Reflections Reflections Harker Cum Laude 2011 Edition
In Reflections the Harker Chapter of the Cum Laude Society brings to you the work of students whose teachers believe they have reached a level of excellence that merits recognition.
Table of Contents English Department 1 Language Department 15 Science Department 19 Visual Arts Department 23 Communication Studies Department
History and Social Science Department
English â€œEverything in life is writable about if you have the outgoing guts to do it, and the imagination to improvise. The worst enemy to creativity is self-doubt.â€? -Sylvia Plath
English, A. Perelman
Russia as Stage and Russians as Players: Performance as Motif and Metaphor in Anna Karenina Adam Perelman All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players. —William Shakespeare, As You Like It
Theater has served as a metaphor for the human condition since before the time of the Bard of Avon. In recent decades, philosophers have begun to investigate more closely and systematically this conception of life as a play, scrutinizing the ways in which “social agents constitute social reality through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social sign”; some have gone so far as to interpret the individual as “an object rather than the subject of constitutive acts” (Butler 519). Literature has been a central participant in this dialogue concerning life as stage. Anna Karenina, in particular, can be read as Leo Tolstoy’s interrogation of the relationship between identity and performance. Tolstoy reveals that many of his characters as well as many of the social conventions of nineteenth-century Imperial Russia are, at heart, theatrical. Yet Tolstoy does not accept this condition as inevitable or as desirable. Through Anna Karenina, and in particular through the character of Levin, Tolstoy attempts to restore the purity and primacy of an authentic, stable Self defined outside the context of performance. Tolstoy exposes high society of nineteenth-century Imperial Russia as based on performance, its members living and acting in accordance with the expectations of their metaphorical audience. Judith Butler contends that “social action requires a performance which is repeated”; this certainly holds true for the elite of Tolstoy’s Russia (526). The famous eponymous protagonist of Anna Karenina expresses her recognition of this theatricality early in the novel as she describes the highest circles of Petersburg society: “It seemed to her that both she and all the others were pretending” (127). The many tea parties, balls, and social events of high society, Anna has come to realize, are aimed not at achieving genuine human interaction but at presenting a façade of elegance and sophistication—Lydia Ivanovna and her like are “pretending” in that they are effectively actors playing predefined social roles. It is this prescripted, superficial quality that causes Anna to feel “so bored and awkward in this company that she called on Count-
ess Lydia Ivanovna as seldom as possible” (127). Yet despite this initial discomfort with the theatrical conventions of high society, Anna eventually embraces the artificial practices of the very society that has expulsed her from its circles. Living in the country with Vronsky, she recreates the minute details of elite urban life, as exemplified when Dolly visits the lovers at their estate. Though hosting only Dolly and Vasenka, Anna stages an elaborate banquet for her two guests. She appears at once as director and as actress, staging an elaborate show complete with the costumes of formal evening dress and, more importantly, with predefined roles: “At the table, both Anna and Vronskii assume roles—she that of a coquette, flirting with one of the guests in order to arouse Vronskii’s jealousy, he that of a rich landowner. Spontaneity has been replaced by sheer theatricality” (Yoon 146). Tolstoy explicitly describes Anna as “perform[ing]” the role of socialite hostess; describing an innovative type of harvesting machine, she takes “a knife and fork in her beautiful, white, ring-adorned hands and began to demonstrate. She obviously could see that her explanation would not make anything understood, but, knowing that her speech was pleasant and her hands were beautiful, she went on explaining (630). Her performance is greeted with an appropriately enthusiastic reception from her captive audience, underscoring the extent to which the Russian elite celebrated appearance and dismissed substantiality. The overwhelming artifice of the occasion prompts discomfort on the part of Dolly, who, less accustomed to the elaborate performances of the elite, renders explicit Tolstoy’s connection between theater and high society as she laments her feeling “that she was playing in the theatre with actors better than herself” (634). Tolstoy’s evocation of an elite class obsessed with image over substance corresponds with the real aristocracy of his native Russia. Historian Orlando Figes, for instance, describes the case of one “G. A. Rimsky-Korsakov (a distant forebear of the composer) [who] was kicked out of the Guards in 1810 because at a dinner following a ball he loosened the top but3
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ton of his uniform” (18). His sartorial slip represented an unacceptable transgression to his superiors precisely because it disrupted the smooth functioning of Russian social theater; Rimsky-Korsakov represents the unfortunate actor caught on stage and out of costume. Anna’s banquet parallels the Guards’ dinner as representative of an Imperial Russia where the nobility “enjoyed, along with sumptuous dishes, elements of theatricality in eating,” privileging form over content and appearance over substance (Yoon 135). Tolstoy elaborates on the motif of food as theater through the character of Stiva, who invites Levin to a dinner where staged spectacle overwhelms the meal itself. Levin describes his sense of oppression by “these surroundings of bronze, mirrors, gas-lights, Tartars,” symbolic of the occasion’s artificiality (33). The act of ordering food, too, becomes an occasion for performance, as Stiva “evidently did not want to give [the Tartar] the pleasure of naming the dishes in French” (34). In refusing the familiar French names, Stiva engages in a “mischievous deviation from conventions [that] allows Oblonskii to enjoy the aesthetic pleasure of ‘estrangement,’ no less than the Tartar waiter enjoys the use of foreign names” (Yoon 138). Even the apparently fundamental act of eating is thus subsumed by the theatrical obsession that defined the conventions of the Russian elite. Tolstoy further highlights the artifice of Russian life by explicitly juxtaposing theater and society, blurring the lines between performers and spectators. When the socialite Betsy attends the opera, for instance, she is as concerned about her attire as those on stage. Before the performance begins, she “lower[s] the slightly ridden-up bodice of her dress with a movement of her shoulders, so as to be well and properly naked when she stepped out to the foot of the stage under the gaslights and under everyone’s eyes” (131). Less concerned with seeing the performance than with being seen herself, Betsy highlights the impossibility of distinguishing between performers and spectators in a social landscape where even the audience assumes a starring role. Much later, when Anna attends the opera, defying society’s concerted attempts to ostracize her, she becomes the star of a very different scene, but one that is theatrical in its own way. Her appearance is striking in “the poise of her head on her beautiful, broad shoulders, the glow of restrained excitement in her eyes and her whole face,” highlighting Anna’s understanding of herself as an actress, proud of her defiant performance for her audience (546). Anna’s attendance and bearing shock the Petersburg elite, drawing their attention from all quarters; though Vronsky refuses to look at her directly, “from the direction of all eyes he knew where she was” (545). The audience thus directs its attention not at the stage but at Anna, who becomes the true performer of the night. As members of the audience, Betsy stages a performance of sensuality and frivolity while Anna stages one of defiance. Though their intentions are markedly different, they both act for the benefit of their spectators. 4
Certainly, Anna and Betsy are not the only performers in the audience. Vronsky describes the entire crowd of spectators in dismissive terms: “As usual, there were the same sort of ladies in the boxes with the same sort of officers behind them; the same multi-coloured women, uniforms, frock coats…in all this crowd, in the boxes and front rows, there were about forty real men and women” (545; emphasis in original). Vronsky establishes a dichotomy between “real” society and the anatiferous dirty crowd, defining authenticity in terms of social status instead of in terms of character. The script for Imperial Russian life thus precluded genuine human interaction between those with elite roles and those with plebeian parts to play. Beyond the social life of Imperial Russia, Tolstoy exposes even the apparently substantive realm of politics as subject to the imperatives of theatricality. Sergei Ivanovich, representative of the Russian intelligentsia, expounds at length on the importance of involvement in the political sphere; because he “was very interested in the zemstvo and ascribed great significance to it,” he chastises Levin for his reluctance to become involved (25). When Tolstoy presents us with a firsthand account of the political activity so highly regarded by Russian society, however, as Levin attends the regional elections, political spectacle overwhelms any focus on enacting material change through the government. Before the elections take place, “Levin, lifting his hand and repeating the words of the archpriest along with the others, swore with the most terrible oaths to fulfill all the governor’s hopes” (647). These “terrible oaths” are more impressive than genuine, especially given Levin’s demonstrated indifference to politics. Once underway, the elections themselves appear as equally hollow. Tolstoy describes a heated discussion about a legal technicality regarding whether a particular nobleman should be admitted to the elections: Sergei Ivanovich read the article and began to explain its meaning, but here a tall, fat, slightly stooping landowner with a dyed moustache, in a tight uniform with a collar that propped his neck up from behind, interrupted him.... He was saying the same thing that Sergei Ivanovich had suggested; but he obviously hated him and his whole party and provoked a response of the same anger, though more decent, from the other side....Levin had no idea what it was all about and was astonished at the passion with which they discussed the question of whether the opinion about Flerov should or should not be put to the vote. (651) The two parties agree on a particular issue, yet that issue nevertheless triggers an upsurge of intense hatred and animosity between their respective camps. Clearly, everybody at the elections—with the obvious and significant exception of Levin— defines his identity (for they are indeed all male) in terms of political affiliation. Their political performance, however, seems to be essentially meaningless; Tolstoy does not present us with any in-depth, substantive discussions of politics, only with superficial disagreements and alliances. Levin has “no idea” what
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the dispute is about because it is, in fact, about nothing of any import. A landowner at the elections confirms this perception, confiding to Levin, “What’s there to understand? There is no significance. An obsolete institution that goes on moving only by the force of inertia” (656). He explains that he comes only “out of habit,” apparently like all the other participants—this is not so much authentic political debate as ritualized convention (656). The elections thus parallel Stiva’s equally meaningless political sinecure, where his primary responsibility is that of “reminding the ministry of himself” (259). Perhaps most radically, Tolstoy suggests that even religion, the apparent bastion of authentic spirituality, lends itself to corruption by the demands of theatricality. Mme Stahl epitomizes the artificial manifestation of religious morality. A Pietist, she presents herself as the epitome of Christian charity and benevolence. Early on, Tolstoy reveals clues suggesting that her spirituality does not extend beyond a pious façade. For instance, we are told of the many cynical tongues who suggest that charity is only a tool for Mme Stahl to form “a social position for herself as a virtuous, highly religious woman” (220). Though the naïve Kitty soon falls under her spell of Mme Stahl’s affected religiosity, her father Shcherbátsky quickly reveals the hypocrisy underlying Mme Stahl’s persona with a few incisive offhand comments when he arrives at the German watering-place. She remains in her wheelchair not out of true illness but “because she’s stubby-legged,” a condition that vanity forbids her from revealing; and, as the prince points out, if one attempts to do good, “it’s better to do it so that, if you ask, nobody knows” (231; 232). Morality is authentic, Tolstoy contends, insofar as it is discreet, a conception diametrically opposed to Mme Stahl’s ostentatious and deliberate acts of benevolence. The beautiful and meticulously organized traditional Orthodox wedding between Levin and Kitty highlights the theatrical nature of a different aspect of religion: that of ritual rather than of morality. The evocation of the marriage as a staged performance begins with the weeks of elaborate preparations, all of which are meaningless to Levin because their purpose is so far removed from the simple, blissful union he envisions for himself and Kitty. Levin’s confession is among the many necessary preludes to his wedding. He dreads the “necessity to pretend [which] was not only difficult for him but seemed utterly impossible” (439). When Levin decides to honestly describe his spiritual doubts, the confession proves to be more superficial convention than authentic spiritual engagement, as the priest responds with “a barely perceptible smile” and a “quick, habitual” religious discourse, rather than with genuine concern or compassion (440). The spectacular marriage ceremony itself is no less theatrical. Tolstoy emphasizes its theatrical nature by highlighting the perceptions of the audience, as “spectators, complete strangers, watched with breathless excitement, afraid to miss a single movement or facial expression of the bride and bridegroom” (456). The original intent of the ceremony is lost
beneath this spectacle. Kitty, for instance, “was listening to the words of the prayer, wishing to understand their meaning, but she could not” (457). Certainly, the ceremony is meaningful and deeply emotional for Kitty and Levin. It is momentous, however, not because of but rather in spite of the grandiose rituals of the religious ceremony. The wedding is not only itself a staged performance but also implies a broader conception of all of life as a play. Bruce Wilshire contends, “The ‘playing area’ of traditional religious rites and rituals is a unique sort of boundedness, and it involves a unique, borderline fictionality…for the intent of these rites and rituals is, apparently, to set up an area which bounds, in some way, the actual world itself” (176). The traditional rites of the wedding, accordingly, serve to limn the real by delineating the future married life of Levin and Kitty and their appropriate pre-scripted roles of husband and wife, just as the opening of the theater curtains signals the beginning of a particular act of a play. Tolstoy thus exposes major forces in Russian society— elite social conventions, politics, and religion—as artificial, affected constructs. On a smaller, more individual scale, however, Tolstoy also reveals that “more intimate episodes are no less theatrical in their underlying dramatic structure” (Buckler 136). He exposes the deep roots of this performativity in childhood through the figure of Seryozha, who explains a favorite game he plays with his friends: “It’s like this: two of us sit on a bench. They’re the passengers. And one stands up on the same bench. And everybody else gets in harness. You can do it with hands or with belts, and they start moving through all the rooms” (727).These children are deliberately play-acting certain social roles—passengers and conductors. As they grow older, Tolstoy suggests, this habit of play-acting becomes entrenched as the process of “acting” more nuanced social roles in adult life. Anna evokes this connection between childhood and adult performances immediately before her suicide, when “she crossed herself [and] the habitual gesture of making the sign of the cross called up in her soul a whole series of memories from childhood and girlhood” (768). As Anna’s adulterous affair amply demonstrates, religion and its values matter little to her. Nevertheless, her performative habit, with little authentic spiritual significance, serves as a thread connecting and evoking a “series” of experiences throughout her life, just as an actor employs a consistent physicality to create a believable character throughout a multiplicity of scenes. Epitomizing the theatricality of Tolstoy’s Russia is Stiva. We are first introduced to Stiva in the role of the unfaithful husband who has been discovered. The hapless Stiva laments his unintentional reaction to evidence of his infidelity: He had not managed to prepare his face for the position he found himself in with regard to his wife now that his guilt had been revealed. Instead of being offended, of denying, justifying, asking forgiveness, even remaining indifferent—any of which would have been better than what he did!—his face quite involuntarily (‘reflexes of the brain,’ thought Stepan 5
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Arkadyich, who liked physiology) smiled all at once its habitual, kind and therefore stupid smile. (3) Tolstoy thus interrogates the meaning of body language and specifically of facial expression, a critical mediator of human interaction, questioning its authenticity. Obviously, Stiva’s expressions are far from ingenuous—like an actor, he considers a range of possibilities he could have performed. Even his smile, which Stiva interprets as an accidental glimpse of his innate reflexes, is described as “habitual,” “a word distinctly implying that the smile represents not some physiological reflex as he would like to believe, but an acquired practice….In the social theater where people imitate one another or perhaps in the theater per se, Stiva has learned what it is to play-act a smile” (Justman 430). Like the actors he so enjoys seeing, Stiva attempts to use his smile to smooth his superficial passage through life; in this case, his theatrical ploy fails him. Contemplating the consequences of this failure, Stiva muses, “The most terrible thing is that I’m the guilty one in it all—guilty, and yet not guilty. That’s the whole drama” (2). Stiva thus conceives of himself as an actor in a play who happens to be playing the role of villain but is in reality blameless. Through Stiva’s description of his situation as a “drama,” the text explicitly asks us to interpret his perception in theatrical terms, supporting Julie Buckler’s contention that “the characters themselves in Tolstoy’s novel use… theatrical categories to interpret their experience and structure their behavior” (131). In fact, Tolstoy was deeply influenced by the critique of theater advanced by Socrates, who decried the penchant of the stage to promote “nonsensical transformations, as when the unscrupulous actor will imitate ‘the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds’…deplor[ing] the commonwealth where crossed identities become the rule, where the shoemaker is also a pilot and the soldier a trader” (Justman 431). Tolstoy extends Socrates’ critique of formal theater to the realm of social theater, decrying Stiva’s own attempt to merge two identities: the contradictory roles of devoted husband and of womanizer. Thus, unable or unwilling to confront the imperfect realities of his life, Stiva structures his thoughts and his actions according to a conception of his identity as that of an actor, falling prey to what Wilshire describes as the “diabolical drive to bound the boundless actual world, to turn all of living into theatrelike performances which we master” (175). Just as life can be transformed into a series of performances, Tolstoy reveals that death, its inverse, can also be staged as theater. Anna describes her decision to commit suicide in terms of its reception by the rest of society, which forms her metaphorical audience: And suddenly, remembering the man who was run over the day she first met Vronsky, she realized what she must do....‘There!’ she said to herself, staring into the shadow of the carriage at the sand mixed with coal poured between the sleepers, ‘there, right in the middle, and I’ll punish him and be rid of everybody and of myself.’ (766) 6
Her suicide is thus theatrical both in its inspiration and in its motivation. Anna is prompted to consider her suicide by the memory of an earlier “man who was run over”; she thus bases her suicide on an imitation of a previous experience, just as a method actor draws on real-life occurrences in creating staged performances. So too, her suicide is primarily for the benefit of Vronsky and of society at large, not for her own sake. She seeks revenge, and believes that her performance of a suicide will “punish” Vronsky for his failure to love her and castigate society for its failure to accept her. In fact, Tolstoy describes her death in the language of a performance: as she walks towards the train, “The noisy men quieted down when she passed them on the platform,” just as a well-behaved audience should (765). For Tolstoy, however, the theatrical drive that defines Stiva and that eventually consumes Anna is one that can and should be resisted in favor of a more stable, authentic understanding of identity. His characters provide varied responses to what Wilshire describes as the fundamental question in a world defined by performativity: “How are we to achieve what we so deeply want and need: the achievement of actuality and substantiality as selves in the actual, larger world?” (174). Kitty, for instance, initially struggles in fashioning a sincere identity; she renounces in dramatic fashion her attempt to emulate the ethical model of Varenka upon her recognition that “it was all pretence! pretence! pretence!” (235). However, Kitty eventually succeeds in finding meaning and substantiality as a wife and a mother, like her sister Dolly. Soon after her marriage, Kitty begins preparing for her future as “the wife of her husband, the mistress of the house, [who] would bear, nurse and raise her children….She knew it intuitively and, while preparing for this awesome task, did not reproach herself for the moments of insouciance and the happiness of love that she enjoyed now, while cheerfully building her future nest” (486). Thus, Kitty achieves happiness and fulfillment insofar as she devotes herself to Levin, to their son Dmitri, and to their implied future children. Certainly, she is playing particular roles—those of mother and of wife. However, these roles are not artificial social conventions but rather emerge from her innermost being; the future she envisions for herself is a calling that she feels “intuitively.” Her gender—expressed in her caring, maternal instincts rather than in the sexualized feminine performance of such women as Betsy—is not something Kitty simply “performs.” Rather, femininity and motherhood are intrinsic aspects of her being that Kitty learns to embrace. Tolstoy’s conservative understanding of gender identity thus stands in stark contrast to that of poststructuralist thinkers such as Butler, who argues that gender is “an identity tenuously constituted in time…through a stylized repetition of acts” (519). For Tolstoy, clearly, Kitty’s identity as a woman is neither tenuous nor stylized but rather stable, natural, and admirable. Her repeated acts of maternity are borne not of imitation or of an attempt to impress an audience, but of her innermost, authentic nature.
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Tolstoy finds another avenue to transcending social theater in his romantic conception of true love. At a tea party typical of high Russian society, the guests amuse themselves with “graceful conversation, called ‘small talk’ in English,” turning from one trivial topic to another: “the latest social news, the theatre, and the judging of one’s neighbour” (133; 134). In the words of one guest, “Everything intelligent is so boring”; the Russian elite prefers titillating gossip to substantive discussion (133). However, as Yoon explains, “The theatrical illusion produced and enjoyed by the other guests suffers an unexpected rupture….Anna and Vronskii’s conversation discloses the falsehood of the tea party characterized by its superficial chatter,” as their words, charged with meaning, emotion, and immediacy, stand in stark contrast to the petty gossip of the guests (141). Anna and Vronsky rupture the elegant theatrics of the tea party because their love is so genuine and passionate— in contrast to the “small talk” of the other guests, their words are charged with emotion and import. Vronsky, for instance, avows, “Don’t you know that you are my whole life?…You and I are one for me” (139). His affirmation is not a means towards engendering a “graceful conversation” but a revelation of his deepest emotions. As Wilshire explains, love cannot be evaluated as a performance because “the very point of the ethical commitment is that it is not bounded in time, not conditional at all” (177). Anna and Vronsky love each other and commit to each other not for the benefit of an audience but in response to their authentic and deeply felt private passion. Relatively soon, of course, Anna and Vronsky’s mutual devotion devolves into a series of resentments, conflicts, and arguments, as they adopt the theatrical practices and conventions of the society that condemns them. Their initial affair, however, temporarily disrupts the space of social theater in its purity and passion. Tolstoy’s most powerful and consistent rebuke to the culture of theatricality, however, lies in the character of Levin, who finds substantiality and authenticity through the fundamentals of country life and through faith. As Kitty says of her husband, “He’s not one to pretend” (785). Levin’s success in shaping an authentic, stable Self is predicated largely on his attraction to rural over urban life. In the city, Levin is overcome by “by dissatisfaction with himself and shame at something,” because he fails to find a role for himself in the social theater of elite urban life (92). In the country, however, Levin becomes once again comfortable in his own skin: He felt the confusion gradually clearing up and the shame and dissatisfaction with himself going away. He felt it just at the sight of Ignat and the horses; but when he put on the sheepskin coat brought for him, got into the sleigh, wrapped himself up and drove off, thinking over the orders he had to give about the estate and glancing at the outrunner, a former Don saddle horse, over-ridden but a spirited animal, he began to understand what had happened to him quite differently. He felt he was himself and did not want to be otherwise. (92)
It is instructive to consider the specific aspects of rural life that bring Levin inner peace: his workers, his animals, and his material work. The physically grounded nature of his existence and of his labor in the country provides Levin with a substantial core around which to organize his life. Tolstoy elaborates on this theme of physicality when Levin works with the muzhiks, their shared labor “emotionally unit[ing] peasants with their master” (Yoon 144). The fieldwork engenders a voracious appetite that causes Levin to relish the peasants’ kvass as if he “had never before drunk such a drink as this warm water with green floating in it and tasting of the rusty tin box,” and to perceive their humble mash as “tast[ing] so good that Levin changed his mind about going home for dinner” (252; 254). Their fulfilling and unifying experience stands in stark contrast to the artificial social events of Petersburg society, where the elite connect through superficial idle gossip rather than through meaningful productive labor and eat refined delicacies instead of the more satisfying but simpler fare of the peasants. Even more powerful in shaping his identity than his physical life is Levin’s spiritual life. Levin responds in an extraordinary manner to a muzhik’s offhand remarks about the ethical convictions of a local peasant: “A new, joyful feeling came over him. At the muzhik’s words about Fokanych living for the soul, by the truth, by God’s way, it was as if a host of vague but important thoughts burst from some locked-up place and, all rushing towards the same goal, whirled through his head, blinding him with their light” (794). The concept of “living for the soul” lies at the center of Levin’s final spiritual epiphany, as he realizes that he must not live and perform for the sake of any audience but rather only for the soul. In fact, the very notion of an objective soul marks a sharp rebuke to the culture of theatricality of Imperial Russia. Whereas social theater seeks to define identity as fluid and performative, the soul is stable, well-defined, and eternal. Levin thus realizes that, as Wilshire contends, “Even when my activities are performances in one sense or other, I as a person cannot be reduced to them….For even when performing—or “performing”—I am the being who possesses potential for more than aesthetically evaluable acts” (177). The recognition of his soul’s existence, independent of his particular actions and social performances, is precisely what motivates Levin’s joy at the novel’s conclusion: the realization of an authentic Self. Levin achieves this epiphany through an individual, reflective spirituality that is diametrically opposed to the ostentatious rituals of the church. Tolstoy reached the same conclusions as Levin in response to his own spiritual crises. Lovell explains the heart of Tolstoy’s spiritual contention: “The human self, he asserted, did after all have the power to make an eight-year-old and an eighty-two-year-old cohere as a single persona…the self actually transcended corporeal flux” (304). Despite the ephemeral nature of social and physical life, Tolstoy—like Levin—thus found an authentic core at the heart of existence. Given the extent to which performance is central to Anna 7
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Karenina, it is particularly revealing to consider theatrical adaptations of Tolstoy’s novel. Iain Hamilton, the composer of an operatic version of Anna Karenina, explains, “I have excluded Levin, a major character in the novel (in a sense Tolstoy himself) as I find him defined by the literary medium of the novel and not translatable adequately into dramatic terms” (295). Levin is impossible to render in dramatic terms precisely because he is not a performer—because his identity is so
grounded in his thoughts and his soul rather than his external actions. Tolstoy would, we can imagine, be delighted to hear that a century after he composed his masterpiece, his protagonist continues to resist corruption by the realm of performance. The world is, for Tolstoy as for Levin, not simply a stage, and individuals are not merely actors. Life cannot be contained by the theater curtains.
