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JOURNAL II

COLLABORATIONS, CONFLICTS & DILEMMA IN ASIA IN THE 20TH CENTURY

HISTORY SOCIETY A.A.H.K.U.S.U.


PREFACE, FOREWORD & FEATURED ARTICLES IN PART I


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/ Journal Tanks, Tank Battles of the First World War and their legacy Lau Barney Pok-Lai Year 3, Bachelor of Arts The tank was a new and major invention in the First World War and the concept of the tank arose from the challenges of static, trench warfare faced by troops of all nations on the Western Front. Since its conception, the tank had been deployed in multiple occasions in the second half of the Great War, and almost after every deployment, the Allies reflected on the tanks’ performances and from there, refined their tank tactics. Even after the Great War, military tacticians from different western powers continued to study the lessons on tank warfare learnt in the war and many of these theories and doctrines had major impacts on how future wars, namely, the Second World War, were fought. While the British and the French were both first to experiment the idea of armored tracked vehicles and to use them in battle in great numbers, due to the limited length of this essay, I will be focusing on the British side of the story. I shall cover the effectiveness and impacts of these first tanks, the tactics on which the first tank battles were planned, the perception of the tank by the generals and the troops, and finally, the influence that tanks’ performance in the Great War had on future armored doctrine. The development truly began with the setting up of the Admiralty Landships Committee by Winston Churchill in early 1915,1 despite the fact that static trench warfare had already been dragging on for about half a year by that point of time and some other British officers had since suggested using machines to help break the deadlock.2 One such officer was Royal Engineer Colonel Ernest Swinton. After Swinton heard from a friend of his about an 1. David Fletcher, British Battle Tanks: World War I to 1939 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016), 4. 2. Fletcher, 8.

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2017 - 2018 / American tracked vehicle called the Holt Caterpillar Tractor, which possessed surprising cross-country ability and could potentially traverse the adverse terrain and cross trenches on the battlefield, he passed the idea on to the War Office3; yet, the War Office did not take his suggestion seriously.4 Fortunately, Churchill’s Admiralty Landships Committee went on with the development and by January 1916, the first fully functional prototype—His Majesty’s Land Ship Centipede, better known as Big Willie or Mother—was available for demonstration.5 However, reactions to this new machine were mixed. Officers such as Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener thought that the new machine was a piece of “mechanical toy”6 while Sir Douglas Haig, the new Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, was quite enthusiastic about this new piece of technology and wanted to have enough of them ready by the launch of the Somme offensive.7 Therefore, the order went on to produce 100 of these new machines under the codename “tank.”8 While the tanks could not make it early enough to assist in the opening stages of the Battle of the Somme, a few of them, nevertheless, arrived in France eventually during course of the long, bloody Somme campaign and Haig could not wait to throw them into battle and to hopefully, at least, achieve some small success.9 General Rawlinson warned Haig against such decision since the tank was still an untested new weapon, yet Haig insisted 3. Ernest Swinton, Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, including the Genesis of the Tank (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1932), 32. 4. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 8. 5. Fletcher, 14. 6. Fletcher, 14. 7. J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 259. 8. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 14. 9. Heinz Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!: the Development of Tank Warfare, trans. Christopher Duffy (London: Cassel, 1999), 58.

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/ Journal to “use tanks boldly, press success, demoralize enemy and try to capture his guns,�10 so on September 15, 1916, the first tanks got their baptism of fire near Flers-Courcelette. The result of this first battle was not very brilliant. Out of the 49 tanks available, only nine ever reached enemy positions and wreak havoc while the rest of them were either stuck or experiencing mechanical reliability issues.11 The coordination of Heavy Section of the Machine Gun Corps (British tanks at first did not have a branch in the army of their own, they were attached to the Machine Gun Corps) with other branches of the army, namely the infantry and the artillery, was poor. The scale of the creeping artillery barrage was altered that day to have lanes left open, without any artillery cover, in the barrage for tanks to pass through safely because the British high command were afraid that the creeping barrage, which went directly in front of the advancing infantry, would hit the tanks, which were now extra units in front of the infantry.12 In theory, this should have worked, but in reality, so few tanks showed up in support of the infantry and with the intensity and coverage of artillery reduced, the infantry did not have enough support and suffered high casualties because of that.13 Besides the errors made by the British high command in coordinating the various branches, there were also issues with the tank crews, specifically, their training. Most of them were still inexperienced and unfamiliar with their machines. They were not trained to fix mechanical failures on the fly and there were also instances in which crews thought that their tanks were disabled with their tail wheels broke off, but in fact, a tank could still steer

10. Harris, Douglas Haig, 261. 11. Fletcher, 24. 12. Harris, 262. 13. Harris, 263.

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2017 - 2018 / just with its tracks without the aid of the tail wheels.14 Some tank crews even expressed that they were completely untrained for the job and were thrust into their tanks with minimal experience.15 An issue more important than those mentioned above was that the way that the tank was deployed in Flers-Courcelette was problematic. There were only a very small number of tanks available at that point of time and this small number of tanks was not deployed in a concentrated manner such that they could win a certain objective.16 Tanks should be used in great numbers and before there were a sufficient number of tanks available, they should not be used “in driblets (for instance, as they may be produced)” because that would just give up the element of surprise intrinsic to the novelty of tanks without achieving a decisive victory.17 While this first tank battle could only be considered “a limited success at best,”18 the tactical impact of the tank was quite well received. Haig was quite happy with the tank and saw its potential in influencing future battles,19 so he ordered 1,000 tanks.20 The infantry was also quite impressed with the tank. Norman Dillon, an infantry officer of the Northumberland Fusiliers who participated in the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, was quite fascinated by the tank when he saw one in action. In an oral history interview with the Imperial War Museum, he expressed that: 14. Fletcher, 25-27. 15. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history),” Imperial War Museum, accessed December 6, 2017, http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80009536. 16. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 59. 17. Swinton, Eyewitness, 202-203. 18. Fletcher, 25. 19. Douglas Haig, Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915-April 1919) (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1919), 42; 55. 20. Haig, 55.

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/ Journal I saw the potential [of the tank] straight away. I thought [and] I saw: that’s the very job for me. I’m going to get inside that box somehow because at least I should have some protection from the weather… Later when the demand came for volunteers to join this organization, I put my name down.21 After these first tank operations in the Somme, the British did learn from some of their mistakes and worked on rectifying them. The new Mark IV tank, compared to the original Mark I, had better armor and the tank was now slightly less cumbersome with shorter guns and with no tail wheels, but the reliability issue of the engine and the drivetrain was still untouched because the improvements could not make it in time before mass production began to fulfill Haig’s order.22 Training for tank crews was also improved with the opening of Bovington Camp in Dorset and with the introduction of Mark II and III training tanks.23 However, there still was not any specific tank tactics developed and taught to the crews as: The only tactic at this time was to get in your tank and drive towards the enemy and the infantry at the back would follow you…You would get half way across a German trench, fire up and down it, and that’s all your job. You’d hope the infantry would come in, take over. [It was] very rough and ready.24 The next major offensive that the tank took part in was Passchendaele. Though the tanks and tank crews were now better, tank tactics were still poor. Similar to their first deployment, tanks were deployed in “penny

21. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).” 22. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 44-45. 23. Fletcher, 28; 33; 38-41. 24. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).”

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2017 - 2018 / pockets” and were tasked with limited objectives,25 so they could have never influenced the battle in any considerable manner. To make matters worse, since the afternoon of the first day, it started to rain and throughout the campaign, the weather remain stormy and unstable.26 The rain made the ground condition at Passchendaele very muddy and as a result, more than 70 tanks were stuck and ditched on the first day alone.27 Major J.F.C. Fuller of the Tank Corps (British tanks and tankers were finally independent from the Machine Gun Corps by the formation of the Tank Corps just before Passchendaele) decided on August 3 to withdraw all tanks from Passchendaele and argued that his tanks should be allowed to spearhead an attack on more suitable grounds, but other officers in the British army, seeing the inability of tanks to traverse the awful terrain at Passchendaele, began to question the usefulness of the tank.28 Many tankers were upset by the influence they had at Passchendaele and wanted a chance to show the worthiness of them and their machines, as one of them, Horace Leslie Birks, expressed: After the conclusion of the Passchendaele debacle, as far as tanks were concerned, there was a serious consideration whether they should wash them out altogether or whether they could use them in some other shape or form. And the tank people put up a plea to have one big attack on good going, open terrain with all the tanks they’d got.29 Because of the failure of Passchendaele and the Tank Corps’ request, Haig

25. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 72. 26. Haig, Haig’s Despatches, 116. 27. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 59. 28. Fletcher, 59. 29. “The Great War Interviews: Horace Leslie Birks,” BBC, last modified March 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01td4l4.

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/ Journal was keen to have some success before the end of 1917.30 Commander of the Tank Corps, Brigadier-General Hugh Elles, suggested a raid in the Cambrai sector in August and Haig accepted the proposal.31 Cambrai was chosen firstly because most German troops were drawn to the Ypres sector and Cambrai was left as a weak point in the German line, and secondly, because the ground there was relatively untouched, which was favorable for tanks— the main assault force of this operation.32 By 1917, artillery had become much more accurate and there were now methods to increase first round accuracy without the need to fire ranging shots, so Brigadier-General Henry Tudor, an artillery officer, suggested applying these techniques to Cambrai to eliminate the need of a preliminary artillery barrage so as to maintain the element of surprise.33 Artillery would lay down fire from one German trench line to another and the barrage would land much further forward from the advancing tanks, since the previous experience at Flers-Courcelette taught the British that leaving lanes in the barrage for the tanks while the infantry “hugged” the normal creeping barrage did not work.34 Cambrai would be the first time when artillery would lay down a considerable smoke screen as this could make it much harder for German artillery to see and target the tanks.35 Artillery would also focus on counter-battery fire to destroy German guns that could hinder the tanks’ advance.36 30. The Tank Museum, “The Battle of Cambrai: Origins Part I,” Tank 100, last modified November 3, 2017, http://tank100.com/headline-news/the-battle-ofcambrai-origins-part-i/. 31. Harris, Douglas Haig, 389. 32. Haig, Haig’s Despatches, 151. 33. Harris, Douglas Haig, 389. 34. Harris, 397. 35. Harris, 398. 36. Haig, Haig’s Despatches, 153.

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2017 - 2018 / Without an intense preliminary artillery barrage, the thick layers of barbed wire of the Hindenburg Line would be intact and would pose a huge obstacle for the infantry and the cavalry. Therefore, tanks were tasked with opening gaps in the barbed wire and as Haig said, “The tanks alone made it possible to dispense with artillery preparation, and so to conceal our intentions from the enemy up to the actual moment of attack.”37 There were some wire-cutting tanks towing huge grapnels behind them and they would work in pairs to drag the wire caught in the grapnels to the sides, clearing up large passages specifically for the cavalry, as horses could not even go over the remnants of destroyed barbed wire, as well as for the infantry.38 Apart from the barbed wire, another obstacle that tanks needed to cross were the trenches of the Hindenburg Line, which were specifically made to be over 12 feet deep and get tanks stuck inside them. Tankers worried that the tail of their tanks would slip into the trenches as they came out, so each tank at Cambrai were fitted with a fascine, a bunch of 1.5-tonne brushwood that would be dropped into the bottom of a trench and stop a tank from falling, on top.39 To ready themselves for Cambrai, the Tank Corps did a lot of preparation work. A mockup of the Hindenburg Line trenches was built and “for the first time, we [the Tank Corps] had some form of tactical maneuver… [because] it wasn’t a very wide front and there were about 350 tanks available for the job.”40 An example of those tactics concerned tacking the two lines of trenches of the Hindenburg Line and it worked as follows: The tanks worked in groups of three. The first tank dropped his fas

37. Haig., 157. 38. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 63. 39. “The Great War Interviews.” 40. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).”

