Review The Royal Logistic Corps Foundation

2018-2019

Bringing together logistics professionals from industry, the Army and academia

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THE REVIEW 2018-2019

Introduction A very warm welcome to the 2018-2019 Review. I am delighted to introduce the 2018-2019 Review. It is worth remembering the original aim of the Review: ‘to improve the staff writing of captains and majors in the Corps’. This narrow aim reflected an era in which, British Army logistic structures and processes were directly traceable back to World War 2 and beyond and in which, arguably, junior officer thought and opinion was not necessarily encouraged: or mention of professional competence, still less excellence, or encouragement to debate. Perish the thought our soldiers, NCOs and warrant officers should be able to both think and write! Of course, it is important that our people write with clarity and brevity but we also need them to be technologically savvy, operate in a joint, multinational and multi-agency contingent context and increasingly, be commercially aware. The context within which the RLC operates has changed substantially in recent years and continues to evolve rapidly post-Iraq and Afghanistan and with the acceleration of technological change. The pace of regimental life remains brisk yet fragmented; budgetary pressures persist and are unlikely to ease; and our training, structures, systems and processes are in a state of continuous evolution, in response. The fiercely-competitive commercial logistics world is both driving the pace of innovation and is a critical component of our defence support network. The RLC Foundation was created to help military logisticians and RLC personnel in particular, grapple with the challenges of this context. Its core purpose is promoting professional excellence, primarily through enabling the wider military logistics community (including our industry colleagues) to interact and share knowledge and experience in this rapidly-changing, complex and diverse environment. The Review is an important medium for this and this years contributions cover a breadth and diversity of subjects unimaginable 25 years ago when the RLC was born; some pick up previous ideas and thoughts; some are factual and Security: This Review contains official information. It should be treated with discretion by the recipient. © Crown Copyright: All material in this Review is Crown Copyright and may not be reproduced without the permission of the Regimental Association of The Royal Logistic Corps. © Cartoons are copyright. Disclaimer: No responsibility for the quality of the goods or services advertised in this Journal can be accepted by the publishers or their agents. Advertisements are included in good faith. The contents of this Journal and views of individual authors or units does not necessarily reflect the policy and views, official or otherwise, of the Corps or Ministry of Defence. Data Privacy: We distribute The Review using mailing data held in a secure contacts database within RHQ The RLC. Your inclusion on this database is by virtue of the fact you are serving in the military, or you are a current member of the RLC or Forming

historical, and through them we trace the trends and issues we grapple with today. Some articles show a healthy appetite to challenge the status quo and others point to the future. The snapshot they provide is important: with each edition of the Review we create an ever-richer repository of RLC historical, personal and professional reflections. MGL’s strategy for an outward-looking RLC at the forefront of thinking and doing, in military logistics is reflected in the Review; it shows a Corps healthily eclectic and outwardlooking. It captures thoughts, ideas and experiences from those both in the thick of Corps activity and those circulating in wider defence, industrial and academic environs. We have views a-plenty on what is good, less good and what could be different. I would like to say, on behalf of MGL and the RLC Foundation, a huge thank you to those who have contributed. As I have written previously there are no ‘right’ answers in military logistics. The more we can stimulate the widest thinking and interaction across the military logistics community and learn from others, from history and from adjacent sectors; the more resilient and effective our future solutions and structures will be and the better equipped our people will be professionally to plan and operate them. So – we hope you enjoy the articles. We look forward to a lively social media follow up. Major General (Retired) DJ Shouesmith Chairman of the RLC Foundation Corps Associations. The RLC Foundation only uses your personal data for the purpose of sending you the magazine. The mailing data is treated in the strictest confidence, is password protected, is only shared with our printer and is deleted after each use. If any serving RLC personnel have concerns with regards to the storage and use of their personal data they should contact RHQ The RLC’s Data Protection Officer, Maj R Barrett. Email: Richard.Barrett862@mod.gov.uk Members of the Associations should contact RHQ The RLC’s Personal Information Risk Manager, Shelley Whittaker. Email: Shelley.Whittaker650@mod.gov.uk Cover photographs are from The Sustainer magazine Editor: Mr Peter Shakespeare Assistant Editor: Miss Anne-Marie Causer BA (Hons) Graphic Design: David Blake Printed by: Holbrooks Printers Ltd.

THE REVIEW 2018-2019

Contents General Interest 7: Winning the War – A Malawian Counter Poaching Op. - By Sgt K Kachoka 11: How Might Drones Be used in Logistic Supply Chains? - By Lt Paddy Shelton 14: Rocket Powered ISOs - a concept that could be the future? - By Lt L Johnson 19: Will automation lead to the death of tank transporting? - By Lt C Jeram 23: Automation in military logistics; where is the people/robot boundary and what are the implications for military skills and culture? - By Lt A Selka REME 28: What impact will the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have on Iran? - By Capt S Harris 31: How is industry starting to use drones in logistics and how could the military benefit from this? By Capt R Offord 34: Robot Stores – Automation in Logistics - By Capt N Husband

History 39: 2 Close Support Squadron – Coming home to Oman By 2Lt G Karr 42: Enabling Logistics: Developing the Lines of Communication in support of the Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1918 - Maj P Lawrence 48: The German Logistic Failure in Operation Barbarossa - By 2Lt R Abernethy 54: The 1990 – 1991 Gulf War was driven by the United States’ thirst for oil and not a desire to reinstate Kuwaiti Sovereignty - By LCpl Jonjo Sheeran

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58: The Battle for Crete 1941 – A Brief Account of the New Zealand Petrol Company demonstrating a ‘soldier first’ ethos - By WO2 P Biggs 67: Fluid Thinking – 152 (North Irish) Regiments US/UK Interoperability progression - By SSgt A Brown

Operations & Training 70: The Joint Force 2025 (Land Component): What are the key logistic challenges for 3 (United Kingdom) Division? - By Capt J Doyle-Tanner 76: The Western Balkans – Its Recent History, British Involvement in The Region and The Current Situation - By Lt O Lewis 84: What lessons can be learned from the French logistical effort in Mali during Operation SERVAL? By Lt D Vachha 87: The Utility of ‘Train Hard, Fight Easy’ For RLC Units By Lt A English 91: Operation SHADER and The Sustainment Improvement Team: Aug 2017-Mar 2018 - By Maj R Gardener 102: Medicines for UNMISS. A chilling lesson on the negative effects of working in silos - Maj T Wilcox 109: Are Reserve soldiers deployable? - By Capt J Wooldridge

Professional Development 113: Is the RLC preparing its young officers for command in the future? - By 2Lt M Leathard 115: Best in Class? A Study of Class Diversity in the British Army - By Capt E Thompson 120: How can 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC (13 AASR) become a Combat Service Support (CSS) exemplar in the British Army? - By SSgt S Ossola REME 124: Toxic leadership – can it truly be cut out of the military? - By Capt T Saddleton 127: The trials and tribulations of troop commanding in a training squadron - By Lt Rob Tams

Review Prize Winners – 2018-2019 Professional Development Best Article – Capt Tom Saddleton Runner-Up – Capt Elizabeth Thompson

Best Contributions Best Article – Capt Tom Saddleton Runner-Up – 2Lt Rob Abernethy

History Best Article – 2Lt Rob Abernethy Runner-Up – Maj Phil Lawrence

Best contribution by an officer – Capt Tom Saddleton Best contribution by a warrant officer or senior non-commissioned officer – Joint winners – WO2 Pete Biggs and SSgt Sergio Ossola REME attached Best contribution by a junior non-commissioned officer – LCpl Jonjo Sheeran Best contribution by a junior officer – 2Lt Rob Abernethy Best contribution by a private soldier – No entries received

Operations and Training Best Article – SSgt Anthony Brown Runner-Up – Capt James Doyle-Tanner General Interest Best Article – Lt Archie Selka REME attached Runner-Up – Lt Paddy Shelton

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Abbreviations 1 RGR 3-D A-CJEF A1 Echelon A2 Echelon AASR AATF AFM AFORGEN AinU APB APCs APOD AQIM ARRC AT BATUS BHC BRITFOR C-IED CC CCWG CEG CES CFA CILT CMO CO COA Comd CommZ COPD CPD CPOE CRP CSO CSS DCLPA DCOS DEFRA DEMS DHL EBO ECHR ELC ERHF EUFOR

1 Royal Gurkha Regiment Three Dimensional Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force Squadron/Battery or Company Support Vehicles Regimental or Battalion Support Vehicles Air Assault Support Regiment Air Assault Task Force Army Field Manual Army Force Generation Articles in Use Ammunition Processing Building Armoured Personnel Carriers Air Port of Departure Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Ammunition Technician British Army Training Unit Suffield (Canada) Bosnia & Herzegovina Command British Force Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Commissioning Course Cold Chain Working Group Career Employment Group [colloquially - Trade] Complete Equipment Schedule Commander Field Army Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Contract Management Organisation Commanding Officer [E4] Course of Action Commander [E5 and above] Communication Zone Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Continuos Professional Development Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment Crisis Response Planning Contractor Support to Operations Combat Service Support "Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration" Deputy Chief of Staff "Department for the Environment, Food" "and Rural Affairs Defence Explosive Munitions School" Deutsche Handlung Logistik Effects Based Operations European Convention on Human Rights Enhanced Learning Credits Equipment Redeployment Hub Forward European Force

THE REVIEW 2018-2019

F Echelon FMEA FOBs FOC FRT FTC GDP GLoC HADR HET HQ ICBM IFOR ISO JADTEU

Fighting Echelon Failure Mode Effect Analysis Forward Operating Bases Full Operating Capability Forward Repair Team Forces Troop Command Gross Domestic Product Ground Line of Communication Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Heavy Equipment Transporter Headquarters Inter-Continental Ballistic missile Implementation Force International Standards Organisation Joint Air Delivery Test & Evaluation Unit JLTV Jonit Light Tactical Vehicles JMC Joint Helicopter Command JNCO Junior Non Commissioned Officer JOFS Joint Operations Fuel Systems JSP Joint Service Publication JTF Joint Task Force KFOR Kosovo Force LFP Logistic Focal point LSR Logistic Support Regiment LTNA Long-Term Non Attender LW(AP)RC Lightweight (Air Portable) Recovery Capability MHE Materiel Handling Equipment MIV Mechanised Infantry Vehicle MLET Modified Light Equipment Transporter MOD Ministry of Defence MSc Master of Science - Degree Qualification MSP Medium Stress Platform NAC National Aeronatical Centre NAO National Audit Office NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCOs Non Commissioned Officers NEM New Employment Model NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command NSE National Support Unit NSN NATO Stock Number NT Non Taskworthy OC Officer Commanding [E3 and below] OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer Op BANNER Counter-Terrorism 2perations in Northern Ireland 1969-1998 2SGRITROCK UK Operation to (radicate Ebola in West Africa 2014-2015 Op HERRICK Operations in Afghanistan 2006-2014 French 2peration in Chad 1983-84 Op MANTA French &ounter-7errorist 2peration in MaOL Op SERVAL -2013 to date Op TELIC Operations in Iraq 2003-2012 THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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ORBAT ORP OTX PDT PJHQ PLMs PPE PPTK PSI PTG QOGLR R-WMIK RAMC RAOC RCT RDC REME RFA RFIs RLC RLS RMAS RN ROG RPAS RPN RTCH RUSI SAC SAT SC SCPT SDSR SFOR SHQ

Order of Battle (structure of the organisation) Operational Ration Pack Overseas Training Exercise Pre-Deployment Training Permanent Joint Headquarters Protected Logistic Movements Personal Protective Equipment Portable Petroleumn Test Kit Permanent Staff Instructor Port Task Group Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment Revised Weapon Mounted Installation Kit Royal Army Medical Corps Royal Army Ordnance Corps Royal Corps of Transport Regional Distribution Centre Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Royal Fleet AuxilLary Request(s) for Information The Royal Logistic Corps Rail Load Supervisor Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Royal Navy Rear Operations Group Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Risk Priority Number Rough Terrain Handling Equipment Royal United Services Institute American Strategic Air Command Senior Ammunition Technicion Supply Chain Supply Chain Pipeline Time Strategic Defence and Security Review Stabilisation Force Bosnia Herzegovina Squadron Headquarters

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SME SOF SPOD SRR SSM STURM SV(R) Tac AT TACOS TCC TES TEWT TLB TLG TPTF TRP TSF UAVs UK UN UNHCR UNMISS UNPA UNPROFOR UORs US USA VaME VITAL VSS WDR WFC WFI WW1 WW2

Subject Matter Expert Special Operations Force Sea Port of Departure Strategic Roll-on Roll-off Staff or Squadron Sergeant Major Sustainable Training and Operational Readiness Mechanism Support Vehicle Recovery Tactical Air Transport Terms and Conditions of Service Troop Commander's Course Theatre Entry Standards Tactical Exercise Without Troops Top Level Budgets Theatre Logistic Group Tactical Petroleum Tank Farm Theatre Redeployment Pool Total Support Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles United Kingdom United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Protected Area United Nations Protection Force Urgent Operational Requirement(s) United States United States of America Vehicles and Major Equipments Visibility In Transit Asset Logging Vehicle Supply Specialist Water Dispensing Rack Whole Force Concept Whole Force Initiative World War One [1914-1918] World War Two [1939-1945]

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About the RLC Foundation

THE REVIEW 2018-2019

What does it do? The Foundation runs a series of national events as well as supporting an increasing range of regional events, using the national footprint of our regular and reserve regiments. Our main events for 2019 are: • Yodel seminar and tour of the Service Centre Farnborough – 21 February • Wincanton (Stoke) seminar and distribution visit – *March • Babcock round table event – *April • Royal Mail seminar and tour of the Postal Operations Centre – *May • Ernst & Young thought leadership event (London) – June • Seminar and Exercise LOG SAFARI – 15 July • Kuehne & Nagel seminar and visit to the Defence Fulfilment Centre – 18 September • The Autumn Lecture – * Re-designated winter lecture and moved to January 2020 • The Awards Dinner – 6 November *Dates to be confirmed

Why should I join the RLC Foundation? As can be seen above, the Foundation offers a wide range of events throughout the year. These events provide exposure to the RLC and its people; an opportunity for joint thinking, examining, evolving logistic capability and networking between the RLC, industry and academia. We have already attracted a wide range of members from industry and we are actively seeking new members. The benefits of the three levels of membership can be seen below: Event

What is it? The Royal Logistic Corps Foundation is the focus for engagement with industry and academia, for the purpose of professional development. Now in our fourth year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of industry and academic organisations. Our corporate partners, supporters and friends enable the Foundation to continue its work and development. Our main objective is to enable members of the Corps (regular, reserve and veterans) to follow a professional career development path and to be recognised with credibility as professional logisticians, both within defence and across industry. The more we can achieve this, then the greater the benefit to the individual, the Corps, defence and to industry. There are obvious benefits for those in career transition and our website www.rlcfoundation.com has links to career opportunities with our corporate partners. Where is it? The RLC Foundation is based at the Regimental Headquarters of the RLC in Dettingen House, Deepcut, Camberley, Surrey. At the end of 2019, it will be moving to Worthy Down in southern Hampshire; the new home of the RLC.

Friend Supporter Partner £795 £1995 £3995 Autumn Lecture • • • Corporate Round Table Events • • • Log Safari and other Military Events • • • Magazine Adverts • • • RLC Foundation Awards and Dinner • • • Regiment/Trade Affiliation • • • Regional Events • • • Web Advertisement • • • Work Experience Opportunities • • • Career Mapping • • Case Studies • • Speaker Opportunity • • Web Editorial • • Advisory Board Involvement • Article Submission to annual RLC Review • Bespoke RLC Tailored Event • Branded Case Study • * ‘Friend’ is now an SME company package only [Employees <150 Turnover <£5M] Both these conditions must be met to take a Friend package

Our website address is www.rlcfoundation.com with links to and from the Corps website www.Royallogisticcorps.co.uk We are also on Facebook or contact Alan Woods on email Alan.Woods195@mod.gov.uk Tel 01252 833389 THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Winning the War – A Malawian Counter Poaching Op. B Kumchedwa, the director of National Parks and Wildlife in Malawi has said, the fight against the illicit wildlife trade is far from over. Poaching halved the country's elephant population from 4000 in the 1980s to 2000 in 2015. This essay is an account of how the British Army is helping to counter the threat from poachers. By Sgt K Kachoka In 2016, His Royal Highness, Prince Harry Duke of Sussex, visited Liwonde in Malawi, home to one of Southern Africa’s largest rhino and elephant populations and Malawi’s principal game reserve. Sadly, this makes Liwonde an enticing target for the continent’s Kalashnikov armed poaching gangs. Whilst there, HRH initiated one of the world’s largest elephant relocations. Named ‘500 Elephants’, the project saw hundreds of these magnificent beasts moved over 200 miles across the heart land of Africa from Liwonde National Park and Majete Wildlife Reserve to their new home in Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve. During his visit, HRH was witness to the tragic truth and the barbaric nature of the wildlife trade, worth over £17bn a year. Even after years of effort, poaching was largely unchecked and in many cases on the rise. Touched by this heart-breaking reality, HRH decided to take an active role in resolving the poaching crisis. His solution; a project to train the British Armed Forces to become counter poaching operators, deploying to different countries throughout Africa to train, mentor and guide the game rangers, improving their skills and tactics in the fight against poaching. In 2016, I was attached to 1 Battalion REME when I heard about the opportunity to deploy as a counter-poaching operator. When I heard that the country of focus was my home Malawi, I knew that this was for me. It was my chance to do something for my motherland, as an ambassador of the British Army, helping Malawi to rid itself of the poacher threat. Selection and training The selection process started with a five-day phase in which the recruitment team assessed candidates’ suitability testing physical, mental and emotional robustness in arduous environments. A total of 62 candidates started the course and after additional assessments in survival skills, tracking ability and tactical awareness, only 20 of us remained; 17

Infantry soldiers, two REME tradesmen and only one RLC soldier, myself, Sgt Kingsley Kachoka. Phase two of the selection and training took us to the warmer climates of Africa; Kenya. The course was run by two instructors, with over four decades of experience between them - they are two of the most experienced counter-poaching operators and instructors in their field. During the six-week package we learnt how to effectively track both poachers and their prey. Through a combination of patience, experience and a detailed understanding of the ground, we were expected to track our enemy up to 30km a day with little more information other than the spoor, paw and footprints they left behind. The survival week followed. During one of the most arduous weeks of our lives, we were taught the ‘bush craft’ skills required to survive including water sourcing and treatment, fire making, food scavenging and trapping and the importance of effective shelter. Protection from the elements and from animal attack were key, with hippopotamus and elephants roaming at night, any unwanted guest could have proved fatal. At the conclusion of the course, all 20 of us were ready for deployment. Trained and practised, we were all keen to begin our assignments and make a positive impact on the continent.

The Malawian Park Rangers being taught basic first aid and lifesaving medical drills

A lot to learn In Aug 2017, a team of seven British soldiers deployed under the blistering Malawian sun during the hottest month of the year. Their mission – to train and mentor the 35-man team of Malawian anti-poachers on how to track down poachers and protect themselves from the dangers of the antipoaching environment and provide a reassuring presence of highly-trained professional soldiers to dissuade the poacher gangs. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

GENERAL INTEREST

Based out of Liwonde National Park, South Malawi, the soldiers were responsible for a beautiful 220 square mile expanse of African wilderness. A non-profit organisation, the National Park is responsible for the protection and preservation of thousands of endangered species. On arrival we were tasked with the creation of the training programme, park familiarisation and initial probing patrols. It was clear from the start that the methods employed were far from efficient, deploying in teams of two doing fiveday patrols along the same routes, returning every night and operating out of the same base of operations. The methods employed were predictable and easy to avoid, we had work to do and were all anxious to get started.

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fire and no noise. Being a tactical outpost, it was similar to an Op; its purpose was to get sight of the poachers at night before they got sight of you. To avoid any unwanted guests, elephants and hippopotamus stumbling through the base, we would urinate around the perimeter and surround the base in elephant dung. Highly flammable, once alight, it was a final warning to any potential intrusion.

“In the past I feared being shot by heavily armed poachers who carry assault rifles when they cross the border in to Malawi in pursuit of elephants…but now after training with the British Army, I know how to protect myself and others from danger”. E Makupiza – Malawian Ranger Sgt K Kachoka sat with his team after a long days patrol

The long walk In four three-man teams we headed out. With each team consisting of one British soldier and two park rangers, we stepped off into the bush of Liwonde National Park. Carrying all the necessary kit and equipment for the five-day patrol we were on the lookout for any signs of illegal poaching activity. Gin snare traps were the top of our list. Placed in the known animal tracks, the traps were designed to noose the animal’s legs when stood on. To provide a certain gravitas to the scale of the problem, in one patrol my team and I accumulated over a hundred traps in a single patrol. A significant amount of animals’ lives were saved on that day. When it came to combating the poachers, we had to think like them and move like they would. Some animals like the buffalo, elephant and rhino could smell any human presence from miles away. With the use of unproven routes and judging the wind direction, we were able to effectively make our way through the African bush without disturbing its natural residents. The key to transforming the patrols came in the form of varying camp sites. This, in combination with pre-dawn step off times and a ‘fight light’ mentality, allowed for unpredictable patterns, a greater distance covered and a more formidable anti-poaching presence. Carrying enough food for the five day patrols was easy, but water was not. Only being able to carry enough for two days at a time we had to educate the park rangers on methods of obtaining and treating water for themselves, without this they would not survive. There were two types of base that we taught them; the administration camp and the temporary base. The administration camp was the only place where we could cook, clean and rest. Used to their home comforts, it took time to settle into the new routine and learn how to quickly prepare meals and keep good all round security. The delegation of tasks was key. The temporary base was simply a place to rest at night. There was no cooking, no 8

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Poachers! I will never forget the first time I came into contact with the poachers. We had set off on a patrol early that morning and the day was not proving to be particularly eventful. It is worth noting at this point that the teaching phase of the deployment had very much been two way. Although there was a lot that we could teach them to have a greater effect on the ground, the Ranger’s knowledge of bush craft and animal behaviour is like nothing I have ever seen. They were educating us as much as we were educating them. We had been patrolling for several hours with little to report that day when all of a sudden we heard an eruption of noise about 400m to our front. I turned and looked at the lead ranger in the patrol and he informed me that it was the monkeys who had seen something significant. We knew it could not have been us so it was highly likely to be poachers. We checked out kit one last time and headed in the direction of the commotion. As we approached, we came across a freshly dug hole in the ground left by a very recently removed snare trap by the poachers. We were getting close. Progressing forward about another 100m, a hand went up from the lead man and we all went to ground. A split second later one of the Rangers yelled ‘Poachers front!’. Within seconds two warning shots were fired and I got a glimpse of the poachers, 30m to our front, as they disappeared into the long grass. Quickly evaluating the situation on the ground, we decided that the best course of action was to try and cut them off at the park fence line. As we sprinted the two kilometres through the long grass, our radio operator sent out a SITREP to higher command and the other patrols within the area. When we arrived at the location we established a number of hidden observation points which allowed us fantastic views all along the park’s fence line. It then became a waiting game.

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After a couple of hours, we reluctantly accepted the fact that we were too late. As we patrolled back to the poacher’s last known location, one of the rangers picked up their spoor. A few moments later we discovered a small poacher site with a bloody knife and rucksack left behind. We continued to track the spoor to the fence line and our hearts sank as we saw the place where they had cut the fence and managed to escape. We had lost this battle but we were resolved to win the war. Operation Nali The second month on tour saw us patrolling the ground around the Shire River. A different battleground within the Liwonde National Park rife with illegal fishing operations. A frequently used point of access for poacher gangs into the park, it was the ranger’s mission to stop the ferrying and smuggling of poachers in and the trafficking of illegal goods.

Operation Nali, the mission; To stop and apprehend illegal fisherman and traffickers and stop their movements through the destruction of canoes. It was early in the morning, the South African sun was a barely visible strip of light on the horizon when we set out from last night’s camp to reach the banks of The Shire River. One of the rangers and I split off from the main group to establish an observation post approximately two kilometres away from the target area. The position afforded us visible arcs across the entire river allowing us to provide an early warning system and dictate the movements of the teams on the ground to react to threats. Once all were established, we went to ground and waited. One, two, three, illegal fishing vessels made their way into the park…but we waited. Twelve, thirteen, fourteen illegal fishing vessels were now conducting their illegal trade in the river…but still, we waited. Once there were over thirty canoes in sight, we gave the signal. On our word, the speed boat team punched its way from cover as another team was injected by helicopter. We had achieved the element of surprise and as a result, after a period of controlled strikes and calculated manoeuvres, several poachers were arrested and a total of eighteen illegal fishing and trafficking vessels were burnt and destroyed. Through prior training in tactics, movement and operational aggression, we really took them by surprise; Operation Nali was an undisputed success. We were winning the war.

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Winning the war In the mission to train and mentor the 35-man team of Malawian anti-poachers and to create a highly-trained professional team of soldiers to dissuade the poacher gangs, we were a success. The new tactics employed have led to the arrest of 130 poachers throughout the park. The prison sentence for poaching now holds a maximum sentence of 30 years. This, together with the trained professionalism and passion of the anti-poaching forces, is a truly effective deterrent. Being part of the British Army has provided me the opportunity to return to my home country and really make a positive difference. There is no limit to the pride my uniform brings me and I thank the organisation for all it has offered. We have changed both the physical landscape of Malawi and the conceptual landscape of anti-poaching techniques. We are winning the war. In our three-month deployment, we confiscated over 27,000 wire snares and recorded cases of poached animals has dramatically decreased.

Sgt K Kachoka after a day’s patrol holding the hoard of wire snares

“We are winning the war against poaching”. B Kumchedwa – Director of National Parks and Wildlife Malawi

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Modernising the UK Defence supply chain DELIVERING INNOVATION THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAIN

Team Leidos is helping transform the UK's Defence supply chain by supporting the British Army, the Royal Logistic Corps and Britain’s small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Since 2015, with a brief to support the transformation of the UK’s Defence supply chain we have re-let over 100 contracts and have seen our use of SME suppliers grow to just under 50% of the MOD’s total commodity supply chain. This is what we do best, delivering innovation and experience to provide solutions for your unique challenges. For more information, visit TeamLeidos.co.uk

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How Might Drones Be used in Logistic Supply Chains?

His team realised they needed an innovative plan to keep the flow of weapons and supplies running to their leader, so they turned to a relatively new technology. For 22 months, the group used drones to conduct no less than 49 resupply missions, delivering almost £1m of supplies to their leader and enabling him to continue his operation. This is not the story of a daring UK Special Forces operations, nor is it a work of fiction pulled from an American TV drama. This was the work of a criminal gang who used drones to keep a supply of weapons, drugs, pornography and mobile phones flowing into prisons in England and Scotland. Small packages would be attached to the underside of commercially available drones and flown over prison walls, allowing inmates to use improvised hooks to pull the supplies into the prison. Co-ordinated by their leader from prisons in Staffordshire, the gang kept these operations running for almost two years before they were arrested in Dec 2017.1 This was by no means an isolated incident. Just three months later, ten people were arrested for their part in a similar operation, smuggling contraband into six different prisons in England.2 It is highly likely that the increased availability and affordability of drones in the past few years has made these kinds of activities more viable. Drones have fallen in price to less than £100, allowing many people around the country to acquire a piece of technology that would have cost hundreds, if not thousands, of pounds just five years earlier. The cheap drones are simple to use, allowing for the resupply operation to be completed in a matter of minutes. Legal and ethical issues aside, this series of events highlights a concept that does not yet appear to have been considered by those on the right side of the law. Police report that the payloads flown into prisons often include drugs, money and mobile phones – crucial supplies for certain types of inmate. If drones can be used to quickly, cheaply and effectively fly crucial supplies into a secure location, could the Army not employ a similar approach for its own mission-critical supplies?

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are not a new concept in the British Army. The Thales Watchkeeper WK450 was used extensively during Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) around fixed locations such as Camp Bastion. The Desert Hawk has been equipped with a variety of sensors and cameras and was used to intercept signals and communications intelligence. The Black Hornet Nano is used for situational awareness at the tactical level, allowing patrols to see over walls and round corners.3 However, while smaller UAVs have been used on the ground for route clearance and the disarming of IEDs, drones or any other kind of UAVs have not yet seen wide-spread use in logistics supply chains. Unusually, this is contrary to the prevailing theory that military research and the technological innovations produced are many years ahead of the civilian world. In the private sector, initiatives to introduce drones into supply chains are already in development. In 2016, Amazon successfully carried out its first test of a customer delivery using the Prime Air service.4 Amazon Prime Air is a pioneering service in which packages are delivered to customers using miniature unmanned aerial vehicles (mini UAVs). Once the service is rolled out, customers living within ten miles of any of Amazon's “Fulfilment Centres” and wishing to order a parcel that weighs under 2.25kg will be given the option to have their parcel delivered to their house by mini UAV. Once the parcel is loaded onto the mini UAV, it takes off vertically to a height of 400ft before flying horizontally to the customer's address, using GPS to guide it to its destination. Upon arriving over the address, it descends vertically onto a printed “helipad” in an open area near the property before depositing the parcel and returning to the fulfilment centre. Amazon guarantee that the parcel

Credit: Shutterstock

For a two-year spell between 2015 and 2017, a covert resupply operation was taking place. The commander of a small team found himself cut off from the rest of his unit and left in a position where conventional resupply methods were simply not possible. By Lt Paddy Shelton

Drones were used extensively on Op HERRICK

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will be delivered within 30 minutes of the customer placing the order.5 Alphabet, the parent company to Google, announced in 2014 that â€œProject Wingâ€?, a similar service designed to deliver packages across short distances within short time frames, was under development in Australia.6 Naturally, there are limitations to this service. Currently, Amazon's only fulfilment centres are in the United Kingdom, United States and Israel, restricting the number of customers who can benefit from this service to those British, American or Israeli residents who live within ten miles of these centres. Furthermore, various technical and legal restrictions mean that the mini UAVs can only fly during the day and in relatively clear and dry weather conditions. Applying similar practices in the Army's logistic supply chains could offer commanders of combat units and subunits greater options in terms of support and resupply. The system of echelons within current sustainment doctrine places the A1 and A2 echelons within 15km of the fighting troops. These echelons contain, among other things, combat supplies, equipment and vehicles spares that may be required by the fighting troops at extremely short notice. Therefore, by employing similar technologies and practices that are currently being tested by Amazon and Alphabet, it may be possible to give commanders the option to have mini UAVs deliver supplies to where they are needed in the battlefield. For vehicle spares, specialists in recovery and vehicle mechanics could have small quantities of mission critical spares transported to them from their workshops further behind the front line. Similarly, drones could also be used to transport life-saving medical supplies such as morphine, blood and plasma from field hospitals or aid posts to areas on the battlefield where they are urgently required. The advantage of employing this technology would undoubtedly be the speed and flexibility it gives to logistic and support (G4) personnel. If similar delivery times could be achieved by military logisticians using mini UAVs as their civilian counterparts claim, it is difficult to imagine supplies being reliably delivered to the end user within 30 minutes if delivered by conventional Army methods. Transporting supplies over distances of 15km by Support Vehicle or by helicopter would likely take considerably longer, not to mention the limitations of where such vehicles could deliver to. However, as experienced by Amazon, there would also undoubtedly be limitations in the employment of mini UAVs in resupply operations. Dispatching supplies to the fighting troops via mini UAV would be a considerably less efficient method of resupply in terms of quantity of supplies transported, compared to the manpower required when compared to more conventional methods. Protected logistic manoeuvres, helicopter underslung loads and air despatch allows units and sub-units to receive quantities of supplies many thousands of times greater than could be transported by mini UAVs with existing technologies. Furthermore, it could be argued that these methods also offer considerably more protection for the supplies being transported. Up-armoured Support Vehicles and aircraft can withstand enemy small arms fire and still 12

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Credit: Defence images

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The T-Hawk was used in Afganistan to clear routes and check for IEDs

complete a resupply mission; UAVs, on the other hand, have been increasingly seen to be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including those from specifically-trained eagles.7 If such technology was available, this would leave G4 personnel in a position where they must decide if and how this option is utilised. The limitations on payload combined with the increased speed of delivery suggests that this technology could only feasibly be employed in the transportation of small, missioncritical pieces of equipment such as vehicles spares, sight units or even intelligence documents. For vehicle spares, therein lies the problem. Experienced members of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers agree that the majority of mission-critical items required for vehicles are most often too large and heavy to be transported under a mini UAV. Power Packs for a Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank, the British Army's primary piece of heavy armour, weighing over five tonnes each, making transportation by mini UAV impossible. The types of vehicle part that are small and light enough to be transported in this manner are often held in quantity by forward formations. The use of these spares is forecasted and replacements are ordered in advance from larger workshops further in rear areas.8

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The same problem exists when considering medical supplies. Though blood packages are smaller in size and weight, they must be transported in a temperature controlled case, vastly increasing the size and weight of even a small quantity of blood to beyond the current limits of commercially-available mini UAVs.9 Furthermore, the same need for urgency when transporting mission-critical equipment may be the very reason why using a mini UAV would not be suitable. The lack of protection offered would leave supplies more vulnerable to interception, theft or destruction. For example, intelligence documents being transported by mini UAV that get intercepted by enemy combatants could compromise the security of friendly forces. As a result, commanders would be left with the decision to change plans and reposition their forces or risk sacrificing lives if enemy combatants are able to use their newly acquired information against British forces. Alternatively, a resupply convoy that dispatched by road but was forced to turn back before reaching its destination, still leaves the intelligence documents in friendly hands. In addition, using a pioneering technology rather than a “tried and tested” method for delivering important supplies presents an increased risk of supplies not reaching their destination on time, if at all. Technical issues and inexperienced logisticians could easily result in mistakes and failed deliveries. Commanders and G4 personnel may simply not be willing to take the risk of mission-critical supplies or equipment not reaching their destination and instead opt for more traditional methods of resupply. Blood packets being transported by vehicle may take longer to reach the destination, but are more likely to arrive in the condition required than by mini UAV. After all, the interception of a drone carrying blood or the loss of its payload could cost lives. Perhaps it is possible to reduce the impact of these limitations by employing mini UAVs elsewhere on the battlefield. If their lack of protection means that UAVs are vulnerable to interception when operating close to the “front line”, they could be used in the rear areas of the battlespace by a Brigade or Divisional Supply Group (BSG/DSG). Such logistic installations can be as large as small towns10, so the movement of supplies around that space could be improved using mini UAVs. Because of their size, such areas often have permanent fixed defences, reducing the risk of the supplies being intercepted or destroyed by enemy forces. Even if technical issues caused a mini UAV to fail in flight, it is likely that it would still land “inside the wire”, allowing for its payload to be recovered far more quickly and safely. The use of mini UAVs in this manner raises the issue of battlespace management. With the potential for a variety of different craft occupying the airspace above a fixed location,

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such as helicopters, fixed wing aircraft and ISTAR assets, adding mini UAVs to what could be an already congested airspace could do more harm than good. It may be that drawbacks associated with putting more vehicles in the air could outweigh the benefits of using mini UAVs for local resupply, resulting in commanders again opting for more conventional logistic methods. In conclusion, there are a large number of variables that need to be considered if commanders are to consider using mini UAVs in a logistic role in the near future. As it stands, too many variables are in direct conflict with each other. The limitation on payload weight means that only smaller items could be transported - these items are often held by fitter sections attached to the very units that would seek to demand them. Similarly, the lack of protection offered by mini UAVs places its payload at an increased risk, reducing the viability of transporting mission-critical supplies to forward troops. For less mission-critical supplies, the increased speed and flexibility potentially offered by mini UAVs is somewhat redundant, making larger conventional logistic manoeuvres a far more efficient and practical solution. In the future, if mini-UAVs are able to transport larger items with a greater degree of security, they may become a more valuable tool for G4 personnel. However, additional technological development would need to take place, followed by lengthy testing and changes in policy. For now, transporting supplies to the front line by mini UAV is not a viable option. To do so with fledgling technology would either be highly costly and/or or extremely risky in a combat environment, neither of which are desirable outcomes. Footnotes BBC News. (2018). Prison drones drug smuggling gang jailed. [online] Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42341416 [Accessed 13 Mar 2018]. 112 BBC News. (2018). Charges over prison drone drug drops. [online] Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-43413134 [Accessed 13 Mar 2018]. 113 British Army website. (2018). Artillery and air defence. [online] Available at: www.army.mod.uk/equipment/artillery-and-air-defence/ [Accessed 10 May 2018]. 114 YouTube. (2018). Amazon Prime Air’s First Customer Delivery. [online] Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNySOrI2Ny8&feature= youtu.be [Accessed 3 Apr. 2018]. 115 Amazon (2018). Amazon Prime Air. [online] Available at: www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&node=8037720011 [Accessed 10 May 2018]. 116 X – The Moonshot Factory. (2018). X – The Moonshot Factory. [online] Available at: x.company/projects/wing/ [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 117 Air Space Magazine (2017). Attack of the Drone-Snatching Eagles. [online] Available at: www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/attack-drone-snatchingeagles-180962543/ [Accessed 29 May 2018]. 118 Wilding, M (2018). A1 echelon resupply. Interviewed by Patrick Shelton. 7 May 2018, 1010. 119 Binfield, N (2018). Use of drones in 84 Med Sup Sqn. Interviewed by Patrick Shelton. 7 May 2018, 1050. 110 BBC News. (2018). Inside Camp Bastion. [online] Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19635544 [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 111

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Rocket Powered ISOs - a concept that could be the future? On a recent study day in 1 Regiment RLC, the officers were tasked to come up with new concepts to enable military logistics to carry more materiel over greater distances; considerably further than we have traditionally been capable of. By Lt L Johnson Split into five syndicates, each had differing scenarios to improve upon. These were generally existing doctrinal concepts that currently work but have flaws, limited by either lift capacity or distance. The CO chose a 6th syndicate comprised of the young troop commanders; the least experienced members in the Mess. The young lieutenants where fortunate to have the brief of an unlimited budget and to let our imaginations flow freely. Some of the concepts that came out of our discussion essentially took existing techniques and made minor adjustments to enable a small margin of gain. We then decided to let the creative juices run wild and come up with completely new ideas, so far outside of the box they seemed unimaginable, or were they? I will put forward to you now the most innovative concept. As the title of this article would suggest, one of the new concepts takes the idea of an ISO container and losing the vehicle or prime mover, attaching a rocket booster and flying it to where it is required. Crazy, unworkable, genius, these are thoughts you might be having now but these are not so wacky when you add some comparisons and look at some real-life examples of where this technology is being developed. I now invite you to think back to when we were transporting materiel around on horse and carts. During the battle of Monte Cassino, we had to resort to using mules An EPLS

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to deliver battle winning supplies. The reason for this is because the vehicles that we had at the time were not suited to the terrain at hand. Currently in service, we have eight wheeled trucks that can drive over terrain that before only tracked vehicles could negotiate. With these vehicles, you can now carry a 20-foot ISO container. This same vehicle picks up and drops the ISO with just two operators and without the need for extra equipment. Mules at Monte Cassino

Now I ask you to imagine traveling back to the foothills of Naples and explaining to the soldiers stacking ammunition onto the backs of mules, that in 70yearâ€™s time this unimaginable bit of equipment will be in operation. I imagine their thoughts and the expression on their faces would be like yours reading this now. I understand that these trucks would have only got so far in the terrain in Monte Cassino, none-the-less they would have shortened the loops that the mules had to do. The physicist Max Ernest Planck, a Nobel Prize winner, famously said that science advances one funeral at a time. He meant that only once one generation passes away do new theories have a chance to take over old ones. This is not only true of science1. With each generation comes these new, young, bright individuals that then have the chance to put forward their ideas; only then is it a generational change. So those reading this now, who are at the end of very distinguished careers, think back to when you first got into the profession. Fundamentally many aspects of how we transport materiel remain unchanged, yet we see transportation methods evolve with new innovative technology. Shipping for example remains essentially unchanged other than the size of the vessel and efficiency of the engines. Our most recent leap forward, with regards to how far we can transport materiel came with the development of the

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large cargo aeroplanes. One of the largest cargo aeroplanes is the Ukrainian Antanov An-225, this can carry up to 250,000kg of payload. Even though this plane has revolutionised how we transport high priority loads, it also enabled us to move great amounts of stock forward to where we require it. A drawback to using aircraft like this is that there is only one of this type in the world. To land this airframe and others of a similar size you will require just short of 3000 metres of tarmac. To make using large cargo planes worthwhile you have such a high dependency on being able to make use of an airport; if one is not available one needs to be made. Building an airport isn’t a fast process so to have the effect that we have been asked to find this isn’t really the solution. Even if the destination was near to an airport, we would require a huge number of aeroplanes and crew to move the quantities of stock required. Ultimately, we end up moving back to our wheeled friends to do the last leg of the journey. I’m not suggesting that rocket propelled ISO containers (RPI) would remove the need for wheeled or tracked vehicles to deliver the materiel the last few miles. They would however increase the distance that we could extend our lines of communication. Those reading this might think that these are the ramblings of an idiot and that this is just a drawing on a white board in my office with me coming up with utter nonsense, however, I believe I have foreseen the next big leap. I would like to now explain why I think that this radical solution could be the one that would solve our requirements and revolutionise how the military, or civilian companies, could soon be carrying out logistic operations.

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to resupply its space missions at a cost of $500 million according to its website2. But things are changing. The International Space Station (ISS) for example, recently started to receive its resupply from SpaceX which is a private aerospace company whose raison d'être is to make rocket powered transport both cheap and reusable. SpaceX was founded in 2001 by Elon Musk. Musk conceptualised a Mars oasis; a project to land a miniature experimental greenhouse to grow plants on the surface of the red planet. If this mission is successful SpaceX plans to launch a programme to inhabit Mars with humans. To accomplish this, Musk had to come up with a way of funding the project. Musk had looked towards Russia as a way of buying cheap rockets, however the rockets on offer were still too expensive. To make his dream a reality he decided he would need to start his own rocket company. He had worked out that the raw materials for building rockets could account for just 3% of the total build cost; by applying vertical integration and producing around 85% of the launch hardware in one place, along with a modular approach to software engineering. It is modern private enterprises like SpaceX that will run the cost down to as cheap as possible in future. SpaceX is pioneering the future of rocket technology with its current reusable rocket pod, Dragon. It is a free-flying spacecraft designed to deliver both cargo and people to orbiting destinations. Dragon made history in 2012 when it became the first commercial spacecraft in history to deliver cargo to the International Space Station and safely return cargo to earth; a feat previously achieved only by governments. It is the only spacecraft currently flying that can return significant amounts of cargo on the return journey - 3000kgs3.

A SpaceX Falcon 9 preparing for launch

Space exploration and the industry that supports it, in recent times, has been limited to the remit of governments. The governments that want to explore the solar system and beyond, have their own state funded space agencies. Only recently has the private sector started to develop companies to match the likes of NASA of the United States of America and Roscosmos State Corporation of Russia. These two programmes needed huge sums of government backing and funding to put space crafts into orbit. They traditionally cost vast swathes of money to run. NASA, until recently, spent on average about US$450 million per mission to launch a space shuttle, which was considered a reusable form of space transport. NASA currently uses a rocket called Titan,

Two SpaceX Falcon rocket boosters returning (landing) after launching a dragon capsule to the ISS

What is so amazing about this is the cost. Each launch is currently costing SpaceX $90 million, a fraction of the cost of previous methods. It will reduce this cost to less than $10 million in the next five years. Due to the reusability of the entire system; the rocket booster lands itself upright ready to be refuelled and once the Dragon pod lands, it can cheaply be refurbished ready for another mission in less than 14 days. Another company operating in a similar fashion to SpaceX, is Blue Origin; a brain child of Jeff Bezos, who at the time of THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Image from the Daily Mail

Blue Origin and their New Sheppard rocket launching

Blue Origin and their New Sheppard rocket landing

The BFR concept from SpaceX

writing is the richest man in the world. Bezos also owns Amazon, the leading logistics company delivering more packages than any company in the world. I don’t wish to base my entire argument on the fact that geniuses like Mr Bezos are developing reusable rocket powered logistic delivery systems, but he isn’t the richest man in the world by coincidence. He took a book store and turned it into the largest online market place, with interests in many new sectors including groceries, which in some cities have a 30-minute delivery time. If he sees a future in rockets, so should everyone else. Part of his dream is looking at using autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI), utilising many drones to carry out most of the delivery network task load. The role his rockets will play isn’t currently clear. Some think it’s to break into the low earth orbiting satellite market by making his rocket - New Sheppard - the cheapest method on offer. It has been rumoured that he would like to put into orbit Amazon warehouses, with drones delivering straight to Earth. The influence of these two space entrepreneurs have on the future logistic industry might not be all too obvious right now, however, they have already reduced the cost of orbital rocket launches by a magnitude of ten and they aim to reduce this further. By the time they have the cost of moving materiel around the globe by rockets down to the same cost of doing so by air-freight or sea, the military would be foolish to continue operating in the way it currently does, especially if we would like to be able to project our forces to greater distances than previously manageable. SpaceX has a dream of inter-planetary travel, costing the same as a long-distance flight. Its most ambitious plan is to be able to fly from New York to Shanghai in 39 minutes; all

by rocket power. It also plans to do other routes, claiming that it could travel anywhere in the world in under an hour. These are not unrealistic aims. It has the technology available to it now, it just requires a lot more testing for human flight. All of this is achievable by utilising the same rocket that it plans to use for its ambitious Mars project. The plan is to fire it up into low earth orbit and then let it come back down in a beautiful parabolic curve and land using its own rocket power. This will turn a 13-hour flight into less time than it takes to get up to cruising altitude on a normal commercial jet airliner. All of this is likely to be available to the general public in the next ten years. President Donald Trump has recently expressed his concern with space; he has decreed that there will be a creation of a space force. We do not currently know what this new force will look like or what role it will carry out. I assume that this space force is going to use rockets for launches. With this new force, I imagine that there will be a great deal of funding to get the space force soldiers up there and to sustain them. As no real details are available this is all speculation. If this does come to fruition though, I think that the work for these rockets will be put out to the private sector. With SpaceX being one of the cheapest options, I would not be surprised if it bid for the contract. This could be a way of making the RPI cheaper and more likely to become a reality. This is all science fiction nonsense to many, scary to some, however it seems like more of a reality and arriving sooner than we might think. Imagine now that in a war 40 years in the future the 3rd line stock will now be held in a geostationary orbit above the conflict zone and troops in

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contact are resupplied by drones automatically from the 2nd line which are unmanned RPIs that plummet down with the exact required quantities moments before they are needed. This is why the idea of the military still using road, rail, boats and planes to deliver its logistic requirements in the future is almost laughable. While the future of military action might not be in the traditional sense that we are accustomed to today; we need to think more broadly and outside the proverbial box. We can dream up visions of infantry soldiers clad in biotech suits to give them extra human strength and rifles that fire not the traditional ammunition that we currently use but charged particles that travel at the speed of light; potentially requiring no ammunition at all. You can’t help but think that resupplying these new assets with lorries or by air dispatch is archaic. Logistic elements will also have to move forwards and be as futuristic as the combat elements they are supplying. To me it would make more sense to look at the reasons for supply, for example the main reason that heavy armoured battlegroups require so much sustainment is by the nature of what they are. They have large fuel hungry power-packs that need to be topped up daily when working at high intensity. They also require large heavy ammunition loaded by the crew. Both require a thick layer of protective armour. If you remove the crew and the high explosive ammunition and a large inefficient internal combustion engine, you would remove a large requirement to the supply chain. Now this may sound drastic and completely against what we are used too. Moreover, cavalry types reading this would drop their cup of tea and curse at the thought of tanks being automated and using a new type of weaponry that isn’t high velocity shells. If you get rid of these old cumbersome vehicles and bring in new faster more controllable ‘tanks’ the logistic requirement, in its traditional sense would almost be nil. Instead of working out how to sustain what we already have over projected distances we should be looking more to reduce the need for sustainment. You will never negate the need for humans in a battlespace, so you will always need to have sustainment, but the less materiel required, the easier it will be to push forwards. Most of what we carry to the front lines are rations, spare parts for the vehicles and ammunition. Once the vehicles are better designed to limit the need for repair and if automated so lessening the need for rations, the requirement for the logistic supply chain will be greatly reduced. I now want to focus on another area of defence and how we have been deployed in the last few decades; the involvement in humanitarian aid and disaster relief. How we currently operate to deliver lifesaving food, water and shelter to those affected in natural disasters is by means of the Navy and its ships running ashore with helicopters and small boats. Once the troops get ashore, they then tediously clear roads and rivers to get to those stranded inland. Now picture this, you are a member of a Caribbean community in the year 2040 and a hurricane has decimated your island. You are cut off from the coastal villages and the weather is still too severe for a helicopter to start delivering aid.

