irregular forces are a constant factor in the history of warfare. And fighting them has become tougher than ever.
Guerrilla conflict has a long history. The Greek historian Herodotus described the difficulties faced by the Persian king Darius during his bloody invasion of what is modern Bulgaria in 512 B.C.. The Persians were lucky to escape with most of their heads still attached after constant clashes with the nomadic and mounted Bulgarians, a people who vanished after lightning hit-and-run raids. Even Julius Caesar had his hands full trying to subdue the elusive Britons. Caesar’s description of this campaign bears a close resemblance to much of the guerrilla warfare writing of the 1960s. The Roman leader said his legions were incapable of countering guerrillas because “the enemy never fought in close array, but in small parties with wide intervals; and had detachments posted at regular stations, so that one party covered another in turn, and fresh, unspent warriors took the place of the battle weary.”
Until the 1950s, the great bulk of these “small wars” had an identical outcome the counter guerrilla force won. There were exceptions. For example, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States successfully supported hundreds of thousands of guerrillas against the Axis powers in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Burma, Indochina, the Philippines, China, and Malaya during World War II. But in these cases, guerrilla campaigns were ancillary to the more conventional military and naval efforts sponsored by major powers. As in the case of popular Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the ultimate outcome depended more on allied regulars than on the farmer-guerrillas waiting to spring a cleverly concealed ambush. And plenty of guerrilla forces operated on losing sides. In the American Civil War, John Mosby and William Quantrill’s guerrillas represented the failed Confederate cause. From the Roman Empire until the mid-twentieth century, the deck appeared to be stacked against the guerrilla.
The Third of May 1808, Francisco Goya
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ETA GRAPO CRLA
26th July bfl
sp mrta nla
falzw eln cnpz egtk sbgc
dtl tmlnt erp mnrt fap
Lehi BSO plO ijm
Haganah al-Aqsa prc Hamas IFPG
FARK UCPMB KLA IRA EQVC
ETA RAPO CRLA
polisario AAI kk pdki MEK jundallah
irafp maql sbgcb unita pla swaps gra
BIA LeT Tamil Tigers
jem spla sla
1780 "as for this damned old fox, the Devil himself could not catch him."
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Francis Marion General Francis Marion born in c.1732 was a military officer who led a band of irregular fighters in the low-country swamps of South Carolina, serving the French in the American Revolutionary War. Acting with Continental Army and South Carolina militia commissions under Lord Cornwallis.
"Swamp Fox, Swamp Fox, tail on his hat... Nobody knows where the Swamp Fox at..."
Marionâ€™s strength was in adapting and knowing the difficult to navigate the swamp terrain around him. He only travelled with a small amount of men who provided their own horses, food and weapons, working for no pay. The small numbers meant that the troop was agile and could move fast, ideal for performing hit and run tactics and avoiding enemy capture. This gave him a massive advantage over the British. Due to General Francis Marionâ€™s irregular methods of warfare, he is considered one of the fathers of modern guerrilla warfare, and is credited in the lineage of the United States Army Rangers. He is known as the 'Swamp Fox'.
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Guerrilla strategy In guerrilla terminology, strategy is understood as the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in light of the total military situation and the overall ways of reaching these objectives. To have a correct strategic appreciation from the point of view of the guerrilla band, it is necessary to analyse fundamentally what will be the enemy's mode of action. If the final objective is always the complete destruction of the opposite force, the enemy is confronted in the case of a civil war of this kind with the standard task: he will have to achieve the total destruction of each one of the components of the guerrilla band.
The guerrilla fighter, on the other hand, must analyse the resources which the enemy has for trying to achieve that outcome: the means in men, in mobility, in popular support, in armaments, in capacity of leadership on which he can count. We must make our own strategy adequate on the basis of these studies, keeping in mind always the final objective of defeating the enemy army.