What’s in a Name? Justine Liu When I was a child, I begged my parents for my very own Brother PT-1400 P-Touch Handheld Label Maker to fulfill all of my labeling needs. Other kids had Ninetendos and would spend their free time with Mario and Luigi. While they pummeled their video game controllers furiously, the pads of their thumbs dancing across their joysticks, I would type out labels on my industrial-standard P-Touch with just as much zeal. I labeled everything imaginable, dividing hundreds of pens into Ziploc bags by color, then rubber-banding them by point size. The finishing touch, of course, was always a glossy, threeeighths inch wide tag, freshly churned out from my handheld labeler and decisively pasted upon the numerous plastic bags I had successfully compiled. Labeling became therapeutic for me; organizing my surroundings into specific groups to be labeled provides me with a sense of stability. I may not physically need the shiny colorcoded label verifying the contents of a plastic bag as “Blue Highlighters – Fat,” to identify them as such, but seeing these classifications so plainly allows me to appreciate the reliability of my categorizations. There are no exceptions when I label the top ledge of my bookshelf as containing works from “Achebe, Chinua to Conrad, Joseph.” Each book is either filtered into that category or placed definitively into another one. Yet, such consistency only exists in these inanimate objects. Thus, the break in my role as a labeler comes when I interact with people. Their lives are too complicated, their personalities too intricate for me to resolutely summarize in a few words or even with the 26.2 feet of laminated adhesive tape compatible with my label maker. I have learned that a thin line exists between labeling and just being judgmental when evaluating individuals. I can hardly superficially characterize others as simply as I do my material possessions because people refuse to be so cleanly separated and compartmentalized. My sister Joyce jokes freely and talks with me for hours about everything from the disturbing popularity of vampires in pop culture to cubic watermelons, yet those who don’t know her well usually think of her as timid and introverted. My mother is sometimes my biggest supporter, spouting words of encour8
agement and at other instances my most unrelenting critic. The overlap becomes too indistinct, the contradictions too apparent, even as I attempt to classify those people in the world whom I know best. Neither would I want others to be predictable enough for me to label. The real joy in human interaction lies in the excitement of the unknown. Overturning expectations can be necessary to preserving the vitality of relationships. If I were never surprised by the behaviors of those around me, my biggest source of entertainment would vanish. For all my love of order when it comes to my room, I don’t want myself or the people with which I interact to fit squarely into any one category. I meticulously follow directions to the millimeter in the chemistry lab but measure ingredients by pinches and dashes in the comfort of my kitchen. I’m a self-proclaimed grammar Nazi, but I’ll admit e.e. cummings’ irreverence does appeal. I’ll chart my television show schedule on Excel, but I would never dream of confronting my chores with as much organization. I even call myself a labeler, but not when it comes to people. As Whitman might put it, “Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)”. I therefore refrain from the temptation to label––despite it being an act which makes me feel so fulfilled when applied to physical objects––when real people are the subjects. The consequences of premature labeling are too great, the risk of inaccuracy too high because, most of the time, not even the hundreds of alphanumeric digits and symbols available for entry on my P-Touch can effectively describe who an individual really is.
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Clock’s Requiem Andrew Zhou The rock is still rolling.i It burns, flickers, asks: “To do or not to do?” Then disappears in its own echoes, the window closes, the diverging roads unite. Once again I stand with no choice. And was the window ever open? Did the road ever fork? Laplace’s little devil haunts me, chanting “Free will is a sin.” I weld myself to the universe-machine, walking ceaselessly with measured step. I follow the one-wayt minute hand down the straight path of life. I remain stuck in time. I walk its death march. God is and has always been dead. There is nothing but this path I tread: No paradise to lose; no inferno to fear; No sound but the click of a gear. April is forever in a world of deus est machina. God ticks, bereft of life and soul. The rock is still rolling. A laugh rings out from Tartarus as the rock comes crashing down. I wake from my slumber like a man newly sighted. The king laughs forevermore, revels in the absurd. He fired the shots, accepts the noose. Can I mock Chronos as he mocks Zeus? I am a child facing the mighty scythe that fells all on this earth. Yet I forge on in my crusade: This war gives me Daedalic wings. I fly; no sun in sight. I am no slave of the clock. The rock is still rolling.
Albert Camus, “The Myth of Sisyphus”
English, M. Deng
English, M. Deng
Common Sense: An Artful Call to Arms Michelle Deng Published at the height of British-American tensions in 1776 on the eve of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine’s landmark Common Sense was the first American pamphlet supporting independence. With his forceful and dynamic prose, Paine won over tens of thousands of colonists to the patriot side. Although Paine polishes his arguments with a gleam of rationality, his real persuasive power stems from his mastery of manipulating the human heart. Paine affects an air of logic, reason, and fact to ground his words and entice readers with apparent tenability. To preface his arguments, he declares, “I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense” (326). Paine wants readers to believe that his points are solid and objective, that he is not simply ensnaring them with sophistic words. He wants readers to listen to him in earnest. Later on, citing various empirical examples of British rule hurting the colonies, Paine exploits the factuality ofhistory to bolster his “rationality.” For instance, he argues, “Europe is too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long at peace, and whenever a war breaks out between England and any foreign power, the trade of America goes to ruin, because of her connection with Britain” (329). These words are purely factual and thus indisputable; a rational observer of the time would agree that by virtue of their relationship with Britain, the colonieshave inheritedBritain’s enemies and at times suffered because of these tensions. Factual examples such as this one bolster Paine’s semblance of reason and credibility. Barely concealed beneath the rationality, however, is Paine’s reliance on emotional appeals to sway the colonists’ alliances. Sometimes his tactics are glaring; for instance, Paine commands his readers, “[E]xamine the passions and feelings of mankind: bring the doctrine of reconciliation to the touchstone of nature, and then tell me whether you can hereafter love, honor, and faithfully serve the power that hath carried fire and sword into your land?” (330). In that one sentence, he blatantly tells them to consider their emotions. He invokes sentiments of love, honor, and faith, all of which stem deep from the heart; he incites anger and desire for vengeance by reminding readers of the war and destruction British soldiers caused in America. However, Paine can be subtler as well. Closer examination of the text reveals that he even emotionalizes those seemingly factual historical case studies, that he relies not on their force of empirics and reason but on blows to the heart. His examination of America’s “inheriting” British enemies is just such a case. The facts alone are convincing proof of British rule harming the colonies. However, Paine chooses to append to his 10
argumenta blatant cry to emotion: “The blood of the slain, the weeping voice of nature cries, ‘ ’Tis time to part’” (329). These words are unnecessary. They do not strengthen the factual and rational force of his arguments; in fact, they rather detract from it, for Paine has no way of knowing whether fallen soldiers or nature is really “crying outv However, the words do kindle memories of those that were loved and lost and of joys that were prematurely robbed, arguably by the British armies. They release sorrow and mourning that potentially could cascade into desires for vengeance and rebellion. In the end, this intensely personal appeal, rather than disinterested logic, is what resonates in the readers and captures their loyalties. By evoking a sense of the grandeur of the conflict and of their cause, Paine’s style and diction further compel his readers’ hearts to align and rise with the patriots. Using adept parallelism, Paine magnifies his words; for instance, he declares, “[This conflict is] not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom; but of a continent—of at least one eighth part of the habitable globe. ’Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be… affected even to the end of time” (327). He paints their story as an epic fight that will shake the whole earth—a scope that, in an era before planes or satellites or even cars, is simply incomprehensible to most. What the colonists do and which side they take will, according to Paine, affect humans for the rest of eternity. Enveloped in such a consequential conflict, readers cannot help but feel obligated to take a stance and fight to the death. Paine increasingly pushes this air of grandeur. By the conclusion, he treats the British-American fight as beyond the earth, as one reaching Biblical dimensions. Taking on the voice of a spiritual guide, he cries, “O! ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose not only the tyranny but the tyrant, stand forth! Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression…. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind” (332). Paine is a seer, a prophet akin to Moses; the fight is a fight for justice and freedom and love and equality, a fight for God. By this point, logic is irrelevant to the argument. The colonists cannot resistindependence—to do so would be sinful. Ultimately, Paine’s true power lies in emotional impact. While his appeals to the mind convince readers of his credibility, his appeals to the heart are what really reel those readers in and mold their passions and beliefs. It only takes a dose of rational analysis and Common Sense to see the truth of Paine’s persuasive magic.
English, A. Zhou
Feminism and its Limitations in Anna Karenina Andrew Zhou The 19th-century Russian society in which Leo Tolstoy lived was plagued by pervasive gender inequality: utterly dependent on their husbands, women had no conceivable future outside of the domestic household and faced brutal criticism for any defiance of social norms. Tolstoy’s striking recognition of this tragic plight is evident in his novel Anna Karenina and its scathing critique of the chauvinism of Russian society, marking him as an author of the realist tradition who possessed prodigious insight into both the human psyche and the social forces that mold it (Greene 108). This critique of the conventional order establishes Tolstoy as a radical feminist for his era, who sought to uproot the masculine institutions responsible for 19th-century Russian society’s legacy of sexist oppression. Yet beneath the noble intentions of Anna Karenina lies an insidious undercurrent of misogyny that lamentably taints his feminist message, suggesting that even the realist in Tolstoy could not escape the corrupting tendrils of society. Indeed, even as Tolstoy fiercely condemns conformity to societal pressures, he falls victim to them himself, casting aside his feminist leanings to take on the traditional mantle of moralistic judge or idealizer of domesticity. Though Tolstoy’s profound, realist understanding of individuals as products of the societies in which they live manifests itself in his moderately feminist criticism of 19th-century Russian society’s treatment of women, this condemnation nevertheless stems from a misogynist conception of women as icons of domesticity to be confined within a staunchly separate sphere from the far more liberating world within which his men reside. Tolstoy’s brand of feminism is rooted in his realist view of the world, a perspective exemplified by his insightfully crafted male characters and their interactions with the 19th-century Russian society of Anna Karenina. His characterization of Karenin through Anna’s eyes epitomizes this realism and reveals his piercing insight into the social forces that shape the bureaucrat’s actions and habits: “Nothing but ambition, nothing but the wish to succeed—that’s all there is in his soul . . . and lofty considerations, the love of learning, religion, are all just means to success” (Tolstoy 207). Here Tolstoy condemns Karenin as a defective product manufactured by a corrupt society, a machine of a man whose scripted actions, carefully-constructed demeanor, and insincere, societally-dictated interests mark him as a mere cog in the greater social order. Tolstoy thus understands Karenin perfectly, from his robotic mannerisms to his grand social ambitions, and masterfully paints a portrait
of a man who is utterly subservient to the society in which he lives. Just as Tolstoy vividly depicts the forces that mold Karenin into a robotic model of utter conformity, so does he portray society’s backlashagainst those less willing to follow its strict mandates. Tolstoy firmlyunderstands 19th-century Russian society’s reactionary need to suppress dissidence and therefore uphold orthodoxy, as evidenced by his portrayal of Anna’s visit to the theatre and her subsequent condemnation at the hands of a harshly judgmental society. When Vronsky arrives at the theatre after Anna is savaged by her societal critics, he notes that despite her “calm and beauty,” she “was experiencing the feelings of a person in the pillory” (Tolstoy 547). In presenting this scene of Anna’s disastrous last stand, Tolstoy advances a fierce critique of societal cruelty toward nonconformists while displaying his own talent for realist characterization; the vivid image of Anna in the pillory exactly encapsulates her feeling of abject humiliation and attempt to project calm defiance. Thus Anna Karenina displays Tolstoy’s nuanced insight into a wide range of individual characters and social phenomena: he masterfully tells the story of both traditional Karenin and rebellious Karenina, weaving a realist tale whose interlocking threads are the societal forces that shape them both. Though Tolstoy’s criticism of society is harshly condemnatory, his depiction of such events as the sensational theatre scene is not hyperbolic; rather, historical context suggests that the hostile societal response that Anna receives was characteristic of the firmly traditionalist society of 19th-century Russia. Scholar Ian Helfant’s case study of poet Karolina Pavlova provides a historical parallel to Anna’s humiliation at the theatre, demonstrating the aptness of Tolstoy’s criticism and the depth of his realist understanding. Pavlova was censured by contemporary critics for trying to defend her personal property from her adulterous, gambling husband; Helfant notes that two male memoirists described her as “an aging woman desperate to avoid spinsterhood” and dismissed her poetic aspirations “as stemming from feminist hysteria” (227). Just as Anna is condemned for her adultery, Pavlova incurs the ire of society for her intellectual ventures and defiance of her husband; the two women are viewed as threats to the traditional masculine order, which necessarily relegated females to the role of housewife. Both face punishment from society for rejecting this Procrustean role into which more subservient women were often forced; theapt parallel between their two situations indicates that Tol11
English, A. Zhou
stoy’s realist understanding of society is rooted in the historical context of the era. By confirming Tolstoy’s credibility as an author, Pavlova’s tale thus affirms his feminist repudiation of traditional male chauvinism. Though Tolstoy’s commitment to the realist tradition is most evident in his portrayals of men and society as a whole, Anna Karenina occasionally demonstrates an enlightened realist attitude toward women that transcends the misogyny governing much of his female characterization. Critic Amy Mandelker defends the realism in Tolstoy’s portrayal of women, noting that he “appreciates, values, and emphasizes with the oppressive work of pregnancy, childbirth, and domestic cares, which he considers to be far more difficult, strenuous, and important than men’s work” (22). Tolstoy’s depictions of Dolly’s trials with childrearing and Kitty’s difficult childbirth attest to the radicalism in his portrayals of women: these events would have been considered mundane or scandalous in his era yet were included in Tolstoy’s characterization of these two women, whose own thoughts regarding their situations are revealed. Tolstoy’s description of these two events is frank and evokes visceral emotions: Dolly “[shudders] at the mere recollection of the pain from cracked nipples that she had endured with almost every child” while Kitty’s “terrible screaming would not stop” during her labor (607, 715).The inclusion of these intensely personal scenes confirms Tolstoy’s understanding of various physical and emotional pains of motherhood, demonstrating his realist mindset. Tolstoy’s realist tendencies as applied to women reach their apex when he reveals the thoughts of women themselves, as exemplified by the various reactions to Kitty and Levin’s marriage, a scene that truly shows Tolstoy at his finest. Kitty herself is beset by a whirlwind of emotions that reveals her hopes and fears about her impending marriage: First she would be horrified at this indifference, then she would rejoice over what had brought her to it. She could neither think nor desire anything outside her life with this man; but this new life had not begun yet, and she could not even picture it clearly to herself. There was nothing but expectation—the fear and joy of the new and unknown. (Tolstoy 453) Here, in a nuanced interpretation of female views of marriage, Tolstoy tempers Kitty’s joy at her marriage with her sober recognition of the “unknown,” acknowledging the gender inequality in 19th-century Russian society that left women subordinate to men. Tolstoy clearly understands that the happiness of women in marriage was ultimately determined by their husbands, who could be benevolent or abusive; the fact that even Kitty, who is about to marry the very emblem of masculine compassion, still has fears for the future reflects the absolute control that husbands exerted over their wives in Tolstoy’s Russia. The author goes on to describe the reactions of various spectators: the women viewers share a camaraderie of sorts, solemnly understanding the gravity of the situation, while the men fail to 12
comprehend the implications of marriage and dismiss the ceremony as trivial. Indeed, Dolly recalls the image of Anna, “pure in her orange blossom and veil,” and contrasts that innocence with her current plight, representing women’s fear of a potentially tragic future (Tolstoy 456). Realism here triumphs over misogyny as Tolstoy’s women demonstrate considerably more insight than do his men, as they should on such an occasion: only they are keenly aware of the dual implications of the wedding, as nearly all the female spectators have faced or will face their own marriage and its contrary potentials. Much of Tolstoy’s feminist advocacy is rooted in his opposition to the traditional masculine order and its honor code, complementing his realist interpretation of the world with a rejection of the potent forces of chauvinism within society. The emblem of Tolstoy’s assault on conventional institutions is Levin, the author’s conception of an ideal man, who rejects the overt masculinity of Stiva and Vronsky and thereby lives a fulfilling life. Stiva and Vronsky symbolize the male order: the formerobjectifies women as “sweet roll[s]” in his endless string of dalliances while the latter is the consummate military man who competes in horse races as a show of masculine virility (Tolstoy 40).Elizabeth Blake posits that the success of Levin’s marriage and his ultimate happiness stem from his repudiation of these masculine norms, suggesting that “Levin resists the formative influence of homosociety and, instead, looks to the domestic sphere for self-fulfillment. With Levin and Kitty’s marriage, Tolstoy promotes a synthesis of the male and female spheres” (110). By contrasting Levin’s ideal marriage with the matrimonial struggles faced by the two more traditional men, who indulge in masculine activities such as philandering, racing, and gambling, Tolstoy criticizes the male honor code, instead arguing that men should seek a state of equilibrium between masculinity and femininity. Tolstoy further demonstrates his realist appreciation of the world by acknowledging the primal appeal of the masculine honor code: at one point, Levin is drawn in by the attractions of life in Moscow, enchanted by the thrill of such masculine activities as gambling. Yet this foray into city life is transient, as Levin eventually returns to Kitty chastened by his experience: “The one thing he confessed most sincerely of all was that, living so long in Moscow, just talking, eating, and drinking, he had got befuddled. They talked till three o’clock in the morning. Only at three o’clock were they reconciled enough to be able to fall asleep” (Tolstoy 703). Tolstoy here recognizes that even Levin, tortured existentialist and ideal man, is affected by temporal concerns; such candor in depicting an ideal character realistically demonstrates Tolstoy’s insight into normative behavior. Levin, however, ultimately rejects what Blake terms “homosociety” and instead chooses domesticity, fatherhood, and a closer relationship with Kitty over the Russian conception of manhood embodied by Stiva and Vronsky; his success with family life makes Tolstoy’s views on this question clear (Blake 105-06). But while his critique of the masculine order
English, A. Zhou
is potent, Tolstoy is nevertheless burdened by misogynist preconceptions, which manifest themselves even in his critiques of conformity. A prominent failing of Tolstoy’s feminist position is his idealization of the concept of domesticity, which reconfirms traditional gender stereotyping and undermines the radicalism of Anna Karenina’s attack on chauvinist normativity and societal repression.The notion of the cult of domesticity and the belief in inherently separate spheres for men and women was prevalent in 19th-century Russian society and had a firm historical basis. Helfant presents a case study of Anna Dostoyevsky, wife of the famed writer, that provides a historical context for Tolstoy’s views: “She accuses herself of being a ‘horrible egoist, almost a criminal,’ for the alleged transgressions of allowing Dostoevsky to abandon her in a strange city, making off with a substantial portion of their limited funds and writing for more as his losses mount, and alarming her with letters detailing his emotional turmoil” (240). Dostoyevsky here assumes the role of nurturing housewife for her husband, even blaming herself for his failures; she posits herself as a stable, sheltering influence from the vicissitudes of society and castigates herself for failing to fulfill the role prescribed for her by social norms.This historical anecdote provides an apt parallel to Dolly in Anna Karenina, who, like Dostoyevsky, has internalized the views of a misogynist society; Tolstoy’s depiction of Dolly’s satisfaction with and acquiescence to the greater social order suggests an approving, misogynist view of the cult of domesticity: despite a brief period of discontent with her marriage, Dolly eventually becomes satisfied with her position after observing Anna’s plight. Despite revisionist interpretations of Anna Karenina as a feminist work, Tolstoy’s preconceived notion of the cult of domesticity impairs his otherwise potent critiques of the masculine order. Mandelker attempts to defend this view of separate spheres as radically feminist, noting that “Tolstoy warns against women seeking employment outside the domestic sphere, not because he feels they are not capable, but because he feels they would be demeaned by it, just as are men, who, in Tolstoy’s view, should return to physical labor in the fields” (27). Yet she ultimately falls short in her argument, as the belief that women and men live in fundamentally different spheres and have disparate callings—domesticity for the women, physical labor for the men—is rooted in a misogynist, essentializing conception of gender that relegates women to a subservient, supporting role. Kitty’s ultimate fate further entrenches the misogyny in Tolstoy’s work, as she becomes a domestic machine fit only for household tasks: “[Levin] was surprised at how she, this poetic, lovely Kitty, . . . could think, remember and fuss about tablecloths, furniture, mattresses for guests, about a tray, the cook, the dinner and so on . . . . though he chuckled at those cares, he could not help admiring them” (Tolstoy 480). As Kitty is Tolstoy’s conception of the ideal woman, her transformation
serves as his affirmation of separate spheres; the author exalts domesticity by depicting Kitty’s eager obsession with household chores, suggesting that ideal women are naturally inclined to such tasks. Furthermore, Levin’s perception of Kitty is insultingly paternalistic; he views her from the perspective of a wise father figure amused by a child’s foolish actions. The fact that he “chuckles” at her domestic obligations affirms this view and suggests that Tolstoy views domesticity as an exclusively feminine sphere, incomprehensible to men, whom he considers more intellectual and philosophical beings. Such paternalism even manifests itself in Tolstoy’s critique of the masculine order: the author places the choice of rejecting chauvinism in Levin’s hands, positing the husband as wise benefactor while placing the wife in a subordinate position. The condescending chuckle also foreshadows the disparity between Kitty and Levin in marriage, as demonstrated by Levin’s decision to keep his existential philosophical insight to himself. Levin justifies his choice by characterizing the revelation as “inexpressible,” but his failure to share the thought with Kitty has insidious undertones of sexism (Tolstoy 816). The fact that women express no sincere interest in intellectual activities throughout Anna Karenina confirms this interpretation of Levin’s “secret”: Tolstoy views Kitty as a simpler being suited for the mundane instead of the metaphysical. Anna in particular exemplifies Tolstoy’s failures at characterization, as the writer falls victim to his own sexist prejudices in developing her interests and motivations instead of crafting her from an unbiased perspective. Richard Gregg notes that this bias is present in all of Tolstoy’s heroines: “Uppermost in the minds of [Tolstoy’s men] are, as critics have seldom failed to note, ethical and metaphysical questions of universal scope and transcendent importance . . . . Not so Tolstoy’s women . . . . [who are] less naturally inclined to cerebration than their male counterparts” (270-71). Compared to the men, who struggle to answer profoundly philosophical questions, Tolstoy’s female characters—particularly the ones whom he idealizes— are intellectually vapid. Anna might initially seem to belie this trend, as she is an intelligent, fiercely independent woman who is brought down by society: perhaps Tolstoy is critiquing the very system that stifles women’s education. Yet overwhelming evidence indicates that Tolstoy launches no such criticism: instead, he sides with society on this question in painting a mocking portrait of Anna’s intellectual pursuits. Anna must be considered Tolstoy’s emblem of female intelligence and independence, yet she reads for the sole purpose of pleasing her lover, “[studying] all the subjects that interested Vronsky” and assisting him “with questions of agronomy, architecture, and, occasionally, even horse-breeding and sports” (643). Just as the memoirists ridiculed Pavlova’s writing, Tolstoy here derides Anna’s intellectual pursuits, affirming the very order he criticizes; in Tolstoy’s world, ideal men such as Levin learn for the sake of learning itself while ideal women such as Kitty are consigned to the drudgery of household chores. 13
English, A. Zhou
Based on Tolstoy’s disdainful depictions of Anna’s intellectual pursuits as well as her ultimate fate, the reader must conclude that she is not a heroine meant to be emulated but an example meant to warn; Gregg notes that “it is no accident that the only Tolstoyan heroine who sins openly, deserts her family and remains defiantly unrepentant—who fails, in other words, to follow her ‘natural’ female calling—pays for her transgression with her life” (279). This approval of female conformity is evident in all of Tolstoy’s works, as his traditional heroines demurely accept domesticity while the unique, vivacious Anna breaks out of her societally-imposed cage only to tragically spiral to suicide. As Kitty, whom Tolstoy idealizes as the perfect woman, is one of his typical, traditional female characters, Tolstoy obviously admires the placid, unquestioning women he creates, who are more domestic tools than human beings. The contrast between Kitty’s supposedly ideal life and Anna’s fate confirms Tolstoy’s admiration of domesticity: Kitty starts a successful family with an exemplary man while Anna abandons her familial obligations and rejects childbirth, representing her failures as a mother, descends into crazed paranoia, demonstrating her psychological deterioration, and finally throws away her life to vindictively punish Vronsky. The misogynist double standard Tolstoy applies to his characters is most evident in the stark contrast between the fates of Levin and Anna, who are otherwise remarkably similar: both have strong, independent characters and defy the norms of society. Greene accuses Tolstoy of hypocrisy in these disparate depictions: “But precisely those qualities which enable Levin to live and find the light doom Anna to darkness and self-destruction . . . . She has the same determination to . . . assume control of her life, to live according to the rule of love and the heart, refusing to accept the lot society assigns her” (119). Tolstoy’s criticism of normative masculine behavior—as symbolized by the traditionally male behavior of Stiva and Vronsky—is evident in his portrayal of Levin, who forges a path of righteousness through the corrupting influence of society by rejecting the male order. Anna’s similar defiance of normative, domestic feminine behavior, however, leads to degeneration and ultimately death, suggesting that Tolstoy’s moralistic censure of her adultery supersedes his admiration of her nonconformity. Tolstoy again displays misogyny in his depiction of Anna’s death: society’s influence cannot fully explain the degradation of her character; rather, she is simply not strong enough to withstand the onslaught of societal pressures as does Levin, instead descending into hateful, suicidal madness. Tolstoy’s application of a sexist double standard is again manifest in his depiction of Dolly’s ultimate contentment with her traditional domestic life, which affirms conventions of feminine behavior. A hint of feminist realism emerges with Dolly’s contemplation of her own unenviable situation; for a time, she laments the cycle of “pregnancy, nausea, dullness of mind, indifference to everything, and above all, ugliness” that her life has become (Tolstoy 607). Indeed, she fantasizes about 14
a “love affair of her own” to parallel Anna’s, romanticizing adultery in a way starkly contrasting societal norms, just as Anna herself does (Tolstoy 609). Yet when she visits Anna, Dolly casts away her ideas of rebellion and remains satisfied with her situation: learning that Anna has renounced motherhood, Dolly “suddenly [feels] she had become so distant from Anna that there were questions between them which they would never agree on and of which it was better not to speak” (Tolstoy 639). Dolly here feels alienated from her friend as she contemplates the implications of rejecting maternity: Tolstoy thus defines women based on motherhood and domesticity, clearly delineating the chasm between Anna, who has forsaken her gender, and all other women. Indeed, after Dolly has seen Anna’s situation, she finds “everyone quite well and especially nice” in her own household (Tolstoy 642). Just as Anna compares Karenin to Vronsky to find her own household lacking, so does Dolly evaluate Anna’s life with Vronsky and her own condition; however, Dolly here develops a greater appreciation of her own domestic role and remains content with the train wreck that is her familial life. By contrasting thedisparate decisions of these two women, Tolstoy suggests that Dolly’s was the correct choice, thereby reifying the cult of domesticity; Dolly keeps her life and her marriage by adhering to conventional gender norms while Anna’s defiance leads to tragedy. Tolstoy’s depiction is a moralistic admonition supporting female societal conformity, even as he harshly vituperates against normative male behavior by exalting Levin. Tolstoy’s realist understanding of 19th-century Russian society is admirable, as he challenges conventional societal norms with an incisive critique of chauvinism. Several instances in Anna Karenina present the logical extension of that critique as Tolstoy displays remarkable insight into the lives of women: he understands their physical concerns as well as their views of the institution of marriage. Yet Tolstoy is a product of his society as well, and some prejudices are inescapable: his women are indelibly stained by misogynist preconceptions inculcated within him by the very society he repudiates. Tolstoy’s idealization of domesticity, failures in feminine characterization, and moralistic condemnation of Anna lamentably mar his censure of conventional social behavior; in some ways, he himself disseminates society’s message of female conformity to the cult of domesticity.
