purposes of the Act.”).
what they term “the sovereign defendants’ money laundering
activities on behalf of al Qa[e]da,” and argue that the law
draws no bright line between “commercial” activities that
are legitimate and those that are criminal.
the Federal Plaintiffs’ argument to be as follows: the
defendants donated money to charities with the intent that
it be funneled to terrorist organizations which, in turn,
would use that money to purchase the plane tickets,
The Federal Plaintiffs focus on
communications devices and weapons necessary to orchestrate
the September 11 attacks.
This argument fails because “it goes to purpose, the
very fact the Act renders irrelevant to the question of an
activity’s commercial character.”
It does not matter that the defendants made (and oversaw)
donations to charities with a specific intent as to where
those donations would end up.
giving away money--is not a commercial activity.
donating to charities is among “those powers that can also
be exercised by private citizens,’” Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S.
at 704,--unlike (say) “participation in a foreign assistance
program administered by the Agency for International
Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
The alleged conduct itself--
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks