Issuu on Google+

RELATÓRIO


A Europa e África num Mundo Multipolar XXV Conferência Internacional de Lisboa Relatório da Conferência realizada a 4 e 5 de Dezembro de 2007

Coordenação & Edição Fernando Jorge Cardoso Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira Rita Pais

Publicado por Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI) Largo S. Sebastião, 8 1600-762 Lisboa, Portugal Telf. + 351 - 210 306 700 Fax: + 351 - 217 593 983 ieei@ieei.pt www.ieei.pt

Maio de 2008


Pag.

Introdução

4

I.

8

Europa e África num Mundo Multipolar

Enquadramento Os valores no diálogo Europa-África, FERNANDO PACHECO Multipolaridade e multilateralismo, THOMAS LAWO A Parceria Estratégica Continental shift? Redefining EU-Africa relations, JOHN KOTSOPOULOS AND ELIZABETH SIDIROPOULOS Outros Documentos e Links úteis

II.

Pilares do Diálogo Europa-África

31

SEGURANÇA Enquadramento Facing African security challenges: are European and African interests and responsibilities converging?, FERNANDA FARIA EU and Africa: a few contentious points on security policies, ROLAND MARCHAL Outros Documentos e Links úteis DESENVOLVIMENTO Enquadramento The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: what role in a changing world? Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations, GEERT LAPORTE Outros Documentos e Links úteis GOVERNAÇÃO Enquadramento Ajuda externa e governação democrática, CARIN NORBERG Outros Documentos e Links úteis

III.

O Papel da Sociedade Civil nas Parcerias Estratégicas

83

A Europe-Africa Research Network (EARN)

IV.

Programa da Conferência

92


Introdução

A II Cimeira de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da União Europeia e da África decorreu a 8 e 9 de Dezembro, em Lisboa, sob a égide da Presidência Portuguesa da UE. Desde 2000, data em que os dirigentes se encontraram pela primeira vez no Cairo, muito mudou no contexto internacional e nas realidades dos dois continentes. Por um lado, no plano global, a proeminência do terrorismo como elemento fundamental na segurança internacional teve como consequência um ressurgimento da importância geoestratégica do continente africano, em boa medida perdida no período pós-Guerra Fria. Para os Estados Unidos, a África Subsaariana tornou-se, para além disso, uma das fontes energéticas prioritárias de fornecimento de petróleo, devido à instabilidade das fontes do Médio Oriente. Por outro lado, a emergência de novos actores no sistema político internacional – como a China – está actualmente a determinar uma reformulação dos equilíbrios estratégicos, na qual África desempenha um papel relevante. O investimento e o comércio chineses em África, sem condicionalidades políticas e determinado em grande medida pela procura de matérias-primas que sustentem um crescimento económico acelerado, veio conferir aos países africanos um maior poder negocial com outros parceiros (nomeadamente com a Europa) e motivar a reflexão europeia sobre o relacionamento com o continente africano. Para além disso, salientam-se várias alterações institucionais e no processo de integração no seio dos dois blocos. Do lado europeu, o desenvolvimento de uma Política Externa e de Segurança Comum (PESC) e de uma Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa (PESD) coincidiram com uma maior ambição de projecção política do projecto europeu na cena internacional, que possa aproximar-se à sua importância em termos comerciais e da ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento. A UE no seu conjunto (CE e Estados membros) é o principal parceiro de desenvolvimento de África em termos quantitativos – é origem de mais de metade da ajuda internacional e 52% da ajuda europeia tem como destino o continente africano. Do lado africano, o lançamento da Nova Parceria para o Desenvolvimento de África (NEPAD), em 2001, e principalmente da União Africana (UA) – em substituição da OUA – em 2002, reforçaram a tendência para formular respostas internas e abrangentes para os problemas africanos. Este novo quadro institucional foi determinante no reforço das relações com a Europa, na medida em que criou um interlocutor institucional mais forte, organizado e pragmático, ao nível continental. A estratégia conjunta UE-África, definida pelas duas partes através de um processo de negociações e de consulta pública, pode representar uma nova fase no relacionamento entre os dois continentes. Se a primeira Cimeira foi marcada por questões políticas simbólicas e pela evocação do passado colonial, a Cimeira de Lisboa caracterizou-se por um maior pragmatismo, de resolução de problemas concretos e de procura de interesses e oportunidades comuns. A Estratégia Conjunta é inspirada por uma nova visão, que pretende mover a parceria UE-África: •

Para além do desenvolvimento – através de uma parceria política, que estabeleça um diálogo profundo e regular sobre questões de interesse de ambas as partes, a procura de benefícios mútuos em relação a assuntos políticos (como a governação ou as migrações, entre outros) e uma mudança de atitudes no sentido de construir uma parceria entre iguais.

Para além de África – através de respostas mais concertadas aos desafios da globalização, promovendo agendas comuns nos fora internacionais, definindo posições comuns sobre conflitos globais e pressionando para uma representação mais forte de África nas instituições internacionais.

4


Para além das instituições – desenvolvendo uma parceria centrada nas pessoas, que inclua consultas alargadas à sociedade civil, a criação de uma plataforma de diálogo e de concretização da Estratégia Conjunta e a intensificação das relações entre os Parlamentos Europeu e Pan-Africano.

Para além da fragmentação de quadros de relacionamento (a Parceria EuroMediterrânica, a Política Europeia de Vizinhança, o Acordo de Cotonou com a África Subsaariana e a Parceria com a África do Sul) – através de uma estratégia abrangente que equacione os problemas e desafios do continente africano no seu todo.

O Plano de Acção aprovado na Cimeira identifica oito parcerias, com as respectivas acções: Parcerias Paz e Segurança

Boa Governação e Direitos Humanos

Acções Prioritárias • • •

Aprofundar o diálogo sobre desafios à paz e segurança; Operacionalização da arquitectura de paz e segurança em África; Garantia de financiamento das operações de paz africanas.

• •

Aprofundar o diálogo bilateral e global sobre este tópico; Promover o Mecanismo Africano de Avaliação pelos Pares e apoiar a Carta Africana sobre Democracia, Eleições e Governação; Reforçar a cooperação no âmbito dos bens culturais.

• Comércio e Integração Regional

• • •

Apoiar a agenda de integração africana; Reforçar as capacidades africanas na área de regras, standards e controlo de qualidade; Implementação da parceria no domínio das infra-estruturas;

Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio

• •

Assegurar o financiamento e base política para o alcance dos ODMs; Acelerar o alcance dos ODMs sobre segurança alimentar, saúde e educação.

Energia

Implementar a parceria sobre infra-estruturas e intensificar a cooperação no domínio da segurança e acesso a fontes energéticas.

Construir uma agenda comum sobre políticas de cooperação no campo das alterações climáticas; Cooperação no combate à degradação da terra e aridez dos solos, incluindo no âmbito da iniciativa “Green Wall for the Sahara”

Alterações Climáticas

• •

Implementar a Declaração de Tripoli sobre Migrações e Desenvolvimento, bem como o Plano de Acção UE-África sobre Tráfico de Seres Humanos, e a Declaração de Ouagadougou sobre Emprego e Alívio da Pobreza em África.

Apoiar o desenvolvimento de uma sociedade de informação inclusiva em África; Apoiar a formação de capacidades em ciência e tecnologia e implementar o Plano de Acção Consolidado Africano sobre Ciência e Tecnologia; Aumentar a cooperação no âmbito da tecnologia espacial e suas aplicações.

Migração, Mobilidade e Emprego

Ciência, Sociedade de Informação e Espaço

É igualmente estabelecida uma arquitectura institucional que prevê reuniões de monitorização e acompanhamento a vários níveis, até à realização da próxima Cimeira, em 2010. A presente Cimeira constituiu, assim, apenas o início de um processo que enfrenta grandes desafios. Com efeito, se a UE pretende manter uma relação privilegiada com o continente africano, deve estar disposta a reforçar e reinventar a sua actual relação a todos os níveis – institucional, político e económico –, através de propostas e resultados práticos, tendo em conta a emergência de outros actores na esfera africana.

5


Um dos maiores desafios está certamente em aproximar esta parceria dos cidadãos, para que não seja resultado apenas de uma negociação política entre altas esferas de governo, mas possa contar com a participação dos mais variados actores nos dois continentes, nomeadamente a sociedade civil e o sector privado. A XXV Conferência Internacional de Lisboa (CIL) do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, sob o título de A Europa e África num Mundo Multipolar, realizou-se nas vésperas da II Cimeira UE-África e pretendeu ser um contributo para os debates sobre este relacionamento, através da participação de um vasto leque de actores, entre os quais se contam representantes de institutos, centros e redes europeus e africanos, académicos, estudantes, jornalistas, membros de várias organizações da sociedade civil, empresários e também decisores políticos. A conferência foi pensada e organizada no contexto deste novo quadro de relacionamento UEÁfrica e, por isso, o seu programa de trabalho abarcou os eixos temáticos da Parceria. Assim, os debates (conforme o programa em anexo) contemplaram a análise dos valores no diálogo EuropaÁfrica; as questões da multipolaridade e multilateralismo; os desafios no campo da paz e segurança; vários aspectos da integração e do regionalismo; as dimensões do desenvolvimento e matérias-primas; a governação democrática e ajuda externa; bem como o papel da sociedade civil nas parcerias estratégicas. Transversais aos vários painéis encontra-se a interligação entre segurança, desenvolvimento e governação e o debate sobre valores, interesses e critérios de acção comuns entre a União Europeia e África. O papel das instituições regionais, estatais e da sociedade civil foi igualmente focado em diversas sessões, contribuindo para a abrangência a multidimensionalidade dos debates. Temas da Conferência Os valores no diálogo Europa - África O balanço entre valores fundamentais (direitos humanos, democracia, Estado de direito) e interesses nas relações Europa-África. Que coerência entre a defesa de valores e o tratamento de minorias, migrantes ou refugiados em solo europeu e africano? Multipolaridade e multilateralismo A União Europeia e a União Africana num contexto de multipolaridade assimétrica. Que multilateralismo face ao papel de alguns dos actores do sistema internacional, como os EUA, a China, a Rússia, o Brasil, a Índia ou a África do Sul? Paz e segurança O papel dos Estados e da comunidade internacional face à ocorrência de tragédias humanitárias, ao terrorismo e a ameaças à segurança internacional. Que cooperação entre a Europa e a África para a resolução de conflitos violentos e a promoção da paz? Integração e regionalismo As diferenças nos processos de integração e regionalismo na Europa e em África. Que impacto nas organizações regionais africanas das divergências de arquitectura entre as brigadas da Standby Force e os Acordos de Parceria Económica com a União Europeia? Desenvolvimento e matérias-primas A competição nos mercados de matérias primas e energia (petróleo, gás, carvão, urânio, bio-combustível) e o papel dos actores externos e internos (Estados, empresas). Que comparação com o final do século XIX? Governação democrática e ajuda externa O impacto da acção externa na governação democrática. Que relação entre critérios de adesão e pertença à União Europeia e critérios da ajuda externa (condicionalidades) a países africanos? A sociedade civil nas parcerias estratégicas A sociedade civil nas parcerias estratégicas entre a União Europeia e África. Que papel para as redes euroafricanas no debate, acompanhamento e elaboração de propostas sobre os temas estratégicos da agenda comum?

6


O objectivo do presente relatório é apresentar algumas contribuições dos intervenientes nos debates e sumarizar os principais desafios que se colocam ao relacionamento entre os dois continentes, organizando essa informação em três grandes pilares do diálogo euro-africano: Segurança, Desenvolvimento e Governação. A criação de uma rede formada por institutos europeus e africanos de relações internacionais e de desenvolvimento figura num capítulo à parte, tal como foi apresentada em painel especial no decurso da conferência. A rede (Europe-Africa Research Network – EARN) pretende contribuir com reflexões e propostas no debate sobre temas estratégicos do relacionamento entre os dois continentes, visando aumentar o protagonismo e o envolvimento da sociedade civil em parcerias estratégicas e no diálogo euro-africano.

7


I.

Europa e África num Mundo Multipolar

Enquadramento A primeira década do século XXI tem sido marcada pelo acentuar dos processos e dinâmicas da globalização que, embora alguns argumentem que não é um fenómeno novo, nem sequer recente, é agora inegavelmente mais expressivo na vida quotidiana dos cidadãos, mas também dos Estados e das organizações internacionais e multilaterais. Surgiram novos desafios, como a luta contra o terrorismo, o tráfico de seres humanos e a criminalidade económica transnacional. Outros problemas surgiram renovados, como os problemas de sustentabilidade ambiental e as alterações climáticas. Outros ainda, porque se reorientou o foco sobre diferentes regiões do mundo, tornaram-se mais visíveis, como é o caso das migrações. Mais do que os problemas, é a abordagem que é nova. Considerar que acontecimentos, decisões, políticas assumidas num canto do mundo terão repercussões noutro, também não é uma ideia recente – já a Teoria da Interdependência apontava nesse sentido – mas hoje os efeitos são mais imediatos e mais profundos. Os Estados perceberam que, isoladamente, não poderão agir eficazmente no sentido de controlar estas dinâmicas globais, e que a regulação das mesmas deve passar por criar, no seio das organizações internacionais, mecanismos de controlo eficazes. O Multilateralismo surge, assim, com novo fôlego. As reformas institucionais das Nações Unidas e, agora, da União Europeia, com a assinatura do Tratado de Lisboa, visam dotar as instituições de mais e melhores instrumentos que possam sustentar lógicas de governação global. Tem havido um esforço no sentido de trabalhar para uma concertação política global em matérias como o ambiente e as alterações climáticas, por exemplo. A par do reforço do papel das instituições multilaterais, uma dinâmica de multipolarização tem vindo a acentuar-se nos últimos anos. O crescimento económico e tecnológico acelerado de países como a China, a Índia, o Brasil, tem introduzido desequilíbrios de poder num sistema internacional que vinha sendo dominado pela grande potência – os Estados Unidos da América. O investimento chinês em África, por exemplo, que se apresenta aos governos africanos como uma alternativa apetecível aos negócios e à cooperação com a Europa e os EUA, introduziu uma nova condicionante e pode ter contribuído para reduzir o poder de influência daqueles dois blocos no continente africano. A China encara o continente africano como uma oportunidade, que responde à necessidade de alimentar com matérias-primas o seu crescimento económico, registando um aumento exponencial do comércio com África e assinando uma multiplicidade de acordos de investimento, quase exclusivamente na área das infra-estruturas de transporte e sociais básicas. Nenhuma empresa ou governo europeu realizou acordos de negócio desta magnitude em África e a UE falha ainda na ligação entre a cooperação para o desenvolvimento e a promoção dos negócios e investimentos como factores essenciais do desenvolvimento no continente africano. Também a vasta experiência do Brasil na implementação de projectos de desenvolvimento e redução da pobreza tem motivado relações mais intensas de cooperação Sul-Sul, que podem revelar-se mais eficazes e adequadas, ter menos impactos negativos para o país beneficiário e, por isso, constituir uma alternativa menos exigente para os Países em Desenvolvimento (PED). A Europa aspira a ser um actor mais relevante e de maior peso no panorama internacional. Actualmente, constitui, no conjunto das transferências comunitárias e de cada Estado membro individualmente, o maior doador mundial de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento. Essa é uma dimensão da política externa europeia, que se quer mais eficaz e mais coesa, que não deve ser descurada, pelo importante poder de leverage que acarreta. A assinatura da Parceria Estratégica

8


surge como oportunidade para a Europa redefinir e reforçar as suas políticas de acção em África, num momento em que outros actores externos começam a ganhar relevância neste continente e que também, por outro lado, alguns países africanos vêem aumentar o seu peso e importância no panorama internacional, muito por via do revivalismo da procura de matérias-primas. Neste quadro, também as relações entre blocos e países se têm transformado. No caso da União Europeia e África, assistimos a um período de reconfiguração que terá tido início com a Cimeira do Cairo em 2000, ou até, mais evidentemente, com a criação da União Africana em 2002, e que se tornou mais claro com a realização da segunda Cimeira Europa-África e com a assinatura da Parceria Estratégica, em Lisboa, em Dezembro de 2007. A verdade é que as relações entre os dois continentes foram sempre marcadas pela história comum do colonialismo e por tensões alicerçadas numa certa “retórica da culpa”. Aos novos países membros da UE, sem uma história de relacionamento com África, não serve este modelo de relacionamento. Nem à própria Europa, que deve projectar no exterior uma imagem mais isenta, nem aos países africanos, que pretendem assumir papéis mais activos no panorama internacional e reduzir a interferência dos doadores na definição das políticas nacionais. Alguns autores e académicos argumentam, assim, que estamos em presença de uma transição para um modelo pós-colonial, o que não corresponde, obviamente, a um período cronológico, mas a um paradigma diferente de entendimento. O próprio processo de preparação da Parceria Estratégica foi já exemplo do que se pretende que seja o futuro das relações Europa-África: um processo de discussão partilhado, mais equitativo e isento, que ultrapasse os bloqueios das relações doador/beneficiário. Ainda assim, muitas organizações da sociedade civil acusam o documento de relegar para segundo plano – dentro do eixo temático “Outras questões de desenvolvimento” – assuntos que são prioritários para os governos africanos, como a segurança alimentar, por exemplo. Mas vários ganhos estão representados nesta estratégia conjunta: a definição de valores comuns, partilhados pelos dois continentes e assumidos como base para a parceria e para o diálogo é um deles. Tanto mais quando conhecemos a história de "imposição" de valores através de condicionalidades, de diferentes interpretações dos conteúdos entre valores (por exemplo, a enfatização dos valores políticos e cívicos por parte dos europeus, por contraposição aos valores económicos e sociais por parte dos africanos), ou a aplicação díspar de valores consoante os interesses (por exemplo, a condenação de determinado regime por comparação a outro nas mesmas condições, que não sofre qualquer sanção devido a interesses económicos e políticos). Neste sentido, o debate conjunto e o acordo partilhado de valores que são considerados comuns é algo que transmite uma nova abordagem, no sentido de uma parceria mais equitativa e pragmática. Outro aspecto importante na estratégia conjunta é o facto de afirmar a necessidade de europeus e africanos trabalharem para que sejam encontrados pontos de convergência e possíveis actuações comuns para lidarem com os problemas e desafios globais que afectam os dois continentes. Entre estes contam-se, naturalmente, questões como as alterações climáticas, as questões energéticas, os desafios da governação mundial nas instâncias internacionais, os problemas mundiais de comércio, entre outros. O grande salto qualitativo estará certamente nesta dimensão, ou seja, em passar de um relacionamento onde se debatem principalmente os problemas africanos e as respostas europeias a esses problemas, para um novo nível em que ambos contribuem para reforçar mutuamente as suas respostas face aos desafios de um mundo multilateral e de interdependências globais.

9


Os valores no diálogo Europa-África FERNANDO PACHECO, Associação para o Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola

A tendência para a globalização de certos valores parece hoje incontornável e tornou-se quase impossível encontrar no mundo contemporâneo qualquer governo, partido político ou organização que se atreva a não tecer louvores, ainda que hipócritas ou de circunstância, à democracia, ao Estado de direito e ao respeito pelos direitos humanos. Contudo, vários fenómenos políticos, culturais e sociais fazem com que o estabelecimento de valores seja posto em causa em contextos específicos, restando por vezes a tentativa mais modesta de se encorajar a generalização apenas dos que parecem mais consensuais. Aqui reside então a questão essencial: como estabelecer a validade e universalidade dos valores? Quem define esses valores? Podem os valores considerados universais ser aplicados em contextos caracterizados por determinadas especificidades (políticas, culturais, religiosas) ou que correspondam ao que alguns designam por “diferentes momentos históricos”? Existe uma hierarquia de valores? Que tensões e equilíbrios se podem encontrar entre valores e interesses? Não tenho respostas definitivas para estas questões. Para lançar a discussão sobre elas vou, de forma provocatória, fazer recurso ao poderoso instrumento de análise que representa a comunicação social, pois ela reflecte hoje em dia uma forma de “moldar” o pensamento dos cidadãos, ainda quando estes pensem que estão a decidir pela sua própria cabeça. Ao mesmo tempo que existem hoje largos consensos sobre a importância do pluralismo de ideias, nota-se, com preocupação, um crescente domínio de uma ideia-força que corresponde à democracia liberal e ao neoliberalismo económico numa perspectiva “ocidentalocentrista” e é difundida por todo o mundo graças ao extraordinário poder da comunicação social e da internet. Ainda que com boas excepções, a comunicação social deixou de ser o quarto poder para ser o poder dos interesses económicos de quem a controla. Nos editoriais e artigos de opinião dos jornais portugueses de referência, salvo uma ou outra ideia dissonante, dificilmente se vislumbra o tal pluralismo de ideias. A imprensa norte americana colou-se tanto à Administração Bush que se tornou tão responsável quanto ela pelo envolvimento no Iraque. São apenas dois exemplos. Noam Chomsky chama a isso “parcialidade sofisticada”. Não posso evitar uma comparação entre o tratamento dado por essa comunicação social a Hugo Chávez e a George Bush para ilustrar essa parcialidade: Chávez foi eleito, apoia os pobres – ainda que se possa considerar que não da forma mais correcta –, não tem presos políticos, faz referendos e aceita – pelo menos por agora – os seus resultados. Mas não mente. Bush, por seu lado, chegou ao poder graças a uma irregularidade eleitoral, fabricou provas para arrastar o mundo para uma guerra extraordinariamente dispendiosa – repetindo agora a abordagem com o Irão –, deu cobertura a processos de corrupção, falsificou informação sempre que isso lhe conveio, usou processos indecorosos – como o caso da denúncia da agente da CIA e o posterior perdão do único condenado do processo judicial que se seguiu – e tem presos em Guantánamo em condições inaceitáveis: sem acusações, sem prazos, sem direitos. Um pode ser demagogo, mas o outro é mentiroso e não cumpre regras e valores que pretende impor a todo o mundo. Contudo, se um extraterrestre chegasse ao nosso planeta e recorresse apenas à comunicação social para conhecer a sua situação, concluiria que Chávez é actualmente o maior perigo para a humanidade. Há pois, uma notória parcialidade dos media, traduzida numa dualidade de critérios do que é ou não é democrático, ou do que é ou não é politicamente correcto. Não se manda calar Bush, embora haja muita gente com vontade para tal. Mas, lendo a imprensa, dir-se-ia que mandar calar Chávez é não só legítimo como imprescindível. Dir-se-á, agora, depois do referendo, que o povo venezuelano mandou – e bem – calar Chávez. Mas esse, sim, tem todo o direito de o fazer.

10


O rei de Espanha, do ponto de vista ético, não o tem. Não acredito que Juan Carlos mandasse calar, naquela circunstância, um líder europeu. Mas se o fizesse, teria de enfrentar uma fortíssima reacção dos media por desrespeito de regras protocolares e má educação. Parece-me que esta constatação deve merecer uma reflexão mais profunda. O diálogo EuropaÁfrica é desejável para as duas partes e, assim sendo, é necessário um exercício sério de discussão despido de preconceitos e ressentimentos. Um aspecto importante desse exercício é o entendimento, por parte dos europeus, das percepções dos africanos sobre o equilíbrio do diálogo. Enquanto tal não acontecer, não acredito que o diálogo – nos casos em que venha a ocorrer – possa ser sincero e eficaz. Para os africanos em geral – não falo de oposicionistas que por razões políticas vêm à Europa com discursos de conveniência do agrado da maioria dos opinion makers – o diálogo está viciado porque se sentem dependentes da ética, dos valores, da cultura, da inteligência e do poder dos europeus. São estes que fazem as agendas, marcam os ritmos e têm a última palavra no processo de tomada de decisões. Se fossem africanos a definir a agenda da Cimeira, assuntos como a educação, os direitos e a situação das crianças, a saúde e em particular o HIV/SIDA, e a dívida, entre outros, seriam seguramente incluídos. O diálogo e a cimeira são Europa-África e não África-Europa. Isto pode parecer um pormenor para os europeus, mas não é entendido como tal pelos africanos, pois é difícil que eles não vejam aí sinais de um eurocentrismo e de um complexo de superioridade a que estão acostumados. Na percepção dos africanos os valores que os europeus dizem defender escondem muitas vezes interesses – e creio que seria muito fácil provar isso através de inquéritos de opinião – e a partir daí as generalizações são inevitáveis. As críticas a Robert Mugabe, José Eduardo dos Santos e, já agora, Chávez, nem sempre são apreciadas pelos bons motivos – que os há, sem dúvida – mas porque são dirigidas a líderes africanos (ou não europeus) que ousam dizer “não” aos poderosos da Europa ou do mundo. Os seguidores internos de Mugabe – que os há, é bom não esquecer, pois ele só perdeu as últimas eleições nos centros urbanos e isso é revelador, ainda que se possa acreditar num ambiente de intimidação e desinformação mais forte nas áreas rurais – e seus aliados africanos (designados por “espúrios” por quem não entende ou dá importância às suas motivações) interrogam-se se a actual preocupação com o Zimbabué é explicada pela violação dos direitos humanos ou, antes, pelo confisco das “white farms” e pelo afrontamento ao poder do Reino Unido. Muitos deles lembram que nos anos 80 teve lugar um terrível massacre de opositores em Matabeleland – sem que isso tivesse merecido a devida condenação –, numa época em que Mugabe foi armado cavaleiro pela Rainha Isabel II e recebeu prémios do Reino Unido e dos Estados Unidos pela sua governação, enquanto os compromissos de Lancaster House sobre a questão da terra permaneciam congelados. Em 1995 a crise já estava anunciada na sequência do Programa de Ajustamento Estrutural imposto pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional, cujo acrónimo (PSPA em inglês) era traduzido ironicamente por “Put Smith in Power Again” por muitos brancos com quem contactei. Era também possível comprovar as graves injustiças sobre a terra, pois aos pequenos agricultores (negros) estavam reservados os solos de pior qualidade – isso era visível por simples observação. Ainda nos anos 90 era chocante a forma de relacionamento entre os senhores brancos – que viviam em guetos com muros altíssimos – e os seus empregados, não sendo visível qualquer convivência inter-racial fora do mundo do trabalho. Estava-se perante um barril de pólvora – que veio a explodir de forma terrível poucos anos mais tarde. Muitos zimbabueanos interrogam-se hoje onde estavam os defensores dos direitos humanos naquela altura e não aceitam as explicações que lhes são dadas para tais ausências. Eu também não consigo compreender nem aceitar que os actuais inimigos de Mugabe estivessem então adormecidos. A aliança espúria, na opinião desses muitos zimbabueanos, existe entre a oposição e os “white farmers” e isso pode explicar os resultados eleitorais a que me referi. A diabolização de Mugabe é sempre feita do ponto de vista jornalístico, e há poucos estudos científicos isentos sobre o assunto. Pessoalmente, acho que a governação de Mugabe é altamente condenável e que a actuação “anti-branco” visou atenuar as consequências das suas políticas de protecção das elites negras aos olhos da opinião pública, prática habitual em vários países

11


africanos. Mas, tal como acontece quando se condenam as governações africanas em geral, não se pode esquecer o contexto histórico e as responsabilidades dos europeus no desastre em que se transformou aquilo a que alguém chamou a “Suíça de África” nos anos 80. Outro exemplo que mostra a importância de se conhecer a percepção dos africanos no relacionamento com os europeus foi o diferendo entre Angola e França por causa do negócio de armas nos anos 90. Muitos africanos exultaram com a forma como o Presidente Eduardo dos Santos protestou e o embaixador francês foi destratado em Luanda e pensou-se que os franceses jamais esqueceriam tal afronta. Passados poucos anos, um enviado do Presidente Sarkozy disse em Luanda que foram “removidas as barreiras” – subentende-se judiciais – que dificultaram as relações entre os dois países. Não se conhece o papel das empresas petrolíferas nesse caso, mas foi fácil entender que, afinal, o poder judicial francês não é assim tão independente do executivo. Alguém afirma que há, por parte dos africanos, uma deliberada confusão entre interesses e valores e que os europeus estão cansados disso e indignam-se tanto com os governos africanos como com os seus próprios governos. Acontece que tais indignações são muito particularizadas. Conheço casos em que académicos e opinion makers mudam de posição – tornam-se mais “tolerantes” – quando passam a integrar governos europeus ou a trabalhar em empresas com interesses em países “violadores”. A forma como alguns jornais portugueses criticam o governo angolano é considerada por muitos angolanos como uma retaliação pelo facto dos seus proprietários verem fechadas portas para negócios em Angola. E cabe aqui lembrar uma frase de Jomo Kenyata, primeiro presidente do Quénia, considerado na altura um “moderado”, quando dizia que os europeus chegaram a África com a bíblia e encontraram os africanos com a terra. Depois os africanos ficaram com a bíblia e os europeus com a terra. Penso que se trata de uma boa metáfora sobre valores e interesses. Estes factos podem ser simbolicamente associados à reacção de Chávez ao “porqué no te callas?” do Rei de Espanha. Eles mostram, como diz o sociólogo Boaventura de Sousa Santos, que estamos a entrar num novo período histórico – o período pós-colonial – teorizado por Gandhi, Fanon e Amílcar Cabral, entre outros, que poderá ser caracterizado por uma afirmação mais vigorosa na vida internacional por parte de países outrora colonizados. Dir-se-á que isto acontece por causa do petróleo. Pode ser parcialmente verdade, mas isso só mostra que o que está em causa é exactamente uma relação de poderes. A minha experiência de trabalho com comunidades rurais ensinou-me que quando estas ganham capacidades surgem tensões e conflitos com as organizações que as ajudam a ganhar tais capacidades. A comunicação social “universal” nem sempre escolhe como alvo preferencial os violadores dos direitos humanos, mas aqueles que ousam dizer não ao diktat – independentemente das suas razões e motivações. E estes só podem fazê-lo porque conseguem poder – neste caso proveniente do petróleo. Se assim não fosse, a denúncia sobre a violação dos direitos humanos na Etiópia seria provavelmente tão ou mais vigorosa do que no Zimbabwe, como nos faz recordar Berham Nega, Presidente da Câmara de Addis Abeba eleito em 2005 mas que não exerce o seu mandato por ter sido preso logo a seguir e enviado para o exílio. Como a Etiópia não tem petróleo ou outros recursos naturais de significado apetecíveis, aparece noutra escala das preocupações, tanto dos empresários e governantes europeus, como dos media e dos defensores dos direitos humanos, estes também muitas vezes acusados de defenderem os interesses dos governos dos seus países. A percepção dos africanos, insisto, que entendo deve ser apreendida pelos europeus, tem outras dimensões. Os media europeus raramente falam dos sucessos de África, preferindo dar relevância apenas aos fracassos como se se tratasse de um destino trágico. O escritor angolano José Eduardo Agualusa refere isso quando ironiza com a frase “saímos de lá e vejam no que aquilo deu”, o que é retomado pelo também angolano antropólogo Ruy Duarte de Carvalho – que de modo idêntico a Agualusa está longe de ser um apoiante do regime – quando afirma que “não nos perdoam o termos sobrevivido”. É verdade que os jornais se vendem com notícias sobre desgraças – mas eu falo dos opinion makers. O continente africano conheceu nos últimos cinco anos uma taxa de

