Page 1


       SPECIAL  REPORT:            Islam,  Secularism  and  the  Battle  for  Turkey¶s  Future              


A u g . 2 3 ,   2 0 1 0        


This analysis  may  not  be  forwarded  or  republished  without  express  permission  from  STRATFOR.     For  permission,  please  submit  a  request  to  



700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900

Austin, TX 78701

Tel: 1-512-744-4300

Islam,  Secularism  and  the   %DWWOHIRU7XUNH\œV)XWXUH     A  deep  power  struggle  is  under  way  in  the   Republic  of  Turkey.  Most  outside  observers   see  this  as  the  latest  phase  in  the  decades-­ long  battle  between  Islamism  and  Kemalist   secularism.  Others  paint  it  as  traditional   $QDWROLDœVVWUXJJOHDJDLQVWPRGHUQ Istanbul,  egalitarianism  versus  economic   HOLWLVPRUGHPRFUDF\œVULVHDJDLQVW authoritarianism.  Ultimately,  the  struggle   boils  down  to  a  fight  over  a  single,  universal  concept:  power.   The  following  special  report  recounts  how  an  Islamist-­oriented  Anatolia  has  emerged  to  challenge  the   secular  foundation  of  the  modern  Turkish  state.  While  those  looking  at  Turkey  from  the  outside  are   RIWHQXQDZDUHRI7XUNH\œVLQWHUQDOWXPXOWDODE\ULnthine  internal  power  struggle  influences  virtually   every  move  Turkey  makes  in  its  embassies,  schools,  courts,  news  agencies,  military  bases  and   boardrooms.  Though  the  Turkish  identity  crisis  will  not  be  resolved  by  this  power  struggle,  the  battle   lines  drawn  during  the  fight  will  define  how  the  country  operates  for  years  to  come.  

A  Power  Struggle  Rooted  in  Geopolitics   Turkey  occupies  a  key  geostrategic  position.  It  sits  at  the  crossroads  of  Asia  and  Europe  and  forms  a   bridge  between  the  Black  and  MediterrDQHDQVHDV7XUNH\œVFRUHKLVWRULFDOO\KDVFHQWHUHGRQWKH isthmus  that  straddles  the  Sea  of  Marmara  and  Black  Sea.  Whether  the  map  says  Constantinople  or   Istanbul,  whoever  lays  claim  to  the  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles  has  control  over  one  of  the  most  active   and  strategic  commercial  routes  in  the  world,  a  key  military  vantage  point  against  outside  invaders,   and  a  launchpad  for  expansion  into  Eurasia.    



              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

When  Turkey  is  powerful,  the  country  follows  a  Pan-­Islamic  model  and  can  extend  itself  far  and  wide,   from  ruling  over  the  Arabs  and  balancing  the  Persians  in  the  Middle  East  to  challenging  the  clout  of   Christian  Europe  in  the  Balkans  to  blocking  Russia  in  the  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia.  But  when  Turkey   is  weak,  its  neighborhood  transforms  from  a  geopolitical  playground  into  a  prison.     Turkey,  then  the  multiethnic  Ottoman  Empire,  found  itself  in  the  latter  position  at  the  end  of  World   War  I.  With  the  aid  of  the  victorious  European  powers,  currents  of  ethnic  nationalism  surged  through   the  empire,  dissolving  the  bonds  of  Ottoman  control.  The  final  blow  to  the  Ottoman  core  came  via  the   1920  Treaty  of  Sevres,  which  dismembered  the  empire  by  ceding  territory  to  the  leading  Allied  powers   and  to  the  Greeks,  Armenians  and  Kurds  ²  a  period  of  history  that  continues  to  haunt  Turks  to  this   day.   Times  of  crisis  call  for  great  leaders;͞  for  Turkey,  that  leader  was  Mustafa  Kemal  ²  who  earned  the   KRQRULILF³$WDWXUN´7XUNLVKIRU³)DWKHURIWKH7XUNV´²  and  whose  face  still  graces  statues,  currency,   paintings  and  emblems  in  every  corner  of  the  country.  Ataturk  sought  to  save  the  Turkish  ethnic  core   from  Sevres  syndrome,  as  it  is  known  in  Turkey  today,  and  to  create  a  true  nation-­state.  His  tool  of   choice  was  nationalism,  though  his  definition  of  Turkish  nationalism  rejected  Pan-­Islamism  and  instead   concerned  itself  primarily  with  those  Turkish  citizens  living  in  the  Ottoman  core  that  would  become  the   new  and  modern  republic.  Kemalist  nationalism  was  also  deeply  steeped  in  secularism,  with  an   uncompromising  separation  of  mosque  and  state.   To  preserve  his  vision  of  the  Turkish  republic,  Ataturk  bolstered  a  secular  elite  that  would  dominate   WKHEDQNVDQGLQGXVWU\DQGPDLQWDLQDILUPJULSRYHUWKHFRXQWU\œVDUPHGIRUFHV$WDWXUNUHJDUGHGWKH Turkish  military  as  the  guardian  of  the  Kemalist  state,  a  responsibility  that  Turkish  generals  have   frequently  exploited  to  mount  coups  against  the  civilian  political  authority.  For  decades,  this  secularist-­ Kemalist  model  prevailed  in  Turkey  while  a  more  traditional,  Islamist-­minded  Anatolian  class  watched   in  frustration  as  it  largely  remained  sidelined  from  the  corridors  of  power.   The  post-­World  War  I  era  saw  Turkish  expansion  into  Europe  effectively  blocked,  leading  Turkey  to   turn  its  attention  inward  toward  the  Anatolian  Peninsula,  focusing  on  consolidating  power  from  within.   Though  it  would  take  several  decades  to  manifest  itself,  the  rise  of  Anatolian  forces  that  would   challenge  the  supremacy  of  the  Istanbul  elite  in  many  ways  was  inevitable.   Indeed,  as  the  21st  century  approached,   a  tremor  began  spreading  through   7XUNH\œVSROLWLFDOODQGVFDSH%\WKHQ Turkey  had  gone  through  its  fair  share  of   political  tumult.  But  with  time,  it  had   consolidated  enough  internally  to  start   looking  abroad  again  through  a  Pan-­ Islamic  lens.  The  Islamic  vision  was   rooted  in  the  Milli  Gorus,  or  National   View,  movement,  which  arose  in  the   1970s  as  a  religiously  conservative   challenge  to  the  left-­wing  secular   tradition.  The  election  of  the  Islamist-­ rooted  Refah  Partisi,  or  Welfare  Party   (RP)  in  1995  officially  brought  political   Islam  to  the  halls  of  power  in  modern   Turkey,  though  the  secular-­dominated   National  Security  Council  banned  the   JOHN  THYS/AFP/Getty  Images   party  in  less  than  two  years.  A  more   Turkish  President  Abdullah  Gul   moderate  strand  of  the  Milli  Gorus   movement  emerged  with  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  (AKP)  in  2001.    


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

Spearheaded  by  Turkish  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  and  President  Abdullah  Gul,  the  party   took  power  in  2002  with  a  mandate  to  close  the  political  and  economic  gap  between  the  Kemalist  elite   and  the  Anatolian  masses.  While  more  moderate  than  its  predecessor,  the  AKP  is  largely  considered  an   affront  by  the  secularists.  Though  the  AKP  was  more  cautious  of  exposing  its  Islamist-­rooted  political   vision  in  its  early  days  of  power,  it  has  become  clear  that  the  party  represents  those  in  Turkey  who   HPEUDFHWKHFRXQWU\œV,VODPLFSDVW7KH$.3œVYLVLRQRI7XUNH\LVDFRXQWU\WKDWJRHVRXWRILWVZD\WR defend  its  Turkic  brothers  abroad,  that  infuses  religion  with  politics  and  that  gives  rise  to  what  it  sees   as  a  long-­neglected  Anatolian  class.  

