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purposes of the Act.”).

2

what they term “the sovereign defendants’ money laundering

3

activities on behalf of al Qa[e]da,” and argue that the law

4

draws no bright line between “commercial” activities that

5

are legitimate and those that are criminal.

6

the Federal Plaintiffs’ argument to be as follows: the

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defendants donated money to charities with the intent that

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it be funneled to terrorist organizations which, in turn,

9

would use that money to purchase the plane tickets,

The Federal Plaintiffs focus on

We understand

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communications devices and weapons necessary to orchestrate

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the September 11 attacks.

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This argument fails because “it goes to purpose, the

13

very fact the Act renders irrelevant to the question of an

14

activity’s commercial character.”

15

It does not matter that the defendants made (and oversaw)

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donations to charities with a specific intent as to where

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those donations would end up.

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giving away money--is not a commercial activity.

19

donating to charities is among “those powers that can also

20

be exercised by private citizens,’” Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S.

21

at 704,--unlike (say) “participation in a foreign assistance

22

program administered by the Agency for International

Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.

The alleged conduct itself--

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Granted,

In Re Terrorist Attacks  

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks

In Re Terrorist Attacks  

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks

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