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Twenty minutes earlier, Cape Canaveral in the USA launched enough RPIs with drinking water, food and tools to allow you to get your community back on track. In 2016 when Hurricane Irma struck the Caribbean, it took days for boots to get on the ground, to help those affected. Theoretically, with what I am suggesting, in under an hour you could have supplies on the ground, which would drastically improve the lives of those devastated by natural disasters. This is only one example, but you can apply it to many others, where it would not only be more cost effective, but the speed at which you would be able to have a positive impact on saving lives is incredible. Recently in Syria, entire cities have been cut off from the outside world by Daesh and the Syrian government. Madaya was one of these cities with circa 40,000 inhabitants close to the point of starvation. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were helpless, the situation inside this city was drastic and in need of long aid convoys to deliver the scale of aid to save countless lives. However, the dangerous nature and the need for a cease fire required for the safe travel of the aid convoys took months of talks and military action to create the circumstances safe enough to deliver. What the people of Madaya needed was food and medicine. The roads were impassable and the airspace needed for cargo planes that could have delivered airdrops was too contested and unsafe. If my RPIs were a reality they would have had the food and medicines they so desperately needed. One of the only pitfalls that I can see with this solution is the vulnerability of the vessel as it comes in to land. Exploring this concept is an interesting one. It is not implausible that a rocket could be shot down; there are many systems out there designed for this purpose. The countries that possess such weapons thankfully are our allies apart from perhaps Russia. I feel if we were at war with Russia, having our resupply occasionally shot out of the sky perhaps wouldn’t be our greatest worry. These drawbacks, to me, are less of a problem than the possibility of a convoy being struck by artillery fire or a strafing run from enemy planes. In recent times, entire logistic patrols have been held up for hours due to roadside bombs. Therefore, the likelihood of a rocket being shot out of the sky is in many respects the least likely scenario and the risk to human life is greatly reduced. One of the other factors is the design of the RPI. Some who’ve heard me explain this, expect a standard shipping container to have four boosters strapped to the side. I’m not in the business of aerospace design, however, I would imagine it to be engineered to reduce drag and maximise thrust. The three principles of flight are thrust, drag and lift. So, I propose you take an ISO, stand the container end on end, fashion a nose and tail, place a rocket engine at the bottom and the fuel at the top. In a nutshell you have the RPI. I’m sure once this becomes a reality you’ll see a first and second stage rocket set up just like SpaceX’s Falcon 9. The first stage gets the RPI into low earth orbit or to a height where it can make the parabolic curve to its destination. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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SpaceX’s Falcon heavy preparing for a launch

Then the first returns to the launch site and the second stage gets the RPI to its destination and lands it. People I have explained my idea to, say they just can’t imagine that it is possible for a RPI to carry that much weight. However, if we must imagine that the RPIs can carry 40,000 Kg, as its something that existing rockets already can achieve. Currently, the SpaceX designed Falcon Heavy Rocket can carry 68,300kg to low earth orbit4. It has designs for a larger rocket, the BFR or Big Falcon Rocket, but it hasn’t yet disclosed its payload capability. The BFR is going to be almost twice the size of Falcon Heavy so as you can imagine the size of the payload isn’t the issue. The only issue to this becoming a reality is appetite. If the generals of the future,

wish to operate at these great distances, then they will require something to get their force to the start and something to sustain it. If speed is one of the main issues they want to overcome, then they should really look at this option. Under the current system, the UK could not get an armoured battle group out of the country in five days, let alone get 2000km across Europe. To conclude, the wars of tomorrow will need much better technologies to support them, something like my rocket propelled ISO, is how I believe it can be achieved. Looking at how private industry wants to move forwards is the greatest indicator. Along with the President of the United States looking to create a Space Force, it’s clear to see that there will be military investment in rocket technologies soon. It is going to cost a large sum of money to accomplish in the initial stages. This is going to require a bold move by the government to sanction defence spend in this area. I only hope that in the future the Army of tomorrow will be operating with the best technology available to them. enabling it to have the greatest effect possible on both its war fighting capability and its humanitarian obligations. Footnotes 111

Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari, Chapter 1 page 104 https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/information/shuttle_faq.html 113 http://www.spacex.com/dragon. 114 http://www.spacex.com/about/capabilities 112

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Will automation lead to the death of tank transporting? The British Army is a complex, continuously changing and professional organisation; always ready to fulfil the role of protecting the nation and its interests, whether at home or abroad. The military budget is largely consumed by Trident, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy (most noticeably with the recent procurement of two £3.1 billion carriers). By Lt C Jeram This leaves the Army to protect the nation’s landbased interests, with one arm tied behind its back and an upkeep budget required to be increasingly and alarmingly more ‘efficient’. The use of technology (specifically automation) to act as a force multiplier, could be a lifeline when combating reduced manpower levels, especially to a unique, high demand, capability such as tank transporting. This paper aims to highlight some positives and challenges when considering plans for the integration of automation in tank transporting. Since the dawn of warfare, the need for logistic support has always been evident, with beasts of burden and lowranking soldiers, often being utilised to lift and shift the material of war. Whether moving rations, ammunition, the wounded or artillery, the use of the automobile reduced the workload for all. It allowed the private soldiers to go back to their traditional roles and allowed inventions, like the ‘landship’ in the First World War, to steal the limelight. In the 1920’s the British Army quickly realised that the short operational and strategic range, of its war winning machine and an over dependency on rail, could somewhat blunt the spear thrust, if the vehicles broke down before they got to the front. Thus, the concept of tank transporters was born. It is clear, that the vehicles used to transport tanks have changed considerably, when comparing the Scammel Pioneer (Figure. 1), to the more modern OSHKOSH (Figure. 2) that we know today. However, the concept of tank transportation has largely remained the same. The tank is still a glory stealing, battle winning asset that must be transported to the front line, along with numerous variants of tracked vehicle platforms, on multiple operations and exercises around the world; Op CABRIT and Ex SAFE SAREEA 3 being the most recent examples. However, with the disbandment of 16 Tank Transporter Squadron in Jul 14, the responsibility for heavy lift now falls

Figure 1: WW2 Scammell Pioneer moving a Medium Tank

Figure 2: OSHKOSH HET transporting Challenger II

entirely to just one tank transporter squadron (Bulfordbased, 19 Squadron, part of 27 Regiment) and FTX, the contractor that provides the Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) and sponsored reserves to drive them. FTX has primacy on peacetime HET taskings. As with the rest of the British Army, the Sqn is suffering from low manning levels, exacerbated by the considerable, but justifiable time, it takes to train a qualified operator to drive the HET safely as well as effectively. It takes at least three years to gain the Driver Tank Transporter Operator Class One qualification. The new STRIKE brigade concept, relies heavily on the swift deployment of various armoured platforms across the world, so you would think that the idea of introducing full automation, where software can allow a driverless vehicle to pathfind, decision make and then execute its plan to bring commodities forward, would help the Sqn and ultimately be warmly received? However, there are some important factors to take into consideration, before automation of the tank transporting capability could become a reality. As a concept, the use of vehicle automation in logistics is not new. Automated driving was presented at General Motors’, Futurama exhibit. in the New York World’s Fair 1939 and its potential as an important facilitator of logistics was clear. The five phases of vehicle automation1 are listed below and the current use of automation (such as collision warning, automatic braking, lane keeping assist) can assist the driver, remove elements of human error and reduce friction in the supply chain. • Level 0 (L0, No-Automation) - The driver is in complete and sole control of the primary vehicle controls (brake, steering, throttle, and motive power) at all times and is THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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solely responsible for monitoring the roadway and for safe operation of all vehicle controls. • Level 1 (L1, Function-Specific Automation) Automation at this level involves one or more specific control functions; if multiple functions are automated, they operate independently from each other. • Level 2 (L2, Combined Function Automation) - This level involves automation of at least two primary control functions, designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control of those functions. Vehicles at this level of automation can utilise shared authority when the driver cedes active primary control in certain limited driving situations • Level 3 (L3, Limited Self-Driving Automation) Vehicles at this level of automation enable the driver to cede full control of all safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions and in those conditions to rely heavily on the vehicle to monitor for changes in those conditions requiring transition back to driver control. • Level 4 (L4, Full Self-Driving Automation) - The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. A fully automated Level 4 system for heavy equipment transporting, could allow manpower to be reallocated, reduce casualty rates in high threat areas and remove the delay to the logistic supply chain due to human limitations (drivers’ hours and the need for sleep, food, rest etc). However, when the ideas of full and partial automation were put to some of the soldiers within 19 Sqn, it was largely met with scorn, concern and a few un-repeatable choice phrases. The main concerns they listed can be seen below (Figure. 3), which will be addressed in this essay. Firstly, will an automated vehicle be able to do the job of a Driver Tank Transporter Operator (DTTO)? It could use a similar system as seen with automated Google self-drive cars and follow a set route via GPS to a drop off point. Once it arrives, it could be unloaded and then return to its home base or next destination, via a designated route. The

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software would have to be adaptable and user friendly and all units receiving armour would have to be trained how to unload, load and chain their own vehicles. User friendly, is not something traditionally associated with adopting new technology into the British Army and whether an armoured infantry regiment wants another training burden, so it can unload its own vehicles remains to be seen. Assuming the technology worked, it is feasible that this system could be successful. Despite a positive start for full automation, an initial barrier to success is the level of sophistication of the technology. Can it trouble shoot and understand the environment more effectively or more successfully than a DTTO? Naturally soldiers would scoff at this, but with the rapid advance of automated vehicle technology research, suggests that we could see interstate automated commercial vehicles delivering logistics more efficiently by 2025, a surprisingly short time away.2 Unfortunately, the various theatres that we operate in, often have poor infrastructure and unhelpful groups that try to disrupt the Army in various ways. In a high threat area, would the software be able to determine atmospherics, see a subtle ground marker or improvised explosive device and then be able to choose an appropriate response, in accordance with its overall mission? If gold-plated software existed, which fulfilled all needs specified, then we could deliver armour to the frontlines, while negating the need to put a single soldier’s life at risk. What about the tank transporters, I hear you say? Fear not, as extreme terrain, the ability to prioritise life and the actions of the enemy are a few disadvantages on a long list, this would suggest that a DTTO will always be required to be in control. An experienced DTTO will know what terrain a HET can or cannot pass. Their ability to complete a task is intrinsically linked with how to make their lives easier and therefore they will know what a HET is allowed to do and what a HET can actually do. A soldier may try something a machine wouldn’t (admittedly not always a good idea) and this could be crucial. Software could malfunction or predict that it cannot pass an easily accessible area. Unless a soldier is watching a live feed of what vehicles are doing and can

Figure 3: 19 Tank Transporter Squadrons soldiers concerns over automated vehicles

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easily confirm or re-route them quickly, software malfunction could delay the movement of armour or inexplicably halt convoys leaving the commodities at risk. Another point in favour of the DTTO, is the ability to choose when prioritising life, as shown below (Figure. 4). It is a sticky situation and if the MOD made a software algorithm to determine who should live or die, there would be an outcry from our soldiers and a considerably negative reaction from the press. A real-life example in 2002, was when a Scammell Commander (the HET predecessor) loaded with a Challenger II, developed breaking problems. Sod’s law decreed, there was a children’s nursery at the bottom of the hill it was driving down. The driver took the decision to endanger his and the co-driver’s life and steered off road to avoid the nursery and the unthinkable impact of the combined weight of 98 tonnes. Would software be able, or be trusted to make that decision?

Figure 4: The Train Moral Dilemma

As you can see below (Figure 5), the impact of a freewheeling tank transporter would ruin anyone’s day and a malfunction of the GPS or navigational software, could lead to devastating consequences. The increased activity of certain state backed hackers, who are gaining unauthorised access to data and software (with perceived ease and impunity), could be another security issue that an enemy could be used against us. Although it seems like a 90’s ‘Hack the Planet’ film script, the increasing sophistication and boldness that has been shown in cyber warfare, should be a concern if the military ever decides to pursue full automation in its logistic vehicle fleet. Partial automation with the use of a DTTO and a failsafe switch to have full manual control over the system, could negate the possibility of any automated vehicle being used for nefarious purposes.

Figure 5: The aftermath of brake failure with a Tank Transporter

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Automated commercial vehicles are on the horizon. The government has given the green light (plus £8.1 m in funding) to the Department for Transport’s lorry platooning trial.3 Platooning consists of two, or more, wirelessly connected HGVs travelling in convoy, with the acceleration, braking and steering controlled by the driver of the lead vehicle. If it shows increased efficiency and safety, there is no reason why it cannot be carefully incorporated into the Army’s Logistic Joint Supply Chain. A function specific or combined function automation (level 1 and 2) could have quite a positive effect on the safety and effectiveness of the vehicles, as the systems only support the driver rather than taking over completely. This would allow a DTTO to stay in full control. The HET itself is Euro Tech Class 3 and its CAN bus (Controller Area Network, described as the vehicles nervous system) may not have the architecture to support the advanced driver assistance systems required to enable platooning, such as: adaptive cruise control, collision warning, automatic breaking and lane keeping assistance. The vehicles used in the platooning trial are Euro Tech 6. However, civilian companies have been retrofitting buses to Euro Tech 64, reducing the need for significant investment in new fleets and introducing advanced driver assist systems. These would have been highly beneficial for the DTTO’s who endured long operational hours in Iraq and Afghanistan. They could have allowed them to concentrate more on enemy threat, possibly reduce the amount of fatigue induced error and allowed them to be better rested for secondary tasks. There is a possibility that misunderstanding the systems could cause an over reliance and a lack of concentration from the driver. Route planning should be down to the driver alone, as the consequences of blindly following the GPS could also lead to collisions, when roads change etc. Luckily for us, I am certain that every soldier holds dear, the values and standards of the British Army. Not a night goes past without me hearing CDRILS5 echoing from the troop lines with discipline being a firm favourite. Now, you may have detected a slight bias in favour of the DTTO and as an officer at 19 Tank Transporter Sqn, I assure the reader that the impending lynch mob that would descend upon me, if I suggested anything other than that full automation will not work with tank transporters, has in no way swayed my opinion of its effectiveness. Despite all that is for and against automation, there is an elephant in the room that will inevitably be its downfall and that is cost. Despite wanting to embrace new technology, the defence budget has reduced by £8bn, in real terms, from 2010 to 2015 (Figure. 6) and Britain’s Armed Forces are now at their smallest since the Napoleonic Wars. All the services are having to make ‘efficiencies’ and yet still provide the required capability, with the evolving enemy threat that the UK faces. It appears there may not be enough money available to introduce such an expensive technology, despite the benefits it might bring. This is not as much a grievance at the budget, but more the reality that to bring in either part or full automation for THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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a tank transporter is not needed currently. The defence budget has far higher priorities then making a DTTO’s life easier (although it would be well received). But if vehicle automation increases safety and efficiency, then this would benefit all vehicles involved in the logistic supply chain. Lacking the budget to implement this now, isn’t suggesting: will the Army ever see vehicle automation? The question should read: when it will be implemented? Automated vehicles have the potential to deliver commodities more safely and efficiently, via cleared main supply routes, relieving pressure on manpower further to the front. The British Army may not have the resources to adopt the technology it requires, but it must ensure that it continues to monitor industrial and commercial practice and development. If it invests as a stake holder, committing a small but reasonable amount into tech development, this joint enterprise could ensure it keeps track and is involved in technological developments, which could be incorporated into the military logistic fleet in the future

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2025, the Army would be missing a great opportunity to have a more efficient and continuous supply chain at a reduced cost (not to mention possibly reducing soldier casualty rates, due to road traffic collisions). As with many parts of the Armed Forces, spending money now could save more money in the long-term and partial automation would allow soldiers to concentrate on more important tasks across all services. It would seem the DTTO’s jobs are safe for now and their expertise is not something that can be so easily replaced and I look forward to seeing if partial automation is incorporated in the next generation of tank transporters. One thing is for sure; they will continue to provide the heavy lift capability of the British Army regardless of what may change. References Dokic, J., Müller, B. and Meyer, G., 2015. European roadmap smart systems for automated driving. European Technology Platform on Smart Systems Integration. Ginsburg, R. and Uygur, A.R., 2017. Changing Technology in Transportation: Automated Vehicles in Freight. Ricardo, TRL, TTR., 2017. Heavy Vehicle Platoons on UK Roads: Feasibility Study. Department for Transport. Rüßmann, M., Lorenz, M., Gerbert, P., Waldner, M., Justus, J., Engel, P. and Harnisch, M., 2015. Industry 4.0: The future of productivity and growth in manufacturing industries. Boston Consulting Group, 9. Trimble, T.E., Bishop, R., Morgan, J.F. and Blanco, M., 2014. Human factors evaluation of level 2 and level 3 automated driving concepts: Past research, state of automation technology, and emerging system concepts. http://blog.triskelogi.com/logistics-sector-to-be-revolutionized-byautomated-vehicles https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/truck-platooning-uk-road-trialfeasibility-study https://www.smmt.co.uk/2016/10/feature-how-euro-6-retrofit-tech-givesbus-operators-options/

Figure 6: UK Defence Spending

Footnotes Regardless of what contract the Army may look to secure, it seems that automation won’t be incorporated into the Army logistic supply chain for some time (and especially tank transporting) unless more money is spent. With automation in logistics set to become a part of everyday civilian life by

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NHTSA, 2014 Ginsburg and Uygur, 2017 113 Ricardo, 2017 114 SMMT, 2016 115 A mnemonic for the Army’s Core Values, namely: Courage; Discipline; Respect for Others; Integrity; Loyalty and Selfless Commitment. 112

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Automation in military logistics; where is the people/robot boundary and what are the implications for military skills and culture?

The various current technological, political, financial, situational and social limitations of automation will be discussed and how these may shape the future of military logistic autonomy. The current boundary separating humans and robots within British Army logistic units occurs somewhere between management systems, which use desktop computers or plug-in vehicle diagnostic equipment and the use of communications systems. In today’s military logistics, there are currently only two ‘automation’ possibilities: Firstly, the removal of a vehicle’s road-worthiness status (which can be due to issues such as overdue maintenance, modification requirements, or for safety reasons) and secondly, alerts and notifications in communication systems with limited data capability. When it comes to vehicle operation and navigation, a human operator is currently almost always required. Any current deployment of automation, whether during training or operations, is extremely limited and does not include any form of robotics. However, it should not be assumed that, because British Army logistic units do not currently employ any form of robotics, they do not exist within a military context. As computer systems get more powerful and smaller in size, the possible adoption of applications increases exponentially. Outside of the military, for example, the rise of automated vehicles is impossible to ignore: Technology companies and automotive manufacturers, most notably Tesla and Elon Musk, have invested more than $80 billion in the underlying technologies and acquisitions1. This environment is bound to impact on military technology. The US Military has already trialled autonomous driving systems fitted to military vehicles including on vehicle convoys with a single manned vehicle guiding the others and also using completely unmanned convoys2,3. The advantages for this are obvious and have been recognised by UK parliamentarians:

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This essay will examine a range of issues concerning automation in military logistics to explore the question of where the boundary between people and robots lies and what the implications of this boundary may be for military skills and culture. By Lt A Selka REME

‘Logistics Automating military logistics could save manpower costs and reduce injury to personnel, for example due to improvised explosive devices. For example, unmanned ground vehicles could be used in a ‘leader follower’ convoy where one manned vehicle leads a convoy of unmanned vehicles’4. During the most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan the risk of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) meant new ‘v shaped hull’ vehicles were ordered along with other antiIED equipment as urgent operational requirements (UORs)5. Their urgent status resulted in the bypassing of the usual defence procurement system and reflects both the degree of threat and the necessity to counter it without delay. Interest and investment in this kind of technology was thus accelerated, but even so, results have taken longer to emerge than might have been hoped or expected. Incidentally, the IED threat is not as applicable to dronebased automated delivery systems as it is to on-the-ground vehicles, which come with their own limitations, limited payload being one among others. It is worth bearing in mind that whatever the current definition of the boundary between human and robot activity in military logistics, this is going to change rapidly as technology in the field of robotics develops, significantly affecting all forms of transportation. However, there are certain specifics which do not vary. For any future automated logistic delivery system to work effectively it must be able to do the following: It must be capable of loading, navigating and delivering a required payload safely and relatively quickly. Today, this composite task is completed in the air, by sea and on land using aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary, ships and vehicles, all of which are operated by humans, which therefore involves putting personnel at risk. Future technology could theoretically provide vehicles and aircraft that, once a resupply request was programmed THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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AI concept lethal force vehicle

through communications, could be loaded with the correct payload6 and then take off or drive to their destination autonomously, navigating obstacles and enemy activity using artificial intelligence (AI) based systems. Notably and critically, these systems do not and should never have control of weapons capabilities and programming. Currently drone control systems are remote and autonomous for navigation, but remote only (not autonomous) for use of lethal force. This means a person is required to pull the trigger wherever the person and the weapon, may be in the world. The development or potential development of autonomous AI systems with the ability to identify targets and use lethal force defensively or offensively is of major concern to many around the world7,8. Images of futuristic robotic warriors dispensing death as in science fiction films are terrifying (as they should be) to most people. The use of AI systems capable of lethal force is a moral and political issue that could disrupt the development of autonomous payload delivery if the distinction is not clearly articulated. It also raises the interesting related issue of logistic vehicle defence. An aircraft can use manoeuvre to avoid being damaged or destroyed by enemy activity more easily than ground-based autonomous delivery systems. This means that some form of defence is required. If this defence took the form of the previously used and proven protectedmobility (fast, lightly armoured and heavily armed) vehicles traditionally used to protect the flanks of combat logistic patrols,9 then soldiers would still be at risk. They would also be in a position arguably much riskier than the patrol itself, although such a system does still reduce the threat to those in the patrol. Currently, vehicle crews have 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG) which can be mounted on vehicle cabs10. These weapons are primarily for self-defence if an enemy threat has managed to bypass the first line defence of the protected mobility vehicle force protection. They can also be used to ‘fight logistics though’ which would be made much more difficult without having the situational awareness of personnel physically on the ground. Were cargo vehicles to have defensive weapon systems similar to those of the Panther,11 (a remote GPMG) they could be operated remotely. However, the function provided by 24

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protected-mobility vehicles would still be required as they are used to guide and control convoys and traffic, something that would be extremely difficult to do remotely, particularly through populated areas. Autonomous robots and military logistics This leads us to consider the potential use of autonomous vehicles in military logistics. There are many possible tactical advantages in military logistics for the use of autonomous vehicles. Their use could remove one of the biggest risks of driving vehicles long distances, namely driver fatigue. The need to have multiple drivers to swap throughout a long convoy or back-to-back convoys would thus be removed, as would the risk of an incident due to individual driver fatigue. There is also an obvious reduced manpower requirement if a driver or vehicle commander is controlling a vehicle remotely. Vehicles could be redesigned to put control systems in easier-to-protect areas of a vehicle, including removal of a driver’s cab altogether. This could reduce the amount of armour required and increase cargo space. Another positive consideration in the employment of robotics in military logistics is the use of autonomous navigation systems. These vehicles could potentially navigate through difficult terrain more easily at night than vehicles reliant on human night vision. Radar and laser systems do not require visible light to navigate, in contrast to night vision systems for humans which can be difficult to operate and in any case, do not provide vision comparable in quality to day time12. Robotic vehicles can operate in much higher-threat environments and are ‘expendable’ when compared with human life. Additionally, if a vehicle has a fault or failure, the diagnosis information can be communicated digitally to prepare any equipment support team and logistics chain to send and receive spares and either push forward and repair or prepare for a vehicle’s recovery. These are all considerations on the ‘plus’ side of the equation. However, on the ‘minus’ side there are various tactical disadvantages of autonomous vehicles too. The most obvious of these is the civilian scenario. Operating in a populous urban environment is extremely difficult even

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for a manned convoy. Humans are unpredictable and often require human-to-human body language and signals to overcome language difficulties and barriers. An autonomous system could easily be ignored or misunderstood by a civilian population which could consequently increase tension rather than dissipate it with negative results. This is particularly apparent when considering counterinsurgency operations, where to win a population’s hearts and minds there must be meaningful human-to-human contact. If a vehicle were to break down due to mechanical or software failure, or if a navigation system was to guide a vehicle into boggy or uneven terrain and get stuck or roll over, it would require recovery or denial. Recovery would require a manned team that would also need protection, putting soldiers at risk. Denial could be achieved by various weapon systems and might involve destroying the vehicle and most likely its payload or putting both beyond repair to deny it from the enemy. This would be a waste of time, effort and money. Another risk is if the enemy has a sufficient electronic warfare capability, a vehicle could have its navigation and communication systems jammed or hacked. This could stop vehicles operating or even allow them to be controlled by the enemy. An example of this and evidence of the risk, is the incident during which Iran took control of and landed an American stealth drone13. In conclusion, it seems that the ideal environment for autonomous delivery systems is rural, sparsely populated, high threat areas where it is too risky to send soldiers and the payload is of relatively little worth, or consists of critical battlewinning equipment, for example water, rations or ammunition. Factors influencing the people/robot boundary So where is the best place for the people/robot boundary? It depends on which factor is the priority of those making these decisions. Once that has been decided, vehicles should be designed accordingly. There is no doubt that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shaped the political viewpoint that conflicts should be fought at distance or from the air with as few as possible boots on the ground, special forces being the exception to this14. The risk of death to personnel outweighs any tactical benefits and potentially draws a country much deeper into conflict.

Politically, autonomous and remote warfighting and logistics, although costly, are desirable because they reduce risk to life and therefore minimise political risk whilst still being effective. Therefore, politically the people/robot boundary should be as remote as possible. Drones being flown from thousands of miles away is a good example of this15. Technologically, the boundary depends on the aim of any given operation, as to how effective autonomous logistics could be. Although some vehicle technology is available, it is not quite yet at a standard that is ready for operational use and fails to recognise the essential human element of logistics, particularly in urban areas. This does not make autonomous vehicles redundant, but restricts their use to extra vehicles in manned patrols or to exceptionally high-risk areas. Autonomous aircraft do not have the same issue. For point-to-point logistics they are highly effective, the size and design of the drone depending on the payload, distance and environment. This has been proven using drone delivery in operational environments to deliver supplies16 including drones delivering blood in Rwanda17 and the development of commercial Amazon drones in urban environments18. There is also a significant equipment support burden that must be considered. The thought of brand new futuristic highly advanced autonomous vehicle or aircraft that never breaks down is very enticing but unrealistic and arguably naïve. All equipment fails at some point in some way and therefore the British Army, specifically the Corps of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), must be trained to maintain, repair and recover all the British Army’s equipment. This takes a considerable amount of time and although it seems fashionable to simply dismiss this during any procurement process and assume civilian contractors will maintain this equipment, this is also naïve. The REME aims to repair as far forward as possible by repairing equipment in the same battlespace as the user to ensure it is operational as soon as possible, thereby minimising the impact to operational capability. Civilian contractors will not provide this. Vehicles requiring repair will be backloaded (transported rearwards) to a point of adequate safety to allow civilian contractors to work on them, something that will require a huge logistic effort and detract from the mission, further reducing operational capability. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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The introduction of a civilian workforce into the battlespace, even the safest areas, is highly contentious and possibly counterproductive on many fronts including the practical and political; for example, insurance implications. Situationally, the ideal boundary can vary hugely. Whether it be enemy threat, how populated an area is or even the type of ground that must be crossed, automated groundbased vehicles are unsuitable without human protection. They do however provide a capability in very specific scenarios, namely extremely high-risk areas, sparsely populated with good ground, particularly at night. The option of a leader follower system within a traditional patrol is also a more realistically practical application of autonomous ground-based vehicles. During counter insurgency operations in particular, there must be a human face on any military presence. The scenario for drone-based logistics has much fewer limitations. Enemy anti-air and electronic warfare capability would increase the risk to aircraft-based automated logistics, but the lack of crew would allow autonomous aircraft greater flexibility to operate in high risk areas, particularly at night. This has been proved with great success by the US Marine Corps in Afghanistan16. Socially the main risk to a mission by using autonomous land vehicles could be poorly-navigated vehicles accidentally causing injury or damage to civilians and their property – a faceless vehicle driving through populated areas causing fear and confusion rather than reassurance. The use of autonomous robotic aircraft would have little social impact so long as they stay in the air. Financially, these vehicles are a long way off being affordable and widely available. The automation of a vehicle’s driver while still requiring manned protection is a small gain for a large cost. The resulting reduction of the manpower requirement could offset this cost in a plethora of other ways. For the British Army, it is highly unlikely in the context of the current military funding cuts19 that there will be any contribution to the development of robotic technology of either type, ground or air-based. Most likely this will be developed, tested and proven by the US Military well before the British Army think about taking any financial risk with new vehicle technology and the training burden that would go along with it. Politically, technologically, situationally, socially and financially, the ideal people/robot boundary varies as to which factor is a priority over the next. These decisions can only be made by someone with the power to influence British Army procurement to ensure future equipment fits with the priority at the time and predicted priority in the future. One key element is consistent throughout and that is the difficulty of autonomous ground-based vehicle logistics compared to autonomous aircraft-based logistics. The risk to mission and crew is greatly reduced in the air environment as it is much more two-dimensional and does not have a human element (aside from other aircraft) which makes it a much easier place to operate autonomously. It also greatly reduces the logistic footprint on the ground, thereby reducing risk to soldiers, equipment and the loads 26

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themselves. The best way to reduce the number of vehicles and therefore soldiers at risk as part of military logistics is to use aircraft, autonomous or manned, to reduce their requirement altogether. This would at least allow manned logistic patrols to stay in the lowest risk areas. The impact of automation on skills and culture There are arguments for and against automation in military logistics. The trade-off of vehicle automation against risk to personnel is one that seems to have minimal downsides, but such automation, if introduced, could remove/reduce the requirement for the driver trade within the British Army. The ability for a logistics system automatically to account for and load supplies to an awaiting automated vehicle could also directly impact the supplier trade. Both trades could be reduced at the same time as the need for technical specialists to maintain these systems increased. This would create inevitable feeling of ‘job stealing’ as one trade is reduced as the other increases. Soldiers within these trades could retrade to another part of the Army but this would come with a loss of seniority or rank due to their inexperience in their new trade. This would certainly impact on the morale of these trades but only initially; moreover, the Army has managed this type of human resources situation previously, with the removal and merger of various trades and units. Reducing driver and supplier trades also carries a degree of risk. An overreliance on technology could recreate a weakness of trade which could be exposed if the technology were to fail with potentially catastrophic results in already stressful and dangerous situations. ‘Reversionary tactics’ are key to many commander’s directives as it allows the mission to be completed even if elements of technology fail. If the equipment were to fail through fault or enemy action, a large number of drivers would be required. This would require pulling soldiers from their primary roles to fill the gaps, affecting operational capability. On the other hand, the ability of a unit to free up time previously spent trade training would allow concentration on basic soldiering skills such as shooting, personal fitness and operating at section, platoon and company level. This is in line with the current ‘Back to basics’ direction of ensuring all soldiers are trained and current in basic soldiering skills. It could also result in more Military Training Instructors, a career path for only the highest quality of soldiers within the Army whose responsibility is to train recruits to the highest standards. Although skills would be reduced/lost in one area, the introduction of robotics and consequent reorganisation might offer an opportunity to increase skills in another. The implications for military skills and culture, were robotics to be introduced, become particularly interesting when one considers military culture. British Army culture is extremely interesting and makes for worthwhile study. For an outsider looking in it can be confusing, yet at the same time regimented and sometimes even offensive as soldiers conduct themselves and communicate with each other in

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ways that can appear to outsiders bizarre and unorthodox. This behaviour is because of the closely-knit family culture of soldiers. The intense loyalty among those alongside whom you may fight is one that can never be replicated in any civilian environment. It is this tight culture that may react badly to change as trades and skills are altered or removed, but it is also, ironically, the culture that gives soldiers the mindset to ‘adapt and overcome’. As shown previously when units and trades have been merged or disbanded, there is no extreme knee-jerk reaction – instead one finds, as in an operational situation where things do not develop as one would wish, a determination to ‘deal with it’ in a considered and professional manner and thus to overcome. In recent years, British Army culture has become wearily familiar with funding cuts affecting the make-up of the Army in one way or another. The implications of the people/robot boundary on military skill and culture would depend on which aspect of logistics automation was deemed most important, therefore deciding where the boundary would lie. Only then could the impact on military skills be understood, but it would almost certainly involve a reduction in some skills and an increase or introduction of others. The British Army is always changing and has been since its formation. It is that ability to change which has made it so successful in its long and illustrious history and why any introduction of automated logistics would have little impact on its culture. Let us hope the current long and complicated procurement process for new equipment does not undermine that ability to change20.

“It is not the strongest or the most intelligent who will survive but those who can best manage change.” - Leon C. Megginson21.

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Footnotes 111

https://www.rdmag.com/article/2018/01/rise-autonomous-vehiclesplanning-deployment-not-just-development 112 https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/security/autonomous-militaryvehicles-backbone-next-gen-u-s-might/ 113 https://oshkoshdefense.com/components/terramax/ 114 http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN0511/POST-PN-0511.pdf 115 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/528625/DSPCR_Chapter_09_UOR_Procurement _Jun_16_Edn.pdf 116 http://www.loading-automation.com/automatic-truck-loading-system.html 117 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/oct/19/stephen-hawking-aibest-or-worst-thing-for-humanity-cambridge 118 https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-solution/ 119 http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/julaug06/suces_log_patrol.html 110 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/in-pictures-combat-patrols-thebiggest-thing-in-helmand 111 https://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/protected-patrol-vehicles/ 112 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/05/self-driving-carsmay-soon-be-able-to-see-around-corners 113 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16095823 114 http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7166/CBP7166.pdf 115 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9552547/The-airforce-men-who-fly-drones-in-Afghanistan-by-remote-control.html 116 ‘37 K-MAX unmanned helicopters flew 1,730 resupply sorties for the Marine Corps in Afghanistan, delivering four million pounds of cargo. (Haddick, 2016, p. 21)’ https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/51689/ 16Dec_Ergene_Yigit.pdf?sequence=1 117 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/02/rwandascheme-saving-blood-drone 118 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/14/amazon-claimsfirst-successful-prime-air-drone-delivery 119 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/12/pm-warned-tory-revolthorrific-defence-cuts/ 120 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-ofdefence/about/procurement 121 https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/293400-it-is-not-the-strongest-orthe-most-intelligent-who

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What impact will the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have on Iran? The decision by President Trump to pull out of the nuclear enrichment agreement (known as JCPOA) reached between Iran and P5 + 1 counties (the US, Russia, China, France and UK plus Germany) has sent shock waves across Europe and the Middle East. The US withdrawal will exacerbate the Iranian leadership’s deep distrust of powerful foreign states, stemming from damaging interventions throughout Iran’s history. In doing so, the US has misunderstood the importance of how Iranian leaders’ decisions are shaped by historic events and has ultimately set Iran and its neighbours on a path of increased instability. By Capt S Harris

Turbulent history The last time Iran rose to regional prominence was during the Safavid period (1502 to 1736). The great Safavid kings successfully resisted the Ottoman ruling influence and offered refuge to persecuted Shi’a from their powerful neighbours. They forged Iran’s distinctive Shi’a identity; a factor which continues to hinder Iran’s inclusion in the western dominated international system. After the Safavids’ reign, Iran entered a period of decline and by the nineteenth century, Russia and Great Britain exploited it as a buffer zone. It was only after the discovery of oil in the early twentieth century that Iran re-emerged from the turmoil. In the early 1950s, the nationalisation of oil production and the renegotiation of biased agreements, favouring Western interests, were implemented (Elahee et. al., 2015). During those years of fervent nationalism, Iran was subjected to an embargo on its oil exports by Great Britain and its allies. Iranian patriots hated their British colonisers and passionately supported the democratically elected prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in the struggle to restore Iranian independence and dignity. For the British, the basic concern was over energy security and its continued control over Iranian oil, which came at the detriment to Iranian sovereignty. In 1953, with a Cold War mindset, the US intelligence services resorted to the outright removal of the elected leader through a coup, for a western leaning Shah (Kinzer, 2003). Once in power, Shah Pahlavi and his son 28

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looted the treasury and lived a lifestyle, which was at odds with the majority of the nation’s lifestyle and was becoming increasingly secular and associated with self-determination. This corruption and abuse of power, from the western supported leadership, served to reinforce misgivings associated with outside influences. This foreign interference reinforced the foundations of a deep distrust towards the west on the Iranian psyche; an important point to consider when attempting to understand modern day Iranian leadership decisions and policy outputs. The next significant event was in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution transformed Iran and its place in the world. For the West and specifically the US, the revolution swept away a controlling influence in the Middle East and replaced it with a regime, long considered a “mystery” and a “puzzle” (Brown et. al., 2005). After the revolutionaries succeeded in ousting the Shah in February 1979, they abandoned many of his projects, including the nuclear program. Shortly after, Iraq attacked Iran and an eight-year war ensued. Security strategy The 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War stands as the pivotal event for Iran's national security strategy; especially as it pertains to the country's controversial nuclear program. This war cemented Iran’s isolated self-perception and put it on the defensive, striving for self-reliance and survival, in what it continues to perceive as an unjust international order. The war has shaped both Iran's strategic outlook generally and its nuclear policies, specifically. It has also had direct and substantial bearing on the continuing efforts to implement the JCPOA. The security doctrine developed, has two major implications for Iran's nuclear polices that must be recognised and addressed by the international community: Firstly, Iranian leaders’ fundamental distrust of international law and institutions, which they believe serve the interests of certain powers to the detriment of others and secondly, their pursuit of self-sufficiency in matters of security and technology (Tabatabai et. al., 2017).

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This was evident when in 2002, the Natanz uranium enrichment facility (see Fig 1 below) was exposed, which the Iranian government had not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Tabatabai et. al., 2017). Since then, one of the most pressing national security issues for the UK and its western allies has been to prevent such an apparently threatening regime from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Negotiations were primarily carried out through diplomatic means, with the UK and western allies overall aim to avoid escalation. Finally, after 12 years of negotiating, the JCPOA was agreed in 2015. The IAEA director described the JCPOA, as the ‘world’s most robust nuclear verification regime’ (Laub, 2018) and in exchange, the UN, EU and US committed to lifting sanctions, freeing Iran to trade on the international market.

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2018). President Trump may believe that by pulling out of the JCPOA, scolding the Tehran regime and simultaneously squeezing its finances will result in popular unrest and propel it towards the negotiating table, in a weak negotiating position. However, it may have unintended consequences considering Iran’s previous history. Sanctions on Iran’s oil, along with the possibility of Venezuela’s oil, may cause the oil price to surge due to an international drop in supply. Already at $80 a barrel for Brent crude, a sharp increase may buoy both Russia’s purse and its room for manoeuvre in the region (Boyes, 2018). Although, as the US is currently not so dependent on international supply, this could be a fleeting opportunity for Trump to apply pressure. Wide ranging sanctions will also weaken a reforming President Rouhani (pictured below), who has sought reconciliation with old enemies like the UK and who won his last election on a promise to raise economic prosperity (Spencer, 2018). It will subsequently strengthen more hard-line leaders like General Mohammad Ali Jafari and the Revolutionary Guard’s support for President Assad in Syria and will increase hostility towards a reciprocal Israel. Specific sanctions on ballistic missiles may have some utility, however, sweeping US sanctions are likely to force Iran to become more isolated and increasingly pursue self-sufficient security policies. All told, this course will only destabilise Iran and the region further.

Fig 1: Iranian nuclear programme laydown (BBC news, 2018)

US withdrawal from JCPOA Iran's geographic position sees Russia and its former empire and satellites to the North. To the east, are Pakistan and Afghanistan and the challenges presented by a plethora of tribal areas. To the west are the old enemy; traditionally hostile Arab tribes, now Sunni Muslim nations. It faces USbacked adversaries; including Israel (with its own nuclear weapons), who is also fighting to guarantee its own existence in the region (Spencer, 2018). Iran’s belief is that both the US and Israel’s ultimate objective is to weaken and isolate Iranian influence both regionally and internationally. This in turn fuels Iran's security dilemma, which Tehran has attempted to address, by building its own capabilities. These are often rooted in asymmetric warfare, to compensate for its conventional inferiority (Tabatabai et. al., 2017). The US pulling out of the JCPOA has only served to diminish trust and deepen suspicions enshrined in Iranian psyche. Regime change and western selfish motives, are at the forefront of Iranian leader’s beliefs. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, recently said that the United States had done everything it could to bring about regime change in Tehran, but it would be defeated (Spencer,

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks with media at the Saadabad Palace in Tehran, Iran (ThetimesofIsrael, 2017)

The US has already reinforced Iran’s distrust of the international systems, despite the other P5 + 1 members support for the continuity of the JCPOA. It is likely that with hardening sanctions, Iran will become isolated in the region. To compensate for this President Rouhani may have few options but to strengthen ties to other regimes which find themselves aligned to operate outside the international system. Such limited options could lead to a spiralling of distrust and arrangements between alliances which the US perceives to be increasingly hostile. Without some semblance of de-escalation and without a framework for negotiation (the international system cannot be used) the current situation seems to offer little hope for restricting the potential for some form of conflict. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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References BBC News, 8 May 2018 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east33521655 [Accessed 4/6/18] Boyes, R., 23 May 2018, Trump’s threats make his enemies stronger https://www.thetimes.co.uk/my-articles/trump-s-threats-make-hisenemies-stronger-c2xfpxd6j [Accessed 4/6/18] Brown, L.C. & Pollack, K.M., 2005. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. Foreign Affairs, 84(2), pp.166–166. CHACR 2018 (Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research May 2018 newsletter) http://chacr.org.uk [Accessed 4/6/18] Elahee, M., Sadrieh, Farid & Wilman, Mike, 2015. Reintegrating Iran with the west: challenges and opportunities First., Kinzer, S. & Brown, L.C., 2003. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern Terror. Foreign Affairs, 82(6), pp.170–170.

Laub, Z., 8 May 2018 The Impact of the Iran Nuclear Agreement https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/impact-iran-nuclear-agreement [Accessed 4/6/18] Spencer R., 11 May 2018, Behind the bombast and sabre rattling, Iran is tottering https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/behind-the-facade-iran-isweaker-than-it-looks-qkrnt0lvt [Accessed 4/6/18] Tabatabai, A.M. & Samuel, A.T., 2017. What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal. International Security, 42(1), pp.152– 185. ThetimesofIsrael, 7 Sep 2017 Iran president calls on Muslims to punish Saudi ‘crimes’ https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-president-calls-on-muslimsto-punish-saudi-crimes/ [Accessed 4/6/18]

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How is industry starting to use drones in logistics and how could the military benefit from this?

Since then, industry has started to take this process seriously and has made huge developments in the last five years resulting in Amazon beginning beta testing of Amazon Prime Air in 2017. Price Waterhouse Coopers’ UK drone team believes this market could be worth upwards of $127Bn1 in the future, all be it with a lot of investment required. With all these developments in this field of technology happening at such a rate, is this something that the UK military could utilise in modern warfare? This paper aims to investigate how the technology has advanced and what its capabilities are and therefore what applications this could have for the UK military. Amazon Prime Air has been conducting beta testing in Cambridgeshire since early 2017. This is conducted using a limited number of products and a limited number of aircraft and results so far have been positive. The aircraft in use currently can carry packages of about 5lbs, which Amazon believes will account for approximately 90% of its deliveries. In Dec 2017 Amazon managed to deliver a package, completely autonomously, to an address in Cambridge. However, throughout the initial research and concept development in 2013, the company has struggled with approval from the Federal Aviation Administration and other regulatory organisations. The key concerns focus around safety and ensuring that the drones remain within eye-sight of the pilot. This is a key concern in the use of the concept in military operations, in airspace that is already congested is there really the capacity for more clutter? There have been key developments in “sense and avoid” technology and low-level navigation which should help to ensure the safety of these vehicles and could arguably make an autonomous vehicle safer than one piloted by a human. There is, with these considerations in mind, likely to be a

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Until recently, drones have been seen as the domain of the joystick wielding enthusiast, the drug running criminal and as a platform for launching missiles by the military. However, in 2013, this started to change when Amazon announced its ambition to use drones as a door-to-door delivery system, with a timeline from order to delivery reduced to around 15 minutes. By Capt R Offord delay while technology advances and regulations are adopted, before this service is widely available. Furthermore, a load of 5lbs is unlikely to be of great use to the military at this time. Airbus has been focusing on the last mile of delivery, as this contributes to the highest proportion of delivery costs. It believes that the use of autonomous drones in cities could result in fewer vehicles on the road and therefore less accidents. This issue could translate well onto the battlefield; if you are using autonomous drones in the air then you are not putting so many boots on the ground and risking lives. Airbus has been testing its system in Singapore and has looked at using air corridors to minimise any risk of in air collisions. This is an important hurdle to overcome and the company admits it is in the early stages of design, with improvements in avoidance and sensor technology still in development2. Airbus has also considered the use of the drones to move medical supplies quickly across the city. There is a clear military application for drones in a theatre of war, where every moment can be the difference between life and death. To make real steps in the drone delivery market, Bell has identified that size and range is what matters. It is currently testing a drone capable of delivering a 10lb package with a range of up to 50 miles, twice the size of Amazon’s current ability, but has plans to push this capacity to a 200lb package out to 300 miles3. This is starting to get into the realms of having much broader military applications. Boeing is taking this even further and is developing a quadcopter that can carry 500lbs and deliver packages autonomously4. The project was achieved in just a three-month timeline, which is an indication of how quickly technology is advancing. The drawback of this drone, however, is it has a 4 x 5m footprint. This would mean presenting an obvious target if used in military applications, either presenting itself for being THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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shot down or giving away the location of troops. It also presents a difficulty in some FOB locations where they may not have the footprint to receive the drone within the compound walls. This wouldn’t be such a problem with a more conventional type of warfare. What both companies seem to be finding is that their progress is being held back by current battery technology. With both these loads the companies are no longer just looking at last mile distribution, they are now looking to utilise drones throughout all stages of delivery. This ultimately could mean a possible use for drones throughout all stages of the logistic supply chain. In the short term this could be for essential resupplies to the F Echelon. However, as the technology develops there is no reason why emergency spares could not be sent directly from the factory to the Brigade storage area in order to achieve a rapid resupply. More than two billion people lack access to essential medical products across the world partly due to a lack of infrastructure and difficult terrain5. Zipline has started using drones in Africa to facilitate the delivery of these medical products to places that are difficult to reach and would otherwise be outside of the area of service. They have a capacity to deliver up to 500 loads a day and although each one is of a limited payload of a couple of kilos, they are already making a huge difference to people’s lives in central Africa. The technology involved is fairly low tech, but in a benign environment it does not need to be complicated.

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Instead of a quadcopter, as other companies are using, Zipline uses a remote-control plane type drone to parachute out the deliveries. This method could reduce the accuracy of the drop and therefore could mean limitations to the system’s military use. The speed of delivery reduces the requirement for expensive cold storage in these remote locations. Even if the technology itself was not used, it shows a clear and proven use for drones within the medical support chain and therefore could certainly have some military use. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts saw a rise in the use of IEDs, targeting not only foot patrols, but also convoys. Combat Logistic Patrols were very heavily targeted due to their large signature and the use of Main Supply Routes. At times, this could make the delivery of vital supplies all but impossible. This is where drones could start to have an impact on the military supply chain. In the same respect as an Air dispatch capability or a support helicopter would be able to bypass these IED hotspots, a drone would be able to do likewise in a much more cost-effective way. While they would be limited in the payload they could deliver compared to traditional distribution assets, they could relieve dire shortages in the supply chain and could fly much more regularly to alleviate the burden of the troops on the ground. Clearly for a drone to be able to deliver at a viable rate then the greater capacity of the Bell or Boeing drones would be required for this. Furthermore, the same weather limitations that affect a support helicopter would not necessarily apply to a drone that is not flying by sight but by a GPS or by inertia navigation systems. This could mean that a more reliable resupply schedule could be implemented. Because of the risks involved in Afghanistan, soldiers were expected to carry heavier and heavier loads to ensure that troops were protected against all eventualities. Project HERCULES took a scientific approach to how weight was affecting soldier’s ability to fight. The results showed that with heavier loads there was a large reduction in mental agility, reduced ability to recognise threat cues and a reduced reaction time to these threats6. Accepting that soldiers will continue to carry body armour and other PPE, Project VIRTUS has aimed to reduce the weight of these countermeasures. However, ammunition,

Credit: Defence images

Drones could reduce the need for large logistic convoy

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water and rations could also be reduced using drones. At the request of the commander on the ground, supplies could be dropped near the deployed unit and offer them a responsive option for resupply and potentially reduce the requirement to put more men on the ground. There are, however, some significant drawbacks to this. Dependent on the size of the drone, it could act as an identification beacon to the enemy, this could then allow a peer level enemy to target its indirect or direct fire onto that position. Operating procedures could be developed however to minimise these potential limitations. An inhibitor could be used to disrupt the signal of these drones which could result in a vulnerability to the drone delivery system. This could be overcome by a combination of technology and the development of operating procedures. Drones have been used more and more in recent times and since being acknowledged as a serious delivery method, the technology has developed at a rapid rate. There are clear opportunities for military applications for a drone delivery system. This could be for rapid movement of ammunition and water to troops in contact, or for the movement of emergency medical supplies to increase the chances of survival. The most likely use of these drones, certainly in a short time frame, is liable to be the movement of relatively small loads of supplies quickly between locations, reducing the need to place soldiers in more risk than necessary. However,

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as has been shown, there are significant hurdles to be overcome before this can become a reality. Technology, especially the aspect regarding the power sources, will need to be improved upon; the possibility of enemy electronic countermeasures could make the drones especially vulnerable if not properly countered and the tactics required for the implementation of drones to supply front line troops will have to be properly thought through for there to be no increased threat to the F Echelon. Such technology is unlikely to be seen in service immediately, but it presents a realistic opportunity that should be studied further for it to be fully exploited to its greatest potential in the future. Footnotes 111

PWC, 9 May 2016, Accessed 08 Apr 2018, https://press.pwc.com/Newsreleases/global-market-for-commercial-applications-of-drone-technology-v alued-at-over--127-bn/s/ac04349e-c40d-4767-9f92-a4d219860cd2 112 Airbus, 7 Feb 2018, Accessed 8 Apr 18, http://www.airbus.com/ newsroom/news/en/2018/02/shaping-the-future-of-drone-delivery.html. 113 Papalardo J, 11 Jan 2018, Popular Mechanics, Accessed 8 Apr 18, https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/infrastructure/a1506137 4/drone-delivery-bell-boeing/. 114 Davies A, 14 Jan 2018, Wired Magazine, Accessed 9 Apr 18, https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-delivery-drone/. 115 Fly Zipline, 2018, Accessed 8 Apr 2018, http://www.flyzipline.com. 116 Think Defence, Jan 2018, Accessed 8 Apr 18, https://www. thinkdefence.co.uk/overburdened-infantry-soldier/

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Robot Stores – Automation in Logistics This essay will analyse the feasibility of using automated, robotic systems in the military logistic train, specifically at the third line. It will explore how these types of systems are currently used within the commercial sphere and the successes and failures experienced in their infancy. The essay will also look at what adaptions would be required to make these systems suitable for a military environment and the impact this would have on their effectiveness. A brief review of past attempts to automate military equipment, and use robotics, will be followed by a final assessment of the future of automating the logistic train. By Capt N Husband Throughout, this essay it is assumed that British military logistics is used in line with Army 2020 refine: moving supplies from the home base (fourth line) to a point of departure and through a Divisional Supply Area (DSA) manned by a Theatre Logistic Regiment (third line) before subsequent movement through a Brigade Support Area (BSA) (second line) and then on to a Close Logistic Support Regt (first line). It is assessed that due to the need for the first and second lines to be more mobile assets, current automated technology would not be suitable for these areas due to the constraints they would cause which will be shown later in the essay. Automation in civilian logistics Automation and the use of robotics within civilian logistics businesses is not a new concept. In the context of warehouses, automation is used to better existing processes by improving efficiency, speed, reliability, accuracy and therefore increasing cost savings1. Large companies have sought to benefit from warehouse automation for several years, with Tesco initially hoping to half its 2013 logistics bill, through automation of key storage and distribution sites2. When a civilian warehouse begins its transition to automation, the first step is usually the tracking of all products, both into and out of the storage site. This is done by either barcode or, more commonly nowadays, radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. This allows an instant and up to date inventory to be available at the touch of a button. Once these systems are implemented it is very easy for the warehouse manager to monitor stock levels and 34

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Fig 1: A warehouse robot at work

therefore limits the risk of any lines becoming critically low or even being reduced to zero. The technology can also be easily used to track trends of use, such as at peak times where certain product lines are in high demand while others wasting space lying idle in the racking. Stock management processes are a well-developed and proven capability that is in common usage across civilian logistics. The technology in use for tracking goods in a store is also used extensively in warehouses where people are still employed. Here it gives the optimum route for the worker to collect all the goods required to fulfil an order. This creates maximum efficiency for minimal effort, leading to increased productivity and greater profit margins. Where humans have been replaced by robots, the warehouse management systems allow for even greater productivity. As well as optimising the routes that the robots take to collect goods from the shelves, businesses no longer loose productivity through workers taking breaks, slowing down towards the end of shifts, missing work or simply working in an inefficient manner. Robots can carry greater weights, for longer periods, at higher speeds and with less errors than humans3. The robot shown in Fig 1 can work non-stop for nine hours, carrying up to 1500kg at a time. When coupled with a robot that picks items from the racking, this makes for an extraordinarily effective warehouse and is why so many companies are phasing out human workers in favour of their electronic counterparts. Amazon’s warehouses around the world are now home to over 100,000 robots4. This allows it to receive an order for one of the upwards of 480 million product lines it currently offers, trace its location in one of Amazon’s gargantuan warehouses (the smallest in the UK being 800,000 ft² or 11 football pitches5), and then have it delivered to the customer within two hours in select locations. This speed on such a vast scale would be unachievable without automation and robotics, and is a driver for Amazon’s dominance of the retail

market. It has sought to automate even more of the process with the use of delivery drones (Fig 2) that it states will make deliveries even quicker and further reduce its overheads as they remove the human from the final link in the supply chain6. It hopes to achieve a time of 30 minutes from the customer ordering to delivery, on certain products, in large cities such as London. Despite these advances in the management and operation of warehousing and distribution, there is still a requirement

Fig 2: An Amazon delivery drone in action

for human action to ensure a smooth process. The phasing out of the human is also far from complete. Amazon still requires a huge uplift of personnel around busy periods such as Christmas. In the run up to Christmas 2017, Amazon looked to recruit an extra 20,000 people across the UK7. This shows that despite the savings in personnel costs automation could provide the Army, there would still be a requirement for man power that could not be eradicated. It may not be as high as the need in civilian warehouse as these seasonal workers tend to be unskilled and low paid. Military logisticians tend to be better trained and are encouraged to develop leadership and management skill. This is likely to lead to more efficient working practices and ultimately a higher level of productivity. The systems in use in the civilian world have been in general very successful. Delivering savings, despite a large initial outlay, increasing efficiency and massively improving the time from original demand to final delivery to the end user. Despite serious incidents, such as the automated Uber car killing a cyclist in Arizona8, the public perception and business appetite for further automation is increasing. It is inevitable and therefore businesses are embracing the idea. All the aforementioned factors, suggest that a highlyautomated warehouse at the third line could offer greater efficiency to military logistics, while also providing a way of saving money – highly desirable to the Ministry of Defence in the current political climate. The big factor that makes automation of the third line less likely is the fact that a huge outlay, estimated at a minimum of $20 million9, would be required for a system that wouldn’t be used routinely. At times when there is a not a large-scale conflict requiring a third line logistic node, there would be very few large-scale exercises that would require such a system, or be long enough to make its deployment feasible and cost effective.