12


crescimento de cerca de 5%, acima da média mundial. A produção agrícola de países como Moçambique, Mali e Burkina Faso está a atingir níveis assinaláveis. Em cinco anos, a taxa de escolarização na Tanzânia passou de 51% para 91%, graças ao perdão da dívida que teve como contrapartida o encaminhamento de verbas para esse sector. Em Moçambique o mesmo está a acontecer com a saúde. Em Angola o número de crianças no sistema de ensino primário passou de 1,9 milhões em 2002 – quando acabou a guerra – para cerca de 4,6 milhões em 2007, enquanto o número de estudantes universitários subiu de aproximadamente 20 mil para mais de 60 mil no mesmo período. Tudo isso parece ter pouca importância no discurso veiculado pelos opinion makers que refiro. Pela primeira vez ao longo de séculos África encontra fora da Europa alternativas – pelo menos aparentes – para o seu desejo de recuperar o tempo perdido. Na China, no Brasil, na Índia e noutros países, parecem surgir respostas talvez mais adequadas aos problemas reais e mais sustentáveis do ponto de vista social e cultural. Os progressos no domínio da democracia e dos direitos humanos são claros em vários países africanos. Em Angola, país que é frequentemente acusado de violação dos direitos humanos – o que todos sabemos ser verdade –, existe hoje o melhor ambiente de respeito pelos direitos humanos que conheci, principalmente no que se refere aos cívicos, políticos e culturais. As sociedades civis africanas estão mais vibrantes do que nunca – apesar de alguns teóricos europeus negarem até a possibilidade da sua existência –, são significativos os êxitos desportivos a nível mundial e assiste-se a um “renascimento cultural” do ponto de vista da música, do cinema, da literatura, da arte, do teatro, numa perspectiva de negação da tradição imutável a que alguns teóricos teimam em associar o continente africano, sendo isso entendido também como uma resposta ao “esquecimento” a que a Europa a devotou, dada a sua maior preocupação com o leste, por exemplo, pois África representava nos anos 90 apenas um a dois por cento do comércio mundial. Até que chegaram os chineses e os outros. Voltemos à questão inicial do debate sobre os valores. Até agora, a Europa considera-se uma exportadora dos seus valores, como diz o espanhol Andrés Ortega. Mas se não quiser impor tais valores na ponta das baionetas como o fez no passado – e como os seus considerados mais importantes aliados tentam fazê-lo na actualidade – deve procurar fazê-lo com sabedoria. Em primeiro lugar, há uma questão de credibilidade. Parece haver vários indicadores de que os europeus por vezes parecem não acreditar nos seus valores, ainda que procurem impô-los a outros. A forma como vários países europeus lidaram com os tristemente famosos voos da CIA com destino a Guantánamo e outros lugares, ou a supressão do habeas corpus na luta contra o terrorismo, especialmente no país que inventou esse direito, afectam seriamente a solidez desses valores. A própria União Europeia não pode ter moral para dar lições de democracia quando faz “consultas” às sociedades civis africanas meramente formais, para obter o aval às suas políticas e quando por vezes deixa de publicar os resultados que lhe são desfavoráveis. Em segundo lugar, é necessário ter em conta que, ao contrário do que parecia suceder nos anos 90, nada garante estarmos agora perante “uma imparável tendência para o triunfo do tríptico de mercado, democracia e direitos humanos”, como dizia recentemente de forma perspicaz Javier Solana. Se os chamados casos de sucesso de desenvolvimento económico em África – Moçambique, Gana e Botswana, entre outros – eram atribuídos à conjugação de boa governação e respeito pelos direitos humanos, o exemplo da China (com ausência de democracia) e da Rússia (onde o autoritarismo regressa com vigor) produzem algum “fascínio” em países que reivindicam o reconhecimento dos seus sistemas políticos e sociais, das suas culturas e dos seus valores. Outros afirmam, por vezes, que só com o autoritarismo que caracterizava os “colonos”, que impunha disciplina, é possível o progresso. Finalmente, a globalização não tem sido suficientemente inclusiva e está a produzir crescentes desigualdades entre os países, e a ajuda, que deveria sobretudo aumentar as capacidades dos governos, mostra que aquilo que é dado por um lado é retirado por outro, de forma ampliada, através de mecanismos vários, sobretudo de regras comerciais injustas, como bem demonstra o holandês David Sogge nos seus trabalhos.

13


A propósito do campeonato mundial de futebol de 2006, Kofi Annan, então Secretário Geral da ONU, dizia que o evento (jogo) causava inveja à sua organização porque nele, entre outras razões, todas as pessoas sabem qual a posição da sua equipa e o que ela fez para lá chegar; analisam ao pormenor o que a sua equipa fez bem ou mal e o que poderia ter feito; todos os actores estão sujeitos rigorosamente às mesmas regras; e sobretudo, porque efectivamente se obtêm resultados. Isto é verdadeiramente sintomático quando provém de um africano que conhece as regras e os valores dominantes. É preciso, pois, repensar a questão dos valores quando falamos em diálogo. A imposição dos valores europeus, além de preconceituosa, nega valores que os europeus já defenderam e puseram de parte e os africanos ainda preservam. Se a Europa abandonou duas das bandeiras da Revolução Francesa (igualdade e fraternidade) e hoje enaltecem apenas a liberdade e o indivíduo, os africanos valorizam a solidariedade e têm vivências muito condicionadas pelo funcionamento em grupos, pequenos ou alargados, que lhes permitem maximizar a segurança social. É isto que por vezes explica as tais solidariedades consideradas espúrias mas necessárias para a sobrevivência de pessoas e de grupos. Não se pode imaginar que um governante africano possa desprezar as dezenas de pessoas que se alojam em sua casa ou recorrem aos seus favores logo que é nomeado para o cargo. Se o fizesse ele teria muitas dificuldades em se manter nos grupos de que faz parte. Isso explica também alguns consensos considerados estranhos entre os países dentro da União Africana. África e Europa devem demonstrar o seu compromisso em garantir os direitos humanos (não apenas os direitos cívicos e políticos, mas também os económicos, sociais e culturais) numa perspectiva de combate à pobreza e de luta pelo equilíbrio de género, mas têm de entender que a Estratégia Conjunta não pode ser vista como ponto de partida nem como um fim, mas uma etapa na construção de uma relação de longo prazo, assente num processo de participação efectiva, isto é, que permita um maior equilíbrio de poderes e um diálogo mais horizontal, no respeito pela história, que não começou com a colonização nem tem que ser determinista no sentido da civilização judaico-cristã. É finalmente necessária uma clarificação de conceitos em relação a realidades muitas vezes mal conhecidas que dizem respeito ao continente africano. Com efeito, são evidentes em muitos países os problemas de má governação, ligados nomeadamente à corrupção e à falta de participação da sociedade civil e de respeito pelos direitos humanos, e isto não pode ser permanentemente explicado pelos líderes africanos com razões ligadas às raízes culturais. Contudo, muitas vezes o que é designado de má governação constitui na realidade uma disfunção resultante da fragilidade das instituições, nomeadamente o modo como foram ou estão a ser construídos os Estados, e do entendimento da democracia. O Estado, tal como se apresenta em África, diz pouco ou nada à maioria dos cidadãos e a forma como foi sugerido ou imposto o modelo de Westminster não viabiliza o funcionamento democrático das instituições, dado que se limita a democracia a um formalismo que exclui a maioria dos cidadãos. Contra o argumento simplista de que se trata de uma questão de “atraso” em relação ao padrão inevitável da modernidade, penso que a questão é bem mais profunda, pois a política de cada Estado tem a ver com o sistema de valores que serve de referência às populações, não sendo de menosprezar, por exemplo, as religiões africanas e as atitudes em relação ao sobrenatural, à superstição e aos antepassados, que perduram e são subalternizados em relação às crenças cristãs. Em Angola, as igrejas cristãs aliaram-se à administração colonial na eliminação de instituições educativas (como o onjango) que utilizavam técnicas de comunicação que hoje são consideradas modernas e universais. As elites africanas têm de saber viver quase simultaneamente em “momentos históricos” diferentes e movimentar-se entre quadros de valores por vezes contraditórios: negociar em Lisboa ou Bruxelas e depois conviver com chefias tradicionais, relações familiares alargadas ou com o peso dos sistemas mágico-religiosos. O português Victor Ângelo, Subsecretário Geral das Nações Unidas e com larga vivência recente em África, tem opiniões semelhantes sobre o assunto e recorda que as relações com a Europa são ainda muito inspiradas 14


em filosofias da época das lutas de libertação nacional, principalmente na África Austral, que representam, apesar de tudo, uma afirmação de identidade e contestação ao poder colonizador que a democracia ainda não fez esquecer. Há quem compare a situação de África com a da Ásia, referindo que este último continente também foi colonizado, mas esquecem-se essas pessoas de que, para além da terrível herança do tráfico de escravos, as sociedades africanas e os seus valores foram muito mais dilaceradas pelo colonialismo do que as asiáticas, e que as políticas neocolonialistas – algumas perdurando até hoje – e neoliberais quase arruinaram a agricultura da África Subsariana. Neste sentido, é também necessário identificar as causas da má governação ou da ausência de governação e da fragilidade dos Estados, aprendendo a conhecer que as prioridades de uns não são as de outros. Por exemplo, um estudo realizado em Luanda em 2005 por uma organização americana mostrou que as prioridades para Angola identificadas por estrangeiros e por angolanos estavam ordenadas de forma inversa. Em relação à corrupção, devemos pensar que “o tango é dançado a dois”, embora isso possa parecer um argumento estafado. Se houvesse recusa sistemática por parte dos corruptores, a prática estaria, há muito, abandonada ou esbatida. Tais atitudes podem ser vistas também como o desprezo com que muitos estrangeiros encaram as leis e as instituições angolanas. E não posso deixar o tema “corrupção” sem me referir aos escândalos sucessivos de partidos políticos em países europeus cujos líderes passam durante o dia a mensagem dos valores e de noite fazem tráfico de influências e financiamentos à margem da lei, ou à forma como se (não) trata a questão da pedofilia. Insisto com a ideia da recusa dos valores: é como se certos europeus actuassem sem dar valor aos valores que dizem defender. Sempre que podem, livram-se deles, até das regras de trânsito. Exagero? Talvez, mas são realidades que necessitam de mais atenção. Um passo importante será virar a página do passado, mas não rasgá-la. Se não deve haver impunidade em relação aos direitos humanos, por exemplo, também não deve haver imposição, pois esta não respeita o outro e não garante sustentabilidade. Ao defender a universalidade dos direitos humanos os europeus não podem deixar perceber que se trata de uma imposição neocolonial, mas ajudar os seus aliados africanos a fazer passar a mensagem de acordo com os contextos específicos. Acredito que, encarada como um processo, tal mensagem chegará aos destinatários, os cidadãos africanos em geral, os únicos que poderão efectivamente lutar pela sua defesa de forma continuada e permanente. Mas é necessário bom senso, tempo e paciência. Termino, chamando a atenção para o que o guineense Carlos Lopes, Subsecretário Geral da ONU, dizia no final da Mesa Redonda de 13 de Setembro de 2007, organizada pelo Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais: “O diálogo político entre os dois continentes deve ter uma base igualitária de opiniões divergentes sem recurso aos instrumentos da condicionalidade, particularmente no que diz respeito ao lugar dos valores” e não deve limitar-se aos governos, mas alargar-se às sociedades civis, acrescento eu. Em nenhum caso pode existir uma relação de superioridade segundo a qual uma parte diz à outra, de forma irredutível, quais os valores a respeitar e as condicionalidades do diálogo. Ainda que as posições sobre democracia ou direitos humanos, por exemplo, possam ser coincidentes, elas não devem ser discutidas sob o vínculo da condicionalidade, pois isso inviabiliza a predisposição para o diálogo. Diria eu, ainda, que o importante é construir valores comuns que sejam consensuais e possam servir de base ao diálogo e à definição de parcerias centradas nos cidadãos. Esta é a recomendação mais importante que eu faria aos participantes da Cimeira UE-África.

15


Multipolaridade e Multilateralismo THOMAS LAWO, European Association of Development Institutes Introduction Invited to deliver the prestigious “Schumann Lecture 2007” in Maastricht, the city known for the bold and programmatic Treaty of the European Union, signed there in 1992, the American writer and economist Jeremy Rifkin congratulated the EU on its 50st anniversary of the Treaties of Rome (1957) by stating: “Europeans need to play a much larger role on the world stage by making the European model of transnational peace and cooperation a global model. In Asia, Latin America and Africa, efforts are underway to create transnational political spaces like the European Union. The EU can help facilitate the process by sharing “best practices”, acting as a goad and conscience, and by building cooperative relationships with other regions that are preparing to make their own journey into a transnational global era.”1 Multipolarity and Multilateralism revisited – a European perspective Turning to the subject of the conference and the theme assigned to my paper, I would like to start by recalling my very first visit to this beautiful city of Lisbon way back in 1976. Being a young student from divided Germany, I was member of the (West-) German delegation to the “World Conference against Apartheid, Colonialism and Racism in Southern Africa”. The bi-polar world order was clearly visible and – like the Iron Curtain – cutting across quite a few delegations. Hence we had background meetings, informal briefings and “non-meetings” with representatives of various liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South-WestAfrica/ Namibia and South Africa. I personally felt the political division and segregation into “friends” and “foes” quite strongly. Solidarity was not an empty slogan, but a challenge to all, who were genuinely concerned and keen to overcome barriers and the rather cruel and oppressive situations still existing in those war-torn countries. But behind the visible and public conference, one could experience the power-play of the two big and antagonistic world powers, the USA and the USSR, fighting with their respective allies and satellite affiliates to garner support for their expressed positions. Conference declarations were fiercely negotiated and this stood in stark contrast to the sufferings of the victimised civilians in those countries, whose well-being and “independence” was at the focus of this high-level event. Today, more than 30 years later, we cannot only celebrate 50 years of the EU and almost 60 years of rather stable peace in Europe, but are in a sustained and promising process to overcoming the negative effects of the dichotomy well-known to most of us, now that the iron curtain has disappeared and the military blocks have partly disarmed and embarked on a road to global stability. Since “Glasnost and Perestroika”, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989/90, the bi-polar world order has given way to a multi-polar one. Yet, as critics would argue, this is more of a misnomer, as the world has been left with only one real (= military + economic) super power, the US, nicknaming the US and its present Bush administration the “G–1” of the present world order. Let us have a closer look at the present situation and analyse, where the EU stands. Is Europe, more in particular the European Union, in the traditional sense of the word a “global power”, or at least a “global player”? And where do we see newly emerging power centres like China, Russia

1

Rifkin, Jeremy (2007). The European Dream – How Europe’s Vision of the Future is offering an alternative model to the American Dream; Schumann Lecture 2007, Maastricht, p.11

16


and India and their influence on Asia, Europe and Africa and global governance challenges in a multilateral world system? Promoting Multilateralism – the EU agenda in strengthening the UN With 27 member states, close to 500 million inhabitants and a share of25 % world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the EU is certainly an economic giant with the potential to translate this into political influence to deal with global issues and shape a multilateral system which is fair to all. And while the UN has undergone a major soul-searching exercise triggered off by the crisis over Iraq and the unilaterally declared and US-led “War on Terror” – following the terrorists’ attacks on September 11, 2001 – the debate about the global reach of the European Union is finally coming of age. Just like the United Nations, the EU has also been spurred by a changing international climate. Its ambition is not only to strengthen and sharpen its foreign and security policy tools, but also to discuss what the European project is actually all about with respect to international affairs (Espen Barth Eide, 2004)2. The rift among “Old Europe” and “New Europe” had become a major burden in the European and international debate. The issues around the need to (re-) define the role of NATO and the decisions about the contribution of the EU in international peacekeeping missions all warranted a clear strategic and political positioning. The European Security Strategy3 of December 2003 had – at least on paper – underlined the readiness of the Union to take much greater responsibility in the global governance system, yet the EU lacks a clearly formulated foreign policy agenda. As long as the member states maintain their sovereignty over the foreign and secutity policies of their respective countries, the EU remains a political dwarf. In this context, Charles A. Kupchan, former Director of the the Europe Division of the US National Security Council during the first Clinton administration also takes the US to task and demands a return to a “balanced internationalism” while criticising the present security doctrine of the Bush administration with its preventive military interventions in “evil states”4. Dirk Messner, Director of the German Development Institute argues in line with Kupchan: “It is clear that the transition from a quasi-unilateral, US-dominated power constellation to a multipolar one can lead to a creeping erosion of multilateral institutions… At present the European Union is the most important actor in world politics which is firmly pursuing a multilateral concept of the world order. The EU could therefore… become the central protagonist of an effective and fair multilateralism.5” The concept of “effective multilateralism” has been given a central role in the European Security Strategy and embodies one of the fundamental credos of the European integration project: International relations should be organised through strong, negotiated and enforceable multilateral regimes. The EU: Global Player or World Power? Looking at the EU today, we cannot but critically evaluate the present strenghths and weaknesses and ask if the EU is a pole of power, a global player and a promotor of multilateralism.6

2

Eide, Espen Barth (2004). Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalised UN; in: Global Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre, London. 3 “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy”, approved by the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 4 Kupchan, Charles A. (2003). Einvernehmliche Trennung oder Scheidungskrieg?; in: Europa – Global Player oder Statist der Weltpolitik?; Alfred-Herrhausen-Gesellschaft; Frankfurt; pp. 23-28. 5 Messner, Dirk (2007). The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the “AsiaPacific” Century ?; in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG), 1/2007, p.11 6 This section and the analyses reported draw from three main publications: (1.) Hassler, Stephen (2004). Super State – The New Europe and Its Challenge to America, London/ New York; (2.) Casier, Tom and Sophie Vanhoonacker (2007). The EU as a Global Player; in: Bloom, Tannelie (Ed.); Reviewing Europe – Missed opportunities and possible potential, Maastricht; and

17


The Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung published in 1973, the year of the first EU-enlargement to the UK, Ireland and Denmark, one of the most pertinent studies7 on the future role of the European Community in the world. Based on an analysis of the existing resources and the structural power of this enlarged community, he came to the conlusion that the European Community was nothing less than an emerging superpower trying to recreate a world with its centre in Europe. Though he underestimated at that time the obstacles for the creation of a pax bruxelliana, his study called attention to the importance of non-military sources of influence and power. It also examined the question of the international implications of the European integration process in great detail. More than thirty years later, the EU is by far the most advanced regional integration system and definitely much more than a traditional regional or international organization, including the African Union8. The key feature being the blending of the principles of national integrity with subsidiarity and upward delegation of power from the member states to the Commission. It is quite common that the Commission interferes in the domestic affairs through EU-legislation and respective enforcement and this is an accepted commonality in the Union to which individual member states have to follow suit. The “acquis communitaire” is the one and only legal framework that all candidates for membership have to accept and adopt in full before accession. That is why the EU model certainly is an inspiration and benchmark for other regional integration projects. The construct of the African Union (AU) closely resembles and reflects the EU when looking at vision, approach and institutional architecture, yet distinctly different when looking at budgets, financial transfer mechanisms and the normative aspects of human rights and interventions in the sovereign affairs of other states. Thus the EU is proving to be a global actor. The emerging partnership between the EU and the United Nations in reforming and strengthening this global body has been propelled by the unilateralism displayed by the US on divisive issues like the International Criminal Court and the war in Iraq in particular. The EU has become the UN’s main Western partner, despite lacking attempts to request and lobby for a permanent EU-seat on the Security Council and to fend off demands for an additional seat for another individual member state. At the same time, the UN and its different agencies have become the main partner of the EU to foster better global governance and strengthen the international security system. This comes at a time where it has been widely acknowledged that security and development are closely intertwined9. It follows from there that improving the multilateral instruments on the economic, financial, trade and development side are at least as, if not more important than equally needed reforms of the UNsystem in the narrower confines of “high politics”.10 EU as a World Power: Four Strong Points11 Assessing the competencies and conducting a critical inventory of the EU as a global player, the following advantages can be listed: First, the EU has globally been ascribed the mostly positive role of an international negotiating or civil power, which stands for the development of a fair multilateralism. The EU is perceived as a “benevolent actor” and a broker / mediator of conflicting interests (e.g. Middle East, Iran) and a (3.) Messner, Dirk (2007). The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the “Asia-Pacific” Century ?; in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG), 1/2007. 7 Galtung, Johan (1973). The European Community: A superpower in the making; London. 8 This comparison would encompass regional bodies like ASEAN, APEC, NAFTA, Mercosur, SADC, SAARC or others. 9 von Itter, Susanne and Jeanne Lätt (Eds.) (2006). “Insecurity and Development - Regional Issues and policies for an interdependent world“; EADI Conference Report 2005, EADI/ DIE, Bonn. 10 Eide, Espen Barth; ibid.; p.3. 11 The listings of strengths and weaknesses refer to a similar section and partly contain quotes adapted from: Messner, Dirk (2007). The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the “Asia-Pacific” Century ?;

18


serious problem solver in important areas of world politics (e.g. climate change) in comparison with the USA and other influential states. Secondly, against this backdrop, the EU is helping to put a brake on rampant anti-Western world views and perceptions which have gained momentum due to the “War on Terror” and its collateral interventions in different countries12, and the portrayal of unilateralism by the Bush administration. Jeremy Rifkin underlines that Europe enjoys in many parts of the world a high level of trust which could serve as a foundation for more effective international initiatives on the part of the EU but also of the West in general. The EU therefore possesses moral capital which could be of the highest importance in the translation of economic, political or even military potential into legitimate global action. The EU collectively accounts for more development aid than any other donor. In 2006 the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the EU amounted to 57% of world total ODA. Yet its influence appears to be much smaller than this would warrant13. Third, the EU is often reproached with making only marginal contributions to stability and security in the international system. The EU’s engagement in the successor states of the Soviet Union14, as well as – in particular – the process of eastern enlargement of the Union, have substantially contributed to the largely peaceful transformation process in the former socialist countries. In this context the EU has made major political and financial investments in Europe’s stability and security and in doing so also in the international system, although this strategy has been controversial in many member states15. The EU should capitalize on these successes both internally and externally to make its mark as an effective player in international politics. Fourthly, the EU itself constitutes a kind of regional “laboratory for global governance”. Multilevel politics between national states and the Union, the far-reaching codification of its legal framework for EU’s international cooperation (European jurisdiction), the bundling of “shared sovereignties”, the continuous development of common interests between the member states, as well as the division of labour between the national states, the EU Commission, the EU Council, representing the Heads of member states, and the EU Parliament – that is, the complicated but unavoidable “governing beyond the nation states” – has been practiced in the EU for a number of decades. The experiences obtained in this way and the political habits handed down and internalised in this process represent for both the EU and the member states a political comparative advantage which is not to be undervalued when it comes to helping effectively to shape the development of the global-governance architecture. The EU is both the most advanced and at the same time the most ambitious project of regional cooperation in the world and in principle an appropriate answer to the challenges of globalisation, which is increasingly giving rise to trans-national sets of problems and necessitating cross-border governance. The EU as a Global Player: Four Weaknesses Having listed some of the positive assets, one must also recognize aspects speaking against the EU setting itself up as a cooperative world power.

12

Most notably here the “Operation Enduring Freedom“ in Afghanistan, the invasion and lasting occupation of Iraq and human rights abuses in Abu Ghraib or Guantánamo Bay. 13 For a more detailed analysis, see: Mold, Andrew (ed.) (2007). EU Development Policy in a Changing World – Challenges for the 21st Century; Amsterdam University Press. 14 This encompasses Russia and the CIS –countries in Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasian Republics, Ukraine and Belorus. 15 Case studies proving this point are collected in the published results of a larger research project: Coppetiers, Bruno, Michael Emerson et al. (2004). Europeanization and Conflict Resolution – Case Studies from the European Periphery; Academia Press, Gent.

19


First, Europe’s only limited economic, technological and scientific attractiveness in comparison with the USA (and in future possibly also China, Russia and India) implies a loss of “soft power” which should not be underestimated. The capacity to act globally is based not only, perhaps not even principally, on military power, but on top of that political, economic and cultural attractiveness. Europe can therefore in future only become a relevant “cooperative world power” if it at the same time overcomes its economic weaknesses and becomes a driving force of innovation in the world economy. Secondly, despite the European Security Strategy of 2003 the EU has still not managed to develop pan-European interests – which can even be opposed to individual national interests – and, on that basis, common strategies for helping to shape the international system, which is fair, robust and sustainable on a long-term basis. The crisis of the EU – and of the UN and NATO at the same time – in the run-up to the second Iraq war (2003) showed that in difficult international crises it is still the nation states and their capital cities, not the EU, Brussels, or the European Council of Foreign Ministers which ultimately are the relevant actors. The crisis over the European Constitution triggered off by the popular rejection through the referenda in France and the Netherlands (2005) and the dispute between some European member states concerning the reform of the UN Security Council in 2006, only mirrors or even reinforced this impression. Only a common European foreign policy would provide the opportunity to play a major role in global politics. Thirdly, although the EU is regarded worldwide as a “benevolent player” on the international stage, at the same time it is considered a political actor which, in the context of the troubled further development of the European cooperation and integration project, is preoccupied above all with itself, its complicated decision-making processes and its confused institutional structures. The breath-taking political and economic dynamics in parts of Asia contrast with the often finicky and stolid machinery of the EU. And while the USA is reproached with exhibiting the hybris of power the EU must often give the appearance of being involved internationally far below its real economic and political weight16. Against Europe’s good international reputation overall must be set the not unjustified observation that the EU is still not a truly globally thinking and capable “cooperative world power”. Fourthly, the EU’s efforts to develop its global capacity to act continue to be undermined by the internationally widespread image of “Fortress Europe”. Two things in particular which contribute to this image of the “walled fortress” are (1) the disputed immigration and migration policy of the Union which in the context of rising refugee movements from Africa have gained in importance in recent years. (2) In addition, European agricultural policy is a symbol of the protectionism which inflicts great damage on the image of a cosmopolitan actor with a far-sighted interest in global issues. For example, Europe’s (and that of the USA) intransigence on trade of agricultural commodities and related issues in the negotiations of the Doha Round and WTO continue to harm Europe’s standing in developing countries. This sketch of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses shows that it has a good starting position from which to gain significance as a global power without giving rise to international worries about an aggressive Europe17, or one solely orientated towards its own, narrow interests. On the other hand, the economic, political and institutional framework is visible on which the EU must build in order to translate ist global-governance potential into an effective capacity to act. 16

Nijhuis, Ton (2007). America and the search for a European political identity; in: Blom, Tannelie; op.cit. This would encompass military power to be collectively used by the EU and including “pre-emtive strikes” without a clearly established external threat to the integrity of the EU or one of its member states. The rift within NATO-member states and Russia together with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) over the US-initiated nuclear defence shield in Eastern Europe, or the future policies on the deployment of Stategic Weapons in EU-member states to fend off the percieved threat of the Iranian nuclear programme, or the “War on Terror”- related different military interventions from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan are all calling for further analysis and research which go much beyond the scope of this paper. 17

20


EU needs a strategy for dealing with Russia, China and India While Russia is re-entering the global power system by flexing its “energy-rich muscles” and being a member of the G-8, China and India are developing into significant global-governance actors which are fundamentally changing the basic pattern of the world economy and politics. We are currently witnessing a second phase of transition after the end of the Cold War with its bipolar system of two rivalling power blocks, followed by the quasi-unilateral “western world order” dominated by the USA to a multipolar power constellation in which the two Asian countries – the most populous in the world – play a central role18. The European attitude to the two rising Asian powers will in future be as important as the transatlantic relations between the EU and the USA. The reshaping of the global-governance architecture produces therefore an enormous pressure for adaptation – a new global power configuration is emerging. It can scarcely be imagined that the UN, the G-8, NATO, WTO, and the International Financial “Bretton Woods” institutions or other World Organizations will look the same in 2020 as they do today. The decisive question is whether China and India, on the analogy of their remarkable economic and technological catch-up processes, will also, as global governance actors, be able to go through similarly rapid political learning processes – as did Europe and Japan after 1945 – and what models they will emulate in world politics. The rise of China and India not only means that two more actors will become players in world politics. The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar power constellation implies a radical change to a new world order. This new multipolar power constellation and the resulting competition for power and influence in world politics in the coming two or three decades will turn into the central and decisive line of conflict in the global-governance architecture – similar to the system conflict during the Cold War or the drawn-out conflict between European central powers before the First World War. While the USA has been concerned with dynamics in Asia (“The Pacific Century”) for some time, German and European thinking is ultimately still strongly shaped by a transatlantic world order. Stephen Haseler aptly describes the different approaches of the US and the EU in the chapter: “Europe Versus the USA – The Battle for Eurasia”19. For example, in the European Security Strategy, Asia in general, and China and India as strong regional powers in particular, are only of marginal concern. This overlooks the fact that in the coming decades Europe could find itself marginalized in world politics, if it fails to develop its global-governance capacities energetically. What is certain is that in the future all European nation states, in comparison with the USA, China and India, will be minor actors with quite limited power resources. The EU has often been capable, under considerable external pressure, of great reforms: for example, the breakdown of the Eastern bloc and German reunification became the driving force of the European monetary union. Perhaps the dynamic of change emanating from China and India will force acceleration in the development of a globally oriented European foreign policy. The point of departure of such a strategy may not be the question of whether China and India will become powerful actors, but how they will deploy their growing power20. Concluding remarks Taking the debate on multipolarity, multilateralism and regional and interregional cooperation one step further, one has to see what this entails for EU’s role in the world and for the Europe – Africa partnership. From a European perspective the following elements are of particular importance: 18

Humphrey, John and Dirk Messner; China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries; in IDS Bulletin, Vol 37 No 1, IDS Sussex (2006). 19 Haseler, Stephen (2004), op.cit., pp141. 20 Messner, Dirk (2007). op.cit.; p.18.