Languages â€œIf we spoke a different language, we would perceive a somewhat different world.â€? -Ludwig Wittgenstein
Languages, J. Kwong.
La realidad, la fantasía y el destino
Jeffrey Kwong Los relatos “Continuidad de los parques” de Julio Cortázar y “El Sur” de Jorge Luis Borges son dos obras que exploran el género literario del cuento fantástico del siglo XX. Aunque desarrollan temas similares: la importancia de la lectura para escaparse de la realidad y la línea efímera entre la realidad y la fantasía, los dos tienen mensajes diferentes acerca de la posibilidad de controlar un destino preestablecido. Estos dos cuentos sugieren que la literatura se puede usar como medio de escape de las preocupaciones del mundo. En la obra de Cortázar, el protagonista usa la lectura para alejarse de sus deberes prosaicos. Después de terminar su cita con el abogado y manejar los asuntos de su finca, finalmente puede leer y descansar en su sillón de terciopelo verde. Mientras lee las líneas de un relato, una “ilusión novelesca” lo gana y lo transporta a otra dimensión, la del cuento. Por esta razón, la “ilusión” indica que los libros tienen la capacidad de crear otra realidad donde se puede huir de los deberes mundanales, pues el protagonista se va hacia ella para reposar y escapar de su realidad cotidiana. De manera parecida, Juan Dahlmann en el “El Sur” usa la literatura para fugarse de las expectativas de su mundo. En el almacén, unos parroquianos lo fastidian tirándole unas bolitas de pan. Para evadir la obligación de confrontarlos, Dahlmann abre su copia de las Mil y una noches y empieza a leer, y así, el autor hace notar que Dahlmann emplea la literatura para entrar en el mundo fantástico de Shahrazad. Puesto que tanto Dahlmann como el protagonista del cuento de Cortázar usan el acto de leer como una manera de escaparse, ambos escritores sugieren de manera similar que los libros pueden servir como refugio de la realidad, pues pueden transportar a los lectores a otra existencia donde no están sujetos a sus obligaciones ni a sus rutinas ordinarias. Los dos cuentos también indican que la línea entre la realidad y la fantasía no está siempre bien definida. Por ejemplo, al leer su libro, el protagonista de “Continuidad de los parques” entra “sin esfuerzo” al mundo de la literatura para servir como “testigo” de los acontecimientos de la trama. Además, al final, el mismo protagonista del cuento que está leyendo, lo mata. Ya que los personajes del mundo verdadero y del mundo novelesco cruzan libremente esas dos realidades, Cortázar demuestra que no hay frontera clara entre ellas. De forma similar, Borges en “El Sur” indica que la realidad y la fantasía se mezclan fácilmente. Dahlmann crea otra realidad, la de su viaje al sur, basándola en su aburrida existencia muriendo lentamente en un sanatorio. Borges expone esta conexión entre los dos mundos, pues Dahlmann confunde al dueño del almacén con un empleado del hospital. Por esta razón, Borges
también sugiere que la realidad y la fantasía no son entidades completamente separadas ya que, como en el cuento de Cortázar, los personajes pasan de una a otra tan sencillamente. A pesar de estas similitudes entre los dos cuentos, “Continuidad de los parques” y “El Sur” tienen mensajes diferentes sobre el destino. En ambas obras, los sinos de los protagonistas ya están bien establecidos. El hombre que lee la novela ya tiene su destino escrito en el libro que está, irónicamente, gozando; por otro lado, el doctor le dice a Dahlmann que por una infección seria de sangre, su recuperación no será probable. Sin embargo, el hombre en el sillón de terciopelo verde solamente sirve como un “testigo” de los eventos de la novela. Cortázar indica por consiguiente que ni se puede controlar ni elegir el destino de uno, sino que se está obligado a simplemente observarlo, y, en última instancia, a aceptarlo. No obstante, al final de “El Sur,” Dahlmann claramente selecciona su propio sino. Aunque sabe que va a morir, Dahlmann escoge la manera de hacerlo: crea una realidad paralela mucho más romántica, en la que él muere, no en un sanatorio con una infección de sangre (que lo ha ido consumiendo poco a poco), sino en una pelea de puñales desafiando con honor y valentía al hombre que lo enfrenta. En conclusión, las dos obras de Cortázar y Borges desarrollan los temas de la capacidad de la literatura de modificar la realidad palpable, y la línea efímera entre la realidad y la fantasía. Sin embargo, Borges sugiere que con una realidad inventada, existe la opción de elegir y cambiar el propio destino ya preestablecido, mientras Cortázar indica que no se tiene en absoluto la opción de poder modificarlo.
Sciences â€œIn questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble reasoning of a single individual.â€? -Galileo Galilei
Science, T. Koteskey
Entanglement and Our (Imagined) Understanding of the Quantum World Tyler Koteskey Entanglement is the linking together of two objects’ properties such that when the characteristics of one object are detected, the properties of the other can be instantaneously predicted before observing it. Entanglement is the norm at our macroscopic level. If someone is mailed a package containing a red ball and blue ball, they will automatically know that the second ball is blue if they take out the first one and see that it is red. The person does not have to look at the other ball to know what its color will be because he or she can anticipate the outcome in advance. What makes entanglement so tantalizing is that it occurs at the quantum level despite the super-position of states principle, a central component to our understanding of sub-atomic interactions. The principle of super-position of states, or quantum superposition, dictates that a particle can occupy all of its possible quantum states of existence simultaneously. To understand this concept in our macroscopic scale, imagine a pair of different colored socks owned by Joe Quantum (let’s say they are blue and green). In this example, the possible quantum states for the color of Joe’s socks on either of his legs would be blue or green. Under super-position of states theory, Joe’s socks would be both blue and green at the same time if they were not observed. The possible quantum color states of one of the socks would only “collapse” into one discernable blue or green sockcolor wave function after that sock was observed individually. Probability distributions could be developed to determine the most likely quantum color-state of each sock. After observing the individual socks over a long period of time and recording their quantum color-state after each observation, the probability distribution would show the relative frequency of each color-state for a given sock. The key here is that an observer could view Joe’s left sock in one instant as green, then blink and observe it at as blue a moment later. Because both socks would have non-zero probabilities of being either color on any given observation, the pair together could be seen at any given time to be both blue, both green, blue on the left and green on the right, or green on the left and blue on the right. While these probabilities would not necessarily be equal, the important point is that under super-position of states theory, each plane of color-existence would be simultaneously possible for both socks. The theory of quantum superposition had come to be viewed as a workable model for explaining the sub-atomic world, and physicists became confident that they were on the way to understanding quantum interactions. Then it was back to the theoretical drawing board when physicists observed entanglement at the subatomic level. Quantum-scale entanglement was far more bizarre than what physicists were accustomed to
in macro-land because it occurred in spite of the principle superposition of states. Let’s get out the socks again to understand what was so troubling. If Joe’s socks are not observed, super-position of states tells us that both are simultaneously green and blue until we observe one of them. In other words, if Joe pulls up his left pant-leg right now, his quantum sock, which formerly existed as both blue and green, now exists only as blue or green. Additionally, observing the left sock should not affect whatever color the right sock becomes when Joe looks at it. Depending on the color-state probability distribution for the right sock, it’s possible to predict which color is most “likely” to appear when it is observed, but both color-states are ultimately possible for any given observation and occur independently of each other. Introducing entanglement changes everything. Now Joe automatically knows the color of the second sock as soon he observes the first, without having seen the second one. Rather than staying independent of each other, the quantum colorstates of Joe’s socks are now inextricably linked. If Joe mow pulls up his pant leg and sees a blue sock, he instantly knows that the other sock is green. Entanglement has been widely documented in the quantum world. A well-studied instance of the phenomenon is its occurrence within an electron’s spin, a measurement of its angular momentum. Though electrons in a given orbiting pair around a nucleus have opposite spins, quantum superposition tells us that, like the socks, each electron would occupy both spins (it’s possible quantum states) simultaneously until observed. Due to entanglement, an observation of an electron with a positive spin instantaneously allows us to predict that its partner electron will have an opposite negative spin, even before we can check to see for ourselves. Quantum entanglement presents a contradiction with both our understanding of the theory of super-position of states and our basic conception of the sub-atomic world. Super-position of states rests on the fundamental uncertainty of quantum particles. Our friend Joe can look at his right sock and then predict the color of his left, as is the case under entanglement. But if Joe can forecast his unobserved sock’s color in advance, then there is no way that his sock can occupy all of its possible quantum-color states at once, as is the case under quantum superposition. In other words, the uncertainty of Joe’s left sock, determining its ability to collapse to an either blue or green state upon any observation, is lost. The logical inconsistency between quantum entanglement and super-position of states tells us that our quantum theory still leaves gaping holes in our understanding the sub-atomic world. If the inconsistency with super-position of states wasn’t 21
enough, it has also been shown that quantum entanglement causes objects to interact at faster than the speed of light, the supposed cosmic speed limit under Einsteinâ€™s Theory of Special Relativity. Talk about some serious questions! Quantum entanglement continues to cloud our knowledge of the sub-atomic world. What remains clear is that contrary to our earlier beliefs, the quantum world is far from being understood. Hopefully more inquiry into solving the paradox of quantum entanglement will help us explain this phenomenon in the future.
Visual Arts “Art washes from the soul the dust of everyday life.” -Pablo Picasso
Top Left: Anshul Gupta Top Right: Julia Shim Bottom Left: Kevin Saxon Back Cover: Top: Najung Kim Middle Left: Jackie Ho Middle Right: Kyle Drummer Bottom Left: Kevin Saxon Bottom Right: Kelsey Chung More artwork may be found at http://web.harker.org/cls/annualpub.html 25
Communication Studies â€œIt is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it.â€? -Joseph Joubert
Communication Studies, A. Chona and A. Sharma.
The Consequences of Religious Debate: Creating Inequalities and Undercutting Individual Identity Aneesh Chona and Anuj Sharma We affirm. Resolved: High school Public Forum Debate resolutions should not confront sensitive religious issues. We provide the following observations. According to George A. Miller of Princeton Dictionary, “confront” means “to deal with head on.” Although many issues are linked to religion indirectly, the wording of the resolutions must explicitly address a specific religion and a central tenet. In addition, although some types of religious discourse may be beneficial, we must analyze the process in the specific context of a competitive activity involving adolescents. Contention One: Debating religious issues eliminates the value of skill in Public Forum. Sub Point A: Competitive Inequalities. Debating religious issues creates inequality between debaters of otherwise equal skill levels. Debaters affiliated with the religion that the resolution concerns would be more likely to win, creating an unfair advantage. A study done by Communication Quarterly compared debates on religious and non-religious issues and concluded that students following the religion that the topic concerned were likely to disclose their religious orientation. Additionally the study found a significant positive [causation] between a speaker’s religious [orientation when it pertained to the issue] and an audience’s perception of that speaker only while debating religious issues. It furthered that people with equal argumentativeness levels, which measure ability to make and refute arguments, no longer displayed the same persuasion abilities, but “overall contribution of religious orientation on the audience’s perception of that speaker’s [credibility] was the same as that of [skill].” Thus, in debating religious issues, ability to win depended more on a debater’s religious affiliation than skill. Sub Point B: Arbitrary Decisions. Although judge identity conflicts are inevitable, debating religious issues creates conflicts that are nearly impossible overcome, eliminating judge objectivity. A study by Harvard Law School explains that because religion is “at the core of identity,” religious identity influences biases far more than other forms of identity. The Journal of Intercultural Communication Research found that listening to debates about religious issues caused an individual to be less receptive to information from someone from a different religion and decreased tolerance overall. Thus, judges do not give both sides of a religious debate equal opportunity. Furthermore, when judging debates on religious issues, judges subconsciously view rounds through emotion instead of judging objectively. According to the University of Nebraska, after hearing a religious argument, a person responds emotionally rather than rationally in weighing costs and benefits, making decisions on religious issues independent of the merits of the arguments presented in round. These factors would harm debaters and debate itself. First,
they would eliminate fairness. Debate is a competitive activity that requires equal ground for both sides. However, because the end result of a round depends upon a debater’s religious orientation and judges’ arbitrary decisions, there is no equal opportunity in any given round. Second, Casey Harrigan of Wake Forest explains that lack of fairness will eliminate access to educational benefits because competition is the biggest motivation for additional research and education. Third, unfairness will extend to the college admissions process, as according to Yale University, being a competitive debater who wins often compared to being an average debater can impact college admissions by 60 percent. Overall, debating religious issues forces decisions to be made independent of the merits of arguments, making the events of round, and therefore debaters’ futures, rest on arbitrary will rather than skill. Contention Two: Debating religious issues causes adolescents to challenge their preexisting beliefs in a way that is harmful. By forcing a student to advocate the views of and intensely research a religion whose beliefs contradict their own, Public Forum Debate resolutions about sensitive religious issues lead to greater doubt with respect to previous beliefs. Casey Harrigan explains that switch- side debate causes debaters to change their opinion after becoming pseudo-advocates for certain positions. According to The Journal of Psychology and Theology, forcing adolescents to research opposing religious views fosters “a divided state of mind created by the collision of evidence with prior belief or one belief with another.” A study by The Journal of Adolescence found that, although in later stages of life when identity has been developed, people are less susceptible to doubts, during adolescence these doubts have significant psychological impacts resulting from a decreased identity and adherence to previous belief systems. First, the presence of such doubt lowers overall mental health because of the protection that belief systems usually provide. The study found that “doubts undermine prior belief systems’ protective effects on mental health. For example, the prevalence of belief system doubts accounts for up to 23.2 percent of the variance in depressive symptoms and 14.2 percent in anxiety among adolescents. Second, increased doubts lead to more participation in risky behavior. For example, a study done by the University of Nebraska found that reduced religious identity increased the prevalence of smoking among adolescents by 16 percent. Thus, during adolescence, forcing students to debate religious issues decreases overall psychological and physical health. Therefore, because debating sensitive religious issues undermines not only the competitive aspects of the event but also the health of participants, Aneesh and I urge a vote in the affirmation. 29
History and Social Science â€œYou have to know the past to understand the present.â€? -Carl Sagan
History and Social Science, O. Zhu
Bushehr and the Bush-era India Deal: America’s Shifting Stances, the Need for a Stronger IAEA, and Civilian Nuclear Reactors in the TwentyFirst Century Olivia Zhu The modernized world assumes that weapons of mass destruction are the bane of humankind, yet forgets the fact that civilian nuclear power plants, run with similar technology and materials, can serve as economic and environmental boons. The conundrum of what the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories should do when a country seeks to build for both energy and war has become an issue that increasingly concerns the international community, given the current conflicts and electrical needs of growing states. Nowhere are these issues and the attempts at resolution clearer than in the cases of India and Iran.1 As two arguably belligerent and certainly growing regions, both are being eyed cautiously by nuclear countries—especially the United States. Interestingly enough, both President Bush and now President Obama, along with their administrations and coeval Congresses, have taken vastly different tacks toward the two states. The disparity of the American responses regarding India and Iran’s civilian nuclear programs alone is impacted by perceptions of their processes in developing weapons and uranium enrichment, an issue that subsumes local needs. With the added effects of the U.S.’s divergent diplomatic ties to and cultural perceptions of India and Iran, as well as America’s international clout, the IAEA and global community have passively aided India’s and censured Iran’s respective civilian energy plans—despite the few differences between the programs. To create and sustain a more equitable and effective system for regulating Iran’s development of reactors, the IAEA and NPT must be reorganized to reflect the needs of growing countries, not power plays of states that have built themselves into the structure of the most influential nuclear intergovernmental organizations. Clouding of Rhetoric: Differences in Civilian and Military Nuclear Power The technical differences between civilian and military nuclear power revolve primarily around the types of fuel and the specific reactors used to produce that lowly- or highlyenriched uranium. Of course, the most important aspect is the final resting place of that radioactive substance: in a power
plant or in a warhead. Thus the quandary posed by Iran’s recent development of the Bushehr, Natanz, Arak2, and Qom locations.3 The most cogent argument for Iran’s development of power plants and potentially enrichment factories is the nation’s claim that it needs both energy resources and medical isotopes.4 The first case is, perhaps, the better developed of the two, considering nuclear power’s popularity as an environmentally friendly electricity source.5 David Wood, an international energy consultant, indicated “Iran’s population has more than doubled, from 32 to nearly 70 million, while her oil production is less than 70% of the pre-revolutionary level.”6 These statistics are particularly compelling considering three facts: Iran now seeks nuclear power as a means to provide electricity to its population; to offset oil costs; and must now import and ration refined oil products like gasoline.7 He also notes that, in addition to the U.N.’s nuclear sanctions against the state, the Americans have also “[imposed] wide ranging unilateral sanctions on Iran, especially against its oil industry,”8 a move that further places the country’s economy and populace at a competitive disadvantage. Pursuing civilian nuclear power appears to be Iran’s best option for securing its place in the energy world. However, development of nuclear weapons material is relatively straightforward once the hurdle of building a reactor is overcome. Civilian reactors require low-enriched uranium, but Iran, along with other states unfriendly to the United States, is developing the capacity to enrich this fuel to create “the raw stuff of nuclear bombs.”9 Considering the fact that India’s original civilian-driven nuclear program soon turned into a “militantly anti-NPT stance,”10 critics’ concerns that a energy-only program could shift rapidly to support any government’s more defense-oriented agenda are justified. Under President Ahmadinejad, Iran has been cited as being able to obscure its military operations from international watchdogs11 like the IAEA despite the supposed resources and reach of the U.N.-affiliated organization. For comparison’s sake, India openly displays its weapons potential. Though the first reactors envisioned in 1944 were intended for research and energy purposes,12 the non-NPT signatory has “insisted on retaining 33
History and Social Science, O. Zhu
[its] right to develop nuclear weapons.”13 In any case, the man who originally discovered the military sites in Iran, Alireza Jafarzadeh, pronounced that “a light-water reactor, like the one at Bushehr, contains plutonium” that could be easily and rapidly processed for weapons use in “relatively small facilities” with “as little as 65 square feet.”14 Estimates from the IAEA suggest that Iran would require only “a few months” to develop enough material to use in a warhead.15 India’s Tenuous Nuclear Relationship with the West As a former British colony, India has long sought independence not just in terms of governance but also with respect to security: economic and otherwise. When nuclear technology came to prominence during World War II, the South Asian state immediately began seeking the technology for industrial use under the guidance of the expert Homi Jehangir Bhabha in 1944.16 The United States even aided India as it sought to develop nuclear capabilities in the 1950s.17 Just a few decades later, in the late 1960s, India refused to sign the NPT, controlled as it was and is by a block of primarily Western states,18 chief among them the United States and Great Britain, current competitor and historical oppressor. In fact, the developing country’s current nuclear position is based on its tensions with the West. Foreign policy analysts Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, who have extensively researched nuclear proliferation and deterrence in South Asia, recognize that both India and Pakistan “believed that Western efforts to prevent [them] from acquiring nuclear weapons resulted from a condescending, even racist, worldview.”19 However, India is inextricably tied to the United States through trade20 and anti-terrorism21 initiatives, and it has signed binding nuclear power plant resolutions with countries like Russia.22 As such, the rapidly growing state must present an amicable face to the international community when it comes to nuclear arms and reactors. The India Nuclear Deal is an example of this acquiescence to international pressure, particularly that of the United States. The agreement, proposed in 2005 by the Bush Administration,23 allows the “overturning [of] three decades of American sanctions on nuclear trade to help India meet its burgeoning energy needs, even though New Delhi has tested nuclear weapons and is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”24 One of the major points of contention when the treaty was being negotiated was what to do with the spent fuel, as the United States was wary of India’s desire to reprocess the used reactor material.25 Despite the risks of either party reneging on their agreement, Bush and Prime Minister Manhoman Singh pursued the IND for a wide variety of reasons. Chief among them was the fact that the accord would “[bolster] US-India ties at a time of rising Chinese influence,” a must for two countries focusing on environment, security,