The  Turkish  Islamist  Movement   The  AKP  is  by  no  means  pursuing  the  Islamist  vision  alone.  A  powerful  force  known  as  the  Gulen   movement  has  quietly  and  effectively  penetrated  the  armor  of  the  Kemalist  state  over  four  decades.   The  charismatic  imam  Fethullah  Gulen,  who  lives  in  Pennsylvania,  leads  the  transnational  organization,   DORQJZLWKDVPDOOJURXSRIZKDWWKH*XOHQLVWVWHUP³ZLVHPHQ´,QVLGH7XUNH\WKH*XOHQPRYHPHQW follows  a  determined  agenda  that  aims  to  replace  the  Kemalist  elite  and  transform  Turkey  into  a  more   religiously  conservative  society.  Outside  Turkey,  Gulen  presents  itself  as  a  multifaith  global   organization  working  to  bring  businesses,  religious  leaders,  politicians,  journalists  and  average  citizens   together.  Whatever  its  public  relations  moves,  the  Gulen  movement  is  at  base  just  one  more  player   jockeying  for  power  in  Turkey.     The  Kemalists  have  long  viewed  the  Gulen  movement  as  a  critical  threat  to  the  secular  nature  of  the   Turkish  republic.  When  Fethullah  Gulen  left  Turkey  for  the  United  States  in  1998,  the  court  documents   WKDWKDGEHHQLVVXHGDJDLQVWKLPLQFOXGHGVHUPRQVLQZKLFKKHFDOOHGRQKLVIROORZHUVWR³PRYHLQWKH DUWHULHVRIWKHV\VWHPZLWKRXWDQ\RQHQRWLFLQJ\RXUH[LVWHQFHXQWLO\RXUHDFKDOOWKHSRZHUFHQWHUV´ +HDOVRVDLGWKDW³WKH  time  is  not  yet  right.  You  must  wait  for  the  time  when  you  are  complete  and   FRQGLWLRQVDUHULSHXQWLOZHFDQVKRXOGHUWKHHQWLUHZRUOGDQGFDUU\LW´   0RUHWKDQDGHFDGHODWHUWKH*XOHQPRYHPHQWKDVDSUHVHQFHLQYLUWXDOO\DOO7XUNH\¶VSRZHUFHQWHUV In  LWVHDUOLHU\HDUVWKHPRYHPHQWPRYHGPXFKPRUHGLVFUHHWO\IRFXVLQJRQPRYLQJLQWRWKH³DUWHULHV RIWKHV\VWHP´ZLWKRXWGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRLWVHOI6LQFHKRZHYHUZKHQWKH$.3ZDVHOHFWHG with  47  percent  of  the  popular  vote,  conditions  have  ripened  such  that  the  Gulen  movement  can  be   much  more  open  about  its  activities  in  the  country.  Gulenists  now  transmit  a  strong  sense  of   confidence  and  achievement  in  their  discussions  with  outsiders,  as  the  movement  knows  this  is  its   moment  and  that  decades  of  quiet  work  aimed  at  transforming  Turkish  society  are  paying  off.   For  its  part,  AKP  does  not  walk  in  lockstep  with  the  Gulen  movement,  nor  does  it  want  to  become   overly  dependent  on  the  Gulenists.  The  party  does  not  see  eye  to  eye  with  the  Gulenists  on  a  number   of  issues,  and  consciously  attempts  to  keeps  its  distance  from  the  group  for  fear  of  reinforcing   secularist  allegations  that  the  AKP  is  pursuing  a  purely  Islamist  agenda.  Likewise,  the  Gulenist   movement  will  occasionally,  albeit  rarely,  air  its  disagreements  with  the  AKP.  For  instance,  in  the  wake   of  the  Turkish-­Israeli  flotilla  crisis,  in  which  nine  Turkish  citizens  were  killed  during  a  raid  by  Israeli   special  operations  forces  on  a  flotilla  full  of  pro-­Palestinian  activists,  Fethullah  Gulen  said  in  an   interview  that  the  Insani  Yardim  Vakfi  (IHH)  aid  group that  led  the  flotilla  had  defied  authority  for   IDLOLQJWRVHHNSHUPLVVLRQIURP,VUDHOEHIRUHDWWHPSWLQJWRGHOLYHUDLGWR*D]D*XOHQ¶VFULWLFLVPRIWKH DLGRUJDQL]DWLRQFDPHLQVWDUNFRQWUDVWWRWKH$.3¶Vdenunciations  of  Israel¶s  actions  and  strong,  public   support  for  the  IHH.  Gulen  apparently  used  the  flotilla  crisis  as  an  opportunity  to  alter  outside   perceptions  of  his  organization,  showing  that  his  pragmatism  in  responding  to  the  situation  has  more   in  common  with  the  West  against  critics  who  accuse  the  movement  of  being  too  strictly  Islamist  and   H[WUHPHLQLWVYLHZV<HW*XOHQ¶VFRPPHQWVDOVRFDXVHGDQRXWUDJHDPRQJVWPXFKRIWKH7XUNLVK public  (not  to  mention  within  the  AKP),  leading  one  oIWKHPRYHPHQW¶VOHDGHUVWRUHWUDFWWKH statements  the  next  day.  Clearly,  tension  exists  between  the  AKP  and  Gulenists,  but  the  two  sides  also   need  each  other  and  share  a  desire  to  replace  the  traditional  secular  elite.  This  objective,  along  with   the  common  threat  they  face  from  the  secularist  establishment,  forms  the  basis  of  their  symbiotic  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

relationship:  The  Gulen  movement  provides  the  AKP  with  a  social  base,  while  the  AKP  provides  the   Gulenists  with  a  political  platform  to  push  their  agenda.   7XUNH\œVZUHQFKLQJ  struggle  for  national  identity  reaches  every  corner  of  society.  In  the  education   realm,  the  Gulen  movement  is  a  powerful  force,  creating  schools  across  the  globe  to  extend  Turkish   influence  and  intelligence  capabilities  as  the  number  of  Turkish  embassy  staffers  educated  in  Gulenist   schools  continues  to  rise.  The  struggle  is  fiercest  in  the  security  arena,  with  generals  regularly  being   MDLOHGRYHUPXUN\FRXSDOOHJDWLRQV,QWKHPHGLDDUHQD7XUNH\œVPHGLDJLDQWVZDJHZDUYLDHGLWRULDOV and  lawsuits.  In  the  world  of  business,  the  secularist  Istanbul  giants  continue  to  dominate,  though  an   emerging  Anatolian  merchant  class  is  rapidly  gaining  prominence.  Within  the  judiciary,  the  secularists   of  the  high  courts  are  locked  into  a  battle  against  AKP  allies  in  the  lower  courts  over  a  series  of  thorny   constitutional  reforms  that  would  go  far  to  undermine  Kemalist  legal  dominance.  And  on  the  street,   Turkish  citizens  debate  whether  drinking  raki  (an  anise-­IODYRUHGOLTXHXU LVRIIHQVLYHWRWKHFRXQWU\œV Islamic  culture  aQGZKHWKHULWLV³WRR,VODPLF´WRRUGHUKDODOPHDWZKHQWUDYHOLQJRXWVLGHRI7XUNH\  

Education:  Sowing  Seeds  in  the  Schools   7XUNH\œVSRZHUVWUXJJOHEHJLQVLQWKHFODVVURRP7KHPRVWLQWHQVHSHULRGRIideological  cultivation  for   many  Turks  takes  place  between  grades  eight  through  12,  and  the  Gulen  movement  has  spent  the   past  three  decades  working  aggressively  in  the  education  sector  to  mold  young  minds  in  Turkish   schools  at  home  and  abroad.  The  goal  is  to  create  a  generation  of  well-­educated  Turks  who  ascribe  to   the  Gulen  tradition  and  have  the  technical  skills  (and  under  the  AKP,  the  political  connections)  to   assume  high  positions  in  strategic  sectors  of  the  economy,  government  and  armed  forces.     The  AKP-­run  government  distributes  free  textbooks  published  by  a  firm  close  to  the  Gulen  movement   in  primary  and  high  schools.  Gulen-­funded  schools  are  increasing  in  number,  along  with  thousands  of   public  Imam  Hatip  schools  and  state-­run  Quran  schools  for  high  school  education.   6LQFHWKH$.3PRVWO\DSSHDOVWR7XUNH\œV religious  conservative  and  lower-­income   IDPLOLHVPDQ\RIWKHSDUW\œVSRWHQWLDO political  supporters  attend  public   technical  schools  for  working-­class   laborers  as  well  as  religiously  oriented   Imam  Hatip  schools,  where  girls  are   permitted  to  don  the  Islamic  headscarf,   for  their  high  school  education  instead  of   UHJXODUKLJKVFKRROV8QGHU7XUNH\œV current  educational  system,  graduates   from  technical  schools  are  only  qualified   to  attend  two-­year  colleges  and   graduates  from  Imam  Hatip  schools  are   only  qualified  to  attend  theological   schools,  even  though  many  graduates   from  Imam  Hatip  schools  want  to  pursue   careers  in  law,  medicine,  engineering  and   MUSTAFA  OZER/AFP/Getty  Images   other  professions.  Meanwhile,  graduates   Turkish  girls  in  Istanbul  wearing  headscarves   from  regular  public  and  private  high   schools  ²  where  the  headscarf  is  banned   by  law  ²  are  qualified  to  attend  four-­year  accredited  universities  in  seeking  a  higher  education.  Both   the  technical  and  Imam  Hatip  schools  fall  under  the  labor  school  category,  and  since  graduates  from   labor  schools  are  not  permitted  to  attend  four-­year  univeUVLWLHVPXFKRIWKH$.3œV\RXQJHUSROLWLFDO base  is  prevented  from  rising  in  economic  stature  when  seeking  a  higher  degree.    