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Civilian to military usage Aside from painting the currently available equipment green, there are many other changes that would be required to make commercial products suitable for military use. The main issue with the civilian automated equipment is its robustness. The equipment is designed for use in a very controlled, benign and stable environment – almost the polar opposite of a large-scale military deployment that would require a third line logistics node. The systems in place in warehouses in this country are placed into an environment that is already established, therefore the moving robots can have the routes around the area pre-programmed. In an operational theatre, it could not be guaranteed that a certain layout could be achieved – therefore the robots could only be programmed once the storage area was established. This would add considerable time to the facility becoming fully operational. Furthermore, the area of the third line node is unlikely to be well-controlled or a perfectly flat warehouse, and so conventional robots would not be suitable to the potentially variable terrain. The machinery would have to be built more robustly to be able to handle the tougher environment and this development cost would be borne by the military. Civilian companies have no requirement for rugged warehouse robots and therefore there is no commercial off the shelf product available. A fully automated warehouse would have a huge electrical signature and this is an unacceptable risk in a modern war fighting environment. Any technologically equivalent enemy would be able to identify and target the logistics node easily. A third line logistic area would be a valuable target for the enemy as destroying it could have huge ramifications for the entire military operation. Furthermore, having more electrical equipment, which is linked to an automated system, presents an opportunity for hacking to take place. With rapid advances in cyber warfare, there would have to be a huge effort to safeguard the facility from subversive acts. As Bradley Strawser expresses: “Even if a nation could prevent data infiltration and exfiltration, by protecting the supply chain, encryption and so on, it would likely be able to protect only a small part of its system’10. This goes to show that increasing automation could potentially increase vulnerability. The idea of using an automated drone to deliver supplies closer to the front line, would also present the enemy with

Credit: Defence images

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Defence spending on big ticket items means there isn't much left for smaller projects

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Automation in civilian warehouses is built for a stable benign environment

a new target. As has been seen in Syria, Russia has been targeting spy drones11 and there is no reason to believe that if the technology already exists, it would not be used to target logistics drones. Ironically, the final issue would be that by increasing automation, it would increase the logistic burden across the coupling bridge. Robots and automated machinery would require a huge lift capability, by a UK military that is already overstretched in this area. The establishment of an automated third line would also require significant input from many areas. A storage area that is currently run and established, almost exclusively by RLC units would suddenly require input from the Royal Engineers, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Royal Signals and potentially more. This would have the effect of increasing cost and complexity in the short term from a process that would be intended to save money and increase efficiency. Military attempts at modernisation In recent years, the military has not been at the forefront of logistic modernisation. So why would it be expected to deploy a relatively recent development? During the both World Wars, the Cold War and more recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military pushed technological advances; jet power, nuclear sciences, communications, space travel and more recently prosthesis technology. When the more recent conflicts reached their conclusion, there was a vast expenditure on destroying kit rather than reusing it. Had the military supply chain been working more efficiently, then it is probable that this would not have even be considered. This suggests that advancements in logistics processes and technology aren’t at the top of the military priority list. Where advances have been adopted, they have been on a small scale such as the Boston Dynamics Robot ‘Dog’,12 which can deliver packages up to 50kg across challenging terrain. This is the general theme of recent developments in the logistic field, delivering supplies to the front line to minimise human exposure to higher risk. These robots are designed for smaller delivery tasks and even these come with huge risks13. Crucially they can’t be relied upon to think 36

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in the same way as a human being. This lack of logical, and tactical, thought is not conducive with military operations. When other aspects of the military are looked at in comparison with civilian companies, it can often be concluded that the equipment used is somewhat lacking. For example, the Bowman radio system is years behind commercial encrypted communications equipment and yet is still ubiquitous in the UK armed forces. Despite recent upgrades, the MoD’s computer systems are behind what would be expected in civilian businesses. Inspections are over reliant on paper trails and the military still requires gunners in Scimitar vehicles to manually aim the main armament. All this points to a common theme. The bulk and specific needs of the military lead to a retardation of development. This issue is further compounded by the painfully slow procurement cycle that can see pieces of kit and equipment entering service years after they were first required. However, the main driver of slow modernisation is money. The UK has a limited budget and therefore spending must be focused to gain the most collective benefit. As defence is for the public good, the full burden of cost falls upon the UK Government and therefore it will spend money on what it believes is in the national interest. The ‘big ticket’ items such as aircraft carriers and new fighter jets cost billions of pounds. In relative terms, there isn’t much left for the smaller projects, which are perceived to have a more limited strategic impact. If the UK can deliver an aircraft carrier battlegroup half way around the world, this will have a greater impact on our adversaries than a slick, modern, automated warehousing system. This is despite the impact that efficient logistics could have in years to come. Governments are not always primarily driven by long term successes – funding a fantastic military logistics system, for delivery in the future, will not get the current Government re-elected at the next election. On top of this, at a time when public sector budgets are scrutinised in detail, defence must set tighter annual spending limits and make short-term savings14. These cannot be achieved by spending on a system that will not create immediate visible benefit for the UK Armed Forces or the country. This type of system will not meet the criteria required so the Government can sell it to the public as a short-term outgoing resulting in future savings, due to its high cost of deployment and initial set up. It would only provide realistic savings if the UK was to be involved in a large-scale conflict for a long period of time. Conclusion The future of large-scale automation of military logistics, in the rear area of the battlespace, does not look positive. It is likely that the advances will be made, but they are unlikely to be seen by many currently serving military personnel. The massive issues with establishing an automated system, in an unknown area, in a short space of time, while under the constant threat of enemy bombardment, makes the task seemingly impossible with current commercial technology. This issue is confounded by the fact that logistics is never at the top of the list when the military is given a larger

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budget. Therefore, it can be expected that there are many more pressing projects to be completed and other, more essential, equipment that will be prioritised for improvement. The final nail in the coffin for an imminent automation of third line logistics is the fact that the current system works, and works well. The Regts that undertake this task are capable and proficient in the storage and distribution of equipment. Therefore, they do not need modernisation. Furthermore, the use of manpower gets around the issue of working in austere and challenging environments, without issue and precludes the need for a huge investment. Finally, the UK’s military has always been known for its ability to overcome adversity and work well without necessarily having the best equipment. It can be said that a small but professional force has often served Britain and its allies fantastically well. One thing that never changes is the need for good command, organisation and leadership15. This is where the strength of the UK military lies and therefore the third line does not need automation in the same way that civilian companies do. Until such a time that technological advancement happens, the traditions and hard-earned skills that are inherent within the armed forces will mean that the problems caused by a lack of technological advancement will be negated. However, when significant technological advancement does happen, one thing can be guaranteed – service personnel will moan about the changes.

GENERAL INTEREST

Footnotes 111

http://www.industryweek.com/warehousing-and-distribution/automationwarehouse-asset-or-obstacle accessed 30 Apr 18. 112 http://www.supermarketnews.com/archive/warehouse-automation-helpsslash-tesco-costs accessed 30 Apr 18. 113 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604057/this-robot-will-haul-up-to1500-kilos-around-a-warehouse-for-nine-hours-without-stopping/ accessed 30 Apr 18. 114 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/technology/amazon-robotsworkers.html accessed 30 Apr 18. 115 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/01/week-amazoninsider-feature-treatment-employees-work accessed 30 Apr 18. 116 https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&node= 8037720011 accessed 30 Apr 18. 117 http://www.e4s.co.uk/news/articles/view/2178/job-news-andinformation/part-time/Amazon-To-Create-20000-Christmas-Jobs-In-2017 accessed 04 May 18. 118 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43459156 accessed on 08 May 18. 119 https://www.business2community.com/product-management/moveautomated-warehouses-worth-investment-0623214 accessed on 25 Sep 18. 110 Bradley J Strawser, 2016, Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies’, Routledge 111 https://nypost.com/2018/04/10/russia-reportedly-jamming-us-drones-insyria/ accessed 06 May 18. 112 https://www.recode.net/2017/4/25/15422130/boston-dynamics-robot-dogdeliver-packages-boston-ted accessed 07 May 18. 113 Paul Springer, 2018, Outsourcing War to Machines: The Military Robotic Revolution, ABC-CLIO. 114 https://rusi.org/commentary/uk-defence-modernisation-programme-riskand-opportunity accessed on 07 May 18. 115 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14218909 accessed 30 April 18.

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WHATEVER THE REASON FOR BOARDING, CHILDREN FROM SERVICE FAMILIES NEED TO BOARD. After a life of being uprooted from country to country and school to school, leaving friends and family behind, boarding schools RĆŠHUWKHPDUHIXJHDKRPHIURPKRPHDSODFHRIFRQVLVWHQF\ and stability. They are somewhere where relationships are developed with peers and adults over a number of years. They are also a place where the stresses of life as the child of parents in the services can be escaped. As such, schools need to go beyond the set curriculum and provide the necessary environment for the physical, emotional and spiritual welfare of children from services families. It is also imperative that additional help is put in place to plug any holes in their learning as understandably from attending so many GLĆŠHUHQWVFKRROVHGXFDWLRQFDQEHSDWFK\ The Government, sympathetic to the strains put upon children ZKRVHSDUHQWVDUHLQWKHPLOLWDU\RĆŠHUVIXQGVLQWKHIRUP of Service Pupil Premium. The MoD provides bursaries for education in the form of a Continuity of Education Allowance (CEA). With over half our residential boarders from service backgrounds, service pupil premiums are directed towards individual tuition and employing an extra counsellor for them. The success of these measures is illustrated by the statistics which show Gordonâ€™s in the top one per cent of schools in the country for achievements at A-Level.

The Francis family from Surrey decided that rather than their children having the upheaval of changing schools when he was posted to another part of the country or abroad, they should be sent to a boarding school. While it was expected they would move around with his job, they found it comforting that their children would not have to do so too. â€œOne thing you want to be assured of is that your kids have continuity and supportâ€? said Col Steven Francis. He and his wife Kristin chose Gordonâ€™s for its location â€“ close to major routes across the country as well as Heathrow Airport. In addition, Mr Francis wanted a state boarding school reasoning that were he to leave the services and lose the education allowance, the fees (from ÂŁ5,378 a term for residential boarding) ZRXOGVWLOOEHDĆŠRUGDEOH Would they advise other service parents to send their children to boarding school, â€œAbsolutely!â€? says Mr Francis, adding â€œState boarding schools are the best kept secret in educationâ€?. GORDONâ€™S SCHOOL WEST END, WOKING SURREY GU24 9PT Tel: 01276 858084 Fax: 01276 855335 For general information email: info@gordons.school www.gordons.school

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HISTORY

2 Close Support Squadron â€“ Coming home to Oman

Like many sub-units, 2 CS Sqn has always been in continuous transition when it comes to terminology, equipment and structure; but still remains a squadron of drivers providing transport capabilities and essential supplies to front-line troops in inhospitable areas. Its 150-year history has seen it serve across Europe, Africa and the Middle East. It was part of the ill-fated British Expeditionary Force in 1940 and took part in the bloody Anzio landings where one of its drivers, Sergeant Wakefield, won a posthumous George Medal. The Sqn took part in the invasion and occupation of Germany and was recovered back to the UK for use as an expeditionary reserve. In 1957, the territorial evolution of the British Empire was at its height. The British military was building up its presence in strategic hot spots; of key importance was the Arabian Gulf, where relationships with local leaders of questionable morals were the key to maintaining British influence over much of the world's oil supply.

The city of Aden, capital of Yemen, was of particular importance to the Royal Navy at this time, given its proximity to the shipping lanes. Its neighbours: Saudi Arabia and Oman and the nearby UAE and Bahrain were and still are, key allies. Their control of shipping lanes and the air bridge to India, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore made their cooperation vital. And all of them faced a threat from internal insurgency or external instability between 1945 and 1975. The Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) contributed to the British Forces Arabian Peninsula (BFAP) with niche capabilities in the form of independent air dispatch by independent platoons as well as port operations. Unit designations changed after 1965 and the formation of the RCT. Motor transport capabilities were provided by a hastily reformed 90 Company RASC. The more experienced 2 Company joined them from the UK in 1958. The muchappreciated air-mobile 60 Company, its Bedfords and Landrovers modified for easy air transportability, would also fly to Aden. The 1962 Radfan uprising in Yemen, demanded a military response to ensure the transition to self- rule was achieved, without fracturing the delicate colonial state and destabilising the region. The ensuing small, unpleasant and ultimately unsuccessful war did not see the British Army acquit itself well in the face of popular opposition. Concurrently, the Sultanate of Oman saw only a brief window of peace between war with communist-supported separatists, between 1954 and 1976. The British contribution to the Sultan's war was discreet but highly effective. 2 and

Credit: 9 Regt RLC

The autumn of 2018 saw 2 Close Support Squadron (2 CS Sqn) of 1 Regiment RLC deploy to Oman on Ex SAIF SAREEA 3. For 2 CS Sqn, this represented not just a challenging exercise in a far-flung desert environment, but a return to a part of the world it called home for 12 years. By 2Lt G Karr

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90 Squadrons formed the core of the BFAP's motor transport capability. Throughout this period, they provided staff cars and internal transport to the military and diplomatic staff in Aden city, as well as detaching drivers to support the British contract officers and soldiers seconded to the Sultan of Oman's army. However, they also supplied MT functions for the newly reformed SAS. Their key operational function and the one for which there was no shortage of volunteers, was driving convoys from the relative safety of the port cities into the inhospitable mountain regions, where British and allied combat arms were taking the fight to the insurgents’ strongholds. The road from Aden to Radfan was winding, precipitous, and susceptible to ambush from a guerilla armed with small arms and anti-personnel mines. The coast road north out of Aden and into Dhofar was menaced by sudden tides which could, and did, wash away the heavy Bedford trucks. The terrain favoured the local guerrillas and small scale attacks designed to disrupt and undermine morale. The desert plain was quite flat but unforgiving for off-road tyres, which rapidly degraded. Mountains loomed over the dirt roads providing unassailable ambush sites. Afghan veterans will find the convoy operations in Yemen and Oman strikingly familiar. Convoys of up to 75 vehicles carrying troops and supplies made their way along dusty and almost completely unmade desert roads. Close protection was provided by attached cavalry units driving armoured cars and command and control was executed from windowless Land Rovers. Dismounted infantry dominated the high ground from sangers atop the jagged mountains and clearance drills were conducted along the route and at identified vulnerable points. A normal fourhour journey by Land Rover, became a two-day crawl through the desert. Air support could be brought to bear rapidly via an attached Royal Navy liaison officer. The accompanying Scammell recovery vehicle - wide, top-heavy and weighting 27 tonnes - would stop at the base of the winding mountain trail, which consisted the last few miles. Laden lorries were driven with exceptional skill to avoid an unglamorous death in a mountain ravine. The three-ton Bedfords were mine-plated for extra protection, but were operating well beyond their design envelope in the desert. Their deep tyre treads came in useful during flash flooding and the piles of dust deposited by sand storms; but they would be quickly worn out and needed replacing after just two days of convoys moves. Driven beyond their limit, the venerable “Bathtub’s” life span in the Gulf was just 14 to 30 months. 35 were written off in one three-month period. Land Rovers lasted longer, but were far less comfortable. For fear of splintering glass from a sniper’s bullet, windows were removed and faces swathed in scarves and goggles to keep out the dust. At this time, the British Army of the Rhine was trialling the Alvis Stalwart and they were introduced in a protected mobility role in the Gulf. 40

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Credit: 9 Regt RLC

HISTORY

They performed well and provided much improved physical protection, but the desert took its toll. Designed for river crossings in Europe, the “Stolly's” fatal flaw was realised on the rock-hard desert. Transmission wind-up caused by the lack of a disengageable differential lock caused damage, which would not have occurred on soft ground where wheels can spin more freely. The attached REME fitters worked exceptionally hard to keep the fleet operational. The RASC/RCT lost 26 soldiers KIA in Aden, seven of them in a single incident. A 60 vehicle desert convoy was ambushed as it returned to Aden. The national police sided with the nationalists and the men of one police station turned their weapons on their unsuspecting former allies as they drove past. These men are still buried in Commonwealth war graves across the peninsula. While much of how these men worked and indeed played and rested, is familiar, there are striking differences. Companies and platoons were significantly larger, but the independence of action and concurrent level of responsibility was also far higher. The 2, 60 and 90 Companies operated outside a regimental structure and at times individual platoons or troops had theatre-level responsibilities, which would today lie with a full CSLR. RASC units in the Arabian Peninsula came under command of the teeth arms they supported. Although there was an active insurgency in the country and a real threat to life, Aden was a posting as well as a tour. Families were expected to accompany their men to Aden and make the most of life in heavily guarded compounds, while those left in the UK were urged to send letters, postcards and newspapers to keep the men's morale up. Off-duty soldiers could avail themselves of many sporting and adventurous training facilities, including spear fishing in the Gulf. The men, lucky to see the home base twice a year, built a busy social life and enjoyed a close-knit family ethos. Aden was a well-established British colony and the diversions for the off-duty soldiers were many. Not so in Bahrain, where social life was more conservative and British home comforts harder to come by. Bahraini women were less open to the amorous advances of the troops than those found in Aden and alcohol was scarce. In 1967, Britain pulled its forces out of Aden, and 2 and 90 Squadrons were dispersed between the Trucial States (now

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the UAE) and Bahrain. They continued to support the Omani government in its wars with the communist separatists in Dhofar, as well as taking on less glamorous third-line jobs, much to the disappointment of the men. In 1971, 2 Sqn RCT was withdrawn from Bahrain and moved to BAOR. It is in this iteration, as a Germany-based squadron supporting armoured infantry, the current 2 CS Sqn soldiers understand as their heritage. This self-image is consistent with its potential role as part of the first CSS STRIKE Regiment in the near future. 90 Sqn met a less enviable fate. As Britain withdrew from the Gulf region, no longer needing an air bridge to India and Singapore due to independence, 90 Sqn RCT was disbanded. As its sister Sqn in the Gulf, it must be the responsibility of 2 Sqn to remember and pass on 90 Sqn’s story. The 2 CS Sqn flag features a jerboa. An animal associated in the British Army with the successors to Montgomery’s Desert Rats. I suspect we also adopted this animal, endemic across the MENA region, as a tribute to the long years spent in the desert. Our sub-unit history has much to teach us and we can gain great pride and esprit de corps from it. The size and ubiquity

HISTORY

of the RLC, can get in the way of learning from and identifying with, our regiments and squadrons in the way the teeth arms do. This can cost us specific histories which are our heritage as soldiers. I will leave the last word to the OC of 2 Sqn RCT on the eve of the move from Aden to Bahrain, which feel I prescient in these current long days as we work hard on our brief return to the Arabian Peninsula:

This may be an appropriate occasion to remind you of the Corps motto NIL SINE LABORE, (sic) the correct translation being “nothing achieved without effort” and not (...) “no sign of anybody working” Maj RJ Carter July 1967 Bibliography Sutton, Brig D.J.; (1983) The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Corps of Transport, 1945-82 Leo Cooper, London Arkless, D.C.; (1988) The Secret War: Dhofar, 1971/1972 Kimber, Michigan Newsinger, J.; (2015) British Counterinsurgency, Palgrave Macmillan, London Gardiner, I.; (2006) In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency, Pen & Sword, London 2 CS Squadron scrapbook archive

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HISTORY

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Enabling Logistics: Developing the Lines of Communication in support of the Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1918 The historiography of the First World War has generally focused on the Western Front, given the magnitude of the events on this front, it is hardly surprising. However, this was a global war; the campaigns in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Mesopotamia all had profound influences on its course and indeed outcome. The campaign in Mesopotamia, was a theatre that has resonated through recent history. By Maj P Lawrence

Mesopotamia, modern day Iraq, is an ancient land dominated by two rivers â€“ the Euphrates and the Tigris, that meet at Qurna, 40 miles North of Basra. Here they come together to form the Shatt-Al-Arab, a sprawling delta that flows into the Persian Gulf. They are the lifeblood of the country and have a profound effect on operational logistics. Other than these two rivers, the land is arid and prone to extremes of weather â€“ baking sun in the summer and extreme wet weather from January through to April. The harsh geography and climate make operations and supporting those operations, much harder. Setting the stage In 1914 the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse. Having suffered greatly in the recent Italo-Turkish and Balkans Wars, it needed time to rebuild and reform, something that it was not afforded with the outbreak of the First World War. The Ottoman Empire was placed in a position of needing to align with either the Allies or the Central Powers. Despite its geostrategic position, Britain treated it with hostility and the French were aligned to their historical enemy in Russia. The Central Powers were keen to align with the Ottomans and actively courted an alliance. This was achieved through a secret Ottoman-German alliance, signed in August 1914, with the Ottoman Empire actively entering the war on the side of the Central Powers in November. Its primary strategic objective was to maintain its territory, avoid any large-scale military defeats and to take any opportunity to regain territory lost to Russia, during the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878). From the Ottoman perspective, Mesopotamia was considered a backwater and low priority. The Caucasus was 42

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of much greater importance, and when this campaign became a reality Mesopotamia was stripped of forces, leaving only a single division - the 38th - under the Iraq Area Command, to cover an area approaching 500,000Km2; with the Division amounting to: Infantry

Artillery Cavalry

38th Division 26th Regiment Gendarmerie Frontier Troops

6 Bns 1 Bn 9 Bns 6 Bns 10 Bns 1 Sqn1

Despite their hostility, the importance of the geostrategic position of the Ottoman Empire was not lost on the British. The Dardenelles and the Bosphorous straits dominated key sea routes to the Empire and the government held a fear that the Germans would seek to incite the local tribes in the region, posing a risk to their assets and sea lines of communication to India. The German plan to construct a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad and Basra only added to this concern in both London and Delhi; and of course, there was the risk to the oil supply. Winston Churchill, then First Sealord of the Admiralty, had undertaken to modernise the Royal Navy with a three-year programme to convert the fleet from coal to much more efficient oil. The discovery of oil in Southern Persia in 1901 led to the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) (one of the antecedents of BP), who had obtained exclusive rights to oil deposits throughout the region. In 1913, a 20-year contract had been signed for the provision of oil to Britain, with the primary customer being the Royal Navy. The driving force behind APOC became the British Government who had secured a controlling stake in the company and any threat to the lines of communication or the oil fields in the region or the refinery and pipeline at Abadan was a serious strategic concern. It was imperative that the British Government act, to protect their oil infrastructure assets on the island of Abadan in the Shatt-al-Arab, but at first, the need was not considered serious enough to be dealt with directly by the War Office. The issue was left very much in the hands of the India office and the Indian Army. The 6th Indian Division, with additional assets, formed what would become the Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEF D). It was deployed to the region as a precaution and was considered more than sufficient to deal with any Ottoman incursions south of Baghdad. Such a deployment had four main objectives2:

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a. It would check Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike. b. Encourage the Arabs to rally to us. c. Safeguard Egypt, as without Arab support a Turkish invasion is impossible. d. Protect the oil installations at Abadan. The British moves raised tensions, but Ottoman entry into the war was still in the balance in September 1914. However, tensions escalated with the closure of the Dardenelles to all shipping on 27 September, with the point of no return for entry into the war reached at the end of October. On 29 October 1914, an Ottoman fleet, under the command of Admiral Souchon attacked Russian merchant and naval vessels and bombarded the ports of Sevastopol, Odessa, and Novorossiysk. Despite conciliatory gestures by the Ottoman government, Russia declared war on 2 November with the British and French following suit on the 5th. Operations

The initial landings at Fao and subsequent operations3

The British reacted immediately to protect their interests. On 6 November, the IEF D landed, almost unopposed at Fao, overrunning the fort with ease and by the middle of the month the Division was fully ashore and making its way to Basra. On the 22 November Basra was occupied, with the Turkish forces withdrawing and retreating up the river. The British continued their advance and at the Battle of Qurna captured 1,000 Turkish troops. This victory and the taking of Basra, ensured that the oilfield would be secured from any Ottoman advance. Only weak efforts were made by the Ottomans to dislodge the British, with the main Ottoman Army remaining to the North West of Baghdad. The British, operating with a small footprint and limited objectives, continued to be successful into 1915. In April, the IEF D, now grown to Corps strength with the addition of the 12th Division, repulsed a counter attack by the Ottomans at Shaiba, 10 miles west of Basra. This unexpected run of success and the lack of it in other theatres encouraged the British Government to demand

HISTORY

further exploitation in Mesopotamia. The new British commander, Gen Sir John Nixon, ordered an advance on two axis. Maj Gen Townshend was to advance to Kut-Al-Amara on the Tigris and if possible onwards to Baghdad and Maj Gen Gorringe to advance to Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates. Both were successful, but the supply lines were already stretched and had now branched, adding 60 miles to the north and a further 75 miles to the west. General Nixon noted however that:

‘Had we sufficient river transport we could have entered Nasiriyeh at the heels of the Turkish force defeated at Shaiba and at the same time despatched troops to drive off the Turks, then threatening the pipeline up the Karun. We had sufficient troops, but not sufficient steamers, to undertake simultaneous operations.4’ Kut-Al-Amara fell in September 1915. Already, the lines of communication back to the ‘Base Port’ at Basra were extended beyond a sustainable reach. Despite this evergrowing logistic weakness, the IEF D pushed on another 70 miles to Ctesiphon - 20 miles south of Baghdad, a further 204 miles by river and 112 miles by land.5 A decision made largely on political grounds, it was a matter of regaining some prestige from the losses sustained at Gallipoli and placing additional pressure on the Ottoman Empire, while helping Russia and India’s sub-imperial expansion ambitions. On 8 July 1915, in a comprehensive memorandum forwarded to India by General Nixon this logistic weakness was strongly emphasised:

‘The shortage of river craft and the urgent need for further supplies of craft of a suitable type were strongly emphasised and warnings given that if steps were not taken in good time to meet these requirements grave risks were being run of breakdown at possibly a serious moment’.6 This moment occurred in November 1915. The 6th Division, overextended at Ctesiphon, withdrew back to KutAl-Amara to await resupply and reinforcements. The Ottoman forces pursued and surrounded Kut-Al-Amara, cutting it off from resupply and relief. The 6th Division was now under siege, which despite all efforts to relieve it, lasted until 29 April 1916. Maj Gen Townshend, left with no other alternative, surrendered his force of 13,309 men, consisting of 277 British officers, 204 Indian officers, 2,592 British soldiers, 6,988 Indian soldiers, and 3,248 Indian support staff. On 2 May 1916, 1,306 sick or wounded soldiers were allowed to leave aboard British medical ships, together with 694 nursing and support staff to tend them.7 The logistic challenge The major weakness for the British operation was the massively over extended line of communication. Basra became the main ‘Base Port,’ despite its unsuitability as an SPOD. When ships arrived, there were no wharves to which THE REVIEW 2018-2019

HISTORY

they could tie up for unloading. They were unloaded by small lighters, stored (where possible) in the inadequate warehousing, prior to being sent northwards in shallow draft steamers, of which there were few. In sum, Basra was an unfounded port not configured for rapid offload, storage or onward movement. Onward movement via road and rail was extremely limited. At this stage in the campaign, there were few well founded roads and the sole railway that existed in the region was the Baghdad-Samarra section of the TurcoGerman Baghdad railway (about 40 miles in total), on the right bank of the Tigris. The campaign was entirely reliant upon the rivers for transport of personnel and supplies, a point not lost on the commanders on the ground:

Military exigencies have permitted no pause in our operations and the consequence has been that all the steamers have been used incessantly. Indeed, these vessels have only been sent for overhaul when they actually break down; but in spite of these exertions, it has been impossible to prevent operations being prolonged into a season which on account of low water and heat adds difficulties which greater celerity might have avoided. Such are the conditions day to-day and there can be no doubt that river transport will continue to be the governing factor in any future operations.8 This was further emphasised in the despatches of General Lake, covering the period of the siege of Kut-al-Amara:

The number of steamers available in January 1916, for river transport purposes was practically the same as when in June, 1915, the first advance up the Tigris took place. Additional river craft had from time to time been demanded, as augmentations to the force in Mesopotamia were decided upon, but owing to the peculiar conditions which vessels intended for the intricate navigation of the Tigris have to satisfy, the provision of these vessels was a difficult problem, necessarily entailing long delays and the supply was never able to keep pace with the requirement of the force. In consequence of this it was never possible during the period now under report either to concentrate at the Tigris from the whole of the forces available in the country or to equip such forces as could be concentrated there within sufficient transport to make them mobile and enable them to operate freely at any distance from the river.9 In 1917, the Mesopotamia Commission concluded that there was overwhelming evidence that a shortage of river transport existed from the time of the occupation of Kurna in December 1914 and became serious from and after May 1915:

Practically at no time after the advance above Qurna [Nov 1914] was river transport adequate to requirements. It greatly delayed military operations in which celerity was an important factor in success, 44

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it affected the comfort and feeding of the troops, and it has a direct cause of suffering to the sick and wounded.10 It was recognised at the highest level that logistics (and in particular a lack of foresight) was the limiting factor. In a telegram from CinC India to CIGS, it was noted that:

We must recognise that whatever course the Turks decide upon, we shall be unable to undertake advance on Baghdad in near future, especially as at present there is a shortage of river transport which is most difficult to remedy, though we are taking every possible step to this end.11 The shock of the defeat at Kut-Al-Amara brought the ‘side show’ of the Mesopotamia theatre sharply into focus, both in Britain and India. There was no shortcut to victory and the campaign could not be waged without the requisite resources being allocated. The British War Office assumed operational control of operations in Mesopotamia from February 1916 and all policy and management in July 1916. As a result, Lt Gen Maude was selected to replaced Lt Gen Lake on 28 August 1916. The crux of the issue, as recognised and highlighted by Lt Gen Maude himself, was that the lines of communication were vastly over extended with an inadequate and hugely overmatched supply chain.

Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude KCB, CMG, DSO (24 June 1864 – 18 November 1917)12

Even before Lt Gen Maude had taken command, steps were being taken to improve the supply chain, starting with the SPOD at Basra. On 20 May, Basra was flooded to a depth of 9 feet above sea level.13 At the time of capture, ocean going vessels were offloaded by lighters14 rather than tying up. Although not such a drawback if they immediately connect to the inland water network, at the time, they were offloaded, sorted and then dispatched upstream. The War Office also took note15 of the lack of proper facilities in the

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port itself. Bunds were constructed to protect the port facilities, the most important of which was the Shaiba bund which ran west from Magil to the Shaiba ridge to prevent the Euphrates from overflowing. 38 miles of concrete road was laid, including the construction of several bridges. From August 1916, construction of wharves was begun, with the first commissioned on 3 October 1916 and the second on 10 July 1917. Construction on a further five wharves then commenced, three of which were commissioned in February 1918.16 This led to the development of docks, wharves and storage depots that enabled Basra to be a fully functioning SPOD and supply node, able to dispatch materiel and manpower by road, river or rail. During the year 1916 a Directorate was formed at Basra under the title ‘Port Administration and River Conservancy.’ It was charged with:17 (i) The discharge of ocean transports to quay or port craft and the conveyance of port craft so loaded to the quay. (ii) The construction and maintenance of port works. (iii) River conservancy from Gurmat Ali in the north to the sea. (iv) The control of ship movements and matters within the areas specified in (iii) above. To increase the area available for storage a total of 800,000 square yards of river front was reclaimed by donkey and light tramline haulage. River transport was also steadily improved. The existing infrastructure and available haulage in 1916 was insufficient to meet the demands of the forces in Mesopotamia. The number of vessels available to the Inland Water Transport Corps rose steadily, as the graph demonstrates.

Rise in available river craft Oct-16 to Jun 1818

Lt Gen Lake’s doubt that - ‘firstly whether the paralysing effect which the inadequacy and late supply of river craft has had on operations up the Tigris is fully realised by the General Staff at home, and secondly, why our forecasts as to what will be possible to convey up river have varied, and of late have considerably developed;’19 - was finally being remedied. Commensurate with the increase in the number of craft available, was the increase in the movement of personnel, animals and freight by inland waterways, as illustrated above top right. When moving away from the riverbank they were dependent upon wheeled transport and animals for distribution. Much of the supplies for the forces were moved in carts, drawn by two mules. This posed its own problems,

HISTORY

Movement of personnel, animals and Freight by river Oct 16 to Jun 1820

Lt Col Dallas, Deputy Director of Supply and Transport Corps noted that the wheeled transport of the 3rd and 7th Divisions could only be used when the ground was dry. The Supply and Transport Corps was in a no-win situation. There was a shortage of animals, more animals than normal were required to pull the supplies due to the terrain and the number of animals required could not be adequately sustained.21 The solution was to build a railway. Development of the railroads started in 1916 and continued at pace, throughout the campaign. Three separate ‘island systems’ of railways developed over the course of the war. The first connected Basra with Amara on the Tigris with Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates. The second connected Baghdad with Kut on the Tigris and Baqubah on the Dyala. A third, a branch from Baghdad to Feluja on the Euphrates, was later extended to Dibban.22 The first line to be built was that from Makina to Nasiriyeh. Military considerations at that time necessitated a concentration of force in that direction. This was followed by a railway laid alongside the road connecting Qurna with Amara and following very closely the path of the river thus necessitating frequent sharp curves. The main objective of this line was to take traffic from that section of the river, as it posed most difficulties to successful navigation.23 Further, to improve the capacity of the lines of communication at its lower end and to aid in the establishment and development of the new port of Nahr Umr, a line was built northwards from Nahr Umr and ultimately extended southwards to Makina, thus completing the link in the Southern group.24 The materiel and labour required for the construction could not be sourced locally and much had to be imported into the country, primarily from India. The Tata Iron and Steel works was one of the chief suppliers of rails for Mesopotamia. Teakwood required for constructing the metre-gauge lines was supplied by the princely state of Mysore. The Cochin princely state provided timber. Most of the railways were constructed with Indian labourers who were trained at the Military Railway Labour Training camps of Saharanpur, Tirupattur, Gaya, Puri and Jabbalpur. Completing the Operations – the taking of Baghdad March 1917 Lt Gen Maude was given specific orders not to undertake another attempt to take Baghdad. What he did receive though was additional equipment and reinforcements (not THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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arranged. Supplies arriving at Hinaidi by rail - and intended for the Advanced Base on the right bank - had to be transhipped into barges and conveyed thence by water; and, of course, supplies destined for places beyond Baghdad and brought thither by boat had to be offloaded and dumped, or transhipped onto rail.

Entry of Lt Gen Maude into Baghdad

forgetting the considerable investment in improving the logistic supply chain). The Ottoman threat was also weakening and when towards the end of 1916 there was a perception that Russia may move to take Mosul, Lt Gen Maude was given permission to move from the defensive to the offensive; with the objective of removing any remaining Ottoman threat in Mesopotamia. He subsequently launched the next phase of the campaign in December 1916. The now named Tigris Corps advanced on both sides of the Tigris, against the Ottoman forces concentrated around Kut-al-Amara. Lt Gen Maude chose to bypass this force, with the Ottomans only escaping destruction through desperate fighting. By the end of March 1917, they had reached Baghdad, quickly defeating the weak defence, they entered the city. The advance stopped only when Maude recognised that his line of communication had reached its limit of exploitation and the heat of the summer started to take its toll on sustainment operations. He had certainly learned from the errors of his predecessors.

Our long line of communication has complicated the delivery of supplies and ordnance stores at the front considerably. Although large stocks of foodstuffs, munitions and stores were available at the Base early in the autumn, accurate calculations and ceaseless activity on the part of all ranks were required to ensure their delivery to the troops punctually and in due proportion. Difficult as the problem was whilst the Army was sedentary in the vicinity of Sannaiyat and Kut, it became more and more complex as the advance proceeded.26 Advanced Base - Baghdad After taking Baghdad, the city became the location of the ‘Advance Base’ and the line of communication from the ‘Base Port’ at Basra to the advanced base was 500 miles along the Tigris river. The base was located on both banks of the Tigris. The section on the left bank was located at Hinaidi, some three miles south of Baghdad by road. But owing to a big bend in the river, some 13 miles by water from the section on the right bank, which was about two miles south of Baghdad by road. Hinaldi was located as the nearest convenient site to Baghdad, which could both be served by rail and at which steamers and railway connection was easily 46

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Summary By the end of the war, Maude’s successor, Lt Gen Sir William Marshall (1865-1939), commanded one of the largest riverine fleets in the world, operating from what had become a very large base port. Indeed, Basra’s mid-1918 capacity, of 130,000 tons per month, was not far short of what the BEF planned to import to France in March 1917, through the wharves it had been assigned at Boulogne.28 Marshall’s inland water transport ran a daily average of nearly 3,700 tons of supplies from this base port to the river head at Mosul, 792 river miles upstream. On land, forty-two Army Service Corps motor transport companies, with over 7,000 vehicles, provided support still further forward and supplemented around 750 miles of railways and their attendant 191 locomotives and 3,950 wagons.29 The Campaign in Mesopotamia was instigated with limited and very specific objectives. These were completed successfully with a small military footprint in a restrictive and austere environment. Political imperative and false assumptions about the campaign, geography and capability of the force subsequently led to military failure. It was realised (belatedly) that logistics and enabling the theatre were the dominating factors for any further strategic goals. Specifically, the development of the lines of communication, required to enable the operations.30 Bibliography Brown, Ian M.: Transportation and Logistics (Version 1.1), in: 1914-1918online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 201802-06. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10454/1.1. Department of Military Art and Engineering The initial landings at Fao and subsequent operations, (U.S. Military Academy (West Point)) https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War %20I/WWOne43.jpg (accessed 2 Oct 18) Gibson, Martin William (2012) British strategy and oil, 1914-1923. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow. Kappelman M A Parallel Campaigns: The British in Mesopotamia, 1914-1920 and the United States in Iraq, 2003-2004, MA Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College Kaushik Roy (2010) From defeat to victory: logistics of the campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918, First World War Studies, 1:1, 35-55, DOI: 10.1080/19475021003621051 Lake P Lt Gen Despatch from Lt. General Sir Percy Lake on the operations from January to April 1916, Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette, 10 October 1916, Issue 29782, pp. 9851–9858. Lake P Lt Gen Despatch from Lt. General Sir Percy Lake on events from April to August 1916, Supplement to the London Gazette, Issue 29823, pp. 11035–11038. Maude S Lt Gen Despatch from Lt. General Sir Stanley Maude on operations between September 1916 to the end of March 1917, Second Supplement to the London Gazette, Issue 30176, pp. 6937–6950. Maude S Lt Gen Despatch from Lt. General Sir Stanley Maude on operations between April and September 1917, Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette, 8 January 1918, Issue 30469, pp. 699–706. P704

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Mesopotamian Transport Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of India with the Approval of the Right Hon'ble The Secretary of State for India, to Enquire into Questions Connected with the Organisation and Administration of the Railway and River Transport in Mesopotamia' [2r] (3/114), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/15/125/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023464681.0x000005> [accessed 11 July 2018] Moberley F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mespotamia 1914-1918 Vol 1 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923) Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 2 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923) Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 3 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1924) Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 4 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1927) Moyd, Michelle: Extra-European Theatres of War, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10318. Nixon J Lt Gen Despatch from Lt. General Sir John Nixon on the operations from mid-April to September 1915, Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 4 April 1916, Issue 29536, pp. 3655–3672. Nixon J Lt Gen Despatch from General Sir John Nixon on the operations in October, November, December 1915, Third Supplement to the London Gazette, 9 May 1916, Issue 29576, pp. 4657–4662. Stevenson D. The War Machine – Supply and Logistics 29 Jan 2014 https:// www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/supply-and-logistics accessed 9 Jul 18 The Illustrated War News. Volume 4. (London: Illustrated London News and Sketch, Ltd) Report of the Commission appointed by act of Parliament to enquire into the operations of war in Mesopotamia, together with a separate report / by J. Wedgwood and appendices, Mesopotamia Commission. London : H. M.'s Stat. Off. ; London : HMSO, 1917 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920, London: HMSO, 1922

Footnotes 111

Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1923) p.353. 112 Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1923) p.38. 113 Department of Military Art and Engineering The initial landings at Fao and subsequent operations, (U.S. Military Academy (West Point)) https:// www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20I/W WOne43.jpg (accessed 2 Oct 18) 114 Report of the Commission appointed by act of Parliament to enquire into the operations of war in Mesopotamia, together with a separate report / by J. Wedgwood and appendices, Mesopotamia Commission; London : HMSO, 1917 p44 115 Mesopotamian Transport Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of India with the Approval of the Right Hon'ble The Secretary of State for India, to Enquire into Questions Connected with the Organisation and Administration of the Railway and River Transport in Mesopotamia' [2r] (3/114), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/15/125/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/ vdc_100023464681.0x000005> [accessed 11 July 2018] p.6 116 Mesopotamia Commission Report (1917) p44 117 Moberly F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1923) p.452 118 Report of the Commission appointed by act of Parliament to enquire into the operations of war in Mesopotamia, together with a separate report / by J. Wedgwood and appendices, Mesopotamia Commission. London : HMSO, 1917 p45 119 Despatch from Lt. General Sir Percy Lake on the operations from January to April 1916, Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette, 10 October 1916, Issue 29782, pp. 9851–9858. P9858

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Mesopotamia commission (1917) p43 Telegram – From Commander-in-chief, India, to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 27th January 1916 10.40 Moberley F J Brig Gen The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 Vol 2 (London: HSMO, 1923) p.495 112 The Illustrated War News. Volume 4. London: Illustrated London News and Sketch, Ltd. p. 31. 113 Kaushik Roy (2010) From defeat to victory: logistics of the campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918, First World War Studies, 1:1, 35-55, DOI: 10.1080/19475021003621051 p46 114 A flat bottomed barge used to offload passengers and freight, from large ships. 115 https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205315942 116 Kaushik Roy (2010) p46 117 Mesopotamian Transport Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of India with the Approval of the Right Hon'ble The Secretary of State for India, to Enquire into Questions Connected with the Organisation and Administration of the Railway and River Transport in Mesopotamia' [2r] (3/114), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,IOR/L/MIL/17/15/125/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023464681. 0x000005> [accessed 11 July 2018] p.8 118 Derived from data in: War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920, London: HMSO, 1922 p. 626 119 General Lake, at that time General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff, Delhi, on March 22nd, 1916. In Report of the Commission appointed by act of Parliament to enquire into the operations of war in Mesopotamia, together with a separate report / by J. Wedgwood and appendices, Mesopotamia Commission. London : HMSO, 1917 p43 120 Derived from data in: War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920, London: HMSO, 1922 p. 626 121 Kaushik Roy (2010) From defeat to victory: logistics of the campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918, First World War Studies, 1:1, 35-55, DOI: 10.1080/19475021003621051 p50 122 Mesopotamian Transport Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of India with the Approval of the Right Hon'ble The Secretary of State for India, to Enquire into Questions Connected with the Organisation and Administration of the Railway and River Transport in Mesopotamia' [ 2r] (3/114), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,IOR/L/MIL/17/15/125/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/ vdc_100023464681. 0x000005> [accessed 11 July 2018] p.8 123 Ibid. p.8 124 Ibid. p.8 125 Kaushik Roy p50 126 Despatch from Lt. General Sir Stanley Maude on operations between September 1916 to the end of March 1917, Second Supplement to the London Gazette, Issue 30176, pp. 6937–6950 p 6949 127 Mesopotamian Transport Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of India with the Approval of the Right Hon'ble The Secretary of State for India, to Enquire into Questions Connected with the Organisation and Administration of the Railway and River Transport in Mesopotamia' [ 2r] (3/114), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,IOR/L/MIL/17/15/125/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023464681. 0x000005> [accessed 11 July 2018] p.8 128 Brown, Ian M.: Transportation and Logistics (Version 1.1), in: 1914-1918online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 201802-06. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10454/1.1. 129 ibid. 130 Brown, Ian M.: Transportation and Logistics (Version 1.1), in: 1914-1918online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 201802-06. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10454/1.1. 111

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The German Logistic Failure in Operation Barbarossa The Wehrmacht is a source of unending fascination to the British Army. Aphorisms dubiously attributed to Erwin Rommel are common features in presentations at RMAS, while the Fall Gelb1 campaign is given as the example of manoeuvrist thinking in the War Studies curriculum. However, the mystique of the Wehrmacht’s tactical achievements obscures its many grievous failings at the operational and strategic level of war. In no campaign are these clearer than in Operation Barbarossa. Given that Barbarossa foundered at the very gates of Moscow, the campaign has been picked over for decades by historians and enthusiasts looking for the poor tactical decision that caused it to fail. However, when considering pre-invasion planning, especially the logistics plan, it becomes clear that the campaign was doomed long before Army Group Centre was hurled against the Moscow defences. By 2Lt R Abernethy

The British Army currently recognises five principles of logistics: Foresight, agility, co-operation, efficiency, and simplicity.2 This article will argue that German logistic planning for Barbarossa, fulfilled none of these principles. They failed to anticipate both the scale of the Soviet reaction and the poor state of the Russian transport network. They were over-reliant on horses at the expense of motor transport; there was very little cooperation with Axis allies or even between German staffs. Their use of both horses and requisitioned civilian transport, to redress the shortfalls in their supply chain, created a grotesquely-inefficient logistic system, that inevitably collapsed in the Russian mud season and winter. All of these planning failures can be traced to the sense of racial superiority that permeated the entire Nazi state. They saw the Slavs as a backward people. They could not see them as being capable of launching dynamic counterattacks, nor even conducting partisan activity in defence of their homes and their hubris brought their schemes to naught. 48

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Foresight Foresight is defined as: “The ability to predict and circumvent critical logistic constraints to the Commander’s freedom of action.”3 German planners at all levels, operated on enormous assumptions that failed to consider the reaction of the enemy and paid little attention to the state of Soviet roads and railways. Where they were considered, they were inadequately resourced or dismissed as unimportant. The concept of operations for Barbarossa assumed that the bulk of the Red Army would be destroyed west of the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, with major encirclements being formed at Minsk and Smolensk. This would be followed by an operational pause to rehabilitate, with the remainder of the campaign envisioned as a mopping-up exercise, until the Ostheer (“Eastern Army”) reached its final objective line from Archangel to Rostov-on-Don.4 The assumption that the Red Army could be defeated early and that this would grant the Ostheer an unproblematic “logistics pause” to tidy up its lines of communication, was driven by the fact that the Wehrmacht’s vehicle-based supply system was incapable of sustaining an advance further than 500 kilometres from railheads.5 The reaction of the enemy to the attacker having halted its advance should have been obvious to Barbarossa’s planners. They made no allowance for a Soviet counteroffensive and saw their plans completely derailed when five Soviet armies launched a series of counterattacks against the Smolensk encirclement from 23-31 July.6 Not only did this week of fighting severely attrit German divisions trying to hold the kessel7, it also denied them the opportunity to reconstitute formations that were exhausted after six weeks of fighting: far from being permitted a “logistics pause”, the defensive fighting around Smolensk consumed exactly the same amount of supplies as offensive fighting, but in different commodities.8 Artillery ammunition was the single largest commodity in the German logistics system.9 Older officers compared the attacks to the trench warfare of the First World War, with one significant difference: German divisions, designed for a war of movement, lacked the transport capacity to supply the volume of artillery shells necessary for positional fighting.10 This inability to support the infantry at the front resulted in a steady flood of casualties that slowly attrited Army Group Centre. The supply situation was made worse by the roads. German planners admitted that the Red Army would have to be destroyed west of the Dvina-Dnepr line, because the Soviet road network deteriorated dramatically east of Smolensk.11 However, the transport infrastructure in the western Soviet Union was “better” in only the most relative

sense: of the 850,000 miles of roads in the Soviet Union, only 40,000 miles were hard-surfaced and suitable for all weathers.12 Most roads were little more than dirt tracks, which became rivers of glutinous mud after a summer downpour. These quickly became impassable quagmires to thousands of marching men, horses and vehicles. The roads were so bad that at one point it took the 7th Panzer Division, two days to advance 90 kilometres.13 When they dried, they became rutted and treacherous, ready to turn an ankle or break an axle and produced great clouds of dust that choked man, beast and machine alike. Vehicles broke down at an alarming rate, as engines suffered dust contamination.14 POL consumption accordingly rocketed. It was discovered as early as June that the roads were so bad that one Verbrauchssatz (V.S., literally translated as “consumption rate”)15 of fuel, assumed to be sufficient for 100 kilometres of movement, was in fact only good for 70 kilometres, if that.16 LVII Panzer Corps reported in August that its vehicles were consuming up to 30 litres of oil per 100 kilometres rather than the usual half-litre of oil.17 Words like “catastrophic”, “indescribable”, and “unmaintained” to describe Soviet roads abound in German records from only the first week of the campaign.18 A comparable lack of foresight was shown in the Germans’ appreciation of the Soviet railways. This was a critical error given the distance they planned to advance. At distances exceeding 200 miles, railways were more efficient than trucks in almost every possible metric – they required less fuel, personnel, spare parts and maintenance relative to the payloads they could carry. A double-tracked railway line had a lift capacity equal to 1,600 trucks.19 Not only did the Eisenbahntruppe (railway troops) have to contend with the Soviet railway gauge being famously wider than the European standard, the Red Army destroyed tracks, signal boxes and railway yards as it retreated, making their job immensely more complicated than just re-laying track. Furthermore, Soviet locomotives were larger than German models and so could carry greater loads of water and coal. Accordingly, Soviet coaling and water stations were too far apart for the smaller German locomotives and very few Soviet locomotives were captured.20 While the “logistics pause” at Smolensk recognised that the Eisenbahntruppe would need time to re-lay track and make some minor repairs, this was hardly sufficient to recreate an entire railway infrastructure. Army Group South’s three field armies and one panzer group fought the Battle of Kiev relying two railway lines, when German doctrine called for a minimum of one line per army.21 During the defence at Smolensk, rail transport remained so poor that trucks often had to make trips all the way back to the pre-war border for desperatelyneeded supplies,22 across the same dreadful roads that slowly decimated the Ostheer’s vehicle park. Agility Logistic agility “provides the commander with the ability to respond quickly to the unexpected… remain effective under arduous conditions, be flexible in overcoming the unforeseen and adjust rapidly.”23 The doctrinal component of the

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Dirt roads decimated the German vehicle fleet

German logistic network failed to provide any of these and nor did the physical component. German logistic agility was hampered by their over-dependence on the horse. Outside the panzer divisions, motorisation was sporadic at best. An infantry division had an establishment strength of 942 vehicles and 1,200 horses24 and became even more dependent on animal transport, before Barbarossa, when Hitler arbitrarily doubled the number of panzer divisions. Consequently, the infantry was forced to shed even more of their vehicles to equip the new divisions, while the shortfall was made up by procuring more horse-drawn carts.25 The Wehrmacht effectively invaded the Soviet Union with two armies: one was mechanised, armoured, and capable of a high tactical and operational tempo; while the other, the great mass of the three million troops committed to the east, could travel no faster than the speed of marching men and its 625,000 draft horses.26 This reliance on horses had deep implications for the Ostheer’s logistic agility. Horses are incredibly slow in comparison to trucks: a pack horse’s best pace is little more than five kilometres in an hour and is unlikely to be able to travel more than thirty kilometres daily.27 Horse transport is also extremely inefficient: one 4-ton truck can carry the equivalent of approximately 42 pack mules, while approximately 10% of a pack lift will be required to transport fodder. A healthy horse requires 4.5kg of grains, 4.5kg of hay, 28.3g of salt, and up to 23 litres of water a day.28 Transporting fodder alone therefore requires an immense logistic commitment. Finally, the horse is a surprisingly fragile creature. It is susceptible to colic caused by poor feeding, making foraging of limited utility. It can succumb to diseases contracted by, for example, drinking contaminated water. And while a truck can ford a river or be towed if it becomes stuck in mud, trying to drive a horse through similar terrain will soak the poor beast and increase its susceptibility to hypothermia. Within a year of the start of Barbarossa, fully half the Ostheer’s horses had perished from either exhaustion or hypothermia in the winter in 1941-42.29 The deficiencies of horse transport became apparent within the first week of Barbarossa. Russia’s climate in summer becomes subtropical and horses became exhausted THE REVIEW 2018-2019

in the sweltering temperatures. The rate of advance required the infantry and their horses, to conduct forced marches with very little opportunities for rest. Horses predictably collapsed dead from exhaustion. Within two weeks, the 6th Infantry Division was reduced to using captured Soviet horses. As lines of communication extended, it became increasingly difficult to supply horses with fodder, while neither time nor manpower were available to collect the immense amount of forage from Soviet farmland.30 Far from agile, the German logistic network was effectively restricted to a single speed and the frequent attempts to exceed this resulted in the mass death of horses. The effect of this became clear around Minsk and Smolensk less than a week into the campaign: the gap between the panzer groups and the infantry became so large that the Germans could not properly close encirclements. When the first encirclement at Minsk was nominally completed on 26 June, many trailing units of Army Group Centre’s lead formations had yet to cross the frontier, while the panzer groups had already advanced over three hundred kilometres. This left the southeast side of the kessel incredibly porous: thousands of Soviet soldiers escaped to the south to become partisans.31 Co-operation Co-operation between arms, with other services, and with allies is essential to achieving logistic effects.32 Barbarossa was a coalition operation, with contingents from Italy, Finland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Spain fighting alongside the Germans. The vast majority of these forces were well below the par set by the Wehrmacht and cooperation with them was minimal. Romania was an essential springboard to invading Ukraine, but the Romanian Army was not formally briefed until just two days before Barbarossa was launched. The Romanian Army was a logistic nightmare of Czech, Dutch, French, German, Polish and indigenously-produced equipment. Its soldiers were generally brave and resourceful, but incompetent leadership saw it lose nearly a third of its 325,000 men at the Siege of Odessa. They would have better employed in security duties. The Finns too laboured under the burden of an international mishmash of equipment and Finland’s neutral status prior to June 1941 made Helsinki a spy capital. Thus they were excluded from serious planning until May. When the Finns had achieved their own territorial aims, largely recovering ground that had been lost in the 1939-40 Winter War, they made no effort to co-operate with Army Group North to complete the Siege of Leningrad. In all the allied armies, obsolescent weapons and lack of motorisation compounded logistic woes.33 Logistic co-operation between the Wehrmacht’s arms was comparably poor. The Navy (Kriegsmarine) came a distant third in German strategic planning and so the possibility of supplying Army Group North through the Baltic ports after their capture was not properly considered.34 Tactical cooperation between the Army and the Luftwaffe was better and transport aircraft often flew emergency resupply missions to makeshift airfields only a few miles behind the 50

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Credit: Shutterstock

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The Germans failed to capitalise on the Russian rail network

front. However, a single Ju-52 could carry 1,600 litres of fuel, sufficient for five Panzer IIIs. To refuel an entire kampfgruppe therefore required twenty-five sorties, to say nothing of flights for other combat supplies.35 Air dispatch could never replace land supply chains and attempts to do so would have serious long-term consequences. During the defence of the kessel at Demyansk, which had been encircled during the Soviet winter counteroffensives, German troops were able to hold out for seventy-two days, while being resupplied by 100 Ju-52 sorties a day. 60,000 tons of supplies were delivered before the kessel was finally relieved in late April 1942. However, the operation resulted in the loss of 265 irreplaceable transport aircraft, at a time when the German air industry was producing only 500 transports a year. The effect was to fatally convince Hitler that encircled troops could be easily sustained by air. This would have catastrophic consequences at Stalingrad less than a year later.36 Efficiency Efficiency “involves achieving the maximum level of support for the least logistic effort and making the best use of finite resources, transportation assets, and lines of communication”.37 Sustaining the Ostheer in the field was a mammoth task, but sustaining the logistic network required a massive resource commitment in its own right. We have already seen the issues the Germans faced with maintaining horses in the Soviet Union; their motor transport fleet faired little better. In German terminology, “Kleinkolonnenraum” (small column area) referred to transport that was organic to the divisions. The “Grosstransportraum” (large transport area) is somewhat comparable to the British Army’s “third line”; the bridge between railheads and the divisions. The Grosstransportraum in 1941 was formed of only 9,000 men in three regiments, with only 6,600 vehicles, of which 20% were routinely undergoing maintenance.38 This was utterly insufficient to meet the logistic needs of three million men. To make an illuminating comparison, these vehicles had a total capacity of 19,500 tons to supply over 150 divisions, while in 1944 the Western Allies used 69,400 tons of motor transport capacity to supply 47 divisions in France.39 Observers of the Western European campaign will note that despite this spectacular bounty of vehicles, once their lines

of communication extended beyond 450 kilometres, the Allies were only able to sustain a major advance by one army group and that was on the dense road network of Western Europe.40 Sustaining three army groups on an infinitelyworse road network, inevitably proved to be beyond the Grosstransportraum. The Grosstransportraum’s capacity was somewhat boosted by requisitioned civilian and captured French trucks, but this meant that, having operated nearly 303 types of vehicle in 1938, by June 1941 the Army was operating over 2,000 different types of vehicle. The 18th Panzer Division alone, operated 96 different types of personnel carrier, 111 types of truck, and 37 types of motorbike. This created a maintenance nightmare as quartermasters had to stock over a million types of often-incompatible spare parts.41 One panzer battalion in Finland equipped with captured Hotchkiss tanks had to receive spares sourced from Gien in France. At least 22,000 tons of spare parts were shipped by rail to supply depots from June-August 1941,42 but they often could not be moved to the front line. Many of the trucks were requisitioned civilian models. They were not robust, four-wheel-drive models that could survive the rough, dusty roads of the Soviet Union, but ordinary two-wheel-drive vehicles. Predictably, they were soon falling out in droves, regularly bottoming-out and tearing out the oil sump or transmission, or wrecking their suspension.43 Within the panzer divisions, 30-50% of trucks had broken down by September 1941,44 while on a given day, the Grosstransportraum was able to supply about 70 tons of supplies to the motorised divisions, against a demand signal of 300 tons.45 In order to push the panzer groups as far as possible, in what was anticipated to be the decisive early stage of the campaign, the tanks were festooned with jerrycans and trailers capable of carrying 400 litres of fuel. Their turrets were crammed with twice the standard ammunition complement.46 German doctrine required each panzer division to have four V.S. (see above) of fuel stockpiled before beginning offensive operations. Normally sufficient for an advance on roads of 400 kilometres, as we have seen, the Soviet roads were so poor that one V.S. might be sufficient for only 70, or even 50 kilometres. Each panzer division’s Kleinkolonnenraum had three fuel companies with thirty trucks between them that could transport a total of 75,000 litres of fuel, or 0.6 V.S. When this was exhausted, the panzers had to stop until they were resupplied by the Grosstransportraum, which as we have seen, was rarely sufficient to meet requirements and would have to be supplemented by air dispatch.47 Simplicity Simple logistic arrangements help ensure robustness and understanding. Simplicity can be enhanced through the use of common processes and the maintenance of control along lines of communication.48 At this point it is tempting to conclude that German logistic arrangements were simple to the point of non-existence. We have already discussed the almost total lack of common processes and the Germans had