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/ Journal cine in, the two other tanks crossed over it. And when it came to the second line, the second tank dropped his and the three crossed over and then left one [fascine] in reserve.41 Besides training, the Tank Corps also had to prepare themselves to move into the staging area for the attack. They paid the utmost attention to do so under cover and Birks explained how it was achieved: Then we moved up to a place called Havrincourt Wood which was in 2000 yards of the German frontline. The move was made at night and dead slow. We went a mile an hour… And we crept in, under cover, camouflaged ourselves and observe the strictest possible precautions.42 Since Passchendaele, the morale of the Tank Corps was at an all-time low and Cambrai would be the chance the redeem themselves. To encourage the tankers to pull off an extraordinary feat in the upcoming Cambrai attack, their commander, Brigadier-General Hugh Elles, issued Special Order Number 6 the night before the attack. In this order, Elles did not only give verbal encouragement, he also told his men that he would be leading the centre division into battle.43 Having an officer with such seniority going into the heat of battle was extremely rare in the Great War, or in any modern warfare in general, but his way of leading by example certainly boosted the spirit and morale of his men, as Norman Dillon remarked, “It was a rather gallant show and it showed the spirit of the regiment. They were determined to do something which they had been frustrated so much in the past.”44 41. “The Great War Interviews.” 42. “The Great War Interviews.” 43. “Cambrai Day,” The British Army, accessed December 6, 2017, http:// www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/34277.aspx. 44. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).”

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2017 - 2018 / At daybreak on November 20, 1917, all available tanks attacked at once without leaving any reserves behind and the surprise attack was a huge success. The Germans were completely caught off guard, as most of them expected to make contact with advancing British infantry a few hours after the start of the artillery bombardment, which was what used to happen in previous battles, instead of having tanks suddenly appearing through the smoke and fog shortly after the start of the barrage.45 After the tanks punched through the initial lines of German defenses with ease, they caught the Germans at the rear completely unprepared: There, the most extraordinary sight, the Germans had just finished breakfast. They were completely taken by surprise. They were running about with their hands up, hands down, hands everywhere.46 In all but a few areas, the tanks broke through, made their way to their first day objectives and stopped. Most of the tankers thought the breakthrough was “a piece of cake” and the breakthrough was so complete that they had time to have a cup of tea, loot some German war trophies, and even steal a cow from a local farm and bring it all the way back to base for milk.47 Yet, a question remained in the tankers’ minds was that why there was no cavalry, or infantry, to support them and exploit their breakthrough, and many of them were very disappointed by that. 70 years after the Battle of Cambrai, veteran tankers like Norman Dillon still remembered that sense of frustration: There weren’t enough troops on the ground, partly because a lot of ry).”

45. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 81. 46. “The Great War Interviews.” 47. “The Great War Interviews”; “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral histo-

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/ Journal troops had been sent to Italy… Those troops who should have been taking part in Cambrai, and should have been the backup, and should have been available for a German counterattack… It was obvious at the time at about ten o’clock in the morning, it was obvious the time was too late because there had been 3-4 hours for the Germans to reorganise and it was too late to do anything… And [this was] really typical of Haig. First of all, he didn’t want to use the tanks because he said they’re no good. Then, he used them as we wanted to in a half-hearted way that he didn’t support them… They [tankers] were fed up they hadn’t been supported. There is your old gap and you haven’t taken it! And of course a lot of the old feelings exist to this very day: tanks versus cavalry.48 As Dillon said, the British did not exploit the breakthrough and the grounds gained were thinly held, so the Germans were able to stage a counterattack ten days later and the British lost most of the grounds they had won. Yet, Cambrai was perceived as a great success at home. After the news of Cambrai reached England, the tank became so popular that a pair of Mark IV tanks took part in the 1917 Lord Mayor’s Show in London and was displayed in Trafalgar Square.49 With its popularity, it was only obvious for the National War Saving Committee to use the tank as war propaganda. Six tanks toured around the country to raise War Bonds and other tank-related merchandises, including china model tanks, tank-shape money boxes and paper napkins with tank photos and logos on them, were produced.50 Today, Cambrai is either remembered as the first great tank battle and the first mil 48. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).” 49. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 72. 50. The Tank Museum, “Tank Banks and Souvenirs,” Tank 100, last modified March 23, 2016, http://tank100.com/objects/tank_banks/.

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2017 - 2018 / itary operation that was centered around the tank,51 or for some others who believe that the tanks at Cambrai were still “purely auxiliary to the infantry” as prescribed by Ernest Swinton,52 then perhaps Cambrai was the first combined arms battle that required coordination between, the Tank Corps, Royal Artillery, the infantry and the Royal Flying Corps.53 After the successful use of the tank en masse in the opening stages of Cambrai, and also a successful small-scale surprise attack at Hamel in July 1918, the British now had more confidence in the tank and planned for a similar attack but on a greater scale for August 8, 1918. Hamel itself, though was just an attack on a minor front, was also significant in shaping the British high command’s views towards the tank because it demonstrated that infantry and tanks could truly cooperate flawlessly. Before the assault of Hamel, trainings were organized to strengthen coordination and build comradeship between the tanks and the attacking Australian infantry,54 and as a result, the cooperation between tanks and infantry was nearly perfect.55 With the success at Hamel, Rawlinson advised Haig to go on a much greater attack,56 which would become the Battle of Amiens, or what the Germans called it, the Black Day. Amiens was to be “a scaled up Hamel”57 and “another Cambrai battle all over again.”58 Battalions of the new Mark V tanks would be 51. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 61; Fuller, 152-153. 52. Swinton, Eyewitness, 211. 53. The Tank Museum, “The Battle of Cambrai: Origins Part II,” Tank 100, last modified November 8, 2017, http://tank100.com/training-combat/cambrai-origins-ii/ 54. J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1920), 205. 55. Fuller, 207. 56. Harris, Douglas Haig, 287. 57. Harris. 58. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).”

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/ Journal attached to infantry divisions while the new, relatively faster Medium A “Whippet” tanks to cavalry divisions.59 Most of the artillery would operate in a manner similar to Cambrai, while field artillery would advance closely behind the infantry to provide support and some artillery would provide special noise barrages, in addition to the normal high explosive barrage, to muffle the sound of the approaching tanks to achieve maximum surprise.60 The newly formed Royal Air Force would send 500 aircrafts in the air to carry out reconnaissance and ground attacks behind enemy lines.61 To achieve even greater surprise, Haig carried out some deceptive operations to make the Germans believe that an attack was imminent further north in Flanders while the tanks and cavalry of the real attacking force secretly assembled around Amiens only at the very last minute possible.62 On August 8, the Germans were surprised for the third time by the “Cambrai model,”63 and thus, this day became a great victory for the Allies and the beginning of the war-winning Hundred Days Offensive, and for the Germans, “the Black Day of the German Army.” Despite the huge success at Amiens, there were still things that could be done better and lessons to be learnt for future armored warfare. While Haig saw the tank as the most important part on August 8 and the rest of the Hundred Days Offensive,64 many criticized his way of attaching tanks to the infantry and cavalry. Heinz Guderian thought that “liberat[ing] their [British] tanks from the conventional arms, which were inherently slow and vulnerable to machine-gun fire” would allow the British to have even greater success.65 Others like 59. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 219. 60. Fuller. 61. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 113; Haig, 302. 62. Haig, Haig’s Despatches, 260. 63. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 112. 64. Haig, Haig’s Despatches, 302. 65. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 122.

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2017 - 2018 / J.F.C. Fuller specifically criticized Haig for the unrealistic combination of the new Whippets and the cavalry because “[d]uring the approach marches the Whippets frequently were reported to have been unable to keep up with the rapid movement of the cavalry; during actual fighting the reverse took place.”66 In fact, there were instances where some of the relatively quick tanks flanked and burst through the enemy lines by destroying their field artillery and then went on behind the lines to wreak havoc upon enemy transport, supplies and troop build-up.67 Therefore, in this sense, as Guderian suggested, the tank, particularly ones with decent mobility, was indeed the new cavalry and the horse cavalry was simply an outdated thing of the past that had become large, vulnerable targets on the modern battlefield.68

Epilogue After the Great War, army officers of different nations began to examine the impact that the tank had in the war. J.F.C. Fuller, a British army officer, has always been a proponent of the tank and after the war, he wrote some suggestions regarding tank and anti-tank tactics. On anti-tank tactics, he thought that the German practice of using machine guns loaded with armored piercing SmK rounds would never be viable in the future when tank armor would definitely get better and better and there would be just so much that a man-portable machine gun could penetrate; therefore, to him, the only viable anti-weapons would either be a field gun or another tank, as he suggested that “[i]f a heavier machine gun is made it will be forced to take to a mounting, and for choice to a mechanical one ; it will in fact

66. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 228. 67. Fletcher, British Battle Tanks, 123-124. 68. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 123.

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/ Journal become a tank or a tank destroyer.”69 On tanks, he said that “trenches at best but static makeshifts, the infantryman must don armour and, as he has not the strength to carry it, he must get into a tank. If this is common sense, let us attempt to visualise what a tank war of the future may entail,”70 meaning that on the modern battlefield, tanks would worth more than infantry, so wars in future would inevitably be mechanized warfare. But the ones who really perfected the use of the tank were the Germans. Heinz Guderian was probably the German officer who paid the most attention to the development of armor in the First World War. In his famous book Achtung—Panzer!, a piece of work he wrote to convince Hitler and the Nazi leadership of the worthiness of the tank in modern warfare, Guderian examined the battles where the Allies deployed their tanks, learned a thing or two from each of them, and then finally, basing on those experiences, formulated the tactics which would serve as the basis for German tank deployment in the future. Throughout his book, he criticized the early deployments of British tanks for mostly three things: one, deployment in penny pockets and not en masse; two, attacking without the element of surprise; three, deploying tanks on unsuitable grounds, specifically, Passchendaele. For the tank battles since Cambrai, the British did not commit the earlier mistakes, but Guderian thought they could have done better by attacking deeper into the German lines (he was specifically talking about Cambrai where the British stopped pushing on after the first day and allowing the Germans at the rear to regroup and ultimately counterattack)71 and not tying tanks to the infantry and cavalry support role.72 69. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 312. 70. Fuller, 313. 71. Guderian, Achtung—Panzer!, 89. 72. Guderian, 122.