and economic issues.26 Fortunately for India, the new deal led to more approval by the IAEA. Still considered a threat for not being a NPT signatory,27 the South Asian state depended on the IND to ensure it could gain access to nuclear technology that was vital to development of reactors. During the first years of discussion of the arrangement, there had been a certain amount of friction between the IAEA and the growing nation, especially as India’s refusal to sign the NPT caused it to conflict with the mandatory inspections necessitated by the IAEA.28 However, sheer association with the United States and promises to secure reactor fuel so that it could not be used for weapons facilitated the negotiation of “an India-specific protocol with the IAEA.”29 Of course, the IND was also contingent upon India’s acceptance of certain “important nonproliferation criteria such as a moratorium on nuclear testing and an implementation of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.”30 The entire process prompts a pressing question about the role of supposed watchdogs like the IAEA. The United States circumvented the restrictions of the NPT to provide India with nuclear material—a specific violation of Article I, which declares: “nations that possess nuclear weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them.”31 In addition to weakening the strength of the NPT, the IND also paved the way for perceptions of weakness of the IAEA and, actually, America’s “acquiescence in India’s non-compliance with the main nuclear weapons treaties undermines global security.”32 The IND did not simply invalidate the IAEA. It also increased the potential for proliferation, as Pakistan has declared that “similar access to nuclear supplies” should be granted to them as well.33 If the United States was able to secure inspections and sanctions through a bilateral deal, then theoretically there would be no use for an arbitrating body under the auspices of the United Nations. The Other Side: Reactions to Iranian Reactors It would seem that Iran should receive the same treatment as India has, given similarities between the states. Both experienced early American help with their nuclear programs during the 1950s; in Iran’s case, the United States even supported the state’s civilian reactors with an influx of technology and expertise in exchange for what were rumored to be large sums of payment from the Shah.34 Like India, Iran was then blacklisted and labeled as a security threat. However, the situation of this Middle Eastern state is vastly different when looking at the modern-day sentiments toward its civilian nuclear energy program at Bushehr. U.S. nuclear energy policy has paralleled the strength of the relationship between the two countries. Citing the popularity of supporting Iran’s ambitions at the time, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor and foreign
History and Social Science, O. Zhu
analyst Noam Chomsky said that an agreement “passed overwhelmingly” and that the “strongest supporters of this U.S.Iranian nuclear program were Henry Kissinger, [Dick] Cheney and [Donald] Rumsfeld and [Paul] Wolfowitz,”35 working during the 1970s during the Ford Administration. Decades later, Kissinger claimed Iran had no need to pursue nuclear energy, especially with the region’s considerable oil reserves; when questioned, the former secretary of state confessed “[Iranians] were an ally then, so they needed nuclear energy. Now they are an enemy, so they don’t need nuclear energy.”36 This continuous shifting of promises and positions has protected United States interests, but the end result, particularly in the context of the strength of the IAEA, impacts far more than just American security. The censure—at least the claims emanating from the United States—may have to do with Iran’s distinctly antiAmerican policies following the fall of the Shah, but the state’s new nuclear capabilities have also stoked fear in other countries, especially since the civilian reactors could be used for military purposes.37 Take, for example, the recent release of controversial WikiLeaks documents suggesting that the King of Saudi Arabia “is just as alarmed about Iran’s nuclear weapons program as Israel,”38 not to mention other nearby Middle Eastern countries who are left vulnerable and “are at least 10 to 15 years away”39 from developing a nuclear bomb. There are also claims that the Israeli Defense Force, with the potential support of the United States, launched the Stuxnet virus in December of 2010 that effectively took over Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz, crippling the entire program and threatening more reactors.40 The cyber warfare was specifically targeted at Iran,41 suggesting that the IDF decided to take preemptive action. The suggestion that Iran is not to be trusted has merit. Numerous incidents suggest the state, especially under Ahmadinejad’s authority, has continued to fluster the IAEA. What is especially frustrating is the fact that there appears to be “no evidence that Iran is working actively to develop nuclear weapons,”42 though the regime has attempted—and failed—to acquire technology secretly from Russia and China,43 and there was an “eighteen-year lapse in declaring its nuclear program”44 to the IAEA. Iran has a history of violating sanctions by concealing information about its reactor plants or enrichment abilities, leaving the IAEA and its former head, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, with “vexing questions” that the organization was and is unable to answer.45 The repeated evidence of a growing potential for or Iranian interest in arms draws the attention of the IAEA every year,46 but all sources corroborate the impossibility of determining whether the state has nuclear weapons capacities and enrichment programs. Since the U.N., the IAEA, and the international community cannot resolve the issue of Iran’s adherence to the NPT
or other sanctions, the question of how to address such a potential threat becomes more contentious and significant. On the one hand, securing the region and protecting neighboring states is one of the primary concerns of watchdog organizations. With the mere insinuation that Iran has nuclear arms, Israel might even attack its enemy first.47 On the other, even ElBaradei admitted “he has no evidence that Iran is working actively to develop nuclear weapons” and fears that “if the rhetoric escalates, ‘we cannot add fuel to the fire.’”48 In addition to the lack of evidence, the continued condemnations of Iran by parties such as the United States have incited yet more anti-Western sentiment. After all, the conception that Iran is a nuclear proliferation flashpoint in the Middle East reflect “the West’s poor understanding of Iran”49 given the discontinued relations between the two states. Foreign analyst Joseph Bergenas, a researcher for the security-and-anti-proliferationbased Henry L. Stimson think-tank, believes that these misconstructions of Iran’s power and impact have lead to rhetoric filled with “simplistic grandstanding, reprising outdated political fears that lack historical nuance or modern perspective.”50 For example, President Barack Obama’s speech at the 2009 G20 summit suggested the presence of dangerous material that Iran could weaponize at its Qom facility—a declaration that arguably did not reflect reality.51 After all, the Qom location had already been reported to the IAEA by Iran and no nuclear material had been added to the premises; furthermore, it was actually the United States and Israel that had repeatedly expressed an intention to bomb Iran at the time, not the other way around.52 Former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter aptly concludes that: Calls for ‘crippling’ sanctions on Iran by Obama and (former British Prime Minister Gordon) Brown are certainly not the most productive policy options available to these two world leaders. Both have indicated a desire to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iran’s action, in declaring the existence of the Qom facility, has created a window of opportunity for doing just that, and should be fully exploited within the framework of IAEA negotiations and inspections, and not more bluster and threats from the leaders of the western world.53 What Ritter is highlighting is the notion that preemptive posturing may harm the slowly improving attitude of Ahmadinejad’s regime. In recent years, it has “adopted a sophisticated policy” of declaring some locations to the IAEA and opening diplomatic negotiations about its nuclear activities.54 Instead of facilitating the process, United States politicians and officials from allied countries like Great Britain have trended toward antagonistic behavior carried over from Soviet-era foreign policy. The remnants of policies created by Kissinger and his kind are still in effect, along with statements that frame Iran as either an enemy or not. 55As ElBaradei feared, the current
History and Social Science, O. Zhu
hostile global discourse may spark security concerns instead of a program of mutual benefit whereby Iranian compliance might be met with American aid and acceptance. The disparate accounts of Iran’s belligerence and the orthodoxy of American responses indicate a complex relationship and balance that both states, along with other international players, are obliged to uphold. Structural Inequalities in a Nuclear World Claims that the IAEA and NPT favor Western countries or that particularly powerful players like the United States and Russia are able to influence nuclear bodies abound, with good reason. The very foundations of the NPT in 1968 revolve around favoritism, as: the [original] nuclear powers—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—negotiated a free pass that shielded their weapons programs from IAEA inspection but placed under safeguards civilian facilities that use or store nuclear materials. Nonweapons states that signed the treaty entered an agreement to place all their nuclear facilities and materials under IAEA watch.56 What this specific arrangement signifies is that firstly, civilian facilities of these five original countries are more closely observed than the far more dangerous military facilities, placing these states at a strategic advantage and on a far different level—at least in terms of perceptions—than still-developing countries like India or Iran. In fact, the arrangement between the first five nuclear powers and their allies, especially the Western states, was described as a confederation of actors that sought to work in conjunction against what the members believed would be problematic. In one scenario, the major European parties of Germany, England, and France—the EU3—agreed to a diplomatic plan against Tehran’s enrichment programs; meanwhile, the three states monitored American foreign policy to avoid “the western alliance [splitting] again over Iran.”57 Such polarization is worrying: if the developed nuclear West is set against the developing nuclear world, no anti-proliferation working relationships between the regions will come to term. After all, the newly industrializing states of India and Iran are not afforded the same degree of privacy that the NPTfavoring ones were awarded back in 1968, instilling a sense of resentment and injustice when countries become aware of the disparities between the two groups of nuclear actors. For example, as discussed earlier, India and Pakistan feared the West’s domination of the NPT—a perception so accepted that “Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh famously labeled Western nonproliferation efforts ‘nuclear apartheid.’”58 Neither India nor Iran trusts the United States with its security, especially considering that their respective enemies, Pakistan and Israel, have weapons as well.59 Perhaps the very inequalities evident in current international models for civilian nuclear
reactor safeguards and inspections are what drive Iran to protest by developing of new facilities and conducting its nuclear affairs with more secrecy. Former president Akbar Rafsanjani stated that developing nuclear technology, specifically weapons, was the best way to preserve his country’s “independence and survival in this unsuitable international climate.”60 Iran, now driven by Ahmadinejad’s ambitions, has not changed its attitude toward civilian power despite resolutions and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council61 and the IAEA. To return to the case of Obama’s unwarranted accusations of Iran, his and Brown’s “bluster and threats”62 form another cogent argument for a more equitable nuclear stage, as it is entirely possible that their talk of Iranian reform hides other plans to justify a premeditated strike. The rhetoric revolving around the Qom facility focused on the militarization of the Middle East, which “only reinforces [an aggressive] type of thinking.”63 Moreover, Iran was not legally obligated to allow inspections at the time of Obama’s announcement since the country’s parliament had not yet ratified the additional safeguards agreement; though an inconvenient and uncooperative move, the delayed acceptance of the regulations meant that Iran technically never reneged on any promises in this one, specific situation.64 Hypocrisy and Strategy: The Vastly Different Policies toward India and Iran While Iran upheld the letter of the law, the same could not necessarily be said of the United States. First, in addition to the special status granted to the country by its role as a founding member of the NPT, American nuclear dominance is such that the state has been able to coerce major international organizations like the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) into being more lax or stringent, all to achieve U.S. aims. It is true that Iran was motivated to disclose some enrichment sites partly because the state’s leaders knew if they “refused to cooperate with the western powers, [Iran] faced tough international sanctions.”65 Yet securing the compliance of risky nuclear states is not the duty of the United States or its allies: the IAEA should and must be powerful enough to do so on its own. Another organization that has complied with American demands is the NSG, which was compelled “to bend its rules to facilitate the India deal” after what “verged on outright bullying, leaving that proliferation control body divided and weakened.”66 It is due to the structural weaknesses of the IAEA and associated groups that U.S. abuses of nuclear procedure and organizations have been allowed to occur. In turn, such disregard for the authority of the international watchdog agencies has caused even more weaknesses to develop. Specifically, the vastly different treatments of India and Iran invite questions given the twisting of laws and the strong-arming of coalition groups that were necessary for such a disparity to be present at all. Countries were coerced as well: obliquely
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addressed during a Congressional committee meeting on the IND the was the fact that United States subtly turned one state on another, as India’s vote for the IAEA to increase sanctions on Iran was bought by a U.S. agreement to pass the IND.67 What is even more concerning is the fact that American foreign policy toward Iran is viewed as a direct violation of Article IV of the NPT. The provision “offers a nuclear reward to non-nuclear weapons countries who sign the treaty” in that agreeing to never construct armaments means a state will be allowed to construct civilian reactors. 68 Iran signed the NPT and agreed to the conventions of Article IV; India has done neither. Yet, while Iran’s ambitions have been politically and physically attacked by the United States and other countries, India’s have been aided. Regardless of whether Article IV is a “cornerstone of the NPT” or a contributing “problem” to proliferation, the inconsistency of U.S. and international policy is questionable.69 In fact, the IND prompted accusations from Iran “that the west is applying a double standard by penalising what it claims is a similarly peaceful civilian nuclear power generation programme.”70 Even taking into account the antagonistic and fragile relationship between Iran and the United States, the Bushehr reactor plans should not be the targets of American criticism if all countries uphold the letter and spirit of the NPT. The Next Step for the IAEA: Resolving Approaches toward Civilian and Military Reactors There are certain realizations necessary when considering the best future for IAEA and U.S. policies. Yes, the international community is correct in assuming Iran is a belligerent state possibly pursuing nuclear arms. Yes, the United States and other nations are wise and correct in pursuing preventative measures in the form of sanctions—not attacks. Yes, the IAEA should be conducting investigations into possible enrichment facilities. However, these three points in no way justify the actions taken to block Iran’s civilian programs. Already in place is a reactor fuel trading agreement with Russia, which allows the Middle Eastern state to receive enough uranium to power its plants before returning the spent fuel to its partner for processing, avoiding the prospect of proliferation.71 The security of IAEA sanctions, trading plans with various partners, and Ahmadinejad’s relative openness to negotiating with other countries are promising;72 attacks like Stuxnet, bombs, and cutting off a fuel supply seem not only superfluous, but dangerous. The United States needs to reanalyze its policies toward India as opposed to its treatment of Iran, then revise the Cold War mentality with which it approaches Tehran with regard to nuclear technology. America should not forget its suspicions, but instead refrain from basing its actions on innuendo and Soviet-era philosophies—and that attitude should be carried over to any talks it has with or regarding Iranian
nuclear programs. There is ample historical evidence that “raw politics [and] emotions” have impacted proliferation politics,73 and equally significant empirics support the idea that calmer judgment is needed. The IAEA, on the other hand, must revise its structure by becoming more vigilant. Along with the U.N., the NSG, and other major international organizations, the IAEA should seek to increase its presence and strength. Bilateral nuclear accords like the IND or the Russia-Iran fuel exchange could be supervised or mediated by the IAEA, and the group could surely take more action in the talks with Iran and the first five nuclear powers. What is most important now is maintaining the integrity of the NPT as it was originally intended to exist, and the even the former American ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, felt that the organization he was a member of had to focus on diplomacy that “[goes] beyond reiterating wellknown U.S. positions.”74 More than ever, the IAEA should aid in efforts to develop civilian power with sufficient safeguards so that states can supply their citizens with a reliable and environmentally friendly energy source. At the same time, the organization must place an emphasis on disarmament and antiproliferation efforts for all states. That is, if Iran is expected to refrain from nuclear enrichment, so should the United States, Russia, China, and other NPT signatories. India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel75 must be encouraged to join a nuclear community that is hopefully more balanced in its distribution of rights—without special exceptions for certain powerful states, a major source of dissent for these four non-signatory countries will be removed. The world will have much to do before it is truly safe from weapons of mass destruction, but the first step involves leveling the playing field. Ideally, the IAEA should be a neutral arbiter of nuclear policy, a feat it can accomplish only with international cooperation. The necessary shift in the way that the United States and fellow states like the EU-3 perceive developing countries like India and Iran is the key to effective multilateral action by the IAEA for greater global security and economic development. Those dual goals are what every state hopes for in the end, regardless of alliances, culture, capabilities, or history. This is not an easily achieved goal, and there is no assurance of an idealized future. However, current issues and tensions can be mitigated through a slow acceptance of the right to civilian power conducted under the auspices of the IAEA. Notes 1 Linda Gunter, “The Flaw in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Article IV: Nuclear Power and the Pathway to Nuclear Weapons,” AlterNet, May 3, 2010, http://www.alternet.org/story/146710/ (accessed October 22, 2010).
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2 Alireza Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 126.
ber 22, 2010).
3 Scott Ritter, “Keeping Iran Honest,” The Guardian (London), September 25, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ cifamerica/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-nuclear-plant-inspections (accessed October 22, 2010).
17 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/usindia_nuclear_deal.html (accessed January 3, 2011).
4 Ali Akbar Dareini and John Heilprin, “Ahmadinejad Says Iran May End Enrichment,” Associated Press, September 24, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/ 20100924/ap_on_re_us/ un_un_ahmadinejad (accessed October 22, 2010). 5 W. Conard Holton, “Power Surge: Renewed Interest in Nuclear Energy,” Environmental Health Perspectives 113, no. 11 (November 2005): A 743, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3436551 (accessed October 20, 2010). 6 David Wood, “Iran’s strong case for nuclear power is obscured by UN sanctions and geopolitics,” Atoms for Peace: An International Journal 1, no. 4 (2007): 290, http://inderscience.metapress. com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue ,3,8;journal,7,9;linkingpublicationresults,1:119867,1 (accessed October 21, 2010). 7 Wood, 290. 8 Wood, 289. 9 Richard Stone, “Another Middle East Showdown,” Science 300, no. 5626 (June 2003): 1642, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3834550 (accessed October 20, 2010). 10 John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 102. 11 Jafarzadeh, 125-126. 12 Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Handbook, Contemporary World Issues Series (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), 59. 13 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, ed. David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha, Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 18. 14 Jafarzadeh, 141. 15 Simon Tisdall, “US-India pact strains nuclear rules,” Guardian (London), October 3, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/03/tisdallbriefing.india/print (accessed Octo38
16 Diehl and Moltz, 59.
18 Ganguly and Kapur, 17. 19 Ganguly and Kapur, 18. 20 Ganguly and Kapur, 71. 21 Diehl and Moltz, 155. 22 Diehl and Moltz, 155. 23 Dinshaw Mistry, “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.India Nuclear Agreement,” Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (SeptemberOctober 2006): 675, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4497201 (accessed October 20, 2010). 24 M. G. Srinath, “India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Sputtering,” Worldpress (New Delhi), June 7, 2007, http://www.worldpress.org/ Asia/2818.cfm (accessed October 22, 2010). 25 Srinath. 26 Tisdall. 27 Gunter. 28 Mistry, 687. 29 Mistry, 687. 30 Mistry, 696. 31 Bajoria and Pan. 32 Tisdall. 33 Tisdall. 34 Noam Chomsky, “Chomsky: ‘The Majority of the World Supports Iran,’” interview by Subrata Ghoshroy, AlterNet, October 3, 2008, http://www.alternet.org/story/101290/ (accessed October 22, 2010). 35 Chomsky. 36 Henry Kissinger, interview by The Washington Post, qtd. in Chomsky.
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37 Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 113. 38 Caryle Murphy, “WikiLeaks Reveals Saudi Efforts to Thwart Iran,” Global Post, November 29, 2010, http://www.globalpost. com/dispatch/saudi-arabia/101129/wikileaks-saudi-arabia-iranking-abdullah (accessed January 5, 2011). 39 Johan Bergenas, “The Nuclear Domino Myth: Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenarios,” Foreign Affairs (New York City), August 31, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-bergenas/the-nuclear-domino-myth (accessed October 22, 2010). 40 Ryan Fleming, “Bits before Bombs: How Stuxnet Crippled Iran’s Nuclear Dreams,” Digital Trends, December 2, 2010, http:// www.digitaltrends.com/computing/bits-before-bombs-how-stuxnet-crippled-irans-nuclear-dreams/ (accessed January 9, 2011).
55 Chomsky. 56 Richard Stone, “Another Middle East Showdown,” Science 300, no. 5626 (June 2003): 1642, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3834550 (accessed October 20, 2010). 57 Gold, 38. 58 Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September-October 1998), qtd. in Ganguly and Kapur, 18. 59 Abhinav Aima, “Understanding Nuclear Iran,” Common Dreams, November 23, 2004, http://www.commondreams.org/ views04/1123-32.htm (accessed November 1, 2010). 60 Gold, 118. 61 Gold, 49-50.
42 Alexander and Hoenig, x.
43 Alexander and Hoenig, 111.
44 Alexander and Hoenig, 113.
65 Gold, 38.
45 Alexander and Hoenig, 111.
46 Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009), 3.
67 Committee on Foreign Affairs, More Than Just the 123 Agreement: The Future of U.S.-Indo Relations, 110th Cong., 2d sess. (June 25, 2008), 3, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1013 (accessed October 21, 2010).
47 Murphy. 48 Mohammed ElBaradei, cited in The Washington Times, October 29, 2007, qtd in Alexander and Hoenig, x.
68 Gunter. 69 Gunter.
71 Stone, 1642.
51 Scott Ritter, “Keeping Iran Honest,” The Guardian (London), September 25, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ cifamerica/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-nuclear-plant-inspections (accessed October 22, 2010).
72 Dareini and Helprin.
52 Ritter. 53 Ritter. 54 Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2009), 37-38.
73 Baylis and O’Neill, 119. 74 Gregory L. Schulte, “Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark,” Strategic Forum, no. 253 (March 2010): 2, www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/sf%20253 _web.pdf (accessed October 21, 2010). 75 Gunter.