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very little control over their rear areas, which further complicated their logistics. The genesis of an enormous Soviet partisan movement lay in Nazi Germany’s racial policies. One cannot responsibly discuss the war in the east, without reference to Nazi Germany’s genocidal ambitions towards the Slavs and Jews. Despite post-war attempts to present itself as “clean”, the Wehrmacht was deeply complicit in Nazi war crimes. Wehrmacht policy echoed Nazi propaganda in emphasising the struggle against “Jewish Bolshevism”, which was seen to have “stabbed Germany in the back” in 1918. Erich von Manstein’s order to the Eleventh Army emphasised: “The necessity of harsh measures against Jewry”.49 Under the OKW’s50 Commissar Order, Jews, Soviet Commissars and partisans, were seen as one and the same and were required to be executed on capture. Walther von Reichenau’s infamous Severity Order, emphasised the war’s racial character and legitimised the handing-over of captured Jews to the Einsatzgruppen. Finally, the Barbarossa Decree, signed by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, made it a crime punishable by summary execution, for a Soviet citizen to disobey a German soldier and effectively exempted soldiers from punishment for war crimes committed on the Eastern Front.52 Consequently, the Soviet people had zero incentive to surrender or cooperate with German troops. The gap between the armoured spearheads and the marching infantry was such that Soviet soldiers bypassed in the initial invasion could not be taken prisoner. They instead melted into the Belorussian forests and marshes, creating an instant insurgency that denied the Germans any control of their rear areas.53 This became institutionalised by Stalin’s 3 July order to “foment partisan warfare everywhere… conditions in the occupied regions must be made unbearable for the enemy.”54 The Germans’ racially-driven brutality, soon caused any sympathy to evaporate. Reprisals were meted out a rate of fifty or a hundred to one for every German wounded or killed in partisan actions, but this failed to cow the civilian population. The 110,000 older reservists mobilised for the security divisions and police battalions, could not control 850,000 square miles of occupied territory. By February 1942, German efforts had reduced the partisan movement from 87,000 to 57,000 men, but within a year this had more than doubled to 120,000 men. As late as 1943 and the beginnings of the retreat, the German rear areas were still nothing like secure.55

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Germans hang Russian partisans, Smolensk September 1941

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Horses proved slow and vulnerable to disease

Conclusion The Germans made only the most token of efforts in their logistic planning for Barbarossa. Their worst failing was their lack of foresight: they made no allowance for the deficiencies of the Soviet Union’s roads and railways. However, even if they had, it is unlikely that they would have been able to do much about it owing to their supply system’s structural deficiencies. They were over-reliant on horses which came at the expense of speed and agility and attempts to boost their truck fleet with civilian vehicles, only resulted in massive losses in vehicles through breakdowns. Taking the Germans’ issues with railways, horses, and trucks together gives light to just how inefficient their logistics system was. Railways were the most efficient means of transporting bulk loads great distances, but the High Command neglected railway troops and were incapable of restoring them to the doctrinally-required capacity. They lacked both the numbers and quality of trucks to properly support their divisions, much less make up the railway shortfall and attempts to do this slowly destroyed the truck fleet on the horrendous roads. Finally, the excessive reliance on horses made the whole system slow, unwieldy, unresponsive and horribly vulnerable to disease even before the winter set in. Co-operation between German staffs and with their allies was minimal. Even when tactical cooperation, for example with the Luftwaffe, was good, it could not make up for the failures of the rest of the supply system. Finally, Nazi racial policy prevented them from predicting the effect of Soviet counteroffensives, or even the possibility of a partisan movement in their rear areas, which was intensified by their own criminal actions and only further complicated their logistics. With this in mind, it is easy to wonder how the Germans managed to advance as far as they did. Firstly, they were helped by Soviet incompetence. Stalin’s insistence on hanging on to his ill-got conquests in eastern Poland, achieved under the Nazi-Soviet Pact, meant that the Red Army had abandoned its pre-war defensive lines in favour 52

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of a ready-made salient around Bialystok and Minsk. Furthermore, the Red Army was still reeling from the impact of the Purges and many of the officers in command on the day Barbarossa was launched, were political appointees who had zero motivation to ignore orders from Moscow, telling them not to respond to the obvious German build-up on the borders. An exception to this was the capable and aggressive Mikhail Kirponos, commanding the Southwestern Front, who caused Rundstedt’s Army Group South serious difficulties until he was killed in the encirclement at Kiev. The Soviet military however, was hobbled by ineffective, untested doctrines, poor training, and critical shortages of basic equipment like radios and would remain in that state arguably until the end of 1942. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that whatever its operational and strategic deficiencies, the German Army was at the height of its tactical skill in mid-1941, having digested the lessons of the Polish and French campaigns. Its soldiers and officers were generally determined, resourceful, and capable of brilliant improvisation even in the face of heavy casualties. The German Army’s ultimate failure, however, was not a case of the front being failed by the rear. Rather, it was a case of failure at all levels of planning, largely revolving around the fact that Smolensk was clearly the culminating point of any offensive into the Soviet Union. This was recognised, but far too little attention was paid to rectifying it. German planners defended this with the blasé assumption that there would be no significant Soviet forces remaining to defend Moscow, after the bulk of the peacetime Red Army was destroyed in the border regions. This assumption came from a gratuitous intelligence failure that was underpinned by racial beliefs. To discuss this in depth, is beyond the scope of this essay, but it bears some analysis. German staff officers who had served in Russia in the First World War, were happy to remember the country’s backwardness while ignoring the massive industrial development that had been achieved (though at massive human cost) under Stalin. Consequently, German intelligence estimated that, on top of the peacetime Red Army strength of 5.5 million, the Soviets could raise an additional 2 million reservists in six months. After the invasion began, the Soviets in fact raised 4 million reservists, in ten days. By December 1941 the Soviets had lost nearly 4.4 million men in 229 divisions and yet in a fraction of that time they had not only completely made good their losses, but had raised an additional 821 divisions.56 It was this failure to comprehend the massive military imbalance between their two states that was perhaps the worst German logistic failing of the entire war. Bibliography Beevor, Antony, Stalingrad (London: Penguin Books, 2011) Caddick-Adams, Peter, Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 (London: Arrow Books, 2015) van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: An Overview Essay (Clemson: Clemson University, 2001) Forczyk, Robert, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2016)

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Kirchubel, Robert, Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of Soviet Russia (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013) Kirchubel, Robert, Atlas of the Eastern Front, 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016) RLC Doctrine Branch, Royal Logistic Corps Operational Handbook (Ministry of Defence, 2007) The Royal Logistic Corps Data Book (Ministry of Defence, 2012) Stahel, David, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Footnotes Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) was the codename for the invasion of France and the Benelux countries in 1940 112 RLC Doctrine Branch, Royal Logistic Corps Operational Handbook (Ministry of Defence, 2007), pp. 1-4-16 113 RLC Doctrine Branch, 2007, p. 1-5 114 Kirchubel, Robert, Atlas of the Eastern Front, 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016), pp. 18-9 115 Stahel, David, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 132 116 Kirchubel, 2016, pp. 26-7 117 Literally translated as “cauldron”, the German term for an encirclement 118 Kirchubel, 2016, p. 16 119 Kirchubel, Robert, Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of Soviet Russia (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), p.71 110 Stahel, 2010, p. 280 111 Kirchubel, 2013, p.45 112 Stahel, 2010, p. 137 113 Stahel, 2010, p. 214-5 114 Ibid. 115 The amount of fuel required to move an entire panzer division 100 kilometres on roads, equivalent to 125,000 litres of petrol 116 Forczyk, Robert, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2016), p. 65 117 Stahel, 2010, pp. 334-5 118 Stahel, 2010, pp. 155-9 passim 119 van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 143-4 120 Kirchubel, 2013, p. 73 121 Kirchubel, 2013, p. 266 111

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Stahel, 2010, p. 333 RLC Doctrine Branch, 2007, p. 1-6 124 Kirchubel 2013, pp. 73-4 125 Stahel, 2010, p. 130 126 Stahel, 2010, p. 118-9 127 The Royal Logistic Corps Data Book (Ministry of Defence, 2012), pp. 20-3-4 128 Ibid. 129 Kirchubel, 2016, p. 67 130 Stahel, 2010, pp. 183-5 131 Kirchubel, 2013, pp. 154-8 132 RLC Doctrine Branch, 2007, p. 1-5 133 Kirchubel, 2013, pp. 81-9 134 Kirchubel, 2013, p. 80 135 Forczyk, 2016, p. 66 136 Beevor, Antony, Stalingrad (London: Penguin Books, 2011), pp. 43-4 137 RLC Doctrine Branch, 2007, p. 1-5 138 Stahel, 2010, pp. 128-31 139 van Creveld, 2004, p. 144 140 Caddick-Adams, Peter, Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 (London: Arrow Books, 2015) pp. 75-88 141 Ibid. 142 Forczyk, 2016, pp. 111-3 143 Stahel, 2010, p. 213 144 Forczyk, 2016, pp. 111-3 145 Stahel, 2010, p. 133 146 Ibid. 147 Forczyk, 2016, p. 28 148 RLC Doctrine Branch, 2007, p. 1-6 149 Beevor, 2011, pp. 14-7 150 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, notionally the unified high command for the entire armed forces, in practice often bypassed 151 Literally translated as “task forces”, a euphemism for SS death squads responsible for up to two million killings during the Holocaust 152 Beevor, 2011, pp. 14-7 153 Stahel, 2010, p. 160 154 Stahel, 2010, p. 199 155 Kirchubel, 2016, pp. 262-4 156 Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: An Overview Essay (Clemson: Clemson University, 2001) p. 17 123

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The 1990 – 1991 Gulf War was driven by the United States’ thirst for oil and not a desire to reinstate Kuwaiti Sovereignty

Throughout most of the 1980s, Iraq had endured a bloody conflict with Iran. During the Iran – Iraq War, Kuwait loaned the Baghdad regime billions of dollars, to fund its war machine. Following the UN negotiated peace deal between Baghdad and Tehran the Kuwaiti government sought to recoup the financial support it had provided; however, the response from Baghdad was less than favourable. In an effort to broker the stalemate, the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, suggested raising the price of a barrel of oil, to boost his country’s ability to repay its war debt. However, in 1989 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, increased their production of oil, making output more than the amount agreed within OPEC. This drastically decreased the international oil price; to the immediate detriment of the Baghdad government. A diplomatic spat unfolded between Iraq and Kuwait, leading to unfounded accusations from Baghdad that its southern neighbour was illegally drilling into Iraq’s oil fields. Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of using ‘advanced drilling techniques’, to extract oil from the Rumaila oilfield, which lies on the Iraqi side of the border with Kuwait. In August 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, justifying their actions by stating they were taking control of the Kuwaiti oil fields in compensation for the stolen oil. The response to the actions of the Baghdad regime was predictable international condemnation, but throughout this essay, the author will argue that the international response was not motivated by 54

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The Persian Gulf War 1990 – 1991 (hence-forth simply referred to as the Gulf War), was the first in the late twentieth century to undo the Middle East’s delicate political balance. It stopped the Arab countries voting as one in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, it is the author’s belief that this conflict was driven not by an international desire to reinstate Kuwaiti sovereignty, but by the United States’ thirst for oil. By LCpl Jonjo Sheeran

political belief in the integrity of the independence of the Kuwaiti people and government; it’s motivation was to combat instability in the global oil price and the on-going insecurity of the Middle Eastern oil fields. To justify this assertion, the author will discuss the following five main subject areas: 1. The historical and geographical importance of the Middle East to the US. 2. The financial situation. 3. The role of OPEC in the Gulf War. 4. Possible outcomes if the Joint Alliance had not deployed military force. 5. Protecting Saudi Arabia. By the conclusion of this article, the author will have endeavoured to articulate a justification for the motives of the US’s controversial actions and the assertion that the Gulf War was driven by an economic approach rather than a desire to reinstate the sovereignty of an independent state.

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1. The historical and geographical importance of the Middle East to the US during the late 1900s - 2001 American strategic interest in the Middle East, dates to at least the start of the Second World War when the Persian Gulf became an important source of petroleum products and a strategic lifeline to Russia. The discovery of massive oil reserves in the Middle East and the Soviet expansion and communist insurgencies during this time, caused national security concerns for the US and the Gulf. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War dramatically changed the world view of Gulf security. The Middle East had broadly been protected by the British Empire until the late 1960s, but as the British Empire dwindled, America saw an opportunity for personal gain. Consequently, US interest in the Middle East oil industry and responsibility for its security, increased significantly in the 1970s. American foreign and defence policy focused on preventing a hostile Soviet Union from controlling Iran, gaining access to a warm water port in the Persian Gulf. The United States determined that its security interests demanded a military presence in the region. (Cordesman & Burke, 2017). 2. The financial situation An article published by Historyplex.com (2018), entitled “The Notably and Far-reaching Effects of the Persian Gulf War,” suggests there were several reasons behind Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait. The spark, however, was the UAE and Kuwait’s increase in production of oil, beyond limits set in the 1990 OPEC agreements. This was damaging to the already struggling Iraqi economy and lowered oil prices globally. Iraq’s war debt from the Iraq-Iran War amounted to billions of dollars. This was owed to several countries, including Kuwait. The Ba’athist Regime in Baghdad felt that Kuwait and the UAE had deliberately over-produced oil, in an effort to stifle the Iraqi economy and keep their northern neighbour financially in check. History.com (2018), published an article entitled “Persian Gulf War,” which highlighted that following peace talks in Geneva in July 1990, (relating to the Iran-Iraq War), Saddam Hussein had insisted that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should cancel Iraq’s $30 billion debt and then accused them of conspiring to keep oil prices deliberately low, to satisfy the oil-thirsty western nations. This resulted in Iraq being unable to recoup its financial loss. It was also suggested that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were using this as an opportunity to keep Iraq from disturbing the delicate political balance in the Middle East. 3. Was OPEC at the centre of the Gulf War? OPEC was founded in Baghdad in 1960 and was created to provide a solid foundation for the international trade of oil. Its price, production rate and global export. In 1960 OPEC consisted of only five countries - Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. In 2018, there are 14 member countries and they possess 74% of the world’s known oil reserves. The producers in the Gulf, account for 62% of the planet’s oil reserves. (Aarts & Renner, 2017).

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Paul Aarts and Michael Renner strongly argued, in their article in the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), that the entire Gulf War was based on a power struggle for control of OPEC; or at least it’s future direction:

“Iraq, by invading Kuwait, was moving to augment its endowments of geology and capital and in the process to redefine the political relationships that have linked the OPEC producers, . . . Saudi Arabia identifies itself closely with the economic and political interests of the US and the major European states. . . . It was this balance that Iraq attempted to restructure, and the US was determined to re-impose.” (Aarts & Renner 2017) In the decade leading up to the Gulf War, there were concerns raised internationally that the OPEC nations could gain financial export dominance by controlling oil pricing globally and a lot of major international oil companies moved their trading to politically safe non-OPEC areas like the United States and countries drilling in the North Sea. This activity proved how fragile the global oil market was and supports Aarts and Renner’s argument above. 4. What if the International Alliance, led by the USA, hadn’t intervened? An article written by American Political Scientist Joseph Samuel Nye Jr and published in The Atlantic Magazine agrees with Aarts and Renner’s sentiment, stating that:

“Not only was annexing Kuwait like capturing a gold mine, had Iraq's President gone unchallenged in his use of force, he would have been able to cow Saudi Arabia and the smaller states into cutting their oil production, jacking up the world price.” (Nye Jr, 1991) This would have meant that the cost of the war with Iran would have been significantly reduced and the Ba’athist Regime in Baghdad could rebuild their nation and economy. However, this positive course of action for Bagdad was less than positively received in Washington DC. Higher oil prices would have two effects on the American economy in the THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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1990s. A larger import bill and the ripples, high oil prices create for the global macro-economy, spreading across the US economy. It is estimated that if Saddam Hussein had been able to raise oil prices, the United States’ import bill alone, would have been approximately $20 billion a year. 5. Protecting Saudi Arabia Aside from the financial implications of the United States, not acting, there were other international diplomatic concerns; as Historyplex.com stated in its article:

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Regardless of the suggestion that the real reason the United States acted, was the protection of Saudi Arabia; the practical concern in Washington was the preservation of a steady, reasonably priced, source of oil from the Middle East. As can be seen in the graph below, until the Gulf War the United States had sourced most of its oil from home soil. It is only following the Gulf War that it became a net importer of oil. This situation continued until the second decade of the twenty-first century.

“In early 1991, the United States and many other countries felt that Saudi Arabia would be Iraq's next target.” (Historyplex.com, 2018) The risk associated with leaving Saddam Hussein to influence three quarters of the world’s known oil supply, was too great for the United States. His ability to manipulate, not only OPEC, but control the majority of international oil production, would allow a single dictator unprecedented control of global oil prices. However, there is no significant evidence to suggest that this was a course of action, either Saddam Hussein or his regime in Baghdad, had considered. Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be the case as Farley (2015) states:

“There was little chance that Iraqi forces could have successfully undertaken an offensive into Saudi Arabia . . . Hussein and his Senior Commanders almost certainly understood this, which is one reason why they gave little consideration to a full invasion of Saudi Arabia.” (Farley, 2015) This threat and the importance of Saudi Arabia does, however, appear to be at the forefront of President Bush’s thoughts, as can be seen in a speech he gave to the American people in August 1990:

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“At my direction, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defence of its homeland.” (American Presidency Project, 2018)

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www.crudeoildatsuhata.blogspot.co.uk

On the 28 Feb 91, President Bush declared a ceasefire, ending the Gulf War. The terms for peace stated that Saddam Hussein would recognise Kuwaiti sovereignty and relinquish all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including: nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. At the end of the Gulf War the estimated losses to Iraqi forces were 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers killed. This is compared with the 300 coalition troops, who lost their lives. Inevitably, when met with statistics of the deaths on the battlefields of Kuwait and southern Iraq; it is hard not to compare them with the financial ones that arguably were the principle cause of the Gulf War. The billions of dollars in war debt that Iraq owed, following the Iran-Iraq War and the losses caused to the Iraqi economy by the sudden fall in the international oil price caused by Kuwait and the UAE. But perhaps most telling of all, is the volume of oil imported by the United States both before and after the Gulf War, mainly from the Middle East. The author has used facts based on actual events to show readers that Kuwaiti Sovereignty was a cover utilised by western nations, led by the United States. They wanted to secure reasonably priced oil for the near future and to exercise their influence on this strategically important oil-rich region. The author also demonstrates how the situation was inflamed by the manipulation of OPEC agreements, exploiting the situation to rein in a Middle Eastern President, who they perceived to be a loose cannon. Ironically only months previously, many OPEC members had encouraged and supported Saddam Hussain in his attack on another nation, they perceived to be rogue. The evidence shows, that not only had some OPEC states supported; many had funded, the Iraqi part in the Iran-Iraq War, alongside the United States. By a cruel twist of fate, it was (to a degree) American money and weaponry that enabled the invasion of Kuwait. In truth, had the Iraqi Forces been successful in their invasion

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and held Kuwaiti territory, the Ba’athist regime may have had a genuine opportunity to rebuild their failing economy. A failing economy that had been encouraged to collapse by the widely-perceived victims of the Gulf War – Kuwait. “Even a dolt understands the principle,. . .We need the oil. It’s nice to talk about standing up for freedom, but Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not exactly democracies, . . . This war was about oil access, prices and profits.” (Aarts & Renner, 2017) References 1. Bookings.edu. (2002). “The Persian Gulf: Understanding the American Oil Strategy.” Can be found at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thepersian-gulf-understanding-the-american-oil-strategy/ 2. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. (2018). “The First Gulf War.” History Archive. Can be found at: https://history.state.gov/ departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf 3. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. (2018). “The Gulf War, 1991.” History Archive. Can be found at: https://history.state.gov/ milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war 4. CNN Library. (2017). “Gulf War Fast Facts.” Can be found at: https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/gulf-war-fastfacts/index.html 5. Cook, M.A. (2012) “Enduring U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf Region.” United States Army War College Strategy Research Project. Can be found at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a561096.pdf 6. Conetta, C. (2003). “The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict.” Project on Defence Alternatives. Can be found at: http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8ap2.html 7. Anthony H. Cordesman. (2017). “American Strategic Interests in the Gulf States.” Washington D.C. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Can be found at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/americanstrategic-interests-gulf-states 8. Dudda, P. (2013). “The 10 biggest oil consuming countries.” Hydrocarbon Analysis. Can be found at: www.hydrocarbons-technology.com 9. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2018). “The Persian Gulf War.” Can be found at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War

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10. Farley, R. (2015). “America's Greatest Fear: What If Saddam Had Invaded Saudi Arabia?” The National Interest. Can be found at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-greatest-fear-what-ifsaddam-had-invaded-saudi-12589 11. Fitzgerald, P. (2018). “The Invasion of Kuwait.” The Finer Times. Can be found at: www.thefinertimes.com 12. Friedman, T.L. (1990). “Confrontation in the Gulf: Behind Bush’s Hard Line.” The New York Times. Can be found at: https://www.nytimes.com/ 1990/08/22/world/confrontation-gulf-behind-bush-s-hard-line-washingtonconsiders-clear iraqi.html?scp=1&sq=Confrontation+in+the+Gulf%3A+ Behind+Bush%27s+Hard+Line&st=nyt 13. History.co.uk. (2002). “Persian Gulf War.” Website History Library. Can be found at: https://www.history.co.uk/this-day-in-history/02-august/ iraq-invades-kuwait-to-start-the-first-gulf-war 14. Historyplex.com. (2018). “The Notably and Far-reaching Effects of the Persian Gulf War.” Website History Library. Can be found at: https://historyplex.com/effects-of-persian-gulf-war 15. Ibrahim, Y.M. (1990). “Iraq Threatens Emirates and Kuwait on Oil Glut.” The New York Times. Can be found at: https://www.nytimes.com/ 1990/07/18/business/iraq-threatens-emirates-and-kuwait-on-oil-glut.html? 16. Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1991). “Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest.” Can be found at: https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/ issues/91jul/nye.htm 17. Knipp K. Deutsche Welle. (2015). “Saddam Hussein, the Gulf War and the new Middle East.” Germany. Can be found at: www.dw.com/en/ saddam-hussein-the-gulf-war-and-the-new-middle.../a-18622913 18. Peters, G. & Woolley, J.T. (1990). “George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia.” The American Presidency Project. Can be found at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18750 19. Renner, M. Aarts, P. (2017). “Oil and the Gulf War.” MER171, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). Can be found at: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer171/oil-gulf-war 20. U.S. Energy Information Administration, (EIA). (2018). “Independent Statistics and Analysis.” Search Engine Archive. Can be found at: www.eia.gov Additional Sites Used 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War 2. https://www.quora.com/Why-did-the-US-enter-the-original-Gulf-War

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The Battle for Crete 1941 – A Brief Account of the New Zealand Petrol Company demonstrating a ‘soldier first’ ethos During the battle for Crete, logistics troops from the New Zealand (NZ) Division’s composite Battalion fought as infantrymen successfully repelling assaults from German paratroopers. When the situation required they were soldiers first and tradesmen second, stepping up to the task with bravery and professionalism. By WO2 P Biggs On 20 May 1941, elite German paratroops attacked a key hill feature in the Galatas area of Crete. Defending this was the NZ Petrol Company made up of drivers, cooks and technicians. With limited ammunition, small arms and training, they stubbornly and bravely repulsed repetitive attacks for five days, until they were directed to withdraw as the situation became untenable. It is not difficult to imagine that circumstances may arise in modern conflict, when Combat Service Support (CSS) soldiers may have to confront similar challenges that test their soldiering skills rather than their expertise at trade. Prelude to battle The failure of the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain compelled Hitler to seek alternatives in the Mediterranean to make Britain and her Allies yield to German domination. Consequently, a ‘peripheral strategy’ was adopted to deny Britain the Suez Canal, which Grand Admiral Raeder described as ‘the pivot of Britain’s World Empire1. Mussolini wanted to establish a ‘new Italian Empire’ in the Mediterranean and the Balkans which would also work to Hitler’s advantage. However, executing that strategy would prove difficult when the Italian invasion of Greece in Oct 1940 faltered in the mountains against an underestimated and resilient Greek Army. A subsequent counter attack pushed the Italians back into Albania in Jan 1941 demonstrating to Hitler the lack of capability within the Italian Army2. Hitler, whose interest in the peripheral strategy was diminishing, switched focused to Operation BARBAROSSA (the invasion of the Soviet Union 22 Jun – 5 Dec 1941); however, he still had to secure his southern flank. On 13 Dec 1940 he issued Fuhrer Directive 20 for operations in Yugoslavia and Greece to help the Italians3. It was envisaged that these operations would set the conditions for the successful prosecution of Op BARBAROSSA. Germany also 58

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recognised the strategic importance of Crete and Hitler encouraged Mussolini to capture the island. With the hardened 5th Cretan Division deployed in mainland Greece, the island was practically undefended. However, with the difficulties encountered on their Greek campaign, the Italians were never capable of mounting an invasion.

Hitler (right) with Mussolini (centre) and Field Marshall von Rundstedt in Russia 19414

Crete offered an excellent base for hosting German and Italian forces to support operations in North Africa allowing domination of the eastern Mediterranean. In contrast, for Britain, Crete offered an airfield within range to bomb the Ploesti oil fields in Romania; providing most oil-based resources to the German war machine5. The British commander in the Middle East, General Archibald Wavell, decided to concentrate his forces on defending Egypt from the Italians. He also had to think about defending Sudan, Palestine, Iraq and Cyprus. With contested supply lines and limited materiel resources, the build-up of stocks to defend Crete was problematic as British capability was spread thinly in the Mediterranean theatre. However, troops were still placed on short notice to move to Crete6. Breaking the German Enigma code7 provided Britain with vital intelligence regarding Germany’s intention towards Greece. Wavell was instructed to send an expeditionary Army and formed ‘W’ Force named after its commander Lieutenant General Henry ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, consisting of 58,000 men from the 1st British Armoured Brigade, 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division8. However, the German Wehrmacht proved to be too strong for the Greek and British forces. Despite fighting bravely, they had to be evacuated at a cost of 11,000 men and most of ‘W’ Forces’ heavy equipment, including 8,000 trucks

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(which would later prove detrimental to the defence of Crete). Germany now had air superiority in the Aegean and could harass, unmolested, the evacuating Allied ships during their short voyage to Crete9. The New Zealand Petrol Company The Petrol Company formed when volunteers were requested in Sept 1939 to create a specialist logistic unit of sub-unit strength. Composed mainly of drivers they also had cooks, mechanics and technicians. They eventually formed part of the composite Battalion alongside supply and medical troops within the NZ 10th Brigade10 - perhaps the precursor to a STRIKE CSS Regiment. After a period of basic training, on 23 Nov that year, the Company as part of the force, now under command of Major General Freyberg, made the long transit overseas to Egypt. After prolonged desert training and some minor skirmishes in Libya with the Italians, by early 1941 the Company was part of the NZ Division preparing to deploy to Greece with ‘W’ Force.

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evacuated, without its trucks on 26 Apr, arriving in Crete later that afternoon in good order, despite having suffered further air attacks during the crossing. Operation Mercury and the Fallschirmjäger The Fallschirmjäger (German paratroopers) exemplified the principle of a lightning war conducted with speed and risk. Although not a new idea, it was Germany who developed this concept into a combat formation14. It formed the 7th Fliegerdivision under control of the Luftwaffe and commanded by General-der-Flieger Kurt Student (a proponent of airborne forces) made up of three Regiments, each equivalent in size to a British Brigade. Two Regiments came from the Army with the other being formed by men recruited from the Sturmabteilung (SA). Although the association with the Nazi party was high from the beginning, the Fallschirmjäger never attained a Nazi national indoctrination to a comparable level with the SS. They did develop an elite status based on fighting prowess and proved a formidable opponent for the Allies15.

Petrol Company during desert training11

In Greece, the Company sustained the NZ Division with petrol, oil and lubricants, as well as providing additional transport to haul supplies and manpower. After weeks of conducting convoy moves, as the situation deteriorated, the Petrol Company was ordered to withdraw with the main Allied forces. During the retreat from Greece the Company was heavily tasked transporting troops to the evacuation beaches. Driving day and night it was regularly attacked by the Luftwaffe, resulting in the loss of ten trucks and four killed. However, a sign of the bravery that was to come was already being demonstrated by members of the Company with a Military Medal awarded to Cpl Bailey for attending to the wounded under enemy fire12. The Company was eventually

General-der-Flieger Kurt Student16

Workshops Section in Egypt13

Student was determined to see his new organisation in action as a formation at scale, having already conducted smaller successful operations in Poland, Norway and Holland and a raid into Belgium at Eben Emael. With the support of Reichmarshall Hermann Göring, who wanted to rehabilitate his Luftwaffe’s reputation after their defeat in the Battle of Britain, Student persuaded the German high command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – OKW17) of the benefits of invading Crete18. The OKW drafted directives for Op MERKUR (MERCURY) and produced a warning order on 25 Apr 1941 which assigned overall command of both air and ground forces to THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Generaloberst Lohr. As head of Luftflotte 4, he was allocated Generaloberst von Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps and Student’s XI Fliegerkorps. Richthofen was tasked with conducting aerial reconnaissance and close air support, while Students’ XI Fliegerkorps, consisting of the 7th Fliegerdivision, commanded by Generalleutnant Süssman and the 5th Gebirgsjägerdivision (mountain) commanded by Generalmajor Ringel, were the ground forces19. Op MERCURY was to be conducted quickly to prevent any postponement to Op BARBAROSSA. However, the start date was regularly delayed due to a lack of logistic support20. Student’s plan was uncomplicated and he proposed to deploy his parachute Regiments on the three northern coastal towns from east to west; Maleme, Retimo (now Rethimno) and Heraklion and capture the airstrips21. When secured they would be utilised to fly in reinforcements and heavy equipment. Nevertheless, Student did not have the aircraft to fly the whole of 7th Fliegerdivision in one lift. He determined that the Maleme area (which includes Prison Valley and Galatas) was of strategic importance and that would be his Schwerpünkte (main effort), therefore apportioning the bulk of his forces there22. Expecting to be outnumbered, Student took immense risk with his spearhead force, with the LuftlanderSturmregiment, who would land at Maleme in gliders to achieve surprise. He was sure the quality of his troops and air superiority would subdue the enemy after a few days of ruthless action23. Concurrently, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment-3 would drop in the Prison Valley area and secure Canea (now Chania) and Galatas. The other airfields at Retimo and Heraklion, would be taken in the subsequent wave that afternoon by FallschirmjägerRegiment-2 and 3 respectively. Once captured, the Gebirgsjäger would be flown into Maleme airfield arriving in the afternoon and the following day by sea. The operational order sent a chill down Generalmajor Ringel’s spine who considered it suicidal, yet, the Fallschirmjäger were far more enthusiastic24.

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Defensive preparations Arriving in Crete without their trucks, the Petrol Company were also deficient in bayonets, entrenching tools and automatic weapons. Having some time to rest, they were sleeping rough (like most troops in Crete) in olive groves and on limited rations. By the 15 May they were now resubordinated (for the final time) into 10th Brigade’s composite Battalion which included medics, supply troops, the 6th and 8th Greek Regiments and the NZ Divisional Cavalry, all to be utilised as infantry. 10th Brigade was commanded by Colonel Kippenberger whose task was to garrison the defences on the high ground in the Galatas area and guard the approach to Canea from the West25.

Soldiers sheltering in the olive trees on Crete26

Split into five Sections27 the Petrol Company occupied positions around Pink Hill which was described by Kippenberger as ‘the most dangerous portion’ of his southern flank28. B Section faced south towards Prison Valley comprising six hundred yards of flat ground with olive trees. On its front, was the prison itself which dominated the ground with its square solid walls being impregnable to small arms. This would provide a fortified position which should

Operation MERCURY Invasion Map

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have been occupied by Allied forces or denied to the enemy but no attempt to undertake either activity was made for unknown reasons. The prison would eventually be used as the HQ for 3rd Battalion, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment-329. On B Section’s left was the road junction close to the prison running from Galatas to Souda. Further left was Cemetery Hill which would eventually be occupied by the Divisional Cavalry. B Section was accompanied by C, D, A and HQ Sections in that order which made an arc facing south-west with its far right of arc fronting the gully between Pink Hill and Wheat Hill.

Composite Battalion positions around Galatas on 2 May30

A couple of miles down the valley were the 8th Greek Regiment. Only holding isolated positions, the Greeks were an ad-hoc formation with old rifles which the troops had only fired ten rounds a man during training. Their CO was also ineffective and throughout the forthcoming battle the Regiment had to be commanded by a New Zealander31. The 6th Greek Regiment was in no better shape. Although commanded by a staunch and loyal soldier; Colonel Gregarios, his troops had yet to fire a single shot and each man carried only three rounds. For unknown reasons, extra ammunition sent to them the night before the attack was not distributed32. Living conditions, although not dreadful were primitive. Food was being cooked in cut down petrol tins over open

HISTORY

log fires. The wood was gathered from the fields and nearby trees. The rations were the usual bully beef, which on rare occasions was supplemented with tinned carrots or potatoes and even rarer, tinned fruit. Fresh food was bartered for with the locals by the troops who could acquire oranges and sometimes eggs in exchange for cigarettes33. Sustainment of the troops at this stage was very much focused on foraging and living off the land as best as possible. The Attack on Pink Hill On the morning of 20 May Freyberg knew exactly where, when and in what strength Student’s forces were landing thanks to ULTRA intercepts. Therefore Student, unknowingly lost the element of surprise which was the foundation of Airborne operations34. Nevertheless, with the fortune of intelligence must come capability and Freyberg’s forces although in the right location had insufficient equipment, transport and reserves; any losses could not be quickly replaced. Whilst Maleme was being subjected to an intense air bombardment as a precursor to the glider borne assault force attack, paratroopers were landing around the Galatas area. The first enemy aircraft that flew overhead towing gliders caught the men washing and going about their morning routine off-guard. However, the Petrol Company positions were carefully sited and the procedure for manning them was rigorously rehearsed35. Junkers-52s flying up the valley started deplaning paratroops from Fallschirmjäger-Regiment3 about 1200 yards from the Petrol Company, which could only watch and wait. Within half an hour, the Germans were dropping mortar rounds on the Company’s position; the fire was accurate being directed by a spotter, who was soon incapacitated by the defenders. Unwaveringly, the spotter was replaced three times after each man was shot by Petrol Company soldiers before the Germans moved position36. Life was starting to become intense for the Company; many men were now in their trenches firing on the advancing Germans struggling through the perimeter barbed wire. However, the Fallschirmjäger moved fast and managed to set up a machine-gun which started effectively suppressing the positions inflicting some early casualties. The Fallschirmjäger, shocked that they were being shot at during their descent, thought they should be allowed to land first and they suffered heavy losses as a result. Many commanders were killed including the Divisional Commander, Generalluetnant Süssman, when his glider crashed into the island of Agina37. Having no control of their parachutes they were at the mercy of luck and the elements with those unfortunate enough to land directly on Pink Hill being quickly dispatched. One dead paratrooper caused disgust among the NZ troops when he fell graciously onto a breakfast table sending the only hot meal flying38. Some that survived were promptly captured. Driver Carson recalls searching a prisoner who had three grenades, a pistol, two days of rations and two cubes of ‘dope’ or amphetamine tablets; these were quickly utilised by the New Zealanders with enthusiasm39. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Fallschirmjäger parachuting around Maleme40

Fallschirmjäger attacking and coming under fire44

An Allied machine-gun post forward of the barbed wire between the prison and Galatas village occupied by Petrol Company drivers were some of the first Kiwis in action. Paratroopers landing near the position surrounded them. The machine-gun post was attacked by 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment-3 directed by their CO, Oberst Heidrich who landed near the prison. The drivers managed to shoot many paratroopers, but within fifteen minutes they were overwhelmed by the Germans throwing grenades onto their position, forcing them back to B and C Section’s lines. As the pressure intensified, the Company Sergeant Major Ordered B Section to retreat to C Section’s lines as their position was untenable. Although landing near Pink Hill by mistake and scattered, the Germans managed, by skill and by fighting to temporarily dislodge some of the Petrol Company. B Section, under heavy machine-gun fire succeeded in withdrawing whilst also evacuating their wounded on foot41. The German paratroopers that landed around C Section were faced with effective fire, causing them heavy casualties. However, C Section was also under fire from the Cemetery Hill direction where the Germans had dislodged the Greeks. Captain McDonagh (the Company Commander) was killed by a rifle shot from Cemetery Hill while running from position to position cheering his men on and taking photographs of the German paratroopers. He was a fearless and inspiring leader and his loss had a severe impact on the Company. Lieutenant MacPhail took over but was soon wounded. Second Lieutenant Jackson then assumed command but also became a casualty after taking a bullet in the hand and then the head. Driver Johnson managed to drag the fallen officer, under sniper fire into his trench, bandaged his wounds and applied a tourniquet. Eventually, Johnson evacuated him to a field hospital where he survived his wounds but had his hand amputated42. The Petrol Company was now without any officers in the Galatas area leaving Sergeant Major James to take command. He directed operations with great competence with help from Sgt Hopley, who was later killed during the battle43.

Although the Germans managed to advance some way onto the hill, they were unable to capture it, suffering heavy casualties. One of their Sergeant Majors describes the ordeal:

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“The enemy had held their fire with great discipline and had allowed us to approach well within effective range before opening up. Our casualties were extremely heavy and we were forced to retire leaving many dead behind us…. This first attack on Galatas had cost us approximately 50% casualties, about half of whom were killed45.’’ The Greeks, having been forced from Cemetery Hill attempted to retake their positions and were inspired by their British Military Attaché, Captain Forrester. An unlikely looking hero, he was in the area to ‘see what was happening and stayed for the action’46. Local Cretans and some Petrol Company soldiers also joined in with the counter attack. They looked like crazed animals with charging red faces screaming and it was witnessed by Sgt Pope who gives this account:

“Forester was at the head of the crowd of disorderly Greeks, including women; one Greek had a shot gun with a serrated-edge bread knife tied on like a bayonet, others had ancient weapons – all sorts. Without hesitation, this uncouth group, with Forrester right out in front, went over the top of a parapet and headed to the crest of the hill. The enemy fled47.’’ D (Workshops) Section had a quieter morning and it wasn’t until the afternoon that they started coming under heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Exploiting this barrage, at 1515hrs the Germans advanced towards their positions under cover of the natural foliage. They managed to get within 200 yards without being detected and inflicted several casualties, but D section’s effective return fire slowed the attack. However, by 1700hrs with increased mortar fire, D Section was forced to retreat to their rear defences. There was

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notable bravery as shown by Driver Mackinder, who held his forward position whilst the rest retreated. Under fire from the Germans he faced the brunt of the final attack until he was mortally wounded48. During the day, Colonel Kippenberger frequently asked for infantry reinforcements to support a counter attack into the prison area to prevent the Germans forming a landing ground. He praised the ‘sturdy Petrol Company’ for holding its line but acknowledged it was not trained or equipped for such an operation49. Eventually, two companies from 19th Battalion in the neighbouring 4th NZ Infantry Brigade and three tanks from C Sqn, 3rd Kings Own Hussars, commanded by Lieutenant Roy Farran arrived. After a quick drive towards the prison, inflicting some German casualties they were soon forced back.

HISTORY

the Petrol Company returned to their original positions51. Heidrich suffered 540 casualties during the day but he still had 1,200 men ready for any counter attack which he expected. The Germans were also under constant threat from the local Cretans; exemplified by elderly men who went out with their old blunderbusses to shoot at them before simply returning home. The final stand The following day, the 21 May, was initially a precarious one for the Germans as the Battle for Crete hung in the balance. Although the Germans managed to secure a foothold around Maleme, Student knew the situation was fragile and expected a counter-attack; which he feared would be successful. Nevertheless, the allies were unable to mount one in good time. Despite the casualties that the Germans had already suffered, Student gambled by committing his parachute reinforcements to attack Maleme. This paid off and his forces eventually conquered the airfield which was now open to fly in supplies and the Gebirgsjäger. Student knew that as soon as Maleme was securely in German hands the Battle for Crete was over52.

German paratroops capturing allied troops at Maleme53

NZ medics treating German Paratroopers50

By dusk on the 20 May, Pink Hill was becoming increasingly harder to defend and Sergeant Major James, still commanding the Company, ordered a general withdrawal to the rear lines. B Section had the hardest retreat having to go back over the hill exposing themselves to German fire so they had to crawl the distance on their belt buckles. Overnight, James reorganised Petrol Company then handed over to Captain Rowe, 10th Brigade’s Supply Officer, sent forward by Colonel Kippenberger to take command. The Company acquitted themselves well on 20 May despite initially being forced back, allowing Heidrich’s forces to establish a foothold on Pink Hill. However, with help from Roy Farran’s tanks, the Germans withdrew from the hill and

For the Petrol Company, the 21 May was relatively quiet compared to the previous day. On Pink Hill, the stubborn resistance from the Company and other NZ forces had frustrated Heidrich’s Regiment in capturing Galatas quickly. The ground Heidrich now occupied was not easily defendable and as a result, they had suffered heavy casualties with many killed. Throughout the day, the New Zealanders watched the numerous German troop transport planes flying around Maleme, but incorrectly assumed the Germans were evacuating. Defeat was never an idea that crossed their minds54. However, early on the 22 May the Petrol Company joined 19th Battalion to counter-attack towards Maleme and regain some of the ground that had been lost. The battle at Maleme was not going well for the Allies, Colonel Kippenberger knew this and decided to undertake an assault to improve the situation. Consequently, the Germans with Air support rebuffed this attack. After about three hours of haphazard scrapping the Allies withdrew with a dozen casualties. Later that day, the Germans attempted several assaults towards Petrol Company lines only to be repulsed. In the evening, there was another attempt, but this time towards THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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the prison road which again was resisted. The Petrol Company gave no ground on the 22 May, but Colonel Kippenberger was misled by inaccurate reports that the Company was driven out of Galatas. This rumour was dispelled when Captain Rowe sent a message to Brigade stating ‘Div Pet are, and will remain, in their original positions’55. The Petrol Company was exhilarated but exhausted as their casualties were relatively light and they had justified their Soldier first credentials. The failure to counter-attack Maleme allowed the Germans to reinforce through the airfield on the 22 May with around 12,000 troops, including light tanks, field guns, motor-cycles, machine-guns and heavy mortars. This force, along with the Fallschirmjäger, could bring overwhelming pressure towards the lines in the Galatas area. On the 23 and 24 May, the Germans showed their intentions to attack with patrols and reconnaissance sorties enabling them to move artillery, mortars and machine-guns into position. Then on the morning of the 25 May, the sixth day of fighting for the Petrol Company, German infantry was seen moving to start positions, numbering around 1,500 they attacked in force at 1400hrs56. The Germans identified the Petrol Company positions as their best way forward and directed their main thrust towards them. However, with the Company giving stiff resistance, helped by supporting fire from the Divisional Cavalry, the Germans were again held at Pink Hill. Later in the afternoon, the entire Galatas front was under siege and 18th Battalion’s A and D Company on Petrol Company’s right flank from the 4th NZ Infantry Brigade were overrun leaving Wheat Hill in enemy hands. At this point, it was clear the Germans were attempting to out flank the centre positions. Under sustained pressure and heavy casualties, C Company also withdrew unbeknown to the Petrol Company. Runners were sent to warn them but none made it through. Consequently, the Petrol Company was now taking heavy fire from its right as well as the front, but it fought on stubbornly. Eventually, a message was received over a field telephone explaining that 18th Battalion had withdrawn and the Company should also withdraw back towards Galatas and regroup with the remnants of 4th NZ Infantry Brigade57. The extraction was perilous, but the Company managed to take ammunition, food and their wounded with them. They withdrew in good order by wheeling their right flank back in a manoeuvre that would have challenged a skilled infantry unit whilst in contact with enemy fire58. The Germans pressed on and attacked Galatas village forcing the troops to withdraw further. Kippenberger decided that Galatas must be held to prevent the Germans driving north towards the coast road and encircling his Brigades’ right flank. Lieutenant Roy Farran and his tanks provided some hope to retake the village. He was ordered by Kippenberger to enter the streets along with troops from the 23rd Battalion in the 5th NZ Infantry Brigade including some Petrol Company men who were isolated from the Company. 64

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Although the tanks came under fire leaving Farran and his crew wounded, the attack was successful. The troops charged fiercely against the German occupiers routing them from the village. Although this gave Kippenberger some breathing space, there was no chance to re-establish the lines and by the 26 May it became clear that Crete could no longer be defended. That night a general retreat began, moving south over the White Mountains towards Sfakia. The evacuation Sfakia, a small fishing village on the south coast, was chosen as the main point of embarkation. The Petrol Company, along with the remaining allied forces, after fighting hard for six days had to march forty miles over steep mountainous terrain chased by the Gebirgsjäger. This turned out to be a traumatic experience of extreme hardship over the next five days. Numerous troops only had the clothes they fought in and their boots were falling apart. Some simply marched in their socks with makeshift soles attached made from cardboard59.

NZ Troops waiting to be evacuated60

The evacuation towards Sfakia became a fiasco with accounts of ill-discipline and cowardice, as well as selfsacrifice from both officers and soldiers61. Several men of the Petrol Company were separated from the main body and found other ways to evacuate. Those managing to get to Sfakia in time boarded Royal Navy ships bound for Egypt. Others that were left behind were ordered to surrender by General Wavell and were captured. The prisoners were then forced to make the long walk back to Canea on foot by the Germans. There are some cases where Petrol Company men managed to hide out in the hills helped by local Cretans, eventually escaping by wandering through Turkey or other Mediterranean islands. After months, they re-joined their comrades in Egypt. Although the Allied evacuation could be regarded as a successful manoeuvre, the Battle of Crete was won by the Germans. But they suffered over 23,000 casualties with 3,986 killed or missing, around 2000 of them on the first day63. This led Hitler to proclaim to Student that the day of the paratrooper was gone and he never authorised a large scale airborne operation again64. The British in contrast, would use the Crete operation to develop its own airborne capability that went on to have its

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sustain the future STRIKE capability when operating dispersed at reach. As the British Army looks to re-establish Divisional level warfighting, with a greater emphasis on contracted support through a Whole Force Approach, the capacity and balance between regular, reserves and contractors should be carefully considered. As demonstrated by the NZ Petrol Company in Crete, the ability to down tools and pick up rifles to man the front lines as they give way to more asymmetric threats, is a capability only trained soldiers can provide. Despite its limited infantry training, the Petrol Company showed that with determination, courage and leadership, this composite force was able to hold off the elite German Fallschirmjäger. Bibliography

Allied prisoners of war in Crete62

successes and failures65. The Petrol Company suffered 183 casualties with 26 killed in action during the Battle for Crete66. It went on to support the NZ Division fighting with Field Marshall Montgomery’s 8th Army in North Africa, opposing Rommel’s Afrika Korps, and then into Italy finishing the war in Rome. Soldier first The heroic experience of the Petrol Company during the battle of Crete is a reminder of the importance of maintaining a ‘soldier first’ mentality within any Army. CSS soldiers will be faced with similar situations in future conflicts. Their training and conditioning must be rigorous and robust, enabling them to operate effectively in a dynamic combat environment. All military CSS elements must be capable at performing as a soldier first, reducing the force protection burden on combat troops, whilst continuing to conduct their primary trade function efficiently. The ability for CSS personnel to self-protect will be critical to their capacity to support and

Bond, G. (2010) Crete: the graveyard of the Fallschirmjäger. Michigan: Nimble Books. Filmer, D. (2013) Defeat on Crete – A New Zealand perspective. London: British Army Review 157. Homes, R. (2007) The World at War. London: Ebury Press. Kostic, S. (2010) Self-inflicted wound Allied defeat in Crete, May 1940. Michigan: Nimble Books. Kurowski, F. (2010) Jump into hell: German paratroopers in World War II. USA: Stackpole Books. Lofthouse, J. (2017) Trouble ahead: the battle for Crete. London: Hachette UK. Moss, W. (2010) Ill met by moonlight. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books. Parker, J. (2000) Commandos: the inside story of Britain’s most elite fighting force. Reigate: Headline. Palazzo, A. (2007) Battle of Crete. Canberra: Big Sky Publishing Plowman, J. (2013) War in the Balkans: The battle for Greece and Crete 1940-1941. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. Sadler, J. (2008) Operation Mercury: the battle for Crete, 1941. USA: Stackpole Books. Shirer, L. (1959) The rise and fall of the Third Reich: A history of NAZI Germany. Trowbridge: Redwood Burn. Thompson, P. (2010) Anzac fury: the battle of Crete 1941. Australia: Random House. Warren, A. (2008) World War II: A military history. Cirencester: Tempus. Willingham, M. (2005) Perilous commitments: the battle for Greece and Crete 1940-1941. Staplehurst: Spellmount.