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2017 - 2018 / At the end of his book, he proposed the ways that tanks should be deployed in future warfare. In addition to attacking en masse on good terrain with the element of surprise,73 Guderian thought that attacking on a broad front could prevent the attacking force from being flanked by the enemy74 while striking deep into enemy territories could eliminate the enemies at the rear who would be regrouping and preparing for a counterattack.75 Contrary to the British organization of tanks in the Great War, Guderian’s tanks should have their own branch and their primary job was not to support the infantry, but to destroy the biggest counter to themselves—enemy tanks, anti-tank defenses and artillery; afterwards, the tanks would be free from any significant threat and could go back to support the infantry.76 While the tank would be the main force of Guderian’s attack, the infantry was still indispensable as they were needed to support the tank, and to keep up with the tanks, infantry should be motorized by traversing the battlefield in armored vehicles with cross-country mobility.77 Similar to all British tank operations after Cambrai, the artillery should only lay down fire after the assault commenced, and artillery and anti-tank guns should keep up with advancing troops to provide covering fire; therefore, Guderian demanded them to be self-propelled and not horse-drawn.78 The biggest threats, by far, to the advancing tanks would be enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, so Guderian also made specific suggestions on how to tackle these threats. Borrowing from the experience of the two only instances when Allied and German tanks clashed head-on and engaged in the first tank-on-tank battles in history, Guderian came to the conclusion that shooting on the move 73. Guderian, 181. 74. Guderian, 182. 75. Guderian, 189. 76. Guderian, 189-190. 77. Guderian, 195-196. 78. Guderian, 188; 192-193.

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/ Journal at another moving tank was not possible since at the time when the book was written, the gyrostabilizer for tank guns did not exist; therefore, Guderian’s doctrine dictated that tanks should come to a complete halt to aim and shoot to ensure maximum first shot accuracy.79 To tackle anti-tank guns, Guderian suggested that the battlefield should be saturated with tanks to a point that there would be too many targets for the anti-tank guns, and tanks would use their speed to overwhelm and overrun the anti-tank gun positions.80 Aside from tanks, another branch of the military that Guderian considered as indispensable in this new age of warfare was the air force. The air force should be tasked with the missions of surveying enemy troop movements deep behind the frontline and assisting the armored forces by attacking enemy reinforcements, especially, enemy tanks.81 Finally, all the above maneuvers would be coordinated through a piece of equipment that had recently become increasingly popular—the voice radio.82

Conclusion The tank was certainly an impactful weapon in the First World War. While it cannot be said that the invention of the tank won the war for the Allies, the tank did certainly play a major role in breaking the deadlock in trench warfare. The First World War not only served as the test bed for this new weapon, but also the pioneer of a new form of warfare.

79. Guderian., 187. 80. Guderian, 179; 182. 81. Guderian, 191; 196. 82. Guderian, 197.

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Bibliography Primary sources “Cambrai Day.” The British Army. Accessed December 6, 2017. http://www. army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/34277.aspx. “Dillon, Norman Margrave (Oral history).” Imperial War Museum. Accessed December 6, 2017. http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80009536. Fuller, J.F.C. Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1920. Guderian, Heinz. Achtung—Panzer!: the Development of Tank Warfare. Translated by Christopher Duffy. London: Cassel, 1999. Haig, Douglas. Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915-April 1919). New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Swinton, Ernest. Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, including the Genesis of the Tank. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1932. “The Great War Interviews: Horace Leslie Birks.” BBC. Last modified March 10, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01td4l4.

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/ Journal The Tank Museum. “Tank Banks and Souvenirs.” Tank 100. Last modified March 23, 2016. http://tank100.com/objects/tank_banks/.

Secondary sources Fletcher, David. British Battle Tanks: World War I to 1939. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016. Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008. The Tank Museum. “The Battle of Cambrai: Origins Part I.” Tank 100. Last modified November 3, 2017. http://tank100.com/headline-news/ the-battle-of-cambrai-origins-part-i/. The Tank Museum. “The Battle of Cambrai: Origins Part II.” Tank 100. Last modified November 8, 2017. http://tank100.com/training-combat/cambrai-origins-ii/.

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2017 - 2018 / Evolution of US’s interpretation on One-China policy from 1979 - 2009 Ng Cheuk Hang Year 3, Bachelor of Arts

Introduction Conceived as the centripetal force in the international society, the role the US played on the issue of One China seems to be vital. After Donald Trump won the US Presidency in 2016, he on several occasions threatened to put an end to the One China policy 1, the policy that recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China, including Taiwan, where the Republic of China (ROC) is the de facto government. Such a statement provoked a strong rebuke from the PRC, which reiterated that US intervention on the One-China policy would not be an option or cooperation on all fields would be forced to suspend. 2 The international spotlight was once again brought to the Taiwan Strait. With the rising tension between the PRC and the ROC after Tsai Ing-wen, a politician from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who supports the Taiwan independence movement, inaugurated as the President of the ROC in May 2016, it is feared that another military crisis would be induced at any time. Indeed, the parlous triangle relationship of US-PRC-ROC presents to the leaders of these three countries a profound dilemma. In this essay, the American 1. Eric Baculinao and Alexander Smith, “‘Serious Concern’ in Beijing at Trump’s Threat to End ‘One-China’ Policy,” NBC News, December 12, 2016, accessed May 2, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/serious-concern-beijing-trump-s-threat-end-one-china-policy-n694771. 2. Baculinao and Smith, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/seriousconcern-beijing-trump-s-threat-end-one-china-policy-n694771.

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/ Journal interpretation of the “One-China” policy since 1979 will be discussed, first from 1979 – 1988, then 1989 – 1996, and finally, 1997 - 2009. During my discussion, aspects of sovereignty and the use of force will be touched upon.

1979 - 1988 The American officially broke up with the ROC and turned to the PRC in 1979, which seemed to be ushered in a period of honeymoon between the US and the PRC; suspicion and distrust were indeed the main theme of the period, contributing to a vague US interpretation on One China. When it comes to the normalization of the relationship, what was indispensable to the discussion is that which of them – the PRC or the ROC – was the legitimate government of China, when both claimed their sovereign over the other’s territory. Obviously, Nixon and his successors beyond doubt have chosen the PRC. The issue on sovereignty was among the first several things which the US dealt with. In Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, he promised that “there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China” 3, and the Nixon’s idea was made public in the jointly announced Shanghai Communiqué, in which Nixon chose to acknowledge the PRC that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” 4

setting the earliest US interpretation of One China policy. If it was so, the

3. Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei (CRS Report No. RL30341) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 7, https://file.wikileaks. org/file/crs/RL30341.pdf 4. Steven E. Phillips, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 815.

26


2017 - 2018 / only question remaining would be which government was that “one China”. The question on whom the genuine China was had finally been settled in 1979, when the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations further stated that the US “recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China” and “the United States will maintain … unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” 5 In the struggle of the legitimate government, the PRC gained the upper hand, defeated the ROC, and on the American side of the coin became the de jure government of Taiwan. With the emergence of Taiwan Independence Movement, the ROC’s status as the government of China including the mainland or simply the government of the island of Taiwan and surrounding areas became controversial. While the PRC regarded the independence movement as an act that seceded Taiwan from motherland, the US, in 1982, again stood with the PRC in the August 17 Communiqué that US would decrease the arms sales to ROC in order not to violate the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan 6, reaffirming that Taiwan was supposed to be a part of PRC. Theoretically, the principles listed in the three Communiqués should work out well when the US gradually phased out of prominence. In practice, however, status quo was what the US tried to preserve, rather than facilitating the unification of China. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a de facto diplomatic treaty with the ROC, came into effect immediately after their breakup. 5. David P. Nickles, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIII, China (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2013), 652. 6. The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed May 3, 2017, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/china-communique

27


/ Journal In this act that provided the US the legal framework to get along with the ROC, US’s interest in the ROC was maintained, among which included a huge volume of trade, recorded at USD $ 9.2 billion solely in 1979. Intriguingly, the purpose of the act was to maintain peace and stability in the Western Pacific, plus allowing non-official communication between the US and ROC 7, which indirectly recognized the ROC as the government of Taiwan 8. Another area which is also vital to the ROC’s survival is the military. The ROC Armed Forces (ROCAF) was no match for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in terms of the size for sure, which forced the ROCAF to rely on technology from the west, and the U.S. in particular. In the TRA it rules that “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means”, 9 which could be considered as a guarantee that US would try to halt the annexation of Taiwan through the use of force. TRA allows the US President and the Congress considering the needs of Taiwan people and selling of arms whenever it is needed in order “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” 10 As suggested by Chang, the definition of necessary and sufficient, which are the preconditions of selling arms, is under the interpretation of the US 11, reserving the right of final decision to the US President and Congress. While 7. An Act to Help Maintain Peace, Security, and Stability in the Western Pacific and to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States by Authorizing the Continuation of Commercial, Cultural, and Other Relations between the People of the United States and the People on Taiwan, and for Other Purposes, Public Law 968, U.S. Statutes at Large 93 (1979): 14. 8. Rulun Chang 張如倫, “Cong ‘Taiwan Guanxifa’ Jianshi Meiguo Duiliang’an Zhengce zhi Yanbian” 從《台灣關係法》檢視美國對兩岸政策之演變 [A Review on the Evolution of US Policy towards the Taiwan Strait through the Taiwan Relations Act], Army Review 陸軍月刊 479 (2005): 37. 9. An Act to Help Maintain Peace, 14. 10. An Act to Help Maintain Peace, 15. 11. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act,” Orbis Winter 2000 44 No.1 (2000), 65 – 66.

28


2017 - 2018 / the US opted to give up her formal relationship with the ROC, the TRA provided the ROC the confidence to survive under the threat from the PRC. The Six Assurances, though was passed in the Congress as late 2016, was raised in 1982, disclosing that the US would “[not] attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC” 12. Yet, a month after the Six Assurances were suggested, the US and the PRC issued the August 17 Communiqué, in which the PRC requested a termination of arms sales, and the US replied that she would “gradually to reduce those sales over time.” 13, The ambiguous attitude of the US government caused Taiwanese people to be unsure of the true intent of the US, worrying them. They feared that the US would phase out of prominence on the issue of Taiwan. 14 In fact, what the US was doing was to maintain relationships with both the ROC and the PRC. Though it contradicts the statement she made, a US Congress Report in 2007 leaked by WikiLeaks points out that the American indeed holds a different interpretation of One China, comparing to the PRC’s version. The US version of One China focuses more on the process, namely facilitating dialogue, peaceful resolution etc. – an ultimate reunification was not a must. The PRC concentrates more on the outcome, that is, the reunification. 15 As a matter of fact, the US government deliberately 12. Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations, H. Con. Res. 88, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 162, no.77, daily ed. (May 16, 2016): H 2395. U.S. Congress. House. Food Security Act of 1985. HR 2100. 99th Cong., 1st sess. Congressional Record 131, no. 132, daily ed. (October 8, 1985): H 8353–8486. 13. The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. 14. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Why Taiwan Matters: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, 13. 15. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 6-7.

