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‫املجتمع املــــــــــــــــــدنى‬ ‫والتحول الدميقراطى فى الوطن العربى‬

‫عودة اجلي�ش‬ ‫نشرة غير دورية ‪ -‬تصدر عن مركز ابن خلدون للدراسات االمنائية ‪ -‬السنة الواحد والعشرون‬ ‫العدد رقم ‪ - 215‬إبريل ‪2013‬‬


‫فى هذا العدد‬ ‫صفحة‬

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‫هل هي نكبة برامكة‪ ،‬أم مذحبة‬ ‫املماليك‪ ،‬أم ثورة تصحيح؟‬

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‫م��ص��ر ب�ي�ن نوستاجليا احلكم‬ ‫العسكري وال��واق��ع امل���ر حلكم‬ ‫اإلخوان‬

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‫دراسة حول عودة اجليش‬

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‫عمود اخليمة‬ ‫ابن خلدون يناقش وثيقة األمم املتحدة‬ ‫ملناهضة العنف ضد املرأة‬

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‫وطن العك‬

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‫تفتكر ؟‬

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‫اجليش املنقذ من الضالم وختوفات‬ ‫تكرار التجربة‬

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‫حوار مع الدكتور ثروت اخلرباوي‬

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‫أخبار اجملتمع املدني يف الوطن العربي‬

‫العنوان‪ :‬فيلال ‪ ، 17‬شارع ‪ ، 12‬املقطم‪ ،‬القاهرة‬ ‫تليفون‪26670974 - 25081030 :‬‬ ‫فاكس‪26670973 :‬‬ ‫املوقع االلكرتونى‪www.ibnkhalduncenter.org :‬‬ ‫للتواصل مع العالقات العامة‪:‬‬ ‫االمييل‪mohamed.khalil@ibnkhalduncenter.org :‬‬ ‫موبايل‪01112284006 :‬‬

‫رئيس جملس األمناء‪:‬‬ ‫د‪.‬سعد الدين إبراهيم‬ ‫املدير التنفيذي‪:‬‬ ‫أ‪ .‬داليا زيادة‬ ‫املدير املالي‪:‬‬ ‫حممد خريي‬ ‫مدير مركز املعلومات‪:‬‬ ‫إبراهيم حسن‬ ‫مدير املشروعات‪:‬‬ ‫علي حسام الدين‬ ‫املنسق اإلعالمى‪:‬‬ ‫حممد خليل‬

‫هيئة التحرير‪:‬‬ ‫نهى رشوان‬ ‫حممد على سامل‬ ‫رانيا القطان‬ ‫داليا سيد‬ ‫حممد عز‬ ‫أمحد سامل‬ ‫عمرو مسري‬ ‫عماد الدين حممود‬ ‫مركز ابن خلدون‬ ‫تأسس مركز ابن خلدون للدراسات‬ ‫اإلمنائية فى عام ‪ 1988‬كمؤسسة‬ ‫مهنية تقوم بالدراسات واألحباث‬ ‫واإلستشارات التطبيقية فى جمال‬ ‫العلوم اإلجتماعية واإلسرتاتيجية‬ ‫مبصر وال��وط��ن العربى والشرق‬ ‫األوسط‪.‬‬ ‫الرؤية‪:‬‬ ‫أن نرى اجملتمع املدنى فى مصر‬ ‫وال��دول العربية شريكا أساسيا‬ ‫فى إدارة احلكم الرشيد للدولة‬ ‫املدنية‪ ،‬والقائم على الدميقراطية‬ ‫وحقوق اإلنسان والليربالية‬


‫‪2‬‬ ‫هل هي نكبة برامكة‪ ،‬أم مذحبة‬ ‫املماليك‪ ،‬أم ثورة تصحيح؟‬

‫مصر بني نوستاجليا احلكم‬ ‫العسكري والواقع املر حلكم‬ ‫اإلخوان‬

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‫مع جملس رئاسي به شخصية‬ ‫عسكرية ليس السيسي حتى ال‬ ‫تفقد هيبة وزير الدفاع‬