Footnotes T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008) p9 112 J, Carr, The defence and fall of Greece 1940-1941, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2013) p55 113 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, (London: John Murray, 1991) p34-35 114 Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1987-121-09A Foto: o.Ang | 1941 115 J, Keegan, The Second World War, (London: Pimlico, 1989) p194 116 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p12 117 This operation was known as ULTRA by British Military Intelligence at the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), Bletchley Park. 118 J, Keegan, The Second World War, p126-127 119 A, Clark, The fall of Crete, (London: Hachette UK, 2016) 110 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p12 111 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, (Wellington: Historical Publications, 1961) p134 112 Ibid, p96 113 Ibid, p134 114 C, Ailsby, Hitler’s sky warriors, (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2000) 115 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p32-33 116 Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1979-128-26 117 The German Armed Forces Joint High Command 111

Colonel Kippenberger, receiving the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his leadership during the Battle of Crete, in Egypt67

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J, Keegan, The second World War, p130 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p38-40 120 S, Badsey, World War 2 battle plans, (Oxford: Helicorn, 2000) p195 121 GHQ Middle East, Inter Services report on Operations in Crete Nov 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941 (London: British Embassy Library, 1941) p17 122 J, Keegan, The second World War, p131 123 G, Forty, Battle for Crete, (Shepperton: Ian Allen, 2009) 124 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p44 125 R, Palenski, Men of valour: New Zealand and the battle for Crete, (Auckland: Hachette NZ, 2013) 126 Feldgrau.com, German Armed Forces research 1918-1945 127 The NZ Petrol Company is formed of sections which are comparable to platoons. 128 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the second World War 1939-1945, p110 129 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, p128 130 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the second World War 1939-1945, p109 131 Ibid, p109-110 132 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p103 133 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p111 134 J, Keegan, The Second World War, p133 135 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p112 136 Ibid, p113 137 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p51 138 Ibid, p102 139 Ibid, p103 140 Ibid, p98 141 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p114 142 Ibid, p116

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118

143

119

144

Ibid, p117 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p118 145 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p115 146 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p110-111 147 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, p175-176 148 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p117 149 Ibid, p120 150 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p149 151 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p122 152 J, Spencer, Battle for Crete, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008) 153 Lippman, D, Anzacs at Maleme, (Warfare History Network, 2016) 154 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p126 155 Ibid, p126 156 Ibid, p130-131 157 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, p194 158 T, Saunders, Crete: the airborne invasion 1941, p204 159 C, McDonald, The lost battle (London: Pan Macmillan, 2002) 160 Feldgrau.com, German Armed Forces research 1918-1945 161 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, p209 162 Feldgrau.com, German Armed Forces research 1918-1945 163 A, Beever, Crete: the battle and the resistance, p234 164 S, Badsey, World War 2 battle plans, p195 165 GHQ Middle East, Inter Services report on Operations in Crete Nov 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941, p42 166 A, Kidson, The official history of NZ in the Second World War 1939-1945, p349 167 Official NZ Military Forces photographer - http://beta.natlib.govt.nz/ records/22899092

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Fluid Thinking – 152 (North Irish) Regiments US/UK Interoperability progression In 2014, as part of Army 2020, 152 (North Irish) Regiment RLC was reformed to its current role as the Army’s only fuel regiment. Although that created wide ranging challenges for the Regt’s personnel, such as: re-trading, learning new skills on new equipment and the requirement to replace its aging DROPS vehicles, with a fleet of Bulk Fuel Carrying Vehicles (BFCVs) to meet its new role. The changeover was fast paced, with an unrelenting momentum, it seemed, for the first 24 months. By SSgt A Brown While individual development, qualifications and skills were first and foremost on the regimental agenda for training its soldiers, this was quickly achieved through course based and distributed learning. The unit met its full operating capability (FOC) in an impressive timeframe by 2017. This resulted in the Regt having 211 Tanker (Tkr) and 220 Tkr Sqn’s equipped with Close Support Tankers (CSTs), Unit Support Tankers (USTs) and manned by Driver Career Employment Group (CEG) operators. 400 (Belfast) Petroleum Sqn, now re rolled from Driver CEG to petroleum operators, together the two tanker Sqn’s provide a regimental capability of static Bulk Fuel Installations (BFIs), providing fuel storage and distribution of fuel by road from its BFCVs. Although at sub-unit level other organisations boast similar capability, no other Regt reserve or regular - is tasked with this as its core role. Being new in the fuel storage and distribution field and being a reserve unit, the seizing of every possible opportunity to expand the organisations corporate knowledge must be exploited. Whether that be representation on forums and working groups within UK defence, NATO partner exercises or in this case; striking a successful and mutually beneficial working relationship with our allies from across the pond. The US Army offers 152 Regt RLC a unique opportunity to expand its understanding of large scale fuel operations and to develop its own strategic understanding and best practice. While we can look to other similar organisations such as 8 Fuel & GT Sqn, who operate in a similar vein, as a sub-unit the scope which it can project and therefore the lessons we can learn, are limited. As of 2012, 90% of all US Army fuel operations capability

became the remit of its reserve forces. The questions for 152 were: How does an army of such scale, with such a reliance on armoured and aviation assets meet its fuel requirements by utilising 90% of its support from reserve elements? Most importantly, what lessons can we learn and which can be adopted across our organisation? 152 has been deploying personnel to the USA as part of the Military Reserve Exchange Programme (MREP) for several years. An opportunity arose to deploy 152 personnel in support of the US Army’s annual Quartermasters Liquid Logistics Exercise (QMLLEx) 17, at Fort 61st QM Bn, US Army Bragg, North Carolina (Nc). In terms of scale, QMLLEx annual training is impressive to say the least. 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) of Fort Hood, Texas (Tx), is responsible for the overall planning of the package and mounting of the several participating units consisting of regular, reserve and National Guard from across the US. 2017 saw 152 Regt deploy ten personnel who were attached to the 61st Quartermaster Battalion (QM Bn), specifically the 53rd QM Company (Coy). In addition to the US Army, US Army Reserve, there were National Guard logisticians from eight states – California, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. No wonder this is considered the US Army Reserve’s premier readiness exercise for fuel and water distribution.

152 & 61st QM Bn personnel operating in the austere Fort Bragg swampland

The dynamics of operating fuel storage and distribution activities in any environment are challenging. Add to that: a contested battle space, humanitarian crisis, limited THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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excellent piece of kit, but generally a one stop shop for all required tests. Anything outside of the PPTK Mk 5 capability would have to be sent to the UK for testing by a contracted civilian laboratory. The Americans have extensive laboratory facilities, from portable field testing to portable containerised labs. All manned by soldiers in the 92L CEG, which unlike the UK is its own specialisation.

152 Pet Ops and 53rd QM Coy operators unload IPDS from ISO containers

infrastructure, testing landscapes, cultural considerations and equipment limitations. Operating in the training environment, which QMLLEx provides, gives access to many of these themes and considerations, not in the confines of a notional simulation with limited product, but practical hands on distribution of mass product to a real tangible customer. The system utilised at Fort Bragg on QMLLEx 17 for static storage was the Inland Pipeline Distribution System (IPDS). In this case, approximately four miles of six-inch metal pipe, snaked its way from the IPDS on the western shore of Fort Bragg’s MacArthur Lake, using the carved fire breaks as channels for the pipe to be laid along. The deployment of pipework on that scale is not often rehearsed by UK forces, so participating in this was a real challenge for the Pet Ops of 152. The combination of the austere environment, timeline and reliance on the supply chain to ensure essential technical, mechanical handling equipment and life support was available to enable task completion; made this feel like a ‘real world’ operation.

152 Pet Ops and BFCV operators with members of 53rd QM Coy operators

As QMLLEx 17 ended, those members of 152 whom deployed could see a real benefit to deploying to the US, to further build relationships and exploit the huge training environment and deployment of resources this annual exercise offers. The mission now, having had the experience of participating is best identifying how to capitalise on any future participation and to conduct all levels training and not just focus on junior soldier operator based skills.

US Conceptual Theatre fuel operations

152 Pet Ops utilise 61st QM Bn laboratory facilities testing JP8 product

Quality Assurance (QA) was a key dynamic of the exercise. In a field, south of Holland Drop Zone, petroleum lab specialists from the 373rd QM Bn, tested actual militarygrade fuel provided by the US Defense Logistics Agency as part of the QLLEx 17. Unlike the UK capability, the US had a tiered approach to their testing facilities. Where we have the Portable Petroleum Test Kit (PPTK) Mk 5, which as an 68

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In Feb 2018, Force Troops Command (FTC) notified 152 of the requirement to deploy personnel on QMLLEx 18. The location for this year’s training was Fort Stewart, Georgia (GA); a 279,270-acre training area and home of the 3rd Infantry Div. Encompassed in the vast scope of QMLLEx 18 will be Jacksonville Naval Air Station Florida (FL). 152 quickly exploited the opportunity to participate in this highly desirable training and force generated 20 personnel to deploy. The composition of those deploying was identified as a key component. An equal representation of Pet Ops

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and BFCV operators was needed and the attendance of junior officers representing each trade group was also desirable with an OIC in overall command. Additionally, two Permanent Staff Instructors (PSI’s) also deployed to provide safety assurance and act as liaison with our US counterparts. A heavy focus for the PSI’s was documenting the US capability and the UK conceptual interoperability of Joint Operational Fuel Systems (JOFS) into a US lead battle space in which a UK contingent with fuel support assets may be deployed. A likely scenario. This deployment on QMLLEx 18 saw the exercise OIC, an RLC Maj, and an AGC, Cbt HR Corporal, integrate with 61st QM Bn Plans and Operations Offr (S3) and a section of Pet Ops and BFCV operators, integrate with their respective counterpart managed by a Lt and SSgt. Each activity and equipment was analysed by the PSI’s comparing against UK equipment equivalents, capabilities, safe operation, time taken to learn to operate and integration or connectivity to UK assets. This built not only 152 Regt’s knowledge and understanding but gave a greater UK defence understanding of how better to work with our closest military partner in specific fuel operations.

A model of the TPT deployed

Key equipment’s and capabilities which were trained on and analysed during QMLLEx 18 was the Tactical Petroleum Tank Farm (TPT). With a similar role to the JOFS 2 Primary BFI (PBFI), but much larger in scale, the TPT’s function is to receive, store and issue bulk fuel product. The standard TPT configuration incorporates three fuel units and one pipeline connection assembly. It has a capacity of 14,308,856 litres

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

M978 HEMTT & Fuel Dispensing Rack Trailer

of bulk fuel, which is possible due to it being able to receive fuel into its three fuel units by either pipeline or BFCV. The three fuel units provide the capability, if needed, of holding three separate commodities of fuel within the TPT. Much of the anticipated petroleum operator learning was on the build, commission, operation, QA, decommission and disassembly of the TPT. While 400 Sqn Pet Ops immerse itself in the technical aspects of the TPT, the BFCV operators from 211 and 220 Tkr Sqn’s learnt about the M978 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tanker Truck. The primary bulk fuel carrying vehicle utilised by 61st QM Bn, it’s capabilities differ significantly from the CST and UST BFCV’s, 152 Regiments personnel have become adept at operating. The HEMTT can carry 9,450 Litres of product and sits between the UK UST and CST for utilisation and off-road performance. It was not just be the practical aspects of operating the Filter Walter Separator (FWS), 50Gpm pump unit or on board volume measurement system the operators learnt, but the planning of Dispense Points (DP’s) to cross load product customers in a tactical environment. The officers deployed on QMLLEx 18 also produced arguably the most important aspect of the exercise; the learning account of how our most likely ally conducts large scale fuel operations, over distance in a contested battle space and how the UK could conceptually link in to that supply chain. Following QMLLEx 18 152 Regt has a better practical and doctrinal understanding of how UK defence can incorporate its JOFS capability, into both US undeveloped and developed theatre fuel provision. This will be highly beneficial to any future UK operations and our learning accounts can be utilised as a reference.

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The Joint Force 2025 (Land Component): What are the key logistic challenges for 3 (United Kingdom) Division? The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) realigned the British Army’s force structure towards the deployment of a division. (Ministry of Defence, 2015a) There was an acknowledgement that the 2010 SDSR planning assumption that the UK could deploy a division at “best effort” was insufficient and that further planning and resources would need to be committed to allow the UK to deploy such a force. (House of Commons, 2017). By Capt J Doyle-Tanner The divisional level of operations is where the concept of integrated action can be fully applied, in what the now Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, has described as “the full orchestra coming together” (King, 2016, House of Commons, 2017). The 2015 SDSR changed the Army’s structure from having three armoured infantry brigades, of which one was ready at a time, to two armoured infantry and two strike, with one of each held at readiness. This essay will examine the current doctrine as to how the division will be sustained and use the manning, equipment, training and sustainment (METS) model to critically evaluate the key logistic challenges facing the Joint Force 2025 (Land Component) (JF25 (L)), should it be deployed. The JF25 (L) First it is necessary to confirm exactly what is meant by the JF25 (L). The short answer is 3 (United Kingdom) Division, which, when reconstituted from its current ORBAT, will consist of two armoured infantry brigades (from the current 1, 12 and 20 Armoured Brigades), two new strike brigades and 101 Logistic Brigade. At best effort, this would be reinforced, by up to the six infantry brigades of 1 Division or 16 Air Assault Brigade, to generate infantry mass. It would be supported by a wide variety of enablers from Force Troop Command, likely to include 8 Engineer Brigade, 1 Artillery Brigade, 11 Signal Brigade, 77 (Information Warfare) Brigade, 1 (ISTAR) Brigade, Royal Military Police support and Army Air Corps aviation assets from Joint Helicopter Command. (Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR) 2016, The 70

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Wavell Room, 2017a, Ministry of Defence, 2017c). The two new strike brigades are not due to be operationally ready until 2021 and 2025 respectively and the exact nature and regiment structure is yet to be released into the public domain. Indeed, the SDSR is very light on the details of what exactly would comprise any deployed task force (Tuck, 2015). Therefore, for the sake of clarity this essay will evaluate issues with the JF 25 (L) concept, assuming that both strike brigades are fully operational and the restructure envisaged by SDSR 15 is complete. The enabling section of the ORBAT is of course likely to depend on the operation in question, but this essay will assume that the full spectrum of enabling activity is required in a conventional peer on peer warfighting scenario and thus the deployable division would be the UK’s “best effort”. Having established the laydown of the JF 25 (L), it is necessary to examine how the force would be doctrinally sustained. Army Field Manual (AFM) Sustainment (2017a) describes the key logistic doctrine that would be required to sustain the division on operations. In contrast to the linear model that dominated previous logistic thought, AFM Sustainment reflects the asymmetric, hybrid warfare characterised by the 5Cs described by the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), in 2015’s Future Operating Environment 2035 and echoed by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP): Land Operations (Ministry of Defence, 2015b, 2017b). It describes logistic support to operations with agile and flexible nodes, capable of reacting to surges in demand and

Figure 1.1: An illustrative support network in a non-contiguous divisional operation

changes to the battlespace, acting as a network or sustainment system rather than a linear model. It also reflects the fact that different elements of the force could be engaged in different functions requiring vastly different support. Instead of a linear move of materiel from a fourth line home base, through a third line deployed divisional support area, followed by a move to a second line brigade support area and onwards towards the fighting echelon at first line, AFM Sustainment views the battlefield as more complex. A brigade support group must be capable of providing not only support to its client brigade but also of rapidly deploying stocks in support of other formations, be that armoured infantry, strike or light infantry. The concept is illustrated in Figure 1 (Ministry of Defence, 2017a).1 The publication is a welcome addition to logistic doctrine and better reflects wider strategic thinking. However, there are numerous issues with implementing the thinking - the gap between the thrust of the doctrine and the reality of logistic capability on the ground is stark. Manning The first problem is manning. This is a common issue across the British Army and not simply in the sustainment function. A full-scale divisional deployment would see approximately 50,000 soldiers deployed (House of Commons, 2017). The British Army is not capable of sustaining such a large-scale deployment with the manpower it current holds within CSS units. The well-publicised cuts to army manning articulated in the Army 2020 concept planned to reduce British Army manning from 102,000 to 82,000. (Ministry of Defence, 2012a). This figure has fallen even further to approximately 79,000 (House of Commons, 2017). Most logistic units within 101 Logistic Brigade, the only organisation tasked with sustaining 3 Division, are undermanned. Across the Field Army only 80% of soldiers are medically fully deployable, with gapping currently at 10%. (Ministry of Defence, 2017d). To fully man the equipment table required of a divisional deployment, augmentees from 102 Logistic Brigade in 1 Division would be required, negating our ability to later reconstitute and deploy follow on forces to relieve 3 Division. General Sir Richard Sherreff, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, raises valid concerns over a “hollowed out” force (Atlantic Council, 2016, House of Commons, 2017). Even General Carter has conceded that when deploying 50,000 troops from 80,000, “the margins can be quite tough” (House of Commons, 2017). If this level of concern is being articulated in the public domain, it is reasonable to assume that behind closed doors the Army has a real problem with manning the structure it has created. To compound the problem further, simply looking at the manpower figures in isolation does not consider critical shortfalls in certain key trades vital for the persecution of integrated action. For example, “pinch point” trades such as Royal Signals Communications System Operators, vital in any substantial divisional deployment, are critically undermanned. Moreover, simply generating enough capable

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Ajax will be highly mobile, giving the strike brigade the ability to move and disperse quickly and with a lighter logistic footprint

staff officers to man the brigade and divisional headquarters has proven a challenge. 3 Division currently has between 80 and 100 staff officers. In contrast, the French equivalent force, the Etat Major du Force, has 270 and a typical US divisional headquarters has 400 staff (King, 2016). The final key issue with manning is the reliance on the reserves. A key tenant of Army 2020 was that the reduction in regular army manpower could be augmented with an increase in the Army reserve, up to 30,000 by 2018, articulated through the Future Reserves 2020 model. (Ministry of Defence, 2012a). For example, a whole transport squadron from second line RLC units was to have been drawn from reserve forces (Ministry of Defence, 2015d). However, the Army has struggled to hit its manning targets in this area and more broadly it is accepted that by the nature of their employment, Reservists will need additional training to bring them up to regular standards prior to deployment (CHACR, 2016, Bury, 2017). This negates the principle of readiness and would result in delays. General Sherreff has raised the concern that we are over-relying on an under trained and under manned reserve (House of Commons, 2017). Overall, there are significant issues with the Army’s current manpower that would make prosecuting a divisional level operation incredibly difficult. The three key issues are undermanning (including a lack of deployability), specific manpower shortages in key trades and an over-reliance on reserve forces to plug the gaps. There have been attempts to improve this, such as the Regular Army Re-join Bounty and changing standards within the Army Recruiting and Training Division (ARTD) (Ministry of Defence, 2018a). However, there is a large amount of work required to deploy the division, even in 2025. It could be done, but not easily and not sustainably. For General Carter’s orchestra to perform, someone needs to play the instruments. Equipment The second constraint is one of equipment. The procurement of the Ajax vehicle to equip the new strike brigade and its suitability, is another debate altogether, so this essay will focus on how Ajax will be supported and sustained as an example of the challenges facing a deployable division. It THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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does not discount the difficulties of sustaining Challenger 2 or Warrior in the armoured infantry brigades, nor the vital engineering and artillery vehicles that are crucial in the operation of integrated action, particularly manoeuvre. It also notes that even with the recent announcement that the 8x8 wheeled Boxer will be the new mechanised infantry vehicle (MIV) accompanying the Ajax in the new strike brigade, little detail as to how it will fit into the ORBAT has been released yet and so will not be analysed. (Anthill and Smith, 2017, Tovey, 2017, Ministry of Defence, 2018b) According to the MoD, Ajax will be highly mobile, giving the strike brigade the ability to move and disperse quickly and with a lighter logistic footprint (House of Commons, 2017). This lighter logistic footprint seems based on the fact that as a new, lighter tracked vehicle it will suffer fewer breakdowns per mile then its heavier Challenger cousin. (Owen, 2017). However, the key constraint will undoubtedly be fuel. While there is potential for the use of local contracts on the move (dependent on the environment) or packed fuel held as first line stocks, the range of the Ajax will be constrained by its ability to re-fuel and to receive additional combat supplies such as ammunition and rations. (CHACR, 2016). Given that it’s lack of protection from enemy artillery has been mitigated only by its exceptional manoeuvre, if it loses the ability to move quickly the potential for destruction is high. As an example, the range at which we wish to project the division is 2000km (House of Commons, 2017). A Strike brigade with 120 vehicles2 would consume over half a million litres of fuel, or 28 CST (F) loads, to reach that distance3. The loops required of second and third line logistic regiments from a bulk fuel installation would be crippling and would result in logistic drag on the brigade. The use of Heavy Equipment Transporters (HETs) would help, but the small number held would make this a partial solution only (Owen, 2017.) Perhaps more pertinently, it is highly unlikely that the Army could deploy and crew sufficient fully fit CSTs and USTs in support of two strike brigades while concurrently supporting two fuel hungry armoured infantry brigades. Furthermore, given the asymmetric nature of the threat

Deploying a division is inherently a joint function, reliant of RAF strategic lift and potential Royal Navy roll on, roll off (RORO) support

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articulated throughout British doctrine and within AFM Sustainment in particular, it seems strange that little effort has been made to better protect logistic vehicles that are vulnerable to small arms fire as they transit to support front line units. If they are not protected then fighting resources must be drawn away from combat operations to protect convoys. Generally, the better protected a vehicle is, the greater freedom of movement and mobility it has. A recent example of a lack of such logistic protected mobility causing significant issues would be the lightly armoured Humvees used by the US Marine Corps during Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993. (Owen, 2016). The current logistic vehicles in use by the British Army are DROPS, a thirty-year-old platform and EPLS, its replacement, though many logistic units are still operating the older vehicle. Neither vehicle is routinely up-armoured and both are vulnerable to small arms fire. Due to the age of the DROPS, the Army also has only a small percentage of them fully fit at one time, causing issues with readiness. Even with an uplift from vehicles held in whole fleet management, it is highly unlikely that logistic units could generate enough lift capacity to support demand. Should we deploy either DROPS or EPLS in support of 3 Division, we risk the prospect of not only a severe lack of lift capability but routine route denial by someone with an AK47 (Owen, 2016). The inability of logistic units to rapidly resupply the division, would have a significant impact on the ability to conduct operations, especially when, in high intensity warfighting, an armoured infantry brigade can consume up to 560 pallets of combat supplies a day4 (Ministry of Defence, 2012b). It is obvious that no matter how good Ajax is, it is only as good as the vehicles that sustain it. Currently, we simply do not have enough and they are not fit for purpose. In sum, further work needs to be done on improving the Army’s logistic fleet to match the improvements in combat vehicles. Without stretching an already imperfect metaphor, the orchestra is going to require instruments that are fit for purpose if it is to play to best effect. That said, there have been some positive developments as well. The procurement of the “off the shelf” US Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) is a hugely welcome step, though it is unlikely to replace DROPS as a logistic prime mover and is more likely to be used in other functions. (United States Defence Security Co-operation Agency, 2017, House of Commons, 2017, Hawkes, 2017). Furthermore, innovative experimentation with unmanned vehicles and UAVs to deliver logistic lift is also ongoing and should be developed further (Yoho, Rietjens and Tatham, 2013, Rovery, 2017). Training The next key issue is training. At present, the current training mechanism for logistic units does not result in a readiness for a divisional level deployment. There are numerous reasons for this. The first is teeth arm primacy of training, both budgetary and of training estate. While understandable given the high stakes involved and all other

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units acting in support of them, it can be argued that the trend of neglecting logistic unit training has gone too far. For example, in the UK’s only training area large enough to conduct accurate large-scale training of manoeuvre assets, British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) on the Canadian prairie, logistic units are trained in small numbers only and not as part of the exercise itself. They are used as real-life support only and not tested in their divisional function and certainly not in the agile and flexible nodal support system described by AFM Sustainment. Moreover, logistic units do not practice mounted TTPs or conduct range work from vehicles on any sort of regular basis due to a paucity of instructors, equipment and direction, creating a huge training gap should troops be deployed in a doctrinally pure role. Secondly, the focus on peacekeeping and sustaining operations in the 1990s and the counter-insurgency campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan have shorn most NATO logistic units of the skills required to successfully engage in large scale, conventional warfighting. For example, common Russian TTPs are the use of UAVs to find enemy locations prior to heavy artillery bombardment to fix and destroy. Recent Ukrainian experience tells us that the Russians have become so proficient at this that, once located, the Ukrainians would have between five and 15 minutes to move locations before the location was accurately hit by fire (CHACR, 2016). The skills of vehicle camouflage and concealment, use of ground, emission control and dispersing rather than concentrating large scale logistic installations have all not been practiced for a generation (Hoffman and Holoye, 2017). During a recent US Army logistic simulation exercise in Germany, red forces targeted logistic nodes at the start of each phase, resulting in a dramatic degradation of the formation’s manoeuvre capability and operational reach. (Hoffman and Holoye, 2017). Furthermore, RLC tactics have not been revised to reflect the new (old) thinking. The RLC Pocketbook was last updated in 2002 and is out of date given the changes made to the Corps and wider Army structure during that time (Ministry of Defence, 2002). The RLC Operational Handbook is a little better, having been updated in 2007, yet is still fixed to the linear model (Ministry of Defence, 2007). The RLC Databook does not list planning data or fuel consumption rates for many of the new additions to the Army’s PM fleet, such as Ajax, or even Op Herrick Urgent Operational Requirements such as Mastiff or Foxhound (Ministry of Defence, 2012c). The most up to date publication, The RLC Tactical Logistic Support Handbook (2015) is an improvement, in that it at least lists an up to date ORBAT, but is still completely out of date given the change in wider strategic and operational thinking. Its plans for a divisional deployment are still based on two armoured infantry and one specialist brigade, not two AI and two strike, while the planning assumption is still 450km not 2000km. More worryingly, it is still a linear model, effectively requiring the whole corps to deliver (negating any relief in place for an enduring operation) and needs a non-existent reserve transport squadron and

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Due to the age of the DROPS, the Army also has only a small percentage of them fully fit at one time

contracted support to achieve its aim. (Ministry of Defence, 2015c, Bury, 2017). Moreover, a third training issue is the significant problem of actually training for a large-scale divisional deployment. The last time this was done was during Op TELIC 1 in 2003, which was plagued with problems due to a lack of training (Tipping-Head, 2008, Rutner, Aviles and Cox, 2012, Yoho, Rietjens and Tatham, 2013, Owen, 2016, CHACR, 2016). Deploying a division is inherently a joint function, reliant of RAF strategic lift and potential Royal Navy roll on, roll off (RORO) support. While the cost of training such a skill is large and there are wider geo-political implications, it is still vital that the JF25 (L) can successfully deploy if required. The use of Omani training areas is a positive step in practising large formation moves and change towards a fouryear readiness cycle through the Sustainable Training and Operational Readiness Mechanism (STORM) process, in which units will be held at readiness for two years followed by one year at other tasks and one year of training. This will also improve our expeditionary posture; though it should be noted that the exact methodology as to how this will practically work is still being developed (Ministry of Defence, 2017d). Sustainment Finally, there is the issue of sustainment. The JF25 (L) force structure is fundamentally not configured toward sustainment (Owen, 2016). Firstly, as discussed above, manpower constraints mean that once 3 Division is deployed, it will not be possible to replace or rehabilitate a subsequent relief in place with the remaining manpower left in 1 Division. Current planning assumptions could see us deploy the division for only nine months (House of Commons, 2017). More broadly, shrinking defence budgets post-Cold War have meant that Western forces, with the exception of the US, are not capable of sustaining large operations by themselves (Davids, Beeres and van Fenema, 2013). There is a question mark over the amount of combat stocks and spares held at readiness in the event of a divisional deployment (Yoho, Rietjens and Tatham, 2013). 3 Division will therefore inherently be reliant on both allies and contractors to support operations. With the sustainment of the division likely to be a joint effort, it will be constrained by a potential overreliance on THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Logistic vehicles are vulnerable to small arms fire as they transit to support front line units

contractors. The use of contractors to support operations has been in use for hundreds of years, but in today’s hybrid warfare is fraught with risk. (Tipping-Head, 2008). It is estimated that 30-40% of UK defence overseas sustainment effort is provided by civilian companies (Tipping-Head, 2008). This reflects experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the Balkan campaigns of the 1990s, in which a secure base was established at third line to support fighting echelon troops. This is not the case within contemporary operations, with logistic nodes key targets for enemy forces. Therefore, we face the issue of contractors removing themselves from the battlefield due to increased levels of risk and with the Army unable to fill the capabilities they have left behind, of which there are potentially a huge number (Cardinali, 2001, Tipping Head, 2008). The Whole Force Concept speaks in detail about this strategy and the consensus is that co-ordination, security and management issues have improved as the MoD has got better at “plugging in” to civilian companies, (often the same ones, such as Kellogg, Brown and Root) but the concept is not tried in the environment that we have designed our fighting force structure for and so remains a concern (Davids, Beeres and van Fenema, 2013, CHACR, 2016). There is an acknowledgement of this risk from within the Army but little appetite to explore it further or plan for the removal of contracted support5 (Ministry of Defence, 2017c). Furthermore, with a complex force structure such as 3 Division’s, the 4Ds of logistic planning will vary drastically between armoured infantry and strike forces. (CHACR, 2016). Moreover, the legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan’s Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) has left the Army with many vehicle platforms that are difficult to maintain and even harder to integrate into a force structure. Trying to incorporate vehicles such as Foxhound and Mastiff into contingent capability will be difficult and it is unclear what the future is for these vehicles (Anthill and Smith, 2017). Simply put, the higher the number of different vehicle platforms you have, the harder it makes logistic support. For example, spares procurement through the supply chain is more complex, the additional planning considerations for staff are large and the training burden even to maintain the vehicles in barracks is severe. It is also at odds with an expeditionary posture. (Anthill and Smith, 2017). 74

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Conclusion In conclusion, the divisional scale deployment is still fraught with problems and military planners have much to do prior to the UK’s division being capable of deploying and more importantly, being sustained. It seems difficult to imagine that such a large scale reorganisation of the Army, in which during the seven years until 2025: 4500 soldiers will be transferred between units; 40 major units will be reconfigured; 39 units will be moved location and 97 battalion sized units will be required to change either role, location, the major equipment they operate or which brigade they belong to that we still have not looked in detail about sustainment, despite the importance of it being stressed in countless doctrine publications. (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2016). General Carter at the 2017 RUSI Land Warfare Centre discussion, asked his audience to think about eight key questions that still needed answering in today’s Army. (The Wavell Room, 2017b). Not one of them was about how we sustain a force in theatre. In the seven years until 2025, we must hope more thought is given to such a crucial function. Bibliography 1. Anthill, Peter and Smith, Jeremey, 2017. “The British Army in transition: from Army 2020 to the strike brigades and the logistics of future operations” Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol 162, Issue 3, pages 50-58. Available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 03071847.2017.1353249. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 2. Atlantic Council, 2016. “Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an Age of Turbulence and Competition”. Available at http:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Alliance_at_Risk.pdf. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 3. Bury, Patrick, 2017. “Recruitment and retention in British Army reserve logistics units”. Armed Forces and Society, Vol 43, Issue 4, pages 608-631. Available at http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=12&sid =f0b37d49-3f50-4086-ae8d045bb898012e%40 sessionmgr4006&bdata= JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=124789288. Accessed 5 Jan 18. 4. Cardinali, Richard, 2001. "Does the future of military logistics lie in outsourcing and privatization? Accountants – the new gatekeepers of wartime operations", Work Study, Vol 50 Issue 3, pages 105-111. Available at http://emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/00438020110389236. Accessed 30 Dec 17. 5. Davids, Christiaan, Beeres, Robert and van Fenema, Paul, 2013. "Operational defence sourcing: organising military logistics in Afghanistan", International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol 43, Issue 2, pages 116-133. Available at https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-11-2011-0198. Accessed 30 Dec 17. 6. Hawkes, Jon, 2017. “UK confirms FMS JLTV buy for MRV-P” Jane’s Defence Weekly. Available at http://www.janes.com/article/67246/ukconfirms-fms-jltv-buy-for-mrv-p. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 7. Hoffmann, Jerad and Holoye, Paul, 2017. “Logistical operations in highly lethal environments” Military Review, Vol 97, Issue 6, pages 86-93. Available at http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid =1&sid=08241194-a933-45dd-90bf-adf8d6e1a5e0%40sessionmgr101. Accessed 2 Jan 18. 8. King, Anthony, 2016. “Corroding the iron division: personnel problems” British Army Review, Vol 168, pages 58-63. Available at https:// akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAR2/BAR%20168/09%2 0BAR%20168%20Corroding%20The%20Iron%20Division.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 18. 9. Military Periscope, 2012. “ASCOD infantry fighting vehicle”. Available at http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/gcv/apc/w0004705.html. Accessed 3 Jan 18.

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10. Ripley, Tim, 2016. “Details emerge of major British Army re-organisation” Jane’s Defence Weekly. Available at http://www.janes.com/article/68789/ details-emerge-of-major-british-army-re-organisation. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 11. Rovery, Melanie, 2017. “CAAR demonstrates autonomous resupply”, Jane’s Defence Weekly. Available at https://janes.ihs.com/ Janes/Display/FG_684653-IDR. Accessed 31 Dec 17. 12. Rutner, Stephen, Aviles, Maria and Cox, Scott, 2012. "Logistics evolution: a comparison of military and commercial logistics thought", The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol 23, Issue 1, pages 96-118. Available at https://doi.org/10.1108/09574091211226948. Accessed 31 Dec 17. 13. The Wavell Room, 2017a. “The divisional paradox” (blog). Available at https://wavellroom.com/2017/10/19/the-divisional-paradox/. Accessed 31 Dec 17. 14. The Wavell Room, 2017b. “RUSI LWC: the view from the Wavell Room” (blog). Available at https://wavellroom.com/2017/06/30/rusi-lwc-theview-from-the-wavell-room/. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 15. Tipping-Head, Christianne, 2008. “Key issues affecting the provision of logistics support to the UK armed forces in expeditionary operations”, RUSI Defence Leadership and Management Programme. Available at https://rusi.org/system/files/IBM_Logistics.pdf. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 16. Tovey, Alan, 2017. “Battle over plans for £3 billion contract for new army vehicle” The Telegraph, 24 Sep 2017. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/09/24/battle-plans-new-3bn-contractnew-army-vehicle/. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 17. Tuck, Christopher, 2015. “SDSR 15- five questions”, Defence in Depth. Available at https://defenceindepth.co/2015/12/16/sdsr-15-five-questions. Accessed 29 Dec 17. 18. United Kingdom Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), 2016. “Warfighting at scale: regenerating and reconstituting mass”. Available at http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/ AresAthena_Issue_6_WARFIGHTING_AT_SCALE.pdf. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 19. United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 2017. “SDSR 2015 and the Army, eight report of session 16-17”. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/31 1/311.pdf. Accessed 31 Dec 17. 20. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2002. “RLC pocketbook”. Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBCSS/ 20120621-RLC_Pocketbook_CDCSS_SO2_TechDoc-U.pdf . Accessed 27 Dec 17. 21. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2007. “RLC operational handbook”. Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/ BAeBBCSS/20120621-RLC_Operational_Handbook_CDCSS_SO2_ TechDoc-U.pdf. Accessed 27 Dec 17. 22. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2012a. “Modernising to face an unpredictable future: transforming the British Army”. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20130418031611/http://www.army.mod.uk/ documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf. Accessed 4 Jan 18. 23. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2012b. “Army Field Manual: Volume 1 (Combined arms operations), Part 1B, Brigade tactics”. Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBDoctrine/AF M%20Vol%201%20Part%201B%20Brigade%20Tactics.pdf. Accessed 5 Jan 18. 24. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2012c. “Royal Logistic Corps databook” Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/ vault/BAeBBCSS/20120614-RLC_Data_Book_CDCSS_SO2Tech_DocU.pdf. Accessed 27 Dec 17. 25. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2015a. “The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review”. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf. Accessed 6 Jan 18.

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26. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2015b. “Future Operating Environment 2035”, Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/646821/20151203-FOE_35_final_v29_web.pdf. Accessed 6 Jan 18. 27. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2015c. “Tactical Logistic Support Handbook”. Available at https://akx.sps.ahe.r.mil.uk/sites/vault/ BAeBBCSS/20151119-TLSH_Final_LCD%20v2%200-SO2DocLog.pdf . Accessed 2 Oct 18. 28. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2017a. “Army Field Manual: Sustainment”. Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/ sites/vault/BAeBBDoctrine/Army%20Field%20Manual%20(AFM)%20Sus tainment%20(Web).pdf. Accessed 4 Jan 18. 29. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2017b. “Army Doctrine Publication: Operations”. Available at https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites vault/BAeBBDoctrine/ADP%20Land%20Operations.pdf. Accessed 5 Jan 18. 30. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2017c. “Freedom of Information Request” Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/632554/2017-02130.pdf. Accessed 31 Dec 17, through The Wavell Room, 2017a (referenced above). 31. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2017d. “Field Army Plan 17/18”. Available at https://akx.sps.ahe.r.mil.uk/sites/vault/CLF. Accessed 2 Oct 18. 32. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2018a. “Army Briefing Note: Introduction of the Regular Army re-join bounty”. Private email, delivered 4 Jan 18. 33. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2018b “British companies get green light to press ahead with new Army vehicle plans, Defence Minister announces”. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britishcompanies-get-green-light-to-press-ahead-with-new-army-vehicle-plansdefence-minister-announces. Accessed 2 Oct 18. 34. United States Defence Security Co-operation Agency, 2017. “United Kingdom- Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and Accessories”. Available at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/united-kingdom-joint-lighttactical-vehicles-jltv-and-accessories. Accessed 1 Jan 18. 35. Yoho, Keenan, Rietjens, Sebastiaan and Tatham, Peter, 2013. "Defence logistics: an important research field in need of researchers", International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol 43, Issue 2, pages 80-96. Available at http://emeraldinsight.com/doi/ pdfplus/10.1108/IJPDLM-03-2012-0079. Accessed 30 Dec 17.

Footnotes 111

AFM Sustainment, Chap 1, page 7, Figure 1.1 Based on 60 Ajax per regiment in a brigade with 2 regiments equipped with Ajax (Owen, 2016). 113 1 Ajax can travel 370 km on 860 litres of fuel (Military Periscope, 2012). Therefore, Km per litre= 2.32. 2000km= 2.32 x 2000= 4640 litres. 120 Ajax therefore need 4640 x 120= 556, 800 litres of fuel or approximately 28 loads of CST (20,000l capacity) or 79 loads of UST (7000l capacity). 114 No planning figures yet exist for Strike brigades, though a reasonable assumption would be that this will be broadly similar. 115 Para 45 of the Field Army Plan 17/18 acknowledges that contracted support is critical to the sustainment function and could constitute a single point of failure. However, the current solution to this is to ensure that contracted support is assured at appropriate readiness rather than exploring the risk of a complete removal of contracted support to the divisional battle. 112

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The Western Balkans – It’s Recent History, British Involvement in The Region and The Current Situation Although there are no current wars in the region it does suffer from authoritarian leadership, weak democratic institutions and serious challenges from organised crime and corruption. This situation is exacerbated by a brain drain of young and educated people, uncertainty about EU accession and a rise in extremism and anti-democratic nationalism.3 Croatia has recently become a member of the EU and currently every country in the Western Balkans aspires to join, although, they are each at different stages in the membership process. Albania and Montenegro are already members of NATO and Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo also aspire to join. Each face serious challenges before membership can be a realistic prospect.3 Serbia takes part in joint military and civil defence exercises with NATO, but currently has no aspirations to join.

This article reviews the modern history of the Western Balkans, including the British Army’s recent engagement in the region. It notes specifically that this was the Royal Logistic Corp’s first operational deployment on formation in 1993. By Lt O Lewis

Source: The Economist, 2016

Although there is some disagreement as to exactly which countries constitute the Western Balkans, according to the World Bank, the region comprises: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania.1 However this article will also be discussing the former Yugoslavian country of Croatia. Kosovo is the partially recognised and disputed territory, to the South West of Serbia that declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Among others, Serbia and Russia refuse to recognise its independence.2 The main religions in the region are Orthodox Christian, Catholicism and Islam.3 In the 1990s the region suffered from several serious conflicts that resulted in the deaths of 130,000–140,000 people and the displacement of up to 4 million people. 72 British military personnel died on operations.4

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History of Yugoslavia Before the official formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, relationships between the Western Balkans and Western Europe developed during the First World War, when French, Russian, Serbian, British and Italian soldiers fought and died together in the Western Balkans, opposing the Bulgarian Army.5 This front, known as the Salonika Front, helped to establish strong relations between these countries and brought Britain, in particular, favour among the Serbians.5 Furthermore, a British woman named Flora Sandes, became the only woman to officially fight in the war when she enlisted as a private into the Serbian Army. Eventually she rose to the rank of Captain and gained worldwide fame.6 Gaining international recognition in 1922 Yugoslavia contained the socialist republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.7 In 1929, it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in 1941 was invaded by the axis powers. Complicated fighting ensued between several different groups of Yugoslavians and eventually a group called the Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, liberated Belgrade in October 1944. Then, with the help of both British and Red Army supplies, the Partisans liberated the rest of Yugoslavia until the Nazi surrender in May 1945. After the war, the county was renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and a communist government was established with Josip Broz Tito as the ruler.9 In 1963, the country was renamed again; this time the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Tito ruled until his death.8 Throughout Tito’s rule Yugoslavia was a relatively peaceful and stable country with some prosperity. Though a communist leader, Tito kept his distance from the USSR and

human rights violations were minimal. The capital of Yugoslavia was Belgrade and Serbia was considered, by most, to be the dominant republic.8 The Yugoslav Wars After Tito’s death in 1980, the country went through an economic and political crisis with nationalism rising and more autonomy being requested by several republics throughout the 1980s. This was met by opposition from Serbians who saw this as an obstacle to Serb interests.9 In 1987, communist leader Slobodan Miloševic came to power in Serbia and acquired de facto control over Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina.7 His policies were centralist and he garnered a high level of support among Serbs, though, he was met with opposition by party leaders of the western republics of Slovenia and Croatia, who desired a more representative form of government for their countries.8 In January 1990, socialist parties (former communists) lost power across the region in the first multiparty elections. The exceptions were, Serbia and Montenegro where Miloševic and his allies won.8 Between Jun 1991 and Apr 1992, all republics apart from Serbia and Montenegro (which remained federated) declared independence. This breakup of Yugoslavia led to the start of the Yugoslav Wars which were a series of ethnically-based wars and insurgencies fought from 1991 to 2001.5 The wars are generally considered to be a series of separate but related military conflicts which occurred in and affected, most of the former Yugoslav republics. In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was renamed the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This effectively ending Yugoslavia for good.5 The Bosnian War The main aspect of the Yugoslav Wars that will be discussed in this article is the Bosnian War, which occurred between 1992 and 1995 as this is where British troops were most heavily involved. Following the Slovenian and Croatian secessions from Yugoslavia in 1991, the multi-ethnic Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which was inhabited by mainly Muslim Bosniaks (44 percent), as well as Orthodox Serbs (32.5 percent) and Catholic Croats (17 percent) – passed a referendum for independence on 29 Feb 92.10 On 6 Apr 92, the European Union recognised Bosnia’s independence and war broke out between Bosnian Serb forces on one side and Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on the other. The Serbs, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, laid siege to the capital Sarajevo and occupied 70 percent of the country, killing and persecuting Muslims and Croats to carve out a Serb Republic.11 In May 92 UN sanctions were imposed on Serbia for backing rebel Serbs in Croatia. Nearly a year later in Jan 1993 Bosnia peace efforts failed and war broke out between the Muslims and Croats, previously allied against Serbs. In Apr, the same year, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde in eastern Bosnia were declared three of six UN "safe areas". The

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United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR deployed troops and Bosnian Serb Army attacks stopped; although the towns remain isolated and only a few humanitarian convoys reached them in the following two years.11 In Mar 94, a US brokered agreement ended the MuslimCroat war and created a Muslim-Croat federation; once again partnered against the Bosnian Serbs. In Mar 95 Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic ordered that Srebrenica and Zepa be entirely cut off and aid convoys stopped from reaching the towns and in July issued a new order to conquer Srebrenica.11 Bosnian Serbs troops, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, captured the eastern enclave and UN "safe area" of Srebrenica in Jul 95, killing approximately 8,000 Muslim males during the following week. This caused international outrage and condemnation and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the UN.10 Following NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in late 1995, Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a US-brokered peace deal in Dayton, Ohio. This agreement was signed in Dec 95 in Paris, paving the way for the arrival of a 66,000-strong NATO peacekeeping Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.11 In 1996, the West forced Karadzic to quit as Bosnian Serb president and in September, Nationalist parties won the first post-war election, confirming Bosnia’s ethnic division.12 By early 2008, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had convicted 45 Serbs, 12 Croats and 4 Bosniaks of war crimes connected to the war in Bosnia. The most recent estimates suggest that around 100,000 people were killed during the war and over 2.2 million people were displaced. This makes it the most devastating conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. In addition, an estimated 12,000–20,000 women were raped, most of whom were Bosniak.1 UN intervention As a direct result of the inter-ethnic fighting and human rights violations the UN created a mandate to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region in Aug 92.13

Source: IWM, 2018

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Members of the 1st Battalion, Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment distributing aid, 1994

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The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was to coordinate this humanitarian aid. The headquarters Bosnia and Herzegovina Command (BHC) - the predecessor of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) - was set up to implement this mission and was composed of nearly 39,000 personnel from 42 different countries.14 The initial mandate of UNPROFOR included Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Croatia, there was a mandate for ensuring conditions for peace talks and security in three demilitarised "safe-haven" enclaves, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). The UNPROFOR mandate for Bosnia and Herzegovina was largely to keep the population alive while the war ended.15 The mandate for Bosnia and Herzegovina can essentially be divided into four phases, but it is important to note that the old responsibilities continued even as new tasks were added. Phase 1: Aid to Sarajevo - Beginning on 5 Jun 92, UNPROFOR was responsible for the protection of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes. Phase 2: Escort of Humanitarian Aid. Phase 3: The Protection of Safe Areas on 16 Apr 93 the town of Srebrenica was declared a "safe area" free "from armed attack or any other hostile act." In May 93, Bihac Sarajevo, Goražde, Žepa and Tuzla were also added as "safe areas". Phase 4: Monitoring of the USbrokered cease-fires in Bosnia.15 As a part of UNPROFOR a force of British troops (BRITFOR) deployed in Oct 92 in the form of a brigade staff, infantry battalion, logistics battalion, reconnaissance squadron and an engineer squadron, with Royal Navy Sea Kings providing helicopter support.14 BRITFOR The primary role for BRITFOR was to escort UNHCR convoys delivering humanitarian aid in, protecting them from attack and to ensure the aid was delivered properly. This operation was known as Op GRAPPLE.16 The forces’ headquarters and supply base was at Split, on the Croatian Coast, with units being deployed throughout central Bosnia. In January 1993, the first British fatality happened when Lance Corporal Edwards was shot and killed by a sniper.17 Throughout 1993, BRITFOR escorted convoys on a regular basis. However, they had differing levels of success, usually depending on the level of local compliance. BRITFOR’s use of the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and armoured reconnaissance gave it a big advantage over other UN contingents, enabling more effective "escorts," and it meant that when fired upon, they could return fire with some impunity.17 The UNPROFOR wished to be seen as having robust capabilities; however, this was undermined by non-robust rules of engagement, which limited its capabilities. There was a joke used by the locals along the lines of: "If you make a wrong move, I will speak to my colonel, who will ask the General to ask our national defence minister to ask the Prime 78

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Minister to ask the rest of the UN to order me to open fire, so be warned." This clearly shows what the locals thought of the force and the perceived bureaucracy of the system.18 Throughout 1994 humanitarian conditions continued to improve and two of the warring factions (the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims) continued with their ceasefire, UNPROFOR continued to achieve its mission wherever conceivably possible; however, the resolution of human rights issues proceeded.16 In winter 1995 UNPROFOR would eventually hand over the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). The IFOR mission would last approximately a year, before it transitioned to the follow-on Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR).16 British Army Logistics

Source: Forces TV, 1992

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British Royal Corp of Transport soldiers, Split, 1992

All the RLC’s forming Corps took part in the Bosnian War in some way, with their main task being the effective delivery of supplies for refugees and British troops. The supplies came in on ship to the Croatian port of Split. Here they were offloaded and stored by the Royal Army Ordnance Corp (RAOC). 360 Sqn RAOC was the first unit to do this.19 The RAOC was allocated warehouses at the port, although they had to spend several days clearing them out before they could be used. The troops in Split lived in the Sir Bediver barracks, which was the HQ of BRITFOR for both counties.20 After being offloaded at Split, the supplies were then loaded onto trucks belonging to the Royal Corp of Transport (RCT) who transported them 200km into Bosnia, to their final destination of Vitez.20 The first stop for the supplies was Tomislavgrad in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the home of the HQ for the National Support Unit (NSE). This was effectively the main base for logistical support for the whole of Croatia and Bosnia.20 The NSE was effectively a logistic battalion, whose main purpose was to support the mechanised formation at the front line; formed of both armored infantry and light cavalry units.20 The NSE was made up of an integrated battalion structure containing: • Members of the Royal Pioneers Corp who worked to create protection for the base and carried out repairs on the infrastructure

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• Members of the Royal Military Police, who conducted route recces ahead of the main force to check the suitability of routes with regards to suitability for heavy vehicles as well as the potential for the convoys to be attacked • The RAOC who dealt with the warehouse element, loading and unloading vehicles with supplies for the mechanised battalion • An RCT Sqn that carried out the delivery of the supplies themselves • Members of the Royal Army Medical Corp (RAMC) who gave medical support to the British soldiers in a make shift medical center • A Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers (REME) element, that dealt with the maintaining and recovery of vehicles • Members of the Royal Engineers Postal and Courier Service who worked to ensure soldiers received mail from home and that letters could be sent back • Members of the Army Catering Corps who fed the British soldiers, first on composite rations and then with fresh food. • Members from the Royal Engineers who worked to keep routes open and passable; widening tracks, clearing debris and re-levelling adverse cambers.21 All these elements came together to create a very effective logistic battalion that proved itself more than capable of performing the job at hand, under difficult conditions in a hostile environment.22

Source: Forces TV, 1992

was kept open and aid was successfully delivered until the end of the conflict.24 The main contingent of British soldiers left in late 1995, when UNPROFOR handed over the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to NATO’s Implementation force (IFOR). This followed the signing of the Dayton Agreement that effectively ended the conflict.23 Noting that the combined number of Royal Logistic Corps soldiers deployed during this period was proportionally very large, few realise that the RLC lost more soldiers during this operation that any other cap badge (11 of the 59). In the Corps’ 25th year since formation, we remember them, their sacrifice and all those who contributed to establish the RLC’s professional reputation from the day of its inception. NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Operation ALLIED FORCE) In early 1998, armed clashes between Kosovan and Serbian troops broke out. A NATO-facilitated ceasefire was signed on 15 Oct, but both sides broke it two months later and fighting resumed. When the killing of 45 Kosovar Albanians in the Racak Massacre, was reported in January 1999, NATO decided that the conflict could only be settled by introducing a military peacekeeping force to forcibly restrain both sides.25

British Royal Corp of Transport soldiers, between Split and Tomislavgrad, 1992

The end of the supply chain was Vitez, where the infantry and cavalry units were based.22 Many RCT drivers completed the journey from Split to Tomislavgrad to Vitez, known as Route TRIANGLE and then back several times and in the first three weeks of Op GRAPPLE the RCT clocked up 300,000km of road moves.23 The British military kept this supply line open throughout the war, enabling the effective delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees in Bosnia. It was during this operation that the RLC was formed. In 1993, the five Forming Corps were combined. This therefore makes Op GRAPPLE the RLC’s first operation and it was one that would put the newly formed Corps of 26,000 regular and reserve soldiers and officers to the test. Convoys were attacked on a regular basis and the risk from snipers was large. Regardless of the threat, the route from Split to Vitez THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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After the Rambouillet Accords broke down on 23 March, with the Yugoslav rejection of an external peacekeeping force, NATO prepared to install the peacekeepers by force.26 NATO’s objectives in the Kosovo conflict were stated at the North Atlantic Council meeting held at NATO headquarters in Brussels on April 12, 1999: • An end to all military action and the immediate termination of violence and repressive activities by the Milosevic government • Withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo • Stationing of UN peacekeeping presence in Kosovo • Unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons • Establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo based on Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.25 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was justified on the grounds of 'humanitarian intervention'. Air strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo proved highly controversial as they killed many civilians.25 Serbia had singled out the UK, for its perceived betrayal of trust and friendship. Human Rights Watch verified that around 500 civilians died as a result of the air attacks. Nearly 60% of whom were in Kosovo. Bombed buildings in Belgrade were not repaired and remain in the same state today as a reminder of the conflict.26 After 72 days, the conflict ended with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and the entry of NATO peacekeepers, Kosovo then being placed under UN administration.26 International efforts to resolve the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo sharply deteriorated in 2007/8, when the UN Security Council (due to opposition from Russia, who supported the Serbian position) rejected UN Special Representative Ahtisaari’s plan for Kosovo to become gradually independent, under supervision from the international community.25 The Kosovo Assembly in Pristina declared independence on 17 Feb 08 and to date, over 90 countries around the world - including the UK and 22 out of the other 27 EU member states (Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece have not) - have recognised the independent Republic of Kosovo. Serbia does not.27 KFOR The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international peacekeeping force, which was responsible for establishing a secure environment in Kosovo.28 KFOR entered Kosovo on 11 June 1999, two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. At the time, Kosovo was facing a grave humanitarian crisis, with military forces from the Yugoslavian and the Kosovan armed forces in daily engagement. Nearly one million people had fled Kosovo as refugees.28 KFOR has gradually transferred responsibilities to the Kosovo Police and other local authorities. As of 23 May 16, KFOR consisted of 4,600 troops.29 80

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Currently troops are under the command of the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia. In 2016 in addition to the two officers serving on the KFOR staff in Pristina, the UK has a 30-man unit deployed.30 Current Situation Currently the Western Balkans are at peace. However, there are still deeply held ethnic and religious divides in the region as well as political infighting.31 Serbia remains an important area of interest for the West as well as Russia. Serbia would like to join the EU. The main barrier standing between it and accession is the on-going dispute with Kosovo.32 Serbia cooperates with Russia in a number of different ways; it relies on Russia heavily for energy supply and recently both countries signed an agreement to increase security cooperation.31 Russia’s influence in the region as a whole and specifically over Serbia, will undoubtedly be a concern to some, if not all, of the EU member states. Serbia has no desire to join NATO and there is a relatively large amount of anti-NATO sentiment, mostly stemming from the bombing of Belgrade in the late 1990s.31 Whereas most Western Balkans countries are firmly west leaning, it appears that Serbia cannot decide which side it wants to be on, with regards to current global politics. Serbia is trying to increase cooperation with both Russia and the West, but is trying to ‘sit in two chairs’ with regards to cooperating with both sides.32 Most would agree that this situation is untenable for much longer and that it must make a firm decision as to where its allegiance lies. This would be hard for Serbia as it has strong ties with Russia, is critically dependent on Russian gas and is mindful of historical political debts.32 With regards to British cooperation with Serbia, as Serbia is consistently increasing ties with Russia, the UK may want to be very careful how much it cooperates, especially with regards to the sharing of sensitive materiel. The main concern for the UK security services, is likely to be the newly signed security agreement, since its implementation will almost certainly see Serbia and Russia sharing more sensitive information.32 Conclusion It is clear, the UK has a long and at times bloody relationship with the Western Balkans. It has been an area of interest for the UK for many years, due to its strategic location as well as its politics. Today, it directly impacts UK interests, thanks to arms and people trafficking, drugs and cigarette smuggling as well as the indirect consequences of unregulated migration. Looking to the future, it is likely the UK will want to maintain its influence in the region, due to the investment in peace and stability it has already made there. It will want to act in the common good, multilaterally, in the face of Russia’s malign influence in the region. We should also remember that we have enjoyed strong and prosperous friendships with many Western Balkan States in the past, which provides a solid foundation for the future.