29


/ Journal blurred the difference between the interpretations, hiding her real stance on the issue of One China. On the surface, the US government satisfied the PRC’s demand and protected the PRC’s face; this was only an illusion as ROC still maintained semi-official ties with the US. The fact that the US did not even participate in the efforts facilitating the reunification proved that the true intent of the US was to maintain the existing situation. The reason behind allying with the PRC was more likely to resist the USSR, instead of betraying or giving up the ROC. To summarize the period from 1979 –1989, the US stance on One China was characterized by her vague and ambiguous words and deeds. While in public statements the US government openly recognized the PRC as the only legitimate government of China and agreed that the ROC was a part of China, nothing that could facilitate the reunification of China was carried out. Under the table the US through TRA and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) etc. continued to retain the de facto diplomatic ties with the ROC. It is reasonable to comment that the US was not a real proponent of One China. However, as we are going to see, towards the 1990s the US stance on One China again evolved and once again brought great effect to the two Chinas.

1989 – 1996 Up to 1988, almost ten years after the shift of recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979, the situation of the Taiwan Strait was relatively peaceful and stable, and the international spotlight was still on the US-USSR-PRC struggle. However, since 1989, the atmosphere of the international society changed drastically. The Tiananmen Massacre, during which the PLA violently suppressed the protesters who urged for political reform in the PRC, 30


2017 - 2018 / immediately resulted in a strong anti-Beijing atmosphere worldwide. What is more, the collapse of the USSR raised the doubt in the need of US-PRC cooperation, as the anti-USSR stance was the basis of the US-PRC alliance. 16

Meanwhile, inside the ROC political reforms was launched, gradually

turning the ROC into a democratic state, and thus reshaping the basis of the US-ROC non-official relationship from strategic reasons to sharing the same values such as democracy and freedom. In this period, the US’s stance on One China policy inclined in favor of the ROC. The US’s action in this period featured an improvement of the US-ROC relationship. Bill Clinton was eager to review the US policy on Taiwan as soon as he took the office of US President in 1992. After two years of research, the result of the review benefitted the ROC in several ways. Regarded as the first systematic enhancement of the US-ROC relationship, the review suggested a modest upgrade for the ties between them.

17

A case in point was that

high-ranking US officials including cabinet officials were allowed to visit the ROC, and the AIT was cleared to access the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, granting the AIT more power as an embassy in disguise.

18

While

the ROC was diplomatically isolated by the rest of the world, the US in the review also asserted that the ROC would be supported to join the international organizations where statehood was not required to become a member. In those where statehood was needed, the US promised that the voice 16. James C.P. Chang, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan, The Fellows Program, accessed May 3, 2017, https://programs.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/chang. pdf. 17. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: The “Three No’s,” Congressional-Administration Differences, and U.S. Policy Issues (CRS Report No. 98-837) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 5, https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/98-837. pdf . 18. Chang, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan, 10.

31


/ Journal of Taiwan people would be reflected.

19

Basically, the US tried to improve

the status of ROC, helping her obtain international recognition, under the condition of not breaking any agreements the US made with the PRC. An improving US-ROC relationship could be regarded as a diplomatic victory of the ROC, providing her much more support from the US. In terms of military, the ROCAF also advanced under the US-ROC relationship. Before Clinton took power, George H.W. Bush, who was approaching the end of his term of office, approved an arms sale of 110 M60A3 Main Battle Tanks and 150 F-16 Fighter Aircrafts to the ROC in 1991 and 1992 respectively 20, though critics argued that this broke the agreement made in the August 17 Communiqué that the US would reduce the sale of arms to the ROC. 21 In fact, the value of sales skyrocketed from 1990 to 1993, from a total of USD $153 and $372 million in 1990 and 1991 to USD$7,706 and $2,184 million in 1992 and 1993 22, a rapid rate within of four years. One reason behind the relaxation of arms sales, obviously, was to protest the PRC’s bloody suppression on human rights movement in 1989, and to honour the efforts of the ROC in implementing democratic system. Bush, after the disclosure of selling 150 F-16s to the ROC, said that “the United States has provided Taiwan with sufficient defensive capabilities … to reduce tensions [between the PRC and the ROC],” 23 implying the distrust of the PRC, which in the meantime was boycotted by the west. The ROC’s trade with 19. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 14. 20. Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 (CSR Report No. RL30957), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 56, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf 21. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, 21. 22. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, 56. 23. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 42.

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2017 - 2018 / the US was also what gave rise to a closer relationship between the two. Ranked sixth in the volume of trade with US, the value US exports to the ROC, in 1993, was recorded a total of USD $16 billion, doubled the figure of the PRC. 24 In order to secure the economic tie with the ROC, the US, as also proposed in the Taiwan Policy Review, affirmed the ROC that the US would not give up the interest of ROC, and fulfilled her duty to provide the ROC the capacity of self-defense in case of a war over the strait, which the US tried hard to prevent. Generally, the US never supported any Taiwan independence movement, and the interpretation of One China that the PRC was the sole legitimate government was not violated, given that the sales of weapons was an act merely to boost up the ROCAF’s ability of self-defense. The honeymoon of the US-ROC relationship, nonetheless, did not last long, as the outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96) implies a defeat of the US’s diplomatic policy on the One China issue. In 1994, the rejection of entry of Lee Teng-hui, the then President of the ROC, during his return from a visit to South America by the US authority won him much empathy from Americans. Among them was the Republican Senator Craig Thomas, who commented that Lee was compared to criminals and terrorists – people who are blocked from entering the US. 25 Another Democratic Senator Paul Simon also showed his empathy towards Lee, criticizing the government’s rejection of Lee’s entry allowed PRC to step on US’s support on human rights, and further described the ROC-US relations as an “embarrassment”. 26 In the subsequent year, Lee’s visa to visit to Cornell University for a reunion was granted as the House of Representative and Senate passed 24. Chang, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan, 8. 25. Senator Thomas of Wyoming, speaking on Taiwan, on March 14, 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 141, pt. 47:3859. 26. Senator Simon of Illinois, speaking on Taiwan, on March 14, 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 141, pt. 47:3855.

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/ Journal a concurrent resolution requesting the US government to issue him a visa with 396 to 0 and 97 to 1 respectively, showing the overwhelming majority in favor of Lee’s visit, leaving no space for Clinton’s administration to reject. What followed was that Lee, in his speech in Cornell, raised the concept of “Republic of China on Taiwan” 27, which the pro-independence faction interpreted as a statement which stated that the territory of the ROC was only limited to Taiwan, renouncing the claim of territory in the mainland. As a matter of fact, one may doubt that the policy of and the public opinion in the US that were inclined to the ROC since the early 1990s were what encouraged the spread of independence movement. Inasmuch as the speech Lee delivered had a slight taste of independence, the PRC, viewing it as a violation of One China policy, reacted by launching military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, hoping to threaten the Taiwanese from supporting the independence movement in the coming ROC Presidential Election. The tension reaches its climax when the US deployed two Carrier Battle Groups to the Taiwan Strait, serving not only as a demonstration of her readiness to fight, but also a real capacity to fight. 28 The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis proved to have profound impacts on the triangle US-PRC-ROC relationship. One and perhaps the most important impact was that it proved that the US was willing to deploy troops to defend Taiwan in case of an imminent PLA invasion. While the US deliberately hid her true intent on the issue of One China in the past, hoping that the uncertainty of US’s action could deter the PLA from invading Taiwan, the incident showed the PRC the bottom line of the US, that is, not to resort the 27. Teng-hui Li, Always in My Heart (speech, Ithaca, NY, June 9, 1995), Cross-Strait Peace Initiative, http://www.straittalk88.com/uploads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_--_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf. 28. Chang, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan, 13.

34


2017 - 2018 / One China issue to the use of violence.

1997 – 2009 The off-track stance of the US was exemplified in the 1996 crisis, during which the US and the PRC were at the edge of a war. To the US, it was a warning that her stance on One China policy did not match what the PRC expected. More than that, it showed that the PRC was also determined to fight against the US in case of US intervention on the Taiwan issue. Consider that starting a war with the PRC was unwise, the US tuned her policy in the interest of the PRC, which could be conducive to a better US-PRC relationship. It is suggested that after the 1996 crisis the US abolished her vague stance on One China issue, adopting the policy to contact with the PRC 29, but judging from what happened afterwards, it turned out to be another game of politics. Since the last missile crisis, the US government eventually explicitly admitted that the PRC was the legitimate government over Taiwan. In Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, during a Q&A session in Peking University, he said that, “the US policy would not be an obstacle to the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan.” 30 This statement indicated a fundamental change of the US policy towards Taiwan, not only expressing the US’s recognition of the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, but also displaying a change from the 29. Gu Cheng 谷誠, “Cong Sanci Taihai Weiji kan Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” 從三次台海危機看美國對華政策 [A review on the U.S. Policy towards China through the three Taiwan Crises], Journal of Tianjin Modern Enterprise Management College for Staff and Workers 23 (2004): 23. 30. President Clinton at Peking University (1998), YouTube video, 1:08:13, posted by “clintonlibrary42,” July 9, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6IpJZihF0Lw

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/ Journal “peaceful resolution” proposed in the TRA in 1979 to a “peaceful reunifica tion”, supporting the PRC to recover Taiwan. Clinton further, on President Jiang Zemin’s request, declared “Three Noes”, namely objecting Taiwan independence, “two Chinas” or “one China one Taiwan”, and ROC’s membership in the United Nations. 31 Compared with 1979 when the US was only required not to support the above-mentioned conditions, Clinton’s “Three Noes” signaled an increasing pressure from the PRC to push the US away from the ROC. Henceforth, the US was finally in line with the PRC’s interpretation on One China. George W. Bush, succeeded Clinton in 2001, also on several occasions showed his stance of rejecting the independence of Taiwan. 32 In 2004, Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, further delivered a coup de grâce to ROC, declaring that “there is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation.” 33 It was for the first time that a high-ranking US official publicly commented that the ROC lacked sovereignty, which could be conceived as a complete turnover of the former US policies. The comments expressed by the US officials seemed to refute what they used to support, but the core of their thoughts, as revealed by their actions, indeed did not change much. While what the US said was to resist Taiwan independence, her words and deeds did not echo what she said to abide. Certainly, no US President would support the independence movement of Taiwan, but the willingness of deploying troops and helping defend the ROC remained the focus of the One China issue, as this could affect the means of reunification. In 2001, Bush once that the US would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself ” 31. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 8. 32. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 10. 33. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 71.

36


2017 - 2018 / in case of a Chinese attack 34, halting any kind of military threat to the ROC. Chen Shui-bian, the DPP-backed President of ROC, was granted visas to enter the US for at least five times from 2000 – 2005, and even met with a number of US Congressmen. 35 The determination of the US to oppose Taiwan independence was further doubted when the sales of arms to the ROC continued. Chen was not the only ROC official who was granted a visa to enter the US. Tang Yiau-ming, the ROC Minister of Defense was invited to visit the US officially for a conference of closer US-ROC military cooperation in 2002. 36 Bush’s administration from 2001 to 2009 removed the vagueness in the interpretation of One China, and replaced it with a firm attitude. In a TV interview in 2005, Bush stated that “If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. If Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, it would be a unilateral decision, that would then change the U.S. equation.” 37 A sense of aiding the ROC in the event of PRC launching an invasion was identified, as well as his objection to the independence movement of Taiwan.