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Formation in secret of the first fighter band Guerrilla warfare obeys laws, some derived from the general laws of war and others owing to its own special character. If there is a real intention to begin the struggle from some foreign country or from distant and remote regions within the same country, it is obvious that it must begin in small conspiratorial movements of secret members acting without mass support or knowledge. If the guerrilla movement is born spontaneously out of the reaction of a group of individuals to some form of coercion, it is possible that the later organization of this guerrilla nucleus to prevent its annihilation will be sufficient for a beginning.
But generally guerrilla warfare starts from a well-considered act of will: some chief with prestige starts an uprising for the salvation of his people, beginning his work in difficult conditions in a foreign country. Almost all the popular movements undertaken against dictators in recent times have suffered from the same fundamental fault of inadequate preparation. The rules of conspiracy, which demand extreme secrecy and caution, have not been observed.
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rish War of dependence
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The Birth of the Irish Republic, Walter Paget
Irish Republican Army The "Irish War of Independence" or the "Anglo-Irish War" as it was known in Britain was a guerrilla war mounted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), against the British government and its forces in Ireland. This movement originated from the 1916 Easter Rising. The IRA that fought in this conflict is often called the Old IRA to distinguish it from later groups that also used the name. The guerrillas mimicked the successful tactics of the Boers, fast violent raids without uniform. This was at first deeply unpopular with the people of Ireland and it took the heavy-handed response by the British to popularise it.
Communications were systematically destroyed and even the British army's transport system in the country was disorganised. The enemy's intelligence service was completely dislocated. The R.I.C. -The eyes and ears of British rulewas demoralised. British justice courts could not operate-for the people ignored them. The British gradually were forced to evacuate the smaller more isolated garrisons. They concentrated in the larger towns. The areas evacuated came under sole control of The Republic. The next step was to isolate the larger centres and keep cutting communications and constantly hitting the enemy. In time these would have been evacuated too. Thus ended the last great phase of guerrilla operations against British rule in Ireland.
"They acted in small numbers"
They acted in small numbers in the right localities and compelled the British to disperse to find them. Then as they searched they hit them at will by means of the ambush.
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"The guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that it is the enemy that must serve as his source of supply of ammunition and arms"
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Training The fundamental training of the soldier of liberation is the life itself with the guerrilla band, and no one can be a chief who has not learned his difficult office in daily, armed exercises. Life with some companions will teach something about the handling of arms, about principles of orientation, about the manner of treating the civil population, about fighting, etc.; but the precious time of the guerrilla band is not to be consumed in methodical teaching. Schools perform a very important function. They are to form new soldiers from persons who have not passed through that excellent sieve of formidable privations, guerrilla combatant life. Other privations must be suffered at the outset to convert them into the truly chosen. After having passed through very difficult tests, they will arrive at incorporating themselves into the kingdom of an army that lives from day to day and leaves no traces of its path anywhere. They ought to perform physical exercises, mainly of two types: an agile gymnastic with training for war of a commando type, which demands agility in attack and withdrawal; and hikes that are hard and exhausting that will serve to toughen the recruit for this kind of existence. Above all, they should live in the open air. They should suffer all the inclemencies of the weather in close contact with nature, as the guerrilla band does.
The school for recruits must have workers who will take care of its supply needs. For this there should be cattle sheds, grain sheds, gardens, dairy, everything necessary, so that the school will not constitute a charge on the general budget of the guerrilla army. The students can serve in rotation in the work of supply, either as punishment for bad conduct or simply as volunteers. This will depend upon characteristics proper to the zone where the school is being held. The school should have its small medical organization with a doctor or nurse. Shooting is the basic apprenticeship. The guerrilla fighter should be carefully trained in this respect, so that he will try to expend the least possible amount of ammunition. He begins by practicing what is called dry shooting. It consists of seating the rifle firmly on any kind of wooden apparatus. Without moving or firing the rifle the recruits direct the movement of a target until they think they have a hole at the centre exactly in the line of sight. A mark is made on a backboard that remains stationary. If the mark for three tries gives a single point, this is excellent. If there is an excess of ammunition or a great need for preparing soldiers, opportunity will be given to fire with bullets.