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‫ثروت اخلرباوي‬ ‫احلاسم هو األغلبية الصامتة‬ ‫فى‬ ‫و الوزن السياسي لألخوان ال‬ ‫يزيد عن ‪% 20‬‬ ‫حوار خاص‬ ‫‪12‬‬


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civil society AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Army Returns Non-periodical Newsletter - Published by Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies - Twentieth Year - Issue 2015 - April 2013


IKC, Founding Chairman

dr.Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Executive Director: Dalia Ziada Finacial manager: Mohamed Khairy

IN THIS ISSUE

Director of Information center: Ibrahim Hassan Media Coordinator: Mohamed Khalil Programs Coordinator

Ali Hossan El Din

Editors: Noha Rashwan Rania Elkattan Dalia Sayed Mohamed Ali Salem Mohammed Ezz Ahmed Salem Amr Samir Emad El Din Mahmoud ------------------------------------------------------------About IKC

page

Implications and Fears on Morsi’s Massacre of SCAF As turmoil grows in Egypt army rule finds new support Interview with Tharwat Al-Kherbawy

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Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies: The Ibn Khaldun Center(IKC) was established as a civil society organization in 1988. IKC is dedicated to advocating for democracy, human rights, and civil freedom in Egypt and the Arab World. Vision: Our Center’s vision is to have civil society considered a main partner in rational governance based on democracy human rights, and liberalism.

Address: 17 Twelfth Street, Mokattam, Cairo Phone: 25081030 - 26670974 Fax: 26670973 Website: www.ibnkhalduncenter.org To communicate with the public relations: E-mail: mohamed.khalil@ibnkhalduncenter.org mobilephone : 01112284006

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Implications and Fears on Morsi’s Massacre of SCAF | Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim

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On the 12th of August of last year, President Mohamed Morsi committed what we may call a “presidential coup.” On that quite Ramadan day, he announced the removal of the leaders of the military and dissolving the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) that ruled Egypt for 20 months after the fall of Mubarak. He also canceled the constitutional declaration that gave the military the right to co-rule side by side with the civilian government. President Morsi’s decisions reminds us with two main incidents in the Arab-Islamic history when civil leaders removed the heads of their military forces in a sudden and unexpected gesture of seizing power. The first was “The Massacre of Baramekah” by Haroun El-Rashid (803 AD). The second was “The Massacre of Mamluks” by Muhammad Ali (1811 AD). In the latter, Muhammad Ali killed 470 people of the Mamluks, after inviting him to dinner at his palace to see off his son Tosson. The massacre of Mamluks was only step of a broader strategic project that Muhammad Ali adopted and gave it the name of Al-Nahda (Renaissance). Both moves of Ali and Morsi were preceded by a luxurious dinner where the committer of the massacre praised the performance of the

victims. Yet, the massacre of SCAF had to be more consistent with the nature of conflicts between power centers in the twenty first century. Rather than killing them, Morsi referred the Minister of Defense, Mohamed Tantawi and the Joint Chief of Staff, Sami Annan to retirement and honored them by the prestigious “Collar of the Nile” award. In addition, he appointed some of the other SCAF leaders in important civil positions. On the other hand, Morsi was very careful about the new officers he appointed as a replacement for the removed leaders. He chose all of them to be young and sharp. That is to guarantee their loyalty as a reaction to him giving them this opportunity in a young age. At the same time, the people’s anger towards removing the military leaders whom they love would be cooled down by seeing younger officers taking leadership. The revolution’s spirit is all about replacing older leaders with younger ones in all policymaking positions. In contradiction to the expectations of the people and analysts, the military neither opposed the “presidential coup” nor launched a coup against Morsi who removed their leaders. The whole process went smooth for more than one reason. First, the Egyptian military is highly disciplined. It is governed

by strict military traditions that include, among other things, absolute obedience for the leaders even if you do not agree with them. Second, the leaders of SCAF, whom Morsi removed, were weakened by their sadness over the murder of officers and soldiers in a terrorist attack in Sinai while they were breaking their Ramadan fast. The whole community was shocked and there were protests calling upon the military to take care of their primary duty of protecting our borders rather than being exhausted by internal political conflicts. Third, the concept of letting the Armed Forces fall under the control of the civil state was widely promoted after the revolution. Our western allies, especially the US would not interfere in Morsi’s decisions regarding the military forces. But, simultaneously, they would not welcome any military coup against his decisions. As Muhammed Ali started a project of renaissance that changed Egypt forever, after the “Massacre of Mamluks,” should we expect that the “massacre of SCAF” by Morsi is the official beginning of his “Al-Nahda” project that he once promised would bring another renaissance to Egypt? Or, would be a beginning of a state of chaos and lack of security? Days would show us.