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Clinical Hypnosis: A Review of the Literature Appu Bhaskar Hypnosis can be defined as an altered state of consciousness, which is usually induced by a series of preliminary suggestions that may be self-administered or delivered by a hypnotist. The term “hypnotic suggestibility” is a measure of a subject’s response to hypnosis, influenced by various factors such as age and emotional state. The intriguing aspect of this field is the wealth of mistaken beliefs regarding it. These misconceptions include the beliefs that it can induce sleep and control another’s mind and free will. Reflecting these misleading ideas, the term “hypnosis” was derived from the Greek word hypnos, meaning “sleep.” Although hypnosis can bring about a trance, it does not cause sleep. Also, even though people in the hypnotic state are unusually responsive to ideas or exercises, their minds are not being controlled, as they are awake and able to speak and move (Anbar, 2002). A treatment using hypnosis for a therapeutic goal is called hypnotherapy, which is brought about by exercises that evoke a deeply focused state. To execute this treatment, trained hypnotherapists provide patients with instructions on how to use self-hypnosis or guide their patients through suggestions and mental images to replace behavior. With these suggestions, the subjects’ bodies relax and thoughts become more focused. The strength of their response will vary based on each individual’s hypnotic suggestibility. Another common method of hypnotherapy is the eye fixation method, which requires the subject to stare at a moving object to get into a trance. Whether it be through self-hypnosis or guided hypnosis, hypnosis can complement medical therapy by treating anxiety, pain, and discomfort. It can even alter the human body’s physiological response to conditions like asthma. As established by recent studies that utilize self-evaluations and brain scans like fMRIs and PET, hypnotherapy can mitigate clinical pain. Hypnotherapy & Fibromyalgic Pain A study was conducted by Castel, Perez, Sala, Pedrol, and Rull (2003) to determine the difference between the effects of hypnotic suggestions and relaxation suggestions on fibromyalgia, the leading cause of chronic muscular-skeletal pain. The second purpose was to compare the relative effect of relaxation suggestions when they are presented as “hypnosis” and as “relaxation training.” The definition of relaxation is “a systematic approach to teaching people to gain awareness of their physiological responses and achieve both a cognitive and
psychological sense of tranquility” (Castel et al., 2003, p. 2). The researchers hypothesized that hypnotic suggestions would cause more of a decrease in fibromyalgic pain than relaxation suggestions and that relaxation suggestions would have the same effect when presented as “hypnosis” and “relaxation training.” Forty-five patients with fibromyalgia were randomly assigned to one of the following experimental conditions: hypnosis with relaxation suggestions, hypnosis with analgesia suggestions, and relaxation. Before and after the experimental session, the pain intensity was measured using a visual analogue scale (VAS), which consists of a 10 cm line anchored by two extremes of pain: “no pain” and “worst possible pain.” Subjects were asked to make a mark on the line to quantify their level of pain intensity. The scale is scored by measuring the distance from the “no pain” side of the line to the subject’s mark. The sensory and affective dimensions of the pain were measured with the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ). Although the entire questionnaire was administered, only the Pain Rating Index Sensory (PRI-S) and the Pain Rating Index Affective (PRI-A) Indexes were considered. The hypnosis with relaxation suggestions treatment was presented as a hypnosis technique. Participants were instructed to stare at an external stimulus and close their eyes. A chain of relaxation suggestions were made using palpebral catalepsy, catalepsy of the vocal cords and the raising of an arm. Afterwards, they were asked to visualize a leaf swaying on the branch of a tree and then floating slowly to the found. This image was associated with the descent of the arm and deeper hypnosis. This procedure lasted for ten minutes. Subsequently, participants were instructed to imagine a pleasant beach (if they agreed this was a suitable image) and advised to think about the visual, auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic, and olfactory stimuli of the image. This procedure lasted for twenty minutes. The hypnosis with analgesia suggestions treatment was presented as a hypnosis technique. The same initial procedure from the relaxation suggestions treatment was used. However, instead of being asked to imagine a beach, the participants were asked to imagine a liquid or blue analgesic (pain-relieving) stream that filtered through their body and soothed their pain and created pleasant feelings. The relaxation experimental condition was presented as a
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relaxation technique. For five minutes, the patients were shown how to relax various parts of the body, beginning with their feet and finishing with their heads. Then, for ten minutes, they were told to focus on their diaphragmatic breathing. Finally, feelings of well-being and general relaxation were suggested for five minutes. The technique lasted for twenty minutes. After analyzing the results of the study, the researchers corroborated their hypothesis by finding that all of treatments reduced pain significantly, as revealed by both pain descriptions and intensity reporting. There was a statistically significant difference between pain reductions caused by hypnosis with analgesia suggestions and both forms of relaxation, with hypnosis leading to double the pain reduction. On the other hand, there was no difference between relaxation training presented as hypnosis and simple relaxation in any of the measures compared. The findings of this study have implications on understanding the importance of hypnotic suggestions and the differences or similarities between hypnotherapy and relaxation training. In 2009, Derbyshire, Whalley, and Oakley conducted a study to determine the impact of hypnotic suggestions on fibromyalgic pain by measuring neural activity and determining the areas of the brain activated. Unlike Castel et al. (2003), Derbyshire et al. (2009) examined the activation of brain structures dependent upon alterations of fibromyalgia to discover more about neuropsychological process of hypnosis. No hypothesis was stated. 46 patients took part in the study. Suggestions following a hypnotic induction and the same suggestions without a hypnotic induction were used during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to decrease the subjective experience of fibromyalgic pain. Both hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion resulted in significant changes in reported pain experience, with patients claiming significantly more control over their pain and reporting greater pain reduction when hypnotized. Activation of the midbrain, cerebellum, thalamus, midcingulate, primary and secondary sensory, inferior parietal, insula and prefrontal cortices correlated with reported changes in pain with hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion. However, with hypnotic suggestions, these activations were stronger in the cerebellum, anterior midcingulate cortex, anterior and posterior insula, and the inferior parietal cortex. The differences between the results of these two treatments were in degree rather than type. After creating a separate group in the data with subjects that took medication, the neural activations of that group were then compared to the group with no medication. Intriguingly, regions of the right hemisphere were more greatly activated by hypnosis, which is consistent with the theory of a greater involvement of the right hemisphere in hypnosis of highly hypnotizable individuals. Thus, since it causes a strengthened response, hyp-
notic suggestion is more effective at pain mitigation than nonhypnotic suggestions. Other Antinociceptive Effects of Hypnosis Hypnosis is an alternative to anesthesia during operations. Because the neural mechanisms underlying the pain-relieving effects of hypnosis are unknown, there is controversy whether it is actually hypnosis that causes the positive changes. Like the Derbyshire study, this study attempts to demonstrate cerebral functional modulation in response to hypnosis. Faymonville, Roediger, Fiore, Delgueldre, Phillips, and others (2003) set up an experiment to quantify the decreased pain perception and name the brain areas affected using PET scans. No hypothesis was stated. Nineteen hypnotically suggestible subjects underwent PET scans while in a hypnotic state, a mental imagery state, and at rest. PET data was also collected by subjects undergoing hot noxious stimulation or warm non-noxious stimulation on their right hands (details not specified in study). The eye fixation method was used to induce hypnosis. Faymonville found that hypnosis reduced pain perception by 50% compared to the resting state and 43% compared to the mental imagery state. Increased functional modulation was found to occur in the midcingulate cortex, which is known to be a part of pain processing. Like the past few studies, the Faymonville study demonstrated that there are not only pharmacological but also scientifically demonstrated psychological methods to mitigate pain by modulating the cortical region of the brain in response to noxious stimuli. Anesthesia vs. Hypnosis Cancer by itself is not the lone cause of pain for patients. It is also the procedures for therapy and diagnosis that cause distress, such as lumbar punctures that insert needles to extract fluid between vertebrae and bone marrow aspirations. For children with cancer, pain is especially an issue, as it is more difficult for children to comply with procedures while experiencing severe pain. Studies have even shown that invasive protocols on children on a repeated basis cause long-term psychological distress. However, in response to these needs, the World Health Organization established hypnosis as a standard procedure for managing treatment-related pain. Although existing studies demonstrated that hypnosis is the most effective method at mitigating pain, these gains were never maintained after 6-month follow-up appointments. At a pediatric cancer clinic, Hatira, Liossi, and White (2006) wanted to test three different hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that the combination of hypnosis with local anesthesia will reduce pain during treatment more than local anesthesia alone. The second hypothesis was that the self-directed use of hypnosis will reduce pain, anxiety, and distress before the procedure more
History and Social Science, A. Bhaskar
than local anesthesia alone; the effect will be maintained at the 6-month follow-up. The third hypothesis was that highly hypnotizable children will reduce pain, anxiety, and distress during treatment before the procedure more than low hypnotizable children. Fourty-five patients, between the ages of 6 and 16, participated in the study. Using a random digits table, patients were randomly assigned to one of three groups: local anesthetic, local anesthetic plus hypnosis, and local anesthetic plus attention. Patients were not told the group they were assigned to, as the experiment was single-blind. The local anesthetic was an analgesic cream called EMLA. The patients’ hypnotic susceptibility was measured through the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale for children. Subjects were also taught self-hypnosis to continue treatment on own. During an intervention session, each participant met with a therapist. They then discuss several topics such as extracurricular activities or whatever interests the child. Five days after this intervention session, the participants had a lumbar puncture as part of their usual schedule of procedures. Throughout the study, the patients’ pain was self-reported on a visual-analog scale, just like the Castel study mentioned earlier. Like the results of all of the previous studies, it was found that hypnosis does have an effect in mitigating pain. All three of the hypotheses were verified. The group with hypnosis and the cream had significantly less amount of pain compared to the control group with only the cream. Also, it was found that there is a correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and benefit from hypnosis, although susceptibility is only one of many factors. Additionally, it was found that there is little therapeutic value of a therapist and that self-hypnosis is effective by itself. Thus, pediatric procedure-related cancer pain can be decreased using hypnosis. The implications of this study’s findings are enormous, as hypnotherapy lacks the adverse side-effects of many medications and can be a cost and time-effective treatment in clinics. Also, children knowing self-hypnosis will be able to apply it to a variety of conditions. Additionally, by reducing the distress of their children, parents will decrease their own sense of helplessness. Interesting Relationships, Many Weaknesses, Few Strengths, What Now? These studies on hypnotherapy are very similar, yet very different at the same time. The Castel and Derbyshire studies measured the antinociceptive impact of hypnosis on fibromyalgic pain, while the Faymonville and Haitri studies measured hypnosis’ impact on heat and cancer. Another interesting difference between these two groups of studies is a demographic difference, with the Castel and Derbyshire studies on aged people and the Faymonville and Haitri studies on children. This difference is significant, as hypnosis works differently on children than it does on adults. The Castel and Haitri studies
relied on patients self-reporting their pain through the visual analog scale (VAS), while the Derbyshire study used an fMRI and the Faymonville study used PET scanning. Both scans found that the same areas were activated by hypnosis. All of these studies concluded that hypnotherapy mitigates clinical pain more than many other procedures. These studies have several shortcomings that are common to all of them. For all of these studies, the small number of participants is a drawback that limits the power of statistical analysis and the generalization of the results obtained. Also, all of them do not control the confounding variable of differences in the application of each experimental condition. There may have been changes in language or other variations as a function of the participants’ responses. Furthermore, all of these experiments were single-blind, leaving room for the researcher to unintentionally skew results. Since their samples did not cover the entire population age-wise (most participants at ages forty through fifty) or medication-wise, the researchers cannot extend their results to the entire population. Another flaw common to all of them was that they were voluntary samples, so the subjects were more susceptible to hypnosis than the general population. There is evidence to suggest that highly suggestible subjects are more responsive to hypnotic suggestion than other forms of relaxation. Although a difference between hypnosis and relaxation may be inferred since the increased suggestibility applies to subjects exposed to both treatments, the magnitude of the pain relief is not reliable and cannot extend to the entire population. Many of the weaknesses in the Castel and Faymonville studies were strengths of the Derbyshire and Hatira studies. The Castel study did not measure hypnotic suggestibility, but the Derbyshire and Hatira studies did using the Harvard and Stanford Susceptibility Scales. Thus, the voluntary sample may have caused a confounding variable to influence results, although the Derbyshire and Hatira studies did control for this. Also, as a statistical rule, if a voluntary sample is taken, inference cannot be made about the larger population. Furthermore, for the Castel and Faymonville studies, the sample was not homogeneous in terms of medication. They failed to take into account the impact of medication on hypnotic suggestibility, and since they did not even initially measure hypnotic suggestibility, they completely neglected that variable. The Castel study stated that its sample was homogenous and took into account clinical data, but this data was not even posted in the study unlike the more useless demographic data. In contrast, the Derbyshire and Hatira studies effectively controlled this variable by measuring hypnotic suggestibility and separately analyzing results from the medication and non-medication groups. Another weakness of the Castel and Hatira studies was that patients subjectively assessed their health condition. To quantify pain, they used subjective methods of reporting pain.
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The intensity of pain for one person may be much greater than that of another person, yet the more pained person may still record his pain as less than a subject that is less pain tolerant. In contrast, the Derbyshire and Faymonville studies utilized fMRI to actually illustrate how different regions of the brain are strengthened and more effectively quantify the pain. One strength of all of these studies is that they effectively crafted control groups, although they did not add control measures for many confounding variables. Also, although the sample was not randomly selected (which indicates that inference cannot be made about a population), the treatments were randomly assigned, which allows for inference about cause and effect as a statistical rule. Also, to partially account for one of the weaknesses of the Castel and Faymonville studies, in clinical pain, scale-assessed hypnotic suggestibility is much less predictive of the response to hypnotic intervention. In clinical samples, patients with low suggestibility have similar levels of response to hypnotic suggestions as patients with high suggestibility (Castel, 2003). However, it was still necessary and not unreasonable to measure the suggestibility for the patients in those studies to more effectively control that variable for the subjects. Additionally, all of the studies effectively controlled the placebo effect by not informing the patients whether what they were receiving was truly hypnosis or relaxation training. The procedure and effects of hypnosis have been thoroughly studied. However, studies on the clinical application of hypnosis and how best to implement it are not abundant. Even though hypnosis is a WHO standard treatment for mitigating pain, hypnotic suggestion is usually not studied in the contextÂ of a clinic. Doing so would more effectively demonstrate the therapeutic value of hypnosis and control another variable of where the hypnosis is conducted. Further studies should also be performed to quantify the cost and time effectiveness of using hypnotherapy for both therapists and patients. Once studies on how to effectively implement hypnotherapy are released, it will become a more common practice and society will be benefitted. Also, studies that investigate the individual components of a hypnotic intervention (suggestions stage, relaxations stage, etc.) should be performed to determine which component has the most beneficial effects. Additionally, there are not many existing studies that measure the duration of the beneficial effects of hypnosis. Further studies on hypnosis should focus on measuring its long-term impact too, by having patients return after 6 months to be tested. Furthermore, these results should be confirmed at many institutions and with patients of other clinical and demographic history. With more studies demonstrating the success of hypnosis among a variety of samples, clinics would more easily be able to conclude that hypnosis is an effective procedure and possibly adopt it.
History and Social Science, J. Liu.
Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula: Yemen as the “Third Front” Justine Liu Yemen has in recent times been referred to as a “Third Front” in the “War on Terror” to follow the United States’ ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, attempted by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and attributed to Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), brought Yemen to the forefront of the United States’ attention as a potential terrorist threat. However, prior attacks in Yemen have been successfully perpetrated by Islamic extremists, most notably the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and a September 2008 attack on the U.S. Embassy in the capital Sanaa.2 Facing a rising Southern secessionist movement, Saada wars led by Zaidi Al Houthis, and shortages in oil and water, Yemen’s political and economic struggles only increase its susceptibility to jihadists. Since 1992, Al Qaeda is estimated to have engaged in sixty-one attacks in Yemen, and as recently as November 2010, Yemen and AQAP were associated with the discovery of FedEx and UPS packages containing explosives in United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates airports, en route to Chicago.3 Furthermore, Yemenis are estimated to constitute anywhere from one-third to one-half of the approximately 181 Guantanamo Bay detainees and more than half of AQAP’s total membership, suggesting that Al Qaeda’s rhetoric resonates particularly powerfully within the citizens of a politically unstable Yemen.4 The confluence of a growing Southern movement, the Al Houthi conflict, and a deteriorating economy have strengthened AQAP’s capacity to harm the United States, warranting the adoption of more targeted counterterrorist measures in Yemen to prevent future attacks. What is the history of Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula? Prior to 9/11, the most successful Al Qaeda operation perpetrated in Yemen was a maritime suicide attack on the USS Cole in Aden that killed seventeen Americans and injured thirty-nine more.5 Post-9/11, what was then termed Al Qaeda in Yemen perpetrated a number of attacks in the region, including failed attempts in the cities of Hadramaut and Marib in 2006 and a Marib car bombing in 2007. In 2008, Al Qaeda in Yemen, the precursor to AQAP, launched an ambush on Belgian tourists as well as two separate attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, one of which resulted in seventeen casualties. The January 2009 merger of the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni branches of Al Qaeda to create Al Qaeda in the Arab Penin-
sula coincided with an escalation of the media campaign and the severity of attacks, with a suicide bombing targeting South Korean tourists in March, an assassination attempt on the Saudi intelligence chief Muhammad bin Nayef, and the infamous Christmas Day bombing.6 The latest developments revolve around the discovery of FedEx and UPS packages containing explosives sent to Chicago, an action linked to Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri of AQAP, who is also suspected of masterminding the attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253.7 Since the loss of Afghanistan as a base in 2001, Al Qaeda has adopted a more decentralized networked structure of associate groups and operational cells.8 To illustrate the connection that remains between Al Qaeda central and AQAP, deputy leader of AQAP Saeed al-Shihri referred to the organization as the “mujahideen children in the Peninsula of Mohammad” of the “sheikhs and amirs in the general command in Khorasan [Afghanistan].”9 AQAP can then be considered a regional hub in the global terrorist network, using the Al Qaeda core left in Afghanistan and Pakistan for ideological support but otherwise operationally independent. Its core group includes twenty-three prisoners who escaped the Sanaa facility in 2006 united under the guidance of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Osama bin Laden’s former secretary.10 Following effective counterterrorism operations undertaken within Saudi Arabia between 2002 and 2005, the remaining Saudi members of Al Qaeda fled to Yemen to join AQAP, along with displaced individuals who were part of Al Qaeda’s core in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and newly recruited Yemenis. Current estimates place AQAP membership at anywhere from a few to several hundred extremists.11 Whether Al Qaeda’s change into a more transnational movement necessarily makes it a greater threat, however, is unclear. While a recent Yemen Post article written by political analyst Hakim Almasmari predicts a sizeable Al Qaeda attack within the next four months, other international relations scholars believe that Al Qaeda’s decentralization has actually hindered its ability to plan and succeed in deploying large-scale attacks on the West.12 Indeed, some experts observe that the very transformation of Al Qaeda into a diffuse network characterized by regional nodes of influence may leave the group more vulnerable and less effective. By this logic, independent cells who act without regard for the central group create strategic weaknesses in effective coordination and preparation: lack of organizational support hinders Islamic extremists’ ability to
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conduct professional training, gain recruits, and successfully launch attacks. No particularly complex attacks have been successful following 9/11, and specialist in Middle Eastern politics Fawaz Gerges has even termed Al Qaeda as comprising nothing but “desperate local affiliates and cells.”13 Despite such optimism, these indications of Al Qaeda’s vulnerabilities if anything escalate the severity of Yemeni state failure. If Al Qaeda’s most effective attacks originated when it had access to a safe haven in Afghanistan, a collapsed Yemen might improve terrorist capacity to threaten Western interests. A Yemeni power vacuum might allow Al Qaeda ungoverned spaces where they have the freedom to collaborate and plan attacks. Norman Cigar political science professor at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia translated Al Qaeda’s doctrine for insurgency, revealing that AQAP founder Al-Muqrin emphasizes that “any group that wants to wage a successful guerilla war must pay attention to the situation of the ordinary people, and address their rights and needs.”14 Thus, the United States, even as it increases its influence in the area, ought to be wary of the appeal of Islamic extremism to the average citizen dissatisfied with the fragile political and economic state of Yemen, especially since AQAP already has attempted to take advantage of the Yemeni crises to lay the groundwork for this popular response precondition. How can AQAP take advantage of indications of Yemeni state failure? The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), or South Yemen, and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or North Yemen, unified in 1990 after centuries of conflict. Yet issues of land ownership, loss of power among the PDRY elite, and failure to develop infrastructure in the region have given rise to the Southern Mobility Movement.15 In the spring of 2009, South Yemen’s most famous jihadist, Tariq al-Fadhli, broke his 1994 alliance with President Salih to begin openly championing independence for “South Arabia” as part of the Southern Mobility Movement.16 The implications of this Southern insurgency are not only to weaken Salih’s already tenuous authority in the region, paving the way for greater AQAP presence, but for Southern tribes to actively harbor terrorist groups. The development of extremist Islam in Yemen is historically tied with the Southern civil conflict, since PDRY had been host to Palestinian and other terror organizations prior to unification.17 With such roots, the increasing levels of violence and the Salih administration’s harsh crackdown on the Southern Movement augmented the group’s radicalization, and evidence has emerged suggesting that the group has allied with AQAP.18 Indeed, AQAP’s leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi openly declared support for the Southern Movement in 2009 and expressed optimism regarding the development of an independent Islamic state in South Yemen.19 Although it does not appear that a for-
mal partnership has emerged between AQAP and the Southern Movement, the costs of secession would be to create an environment conducive to spreading Islamic extremism, a facet of Yemeni politics that has not escaped AQAP’s notice.20 Like the Southern Mobility Movement, the Al Houthi rebels fighting the Saada wars in the north have preoccupied the Salih administration and exacerbated the Yemeni political situation to make the state more attractive to Islamic terrorists.21 The Saada conflicts have occurred sporadically in six distinct wars since 2004 and, despite the February 2010 ceasefire, show little indication of being resolved.22 The Houthis are Zaidi Shi’i revivalists whose grievances originated in perceptions of decreasing Zaidi influence, economic underdevelopment in Sadaa, and general discontent with the central government for its cooperation with the United States and Saudi Arabia. Current violence, however, stems from outright opposition to President Salih.23 Salih’s aggressive military offensives in the traditionally independent northern tribal lands since 2004 have alienated the Houthis from the central government even further, accounting for continued tensions in the region.24 Additionally, the issues have been worsened by the relocation of Sunni Salafi fundamentalists, who clash with the Zaidi Shi’i population, to the Saada area.25 In the latest conflict, Saudi Arabia allied with Salih against the Houthis in an open military response to the insurgency, and there have been accusations that Iran has been providing support to the rebels.26 The wars in Saada are particularly important to the United States not only because they risk accelerating Yemeni state failure and therefore strengthening jihadists but also because President Salih has branded the Houthis as terrorists and strongly criticized America for refusing to recognize them as such.27 Moreover, the Houthis, along with Iranian news source PressTV, have accused the United States of launching air raids that have caused the deaths of innocent civilians, an attempt to spread propaganda throughout the international community decrying U.S. involvement in the Arab Peninsula.28 Saudi Interior Minister Naif bin Abdulaziz even indicated that there could be outright coordination between AQAP and Houthi rebels, since they share the common goal of destabilizing Saudi Arabia. An article published by Asharq Alawsat, a newspaper owned by a Saudi royal, articulated that since both Houthis and AQAP elements have been operating in the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border region, “it is more difficult to deny the existence of links between Al Qaeda and the H[o]uthi insurgents than it is to confirm them, and all indications point to the existence of such ties and coordination.”29 Regardless of whether the Houthi rebels and AQAP have established a formal cooperative relationship, however, the costs of Houthi momentum are clear: the Saada wars emphasize the state’s vulnerabilities and embolden other rebel groups such as AQAP in addition to straining the Salih administration’s military resources and the Yemeni economy.30
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Yet, even if such conflicts represent the growing tendency toward Yemeni fragmentation, the economic crisis might be the most likely trigger for an official breakup of the state.31 Thus although the violence associated with Southern Mobility Movement and Houthi rebellions are concerning, the fact that Yemen’s economy is wholly dependent on water and oil, resources which are rapidly being depleted, is perhaps an even greater issue. Although oil accounts for almost seventy percent of Yemen’s GDP, production has decreased dramatically since 2002.32 Indeed, oil revenues fell by seventy-five percent in early 2009 compared to 2008 figures. Moreover the world economic recession only exacerbated Yemen’s issues, since international aid and development dwindled even as the Salih administration struggled to support the military and a civil servant system rife with bribery and corruption.33 The oil problems are connected with the water crisis that threatens to undermine Yemen’s stability, whereby the state’s freshwater availability has fallen well beneath the international water poverty line. The Yemeni government has attempted to respond to the water shortage by using its oil revenues to subsidize diesel fuel pumps for groundwater extraction.34 However, with most experts estimating that Yemen’s oil production is at or near its limit, no longer-term solution, either for the water crisis or high unemployment levels, has emerged.35 Moreover, although the reduction of diesel subsidies would alleviate the water issues, efforts to do so in the past fostered intense public opposition and violence from those who profit from the current situation.36 With an economy based almost entirely on petroleum revenues, remittances, and foreign aid, Yemen’s fiscal future seems bleak.37 AQAP may very well capitalize upon these economic woes and the resulting general dissatisfaction with the state’s inability to respond effectively. As Abdul Rahman al-Eryani, Yemen’s Minister of Water and Environment, describes: “Already, the lack of water is fueling tribal conflicts and insurgencies.”38 With economic issues further dividing an already unstable state, Yemen may be at even greater risk of becoming a safe haven for Islamic extremists.39 How effective has the United States response to Al Qaeda’s Yemeni presence been since 2000? Although the United States has been aware of the Al Qaeda threat in Yemen since the U.S.S. Cole maritime bombing, with myriad other issues to confront in the greater Middle East, including Iraq, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Somalia, it was only following the 2009 Christmas Day attempt that attention to counterterrorism operations in Yemen reemerged.40 In 2001, following the U.S.S. Cole attack, U.S. assistance levels were only about $50 million, but this declined to a mere $9 million in 2006. As former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen Barbara Bodine observed, “Yemen just slipped quietly off our radar screen. There was no major economic interest
and no apparent security interest.”41 Thus it seems that U.S. attention to Yemen, from both development assistance and a security-centric perspectives, was woefully inadequate prior to 2009. However, throughout 2009 and in the aftermath of the Northwest Airlines attempt, U.S.-Yemeni intelligence and security cooperation expanded significantly. The United States has been supplying the Yemeni security forces with satellite and surveillance imagery and communications intelligence to aid the central government in launching air raids against AQAP. Moreover, the U.S. deployed several troops from the Joint Special Operations Command towards tactical training, arming, and planning missions for Yemen’s military.42 The U.S. also announced a doubling of aid to Yemen to $40 million in addition to $120 million in security assistance in 2009.43 For 2011, the Obama Administration has requested $106.6 million in foreign aid, and Yemen has become the recipient of the largest amount of Department of Defense funding as of 2010.44 Yet, tensions still exist between the U.S. and Yemen over the eradication of AQAP elements. According to an unnamed Yemeni senior government official in a recent CNN article, Yemen may be overstating the magnitude of the conflict with AQAP in a ploy to gain more international aid and U.S. security assistance.45 In direct response to the article’s accusations, an official Yemeni media source emphasized that “Al Qaeda is now the number one enemy of Yemen” and that it was “foolish and illogic[al] to cast doubt on the efforts of Yemen and its seriousness in the fight against terrorism.”46 This exchange suggests that Yemen is particularly sensitive to doubts regarding its commitment toward countering AQAP, a level of defensiveness that suggests that the Yemeni government is indeed using the AQAP threat to its advantage in receiving greater levels of economic and military assistance. Moreover, the Yemeni public’s objection to greater U.S. intervention in Yemen has meant that Salih has needed to downplay the actual extent of the United States presence in the country, as a recent Wikileaks file release implies.47 Such issues hinder United States attempts to successfully engage in counterterrorism operations in the region, despite the allocation of increased military and aid spending toward preventing Yemeni state failure. Regardless, greater U.S. interest in Yemeni security in 2010 seems to have been effective. AQAP’s offensive abilities have been weakened and the central government has captured or killed a number of mid- and upper-level members of the organization. The Yemeni government estimates that it has succeeded in killing approximately thirty AQAP leaders since January 2010, and successful Yemeni security force air raids have resulted in the incapacitation of many AQAP subcommanders and a greater ability to monitor AQAP leadership, even if the highest-ranking operatives remain in the region.48 However, greater military offensives in Yemen, carried out by