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

In  an  effort  to  change  this  system,  the  AKP  government  has  been  engaged  in  an  intense  struggle  with   the  secularist-­dominated  State  Council  to  revise  the  strict  grade  point  average  calculations  such  that   graduates  from  all  labor  schools  (including  Imam  Hatips)  can  enter  all  four-­year  universities  (not  only   theological  ones),  from  which  they  can  rise  to  more  prominent  positions  and  remain  loyal  to  the  AKP   and  the  Gulenists.  The  AKP  has  yet  to  succeed,  but  it  has  not  given  up  on  this  crucial  point  on  its   education  agenda.     The  Gulen  movement  claims  the  majority  of  Turkish  students  are  enrolled  in  its  private  and  public   schools.  The  Gulenist  schools  are  not  madrassas;͞  in  fact,  they  focus  heavily  on  the  sciences  and  math.   That  said,  religious  classes  and  customs  can  make  their  way  into  the  curriculum  and  daily  activities,   especially  in  countries  with  existing  Islamic  links.     The  Gulenist  educational  institutions  are  easily  identified  because  they  typically  have  newer  facilities   and  better  equipment  than  most  schools,  and  they  offer  the  most  intensive  preparation  courses  for   university  entrance  exams.  These  exams  will  make  or  break  a  Turkish  stXGHQWœVFDUHHUDQGDUH something  most  Turkish  youths  remember  as  the  most  dreaded  and  stressful  experience  of  their   academic  lives.  Many  Turkish  parents  are  willing  to  pay  a  great  deal  of  money  to  ensure  that  their   children  receive  the  preparation  they  need  to  pass  their  exams  and  get  into  a  good  university.   Consequently,  the  Gulen  movement  has  strategically  developed  private  courses  and  Isik  Evleri,  or   Lighthouses,  which  are  tuition  centers  that  arguably  offer  the  best  preparation  for  university  exams  for   students  and  the  best  recruiting  grounds  for  the  Gulenists.  For  those  exceptionally  bright  students  that   come  from  low-­income  families,  private  courses  are  offered  for  free.     6WXGHQWVZKRKDYHWDNHQWKHVHFRXUVHVGHVFULEHKRZWKH³HOGHUEURWKHUV´ZKRUXQthese  Lighthouses   maintain  an  intense  curriculum  that  keeps  the  students  at  school  late  and  on  the  weekends  instead  of   out  socializing  and  engaging  in  behavior  frowned  upon  by  religious  conservatives.  Students  may  start   going  to  Lighthouses  two  to  three  times  a  week,  but  can  find  themselves  attending  nearly  every  day  of   the  week  by  the  time  they  reach  the  end  of  the  course.  Based  on  their  participation,  attendance  and   performance  in  the  courses,  the  Gulenist  brothers  are  able  to  pick  out  the  brightest  and  most  loyal   students  as  potential  recruits.  To  test  their  loyalty,  a  student  may  be  called  late  in  the  evening  or  early   on  a  weekend  morning  and  asked  by  his  or  her  mentor  to  attend  a  function  or  perform  community   service.  This  is  intended  to  help  the  Gulenists  evaluate  whether  the  student  will  respond  to  orders  from   his  or  her  Gulenist  mentors.   The  Gulen  movement  and  AKP  have  carried  their  presence  to  the  university  level  as  well.  The  pivot  of   the  university  battle  is  an  institution  called  the  Higher  Education  Council  (YOK).  YOK  was  created  by   the  1982  Turkish  Constitution  to  keep  a  lid  on  political  dissent  in  the  universities,  since  prior  to  the   1980  military  coup,  universities  were  the  driving  forces  behind  the  political  violence  between  right-­   and  left-­wing  activists  that  marred  the  1970s  in  Turkey.  Up  until  2007,  YOK  was  a  bastion  for  hardcore   secularists  in  Turkey  to  ensure  their  dominance  over  the  universities  and  prevent  the  entrenchment  of   ,VODPLVWVLQ7XUNH\œVKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV   When  the  last  secular  president  of  YOK  retired  in  2007,  the  AKP  had  its  chance  to  appoint  one  of  its   own,  professor  Yusuf  Ziya  Ozcan,  an  AKP  loyalist  and  sympathizer  of  the  Gulen  movement.  Since  then,   YOK  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  the  highly  polarizing  headscarf  issue  in  Turkey  and  has  used  its   SRZHUVWRDSSRLQWUHOLJLRXVFRQVHUYDWLYHVWRXQLYHUVLW\SUHVLGHQFLHV8QGHUWKH$.3œVZDWFKDQG particularly  since  2007,  37  public  universities  and  22  new  private  universities  have  been  built,  many  of   them  in  Anatolian  cities  such  as  Konya,  Kayseri  and  Gaziantep  where  the  Anatolian  business  class  is   concentrated  or  in  less-­populated  and  impoverished  cities  where  young  Turks  have  traditionally  lacked   access  to  higher  education.  The  private  universities  are  mostly  funded  by  Gulenist  businessmen.   Strategic  Placement   But  the  Gulen  movement  and  AKP  do  not  only  want  loyal  students  to  attend  Gulen-­run  universities.   Indeed,  a  core  part  of  their  strategy  is  to  ensure  the  placement  of  their  students  in  a  variety  of  secular  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

institutions  where  they  can  gradually  grow  in  number  and  position  themselves  to  influence  strategic   centers  of  Turkish  society.  For  example,  the  university  results  of  a  Gulenist  student  may  qualify  him  to   attend  the  most  elite  university  in  Istanbul,  but  the  movement  will  arrange  for  the  student  to  attend  a   military  academy  instead,  where  the  Gulenists  are  trying  to  increase  their  presence.  While  at  the   military  academy,  the  student  will  quietly  remain  in  touch  with  his  Gulenist  mentor,  but  will  be  careful   not  to  reveal  any  religious  tendencies  that  would  flag  him  and  deny  him  promotion.  Once  placed  in  a   strategic  institution,  whether  in  the  military,  police,  judiciary  or  major  media  outlet,  the  graduate   continues  to  receive  guidance  from  a  Gulenist  mentor,  allowing  the  movement  to  quietly  and  directly   influence  various  organs  of  society.  The  Gulen  movement  is  also  known  to  influence  its  young   followers  to  attend  universities  in  cities  away  from  their  families  where  the  movement  can  provide   them  with  free  housing.  This  separation  allows  the  Gulen  to  step  in  as  a  family  replacement  and   strengthen  its  bond  with  the  student  while  he  or  she  is  away  from  home.     *XOHQLVW6FKRROVœ([SDQGLQJ*OREDO,QIOXHQFH   Over  the  past  few  decades  the  Gulen  movement  has  spread  to  virtually  every  corner  of  the  globe   through  its  expansive  education  network.  The  Gulenist  international  footprint  comprises  1,000  private   schools  (according  to  Gulen  estimates)  spanning  115  countries,  including  35  African  countries.  These   Gulenist  schools  can  be  found  in  small  towns  everywhere  from  Ethiopia,  Bosnia,  Cambodia,  India,   .D]DNKVWDQ3DNLVWDQ&RWHGœ,YRLUH$]HUEDLMDQ²  and  even  the  United  States,  where  according  to   some  estimates,  the  movement  runs  more  than  90  charter  public  schools  in  at  least  20  states.   Like  their  counterparts  in  Turkey,  the  facilities  and  quality  of  instruction  at  these  schools  are  excellent,   making  them  attractive  places  for  elite  families  of  various  ethnicities  to  send  their  children  to  receive   an  education.  Gulenist  businessmen  proviGHWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHVHVFKRROVœIXQGLQJ6XFKGRQRUVKDYH given  a  portion  of  their  incomes  to  schools  in  an  assigned  region  in  exchange  for  help  finding  business   deals.  The  teachers  of  the  schools  are  typically  devout  Gulenist  followers  willing  to  live  far  away  from   home  in  foreign  lands  for  what  they  see  as  the  greater  mission  of  the  Gulenist  cause.   The  curriculum  at  these  schools  includes  math,  science,  and  Turkish-­  and  English-­language  instruction,   but  there  is  a  deeper  agenda  involved  than  pedagogy.  Graduates  of  these  schools  can  usually  speak   Turkish  fluently,  have  been  exposed  to  Turkish  culture  and  history,  and  are  prepared  for  careers  in   high  places.  In  regions  like  Africa  and  Central  Asia  in  particular,  where  quality  education  is  difficult  to   come  by,  the  children  of  the  political  elites  who  attend  these  schools  usually  have  developed  a  deep   affinity  for  Turkish  culture.  As  a  result,  the  Gulenists  are  able  to  raise  a  generation  of  diplomats,   security  professionals,  economists  and  engineers  who  are  more  likely  to  take  Turkish  national  interests   into  account  when  they  reach  positions  of  influence.   The  Gulenists  have  made  a  conscious  attempt  to  avoid  the  perception  that  they  are  proselytizing  to   students  through  these  schools,  however.  Lessons  in  Islam  tend  to  be  more  prevalent  in  Gulenist   schools  where  the  religion  already  has  a  foothold.  For  example,  Islam  has  a  deep  history  in  the   Caucasus  and  Central  Asia,  though  the  religion  was  severely  undermined  by  decades  of  Communist   rule.  Many  Azerbaijanis,  Kazakhs,  Uzbeks  and  other  descendants  of  the  Soviet  Union  do  not  identify   with  Islam;͞  the  Gulenist  schools  in  these  regions  aim  to  revive  moderate  Islam  in  the  former  Soviet   territories.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  Gulenists  are  radicalizing  these  countries,  however.  In  fact,  the   Gulenists  emphasize  that  the  Turkish  version  of  Islam  that  they  teach  is  moderate  in  its  approach  and   distinct  from  the  strict  Islamic  practices  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Iran.     As  such,  the  Gulenists  are  not  welcome  everywhere  they  would  like  to  set  up.  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia,   neither  of  which  wants  a  foreign  strand  of  Islam  influencing  its  people,  have  both  shut  the  Gulenist   schools  out.  In  the  Netherlands,  where  concerns  over  the  growth  of  Islam  run  particularly  high,  the   government  has  tried  to  force  out  Gulenist  institutions.  For  its  part,  Russia  ²  a  natural  competitor  to   Turkey  ²  is  extremely  wary  of  this  channel  of  influence,  and  has  reportedly  shut  down  at  least  16   Gulenist  schools  so  far.  Russia  is  also  heavily  reasserting  its  influence  in  the  former  Soviet  Union;͞  to   this  end;͞  it  wishes  to  block  the  Gulenist  movement  from  expanding  in  places  like  Central  Asia  and  the  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

Caucasus.  Uzbekistan,  with  a  government  paranoid  about  external  influences  ²  especially  those  tinged   with  Islam,  which  they  fear  will  inflame  the  various  militant  Islamist  groups  in  the  region  ²  banned  a   number  of  Gulenist  schools  in  2000.  The  Gulenists  have  had  greater  success  in  setting  up  private  high   schools  and  universities  in  Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan  and  Kyrgyzstan.  Meanwhile,  Azerbaijani  officials   UHJXODUO\FRPSODLQLQSULYDWHDERXWWKH*XOHQLVW³HQFURDFKPHQW´LQtheir  country,  claiming  they  do  not   QHHG7XUNVWRLQVWUXFWWKHPRQKRZEH³JRRG0XVOLPV´(YHQ,UDTœV.XUGLVWDQ5HJLRQDO*RYHUQPHQW reportedly  shut  down  four  Gulenist  institutions  in  December  2009.   6XFKUHVLVWDQFHLVOLNHO\WRLQFUHDVHDVWKHPRYHPHQWœVSURILOHULVHVDQGDVFRXQWULHVJURZQHUYRXV RYHU7XUNH\œVH[SDQGLQJLQIOXHQFH,QSODFHVOLNH$IULFDKRZHYHUZKHUHFRXQWULHVDUHdesperate  for   development,  Muslims  are  in  abundance,  chaotic  conditions  prevail  and  foreign  competition  lacks  the   intensity  it  has  in  strategic  battlegrounds  like  Central  Asia,  the  Gulen  movement  has  far  more  room  to   expand  its  educational,  business  and  political  ties.  