headquarters. This huge protest and the clash came after a week of smaller rallies, at that spot and elsewhere. The anger of the Egyptian people is now turning towards the Broth-

erhood (MB) to which President Mohammed Morsi belongs. People understand that it is not the president who is making the moves that are hurting the nation’s economy and threatening its stability, but

As turmoil grows in Egypt army rule finds new support

| By : Dalia Ziada

From the window of my office in the Moqattam district of Cairo, I followed with much curiosity Friday’s violent clashes between protesters and Muslim Brotherhood members, outside the group’s


the Brotherhood. On March 11, ordinary people verbally attacked Mohammed Badie, the “General Guide” of the MB, while he was having dinner with family at City Stars mall in Nasr City. They warned him that the people would no longer tolerate the MB’s failures in running state affairs, and would thus bring them down. It is significant that this kind of anger towards Mr Morsi and the MB has a parallel trend: increased support for the military leadership. Since the beginning of March, Egyptians from various backgrounds have joined demonstrations in different cities, calling for the military’s return to political leadership. Since the deadly riots in Port Said in eastern Egypt, in January and again this month, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens have gone to the offices of notaries public all over the country, to sign petitions calling for a return to military rule. A public opinion survey by my Ibn Khaldun Center over the past month discovered that no known political party or group is behind the wave of petitions. This is a spontaneous search for a viable and realistic alternative to Mr Morsi’s failing government. The surveyed sample involved Egyptians with different social and political backgrounds, urban and rural: greater Cairo, the Delta, Upper Egypt and the eastern governorates. Most of the people polled were under 35. Among the 82 per cent who supported the return of the military institution to political leadership, 46 per cent agreed that the generals should return for a limited period of time, with specified goals that include restoring stability, drafting a consensus constitution and basic supporting laws, restructuring state institutions, and paving the way for free and fair elections that would

bring in a qualified civilian president. Of course, none of this is the normal job of the military. So a return to military rule would seem to many to be a step backwards, and thus an indication that the revolution had failed. The ultimate goal of the majority of Egyptians, especially the young people who led the drive to bring down former leader Hosni Mubarak, is to have a liberal democratic state. We toppled Mubarak because we were not happy with his illiberal state that tolerated corruption and denied basic human rights and civil freedoms. He, too, ran elections, but they were never free and fair. The Mubarak regime said it supported women’s rights, to please its friends in the West, but ordinary people were brutalised in police stations and bloggers were taken to jail without being charged. The state adopted policies to facilitate an open market economy and encourage foreign investment, but only businessmen profited from this, not the poor. All this and more ignited anger in the hearts of the people, who brought down this masked dictatorship. Apparently, we knew how to bring down a dictator but not how to build a democracy. Rather than focusing on drafting a constitution as a first step, we rushed into parliamentary and then presidential elections. Only later did we realise our error: we had been grooming a new dictator without setting up a system that would enable us to question him. It is time now to correct this mistake before the economy deteriorates further and political instability turns into chaos. The removal of the Morsi regime is one step, but finding an alternative will be more difficult. The fragmented nature of the opposition has left the young revolu-