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c cir le
Guerrilla tactics The first thing to be considered is the adjusting of guerrilla action to the action of the enemy. The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility. This permits it in a few minutes to move far from a specific theatre and in a few hours far even from the region, if that becomes necessary; permits it constantly to change front and avoid any type of encirclement. As the circumstances of the war require, the guerrilla band can dedicate itself exclusively to fleeing from an encirclement which is the enemy's only way of forcing the band into a decisive fight that could be unfavourable; it can also change the battle into a counterencirclement (small bands of men are presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy is surrounded by stronger contingents; or men located in a safe place serve as a lure, leading to the encirclement and annihilation of the entire troops and supply of an
attacking force). Characteristic of this war of mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band, the same. Thus, successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers.
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che & Castro
Ernesto Guevara Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, commonly known as Che Guevara, was born in 1928, into a middleclass Argentina family. While living in Mexico City, he met Fidel Castro, joining the 26th of July Movement, and sailing to Cuba with the intention of overthrowing U.S.-backed Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Che soon rose to prominence among the revolution, was promoted to secondin-command, and played a pivotal role in the victorious two-year guerrilla campaign that deposed the Batista regime.
Che Guevara is considered one of the founding fathers of modern guerrilla warfare. He showed the worlds public that they had the capacity to free them selves by means of guerrilla warfare from an oppressive government that oppresses them. We consider that the Cuban revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in America and they are:
1. Popular forces can win a war against the army. 2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them. 3. In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.
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Of these three propositions the first two contradict the defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext that against a professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them. As these problems were formerly a subject of discussion in Cuba, until facts settled the question, they are probably still much discussed in America. Naturally, it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given
to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first centre is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law; peace is considered already broken. In these conditions popular discontent expresses itself in
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"I don't care if I fall as long as someone else picks up my gun and keeps on shooting" CHE GUVARA
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Organising a guerrilla band No rigid scheme can be offered for the organisation of a guerrilla band; there will be innumerable differences according to the environment in which it is to operate. For convenience of exposition we will suppose that our experience has a universal application, but it should be kept in mind that it is the only way, that there will possible be new forms that may work better with the particular characteristics of another given armed group. The size of the component units of the guerrilla force is one of the most difficult problems to deal with: there will be different numbers of men and different compositions of the troops, as we have already explained.
Let us suppose a force situated in favourable ground, mountains with conditions not so bad as to necessitate perpetual fight, but not so good as to afford a base of operations. The combat units of an armed force thus situated ought to number not more than one hundred and fifty men, and even this number is rather high; ideal would be a unit of about one hundred men. This will constitute a 'column'.
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Warfare on favourable ground Fighting on favourable ground and particularly in the mountains presents many advantages but also the inconvenience that it is difficult to capture in a single operation a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, owing to the precautions that the enemy takes in these regions. (The guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that it is the enemy that must serve as his source of supply of ammunition and arms.) But much more rapidly than in unfavourable ground the guerrilla band will here be able to "dig in," that is, to form a base capable of engaging in a war of positions, where small industries may be installed as they are needed, as well as hospitals, centres for education and training, storage facilities, organs of propaganda, etc., adequately protected from aviation or from long-range artillery. The guerrilla band in these conditions can number many more personnel; there will be non-combatants and perhaps even a system of training in the use of the arms that eventually are to fall into the power of the guerrilla army.
The number of men that a guerrilla squad can have is a matter of extremely flexible calculation adapted to the territory, to the means available of acquiring supplies, to the mass flights of oppressed people from other zones, to the arms available, to the necessities of organization. But, in any case, it is much more practicable to establish a base and expand with the support of new combatant elements. The radius of action of a guerrilla squad of this type can be as wide as conditions or the operations of other squads in adjacent territory permit. The range will be limited by the time that it takes to arrive at a zone of security from the zone of operation; assuming that marches must be made at night, it will not be possible to operate more than five or six hours away from a point of maximum security. Small guerrilla squads that work constantly at weakening a territory can go farther away from the zone of security.