Security:  Taking  on  the  Military   Ataturk,  a  military  man  at  heart,  wanted  to  ensure  his  work  and  vision  for  Turkey  would  remain  intact   long  after  his  death.  The  Turkish  armed  forces  seized  responsibility  for  that  legacy  upon  his  death.   Article  35  of  the  Army  Internal  Service  Law  of  1935  gives  the  military  the  constitutional  right  to   protect  and  defend  the  Turkish  homeland  and  the  republic.  While  the  Turkish  Constitution  outlaws  the   removal  of  democratically  elected  governments  by  force,  according  to  the  majority  of  the  armed  forces   and  the  Kemalist  camp,  a  constitutional  republic  is  defined  as  the  liberal  and  secular  republic  founded   by  Ataturk,  not  the  religiously  conservative  republic  growing  under  the  rule  of  the  Islamist-­oriented   AKP.     Turkish  generals  throughout  much  of   7XUNH\¶VKLVWRU\LQWHUSUHWHGWKHVHODZVDV permitting  the  armed  forces  to  intervene   in  civilian  affairs  whenever  stability  was   threatened  or  the  secular  fabric  of  the   country  showed  signs  of  unraveling.   Consequently,  Turkey  has  experienced   three  military  coups  -­-­  in  1960,  1971  and   1980  -­-­  DQGRQH³VRIWFRXS´LQ when  the  military  worked  through  the   National  Security  Council  to  bring  down   the  government  without  dissolving  the   parliament  or  suspending  the   Constitution.  When  the  military  was  not   directly  holding  the  political  reins,  it  did   so  indirectly  via  the  so-­called  Derin   'HYOHWRU³'HHS6WDWH´ZKLFKZRUNHGLQ the  parliament,  courts  and  media  to   ADEM  ALTAN/AFP/Getty  Images   HQVXUHWKDW7XUNH\¶V,VODPLVWVUHPDLQHG Turkish  soldiers  at  Kocatepe  Mosque  in  Ankara   impotent.  The  Deep  State  refers  to  a   murky  network  of  members  from  the   armed  forces  and  the  National  Intelligence  Organization  (MIT),  some  with  links  to  organized  criminal   syndicates  and  ultranationalist  groups  that  view  themselves  as  the  guardians  of  the  secular  republic,   and  are  willing  to  ignore  the  law  to  uphold  that  secular  tradition.   7XUNH\¶V,VODPLVWVNQHZWKDWLIWKH\KDGDQ\FKDQFHRIRYHUWXUQLQJWKHSRZHUEDODQFHRIWKHVWDWH they  would  have  to  take  on  the  armed  forces.  The  process  would  be  slow,  quiet  and  deliberate,  but   would  ultimately  see  the  military  stripped  of  its  long-­held  untouchable  status.  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

From  Deep  State  to  Ergenekon   The  Gulen  movement  began  this  task  with  the  police  intelligence  services.  The  Turkish  police  force  had   long  been  the  weakest  institution  within  the  security  apparatus,  largely  a  UHIOHFWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\œV rural-­urban  divide  through  much  of  the  20th  century.  In  the  early  part  of  the  century,  the  rural   population  comprised  two-­thirds  of  the  country,  giving  the  gendarmerie,  the  branch  of  the  armed   services  responsible  for  the  security  of  the  countryside,  far  more  influence  than  the  police,  which   patrolled  urban  areas.  As  more  Turks  began  moving  to  the  cities  in  the  latter  half  of  the  century  and   eventually  came  to  outnumber  the  rural  population,  however,  the  police  steadily  gained  clout,   providing  the  Gulen  movement  with  a  rare  opportunity.  Since  the  police  were  not  a  powerful  force  at   the  time,  secularists  within  the  security  establishment  did  not  scrutinize  them  as  carefully.  As  a  result,   background  checks  for  Islamist  tendencies  in  police  officers  were  more  lax,  allowing  religious   FRQVHUYDWLYHVWRJUDGXDOO\LQFUHDVHWKHLUSUHVHQFHLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQXQGHUWKH*XOHQPRYHPHQWœV guidance.  Within  three  decades,  the  police,  and  particularly  police  intelligence,  came  under  the   umbrella  of  the  AKP  and  Gulen  movement.   The  Islamists  now  had  a  powerful  tool  with  which  to  undercut  their  secularist  rivals.  Not  only  did  they   HQMR\WKHSHUYDVLYHQHVVRIDVHFXULW\QHWZRUNWKDWSDWUROVWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI7XUNH\œVSRSXODWLRQDQG the  wiretapping  capabilities  to  investigate  the  bowels  of  the  security  establishment,  they  also  had  a   SRZHUIXOPDFKLQHLQWKHIRUPRIWKH$.3WRXSURRWWKH'HHS6WDWHDQGQHXWUDOL]HWKHPLOLWDU\œVJULS over  the  government.  The  AKP  spent  its  first  five  years  in  power  from  2002  to  2007  trying  to  establish   a  working  relationship  with  the  Turkish  General  Staff  as  it  made  inroads  into  the  National  Security   Council  and  started  playing  a  role  in  the  appointment  of  senior  military  leaders.  In  summer  2007,  as   the  party  prepared  itself  IRUDODQGVOLGHHOHFWLRQYLFWRU\WKH$.3œVPRYHVDJDLQVWWKHPLOLWDU\WRRND bold  turn  in  the  form  of  the  now-­infamous  Ergenekon  probe.   Ergenekon  is  an  investigation  launched  in  June  2007  upon  the  discovery  of  a  few  grenades  in  the   slums  of  Istanbul.  As  word  of  the  investigation  hit  the  newsstands,  allegations  began  flying  about  how   the  Deep  State  was  at  work  again  to  overthrow  the  AKP  government.  Alleged  anti-­AKP  conspirators   had  their  phones  tapped,  and  purported  transcripts  of  their  conversations  were  published  in  the   (mostly  Gulenist-­backed)  media.  Meanwhile,  hundreds  of  suspects,  including  journalists,  retired   soldiers,  academics  and  everyday  criminals,  were  arrested  in  predawn  raids  for  allegedly  taking  part  in   this  conspiracy.     Though  there  is  little  doubt  that  elements  of  the  Deep  State  were  legitimately  rolled  up  in  this   Ergenekon  probe,  there  is  also  reason  to  believe  that  this  probe  took  on  a  life  of  its  own  ²  and   increasingly  became  a  tool  with  which  to  quash  political  dissent.  The  AKP  defended  the  probe  to  the   RXWVLGHZRUOGDVDVLJQRI7XUNH\œVGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQDUJXLQJWKDW7XUNH\ZDVILQDOO\HYROYLQJWRDSRLQW where  the  military  could  be  brought  under  civilian  control.  But  as  the  Ergenekon  probe  continued  to   grow,  the  legitimacy  of  the  indictments  began  to  be  questioned  with  greater  frequency.  By  late  2009,   the  investigations  began  to  slow  down.  Then,  in  January  2010,  another  purported  conspiracy  was   uncovered.   Breaking  Precedent  with  Jailed  Generals   A  new  and  even  more  politically  explosive  coup  plot  was  revealed  in  January  by  Taraf,  a  newspaper   UHJXODUO\SUDLVHGE\*XOHQLVWV7KHSORWFDOOHG³%DO\R]´7XUNLVKIRU³6OHGJHKDPPHU´DOOHJHGO\ involved  162  members  of  the  armed  forces,  including  29  generals.  The  group  reportedly  composed  a   5,000-­page  document  in  2003,  shortly  after  the  AKP  came  to  power,  detailing  plans  to  sow  violence  in   WKHFRXQWU\DQGFUHDWHWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUDPLOLWDU\WDNHRYHUWR³JHWULGRIHYHU\VLQJOHWKUHDWWRWKH VHFXODURUGHURIWKHVWDWH´7KHSORWDOOHJHGO\LQFOXGHGFUDVKLQJD7XUNLVKMHW  over  the  Aegean  Sea  in  a   dogfight  with  a  Greek  jet  to  create  a  diplomatic  crisis  with  Athens  and  bombing  the  Fatih  and  Beyazit   mosques  in  Istanbul.  By  late  February,  more  than  40  military  officers  were  arrested,  including  four   admirals,  a  general,  two  colonels  and  former  commanders  of  the  Turkish  navy  and  air  force.    