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Yemeni security forces but attributed to the United States, have also resulted in collateral damage that may alienate Yemeni civilians from the West and the central government. Even if Yemeni forces are the figures carrying out the actual air strikes that cause unintended civilian casualties, the sentiment remains among the general public that the United States is responsible.49 Furthermore, AQAP has been persistent in framing the collateral damage in the context of a central government that is nothing but “America’s lackey.”50 Estimates that Yemenis comprise more than half of AQAP’s membership, and that “tens of thousands of Yemenis share their grievances,” indicates that such rhetoric seems to appeal strongly to Yemeni civilians dissatisfied with the government.51 Therefore even in increasing the pace and intensity of its campaign against AQAP, the United States must balance its attempts to eradicate AQAP in Yemen with long-term political and economic development in the region. How ought the United States adapt its counterterrorist measures to Yemen’s unique circumstances? With these issues undermining Yemeni security and indications of AQAP’s growing ability to threaten international security, a reevaluation of U.S. policy in the region seems necessary. Heavy militarization or an overly security-centric perspective to the detriment of necessary governmental reforms risks further strengthening AQAP’s foothold in the country. Moreover, increasing amounts of development aid unaccompanied by fundamental political and economic restructuring is only a short-term solution that will reinforce Salih’s corrupt regime.52 Aid that is interpreted as supporting the Salih administration is likely to backfire, particularly since the central government may reallocate additional funds and arms from the United States toward either the Southern Mobility Movement or the Saada wars to potentially reaffirm jihadist claims of Western military occupation and oppression.53 Yet, counterweights to AQAP influence exist in all areas of the state: Sufi traditions in the south object to Islamic jihadist control; Zaidi al-Houthis in the north are ideologically opposed to the Wahhabism and Salafism that characterizes AQAP; and indigenous tribes scattered throughout the region have no inclination towards Al Qaeda’s Islamic extremism and indeed seek commercial interests and the tenets of justice and free speech introduced by the British rather than the formation of an Islamic sharia state.54 AQAP has in the past attempted to use Yemen’s tribal structure to its advantage, calling upon the communities to mirror their “brothers in the defiant Pushtun and Baluch tribes who aided Allah and His Messenger and made America and the Crusaders dizzy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”55 Local groups may align with jihadists because tribes can provide operation-
al space and support in exchange for money and arms from AQAP, and government offensives incurring collateral damage would only further motivate such cooperation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, even if AQAP is successful in appealing to Yemeni tribes which have been historically resentful of Salih and the central government, the organization’s desire to create an Islamic state in Yemen is a goal incompatible with the strong tradition of autonomous local communities.56 The United States and Yemen therefore should use this inconsistency to demonstrate to these groups that the central government is better suited toward their interests than AQAP is, and the United States ought to guide the political system toward the necessary reforms to reduce local tribal grievances. Such measures might include the election of local officials instead of their appointment by the central government, the establishment of greater mechanisms for sharing revenues with municipalities, and the introduction of a parliament that has equal regional representation.57 To accomplish these long-term goals, more United States support and training to Yemeni security forces is necessary, but this should not be construed as prescribing a military solution to what is fundamentally a political problem. Rather, military responses to AQAP are important but must be led by Yemeni forces rather than Western ones and be orchestrated so as to reduce the chance of collateral damage and deprive AQAP of the opportunity to gain ideological support from U.S. and Yemeni tactical mistakes.58 Improved intelligence collection and cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni security forces beyond those established in 2009 and 2010 following the Northwest Airlines attempt would be crucial to making these objectives a reality to minimize AQAP’s ability to use its facilities in Yemen to threaten international security.59 Furthermore, these measures must also be accompanied with development aid and broad-level structural reforms to decrease the possibility of future Yemeni state failure and address the grievances that cause AQAP ideologies to appeal to the citizens of Yemen. Such reforms would entail initiatives toward eradicating corruption in the civil service system and creating working judicial and law enforcement institutions at the local level that adhere to human rights and are held accountable for their actions.60 Similarly, the health and education sectors have not received necessary funding and support in the past, therefore development assistance must be targeted toward establishing these infrastructures as well to pave the way for long-term stability.61 Conditioning aid on these stipulations would perhaps be an effective mechanism toward pressuring the state to prioritize such development programs. Any steps taken toward restoring Yemeni stability must also involve economic reform and the establishment of industries alternative to oil. The first steps ought to be the improvement of the bureaucracy managing water resources and
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the investment of development funds in more sophisticated rainwater collection and irrigation systems. Programs implemented by the German Technical Cooperation toward a more localized approach to water management could provide the models for future plans.62 Moreover, establishing a coast guard ought to be a priority, both to reduce the chance that Yemen’s coast will be exploited by pirates, smugglers, and jihadists and to create the conditions for a successful fishing industry. In the past, Yemen played a key role in the Indian Ocean trading network, therefore with the proper administration of coastal fisheries and added measures to maintain port security, Yemen, according to former U.S. Ambassador Bodine, “has the potential to be another Singapore.”63 Recognizing that the military response must be moderated by appropriate soft power developments must be a key aspect of any U.S. strategy toward Yemen, but there is reason for optimism. Yemen possesses neither the violent sectarian tensions that characterized Iraq, nor the ethnic divisions and “warlordism” of Afghanistan, and it is more politically developed and inclined toward democracy than either state.64 Thus, with a policy that recognizes Yemen’s unique conditions by including security responses adapted toward preexisting tribal structures, political reforms, and investment in working economic infrastructures, the United States can indeed avoid making Yemen the “Third Front” in the war against Al Qaeda.
9 Al-Shihri quoted in Harris, 2. 10 Harris, 3. 11 Juneau, 141. 12 Hakim Almasmari, “Massive Al-Qaeda Attack in Next Four Months,” Yemen Post, October 17, 2010, http://www.yemenpost. net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=1&SubID=2662 (accessed October 22, 2010).
22 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), 1, http:// www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf (accessed September 27, 2010).
1 Barbara K. Bodine, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions,” Prism 1, no. 3 (June 2010): 44, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/ prism1-3/Prism_43-58_Bodine.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 2 Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34170, 4, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). 3 Thomas Juneau, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 140, http://puffin.harker.org:2084/pqdlink?did=2155147501& Fmt=7&clientId=14606&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed October 16, 2010); Laura Kasinof, “Yemen packages may signal Al Qaeda franchise is ‘amateurish,’” Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2010/1030/Yemen-packages-may-signal-Al-Qaeda-franchise-is-amateurish (accessed November 30, 2010). 4 Sharp, 31; Alistair Harris, Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, Yemen: On the Brink 4, 5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 5 Shaul Shay, “Part III: Yemen and Islamic Terror,” in The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror, trans. Rachel Liberman (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 126. 6 Harris, 3-4. 7 Sharp, 1. 8 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 35, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/ v033/33.2.eilstrup-sangiovanni.pdf (accessed October 16, 2010). 48
13 Gerges quoted in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 41. 14 Norman Cigar, Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd Al’Aziz Al-Muqrin’s “A Practical Course for Guerilla War” (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 104. 15 Robert D. Burrowes, “Yemen: Political Economy and the Effort against Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2005), 143; Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 242-43. 16 Clark, 252-53 17 Shaul Shay, “Part V: Theoretical Analysis and Conclusions,” in The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror, trans. Rachel Liberman (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 161. 18 Stephen Day, The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement, Yemen: On the Brink 2, 1, http://carnegieendowment. org/files/yemen_south_movement.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 19 Clark, 254. 20 Day, 11. 21 Clark, 256.
23 Christopher Boucek, War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge, Yemen: On the Brink 3, 4, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 24 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, 8. 25 Christopher Boucek, Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral, Middle East Program 102, 15, http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 26 Boucek, War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge, 11. 27 Ali Al-Jaradi, “Stance of U.S. Administration on Houthi Movement; Houthis and Al Qaeda Mixed Cards Between Washington and Yemen,” Yemen Post, April 10, 2010, http://www.yemenpost. net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1721&MainCat=6 (accessed October 22, 2010). 28 Press TV (Tehran), “U.S. Air Raids Kill 63 Civilians in Yemen,” December 18, 2009, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/114056. html (accessed October 29, 2010). 29 Tariq Alhommayed, “Is al-Qaeda Coordinating With the Houthis?” Asharq Alawsat (London), November 25, 2009, http:// www.alarabiya.net/views/2009/11/25/92323.html (accessed November 1, 2010). 30 Juneau, 139. 31 Clark, 286.
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32 Owen Barron, “Things Fall Apart: Violence and Poverty in Yemen,” Harvard International Review 30, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 12, http://puffin.harker.org:2084/pqdweb?did=1580344781&si d=1&Fmt=3&clientId=14606&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed October 8, 2010). 33 Clark, 268.
61 Bodine, 56. 62 Juneau, 146. 63 Bodine, 56. 64 Bodine, 45-6.
34 Andrew M. Exum and Richard Fontaine, On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests, 4, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/yemen_Policy_Brief_0.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). 35 Charles Schmitz, “Politics and Economy in Yemen: Lessons from the Past,” in Yemen Into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change, ed. Kamil A. Mahdi, Anna Wurth, and Helen Lackner (United Kingdom: Ithaca Press, 2007), 37. 36 Bodine, 50. 37 Schmitz, 36. 38 al-Eryani quoted in Exum and Fontaine, 4. 39 Burrowes, 142. 40 Sharp, 4. 41 Bodine, 49. 42 Sharp, 6. 43 Bodine, 50. 44 Sharp, 26-8. 45 Mohammed Jamjoom, “Official Doubts Scale of Yemen’s Campaign Against al Qaeda,” CNN, September 25, 2010, World edition, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-25/world/yemen. al.qaeda_1_yemeni-security-forces-shabwa-saba-news-agency?_ s=PM:WORLD (accessed November 1, 2010). 46 News Yemen, “Yemen Slams Doubts on Its Campaign Against al-Qaeda,” September 27, 2010, http://www.newsyemen.net/en/ view_news.asp?sub_no=3_2010_09_27_40156 (accessed November 1, 2010). 47 Pam Benson, “U.S. role in Yemen covered up by its president, Wikileaks file reveals,” CNN, November 29, 2010, U.S. edition, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/28/wikileaks.yemen/ (accessed November 29, 2010). 48 Sharp, 8. 49 Sharp, 7. 50 Reuters quoted in Sarah Phillips, What Comes Next in Yemen: Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building, Yemen: On the Brink 1, 11, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes1.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). 51 Harris, 5. 52 Phillips, 11. 53 Clark, 286-87. 54 Clark, 285-86. 55 al-Zawahiri quoted in Phillips, 4. 56 Juneau, 142-43. 57 Juneau, 147. 58 Harris, 9. 59 Juneau, 149. 60 Harris, 11. 49
History and Social Science, R. Chiou
The Effects of Sleep Deprivation: Analyzing Cognitive, Motor, and Psychosocial Impairments Resulting from Reduced Sleep Richard Chiou Sleep is very important to the health and well-being of an individual. Prior research has demonstrated a positive correlation exists between amount of sleep, learning, and memory function. However, many people sleep for less than the recommended amount due to various reasons. For example, due to multiple factors such as increased amounts of homework, more social and extracurricular activities, part-time jobs, and longer duration of time spent on the internet gaming and socializing, adolescents often stay up later, significantly shortening their sleeping time. For adults, longer working hours, late-night parties, or disruptive babies are all factors that can result in less sleep. Regardless of the cause, any form of sleep deprivation can negatively affect many people of any age. Fatigue resulting from just one night of sleep loss can have multiple detrimental effects. For example, it is estimated that 16 to 60 percent of all road accidents are due to fatigue from sleep restriction, costing around $50 billion of damage in the United States alone (Feyer et al, 2000). Prolonged sleep deprivation can also lead to long-term negative repercussions on the well-being of an individual. Studies have shown that sleep problems can lead to learning difficulties and compromised neurobehavioral functioning (NBF) by affecting the executive control of the prefrontal cortex (Sadeh et al, 2003). A study by Wolfson and Carkasdon found that high school students who were struggling in school went to bed an average of 40 minutes later than students with better grades. The same study also observed that decreased sleep in teenagers can lead to increased depression and less control over their emotions (Fredriksen et al, 2004). Another study demonstrated that sleep restriction for one week can temporarily reduce insulin sensitivity in healthy men (Buxton et al, 2010). Finally, Finnish researchers have also suggested that decreased amounts of sleep may ultimately shorten one’s lifespan (Hublin et al, 2007). To summarize, sleep deprivation can have a profound effect on performance in school and at work, social interaction, mood, and health. Thus, it is important to learn the exact importance of enough sleep time and the risks associated with sleep deprivation. The following articles detail sleep restriction experiments performed on school students and adults, revealing an astounding amount of negative effects that result from sleep deprivation: for example, diminished NBF, worse grades, de50
creased self-esteem, increased depression, and longer reaction times. The Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Effects of Sleep Loss on School Children Though many studies have documented how sleep deprivation results in reduced neurobehavioral functioning (NBF) in adults, there have been very few experiments involving children. The few that have been performed on younger participants came to conflicting conclusions (Sadeh et. al, 2003). Thus, Avi Sadeh, Reut Gruber, and Amiram Raviv conducted an experiment assessing the effects of sleep restriction on the NBF of elementary school children. They designed their experiment to test three hypotheses: that most children would adjust their sleep time if asked to, that sleep extension would lead to worsened sleep quality (i.e. more night awakenings) than sleep restriction, and that sleep restriction would result in more reported fatigue and worsened NBF than sleep extension. A total of 39 boys and 38 girls from fourth and sixth grade, all healthy, participated in the experiment. For two days, the children were allowed to sleep normally. Afterwards, they were randomly divided into two groups. Over the following three days, the first group was asked to sleep 1 hour earlier and the other was asked to sleep 1 hour later than their normal bedtime. The researchers measured the effects of sleep extension and restriction in three ways. First, the children wore actigraphs around their wrists during each night of sleep (an actigraph is a wristwatch-like device that uses a piezo-electric beam to detect movement). The actigraphs recorded the following information: sleep length, the number and duration of night awakenings, and the amount of quiet sleep (motionless sleep). The actigraph data was supplemented by daily sleepwake diaries, in which the participants reported the following: lights-off time and the time they woke up, the number of times they woke up during their sleep, the quality of the past night’s sleep on a 4-point scale, the ease with which they fell asleep on a 4-point scale, and their perceived fatigue in the evening and morning (both on a 3-point scale). Thirdly, the children completed a series of tests designed to test their NBF twice — once after the first two nights of normal sleep and once after being subjected to three days of additional or decreased sleep.
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Sadeh and his colleagues’ data first revealed that on average, the sixth-grade subjects went to sleep later and got less sleep than the fourth-grade participants. The diaries also revealed that the children with less amount of sleep reported significantly higher fatigue levels in the evening. Ultimately, all three of their hypotheses were supported. Not only were the children easily able to extend or restrict their sleep period on demand, but there also existed a negative correlation between hours of sleep and the number of night awakenings. Finally, the sleep-extension group achieved higher scores on the researchers’ tests than their peers, which indicated a positive correlation between length of sleep and performance (Sadeh et. al, 2003). One important finding from the first study was the negative correlation between length of sleep and age. This finding was further explored in a longitudinal, cross-sectional study by Katia Fredriksen, Jean Rhodes, Ranjini Reddy, and Niobe Way that followed 2259 middle school students in Illinois from 1995 to 1997. The researchers hypothesized that as students progressed from sixth to eighth grade, there would be a notable decline in the amount of sleep. Furthermore, they believed that insufficient sleep would negatively affect both academic performance and psychosocial variables such as self-esteem. The researchers also predicted that boys would obtain more sleep than girls, namely because the latter spent more time grooming in the morning. Finally, they anticipated that students of lower socioeconomic status would get less sleep because of increased responsibilities (i.e. jobs and chores) and the crowded, noisier neighborhoods in which they live in. (The researchers assumed that those with eligibility to receive free or reducedprice lunches were of low-income status, which encompassed approximately 23 percent of the participants.) The data for this study was provided solely through weekly surveys that were administered to the students by their homeroom teachers. Each survey asked how much sleep the student on average received per night and how well their recent grades were. These surveys also included a shortened version of the Children’s Depressive Inventory, consisting of 16 questions that measured the cognitive, affective, and behavioral symptoms of depression, and the global self-esteem subscale of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire, consisting of eight items that assess overall perceptions of self-worth. Although the data did not demonstrate lower socioeconomic status led to less sleep, it clearly indicated declines in sleep, self-esteem, and grades over time. Additionally, it was found that girls reported more sleep than boys at the start of sixth grade but experienced a sharper decline in hours of sleep than boys. In contrast, boys initially reported higher self-esteem than girls, but reported a sharper decline over time than girls; furthermore, their grades were on average worse than the girls’. Finally, the results revealed a distinct negative correlation between sleep
and depression; the more sleep a student got, the fewer depressive symptoms he or she reported. Thus, the researchers’ first three hypotheses were supported (Fredriksen et al, 2004). Cognitive and Motor Impairments in Adults due to Sleep Deprivation Although it is widely acknowledged that adults require far less sleep than children and teenagers, research has indicated that if they do not sleep enough for even one days, visible impairments can be noticed. A.M. Williamson and Anne-Marie Feyer wanted to specifically know at what level of sleep fatigue does cognitive and motor performance in adults become seriously impaired. Because the effects of alcohol on performance are well-documented, many countries have set limits for alcohol levels while driving; thus, the researchers used alcohol as the baseline comparison for performance deficits caused by the fatigue of sleep deprivation. Because the researchers already knew that enough sleep deprivation would result in impairment similar to that caused by intoxication, no hypothesis was conjectured at the start of the study. The participants of their experiment were 37 males and 2 females whose jobs related to long-distance driving (they worked at either a large road transport company or the transport corps of the Australian army). The researchers used a cross-over and within-subject design, which meant that the subjects were subjected to the effects of both alcohol consumption and sleep deprivation. On the afternoon before testing began, subjects spent about 4 hours doing three practice sessions for eight tests: a passive vigilance test with very low cognitive demand, a simple reaction time test, a low level hand-eye coordination task, a divided attention task combining the previous two tests, a perceptual coding test, a spatial memory test involving moderate complex cognitive demands, a memory and search test, and a grammatical reasoning test. Testing began at 8:00 the next morning, approximately 2 hours after the participants woke up. The subjects were divided into two groups; the first group was subject to the effects of inebriation first, while the second group was sleep-deprived first. The alcohol consumption group took a baseline performance test before being subjected to hourly doses of alcohol designed to increase their BACs by 0.025%. Thirty minutes after each dose, the researchers assess their cognition and motor function with the same eight tests. The sleep deprivation group was also subject to a baseline performance test and hourly tests for the first 5 hours; then they were tested every other hour over the next 20 hours (meaning that they were awake for 26 hours at the time of the final test). After a week of recovery time, the subjects were then exposed to the other condition so that the researchers could draw individual comparisons. The results revealed a negative correlation between the alcohol level and the performances on most of the tests. At
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a BAC of 0.05%, response speed and accuracy significantly decreased for all the tests except for the grammatical reasoning and memory and search tests. At a BAC of 0.1%, performance (especially accuracy) was even worse â€” the number of misses in the reaction time test was nearly seven times poorer than a test at a BAC of 0. However, the performances on the grammatical reasoning and memory and search test still only deteriorated by approximately 10%, indicating that alcohol potentially exerts different effects on different functions. On the other hand, the performance of the sleep deprivation group worsened over time. At around 20 hours of wakefulness, reaction speed had decreased by 57% for the Mackworth test, 9% for reaction time, 27% for the dual task, and 15% for symbol digit tests. Accuracy was also impaired; the number of missed signals also increased by 187% for the reaction time test and the number of false alarms tripled for the vigilance test. However, the grammatical reasoning and memory and search tasks showed only decreases of 5 to 10 percent, results that were similar to those of the alcohol consumption group. Thus, the researchers concluded that performance at around 17 or 18 hours of wakefulness was equivalent to that for a BAC of 0.05% and noted that a person awake for more than 16 hours could pose a danger to other drivers. The researchers also noted that their experiment lasted only one day; many people in society often subject themselves to more than eighteen hours of wakefulness over extended periods of time, which poses a clear danger on the road. Thus, Williamson and Feyer concluded that standards for fatigue from sleep deprivation similar to those for alcohol should be implemented. Such rules would prevent people who have been awake for more than 18 hours from doing risky activities such as driving, piloting aircraft, and operating machinery (Williamson and Feyer, 2000). An Alternative View on the Cognitive Effects of Sleep Deprivation Though the past three articles have demonstrated the negative effects of sleep deprivation on many aspects of an individual, the last article discussed how sleep deprivation was found to have a significantly smaller effect on tasks involving than those involving complex cognitive demands than those involving hand-eye coordination and/or reaction speed. In 1998, Horne and his colleagues had shown that sleep loss affects divergent cognitive tasks requiring creative thinking far worse than more convergent tasks with similar information processing strategies. Thus, J.R. Jennings, T.H. Monk, and M. W. van der Molen wanted to analyze two hypotheses. The first speculated that sleep deprivation alters all processes of supervisory attention, while the second conjectured that only one of the following was affected: the ability to suppress an action, the efficiency of switching between different tasks, or the abil-
ity to adopt a strategic preparatory set. Their experimental design was similar to that of Williamson and Feyerâ€™s; ten healthy men and ten women with an average age of 22 were first trained to perform an experimental task accurately with median reaction times less than 600 milliseconds (ms). The task tested the ability to press the * or / key as soon as possible with their left or right index fingers, respectively, corresponding to the appearance of a 7-cm white arrow that pointed at a 30 degree angle to the right or left. In 35 percent of the trials, the arrow was black, signaling the subjects to withhold their response. On each trial, subjects were cued to provide a compatible or incompatible response (e.g. if a white arrow pointing left appeared, the compatible response would be to press the * key, while the incompatible response would be to press the / key). In half of the trials, the cue was provided 50 ms prior to the appearance of the arrow; in the other half, the cue was provided 500 ms prior. A coin flip was used to randomly determine the order for the two sleep conditions for each participant. The first condition, labeled normal sleep, consisted of a 12-hour performance session after a night of regular sleep. The other condition, titled sleep deprivation, consisted of a 12-hour performance session after an entire night of no sleep. The performance session consisted of eight 90-minute blocks, each containing 150 trials per set; $0.05 was awarded for the correct feedback in order to get participants to be active. Each participant was given one week to recover between the two conditions. It was found that sleep loss failed to influence the ability to suppress an action, as there was not an increased amount of errors on no-go trials (i.e. with black arrows). Similarly, sleep deprivation failed to disrupt the ability to switch between switch between different tasks. However, sleep deprivation slowed reaction time and affected accuracy if the participant was predisposed towards a compatible or incompatible response. The data collected showed that incompatible-biased participants performed more accurately on incompatible than on compatible trials after normal sleep but not after sleep deprivation. Thus, the researchersâ€™ first hypothesis was refuted, while the second was supported (Jennings et al, 2003). Analysis and Conclusion The four aforementioned articles show the effects of sleep deprivation on emotions, academic performance, and cognition and motor performance. The literature, which consisted of longitudinal and within-subject experiments, provides ample evidence that demonstrates how even slight sleep restriction can dramatically worsen the emotional perception or performance of an individual the following day. However, the studies do have their shortcomings that may call into question the validity of their conclusions. Thus, there exist many techniques or modifications to their experiments that could result
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in improved data. Because Sadeh and his colleagues used three distinct methods (including technologically advanced actigraphs) to measure the NBF and cognitive performances of the participants, the data can definitely be considered reliable. However, the experiment was not longitudinal, lasting for only six days. Because only one test was taken after being subjected to sleep restriction or extension, continuing the experiment for another week and having the children complete more tests could better reflect the performance of the children. On the other hand, the experiment was also not a within-subject design, which meant that the researchers had to compare the performances of different children in order to arrive at their conclusions. Thus, if the participants that were more susceptible (or less susceptible) to sleep restriction, then the data may not truly reflect the actual differences between having sleep extended or reduced for one student. If the children were subject to both sleep restriction and extension (with one week between conditions to allow for recovery), then the researchers might be able to make more meaningful comparisons. In contrast, the biggest strength of Frederiksen and her partners’ study is its large sample size and frequent surveys over a long period of time, which provided sufficient evidence to show the negative correlation between age and amount of sleep, academic performance, self-esteem, and happiness. However, the study’s primary shortcoming is that all of its data is self-reported by students, which can lead to inaccurately perceived grades. One way to verify the academic performance is by examining their transcripts, but it would be difficult to obtain the consent necessary for those forms. Another potential source of error in the experiment is whether or not the increased depression or decreased self-esteem was actually caused by sleep deprivation. When the students answered the surveys, it was possible that instead of a bad night of sleep, recent events such as a failing grade on a major test or break-up could have temporarily depressed the mood and perceptions of the subjects. Although a case study could potentially allow the researchers to analyze a few students in consideration to recent events, the study would then suffer from a reduced amount of subject information. The results of Williamson and Feyer’s, as well as those of Jenning and his colleagues’ experiments, are perhaps the most sound. Since each participant was subjected to the experimental (e.g. sleep deprivation) and base (e.g. alcohol consumption) conditions, the researchers could obtain accurate comparisons on an individual basis between the two groups. Furthermore, Williamson and Feyer’s results were presented in comparison to the effects of alcohol intoxication, which have been wellresearched and documented. Finally, the large number of tests in both cases also allowed for analysis of many cognitive functions such as reaction time, hand-eye coordination, and
memory recall. The experiments, however, only reflected one (really long) day of sleep deprivation. By running the experiments over a longer period of time, the researchers could have studied whether the cognitive impairment produced by sleep restriction is compounded over time. In addition to decreasing motor performance and selfreported happiness, sleep deprivation can also cause other detrimental effects that were not discussed in this literature. One prominent example is the effect of sleep loss on an individual’s health, which was briefly discussed in the background (reduced insulin sensitivity and a possibly shortened life span). However, an experiment analyzing the health effects of an individual would be difficult to study, since it would likely have to take place over a long period of time in order to yield meaningful results. Nevertheless, such an article could address the long-term detriments of sleep deprivation on one’s well-being. Finally, based on the findings from the literature, a possible further research question could focus on whether certain ages can reduce or augment the effects of sleep deprivation. An experiment with older subjects, the only age group not analyzed by any of the articles, would fill a gap in the current literature, though such an experiment may provoke health concerns by the IRB. In conclusion, the articles all share a similar theme: reduced sleep can lead to noticeable deficits in cognitive and motor performance. Even one hour of less sleep, can have a dramatic difference on one’s well-being, no matter how old the individual is. Children who get more sleep have reported increased happiness and better grades; the opposite is true for those who get less sleep. Sleep remains just as important for adults. Staying awake for too long can lead to significant cognitive and motor impairments, conditions that are similar to being intoxicated. Combating sleep deprivation and allowing for more hours of sleep should thus be an important goal for those who seek to improve their performace in school and at work, as well as their social lives.