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Warfare on Favourable Ground
The ideal guerrilla squad
An ideal composition for a guerrilla squad of 25 men would be: 10 to 15 singleshot rifles and about 10 automatic arms between Garands and hand machine guns, including light and easily portable automatic arms, such as the Browning or the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14 automatic rifles. Among the hand machine guns the best are those of nine millimetres, which permit a larger transport of ammunition.
The simpler its construction the better, because this increases the ease of switching parts. All this must be adjusted to the armament that the enemy uses, since the ammunition that he employs is what we are going to use when his arms fall into our hands. It is practically impossible for heavy arms to be used. Aircraft cannot see anything and cease to operate; tanks and cannons cannot do much owing to the difficulties of advancing in these zones.
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The People's Liberation Armed Forces, more popularly known as the Viet Cong, was the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Established at the end of 1960, the Viet Cong was created by the North Vietnamese communists to escalate the armed struggle in South Vietnam. In the early 60's they grew rapidly and by 1964, totalled over 30,000 soldiers. By the mid-1960s, most main force Vietcong troops were armed with Chinese versions of the Russian AK-47 sub-machine gun. They also used a range of effective Soviet and Chinese light and medium machine guns, and infrequently, heavy machine guns. In particular, heavy machine guns were valued for defence against American helicopters.
Many weapons, including booby traps and mines, were homemade in villages. The materials ranged from scavenged tin can to discarded wire, but the most important ingredients were provided by the enemy. In a year, dud American bombs could leave more than 20,000 tons of explosives scattered around the Vietnamese countryside. After air-raids, volunteers retrieved the duds and the dangerous business of creating new weapons began. Local forces also designed primitive weapons, some designed to frighten intruders, but others were extremely dangerous. "Punji traps" sharp spikes hidden in pits could easily disable an enemy soldier. Punjis were often deliberately contaminated to increase the risk of infection.
For destroying armoured vehicles or bunkers, the Vietcong had highly effective rocket propelled grenades and recoilless rifles. Mortars were also available in large numbers.
Viet Cong In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership ordered a change in a way the war in the South was to be fought. From now on, the Vietcong would avoid pitched battles with the Americans unless the odds were clearly in their favour. There would be more hit and run attacks and ambushes. To counter the American build-up, Vietcong recruitment would be stepped up and more North Vietnamese Army troops would be infiltrated into South Vietnam. The Vietcong, following the example of Chinese guerillas before them, had always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas. They were training grounds, logistics centres and headquarters. They also offered secure sanctuaries for times when the war might go badly. Hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for the Vietcong. Now, with American spotter planes everywhere, it was more vital than ever to protect them. In remote swamps or forests, there were few problems, but nearer the capital, it was much more difficult. The answer was to build enormous systems of underground tunnels.
The orders coming from NLF headquarters were absolutely clear. Tunnels were not to be treated as mere shelters. They were fighting bases capable of providing continuous support for troops. Even if a village was in enemy hands, the NLF beneath were still able to conduct offensive operations. There were complexes big and small scattered across the country. Each villager in a NLF area had to dig three feet of tunnel a day. There was even a standard handbook specifying how tunnels were to be built. The biggest tunnel systems were in the Iron Triangle and the Cu Chi District, only 20 miles from Saigon.
"priority to creating safe base areas"
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The base area at Cu Chi was a vast network, with nearly 200 miles of tunnels. Any facility used by the guerillas had almost immediate underground access. Hidden trapdoors led below, past guarded chambers, to long passages. At regular intervals, branches led back to the surface and other secret entrances.
Some openings were even concealed beneath the waters of streams or canals. At the deeper levels, there were chambers carved out for arms factories and a well for the base's water supply. There were store rooms for weapons and rice, and there was sometimes a hospital or forward aid station. Long communication tunnels connected the base with other distant complexes. This turned the tables and manufactured incredibly favourable ground for the Viet Cong guerrillas.
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"The woman receives a less harsh treatment than man"
The role of the woman in conflict The part that the woman can play in the development of a revolutionary process is of extraordinary importance. She is capable of performing the most difficult tasks, of fighting beside the men; and despite current belief, she does not create conflicts of a sexual type in the troops. In the rigorous combatant life the woman is a companion who brings the qualities appropriate to her sex, but she can work the same as a man and she can fight; she is weaker, but no less resistant than he. She can perform every class of combat task that a man can at a given moment. The combatant women are a minority.