Conclusion The US interpretation of One China did experience a lot of changes, though most of which were done verbally. To conclude the US stance on the One China policy, it was characterized by her vague and ambiguous attitude. Depending on the situation, the US President and the Congress could make 34. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, 27. 35. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy, 13. 36. Kan, 19. 37. Kan, 72.

37


/ Journal use of the vagueness left in the TRA to act in favour of her own interest, that is whenever the existing situation is threatened, the US will send forces to protect Taiwan and also her interests there. In spite of the fact that she diplomatically allied with the PRC, she never renounced her interests in the ROC. This two-sided diplomatic relation granted the US not only the cover of her long-term interest over the ROC, but also a brake on the surge of tension, a tension which would lead to armed conflicts, through allying herself with the PRC. Indeed, the US understood that to her the status quo was the situation that US interest could be maximized. In the future, the US-PRC-ROC relationship will still de jure be bounded by three Sino-U.S. communiqués and One China principle, but it is also expected that the USROC relationship will not come to a pause in the foreseeable future, for that the reliance on the US is what provides the ROC the confidence to survive under the threat of a possible PLA invasion. While the US, as the monopoly of arms sales to the ROC, only sells her the second-hand or second-class equipment, the ROC needs the assistance of the advance technology of the US Armed Forces to survive, and in the event of a war, the US’s engagement to protect her. Meanwhile, Trump’s threat to give up on the One China policy should not be taken as real, as in a phone call with President Xi Jinping in February Trump recognised the One China policy 38, which every predecessor of his since Nixon also honoured.

38. Tom Philips, “Trump agrees to support ‘One China’ policy in Xi Jinping call,” The Guardian, February 10, 2017, accessed May 5, 2017, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/donald-trump-agrees-support-one-chinapolicy-phone-call-xi-jinping

38


2017 - 2018 /

Bibliography An Act to Help Maintain Peace, Security, and Stability in the Western Pacific and to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States by Authorizing the Continuation of Commercial, Cultural, and Other Relations between the People of the United States and the People on Taiwan, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 96-8. U.S. Statutes at Large 93 (1979): 14 - 21. Baculinao, Eric & Smith, Alexander. “‘Serious Concern’ in Beijing at Trump’s Threat to End ‘One-China’ Policy.” NBC News, December 12, 2016. Accessed May 2, 2017. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/serious-concern-beijing-trump-s-threat-end-one-china-policy-n694771. Chang, James C.P. U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan. The Fellows Program. Accessed May 3, 2017. https://programs.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/fellows/ files/chang.pdf . Chang, Jaw-ling Joanne. “Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act.” Orbis Winter 2000 44 No. 1 (2000), 63 – 77. Chang, Rulun 張如倫. “Cong ‘Taiwan Guanxifa’ Jianshi Meiguo Duiliang'an Zhengce zhi Yanbian” 從《台灣關係法》檢視美國對兩岸政策之演 變 [A Review on the Evolution of US Policy towards the Taiwan Strait through the Taiwan Relations Act]. Army Review 陸軍月刊 479 (2005): 36 – 43. Gu Cheng 谷誠. “Cong Sanci Taihai Weiji kan Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” 39


/ Journal 從三次台海危機看美國對華政策 [A review on the U.S. Policy towards China through the three Taiwan Crises]. Journal of Tianjin Modern Enterprise Management College for Staff and Workers 23 (2004): 23-24. Kan, Shirley A. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One-China” Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei (CRS Report No. RL30341). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL30341.pdf. Kan, Shirley A. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 (CSR Report No. RL30957). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf. Li, Teng-hui. Always in My Heart. Speech, Ithaca, NY, June 9, 1995. Cross-Strait

Peace

Initiative.

http://www.straittalk88.com/up-

loads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_--_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf. Nickles, David P. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIII, China, Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2013. Philips, Tom. “Trump agrees to support 'One China' policy in Xi Jinping call.” The Guardian, February 10, 2017. Accessed May 5, 2017. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/donald-trump-agrees-support-one-china-policy-phone-call-xi-jinping.

Phillips, Steven E. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume 40


2017 - 2018 / XVII, China, 1969–1972, Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006. President Clinton at Peking University (1998). YouTube video, 1:08:13. Posted by “clintonlibrary42,” July 9, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=6IpJZihF0Lw. Sutter, Robert G. Taiwan: The “Three No’s,” Congressional-Administration Differences, and U.S. Policy Issues (CRS Report No. 98-837). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009. https://file.wikileaks.org/ file/crs/98-837.pdf. U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995. Vol. 141, pt. 47. U.S. Congress. House. Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations. H. Con. Res. 88. 114th Cong., 2nd sess. Congressional Record 162, no. 77, daily ed. (May 16, 2016): H 2395 – 2397. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Why Taiwan Matters: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2011. U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan. Accessed May 3, 2017. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/china-communique. 41


/ Journal In what ways did the Black Death undermine the social fabric of medieval Europe?

Leung Yu Hang, Thomas Year 4, Bachelor of Laws

Black Death was a devastating plague rampaging in Europe during 13461353. It undermined the social fabric, the ties that bind the diverse people, businesses, organizations, and institutions that make up a community, of the medieval European kingdoms.1 The Black Death took 60 per cent of Europe’s entire population away at that time, posing a heavy blow to the feudalistic society.2 The plague caused a great decrease in population, inducing the persecution of the Jews and catalysing the decline of the authority of the church. The drop in population also drove the rise of peasants’ power and changed people’s attitude. All these weakened the social fabric and eventually led to the collapse of feudalism, the old order in Europe. In this essay, the roles of Black Death in tearing the social fabric are assessed from four different factors, focusing on western and central Europe. Firstly, the Black Death induced the persecution of the Jews. At the time of Black Death, people in Europe had little scientific knowledge of diseases and were deeply religious. They were greatly influenced by the teachings of the church. Thus, when the church suggested that God sent the plague because of people’s sinful ways of living, many people believed.3 While some 1. David Swanson, Social Fabric, 2014, accessed on 24 November 2014, http://www.google.com.hk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQFjACOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fprojectdto. com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F05%2FSocialFabric.pdf&ei=V9d1VO63GsK3mwWasoD4BA&usg=AFQjCNGrwE8INQ2-LYx5gQp5j0fyERFqHA. 2. Ole J. Benedictow, ‘The Black Death: The Greatest Catastrophe Ever’, History Today, volume 55 issue 3 (March 2005), 42. 3. Derek Turner, The Black Death (London: Longman, 1978), 56.

42


2017 - 2018 / confessed their sins to try to prevent being infected or to seek a cure,4 others put the blame on the Jews. The Jews, who had a different religious belief from Christians, were often stigmatized by the church as “Christ killers”5. A religion-based anti-Semitism was promoted to the public, describing the Jews as agents of evil and devils who betrayed Jesus Christ. Many people took this claim seriously, and actively engaged in persecution and killing of the Jews even before the Black Death occurred. For instance, a pogrom of the Jews in the Middle Rhine region, as well as the Moselle and the Lower Rhine region started in 1287 after a Christian was said to be killed by the local Jews .6 Given the strongly anti-Semitic trend and the weakness of the Jews, it was not surprising that the Jews were accused of bringing the Black Death to Europe. When the plague took the lives of more and more people, people became desperate to take actions to stop the plague.7 In 1348, the Jews in Narbonne and Carcassonne were burnt alive by the local people.8 This was followed by a killing of 600 Jews in Brussels.9 In Mainz, a massacre wiped out its Jewish community, which was the largest in Germany.10 In 1349,

4. Merry E. Wiesner, Discovering the Medieval Past: a Look at the Evidence (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 177-178. 5. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (the United States: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996), 15-50. 6. Schaufel und Wanne, Werner von Oberwesel, 2012, accessed on 24 November 2014, http://www.heiligenlexikon.de/BiographienW/Werner_von_Oberwesel_von_Bacharach.htm. 7. David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West (New York, Harvard), 65. 8. Barbara W. Tuchman, ‘The Black Death Blamed on the Jews’, in Don Nardo, The Black Death (The United States: Greenhaven Press, 1999), 82. 9. Turner, The Black Death, 59. 10. Turner., 60.

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/ Journal more than 900 Jews in Strasbourg were burnt on the grounds of the Jewish cemetery.11 In fact, a historian even suggested that the killings during the Black Death were the “worst massacre of Jews in Europe, until in the 1940s Hitler set a new grim record of men’s brutality”.12 All these pogroms were done by the local people, who thought they were “doing what God wanted them to do”,13 in order to please God and stop the plague. This elimination of Jews greatly weakened the social fabric. An ethnic minority group was nearly wiped out in the society. Although the surviving Jews were invited to resettle later in many places,14 the great massacre created an even greater mistrust between locals and the Jews, which led to the forming of the Jewish ghettos later, in which the Jews isolated their communities from the outside world. Exchange between the Jews and the outside society became so minimal that there were almost no social ties remained. Thus, the Black Death was an inducer which created a surge in people’s anti-Semitic feelings and actions, leading to an exclusion of Jews from the society later, which undermined the social fabric. Secondly, the Black Death catalysed the decline in the church’s authority. Before the Black Death, the church had great control over people’s thought, providing codes for human behaviours as well as schoolings.15 However, the church was declining in popularity due to its involvement and use of religion in political struggle with kings, and people became less confident 11. Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West, 65. 12. Turner, The Black Death, 59. 13. Turner, 60. 14. Tuchman, ‘The Black Death Blamed on the Jews’, 89. 15. Frederick F. Cartwright and Michael D. Biddiss, ‘How the Black Death Affected the Church’, in Don Nardo, The Black Death (The United States: Greenhaven Press, 1999), 119-120.