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

The  military  was  backed  against  a  wall.  Though  it  still  had  enough  influence  over  the  courts  to  fight   the  arrests,  there  was  no  question  it  was  locked  into  an  uphill  battle  against  the  Islamist  forces.  The   Ergenekon  probes  that  began  in  2007  went  after  retired  soldiers,  but  the  arrests  of  active-­duty   generals  in  Sledgehammer  completely  broke  with  precedent.  More  recently,  the  AKP  has  taken  it  upon   itself  to  exercise  its  constitutional  right  to  make  decisions  on  promotions  for  high-­ranking  members  of   the  military  ²  something  that  no  civilian  government  dared  in  the  past.  What  was  once  considered   unthinkable  for  Turks  across  the  country  was  now  becoming  a  reality:  The  military,  the  self-­proclaimed   vanguard  of  the  secular  state,  was  becoming  impotent  as  a  political  force.   :KLOHWKH$.3DQG*XOHQPRYHPHQWDOUHDG\KDYHGHIDFWRRZQHUVKLSRIWKHFRXQWU\œVSROLFH intelligence,  they  are  also  making  significant  inroads  into  MIT,  the  national  intelligence  service.  Long   dominated  by  the  secularist  establishment,  MIT  historically  spent  a  good  portion  of  its  time  keeping   tabs  on  domestic  political  opponents  like  the  AKP.  The  Turkish  National  Security  Council  in  late  May   appointed  42-­year-­old  bureaucrat  Hakan  Fidan  as  the  new  MIT  chief.  Though  Fidan  has  both  a  civilian   and  military  background,  making  him  more  palatable  to  the  army  and  civilian  government,  his   sympathies  appear  to  lean  heavily  toward  the  AKP.  This  has  not  gone  unnoticed  by  Israel,  which  has   launched  a  campaign  to  defame  Fidan  in  various  media  outlets,  alleging  that  he  would  be  more  prone   to  sharing  intelligence  with  countries  like  Iran.  Notably,  Fethullah  Gulen  publicly  praised  Fidan  for  his   previous  work  as  leader  of  the  Turkish  International  Cooperation  and  Development  Agency  (TIKA),   ZKLFKZRUNVFORVHO\ZLWKWKH*XOHQPRYHPHQWDEURDG)LGDQSODQVWRLQFUHDVH0,7œVFDSDELOLWLHVDQG focus  on  foreign  intelligence  collection,  allowing  more  room  for  the  police  intelligence  (already  under   heavy  AKP  and  Gulen  influence)  to   operate  at  home.  By  drawing  a  more   distinct  line  between  foreign  and  domestic   LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGVKLIWLQJWKH0,7œVIRFXV outward,  the  AKP  and  Gulen  movement   are  advancing  their  aims  of  using   intelligence  as  a  foreign  policy  tool  to   promote  Turkish  expansion  abroad  while   slowly  denying  the  secularists  the  ability   to  use  MIT  for  domestic  espionage   purposes.   It  has  now  become  all  the  more   imperative  for  the  military  to  maintain  a   hold  on  the  security  issues  that  still  give   the  armed  forces  some  leverage  against   the  AKP.  The  Kurdish  question  and  the   dispute  with  Greece  over  Cyprus  top  this   list,  but  even  here  the  AKP  is  working   KAYHAN  OZER/AFP/Getty  Images   aggressively  to  take  ownership  of  these   Turkish  Prime  Minister  Tayyip  Erdogan  (L)  with  outgoing  military  chief   issues  by  recasting  them  as  inherently   Gen.  Ilker  Basbug  and  soldiers  near  the  Turkey-­Iraq  border   political  problems  resolvable  through   economic  GHYHORSPHQWDQGGLSORPDF\DVRSSRVHGWRPLOLWDU\PLJKW$VORQJDV7XUNH\œVHFRQRP\ remains  stable,  the  military  simply  does  not  have  the  popular  dissatisfaction  necessary  to  form  a   campaign  against  the  AKP  and  Gulenist  forces.  The  Turkish  armed  forces  thus  no  longer  have  the   SRZHUH[FOXVLYHO\WRFKDUW7XUNH\œVSROLWLFDOFRXUVHDQGZKDWHYHUUHPDLQLQJSRZHUWKH\KDYHLQWKH political  arena  continues  to  slip  by  the  day.    


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

Media and  Business:  Challenging  the  Secular  Establishment   Controlling  the  Message   Turke\¶VPHGLDVLWVDWWKHFHQWHURIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRZHUVWUXJJOH1HZVSDSHUVDUHWKHVRXUFHRIOHDNV that  have  thrown  generals  in  jails,  courtrooms  are  filled  with  legal  battles  between  media  agencies  and   op-­eds  spar  daily  over  which  ideological  direction  the  country  should  take.     The  media  is  an  especially  potent  tool  in  the  Gulenist  and  AKP  fight  against  the  armed  forces.  The  vast   majority  of  leaks  in  the  Ergenekon  and  Sledgehammer  probes  mysteriously  emanated  from  a  single   newspaper,  Taraf.  Taraf  was  founded  in  2007  as  a  paper  for  liberal  democrats  shortly  before  the   (UJHQHNRQSUREHZDVODXQFKHG7KH*XOHQLVWVKDLO7DUDIDV7XUNH\¶V³PRVWFRXUDJHRXV´QHZVRXWOHW for  its  detailed  coverage  of  Deep  State.  It  printed  everything  from  telephone  transcripts  of  alleged   FRXSSORWWHUVWRVDWHOOLWHLPDJHU\RI.XUGLVWDQ:RUNHUV¶3DUW\(PKK)  militants  crossing  the  Iraqi-­Turkish   ERUGHUWRGRFXPHQWDOOHJHGPLOLWDU\QHJOLJHQFH:KLOHWKH*XOHQLVWVFODLP7DUDI¶VVXFFHVVLQ investigative  journalism  is  due  to  brave,  disillusioned  soldiers  willing  to  leak  information,  others  within   the  secularist  camp  suspect  the  transfers  of  sensitive  information  to  Taraf  have  arisen  due  to  years  of   successful  infiltration  of  the  armed  forces  by  the  Gulen  movement.  



             ©  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

0RVWRI7XUNH\œVSUHGRPLQDQWO\VHFularist  media,  including  the  dailies  Hurriyet,  Milliyet  and   Cumhurriyet,  have  been  around  as  long  as  the  republic  itself.  Beginning  in  the  mid-­1980s,  however,   Islamist  forces  began  making  their  appearance  in  the  media  world  through  newspapers  like  Zaman,   Star,  and  (since  2007)  Sabah.  Today,  these  newspapers  have  come  to  dominate  the  Turkish  media   landscape,  providing  pro-­AKP  coverage.  Even  in  the  English-­language  arena,  which  is  vital  for  the   outside  world  to  monitor  developments  in  Turkey,  the  Gulenist  TodD\œV=DPDQLVQRZRXWSDFLQJWKH secularist  Hurriyet  Daily  News.  The  Gulenist-­backed  papers  also  have  the  benefit  of  a  massive,  well-­ organized  social  network  to  distribute  newspapers  for  free,  boosting  their  circulation.  Meanwhile,  the   secularist  newspapers  are  increasingly  finding  themselves  faced  with  a  choice  between  pleading   political  neutrality  or  fighting  legal  battles  in  the  courtroom.   The  most  prominent  media  war  in  this  power  struggle  is  being  played  out  between  Dogan  Media,   RZQHGE\RQHRI7XUNH\œs  leading  business  conglomerates,  and  Feza  Yayincilik  media  group,  with   'RJDQœV+XUUL\HWDQG)H]DœV=DPDQQHZVSDSHUVUHVSHFWLYHO\DWWKHHSLFHQWHURIWKHEDWWOH'RJDQ Media  is  extremely  uncomfortable  with  the  shift  toward  one-­party  rule  under  the  AKP,  and  has  publicly   proclaimed  the  need  to  balance  against  the  rapid  growth  of  pro-­AKP/Gulenist  news.  After  the  Dogan   group  devoted  considerable  coverage  to  a  corruption  scandal  involving  money  laundering  through   Islamist  charities  in  Germany  by  senior  members  of  the  Erdogan  government  in  2008,  the  media   group  soon  found  itself  slapped  with  a  $2.5  billion  fine  for  alleged  unpaid  back  taxes.     :KLOHWD[IUDXGLVUHODWLYHO\FRPPRQLQ7XUNH\œVPHGLDVHFWRUDFURVVWKHSROLWLFDOVSHFWUXPDQG'RJDQ Media  was  no  exception,  suspicions  run  deep  that  Dogan  was  singled  out  as  an  example  to  other   media  of  what  can  happen  to  a  powerful  business  tycoon  who  challenges  the  AKP.  Members  within  the   pro-­AKP/Gulenist  media  camp  counter  that  Dogan  got  what  it  deserved,  and  cite  the  fining  of  the   group  as  an  example  of  a  more  democratic  society  that  no  longer  shies  away  from  punishing  powerful   RIIHQGHUV$WWKLVSRLQW7XUNH\œVPHGLDEDWWOHVLQWHUVHFWWKHFRUSRUDWHDUHQDZKHUHDTXLHWDQG brooding  competition  is  being  played  out  between  the  old  Istanbul  elite  and  the  rising  Anatolian  tigers.     Anatolia  Takes  on  the  Istanbul  Business  Elite   $KDQGIXORIVHFXODUIDPLO\FRQJORPHUDWHVEDVHGLQ,VWDQEXOKDYHGRPLQDWHG7XUNH\œVEXVLQHVVVHFWRU IRUGHFDGHVVHUYLQJDV7XUNH\œVHFRQRPLFRXWOHWWR  the  rest  of  the  world.  On  the  other  side  of  the   struggle  stand  the  millions  of  small-­  and  medium-­sized  businesses  with  roots  in  more  religiously  and   socially  conservative  Anatolia.  While  the  secular-­nationalists  still  enjoy  the  upper  hand  in  the  business   world,  the  Anatolian  tigers  are  slowly  gaining  ground.     At  present,  the  Turkish  economy  is  dominated  by  names  like  Sabanci,  Koc,  Dogan,  Dogus,  Zorlu  and   &DOLN'RJDQ0HGLDRFFXSLHVWKHVWDXQFKO\VHFXODUQLFKHRIWKHEXVLQHVVVHFWRUDWRGGVZLWKWKH$.3œV Islamist-­rooted  vision,  and  has  taken  a  public  stand  against  the  ruling  party.  Sabanci  and  Dogus  also   belong  in  the  staunchly  secular  group,  but  tend  to  exhibit  a  more  neutral  stance  in  public  toward  the   AKP  for  business  reasons,  such  as  avoiding  the  sort  of  legal  battles  Dogan  has  faced.  Calik  and  Zorlu   groups  are  far  more  opportunistic:  They  keep  close  political  connections  to  the  AKP  to  secure  business   contracts  and  tolerate  the  Gulen  movement,  though  they  are  not  considered  true  believers  in  the   Islamist  agenda.  The  last  category  consists  of  business  conglomerates  legitimately  pro-­AKP  and   Gulenist,  such  as  Ulker  Group  and  Ihlas  Holding.          