When the internal front is being consolidated and it is desirable to remove as many combatants as possible who do not possess indispensable physical characteristics, the women can be assigned a considerable number of specific occupations, of which one of the most important, perhaps the most important, is communication between different combatant forces, above all between those that are in enemy territory. The transport of objects, messages, or money, of small size and great importance, should be confided to women in whom the guerrilla army has absolute confidence; women can transport them using a thousand tricks; it is a fact that however brutal the repression, however thorough the searching, the woman receives a less harsh treatment than the man and can carry her message or other object of an important to its destination.
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Warfare on unfavourable ground In order to carry on warfare in country that is not very hilly, lacks forests, and has many roads, all the fundamental requisites of guerrilla warfare must be observed; only the forms will be altered. The quantity, not the quality, of guerrilla warfare will change. For example, following the same order as before, the mobility of this type of guerrilla should be extraordinary; strikes should be made preferably at night; they should be extremely rapid, but the guerrilla should move to places different from the starting point, the farthest possible from the scene of action, assuming that there is no place secure from the repressive forces that the guerrilla can use as its garrison. A man can walk between 18 and 31 miles during the night hours; it is possible also to march during the first hours of
daylight, unless the zones of operation are closely watched or there is danger that people in the vicinity, seeing the passing troops, will notify the pursuing army of the location of the guerrilla band and its route. It is always preferable in these cases to operate at night with the greatest possible silence both before and after the action; the first hours of night are best. Here, too, there are exceptions to the general rule, since at times the dawn hours will be preferable. It is never wise to habituate the enemy to a certain form of warfare; it is necessary to vary constantly the places, the hours, and the forms of operation.
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“The significance of guerrilla movements often has been politically and historically overlooked” DANIEL CASTRO
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Sabotage Sabotage is one of the invaluable arms of a people that fights in guerrilla form. Its organization falls under the civil or clandestine branch, since sabotage should be carried out, of course, only outside the territories dominated by the revolutionary army; but this organization should be directly commanded and oriented by the general staff of the guerrillas, which will be responsible for deciding the industries, communications, or other objectives that are to be attacked. Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism; terrorism and personal assaults are entirely different tactics. We sincerely believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement, and that it can bring a loss of lives to its agents out of proportion to what it produces.
"terrorism is of negative value"
On the other hand, attempts to take the lives of particular persons are to be made, though only in very special circumstances; this tactic should be used where it will eliminate a leader of the oppression. What ought never to be done is to employ specially trained, heroic, self-sacrificing human beings in eliminating a little assassin whose death can provoke the destruction in reprisal of all the revolutionaries employed and even more. Sabotage should be of two types: sabotage on a national scale against determined objectives, and local sabotage against lines of combat. Sabotage on a national scale should be aimed principally at destroying communications. Each type of communication can be destroyed in a different way; all of them are vulnerable. For example, telegraph and telephone poles are easily destroyed by sawing them almost all the way through, so that at night they appear to be in normal condition; a sudden kick causes one pole to fall and this drags along with it all those that are weak, producing a blackout of considerable extent.
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The guerrilla as combatant The life and activities of the guerrilla fighter, sketched thus in their general lines, call for a series of physical, mental, and moral qualities needed for adapting oneself to prevailing conditions and for completing any mission assigned. To the question as to what the guerrilla soldier should be like, the first answer is that he should preferably be an inhabitant of the zone. If this is the case, he will have friends who will help him; if he belongs to the zone itself, he will know it (and this knowledge of the ground is one of the most important factors in guerrilla warfare); and since he will be habituated to local peculiarities he will be able to do better work, not to mention that he will add to all this the enthusiasm that arises from defending his own people and fighting to change a social regime that hurts his own world. The guerrilla combatant is a night combatant; to say this is to say at the same time that he must have all the special qualities that such fighting requires.