21


1. Europe’s role could be to act as a catalyst and main protagonist of a fair and effective multilateralism which will increasingly come under pressure from the threatening competition of the great powers, meaning the US, Russia, China and other regionally dominant states. 2. The EU must clearly formulate, develop, test and adapt its strategies in the globalgovernance arenas particularly affected by the rise of the Asian powers (especially in Africa). 3. This requires also the mainstreaming of concepts and strategies, like the concept of “Global Public Goods” (defined as physical, legal, economic and environmental security) and a consensual “Global Strategy for Peace and Security” designed as constituent components of an effective global-governance compact21. 4. The EU must conceptualise and develop strategic partnerships with other regional organizations and powers like China and India without neglecting relations with the USA. Whether Europe is willing and capable of such a show of strength and will have the stamina to carry this through remains to be seen. Coming back to the title of this paper, the answer is “Yes, but !” If the needed re-focussing and target orientation do not succeed, a creeping erosion of multilateralism and a declining influence of the EU in the global governance arena are to be expected.

A Parceria Estratégica: Continental shift? Redefining EU-Africa relations22 JOHN KOTSOPOULOS, European Policy Centre (EPC) e ELIZABETH SIDIROPOULOS, South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Background The term “partnership” has been used in reference to EU-Africa relations since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. While the spirit of cooperation this implies has persevered over the decades, it has been largely unequal and mostly limited to a development agenda. However, the EU and Africa have vowed that the December 2007 EU-Africa Summit – the first in seven years – will be different, marking the beginning of a “strategic partnership” to reflect the changing nature of EU-Africa relations. So what has changed? For one, and despite several egregious exceptions, Africa is at its most stable and democratic since the independence movements of the 1960s. Moreover, it is in the midst of something of an economic boom, with overall continental growth rates consistently above 5% in recent years. At the same time, Africa’s voice on the international stage has become louder, fostered by the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002. The EU’s position has also changed. It has increased its range of foreign policy capabilities and its willingness to use them, including putting its own “boots on the ground” through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This has had a profound effect on how the EU views its responsibilities as an international actor.

21

See for a more detailed elaboration of these points the contribution of Richard Gowan in: Effective Multilateralism; op.cit., London 2004. 22 This text was originally published as an EPC Policy Brief, European Policy Center, on November 2007

22


The international context has also lent new urgency to both sides’ commitment to a strategic partnership. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has obliged the EU and Africa to replace the traditional Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferential trade agreements with (still controversial) new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The role of new outside political powers in Africa, most specifically China, has also forced a reevaluation of the relationship. But has this change been matched by a corresponding convergence of understanding between the two sides? While the EU and Africa share many of the same core values, as espoused in the Joint Strategy to be agreed at the Summit, they do not necessarily have the same priorities nor put the same emphasis on some values. This Policy Brief written jointly by the European Policy Centre (EPC) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) analyses how the EU and Africa see each other, identifies both the commonalities and the gaps between the two sides, and assesses just how real and sustainable this new strategic direction in the relationship is. State of play The EU perspective Although things are changing, many in the EU complain that Africa still lacks a coherent ‘face’. Ironically, this is a charge which is all too often levelled against the Union as well, but it is a far more daunting challenge for the opaquely-defined “Africa”. For the EU,'Africa' is chiefly – although not exclusively – represented by the African Union. It is with the AU that the EU has invested much of its energy, and it is the AU which will be responsible for implementing the bulk of the commitments made by Africa at the 8-9 December Summit. But does the AU have the capacity and capabilities required to this? The 27-strong EU has a Commission with some 25,000 staff, while the 53-strong AU’s Commission only has around 500. National sovereignty is also much more closely guarded in Africa than it is by EU Member States. The EU may therefore be guilty of willing the AU to be its virtual equivalent when, in reality, it is not only far away from this in organisational terms, but also lacks the supranational powers at the EU’s disposal and the same degree of political commitment from its members. This reflects the disconnection between what the African side trumpets as its wish – to be treated as “one Africa” – and the reality on the ground. The ‘one Africa’ approach belies the fragmentation in the region, which is home to countless regional organisations with overlapping memberships and portfolios, from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the growing East Africa Community. The reality is that ‘one Africa’ is in fact ‘many Africas’. While no regional organisation, particularly one comprised of 53 members spread over a massive geographic landmass, can be expected to be entirely consistent, Europeans complain that Africa’s positions sometimes shift depending on who they are talking to. Thus when Beijing hosted the China-Africa Summit in November 2006 and excluded a number of African states that recognised Taiwan, there were few complaints; but when EU politicians (most notably in the UK) suggested that Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe should not be invited to the forthcoming EU-Africa Summit, they were roundly criticised for dictating terms to Africa. Similar complaints about a lack of consistency have also been heard in relation to Africa’s ability to uphold its own stated principles, particularly those entrenched in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Launched in 2001, NEPAD is aimed at setting standards and approaches to good governance and development, and includes the African Peer Review Mechanism, in which laggard states are identified by a panel of fellow African leaders. However, less than half of the continent’s countries

23


have signed up to it and there has been little more than ‘quiet diplomacy’ to address the most serious examples of bad governance, such as Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the AU and ECOWAS have shown a great willingness to play a leading role in peace and security operations – most recently in Darfur, but also in countries like Liberia and the Ivory Coast. This idea of ‘African solutions for African problems’ resonates well in a traditionally risk- averse EU. Furthermore, while continuing and even expanding its ESDP commitments in Africa (with the planned EUFOR mission to Chad and the Central African Republic), the EU has found supporting African initiatives to be an effective way to address peace and security issues constructively with the continent. Dedicated EU funds are now available – largely in the form of the African Peace Facility – specifically for this type of initiative. Claims that the EU-Africa agenda is driven solely by European values and priorities are unfair, especially given that the new Joint Strategy was formulated following an unprecedented mutual consultation process and tackles all the key areas of common concern, including peace and security; trade and regional integration; governance, democracy and human rights; and, of course, development. There is a significant difference, however, in the emphasis placed on these issues by either side. One example of this is the importance attached to good governance and human rights promotion – crucial for the EU; and migration, which the Europeans tend to view largely as a threat and something to be thwarted, while African countries see it as the result of inequalities in an international system which keeps the West on top and which therefore compels people to migrate there. African countries also fear the resulting ‘brain drain’. Finally, the EU considers itself a “soft” or even “moral” power, and this not only affects the way the EU sees its role in Africa, but also how its actions on the continent contribute to its standing on the international stage. By broadening the sectors in which it is involved in Africa (from development to security and governance support), the EU can better champion its core values of human rights, rule of law and democracy. Still, strategic interests matter too. For instance, Africa is increasingly an economic magnet for the EU. The broader the relationship and the deeper the engagement between the two sides, the better this is for European business and geo-political interests. With immense competition for Africa’s natural resources coming not only from China, but also from India and the US, Europe’s perception of Africa needs to evolve from ‘development client’ to fully-fledged partner. The African perspective Since the mid- to late-1990s, Africa has undergone a degree of soul-searching and changes in approach to the problems that have plagued it since decolonisation. Influenced by global developments and a new breed of modernising leaders in key African states, the focus began to shift to the need for greater democratisation, human security and the unleashing of productive capacity within African economies. The creation of the AU and its subsidiary institutions, coupled with the lofty ideals espoused in the NEPAD adopted by African states a year earlier, cemented this shift in outlook. For the external world, it provided an opportunity for a more systematic engagement with African states and institutions on a host of new issues, well beyond development aid. Inasmuch as African countries are not all the same, there is also a multiplicity of African views of Europe. Perceptions of how Europe interacts with Africa range from neo-imperialist and paternalistic to friend or equal partner. Furthermore, in the minds of many Africans, there is not necessarily a clear distinction between Europe as the EU and European countries as former colonial masters. This perspective – which is replicated in Europe, where the diversity of African 24


levels of development and political culture are often lumped together – can complicate the perceptual landscape. Many Africans see what they regard as Europe’s ‘obsession’ with democracy and human rights when dealing with Africa as a neo-colonial conditionality which pays little regard to particular local conditions. Africans also argue that economic development and poverty alleviation/eradication are the continent’s main concerns, and must have primacy given the level of development in African states, whereas democracy and human rights seem to be Europe’s over-arching priorities. Although one-dimensional, these perceptions exist – and the EU’s actions sometimes reinforce them. The Joint Strategy, for example, places agriculture, food security, infrastructure, debt cancellation, and human and social development under the fourth pillar of ‘key development issues’, even though Africans regard these as the most important issues to be addressed. Good governance is clearly a necessary precondition for sustainable development, as is responsible and accountable political leadership. In the absence of an open articulation of different interests domestically, with the requisite pressures exerted on political leadership, the elite has often abused its power for its own gain and suppressed opposition when it has become inimical to promoting those interests. Notwithstanding the existence of a large body of declarations and institutions aimed at promoting the values enshrined in the AU’s founding documents, African leaders are still uncomfortable about dealing with recalcitrant states. They prefer not to use the stick of sanctions – except in cases of unconstitutional changes of power, where states have been suspended from the AU – and are angered by what they regard as the inconsistencies in the EU’s approach. Furthermore, many African officials believe that if the Joint Strategy is truly about entrenching a real partnership, there should also be frank discussions of human rights violations in Europe, especially against many migrants from Africa, as well as the practice of extraordinary renditions. In other words, there is a strong perception that Europe’s emphasis on values is littered with double standards and underlying hidden agendas – often driven by a colonial mentality. In many African minds, economic development and trade issues confirm this perception: the negotiations on both the EPAs and the WTO’s Doha Round are highly complex issues. In the public perception, EPAs are seen as potentially costly for African states, although the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ policy will continue to apply to low-income countries. The EU’s stance in the Doha negotiations is also seen in Africa as a stumbling block to progress and thus as undermining the EU’s stated commitment to promoting economic development. As new external actors emerge on the African stage, the continent’s countries inevitably draw comparisons between them and the EU, its Member States and other traditional partners, on the focus, the types of conditions attached, the activities funded and the speed with which commitments are met. However, the EU and its Member States have made a significant contribution to Africa’s development in many ways – and these contributions have not gone unnoticed by both African leaders and civil society (notwithstanding the fact that support for civil society has not always been viewed positively by African elites). In the face of scarce resources among citizens and more organised civil society actors, support to help bolster such institutions is critical. A true partnership necessitates first and foremost that both sides internalise what this means. For African countries, it means breaking out of the old reactive and sometimes passive mindset, which focused excessively on the donor-recipient relationship. They argue that Europe needs to become more aware of the perceptions outlined above and recognise that it is not easy to change them overnight.

25


In breaking out of the aid-relationship syndrome, Africans must pay more attention to the areas where they can effect change with minimal resources (‘low-hanging fruits’) and which can contribute to unleashing the productive potential within their economies. African states are not homogenous. There are clearly reformers and drivers of progress in the continent, such as South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria, which have a responsibility to champion the values and principles espoused in AU declarations and thus give greater substance to many of the positive initiatives begun in the last decade. Prospects The relationship has the potential to reap enormous benefits for both sides, and the Joint Strategy charts a path for the future based on partnership and mutual accountability. However, this will not happen overnight. If the aim is to move the two continents ‘beyond aid’, then African states and the AU should develop a more comprehensive game plan, identifying clearly what they want from this, encompassing both political and multilateral/ global issues. This will not be easy, as African states have not reached anywhere near the level of Europe’s integration, thus making it difficult to talk of a common African policy towards Europe, the US or China. While conflict still plagues some parts of Africa, the continent has made great strides over the last 20 years. South Africa’s re-entry into the global community after 1994, the democratisation of most African states, and the creation of the AU and NEPAD, have provided the impetus for the development of a new set of criteria to govern the relationship between the two continents. As this relationship matures, African states must recognise that external partners – from former colonial powers to new emerging players such as China and India – will be driven not only by altruism but also by their own national interests. Although operating on this basis and acting as ‘good global citizens’ are not mutually exclusive, Africans need to recognise this and to become clearer – both individually and collectively – about their needs and concerns, and how to achieve them. On the European side, the concerted effort to build a partnership is having an effect on the way EU countries shape their external actions, especially considering that policies towards Africa – outside of the parameters of the ACP agreements – were once firmly a matter for those Member States with colonial histories and interests. While national policies have so far only been partially channelled into an EU framework, there is an increasing drive towards establishing common benchmarks and rules of behaviour. Furthermore, perceptions on each side about the other are gradually converging through improved and more regular elite-level engagement and enhanced exchanges among civil society, business, and academia. While it is unrealistic to expect the two continents to see eye-to-eye on all the major issues, this should not undermine the process of building a stronger partnership – and one which could potentially extend to the development of a stronger rules-based multilateral framework. The 2007 Joint EU-Africa Strategy heightens expectations about the future of EU-Africa relations. The most significant element of this strategy is, in fact, not so much the document itself but more the process which has led to its production. While major stumbling blocks such as the EPAs remain – and there are concerns that the strategy is too general in many areas – it does reflect an explicit acknowledgement by both the EU and Africa that ‘business is usual’ is not an option. A new chapter has been opened: it now needs to be written.

26


Outros documentos e links sobre a Parceria UE-África

Documentos Oficiais Conclusões da II Cimeira UE-África: Declaração de Lisboa (Inglês) http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/BAC34848-05CC-45E9-8F1D8E2663079609/0/20071208LISBONDeclaration EN.pdf Conclusões da II Cimeira UE-África: Estratégia Conjunta e Plano de Acção (Inglês) http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4CB3-B566407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos formatado.pdf Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro de Portugal e Presidente em exercício do Conselho Europeu, José Sócrates, Sessão de Encerramento da Cimeira UE-África http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/8A63447E-E6DC-49AC-B6B0C9C6F9C872B4/0/DISCURSOSESSAODEENCERRAMENTO.pdf Follow-up to the Africa-EU-Lisbon Summit: engaging the Commission in a partnership of results Communication from the European Commission, 19.03.2008 http://www.dgroups.org/groups/CoOL/docs/Africa-EU Summit Follow UpEC Communication 190308.doc?ois=no Europe-Africa: the indispensable partnership Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, 30 Novembro 2007 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/782&format=HTML&aged=0&langu age=EN&guiLanguage=en European Parliament report on the joint EU-Africa Strategy, 25 Outubro 2007 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-20070375+0+DOC+WORD+V0//EN From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership Communication from the European Commission, 27.06.2007 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007 0357en01 01.pdf Beyond Lisbon: Making the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership work Commission/Council Secretariat Joint Paper, 27.6.2007 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007 0357en01 02.pdf The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. The way forward and key achievements in 2006 Council of the European Union, 11.12.2006 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st16/st16630.en06.pdf EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development Communication from the European Commission, 12.10.2005 http://ec.europa.eu/development/ICenter/Pdf/04 eu strategy for africa 12 10 2005 en.pdf Declaração do Cairo, I Cimeira UE-África, 2000 http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europecares/africa/docs/10 cairo declaration summit 3-4 apr 2000.pdf Acordo de Parceria UE-ACP (Acordo de Cotonou), 2000 http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/index en.htm

27


Outros Documentos Dados do Comércio entre a Europa e a África Eurostat, 06.12.2007 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP PRD CAT PREREL/PGE CAT PREREL YEAR 2 007/PGE CAT PREREL YEAR 2007 MONTH 12/6-06122007-EN-BP.PDF The EU-Africa Summit: strategy and partnership Romy Chevallier, FRIDE, Dezembro 2007 http://www.fride.org/download/COM EUAfricaSumm ENG dec07.pdf La Cumbre de Lisboa: una agenda para el desarrollo y la seguridad de África Teresa Cavero, Gonzalo Fanjul, Isabel Kreisler y Javier Pérez Real Instituto Elcano, 03.12.2007 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM GLOBAL CONTEXT=/Elcano es/ Zonas es/ARI127-2007%20 Lisbon EU-Africa Summit: The Day After World Economy & Development In Brief, Luxembourg, issue 6/Nov-Dec. http://www.weltwirtschaft-und-entwicklung.org/cms en/wearchiv/042ae699f11070201.php How to deliver on the EU-Africa Partnership’s ambitions? Adapting the institutional framework for EUAfrica relations Marie-Laure de Bergh, ECDPM, September 2007 http://www.ecdpm.org/Web ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/816B842BDDEDB8ADC12573610031C A63/$FILE/how%20deliver%20on%20eu%20afr%20partnership%20ambitions-inst%20framework.pdf The European Union in Africa: The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective Niagalé Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gibert, Institute of Devlopment Studies, Working Paper 284, May 2007 http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp284.pdf Developing a new Euro-Africa partnership Nathalie Delapalme, March 2008 http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=f1218c47-05a2-4e65-94b930d9d0d549c4 The EU and Africa: coming together at last? European Policy Centre, Julho 2007 http://europafrica.org/2007/09/01/the-eu-and-africa-coming-together-at-last/ The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective ECDPM, Maio 2007 http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/historical perspective.pdfhttp:/europafrica.files.wordpres s.com/2007/05/historical perspective.pdf Our Common Interest Report of the Commission for Africa, 2005 http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html

28


Outros Actores em África: Meeting of the task force on Africa’s partnership with emerging powers: China, India and Brazil 11-13 September 2006, Report, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa. http://www.acbf-pact.org/newsletter/archives/2006/Third quarter/index.asp Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) www.cfr.org/publication/12278/forum on chinaafrica cooperationbeijing action plan 20072009.html Emerging Countries as New ODA Players in LDCs: The Case of China and Africa. Chris Alden, LSE, 2007. http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/Emergingcountries-as-new-ODA-players-in-LDCs-The-case-of-China-and-Africa China’s Engagement in Africa: Singular Interest or Mutual Benefit. st Conference Paper, Resource Governance in Africa in the 21 Century, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2007. http://www.boell.de/downloads/intlpolitics/China Li Anshan.pdf China’s expanding role in Africa: implications for the United States. Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2007 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf From strategic triangle to tripartite stakeholdership. Position Paper to the internatinal symposium The New Strategic Triangle: China, Europe and the United States in a Changing International System, KAS Publication Series 76, 2007 http://www.kas.de/db files/dokumente/veranstaltungsbeitraege/7 dokument dok pdf 9537 2.pdf EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: Common challenges and new directions. Berger & Wissenbeach, Discussion Paper, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2007 http://www.ec-an.eu/files/bergerweissenbach 0.pdf China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony. H. Campbel, In African Perspectives on China in Africa, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks (eds), 2007 http://www.fahamu.org/downloads/cia download.pdf Completing Hegemons? Chinese Versus American Geo-Economic Strategies in Africa. P. Carmody & F. Owusu, Political Geography 26, 2007 http://www.public.iastate.edu/~fowusu/Competing%20Hegemons.pdf Davies, P. (2007): China and the End of Poverty in Africa – toward Mutual Benefit? Diakonia, Sundbyberg, September 2007. http://www.diakonia.se/documents/public/NEWS/China and the end of poverty in Africa 2.pdf A Política da Administração Bush para África. Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira, Lumiar Brief 2, IEEI, Abril 2008 http://www.ieei.pt/files/Bush Africa brief2.pdf The Rise of China and India: What’s in it for Africa? A. Goldstein, OECD, 2006 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/62/36905545.pdf Militarization of U.S. Africa Policy, 2000 to 2005. William Hartung & Frida Berrigan, Arms Trade Resource Center, 2005 http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/AfricaMarch2005.html Friendly Giant? China’s Evolving Africa Policy J.Holstag, BICCS Background Paper, 2007. http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/documents/Holslag,%20Jonathan%20(2007),%20Friendly%20Giant,%20Asia%2 0Paper,%20Asia%20Paper%202%20(5),%20BICCS,%20Brussels%5B1%5D.doc.pdf

29


Research in Europe and Africa-China Relationships. J. Humphrey, A Report for the Rockefeller Foundation, Institute of Development Studies, 2007 http://asiandrivers.open.ac.uk/documents/china africa research.pdf Beijing’s Safari – China’s move into Africa and its implications for aid, development and governance. J. Kurlantzick, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kurlantzick outlook africa2.pdf The United States and Africa in the Era of Globalization. A. Malaquias, In «Estratégia e Segurança na África Austral», FLAD e IPRI-UNL, 2007 http://www.ipri.pt/publicacoes/working paper/pdf/15-Malaquias.pdf Will Emerging Donors Change the Face of International Cooperation? Richard Manning, Development Policy Review 24:4, 2006 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/38/36417541.pdf UE–Chine-Afrique: d'une relation de concurrence à un partenariat triangulaire pour le développement de l'Afrique. Louis Michel, Conference "EU-China-Africa", EC, 28/06/07. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/442&format=HTML&aged=0&langu age=FR&guiLanguage=en Competition or Partnership? China, United States and Africa – An African View. Lopo do Nascimento, Discussion Paper 2/2007, Brenthurst Foundation, 2007 http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst Commisioned Reports/BD0702 China US Afri ca.pdf The African Dimension in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 Era P. Schraeder, In «Estratégia e Segurança na África Austral», FLAD e IPRI-UNL, 2007. http://www.ipri.pt/publicacoes/working paper/pdf/13-Schraeder.pdf Challenges for EU-China Cooperation in Africa. Javier Solana, China Daily, 7 February 2007 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/92678.pdf Partners in Competition? The EU, Africa and China. U. Wissenbach, Conference Summary Proceedings, 28/06/2007. http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/EU%20Africa%20China%20Conference%20Summary.pdf

30


II. Pilares do Diálogo Europa-África

SEGURANÇA Enquadramento A paz e a segurança são uma das vertentes principais das relações entre a União Europeia, a União Africana e os parceiros africanos em geral. Desde a sua criação, em 2002, a UA tornou-se rapidamente um actor primordial da segurança no continente, assumindo-se como protagonista na área da mediação e da intervenção em situações de conflito violento, como ilustram as várias acções de mediação continental e regional (Somália, Sudão, conflitos na África Ocidental), ou de intervenção de forças continentais africanas no Burundi (AMIB), no Sudão (AMIS) e regionais em diversos conflitos (por exemplo, CEDEAO na Serra Leoa, Libéria e Costa do Marfim). Verifica-se, porém, uma disparidade entre a existência de vontade política de intervenção e resolução de conflitos, por um lado, e as reais capacidades africanas – limitadas ao nível financeiro, logístico e de equipamentos marítimos e aéreos –, por outro, o que atrasa o tempo de resposta e tem afectado a continuidade das missões no terreno. A UE tem prestado um inegável apoio a estes desenvolvimentos, contribuindo de várias formas para aquilo que se espera poder vir a ser uma “arquitectura africana de paz e segurança”, nomeadamente através do Mecanismo de Paz para África (African Peace Facility-APF). Destacamse três componentes em que a UE tem prestado apoio às aspirações africanas nesta área: no destacamento de missões africanas para o terreno (por exemplo, Sudão), na criação e reforço de um sistema continental de alerta antecipado (composto por centros e mecanismos nas várias subregiões) e no processo de constituição de uma força “stand-by” africana, formada por brigadas das cinco principais sub-regiões. A assinatura, em 2003, de um programa de apoio às actividades de peacebuilding no seio do Conselho de Paz e Segurança da UA (CPS), podendo incluir financiamentos para apoio logístico e financeiro às missões de observação e de manutenção da paz; a adopção de um plano de acção no quadro da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa (PESD) para o reforço das capacidades africanas; e a aprovação de um novo período de financiamento do Mecanismo de Paz para África até 2011, são alguns exemplos de avanços concretos na actuação europeia. No entanto, a actuação europeia não está isenta de críticas, nomeadamente por privilegiar as acções de curto-prazo em detrimento da prevenção de conflitos, por utilizar fundos de desenvolvimento para actividades de segurança, por não conseguir coordenar a sua acção com as actuações bilaterais dos Estados-Membros, ou ainda por não assegurar uma coerência de políticas que sejam mais “conflict-sensitive”, integrando a dimensão da prevenção de conflitos em outras áreas de actuação (como o comércio ou o desenvolvimento, por exemplo). Para além do reforço das capacidades africanas, e apesar de privilegiar claramente as acções nãomilitares, a UE não exclui a possibilidade de utilização de meios militares para a prossecução da paz e segurança no continente africano, desde que utilizados como instrumentos de curto-prazo. É nesse quadro que se inserem as intervenções, fora do contexto NATO, no leste da R.D.Congo em 2003 (Operação Artemis) e no mesmo país, em 2006 (EUFOR, de apoio à missão das Nações Unidas – MONUC, durante o período eleitoral). Existem ainda três missões PESD em curso no continente africano: a Missão Policial da UE na RDC (EUPOL RDC), a Missão de Reforma do Sector 31


de Segurança da RDC (EUSEC RDC) e a missão militar da UE no Chade e na República CentroAfricana (EUFOR Chade/RCA), criada em Outubro de 2007. Neste quadro, a UE tem tentado coordenar os vários instrumentos disponíveis, combinando a actuação militar, diplomática, política e de desenvolvimento. A RDC é um exemplo paradigmático desta tentativa, com a existência de um enviado especial para os Grandes Lagos, a actuação na área policial e do sector de segurança e os vários programas de desenvolvimento. No entanto, verifica-se que os vários instrumentos resultam menos de uma convergência de políticas ou de uma abordagem integrada, do que da simples presença de múltiplos instrumentos no terreno. Sendo uma área recente de actuação, a política de segurança da UE é ainda uma área de “experimentação” para os organismos institucionais responsáveis pela definição e implementação da PESC e da PESD, estando muito ligada a dois constrangimentos: a rivalidade e dificuldade das instituições da UE trabalharem em conjunto (o que é particularmente evidente entre as áreas de desenvolvimento e de segurança), e a influência dos interesses dos Estados-Membros. O apoio europeu à resolução de conflitos em África não é, nem deverá ser, o único elemento de ligação e cooperação entre os dois continentes nesta matéria. A paz e segurança são interesses comuns e objectivos partilhados entre a África e a Europa, sendo actualmente considerados indissociáveis de outros elementos, como o desenvolvimento ou as migrações. Nesse sentido, as ameaças globais à segurança são materializadas não só no terrorismo, mas igualmente na globalização de redes criminosas (de tráfico de pessoas, droga ou matérias-primas) e na proliferação de Estados Frágeis onde se torna difícil assegurar o controlo efectivo sobre o território e a segurança das populações. O debate conjunto e a procura de soluções comuns entre os dois continentes para estes problemas seria útil não só para projectar o papel da Europa como promotor da estabilidade e da paz, mas também para aumentar a apropriação por parte dos africanos destas dinâmicas, simultaneamente locais e globais. A “obsessão securitária” pós-11 de Setembro pode ter contribuído para abordagens externas que privilegiam o factor segurança em detrimento de outros, como o desenvolvimento ou a governação, gerando algum cepticismo da parte africana, como se verificou, por exemplo, durante o processo de criação da AFRICOM, o comando dos Estados Unidos para África. A abordagem europeia poder-se-á distinguir por um maior ênfase nas questões da “segurança humana”, restaurando a validade do conceito da “responsabilidade de protecção” (responsability to protect – R2P) lançado pelas Nações Unidas no início do século e afectado na sua credibilidade junto de muitos países em desenvolvimento após a recente intervenção no Iraque. A perspectiva da segurança humana assenta no primado dos direitos humanos e na promoção do multilateralismo. Abrange as várias dimensões da segurança e da consolidação da paz, estando, por isso, mais em consonância com a necessária abrangência e multidimensionalidade das respostas em Estados frágeis ou em situação de pós-conflito (realidade de muitos países africanos). Nesse sentido, um dos elementos distintivos da abordagem da UE em países frágeis ou em situações de conflito poderá ser o trabalho desenvolvido com e através das organizações regionais dos países parceiros. Várias organizações africanas, regionais e sub-regionais, estão a desenvolver mecanismos que permitam responder aos problemas estruturais de países frágeis e a reforçar capacidades para lidar com focos de instabilidade, incluindo sistemas de alerta antecipado, gestão de crises, ou estratégias de peacebuilding. A expectativa é que a UE apoie os seus esforços nesta área, quer em termos financeiros, quer em termos estratégicos/políticos. Assim, para além de todas as iniciativas de apoio em curso, a UE deverá cada vez mais trabalhar com os vizinhos regionais de forma a envolver-se conjuntamente – por via diplomática, política, da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, etc. – num país em situação de fragilidade ou num determinado conflito. A UE pode também desempenhar um papel importante na área da prevenção de conflitos – área até agora mais descurada na colaboração com as organizações regionais africanas –, nomeadamente através do reforço das iniciativas de governação existentes (como o

32


Mecanismo Africano de Revisão pelos Pares) e dos esforços africanos de promoção dos direitos humanos e da democracia.