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

7KHOLQHVGLYLGLQJ7XUNH\œVEXVLQHVVPHGLDDQG politics  have  become  increasingly  blurred  over   the  years.  SeverDORI7XUNH\œVSURPLQHQW business  conglomerates  contain  media  outlets,   and  the  AKP  has  worked  to  keep  those  media   outlets  friendly,  or  at  least  neutral.  Those  that   oblige  often  obtain  business  deals  with  the  state,   while  those  that  resist  can  find  themselves   slapped  with  lawsuits  or  having  to  transforming   their  newspapers  into  mostly  apolitical  tabloids   to  avoid  political  pressure.  Calik  Group  is   perhaps  the  most  obvious  example  of  the   corporate  benefits  that  can  follow  a  healthy   relationship  with  the  AKP.  In  April  2007,  the   state-­run  Saving  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  (TMSF)   seized  Sabah  news  agency  in  a  predawn  raid  on   the  charge  of  fraud  of  its  owner.  Sabah  is   7XUNH\œVVHFRQG-­largest  media  group;͞  prior  to   the  raid,  it  was  considered  the  strongest  liberal   and  secular  voice  in  the  Turkish  media.  The   TMSF  sold  the  group  to  Calik  Holding  in  an   auction  in  which  Calik  was  the  sole  bidder,  after   ZKLFK(UGRJDQœVVRQ-­in-­law  became  CEO  of  the   agency.  Loans  from  two  state-­owned  banks   PDGHDOOHJHGO\DW$.3œVXUJLQJ DQGIrom  a   media  agency  based  in  Qatar  financed  the  deal.   Today,  Sabah  is  considered  pro-­AKP.  

ADEM  ALTAN/AFP/Getty  Images   Turkish  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  

This  intersection  between  politics  and  business  can  also  be  seen  in  the  energy  sector.  The  AKP  has  a   strategy  to  boost  four  energy  firms  in  the  country  that  have  aligned  themselves  with  the  ruling  party.   7KHILUPVDUHGLYLGHGDPRQJ7XUNH\¶VIRXUPDLQHQHUJ\DUHDVRILQWHUHVW&LQHU¶V3DUN7HNQLNLQ Russia,  SOM  in  Turkmenistan  and  Azerbaijan,  Inci  in  Iraq,  and  AKSA  in  Turkey.  Park  Teknik  and  AKSA   are  expected  to  work  togHWKHUWRSXUVXHDGHDOZLWK5XVVLDWREXLOG7XUNH\¶VILUVWQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQW   The  AKP  and  Gulen  movement  lack  the   leverage  the  secularist-­nationalists  hold   in  the  banking  sector,  but  that  has  not   stopped  them  from  finding  resources  to   finance  strategic  projects,  as  the  Sabah   takeover  demonstrates.  Banks  such  as   Turkiye  Is  Bankasi  -­-­  created  by  Ataturk   in  the  early  days  of  the  republic  to   maintain  a  secular  stronghold  on  the   FRXQWU\¶VILQDQFHV-­-­  are  difficult  to   compete  with,  but  state-­owned  Ziraat   Bankasi  has  increasingly  become  the   $.3¶VJR-­to  bank.  Ziraat  bank  CEO  Can   Akin  Caglar  comes  from  a  pro-­ AKP/Gulenist  background.  Prior  to   becoming  Ziraat  CEO  in  2003,  he  worked   for  Turkiye  Finans  Bank,  a  known   conservative  bank  owned  jointly  by  Ulker   and  Boydak  Groups.  (Ulker  is  a  staunchly  pro-­AKP/Gulenist  business  conglomerate.)  Later,  60  percent   RILWVVKDUHVZHUHVROGWR6DXGL$UDELD¶V1DWLRQDO&RPPHUFLDO%DQNLQ7KH*XOHQPRYHPHQWDOVR deposits  much  of  the  donations  it  receives  with  Turkiye  Finans,  now  named  Bank  Asya.  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

The  Gulenist  Business  Cycle   The  AKP  and  Gulen  movement  recognize  the  lack  of  space  for  competition  with  the  Western-­oriented   trade  markets  ruled  by  Koc,  Sabanci  and  the  other  secularist  business  elites.  Instead,  the  Islamist   forces  have  created  their  own  business  model,  one  that  speaks  for  Anatolia  and  focuses  on  accessing   markets  in  places  like  the  Middle  East,  Africa,  Central  Asia,  Latin  America  and  the  Asia-­Pacific  region.   7KHGULYHUVEHKLQGWKLVEXVLQHVVFDPSDLJQDUH7XUNH\œV,QGHSHQGHQW,QGXVWULDOLVWVDQG%XVLQHVVPHQœV Association  (MUSIAD)  and  Turkish  Confederation  of  Businessmen  and  Industrialists  (TUSKON),  made   up  of  thousands  of  small-­  and  medium-­sized  business  owners.  TUSKON  has  existed  for  just  five  years,   but  is  slowly  emerging  as  an  alternative  to  the  larger,  and  more  well-­established  business  associations   OLNH7XUNLVK,QGXVWULDOLVWVœDQG%XVLQHVVPHQœV$VVRFLDWLRQ 786,$' ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWELJ-­name  firms   like  Sabanci,  Koc  and  Dogan  (and,  which  as  expected,  support  the  secularists).   As  opposed  to  the  Istanbul-­entrenched  secularist  corporations,  most  businessmen  who  belong  to   TUSKON  and  MUSIAD  hail  from  small,  generally  poorer  and  religiously  conservative  towns  and  cities   across  Anatolia.  TUSKON  is  tightly  linked  into  the  Gulen  movement  and  forms  an  integral  part  of  the   Gulenist  business,  education,  political  and  even  foreign  intelligence  agenda.  The  business  association   organizes  massive  business  conferences  in  various  parts  of  the  globe  attended  by  high-­level  AKP   officials  that  aim  to  bring  hundreds  of  Turkish  businessmen  into  contact  with  their  foreign   counterparts.  While  there  are  variations  to  how  the  Gulenist  business  cycle  works,  the  following  is  a   basic  example:   A  small-­business  owner  from  the  eastern  Anatolian  city  of  Gaziantep  makes  a  living  manufacturing  and   selling  shirt  buttons.  A  Gulenist  invites  the  buttonmaker  to  a  TUSKON  business  conference  in  Africa,   where  he  will  be  put  into  contact  with  a  shirtmaker  from  Tanzania  who  will  buy  his  buttons.  The   Turkish  buttonmaker  and  the  Tanzanian  shirtmaker  are  then  incorporated  into  a  broader  supply  chain   that  provides  both  with  business  across  continents,  wherever  the  Gulenists  operate.  In  short,  the   Anatolian  buttonmaker  can  expand  his  business  tenfold  or  more  if  he  belongs  to  the  Gulenist  network.   In  return,  the  Gulen  movement  will  ask  the  buttonmaker  to  provide  financial  support  for  the   development  of  Gulenist  programs  and  schools  in  Tanzania.  The  end  result  is  a  well-­oiled  and  well-­ financed  business  and  education  network  spanning  115  countries  across  the  globe.  Not  only  do  these   business  links  translate  into  votes  when  elections  roll  around,  they  also  (along  with  the  schools)  form   WKHEDFNERQHRIWKH$.3œVVRIWSRZHUVWUDWHJ\LQWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\VSKHUH  

Foreign  Policy:  Enabling  the  Rise   The  Gulenist  WUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNLVDQDWXUDOFRPSOHPHQWWRWKH$.3œVIRUHLJQSROLF\DJHQGD:KLOH many  within  the  secularist  and  nationalist  camp  are  highly  uncomfortable  with  the  notion  of  Pan-­ Islamism  and  Pan-­Turkism  ²  strategies  that,  in  their  eyes,  brought  about  the  collapse  of  the  Ottoman   Empire  ²  AKP  followers  embrace  their  Ottoman  past  and  favor  an  expansionist  agenda.  As  espoused   by  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  Turkey  is  a  unique  geopolitical  power,  at  the  same  time   European  and  Asian,  Middle  Eastern  and  Central  Asian,  Balkan  and  Caucasian  and  straddling  the  Black,   &DVSLDQDQG0HGLWHUUDQHDQVHDV,QWKH$.3œVYLHZ7XUNH\œVSRWHQWLDOLVJUHDWDQGWKRXJKLWVKLHV DZD\IURPWKHWHUP³QHR-­2WWRPDQLVP´IRUIHDURISURYRNLQJDQLPSHULDOLPDJHLWLVGLfficult  to  see   7XUNH\œVFXUUHQWIRUHLJQSROLF\DVDQ\WKLQJEXWDGULYHWRUHWXUQWRLWV2WWRPDQVSKHUHRILQIOXHQFH   0HPEHUVRIWKHVHFXODULVWFDPSKLVWRULFDOO\KDYHGRPLQDWHG7XUNH\œV0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV7KH\ continue  to  maintain  a  strong  presence  in  Turkish  embassies,  since  Turkish  diplomats,  as  in  many   countries,  generally  must  serve  an  average  of  20  years  before  they  reach  a  position  of  influence.  But   this,  too,  is  gradually  shifting  under  AKP  rule:  Foreign  Ministry  sources  report  than  an  increasing   number  of  graduates  from  Gulenist  schools  are  being  recruited  into  the  diplomatic  service.  To  help   speed  up  the  Islamist  integration  with  the  Foreign  Ministry,  the  AKP-­led  government  has  passed   legislation  to  allow  Turks  to  become  ambassadors  at  younger  ages  ²  lowered  from  45  to  35.  Turkey   has  also  accelerated  the  opening  of  embassies  in  countries  where  the  Gulen  movement  has  a  strong  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