He must be cunning and able to march to the place of attack across plains or mountains without anybody noticing him, and then to fall upon the enemy, taking advantage of the factor of surprise which deserves to be emphasized again as important in this type of fight. After causing panic by this surprise, he should launch himself into the fight implacably without permitting a single weakness in his companions and taking advantage of every sign of weakness on the part of the enemy. Striking like a tornado, destroying all, giving no quarter unless the tactical circumstances call for it, judging those who must be judged, sowing panic among the enemy combatants, he nevertheless treats defenceless prisoners benevolently and shows respect for the dead. A wounded enemy soldier should be treated with care and respect unless his former life has made him liable to a death penalty and should be executed.
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In War and Peace, Tolstoy remarks that military science assumes that the bigger the army, the stronger it is. On the other hand, only vaguely do they recognize that during military combat the final strength of an army is also its true physical capacity multiplied by one unknown X. This X is none other than the spirit of the troops measured as the greater or lesser desire to fight and confront danger. Men with the desire to fight, who also understand why they are fighting, regardless of who they are fighting, whether under the command of military geniuses or those of normal intelligence, fighting with clubs or with machine guns that fire thirty rounds a minute, these men will put themselves under the most advantageous conditions for fighting and they will triumph.
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Supply and demand A good supply system is of basic importance to the guerrilla hand. A group of men in contact with the soil must live from the products of this soil and at the same time must see that the livelihood continues of those who provide the supplies, the peasants; since in the hard guerrilla struggle it is not possible, above all at the beginning, for the group to dedicate its own energies to producing supplies, not to mention that these supplies would be easily discovered and destroyed by enemy forces in a territory likely to be completely penetrated by the action of repressive columns. Supply in the first stages is always internal. As the guerrilla struggle develops, it will be necessary to arrange supply from outside the limits or territory of the combat. At the beginning the band lives solely on what the peasants have; it may be possible to reach a store occasionally to buy something, but never possible to have lines of supply since there is no territory in which to establish them. The line of supply and the store of food are conditioned by the development of the guerrilla struggle.
The first task is to gain the absolute confidence of the inhabitants of the zone; and this confidence is won by a positive attitude toward their problems, by help and a constant program of orientation, by the defence of their interests and the punishment of all who attempt to take advantage of the chaotic moment in which they live in order to use pressure, dispossess the peasants, seize their harvests, etc. The line should be soft and hard at the same time: soft and with a spontaneous cooperation for all those who honestly sympathize with the revolutionary movement; hard upon those who are attacking it outright, fomenting distensions, or simply communicating important information to the enemy army.
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Syrian civil war
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Riyad alAsad Colonel Reyad Musa Al Asaad is a commander of the Free Syrian Army. He was a former Colonel in the Syrian Air Force who defected in July 2011. Al-Asaad had announced his defection on 4th July 2011, while he established the Free Syrian Army on 27th July 2011. The Free Syrian Army has sworn to forcefully remove the current corrupt regime to create a more democratic fairer Syrian society for the people.
Syria's turmoil began with protests against President Bashar al-Assad's regime in March 2011, in the Syrian city of Deraa. After fifteen school children had been arrested and reportedly tortured for writing anti-government graffiti on a wall. Protesters were immediately met by Syrian security forces who at first detained and attacked protesters with batons, and later opened gunfire, and deployed tanks and naval ships against civilians. The following day, they shot at mourners at the victims' funerals, killing another person. People were shocked and angry at what had happened and soon the unrest had spread to other parts of the country. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad refused to halt the violence. Assad continued to deny responsibility for the attacks on protesters, placing the blame for the violence on armed groups and foreign conspirators instead.
Because of the current un-resolved nature of the Syrian conflict it is hard to have a deep understanding of what tactics are being employed and even who's winning. This is the most modern guerrilla war the world has currently seen and has already been documented to be employing many of the guerrilla techniques on both sides. What I wanted to draw attention to is the nature in which it started. It has revolved around a catalyst sparked by a small number of citizens, in this case it was fifteen children writing anti-government messages on a wall. Protest sprang up in the streets, but this alone was not responsible for sparking the conflict and demand for a regime change in Syria. It was the heavy handed response by the government forces that led to a mass unionisation and uprising of the people. There are the tell tail signs that international forces and influence are beginning to creep into the country with the soviets on one side and the united nations on the other.