33


Facing African security challenges: are European and African interests and responsibilities converging?23 FERNANDA FARIA, European Centre for Development Policy Management e IEEI

1. Africa in the EU security debate and priorities Ever since the start of the European integration process, Africa has had a place in European external relations, very much as an heritage of the colonial ties of some of its member states (MS), but the focus was almost exclusively on economic and social development and cooperation, evolving only in the 90s into a more complex and comprehensive policy, where the political and security dimensions have gained further importance24. Concerns over African security were until recently confined to national interests and foreign policies of some European states, within the framework of the strategic imperatives of the Cold War period. Although European concerns over security in Africa remain strongly driven by the same MS who have special historical ties with the continent, there are important changes in the European, the African and the international context that bring new dimensions into this debate and the way it is perceived in and addressed by the EU, in particular:  The recognition of the ‘failure’ of development policies and of the importance of addressing political and security constrains to development, alongside economic and social needs. The whole debate about Aid Effectiveness aims at understanding and addressing the shortcomings of a development policy that has had little impact on the development of recipient countries. It’s also strongly linked to the need for more coherent, coordinated and complementary European policies (the 3Cs), including the linkages between security and development (one of the twelve policy areas for Policy Coherence for Development). Africa, and the DRC in particular, is one of the scenarios where the EU has all its external relations’ tools at work, where coordination efforts have been significant (in the DRC case at least up to the holding of elections, but eroding since then), and comprehensive and integrated approaches are being tried out.  The deepening of the European integration process and the EU ambitions to play a greater political and security role in world affairs that would match its economic power. CFSP/ESDP is a response to those ambitions and a recognition that ‘soft power’ needs to be supported, if to be credible, by means and capacity to engage in security and defence activities. Africa has been in the last few years an important ground for EU crisis management activities. Operation Artemis in 2003, under a UN mandate, was the first ESDP fully autonomous crisis management military operation outside Europe, under a UN mandate.  The emergence of the African Union and of more committed African regional organizations, with a stronger peace and security agenda25. The EU has been a major supporter of African efforts to strengthen their capacity to address security challenges in the continent. The Africa Peace Facility (APF), created under the European Development Fund (EDF) at the request of the Africans, has been instrumental to support African-led peace operations, but unable to go 23

This is a version of the paper presented at the EU-ISS and Portuguese Presidency High Level Conference on ESDP, Crisis Prevention & Conflict Resolution in Africa, held in Lisbon, on October 23, 2007 24 The link between peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance is part of EU bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements with African countries and organizations. 25 Since the 90s, African countries and organizations have proven much more willing and determined to engage in resolving African problems, including in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent, but their efforts have been hampered (not only, but also) by major capacity problems.

34


much beyond the immediate needs and focus on building African institutions long-term capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution.  At the international level, the generally accepted principle that the international community has the “responsibility to protect” and prevent serious violations of International Humanitarian Law and/or human rights. This is one of the fundamental dimensions (probably the least disputed) of the still ill-defined Human Security concept26, upheld by the EU in many of its policies and activities with expression also in European policies towards Africa (e.g. crisis management, human rights and democracy promotion, development and humanitarian aid, to name some). Africa has therefore a place in European foreign and security policy, but what are effectively EU security concerns and interests in Africa? How strong are they to mobilise a Union of 27 MS with diverse foreign policy agendas to join-up action and activities in Africa or in support of African efforts? How much of a priority is Africa for the EU? 2. EU security concerns and interests in Africa In the European Security Strategy (2003), African countries/regions are referred namely in relation to the following “key threats”: regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. All three are interlinked and are often the expression of the other. They can also lead to terrorism and fuel the demand for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which are the other two key threats identified in the strategy. But how effectively concerned are Europeans by these threats from Africa? These are first of all not direct or immediate military threats to Europe and not all of them deserve the same concern from EU member states or by all of them. Terrorism or the role of African players in international terrorism, and the proliferation of WMD in Africa are not (for now, at least)27 a significant security concern for the whole of the EU28 (unlike for the US, who has been stepping up support for and activities in African countries on these matters), and although these are often referred to in official documents as issues for closer dialogue, they are not as yet the subject of specific or more developed EU-Africa cooperation arrangements. Furthermore, terrorism is not the main priority for most African countries and when raised if is often to stress the need to balance the fight against terrorism and respect for human rights, a perspective widely shared in Europe. Regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are much more real concerns, not so much for their direct impact on European security, but for their negative impact on European efforts to support sustainable development and peace and security in Africa, in light of moral values and international commitments upheld by the EU, not least with African countries and organizations. Despite being inconsistently applied, these values and commitments are not without influence in the making of European interests/sense of obligation in Africa. The EU has energy interests in Africa, particularly in North Africa, while some European countries have important economic links to Africa. Although these are not directly linked to security, such interests also have an impact in shaping European security concerns and interests in the continent and in EU support to national/regional agendas for peace and stability in Africa. The EU also has a responsibility to address some of the activities that 26

Although no real consensus exists on when is it legitimate to override a country’s sovereignty to uphold the protection of human rights when the state is not in a position to do it or is directly responsible for human rights’ violations. 27 On the opposite, there are examples in Africa of States that have decided to give up of their WMD programmes (e.g. South Africa, Libya). It is, however, not unlikely that the issue will rise again if Iran goes nuclear, particularly in North Africa. 28 France and, more recently, Spain were targets of terrorist acts perpetrated by people of North African descent. While terrorism is a real concern for these countries and others in Europe, and because this a reality they have been living with for many years within their own borders, European States tend to see and address terrorism from a different perspective as the US.

35


contribute to fuel instability and conflict in Africa (e.g. drugs and SALW traffic, illicit exploitation of natural resources) as some of these are linked to European businesses. For some European countries, the human factor is also important: the presence of European communities in Africa and of African communities in Europe is another factor which makes that security in Africa is not indifferent to at least some countries in Europe. Again, these countries are generally the ones who have historical ties, stronger strategic and economic interests in the continent and that are more willing to engage in security activities in Africa, although not necessarily under UN peacekeeping missions nor have they always tended to push for a greater EU involvement on security issues in Africa, specially those MS with more means and capacity to engage alone. There are however, some changes to this trend, too, France being a case in point with the ‘europeanisation’ of its African policy (e.g. RECAMP). But do these concerns, interests and trends constitute a solid basis for a common European security and defence policy towards Africa? One important element that is likely to weight decisively, particularly for those MS with fewer links to Africa but committed to the European integration process, is the fact that Africa has been an ‘experimenting ground’ for the EU to reaffirm its role as an international political and security actor, and specifically for the development of ESDP29. It is also where the EU is ‘experimenting’ integrated approaches, including linking security and development, and attempting to find solutions to institutional and operational constraints in implementing them. European security concerns and interests in Africa are thus shaped by:    

International values and commitments, National interests and historical ties of some MS, Coherence and consistency with long-term European policies towards Africa, and EU institutional dynamics and integration process (e.g. the security–development link within EU policies, consolidation of ESDP)30.

Notwithstanding the general consensus on the need and interest to support ‘African responses for African problems’, there are still clear differences in the level and areas of priority of European engagement, the means to address it and the work division among European institutions and with/between MS. Illustrative of this is the constant debate in Brussels over the replenishment of the APF (and more generally over the definition of ODA) and whether development funds should be used to pay for peacekeeping operations and related activities. It is important to underline that the EU focus and main strategy with regard to the security situation in Africa is and will continue to be the prevention of conflicts and addressing the root causes of conflict its main priority, in line also with the EU perceived added-value, experience and tools at its disposal. Humanitarian aid and crisis management are short-term tools aimed at supporting long-term policies, but not a substitute to them, while it is also recognized that in some situations security is the main priority for those who endure the consequences of conflict or instability and an important part of long-term solutions. In those situations, what are the EU incentives to act? 3. Drivers of EU action in Africa Despite the EU focus on prevention, EU record for taking early action is rather poor, as is the case for other regional and international organizations. Responses in general tend to be reactive, rather than preventive, and policy/action in Africa is no exception. 29

Furthermore, it is a ground where the EU is not seen as competing with other international organizations (e.g. NATO, although that can not be taken for granted), its activities being rather in support of or/and complementary to UN efforts in Africa. 30 See namely: Niagalé Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gibert, The European Union in Africa: the linkage between security, governance and development from an institutional perspective, Working Paper 284, IDS – University of Sussex (UK), May 2007.

36


Although institutional constraints, and namely complex and lengthy decision-making procedures, are a recognized bottleneck for EU joint action – and an incentive for the planned creation of the European External Action Service –, there are situations where the EU proved it can overcome such constraints (e.g. EU operations in DRC). Among those aspects that are more likely to trigger joint action by the EU in Africa, as elsewhere, are31:  Political will and leadership… but still linked to a common European agenda. It often takes a MS or group of MS who consider their interests are at stake, who are willing to take the lead, who have the capabilities to implement action and are also prepared to take a large part of the financial and logistic burden32. This implies that the decision to take action is always subordinate to a specific interest of a member or group of MS and will never be coherently applied to all situations in need. These are more likely to happen in areas of interest of those countries that have the capability to implement such actions (potentially hindering EU cohesion and solidarity), but also where there is a minimum sense of EU added-value (e.g. where the EU is one of the few international actors present or has been engaged in that country or region for a considerable period of time and with significant resources). Not all MS nor at all times are they likely to push for EU joint action in every country where they have special security concerns or interests. In fact, that has been more the exception rather than the rule.  Having the means and capacity to deal quickly and effectively with the situation, and with well calculated risk. In the EU such required conviction translates often into strict time-frames for external action, particularly when it implies the mobilisation of military forces and of crisis management activities in general, namely for budgetary reasons (cost lying where they fall, those MS who participate in the mission bare with the costs in equal proportion). This may be a needed compromise to be able to take such action, but its implications must be properly weighted both in terms of effectiveness and credibility, particularly when there is need to adapt to changing conditions on the ground (e.g. the case of Germany’s participation in the EUFOR mission in DRC).  Legitimacy by the UN. The will seek to frame its external interventions within a UN framework, legitimised by a UN mandate, in support of UN activities and at its request. Without it, agreement among the EU MS for ESDP action (especially military operations) is quite unlikely; with it, it is not guaranteed if not supported and sustained by other triggers, political will above all.  A drive by African organisations and actors. A specific request and drive (ownership) by partner countries or regional/continental organizations like the AU or African sub-regional organizations, again subject to UN approval or within a UN framework, is also likely to be an important incentive for EU engagement, given namely the EU support to these organisations efforts and activities in the area of peace and security, among others. Such commitment is expected to be reinforced with the future Joint EU-Africa Strategy to be adopted at the II EUAfrica Summit in Lisbon in December 2007, under a joint/shared agenda. 4. How much are European and African security concerns and interests converging? At present, peace and security is considered a top priority in EU-Africa relations reflecting the increasing convergence of thinking and interests in this area, as illustrated by the on-going negotiations for a Joint EU-Africa Strategy. Both Africans and Europeans acknowledge that priority 31

See Fernanda Faria and Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira, An adequate EU response strategy to address situations of fragility and difficult environments, Study for the Portuguese Presidency of the EU, ECDPM (Maastricht), IEEI (Lisbon), 2007 (forthcoming). See section 2.7. in draft version available at http://ecdpm.org or http://www.ieei.pt. 32 ESDP missions have so far been organized under the framework of a leading nation (e.g. Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR in 2006 in DRC) and most of the costs are distributed according to the rule of ‘costs lie where they fall’, meaning those who are more involved are those who borne most of the costs, with only part of the operation costs being eligible as ‘common costs’ and therefore borne by all MS.

37


should be given to addressing the root causes of conflict, while promoting a holistic approach encompassing crisis management and long-term peace building linked to governance and conflict prevention. Both acknowledge the close link between security and development and the need to better articulate short- and long-term responses to security problems. They also agree on the interest of stepping up cooperation and coordination in international fora (UN, G8, WB) and with other donors (e.g. Canada, US) to support African agendas and capabilities on conflict prevention and resolution, long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management and coherent and coordinated support for the African-stand-by Force, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. African and European officials equally declare to be committed to ‘go beyond Africa’, deepen their dialogue and work jointly towards common positions on global issues where peace and security is at stake (e.g. organised crime and terrorism, small arms, landmines, illicit trade of natural resources, WMD, amongst others) or/and on issues that, although not directly linked, can have an impact on security and stability (e.g. environmental issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, water management, toxic waste deposit).33 This is not to say, however, that there are no differences or divergences between Europeans and Africans, as there are within African and European societies. These are however, more than on content, divergences on approaches and prioritization. It is nevertheless important to recognize that progress in EU-Africa relations in the security area has been substantial, in political terms and increasingly also in financial commitments. It is equally important to acknowledge that joint efforts have been hampered by political and capacity problems at both European and African level. 5. Some challenges and difficulties for an effective EU role in addressing African security problems Beyond the structural challenges posed by the institutional set-up of the EU, there are political hurdles and operational difficulties that may contribute to some skepticism as to what extent the EU may indeed be able to mobilise the will and resources, and change and adapt its instruments and approaches, if to engage with African actors in a different manner: promoting African ownership, mutual accountability, and tailoring approaches and responses to each specific context. The EU is making considerable contributions to support and strengthen African capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution and African initiatives like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including, inter alia, the support to peacekeeping operations, to the preparation of an African Stand-by force and regional brigades, to the establishment of earlywarning systems and several capacity-building actions targeted to pan-African institutions and African Regional Organizations, namely through the African Peace Facility. At the centre of these capacity-building programmes is the principle of African ownership, but that entails a focus on processes rather than on immediate results, making it therefore more difficult, on the longer run, to buy-in support of those MS who do not necessarily perceive the need for a continued strong EU support and engagement in Africa, particularly if no concrete results are visible on the short-term. On the other hand, while it is generally accepted that no sustained results can be achieved if key local actors do not identify and feel they ‘own’ the responses to the problems they face, there are situations when supporting African ownership entails difficult dilemmas and/or political choices and risks, particularly in the absence of accountability mechanisms, and in volatile political situations, with on-going power struggles. One means of addressing the ‘accountability’ issue would be to engage in political dialogue not only with state actors but also with (local and other) relevant non-state actors. But how good is 33

See the Joint EU-Africa Strategy Outline, available at http://europafrica.org/2007/05/24/outline-of-joint-strategyofficial/

38


the EU at doing it? The EU acknowledges it needs to develop considerably its dialogue and cooperation with non-state actors in Europe, let alone in Africa. Relations with African countries for the most part have been on a state-to-state basis, and there is strong resistance from many African governments to see a greater European focus on dialogue with and participation of nonstate actors in general, let alone on issues regarding security. Suspicion as to ‘hidden agendas’ by European/international actors and local non-state actors, namely to undermine the state role and authority in already weak states, are often echoed by many African leaders. Engaging in a more inclusive and participatory political dialogue, more close to the effective security reality and actors on the ground, entails also an enhanced political role by those EU actors who are in the field. Most often EC delegations are essentially managing development funds, lack a political mandate and/or the capacity to engage in political dialogue and securityrelated activities. The argument for working more at the field level is even more strongly stressed by the acknowledgement that there is no ‘one size fits all’ and that each situation/context is unique and needs to be understood and addressed in its specificities. Furthermore, in volatile situations, there is a constant need for monitoring and adapting responses to the dynamics on the ground. How feasible is this for a large and complex institution like the EU? The EU is trying to develop more integrated approaches to strengthen coherence and adapt tools for better coordination of policies, resources and instruments at the whole-of-EU level, namely: the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; EU Concepts for DDR and SSR; the on-going debate on an adequate and coherent EU response towards situations of fragility, that often are precursors of instability and conflict or a consequence of it. These are instrumental in coordinating EU and MS policies and programmes on those areas, as well as with regional and other international stakeholders, but they are only guiding references to policies and priorities that need to be defined on a case by case basis. These are just a few of the many difficulties the EU faces both as a result of the external environment it is called upon to act/react, as well as of its own integration process. Africa is again reversing challenges into the internal EU process, becoming an experimental ground for the EU on its capacity and modus operandi and consequently implying also a rethinking of its institutional set up if it is to fulfill its political objectives.

EU and Africa: a few contentious points on security policies ROLAND MARCHAL (CNRS/CERI) Introduction Regional organizations have been the pillars of the EU-Africa relations for more than two decades. This time allows reflecting on the successes and weaknesses of this priority, though there is a strong consensus that any assessment should be positive, first of all because there is no alternative to this policy. The main debates nowadays focus on which regional organizations within the continent to promote first, what agenda to push forward, which tools to build as to implement more efficiently and then what the consistency of this policy is, when considered with larger lens. Yet, this important but slightly technocratic discussion often is more complex for two reasons. On the one hand, EU policies towards Africa are not always what they are stated. Member States, competing agendas, relations with other international organizations, European public opinions move or reframe them in ways that more than often may appear debatable or unclear seen from Africa.

39


On the other, African regional organizations have very diverse origins and, to a large extent, dealing with one does not help dealing with another. The history of each regional organization and the behaviour over time of the former colonial powers is not the only problem. From the independence onward, new regional settings were set up and some African countries are nowadays part of different organizations that do not always share the same priorities and agendas. The European commitment to deal with all African regional organizations is also tempered by other considerations: ECOWAS gathers more western sympathy than CEN-SAD… A reassessment of the Africa policy after 1990 Since the independences, the European States tried their best to promote regional organizations as economic actors. Typically ECOWAS was seen as a way to encourage regional economic policies which would have positive impacts at national level. In order to carry out economic reforms, the strategy was to start top down more than bottom up, i.e. from regional to national levels more than the opposite. This strategy was rooted in a very negative understanding of the African State as a channel to provide opportunities for rent seekers and coercing the market. In the early 1990s, this policy was largely left out without actually assessing its success or failure. Suddenly, the debate went on the new regionalism boosted by the transformation of the European Community into a European Union. The debate also shifted to security issues after the failures of peace keeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda: the genocide in the latter country was just another proof that military cooperation on a mere bilateral basis was increasingly costly and that Western contingents were not willing to intervene within a normal peace-keeping operation anymore. In a more nuances manner, this shift could also be understood as an indirect consequence of the reforms affecting the European armies at the end of the Cold War. The reduction of national defence budgets, the end of military competition in Africa, the need also to adapt to new crises (e.g. in the Balkans) convinced former colonial powers that Africa was not worth investing again time, resources and people. Actually the Western ODA to Africa drastically decreased until 2002. A new doctrine? The failure of multilateral interventions certainly played a role in the way new military cooperation policies were designed. The French for instance put emphasis on stabilisation operations with RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités de maintien de la paix). Compared to the US led program ACRI, the French integrated a more civilian-military dimension that today after Afghanistan and Iraq is also acknowledged by the US army. Yet, the justification of a new doctrine could not rely only on Western military capabilities. It has also to involve African governments; willingly or not, they had to endorse the new situation and find their own advantages in it. Western powers made a concerted effort in public diplomacy to convince everybody that a number of peace-keeping operations under regional or continental umbrella had been great successes that could be used as models to frame a new policy that would provide African solutions to African problems. For instance, ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone became described as a near to successful operation while its legality was contested at the very beginning by many “Francophones” leaders and its effectiveness even more after the dubious election of Charles Taylor in 1997as Liberia’s President. As always, the French added their specific touch. The MISAB (Mission de surveillance des accords de Bangui) became a paradigm of the “new spirit” by which African troops were in the forefront of any African peace settlement. African institutions, under heavy suggestions, endorsed this policy, some because they genuinely thought that they should become collective security actors, others simply because funding was available and this policy offered a way to gain again some leverage on western policies towards the continent.

40


Yet, many crises were dismissed by African regional or continental bodies, which should have already been a motive of great concern. Even more problematic, this policy provided some ambiguous support to African interventionism. Certainly, the best example was the SADC security organ endorsing an intervention in DRC in 1998 while South Africa was boycotting the meeting. A recent example is the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia with the dubious endorsement of IGAD. Those facts could and should have provoked an intense political debate between European and African State institutions and CSOs. As often, the opposite happened. As disagreements would have surfaced, it was decided to look the following point on the agenda: debates are necessary as far they can conclude by an agreement… The resilience of Western interventionism Old habits die hard. Whenever, Western national or European interests were at stake, old style interventions were still possible with only lip-service paid to African would-be security actors. Those interventions –it should be highlighted- were not always for the mere interests of individual western States but could encompass global issues. UK intervened in Sierra Leone in different manners. First in 1997, it did so by supporting (or closing its eyes on) private security firms with debatable practices and records. When British troops were sent early 2000 to avoid a new UN disaster (with hundred of peacekeepers near to become hostages), Tony Blair did not take time to call President Obansanjo and consult with ECOWAS. He did it and then convinced his African colleagues that they actually agreed on this operation. The same line of argument could be used for France acting in CAR and using the regional forces (FOMUC) as a smokescreen for its own military deeds. More concerning than the unilateral operation in Sierra Leone was the political context of such intervention. Actually, the main target was not violent thugs trying to overthrow a legally elected president Bozizé but Chadian rebels trying to use north-eastern CAR to enter Chad. While François Bozizé had formally accepted national dialogue with its opponents, Idriss Déby was adamant to find a military solution. Even, EU interventions as the Ituri’s were not so clearly endorsed by its African counterparts. Many African leaders thought that the crisis in Ituri was overplayed by the UN for its own stake and did not want to hear about such a military intervention. For the European Union (especially the French who played the leading role), it was necessary to save the UN mission in DRC from a major setback after the Iraq crisis. For African leaders, again Africa was the playing ground of a French-US rivalry that had little to do with long term African interests… A number of potential pitfalls Even though no one has articulated an alternative policy, one should be aware of the potential shortcomings of such a new security policy. It would be easy to illustrate the following points with crises, events or incidents that took place over the last two or three years. First, whatever the rhetoric is, conflict prevention is no more a focus and this is troublesome especially at a time the new resolution on “the responsibility to protect” mentions prevention as a first step, while most leaders and public opinions in the West think that military intervention is the solution. The destruction of N’djamena in February 2008 was the outcome of a crisis foreseen for two years. Yet, the European Union just has preferred to endorse the very debatable commitment to Idriss Déby by Paris. Another policy – that was not the support to the rebels- was possible but never really discussed and put on the agenda by Germany and UK, two States that have interests either in Darfur or Chad. Second, this policy rewards the African military and put them at the core of any efforts to tackle crises. Yet, the impact of such policy on African troops that may have been involved in politics or dream to be is not assessed. In a number of incidents, especially in West Africa (Ivory Coast in 1999 and Guinea Bissau in 1998), African contingents supposed to restore peace and order 41


actually became the very destabilizing element. Only these extreme situations are mentioned here to illustrate the point but one may believe that the problem occurs even in case the Army is genuinely republican. Third, willingly or not, this policy intends to create regional hegemons that could themselves become points of contradiction. For instance, the European Union is betting on South Africa for obvious reasons. Doing so, it downplays the rivalries between Pretoria and other African capitals and the fact that South Africa might use this international leverage for other debatable purposes. For instance, nobody raises question on the surprising South African attitude toward Khartoum in the Darfur crisis. South Africa is a democratic country. Uganda or Ethiopia have a more debatable democratic record: yet, they appear as reactive actors as far as the EU is concerned‌ Fourth, regional organizations often may be part of the conflicts more than the solution. Most armed crises in Africa are nowadays regional in certain ways. How to deal with organizations that behave irresponsibly (they are not the only ones in the world) without freezing a policy that looks so consensual. For instance, in the very different situations of Ivory Coast and Somalia, one may strongly argue that the respective regional organisation behaved at some points in a very negative manner that put the lives of dozens of thousands people at risk. Conclusion As said in the introduction, there is no alternative to this policy. What is becoming increasingly important is tuning. It is clear that short terms and long terms interests have to be spelled out and in specific moments one may have to accept to contradict either one or the other. A true partnership is not only based on commonalities; it is also based on the acknowledgement of differences. Therefore, it would be precious to have frank discussions on previous crises which showed completely diverse understandings and not only on the planning of the next ones‌.

42


Outros documentos e links sobre segurança nas relações UE-África Documentos Oficiais: EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts Council of the European Union, 13 November 2006. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91667.pdf Securing Peace and Stability for Africa: The Africa Peace Facility, 2004 http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/flyer peace en.pdf Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa Council of the European Union, November 2004 http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-m/reu/04/Aktionsplan%20Afrika-en.pdf Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa Common Guidelines, 2005 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l 097/l 09720050415en00570062.pdf EU Support for Peace and Security in Africa: Factsheet, 2005 http://europa.eu/press room/presspacks/us20050222/africa.pdf A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 2003 http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Göteborg European Council, June 2001 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key docs/goteborg concl en.pdf Communication on Conflict Prevention. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, April 2001 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external relations/cfsp/news/com2001 211 en.pdf

Outros documentos: The European Union (EU): African Peace and Security Environment’s Champion? William Assanvo and Christian E. B. Pout, Novembre 2007 http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/stabilisation/pv 20071127 eng.pdf Situations of Fragility: Challenges for an European Response Strategy. Fernanda Faria & Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira, ECDPM/IEEI, 2007 http://www.ieei.pt/files/Estados Frageis2007.pdf The African Standby Force. An Update on Progress Jakkie Cilliers, ISS Paper 160, Marçh 2008 http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file manager/file links/PAPER160.PDF?link id=&slink id =5753&link type=&slink type=13&tmpl id=3 European security in 2020: Threats, challenges and responses ISIS Europe, March 08 http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008 artrel 149 esr37europeansecurity2020-mar08.pdf Acting on Commitments: How EU strategies and programming can better prevent violent conflict. International Alert / Saferworld / EPLO, 2007 http://www.eplo.org/documents/IA-SW-EPLO-final3.pdf

43


The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia Tim Murithi , African Security Review Vol 17 No 1, 2008 http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file manager/file links/17NO1MURITHI.PDF?link id=3&s link id=5820&link type=12&slink type=13&tmpl id=3 Supporting Peace and Security in Africa: Civilian and Military Missions ESDP Newsletter 5, ISS Europe, Dec 2007 http://www.euiss.serveur-host.fr/uploads/media/ESDP newsletter 005.pdf PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge? TOMMI KOIVULA and HEIDI KAUPPINEN, May 2006. NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE , HELSINKI http://www.mpkk.fi/attachment/ad9d29e3539815313b364464a41b98a9/99d50ea8fe62777fc26098cb843d 0044/StratL2 35.pdf The European Union and The African Union as Strategic Partners in Peace Operations Mark Malan, 5th Seminar on Peace Operations, International Peace Academy / Geneva Centre for Security Policy, July 2006 http://www.gcsp.ch/e/meetings/CM Peacebuilding/Peace-Ops/Seminars/EU-Peace Ops/2006/Malan.pdf Five years after Göteborg: The EU and its conflict prevention potential A Conflict Prevention Partnership Report, September 2006 http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic issues/eplo5yearafterweb.pdf The EU and international organisations – partners in crisis management European Policy Center, Issue Paper No.41, Oct.2005. http://www.theepc.be/TEWN/pdf/692920894 EPC%20Issue%20Paper%2041%20EU%20and%20internation al%20organisations.pdf The EU as a Security Actor; “Security by Being” and “Security by Doing”, Bjorn Moller, DIIS Report 2005:12 http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/diisreport-2005-12.pdf La Gestion des Crises on Afrique Subsaharienne: Le rôle de l’Union Européenne Fernanda Faria, Occasional Paper 55, Instittute for Security Studies, European Union, 2004 http://www.isseu.org/occasion/occ55.pdf

44


DESENVOLVIMENTO Enquadramento Os países da UE e a Comissão Europeia partilham uma visão, objectivos e valores comuns para o desenvolvimento, desde 2005, com a adopção do Consenso Europeu sobre o Desenvolvimento, uma Declaração assinada pelos Chefes de Estado da UE que estabelece alguns objectivos na linha dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM): reduzir para metade a pobreza extrema, assegurar o acesso à educação básica para todos e melhorar os níveis de saúde nos países em desenvolvimento até 2015. A recente Comunicação da Comissão Europeia sobre o papel da UE como parceiro global para o desenvolvimento, publicada em Abril de 2008, propõe uma série de medidas para encorajar os Estados membros a aumentar o volume e a eficácia da sua ajuda. A acção da UE dever-se-á desenvolver em torno de 4 áreas: a) Mais recursos financeiros. A UE deve concretizar os seus compromissos e aumentar o volume da ajuda ao desenvolvimento para que esta represente 0,56% do Rendimento Nacional Bruto em 2010 e continue a aumentar para alcançar 0,7% em 2015. Para recordar as suas promessas e garantir a previsibilidade da ajuda, cada Estado-Membro deve apresentar um plano de financiamento plurianual, indicando os acréscimos graduais de ano para ano – como já fazem oito Estados-Membros. b) Maior eficácia da ajuda. Foram já realizadas várias reformas para melhorar a eficácia da ajuda, entre as quais se conta a adopção, em 2007, do Código de Conduta da UE em matéria de divisão do trabalho, a fim de encorajar os doadores a trabalhar em conjunto para evitar a duplicação de esforços. Mas os princípios fundamentais em matéria de Eficácia da Ajuda não estão ainda a ser respeitados, pelo que seria conveniente retomar algumas experiências positivas, como a formulação conjunta, ao nível da UE, das prioridades plurianuais em matéria de ajuda à Serra Leoa, à Somália e à África do Sul. c) Melhor coerência das políticas da UE. A UE decidiu conceder uma atenção especial aos efeitos das suas políticas em matéria de comércio, agricultura, migrações, investigação e ambiente – para referir apenas cinco dos doze domínios identificados – sobre os países em desenvolvimento, tendo publicado um primeiro relatório sobre a coerência das políticas em prol do desenvolvimento em Setembro de 2007. Na comunicação, a Comissão propõe, por exemplo, apoiar os países em desenvolvimento a tirarem partido, na sua luta contra a pobreza, das novas oportunidades oferecidas pela expansão dos mercados de bio-combustíveis. As migrações constituem um outro exemplo: a Comissão identificou toda uma série de medidas susceptíveis de limitar a fuga de cérebros dos países em desenvolvimento, especialmente em sectores importantes como a saúde, a educação ou a investigação. d) Ajuda ao comércio. A UE deveria consagrar anualmente 2 mil milhões de euros à ajuda ao comércio até 2010, prestando especial atenção ao apoio aos Estados de África, das Caraíbas e do Pacífico (no âmbito da negociação de Acordos de Parceria económica com estas regiões).