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2017 - 2018 / in it.16 For example, Pope Boniface VIII committed suicide in 1303 when Philip IV of France defeated and captured him after the Pope excommunicated the king.17 Dante’s suggestion that the church’s power should only limited to spiritual sphere also led to the decline of church.18 During the Black Death, people believed that the disease came from God as a punishment and they asked the priests to cure them through prayer. Not only did the priests fail to stop the plague, but many of them were also infected and killed. Some priests who tried to avoid catching the disease from approaching the patients even ran away.19 On the other hand, some priests demanded higher pay for service during Black Death from the people.20 As the church was totally unable to stop the Black Death, people began to lose even more confidence in it, and became more cynical about it.21 Although some people became more pious after the Black Death,22 they pursue their own ways to God as they had little faith in the churchmen. Some became mystics like the Brethren of the Common Life,23 while some became heretics like the Lollards, who demanded changes in church.24 The decline of the church was thus confirmed by the Black Death. The church also suffered directly from the Black Death. Many clergy were killed by the plague, especially those who visited and took care of the patients. In England, half of the priests died in the plague.25 To make the mat-

16. Carlton J.H. Hayes, P.T. Moon and J.W. Wayland, World History (New York: Macmillan, 3rd rev. ed. 1955), 444-447. 17. Hayes, Moon and Wayland, 445. 18. Hayes, Moon and Wayland, 445. 19. Turner, The Black Death, 61. 20. Ziegler, The Black Death, 211. 21. Turner, The Black Death, 72. 22. Turner, 74. 23. Turner, 75. 24. Turner, 76. 25. Turner, 69. 45


/ Journal ter worse, “the best of the clergy died, the worst survived”,26 as the one who escaped from service was less likely to get infected. To replace such a huge loss in churchmen in a short period of time, the church even recruited new members without proper selection. As a result, there were many incompetent churchmen. As suggested by Henry Knighton, a monk at Leicester, “many of them (new priests) could not write and were no better than laymen, except that they could read, but not understand”.27 William Langland, an English poet, also criticised that many benefices were filled by “number of youths that had only devoted themselves for clerks by being shaven”.28 Moreover, more jobs and employment opportunities were available after the Black Death due to the death of many professionals. This attracted people from spiritual pursuits, and less people were willing to serve as clergy.29 These led to a decline in quality of the church’s teaching. Some of the new churchmen were even corrupted and did not behave properly. The church’s popularity further dropped, and it no longer had the strong ability to control people’s behaviour as before. Therefore, the Black Death catalysed and sped up the decline of church’s authority. People became much less influenced by the church and were more critical at its preaching. The church, which suffered a loss of specialists, was no longer able to slow down its decline, not to mention exerting great influence. This undermined the social fabric between the church and people, as their relationship became less close than before. Thirdly, the Black Death led to the rise of peasants’ power. In feudalism, 216.

26. Ziegler, The Black Death, 212. 27. Turner, The Black Death, 67-70. 28. Cartwright, ‘How the Black Death Affected the Church’, 110. 29. Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (London: Sutton Publishing, 1997),

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2017 - 2018 / the peasants were given land by their lords, and had to pay a large part of their produce as tax. Since there was a large supply of labour, the peasants did not have a choice and had little bargaining power. However, the Black Death killed more than half of the total population in Europe. There was not enough peasants to grow crops, which led to a rise in food price.30 The peasants could then choose to farm for the lords who gave preferential tax rates.31 For example, a ploughman earned 7s per annum in 1349-1350 in Cuxham, increasing dramatically from 2s before the plague. In 1350-1351, the wage even increased to as much as 10s 6d.32 All these led to an increase in the peasants’ income and economic power. On the other hand, the lords received less income from the selling of manufactured products like wool, due to a drop in their market prices, which resulted from a decrease in population.33 Combined with the fact that the lords received less tax from peasants, their power dropped. All these shocked the very foundation of feudalism, which depended on peasants to submit themselves to the lords. To maintain their superior position, the king and the lords tried to limit the power of peasants. For example, the Statute of Labourers (1351) was passed to freeze the peasants’ wage to the pre-Black Death level in England.34 When the king decided to introduce new taxation to the peasants later, a nation-wide peasants’ revolt occurred in 1381, which the rebels entered London, causing great damages.35 Although the king managed to suppress the revolt in the end, the revolt caused great chaos to the society by causing 30. Turner, The Black Death, 89. 31. Turner, 90. 32. Ziegler, The Black Death, 190. 33. Turner, The Black Death, p. 91. 34. Tony D. Triggs, The Black Death and the Peasants’ Revolt (London: Macmillan Education Limited, 1985), 28. 35. Triggs, The Black Death and the Peasants’ Revolt, 35-47.

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/ Journal military confrontations, especially five regional revolts occurred afterwards in 1381 to 1405.36 Nevertheless, the rise of peasants’ power still continued in a slower progress. The Black Death caused a subsequent labour shortage and a rise of peasants’ power. The original social fabric was undermined. Lords could not bind the peasants on their own land and exploited the peasants anymore, as peasants could choose to serve under better lords. To maintain the feudalistic social structure, the lords managed to limit the power of the peasant. However, this led to peasant uprisings and social upheavals, which undermined the social fabric even more by causing military confrontations between social classes. Therefore, the Black Death weakened the social fabric of medieval Europe by causing the rise of peasants. Fourthly, the Black Death brought about a change in people’s attitude towards life. The Black Death, unlike feudal warfare and natural disasters, caused an unprecedented number of deaths. For example, 1.4 million people perished out of 4.2 million in England.37 People did not understand what actually happened, and there was a strong sense of insecurity and panic during and after the Black Death. Facing the plague, many people became desperate, as described by Giovanni Boccaccio that they “eat and drink and be merry, for tomorrow (they) die”.38 Some people left their sick family members to take care of themselves and escaped to elsewhere too.39 After the plague, people generally became more selfish, cynical and pessimistic about life, and these feelings were passed to the following generations, lasting more than a

36. Michael Jones, The New Cambridge Medieval History Volume VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 100. 37. Ziegler, The Black Death, 182-185. 38. Turner, The Black Death, 74. 39. Hahn, The Black Death, 26.

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2017 - 2018 / century.40 Dance of Death, an artistic genre became popular after the Black Death. The paintings of this genre consist of the dead summoning people of different social class to dance along to the grave, showing the fragility of their lives.41 The pessimistic feeling was then compounded by the decline of authority of the church. The church could no longer comfort the people, as they had little faith in it. People thus became less willing to help each other and were less friendly. Moreover, the strong sense of uncertainty made the people unwilling to give birth, causing a low population growth. In fact, the population of France and England remained low for a long time after the Black Death.42 In this sense, the Black Death undermined the social fabric between individuals by making people more isolated from each other and more pessimistic. The decline of the church’s authority, which was catalysed by the Black Death, deprived people of a spiritual guidance. The low birth rate, which resulted from the insecurity brought by the Black Death, as well as the death directly resulting from Black Death, also damaged the feudalistic system, which required a large population to support the hierarchical system. With a low birth rate, feudalism, and the social fabric in it, was weakened. Thus, the Black Death undermined social fabric by changing people’s attitude towards life. In short, the Black Death undermined the social fabric of medieval European society by killing more than half of its population. The significant loss of population was an inducer for the persecution of the Jews and a catalyser 40. Turner, The Black Death, 72. 41. Brian Tierney, Western Europe in the Middle Ages: 300-1475 (Singapore: McGraw-Hill College, 1999), 472-473. 42. Tierney, 77.

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/ Journal for the decline of the church. It also caused the rise in peasants’ power and a change in people’s attitude towards life. All these undermined social fabrics in feudalism, leading to its eventual collapse and the rise of absolutism, which had great impact in European history.

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Bibliography Benedictow, Ole J. “The Black Death: the Greatest Catastrophe Ever.” History Today, 55, Autumn (2005); 42-49. Cartwright, Frederick F. and Michael D. Biddiss. “How the Black Death Affected the Church.” In The Black Death, edited by Don Nardo. The United States: Greenhaven Press, 1999. Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. The United States: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996. Hahn, Tracee de. The Black Death. The United States: Chelsea House Publishers, 2002. Hayes, Carlton J.H., P.T. Moon and J.W. Wayland. World History. New York: Macmillan, 3rd rev. ed. 1955, 444-447. Herlihy, David. The Black Death and the Transformation of the West. New York: Harvard, 65. David Swanson. Social ber

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rc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQFjACOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fprojectdto. com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F05%2FSocialFabric.pdf&ei=V9d1VO63GsK3mwWasoD4BA&usg=AFQjCNGrwE8INQ2-LYx5gQp5j0fyERFqHA. 51


/ Journal Jones, Michael. The New Cambridge Medieval History Volume VI. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Schaufel und Wanne. Werner von Oberwesel, 2012, accessed on 24 November 2014, http://www.heiligenlexikon.de/BiographienW/Werner_von_ Oberwesel_von_Bacharach.htm. Tierney, Brian. Western Europe in the Middle Ages: 300-1475. Singapore: McGraw-Hill College, 1999. Triggs, Tony D. The Black Death and the Peasants’ Revolt. London: Macmillan Education Limited, 1985. Tuchman, Barbara W. “The Black Death Blamed on the Jews,” in Don Nardo, The Black Death. The United States: Greenhaven Press (1999) 81-90. Turner, Derek. The Black Death. London: Longman, 1978. Wiesner, Merry E. Discovering the Medieval Past: a Look at the Evidence. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003. Ziegler, Philip. The Black Death, London: Sutton Publishing, 1997.

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2017 - 2018 / Using “Cult Films” to Understand Traumatic Events: A Case Study on “Lost Souls” (1980) and its Representation of Mainland Chinese Illegal Immigrants in Hong Kong During the Late 1970s-Early 1980s Chu Ho Ting, Justin Year 4, Global Creative Industries Major

Introduction: Using Films as a Historical Artefact Background Historical films have always been a genre that wins over many movie buffs around the globe. From bibliographical films like Gandhi (1982), to Dunkirk (2017), a war film everyone talks about this year, all emphasize on their originality and historical factor by stating that their films are “based on true events”. In fact, cultural historians in modern days have been seeing movie pictures as a form of evidence, that shows of the discourses, attitudes and values during the time the film is set for a while. By reviewing and evaluating how filmmakers use the past to tell their stories, films could also be seen as documents that reveal something about the time at which the films are released, especially those setting their stories in their presence time1. Hence, one could argue that the director, or the “Auteur” as most film historians would call them, of a historical film could be seen as a historian who transforms the fragmented and decontextualized historical “facts” into a meaningful narrative: a movie. Natalie Zemon Davis, a renowned Canadian historian, pushes this idea forward by comparing the practice of film production and traditional historical writing, in which they both wish to present “easily graspable clarity” for their spectators (readers) on different platforms, namely the framing of the shot, clip editing, and narrative 1. Mike Chopra-Gant, Cinema and History : The Telling of Stories (London; New York: Wallflower, 2008), 7.

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/ Journal for directors and editing articles for historians2. Limitations and Criticism in Using Films as a Historical Source Traditional historians often time criticize films, even those based on historical events, for being too fictionalized as historical facts are not always sparkles and glitters3. Sorlin suggests most traditional historians would argue that historical films, especially those classified as comedy-drama and melodramas would recourse to the tritest vision of history in order to suit a larger audience’s taste4. Victoria & Abdul (2017) would be one of the best examples in recent years to show how historical films are being criticized as “untruthful” and whitewashing, due to the fact that the film tries to portray Queen Victoria as a “progressive anti-racist” and thus negates the cruel colonial history during the British Raj era5. Please be reminded that the film is based on a biography with the same title written by the world-renowned historian Shrabani Basu, where she conducted her research in a “traditional” practice, such as reviewing Queen Victoria’s Hindustani journals, which are the journals she kept in Urdu6. Interestingly, people did not blame her for representing cold hard 2. Natalie Zemon Davis, “Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead”: Film and the Challenge of Authenticity,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 8, no. 3 (1988). 3. Pierre Sorlin, “The Film in History,” in The History on Film Reader, ed. Marnie Hughes-Warrington (Routledge New York, 2009), 16. 4. “Historical Film as Tools for Historians,” in Image as Artifact : The Historical Analysis of Film and Television, ed. John E. O’Connor (Malabar, Fla.: R.E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1990), 9. 5. Christopher Orr, “The Lightweight Appeal of Victoria & Abdul,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/09/victoria-abdul-review/541491/. 6. Damon Wise, “‘Victoria & Abdul’ Author Shrabani Basu on the Foodie Project That Became a Judi Dench Film: “It All Started with Curries” – the Contenders London,” The Deadline, http://deadline.com/2017/10/victoria-and-abdulshrabani-basu-on-the-foodie-project-that-became-a-judi-dench-film-it-all-started-with-curries-the-contenders-london-1202184179/.

