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1

to acquire goods.”

2

foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long

3

been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as

4

peculiarly sovereign in nature,” because “[e]xercise of the

5

powers of police and penal officers is not the sort of

6

action by which private parties can engage in commerce.”16

7

Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361-62.

8 9

Id. at 614-15.

In the same way, “a

With this distinction in mind, “our first task is to identify what particular conduct in this case is relevant.”

10

Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,

11

647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Nelson, 507 U.S.

12

at 356 (“We begin our analysis by identifying the particular

13

conduct on which the [plaintiffs’] action is ‘based’ for

16

The House Report provides additional examples: [A] contract by a foreign government . . . to construct a government building . . . [or] to make repairs on an embassy building . . . should be considered to be commercial contracts, even if their ultimate object is to further a public function. By contrast, a foreign state’s mere participation in a foreign assistance program administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) is an activity whose essential nature is public or governmental, and it would not itself constitute a commercial activity.

House Report at 16. 53

In Re Terrorist Attacks  

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks

In Re Terrorist Attacks  

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks

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