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Although the UK looks to leave the EU; we must remain an advocate of the countries in the Western Balkans, joining the EU. We should recognise the important lever potential membership exerts on countries, to govern and exist according to internationally acceptable norms. Finally, we must guard against any suggestion or impression that by the UK leaving Europe, it no longer cares about the Balkans – nothing could be further from the case. The UK is taking more active steps to increase its engagement in the region. Those members of the RLC who lost their lives working to establish and maintain peace, can be assured that their legacy will continue to be supported by the British Government, the British Army and the Corps. Footnotes 111

The World Bank. 2018. Western Balkans Regular Economic Report. [Online]. The World Bank. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/ region/eca/publication/western-balkans-regular-economic-report [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. 112 BBC. 2018. Kosovo Profile. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859 [Accessed: 21/03/2018]. 113 Great Britain (GB). Parliament. 2018. House of Lords. Select Committee on International Relations. The UK and the future of the Western Balkans 1st Report of Session 2017–19. (HL Paper 53). 114 BBC. 2016.The Yugoslav Wars. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399 [Accessed: 21/03/2018]. 115 Suster, M. 2014. SALONIKA: THE MOST FORGOTTEN FRONT. [Online]. The great War Project. Available from: http://greatwarproject.org /2016/09/12/salonika-the-most-forgotten-front/ [Accessed: 15/05/2018]. 116 Castelow, E. Not Dated. Flora Sandes. [Online]. Historic UK. Available from: https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Flora-Sandes/ [Accessed: 14/05/2018]. 117 Judah, T. 2011. Yugoslavia: 1918 – 2003. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/yugoslavia_01.shtml [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. 118 Lampe, J. 2003. Yugoslavia FORMER FEDERATED NATION [1929–2003]. [Online]. Encyclopedia Britannica. Available from: https:// www.britannica.com/ place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-19292003 [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. 119 BBC, 2016. The Yugoslav Wars. 110 History. 2009. BOSNIAN GENOCIDE. [Online]. History. Available from: https://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide [Accessed:20/03/18]. 111 Reuters. 2008. CHRONOLOGY-What happened during the war in Bosnia? [Online]. Reuters. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSL21644464 [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. 112 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 1995. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Online]. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Available from: https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true [Accessed 22/03/2018]. 113 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. 2017. UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia) (UNPROFOR). [Online]. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Available from: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/ honours-history-medals-chart/medal-unprofor.page [Accessed: 24/02/18]. 114 Krsticevic, D. 1998. UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN CROATIA CARLISLE BARRACKS: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE. 115 Department of Public Information, United Nations (UN). 1996. United Nations Protection Force Profile. [Online]. Department of Public Information, United Nations. Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/ mission/past/unprof_p.htm [Accessed: 23/03/18]. 116 ITN. Not Dated. A Coy 1 Cheshire Bosnia. [Online video]. YouTube. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zT7TUUnvIcY [Accessed 22/03/18]. 117 Marshall, R. Not Dated. British Armed Forces In UN Protection Force. [Online]. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Available from:

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https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/1996-4/marshall.htm [Accessed: 21/03/18]. 118 Needham, J. 1995. 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards Bosnia 1993 -1994 Operation Grapple 3 UNPROFOR. [Online video]. Available from: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrVLem8CPiQ&t=1737s [Accessed: 23/03/18]. 119 Forces TV. 1992. Bosnian War: How Was the British Army Involved? [Online video]. YouTube. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_BpHygNJorU [Accessed: 23/03/2018]. 120 Forces Network. 2016. Bosnian War: The Road To Vitez. [Online video]. Forces Network. Available from https://www.forces.net/news/ tri-service/bosnian-war-road-vitez [Accessed 22/03/18]. 121 Forces TV. 1992. Bosnian War: How Was the British Army Involved? 122 Burns, J. 1993. British Army's Job in Bosnia: To Keep Risky Lifeline Open. [Online]. The New York Times. Available from:https://www.nytimes.com/ 1993/08/23/world/british-army-s-job-in-bosnia-to-keep-risky-lifelineopen.html [Accessed: 25/03/2018]. 123 Forces TV. 1992. Bosnian War: How Was the British Army Involved? 124 Bellamy, C. 1992. Bosnian test for Army's supply-side strategy. [Online]. The Independent. Available from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ uk/bosnian-test-for-armys-supply-side-strategy-1553261.html [Accessed: 14/05/2018]. 125 Hickman, K. 2017. Kosovo War: Operation Allied Force. [Online]. ThoughtCo. Available from: https://www.thoughtco.com/kosovo-waroperation-allied-force-2360847 [Accessed: 04/04/2018]. 126 Zunes, S. 2009. The US War on Yugoslavia, 10 years on. [Online]. Huffington Post. Available from: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ stephen-zunes/the-us-war-on-yugoslavia_b_211172.html [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. 127 BBC. 2018. Kosovo Profile. 128 Defence Forces Ireland. 2018. Kosovo Force. [Online]. Defence Forces Ireland. Available from: http://www.military.ie/overseas/current-missions/ kfor/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. 129 Velebit, V. 2017. What is the state of cooperation between Serbia and KFOR? European Western Balkans. [Online]. Available from: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/12/22/kfor-guarantor-peacestability/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. 130 Warfare Today. 2017. British Army sending More Soldiers to Kosovo. Warfare Today. [Online]. Available from: http://www.warfare.today/ 2017/04/18/british-army-sending-more-soldiers-to-kosovo/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. 131 Great Britain (GB). Parliament. 2018. House of Lords. Select Committee on International Relations. The UK and the future of the Western Balkans 1st Report of Session 2017–19. (HL Paper 53). 132 Dordevic, S. 2018. Security Partnership Between Serbia and Russia. [Online]. Belgrade center for security policy. Available from: https://pescanik.net/security-partnership-between-serbia-and-russia/ [Accessed: 07/04/2018].

References BBC. 2016. The Yugoslav Wars. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399 [Accessed: 21/03/2018]. BBC. 2018. Kosovo Profile. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859 [Accessed: 21/03/2018]. Bellamy, C. 1992. Bosnian test for Army's supply-side strategy. [Online]. The Independent. Available from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ bosnian-test-for-armys-supply-side-strategy-1553261.html [Accessed: 14/05/2018]. Burns, J. 1993. British Army's Job in Bosnia: To Keep Risky Lifeline Open. [Online]. The New York Times. Available from:https://www.nytimes.com/ 1993/08/23/world/british-army-s-job-in-bosnia-to-keep-risky-lifelineopen.html [Accessed: 25/03/2018]. Castelow, E. Not Dated. Flora Sandes. [Online]. Historic UK. Available from: https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Flora-Sandes/ [Accessed: 14/05/2018]. Defence Forces Ireland. 2018. Kosovo Force. [Online]. Defence Forces Ireland. Available from: http://www.military.ie/overseas/current-missions/ kfor/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. Department of Public Information, United Nations (UN). 1996. United Nations

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Protection Force Profile. [Online]. Department of Public Information, United Nations. Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past /unprof_p.htm [Accessed: 23/03/18]. Dordevic, S. 2018. Security Partnership Between Serbia and Russia. [Online]. Belgrade center for security policy. Available from: https://pescanik.net/ security-partnership-between-serbia-and-russia/ [Accessed: 07/04/2018]. The Economist. 2016. The Balkans’ EU Dreams, Applications Deferred. [Online]. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/news/europe/ 21700685-region-still-enthusiastic-about-european-union-being-rebuffedapplications-deferred [Accessed: 08/04/2018]. Forces Network. 2016. Bosnian War: The Road to Vitez. [Online video]. Forces Network. Available from https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/ bosnian-war-road-vitez [Accessed 22/03/18]. Forces TV. 1992. Bosnian War: How Was the British Army Involved? [Online video]. YouTube. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=_BpHygNJorU [Accessed: 23/03/2018]. Google maps. 2018. Split to Vitez. [Online]. Google. Available from: https://www.google.rs/maps/dir/21000,+Split,+Croatia/Tomislavgrad,+B osnia+and+Herzegovina/Vitez,+Bosnia+and+Herzegovina/@44.1501659 ,16.4126802,8z/data=!4m20!4m19!1m5!1m1!1s0x13355dfc6bbcf517:0xa 1798ff631b49f98!2m2!1d16.4401935!2d43.5081323!1m5!1m1!1s0x475f8 0dc233b0729:0xfb35ea0671f7387a!2m2!1d17.2236492!2d43.7187433!1 m5!1m1!1s0x475f03315277563b:0x78474afbcdf8d2a4!2m2!1d17.790527 1!2d44.150897!3e0 [Accessed: 25/03/2018]. Great Britain (GB). Parliament. 2018. House of Lords. Select Committee on International Relations. The UK and the future of the Western Balkans 1st Report of Session 2017–19. (HL Paper 53). Hickman, K. 2017. Kosovo War: Operation Allied Force. [Online]. ThoughtCo. Available from: https://www.thoughtco.com/kosovo-war-operation-alliedforce-2360847 [Accessed: 04/04/2018]. History. 2009. BOSNIAN GENOCIDE. [Online]. History. Available from: https://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide[Accessed:20/03/18]. Imperial War Museum (IWM). 2018. 25 Photos of The Bisnia War 1992-1995. [Online]. Available from: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/25-photosfrom-the-bosnian-war-of-1992-1995 [Accessed: 03/04/2018]. ITN. Not Dated. A Coy 1 Cheshire Bosnia. [Online video]. YouTube. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zT7TUUnvIcY[Accessed 22/03/18]. Judah, T. 2011. Yugoslavia: 1918 – 2003. [Online]. BBC. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/yugoslavia_01.shtml [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. Krsticevic, D. 1998. UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN CROATIA CARLISLE BARRACKS: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE.

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Lampe, J. 2003. Yugoslavia FORMER FEDERATED NATION [1929–2003]. [Online]. Encyclopedia Britannica. Available from: https:// www.britannica.com/ place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-19292003 [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. Lampe, J. 2018. Bosnian conflict. [Online]. Britannica. Available from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict[Accessed:21/03/18]. Marshall, R. Not Dated. British Armed Forces in UN Protection Force. [Online]. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Available from: https:// fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/1996-4/marshall.htm [Accessed: 21/03/18]. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. 2017. UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia) (UNPROFOR). [Online]. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Available from: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/honourshistory-medals-chart/medal-unprofor.page [Accessed: 24/02/18]. Needham, J. 1995. 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards Bosnia 1993-1994 Operation Grapple 3 UNPROFOR. [Online video]. Available from: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrVLem8CPiQ&t=1737s [Accessed: 23/03/18]. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 1995. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Online]. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Available from: https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true [Accessed 22/03/2018]. Reuters. 2008. CHRONOLOGY-What happened during the war in Bosnia? [Online]. Reuters. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSL21644464 [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. Suster, M. 2014. SALONIKA: THE MOST FORGOTTEN FRONT. [Online]. The Great War Project. Available from: http://greatwarproject.org/2016/09/ 12/salonika-the-most-forgotten-front/ [Accessed: 15/05/2018]. Velebit, V. 2017. What is the state of cooperation between Serbia and KFOR? European Western Balkans. [Online]. Available from: https:// europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/12/22/kfor-guarantor-peace-stability/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. The World Bank. 2018. Western Balkans Regular Economic Report. [Online]. The World Bank. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/ eca/publication/western-balkans-regular-economic-report [Accessed: 24/03/2018]. Warfare Today. 2017. British Army sending More Soldiers to Kosovo. Warfare Today. [Online]. Available from: http://www.warfare.today/2017/04/18 /british-army-sending-more-soldiers-to-kosovo/ [Accessed: 27/03/2018]. Zunes, S. 2009. The US War on Yugoslavia, 10 years on. [Online]. Huffington Post. Available from: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/theus-war-on-yugoslavia_b_211172.html [Accessed: 24/03/2018].

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What lessons can be learned from the French logistical effort in Mali during Operation SERVAL? The French logistical effort during Operation SERVAL in Mali from Jan 2013 to Jul 2014 demonstrated that a mechanised infantry capability could be projected at length with streamlined logistic support, enabling the force to strike quickly and effectively into enemy territory at great depth. By Lt Vachha The aim of this essay is to investigate the operation and draw out how they achieved this through understanding the 4Ds1 and applying the tactical logistic principles FACES2 to understand how they were successful before drawing lessons from the operation. Firstly, a summary of the key events can help contextualise the situation in Mali at the time of the incident. In late 2012, Islamic militants took over half the country in a matter of months, they took hold of the northern mountainous regions and pushed south capturing the towns of Gao, Bamako and Timbuktu.

They took hold of the country which prompted the failing government to request help from the French. On the 11 Jan2013, President Francois Hollande gave an executive order for the Frenchâ€™ military to start Operation SERVAL. Shortly after on 26 Jan, French troops reclaimed Bamako (Phase 0, photo above) and moved forward 588 miles to take the former Islamist stronghold in Gao (Phase 1, photo above) and started the push towards Timbuktu. 84

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Within a few months they once again pushed North (Phase 2, photo above) into the northern territories. In Jul 2013, the operation was passed to the United Nations to become a peacekeeping operation. To understand the lessons learned, this essay will explore the logistical effort in Mali through the metric of the 4Ds, to understand the logistic frictions that were faced. This will allow logistic principles to be applied to the French operation in order to understand how they succeeded and what lessons can be learned for the future. The first friction to consider is destination. In Mali, the French faced several significant destination factors. Mali is largely a flat country with a northern mountainous region that the operation needed to transition into. The land was barren, dry and hot with minimal built up infrastructure and lots of small communities dotted around in the expanses of land between the city centres. The long distances and tough terrain presented conditions that complicated heavy tracked vehicles would struggle in and suffer high rates of failure in theatre. The second friction to consider is distance. The vast distance the French needed to project ground lines of communication and supply too, presented challenges. The city of Bamako is located 41,300km from France and 3,000km by road from the nearest French base in Chad. And this was just for the arrival into Mali; within Mali itself, the

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distances that needed to be projected were once again significant. The nearest coast to Bamako was more than 800km. From Bamako forward to Gao, the French needed to project lines of supply up to 1,000km and the projection north east of Gao to the mountainous regions was a total distance of 1,300km. The vast distance to be covered required logistic effort to be based on necessity to supply only vital components and consumables, to prevent logistic formations from being over reached and over tasked. The next friction to consider is demand. The French logistic chain faced the high demands of a mechanised infantry on a high intensity footing. To overcome this, the French streamlined its fighting force by using simpler, wheeled vehicles to minimise the need for complex spares. This increased the mean time to failure allowing for more track miles. The fighting force and vehicles adopted a foraging approach to the operation, they drained fuel stations dry as they moved through the country, taking food and water from the land. This streamlined demand allowed for only critical supplies, such as ammunition and vehicles spares, to be brought forward. Duration is the final friction to consider. French success in Mali depended on the duration of the operation being kept as low as possible to enable the demand, distance and destination frictions to be minimised. A short campaign allowed for logistical success where frictions were met with minimal logistical effort and only a smaller number of vital supplies were required to be brought forward or flown in at great cost. Essentially the operation had high risk, as the high demand was able to be maintained over a short duration but not throughout a long campaign. The frictions discussed above were overcome using the tactical principles of logistics FACES, which led to the operation being a success. There are three aspects to foresight that are key to consider. The first is France’s colonial and historical links to Mali. The second is France’s pre-positioned troops in Chad, which allowed for French troops to enter Mali quickly given their relatively close proximity to the country. It also enabled a staging area with consumable supplies and with a preestablished logistical supply route. Finally, the Guepard alert system allowed France to quickly mass a logistical chain and fighting elements to start the onward projection of force and log facilities to project supply. Looking at the logistic principle of agility, France achieved this by employing several methods. Foraging enabled the fighting elements to fuel, eat and drink without needing an extensive log chain, as food and fuel didn’t need projecting in great mass. Increased lift capacity from Allied aircraft allowed the inload of vital spares and ammunition to be pushed forward quickly without a ground-based log chain. The readiness of the French military enabled quick deployment of vehicles and troops, projection of force and logistic nodes. The principle of co-operation was key to France’s success in Mali, using home nation support and allied help. The ability

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to keep a large force mobile through Mali, with minimal logistical tail, was only achievable through support from the Malian people and government; the access to their fuel pumps, food, water and other consumables, meant the French did not carry these with them as they moved forward. The reliance on knowledge and infrastructure from the home nation was also key. The allied support was mainly achieved with massed allied air, the need for vital supplies was weighed up against food and water and only the absolute minimum was taken forward with the fighting force, the remainder was air dropped in by the allied air fleet available to them. Operation SERVAL also embodied efficiency through the use of allied support and the reliance on home nation support. Working in conjunction with the home nation minimised the areas of responsibility following the operation. The maintenance of momentum kept efficacy to a maximum, while France’s forward movement at speed prevented the enemy from putting up a sustained fight in a defensive position. This efficiency reduced the logistic strain and allowed for further projection of the force. The offensive achieved simplicity through establishing a simple logistic chain. Only ammunition and mission critical kit was moved forward with the fighting force, the remainder of supplies were gained from the land or from host nation support. They embodied fight light and resourced the operation through allied air support and host nation infrastructure. Looking at the logistic effort in Mali, there are several factors identified which contributed to achieving a successful

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campaign. Reducing logistic burden allowed for the vital elements to go forward, for example, during the long distances the French used simple wheeled vehicles that were easier to fix without specialist complex parts and the wheels alone allowed for longer run times between failure. The second key point was the expeditionary nature of the force in the campaign. Foraging for fuel and food allowed for the essential warfighting supplies coming forward to be reduced and therefore the logistic elements could concentrate specifically on ammunition and spares. However, with an overstretched logistic chain, the French often had to rely on flying kit forward at high cost to meet urgent demands. The key lessons learnt from the French logistic effort in Mali during Operation SERVAL, demonstrate that a mechanised infantry capability can be projected successfully at length. What we have learnt analysing the 4Ds is that the key lesson shows us that projection of logistical support at length is hinged on the duration of the operation. If the duration can be kept short, then the projection of logistical support will be successful. If the duration is too long it becomes unachievable and the risk increases as the lines of supply are over extended and strained. Combined with this, the lessons that have been learnt from an analysis of FACES there are clear messages to take home to achieve future success. The type of kit used and the plans for resupply and repair of kit need to be considered before the logistic chain is established itself. This is embodied in the strike concept of a tailored response with a streamlined logistical tail to allow projection at great range. As force is projected across long distances, it is essential that the kit is fit for purpose, but also simple to repair and resupply to reduce the logistic burden. Secondly, the use of

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air assets can allow for specialist kit to be stored away from the fighting elements and brought forward quickly only when required. Although high cost, high risk, this reduces the need for less common spares to be held at readiness and potentially not brought forward if not needed. Finally, the use of host nation support can be vital to provide access to fuel, water and infrastructure and avoid the need to move bulk liquids, food and water across long distances, leaving the logistic chain to focus on the ammunition and common spares. This co-ordination also allows for the force to project quickly and at great depth, as host nations can take control of rear areas and establish their own logistic network to the rear of the strike elements.

Footnotes 111

4 Ds: Destination, Distance, Demand, Duration FACES: Foresight, Agility, Co-Operation, Efficiency, Simplicity

112

References A History Of Violence And Unrest In Mali https://www.firstpost.com/world/ahistory-of-violence-timeline-of-unrest-in-mali-since-january-2012-2515304 .html (Accessed 19 April 2018) France’s Role Explained https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_ 104974.htm (Accessed 21 April 2018) France’s role in Mali https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR770.html (Accessed 23 April 2018) France in Mali http://www.france24.com/en/20140111-france-mali-militaryintervention-operation-serval-anniversary-timeline (Accessed 20 April 2018) Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494? src=recsys&journalCode=fjss20 (Accessed 20 April 2018) Operation Serval https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=10924 (Accessed 19 April 2018) The French Serval Operation https://sldinfo.com/2013/01/the-french-servaloperation-the-double-edged-sword-of-the-mali-operation/ (Accessed 24 April 2018)

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The Utility of ‘Train Hard, Fight Easy’ For RLC Units This article will examine and evaluate the principles of training and its importance within the military. It will identify the potential risks of military training and missed opportunities in current training programmes. Finally, it will argue that the Royal Logistic Corps needs to do more to break away from the perception of being generalists and focus on identifying how synergies in training can be achieved while in support of the training of others. By Lt A English “This was the great Allied lesson of Tunisia; equally important on the technical side was the value of training. Thorough technical, psychological and physical training is one protection and one weapon that every nation can give its soldiers before committing them to battle, but since war always comes to a democracy as an unexpected emergency, this training must largely be accomplished in peace … Many of the crosses standing in Tunisia today are witnesses to this truth”’ General Dwight D Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, Crusade in Europe1 Today, it can be argued more than ever that the old adage 'train hard, fight easy' is more relevant than it ever was. After nearly two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consequent draw down of forces from overseas contingency operations, there no longer seems the urgent requirement to have large numbers of soldiers trained quickly for immediate deployment. As such the Army is returning its focus on the basics of soldiering and shifting the nature of how it fights, with the intention of building an adequate army ready to face a wider array of threats around the world.

business of providing goods or services. Fighting wars or keeping the peace usually occupies relatively little of an army's total time, however such is the complexity of such activities and so significant are the consequences of failure that the main focus of the British Army must be in preparation for future operations and wars. The aim of all training is the creation of hard, resilient soldiers and commanders who can analyse, decide and manoeuvre to win in the complex battlespace of the 21st Century2. Training provides the means to practice, develop and test, within constraints, the practical application of a common doctrine. Its purpose is to produce force elements at readiness to deploy and undertake specified tasks. There are several identifiable principles of training, which have endured for a number of decades. In particular, the need for training to be relevant, realistic and special to arm. From guidance set forth by Commander Field Army, Lt Gen Patrick Sanders, the Army has begun to undertake a ‘back to basics’ training initiative, with the intent "to make a bold correction to our training point of aim away from Battle Group and above to focus on establishing deep, special to arm expertise up to sub unit level”3. The British Army must be able to rapidly deploy, fight, sustain itself and win in an austere environment. Relevant This is critical as the Army gets smaller and budget cuts force the service to slow down its modernisation priorities4. Except for operations, training is the most important thing that an army does. With less investment, the Army needs to find new ways to ensure it remains as one of the best militaries in the world. If it cannot have the most up to date equipment then it needs to ensure its people are its force multipliers. However, at present defence cuts have caused the 'hollowing out and depletion of the Army's deployed capabilities'5.

The Importance of Training The purpose of our armed forces is to defend the UK and its interests by conducting military operations across the world. This could include warfighting, overseas engagement and capacity building, peace keeping or UK engagement and homeland resilience operations. Ultimately any armed force exists to fight and should be adequately prepared to do so. To achieve this, soldiers are prepared as members of that force through training and education. In many professions training can be relatively limited, with little time or resources allocated. The main preoccupation is often with the core THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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extended periods of time, under adverse weather conditions while remaining combat effective? The transition to a BCS syllabus will be challenging for both the soldier undertaking the training, the SME delivering it and the unit programmers planning it.

'... a unit may do badly [on exercise]. That does not matter - it will all be experience which will save casualties when the operation has to be done in battle ...' Lt Gen Montgomery, Lecture to Staff College 194110.

Therefore, it is imperative that the Army works to rebuild a set of skills that have declined in the face of budget cuts and ever improving technology. This will either be achieved by the MoD investing time and money to ensure its soldiers are the most proficient and effective operators they can be, or arguably by the Army becoming more efficient. Realistic Today's society runs on technology. In Bde HQ’s key equipment relies on GPS and satellite information. Mobile phones work virtually everywhere and the internet is a critical component to every strategic operations centre. What would happen therefore, if these systems were to fail? Or if the enemy was to launch an evasive and effective electronic warfare attack? For example, it is well known that Russia has this capability6. Would it be such a farfetched idea, to believe that this could happen to the UK? It could be argued that British troops would struggle to find their way back to base with just a map and compass when GPS stopped working; that they would struggle to communicate with HQs when radios stopped working7. It could be argued that the British Army's reliance on technology, (although accurate, effective and lethal in the operating environment), could undermined its ability to fight against a ‘like for like peer’ if, or even when, it fails. Has it lost sight of these basic skills and degraded leader development? If this is the case and based on our known and assumed threats8, the Army must be more prepared to revert back to its analogue skills and shift its focus from the last two decades of “fight, fight, and fight”. During this period, little time and effort was spent on getting soldiers back to the camp environment, where they could train effectively and become efficient at their trade through understanding the basics. This is - to meet the Army Mission 'to prepare Land Forces for ongoing and contingency operations, deploy them when ordered and succeed - something that will only be achieved through effective training9. Special to Arm The problem is defining the basics. Is it shooting for the Infantry? Cooking for the chefs? Fixing vehicles for the REME? Or does it all come down to basic field-craft teaching our soldiers how to operate out of a rucksack for 88

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Risks in Military Training The last few years have seen a few high-profile deaths occurring in military training. Three recruits died in 2013 during an SAS training exercise in the Brecon Beacons and a further two soldiers were killed in tank training at Castlemartin ranges in 2017. Within military training and operations, this has created tension, between our doctrine which espouses calculated risk-taking and national and international legislation, which seeks to minimise risk. Training risk is a shortfall in training of a given force element compared with the expected requirement. This can clearly exacerbate operational risk, in that force elements are not sufficiently competent to conduct advanced operations and misunderstand the risks they must take. How can the Army experiment with new ideas when its culture is wholly averse to the possibility failure?

'Risk aversion in training, for example ceasing an activity because it might lead to the death or injury of a single solider in a ten-year period, could lead to a loss of expertise that will in turn contribute to the death or injury of ten soldiers in one year of operations' Army Doctrine Publication Operations 201111. The Army needs to adopt a safe to fail environment. One where units, sub units and troops are not afraid to change things and experiment with ideas. It is not enough to have an organisational culture that pertains to embrace learning from failure. There should also be a culture of protecting from failure to safeguard existing values. This is because the identification of failure is frequently followed by the attribution of blame12. The Army needs to adopt practices that ensure and validate outcomes, not just procedures. In most organisations, the focus of management is mostly on procedures, which leads to bureaucracy and stagnation. These procedures may have been fine once, but things inevitably change and workers should feel safe to try new things and experiment with all kinds of novel ideas13. Missed Opportunities At present this lack of freedom to try new ideas is hampering the Army’s ability to fully maximise results. Training opportunities are being missed! Observations from Kenya have suggested that Combat Service Support (CSS) Groups need to realistically practise sustaining themselves as well as the Battle Group (BG). Stories from NCOs recount how

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and Bde level. The ideal solution would be to conduct more exercises where the RLC can train alongside all the attached arms, increasing familiarity, improving integration and overall effectiveness.

“Combat Logistic Patrols are a G3 operation delivering G4 effect”, Brigadier Mark Carlton-Smith Bde Comd 16 AA Bde on Op HERRICK, now CGS. The question for the future therefore must be: Can the RLC remain as professional as it was following Afghanistan, or will the 'loggies' return to a secondary more generalist supporting role in small groups rather than as formed bodies? To some it seems that multiple smaller tasking, ruins troop and squadron cohesion. Better foresight in planning and more selective criteria, providing generalist support to training others (with the proviso that there is clear benefit in the training for the RLC) must become a key consideration if the RLC is to remain match fit in the new ways of working. The RLC should be wary of falling into a habit of taskorging at the lowest level. It doesn’t aid cohesion, improve long-term efficiency, or offer the best training value. The ideal situation would be to aspire to ring-fence a particular cohort of soldiers to conduct training more as formed groups. As a Corps, we must retain our trade and combat skills. By identifying more synergies in training and Real Life Support (RLS) tasks there is a real opportunity to improve overall operational effectiveness across the board. Conclusion

“It is my Royal and Imperial command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill and all the valour of my soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army”. Army Order issued by Emperor William II, 19 August 1914.

Credit: Defence images

the RLC, while deployed to Afghanistan, would conduct protected logistic moves with up to 150 vehicles and travel 150 kilometres over two or three days. By contrast, while training in Kenya the Corps is conducting logistic manoeuvres with two to three vehicles for 15 kilometres. The ability to operate at range should be a primary strength of the RLC. Ex ASKARI TEMPEST goes some way in proving this but the supply lines could be further lengthened to be more testing and add realism without disrupting the existing exercise construct. If the British Army is to reap the maximum rewards from set training pieces such as BATUK, BATUS and the larger UKbased exercises, the organisation needs to ensure that it; force generates early on to enable maximum stability prior to deploying; minimises inconsistencies in training; safeguards common SOPs and reduces fluctuating structures due to last minute details. During the first phase of a recent Kenya deployment, the CSS Gp was granted the time to deliver a week long Collective Training (CT) 1 exercise. This provided an invaluable opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses in a failsafe environment ahead of the more demanding phases of the exercise. Experienced NCOs could deliver individual and section level training and were quickly able to pick up on areas that required further work such as driving with night vision goggles. Weaknesses and previously unreported training shortfalls were ultimately resolved through practice and honest critique to the subsequent benefit of the larger exercise. The RLC now liaises with the combat support and teeth arms more regularly than has been the case, but it could and should do this even more frequently. Multiple PXRs have observed that due to the lack of opportunity for CSS close support troops to train alongside supporting arms (Engineers/REME) before deploying on exercises, SOPs and TTPs aren’t as thoroughly practised as those who are integral to the BGs. This makes co-ordination throughout exercise periods disjointed. Prior knowledge and understanding of the different SOPs among attached arms would enable more effective planning and preparation for tasking’s at both BG

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When Kaiser Wilhelm referred to the British Army in 1914 as that 'contemptible little army' he was referring to its size. However, what the Kaiser did not know was that the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French was at the time one of the best trained armies in the world. That is because, since the Boer War they repeatedly trained harder, to build experience, competence and confidence so that they had the skill set to adapt and overcome, in the most challenging and contested environments.

“Don’t let past mistakes and failures dictate what you are… let it be a lesson for all that strengthens the organisation you want to become”. Anon. In summary, UK forces currently operate with the same quality of equipment as many of its peer and near peer allies and adversaries. It recruits from roughly the same demographic and is comparable in size, if not smaller, than many armies that consider it an aiming mark for quality. The defining factor in the effectiveness and efficiency of the British Army, the unique selling point, is the high level of quality training we put our soldiers, units and formations through. However, more can be extracted from this training if failings are identified in a ‘fail safe’ environment, analysed and then disseminated for the wider benefit of all. Too much focus is currently on streamlining the Army’s capabilities to make it more economical. More effort should be invested in ensuring the British Army and the RLC reap the maximum benefit from the training opportunities that already exist and more effectively share the lessons of failure to refine best practise.

“Good, better, best. Never let it rest. 'Til your good is better and your better is best”. St Jerome. Bibliography General Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 1998 Army Field Manual - Training, Volume 1, Part 7 Commander Field Army, Filmed Brief, Back to Basics https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/akx/training/commanddirection-(training)/commander-field-army-(cfa)/cfa-filmed-brief Ministry of Defence Braced for Brutal Cuts in Security Review – https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/24/ministry-of-defencein-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018 CHARC, Is it time for the West to wake up and smell the vodka, Feb 2016 http://chacr.org.uk/docs/Ares-Athena3.pdf -? Operational Lessons Team – Autumn 2017 – Learning from Operations – Op CABRIT – pg 15 How Much of a Threat Does Russia Pose, And to Who? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40428132 SDSR – 2015 and the Army, House of Commons Defence Committee https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/108/ 108.pdf

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Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations (updated 31st March 2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/605298/Army_Field_Manual__AFM__A5_Master _ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf C. Wajzer, et all, Institute For Government, Failing Well, Pg 34, 2017) https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications /IFGJ4331_Failing-Well_25.07.16_WEBc.pdf Forbes, Create a Safe to Fail Environment, 2016, https:// www.forbes.com/sites/jurgenappelo/2016/04/03/create-a-safe-to-failenvironment/#52dba28d10d8 Ministry of Defence braced for 'brutal' cuts in security review https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/24/ministry-of-defencein-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/108/10 8.pdf - SDSR 2015 and the Army, 25 April 2017 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40428132 - how much of a threat does Russia pose, and to who? https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/british-army-could-be-wiped-outrussia-afternoon - British army could be wiped out by Russia in an afternoon https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21732101-defence-has-faredbetter-most-departments-during-austerity-it-still - Britain’s armed forces braced for cuts Army Doctrine Publication - Operations, Chapter 6, paragraph - 0615, dated November 2011.

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General Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 1998 Army Field Manual - Training, Volume 1, Part 7 113 Commander Field Army, Filmed Brief, Back to Basics https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/akx/training/commanddirection-(training)/commander-field-army-(cfa)/cfa-filmed-brief 114 Ministry of Defence Braced for Brutal Cuts in Security Review – https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/24/ministry-of-defencein-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018 115 CHARC, Is it time for the West to wake up and smell the vodka, Feb 2016 - http://chacr.org.uk/docs/Ares-Athena3.pdf -? 116 CHARC, Is it time for the West to wake up and smell the vodka, Feb 2016 - http://chacr.org.uk/docs/Ares-Athena3.pdf -? 117 Operational Lessons Team – Autumn 2017 – Learning from Operations – Op CABRIT – pg 15 118 How Much of a Threat Does Russia Pose, And to Who? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40428132 119 SDSR – 2015 and the Army, House of Commons Defence Committee https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/108/ 108.pdf 110 Army Field Manual - Training, Volume 1, Part 7 111 Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations (updated 31st March 2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/605298/Army_Field_Manual__AFM__A5_Master _ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf 112 C. Wajzer, et all, Institute for Government, Failing Well, Pg 34, 2017) https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications /IFGJ4331_Failing-Well_25.07.16_WEBc.pdf 113 Forbes, Create a Safe to Fail Environment, 2016, https:// www.forbes.com/ sites/jurgenappelo/2016/04/03/create-a-safe-to-failenvironment/#52dba28d10d8 112

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Operation SHADER and The Sustainment Improvement Team: Aug 2017-Mar 2018 Op SHADER is mutating as it keeps pace with the shifting kaleidoscope of regional armed groups, maintains coalition momentum and importantly, tracks and attempts to understand Iraqi intent. SHADER is of course the UKs commitment to the Combined Joint Task Force - OP INHERENT RESOLVE - covering both Iraq and Syria. The Combined Joint Task Force’s mission is: ‘In conjunction with Partner Forces, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve defeats ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and sets conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability’. And at $1.4 Billion requested for 2019, its work is not finished. By Maj R Gardener Ground in General - Operation SHADER The ISIS leader Baghdadi, at the time of writing, is in poor mental and physical health, unable to walk due to injury and illness. Despite pockets of resistance emerging and receding, ISIS has been defeated in 98% of the territory it once controlled. But it is the echo of this region’s more sinister underbelly that troubles some people the most. The reason why: ‘setting the conditions…to increase regional stability’, is so vital and important. How can the coalition develop Iraqi security forces so they don’t allow sectarian violence to spiral out of control as it did in 2011? How can we help prevent the development and proliferation of ISIS/AQ #2? How can we shore-up the security forces so that they don’t capitulate as readily as they did throughout 2014? All that without looking too far outside Iraq’s own borders and the regional issues that encroach from all sides. Looking through a broad aperture, the view from Taji, 30Kms North of Baghdad, is that the conventional coalition effort has been focused on the development and improvement of the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga. This supports the battle, refines the Iraqi end-product, builds partner capacity, defeating ISIS. In locations right across Iraq coalition, teams have conducted ‘brigade re-sets’, taking ‘trained’ soldiers and offering them advice, assistance and equipment before throwing them back into the fight. In Taji alone, an ANZAC team attempts to improve infantry skills up

to company level. British and Singaporean teams teach bridging, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), and combat lifesaving. Americans divest every class of supply into an imperfect Iraqi supply chain. Contractors work hard to improve equipment availability and provide operational airfields. I’ve scratched the surface. The endeavour is considerable. Without getting bogged down in the longerterm affordability of this concerted effort – Iraq can ill-afford the status quo, let alone its future ambitions – it is a fair observation that the support given to date has been largely focused at the tactical level; win the fight. What now…now the fight is won? A ‘Reliable Partnership’. Coalition plans have waxed and waned. A comprehensive coalition 2-year plan that absorbed much of the Combined Joint Task Force staff effort in 2017, was marched confidently around the Iraqi Ministry of Defence by senior Iraqi officers. A good plan and a good vision, but one that ultimately remained unsigned and unsupported. The Iraqi Army had other plans, grander and worryingly, unaffordable. A structure that could only be hollow in many areas as it largely is now. 12 to ten divisions with the creation of ‘new’ Qwat Kasah brigades; light infantry/ranger formations…or the Republican Guard in old money. A plan that, with admittedly limited detailed knowledge, appears almost oblivious of cross-cutting capability development issues. So scrap the coalition two-year plan and go back to the drawing board. Nest whatever we do next in the US Office for Security Cooperation’s five-year plan. After all, they really are here for the long term. Consolidate the coalition footprint, merge the Combined Joint Task Force and Combined Joint Task Force Land Component Command headquarters; become more efficient, more effective and mutate. Confused? The coalition is slowly moving away from tactical support or ‘Building Partner Capacity’, to focus more on institutional level support and ‘Enhancing Partner Capacity’. What does that mean? Less focus on the end product of a dubiously effective Iraqi training system and more attention given to THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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the training pipeline itself; move away from the operators and towards the institutions that develop them. How can we enable Iraqis themselves to produce better soldiers as opposed to accepting a poor end product and then the coalition attempting to refine it? How can Iraqi Army processes and procedures improve and become more effective and more efficient? Ground in Detail - The Sustainment Improvement Team Combat Service Support (CSS) across the Iraqi Security Forces, not just the Army, is over reliant on external support. Strategic movement is predominantly contracted (~$3 million to move the Armoured Division from the North of Iraq to the Euphrates River Valley; affordable?), maintenance capabilities are inefficient and supply chain management falters repeatedly. There is the faintest whiff of corruption in places. Our focus in the Sustainment Improvement Team is, in part, is the development of sustainment training. Not to delve into the ground forces and try and fix their problems, but to attempt to improve the system that provides the people, concepts, processes and procedures. Focus on the generating force and less on the generated, develop the institutions, enable the Iraqis to train their own force. Support to sustainment training up to the start of 2018, like the other capability areas, has been focused on the tactical level in the field force. The roles of an administration sergeant, duties of electrical and mechanical engineer forward repair teams and so on…the concept of a quartermaster, a quartermaster technical or company quartermaster sergeant being low on the ‘to do list’ and tentatively touched upon. Level one through to four workshops, warehouses for all classes of supply, hazardous material handling, equipment care, transportation managers and operators…all these areas plus many more are operated and led by ‘trained’ officers and soldiers of wildly mixed ability. The institutions that provide the maintenance, supply and transportation tradesmen – the schools – have had little or in some cases no support to date. The ‘next generation’ produced by these schools continue to be sub-standard. If we wanted to move away from building

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partner capacity (polishing the end product) to enhancing partner capacity (generating better end products), then this institutional level of training needs to be developed and improved…and when there’s so much to sink your teeth into, you need to prioritise. What faltering areas have the most direct links to operational effectiveness and where are the big bucks being hemorrhaged? These are as good starting points as any others. Institutional change takes time. Trying to develop fundamentals is not a job for those in a hurry. Patience, cooperation and understanding is required on all sides. The Iraqis have their own plans and ideas, their own vision. These are what we need to support and influence; not simply try and enforce our ways on them. The Iraqis talk about the ‘old Army’, Saddam’s Army. An army heavily influenced by British and Commonwealth structures, systems and processes. Then they talk of the ‘new Army’, the one built after 2004. There is a good deal of sentiment for the old, less pride in the new. Perhaps they are trying to revert to old ways, which may be inconsistent with the driving force behind the Coalition effort? Another consideration is individuals’ ambition. Iraqi officers aside - and that’s a major omission - everyone from the Coalition wants to achieve something in their six, nine or 12-month tour and we’re working on a two to five-year plan. Achieving real, enduring change is going to be a challenge within these tight timeframes. The coalition can only do so much with the resource available and you won’t be surprised to hear that despite some of the rhetoric, sustainment as a capability is not topping the priority list while the fight is still on. The Iraqis move at a pedestrian pace, expect the coalition to move twice as fast. Trust is gained, faith is lost. It’s an interesting if not bizarre operating environment at times. In a short tour, you need to understand and understand fast. You need to draw the line and come up with pragmatic plans for assistance. The grander the plan the less likely it is to actually being executed within your tour, if at all. Take a dose of realism and as Edward Whymper said: ‘from the beginning think what may be the end’.

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The inaugural five-man Sustainment Improvement Team deployed in August 2017. Sat within the Combined Joint Task Force training branch under a Canadian Brigadier General, its marching orders for the first six months were simply to ‘get after’ sustainment training and fleet management. ‘Move the Iraqi Army an inch forward in these areas and you’ll have achieved something’. In a slow-moving culture, rightly focused on combat operations, this would be ‘improvement’. Iraqi sustainment was defined as maintenance, supply and transportation. Our focus, in ‘staff 101’ parlance, would be on understanding the situation then improving the ends; ways and means as an approach to improving overall capability. Who are the principal stakeholders, which ones have influence, who sets training requirements, how are they delivered, do they meet Iraqi objectives, where are the gaps and so on? Iraqi training is for the most part structured the same way as the British training model. It can be broadly divided into, individual training and collective training. This progressive model builds upon a bedrock of prior training and knowledge gained during individual training Phases One through to Three. Due to resource constraints and operational necessity, training steps are circumnavigated and the trained output is often poor. This is where ‘Building Partner Capacity’ has been stepping in and attempting to rectify shortfalls. The Sustainment Improvement Team’s focus has been on individual training and the institutions that provide it. Our effort concentrated on generating instructors, improving curriculums, improving the means to train; ultimately to enable the Iraqis to generate enduring, quality trained output for themselves.

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Iraqi sustainment – logistics, on the whole - is dominated by its army’s electrical and mechanical engineers. The Lt Gen in charge of logistics and the heir apparent hails from this background, so guess where most of the resource goes? The Electrical and Mechanical Engineering school has its problems and difficulties, but it is first world when compared to the Administration and Transportation schools. Taji has always been a large garrison area with dozens of units, warehouses, ammunition supply points, an airfield and training institutions strewn across it, but the investment into each is varied. Priorities is one way of describing who gets what. The more cynical might say, those with ‘wasta’, (connections) in Arabic parlance, get preferential treatment. Take power for example. All the schools are regularly turned off from the mains grid due to a higher priority, air defence, requiring more juice. The schools therefore, must run off generators for which they receive an allowance to purchase fuel. The Electrical and Mechanical Engineering school receives a larger allowance and has engineers to fix problems with the generators. The other schools generally run out of fuel and are left to teach outdoors. There is no sharing of resource unless ordered to do so, despite all being under the M4 (logistics) Directorate. The Electrical and Mechanical Engineers have ‘wasta’ in the Logistics Directorate and Ministry of Defence. Iraqi CSS is not as coherent as in the UK or US. The US delivers sustainment through sustainment brigades, which include maintenance, transportation and supply functions. The UK model is more stove piped; unless of course you’re going to be part of the new Strike CSS Battalion. In the Iraqi

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Army maintenance is similar to the UK’s, but transportation is a separate entity and the supply function is spread thinly right across the force; each cap badge has its own suppliers. Supply. Engineers train suppliers who deal with engineering parts; the electrical and mechanical engineers train their own suppliers; medics train their people and for all other classes of supply you will receive training at the Administration School - a sort of AGC/RLC cross. The process for managing the supply chain is theoretically the same, whether you’re dealing with medical supplies or ammunition. You submit a demand using Form 101. If accepted and items are in stock, you are ‘issued’ using Form 102. If you are denied supplies, you receive a rejected 101 and if there is nothing in stock then the demand goes through a procurement cell; the source is invariably the Coalition but should be sourced using Iraqi methods and means. This relatively simple if not ridiculously over-bureaucratic process is being taught in multiple schools badly. The result is sub-standard tradesmen and a faltering supply chain across all classes of supply. Follow a tradesman, for any class of supply, from his unit back to the school where he received his training and an interesting picture emerges. Take a soldier at an ammunition supply point for example. He doesn’t know what hazard classifications or sub-divisions are, what the groups are or which groups are compatible with others. Shipping containers stacked with ammunition are placed next to habitable buildings. Cameras, phones, smoking materials and naked flames are all used within the supply point. There are no barriers separating bays of any description and forklifts are unserviceable; the place is an accident waiting to happen. Soldiers receive minimal ‘on the job’ training and less formal Phase 3 individual training. Now move to the Administration School, where they received their Phase 2 individual training and you’ll find no qualified instructors to teach ammunition management, no curriculum, no text books, doctrine, safety manuals or practical aides to bring theory to life. Moving away from building partner capacity to enhancing partner capacity and we must move into the 94

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school and address its issues, rather than becoming engrossed trying to patch up the ammunition supply point. There will be more of these and the problem will persist if we don’t tackle the institutions that are responsible for the poorly trained output in the first place. Transportation. Level One maintenance and scheduled maintenance is one of the biggest causes of equipment failure in the Iraqi army. Less than half the heavy equipment transporters in the Armoured Division remain on the road thanks to low-level fixes. Simple jobs done badly or not at all, that any operator should be able to perform, lead to catastrophic failure. Imagine your car running with no oil in it for example. A few dollars of oil as a level one job, is an easier fix than a seized engine requiring level three or even four repair. Tyres worn down to the wire casings, armoured loads tied down with ropes, hazardous material sloshing around in the back of 10-tonne trucks. The Iraqi transportation operators and their managers need improving. The school that delivers this training, has a pitiful vehicle pool and worse still, nowhere of note to drive. Students are taught practical elements using the entrance to the school, driving up and down a 250 meter drag from the front of camp to the back. The classrooms were built by the British in the 1950s and are ‘a little tired’. Under resourced is an understatement. Electrical and Mechanical Engineering. This organisation is doing much better. Battles have been raging and equipment has been key to success. Rehabilitation has been a major priority and resource has been thrown at the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. But the support has gone to their workshops, not invested in their training. A short vignette of sorts - the Iraqi Army has four main battle tanks (MBT) to support and we all know how economical armour can be! T-55, T-72, T-90 (recently procured) and M1A1 Abrams all feature on the manifest. Iraqi generals genuinely believe they need four different types of MBT. They would have more given the chance. The concept that

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they now require four different knowledge groups of trained operators, sustainers and maintainers is a secondary or even tertiary consideration. An appreciation for the CADMID cycle or evidence of a comprehensive pan-DLOD support package appears non-existent. There are no training courses or staff at the school that know the first thing about T-90 or M1A1 for that matter. Poles and Slovaks battle hard to teach T-72 and T-55. US contractors DynCorp are the principal maintainers for tracked artillery and protected mobility platforms such as HMMWV. General Dynamics fix the M1A1s and Man Tech maintain the MRAPS, dozers and plant; so why train Iraqis? The Army fleet is being kept afloat, but not by indigenous means. The famous T.E. Lawrence quote from the 1917 Arab Bulletin springs to mind…’Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them’. Forgotten lessons or a ‘different strategy’? The principal problem facing all the institutions is appropriate manning. Instructor levels at all the schools are between 50 and 75% understrength. Subsequently the ‘Command and Control’ staff must teach. This fundamental problem is not one the Coalition can fix. We can train their trainers, push, cajole and advise the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, but we cannot man these positions. To date every fighting aged male appears to have been syphoned off to fight on front lines; entirely understandable. But the reluctance to now fully man the institutions is taking time to overcome. There are no manning mechanisms that trickle post experience from the ground forces into instructor posts at the schools and likewise, technical excellence from the schools does not move down to the ground forces. In some cases, instructors will be posted to a school and spend 30 years there, having gained zero operational or field experience whatsoever. Personnel management is a huge issue. The schools are focused on theory, delivering explicit teaching in classrooms and rickety lecture halls. There are few opportunities to gain practical experience. Hands-on training occurs during Phase 3 individual training in the

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workplace. Something akin to an apprenticeship, not that our hosts would see it that way. The schools want practical training aides. The workshops, warehouses and units want theory lessons and training aides. In short everyone wants everything and no one wants to share a thing for fear of losing it for good. There is no formal training structure despite it naturally reflecting a sort of British model. Everyone agrees the schools should be the centers of excellence where all tradesmen pass through but they are a long way off achieving this. The model is there and tentatively works, but it desperately needs acknowledging and reinforcing. With a large proportion of the problems identified, the Sustainment Improvement Team set about targeting areas for improvement. Ends: Pressing the Ministry of Defence and Coalition Headquarters for a logistic training coherence board to sit bi-annually, discussing training requirements, delivery and resourcing; ensuring everything is aligned to strategic objectives. Cajole, entice and persuade the Ministry of Defence to invest (appropriate) manpower into its schools; perhaps even design a manning mechanism that rotates the talent through the ground forces and the training establishments. Ways: Make recommendations and preparations for nine expeditionary training teams to go into the schools from mid-2018, to generate new Iraqi instructors and improve their curriculums. Three are needed at the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering school. Two are required at the Transportation and Supply school and the Administration school needs four. Staff gaps analysis, training needs analysis, training objectives, draft programs of instruction also need to be put in place. Force generation across the Coalition to meet these ‘Ways’ has begun. Means: Improve the infrastructure in the schools and make them safe and sanitary places to train. Construct and provide appropriate places to train such as the driver training field for the Transportation and Supply school. Equip the classrooms so that they are brought up to modest Western standards. Within the improved school infrastructure coalition training teams will be able to really dig into the curriculums and start to improve the Iraqi instructors. With a revised manning

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model, improvement should be sustainable and with dialogue between schools and up and down the chain of command, resource should be transparent and go to where it is required most. It may not seem much in six months but progress has been made. The Iraqi logistic schools are developing now and will hopefully continue on this path, even when the Coalition withdraws much of its support. It might be premature to say this but, InshAllah sustainment has begun to improve. Reflecting on this experience with the Coalition and the Iraqi Army, there are lessons to be learned for the British Army. While combat will always remain the primary purpose of the Army, we pay lip service to its sustainment at our peril. The Battle for Mosul suffered severe setbacks, in part, due to the rehabilitation of vehicles; the speed at which the workshops could fix platforms; the confusing and inefficient supply chain that provides the spare parts; the inability to move armour rapidly around the battle space without the need to generate costly and time sapping contracts. All these CSS functions contribute directly to the gigantic effort being made at the F Echelon and were found wanting. Over

reliance on contracted solutions has led to almost complete reliance in some cases. Airfields could not operate, effective transportation would not occur and the vast majority of armoured platforms would not have the equipment support, if it were not for contractors. There is a balance of risk to be taken when training troops. If you rush or provide substandard training at Phase 1 and 2 you carry this risk into operations where there is little time to conduct remedial courses. Ensuring training is appropriately resourced across the DLODs is vital. Bad instructors, poor training opportunities, a lack of realism all generate soldiers who will potential fail when the time comes and CSS Units rarely train to CT3. Educated and trained soldiers are efficient and effective soldiers and the reverse applies. There were warning signs aplenty demonstrating the need for robust CSS. I don’t for one minute think we are in the same ball park as the Iraqis, but as efficiencies bite we need to make sure we don’t tread their path too closely. If we did, the capabilities we would sacrifice and losing the training we must have, risks perceived efficiencies biting us hard when we are most vulnerable.

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Are UK and US armed forces at risk of becoming over-reliant on contracted support to expeditionary operations? Since the end of the Cold War, Western forces have undergone dramatic reformations due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the proliferation of new threats. This transformation has placed huge limitations on the ability to sustain expeditionary operations and has led to an exponential increase in reliance on the outsourcing of logistic and equipment support activities. This review examines literature regarding the benefits and disadvantages related to the use of contracted support on operations, with a focus on US and UK contemporary operations. It outlines key benefits and concerns regarding the issue, concluding that there is a genuine risk of becoming over-reliant on contracted support to expeditionary warfare. By Mr E Foster Civilian contractors provide a wide range of services to military forces deployed on operations. Amongst other things, they have been employed to train and provide security for expeditionary forces, deliver technical services and provide logistical support. According to Kinsey and Patterson (2012), expeditionary operations would be unable to be effectively deployed or sustained, without the support of deployed contractors. This review first provides the historical context on the use of civilian contractors in support of military operations, shifting to an analysis of the more contemporary counter insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The scope of this review covers literature relating to the deployment of contractors providing logistic and equipment support in assistance to UK and US operations, as opposed to other defence contracts such as the provision of equipment or training. The term ‘contractor’ refers to a civilian working for an expeditionary military force and the term ‘deployed’ describes the co-location of these contractors with armed forces on operations. The UK and US are likely to be key allies for future operations and the UK’s approach to contractor support, is likely to be directly relevant to Department of Defense (DoD)

operational planners (Uttley, 2005). Controversies and debates surrounding contractors deployed on operations are likely to be similar in both the UK and US and it is noted that there is a ‘shared government orthodoxy’ on these issues (Uttley, 2005). Based on these deductions, it is assessed that any issues or advantages related to the employment of deployed contractors are shared by both nations. Historical perspective An examination by Knight and Wilcox (2010) of the British Navy’s Victualling Board, which sustained the British fleet during the wars of 1793 to 1815, provides an historical example of the effective use of civilian contractors, in support of military operations. The British Navy was heavily reliant on contracted support and a decisive edge was gained, in the Great Wars with France, through the effective management of these contractors (Knight and Wilcox, 2010). This highlights an early understanding of contracted logistic support as a battle-winning asset. Figure 1 illustrates the growing use of civilian contractors in support of operations over time. In the Great War of 1914-1918, France grew to develop a large and highly diverse workforce, as vast numbers of migrants from Europe, Africa and Asia travelled to France to work for the Allied Forces (Fogarty, 2014). This relatively modern and industrial war, compared with those that proceeded it, required comprehensive support from these non-combatants. The allied nations turned to each other for assistance and many of these workers were then deployed to the operational theatres of East Africa and the Middle East to serve as workers (Fogarty, 2014). This draws parallels to the more recent use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, where their services were shared amongst NATO forces through the employment of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) scheme (Baltrusaitist, 2008; DIANE Publishing, 2013). Deployed contractors have been used extensively in various guises throughout modern history, albeit with varying degrees of success (Smart, 2000). Moore and Antill (2008) identify that the British Army is growing ever more reliant on contracted support on contemporary operations and infer that this is predominantly due to the post-Cold War restructuring of the British Forces. In support of this, there have been significant transformations to the structures of the US and UK Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. Both nations have an increased reliance on private contractors to provide supportive functions on operational deployments that were traditionally performed by military personnel (Uttley, 2005). THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Figure 1. A Historical Perspective on the Importance of Contracted Support. (Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2009).