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2017 - 2018 / “facts” in the stories of Victoria and Abdul, yet people blamed the director for his “unauthentic” representation of the queen. Now we need to ask ourselves this question: Why does written historical material carry greater historical value than cinematic material? In fact, most historical writings carry personal interpretations of the fragmented “truth”, why are they considered trustworthy, yet directors’ views are not?

The Auteur is Key Zemon-Davis states most “feature films”, like those Hollywood blockbusters mentioned earlier, are often seen as inventions without significant connection to the historical past in the academia. Yet, what she found in historical feature films in her previous work on slavery does carry a central plot based on documentable historical events with an imagined plot yet the historical events themselves are logically represented7. As mentioned before, traditional historians have criticized movie for fictionalizing historical facts, yet Zemon-Davis has her view on this issue: The term “fiction films” is often applied to them in cinema studies, highlighting a contrast between unconstrained imagination in feature films and “truth” in nonfictional documentary. It is precisely this dichotomy that I want to question, not merely because there is a play of invention-of “fictive” crafting-in documentary film, docudrama, and cinema-verite (as there is also in prose historical texts), but also because feature films can make cogent observations on historical events, relations, and processes8. 7. Natalie Zemon Davis, Slaves on Screen: Film and Historical Vision (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 5. 8. Davis, 5.

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/ Journal Going back to her view on production of film, Zemon-Davis has mentioned films are in the process of becoming a way to interpret history, given that historical filmmakers need to address the authenticity of History, given that we have sufficient dramatic or visual elements to present it on screen9. She then suggests that one way for filmakers to improve this issue is for them to seek advice from historians for basic historical background research to make the production closer to what had happened. It seems on the surface that Stephen Frears fails to communicate with Shrabani Basu when they are making Victoria & Abdul under this framework, yet Frears does apply to her idea on “fiction/feature” film, where he makes comments on the historical event with his craft. Everything all comes down to the producer of power/ knowledge and his/her choice to represent history in a certain way since they dictate how history is produced on their platform. With that said, if the filmmaker is a historian to begin with, could it breech the gap between historical authenticity and cinematic representation of facts?

Tun-Fei Mou: “Cult” representation as a mean to show the truth Aside from narrative and historical representation, how film tries to recreate “factual” visual representations of history are another huge topic in this field. Traumatic events, namely physical violence and sexual abuse in this case, are required to be censored under both the internal assessment among screenwriters and producers, and the external assessment done by the Film Censorship Authority in the region they want to screen the film. In other words, most mainstream commercial films could never represent the most gruesome part of traumatic events due to the commercial factor of the pro 9. Maria Lúcia G. Pallares-Burke, The New History : Confessions and Conversations (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell Pub., 2002), 70.

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2017 - 2018 / duction company.

Art for Art’s Sake: Using “Cult” representation to counter censorship When there is a problem in the current practice one can always seek the alternative: alternative cinemas are indeed the solution to this problem in most mainstream films nowadays. The term “Cult Film” under Kinkade and Katovich’s framework, could be defined as a theme that “(1) place typical people into atypical situations, (2) allow for narcissistic and empathic audience identification with subversive characters, (3) question traditional authority structures, (4) reflect societal strains, and (5) offer interpretable and paradoxical resolutions to these social strains”10. Now we can ask ourselves: how useful are cult films in terms of factual representation of History? Cult Film, or the subgenre cult horror to be exact, could be seen as historical texts with cultural sensibility, since the main components of this genre are emphasis on physical violence, the refusal to provide a happy ending, and the exposition of fanaticism by showing audiences horrific events relentlessly11. Explicit imageries, namely bloodshed, gang rape, and mental exploitation could be justified in terms of film production as they are seen as key visual elements of the plot and hence will never be censored. In fact, people in traumatic events do not usually end up with comforting endings, meanwhile survivors of these incidents have often gone through humiliation, torture and many more sufferings and lived to 10. Patrick T Kinkade and Michael A Katovich, “Toward a Sociology of Cult Films: Reading Rocky Horror,” The Sociological Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1992): 194. 11. Lawrence O’Toole, “The Cult of Horror,” in The Cult Film Reader, ed. Ernest Mathijs and Xavier Mendik (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008).

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/ Journal tell. To put these concepts in context, I have selected Tun-Fei Mou’s most notable work “Lost Soul” (1980), a film about the suffering of Chinese illegal immigrants coming from China a short period of time before the “Reached Base Policy” ended in 1980 as my example in order to illustrate how Cult Horror could be useful in understanding traumatic events in history. Before going further, please keep in mind that Mou had never considered himself as a cult film director ever in his life. Yet many classify his work as “cult horror” recently in various social media platforms due to the rise of popularity of cult cinema among local youth. In fact, what he did was never classified as “cult” back in his time, he was only seen as “controversial” yet very popular in the eyes of the public. And thus, please bear in mind that what counts as mainstream and thus what counts as alternative may differ according to different social contexts12. Not to mention the Hong Kong Motion Picture Rating System was only established after 1988, meaning that the general public does not have an official guideline to “anchor” the level of obscenity in the industry. An interesting fact is that his film Men Behind the Sun (1988), which is another historical cult film about cruel experiments by the Japanese on the Chinese during WW2, was the first film classified as “category III” since the establishment of the system, further buttressing his status as the “Godfather” of Hong Kong Cult Film.

Example: “Lost Soul” and the traumatic experiences of illegal immigrants “Lost Soul” (1980) depicts the story of three young mainland Chinese - Heung Tung, his girlfriend Ah Chyun and her brother Ta Chung trying to swim 12. Ernest Mathijs and Jamie Sexton, Cult Cinema: An Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2012), 3.

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2017 - 2018 / across Starling Inlet to Hong Kong. They are picked up by a “snake dealer” (people who earn a living by smuggling illegal immigrants into Hong Kong and ask their relatives for ransom), which later falls into the hands of the military as they land. The three protagonists later escape but are kidnapped by another group of snake dealers and are forced to be confined in filth and cruelty with dozens of other unfortunate souls while Hok Ye, the head of “snakes” attempts to extract ransoms from their families. The film ends with Ah Chyun turning herself in to distract the police, letting Heung Tung escape and see the “Diamond Hill” that they have longed for year after year. Yet, after seeing the “real” Diamond Hill, Heung Tung descends into madness since Diamond Hill is in fact not filled with diamonds but a small squatter area in 1980.

Fact Check: Comparing Lost Souls to “REAL” Historical Materials One may ask: how factual the film is in representing the suffering of those illegal immigrants? How accurate is the film in showing the geographical setting and actions against illegal immigrants? The following section of this article is dedicated to the comparison between “hard-cold” historical facts and materials found in local archive, to the film itself and see how accurate Mou is in terms of showing the live of illegal immigrant during late 1970s to 1980s, from historical accuracy (i.e. government policies) to visual representation.

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Collecting Qualitative research data to show authentic experience of illegal immigrant Concerning illegal immigrants’ experiences, the key factor to Lost Soul’s historical accuracy is that Mou casts real life illegal immigrants who came to Hong Kong recently in order to capture the most authentic representation of their lives, as mentioned in interviews on Southern Screen, a monthly magazine published by the Shaw Brothers . In fact, 200 illegal immigrants came to the audition and he said that some of the stories in the film were the actual experiences of those interviewees, which counts as major qualitative research on their lives . Other than in depth interviews, one could also claim that newspapers were also a source he based his film on. Hong Kong Standard, which was one of the few English newspaper at that time, covered a story where an illegal immigrant swam to Hong Kong with two inflated animal bladders in 1975. One can suggest that Mou tries to recreate that image by showing all threemain protagonists swimming to Hong Kong using inflated plastic bags, which is indeed an accurate representation of how those illegal immigrants arrived in Hong Kong.

Border Control Policies In terms of polices and border control, the handbill of the film (points out the film sets at Starling Inlet and the actual Police Tactical Unit (Sai Kung Branch) was also starred in his film in order to increase the accuracy of costumes and the way the police dealt with immigrants during that

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2017 - 2018 / time13(Cheung 1980:13). I would suggest the reason why Mou asked this particular branch to be in his production was mainly because the Sai Kung Branch was the one which took care of border control on the North-Eastern side of Hong Kong, as mentioned by Major Paul Pettigrew, the commander of border control when he was asked in an episode of a RTHK programme called Tuesday Briefing in 1976. As mentioned by Major Pettigrew, illegal immigrants had become more “wildly” towards late 1970s as the policies had changed through these years. He claimed that illegal immigrants just needed to surrender to the police and they would release them back in Kowloon and let them be accepted by the community. In General Correspondence Files (Secret) at the Government Records Service I found out that “Operation Swallow” was the official term for this action of releasing Mainland Chinese immigrants due to humanitarian concern. During 1970s, “Operation Snake” (later change code to “Sledge”) took place, where the government tightened immigration/border control policies due to the massive influx of illegal immigrants across the land frontier. A “Snake Fence” (Border control including spotlight) was set up at the border and “Snake Camps”, rudimentary camps, were established in Laffans Plain (now called Ta Kwu Ling) and Sing Ping School (closed) to hold illegal immigrants entering from the eastern side of the border and deport them immediately back to China if not specified. On 23rd of October 1980, the Legislative Council passed the Immigration (Amendment) Bill where “Reached Base Policy” would end at midnight on the 23rd October, meaning all illegal immigrants who failed to register and acquire an identity card would be deported back to China immediately,

13. Mathijs and Sexton, 3.

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/ Journal marking the official end of “Operation Swallow”. A new policy called “Operation Champion” took place, where citizens needed to bring their identity card outside and government will not provide any service to you if you do not have one; which Mou did mention at the beginning of the film by inserting a short documentary about the policy. Towards the end the director also states the importance of having an identity card not only because of the requirement of Operation Champion, but it was a requirement of police to check their IDs under “Operation Snake Fence”, which Heung Tung failed since he does not know where he lives in Hong Kong, resulting in most of the “human snakes” getting arrested.

Scene Comparison: Kidnapping, physical violence, and sexual abuse Collage 1 shows how “snakehead” kidnaps and charges 5000HKD ransom to Ah Cheung’s family in order to release them. Quite a lot of local Chinese newspapers covered these stories as well, for instance, Oriental Daily New covered 2 stories concerning snakeheads making a huge fortune out of illegal immigrants’ families, especially those who have a direct bloodline like parents and siblings in Hong Kong. Not only that, snakehead would also steal illegal immigrants from another snakehead or catch them on site and impose false imprisonment on those gangs. The most gruesome part of the film is that female illegal immigrants are often time abused sexually, including rape and humiliation. In Lost Souls, illegal immigrants, especially women, if they failed to provide their Hong Kong relative’s number, they will first be raped and later sold to brothels as shown in images below, some may even subject to sexual abuse, such as rape 62


2017 - 2018 / and mental torture. To justify this scene, local newspaper during 1979 also supported Mou’s narrative and representation of history, saying that women are being gang raped in Macau before smuggling to Hong Kong or raped by a man that offers shelter to a female illegal immigrant.