45


A UE continua a ser, no seu conjunto, o maior doador global em volume de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD), com mais de metade da ajuda mundial e contribuindo com €93 euros por cidadão (em comparação com €53 nos Estados Unidos e €44 no Japão). Destaca-se ainda que cerca de 90% do aumento da ajuda global para África em 2007 é proveniente da UE e que todos os países que ultrapassaram a meta dos 0,7% do RNB são europeus: Dinamarca, Luxemburgo, Holanda, Noruega e Suécia. No entanto, no geral, a ajuda europeia baixou de 0,41% para 0,38% do RNB em 2007, afastando-se da meta dos 0,56% estabelecidos pela UE já para 2010. Entre os 27 Estados-Membros da UE, 17 não aumentaram a sua APD em 2007 e 11 registaram mesmo uma queda dos montantes, especialmente devido à diminuição de acções de perdão de dívidas externas. O facto de o volume de ajuda total dos Estados-Membros da UE ter baixado em 2007, pela primeira vez desde 2000, representou um elemento constrangedor para a UE e suscitou várias reacções no seio das instâncias europeias. A instabilidade financeira global e o baixo crescimento económico no Ocidente ameaça colocar ainda mais pressão sobre os recursos afectados à APD, prejudicando as metas definidas. Para além disso, o aumento dos preços do petróleo e dos bens alimentares podem desfazer os efeitos potencialmente positivos da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, na medida em que afecta a procura nos países industrializados e as oportunidades económicas dos países em desenvolvimento, particularmente para os que são mais dependentes de petróleo e bens alimentares importados. Mas, mais do que a quantidade, é a qualidade, a eficácia e a sustentabilidade da ajuda que importa, ou seja, o seu reflexo no desenvolvimento dos países parceiros. A ajuda europeia continua a ser fragmentada, distribuída de forma díspar (o que origina o fenómeno de “órfãos da ajuda”) e gerida através de uma multiplicidade de formas e mecanismos, o que não favorece a coordenação nem a coerência. Se 2005 foi um ano especialmente direccionado para África e para novas promessas de aumento da ajuda, 2008 revela-se como um período de maior atenção internacional sobre os resultados obtidos e sobre os desafios de uma cooperação para o desenvolvimento mais eficaz. A realização de várias reuniões de alto-nível ilustra esta afirmação: a Cimeira dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio nas Nações Unidas, o Fórum de Acra sobre a Eficácia da Ajuda (Setembro) e a Conferência sobre o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento em Doha (final de Novembro), que irão, entre outras questões, rever os progressos realizados desde a aprovação do Consenso de Monterrey em 2002 e da Declaração de Paris sobre Eficácia da Ajuda em 2005. Neste contexto, a coordenação, harmonização e alinhamento não poderão constituir um fim em si mesmo, mas apenas um instrumento para aumentar a qualidade da ajuda ao desenvolvimento. De certa forma, o desafio central permanece o mesmo: aumentar e coordenar a ajuda de forma a apoiar o cumprimento dos ODM até 2015. A este propósito, o relatório de progresso de 2007 salienta que estes apenas serão atingidos por via de uma actuação internacional adicional, concertada e sustentada, até ao fim do prazo proposto. Isto implica não apenas aumentar a quantidade da ajuda, mas a sua qualidade, no sentido de alinhar cada vez mais os fluxos internacionais com as políticas e prioridades dos países parceiros e de assegurar que a ajuda é afectada de forma mais contínua, previsível e não-ligada à compra de produtos ou serviços nos países doadores. Significa, ainda, realizar avanços concretos para que o sistema de comércio internacional e os acordos globais de comércio sejam também instrumentos de desenvolvimento, num quadro de coerência entre políticas (que está ainda longe de ser realizado nos países desenvolvidos). Com efeito, o comércio tem sido um tema particularmente polémico na relação entre a Europa e a África nos últimos anos. Desde 2000, as exportações da UE para África aumentaram de 66 para 92 mil milhões de euros, enquanto as exportações africanas para a UE aumentaram de 85 para 126 mil milhões. Se África permanece um mercado residual para os produtos europeus, já a UE é o principal destino das exportações africanas, sendo que cerca de 85% das exportações de 46


algodão, frutas e vegetais têm por destino o espaço europeu. A necessidade de compatibilizar os regimes comerciais com as regras da Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC) conduziu à negociação de Acordos de Parceria Económica (APE) entre a UE e várias regiões. Os principais factores de preocupação para os africanos residem quer na perda de receitas aduaneiras – que representam em média um quarto das receitas totais do Estado –, quer na falta de capacidade para negociar e competir com os produtos europeus, podendo significar um forte abalo nas indústrias e comércio locais. Não havendo outra alternativa senão a liberalização, a UE e as subregiões africanas estão a negociar compensações financeiras e medidas para assegurar uma transição “mais suave” e colmatar insuficiências e problemas de capacidade, sendo que os Países Menos Avançados (PMA) beneficiam do quadro preferencial “tudo menos armas”. No entanto, vários países africanos continuam a manifestar desagrado pelo facto destes acordos não incluírem uma vertente de apoio aos seus esforços de industrialização e de apoio às capacidades africanas de produção, diversificação e exportação, de forma a construir mercados regionais efectivos. A transformação dos APE em instrumentos de desenvolvimento é crucial para os países africanos e está no cerne de muitos dos debates entre europeus e africanos sobre comércio e integração regional. Neste sentido, a Comissão Europeia pretende elaborar uma nova estratégia através de uma Comunicação sobre desenvolvimento económico e integração regional nos Estados ACP, com forte enfoque no sector privado. A negociação dos APE tem lugar no quadro do Acordo de Parceria de Cotonou (ex-Lomé), que continua a ser o principal instrumento para a ajuda ao desenvolvimento da UE para África. No entanto, este quadro é cada vez mais questionado por diversas razões: quer porque preconiza uma coerência que não existe na prática, entre três regiões distintas (África, Caraíbas e Pacífico), quer porque não responde à necessidade actual de relacionamento com África numa base global e continental (uma vez que se aplica à África Subsaariana, existindo outros instrumentos europeus para o Norte de África e ainda um acordo específico com a África do Sul), quer ainda porque privilegia uma abordagem limitada ao desenvolvimento, o que reduz a sua capacidade de responder de forma eficaz aos desafios multifacetados do mundo actual. Questões complexas como as alterações climáticas, a segurança energética ou as migrações exigem a combinação de políticas e de respostas ao nível económico, político, social e de desenvolvimento. Nesse sentido, a Estratégia Conjunta e o respectivo Plano de Acção, indo “para além do desenvolvimento” incorporam uma abordagem passível de contribuir de forma mais completa e eficaz para o próprio desenvolvimento. As migrações são um exemplo paradigmático, uma vez que até agora as posições europeias têm sido percebidas pelos africanos como privilegiando uma abordagem de segurança, enquanto estes encaram o problema segundo uma perspectiva de desenvolvimento. O diálogo político sobre esta matéria tem avançado através de uma série de debates – destacando-se a adopção da Declaração Conjunta de Tripoli sobre migração e desenvolvimento – e a nova Parceria estratégica incluída no Plano de Acção aprovado na Cimeira parece consagrar a visão multidimensional que associa as migrações não só aos problemas da imigração ilegal na Europa e do tráfico de seres humanos, mas também às questões da mobilidade, do emprego e da redução da pobreza. Outro desafio para a abordagem europeia consiste em passar de uma abordagem que tende a ser primordialmente nacional, com programas de desenvolvimento nacionais e locais, para uma combinação de políticas que visem vários níveis, incluindo o regional e continental. Alguns dos desafios de desenvolvimento – como as epidemias, as migrações, as alterações climáticas, o comércio ou as redes de infra-estruturas – transcendem as fronteiras dos Estados e necessitam de abordagens mais alargadas para promover o crescimento e o desenvolvimento, pelo que a Estratégia Conjunta poderá ser um instrumento-base essencial nessa dimensão.

47


The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: what role in a changing world? Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations34 GEERT LAPORTE, European Centre for Development Policy Management Chapter I: Framing the Debate Framing the debate In June 2000, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA, also referred to here as ‘Cotonou’) was signed between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the European Union (EU). The new partnership, which will be in effect until 2020, was heralded as a ground-breaking and innovative framework for development, adapted to the needs of international cooperation in the early 21st century. Yet it seems particularly important to assess at regular intervals the extent to which this unique cooperation framework actually delivers on its multiple promises. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CPA so far? What progress has been realised in the implementation of key CPA innovations? Has the CPA contributed to more and better development in the ACP? In addition to these questions on the current state of the CPA, there are also more fundamental questions about the future of the CPA and longstanding ACP-EU cooperation in a rapidly changing context worldwide, in both the EU and the ACP. As an independent foundation specialising in ACP-EU relations, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) organised a multi-stakeholder seminar on 18-19 December 2006 that took stock of progress, difficulties encountered and the challenges ahead for the CPA. In recent years and months, there has been no shortage of interesting practices, experiences and lessons learnt that could be used to fuel an assessment of the CPA. These include the first five-year cycle of the European Development Fund (EDF) and its associated process of programming and review, as well as a wide range of independent country strategies and thematic evaluations on several key features of ACP-EU cooperation. However, a reflection on the actual progress of CPA implementation is only part of the challenge. There is also an increasingly urgent need to look at the future and to re-assess the role of the CPA in light of major political changes in the global and overall ACP-EU context. Thus, with negotiations around economic partnership agreements (EPAs) in their final stage, there has been increasing pressure on the cohesion and response capacity of the ACP Group. New actors, such as the African Union (AU), are increasingly becoming privileged dialogue partners of the EU. There is also a growing trend towards regional differentiation, as evidenced in the formulation of specific EU support strategies for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the elaboration of a Joint EUAfrica strategy. Last but not least, there are fears that the partnership is gradually eroding as a result of rapid changes in the arena of EU development and external action and by the growing difficulties experienced by the ACP to project itself as a Group. While the CPA will be in place until 2020, there seems to be an increasing need among various groups of stakeholders to engage in a constructive debate on it, particularly on how it could remain relevant in today’s world and how it could complement and mutually reinforce the new partnerships that the EU is building with the various regions. Focus and approach of the ECDPM seminar The CPA covers a broad range of thematic areas and sectors. In order to ensure focus, ECDPM concentrated the first part of the seminar discussions on the most important innovations that the CPA has sought to achieve, compared with the successive Lomé Conventions that shaped ACP-EU 34

This text was originally published in a wider ECDPM publication – Policy Management Report 13, on November 2007.

48


cooperation between 1975 and 2000. From the outset, it was claimed that Cotonou was more than a change of name: it was intended to mark a clear break with the past and to modernise the overall approach to cooperation in the new millennium. Four key innovations were assessed by the participants on the basis of the following questions: •

Has the increased political focus of ACP-EU cooperation contributed to development? The CPA has put a much stronger focus on the political dimensions of partnership, as reflected, among other things, in the key importance attached to political dialogue and issues of governance, peace and security. To what extent has a stronger political focus contributed to achieving development objectives? What progress has been achieved in practice?

Has Cotonou succeeded in broadening the partnership? The CPA recognises the need for a multi-actor approach to partnership. For the first time, both the ACP and the EU signatories have committed themselves to involving non-state actors and local governments in all aspects of ACP-EU cooperation. Has Cotonou succeeded in promoting dialogue and collaboration between state and non-state actors in the pursuit of common development objectives? What has worked well and led to beneficial outcomes in the field? What bottlenecks have been encountered in the process of implementing these changes?

Are economic partnership agreements (EPAs) instruments for development and poverty reduction? To what extent do EPAs offer opportunities to contribute to CPA objectives, notably poverty reduction (which is the central objective of the CPA), and other international commitments, such as the Millennium Development Goals?

Has performance-based aid management and programming and the rationalisation of instruments contributed to more effective and efficient development? The CPA has introduced major innovations, such as the performance-based review process and multi-annual ‘rolling’ programming. At the same time, efforts have been made to decentralise decision making to the field, to rationalise the complex set of administrative and financial procedures and to introduce new aid modalities, such as budget support. Have these changes been positive from a development perspective? Do they match the realities encountered by developing countries? Are they compatible with the delivery of high-quality aid?

The second part of the discussions focused on the rapidly changing policy environment in which the CPA has to operate and the ways in which this could affect future ACP-EU relations. Participants were invited to identify and analyse evolving trends and to present options and scenarios for the future. The following questions provided guidance to the debates: •

How can Cotonou remain politically relevant in a context of major and rapid change?

What will be the complementarity between Cotonou and the new EC regional strategies for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific?

How can the ACP and the EU work together and complement each other?

Will EPAs and regional differentiation tear the ACP Group apart? What will be the future of the ACP?

Chapter II: How has the CPA delivered on its key innovations? To a large extent, the first part of this policy management report follows the structure of the ECDPM seminar of 18-19 December 2006. Analytical papers (see annexes) and four working-group sessions assessed current progress in the four key areas of CPA innovation: (i) the political dimension of the CPA, (ii) the participation of non-state actors in the partnership, (iii) economic partnership agreements as new instruments for reciprocal trade relations and (iv) the rationalisation of instruments and performance-based aid management.

49


Sound politics as a key pillar of the CPA Context While the Lomé Conventions were essentially economic agreements, the CPA has put politics at the heart of the partnership. Until 1985, neither the EEC nor the ACP countries were ready to extend their cooperation to the political arena. Tentative steps to ‘politicise’ cooperation were taken by the EC in 1985 when it sought to introduce a human-rights clause in the Lomé III Convention. At that time, this was deemed by some ACP partners to contradict the principles of sovereignty and equal partnership. The introduction of a link between development and human rights, respect for democratic principles and the rule of law was a major feature of the Lomé IV Convention (Article 5). Signed in 2000, the CPA is underpinned by a set of jointly agreed-upon core values or essential elements (respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law), whose violation can lead to the suspension of the partnership. In Article 96, the CPA has established a mechanism for prior consultation to preclude unilateral action by the Community except in ‘cases of special urgency’ and this was further strengthened in the CPA review in 2005. Good governance has been defined as ‘the transparent and responsible management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development’ and deemed a ‘fundamental element’ in the partnership. Political dialogue, previously confined largely to issues of political conditionalities with ACP governments is now meant to be used as a tool to manage the partnership. Through political dialogue, the parties are invited to discuss all possible issues of mutual concern. Guiding questions The following questions served to guide the discussions on the political dimension of the CPA. •

To what extent have the political provisions helped to enhance the effectiveness of the CPA as a tool for promoting the development of ACP countries?

What changes might further improve the CPA chapter on ‘Political Dimensions’ so as to enable the EU and the ACP to fully tap the development potential of political dialogue?

What are the main priorities in the coming years for effective mainstreaming of ‘governance’ into the various processes of ACP-EU partnership, including the ‘governance’ of EU external action?

Progress so far •

Recognition of sound politics as a cornerstone for development.

The political dimension of the CPA has proven to be a valuable and timely innovation. In recent years it has provided a framework for a number of important debates. More specifically, the CPA has opened the partnership to a broader range of debates, which have emerged more prominently since the beginning of the new millennium (e.g., peace, conflict, migration, governance). From that perspective, the CPA’s political provisions have enhanced ACP-EU cooperation and helped adapt it better to changing circumstances and challenges. A broader range of partners has also been involved, including non-signatories to the CPA, such as the African Union, and a wide range of non-state actors. •

The political dimension has elevated the ACP-EU partnership beyond aid.

The introduction of the political dimension in the CPA has paved the way for comprehensive external relations between the EU and its ACP partners. It is no longer a relationship that is exclusively based on aid; rather, it has resulted in much closer links between the EU’s development policy and other external policies, including foreign policy, security and migration.

50


In that respect, the CPA was also a child of its time whose negotiation was clearly influenced by major developments at the EU level, including the Maastricht Treaty introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam with the European Security and Defence Policy (1999). The importance of development policy in tackling the root causes of conflict, security and illegal migration is now increasingly recognised. Clearly the CPA has contributed to raising the status of development in the broad range of the EU’s instruments for external action. Constraints Several bottlenecks in the implementation of the political provisions of the CPA have been identified: Erosion of (high-level) dialogue.

In the past, regular contacts (both formal and informal) between ACP and EU heads of state and ministers (the joint EU-ACP Council) have contributed significantly to the success of the ACP-EU partnership. In recent years, however, this type of high-level dialogue between ACP and EU leaders has become less frequent. An increasingly large group of ministers from EU member states no longer participate in joint ACP-EU Council meetings. This is due partly to a growing lack of interest in ACP matters and partly to a certain degree of sterility in the debates, where important political issues seem to be avoided. The apparent disengagement by the EU and erosion of the dialogue has caused irritation in ACP circles. It has also contributed to increasingly asymmetric power relations in the ACP-EU partnership. Risk of double standards.

The CPA strongly advocates governance as a precondition for effective development. The political priority given by the EU to governance in its external action has coincided with growing domestic demand in the ACP (particularly Africa) for improved governance (e.g., NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism, etc.). While the official ACP side seems to fully recognise the importance of democracy and good governance for economic and social development, there is still a degree of wariness about this change. ACP governments have expressed particular concern over some of the new ‘rules of the game’ of the political dialogue, including the lack of clear guidance on (i) how and when political dialogue on (perceived) violations of essential elements would shift into article 96 consultations, (ii) how and when such obligatory consultations would result in appropriate action and (iii) what such unilaterally defined actions would entail. It is also feared that the so-called ‘sanction articles’ 96 and 97, relating to non-execution of the essential and fundamental elements of the Cotonou Agreement would be implemented inconsistently, allowing new forms of European conditionalities to creep in through the backdoor. Different experiences with political dialogue, conditionalities and sanctions (e.g., Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, etc.) illustrate some of the dilemmas that the EU is facing in consistently applying what it preaches. Jointly agreed-upon common values in the CPA risk being undermined when self-interest overrules values. The way forward: Implementation challenges • • • •

Refine ACP-EU political dialogue Strengthen mutual accountability as a response to asymmetric power relations Ensure coherent application of political provisions Ensure synergies between Cotonou and the Paris Declaration

Several proposals to restore an effective and balanced political dialogue could be considered: •

Refine the political dialogue.

51


Ways to conduct the political dialogue under the CPA could be improved by (i) ensuring that the dialogue takes place on an equal footing between both partners, (ii) avoiding the possibility that the dialogue between the two groups of countries might become hijacked by one issue (such as Zimbabwe) and (iii) working out the most effective format for dialogue by clearly defining who should participate, at what level and how. Improving the dialogue could foster ownership of the process and more pro-active, strategic involvement of the ACP in the political aspects of the CPA. Seminar participants also stressed the need for more frequent ACP-EU dialogue at a ministerial level, while not excluding the contribution and expansion of intense dialogue at a more technical level. Ensuring more systematic participation of civil stakeholders in the political dialogue could be fostered. •

Strengthen mutual accountability as a response to asymmetric power relations.

There is an increasing wish in the ACP to ensure that accountability does not only flow from the ACP to the EU but also from the EU to the ACP. This means that the EU should also comply with its responsibilities in the contractual agreement and that ways should be found to hold the EU accountable on issues such as policy coherence and effective delivery of aid. In that respect, a better and more systematic use of article 12 of the CPA was advocated. •

Ensure coherent application of political provisions.

With the emergence of new non-traditional donors (China, India, Brazil, the Middle East region, etc.) in Africa, the credibility of the EU’s governance discourse and the political dimension of the CPA are being put to the test. Some ACP interlocutors have wondered whether the EU, in practice, is genuinely committed to the values and principles of governance and democratisation or whether it adapts its governance discourse and approaches to more opportunistic considerations. In the case of China, which strictly refrains from any type of discussion on governance issues in Sino-African relations, it could be useful to reinforce the emerging trilateral dialogue (EU-Africa-China) so as to discuss common values and coherent approaches. •

Ensure synergies between Cotonou and the Paris Declaration.

There are other challenges related to the growing importance of governance under the CPA, including the commitment under the Paris Declaration to improve the effectiveness of aid. The alignment of donors behind poverty-reduction strategies owned by partner countries opens new opportunities but also raises new questions. Some fear that new aid modalities, such as budget support, might further reduce the incentives for donors to engage in frank and open political dialogue. The implications of these changes need further reflection and analysis.

Opening the partnership to non-state actors Context The Lomé Conventions always reserved a lead role for central governments in ACP-EU relations. There were only a few opportunities for other development players (e.g., civil society, the private sector, local and central governments) to participate in ACP-EU cooperation or to access resources. Opportunities for structured dialogue on key policy issues or on cooperation priorities were rare. In the 1990s, this central-government monopoly was seen as contradicting the major changes taking place in ACP societies, including economic liberalisation, multi-party democratisation and decentralisation. This is the key reason the broadening of participation in the partnership emerged as a priority issue in the Cotonou negotiations. The CPA strongly emphasises the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) as a fundamental principle of cooperation (article 2). A multitude of actors are now legally given opportunities to participate as genuine development partners. While the CPA recognises the right of ACP states to determine their development strategies ‘in all sovereignty’, other development actors could be playing a complementary role.

52


Participation is no longer limited to implementing projects designed by governments. The CPA stipulates that where appropriate, NSAs shall be: •

informed and involved in consultation on cooperation policies and strategies, on priorities for cooperation and on the political dialogue;

provided with financial resources;

involved in the implementation of cooperation projects and programmes in areas that concern them or where they have a comparative advantage;

provided with capacity-building support to reinforce their capabilities, to establish effective consultation mechanisms and to promote strategic alliances.

NSAs are promised greater access to funds available under the national indicative programmes (NIPs) and regional indicative programmes (RIPs), and they have a voice in determining how EU funds, made available to each ACP country and region, should be used. This means that NSAs are associated with the ‘programming’ dialogue that is the process of consultation between the EU and ACP governments, in which the allocation of resources (as well as the priority sectors for support, the type of assistance to be provided and the most appropriate agencies for implementation) is planned. By getting involved in programming, NSAs have an opportunity to influence policies and cooperation strategies. The CPA also defines the categories of non-state actors. They include the private sector, economic and social partners (including trade unions) and civil society in all its forms (art. 6). The CPA does not restrict ‘civil society’ to NGOs. Instead, a broader, more inclusive concept is used, encompassing many different categories, such as grassroots organisations, farmers’ organisations, the media, etc. In addition, while local governments are not formally considered to be ‘non-state actors’, the text and the spirit of the CPA recognise that they are a new actor in the partnership, with a specific role and added value. This certainly applies in ACP countries, where a policy of decentralisation is being followed and where local governments are a distinct and representative sphere of government. All these major innovations in the text of the CPA have raised high expectations in the world of NSAs in both the EU and the ACP countries. However, in practice, strengthening participation and the involvement of NSAs is a very complex and challenging undertaking, with a strong political connotation. In spite of promising changes, there is still a long way to go before participation of NSAs and local governments is properly mainstreamed in an effective and sustainable way. Guiding questions The following key questions provided guidance for the debate on NSAs under the CPA: •

What are the main priorities for improving the quality of participatory processes involving NSAs and local governments?

How can the role of NSAs and local governments in promoting governance be strengthened?

How can the effectiveness of capacity-support strategies for NSAs and local governments be enhanced?

How can ACP-EC cooperation better promote ‘multi-actor partnerships’ (with due respect for the legitimate division of roles and respective comparative advantages of all actors involved)? What are the implications for EC delegations and national authorising officers (NAOs).

What roles should NSAs and local governments play in the new architecture of international aid, based on the Paris agenda and budget-support modalities?

53


Progress so far Since the start of the CPA in 2000, progress in extending the partnership to NSAs has been realised in most ACP countries. •

The CPA has been a key promoter of participation.

The CPA, in combination with other policy processes, such as the poverty-reduction strategy papers, has significantly contributed to opening up political space for NSAs. Democratic and participatory trends have been reinforced and barriers against the involvement of NSAs in rather closed political systems have slowly been removed or reduced. Experience suggests that in most ACP countries the CPA has been a vehicle to encourage the official parties to involve NSAs in dialogue and programming processes and in the implementation of the CPA. •

NSAs are building capacities to participate in the CPA.

In several ACP countries, a vibrant civil society has gradually discovered the potential (but also the subsequent complexity) of ACP-EU cooperation. They have come to realise that there is still a lot of homework awaiting them in terms of institutional development if they want to be credible partners in the cooperation process. The official parties, as well, have made laudable efforts to clarify the opportunities for NSA participation (e.g., a users’ guide for NSAs by the ACP Secretariat). Constraints In spite of the progress with NSA participation realised in recent years, several bottlenecks still need to be addressed: •

Mixed record in terms of the quality of participation.

Assessments made by the EC, suggesting that in a majority of ACP countries participation is well on track, do not seem to be widely supported by the NSAs themselves. NSAs tend to be critical of the overall quality of participation, institutional mechanisms for dialogue, access to funding and the complexities of EC procedures. There is also frustration about the lack of direct access to funding, which was clearly one of the highest priorities of civil society at the start of the CPA. Clearly, the CPA’s promising text on participation has not yet been followed by a change of mindset in actual practice. It will take time to shift from a single-actor approach to multi-actor partnerships. Furthermore, the political and institutional conditions for effective participation of NSAs are not always in place at the country and regional level. NSAs are often part of the problem, as, in many ACP countries, they tend to suffer severe weaknesses, including fragmentation, competition, lack of solid representative structures, and governance problems. •

Complexity and confusion: who is who in civil society?

Experience has also confirmed the complexity of involving NSAs, which tend to be a very diversified group of actors, with different motives and development objectives. This tends to complicate not only the identification of NSAs as change agents but also the consistent application of eligibility criteria for participation in dialogues or access to funding. Not surprisingly, there is still major confusion among NSAs about ‘who should do what’, compounded by territorial fights and competition for funding. •

Instrumental approaches towards NSA participation.

Engaging with NSAs has been rushed, and EC and ACP officials have not always understood the roles of NSAs in development and the potential value they can add. This is the case, for instance, when NSAs are ‘handpicked’ to participate in a dialogue without clear criteria and transparent procedures. Far too often this leads to artificial consultations where NSAs are (mis)used as instruments to validate EU and ACP policies. It also happens when pressure is exerted on NSAs to unite in a single umbrella organisation in order to facilitate collaboration with official bodies.