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Managing the Rare Earth Metal Trade: Limiting the Distressing Effects of China’s Monopoly in the International Community Nikhil Parthasarathy Trading of natural resources is becoming an important part of world markets, requiring increased attention from policy makers in the international community. A current case-study through which this idea can be explored is the topic of China’s restrictions on rare earth metal exports. Rare earth metals are currently used in almost all aspects of modern technology, ranging from national defense to commercial electronics. Over time, China has developed a virtual monopoly on these minerals, which has stirred questions of how to best manage an international resource monopoly and regulate international trade. Recently, fear in countries like the U.S. and Japan has risen as China has exploited its monopoly and the lenient enforcement of WTO law, to restrict rare earth exports in the hopes of improving resource sustainability and satisfying domestic concerns. To approach resolving this issue, both domestic and international reforms must be considered, specifically focusing on rare earth production and recycling development in countries like the U.S. and Japan, the use of production rather than export quotas in China, and modification of the WTO’s review and dispute settlement processes. History and Applications of Rare Earths Rare earth elements (REEs) refer to a group of seventeen elements in the Periodic Table with unique propertiesnamely, scandium, yttrium, and the 15 elements of the lanthanide series.1 The discovery of REEs dates back to the end of the eighteenth century. The elements
themselves are not rare in abundance, but the challenge has been finding them in concentrated ore deposits that can be economically mined. Recently, the use of these elements in modern industries has increased dramatically with the improvement of processes for extraction and refinement of these elements from ore, to oxides, and finally to metals and alloys.2 The rare earth metal industry has developed for over a century; however, the major producers have changed over time. As seen in the following graph made by the U.S. Geological Survey and Center for Strategic and International Studies, a market that was once dominated by the U.S. in the midtwentieth century is now controlled almost exclusively by China.3 Beginning in the 1980s, China started investing in the production of rare earth metals. Because of its strategic advantage in having massive mineral reserves, the Chinese implemented programs such as Program 863 to narrow technological gaps with the rest of the world and fully utilize these resources.4 After years of research and production, China now maintains a monopoly on both the rare earth metal market and many subsidiary industries like the magnet industry.5 From Fig.1, it can be seen that not only has China taken over production of rare earth metals, but total production has also increased dramatically over the last ten years. This increase in production has been accompanied accordingly by an increase in the number of applications for these metals. Specialist in Asian Studies, Richard
Figure 1: Graph showing the amount of production of REEs over time, color coded by geographic location. China now produces 97% of the world’s supply of REEs.
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Stone, states that after researching REEs in detail and creating metals and alloys, the Chinese really showed the world how important the resources really are. He goes on to describe that now, neodymium magnets are used in countless electronic devices, yttrium is used in lasers and superconductors, and elements like samarium are essential for military/defense technology.6 Already, it seems rare earth metals have become a near necessity in the modern world, and as further research is conducted in the twenty-first century, the desire for these elements will undoubtedly grow. Fear of China’s Monopoly Rare earth metals are taking even larger roles in the technological sphere, making the development of a stable international rare earth market a crucial objective. In the case of rare earth metals, the problem lies in the fact that China’s monopoly has been taken to an extreme, as they produce ninety-seven percent of the global supply (seen in Fig.1). In addition, fear among countries like the U.S. and Japan has risen due to the fact that China has given indications that they will not hesitate to restrict rare earth metal exports at any time. This idea can be seen in a recent incident surrounding the detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain. An article in the Japan Times said that while rare earth exports are now back on track, Japanese traders experienced much stress when China suspended shipments after a fisherman was arrested near the disputed isles.7 China denied the allegations; however, according to the article, Japanese still believe much must be done to reduce bilateral tension. In addition, recent information about China’s 2011 plans says that they will slash export quotas by around thirty-five percent, even after the restrictions at the end of 2010.8 The Chinese ministry is said to be “evaluating domestic output and demand, as well as global requirements” in making decisions, yet tensions are rising with both Japan and the U.S. because of their large dependence on China’s exports.9 Adding to the collective international fear, South Korea also is feeling extreme pressure. Looking through the perspective of the Korea Times, Koreans are worried that similar measures that were taken by China in the Japan situation could be taken against their own country, ultimately causing severe problems.10 South Korea is now the top producer in items such as LCD TVs that require rare earth metals to function. While it hopes to maintain reserves of rare earth metals, South Korea believes that it is even more vulnerable to Chinese restrictions than countries like Japan.11 Quantifying the relative extent to which countries like South (or Republic of) Korea, Japan, and the U.S. would suffer from increased export cuts requires indepth risk analysis; however, looking at the overall situation, it is clear that these countries still have much to fear in a world where the demand for rare earth materials is so high.
China’s Reasons for Increasing Export Restrictions From an international perspective, it is evident that export restrictions do not bode well for many countries, but what are the reasons behind these decisions by the Chinese government? The answer primarily comes from two main ideas: 1) simple domestic need and 2) environment conservation or sustainability. One of the basic motivations behind China’s recent actions is the desire to protect resources for domestic needs. Noted in a book about contemporary Chinese economic developments by Ian Jeffries, a professor of economics, “Chinese industry now consumes about two-thirds of rare-earth production… Analysts expect domestic demand to lap up all of China’s output within a few years”.12 Given this prediction, it does not seem unusual that China would wish to protect its domestic industries before supplying the international community; however, it does bring up a question of how to balance the domestic and international markets such that all countries are satisfied. A larger, yet more controversial reason with which China has supported its decisions is the desire to reduce environmental damage caused by the REE industry and implement more sustainable practices. Highlighted by political scientist Neil Carter and professor of environmental sociology Arthur P.J. Mol, the Chinese goal to become an “environmental state” has been driven by a need to fix certain issues with the initial environmental regulatory regime, including incompetence of regulators and confrontation between government and industry.13 In addition, they go on to argue that China’s “increased orientation to the outside world and improved international relations” has stimulated more environmental reforms.14 Specifically, in the case of the mineral and rare earth industry, it has been said that excessive mining in the southern provinces has caused “severe” environmental damage.15 The ministry also said that the “sustainability” of the industry must be reviewed.16 Still, the question of whether China is truly revising their environmental regulation and cutting exports legally is one that is in great debate and will be reviewed in the following sections. WTO and Its Role in Trade Regulations and Environmental Law To analyze the merits and legality of China’s decisions on export restrictions, one must root this evaluation in the WTO statutes and regulations. The WTO is the prime world organization that deals with coordinating trading in the international community and managing related issues.17 As a result, the WTO is one of the only organizations given the authority needed to manage matters such as the rare earth metal trade. The first major point to mention is the idea of being a member of the WTO and what that means for countries that are admitted. Members of the WTO are required to abide by its laws and are subject to the review processes of the
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organization. Recently, China received membership with the WTO, and as a result of this accession, China agreed to uphold relatively strict regulations in the WTO Agreement and the Protocol: “accession encompasses not only commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and market access…but also a set of obligations that aim to promote transparency, predictability, and fairness in the implementation of WTO obligations”.18 Before addressing the issue of transparency and review, the WTO laws on export restrictions must be studied. While the WTO regulation of export restrictions is limited, the quantitative restrictions aspect of Article 11 of the GATT 1994 completely prohibits all Members from using quantitative restrictions such as export quotas, with the exception of 1) temporary restrictions to relieve critical shortages of essential products or 2) prohibitions necessary to apply standards or regulations.19 In these statements, there is much ambiguity and room for interpretation, both of which China has seemingly exploited by cutting huge amounts of exports in the name of general environmentalism. Even if WTO regulations on export restrictions do not mention specific information on the relation between trade and environmental issues, this interface is still one that has been explored in detail. Specific to this situation, GATT Article XX and its formulation provides instances of exceptions given to WTO members to GATT rules with respect to environmental issues.20 In fact, as a result of cases such as the U.S.-Shrimp case, Article XX (g) has been supported numerous times by the WTO’s Appellate Body, stating that Members will be allowed exceptions when necessary for conservation of “exhaustible natural resources”.21 However, to gain an exception it is said that member states (?) must obtain verification that the measure is “necessary”. The process for this determination is one that involves balancing many factors, but has been criticized greatly by scholars for a lack of specific definition.22 One of the big questions still surrounding the WTO is how well its process of reviewing events and Members actually works. With accession to the WTO, China needed to agree to have transparency by establishing practices that could be documented clearly.23 In addition, it would be subject to the WTO’s transitional review mechanism (TRM), or the mechanism by which the WTO tries to ensure compliance by the Members to their obligations. China agreed to be reviewed annually, and the data submitted in these reviews center around import and export statistics, tariffs, and other trading practices.24 In addition, if countries wish to protest the actions of WTO Members, there is a well-defined dispute settlement process formulated in the Uruguay Round.25 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) runs the process now and its efficacy will be studied in following sections. After detailing the regulations and procedures of the
WTO, China’s restrictions can be evaluated on a legal basis. Looking at the previously mentioned exceptions about export restrictions in the WTO agreements, China does seem to have certain grounds for its actions based on the necessity to protect critical resources that are in shortage. China is using up a large portion of rare earth metals domestically, and there is danger of a scarcity of resources. While this fact may provide some explanation for the recent restrictions, most issues have been taken up with China involving the supposed initiative to protect the environment. According to scholars writing recently in 2007, for the most part, any environmental projects that were attempted in the past have not really materialized.26 Further suspicions have arisen after incidents like the aforementioned temporary embargo against Japan. Such a restriction has been criticized greatly as it does not seem to have any legal support and is a clear violation of international law.27 In addition, as stated in a full review done by the U.S. on China’s compliance to WTO laws, China has simply “implemented new barriers to trade” through other methods, “to compensate for those it is removing”.28 If the Chinese government has never followed through on its promises to protect their environment, and has even restricted exports as a result of diplomatic disputes, then the question is: Why believe China now? How to Handle the Rare Earth Crisis Legal reform in matters such as international trade is a complicated process that may take time to complete; however, a lack of rare earth metals for countries like the U.S., Japan, or South Korea is an issue that needs almost immediate resolution. This urgency is mainly the result of the fact that rare earth metals are used in key military and defense systems and are required for functionality in most of these devices.29 Consequently, the first step towards resolving these issues must be the development of domestic rare earth programs in other countries like the U.S. According to an extensive report published by the USGS, the U.S. already controls the Mountain Pass site in California that was used to mine rare earth ore for a large part of the twentieth century.30 Because the mine contains important metals like Neodymium and Lanthanum, restarting the U.S.’s domestic program will at least satisfy some of the most important applications for the metals. In fact, according to Molycorp, the largest rare earth company in the U.S., there is a plan to restart mining by 2012 at the Mountain Pass mine.31 An extremely interesting area that also should be explored is the recycling of rare earths. Companies such as Hitachi in Japan have now begun developing practices to mine discarded products and harvest the still valuable rare earth metals.32 Hitachi hopes to use recycling to meet up to 10% of total rare earth needs by 2013. This process of recycling can and should be explored by countries that have the capability to do so. If enough effort is placed into building up domestic REE markets
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in other countries, the world may be able to put some pressure on the Chinese market in the next few years and satisfy their most urgent needs. China may still argue that it needs to protect the environment; however, if countries are able to stimulate enough growth in domestic REE development, China’s environmental issues would be more aptly addressed if production quotas were mandated over export quotas. Limiting exports of rare earth metals leads to an imbalance between the domestic and international markets. According to a recent news article, world prices for metals are rising way higher than domestic prices in China.33 In addition, when focusing on industries that rely heavily on rare earth metals, it is easy to see how domestic firms in China can possibly enjoy an extreme advantage over international firms. These ideas may or may not lie behind motives for the export restrictions, but a shift from export quotas to production quotas can help stabilize the domestic and international markets. In addition, as long as the rest of the world is able to produce enough rare earth metals and reduce foreign dependence, China will still be able to achieve environmental sustainability while maintaining required levels of global rare earth production. However, the final steps to truly resolving the current rare earth metal crisis must go back to the WTO and its regulation. Although the TRM and WTO review processes mandated transparency in China’s trading practices, the U.S. Economic and Security Commission has still found that gaps between commitment and current practices in China includes the “lack of transparency in adopting and applying regulations”.34 On the other hand, according to China’s chief negotiator at the WTO, accession to the WTO is part of China’s plant to “push forward economic reform…so that China can participate fully in the economic globalization”.35 China’s Ministry of Commerce has also rejected all allegations made by the U.S. and supported “green protectionism” as a completely legal action.36 Such opposing views are being expressed in the international community, and yet no resolution has been found. The problem most likely does not lie in the legislation processes of the WTO. Therefore, the main issue must lie in its review and maintenance of compliance. Additionally, even when the international community hopes to appeal, there are more issues with the dispute settlement process. More than 300 complaints have been filed with the WTO, but one analysis done of the track record of the dispute settlement system has shown its effectiveness to have declined in recent years.37 (Fig. 2) The number of resolved cases has declined greatly
Figure 2: Bar graph describing the status of complaints made to the WTO over time. Each complaint is marked as resolved, ongoing, pending, or not known.
in recent years, and in 2003, virtually all cases were either identified as pending or ongoing. There are many possible explanations for this observation, but a few problems can be highlighted. First, the length of time for verdicts to be reached should be cut down, as the issues that are being debated can have rapid and major consequences. One area between composition and establishment of the dispute settlement panel has been marked as a period when considerable time can be saved.38 Another proposed change that warrants attention is a reform of the process for selecting panelists to review cases. As of now, the WTO Secretariat nominates panelists; however, the parties involved in the dispute are allowed to oppose nominations. Taking advantage of this right, countries have been wasting time disputing nominations “not for compelling reasons”, but rather for concerns such as nationality.39 Ultimately, issues such as these have led to the WTO remaining a relatively ineffective body when demanding issues need to be resolved. Some may argue that the Chinese restrictions are within legal bounds and that China has been making strides in the right direction. In fact, the 2003 Chinese government’s official policy on mineral resources seems to have taken into account a lot of issues that countries have brought up with the WTO, like international trade cooperation.40 Nevertheless, China is still experiencing problems with environmentalism and domestic need, and the rest of the world still fears resource starvation. Appeasing both China’s domestic environmental concerns and the fears of the international community will require changes in the domestic and international spheres. Shortterm problems may be temporarily fixed with the development of rare earth production and recycling in other countries, but in the long run, serious judicial reform such as altering the review and dispute settlement processes of the WTO must come to fruition. 57
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Notes 1 Daniel J. Cordier, "Rare Earths Statistics and Information," USGS Minerals Information, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ commodity/rare_earths/#contacts (accessed December 29, 2010). 2 Cindy Hurst, China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry: What Can the West Learn?,3-5, www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ rareearth.pdf (accessed December 31, 2010). 3 Reed Livergood, Rare Earth Elements: A Wrench in the Supply Chain?, DIIG Current Issues 22,1,http://csis.org/publication/diigcurrent-issues-no-22-rare-earth-elements (accessed January 2, 2011).
(accessed January 7, 2011). 21 World Trade Organization, “WTO rules and environmental policies: GATT exceptions,” World Trade Organization: Trade Topics, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (accessed January 7, 2011). 22 Anupam Goyal, The WTO and International Environmental Law : Towards Conciliation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 139-140 23 Wang, 59
4 Hurst, 6
24 Wang, 60-61
5 Hurst, 13
25 Wang, 488-89
6 Richard Stone, “As China’s Rare Earth R&D Becomes Ever More Rarefied, Others Tremble,” Science 325, no. 5946 (September 2009): 1336-1337, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/ summary/325/5946/1336 (accessed October 21, 2010).
26 Carter and Mol, 167
7 Japan Times (Tokyo), “China’s rare earth exports back on track,” September 30, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ nn20100930a1.html (accessed November 2, 2010). 8 Helen Sun, Richard Dobson, and Patrick McKiernan, “China Cuts Export Quotas for Rare Earths by 35%,” Bloomberg News, December 28, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-28/china-cutsfirst-round-rare-earth-export-quotas-by-11-correct-.html (accessed January 6, 2011). 9 Sun, Dobson, and McKiernan
27 Paul Krugman, “Rare and Foolish,” New York Times, October 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/ opinion/18krugman.html (accessed November 2, 2010). 28 China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), iii, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/ transcripts/04_02_05.pdf (accessed October 7, 2010). 29 Michael Richardson, “China corners vital market,” Japan Times (Tokyo), September 9, 2010, http://search.japantimes. co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100909mr.html (accessed November 2, 2010).
10 Kim Tae-gyu, “Korea more vulnerable to China threats than Japan,” Korea Times (Seoul), September 27, 2010, http://www.koreatimes. co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/09/123_73580.html (accessed November 2, 2010).
30 Keith R. Long et al., The Principal Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States—A Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective, Scientific Investigations Report 2010, 18, http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2010/5220/ (accessed January 7, 2011).
31 Long, 36
12 Ian Jeffries, “The ‘open door’ policy,” in Economic Developments in Contemporary China: A Guide (Guides to Economic and Political Developments in Asia) (London: Routledge, 2007), 424, http://books.google.com/books?id=xPSE VBzbFHMC&pg=PA218&dq=Economic+Developments+in+C ontemporary+China:+A+Guide+London&hl=en&ei=RmatTID 5FIH-ngeUq72TBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum =5&ved=0CEcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=rare-earth&f=false (accessed October 7, 2010).
32 Jason Clenfield, Mariko Yasu, and Stuart Briggs, “Rare Earths from Japan’s Junk Pile,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 6, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ content/11_03/b4211009976168.htm (accessed January 9, 2011).