tionaries with very limited choices. The most prominent opposition leaders are not young. The youth want to introduce their own leaders as potential alternatives to the current regime, but some current opposition leaders are more inclined to negotiate their way to participation in the current regime. While the young activists are idealistic, many veteran opposition leaders are self-interested. But the revolutionaries are too young and politically inexperienced to be real leaders. So the only remaining scenario, though it is strongly disliked by many, is for the military to take the lead in the country once again, until stability is restored, the economy is reformed and political parties get better organised. When the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (Scaf) took over after the fall of Mubarak, they showed little if any commitment to the principles of the civil state. In a sense this is normal, especially during a period of transition, but this attitude meant the people did not have sympathy with the generals. The momentum of victory and the public’s high expectations at that time blinded people to the reality that Scaf needed more time to develop a sound plan for a stable transition. But there has long been a good relationship between the military and the Egyptian people, and so now opinion is changing. The fear of political chaos and economic failure under Mr Morsi, and the need for security and stability, are encouraging Egyptians to reevaluate the role of the military. To many, the armed forces seem like the last bulwark to save Egypt and guide the country towards the liberal democracy we have always longed to have.

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Exclusive Interview :

Al-Kherbawy: “The Muslim Brotherhood Collided with SCAF while Distorting Its Image.”

| Interviewed by: Noha Rashwan

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Tharwat Al-Kherbawy resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) after long years of struggle with his ideals as a believer and the political opportunism of the leaders of the group. His resignation was a rebellion act against the MB’s rule of “listen and obey.” He played an influential role, since he was a teenager in promoting the work of the group and providing his peers with legal and mental support. When he finally decided to resign, he was already a member of the steering committee of the group. Al-Kherbawy considers the years he spent with MB as a life experience that he has learnt from its positives and negatives. He learnt moderation from some of his mentors and learnt how to be positive to balance the negativity of some of his colleagues. He thinks that the decisions to join and quit the group, respectively, are equally important. If he ever had the opportunity to go back in time, he would have made the same decisions in the same time frames. In this interview, we are trying to explore some of his thoughts on the current politics in Egypt: IKC: What are the main weaknesses and strengths of the MB? TK: The MB has only one weakness, which is also its main strength. That is: the Muslim Brotherhood raises its members on the principle of bling “listen and obey.” It is a strength factor because it solidifies the cohesion of the group and make is as strong as a military entity with no internal disputes or conflicting opinions. At the same time, it is a weakness factor because it does not encourage the members to think

and have their own opinions, and thus made the group lack creativity and the generation of new ideas. In other words, the organization of the group is too strong with almost no flexibility. IKC: Why do you think the MB is losing popularity? TK: The MB has always hidden the fact that it raises its members to brag about it with prejudice and arrogance. They have hidden this for so long because the group was banned. After they came under light, the people saw this clearly and started to question if the group that holds the slogan of Islam is contradicting itself by doing nonIslamic acts. They told the people that “Islam is the Solution.” Then, the people discovered that the group members are not qualified to lead or solve anything. Also, the fact that the president of the state is blindly following the decisions of the MB leaders to serve the interests of the group not of Egypt is very disappointing to those who elected him. All that made the Egyptian people hate the Muslim Brotherhood. IKC: Does President Morsi rule according to his legitimacy as an elected president or he depends on street mobilization legitimacy? TK: The legitimacy of elections is the legitimacy a president gains based on an agreement contract with the people who voted for him and accepted to have him as a president. A president makes an oath to respect the constitution and the law that regulates his relationship with the people. If a president violates any of those laws, he should automatically lose his own legitimacy. President Morsi lost the legitimacy

he won as an elected president because he violated the rulings of law and constitution. Therefore, no one can say that Morsi’s legitimacy is derived from the fact that he was elected by the people. For me, I see Morsi and the MB as occupiers or invaders to Egypt. I call upon people to resist the MB occupation of Egypt. IKC: Is it true that the MB seeks to revive Muslim Caliphate system? TK: Of course, the MB seeks to revive the Muslim Caliphate system, but with an MB style and according to their distorted understanding of the spirit of Islam. They do not want to follow the example of the Prophet and his Companions in this regard. IKC: Does MB agree with social justice? Do they have a strategy to implement it? TK: The MB does not have a clear methodology or perspective on how they should rule. They do not even have the creative mentality to produce one. When Nasser came in power in 1952, the first project he set up was social justice and the re-distribution of agricultural properties. The MB, then, was the first group to oppose Nasser in this project although it was meant to achieve social justice. That is because some of the leaders of the MB owned territories, like Monir Eldalah, Hamed Abul Nasr, and Hasan Ashmawy. They put their personal interests ahead of social justice. Therefore, I think that social justice is not on the agenda of the MB. IKC: How does MB sees women? TK: MB thinks that women be-