54


These interventions have a rationale from the perspective of short-term programme efficiency. Yet they are likely to be counterproductive in the medium term because they tend to neglect the natural diversity of civil society, as well as creating fake consultation processes and umbrella organisations. In too many cases, civil support has been delivered in a vacuum, as a self-standing action, isolated from mainstream development processes. Disbursement pressures along with a lack of information and transparency are also seen as major hindrances to participation. These factors clearly undermine official EC and ACP credibility in regard to carrying out real participatory approaches. The way forward: implementation challenges • • • • • • •

Adopting a governance approach to participation Improving the quality of participation Investing in capacity building of NSAs and raising awareness Fostering EC capacity to adopt strategic approaches to participation Adapting the roles of Northern actors Developing the capacity to learn Taking risks

The implementation of NSA provisions in the CPA could be enhanced through the following actions: •

Adopting a governance approach to participation.

Experience suggests that clarity of purpose is essential in dealing with NSAs. Why do official parties want to work with NSAs and local governments? Why do NSAs want to play a role in ACPEU relations? What is the ultimate goal of the support provided? The challenge is to move beyond instrumental approaches and participation as an obligatory exercise by adopting a perspective of societal transformation. This means recognising that participation is all about empowerment, about building social capital for the proper use of the new democratic spaces, as well as demanding rights. It implies adopting a governance approach when promoting participation, which recognises the legitimate roles to be played by central and local governments. This challenge is particularly visible at local levels, where, instead of promoting collaboration, donor funding may exacerbate competition between civil organisations and (elected) local governments. •

Improving the quality of participation.

Experience suggests that the quality, effectiveness and sustainability of programmes to support civil society largely depend on proper articulation with national reform processes (e.g., decentralisation, good governance, public-sector reform), with the activities of key institutions (such as political bodies, sector ministries) or with donor initiatives. The experience of the PASOC (Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile) in Mauritania was given at the seminar as a good example of the EC wanting a process approach and being truly determined to give a role to civil society rather than considering it as a mere funding instrument or budget line. Factors that have contributed to success include light political pressure, involvement of an external facilitator and real ownership of the process by civil society itself. •

Investing in capacity building of NSAs and raising awareness.

In many countries, NSAs are not yet aware of the CPA or of the important role they have to play in its successful implementation. It will require a lot of time to raise awareness and to reach out to the grassroots level. Northern NSAs could play an important role in this endeavour. Genuine participation is also hampered by the shortage of capacity to participate in an effective way. Civil

55


society in ACP countries should invest in improving internal governance systems, self-structuring, and developing complementarity between different categories of NSA actors. •

Fostering EC capacity to adopt strategic approaches to participation.

More investments should be made in strengthening the capacity of EC delegations in facilitating and managing NSA participation. Rather than adopting a technocratic or instrumental approach to NSA participation, EC delegations should invest more in mainstreaming participation in all ACP-EU policies, programmes and projects. By providing strategic support to NSAs and local governments, their role as change agents could be reinforced. For this to happen, however, there is a need for improvements in the quality and quantity of EC staff, a review of the European Development Fund’s (EDF) current procedural framework (for both EC staff and NSAs wanting to interact with the EC) and a reduction of disbursement pressure. •

Adapting the roles of Northern actors.

The CPA and Paris Declaration reflect the shift towards alignment and harmonisation, decentralisation of decision-making and new mechanisms for aid delivery (e.g., sector-wide approaches, budget support). The new aid paradigm calls for a redefinition of the specific role played by European development actors, including NGOs and local government associations, in an increasingly complex, politicised, multi-actor, decentralised cooperation system. It will be a major challenge to implement this new ‘Paris’ approach properly through both geographic and thematic instruments. •

Developing the capacity to learn.

While the CPA has enormous potential to broaden NSA participation, there is hardly any internalisation or dissemination of lessons learnt. Much more investment could be made (by the EC, ACP and NSAs) in strengthening the capacity to learn and to capitalise on experience. Lessons learnt should not only permeate EC delegations but should also reach EC headquarters and the offices of national authorising officers, and they should be properly internalised by decisionmakers in their day-to-day work. •

Taking risks.

Supporting NSAs in most countries tends to be a highly sensitive political exercise, with serious risks involved. This requires courage and flexibility, supported by knowledge of the overall policy context, which is sometimes difficult to ensure within a bureaucratic institution such as the EC.

A new framework of reciprocal trade relations Context The Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) were the most ambitious North-South trade agreements to date, covering non-reciprocal trade preferences, mechanisms to stabilise export prices, as well as commodity protocols for bananas, rum, sugar, beef and veal. These were considered to be measures conducive to development in the ACP. However, the Lomé trade regime did not achieve its expected results. Despite preferential access to EU markets for most products (reaching 90% in 1999), the ACP share in European imports dwindled from nearly 8% in 1975 to 2.8% in 2000. The mechanisms for stabilising export prices and the commodity protocols did not promote export diversification in the ACP. Half of all ACP exports to the EU are still concentrated in just eight products. Perhaps the most striking thing is that non-ACP developing countries that did not benefit from the Lomé trade preferences have been outperforming the ACP countries in exports to the EU. In addition to the disappointing results of the trade regime, tensions have also been growing between the preferences and the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

56


In this context, the EU and the ACP agreed in the CPA to make profound changes in the trade regime by negotiating WTO-compatible economic partnership agreements (EPAs). These EPAs, which should enter into force as of the 1st of January 2008, are based on a number of key principles, including development and poverty eradication, reciprocity, regionalism and special and differential treatment. It is assumed that EPAs will foster economic growth and development, as well as ACP integration into the world economy, mainly through trade liberalisation and the creation of the right policy framework to attract investment. By building on regional integration processes in the ACP, EPAs should also contribute to the establishment of effective regional markets in the ACP. In 2000, EU and ACP parties agreed that the existing non-reciprocal Lomé trade preferences would only be temporarily extended to the end of 2007, by which time the EPA negotiations should be concluded. From 2008 onwards, EPAs would replace them. In principle, the 39 leastdeveloped countries (LDCs) in the ACP are also entitled to duty-and-quota-free market access to the EU, which is part of the everything-but-arms (EBA) regime. For ACP countries that do not sign an EPA, an alternative WTO-compatible regime would have to be found, but only for non-LDCs (as ACP LDCs have the EBA to fall back on). Guiding questions The discussion on EPAs focused on the following questions: •

How can EPAs become instruments for development and poverty alleviation? What is needed in terms of trade regulations, accompanying measures and development support?

What are the most urgent priorities in the ACP, in terms of capacity and institutional development, to reap the benefits of EPAs or new trade regimes?

To what extent can key stakeholders (e.g., the private sector, farmers, NGOs) be more involved in the EPA negotiating process?

How can continuous monitoring of EPAs be ensured in both the negotiating and implementation process (e.g., development benchmark approach)?

What is the link between multilateral aid for trade and development-related financing for EPA implementation? Where should priorities in the use of aid for trade be placed? How can EU/EDF mechanisms, instruments and procedures for effective, efficient and timely delivery of aid for trade to the ACP be improved?

Progress so far •

Increased awareness and analysis of regional integration in the ACP.

EPAs are clearly a controversial issue. While serious scepticism has been expressed over the ownership, pace and sequencing of the EPA negotiating process, some ACP actors recognise that the EPA negotiating process may have been a push factor for more cross-border dialogue and analysis of national and regional interests as well as economic reforms in the various ACP countries and sub-regions. •

Promotion of regional coherence.

Existing regional organisations might have been challenged through the EPA process to regroup and reposition themselves. At least in West Africa, this might have encouraged more convergence between ECOWAS and UMEOA. But also in other regions, the pressure of the EPA negotiating process could have provoked reflection on the issue of overlapping memberships. Constraints In general, EPAs seem to have created major concerns among the EC/EU and the six ACP subregions:

57


How development friendly are EPAs?

ACP countries fear that EPAs are poorly integrated in the development agenda, in spite of several official EC declarations that state the opposite. While most ACP states would agree with the EU on the development opportunities entailed in an EPA, they tend to consider trade liberalisation and regional integration as necessary, yet far from sufficient, conditions to promote development and alleviate poverty. The creation of a free-trade area between countries with very different levels of development would disrupt local production and government revenues, and create unemployment, ultimately increasing poverty rather than reducing it. The opening up of ACP markets to competition from more competitive (and, for agricultural products, often subsidised) imports from European enterprises could result in local producers losing their share in domestic and regional markets. In other words, creating large, open, regional markets and increasing export opportunities for the ACP are only factors of potential development. To make this work in practice, bold steps need to be taken, including adequate policies, institutions and resources to adjust the necessary economic transformation and to produce and market goods competitively. •

Different perceptions on approach and sequencing.

While both parties seem to agree that EPAs should, above all, be about development, there are major differences of opinion between EU member states and the EC on the approach and timing to achieve these development objectives. The ACP Group wants to ensure that EPAs take into account the specific needs and vulnerabilities of ACP countries and regions. This means, among other things, that sensitive products would be excluded from trade liberalisation in EPAs. In addition, there is a need for long-term accompanying and adjustment measures and major aidsupport efforts to allow ACP countries to really benefit from EPAs. •

Do EPAs undermine regional integration?

Both the ACP and the EU agree that the EPAs should help to reinforce regional integration in the ACP sub-regions. However, regional configurations for EPAs may complicate ongoing integration processes rather than fostering them. Several countries that belong to more than one regional economic community have had great difficulty identifying their political and economic interests and selecting the regional grouping with which they would like to conclude an EPA. The way forward: implementation challenges • • • • • •

Reinforce the development orientation of EPAs EPAs should respect the endogenous processes of regional integration Create credible monitoring mechanisms for implementing EPAs Invest in capacity building as a prerequisite for the success of EPAs Ensure effective delivery mechanisms Favour more active involvement of EU member states

The following proposals could provide better guarantees for a smooth and effective implementation of EPAs: •

Reinforce the development orientation of EPAs.

Just as in the Lomé preferences, EPAs should provide the necessary stimuli for development. The ambition is to develop open, regionally integrated markets, conducive to economic activities, that effectively contribute to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. Putting this into practice is not easily done. As prerequisites for effective implementation of a comprehensive development agenda, a strong political commitment among the ACP countries and regions to engage in far-reaching reforms would play a key role. There is also a need for major financial

58


support (which should be ‘substantially more’ than what the 10th EDF is able to provide) to help restructure ACP economies, to tackle supply-side constraints and to address problems of adjustment and the loss of government revenue from import duties. Fears exist however, that little extra support beyond the EDF could be expected and that the EU commitments would be honoured by re-labelling existing aid commitments to trade and regional integration. Critics of EPAs stressed that any support package to accompany the EPA process should be consistent with the key principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and tailored to the specific needs of each ACP country. •

EPAs should respect the endogenous processes of regional integration.

The sovereignty and autonomy of each region in its own regional-integration process should be respected. This means that the time dimension should be taken into account and a careful sequencing between regional integration and the implementation of EPA commitments should be guaranteed. Flexibility and a clear willingness to adapt the implementation process of EPAs wherever and whenever needed are key factors for the success of EPAs. •

Create credible monitoring mechanisms for implementing EPAs.

Clear provisions in the EPA legal text could help to ensure the compliance of both parties to agreed-upon commitments in implementing the provisions for both trade and development assistance. These monitoring mechanisms could also provide the necessary accountability to the general public: that EPAs will deliver on their development promises. •

Invest in capacity building as a prerequisite for the success of EPAs.

This refers particularly to the human and institutional capacity that is essential to negotiating and implementing the trade agreements – to ensure that the ACP will reap the benefits from EPAs. ACP countries are currently engaged in several negotiations: (i) at the regional level, (ii) with the EU in the EPA negotiations and (iii) at a multilateral level in the WTO negotiations. Many of the issues related to market access and trade are actually discussed at all three levels. It seems obvious that outcomes at one level could have a profound impact on the negotiations at other levels. The technical discussions and negotiations on key issues, such as EU norms and standards (sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues, labour conditions, etc.), in particular, are creating major headaches for ACP countries and regions. It is therefore essential to put in place (financial) programmes and institutions that can also help to adopt appropriate accompanying measures, address supply-side constraints and strengthen the competitiveness of ACP products. The Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative recognises developing countries’ needs for (financial) assistance to enable them to take advantage of the potential benefits from liberalised trade and increased market access, and to facilitate their integration into multilateral trading systems. In this context, Europe has committed to providing € 2 billion of AfT support by 2010: € 1 billion from the Community (including trade-related EDF assistance) and € 1 billion from the EU member states. The challenge is for the ACP and the EU to adopt AfT strategies and commitments that match EPA ambitions. •

Ensure effective delivery mechanisms.

Beyond the amounts of support, delivery mechanisms and procedures will need to be carefully designed to ensure the effective disbursement of funds. Indeed, given the operational weaknesses of the EDF (such as low levels of disbursement and delays caused by cumbersome procedures), one could question whether the EDF is the most appropriate instrument for effective, timely and efficient delivery of Aid for Trade resources. The European Parliament and the EU member states, together with other European and ACP stakeholders, should monitor this process closely. They can play a catalytic role in ensuring that appropriate additional resources and effective and timely delivery mechanisms are in place to accompany EPA implementation. •

Favour more active involvement of EU member states.

59


While the EC (as embodied in DG Trade, accompanied by DG Development) should be firmly in the driver’s seat in the EPA negotiations, EU member states also have an important responsibility in ensuring that the EU sticks to agreed-upon commitments in terms of the development orientation of EPAs and financial support packages to the ACP.

Rationalisation of instruments and management of performance-based aid Context The negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, which coincided with the ambitious EC aid-reform programme (1999), introduced various innovations in the area of rationalisation of instruments and aid management. One of the major changes was the replacement of the Lomé aidentitlement system by allocations based on a combination of needs and performance criteria. Moreover, the CPA introduced a system of ‘rolling’ programming in which progress in the implementation of the national indicative plans (NIPs) is systematically reviewed through annual, mid-term and end-of-term reviews. The rationale behind this change in aid management was to adopt a more flexible and strategic approach to cooperation that allows checking progress and making adaptations when and where needed in the five-year programming cycle. In cases of ‘poor performance’ by ACP countries, programmes can be adjusted and the ACP government can lose part of the resources involved. These amounts may then be redirected to better-performing ACP countries. Another innovation in NIP programming was the focus on a limited number of key sectors. This measure was intended to foster a more strategic approach by targeting aid better and by making more effective use of limited human resources on both sides. Last but not least, management of aid was also supposed to benefit from the devolution of EDF management responsibilities to the EC delegations. Guiding questions •

Have the CPA innovations, in terms of aid management (performance allocations, rationalisation of instruments, rolling programming, etc.), contributed to more effective and efficient EDF development programmes? What innovations have been working best in the field? What are the major weaknesses of the current system?

To what extent does the new system also focus on aspects related to EU performance? To what extent have programming and review processes been ‘joint’ EU-ACP exercises?

What have been the results so far of the devolution of responsibilities to EC delegations in the field?

What steps need to be taken to better adapt EDF procedures to the strategic objectives pursued by the EC (e.g., stated objectives of supporting complex political and institutional reform, alignment and harmonisation, etc.)?

How can the risk of putting too much management control in European hands, and thus affecting ACP ownership (e.g., new EDF facilities: water, energy, infrastructure, etc.), be avoided?

To what extent have ACP capacities been sufficient to cope with the increasingly complex and demanding requirements in terms of EDF management? How have NAOs adapted to the new system?

Progress achieved so far It is probably too early to assess whether all the EDF management changes in the CPA have had an effect on the improvement of ACP-EU cooperation and ACP ownership of cooperation. After only seven years, it is hard to disentangle the changes brought about by the CPA itself and those 60


that stem from the Commission’s Reform of EC External Assistance (1999). Clearly, the two processes have been complementary and the rationalisation and more ‘professional’ approach in aid management that the CPA introduced were only possible because of the global EC aid reform. The changes were also in line with the renewed strong emphasis on aid effectiveness and performance that later resulted in the Paris Declaration (2005). Perceived positive changes in aid management arising from the CPA include the following: •

Restoration of confidence.

Clearly, the combined effect of the changes in the EDF has been partial restoration of the credibility and legitimacy of EC aid. The longstanding problem of large amounts of unspent EDF funds has also been tackled. •

Innovations in programming.

The more focused and holistic approach to programming has provided a better understanding of the connections between different sectors. Through such an approach, several aspects of cooperation (politics, economy, trade, environment, etc.) have become better integrated, to the benefit of the ACP countries. •

Sectoral focus.

Overall, this is perceived to be a positive development in fostering greater critical mass and making more effective use of limited human resources on both sides. However, the limitation to two sectors has also caused ‘irritation’ in some ACP countries because of its rigidity and the exclusion of other important sectors. •

Joint strategic approaches.

In the past, the EC formulated its support strategies unilaterally. Sharing the country support strategies (CSS) and regional support strategies (RSS) with the ACP country has been a positive move towards encouraging transparency and ownership. A flexible and regular review mechanism makes continuous updating of the CSS possible, along with matching the volume of resources and the indicative programme to developments in performance and need. However, while the idea is perceived to be good on paper, the reality is that it is difficult to find the time for this timeconsuming exercise. •

A more strategic role for the national authorising officer (NAO).

Another important shift is the change in the role of NAOs. In addition to the predominantly financial and technical management of EDF resources under successive Lomé Conventions, NAOs now also tend to play a central role in the strategic management that the new programming and review system implies. NAOs are supposed to gradually become coordinators of EC support while moving away from the nitty-gritty of financial procedures and hands-on implementation of programmes. •

Increased harmonisation.

The possibility that the EC could also co-finance operations in sectors where other donors have the overall responsibility for policy dialogue and implementation has also been a positive change. It allows for more efficient use of resources available for a country or region, in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. •

More intense consultation with non-state actors (NSAs).

Consultation in the programming process with the private sector and the NSAs has been enhanced. While this is perceived to be a positive development, questions have also been raised over the real impact of these new actors on the final outcome and on the sometimes very timeconsuming consultation process.

61


Constraints In spite of the changes in aid management mentioned above, several bottlenecks have been identified: •

Generalised lack of ACP ownership of the aid-management process.

The degree to which the changes in aid management have really contributed to building ownership of the process (as well as a more strategic approach to ACP-EU cooperation on the rolling programming and performance-based system) is questionable. In practice, programming still seems to be ‘something the EC needs to do’, since Commission delegations understandably have to justify expenditures on development aid. Too often ACP counterparts have limited or no involvement in the new aid management, which is perceived as too complex and EC driven. This feeling is compounded by the new trend of creating EDF-funded facilities (e.g., ACP governance initiatives, the ACP-EU Water Facility, ACP-EU Energy Facility, etc.), which tend to add to the complexity and to place more management control in European hands. The lack of involvement seems inevitable, given the imbalances in resources and the consequent unequal power relationships between the EC/EU 'donors’ and ACP ‘recipients’. •

Increasing complexity of the programming process.

The programming and review processes have not been as ‘joint’ or ‘mutual’ as many would have hoped at the start of the CPA. In the pursuit of higher quality standards for aid, the programming has become increasingly rigid and demanding, putting a heavy strain on ACP capacity. •

Cumbersome procedures.

Reducing the number of instruments in the EDF might have simplified things, but EDF procedures are still proving too cumbersome, leading to slow disbursement. •

‘The piper calls the tune’:

There is a fair amount of suspicion among ACP interlocutors that the criteria for resource allocation and evaluation of performance are not necessarily applied in a transparent and fair way. •

Capacity problems.

Many of the offices of NAOs and RAOs and their line ministries lack the capacity and resources to engage fully in the various programming, review, project-development or monitoring and evaluation exercises. There is a perception that even if NAO/RAO offices were to take more ownership of these processes, the EC would most likely rewrite, amend or even reject a lot of the content in line with EC agendas. Also, the question of the use of long-term technical assistance can be raised. On the one hand, it ensures that EDF procedures are strictly followed and that the quality of the programming documents meets established EC criteria and requirements, but on the other hand, it can seriously erode ownership. Technical assistance offers no short-term gapfilling solutions. Building institutional capacity and ownership requires time and flexibility that the current system does not allow for. The way forward: implementation challenges Putting the ACP country in the driver’s seat Addressing human-resources constraints Further alignment and harmonisation Tackling the bureaucracy of aid

The management of aid in the CPA could be enhanced through the following actions: 62


Putting the ACP country in the driver’s seat.

As mentioned before, CPA-based changes in EDF management show a mixed result, with some improvements but also major setbacks. ACP ownership of the development-cooperation process is probably the greatest victim, and in this respect, there is still much work to be done to adjust ACP-EU practice to the precepts of the Paris Declaration. As the EU seeks to implement the Paris agenda and move towards greater ownership and alignment with ACP country policies and procedures, the issue of ownership needs to be given more attention. In addition, the role of the NAO is no longer adapted to the new requirements of a harmonised, aligned aid system. In line with the recommendations of the recent DAC Peer Review of EC aid, the time may have come for a fundamental review of the system of NAOs in the management of EDF assistance. This longstanding system could be replaced by single government offices that coordinate all donor funding, using national procedures and cooperating closely with the appropriate line ministries that run national-development programmes to which donor funds are contributed. As direct budget support or sector-wide programme support become more common, this is also likely to become the way forward. •

Addressing human-resources constraints.

As the partnership and management of cooperation have become more participatory and sophisticated, there have been more demands on human resources and competencies. This problem should be addressed on both the EC and ACP sides by respectively strengthening the capacity of EC delegations and the public sector in the ACP. •

Further alignment and harmonisation.

Another important challenge is to align aid further, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. There has been some progress with the contribution agreements by making increased use of the systems and procedures in recipient countries. More joint programming among the EC, EU member states and other donors would also be an important step forward. •

Tackling the bureaucracy of aid.

Another challenge is that the ACP side often perceives the bureaucratic requirements for engaging with and benefiting from EDF resources as too excessive, given the limited human resources available in the central administration. There has increasingly been a tendency not to allocate time to preparing for EDF projects because that time could be better spent working with other, more flexible donors. It would help if the EC would adopt a more participatory approach to programming, which would put the ownership of development firmly in the hands of the ACP.

Where to go from here? The shift from Lomé to Cotonou was more than a change of names. It was the intention of the new partnership agreement to mark a clear break with the past and to modernise the overall approach to ACP-EU cooperation. Stakeholders in both the EU and the ACP recognise the great potential of the CPA in providing an ambitious and comprehensive framework for new forms of international relations. However, after several years, there are still major deficits in implementation, and several critical questions remain: Has the increasing politicisation of ACP-EU relations contributed to better development? Have new emerging issues, such as security and migration, been effectively included? Will poor and vulnerable countries reap the benefits of trade liberalisation? What has been the quality of the participatory process? Has it really made a difference? Has the increasing emphasis on performance-based aid management enhanced the impact of aid? Last but not least, has the CPA been able to increase ownership and bring about greater equality in the partnership between the EU and the ACP?

63


Strong believers in the CPA would argue that it is just a matter of implementation and that these major challenges can be effectively addressed between now and 2020. However, others argue that time, alone, will not bring the solution. The problems with implementation may be symptoms of a much more fundamental questioning of the relevance of the CPA and current asymmetrical ACP-EU relations.

Chapter III: Continuing relevance of Cotonou in a changing world? The analysis in part I focused mainly on the record of the CPA so far, and on ways to improve its implementation. However, beyond the challenges of making the CPA a more effective framework for ACP-EU cooperation, other more fundamental questions have emerged. There seems to be an urgent need to look at the future and to re-assess the role of the CPA in a rapidly changing policy environment at global, EU and ACP levels. The enlargement of the EU with 12 new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe in May 2004 and January 2007, respectively, has shifted the EU’s strategic interests to its immediate neighbours in the East and the Mediterranean. In addition, the negotiations for economic partnership agreements with six separate ACP sub-regions have put increasing pressure on the cohesion of the ACP Group. New actors, such as the African Union, entered the scene at the beginning of the new millennium as privileged partners of the EU. There is also a growing trend towards regional differentiation, reflected in the formulation of specific EU support strategies for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Last but not least, there appear to be fears within the ACP that the partnership is further affected by growing difficulties internal to the ACP as it tries to project itself as a Group. This is even further compounded by the increasingly divergent economic and political interests among ACP countries, which was not the case at the start of ACP-EU relations in 1975. In this context of rapid global change, some fundamental questions that will determine the future of the CPA and ACP-EU relations need to be addressed: How can the CPA remain politically relevant in today’s world, adjust to rapid changes and new global political realities, and become a stronger framework for international cooperation?

What is needed to ensure that both the ACP and the EU continue to attach the same importance to the partnership as in the past? Will ACP leadership at pan-African, regional and national levels continue to give more than lip service to the CPA as a flagship of ACP-EU relations? What is needed to ensure that security issues, EPAs and regional differentiation do not tear the ACP Group apart?

How can the CPA complement and mutually reinforce the new partnerships that the EU is building with specific geographic regions (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the European neighbourhood, etc.)?

How can the ACP Group and the African Union better cooperate and complement each

other? The multi-stakeholder seminar, organised by ECDPM, was a first attempt to organise an open and frank discussion on these questions, which is just the beginning of what could become an interesting and hopefully fruitful debate. On the basis of the various views expressed at the seminar, we have tried to extrapolate three possible scenarios for the future. Obviously, these will require more in-depth analysis to substantiate and test the strengths and weaknesses of each of the various future perspectives that have been put on the table.

64


Continuing relevance of Cotonou in a changing world? Scenario 1: Cotonou is relevant but some ‘mini-engineering’ might be needed to make it work better Scenario 2: Cotonou and ACP-EU cooperation have no future and have become irrelevant in a changing world Scenario 3: Cotonou still has potential, but fundamental adjustments are needed to confront new realities

Scenario 1: Cotonou is relevant but some ‘mini-engineering’ might be needed to make it work better The CPA has a solid historic foundation based on common interests and should continue to guide ACP-EU relations. This scenario starts from the assumption that the CPA is still politically relevant for Sub-Sahara Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The three regions joining together reinforce their bargaining power vis-à-vis other regional blocs. As the ‘biggest development grouping in the world’, comprising the largest number of least-developed countries and large groups of landlocked countries, small islands, and vulnerable countries, the ACP is the legitimate body to defend the interests of these countries on the multilateral scene and in relationships with the EU. Defenders of the CPA and the ACP cause argue that ACP solidarity is still going strong. One of the more successful examples of the effectiveness of the ACP Group was the 4th WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha in 2001, where the ACP was able to obtain a waiver until 2008, exempting the current EU preferential trade provisions for ACP countries from legal challenge under WTO rules. A typical example is the Caribbean region which prefers to align with Africa instead of Latin America as it would hardly have an opportunity to manifest its specificity within a Latin American Group. The large diversity among the Group of 79 ACP countries should be seen as a strength in the partnership rather than as an obstacle. Cotonou defenders argue that, aside from the CPA, there is no North-South cooperation framework that has such a sophisticated and stable contractual joint institutional framework for dialogue on political, economic and development issues. New emerging continental (such as the African Union) and regional groupings of developing countries do not have a similar tradition or mechanism for dialogue with the EU, nor do they represent such a large group of countries with whom the EU can negotiate, programme and co-manage important development programmes. Another area where it is argued that the CPA brings added value and still has potential is the framework for increased aid effectiveness. The CPA still provides a model for partnership, good governance, alignment and harmonisation, as well as policy coherence for development, coordination and complementarity. It has the potential to strengthen local and national ownership and multi-stakeholder participation in development. Last but not least, the CPA is also seen to have concrete mechanisms for learning from experience through the comprehensive programming, mid-term review and end-of-term processes. Obviously, even in the eyes of the fiercest defenders of the CPA, all is not perfect; implementation modalities can be refined and bureaucracy reduced, but the fundamentals of the CPA should be preserved at any price.

Scenario 2: Cotonou and ACP-EU cooperation have no future and have become irrelevant in a changing world In this scenario the longstanding ACP-EU framework has reached its limits and is no longer effective in confronting the major and increasingly complex global challenges and changing conditions in the EU. When ACP-EU relations started with the Lomé Conventions in 1975, the 65


world was roughly organised along a North-South axis. During the first years of the 21st century, a more complex and more diffuse multi-polar world has emerged. There are new emerging powers in development (such as China, India and Brazil) with increasing interests in Africa and the ACP. The ACP Group has become increasingly fragmented, and it is striking that in more than 30 years of existence, there has been little intra-ACP cooperation. The cohesion of the ACP Group risks being further threatened by the adoption of EPAs. A regrouping and repositioning of geographic regions and (sub) regional organisations is taking place in all parts of the ACP. One of the strongest examples is the creation of the African Union in 2002, uniting the whole of Africa (including non-ACP North Africa) in an alliance for political, economic, social and cultural cooperation unprecedented within the African continent. Clearly, the CPA does not respond to the African wish to treat Africa as one. Similar changes have become apparent in the EU, which, through its various regional strategies, seeks to separately differentiate its partnerships with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and with the various regional economic communities in the ACP. These rapidly emerging trends challenge the longstanding ACP-EU partnership and the ACP Group as a whole. Critics argue that the ACP Group has major difficulties positioning itself and being pro-active. At the same time, the ACP Group seems to be undergoing changes that reinforce the perception that it is as an artificial construction that only can survive with the blessing of the EU. Outside its historical relationship with the EU, the ACP has been quite invisible in the rest of the world. A clear sign of this is that there is no real interest by other world powers to maintain a special relationship with the ACP countries as a group. China and Latin America prefer to build special partnerships with Africa through the regional economic communities and the African Union but not with the ACP. But neither does the EU (as longstanding defender and ally of the ACP) appear to attach the same importance to the partnership as it did in the past. The growing importance of regional groupings, particularly the African Union, has provided the EU with interlocutors with whom the EU can engage in a region-to-region political dialogue in a way that the ACP Group could not do. The various unique features of the CPA are gradually being taken over in new regional strategies and arrangements (e.g., Joint EU-Africa Strategy, EPAs, etc.). In addition, the EDF, with its specific characteristics (member-state contributions, joint management, etc.), has come under increasing pressure in recent years. The EC seems to increasingly use EDF resources for a variety of programmes and facilities (health, water, energy, Africa Peace Facility, etc.), often abandoning joint-management principles and, in effect, eroding the partnership with the ACP. Critics of the CPA argue that these trends are irreversible and that it does not make sense to continue to defend the CPA at any price. The efforts of the ACP Group to turn the tide and to adjust will be meaningless because the ‘tsunami’ of rapidly changing international interests and relationships cannot be stopped. In addition, critics argue that all this will be further compounded by the ACP Group’s lack of response capacity and that of its institutions. The poor leadership and lack of internal dynamics of the ACP Group and its Secretariat, as well as the slow ACP decisionmaking mechanisms and limited capacity in terms of human and financial resources further broaden the credibility gap.