According to Uttley (2005), this topic is a key issue for US military planners. As the US and the UK are likely to remain close allies in future operations, this issue is also likely to remain a high priority for UK forces (Uttley, 2005). This assertion is echoed by the lack of any fundamental differences in overarching Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DoD policies (Uttley, 2005). The employment of the ACSA mechanism, which enables the US to share its contracted support with the UK and other Coalition partners (DIANE Publishing, 2013) could suggest further interdependence between US and the UK in relation to contracted support. An increasing reliance on contracted support The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, encouraged Western forces to reprioritise and concentrate on force projection, expeditionary operations and manouevre warfare, as they no longer faced a direct threat from the East (Moore and Antill, 2008). This resulted in the modification of doctrine relating to the entire supply chain. Instead of stockpiling fuel and ammunition, a ‘just in time’ approach had to be adopted instead of ‘just in case’ (Moore and Antill, 2008). Hayr (1991) stated that the British Army’s logistic doctrine was optimised to support operations on well-known ground with one battlefront using well-known supply routes. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 98

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‘aimed to remodel Britain’s defence policy’ to ‘meet the challenges of the next century’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998). These reformations brought new challenges to be the supply chain management strategy of Western forces and resulted in an increased reliance on deployed contractors (Uttley, 2005; Moore and Anhill, 2008). With the focus moving from static defence to expeditionary warfare, new supply chain limitations were discovered. Cowan (2000) assessed that the SDR revealed Britain’s weakness in sustaining overseas forces, which strengthens the MOD’s stance that contracted logistic support must be relied upon more extensively. Expeditionary warfare is, by definition, the deployment of a state's military to fight abroad, especially away from established bases. Logistic support must respond to the needs of the combat forces and there are valid arguments for an increased reliance on contractor support instead of solely depending on military logistics (Moore and Antill, 2008). In a comparison of the First and the Second Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003), the ratio of deployed US military personnel to contracted workers was 100:1 and 10:1 respectively (Uttley, 2005). The US DoD began to extend its domestic contracting functions to include logistical operational support during combat operations, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian

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Figure 2. A civilian contractor responsible for construction contracts at Camp Leatherneck. (U.S. Army Photo, 2011)

assistance missions (Utley 2005). This evidence could suggest that the US has steadily become more reliant on deployed contracted logistical support on contemporary operations. The benefits and drawbacks of contracted support The financial limitations placed upon the British military by the SDR, have caused the MoD to seek as much value for money as possible in terms of logistic capability (Cowan, 2000). Uttley (2005) suggests that it is more cost effective to contract out logistic services, based on his study of MoD reports spanning two decades, which indicates that the contracting of services at home has generated savings across a range of support functions. However, it is noted that the financial cost of these functions deployed on operations is much less clear. This indicates that while the benefits of contracted services ‘at home’ may be used as an approximation of potential cost-savings, they cannot be used as an accurate prediction of contracts on military deployments. The notion of lifecycle equipment costs is another key financial issue in the argument for a growing reliance on contractors. Particularly in high-tech areas, contractors are increasingly responsible for the entire life cycle of military equipment (Cowan, 2000). Moore et al. (1999) illustrated the inefficiencies of a self-sufficient military with the performance of the Challenger 1 Tank in the First Gulf War. It experienced a mean time before failure of 723km, against the expected figure of 1235km. As this equipment was far less reliable than anticipated, more parts had to be transported along the supply chain than predicted, leading to a stockpiling of inventory (Moore et al., 1999). This completely counteracts the ‘just in time’ approach discussed by Moore and Antill (2008). Contractors may be able to provide equipment support at a lower cost as they may be more agile and inventive than a government organisation and, in maintaining their own equipment, they will be exercising a core competence (Taylor, 2004). Overstretch is a continuing problem for British forces. Logistic services and support troops may well become the limiting factor in the sustainability of expeditionary operations (Cowan, 2000). Outsourcing services normally performed by soldiers would help with surge capacity, offer enhanced

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flexibility and allow the military to free up assets for additional operations (Cowan, 2000). Manpower limitations have also affected the US, UK and other Coalition forces in recent operations. Gen Rose (2008), whilst discussing operations in the most recent Afghanistan campaign, stated: ‘it is clear that in Afghanistan, Coalition forces have reached their limit with regards to manpower’. He also assessed that there were not enough combat troops to carry out the necessary tasks. Moore and Antill (2011) entertain the option of withdrawing non-combat support troops and replacing them with contractors. This would increase the amount of combat troops deployed and enable the military to contribute more effectively towards the mission. The decision to maintain or relinquish a core competency must be balanced against the potential benefits and drawbacks of outsourcing, particularly when developing a long-term policy or strategy. Much like industry, the armed forces should make a decision, based on what they should be good at and which services should be contracted (Taylor, 2004). The function of a military force should be, successful armed combat and Taylor (2004) argues that the repair and maintenance of equipment, should not be a core competence of the military, unless undertaken in the midst of fighting. In conjunction with the post-Cold War reformations, where the US military had to cut forces, they reduced support elements with the view to leaving combat units intact (Taylor, 2004). This notion is supported by Moore and Antill (2011), who discuss the reduction of military support elements and their replacement with deployed contractors. It also reinforces Cowan’s (2000) comments relating to the improved flexibility and surge abilities of the military due to the deployment of contractors on operations and closely aligns itself with the issue of overstretch. A key concern relating to the increased level of outsourcing is potential loss of knowledge and skill bases possessed by military personnel (Moore and Antill, 2011). In contradiction to the assertion made by Taylor (2004), Moore and Antill (2011) suggest that this could result in operational failure. A worrying potential situation relating to a contracting firm’s employment of ex-servicemen is depicted by Taylor (2014), in which there are rising future costs and availability issues in key areas. Contractors can often provide services cheaper than the military as they have not had to pay for their training costs. When the military outsources a trade, they cease to maintain or develop specific function. Over time, this trained labour force will reduce in size and the cost of employing deployed contractors could soar (Taylor, 2014). In LaPorte’s (2014) analysis, he states that the US Military’s over-reliance on contracted logistic services has resulted in atrophy and that a balance must be struck between outsourcing and self-sufficiency. Contracting is normally used as a means of delivering a certain service or product and in peacetime, the success of a contract is based upon its ability to meet certain key performance indicators. In wartime, however, these measures of success are often overshadowed by how well the use of contracted support, helps contribute towards the THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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strategic goals of the mission (Schwartz, 2011). According to General Allen, commander of ISAF in Afghanistan in 2011, ‘We must improve our contracting practises to ensure they fully support the mission.’ This suggests that contracted logistic support can not only be used to provide necessary services, but that it can directly support the commander’s intent; particularly when trying to influence the human terrain in a counter-insurgency operation. (Schwartz, 2011). However, while using local contractors on expeditionary operations can help to kick start an economy, there is a risk that these contractors will become reliant on the expeditionary force (Moore and Antill, 2011).

Figure 3. U.S. Army interpreter, Afghan National Police officer and contractors, Wardak province, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army Photo, 2011).

While outsourcing logistic activities to host nation contractors, can support the strategic mission, it can also critically undermine it. A study conducted by Varouhakis (2015) on truck drivers in Afghanistan found that local nationals employed in this role in support of ISAF, faced significant dangers. These contractors were found to have keen understanding of the perils that they faced, but these dangers were overshadowed by the salaries on offer that were simply unobtainable for the majority of individuals in their demographic. While the study suggests that the contractors were largely kept content by the relatively high wages they received, it highlights other issues that may not have been initially considered. Varouhakis (2015) suggests that contractors working for ISAF may have developed antipathy towards these Westerners, due to perceived cultural insensitivity that was displayed. He also asserts that there was a sense of animosity brewing due to the forthcoming departure of ISAF forces in 2014, stating that there were concerns over the lack of protection measures put in place for these contractors. This directly contradicts the US intent of employing contractors in support of the strategic goals of a campaign, suggesting that improperly considered contracting can seriously undermine an operation. Supplier selection is a key function of acquisition, where the decision on which supplier to contract must be made. 100

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This is normally based on cost, previous performance and the general quality of service. According to Schwartz (2011), the US DoD has inherent weaknesses in its government’s acquisition service, which are easily exploited during expeditionary operations. Contractors can take advantage of unclear statements of requirement, inadequately planned demand schedules and insufficient quantities of correctly trained and experienced procurement professionals. Vetting is also a crucial factor when issuing contracts. The US founded the Afghanistan Vendor Vetting Cell in 2010, which was created to safeguard against contracting individuals with links to any networks that may compromise their mission. This adds an additional burden and layer of complexity to the acquisition process that is potentially very costly. The speed at which vetting can be completed also creates a significant constraint to the speed in which contracts can be established. The shift towards the core-competency model discussed by Taylor (2004) translates to a greater risk of a contractor failing to perform their duty (Moore and Antill, 2011). As the military greatly relies on contractors providing a service that is not within its core competence, any failing could potentially have dire consequences for the success of an operation (Moore and Antill, 2011). Contractors can also leave an operational theatre whenever they wish and if they do fail to meet their responsibilities, the operational risk still lies with the local commander (Taylor, 2014). Although UK and US experiences with contractors since the Cold War have been favourable, complacency has been identified (Taylor, 2014). The US General Accounting Office (2003) identified that US commanders did not always have contingency plans in place for mission essential contracted services. This could result in mission failure if these contracts were unsuccessful. All members of the British Military are soldiers first (British Army, 2016). Contractors are generally reliant on the military for protection and due to the nature of modern warfare with asymmetric threats, there are no real safe areas for contractor activity (Moore and Antill, 2011). Miller (2010)

Figure 4. Civilian contractors receiving award in lieu of the purple heart medal after being injured at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army Photo, 2012).

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informs us of 100 contractors in Afghanistan, dying within a 6-month period. Contractor deaths are largely unreported (Moore and Antill, 2011) and according to Miller (2010) are ‘by and large, invisible to the public eye.’ Moore and Antill (2011) also address the issue of post-traumatic stress. They state that given the number of cases involving regular soldiers, it is only natural to assume that civilian contractors may also be affected. The number of deaths of contractors deployed on military operations indicates that it is a particularly hazardous environment for them and suggests that they may not be able to protect themselves. Campbell (2009) infers that in Afghanistan, the Taliban deliberately targeted locally employed civilians that were perceived to support the coalition. This could have negative implications on the political will of the host nation, as well as assist in fueling support for the insurgency in the wake of civilian deaths associated with their support for NATO. Conclusions There is a strong argument that the effective use of contractors on operations has been of great benefit to both US and UK forces. At the heart of the issue is cost and there is evidence to suggest that civilian contractors can provide a service at much better value than that military can. Outsourcing logistic and equipment support activities also allows the military to focus on its core competency; being successful at armed combat. Contractors have enabled the military to reduce their support elements and maintain or strengthen their combat forces. This has become particularly useful where force caps have been imposed. It has also been suggested that the use of host nation contractors can align itself with the strategic goals of the mission; although this also has the potential to undermine a campaign. Despite the numerous proposed benefits of contracted logistical support, several concerns have been identified. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that cost savings can be made, there are also additional financial and administrative issues to consider, such as security vetting and the protection of these civilians. Supplier selection is also a key area for development and there have been issues with contractors exploiting the military’s lack of professionalism and experience in this area. Furthermore, civilians cannot be controlled as effectively as soldiers and it has been identified that failing to plan for contractual failure leaves the mission open to significant risk. The restructuring of the US and UK Armed Forces has undeniably increased their reliance on contracted logistic support. Opportunities to use contractors should be exploited where possible and appropriate, if careful consideration is paid to how it either supports or hinders the strategic goals of the campaign. However, in the pursuit of financial savings, there is a genuine risk of losing core capabilities that we may require in the future. Careful, longterm consideration must be made when deciding how we are going to sustain our expeditionary forces, ensuring that overreliance on the availability and capability on deployed contractors on operations is avoided at all costs.

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References Baltrusaitis, D. F (2008). Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in Iraq. PhD Washington DC: Georgetown University. British Army (2016). Logistic Supply Specialist, Royal Logistic Corps [Online]. Available at: https://www.army.mod.uk/rolefinder/role/93/logistic-supplyspecialist. [Accessed 5 April 2016]. Campbell, G. L (2000). Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them. Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Springfield, VA, 27-28 February. (2000). Campbell, S (2009). Civilians on Operations – Can Canada Learn from the Past. Canadian Forces College, JCSP 36, p.43. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009). At What Cost – Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan [online]. Available from: http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_ At_What_Cost_06-10-09.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2011]. Cowan, S (2000). Perspectives on Current MoD Policy, RUSI Journal, 145 (1) p.65-66. DIANE Publishing (2013). Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations [online]. Available from: https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=1428980792 [Accessed 1 April 2016] Fogarty, R (2014). Contract Workers in World War One [online]. Available from: http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/contract-workers-in-worldwar-one [Accessed 2 April 2016]. Hayr, K (1991). Logistics in the Gulf War, RUSI Journal, 136 (3), p.14-19. Higginson, A (2010). Contractor Support to Operations – Proactive or Reactive Support? RUSI Defence Systems, 13 (2), p.16-19. Kinsey, C. and Patterson, M (2012). Contractors and War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations. 1st ed. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies. Knight, R., Wilcox, M (2010) Sustaining the Fleet: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State. 1st ed. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press. LaPorte, M. A (2014). Balancing Act: The U.S. Military's Reliance on Contractors to Fulfill Operational-Level Logistical Requirements [online]. Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a609814.pdf [Accessed 10 April 2016] Miller, T (2010). Contractor Deaths Accelerating in Afghanistan as they Outnumber Soldiers [online]. Available from http://www.propublica.org/ article/contractor-deaths-accelerating-in-afghanistan-as-they-outnumbersoldiers [Accessed 10 April 2016]. Ministry of Defence (1998). The Strategic Defence Review. London: The Stationary Office. Moore, D. M., Antill, P. D. and Bradford, J. P (1999). The Role of Logistics in Modern Warfare: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, RMCS Research Paper, p.14. Moore, D. M., Antill, P. D (2008). British Army Logistics and Contractors on the Battlefield, RUSI Journal, 145 (5), p.46-52. Moore, D. M., Antill, P. D (2011). The Use of Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) in the Age of Austerity [online]. Available from: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/23/9637522.pdf [Accessed 6 April 2016]. Rose, General (2008). RUSI News Release: Coalition forces in Afghanistan have ‘now reached their limit’ [online]. Available from: https://rusi.org/rusi-news/ rusi-news-release-coalition-forces-afghanistan-have-%E2%80%98nowreached-their-limit%E2%80%99 [Accessed 5 April 2016]. Schwartz, M (2011). Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Research Service. Smart, P. (2000). Support to the Front Line, The RUSI Journal. (2008), p.67-70. Taylor, T (2004). Contractors on deployed operations and equipment support, Defence Studies, 4(2), p.184-198. Uttley, M. (2005). Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine, Strategic Studies Institute: DIANE Publishing. US General Accounting Office (2003). Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are not adequately addressed in DoD Plans, GAO-03-695, p.15–16. Varouhakis, M (2015). ISAF'S Afghan Truck Drivers: The Overlooked Counterinsurgency Population, Journal od Strategic Security, 4 (8), p.92113.

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Medicines for UNMISS. A chilling lesson on the negative effects of working in silos The UK’s refrigerated medical supply chain is supporting the United Nations (UN) Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). An analysis on how defence’s organisational culture affected the ability to innovate. By Maj T Wilcox In September 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron addressed the UN General Assembly and announced that the United Kingdom (UK) would contribute to ailing UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa. A decision was made at strategic level to provide engineering support to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The absence, within the force, of a clinically-assured hospital capability close to the focus of intended engineering effort led to the UK’s decision to provide a Role 2 (UN Level 2) medical facility in Bentiu. Bentiu lies to the North West of the country and is accessible by road only during the six-month long dry season. For the remaining six months of the year, the surrounding wetlands are inundated and the area can only be supported logistically by helicopter, via a precarious line of communication. With this isolation in mind, the provision and resupply of high-value, low-population, temperaturesensitive medical commodities (medicines and blood products) was identified as an area of especial logistic difficulty. Prolonged exposure outside specified temperature ranges renders many pharmaceuticals useless, incurring high cost and risking the care pathway and clinical outcome of patients, with potentially catastrophic results. The UK Defence Support Network therefore sought to assure the integrity of the end-to-end movement of such commodities along an international support chain, fraught with environmental and bureaucratic obstacles. Following heated deliberation and careful consideration, the conclusion was reached that defence lacked an appropriate capability within its inventory to meet the operational requirement – an assured, end-to-end, temperature-controlled support chain with sufficient resilience to meet these challenges. A novel, innovative approach was needed to overcome this capability gap. Several groups from across defence came together to contribute to the formation of a Cold Chain Working Group (CCWG). In the problem-solving journey, it was apparent the differing orientations from represented organisations, were to become a source of friction. The willingness to engage and openness or pragmatism, displayed 102

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by CCWG members in attempting to understand and resolve the problem, varied significantly. With vested interests and organisational reputations at stake, tensions and hostility between group members were alarmingly evident at key waypoints. While ultimately a workable solution was found and commissioned to great success, the route to resolution proved protracted and tortuous. This paper will examine the effects of Defence Logistics’ organisational culture and orientation and how they contributed to the rivalry experienced between group members. It will aim to understand resistance to change by exploring key aspects of academic thinking behind organisational culture and will query perceived resistance to innovation. Bennett (1997) explores the causes of conflict within organisations and categorises them into three divisions: conflicts of interest (for example pay disputes), conflicts between functions (who should do what) and conflicts of authority involving managers and their staff. Schein (2010) connects leadership with culture: “Culture is both a here and now dynamic phenomenon that influences us in multiple ways. Culture is constantly re-enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by our own behaviour. When we are influential in shaping the behaviour and values of others, we think of that as ‘leadership’ and are creating the conditions for new culture formation.” (Schein, 2010, 3) Therefore, since the essence of organisational culture is intrinsically linked to its leadership, understanding the nature of leaders may explain some of the forces that drove the behaviours displayed between groups and how this had a negative impact on the ability to examine the problem and find an innovative solution. Contributing members of the CCWG The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is the operational headquarters for all military operations overseas. Headed by the Chief of Joint Operations, a 3-star General based in the outskirts of North-West London, it comprises a staff of military officers organised into defence functions (Combat, Logistics, Finance, Communications, Intelligence) and by global region (Europe and Asia, Middle East, Africa). Some desk functions (for example Engineering, Medical) have global responsibilities, while others (Combat, Logistics) are focussed on planning for specific regions. Owing to its role, PJHQ is a task driven organisation and the ‘ability to get things done’ is a key performance indicator for PJHQ staff. Indeed, staff performance assessments are linked to outputs. Military staff officers are normally assigned for two years. Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) provides UK

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Defence’s primary defence logistics organisation. It has a vast portfolio of functions and employs in the region of 20,000 staff. It is headed by a 4-star civil servant, recruited from industry owing to his previous experience. Three DE&S sub-organisations contributed to the resolution of the medical cold chain problem as part of the CCWG: Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements (DSCOM) is headed by a 1-star officer. It is the conduit between industry, defence’s strategic depots and the operational theatre. All operational movements from the UK to operational theatres are planned and regulated by DSCOM. This is a process driven organisation and comprises both civilian and military staff. Team Leidos (TL) is a large civilian logistics organisation that has been granted a multi-billion-pound contract to manage the defence inventory. It assists DSCOM with the interaction with industry and reacts to DSCOM directed activities, while managing large depots around the country. These depots contain everything from munitions and armour to medical pharmaceuticals and clothing supplies. This is a newly appointed contractor, undertaking an expansive portfolio in a neglected area of defence. The staff are entirely civilian; however, the organisation has employed a large number of retired military officers. As a newly appointed defence contractor, Team Leidos is ‘finding its feet’ and has a low tolerance for risk, on the basis of reputational harm. (Hutton-Fellowes, 2017) The Contract Management Organisation (CMO) is the interface between Team Leidos and defence. It is responsible for the performance management of the contract and for providing commercial oversight. It comprises military and civilian staff and is headed by a retired Brigadier. The military staff will rotate every two years, whilst the civilian staff (civil servants) will remain. A newly created and process driven regulatory organisation. As the operational headquarters, PJHQ had the lead to bring together representatives from across these organisations. A Cold Chain Working Group (CCWG) was formed to analyse the problems and find a way forward. Bennett (1997) depicts groups as either formal or informal, the former being a managerially led formation with clearly defined parameters and goals as opposed to an informal group whom share common interests. He describes formal groups as having a great degree of management involvement in “coordinating, controlling and defining the nature of activities they undertake.” (Bennett, 1997, 159) This may be the first step in understanding some of the paralysis that followed: the CCWG, while organised and administered by PJHQ, was not led by a singular senior management authority. PJHQ eventually assumed a leadership role, but the hierarchical ‘seniority’ of group members was relatively flat. Each group member brought their own area of expertise and experience with them; but owing to the diverse nature of the group, they also brought their ‘cultural baggage’ with them. The result was a group that was neither the purest form of formal group, nor informal; in fact, it displayed the characteristics of both.

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Academics agree on the existence of an innate resistance to change

Bennett (1997) further describes the group formation process through physical interaction. The process of learning about each other, the nature and purpose of the group and the status and hierarchies of those members involved, played an important part of how it developed over time. Military training and doctrine also played heavily into the formation of the CCWG. The relationship between military divisions is depicted in a much more binary sense; organisations are either ‘supporting’ or they are ‘supported.’ This is a common military assumption and pervades military staff culture and is both mutually accepted and understood. It defines who the customer is and who the supplier is; moreover, the assumption is made that the ‘customer’ is senior to the ‘supplier.’ In this case, it was assumed that PJHQ was the customer and therefore was the de-facto senior representative of the CCWG. This was a contributing factor to some of the issues that followed. Some of the external influences, surrounding group members from their representative organisations, would contribute to the frictions the CCWG felt, in a parody of jostling for the ‘customer status.’ The relationship between Culture and Innovation Poskiene (2006, 47) in defining organisational culture states that it: “refers to the complex set of ideologies, traditions, commitments and values that are shared throughout the organisation that influence how the organisation conducts its whole performance, becoming a potential source of innovation.” He states that inevitably: “it is not the value individuals bring to the organisation that count, but the values that the organisation brings to the individual.” Defence comprises many organisations working to a common goal, however their aims and characteristics are in stark contrast; their contribution and operational aims differ markedly and this contributed to the complexity of the cultural mix experienced within the CCWG. Despande et al (1993) proposed that competitiveness requires a unified culture which values innovation. Moreover, Kenny and Reedy (2007) argue that the culture of an organisation impacts the degree to which creative, innovative solutions or questions to problems are encouraged, supported and implemented. Since the CCWG comprised of representatives from several defence organisations, there THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Misinterpretation of e-mails most likely played a significant role in the crossed responses that resulted

were significant variances in the willingness of representatives to explore and engage with an innovative solution to the operational challenge. It could be argued that understanding the context behind the organisations from which the CCWG representatives came, provides an insight into how group members engaged with the problem. Several academics converge on the notion that top level management’s support of an innovative culture plays a critical role. Schein (2010, 3) states that: “culture is ultimately created, embedded, evolved and ultimately manipulated by leaders.” Kenny and Reedy (2007) link a strong relationship between culture and innovation stating that it can be both a driver for innovation, or serve to stifle it. There is an uneasy relationship between culture and innovation within defence. By contrast to most private-sector organisations, defence is not in direct competition for

economic success or failure and is not therefore in a constant race for survival. Private sector firms require innovation to acquire competitive edge within their environment (Hitt et al, 2005). While it could be argued that defence is in competition with adversaries and aggressors, many of the supporting organisations are not necessarily exposed to the direct consequences of failure, but support those whom are. This is not to say that economic considerations may be discounted, HMG continues to wrestle with budgetary pressures and defence works in the context of a resource constrained environment. Indeed, the UK in 2017 was committed to 27 overseas operations and therefore the focus of the leadership across defence was towards sustaining them. This resource constrained environment therefore draws a parallel to private sector firms in that in economically difficult circumstances, the willingness of the leadership to provide the support and resources required for innovation may be curtailed. Since there is an intrinsic relationship between leadership and culture, the inability or resistance to consider innovative solutions could be attributed to the leadership. Response to the problem The CCWG formed in September 2016, following a detailed stakeholder analysis. The purpose was to identify the most resilient solution to meet the cold chain logistic challenge. While the group formed, it was clear from the outset that organisational representatives arrived with their agendas already established. The table below identifies some of those stakeholders, their responsibilities, the lens through which they had approached their pre-CCWG position and their subsequent behaviours. Bennett (1997) describes group conflict in two distinct categories. He states that intra-group conflicts arise owing

Organisation

Responsibilities

Pre-CCWG position

Outcomes and Behaviours

PJHQ Logistics, Medical and Financial Team

Operational command and risk ownership

Open to ideas, planning to use subject matter expert advice

Ownership of the problem, frustration with bureaucracy and lack of progress. Following eventual senior leadership direction, led and directed activities to take place

DSCOM

Management of the supply chain and conduit between defence’s pharmaceutical depot (managed by Team Leidos) and PJHQ

Could only achieve the supply chain as far the theatre entry, but not the end destination. Asserted that PJHQ’s role was to make current capabilities work

Reluctance to engage, unwilling to take or accept risk. Latterly, a broker between organisations

CMO

Management, assurance and governance of the Team Leidos contract. commercial functions

Refusal to engage, organised a rival CCWG, which prevented some stakeholders attending PJHQ

Intransigence, unwillingness to cooperate or contribute. Continued to act as a detractor. Eventually directed to support by senior management

Team Leidos

Management of UK strategic depots, inventory management and processing

Controlled by CMO and concerned about reputational damage. Concerned about contractual limitations which might prevent innovative solutions being implemented

Concerned about corporate risk and liabilities, however pragmatic in offering solutions, subject to CMO willingness to engage

Fig. 1. CCWG Stakeholder positions and behaviours

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to personal disputes, changing expectations of what might be demanded from the group membership, new technology which demands new working methods, members perceiving group objectives differently or a breakdown in communication between group members. By contrast, he describes the reasons for inter-group conflict as competition for resources, differing perceptions on organisational aims, loyalty to fellow members of a particular group regardless of events, lack of coordination, conflicting goals or attempts of one group to dominate another. Handy (1999) broadly agrees, but adds the dimension of ‘territorial violation’ where one group’s responsibilities are infringed upon by another. He asserts that the underlying causes of conflict start from the basis of “two underlying and fundamental issues: goals and ideologies and territory.” (Handy, 1999, 300) Therefore it could be argued that the behavioural traits displayed within the CCWG may be, at least partially, attributed to the culture of the organisations that members represented. The reality was that the CCWG was created to address a known Defence capability gap and in contrast to territory violations, the opposite was true; representatives were reluctant to engage to find a viable solution, stating that it was not their responsibility to innovate. Instead they continued pressing for use of the in-service system, despite having received the evidence that it would not work. In a deviation from Bennett and Hardy’s models, there was claim and counter-claim that researching and suggesting potential solutions was not the responsibility of the organisations they represented. Rather than violating territory, the problem fell onto territory that representatives had no appetite to occupy. This led to the position that PJHQ members would take the lead, accept operational and financial risk and suggest and assess the viability of solutions. This effectively removed everyone else from the decision-making process, with the exception of PJHQ and as a consequence, the ‘relegated’ organisations became “obstructive, disengaged and unhelpful.” (Hallett, R, 2017) The outcome was fragmentation of the CCWG. “For a group to function and develop, one of the most important areas for clear consensus is the perception of who is in and who is not in, and the criteria by which such decisions are made.” (Schein, 2010, 97) The lack of appetite to constructively engage, effectively deselected members from the CCWG and instead PJHQ took the initiative and directed supporting organisations to assist through senior leadership engagement. Transactional Analysis It emerged that the lack of progress was attributed to the lack of a clear hierarchical structure. This led to group members believing that others were stepping outside their boundaries, while silently accusing others of failing to perform the tasks with which their own organisations ought to have engaged. With PJHQ as the leaders, relationships between the group changed; although not in an entirely positive way. DSCOM representatives assumed the role of broker between PJHQ, CMO and Team Leidos representatives

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Rain quickly impedes movement on mud tracks which prevents ground base logistic support for 6 months of the year

who became disengaged, unresponsive and critical to the emerging solution. Transactional analysis may provide further insight to explain this. “Transactional analysis is a powerful psychoanalytical tool that anyone can use to analyse communication transactions between individuals.” (Berne, 1964). The model may be used as a tool to analyse interpersonal, group or organisational levels. Expanding on Freud’s research that concluded human personality is multi-faceted, Berne theorised that the interactions between individuals, in their simplest form, are transactions based upon three distinct ego states: • Parent – taught concepts • Child – felt concepts • Adult – learned concepts Berne (1964) asserted that the interaction between people when they communicate is a transaction. Initiation is the transaction stimulus and the response from the recipient is the transaction response. Berne theorised that the simplest form of transaction is that of an adult to adult transaction; a doctor holds his hand out for a scalpel and a nurse, based on previous and learned experience, places a scalpel into his hand. Almost as simple is a parent-child transaction; he cites a fevered child asking for a glass of water and a parent responding with providing one. Transactional analysis provides a tool to understand the stimulus-response relationship between individuals. It can also be used to extrapolate the interactions between groups. A positive interaction is normally found in a complementary response, a stimulus aimed at a particular ego state and a response received from that ego state (for example parent – child). In what Berne refers to as a crossed transaction, a reasonable stimulus may be met with a less reasonable and unintended response. For example, the rational adult asking a question and the respondent responding irrationally through a child response. Regardless of age, maturity or experience, Berne argues that we possess all three states in our sub-consciousness and that they pervade the human sense of rationality and drive interactions. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Interestingly, Berne argues that much of the stimulusresponse transaction is governed by what is being said; how words are delivered (tone, volume) and the non-verbal clues such as body language and facial expressions. Berne described each interaction as a unit he called a stroke. Every interaction, whether verbal or nonverbal, registered a stroke of recognition. He concluded that adults have a psychological need for recognition or recognitionhunger. Any recognition, whether positive or negative is perceived as better than no recognition at all. The formation of the CCWG followed many transactions to identify the correct subject matter experts, the role and responsibilities of the organisations they represented and the processes and interactions already happening to achieve the in-service (golden hour box) cold chain. Unknown to PJHQ were the interactions that routinely occurred between organisations using the in-service system. It was impossible to know whether the transaction history between them was broadly positive or negative. Applying Berne’s theory helps to explain the dilemma: when PJHQ summoned these organisations together to form the CCWG, the transactional history between them would almost certainly have affected their responses to PJHQ. This had an extraordinary effect; where rational, logical argument was being represented there was an almost imperceptible undercurrent of negative stroke responses, leading to no response at all. This resulted in a change from the intended adult-adult transactional relationship through crossed interactions resulting in a parent-child relationship. Irrational responses were overcome by employing direct, explicit instructions from PJHQ through DSCOM to CMO and Team Leidos. This only happened after direct senior leadership engagement and direction being passed down the management chain. When DSCOM found itself acting as a ‘broker’ between the groups it most likely undermined the ability for a new ‘transaction history’ to be created. This endorses Berne’s theory regarding the verbal clues of ‘what and how’ words are used and the ability for the groups to read the non-verbal signs of body language and facial expressions. It could be argued DSCOM’s intervention to broker between CCWG members contributed to misinterpretation of the intended transaction stimuli and responses. Berne’s research applied to the 21st century workplace creates an interesting area for further study. Increasingly, organisations form groups via electronic means and correspond via e-mail rather than in person. Jackson and Carter (2007) state: “it can never be assumed that the receiver of a message understands it the same way that the sender does. Moreover, there is no way of ensuring that the two understandings can be made to coincide.” (Jackson and Carter, 2007, 34) The very nature of the of the modern working environment precludes individual to individual transactions; email correspondence, telephone and video conferencing are used in preference to travel. CCWG members were geographically dispersed between London, Bristol and Donnington. With the exception of a handful of physical gatherings, communication was electronic. Misinterpretation 106

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The UN Camp at Bentiu

of e-mails and the lack of visual clues to understand the intended meaning of communication, most likely played a significant role in the crossed responses that resulted. Finally, in the face of unwanted change and innovation, Berne’s theory could explain the irrational responses and resistance that the CCWG faced. Reasoned logical argument explaining the need for change, made to respondents that had no appetite for innovation, may have provoked feelings of frustration, leading to child responses. Understanding the reasons for resistance to change is therefore of value in this context. Resistance to Change Academics agree on the existence of an innate resistance to change. There is a divergence in thinking between whether the focus of this resistance is based on organisational shortcomings (Coch and French, 1948) or on the individual (Oreg et al, 2009). Understanding the origin of the resistance to change, may point the way towards strategies to overcome it. If the resistance stems from organisational issues, then a systemic review might need consideration to understand why the organisational culture does not foster an appetite for innovation and change. If the resistance stems from individual or group psychology, then understanding personal motivations might point the way towards resolution. Oreg (2003) researched dispositional resistance, concluding that everyone is disposed towards resisting change and maintaining the status quo, although some individuals are more disposed than others. Resistance to change therefore is an individual psychological condition that varies between people. However, Dent and Goldberg (1999) conclude that since organisations are essentially social systems, then it is not a contradiction to connect individual’s characteristics with those of the organisation. In the case of the CCWG, the appetite for change and innovation would, on the surface, appear to lean towards the early research of Coch and French. The processes and sheer volume of systemic bureaucracy required to introduce a new working methodology serves to dampen the ability to innovate within the Defence Logistics community. Licensing, testing, contractual constraints and the process to instil

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contractual amendments, higher-level leadership engagement and to trigger financial approvals processes, all require engagement to overcome obstacles and resistance to change. In this environment, individuals would have perceived a need to climb a mountain of bureaucracy to meet the demands of PJHQ’s requirements. Although the in-service system was proven to be inadequate for South Sudan, certain CCWG members with vested interests continued to argue the case for its employment. It could be argued, therefore, that those vocally resistant members of the group were aware of the sheer volume of bureaucratic obstacles the organisational system would need to surmount, were an alternative, novel, course of action to be pursued. Consequently, the individual psychological condition to resist change is amplified regardless of whether an individual is more or less accepting of change and innovation. Finally, the involvement of leadership within the organisational culture is widely discussed academically. In a group such as the CCWG – assembled from an array of organisations, each with different organisational aims and definitions of success – it would appear the attitudes of its leadership plays an important role. However, since the CCWG at the outset was a group of unfamiliar people coming together, the group dynamic would almost certainly have been influenced by the attitudes of individual members and the level of influence they achieved would be predicated on whether other group members agreed with their own psychological condition. These attitudes would have stemmed from the leadership of the organisations that they were there to represent. The irony is that if Oreg’s (2003) assertion that everyone has a dispositional resistance to change is true, then a negative response within the CCWG was a predictable outcome. This might explain why Handy (1999), Schein (2010) and Bennett (1997) conclude that 70% of change initiatives fail. Conclusion Crucially, the CCWG ultimately innovated successfully to meet the operational demand. However the journey to resolve the problems faced at the outset was fraught with problems that revolved around organisational culture, the interactions between individuals and their willingness engage with innovation and change. The early establishment of a hierarchy to formalise the group, define its parameters and stipulate the boundaries and responsibilities of represented organisations would have prevented the inertia experienced at the outset. Senior leadership had a role in this and could have provided context into which the group could have formed, as a bedrock of the CCWG’s developing working culture. Rather than the dynamic, leaderless essence of cultural evolution depicted by Schein (2010), alignment behind a task-oriented group theorised by Handy (1978) following direct senior engagement would have focused the group to meet the objective and ensured that organisational or personal agendas were put aside. Symptomatic of a resource-constrained culture, the time and expense of deciding to make a change from a past

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practice or precedent is a bold move. Early understanding of the constraints, obstacles and limitations the group would face, might have played a decisive role in binding the group together. Early engagement with CCWG stakeholders to explain the context of the problem and requirement to innovate may have provided the motivation required for them to engage positively. Berne (1964) and the theory of Transactional Analysis provides explanation of the miscommunication that happened, but understanding the historical interrelationships between group members may have allowed the group to employ appropriate communication techniques to overcome this. The electronic working practices of the modern world have the potential of denying respondents the ability to correctly interpret how and why queries are being raised. If the historical transactional stroke history has been broadly negative, then e-mail correspondence and telephone calls are more likely to continue to encourage crossed transactions. Therefore, physical working groups are more likely to avoid crossed transactions from occurring. Large, multi-departmental organisations are likely to have developed systems and bureaucracies intended to provide governance, assurance and management checks. However, any change programme is likely to challenge these bureaucracies. Therefore, the early development of understanding of how a system works – and consequently what barriers to change a group is likely to encounter – is instrumental in change and innovation projects. It could be argued that understanding these interrelationships may assist those poorly disposed to tolerate change, as it will remove some of the psychological barriers to maintaining the status quo, as described by Oreg (2009). Finally, any strategy for change should acknowledge and accommodate the fact that change is likely to be resisted. Engagement to create mutual understanding of the context and reasons why change is required may reduce the level of inter- and intra-group conflict as described by Handy (1999). Senior leadership engagement to create a unifying effect may achieve the alignment required to defeat systemic bureaucracy and obstructive organisational or individual dispositions.

As part of UNMISS the UK provided a Role 2 medical facility in Bentiu

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Bibliography Books Bennett, R. (1997) Organisational Behaviour. 3rd edition. London: Pitman Publishing. Handy, C. (1999) Understanding Organisations. 4th edition. St. Ives: Penguin Press. Jackson, N. and Carter, P. (2007) Rethinking Organisational Behaviour. 2nd edition. Gosport: Ashford Colour Press. Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., Lampel, J. (2009) Strategy Safari. 2nd edition. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. Morgan, G. (2006) Images of Organisation. 1st edition. USA: Sage Publications Ltd. Schein, E. (2010) Organisation Culture and Leadership. 4th edition. SanFrancisco: Jossey-Bass. Interviews Hallett, R. (2017) Questions on PJHQ’s experience with the CCWG. [interview] Interviewed by Terry Wilcox, 1 Mar. Hutton-Fellowes, E. (2017) Questions regarding Team Leidos contribution to the CCWG. [interview] Interviewed by Terry Wilcox, 16 Mar. Journals Akin, B, Er Ulker, F and Unsar, A (2016) The Effect of Organisational Communication Towards Resistance to Change: A Case Study in the Banking Sector. Economic Review – Journal of Economics and Business, 15 (1) 53-112. Burnes, B. (2015) Understanding Resistance to Change – Building on Coch and French. Journal of Change Management, 15 (2) 92-116. Coch, L. and French, J. (1948). Overcoming resistance to change. Human Relations, (1) 512-532.

Dent, E., Goldberg, S. (1999). Challenging resistance to change. The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science. (35), 1, 25-41. Garcia-Cabrera, A. and Hernandez, F. (2014) Differentiating the Three Components of Resistance to Change: The Moderating Effect of Organisation-Based Self-Esteem on the Employee Involvement-Resistance Relation. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 25 (4) 441-470. Hollins-Martin, C. (2011) Transactional analysis: A method of analysing communication. British Journal of Midwifery, 19 (9) 587-593. Klonek, F, Lehmann-Willenbrock, N and Kauffeld, S. (2014) Dynamics of Resistance to Change: A Sequential Analysis of Change Agents in Action. Journal of Change Management, 14 (3) 334-360. Oreg, S. (2003) Resistance to change: Developing an individual differences measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (4), 680-693. Oreg, S., Nevo, O., Metzer, H., Leder, N., Castro, D. (2009). Dispositional resistance to change and occupational interests and choices. Journal of Career Assessment, 17 (3), 312-323. Websites Berne, E. (2017). Transactional Analysis [online] Available from: http:// www.ericberne.com/transactional-analysis/ [Accessed 18 Mar 2017]. Key Concepts in Transactional Analysis – A Brief Overview. [online] Available from: http://www.itaaworld.org/key-concepts-transactional-analysis [Accessed 11 Mar 2017]. Rick, T. (2015). What is Organisational Culture [online] Available from: https://torbenrick.eu/blog/culture/organizational-culture/ [Accessed 7 Feb 2017]. Developing organisation culture: six case studies [online] Available from: https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/culture/working-environment/ organisational-culture-report [Accessed 7 Feb 2017].

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t: 01473 659225 admissions@orwellpark.org www.orwellpark.co.uk Orwell Park, Nacton, Ipswich, Suffolk IP10 0ER

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The answer to this question is obviously yes, in the same way that any man or woman on any street in the UK is also deployable. However, the difference between a man or woman on the street and a reservist is their current level of training. Therefore, the real question is how much training is required to make a reserve soldier deployable? The answer is, the difference between their current level of training and the training required to enable them to operate in a certain environment when deployed. This is linked with where they are being deployed and how quickly they are required. By Capt J Wooldridge

The training level across the Reserve, is a sliding scale. At one end, you have a reservist who has not attended training for more than 12 months and who is therefore a Long-Term Non-Attender (LTNA). At the other end of the scale, you have a regular attender who is effectively trained as well as a regular soldier. Additionally, they are also able to draw on experiences from their civilian employment. It may seem like an obvious statement, but the latter who attends regularly, is likely to be better trained and therefore more deployable. Overall, the largest difference between regular and reserve soldiers is that the Reservists can say no, to both training and deployment. Therefore, in practice, the deployability of a reserve soldier should consider both their will to train and their will to deploy. The link between deployability and training makes the task of having readily deployable reserves even more difficult. Therefore, reserve units must make their training attractive, without detracting from what the Army requires. To put this another way; the need of reserve soldiers must be aligned with the need of the Army, for the reserve model to work. However, while this article discusses deployability of reserve soldiers, it does not discuss conscription, as this would simply mean that the Reserve Armed Forces would be deployed a little quicker than their civilian counterparts. The need of the Army The Army needs a trained reserve force that can deploy at any point, to any specified location, either in their own capacity or as augmentation to part of the Regular Army. To help this and make the Reserve force deployable: The Defence Reform Act

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Are Reserve soldiers deployable?

Booking leave for training is often contentious with reservists’ civilian employers

2014 (DRA 14) made changes which included amending section 56 of RFA 96, to allow the Secretary of State to authorise call out if it appears to him that it is necessary or desirable to use reserves for any purpose for which members of the regular services may be used1. However, the Army also needs a current and competent reserve force. The issue is that reserves do not train all the time. While a trained reserve can be partially achieved through pre-deployment training at Chilwell, it assumes a prior level of understanding and currency. For example, every soldier will need a base level of knowledge such as basic first aid to be able to complete the Team Medic course, or a current understanding of the SA80 and Glock to be able to apply themselves on ranges. Specifically for a logistician, understanding the world of supply or how to work an EPLS will not be taught at Chilwell. Therefore, due to time constraints it is unlikely that a reservist will be deployable after only completing the training at Chilwell. To guarantee a current and competent soldier, the ideal solution would be for the Reserve to train regularly throughout the year. Enabling this to happen, the Army has regulated that the minimum training required to create a deployable reserve soldier is 19 days training at a national unit or 27 days training at a regional unit per year. The training comprises: • 3 (national unit) or 7 (regional unit) assured events, which could be a weekend or a drill night. • MATTs. • A continuous training camp of up to 16 days and a minimum of 8 days2. Depending on how the training year is set up at a particular unit, there are issues with this model. One of which is a soldier could potentially complete all their required training within 3 months and then not train for the remainder of the year. In this case, it can be argued whether they are still current and competent. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Credit Sgt Dek Traylor

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Some reservists can be as well trained as their regular counterparts

Aside from training, there are a number of other aspects that soldiers require before deployment. One of these is being dentally and medically fit. While vaccinations, for example, can be updated at Chilwell, there will be soldiers who cannot be fixed dentally or medically before deploying. Understandably, it is the responsibility of units to know who these soldiers are. However, information on reservists who don’t attend regularly, or stop attending if injured, is unlikely to be up to date, unless they inform their unit. This creates hidden statistics and has an obvious affect on the ability of the unit to understand who they can deploy. One of the largest issues faced by reserve units regarding deployment, is a soldier is not able to claim for dental assessment or vaccinations unless they are on 30 days’ notice to move or less (R5 readiness). At the same time, screening is only available to those preparing for deployment. This is defined as: those personnel warned for operations, or warned to be held at increased readiness for operations and engaged in pre-deployment activity.3 While the unit has information on how many are fit for deployment at any point in time, as mentioned above, without the pre-deployment screening, it is impossible to have that information accurately assessed. It is even more difficult when LTNA are considered, as only outdated information will be held on them. However, LTNA still form a part of a reserve regiment’s deployable mass until they are discharged. With these problems, it can become difficult to understand why we have a reserve force at all? It would be simpler to a larger regular force. Alternatively, the UK could return to the original reserve model, which started as a home defence force that would never deploy4. One reason behind having an ‘alternative army’ is money. Understandably a part time army costs less than a full time one. A part time army that can do the same job as that of a full time one, is even more attractive. Therefore, this makes it unlikely the Reserve would return to being solely a home defence force. This leads to the idea of the ‘One Army’ concept. However, if this is to be successful, the Army also needs support from its policy makers. Policy needs to be developed with both regulars and reserves in mind from the outset. Two examples of where this currently does not work, are discipline and the PFA re-test policy. Due to the Reserve 110

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soldier’s ability to say no, they do not have to turn up for either a discipline parade or a PFA re-test. Simply put, while a regular soldier must attend a parade, a reserve soldier does not, which creates a divide. Financial considerations are not the only reasons for a maintaining a reserve force. Another advantage is the strengthening link between the military and the civilian population. Without the Reserve, you weaken this connection and consequently you lose both sides understanding of each other. Younger people in the UK have a lower opinion of the Armed Forces than those aged over 655, despite recent operations across the world. This is where the Reserves can have a great influence on the working age population. It is especially relevant today. As we get further away from the World Wars and compulsory National Service, which ended in 19636, society’s understanding of what the Armed Forces do decreases accordingly. Another advantage of the Reserve, is the retention of highly motivated soldiers. Not only does this apply to regular to reserve transferees, but also to pure reservists. Reserves who train regularly leave little time for anything else once their civilian work commitments are accounted for. Reserve soldiers will frequently finish their civilian work on a Friday evening, go straight to their Army Reserve Centre for a weekend’s training and then back to work again on the Monday. This obviously shows their great commitment and motivation. The need of the Reserve soldier A reservist’s civilian work is generally their main source of income. Therefore, financial and material benefits are not the prime reason for joining7. However, while money is not necessarily the main reason for reserve service, it helps, especially where family is concerned8. For example, the bounty that is earned if all training is completed during the year may enable a reservist to give their family a better holiday or a better car. This is in lieu of them being at home every weekend and is therefore effectively used to buy collateral with their family9 so that they can continue to do something they enjoy. The aspect of family, and the role it plays in the Reserves, is vastly different to that of the Regular Army. Unlike the

Deployable reserve soldiers require 19 days training at a national unit level

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regulars, the reservist’s family does not live in married quarters close to their unit. As such, reserve soldiers’ families are a hidden population with their lives being based around the everyday civilian workplace and home. As the Reserve is a volunteer organisation and generally not a primary source of income, families do not tend to give their active support, but instead accept and put up with it10. Therefore, going on tour can be seen by families as being selfish, because unlike in the Regular Army, this is not something the family member has to do; but rather chooses to do, over being with their families. The ability to do something that is enjoyable, which makes them proud appears to be the main driver behind reserve training. This, alongside the ‘soldier excitement factor’ ensures they turn up and train regularly11. However, it means that boring and repetitive training, for example MATTs,12 is not retention positive. For the Reservist, all of this must be tempered with the issue of having to balance work, reserve and home life. The Reserve soldier is therefore time poor, which means that the ‘hurry up and wait’ mentality is not popular. This, and sometimes a lack of understanding by the regular unit staff of what a reservist sacrifices for training, is another reason for a lack of retention. Throughout, the key to maintaining attendance is by maximising good, well delivered and interesting training. Reservists also need to know when training is taking place and have ample notice of this, so that they can book their leave from work, ensure their family have enough notice and arrange childcare if necessary. If training is cancelled or moved with limited notice, while this may not seem like a large issue to those in the Regular Army, for reservists it has further reaching consequences. For example, a reserve may have arranged temporary cover for their position at work. This is difficult to cancel and is likely to mean that they will have to take time off work regardless. They won’t earn the money they would have from the reserves and may have used up some of their civilian holiday entitlement for no reason. While off work, they may not see much of their family, because they will be at work or at school. Again, this not only has a negative effect on family life, but also on retention and frequency of training. As well as being a problem with family, the issue of booking leave for training is often contentious with reservists’ civilian employers. Some employers do not like providing a reservist with extra leave for military training, because of resentment from other employees13. This is because they see the time a reservist takes off to train, as an extra leave entitlement; even though they do the same civilian job and are paid the same amount. As the issue of leave is contentious both with a reservist’s employer and their family, the Army should take steps to mitigate this. One way could be to reduce the amount of extended and continuous time the Reserve spends away from both. This could be achieved by getting rid of the 16day continuous training camp and instead complete the minimum eight-day camp with the remaining eight days being made up of two, four day weekends.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

In short, reserve forces want enjoyable and applicable training that doesn’t always include MATTs and is planned in advance. Money is only one aspect of the package and is often seen as the carrot that makes it possible for a reservist to justify to their family why they train. All aspects however are important, and if applied will result in retention of reservists who are trained to a standard that makes them current and competent. Therefore, aligning the interests of both creates mutual benefit. Summary In answering the question: Are Reserve soldiers are deployable? We should remember they must negotiate more hurdles than their regular counterparts. The volunteer nature of the Reserves has an effect on both the Army and the reservists themselves. It results in the need for reservists to convince both family and employer that training and the resultant deployment are also in their interest. It also puts a burden on the Army, which must work harder to enable the deployment of the Reserves. Not only must the Army work its way around policy issues, especially where medical allowances are concerned, it also must ensure its reservists are content. To maximise training time and benefit, the Reserve Army must ensure that what it does is enjoyable and relevant and not repetitive or boring. In doing so, the Army’s reward is a current and competent part time army, which is also deployable. The reservist’s reward is being able to do something they enjoy, while balancing civilian employment, family life and any spare time they may have in between. Bibliography http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/ JSP 753: Regulations for the Mobilisation of UK Reserve Forces The Reserve Land Forces Regulations 2016 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40428132 http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/1150/bsa29_armed_forces.pdf https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/what-was-national-service

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JSP 753 Pt 1, Page 9. Reserve Land Forces Regulations 2016 Pt 1, Ch 2, Sect 2 – Annual Training 113 JSP 950, Vol 1, Ch 3, Leaflet 1-3-6 114 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/283812/a-history-our-Reserves-Epub-v2.pdf 115 http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/1150/bsa29_armed_forces.pdf 116 https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/what-was-national-service 117 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-themed-briefing-1-Reservist-motivations-to-serve.pdf 118 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-project-briefing-1-Negotiating-civilian-and-military-lives.pdf 119 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-project-briefing-1-Negotiating-civilian-and-military-lives.pdf 110 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/FRRP-themed-briefing-2-Families-relationshipsReserve-service.pdf 111 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-themed-briefing-1-Reservist-motivations-to-serve.pdf 112 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-project-briefing-4-Sustaining-Future-Reserves-2020.pdf 113 http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ FRRP-themed-briefing-3-Supporting-employer-and-employeeengagement-in-the-Reserves-Service.pdf 112

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babcock k Trojan & Titan (T2) Supply Chain Improvement Programme By: Andy Ridler -Project Manager for T2 Supply Chain Improvement Programme, Babcock DSG

TROJAN TROJAN and TITAN TIT TA AN Armoured Armoured V Vehicles ehicles (T2) are are battle winning capability supported supported by by Babcock. Babcock. As a platform, platform, it represents represents low low population equipment, equipment, whic which h inevitably inevitably means a reduced reduced support support package package for for its ‘through ‘through life life management’ management’ (TLM). In conjunction wit with h DE&S Vehicle we T2, w e fformed ormed a Vehicle Support Support Team Team e bespoke bespoke Supply Supply Chain Improvement Improvement Programme to review review Programme (SCIP) to the the E2E TLM afforded afforded to Overhaul to T2 at Maintenance, Maintenance, Repair Repair & Overhaul Level Level 4 (MR (MRO O 4). Support to T2 has been complicated due to the complexity of the equipment, induced austerity measures, complex supply chains for long Lead Time (LLT) T items, aligned with the lack of obsolescence and obsolete management, skill fade of the maintainer and the subsequent availability of Suitably Qualified and Experienced People (SQEP). This has all conspired to produce low vehicle availability and why cannibalisation was necessary to maintain the remaining vehicle fleet. However, this only puts a sticking plaster over the real issues, which is holistic and sustainable spares support. Any solution to future support needed to cover the entire platform, from Running Gear upwards. T2 has c6500 items associated to each platform of which c1607 are common parts to both MRO 1-3 and MRO 4. It is important to understand how to implement any Inventory Management Policy, which takes into account ‘Demand Consumption’ linked to ‘Forecasting’ and aligned to Horizon Planning. Insert 1 illustrates the fine balance of Inventory Management and the requirement to monitor ‘Stock Levels’ verses ‘Customers Orders’ linking to ‘Stock Replenishment’. This is all predicated on the desired service level (Equipment availability) and the associated Inventory, which needs to be affordable. It is important to cleanse the demand picture, ensuring that the picture was not obscured by corrupt or dirty data and that criticality is applied appropriately. To the Army everything is critical and rightly so. However, this does little to assist in producing spares for this Battle Winning platform and maintaining capability in the hands of the user. Insert 2 illustrates the phase of ‘Criticality’, UNDERSTAND A using BV&C Codes as the metric for segmentation; placing them into Insert 2 work streams and priority order. With 96% of the associated T2 items being categorised as Code ‘B’, this was clearly unsustainable. Add into the equation Code V, C and Other’s, all competing for limited funds, capacity to deliver on the desired service levels, on time, is a recipe for failure.