long to the house. All the claims that they are encouraging woman’s participation in public life are not true. In this, they are following the Shiite concept of “Taqya” which always the Muslim to commit the evil to defend or protect the good. To protect themselves against the criticism that they receive all the time about how they negatively view women, they lie about that they believe in women rights and supports women public participation. They do this only to achieve their political goals. IKC: You spent so many years as a MB member. From your point of view, what is the best way to deal with them to end the current political crisis? TK: I have said many times that we should let the MB face the statuesque. We should build a parallel regime or a parallel presidential committee that includes members from civilian and military leaders. Then, the political forces should work on composing a parallel parliament that would generate a parallel constitution. That would help the opposition to give the people a complete image about how the ideal state should be. The people will support the opposition in this and as a result the MB would fail. This is the best alternative to continuing with the chaos we are living in. IKC: What is the truth about the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood? What is its role in Egypt? TK: The international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan Elbanna when he wanted to take the message of the MB to other countries. He first founded a branch for the MB in Syria, Yemen, Palestine, then in Iraq, and Jordan. In 1960s, the MB started to spread their activities all over the Gulf area. In 1970s, Sadat released the MB leaders who were in prison. Most of them travelled to Europe and the US and created as-

sociations that are affiliated to the MB. In 1983, Mostafa Mashehor announced the bylaw of the international organization of the MB, from his office in the US. Mahdy Akef was responsible, then, for managing the communications of the international organization of the MB. This international organization is the actual manager and funder of the MB. The international organization of the MB depends on the decentralization of management of MB affairs; i.e. every branch of the MB can manage its own affairs within its own country, except for funds which is exclusively managed by the international organization. As the MB in Egypt is currently in power, they are no hiding such facts about the international organization as before. IKC: Do you expect a revolution within the MB group? TK: The MB group is decaying from inside. Large numbers of its members resigned while no new members wants to join the group. The disassembly of the group is happening faster than we expected. Before, the MB new members used to be recruited during their early years in college. But now, the MB cannot win the majority of votes at Student Union elections as they had always done in the past. This is a proof that the current generation of the MB students has failed to attract new students to join the group. Nevertheless, the MB members who participate in pro-MB protests are above thirty years old. IKC: Your book “The Secret of the Temple” exposes several crimes committed by the MB group. However, they are still insisting on continuing with committing the same crimes every day. What is your comment? TK: The MB has no shame! As we can see, they do not shy to lie to the public, or break their promises and oaths. Morsi said before “I have a thick skin.” He was speaking about

the whole group not only himself. IKC: What is Masons? Is there a relationship between Masons and the MB group? TK: Masons is an international organization that has been there for more than three thousand years, since the age of Prophet Suleiman. Its one and only goal is to worship God, the great engineer of the universe, without necessarily being a member of some religion. At the beginning, it only accepted Engineers to be members, but later on it was open to everyone. The Masons has Jewish roots. It founded the US with the purpose to create an organizational structure that is composed of a family, then a branch, then a region, then a province, then a state. This is exactly the same structure of the MB group. In structuring his group, Hasan Elbanna was inspired by the Masons. It is not an accident that Elbanna was influenced by the Masons structure, and not their concepts. He was not Masonic, but he liked their structure. It is noteworthy that Elghazaly in 1962 mentioned that Masons intruded the MB group through Hasan Elhodieby, Sayed Qotob, and Mostafa Elseba’ay. Their initial purpose of the intrusion was to destroy the MB from within. IKC: Are the followers of Qotob different from the rest of the members? TK: All the members of the MB now are the followers of Qotob. Some of them follow him in the system of organizing the work of the group. They are running the MB since 1986 and fired all the other non-Qotob members. Then, they raised all the new members to be followers of Qotob teachings. Therefore, I think the current MB is a Qotob group. Continue reading on www.ibnkhalduncenter.org

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Final_apr_2013_mag