Scenario 3: Cotonou still has potential, but fundamental adjustments are needed to confront new realities In this scenario, it is recognised that is necessary for the CPA to be adapted in major ways because the international context has changed dramatically in recent years. Increasing pressure on the CPA can be an incentive to mobilise all troops in the ACP and the EU for a profound and fundamental reflection on the future of EU-ACP relations. This scenario starts from the assumption that several of the underlying principles and instruments of the CPA are still relevant for development. However, the main concerns seem to be about the

66


CPA’s survival, in isolation from the fundamental processes of change that are taking place in the new international context. Significant adjustments are needed to ensure that the CPA still has a legitimate role to play in ACP-EU relations now and beyond 2020: •

Ensure continuing relevance by showing more and better results.

The innovations of the CPA are still a source of inspiration for a modern and original approach to international cooperation: political dialogue, participatory approaches, programming, performance-based management, concrete mechanisms for learning through mid-term and endof-term reviews, etc. The challenge will be to make sure that this original framework also works in practice and that it can promote positive change in terms of development. •

Re-energise CPA institutions for political dialogue.

On paper, the unique joint institutional framework of the CPA (Joint Council, Joint Committee of Ambassadors, Joint Parliamentary Assembly, etc.) provides ACP-EU relations with a comparative advantage over new configurations and emerging regional groupings, which cannot rely on such sophisticated frameworks. However, in order to increase the political relevance of the CPA, some changes should be considered, including (i) strengthening the ACP-EU dialogue and extending it to other important issues beyond aid and trade by giving greater weight to issues, such as security, migration, governance, mutual accountability and policy coherence, (ii) making the substance of the dialogue more political and less technical by providing a lead role to the ACP ministers of foreign affairs (rather than the ministers of planning and finance – the NAOs – who mostly operate as aid managers in the discussions on CPA-related matters), (iii) ensuring the effectiveness of the dialogue by seriously reconsidering the format, which now comprises some 105 countries, (iv) entrusting the ACP Secretariat with a stronger leadership role with more autonomy to give to the group and the CPA greater relevance in light of the emerging initiatives at the pan-African and regional levels. •

Apply principles of subsidiarity.

The diversity of the ACP Group should be seen as a force in the partnership, not as an obstacle. Flexibility, country differentiation and variable geometry can continue to exist as long as there remains clear value-added and a shared role to be played by ACP institutions. This would mean that the ACP Group acts either as a kind of binding force among the different regions or as a facilitating agency that links up the various interests and component parts of the ACP through the exchange of information, analysis and expertise. To make this happen, common ACP interests need to be redefined and ACP institutions will need to give proof of trust, leadership and capacity. •

Complement the Paris Declaration as a solid basis for increased aid effectiveness.

The underlying principles of the CPA provide a good foundation for enhanced aid effectiveness by promoting good governance, strengthening local and national ownership, and programming multi-stakeholder development in the ACP, as well as harmonisation and alignment with regional and country-owned development strategies and coherence of development policy. As such, it has the potential to be an important framework for strengthening partner-country governance, donor transparency and mutual accountability. Although the Paris Declaration is driving the debate on aid effectiveness, the CPA and Paris can mutually reinforce each other. Give modern, practical content to the concept of contractuality and mutual accountability.

The CPA has the potential to play a role in defining what is involved in shifting from an unequal North-South, control-oriented partnership to mutual accountability. One of the ways to do this could be to exploit the CPA potential for policy coherence, by making a more informed and systematic use of article 12 on European policies affecting ACP development. •

CPA will be what its members want to make it.

67


The potential added-value of the CPA in a multi-polar world with lots of conflicting forces will depend on the leadership of both the ACP and EU, and the ways in which they want to prioritise ACP-EU relations. It appears that the EU is moving quite fast in making up its mind as to where it wants to go with the ACP-EU partnership. ACP stakeholders are also engaging in a similar reflection at the level of ACP Ambassadors and the ACP Council. Possible revitalisation – or survival – of the CPA will therefore depend on the highest ACP political institutions and on a dynamic ACP Secretariat that is entrusted with a lead role in the implementation of the CPA. ACP leadership, therefore, is confronted with an urgent challenge to invest in developing a stronger ACP profile based on a division of tasks, added value and complementarity with other emerging initiatives.

Some final thoughts These initial reflections clearly show that the CPA and the long-standing ACP-EU partnership face steep challenges in the coming years. With the centre of gravity of ACP-EU cooperation apparently shifting towards the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), ACPEU partners are confronted with the challenging task of rethinking and repositioning their relationship in a multipolar world. As a non-partisan and independent foundation specialising in ACP-EU relations, ECDPM remains committed to assisting the various interested parties in this process.

68


Outros documentos e links úteis sobre desenvolvimento nas relações UE-África

Documentos Oficiais The EU, a global partner for development: Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, April 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM PDF COM 2008 0177 F EN ACTE.pdf An EU Aid Effectiveness Roadmap to Accra and beyond European COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC(2008)435%20Aid%20Effective.pdf REPORT on experiences from the European regional integration process relevant to ACP Countries, ACP-EU JOINT PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, March 2008 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/90 01/pdf/rr integration en.pdf AU Declaration on EPAs, February 2008 http://europafrica.org/2007/02/11/au-declaration-on-epas/ Global Monitoring Report on MDGs 2008. World Bank, IMF http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALMONITOR/EXTGLOMONREP2008/0,,me nuPK:4738069~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:4738057,00.html OECD Journal on Development: Development Co-operation Report 2007 http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en 2649 33721 40056608 1 1 1 1,00.html Fórum Global sobre Migrações e Desenvolvimento, 9-11 Julho 2007 Conclusões http://www.gfmd-fmmd.org/en/conclusions-and-recommendations The EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure Lançamento http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/africa/partnership en.html EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 28/02/2007 http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/tmp docs/2007/communication labor division en.pdf The European Consensus on Development Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, November 2005 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/eupresidency2005/eu-consensus-development.pdf The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Dec.2007 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf files/consensus/consensus en.pdf Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals Communication from the European Commission, 2005 http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/communications/docs/communication 134 en.pdf#zoom=100

Outros Documentos Economic Partnership Agreements: A ‘historic step’ towards a ‘partnership of equals’? Mareike Meyn, ODI, March 2008 http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working papers/WP288.pdf

69


Coerência e Eficácia: Os Desafios das Relações UE-ACP em 2008 InBrief 20, ECDPM http://www.ecdpm.org/Web ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/8B8C314114ED2424C125741800586 96D/$FILE/InBrief%2020%20PT-challenges%202008.pdf Summary of the AWEPA Conference on ‘The Role of the New EU MS in EU-Africa Development Policy’, February 2008 http://europafrica.org/2007/03/03/summary-of-the-awepa-conference-on-the-role-of-the-new-eu-ms-ineu-africa-development-policy/ The new EPAs: comparative analysis of their content and the challenges for 2008 Christopher Stevens, Mareike Meyn and Jane Kennan (ODI) and Sanoussi Bilal, Corinna Braun-Munzinger, Franziska Jerosch, Davina Makhan and Francesco Rampa (ECDPM), 31 March 2008 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/library detail.php?library detail id=4294 An Impact Study of the EU-Acp Economic Partnership Agreements in the Six ACP Regions Final Report, January 2008 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc 138081.pdf The Development Dimension or Disillusion? The EU's Development Policy Goals and the Economic Partnership Agreements. M. STOCCHETI, Nordiska Africa Institut, May 2007 http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/download.html/978-91-7106-610-7.pdf?id=25253 Aid Effectiveness: Complementing Aid. Bond, May 2007 http://www.bond.org.uk/networker/2007/june/aideffectiveness.htm Evaluation Study on the EU Member States' and Institutions' mechanisms for promoting Policy Coherence for Development, ECDPM, May 2007 http://www.threecs.net/resource corner/ongoing studies/4 eu mechanisms that promote policy coherence for develop ment EU’s Footprint in the South: Does European Community development cooperation make a difference for the poor? CIDSE Report, March 2007 http://www.cidse.org/docs/200703211426497220.pdf

Links EuropeCares: European Union Development Policy http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/index en.html Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD – OCDE) http://www.oecd.org/dac/ Global Humanitarian Assistance 2007/2008 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/headlines.htm European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) http://www.ecdpm.org/ Overseas Development Institute (ODI) http://www.odi.org.uk/ African Economic Outlook Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE / Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en 2649 15162846 1 1 1 1 1,00.html European Development Days http://www.eudevdays.eu/Public/index.html

70


GOVERNAÇÃO Enquadramento As questões da boa governação estão actualmente no cerne das estratégias de vários doadores, como atestam a nova Estratégia do Banco Mundial sobre Governação e anti-Corrupção, o Livro Branco sobre Governação publicado pelo DFID ou a “Iniciativa para a Governação” da UE, destinada a premiar financeiramente os países que demonstram uma boa gestão das contas públicas e a utilização transparente dos fundos em benefício das populações mais carenciadas e do desenvolvimento dos seus países. As interligações entre governação, democracia, direitos humanos, paz e desenvolvimento reforçam esta perspectiva. A persistência de alguns regimes ditatoriais ou autocráticos no continente africano, bem como a violação de direitos humanos básicos (nomeadamente associados a conflitos violentos), são situações que justificam a preocupação e o esforço da comunidade internacional em encontrar respostas mais eficazes e sustentáveis. No entanto, as relações Europa-África nesta matéria têm sido, por diversas vezes, afectadas por uma ausência de consenso sobre as prioridades e modalidades de diálogo, conduzindo a negociações inconclusivas (por exemplo, na questão da devolução dos bens culturais) ou a situações de bloqueio político (como aconteceu relativamente à situação no Zimbabwe). Esta situação tem origem em vários factores. Em primeiro lugar, verifica-se a inexistência de um entendimento comum sobre o que significa o conceito de governação, gerando abordagens europeias tecnocráticas, que se limitam a questões como a corrupção ou a gestão das finanças públicas, em detrimento de uma abordagem política mais abrangente que privilegie a “accountability” do Estado perante os seus cidadãos ou o reforço das estruturas democráticas do Estado (como, por exemplo, os Parlamentos). Por sua vez, a parte africana tende a privilegiar esta última abordagem, definindo a governação num contexto mais vasto de transformação da sociedade, incluindo as regras, processos e comportamentos pelos quais se articulam os interesses, se gerem os recursos e se exerce o poder na sociedade. Desta forma, tende a privilegiar o processo e a evolução, enquanto a abordagem europeia tende a enfatizar os resultados (como a realização de eleições). Em segundo lugar, a imposição restrita de condicionalidades políticas para atribuição de ajuda provou ser contraproducente em vários contextos, sendo necessária uma análise casuística das diferentes situações. Da parte europeia, há cada vez mais fundos disponíveis nesta área, mas existe ainda uma grande dificuldade de operar em ambientes não-democráticos, de conflito ou de fragilidade. Por exemplo, numa situação de fragilidade do Estado ou de pós-conflito, a realização de eleições não assegura por si só a transição para a democracia nem garante a estabilidade, pelo que outros factores deverão ser tomados em consideração – o compromisso de um governo de unidade nacional para com os seus cidadãos, por exemplo. Neste contexto, o conceito de “goodenough governance”, lançado recentemente pelo DFID, parece mais flexível para permitir aproveitar as janelas de oportunidades que existem nestas situações através da ajuda internacional. Em terceiro lugar, as reformas de governação não podem ser impostas pelo exterior, como acontece relativamente a muitos doadores, incluindo a UE. Ao nível continental, existe por vezes a percepção de que a UE tenta pressionar a aceitação das suas agendas, critérios e instrumentos de governação, em vez de apoiar os quadros e mecanismos já existentes ao nível africano. Com efeito, apesar das situações graves de conflito e crise (que parecem ter ganho nova importância na passagem do ano de 2007 para 2008, com a crise eleitoral no Quénia, o reacender de 71


distúrbios graves no Leste da República Democrática do Congo, o agravar da situação da Somália, o culminar da crise política nas Comoros ou os retrocessos no Acordo de Paz do Sudão), é inegável o esforço – e os resultados – da UA na promoção da democracia e do respeito pelos Direitos Humanos no continente africano. As dinâmicas políticas introduzidas pela UA, que estabeleceu um certo nível de governação continental, vieram reforçar a tão aclamada ownership do continente, com várias inovações institucionais (Parlamento Pan-Africano), legais (Carta Africana dos Direitos dos Povos, Convenção da UA sobre Prevenção e Combate à Corrupção) e em termos de instrumentos concretos (Mecanismo de Revisão pelos Pares). Apesar de algumas destas inovações institucionais terem ainda um longo caminho a percorrer, o Mecanismo Africano de Revisão pelos Pares é um exemplo ilustrativo do compromisso de vários governos africanos com a transparência e rigor na prestação de contas perante os seus pares e as suas populações. Assim, as iniciativas europeias nesta área – como as avaliações de desempenho, a realização de perfis de governação, ou a definição de reformas – deverão, o mais possível, ter por base as iniciativas africanas em curso e o diálogo com uma multiplicidade de actores locais. Em quarto lugar, as críticas dirigem-se também ao facto de a accountability ser exigida num único sentido, sem reciprocidade, pelo que se exige uma maior transparência e rigor também da parte europeia. Por um lado, se a reforma e agilização das instituições da UA é uma prioridade continental, do lado europeu urge também uma maior clarificação institucional, desburocratização de procedimentos e flexibilização dos mecanismos existentes na cooperação com África. Por outro lado, as posições europeias estão certamente enfraquecidas perante África, pela existência de critérios diferenciados para cenários similares de conflito e/ou de violações dos Direitos Humanos. É, assim, necessário estabelecer um diálogo franco e aberto sobre as várias questões da boa governação, do reforço do Estado de Direito e do respeito pelos Direitos Humanos, que se centre na responsabilização e transparência mútuas. Uma outra dimensão da governação nas relações entre a Europa e a África é o que estes dois continentes poderão fazer para se apoiarem mutuamente, para concertarem posições ou para coordenarem a sua actuação noutros aspectos da governação global. Entre as questões cruciais contam-se a reforma das Nações Unidas ou os equilíbrios de poder nas instituições financeiras internacionais, onde se definem políticas globais nos mais variados sectores. A capacidade de influenciar a agenda internacional em matérias tão diversificadas como as alterações climáticas e ambiente, a segurança, as migrações, entre outras, será certamente melhorada com uma maior cooperação entre os dois continentes. Disto beneficiará também a implementação das parcerias estabelecidas no Plano de Acção da Estratégia Conjunta UE-África.

72


Democratic Governance and Foreign Aid CARIN NORBERG, Nordic Africa Institute Introduction In December 2007 there was a news article in the Herald Tribune35 with the title “By disregarding Western advice, Malawi becomes a breadbasket”. The basic message was that Malawi’s president against the advice of the donors, in particular the World Bank, had decided to subsidise fertilizers and seed to promote food self-sufficiency and productivity in the agriculture sector. This decision was the result of an extremely poor harvest in 2005 which left Malawi totally dependent on food aid. So in the wake of this emergency Bingu wa Mutharika, Malawi’s president, decided, according to the article “to do what the West practised, not what it preached”. The result has been overwhelming. Again, according to the article, harvests increased from 1.2 billion tons in 2005 to 2.7 billion tons in 2006 and 3.4 billion tons in 2007. This result has been confirmed by an evaluation made by the British and American aid agencies. Yes, there has been a lot of rain, the report says, but the fertilizer input accounted for a larger part of the increase. The above mentioned article is taken as a starting point for this intervention on democratic governance and foreign aid. “The impact of external action on democratic governance: Is there a linkage between the criteria for full membership in the EU and the criteria for foreign aid?” was the question put to the panel. The paper will initially cover some aspects of European aid volumes, and then move to discuss the issue about aid conditionality and aid effectiveness, and finally deal with some dimensions of the debate on the so called aid architecture or the way in which aid is being administered and raised and its consequences for democratic governance. European Union Aid and Africa Everyone certainly remembers that 2005 was a year of great promises and pledges for more support to the development of the African continent. The debate culminated at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, 2005. The pledge from that meeting was to double the total aid volume by 2010 compared to 2004, and that half of this increase should be allocated to sub-Saharan Africa. This implied an increase of USD 25 billion for sub-Saharan Africa. What has happened to the implementation of these promises so far? Aggregated aid statistics for 2006 published by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, DAC, show that compared to 2005 the total aid flows from DAC countries and international organizations declined by 3 billion to USD 104 billion. As a share of DAC countries' Gross National Income (GNI) it declined from 0.33% to 0.30%. As for 2005, the figures for 2006 were strongly inflated by unusually high debt relief. For sub-Saharan Africa an increase of 23 percent between 2005 and 2006 to about USD 28 billion was registered. Also in this case, most of the increase was due to increased debt relief, mainly to Nigeria, where it almost doubled to USD 10.8 billion in 2006. Excluding this, aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased by only 2 percent between 2005 and 2006, thereby returning to the volume of 2004. If the debt relief is excluded, aid to Sub-Saharan Africa increased more rapidly in the years before the Gleneagles pledge than after. In the Monterrey Consensus a commitment was made by donors, including the member states of EU, not to count debt relief as part of official aid flows (ODA). This commitment has so far only been kept by Norway.

35

Herald Tribune: December 3, 2007.

73


The 15 EU countries that are members of DAC have pledged substantial increases of their total aid, and a number of them have also made national commitments to reach intermediate levels of aid/GNI percentage in 2006 or later. According to DAC, 12 out of 15 of them are on track, but European NGO networks (CONCORD) point out that for seven of those 12 member states this is due to increased debt relief and other non-core aid. Projection of member states ODA payments shows that if countries honour their ODA promises the biggest spenders in EU will be Germany and the UK, who pledge to contribute more than Euro 20 billion by 2015. If one looks to the countries that have the furthest to go to meet the 2015 pledge of reaching the projected target of 0, 7 percent, one will find Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Germany. We can now see that the aid volumes have not increased substantially and that the promises made by the EU individually – to achieve 0, 51 % for those members which joined EU before 2002 and to strive to achieve 0, 17 % for those Member States which joined EU after – and collectively to achieve 0, 56% by 2010 as an intermediate step towards achieving the UN target of 0, 7% by 2015 is not on track. The DAC Chairman has warned that Donors will need to undertake major expansions of their core development programmes to Africa if they are to meet the target. The same message was emphasized during the World Bank and IMF Meetings in mid-April of 2007. Resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2004 (% of GDP)

World Development Indicators, 2006 The question of aid volumes is important because aid continues to play a major role as an external financial resource for Africa as can be seen in the table on resource flows to Africa above. Unlike the rest of the world where direct investments and remittances have surpassed aid as the most important source of external finance, aid is still number one in Africa, and EU continues to be a major player there. EU accounts for more than 50 per cent of the world’s total ODA, with about 75 per cent of the total EU ODA provided by its member states.36 It is tempting to compare aid flows with the transfers of resources within EU itself. There are sometimes references to Germany and to the financial transfers which have been made between East and West since the beginning of the nineties. According to available data an average of 4% of the German GNP has been transferred annually. This is equivalent to almost 100 billion Euros per 36

“Development Financing through ODA” by T. Adison, G. Mavrotas and M. McGillivray in The Millennium Development Goals: Raising Resources to Tackle Poverty, Helsinki, 2005.

74


year, which can then be compared to the annual aid for Africa of 28 billion or 18 billion if we exclude debt relief.37 Aid conditionality Moving to the issue of conditionalities and aid it is first of all important to make a distinction between different kinds of conditionalities. There is policy conditionality and there are other forms of more concrete, specific and/or targeted conditionality linked to the implementation of a particular project. In the European Union the reintegration of the East European states in Europe and the successful development of democratic institutions and economic reforms are often mentioned as examples of good policy conditionality. Before becoming a member of the EU the accession state had to legislate and implement a certain set of legal instruments including the Council of Europe conventions on human rights, anti-corruption etc. The process was by and large successful even if there were fears that the leverage of these mandatory requirements would fade away as soon as a state had become a member. This conditionality however had a clear incentive – becoming a member of the EU. The question must therefore be asked if aid has a role to play for substantial changes in the governance structure of an aid receiving country or if it is other factors, which play into this transformation. If one looks to the past experience of aid and policy conditionality the concept of “Washington Consensus” has been the subject for heavy criticism. “Washington Consensus” became the code word for the packages of aid conditionality established by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the nineties. It included budget reforms, inflation targets, reduced role of the state, privatization of important public utilities such as telecommunication and railways but also health and education and a liberalized foreign trade. Even the World Bank itself has questioned the results of this conditionality “package”. In a review of its own policies “Economic Growth in the 1990s” there is recognition of the failures of their recommendations. One conclusion is that there are many different ways of reaching a specific goal, another that reforms must be selective and not linked to a pre-set list of policy reforms. Countries are different and need different solutions to reach the same goal.38 The “Washington Consensus” was understood to deal with economic reforms of countries. Some of its consequences had however far reaching policy consequences well beyond the economic sphere. It affected public institutions at national as well as at local level. In several African countries the advice to privatize a large part of the public sector met with a number of complications. Firstly, there was the pace with which reforms had to be implemented to meet the targets set by the international financial institutions so that they would release their loans. The hastily implemented sell-out of public utilities took place in an environment with weak markets and no regulatory bodies to oversee their activities. Secondly, the small existing “market” in many instances created an unhealthy or blurred mix between politicians’ and private business’ interest. There may have been reasons for a breaking up of previous inefficient parastatals and loss-making public monopolies. These reforms probably should have been spaced over a much longer time period and complemented with the establishment of different kinds of checks and balances to create transparency and accountability. Another serious political consequence was the far reaching effects for the poor created through the insistence on privatizing education and health services. The WHO Commission on Macroeconomic and Health39 could already in 2001 document the adverse effects of introducing fees for primary health services. The paradoxical consequence was that in the poorest countries, including many African countries, the out-of-pocket health costs for the poorest people reached levels of 70 percent or more while in the more wealthy OECD countries a major part of health 37

“ Berliner Republik” by C. Tham, Stockholm, 2007. “Economic Growth in the 1990s”, the World Bank, 2005. 39 WHO Final Report, Commission on Macroeconomic and Health, 2001. 38

75


services were, and continue to be, funded within the framework of publicly financed health programmes. After 1999 the debt relief initiative and in particular the HIPC initiative introduced a new conditionality, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs), with their stress on poverty reduction and allocation to the social sectors. Albeit with good intentions the effects may have contributed further to the undermining of the formulation of national social policies. The economic reforms described above were simultaneously developed with demands for democratic reforms in the wake of the end of the cold war. These two different “reform agendas” have since come to dominate the aid discourse. The fact that there is an inbuilt tension between the demands for democratic reform and the unconditional acceptance of a certain economic reform package has however not yet been sufficiently and critically examined by researchers. Among researchers who have studied the relationship between development and good governance there continues to be a disagreement on issues related to methodology and inference.40 The academic discourse often takes place against the backdrop of giving policy advice to development professionals. The focus is on interventions from the donor community and through foreign aid rather than on changes initiated by political forces inside a specific country, changes to be supported by donors. In the discussion of conditionality the role of aid in building capacity for the implementation of international conventions, be they human rights, the right of children, women’s right, and anticorruption legislation has moved higher on the international agenda. To what extent should aid be made conditional to the implementation of the conventions? Should aid first and foremost be seen as a tool for building capacity? The dilemma remains what to do in cases where governments do not recognize their responsibility. The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central feature of the Africa–EU dialogue, as stated in the Joint Strategy. One example is the section covering the cooperation between Africa and EU on democratic governance. The basic approach is that EU is committed to supporting institutional development, knowledge-sharing and capacity building. The cooperation between institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Right will be promoted. This could be a more promising way to move forward than to attach a direct conditionality to the aid transfers. In cases of severe breaches of national laws and international conventions there are already (if not always) sanction regimes in place. Aid effectiveness In the above focus has been on policy conditionality. From different assessments of aid and its impact at country level we can say, quoting the Danish economist Finn Tarp, that “we lack the necessary understanding of the complex, country-specific links between aid, growth and development objectives such as poverty reduction. And the same could be said about democratic governance“. And he continues “in the present drive to scale up aid, it is critically important to avoid making the mistake of the past of promising too much and contributing to the misconception that aid can on its own turn history”.41 Ownership is a frequent term used in the discourse on foreign aid. Ownership, one could say, is the opposite of conditions. It has become an established truth that aid should be given in such a way as not to undermine national policies. This is at least the rhetoric. But the increasing number of donors from both national aid agencies and international and non-governmental organizations in almost all African capitals raises questions about the donor impact on “ownership”.

40 41

“Good governance enough revisited” by Merilee S. Grindle in ODI Policy Development Review No 5 2007. “Aid Does Work but Beware of Great Expectations” by Finn Tarp in Poverty in Focus, October 2007.

76


According to some findings there is a decline in bureaucratic quality with increases in the number of donors. This phenomenon is linked to the increased demand for aid workers, also by nongovernmental organizations whose work is financed by donors. Another well-known effect of aid flows are price increases on the domestic markets. A first step by donors, according to Nancy Birdsall at the Center for Global Development, “is to reduce the risk that aid from outside undermines existing and incipient institutions”. 42 Today’s system of raising, allocating and deploying aid remains basically the same as that created more than 50 years ago. There are some major problems with that system. Because aid is needed in precisely those countries which are least able to use it well there is an inherent risk that aid will be used in a short-sighted and erratic way. Political changes in the donor countries are spilling over into decisions, which can have dramatic effects in the recipient country. One problem which affects aid effectiveness is the extreme volatility in the flow of aid funds to particular countries. When recipients do not know if aid will be provided two, four or five years from now, they cannot make plans, which reduce the impact of aid. In a recent report by “European Parliamentarians for Africa” (AWEPA) the problem with aid volatility is addressed. Recognizing that Africa needs a gradual and predictable scaling up of aid AWEPA recommends that “European aid should be correctly managed to avoid unnecessary volatility that places an added burden on African nations”.43 Much of the recent debate on aid effectiveness, according to Terry McKinley of the International Poverty Centre, has focused on the danger to macroeconomic stability of a projected aid surge. There is a claim that high inflows of aid create a pressure for currency appreciation resulting in increased imports or inflation if spent by government locally (the so called “Dutch disease” effect). 44’45 According to an evaluation of IMF data, referred to by McKinley, only a minor part of ODA to Africa was actually used to finance public spending, while nearly three-quarters went into reserves or debt buy-backs. A modest 27 percent of ODA was left to finance fiscal expansion. The risk of Dutch disease is therefore seen as a minor problem. On the contrary, according to him, it would seem appropriate to increase public expenditure as there is an acknowledgement that increased public investment could have an “in-crowding” effect on private investments rather than the other way round.