13 Neil Carter and Arthur P. J. Mol, Environmental Governance in China (London: Routledge, 2007), 136. 14 Carter and Mol, 136 15 Sun, Dobson, and McKiernan 16 Sun, Dobson, and McKiernan 17 Guiguo Wang, The Law of the WTO: China and the Future of Free Trade (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005), 33 18 Wang, 58 19 Wang, 234-35 20 World Trade Organization, “WTO rules and environmental policies: GATT exceptions,” World Trade Organization: Trade Topics, http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm
33 Doug Palmer, “U.S. threatens WTO action on China rare earth curbs,” Reuters, December 30, 2010, http:// antidumping.vn/news/2010-12-31/us-threatens-wto-actionchina-rare-earth-curbs (accessed January 7, 2011). 34 China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), iii, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/ transcripts/04_02_05.pdf (accessed October 7, 2010). 35 Yongjin Zhang, “Reconsidering the Economic Internationalization of China: implications of the WTO membership,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 (November 2003): 711, http://puffin.harker.org:2092/src/ detail?vid=8&hid=9& sid=552adedd-4558-43fe-b03c-cfb8 b4421703%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9c3JjLWx pdmU%3d#db=aph&AN=11184937 (accessed October 21, 2010). 36 People’s Daily Online, “China rejects double standards on clean energy,” People’s Daily (Beijing), October 21, 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com cn/90001/90780/91421/7173541.html (accessed November 2, 2010).
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37 Keisuke Iida, “Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 10, no. 2 (2004): 212-14, www.library.eiu.edu/ ersvdocs/4295.pdf (accessed January 9, 2011). 38 Dencho Georgiev and Kim van der Borght, “Dispute Settlement System in the WTO: Developing Country Participation and Possible Reform,” in Reform and development of the WTO dispute settlement system (Cameron May, 2006), 187, http://books.google. com/books?id=RbuX3ydGE1AC&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq =WTO+dispute+settlement+system+time+reform&source=bl& ots=xdKXtqh0jJ&sig=Ta9zsUlyJGkWKuW3FJqXObGFu3g&hl=en&ei=bsAbTbfBAYuCsQP8-rW3Cg&sa=X&oi=book_result&c t=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v (accessed January 7, 2011). 39 Georgiev and Borght, 188 40 Chinese Government, China’s Policy on Mineral Resources ( 2 0 0 3 ) , h t t p : / / w w w. g o v. c n / e n g l i s h / o ff i c i a l / 2 0 0 5 - 0 7 / 2 8 content_17963.htm (accessed November 1, 2010).
Credits COVER PHOTOGRAPH: Laura Yao C LETTER PHOTOGRAPH: Michelle Lo
ENGLISH DEPARTMENT Works Cited in “Russia as Stage and Russians as Players: Performance as Motif and Metaphor in Anna Karenina” Buckler, Julie A. “Reading Anna: Opera, Tragedy, Melodrama, Farce.” Approaches to Teaching Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. Ed. Liza Knapp and Amy Mandelker. New York: MLA, 2003. 131-36. Print. Butler, Judith. “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.” Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519-31. JSTOR. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3207893>. Figes, Orlando. Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia. New York: Metropolitan-Holt, 2002. Print. Hamilton, Iain. “Anna Karenina: An Operatic Version.” Musical Times 122.1659 (1981): 295-97. JSTOR. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http:// www.jstor.org/stable/961890>. Justman, Stewart. “Stiva’s Idiotic Grin.” Philosophy and Literature 33.2 (2009): 427-34. Project MUSE. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http:// puffin.harker.org:2083/journals/philosophy_and_literature/v033/33.2.justman.html>. Lovell, Stephen. “Finitude at the Fin de Siecle: Il’ia Mechnikov and Lev Tolstoy on Death and Life.” Russian Review 63.2 (2004): 296-316. JSTOR. Web. 22 Mar. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664086>. Shakespeare, William. As You Like It. Ed. Samuel Thurber, Jr. and Louise Wetherbee. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1922. Google Books. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://books.google.com/books?id=VhMlAAAAMAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q=&f=false>. Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhnosky. Delux ed. 2000. New York: Penguin, 2002. Print. Wilshire, Bruce. “The Concept of the Paratheatrical.” Drama Review 34.4 (1990): 169-78. JSTOR. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://www. jstor.org/stable/1146050>.Yoon, Saera. “Communion or Camouflage: Food and Focal Locales in Anna Karenina.” Studies in Slavic Cultures 2 (2001): 135-50. Web. 28 Feb. 2010. <http://www.pitt.edu/~slavic/sisc/SISC2/yoon.pdf>. Works Cited in “Common Sense: An Artful Call to Arms” by Michelle Deng Paine, Thomas. Common Sense: Addressed to the Inhabitants of America, on the following Interesting Subjects: visz: I. On the Origin and Design of Government in General; with Concise Remarks on the English Constitution. II. Of Monarchy and Hereditary Succession. III. Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs. IV. Of the Present Ability of America; with some Miscel laneous Reflections. The Norton Anthology of American Literature. Ed. Nina Baym. Shorter 7th ed. Vol. 1. New York: Nor ton, 2008. 326-32. Print. Excerpt from The Writings of Thomas Paine (1894-96). N.p.: n.p., n.d. Ed. Nina Baym. Shorter 7th ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2008. 326-32. Print.
Credits Works Cited in “Feminism and its Limitations in Anna Karenina” by Andrew Zhou Blake, Elizabeth. “Toward a Happy Marriage: Transcending Gendered Social Roles in Anna Karenina.” Studies in Slavic Cultures 2 (2001): 93-110. Web. 15 Feb. 2010. <http://www.pitt.edu/~slavic///.pdf>. Greene, Gayle. “Women, Character, and Society in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina.” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 2.1 (1977): 106 25. JSTOR. Web. 4 Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org//3346113>. Gregg, Richard. “Psyche Betrayed: The Doll’s House of Leo Tolstoy.” Slavic and East European Journal 46.2 (2002): 269-82. JSTOR. Web. 15 Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org//>. Helfant, Ian M. “His to Stake, Hers to Lose: Women and the Male Gambling Culture of Nineteenth-Century Russia.” Russian Review 62.2 (2003): 223-42. JSTOR. Web. 4 Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org//>. Mandelker, Amy. Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1993. Print. The Theory and Interpretation of Narrative ser. Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. Deluxe ed. New York: Penguin, 2000. Print. SCIENCE DEPARTMENT Works Cited in “Entanglement and our (Imagined) Understanding of the Quantum World” by Tyler Koteskey Clegg, Brian. “The Strange World of Quantum Entanglement.” Interview by Paul Comstock and Paul Comstock. Calitreview.com. California Literary Review, 30 Mar. 2007. Web. Jan. 2011. <http://calitreview.com/>. Jarvis, Dave. “Quantum Entanglement.” DavidJarvis.ca. David Jarvis, 17 Jan. 2010. Web. Jan. 2011. <http://www.davidjarvis.ca// entanglement.shtml>. Li, Gengyun. “What is the electron spin?” ElectronSpin.org. Spin Publishing, 2003. Web. 2 Mar. 2011. <http://www.electronspin. org/>. Simmons, Andy. “Quantum Superposition and Schrödinger’s Cat.” Uts.edu. University of Technology Sydney, 20 May 2008. Web. Jan. 2011. <http://www-staff.it.uts.edu.au/~simmonds//.htm>. Yabalik, Cemal. “The double slit experiment and the collapse of the wavefunction.” Bilkent.edu. Bilkent University, May 2002. Web. Jan. 2010. <http://www.fen.bilkent.edu.tr/~yalabik//.html>. COMMUNICATION STUDIES DEPARTMENT Works Cited for “The Consequences of Religious Debate: Creating Inequalities and Undercutting Individual Identity by Aneesh Chona and Anuj Sharma Harrigan, Casey D., et al. “A DEFENSE OF SWITCH SIDE DEBATE.” Wake Forest University . Wake Forest University , 2008. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. <wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/.../harrigancd_05_2008.pdf>. Kézdy, Anikó, et al. “Religious doubts and mental health in adolescence and young adulthood: The association with religious atti tudes.” Journal of Adolescence (Apr. 2010): 1-9. U.S. National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. Miller, George A. “WordNet A lexical database for English .” Princeton WordNet. Princeton University , 27 Oct. 2010. Web. 12 Nov. 2010. <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=confront>. Luong, Minh A. “Forensics and College Admissions.” PBS. Yale University , 2002. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. <http://www.pbs.org/acciden talhero/parents/college.html>.
Credits Miller, Monica K., Julie A. Singer, and Alayna Jehle. “IdentIfIcatIon of cIrcumstances under whIch relIgIon affects each stage of the trIal Process.” Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice 4.1 (2008): 135-71. Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice . Web. 14 Nov. 2010. <www.apcj.org/documents/4_1_Miller_et_al.pdf>. Puffer, Keith A., et al. “RELIGIOUS DOUBT AND IDENTITY FORMATION: SALIENT PREDICTORS OF ADOLESCENT RELI GIOUS DOUBT.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 36.4 (2008): 270-284. EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier . Web. 12 Nov. 2010. Punyanunt-Carter, Narissra M., et al. “An Examination of Reliability and Validity of the Religious Communication Apprehension Scale.” Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 37.1 (2008): 1-16. EBSCOhost Communication & Mass Media Complete . Web. 12 Nov. 2010. Seul, Jeffrey R. “’Ours is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict*.” Journal of Peace Research 36.5 (1999 ): 553 69. Harvard Law Review . Web. 12 Nov. 2010. Soweid, Rema Adel Afifi, Marwan Khawaja, and Mylene Tewtel Salem. “Religious Identity and Smoking Behavior Among Adoles cents: Evidence From Entering Students at the American University of Beirut.” Health Communication 16.1 (2004): 47-62. U.S. National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. Stewart, Robert A., and K. David Roach. “Argumentativeness and the Theory of Reasoned Action.” Communication Quarterly 46.2 (1998): 177-95. EBSCOhost Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. - - -. “Argumentativeness^ Religious Orientation^ and Reactions to Argument Situations Involving Religious versus Nonreligious Issues.” Communication Quarterly 41.1 (1993): 26-39. EBSCOhost Communication & Mass Media Complete . Web. 12 Nov. 2010. HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT Works Cited in “Bushehr and the Bush-era India Deal: America’s Shifting Stances, the Need for a Stronger IAEA, and Civilian Nuclear Reactors in the Twenty-First Century” by Olivia Zhu Aima, Abhinav. “Understanding Nuclear Iran.” Common Dreams, November 23, 2004. http://www.commondreams.org//-32.htm (ac cessed November 1, 2010). Alexander, Yonah, and Milton Hoenig. The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Bajoria, Jayshree, and Esther Pan. “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org///_nuclear_deal. html (accessed January 3, 2011). Baylis, John, and Robert O’Neill, eds. Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World. Ox ford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Bergenas, Johan. “The Nuclear Domino Myth: Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenarios.” Foreign Affairs (New York City), August 31, 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.com///bergenas/nuclear-domino-myth (accessed October 22, 2010). Chomsky, Noam. “Chomsky: ‘The Majority of the World Supports Iran.’” Interview by Subrata Ghoshroy. AlterNet, October 3, 2008. http://www.alternet.org///(accessed October 22, 2010). Cordesman, Anthony H., and Adam C. Seitz. Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009. Dareini, Ali Akbar, and John Heilprin. “Ahmadinejad Says Iran May End Enrichment.” Associated Press, September 24, 2010. http:// news.yahoo.com////_on_re_us/_un_ahmadinejad (accessed October 22, 2010). Diehl, Sarah J., and James Clay Moltz. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Handbook. Contemporary World Issues Series. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002. Fleming, Ryan. “Bits before Bombs: How Stuxnet Crippled Iran’s Nuclear Dreams.” Digital Trends, December 2, 2010. http://www. digitaltrends.com//before-bombs-how-stuxnet-crippled-irans-nuclear-dreams/(accessed January 9, 2011). Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. Edited by David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha. Contemporary Asia in the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Credits Gold, Dore. The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2009. Gunter, Linda. “The Flaw in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Article IV: Nuclear Power and the Pathway to Nuclear Weapons.” Alter Net, May 3, 2010. http://www.alternet.org///(accessed October 22, 2010). Holton, W. Conard. “Power Surge: Renewed Interest in Nuclear Energy.” Environmental Health Perspectives 113, no. 11 (November 2005): A742-A749. http://www.jstor.org//(accessed October 20, 2010). Jafarzadeh, Alireza. The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Mistry, Dinshaw. “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement.” Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (September-October 2006): 675-698. http://www.jstor.org//(accessed October 20, 2010). Murphy, Caryle. “WikiLeaks Reveals Saudi Efforts to Thwart Iran.” Global Post, November 29, 2010. http://www.globalpost.com// arabia//saudi-arabia-iran-king-abdullah (accessed January 5, 2011). Ritter, Scott. “Keeping Iran Honest.” The Guardian (London), September 25, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk//////secret-nuclear plant-inspections (accessed October 22, 2010). Schulte, Gregory L. “Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark.” Strategic Forum, no. 253 (March 2010). www.ndu.edu///%20253_web.pdf (accessed October 21, 2010). Srinath, M. G. “India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Sputtering.” Worldpress (New Delhi), June 7, 2007. http://www.world-press.org//.cfm (ac cessed October 22, 2010). Stone, Richard. “Another Middle East Showdown.” Science 300, no. 5626 (June 2003): 1642-1644. http://www.jstor.org//(accessed October 20, 2010). Tisdall, Simon. “US-India pact strains nuclear rules.” Guardian (London), October 3, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/////.india/(ac cessed October 22, 2010). U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. More Than Just the 123 Agreement: The Future of U.S.-Indo Relations. 110th Cong., 2d sess. (June 25, 2008) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_notice.asp?id=1013 (accessed October 21, 2010). Wood, David. “Iran’s strong case for nuclear power is obscured by UN sanctions and geopolitics.” Atoms for Peace: An International Journal 1, no. 4 (2007): 287-300. http://inderscience.metapress.com///.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,3,8;journal,7,9;linki ngpublicationresults,1:119867,1 (accessed October 21, 2010). References in “Clinical Hypnosis: A Review of the Literature” by Appu Bhaskar Anbar, R. D. (2002, December 3). Hypnosis in pediatrics: applications at a pediatric pulmonary center. BMC Pediatrics, 2(11). doi:10.1186/-2431-2-11 Castel, A., Perez, M., Sala, J., Padrol, A., & Rull, M. (2007, May). Effect of hypnotic suggestion on fibromyalgic pain: Comparison between hypnosis and relaxation. European Journal of Pain, 11(4), 463-468. doi:10.1016/.ejpain.2006.06.006 Derbyshire, S. W., Whalley, M. G., & Oakley, D. A. (2009, May). Fibromyalgia pain and its modulation by hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion: An fMRI analysis. European Journal of Pain, 13(5), 542-550. doi:10.1016/.ejpain.2008.06.010 Faymonville, M.-E., Roediger, L., Del Fiore, G., Delgueldre, C., Phillips, C., Lamy, M., . . . Maquet, P. (2003, July 15). Increased cerebral functional connectivity underlying the antinociceptive effects of hypnosis. Cognitive Brain Research, 17(2), 255 262. doi:10.1016/-6410(03)00113-7 Liossi, C., White, P., & Hatira, P. (2006, May). Randomized Clinical Trial of Local Anesthetic Versus a Combination of Local Anes thetic With Self-Hypnosis in the Management of Pediatric Procedure-Related Pain. Health Psychology, 25(3), 307–315. Re trieved from http://www.psychology.soton.ac.uk///////-200605000-00007.pdf Works Cited in “Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula: Yemen as the ‘Third Front’” by Justine Liu Alhommayed, Tariq. “Is al-Qaeda Coordinating With the Houthis?” Asharq Alawsat (London), November 25, 2009. http://www.alara biya.net/////.html (accessed November 1, 2010).
Credits Al-Jaradi, Ali. “Stance of U.S. Administration on Houthi Movement; Houthis and Al Qaeda Mixed Cards Between Washington and Yemen.” Yemen Post, April 10, 2010. http://www.yemenpost.net/.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1721&MainCat=6 (accessed October 22, 2010). Almasmari, Hakim. “Massive Al-Qaeda Attack in Next Four Months.” Yemen Post, October 17, 2010. http://www.yemenpost.net/. aspx?ID=1&SubID=2662 (accessed October 22, 2010). Barron, Owen. “Things Fall Apart: Violence and Poverty in Yemen.” Harvard International Review 30, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 12-13. http://puffin.harker.org:2084/?did=1580344781&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=14606&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed Octo ber 8, 2010). Benson, Pam. “U.S. role in Yemen covered up by its president, Wikileaks file reveals.” CNN, November 29, 2010, U.S. edition. http:// www.cnn.com/////.yemen/(accessed November 29, 2010). Bodine, Barbara K. “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions.” Prism 1, no. 3 (June 2010): 43-58. http://www.ndu.edu////-3/_43-58_Bodine. pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). Boucek, Christopher. War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge. Yemen: On the Brink 3. http://carnegieendow ment.org//_in_saada.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). ———. Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral. Middle East Program 102. http://carnegieendowment.org//_downward_spiral.pdf (ac cessed October 22, 2010). Burrowes, Robert D. “Yemen: Political Economy and the Effort against Terrorism.” In Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg., 141-172. Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2005. Cigar, Norman. Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd Al-’Aziz Al-Muqrin’s “A Practical Course for Guerilla War.” Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009. Clark, Victoria. Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Day, Stephen. The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement. Yemen: On the Brink 2. http://carnegieendowment.org//_ south_movement.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Calvert Jones. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think.” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 7-44. http://muse.jhu.edu//_security//.2.eilstrup-sangiovanni. pdf (accessed October 16, 2010). Exum, Andrew M., and Richard Fontaine. On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests. http://www. cnas.org////_Policy_Brief_0.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). Harris, Alistair. Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. Yemen: On the Brink 4. http://carnegieendowment.org//_ grievances.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). Jamjoom, Mohammed. “Official Doubts Scale of Yemen’s Campaign Against Al Qaeda.” CNN, September 25, 2010, World edition. http://articles.cnn.com/-09-25//.al.qaeda_1_yemeni-security-forces-shabwa-saba-news-agency?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed November 1, 2010). Juneau, Thomas. “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies.” Middle East Policy 17, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 134 152. http://puffin.harker.org:2084/?did=2155147501&Fmt=7&clientId=14606&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed October 16, 2010). Kasinof, Laura. “Yemen packages may signal Al Qaeda franchise is ‘amateurish.’” Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com//East///packages-may-signal-Al-Qaeda-franchise-is-amateurish (accessed November 30, 2010). News Yemen. “Yemen Slams Doubts on Its Campaign Against al-Qaeda.” September 27, 2010. http://www.newsyemen.net//_news. asp?sub_no=3_2010_09_27_40156 (accessed November 1, 2010). Phillips, Sarah. What Comes Next in Yemen: Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building. Yemen: On the Brink 1. http://carnegieendow ment.org//_tribes1.pdf (accessed October 22, 2010). Press TV (Tehran). “U.S. Air Raids Kill 63 Civilians in Yemen.” December 18, 2009. http://edition.presstv.ir//.html (accessed October 29, 2010). Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon. RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010. http://www.rand.org////_MG962.pdf (accessed September 27, 2010).
Credits Schmitz, Charles. “Politics and Economy in Yemen: Lessons from the Past.” In Yemen Into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change. Edited by Kamil A. Mahdi, Anna Wurth, and Helen Lackner., 31-49. United Kingdom: Ithaca Press, 2007. Sharp, Jeremy M. Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34170. http:// www.fas.org////.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). Shay, Shaul. “Part III: Yemen and Islamic Terror.” In The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror, trans lated by Rachel Liberman, 103-135. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005. ———. “Part V: Theoretical Analysis and Conclusions.” In The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror, translated by Rachel Liberman, 157-201. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005. References in “The Effects of Sleep Deprivation: Analyzing Cognitive, Motor, and Psychosocial Impairments Resulting from Reduced Sleep” By Richard Chiou Buxton, O. M., Pavlova, M., Reid, E. W., Wang, W., Simonson, D. C., & Adler, G. K. (2010, September 10). Sleep restriction for 1 week reduces insulin sensitivity in healthy men. Diabetes, 59(9), 2126-2133. Retrieved from http://puffin.harker.org:2073//. do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=EAIM&docId=A237358008&source=gale&srcprod =EAIM&userGroupName=harker&version=1.0 Feyer, A.-M., & Williamson, A. M. (2000, October). Moderate sleep deprivation produces impairments in cognitive and motor perfor mance equivalent to legally prescribed levels of alcohol intoxication. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 57(10), 649-655. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org// Fredriksen, K., Rhodes, J., Reddy, R., & Way, N. (2004). Sleepless in Chicago: Tracking the effects of adolescent sleep loss during the middle school years. Child Development, 75(1), 84-95. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org// Hublin, C., Partinen, M., Koskenvuo, M., & Kaprio, J. (2007). Sleep and Mortality: A Population-Based 22-Year Follow-Up Study. Sleep, 30(10), 1245-1253. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov//// Jennings, J. R., Monk, T. H., & van der Molen, M. W. (2003, September). Sleep deprivation influences some but not all processes of supervisory attention. Psychological Science, 14(5), 473-479. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org// Sadeh, A., Gruber, R., & Raviv, A. (2003). The effects of sleep restriction and extension on school-age children: what a difference an hour makes. Child Development, 74(2), 444-4555. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org// Works Cited in “Managing the Rare Earth Metal Trade: Limiting the Distressing Effects of China’s Monopoly in the International Community” by Nikhil Parthasarathy Carter, Neil, and Arthur P. J. Mol. Environmental Governance in China. London: Routledge, 2007. China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/tran scripts/04_02_05.pdf (accessed October 7, 2010). Chinese Government. China’s Policy on Mineral Resources. 2003. http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content_17963.htm (accessed November 1, 2010). Clenfield, Jason, Mariko Yasu, and Stuart Briggs. “Rare Earths from Japan’s Junk Pile.” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 6, 2011. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_03/b4211009976168.htm (accessed January 9, 2011). Cordier, Daniel J. “Rare Earths Statistics and Information.” USGS Minerals Information. http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/com modity/rare_earths/#contacts (accessed December 29, 2010). Georgiev, Dencho, and Kim van der Borght. “Dispute Settlement System in the WTO: Developing Country Participation and Possible Reform.” In Reform and development of the WTO dispute settlement system, 177-91. Cameron May, 2006. http://books. google.com/books?id=RbuX3ydGE1AC&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq=WTO+dispute+settlement+system+time+reform&so urce=bl&ots=xdKXtqh0jJ&sig=Ta9zsUlyJGkWKuW3FJqXObGFu3g&hl=en&ei=bsAbTbfBAYuCsQP8rW3Cg&sa=X&oi= book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v (accessed January 7, 2011).
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um Laude Student Members Class of 2011
Appu Bhaskar* Roshni Bhatnagar Tracey Chan Josephine Chen* Christine Chien Tiffany Chien Richard Chiou* Timothy Chou Karthik Dhore* Saloni Gupta Max Lan* Andrew Liang Justine Liu* Alice Loofbourrow* Isaac Madan Rohan Mahajan Zachary Mank
Moneesha Mukherjee Shreya Nathan Jasmine Nee* Margaux Nielsen Nikhil Parthasarathy* Dawn Queen Swetha Repakula Catherine Stiles* Jerry Sun* Benjamin Tien* Brianna Tran Kevin Tran* Susan Tu* Kiran Vodrahalli* Jason Young* Olivia Zhu*
*Inducted in 2010
Class of 2012 Prag Batra Lucy Cheng Chun Man Chow Nicole Dalal Govinda Dasu Michelle Deng Alexander Hsu Max Isenberg
Revanth Kosaraju Jeffrey Kwong Chaitanya Malladi Ramya Rangan Pavitra Rengarajan Kathryn Siegel Albert Wu Patrick Yang
Faculty Members Mr. Butch Keller (Chapter President) Ms. Donna Gilbert Mr. John Hawley
Mr. John Heyes (Chapter Secretary) Mr. Marc Hufnagl Dr. Eric Nelson
Reflections Staff Josephine Chen Richard Chiou Justine Liu Alice Loofbourrow Jasmine Nee Nikhil Parthasarathy
Catherine Stiles Jerry Sun Benjamin Tien Kevin Tran Susan Tu Kiran Vodrahalli