presence.  In  2009  alone,  Turkey  opened  10  new  embassies,  the  majority  of  them  in  Africa.  These   cities  included  Dar  es  Salaam  (Tanzania),  Accra  (Ghana),  Maputo  (Mozambique),  Antananarivo   0DGDJDVFDU $ELGMDQ &RWHG¶,YRLUH <DRXQGH &DPHURRQ /XDQGD $QJROD %DPDNR 0DOL 1LDPH\ 1LJHU 1¶'MDPHQD &KDG %RJRWa  (Colombia)  and  Valetta  (Malta).  In  addition,  Turkey  uses  its   foreign  policy  arm  to  negotiate  with  countries  across  the  Middle  East,  Eurasia  and  Africa  to  eliminate   visa  restrictions  and  open  up  new  markets  for  Anatolian  businessmen.   The  Turkish  Cooperation  Development  Agency  (TIKA)  is  also  key  to  these  foreign  policy  efforts.  The   Turkish  government  created  TIKA  in  the  early  1990s  to  forge  ties  with  former  Soviet  countries  with   which  it  enjoyed  a  shared  Turkic  heritage,  though  TIKA  did  not  make  much  headway  initially.  The  AKP,   however,  reinvigorated  the  TIKA  in  recent  years  for  use  as  a  public  diplomacy  tool,  transforming  it  into   a  highly  active  development  agency.  Davutoglu  has  even  referred  to  TIKA  as  a  second  foreign   mLQLVWU\7,.$¶VGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVSDUWLFXODUO\LQ&HQWUDO$VLDDQG$IUica,  overlap  heavily  with  the   *XOHQPRYHPHQW$VPHQWLRQHG7XUNH\¶VQHZQDWLRQDOLQWHOOLJHQFHFKLHI+DNDQ)LGDQ²  who  shares   WKH$.3¶VYLVLRQIRUDQH[SDQVLRQLVWIRUHLJQSROLF\²  formerly  headed  TIKA.   Some  Gulenists  privately  boast  that  their  institutions  abroad,  whether  schools,  hospitals  or  other  types   of  developmental  agencies,  serve  as  useful  intelligence  satellites  for  the  Foreign  Ministry.  If  a  problem   erupts  in  a  country  in  Central  Asia,  for  example,  where  press  freedoms  are  nonexistent  and   information  is  extremely  difficult  to  come  by,  the  Foreign  Ministry  can  tap  local  Gulenist  contacts  for   information  and  to  facilitate  government  contacts.  Gulenists  abroad  often  learn  local  languages,   allowing  them  to  act  as  Turkish  translators.  They  have  also  developed  close  relationships  with  foreign   governments  through  their  work  as  well  as  their  students,  who  often  are  sons  and  daughters  of  the   local  political  elite.     Success  in  Image  Control   AKP  officials  often  deny  Gulenist  claims  of  serving  as  intelligence  satellites  for  fear  the  AKP  could  be   seen  as  pursuing  a  subversive  global  Islamist  agenda.  Indeed,  some  on  the  far  left  in  Turkey  have   characterized  the  Gulen  movement  as  a  group  of  violent  Islamist  extremists  ultimately  aiming  to   impose  Shariah  in  Turkey.  Though  inaccurate,  this  view  belongs  to  a  fringe  group  within  the  secularist   FDPSWKDWZDQWVWRUHYHUVH7XUNH\¶VWUDMHFWRU\   For  this  reason,  the  AKP  has  made  a  considerable  effort  to  pursue  negotiations  with  the  European   Union  for  full-­fledged  membership  despite  the  high  probability  such  talks  are  unlikely  to  lead   anywhere.  Poll  numbers  reveal  how  Turks  increasingly  are  realizing  that  the  chances  of  EU   membership  have  become  a  distant  possibility.  Yet  the  AKP  cannot  afford  to  allow  that  disillusionment   to  seep  into  its  foreign  policy.  Candidates  for  EU  membership  must  have  a  modern  economy,  a  military   under  civilian  control  and  an  image  of  secularism.  Privately,  AKP  officials  agree  that  unanimous  EU   approval  for  Turkish  membership  would  be  extraordinarily  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  attain.  But   were  Turkey  to  drop  its  bid,  turned  its  gaze  solely  toward  Asia,  and  proceeded  with  a  Pan-­Islamic   foreign  policy,  the  party  would  have  a  much  more  difficult  time  arguing  that  it  is  not  the  threatening   Islamist  power  the  secularists  have  sought  to  paint  it  as  being.  Instead,  the  AKP  and  the  Gulenists   want  to  portray  themselves  as  having  everything  in  common  with  the  liberal,  democratic  values  of  the   West  ²  and  that  these  very  values  have  driven  its  efforts  to  bring  the  military  under  civilian  control.     ,PDJHFRQWUROEHFRPHVHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWLQ7XUNH\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV Conspiracy  theories  run  rife  in  Turkey,  and  both  sides  of  the  power  struggle  will  argue  that  the  United   States  is  backing  onHIDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHRWKHU)RUH[DPSOHVRPHVHFXODULVWVSRLQWWR*XOHQ¶V 3HQQV\OYDQLDUHVLGHQF\DQGKLVSROLWLFDODV\OXPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDV³HYLGHQFH´WKH86 JRYHUQPHQWVXSSRUWVWKH$.3¶VULVH$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKH,VODPLVWVZLOOFODLPWKDWWKHUnited  States   EDFNVWKHVHFXODULVWVDQGSURYLGHGFRYHUWVXSSRUWIRUWKH³VRIWFRXS´DWWHPSWE\WKHVHFXODULVW-­ dominated  courts  to  ban  the  AKP.  Despite  these  charges  being  contradictory,  the  AKP  is  very   conscious  of  the  need  to  present  itself  as  a  nonthreatening,  democratic  power  with  an  Islamist   background  capable  of  facilitating  U.S.  objectives  in  the  Islamic  world.  This  explains  why,  despite  its  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

VWURQJFRQYLFWLRQVWKDW,VUDHOœVDFWLRQVDJDLQVWWKH7XUNLVKDLGIORWLOODZHUHLQH[FXVDEOHWKH$.3TXLHWly  dispatched  a  delegation  to  Washington  to  mitigate  some  of  the  damage  that  was  inflicted  on  the  U.S.-­ Turkish  relationship  over  the  incident.  Likewise,  as  the  Gulen  movement  demonstrated  in  the  wake  of   the  flotilla  crisis,  the  Gulenists  will  occasionally  publicize  their  disagreements  with  the  AKP  on  certain   issues  in  an  attempt  to  present  their  movement  as  a  more  compatible  partner  with  the  West.   Keeping  Turkeyœs  EU  bid  alive  and  relations  with  Washington  on  an  even  keel  will  thus  help  the   Islamists  undermine  secularist  efforts  to  portray  the  AKP  in  a  negative  light  abroad.  Though  the  AKP   will  continue  to  keep  a  fair  bit  of  distance  from  the  Gulen  in  its  dealings  abroad  to  protect  this  image,   the  Gulenist  transnational  network  undeniably  gives  the  AKP  economic  reach,  social  influence  and   SROLWLFDOOLQNDJHVYLWDOWR$QNDUDœVIRUHLJQSROLF\  

Judiciary:  Neutralizing  the  High  Courts   Whether  the  issue  is  headscarves  worn  in  universities,  media  firms  charged  with  tax  evasion  or   soldiers  charged  with  coup-­plotting,  YLUWXDOO\HYHU\VWUDQGRI7XUNH\ÂśVSRZHUVWUXJJOHHYHQWXDOO\ILQGV its  way  to  the  courts.     The  dividing  line  in  the  judiciary  lies  between  the  secularist-­dominated  high  courts  and  the  AKP-­ influenced  low  courts.  This  division  results  in  a  dizzying  judicial  system  in  which  court  rulings  are  often   mired  in  political  mayhem.     7KHKLJKMXGLFLDU\LQ7XUNH\LVPDGHXSRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW RUÂł$QD\DVD0DKNHPHVL´LQ 7XUNLVK WKH+LJK&RXUWRI$SSHDOV Âł<DUJĂ&#x2022;WD\´ WKH6WDWH&RXQFLO Âł'DQLVWD\´ DQGWKH+LJK3DQHO Supreme  Board  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  (HSYK).  The  seven-­member  HSYK  plays  an  instrumental   role  in  the  appointment  of  judges  and  prosecutors.  In  the  current  system,  the  HSYK  is  composed  of   the  justice  minister,  the  justice  ministerÂśs  undersecretary,  three  members  appointed  by  Yargitay  and   two  by  Danistay.  The  secularists  have  long  controlled  the  most  powerful  judicial  institutions.   The  headscarf  controversy  is  perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  the  struggle  between  religious  and   VHFXODULVWIRUFHVLQWKHMXGLFLDU\7XUNH\ÂśVVHFXODULVW-­dominated  State  Council  has  long  barred  Turkish   women  from  wearing  the  headscarf  in  the  public  sector,  making  it  difficult  for  religious  females  in   Turkey  to  seek  a  university  education  or  a  career  in  the  government,  judiciary  or  state-­run  education   system.  The  AKP  obtained  sufficient  votes  for  a  proposed  amendment  in  2008  to  lift  the  headscarf  ban,   but  the  secularist-­controlled  Constitutional  Court  annulled  the  proposed  amendment  four  months  later   in  a  non-­appealable  decision.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  two  sides  butted  heads  again  when  the   &RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWWKUHDWHQHGWREDQWKH$.3RQWKHFKDUJHRIEHLQJÂłWKHIRFXVRIDFWLYLWLHVDJDLQst   VHFXODULVP´7KH$.3HVFDSHGWKHEDQEXWDWWKHFRVWRIEDFNLQJRIIIURPWKHKHDGVFDUIEDQIRUQRZ   Secularists  continue  to  hold  the  upper  hand  against  the  Islamists  in  the  judiciary.  Through  their   dominance  of  the  high  courts,  the  secularists  hold  the  single  most  potent  weapon  in  this  struggle:  The   ability  to  ban  political  parties  for  violating  the  secular  tradition  of  the  state.  The  AKP  is  all  too  familiar   with  this  threat.  The  Constitutional  Court  has  banned  three  AKP  predecessors  ²  Milli  Selamet  Partisi   (in  1980),  Refah  Partisi  (in  1998)  and  Fazilet  Partisi  (in  2001)  ²  IRUÂłEHFRPLQJWKHIRFXVRIDQWL-­ VHFXODULVWDFWLYLWLHV´7KRXJKWKH$.3LVIDUPRUHPRGHUDWHLQLWVDSSURDFKWKDQLWVSUHGHFHVVRUVLW just  barely  escaped  a  ban  in  2008  over  the  headscarf  issue  over  the  same  charge.  So  far,  each  time   the  court  has  struck  the  party,  the  AKP  has  come  back  even  more  resolute  in  its  determination  to   undermine  the  secularists.  Now,  the  AKP  is  ready  to  take  on  the  judiciary  with  a  package  of   constitutional  amendments  designed  to  strip  the  secularists  of  their  judicial  control.   With  some  modifications,  this  package  of  constitutional  amendments  calls  for  several  critical  changes.   One  is  the  restructuring  of  the  Constitutional  Court  and  HSYK,  ending  the  secularist  monopoly  and   giving  the  lower  judiciary  more  clout.  For  example,  the  HYSK  reforms  call  for  increasing  its   membership  from  seven  to  21,  10  of  whom  would  be  selected  by  12,000  judges  and  prosecutors  in  