The real use of ODA in Sub-Saharan countries PRGF countries, 1999 – 2005 Government Expenditures 27 % Retiring Domestic Debt 37 % Reserve Build-up 36 % Cited by McKinley

Aid effectiveness is also severely reduced by the growing complexity of donor-recipient relationships. Today there are over 200 official donor agencies, more than double the number 40 years ago, and the number continues to increase. The negative effects of donor proliferation have been recognized and initiatives taken to counter them. The thus far most ambitious attempt

42

“Aid, Weak Institutions and the Missing Middle in Africa” by Nancy Birdsall in ODI Development Policy Review no 5. “Tracking European Aid, Debt and Trade Commitments to Africa”, AWEPA, Occasional Paper Series 14. 44 “Use Aid for Investing in the MDGS - Not for Reserves and Debts” by Terry McKinley in Poverty in Focus, October 2007. 45 “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth?” by R.Rajan and A.Subramanian in NBER Working Paper no. 11657. 43

77


made by the OECD countries is the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The initiative has resulted in an ambitious plan to reform the system of aid delivery.46 The key policy recommendations of the Paris Declaration rest on five pillars: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. A key aim of the effectiveness agenda is harmonization in order to decrease the transaction costs of delivering aid, reducing the burdens of developing countries required to manage multiple programmes and different donor procedures. Within the framework of the Paris Declaration, the High Level Meeting in Accra in September 2008 will take stock of advances made in aid harmonization. A survey made by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 34 self-selected countries and a comprehensive set of donor organizations shows that there is a long way ahead to meet the commitments. The survey concludes that there are too many actors with competing objectives, especially in the poorest and most aid-dependent countries, leading to high transaction costs.47 The effects of aid on revenues In the wake of the commitments made to increase aid to Africa the effects of aid on domestic revenues, state formation and quality of governance in developing countries have gained increased attention in the academic discourse. In a paper by Paul Collier the effects of aid on growth are compared with those of oil revenues. His conclusion is that “as a financial transfer, aid has been far more successful than a benchmarking comparison with the money transferred to African governments through natural resource revenues”. He warns however that there is no reason to expect that a doubling of aid will continue to be effective if handled in the same way as in the past. Paul Collier focuses his analyses on the effects of aid on growth but he also recognizes the implications on the capacity of governments to formulate policies and to fund them.48 In a recent article by Alice Sindzingre the very structure and organization of taxation is discussed. She says that the fact that a state has the capacity to levy a number of its citizens is what defines it as a state. It is against this broadly accepted definition of the state that it is pertinent to analyze the effects of aid on the capacity to raise domestic revenues and, in the long term, to reduce aid dependence. According to Sindzingre “Many least developed countries, however, are caught in a vicious circle where citizens distrust the state and are therefore reluctant to pay taxes, which thereby further weakens the capacity and credibility of the state”. 49 Mick Moore has looked into the circumstances under which increased dependence of governments on taxation might generate a governance dividend. Compared to dependence on a relatively broad tax base, the dependence of a state on oil revenue tends, according to Moore, to generate a number of ‘pathologies’ among which are i) autonomy from citizens, ii) external interventions, iii) non-transparency in public expenditure and iv) an ineffective public bureaucracy.50 The question is whether aid does have the same effects as oil revenues or not? Given the scarcity of research on the subject we may nevertheless assume that there are some similarities. Aid will

46

“We’re Working on It: Development Partners’ Efforts for Effective Aid” by Jan Cedergren in Poverty in Focus, October 2007. 47 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration – Overview of the results, OECD/DCD. 48 “Assisting Africa to Achieve Decisive Change”, Paul Collier, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, April 2006. 49 “Financing the Developmental State: Tax and Revenue Issues”, Alice Sindzingre in Developmental Policy Review, September 2007. 50 “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries”, Mick Moore, International Political Science Review, no. 3, 2004.

78


no doubt increase a government’s autonomy in relation to its citizens. It has sometimes been argued that it is easier to negotiate with aid donors rather than with tax-paying citizens. From his analysis of aid versus oil Paul Collier draws the conclusion that with increasing levels of aid to Africa there must be a switch from policy conditionality to ‘governance conditionality’. Such a recipient switch would reinforce the accountability of governments to their citizens. It would however, according to him, require an agreed approach by all donors ex ante and need to be formulated as international standards. Aid and its effects on tax revenues and governance seem to be an area, which needs to be taken more seriously. If donors in general, and the EU member states in particular, gave aid on terms which would reinforce the accountability of governments they would position aid more clearly on the side of reformers. Aid Architecture and innovative financing sources Finally some words about the Aid Architecture and innovative sources of financing for development. Over the last couple of years, since the meeting on aid in Monterrey in 2002, there have been several initiatives to look at the sources and architecture of aid flows. The aim has been to increase its effectiveness and volume, reduce transaction costs, and increase ownership by recipient governments. The Paris Declaration, mentioned above, was set up to address some of these problems. According to an UNCTAD report on aid to Africa in 2006, the present international aid system however is chaotic and lacks transparency. What is needed, according to UNCTAD, is a multilateral model similar to the Marshall Plan and to the European Community regional funds. The money should ideally be released in predictable tranches over a long term period.51 What can the Joint EU-AU Africa Strategy do to facilitate such a move by EU donors? The Commission is already one of the major players in the aid system. Every move to improve the system is therefore welcome. The new code of conduct which aims at reducing the number of donor countries in each country and in each sector is a move in the right direction. The challenge so far has been the lack of trust in the bureaucratic system of the Commission as such. The perceived inefficiency of the Commission and the continued politicization of aid do not, at present, make for big promises of a better aid architecture. The deliverables in the Aid Effectiveness Package on joint programming and complementarity are to be implemented in 2008 and 2010. A first EU Donor Atlas showed however a concentration of aid in certain attractive countries and sectors. There certainly needs to be a much stronger multilateralization of aid to counter the distorting influence of individual donor preferences. This is a different governance challenge where member states should also take responsibility to reform the Europe Commission – and international organizations – to improve performance in the desired direction. New sources of finance will pose new challenges to the aid architecture. Innovative sources of financing for development that are additional to Official Development Assistance were proposed in Monterrey. In March 2006 France hosted the Paris Conference on Innovative Development Financing Mechanisms and in July 2006 France started applying the air-ticket contribution. The contribution of this mechanism in France alone will generate, according to early estimates, up to 200 million Euros annually. Another innovative financing mechanism currently being introduced is the International Finance Facility for Immunization. The purpose is to raise money immediately on the international markets by issuing bonds. The system would allow for a front-loading of aid to make more resources available today. 51

“Economic Development in Africa”. Doubling AID; Making the ‘Big Push’ work, UNCTAD, 2006.

79


A third innovative financing tool under discussion is carbon taxes. This is a tax on the consumption of fossil fuels. A carbon tax produces a double dividend: reduced carbon emissions and increased revenues.52 The common feature all of these different initiatives is their global character. The air tax in its present form will be collected on a national basis, and sovereignty over the use of the revenues will lie with the nation-states concerned. It is however also conceivable that the tax be collected by a multilateral institution, and decisions on the use of it be reached multilaterally. This would call for far more multilateral integration than we have at present. According to some observers the EU is now the only place where steps toward such a level of integration have been taken. 53 Conclusions When it comes to foreign aid to Africa significant progress has been made but much is left to do in meeting the commitments made by the EU and its member-states. Aid conditionality in the form of policy prescriptions often creates tensions with parallel demands for increased ownership and improved democratic governance. Aid effectiveness is reduced by the extreme volatility in today’s flows of resources. It is also severely reduced by the growing complexity of donor-recipient relationships. The Paris Declaration set up to counter these effects has so far been more of an ambitious plan than a driver of change. Aid and its impact on democratic governance can be seen through the lens of taxation capacity. EU, being already one of the major players in the aid system, should move to improve the system by overseeing its own bureaucracy, by reducing the number of donors in each country and by using an aid delivery system that increases recipient governments’ accountability and capacity to mobilize domestic resources.

52 53

“Meeting Global Challenges”, report by the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Stockholm 2006. Africa Focus Bulletin, September 30, 2006.

80


Outros documentos e links úteis

Documentos Oficiais Governance in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonised approach within the European Union Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 2006 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006 0421en01.pdf Communication on Governance and Development Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, October 2003. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003 0615en01.pdf Framework for ACP Governance Profiles http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/27/40099520.pdf

Outros Documentos The APRM: A Case Study in Democratic Institution Building?, ISS Paper, Institute for Security Studies, 2007 http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=2913&source=rss “Good Enough Governance” Revisited Merilee S. Grindle, Development Policy Review, 2007 http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00385.x Whose Governance? CONCORD Cotonou Working Group, 2006 http://www.dochas.ie/documents/Concord EU Governance.pdf EC Support to Governance is a ‘Moving Target’: Where do we stand regarding EU-Africa relationships? Ceuppens, F, ECDPM, EU-Africa e-alert, October 2006 http://europafrica.org/2006/10/14/ec-support-to-governance-is-a-%E2%80%9Cmovingtarget%E2%80%9D-where-do-we-stand-regarding-eu-africa-relationships/ Governance and Development Cooperation: Civil Society Perspectives on the EU Approach CIDSE Background Paper, August 2006 http://www.cidse.org/docs/200608301145032995.pdf?&username=guest@cidse.org&password=9999& workgroup=&pub niv=&lang=en&username=guest@cidse.org&password=9999 Making governance work for the poor DFID White Paper, 2006 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/wp2006/default.asp Governance: Who Sets the Agenda? BOND Briefing Paper, October 2006 www.bond.org.uk/pubs/eu/submissions/2006/governancebriefingoct06.doc The EU’s Good Governance Agenda in Development: Europe should prioritise national accountability Denise Auclair, World Economy & Debelopment in Brief, September 2006 www.wdev.eu Good Governance G8 Research Group: Interim Compliance Report, February 2006 http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2005compliance interim/2005-02 g8-i-comp gg.pdf

81


La contribution de l’Union européenne au débat international sur la gouvernance Pierre Calame, Fondation Charles Léopold Mayer pour le Progrès de l’Homme, 20.03.2006 http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/fr/analyse/fiche-analyse-178.html E-Governance in Africa: From Theory to Practice A Handbook on ICTs for Local Governance, IDRC http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=2919&source=rss Reforming European Union Development Cooperation: Good Governance, Political Conditionality and The Convention of Cotonou Carlos Santiso, ACES Working Paper, June 2002 http://www.american.edu/aces/Working%20Papers/2002.4.pdf

82


III.

O Papel da Sociedade Civil nas Parcerias Estratégicas

A Europe-Africa Policy Research Network – EARN A Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN) é uma rede de institutos europeus e africanos dedicada à reflexão e debate das relações Europa-África e das questões de interesse comum para ambos os continentes. Na definição dos seus objectivos foi tomado em conta o Plano de Acção (2008-2010) da Estratégia Conjunta UE-África, assinado em Lisboa em Dezembro de 2007 pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo dos dois continentes, que convida as partes europeia e africana a “estabelecer uma plataforma que permita aos institutos de investigação e grupos de reflexão europeus e africanos oferecer um aconselhamento político independente”. Após reuniões realizadas em Lisboa, a 13 de Setembro e a 5 de Dezembro de 2007 (na Conferência Internacional de Lisboa) um grupo de instituições europeias e africanas decidiram criar esta rede e instituir os seus órgãos de governação. Em 2 de Abril de 2008, em Bruxelas, foram criados os grupos de trabalho e escolhidos os membros dos órgãos constitutivos da EARN. Os objectivos da EARN são: •

Fornecer análises políticas independentes sobre questões de interesse comum para os dois continentes – paz e segurança, governação, direitos humanos, democracia, estado de direito, reforma das instituições multilaterais, alterações climáticas, energia, comércio e integração regional, doenças pandémicas, migrações, ciência e tecnologia e outra questões políticas e de desenvolvimento;

Influenciar, através de pesquisa orientada, a implementação da Parceria Estratégica UEÁfrica e fazer parte dos mecanismos de monitorização e seguimento dessa implementação;

Encorajar a cooperação e parcerias entre institutos policy-oriented na Europa e na África, com vista a explorar formas inovadoras de melhorar respostas conjuntas a problemas comuns e a desenvolver capacidades institucionais dos membros da rede, de forma a reduzir assimetrias entre capacidades de investigação europeias e africanas;

Aumentar a interacção entre investigação e decisões políticas, contribuindo para um processo decisório mais informado dos responsáveis europeus e africanos (abrangendo os organismos nacionais, regionais e multilaterais);

Promover a consciencialização pública sobre questões relativas à Europa e à África, no mundo académico, na grande diversidades de ONG e agentes da sociedade civil, no sector privado e nos media.

Estrutura: A rede é dirigida até 2010 por um Steering Committee, presidido pelo IEEI e co-presidido pelo European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht e pelo South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Joanesburgo. São também membros do Steering Committee os leaders e co-leaders dos seguintes Grupos de Trabalho: Paz e Segurança Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD), Adis-Abeba European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Bona

83


Governação Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), Londres Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (CEEI), Maputo Comércio e Integração Regional ECDPM, Maastricht/Bruxelas Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos Desenvolvimento Associação para o Desenvolvimento Rural e o Ambiente (ADRA), Luanda Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), Uppsala O Steering Committee tem a função de organizar três Programas – Investigação, Diálogo e Informação –, de coordenar as actividades da rede traduzidas em (i) papers e um relatório anual sobre o Diálogo Político Europa-África; (ii) workshops temáticos e conferências; (iii) publicações e um website e de preparar um Orçamento.

O “Mission Statement” da rede, aprovado pelas instituições que a constituem, é apresentado em seguida.

84


EUROPE-AFRICA POLICY RESEARCH NETWORK Mission Statement

1.Background and Rationale In a context of rapidly evolving EU-Africa relations, there seems to be an increasing need to foster stronger co-operation between independent policy-oriented research in Africa and in Europe on several aspects of the EU-Africa partnership. At the same time there is also a need to strengthen the interaction between the policy research and the policy making world (governmental, multilateral, EU & African bodies), as well as the policy dialogue with other stake-holders from civil society, private sector and the media. There is already some type of Europe-Africa co-operation between policy research organisations. However, this is mostly done on an ad-hoc basis, mainly through contacts between experts, researchers and academics in regular conference settings. It appears that these events are not always connected in a structured way to the European and the African policy making world which could benefit from practical policy research analysis and advice for decision-making. After two meetings in Lisbon, on 13 September and 5 December 2007, a group of European and African institutes/organisations decided to create the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN). Building as much as possible on existing networks and initiatives, EARN intends to bring added value on pooling and fostering policy research capacities, dialogue and partnership between European and African non-governmental research institutions on issues relating to EUAfrica relations. By bringing different actors (think tanks, development organisations, academic institutes), and perspectives/expertise (e.g. security, development, migration, environment, trade and regional integration) into the political dialogue, discussion and analysis about issues of common concern, EARN asserts its added-value in promoting a cross-cutting and holistic approach. EARN aims at innovative approaches, and encourages reflection on problems and issues of common concern to both regions and to the partnership. The Action Plan of the joint EU-Africa Strategy adopted at the 2007 Summit of EU-Africa Heads of State and Government, gave an important degree of legitimacy to the EARN initiative as it invites both the European and African parties “to establish a platform for European and African research institutes and think tanks to provide independent policy advice’’.

2. Objectives The objectives of the network are: a) To provide independent policy analysis on issues of common concern for Africa and Europe, such as peace and security, governance, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, reform of multilateral institutions, climate change, energy, trade and regional integration, pandemic diseases, migration, science and technology, and other key political and development issues; b) To influence, through practical research, the implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, and to be part of the monitoring and follow-up mechanisms for its implementation; c) To encourage co-operation, co-ordination and partnerships between policy research institutes in Europe and Africa with a view to explore innovative ways of improving joint responses to common problems and to develop the institutional capacities of the network members, so as to reduce asymmetries between African and European policy research capacities; 85


d) To enhance interaction between the world of policy research and policy making to contribute to a better informed decision-making process of the European and African policy makers – multilateral, regional and national bodies; e) To increase public awareness on issues concerning EU and Africa within the academic world, the broad diversity of NGOs and civil society stake-holders, the private sector and the media.

3. Roles, Activities and Outputs 3.1 In light of the aforementioned objectives, EARN role will be essentially three-fold: a) Policy research, aimed at providing independent, relevant and timely policy analysis and advice to European and African policy-makers on key issues of EU-Africa partnership; b) Dialogue, aimed at fostering a better and shared knowledge and understanding of key issues in EU-Africa relations and common concerns; c)

Information, aimed at stimulating and facilitating debate among key stake-holders involved in the EU-Africa partnership.

3.2. EARN activities and outputs shall reflect EARN’s interconnected roles through papers, reports, workshops and conferences on relevant issues of EU-Africa relations, as well as a website and an electronic dialogue forum. Research and dialogue activities of EARN will be both supplydriven (own initiatives) and demand-driven (upon request of key policy interlocutors54). Papers and Reports ·

Discussion papers, designed for workshops, to analyse relevant developments and perspectives in EU-Africa relations and commons concerns;

·

Policy papers and briefs, with a policy focus, shall make concrete proposals and/or recommendations for high officials and decision-makers in EU and African institutions;

·

An annual report, with the proceedings of the annual conference, to include: i.

papers on each of the themes of the Working groups55,

ii.

a paper on common concerns of the EU-Africa Political Dialogue, and

iii. a paper on an overview of the ‘state-of-the-art’ of the implementation of the Joint Strategy. Workshops and Conferences ·

Workshops, to focus on key issues of the EU-Africa partnership with a view of informing policy-makers, preferably to be organised ahead of key meetings between African and EU policy makers. Similarly, workshops are also intended to fostering personal and working relationships among experts with a view to reinforce networking and capacity building.

·

Annual Conferences (the first to be organised within the period of 2008-2009), organised on an alternating basis in Africa and Europe by members of the network, are occasions for creating synergies and cross-fertilisation among the network members. Contrary to the workshops, conferences are designed to have a strong public impact, particularly in the countries where they are held. They will provide an opportunity for exchange of experiences and knowledge between researchers, institutional partners from the EU, AU

54

European and African, institutional and private, state and non-state, according to the relevance of the issues and response capacity within EARN. 55 Each working group will be responsible for defining one session of the Annual Conference on its respective area of concern.

86


and regional economic communities, representatives of the private sector, civil society, officials & decision-makers working on EU-Africa relations. Dissemination activities ·

Publications. Discussion papers and policy briefs, and the annual report arising from the debates of the Policy Research activities will be widely distributed in Europe and in Africa, mainly by email. To cover a broad range of countries and actors, some of these publications may be available in several languages (English, French and Portuguese, provided funding is available for translation), published on the website, available in PDF and, when pertinent, also in paper.

·

Website. To ensure a wider dissemination of the debates and research projects and products, a website will be created. Until then, a page within the existing website http://www.europafrica.org, animated by ECDPM, is being prepared and will be accessible before end of May 2008. The website is meant to be a useful research and information tool for both the network and beyond. It will be updated on a regular basis to reflect the real-time progress in the network’s research findings and activities, as well as the most recent developments in issues pertaining to Europe-Africa relations.

·

Dialogue forum. An electronic discussion forum amongst different stake-holders aimed at promoting the exchange of views on specific matters of EU-Africa relations can also be envisaged within the EARN website.

3.3. Outputs The following yearly outputs of the network can be envisaged: •

Annual Conference56;

Annual Report;

discussion papers (up to 4);

briefs or policy papers (up to 8);

website (to be created on the course of the first year).

4. Membership Criteria, Organisation and Management EARN is a gradual endeavour. It started with a core group of members and aims to become gradually more inclusive by systematically inviting relevant members and expertise and by putting in place co-ordination and governance mechanisms that can ensure an effective ‘modus operandi’.

4.1. Membership Criteria EARN privileges membership of think tanks and networks with interest, track record and expertise on broad and/or specific areas of concern of EU-Africa relations (e.g. development, humanitarian, political, security, migration, trade, environment, and other areas of concern to EU-Africa relations).

56

EARN Conferences will be scheduled taking also into account the calendar of major events within the EU-Africa Partnership (e.g. EU-Africa Summits) with a view to influence the debate at the official level.

87


Membership is however not exclusive to these and can be enlarged to include academic centres and non-governmental organisations with relevant expertise, engaged in relevant activities and in explicit accordance with this Mission Statement. Regardless of membership, individuals with relevant expertise and experience in the areas of interest and activity of EARN can also participate in the network activities. The decision to accept a new member is taken by the Steering Committee, upon consultation with members, in accordance with the following criteria: ·

Intellectual independence and non-interference in the work of the organisations/institutes by governments, multilateral bodies or funding agencies. This should be reflected in the mission statement, statutes and governance structure of members;

·

Membership can in the future be subject to fees. Members shall contribute through own means (financial and non-monetary means) to the activities. Ownership of the network will only be developed when members contribute effectively to the intended results of the network.

4.2. Interim Organisation and Management Structure To kick-start EARN without putting a too bigger burden on organisational and financial capacities at its inception, a flexible interim organisational and management structure was set up for the first years of EARN, to be revised in light of experience, commitment and funding, in 2010.57 As of April 2, 2008, an interim Steering Committee (SC) has been established, composed of ten members, five African and five European, of which eight are leaders and co-leaders of four thematic Working groups (WG, see below) that members agreed to establish, one acts as Chair of the SC and two other members are co-chairs (one European, one African). The Chair and co-chair members of EARN act as an interim Co-ordination Team (CT) and take responsibility for the broader and overarching theme of EU-Africa relations and for activities that cut across the WG activities (e.g. an annual report); it can also assist WG leaders in managing WG activities if requested. The SC is responsible for identifying priorities, accepting new members, determining the annual activities of the network and supervising the budget allocations. The SC will also seek financial support from sources other than the members, to allow for intended activities to be developed. EARN members have decided to organise activities around five key themes (that also correspond to priorities in the joint Africa-EU Strategy) where current members have proven expertise and capacity: ·

Overall EU-Africa partnership and global issues (including cross-cutting issues like climate change, migration, new actors/economies, among others) under the responsibility and coordination of the Chair and co-chairs of the SC;

· · · ·

Peace and Security; Governance; Trade and Regional Integration; Poverty Reduction and Development.

57

In the future, as it grows and consolidates its experience and activities, EARN members may need to consider developing and consolidating its governance and co-ordination bodies, namely creating a General Assembly constituted by all its members and establishing a more permanent Co-ordination team or a Secretariat. They may also consider the need to rotate the members of the SC, so that no one should remain more than a number of consecutive years in the SC.

88


Themes 2 to 5 are dealt by four working groups that establish a work plan and identify priority issues to be addressed under their theme. Each WG has a leader and co-leader (one African, one European) who in the future shall be appointed by group members and chosen in light of their capacity, expertise and interest. WG activities shall as much as possible be integrated in the programmed (or future) activities of the members, with a view to avoid putting too much strain on financial and human resources. WG leaders alternate every two years. As the network develops, other WG may be suggested by at least two members, one African, one European, to allow research and debate on more specific areas. A member may participate in more than one WG, but can only act as team leader or coleader to one. The interim Co-ordination Team takes responsibility to ensure the information flow to and among the members of the network, make funding proposals and support the SC (and WGs) to execute the programme adopted and follow-up on activities if requested. It has no decision-making powers, other than those derived from mandates of the SC. In the future, it should be up to the CT, in co-ordination with the SC/WG leaders, to prepare and submit to the members for approval a biannual plan of activities and a budget. The production of discussion papers can be of the responsibility of any of the members. Some of these papers can form the basis for annual conferences and reports, and eventually be discussed in workshops, if relevant and if funding is available. Briefs and policy papers can be produced according to relevant areas of expertise inside or outside the network. The topics for the briefs and the policy papers will be more contingent upon events with an impact on issues of the strategic EU-Africa partnership. Members shall make reference in their activities and publications to their membership of EARN (e.g. add the future logo of EARN to own publications and/or activities when in the framework of EARN or in areas of interest to EARN), inform EARN members of their activities in areas of concern to EARN, and when relevant invite/involve other members. A link to EARN members’ websites will be included in the EARN webpage.

April 2008

89


Outros Documentos e links sobre a Sociedade Civil nas Relações UE-África

Delivering better aid: An opportunity for European Union leadership in the fight against global poverty. CONCORD AID WATCH, January 2008 http://www.cidse.org/docs/200801311408171891.pdf The new EU-Africa Strategy: a Civil Society perspective on “political dialogue” aspects Discussion paper for the preparation of the “Seminar: The Europe-Africa Strategy: between vision and reality”, Pascal Richard, Zimbabwe Watch http://doku.cac.at/060321 civilsocietyperspective.pdf Continental Civil Society Platform Meeting Declaration Centre for Citizens’ Participation in the African Union (CCP-AU), January 2008 http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/doc Communique on CSO AU summit 1 .pdf Meeting on Civil Society Involvement in the Implementation and Monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its Action Plan (2008-2010) Organised by the Slovenian Presidency, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/final-report cs-involvement-in-im-ofThe challenges of the renewed EU-Africa Partnership’ CONCORD Paper, October 2007 http://europafrica.org/2007/11/20/concord-paper-on-challenges-of-the-eu-africa-partnership/ African Civil Society Conference, Accra Report, 26-28 March 2007 http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/accra-report.pdf Conference on Civil Society and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, Germany Report, 23-24 April 2007 http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/final-conference-report.pdf “Sound of Africa”: NGO Response to the EU-Africa Strategy Declaration Vienna, 22/23 of June 2006 http://doku.cac.at/soundofafricaviennadeclaration.pdf The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership Bond, February 2006 http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/eu/submissions/2006/euafricasubmissionfeb06.pdf

90


Eventos da Sociedade Civil, paralelos à Cimeira EU-Africa Business Forum, 07 Dezembro 2007 Reuniu associações empresariais, câmaras de comercio e empresas da Europa e da África. A Declaração Final inclui recomendações sobre como melhorar a promoção do comércio, da conectividade e do empreendorismo na parceria entre os dois contimentes. Declaração Final http://www.summits.aip.pt/Africa/docs/Statement Business Forum.pdf Cimeira da Juventude, 5-7 Dezembro 2007 A Cimeira da Juventude contou com a participação de cerca de 250 representantes dos dois continentes e foi organizada pela iniciativa do Centro Norte-Sul do Conselho da Europa. Declaração Final http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/Youth/Youth Summit/Final Declaration YouthSummit en.pdf

Reunião dos Parlamentos Europeu e Pan-Africano, 8 Novembro 2007 Este encontro entre os dois Parlamentos concentrou-se nos debates sobre ao papel destes organismos nas fases de monitorização e implementação da estratégia conjunta UE-África, tendo realçado a importância de reforçar as estruturas de diálogo com os governos e as Comissões Europeia e da União Africana. Declaração Conjunta http://appablog.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/joint-ep-pap-statement-on-the-joint-eu-africa-strategy-to-beadopted-by-the-eu-and-african-heads-of-state-and-government-assembled-in-lisbon-on-8-and-9december-2007-for-the-2nd-eu-africa-summit/

Euro-African Civil Society Forum, 15-17 Novembro 2007 Organizada pela Plataforma portuguesa das ONGD, esta conferência permitiu uma ampla troca de conhecimentos e experiências, tendo resultado na adopção de uma declaração politica e de varias recomendações sobre tematicas especificas do relacionamento Europa-Africa. Declaração Política http://www.dialogoeuropafrica.org/images/Declaracao politica pt.pdf Conclusões do Fórum http://www.dialogoeuropafrica.org/images/docs/recommendations%20workshop%20pt.pdf

Declaration of African Churches on the EU-Africa Strategy Os lideres religiosos de Africa reuniram-se em Acra (Gana), em Novembro, para debaterem a sua visão sobre as relações UE-África. O evento foi organizado em conjunto pelo Council of European Bishops’ Conferences (CCEE) e pelo Symposium of Episcopal Conferences in Africa and Madagascar (SECAM). Declaração http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/accra-statement en.pdf Background report http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/report-of-the-study-on-joint-eu-africa-strategy.pdf

Cimeira Alternativa: Alternatives for Africa-Europe‘ Organizada por Organizações da Sociedade Civil, esta reunião teve por objectivo “alertar os líderes políticos e a opinião pública dos dois continentes para os malefícios causados pela competição comercial, pela exploração económica dos ecossistemas, pelas políticas restritivas sobre as migrações e sobre os direitos económicos e sociais fundamentais”. Incluiu uma série de eventos culturais e debates. http://africa-europa-alternativas.blogspot.com /

91


IV.

Programa da Conferência

4 de Dezembro de 2007 10h00 Abertura Álvaro Vasconcelos, Presidente do Conselho Directivo, IEEI; Director do Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia, Paris João Gomes Cravinho, Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação Os valores no diálogo Europa-África Fernando Pacheco, Presidente, Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente, Luanda José Manuel Briosa e Gala, Representante Pessoal para África do Presidente da Comissão Europeia 14h30 Multipolaridade e multilateralismo Moderador José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, IEEI Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes, IEEI Ismael Valigy, Chefe de Departamento, Direcção para a Europa e as Américas, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação de Moçambique Thomas Lawo, Secretário Executivo, European Association of Development Institutes, Bona 16h30 Paz e segurança Moderador Maria do Rosário de Moraes Vaz, IEEI Belmiro Rodolfo, Dircetor, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Maputo Hans Hoebeke, Egmont Institute, Bruxelas Stefan Meyer, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Madrid Fernanda Faria, IEEI/ECDPM

5 de Dezembro de 2007 09h30 Integração e regionalismo Moderador Paul Engel, Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht Roland Marchal, Director de Estudos, Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales, Paris Alain Toussaint, Secretário-Geral, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques de Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan 11h30 Desenvolvimento e matérias-primas Moderador Vítor Martins, IEEI Ositadimma Eze, Director, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos Elizabeth Donnelly, Coordenadora do Programa África, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Londres John Kotsopoulos, European Policy Centre, Bruxelas 14h30 Governação democrática e ajuda externa Moderador Luís Brites Pereira , Instituto de Investigação Científica e Tropical Carin Norberg, Director, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala Elísio Macamo, CODESRIA, Dacar 16h30 A sociedade civil nas parcerias estratégicas Moderador Fernando Jorge Cardoso, IEEI Françoise Moreau, Chefe de Unidade, Comissão Europeia Fátima Proença , Presidente, Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD Geert Laporte, Director das Relações Institucionais, ECDPM, Maastricht 17h30 Sessão de Encerramento António Figueiredo Lopes, Director Executivo, IEEI Augusto Manuel Correia, Presidente, Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento

92


A Europa e África num Mundo Multipolar