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Medical problems One of the grave problems that confronts the guerrilla fighter is exposure to the accidents of his life, especially to wounds and sicknesses, which are very frequent in guerrilla warfare. The doctor performs a function of extraordinary importance in the guerrilla band, not only in saving lives, in which many times his scientific intervention does not count because of the limited resources available to him; but also in the task of reinforcing the patient morally and making him feel that there is a person near him who is dedicated with all his force to minimizing his pains. He gives the wounded or sick the security of knowing that a person will remain at his side until he is cured or has passed danger. The organization of hospitals depends largely upon the stage of development of the guerrilla band. Three fundamental types of hospital organization corresponding to various stages can be mentioned.
In this development we have a first, nomadic phase. In it the doctor, if there is one, travels constantly with his companions, is just another man; he will probably have to perform all the other functions of the guerrilla fighter, including that of fighting, and will suffer at times the depressing and desperate task of treating cases in which the means of saving life are not available. This is the stage in which the doctor has the most influence over the troops, the greatest importance for their morale. During this period in the development of the guerrilla band the doctor achieves to the full his character of a true priest who seems to carry in his scantily equipped knapsack needed consolation for the men. The value of a simple aspirin to one who is suffering is beyond calculation when it is given by the friendly hand of one who sympathetically makes the suffering his own. Therefore the doctor in the first stage should be a man who is totally identified with the ideals of the revolution, because his words will affect the troops much more deeply than those spoken by any other member.
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Industries of war within the sector of the guerrilla army must be the product of a rather long evolution; they also depend upon control of territory in a geographic situation favourable for the guerrilla. At a time when there are liberated zones and when the enemy establishes strict blockades over all supplies, different departments will be organized as necessary, in the manner already described. There are two fundamental industries, of which one is the manufacture of shoes and leather goods. It is not possible for a troop to walk without shoes in wooded zones, hilly, with many rocks and thorns.
It is very difficult to march without shoes in such conditions; only the natives, and not all of them, can do it. The rest must have shoes. The industry is divided into two parts, one for putting on half-soles and repairing damaged shoes; the other will be devoted to the manufacture of rough shoes. There should be a small but complete apparatus for making shoes; since this is a simple industry practiced by many people in such regions it is very easy to procure. Connected with the shoe repair works there ought always to be a shop making all classes of canvas and leather goods for use by the troop, such as cartridge belts and knapsacks. Although these articles are not vital, they contribute to comfort and give a feeling of autonomy, of adequate supply, and of self-reliance to the troop. An armoury is the other fundamental industry for the small internal organization of the guerrilla band. This also has different functions: that of simple repair of damaged weapons, of rifles, and other available arms; the function of manufacturing certain types of combat arms that the inventiveness of the people will create; and the preparation of mines with various mechanisms.