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

lower  courts  across  the  country  ²  where  the  AKP  enjoys  significant  influence  ²  while  five  would  be   appointed  by  the  president.  Another  calls  for  binding  party  dissolution  cases  to  parliamentary   DSSURYDOWKHUHE\QHXWHULQJWKHKLJKHVWFRXUW¶VDELOLW\WREDQWKHSDUW\DWZLOOZKHQHYHUWKHVHFXODULVW-­ Islamist  balance  tilts  toward  the  Islamists.  This  last  resolution  has  not  made  it  out  of  the  parliament,   though  the  AKP  is  sure  to  try  again  when  the  political  climate  is  more  conducive  to  success.   As  expected,  secularists  in  the  high  courts  and  the  parliament  ²  with  behind-­the-­scenes  military   backing  ²  strongly  oppose  these  changes,  charging  that  they  will  eliminate  checks  and  balances  in  the   JRYHUQPHQW7KH\DOVRFODLPWKDWWKHUHIRUPVDUHLOOHJDODV$UWLFOHRI7XUNH\¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQ states  that  amendments  to  the  first  three  articles  of  the  Constitution  ²  articles  which  declare  Turkey  a   Turkish-­speaking,  democratic  and  secular  republic  loyal  to  the  nationalism  of  Ataturk  ²  cannot  be   proposed,  much  less  implemented.  Once  again,  both  sides  are  seeking  to  seize  the  mantel  of   democracy,  as  the  Islamists  counter  that  an  unelectable  cabal  runs  the  judiciary,  and  that  these   constitutional  reforms  are  necessary  to  make  Turkey  more  pluralistic  and  in  line  with  Western   standards  of  government.     The  package  of  constitutional  amendments  got  approval  from  the  Constitutional  Court  and  barely   PDGHLWWKURXJK7XUNH\¶VSDUOLDPHQWRQ0D\ZLWKYRWHVLQIDYRU:KLOHWKLVSDVVHGWKH threshold  needed  for  the  government  to  put  the  proposals  to  a  referendum,  the  parliamentary  vote  fell   short  of  the  two-­thirds  majority  needed  to  adopt  the  amendments  without  a  referendum.  The  public   referendum  will  be  held  Sept.  12,  the  anniversary  of  the  1980  military  coup.   The  battle  lines  are  thus  drawn,  and  the   struggle  will  be  fierce  in  the  months   ahead.  AKP  and  Gulen  leaders  cannot   claim  with  confidence  that  the   referendum  will  pass,  but  if  it  does,  the   Islamists  will  establish  the  legal   foundation  to  accelerate  their  political   rise.  If  the  referendum  collapses,  the   secularists  will  retain  the  most  critical   weapon  in  their  arsenal  to  uphold  the   Kemalist  traditions  of  the  republic.  Even  if   the  referendum  fails,  however,  the   struggle  will  be  far  from  over.  The  next   phase  of  the  battle  will  be  the  2011   elections,  which  the  AKP  is  counting  on  to   win  a  supermajority  in  the  parliament  to   draft  an  entirely  new  Constitution  that   would  further  cement  its  power.  Following   ADEM  ALTAN/AFP/Getty  Images   A  man  holds  a  portrait  RI0XVWDID.HPDO$WDWXUNLQIURQWRI$WDWXUN¶V the  flotilla  crisis,  the  AKP  is  likely  to  have   mausoleum  in  Ankara   a  more  difficult  time  in  trying  to  achieve   this  goal  after  seeing  its  response  to  the   LQFLGHQWEDFNILUHERWKDWKRPHDQGDEURDG7KHPDLQRSSRVLWLRQVHFXODULVWSDUWLHVWKH3HRSOH¶V Republican  Party  (CHP)  and  National  Movement  Party  (MHP),  were  quick  to  seize  the  opportunity  and   blame  the  AKP  for  mismanaging  the  crisis  and  making  Turkey  appear  reckless  abroad.  The  post-­flotilla   backlash,  combined  with  a  recent  rise  in  PKK  attacks,  have  even  led  the  AKP  to  make  concessions  to   the  secularist  opposition,  including  a  recent  court  decision  to  free  some  of  those  accused  in  the   SledgehammeUSUREH6WLOOHYHQWKRXJKWKH$.3¶VULYDOVKDYHVHYHUDORSSRUWXQLWLHVDWKDQGWKH\DUH no  longer  dealing  with  the  AKP  from  an  obvious  position  of  strength.  The  struggle  of  the  secularists   and  the  advent  of  the  Anatolian  masses  is  a  factional  feud  that  defies  an  easy  resolution,  but  is  a   QHFHVVDU\FRPSRQHQWRI7XUNH\¶VUHJLRQDOULVH        


              Š  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

STRATFOR is  the  world  leader  in  global  intelligence.  Our  team  of  experts  collects  and  analyzes   intelligence  from  every  part  of  the  world  -­-­  offering  unparalleled  insights  through  our  exclusively   published  analyses  and  forecasts.  Whether  it  is  on  political,  economic  or  military  developments,   STRATFOR  not  only  provides  its  members  with  a  better  understanding  of  current  issues  and  events,   but  invaluable  assessments  of  what  lies  ahead.     Renowned  author  George  Friedman  founded  STRATFOR  in  1996.  Most  recently,  he  authored  the   international  bestseller,  The  Next  100  Years.  Dr.  Friedman  is  supported  by  a  team  of  professionals  with   widespread  experience,  many  of  whom  are  internationally  recognized  in  their  own  right.  Although  its   headquarters  are  in  Austin,  Texas,  STRATFOR¶s  staff  is  widely  distributed  throughout  the  world.     ³Barron¶s  has  consistently  found  STRATFOR¶s  insights  informative  and  largely  on  the  money-­as  has  the   company¶s  large  client  base,  which  ranges  from  corporations  to  media  outlets  and  government   agencies.´  -­-­  Barron¶s     What  We  Offer   On  a  daily  basis,  STRATFOR  members  are  made  aware  of  what  really  matters  on  an  international   scale.  At  the  heart  of  STRATFOR¶s  service  lies  a  series  of  analyses  which  are  written  without  bias  or   political  preferences.  We  assume  our  readers  not  only  want  international  news,  but  insight  into  the   developments  behind  it.     In  addition  to  analyses,  STRATFOR  members  also  receive  access  to  an  endless  supply  of  SITREPS   (situational  reports),  our  heavily  vetted  vehicle  for  providing  breaking  geopolitical  news.  To  complete   the  STRATFOR  service,  we  publish  an  ongoing  series  of  geopolitical  monographs  and  assessments   which  offer  rigorous  forecasts  of  future  world  developments.     The  STRATFOR  Difference   STRATFOR  members  quickly  come  to  realize  the  difference  between  intelligence  and  journalism.  We   are  not  the  purveyors  of  gossip  or  trivia.  We  never  forget  the  need  to  explain  why  any  event  or  issue   has  significance  and  we  use  global  intelligence  not  quotes.     STRATFOR  also  provides  corporate  and  institutional  memberships  for  multi-­users.  Our  intelligence   professionals  provide  Executive  Briefings  for  corporate  events  and  board  of  directors  meetings  and   routinely  appear  as  speakers  at  conferences.  For  more  information  on  corporate  or  institutional   services  please  contact      


             ©  2010  STRATFOR            Austin,  TX  78701            Tel:  1-­512-­744-­4300          

Global İstihbarat Şirketi'nin Türkiye raporu  
Global İstihbarat Şirketi'nin Türkiye raporu  

Benim eğitimli ama gerizekalı halkım okusunda görsün. Hadi buradakiler abartıyor yalan söylüyor diyelim, elin istihbaratçıları da mı yalan s...