We needed to identify what items were truly critical within that 96%. We introduced the Criticality Cube, which allows you to segment your inventory along three axes ‘Lead Time’, ‘Criticality’, ‘Frequency of Demand’. Insert 3 illustrates the cube in action. Note: some of the boxes have yellow dot inserted, this represents usage, but may not indicate consumption. This needs to be accounted for when forecasting future Inventory holdings. The beauty of this model is that you can apply it to almost any scenario, setting your own criterion and metrics. This illustrated by Insert 4 and that dependant of the perceived criticality, you can refine an item’s criticality, applying the appropriate level of priority, apportioning the correct level of funding to maintain the Supply Chain. This is based on known requirements for Build of Materiel’s (BOM) (parts needed by platform) for the repair activities to be undertaken. The net result is a more reliable list of requirements, which are then articulated to suppliers, making the Supply Chain more stable and sustainable, which in turn induces greater confidence in the equipment being delivered by Babcock. Industry needs to support our endeavours. Convincing them that their investment is worth the effort can only be achieved if you provide clean and accurate data. Using the models described, we have been able to develop a strategy to recover from the current supply positions. We are not there just yet, but we are getting there and we will get there. Here at Babcock, we understand the equipment being worked upon; we also understand the customer and are actively recruiting ex-military in order to remain current with the military trends. Bringing fresh blood into the business also allows us to develop our internal processes, so that we don’t become stale with innovation. We have developed a process that looks holistically at the needs for T2, focussing on MRO 4, which will deliver a platform (four per year), which is as good, if not better, than the day they were taken into Service from the manufacturer.

FFor or more more information information about this this article article please contact: contact: defencecommunications@babcockinternational.com def encecommunications@babcockinternational.com

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The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) was founded in 1801. Fourteen years later the Battle of Waterloo became one of the earliest battle honours of the Royal Wagon Train, ancestor of the present day Royal Logistic Corps. Since then, the path to a British Army commission and the job once it was gained, has changed beyond all recognition. The role, equipment and doctrine of logistics has also changed considerably as have the requirements they place on the officers charged with sustainment. These factors, combined with the structural, command and capability changes going on in the wider army presently, begs the question: ‘Is the training given to RLC young officers relevant and appropriate and therefore, does it prepare them for the rigours of command in the future? This article attempts to answer that question. By 2Lt M Leathard The current Regular Commissioning Course (CC) stands at 44 weeks consisting of three terms. The junior term of the CC focusses on turning the civilian who walks up Old College steps into a soldier who can effectively work as part of a team. The intermediate and senior terms then continue to develop the skills of the individual but also more crucially instil the leadership and values required of an officer in the British Army. The intermediate and senior term also seek to develop the academic sphere through battlefield studies and seminars on leadership, psychology and war studies. For those officers commissioning into the RLC, a Troop Commander’s Course (TCC) of 12 weeks follows. This course consists of three phases. It covers general knowledge of the RLC, its structure and role. The second phase consists of basic driving skills and documentation lessons undertaken at DST, followed by the final phase covering the orders process applied to a logistical context culminating in Exercise TIMBER TRUSS. Phase three of the course is generally considered to be the most essential phase and includes

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Is the RLC preparing its young officers for command in the future?

several TEWTs (tactical exercises without troops) and theoretical estimates followed by the presentation of orders. TEWT scenarios varied from hypothetical situations with an imagined enemy to real past situations faced by young officers such as those in Afghanistan. The variety of TEWTs and the use of real life genuine scenarios add a level of realism, which focusses the mind and encourages individuals to test themselves more thoroughly. After a year of training some officers may also undergo specialist training such as pre-parachute assessment known as P Company, the All Arms Commando Course or the Nepalese Long Language Course dependent on the unit they are joining. For most officers these 56 weeks must prepare them for command, until their next considerable period of education and training at the rank of Major on the Intermediate Command and Staff Course, (ICSC (Land)). The CC is widely considered to be particularly useful. Firstly, the exercises are varied and challenging in almost every way, particularly physically and mentally taxing. The physical tasks range from digging trenches to regimental level attacks. Perhaps most importantly for officer training, the exercises offered stimulating and diverse mental problems for commanders at all levels including working with indigenous and coalition forces while also operating within a complex, reactive and changing human terrain. Secondly, the opportunity to act within a variety of command appointments, other than that of Platoon/Troop Commander, embodies RMAS motto of “Serve to Lead” and gives Second Lieutenants a thorough understanding of the importance of each member of their team’s role and responsibilities. Although the CC does seem to prepare Officer Cadets well in most respects, the nature of the conflicts and operations that the British Army is engaged in is ever changing and future conflicts will be unpredictable. It must now be asked if RMAS and other army training establishments have fully transitioned from the HERRICK era back to a more general THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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and adaptable syllabus? The increase in the amount of short term training teams and non-kinetic tasks begs a further question; should more emphasis be placed upon training for such routine and predictable commitments? It can be argued that these courses place an overwhelming emphasis on the operational deployment side of army life at the expense of the routine administration of soldiers in barracks. At first this may seem like an obvious statement, however in an army which is shrinking and thus focussing on the maximum deployability of vehicles and personnel; the administration of individuals and financial resources within barracks is becoming increasingly essential. While some elements of this are covered, the vast majority of junior officers believe that they could have been better prepared in this regard. Like the CC, the RLC TCC must also keep adapting. The Army appears to split the task of training for the conventional threat to 3 Division and encompasses all other smaller taskings and non-kinetic operations under the 1 Division banner. The scale and type of training in each division is reflective of this move. The RLC’s “one size fits all” approach to training officers makes it very hard to implement and structure, especially given the multiple and diverse trade groups officers will be assigned to command. In contrast to the CC that prepares infantry officers for the Infantry Battle Skills Course that equips them for command of a rifle platoon; young officers currently leaving each TCC are well versed in the theory of conducting combat logistic patrols, but nearly half go to troops with little to no vehicles or to specialised units such as a MEXI Float Troop at 17 Port and Maritime Regiment. To some extent this is remedied by visits to respective future units by young officers while on the TCC, but it cannot fully prepare everyone to the same standard. It must also be questioned if any type of Phase 3 ‘specific to trade’ training should be codified and given to RLC officers when they reach their unit. While there is some continued leadership professional development (CPD) in the form of the Junior Officer Leadership Programme (JOLP) there is no specified training given regarding the systems, platforms or vehicles that may be operated by soldiers under the new troop commander. It is clearly challenging for the RLC to train young officers for every eventuality that exists within the Corps or the future uncertainty of the battlespaces it might have to operate in. Having said all this, it must be made clear at this juncture that this challenge seems to attract potential officers to the RLC, who specifically do not want a career

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based around a single unit, trade or platform. The variety offered by the RLC is a real test of the adaptability of the leadership training given at both RMAS and the RLC TCC. The fact that the Corps’ junior officers are seldom found wanting suggests that the training is versatile enough to provide a good grounding ahead of on the job development irrelevant of first posting. Many feel that RMAS does indeed prepare young officers for future challenges; however, the course must move with the changing nature of the commitments undertaken by the Army without losing sight of the lessons past conflicts can provide. Like the CC it is my opinion that the RLC TCC must adapt to the view that while the Army considers the conventional threat as the most pertinent, it must recognise and encompass more specific training on the smaller and non-kinetic taskings. In its 25th year, it is evident that the RLC faces the same challenges faced by the rest of the Army. Following the certainty and commitment of the TELIC-HERRICK era, major reductions in manpower and equipment and the increase in small scale tasks; new and novel ways of training must at least also be considered, allowing us to remain relevant. However, as this article has articulated, the British Army and thereby the RLC, is moving into a world in which the only certainty is, the next major challenge will most likely occur suddenly and will require rapid adaptation. Based on this premise, perhaps young officers training should continue to be generic and focus on leadership rather than trade if it is to remain flexible, adaptable and modern enough to counter the next scenario. Recent conflicts and humanitarian aid experiences of RLC junior officers strongly suggests the CC and TCC have met the mark. Only time, and a continued commitment to refinement will tell if they continue to do so into the future.

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Best in Class? A Study of Class Diversity in the British Army The British Army is going through a transformation. The first period of relative peace for 100 years1 has allowed the British Army to take stock of itself and self-evaluate its place in society. This has led to a particular focus on Diversity and Inclusion (D&I, and for that we should be thankful. By Capt E J M Thompson However, as much as we have focused on and improved in this area in recent years, there is still one form of discrimination which members of the British Army practice without question; class. Using the definition of class as ‘a system of ordering society whereby people are divided into sets based on perceived social or economic status’2, this essay will look at two areas of class divide within the British Army. Firstly, that between soldier and officer and secondly, that which happens during regimental selection for officers, before discussing why the Army should care. The first, and most obvious, class divide that is apparent is that between soldiers and officers. This has existed since the formation of the British Army and was traditionally due to the practice of purchasing commissions as a way for wealthy individuals and families to increase their social standing.3 Although this tradition was obviously abolished, how is this divide, although diluted, still present in the 21st century? It can be argued that it is linked to the wider problem of social mobility within the UK. In an ideal world, the divide between officers and soldiers should be based on leadership qualities, not on class. However, in the current ‘peacetime’ Army, it could be said that more emphasis tends to be placed on an officer’s written and verbal communication skills, rather than their ability to inspire and lead. Most officers, whether they are in regimental duty or in a staff role, tend to spend a large proportion of their time behind a computer, writing doctrine, or endless emails. Therefore, it is seen as a requisite that officers possess these skills, and indeed entry into the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) requires at least seven GCSEs Levels 9 4 (A*-C) including English, maths and a science or foreign language, plus two A levels or equivalent qualifications4. The Social Mobility Commission’s recent ‘State of the Nation’ report shows that those who are from underprivileged backgrounds and geographical areas are less likely to possess these minimum entry requirements. It

tells of a clear ‘postcode lottery’ where the geographical area an individual grows up in is directly linked to their chances in ascertaining a good education and personal development opportunities5. Improving social mobility appears to have confounded recent UK governments; despite social mobility being high up on both Labour and Conservative agendas in the last 20 years, there has been no improvement in the GCSE attainment gap between those who are eligible to receive free school meals and their more affluent peers, between 1997-20176. This trend appears to be continuing in Theresa May’s government, with all four members of the Social Mobility Commission resigning in frustration in December 2017, due to the lack of progress and available resource7. Due to this lack of progress, many talented individuals are simply not getting the opportunity to develop their natural talents and attain requisite qualifications to enter into professional industries, including the Army as an officer. This therefore could lead to a correlation of individuals who have been fortunate to grow up in an economically stable environment, or in areas of relative affluence, to apply to be commissioned rather than entering the ranks.

The class divide between officers and soldiers still exists

There is little the British Army can do to prevent this trend without awaiting a change in wider social economic policy. However, an area where it is possible for lower levels of command to have an influence is the option of Direct Entry Commissioning junior soldiers from the ranks. Talented individuals are spotted as having officer potential by their chain of command and will go through the selection process to attend officer training at RMAS. However, there is a flaw in that the Chain of Command tends to only recommend soldiers if they believe they will ‘fit in’ in the Officers’ Mess; usually denoted by if they look or sound like a young officer. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Some very bright soldiers may be in danger of being overlooked as a commissioning candidate simply because they have, for example, a Northern accent. Decision makers need to be aware of this unconscious bias; if an individual has the ability and leadership qualities to become an officer, then there is no question that they should be accepted. Although there are some areas for improvement, the British Army should be celebrated for its unique ability to maximise the opportunity for social mobility within its ranks. Unlike other professions such as law or medicine where if you miss out on educational targets in your teenage years, it is almost impossible to succeed in that field, the military has a plethora of opportunities and benefits which can help an individual from any background hugely improve their social situation. An individual can enter as a private soldier, with no academic qualifications8. By the time, they leave they may have been given an education up to a master’s level degree9, received help to buy their own home10 and the option for their children to attend boarding schools with up to a 90% subsidy of the fees11. As stated in the Department for Education’s plan for improving social mobility through education, ‘opportunity breeds opportunity’12. Individuals who have entered the Armed Forces from underprivileged backgrounds have the chance, if they choose to take it, to maximise their talent and improve their own and their families, chances of becoming upwardly mobile. It seems a missed opportunity that this service which the Army provides society, and which seems so hard to ascertain in almost all professional industries, is not more widely celebrated or utilised in recruiting or enhancing the Army’s reputation. The social gap between officer and soldier should be acknowledged, but the issue can, in part, be put down to a societal problem. Change will come, but most likely it will come with a change in wider society and the implementation of the Government’s social mobility policies. In the meantime, the Chain of Command can help the situation by being conscious of unconscious bias and ensuring talent is recognised, no matter what it looks like.

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The military can help an individual from any background to improve their social situation

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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

However, the second class issue is less often acknowledged, yet is still obviously present within the British Army’s DNA. The Regimental Selection Boards (RSBs) which take place at RMAS are a selection process which occurs just after the half-way point of officer training. They dictate where an officer will be spending their Army career. The candidate is interviewed by their top two choices of Regiment or Corps and are either offered a place, or told to look elsewhere. Thankfully, it is now ludicrous to say that a more qualified, better performing female officer cadet would not get their preferred choice of regiment over an underperforming male competitor. The same can be said for BAME individuals and members of the LGBT community. The Army would, under no circumstances condone discriminating against these characteristics. However, it is still

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Place of birth can have a direct effect on academic achievement

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widely perceived that class plays a large role in why some regiments select their future officers. A shockingly large proportion of graduates from RMAS have their own experience of a ‘top third’ individual being turned away from a regiment, whilst a ‘bottom third’ individual receives the place, with the only feasible reason being their lack of family ties to the regiment, or their lack of the right social credentials. Some individuals are even given confirmed cadetships before they begin officer training. This points to individuals being selected on whether they ‘fit in’ as opposed to on merit; they are selected by the regiment before the individual has had their performance evaluated under the arduous and pressurised conditions which are a given at Sandhurst. If regiments are choosing officers based on their social credentials rather than on a merit based system, do they have the best interests of their soldiers at heart? Or are they content to have mediocre leaders, as long as they can contribute to a good life in the Officers’ Mess? One solution to prevent this behaviour would be to make the RSBs a purely merit based system. Officer cadets could be ranked in order of merit, based on their performance during officer training. The cadets then choose in merit order which regiment they would like to join. An argument against this is that could be that it could dilute the traditions and ‘Character’ of a regiment. But where is the line drawn between tradition and discrimination? The definition of discrimination in the Business Dictionary is ‘bias or prejudice resulting in denial of opportunity, or unfair treatment regarding selection, promotion, or transfer. Discrimination is practiced commonly on the grounds of age, disability, ethnicity, origin, political belief, race, religion, sex, i.e., factors which are irrelevant to a person's competence or suitability’13. If turning away a more talented individual on the grounds of their schooling, accent, or family ties doesn’t fall into this description, then what does? As a relatively new organisation14, The Royal Logistic Corps appears to steer clear from this selection criteria which seems to befall so many of its older counterparts. There are many areas where The RLC should be grateful that its youth does not tie it to outdated traditions; this is one of them. Nevertheless, in the grand scheme of Warfighting, why should the British Army care about these class divides, both between officers and soldiers and between officers themselves? The argument leads back to D&I. Diversity versus uniformity is an on-going question in the British Army. Uniformity usually fosters shared values which can promote a shared understanding. This can be hugely important in uncertain or dangerous conditions and in this respect, it is understandable why parts of the Army could be wary of diversifying a team. However, diversity shouldn’t be seen as a quota, or a buzzword which will go out of fashion. It is a tool which can make us a more agile, innovative and intelligent Army. In research conducted at the Carnegie Mellon University by Anita Williams Woolley, it showed teams from similar

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backgrounds or of the same gender perform better at tasks that involve implementing existing solutions15. In an army where experimentation and innovation are being actively encouraged (evident from the emphasis placed on ventures such as the STRIKE Experimentation Group16 and 77th Brigade17), it can no longer be in the business of implementing existing solutions. We need to be forward thinking and agile to be on par with the plethora of potential threats which the British Army may face in the upcoming years. Creating more diverse teams, at every level, will only aid in this advancement that the Army needs to make. Class should be included in this discussion as much as gender, race or sexual orientation. It is also a case of staying relevant and remaining a respected institution in this changing age. The new generation British Army is looking to recruit, both at soldier and officer level and is more accepting and diverse in thought than ever. The younger generation will not join an organisation which has not moved with the times. In conclusion, there is still an obvious presence of a class divide within the British Army, most notably between its soldiers and officers. Although there is more work that can be done to remove unconscious biases which may creep in when putting forward potential officers, the opportunities for upward mobility will have to increase nationwide before this class divide becomes less apparent. However, there is a more blatant divide, which could be classed as discrimination, in how some regiments choose their officers. These areas of the Army need to be careful they are not holding on to unhealthy traditions. Diversity, including class diversity, needs to be truly embraced, not just accepted, by all members of the British Army. This will only serve to increase innovation, combat effectiveness and enhance its reputation within the wider society. Bibliography ALLISON G, 2015. What does the secretive 77th Brigade do? UK Defence Journal. Available from: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/secretive-77thbrigade/ [Accessed 10 March 2018]. ARMY FAMILIES FEDERATION, 2018. MOD Education Allowances. Available from: http://www.aff.org.uk/army_family_life/education_childcare/ modeducationallowances.htm [Accessed 9 March 2018]. BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 2018. Discrimination. Available from: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/discrimination.html [Accessed 9 March 2018]. DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2017. Unlocking talent, fulfilling potential. Available from:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/667690/Social_Mobility_Action_Plan__for_printing.pdf [Accessed 9 March 2018]. DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2017. Improving Social Mobility through Education. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ improving-social-mobility-through-education [Accessed 6 March 2018]. ENGLISH OXFORD DIXTIONARY, 2018. Class. Available from: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/class [Accessed 3 April 2018]. HILL A, 2018. British army is right to widen search for top-class recruit. Financial Times. Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/db710b72f60f-11e7-8715-e94187b3017e [Accessed 7 March 2018]. HILL A, 2016. Diversity needs skilled leaders. Financial Times. Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/45602ae8-74d1-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a [Accessed 7 March 2018].

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IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, 2018. Timeline of 20th and 21st Century Wars. Available from: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/timeline-of-20th-and21st-century-wars [Accessed 9 March 2018]. THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 1951. Purchase and promotion in the British Army in the eighteenth century. Available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1951.tb00967.x/ abstract [Accessed 9 March 2018]. NATIONAL CAREERS SERVICE, 2017. Army Officer. Available from: https://nationalcareersservice.direct.gov.uk/job-profiles/army-officer [Accessed 7 March 2018]. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2018. Qualifications. Available from: https://apply.army.mod.uk/how-to-join/can-i-join/qualifications [Accessed 9 March 2018]. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2018. Career enhancing qualification. Available from: https://www.army.mod.uk/personnel-and-welfare/career-enhancingqualifications/ [Accessed 9 March 2018]. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2014. Forces help to buy: help to get on the property ladder. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/forceshelp-to-buy [Accessed 9 March 2018]. MORRISON B, 2003. Officer Class. Available from: https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/03/iraq.military1 [Accessed 8 March 2018]. OWEN WF, 2017. Explaining the British Army’s STRIKE Concept. RUSI. Available from: https://rusi.org/publication/newsbrief/explaining-britisharmy%E2%80%99s-strike-concept [Accessed 10 March 2018]. THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS, 2018. History. Available from: http://www.royallogisticcorps.co.uk/heritage/history/ [Accessed 3 April 2018]. SOCIAL MOBILITY COMMISSION, 2017. State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great Britain. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/ government /publications/state-of-the-nation-2017 [Accessed 6 March 2018]. SOCIAL MOBILITY COMMISSION, 2017. Time for Change: An Assessment of Government Policies on Social Mobility 1997-2017. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/622214/Time_for_Change_report__An_ assessement_of_government_policies_on_social_mobility_19972017.pdf [Accessed 3 April 2018].

Footnotes IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, 2018. Timeline of 20th and 21st Century Wars. Available from: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/timeline-of-20th-and21st-century-wars [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 112 ENGLISH OXFORD DIXTIONARY, 2018. Class. Available from: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/class [Accessed 3 April 2018]. 113 THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 1951. Purchase and promotion in the British Army in the eighteenth century. Available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1951.tb00967.x/ abstract [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 111

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NATIONAL CAREERS SERVICE, 2017. Army Officer. Available from: https://nationalcareersservice.direct.gov.uk/job-profiles/army-officer [Accessed 7 March 2018]. 115 SOCIAL MOBILITY COMMISSION, 2017. State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great Britain. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/state-of-the-nation-2017 [Accessed 6 March 2018]. 116 SOCIAL MOBILITY COMMISSION, 2017. Time for Change: An Assessment of Government Policies on Social Mobility 1997-2017. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/622214/Time_for_Change_report_-_An_ assessement_of_government_policies_on_social_mobility_1997-2017.pdf [Accessed 3 April 2018]. 117 BAGEHOT, 2017. Britain ignores social mobility at its peril. The Economist. Available from: https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21732102mobility-has-become-more-important-it-has-also-become-more-difficult-pr omote-britain [Accessed 3 April 2018]. 118 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2018. Qualifications. Available from: https://apply.army.mod.uk/how-to-join/can-i-join/qualifications [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 119 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2018. Career enhancing qualification. Available from: https://www.army.mod.uk/personnel-and-welfare/career-enhancingqualifications/ [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 110 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2014. Forces help to buy: help to get on the property ladder. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/forceshelp-to-buy [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 111 ARMY FAMILIES FEDERATION, 2018. MOD Education Allowances. Available from: http://www.aff.org.uk/army_family_life/education_ childcare/modeducationallowances.htm [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 112 DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2017. Unlocking talent, fulfilling potential. Available from:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/667690/Social_Mobility_Action_Plan__for_printing.pdf [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 113 BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 2018. Discrimination. Available from: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/discrimination.html [Accessed 9 March 2018]. 114 THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS, 2018. History. Available from: http://www.royallogisticcorps.co.uk/heritage/history/ [Accessed 3 April 2018]. 115 HILL A, 2016. Diversity needs skilled leaders. Financial Times. Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/45602ae8-74d1-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a [Accessed 7 March 2018]. 116 OWEN WF, 2017. Explaining the British Army’s STRIKE Concept. RUSI. Available from: https://rusi.org/publication/newsbrief/explaining-britisharmy%E2%80%99s-strike-concept [Accessed 10 March 2018]. 117 ALLISON G, 2015. What does the secretive 77th Brigade do? UK Defence Journal. Available from: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/secretive-77thbrigade/ [Accessed 10 March 2018]. 114

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How can 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC (13 AASR) become a Combat Service Support (CSS) exemplar in the British Army? This essay explores a range of questions relating to CSS; specifically, the opportunities that 13 AASR has by becoming a hybrid CSS Regiment four years prior to the formation of CSS STRIKE Battalions. It will discuss the unique capabilities the Regt has compared to a Logistic Support Regiment (LSR) and REME Battalion. It will also make suggestions as to what the Regt might need to look like in order to realign itself from its current Air Assault Task Force (AATF) ORBAT to be able to support a multi-battlegroup deployment. By SSgt S Ossola REME

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Currently 13 AASR has six sub-units with multiple cap badges and Career Employment Groups (CEGs) throughout. 24 Headquarters Sqn (24 HQ Sqn) provides the Command and Control (C2) node between Battalion HQ and the other sub-units. It also provides the majority of the CSS Battlegroup HQ when deployed. 47 Air Despatch Sqn (47 AD Sqn) and 65 Troop provides bespoke services to Ministry of Defence A Block (MAB) and 16 Air Assault Brigade. 65 Troop will not be considered in this article due to some of its command relationships being outside of 13 AASR. The two Logistic Task Sqns are 63 and 82 respectively, the sixth sub-unit is 8 Parachute Field Company REME (8 Para Fd Coy), which was re-subordinated to 13 AASR from 7 Air Assault Bn REME (7AA Bn REME) in Apr 2016. The change in

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command relationship was due to 16 Air Assault Brigade leaving Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) and being redesignated to Commander Field Army (CFA). This in turn left 8 Para Fd Coy as the Land ES element without a command structure inside of 16 Air Assault Brigade as 7 Air Assault Battalion REME remained within JHC. The course of action (COA) chosen was to resubordinate 8 Para Fd Coy to 13 AASR enabling the Regt to become a CSS Hybrid Regiment.1 As a consequence, this has now given 16 Air Assault Brigade and therefore 13 AASR, the platform to develop a unique unit with Logistic & Equipment Support (ES) capabilities together from levels 1-3 in an Air Assault Manoeuvre Brigade. 13 AASR ORBAT At present, 13 AASR is set up to support the AATF with 2 and 3 PARA rotating through annually as the lead combat element. 24 HQ Sqn provides the majority of the CSS Battlegroup HQ element and permanently stays on R2 (Five days’ Notice To Move). 24 HQ Sqn provides the C2 relationship from the Task Sqns and 8 Para Fd Coy when deployed. With the potential for two, three or square Battlegroup deployments in 16 Air Assault Brigade, 24 HQ Sqn should look to be able to deploy split in two separate locations to support a multi-manoeuvre Bde operation. 63 and 82 Sqns are aligned to 2 and 3 PARA respectively, but as seen with 1 Royal Gurkha Regiment (1RGR) on ASKARI STORM 2-18 when a third Combat Battlegroup deploys within 16 Air Assault Brigade, there is not a standalone Logistic Sqn to deliver second line support. To successfully deliver this, a Hybrid CSS Company was force generated with 8 Para Fd Coy leading with the HQ command element. This proved a success and is evidence that the Regt has strength in depth through all ranks, CEGs and capabilities. REME personnel were commanding the logistic effect utilising the Company’s organic RLC Stores Troop with Drivers from all Sqns force generated for the mission. REME personnel who had driving qualifications were also utilised for additional skills. For this to be a success, it took three months of planning which, when you consider the readiness model of 16 Air Assault Brigade being on between R1 and R4 (Two days – 30 days NTM), would not be a sustainable deployment and would be detrimental to Bde ES effect. To support another Combat Battlegroup such as 1 RGR or another Air Landing Battalion, a further RLC task Sqn would have to be added the 13 AASR ORBAT, in this case it would be an opportunity to re-establish 15 Air Assault Sqn who disbanded in Jul 2013 under Army 2020 reform.2

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Forward repair

8 Para Fd Coy is at best, set up to support two AATF Battlegroups with two platoons of 1+35 rotating through the readiness cycle with 2 and 3 PARA. However, this manning largely only exists on paper due to other taskings such as an extra ASKARI STORM this year with 8 Para Fd Coy forming the basis of the CSS Hybrid group in Kenya. To sustain a third Combat Battlegroup, another platoon of 1+35 must be added as well as an uplift of the Coy HQ to mirror closely The RLC Task Sqns, this will then ensure that on a Bde multi-manoeuvre unit deployment, there would be a competent Coy HQ to deliver best ES effect to 16 Air Assault Bde with the potential to provide a third CSS Battlegroup HQ in extremis.3 Capability review 16 Air Assault Bde’s niche capability is theatre entry Tactical Air Transport (Tac AT) by airborne, air assault and air despatch methods. Most of these capabilities will be transitioning from C-130J to A400M and the RAF will have delivery of the last A400M in 2021 with Full Operating Capability (FOC) soon after.4 47 AD Sqn working with Joint Air Delivery Test and Evaluation Unit (JADTEU) will ideally deliver a British air despatch Medium Stress Platform (MSP) capability on A400M to enable theatre vehicle entry by heavy drop in the next decade, concurrently looking to gain experience from our interoperability partners in the Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (A-CJEF) and 82nd Airborne Division. If a MSP heavy drop capability is not generated for the A400M, this will reduce the options available to 16 Air Assault Bde regarding vehicle delivery into theatre and heighten our reliability on our NATO partners in this area. Air Despatch of vehicles could be viewed as one of the early forms of autonomous delivery of vehicles in the 20th century. As I have mentioned previously, 24 HQ Sqn should look to be able to split to give C2 nodes in separate battlespaces giving a balanced support to a Bde multi-manoeuvre unit deployment. However, as seen on Ex SWIFT RESPONSE 17, 24 Sqn HQ could be called upon to set up and sustain an Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) for 16 Air Assault Bde or our NATO partners, which requires considerable planning and rehearsals. The Sqn should look to develop this to become the “exemplar” for the A-CJEF and NATO. As commander 16 Air Assault Bde has stated:

“The Brigade must be as useful and as productive as possible to our Government, Defence and the Army. First and foremost, this is about Warfighting and we may deploy as part of a Division (3XX or the 82nd AB), enabling follow-on forces or in a niche role. Whether our role is in contact or to prevent combat, 16 Air Asslt Bde must be able to assure theatre entry and provide intra-theatre manoeuvre options to the chain of command. Critically, we need to be able to demonstrate competence as part of active deterrence. Given this, 16 Air Asslt Bde must be the intellectual and competence lead for the Army on both Air Manoeuvre and light infantry urban operations.5” The two current task Sqns of 63 and 82 are a mirror image with a Sqn HQ, Airborne Troop, Fuel and General Transport Troop and Supply Troop. Airborne Troop is used in a variety of roles but has been specifically formed for Heavy Drop Zone clearance and rigging Helicopter Under Slung Loads for airframes in JHC ranging from class l - V stores including vehicles. This capability is where 13 AASR shows agility to resupply the Force at speed without the need of any Ground Line of Communications (GLoC), however, due to airframe constraints the opportunity to carry out such training is scarce using purely British air assets. During interoperability exercises with the A-CJEF and 82nd Airborne Division, 13 AASR should exploit any partner airframes to gain experience and share techniques. If and when a heavy drop capability does come into 16 Air Assault Bde, it will be imperative that the skill sets of 8 Para Fd Coy & Airborne Troop come together to learn how to best clear the drop zone of vehicles and equipment as seen on Ex SWIFT RESPONSE 2016.6

“Helicopter handling and DZ teams from the AASR’s AB troop embedded with 1st line are able to prepare helicopter underslung loads, conduct helicopter landing site and DZ marking and act as additional manpower to assist the battlegroup echelon. All teams/detachments are parachute trained.7” Further to this, second to first line bulk water has needed an uplift and a Combat Support Tanker Water (CST (W), 18,000 litres) would fill the gap between Force and Formation. A Water Dispensing Rack (WDR, 9,000 litres) however, would fit better with the Bde’s “fight light” footing and would also enhance 13 AASR resupply capability. One of the other benefits of the WDR is that if the prime mover is nontaskworthy (NT), it can be cross loaded onto another MAN vehicle with ease even if it needs to be lifted off by crane utilising Support Vehicle Recovery (SV(R)). It is important to note that French members of the A-CJEF do not drink bulk water, (only bottled) so water would be scaled as necessary in different transport forms according to the mission. The third Task Sqn should once again mirror 63 and 82 but instead of an Airborne Troop, it would be beneficial to THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Underslung load

operational effectiveness to have a Medium Lift Troop utilising the Modified Light Equipment Transporter (MLET). This would provide efficiency by avoiding using costly civilian haulage firms for moving the SUPACAT and Revised – Weapon Mounted Installation Kit (R-WMIK) fleet to Brize Norton or Marchwood for operational deployments, whilst also ensuring the equipment and drivers of these platforms arrive at the Air Port of Departure (APoD) or Sea Port of Departure (SPoD) without being exposed to the elements which would occur as a result of being driven there in open architecture vehicles. Whilst the training burden to set this troop up initially would be severe, the cost savings throughout the year would be matched and the enhanced capability would bring simplicity to readiness timelines without the need to outsource to other agencies. On enduring missions and overseas training exercises (OTX) the MLET could also be used as an additional recovery asset for casualty vehicles in co-operation with REME Recovery Mechanics, or transport vital equipment for Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR). For ES within 8 Para Fd Coy, the delay of the Light Weight (Air Portable) Recovery Capability (LW(AP)RC) project has hampered the ability to be able to surge recovery Forward Repair Teams (FRTs) with a platform that can be delivered into theatre by Rapid Air Landing on C130-J and subsequently A400M. One LW(AP)RC is scheduled to be delivered to 16 Air Assault Bde by 2020, with Full Operating Capability (FOC) the following year which will deliver a further two. This will fit well into the future aspirations of the Bde along with other units who may well be added to the future Bde construct, such as a Light Cavalry unit. 8 Para Fd Coy should look to be involved in the final Recovery Trials at CSS Trials and Development Unit (CSS TDU) to ensure that when the platform arrives in 16 Air Assault Bde, the training concerns and burden are minimised due to 13 AASR REME personnel being involved all the way through from the Key User Requirements stage at Army HQ, to delivery and subsequent feedback to manufacturer. In the interim, COYOTE has been used successfully on regular deployments. While this is not a recovery vehicle, it has proved its worth through the provision of a limited level 122

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one recovery capability and can protect itself with area weapons mounted such as Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG). 16 Air Assault Bde will potentially look to move to R-WMIK soon and withdraw the SUPACAT platforms of JACKAL and COYOTE. This is due to R-WMIK being much lighter, air portable and versatile than the SUPACAT fleet meaning greater agility and reach when carrying out intra theatre moves. The CSS arms within the Bde must follow suit so that it mirrors the same operational effectiveness of the rest of the Bde and the supply chain can be simplified due to commonality of parts. New equipment being introduced to Defence, such as the future MORPHEUS communication system, must be seen as an opportunity for 13 AASR to trial and develop it with the view to identifying any short falls it may have especially in the Regt’s niche role operating at reach. Looking towards new technologies, there is no mistaking that autonomous platforms on land, sea and air will make up some of our future force, with the largest autonomous British Army Exercise AUTONOMOUS WARRIOR, taking place in Nov this year with a Battlegroup from 1st Armoured Infantry Brigade taking the lead. This equipment will still have some form of human interface and we should endeavour to be a part of the trials and experimentation process. Providing the Regt’s junior soldiers of today with the opportunity to trial and test the new technological advances of tomorrow is of upmost importance as resupply is one of the key areas for success.

“Autonomous Warrior, the 2018 Army Warfighting Experiment, will push the boundaries of technology and military capability in the land environment. And one of the key areas it is set to test is the autonomous last mile resupply. The ‘last mile’, which represents the extremely dangerous final approach to the combat zone, is crucial to ensuring soldiers have the food, fuel and ammunition to keep them alive. Autonomous Warrior will test a range of prototype unmanned aerial and ground cargo vehicles which aim to reduce the danger to troops during combat.8” In summary, I have looked at the unique capabilities 13 AASR has compared to a LSR and made suggestions as to how it can be developed for the future. I have proposed some recommendations regarding the Regt’s future ORBAT to realign itself from its current AATF ORBAT to be able to support a multi-battlegroup deployment. To conclude, 13 AASR is in a prime position to shape future CSS in 16 Air Assault Bde but also throughout Defence, especially as the Regt is formed, fully operational and has no planned unit moves for the foreseeable future. Having the ability to split 24 HQ Sqn will ensure CSS within 16 Air Assault Bde can have two C2 nodes to support a multi-manoeuvre operation. A sub-unit uplift of an additional Task Sqn along with a further platoon of ES and

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Coy HQ personnel in 8 Para Fd Coy with give best CSS effect for prospective future complex operations. Second to first line water distribution improvements through WDR will enhance 16 Air Assault Bde’s class I resupply capability, along with exploiting training opportunities with partner nations using helicopters for under slung resupply. The Regt should continue to keep looking outwards, experimenting with new methods and technologies to deliver best CSS effect to the force using the principles of logistics: Foresight, Efficiency, Simplicity, Co-operation and Agility to become the CSS exemplar of the British Army.9

“My focus as CGS is the future, preparing the Army of tomorrow, which is why you’ll find in the Army that I command some of the brightest and the best of all generations in those appointments that sign and shape our future; and the further out we’re looking, the younger those teams should be.” General Mark Carleton-Smith, CGS.10”

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Footnotes 111

20151203-ArmyHQ_Plans_IO_ACR_08_003C_Reorganise_CSS_Enablers_ (AnxA_13_Air_Asslt_Sp_Regt_RLC) _DStrat.doc 112 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/army-2020-transforming-thebritish-army-for-the-future 113 https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBCSS/2015112 6-AC71877_BESD_v2.1_Final-U.pdf 114 https://www.raf.mod.uk/aircraft/atlas-a400m/ 115 http://cui1-uk.diif.r.mil.uk/r/240/COMDGP/COSDCOS/BrigadeDirective/ 20180328-16X_Directive-OS.docx 116 https://www.army.mil/article/167464/Swift_Response_16_to_exercise_Alli ed_airborne_forces_in_Europe/ 117 https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBDoctrine/AFM _Sustainment_Aug2017_interactive.pdf 118 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-army-set-to-redefinewarfare-with-joint-autonomous-warrior 119 http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/DINSJSPS/20130815.1 /20130424_JSP%20902-Defence%20Logistics%20Sustainability% 20V1.2-R.pdf 110 https://rusi.org/annual-conference/rusi-land-warfare-conference/ cgs-keynote-address-2018

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Toxic leadership – can it truly be cut out of the military? We all know of, or have worked under, bad military leaders. One’s mind is no doubt immediately cast back to the person that made our life difficult, be it intentionally or inadvertently. While leadership has been the subject of significant army studies, the majority of publications focus on how to be a perfect leader. It is, therefore, important for us to also examine the dark side of leadership, learn from past mistakes and understand the culture in which it can occur. By Capt T Saddleton The term ‘toxic leadership’ has increasingly become synonymous with poor leadership skills. However, its use in this manner deviates from its original meaning and often emphasises underlying negative behaviours. The Army Leadership Doctrine released in 2016 defines toxic leadership as “a combination of selfish attitudes, motivations, and behaviours that have adverse effects on both subordinates and the organisation”1. They operate solely from acute selfinterest, narcissism, lack emotional intelligence and use dysfunctional behaviours to coerce, deceive, intimidate and punish others to achieve their aims2. Toxic leadership harms our people and eventually damages our organisation as well3. Riddled with narcissism, their entire focus both consciously and unconsciously is on themselves, their careers and ego4.

Figure 1 - Toxic traits can be subjective

History is full of toxic leaders: Hitler, Fidel Castro, Stalin, Chairman Mao. The list goes on. While the examples given are extremes, formally identifying toxic leaders at lower levels can be challenging. Successful leaders are driven, charismatic, confident, competitive and often cunning5. Traits that often also 124

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hold true for toxic leaders. Determining a leader’s motives can be subjective and we are often left to interpret on the basis of their actions. Castro was intelligent, confident, courageous and idealistic. All positive qualities, however, he was irrefutably toxic. On the other hand, if Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla) was judged solely on his actions, he could also be described as a narcissist and approaching toxicity. His ability for self-promotion, charisma and grandiose demeanour, are traits that can be misconstrued depending on their application. Although this is not the case, it demonstrates that a scale of toxicity exists, upon which leaders sit, where possible variances in severity can be identified. Military predisposition Does the British Army have a problem with toxic leadership? A questionnaire, part of a recent leadership study conducted during Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) (ICSC(L), revealed that 90% of the newly promoted majors taking part had observed personnel displaying ‘toxic leadership’ traits in one or more rank6. Even if the sample used was one of the most cynical cohorts in the Army, this remains to be a startlingly high percentage. When the US Army declared toxic leadership as an endemic problem in the early 2000s, a substantial amount of research was undertaken as a result. By comparison, analysis conducted by the British Army has been minimal. The most extensive research to date was the ‘Defence Research Paper’ by Lt Col John Dagness in 2015. This paper forms the basis for our doctrine on bad leaders. It concludes that the construct of a military organisation is at greater risk to the effect of toxic leaders than a civilian organisation7, for the reasons explained below. When focusing on toxic leadership, many researchers emphasise the symptoms of toxicity (individual characteristics, traits) and not the disease (culture, climate, outcomes)8. Namely, a toxic leader cannot survive on their own, but require susceptible followers and a suitable environment9 to thrive - a combination known as the toxic triangle. Followers Toxic leadership can only occur when followers allow it to happen. A leader’s primary goal of self-promotion is the driver, but without followers they are powerless. Our doctrine defines two types of susceptible follower; conformers and colluders. Conformers will not challenge bad leaders and prioritise selfpreservation by the path of least resistance. Also known as bystanders11, they do not support the leader but will do nothing to stop them. Often it is the ability to endure a bad leader for only a short period of overlap that spurs inactivity, which is linked to our short and overlapping posting cycles.

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Figure 2 - The Adapted Toxic Triangle10 from the Army Leadership Doctrine

Colluders, or true believers12, are those who seek out toxic leaders and willingly support them. Often motivated by their own promotion prospects, these are the toxic leaders of the future. Unlike civilian organisations, army leaders are trained from the bottom up and cannot be hired in directly to fill mid or senior level management positions. We are therefore products of our environment and if a leader demonstrating toxic behaviour is seen to be successful, this will breed colluders who seek to imitate them. In both cases it is a failure to abide by the Armyâ€™s values and standards, which allows destructive leaders to prevail. For conformers, it is the lack of courage to speak out and for colluders, a lack of integrity and a complete lack of respect for others. Hierarchy Why is it that toxic leaders can thrive so well in the military? Research by the British, US and Australian armies has concluded that the military is more vulnerable to toxic leaders than the civilian sector13 and that it is our traditional culture and promotion systems that allow it. As a hierarchical organisation, our commanders are empowered and given almost absolute authority over their subordinates. It is necessary and central to the method in which we can command our soldiers and convey orders in the most difficult situations. A toxic leader strives to climb this ladder whatever the cost, seeking the power and authority bestowed upon them by the higher rank and the unquestionable control they then have over their subordinates. It is in the higher echelons of such a hierarchy that destructive leadership can more easily occur, as there is less supervision and a greater ability to control the flow of information14. These leaders can manipulate and distort the messages being passed up the chain of command and restrict the passage back down, keeping their behaviour from their superiors15. While the above points are not solely confined to the military, as similar hierarchal issues can be present in civilian organisations, our requirement to have an organised, obedient nature inadvertently allows these leaders to flourish. Our culture driven by the Armyâ€™s values and

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Figure 3 - Hierarchy helps commanding in high pressure situations

standards tells us to have loyalty to our units, to our commanders, peers and subordinates. If confronted by a toxic leader, their actions can often be tolerated, so not to be in contravention of this culture or to bring our units into disrepute. It is the difficult task of all commanders to support the chain of command while providing the opportunity for subordinates to report destructive leadership16. Output driven Arguably the greatest opportunity given to any aspiring toxic leader, is the output-focussed nature of military organisations. Our sole purpose is to deliver a capability to achieve an output when ordered. Mission success therefore takes precedence. Toxic leaders focus on deliverables and prioritise achieving their mission above all else, often to the detriment of their people. Quantifying the effects however can be difficult as it usually concerns the moral component of our workforce, which is often subjective17. Our predilection to have strong, decisive leaders allows them to capitalise on periods of instability and make unilateral decisions to gain power. Our short posting cycles also play into the hands of toxic leaders, creating periods of change that can be exploited. How can we improve? According to Padilla et al. (2007), three things must be done to overcome toxic leadership. This is based on combatting the three elements of the toxic triangle. We must: select and develop leaders, strengthen and empower followers and improve organisational environment18. The most important of these with regards to the British Army is changing the organisational environment. As an organisation, we complete the first two elements reasonably well. The Army has a long established and successful method of developing leaders and only an incredibly small minority become toxic. The dysfunctional behaviours are personality-based and driven by self-interest. Our emphasis on values based leadership and the focus by senior commanders to remove toxic leaders from post are vital. The Army attempts to empower followers to speak out against damaging leadership, through the use of the service complaints process and the Ombudsman established in 2015. THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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is safe to assume that they would not volunteer for this process willingly.

Figure 4 - The organisation has changed with the times, is it time for our reporting system to as well?

Reporting Organisational change, however, is tougher to achieve. A large element of the environment that allows toxic leaders to progress is the top down reporting procedure. As mentioned above, a leader can manipulate their superiors’ perceptions by limiting the information flow upwards. The reporting process is largely subjective, aiding the toxic leader. At the higher levels of command, where the reporting period is skewed towards delivered outputs rather than the values and standards, a toxic leader embraces the culture this generates20. How often has a high flying toxic leader worked their unit tirelessly, delivered their goals and left the unit in disarray in their wake? Our reporting process should consider the legacy we leave and how a unit acts shortly after a leader has left. 360-degree reporting is a commonly used tool in the business world21 and has been trialled by the US, Canadian and Australian Armies22. It has been considered by the British Army, as alluded to by the Army Sergeant Major at the Centre for Army Leadership’s 2017 conference23. The method requires comments from a leader’s superiors (who can be fooled) as well as their peers and subordinates (who cannot), meaning that toxic leaders should be more easily recognised and removed. The US Army has employed the method the most widely of any military organisation and acknowledge that it is a powerful tool for leader development, but highlights that challenges face its widespread implementation24. As an effective tool for self-development, this is not a pure solution to replace the current reporting system. Unless conducted correctly, it could encourage dissent as well as generating an administrative burden. If it was ever used to combat toxic leadership, it would need to be directed as policy. Due to the narcissistic tendencies of toxic leaders, it

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Conclusion There is the potential for all bad leadership to be considered toxic, however this is not the case. “Dysfunctional leaders may simply be unskilled or unaware of their lack of talent to lead. Toxic leaders find their success and glory in their destruction of others”25. The Army’s structure and role make it susceptible to toxic leaders and the power our commanders hold can enhance its effects. If we ever wish to change this, we must first acknowledge that there is an issue, before we can implement meaningful change as policy. More research must be conducted on this subject across all ranks of the Army, not only to raise awareness about toxic behaviours, but to also reduce the ability of toxicity to embed itself within our organisation. Footnotes British Army, Army Leadership Doctrine, Edition 1, 2016, p79. US Army, ADP 6-22: Army Leadership, 2012. 113 Karen Wilson Starks, Toxic Leadership, Transleadership, 2003. 114 Lt Col J Doty and MSgt J Fenlason, Narcissism and Toxic Leaders, 2013. 115 Jean Lipman-Blumen, The Allure of Toxic Leaders, 2004. 116 SJE Hart, Army Leadership Review: Army Division Response, 2015. 117 Lt Col JW Dagless, Defence Research Paper: Toxic Leadership, 2015. 118 Lt Col DW Aubrey, The Effect of Toxic Leadership, 2012. 119 Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, The toxic triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments, 2007. 110 British Army, Army Leadership Doctrine, Edition 1, 2016, p80. 111 B Kellerman, Bad Leadership, 2004. 112 Ibid. 113 Maj Gen CW Orme, Beyond Compliance, 2011. 114 Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, The toxic triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments, 2007. 115 Lt Col JW Dagless, Defence Research Paper: Toxic Leadership, 2015. 116 Lt Col DW Aubrey, The Effect of Toxic Leadership, 2012. 117 Lt Col DW Aubrey, The Effect of Toxic Leadership, 2012. 118 Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, The toxic triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments, 2007. 119 Service Complaints Ombudsman, https://www.servicecomplaintsombuds man.org.uk, (accessed Jul 2018). 120 Lt Col JW Dagless, Defence Research Paper: Toxic Leadership, 2015. 121 3D Group, Current Practices in 360 Degree Feedback: A Benchmark Study of North American Companies, 2013. 122 Chaitra M. Hardison, 360-Degree Assessments: Are They the Right Tool for the U.S. Military?, 2015. 123 WO1 (Army Sergeant Major) Glenn Haughton, Can we prevent the growth of toxic leaders in the British Army? 2017. 124 Col. Kevin McAninch, How the Army’s Multi Source Assessment and Feedback Program could become a catalyst for leader development, 2016. 125 JE. Green, Toxic Leadership in Educational Organisations, 2014. 111 112

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Many officers join because the challenges of leading men and women in arduous conditions appeals to them. They are drawn by the will to achieve something that cannot be accomplished as a civilian and the idea of leading a tightly knit team of professionals who are prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice. After the Commissioning Course, these brand new troop commanders will typically spend two years testing their metal in a regular regiment but once their first assignment is over, what do these young leaders do next? By Lt Rob Tams Often, the next step is a Sqn HQ role or alternatively, a move to a training establishment still as a troop commander. Within The RLC, phase 2 training for the majority of trades takes place in 109 Sqn, 25 Training Regiment in Deepcut. This assignment as Troop Command is quite different from that experienced during initial Troop Command at a mainstream RLC unit. The biggest and most startling difference is the sheer size of a troop in 109 Sqn. In Feb 2018, both troops in 109 Sqn were around 150 trainees strong. This is initially quite daunting, as the imperative for a troop commander is to know their soldiers individually to best motivate and mentor them. However, with a troop of 150 trainees, with an average time in phase 2 training of six to eight months, the turnover of trainees is quite high. It is highly challenging to engage with trainees on an individual level. An adjustment to the protocol for man management is needed instantly. The danger is that the commander only gets to know the soldiers that take up their time regularly, such as for discipline or welfare reasons. The ability to memorise where each trainee is in their individual pipeline becomes unlikely, the opportunity to fully know each of them individually and use that knowledge to help motivate them is arguably nothing short of wishful thinking. If a large proportion of the work load is managing the welfare and discipline of the soldiers, the challenge is to find opportunities to add wider value whilst triaging a compelling range of issues. Many young soldiers have only had 14 weeks training and are still adjusting to the lifestyle in the Army. In the current

Credit Sgt Paul Randall

The trials and tribulations of troop commanding in a training squadron

A training troop commander can be a challenging and rewarding role

climate, there is the added dimension of high foreign and Commonwealth recruiting which has seen as much as 70% of the trainees being derived from outside the UK. This indicates a key challenge which is how to inculcate the values and standards of the British Army to an audience that has a multitude of cultural vantage points. There is also the huge benefits this demographic brings which is the diversity, talent and high educational threshold. The challenge of a phase 2 environment is subtly different to that of phase 1. This issue is neatly captured by one of the section commanders who raised the query: â€œIs it harder to be a leader to 30 phase 1 soldiers who are civilians when you start teaching them, or is it harder to be a leader to 150 phase 2 Soldiers who think their 14 weeks training has made them soldiers?â€?. Most permanent staff within 109 Sqn tell you they enjoy the job role, this is largely because they are individuals who relish a challenge! The scope of section commanding in 109 Sqn offers an opportunity for permanent staff to be hugely creative. Trade training in The RLC is not a neat pipeline with a start and finish. Some individuals take much longer than others to pass driving courses, some trade courses run much less frequently. This leaves significant gaps in which constructive military training must be run with limited resources. Hence there is scope for permanent staff to use their imagination and run a huge range of additional activities and design their own training programme. A troop commander coming to 109 Sqn should create opportunities to add to the development of young soldiers. Activities such as weekly excursions to museums, cultural days and current affairs training are vital to maintaining morale and are also useful to inculcate British values more THE REVIEW 2018-2019

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Credit: Defence images

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Young soldiers only have 14 weeks of training

generally to the trainees. The notion that “Good leaders get people to believe in them. Great leaders inspire people to believe in themselves” seems particularly relevant in this context. With such high numbers and turnover, the troop commander function is arguably a force multiplier to stimulate self-help. One of the challenges of turnover of trainees in the troop is the ownership of an individual’s progress from start to finish. A troop commander manages a constant stream of trainees at the start of their training “pipeline” and a fluctuating stream of trainees “clearing” from phase 2 and being assigned to their first unit. The trade training pipeline and delivery predominantly sits with external sub units and civilian instructors. Hence the perceived satisfaction of successfully aiding a trainee to complete their training is quite different, as much of the training itself has happened remotely. This raises significant

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management challenges of retaining ownership of soldiers who may be attending a string of trade courses without spending much time in the Sqn. This requires high levels of liaison and outreach. The reward for the hard work comes in two main forms. The first being the gratitude from a phase 2 Soldier whom you have personally helped, especially when they are assigned to the field army. The second comes from the satisfaction gained from aiding the development of the JNCOs who are typically eager to learn and are hand-picked for their suitability to instruct in this environment. A further benefit is the development of management and leadership skills demanded by these unique challenges. The requirement of the troop commander to adhere to the ‘duty of care’ fuelled recording of interviews and discipline, does add a different dimension to that originally imagined by the former officer cadet at Sandhurst! The troop commander must be ready to keep a huge array of tasks on the go with the vast numbers of phase 2 trainees, all requiring a tailored support action or activity. In sum, the challenges of troop commanding in phase 2 are significantly different from initial, regular command. The initial assignment as a troop commander gives a basic skillset which is rapidly built upon. Strong working relationships are quickly forged with SNCOs and other officers for mutual support, experience is gained in organising exercises and events and there is a unique opportunity to mentor highly motivated section commanders. Whilst the challenge of this environment is undeniable, the rewards from the skills gained and the sheer impact on high numbers of formative soldiers make this a desirable and stretching role.

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