War industry When conditions permit, equipment for the manufacture of powder may be added. If it is possible to manufacture the explosive as well as the percussion mechanisms in free territory, brilliant achievements can be scored in this category, which is a very important one, because communications by road can be completely paralyzed by the adequate employment of mines. Another group of industries that has its importance will make iron and tin products. In the iron works will be centred all labour connected with the equipping of the mules, such as making their shoes. In the tin works the fabrication of plates and especially of canteens is important. A foundry can be joined with the tin works. By melting soft metals it is possible to make grenades, which with a special type of charge will contribute in an important way to the armament of the troop. There ought to be a technical team for general repair and construction work of varied types, the "service battery," as it is called in regular armies. With the guerrillas it would operate as such, taking care of all necessities, but without any vestige of the bureaucratic spirit. Someone must be in charge of communications. He will have as his responsibility not only propaganda communications, such as radio directed
toward the outside, but also telephones and roads of all types. We will use the civil formation as necessary in order to perform his duties effectively. Remember that we are in a period of war subject to attack by the military and that often many lives depend upon timely communication. For accommodating the troop it is well to have cigarette and cigar factories. The leaf can be bought in selected places and carried to free territory where the articles for consumption by the soldiers can be manufactured. An industry for preparing leather from hides is also of great importance. All these are simple enterprises that can operate quite well anywhere and are easy to establish in the guerrilla situation. The industry for making leather requires some small construction with cement; also it uses large amounts of salt; but it will be an enormous advantage to the shoe industry to have its own supply of raw material. Salt should be made in revolutionary
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Propaganda The revolutionary idea should be diffused by means of appropriate media to the greatest depth possible. This requires complete equipment and an organization. This organization should be of two types which complement each other in covering the whole national area: for propaganda originating outside free territory, that is, from the national civil formation; and propaganda originating within, that is, from the base of the guerrilla army. In order to coordinate these two propagandas, the functions of which are strictly related, there should be a single director for the whole effort. Propaganda of the national type from civil formations outside free territory should be distributed in newspapers, bulletins, and proclamations. The most important newspapers will be devoted to general matters in the country and will inform the public exactly of the state of the guerrilla forces, observing always the fundamental principle that truth in the long run is the best policy. Besides these publications of general interest there must be others more specialized for different sectors of the population. A publication for the countryside should bring to the peasant class a message from their companions in all the free zones who have already felt the beneficial effects of the revolution; this strengthens the aspirations of the peasantry.
A workers' newspaper will have similar characteristics, with the sole difference that it cannot always offer a message from the combatant part of that class, since it is likely that workers' organizations will not operate within the framework of guerrilla warfare until the last stages. The great watchwords of the revolutionary movement, the watchword of a general strike at an opportune moment, of help to the rebel forces, of unity, etc., should be explained. Other periodicals can be published; for example, one explaining the tasks of those elements in the whole island which are not combatants but which nevertheless carry out diverse acts of sabotage, of attempts, etc. Within the organization there can be periodicals aimed at the enemy's soldiers; these will explain facts of which they are otherwise kept ignorant. News bulletins and proclamations about the movement are very useful.
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Intelligence Know yourself and your adversary and you will be able to fight a hundred battles without a single disaster. This Chinese aphorism is as valuable for guerrilla warfare as a biblical psalm. Nothing gives more help to combatant forces than correct information. This arrives spontaneously from the local inhabitants, who will come to tell its friendly army, its allies, what is happening in various places; but in addition it should be completely systematized. As we saw, there should be a postal organization with necessary contacts both within and outside guerrilla zones for carrying messages and merchandise. An intelligence service also should be in direct contact with enemy fronts. Men and women, especially women, should infiltrate; they should be in permanent contact with soldiers and gradually discover what there is to be discovered. The system must be coordinated in such a way that crossing the enemy lines into the guerrilla camp can be carried out without mishap. If this is well done with competent agents the insurgent camp will be able to sleep more quietly. This intelligence will be concerned principally, as I have already said, with the front line of fire or the forward enemy encampments that are in contact with no man's land; but it ought also to develop in the same measure as the guerrilla band develops, increasing its depth of operation and its potential to foresee larger troop movements in the enemy rear.
Though all inhabitants are intelligence agents for the guerrilla band in the places where it is dominant or makes incursions, it is wise to have persons especially assigned to this duty. The peasants, not accustomed to precise battle language, have a strong tendency to exaggerate, so their reports must be checked. As the spontaneous forms of popular collaboration are moulded and organized, it is possible to use the intelligence apparatus not only as an extremely important auxiliary but also as a weapon of attack by using its personnel, for example, as "sowers of fear." Pretending to be on the side of the enemy soldiers, they sow fear and instability by spreading discouraging information. By knowing exactly the places where the enemy troop is going to attack, it is easy to avoid him or, when the time is ripe, to attack him at places where it is least expected. Mobility, the basic tactic, can be developed to the maximum.
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J. H. DAVIDSON