Conclusion Coming to the end of the article, can we say that cult horror is a way to represent history in a more truthful way? After going through all these facts checking processes I can only say real history could be even worse than the represented image shown on screen. As local news articles below revealed that men were beaten up by police while women were raped when they were arrested, and a horrifying image of sea filled with dead body… These are the stories that the film did not cover, yet happened in history. Going back to Davis’ idea of “Featured/Fiction Film”, where she suggests they provide a cogent observation on historical events, relations, and processes during the film was made14, one could argue that Mou was influenced by the news and political state during the 1970s when he was making the film, since he tried to incorporate stories from real illegal immigrants, as well as newspaper articles during that time. One particular scene that I cannot make a comparison of is the scene where Dai Chong is being raped by the Snakehead in the later part of the film. I would see Mou’s act of showing man as a victim of sexual harassment serves as a supplement to the limitation of history, where things like this must have happened during that time but not recorded due to the fact that a man being raped by another man challenges the masculinity they possess and hence, victims chose to

14. Davis, Slaves on Screen: Film and Historical Vision, 5.

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/ Journal keep silence and uphold their dignity. This shows that film could serve as supplement towards history with the aid of directors’ “rights” to fictionalize history within a logical framework. How about the argument where historians resent seeing historic films as resources as they are “not trustworthy”? Perhaps this leads to a greater question: why are academic papers deemed historically accurate while films are not? My simple answer to this question would be “peer review”, as journal articles are fact-checked by another scholar and multiple panels while films are not, at least concerning historical accuracy. We as historians should advocate historical accuracy in the film industry while letting them know that filmmakers carry great responsibility in educate the public about history as the influence of film is much higher than journal articles for non-scholars. Moreover, if we want to convince traditional scholars to believe in films, we need to publish more work regarding films and historical accuracy in showing that most films are in fact capable of revealing some part of the grand history on their own. Without a doubt, Lost Souls could be seen as one of the best examples in showing historical accuracy in the industry. “Cult” representation of history on the other hand needs further discussion as what I have just presented is just a fragment of the discourse and “Cult” in this article only serves as means of showing how film could represent greater accuracy if they choose to override censorship and negate public taste and box office; perhaps another paper on “cult” and how it affects audience reception of history would be great for understanding this matter.

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Bibliography Ah-Mak. “Móu Dūn Fèi Jí Tōudù Zīliào Pāi Dǎ Shé, Xiōng Xiǎng Yǔ Bù Jīngrén Sǐ Bùxiū [Tun-Fei Mou Collects Sources from Illigal Immigrants for His Film “Lost Soul”: Planning to Make a Huge Hit] “ Southern Screen October 1980, 12-13. Cheung, Seung. “Móu Dūn Fèi Zhī Jiā Líqí Gǔguài [the Weird Things in Tun-Fei Mou Home].” Southern Screen June 1980, 12-13. Chopra-Gant, Mike. Cinema and History : The Telling of Stories [in English]. London; New York: Wallflower, 2008. Davis, Natalie Zemon. ““Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead”: Film and the Challenge of Authenticity.” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 8, no. 3 (1988): 269-83. Davis, Natalie Zemon. Slaves on Screen: Film and Historical Vision. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Kinkade, Patrick T, and Michael A Katovich. “Toward a Sociology of Cult Films: Reading Rocky Horror.” The Sociological Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1992): 191-209. Mathijs, Ernest, and Jamie Sexton. Cult Cinema: An Introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2012. doi:10.1002/9781444396447.

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/ Journal O’Toole, Lawrence. “The Cult of Horror.” In The Cult Film Reader, edited by Ernest Mathijs and Xavier Mendik. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008. Orr, Christopher. “The Lightweight Appeal of Victoria & Abdul.” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/09/ victoria-abdul-review/541491/. Pallares-Burke, Maria Lúcia G. The New History: Confessions and Conversations. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell Pub., 2002. Sorlin, Pierre. “The Film in History.” In The History on Film Reader, edited by Marnie Hughes Warrington: Routledge New York, 2009. “Historical Film as Tools for Historians.” In Image as Artifact: The Historical Analysis of Film and Television, edited by John E. O’Connor, 42-68. Malabar, Fla.: R.E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1990. Wise, Damon. “‘Victoria & Abdul’ Author Shrabani Basu on the Foodie Project That Became a Judi Dench Film: “It All Started with Curries” – the Contenders London.” The Deadline, http://deadline.com/2017/10/ victoria-and-abdul-shrabani-basu-on-the-foodie-project-thatbecame-a-judi-dench-film-it-all-started-with-curries-the-contenderslondon-1202184179/.

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2017 - 2018 / Some Reflections on History Wong Kang Shing Year 2, Bachelor of Arts

This essay is written to acknowledge my debts to Mr. William Wong, whose lively lectures and words of encouragement inspire me to develop a lifelong passion for history. What is history? We are frequently asked this very question, history students and professors alike. This essay talks about what history means in the public realm, from the perspective of a member of the History Society. It also talks about the meaning of history in academia, from the perspective of a History sophomore. Such themes as the importance of history to the public, the influence of post-modernism, and the craft of historical research will be covered.

History in the public sphere Linguistically and intuitively, history is essentially events which have happened from the dawn of time to the last elapsed instant. As far as everyone is concerned, and trying not to objectify it, history should refer to our knowledge of history. Therefore, history is the knowledge of events which have happened. By thoughtfully deliberating over the term ‘knowledge’ and ‘events’, Carl Becker offers a more refined definition. ‘History is the memory of things said and done.’1 1. Carl Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian (1931),” in The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, ed. Adam Budd (UK: Routledge, 2009), 20.

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/ Journal Having said that history consists solely of memories, it suddenly becomes very indispensable for everyone. Without history, daily lives will be aimless. The example of Mr. Everyman given by Becker illustrates how every individual performs all the crucial procedures of historical research in everyday lives.2 You wake up in the morning and remember what was scheduled for today or the next few days. You will check your schedule book to make sure you have not missed anything, as historians do their research in sources. History is of great significance in sustaining our daily lives. Another function of history is to keep individuals connected with the community. History provides unique collective memories to a group of people. It defines identities and relations in a civil society.3 Alethea Hayter recalled her frustration at explaining to an adolescent the origin of Sainte-Chapelle, a Gothic chapel in Paris built by Saint Louis after a crusade. The youngster had no clue about ‘Saint Louis’ and ‘crusade’. So Hayter gave up.4 Her case implies that historical knowledge is essential to one’s understanding of his or her position in the community where people share some common experience and beliefs. Especially in the age of globalization, people constantly encounter foreign cultures. History has a daunting task of reminding us who we are. History serves as a reminder to people of their identity. It comes as no surprise that there are propagandists who use history to achieve their purposes, of which, perhaps, not many people approve. One of the common acts is 2. Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian (1931),” 20-22. 3. Peter Seixas, “Schweigen! Die Kinder! Or, Does Postmodern History Have a Place in the Schools?,” in Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives, ed. Peter N. Stearns, Peter Seixas, and Sam Wineburg (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 21-23. 4. Alethea Hayter, “The Rise and Fall of Clio,” The Spectator, 18 July 1998.

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2017 - 2018 / sacralizing certain moments in history. Historians warn that it will obstruct historical understanding by disjoining events prior to and in the wake of the sacralized moments.5 In some authoritarian states, the ruling class even twists what have happened in the past. The motive is simple and plain – to brainwash citizens and acquire allegiance. We cannot forget the intention of Herodotus, the first person to investigate past events, in writing Histories. It is to prevent distortion of record by ‘forgetfulness, partiality, and false accretion’.6 While history may fall prey to distortion in some people’s hand, the ideas of post-modernism have been gaining momentum in recent decades. It is a description of thoughts like deconstruction that challenge modernism and the construction of a modern society in the 19th and 20th centuries. It sparks off a methodological debate concerning history and power. The idea of deconstruction put forward by Jacques Derrida suggests that the production of any text involves selection by the author, who possesses the power to do so, with reference to the context. Hence, bias is ineluctable.7 In applying deconstruction to history, post-modernists propose that the past does not have a beginning before historians define it. The process of defining a beginning is a process of turning a meaningless past into a meaningful 5. David Lowenthal, “Dilemmas and Delights of Learning History,” in Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives, ed. Peter N. Stearns, Peter Seixas, and Sam Wineburg (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 67-68. 6. Donald Lateiner, The Historical Method of Herodotus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1989), 7. 7. Catriona Kelly, “History and Post-Modernism,” Past & Present, no. 133 (November 1991): 209-11.

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/ Journal narrative.8 They reckon that reality is a prejudiced creation by historians;9 and there are always views oppressed by ‘mainstream’ history. They arrive at a conclusion that there are no historical truth and judgements.10 Some historians think that post-modernism casts a blight on history; that it is becoming ‘an endangered species’.11 To put it unpolemically, the presence of post-modernism is believed to prompt the academia to redefine the nature of historical investigation and improve historiographical practice.12 It is also normal that viewers may have different knowledge about the past due to difference in education levels for example.

History in the academic sphere With regard to the academic sphere, the definition of history proposed in the very beginning of this essay seems hardly useful at all. This immensely broad definition cannot explain what historians did, have been doing, or are doing. Again, Becker gives us a sensible understanding. There should be two histories. One of them is the actual sequence of events that once took place; the other is the sequence of events people, or historians, affirm and remember. Becker observes that past events have vanished, and we can only rely on material traces to ‘know’ them. Hence, he concludes that the job of historians is to establish a connection between the two aforementioned 8. Seixas, “Does Postmodern History Have a Place in the Schools?,” 27. 9. Lawrence Stone, “History and Post-Modernism,” Past & Present, no. 135 (May 1992): 193. 10. Lowenthal, “Dilemmas and Delights of Learning History,” 71. 11. Lawrence Stone, “History and Post-Modernism,” Past & Present, no. 131 (May 1991): 218. 12. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “History and Post-Modernism,” Past & Present, no. 135 (May 1992): 207.

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2017 - 2018 / sequences.13 Many historians also consider history as a discipline. It is neither using punishment to correct delinquency, nor a system of rules of conduct. Nevertheless, it is a discipline which carries not exactly rules, but conventions to be observed. For example, citations in a history essay have to follow The Chicago Manual of Styles. It is a discipline which performs a strict supervisory role. There is a strong perception of what is and is not a ‘good’ work. There are no doubts that a good historical work has to be a work of great academic value. The discussion of academic value is twofold. Historians tend to weigh the subject being investigated and the methodology the author used. Every historical work is a conversation with an imagined reader, regardless the general public or the academia. Many scholars adhere to a belief that research should deepen readers’ understanding of a practical problem. Telling readers what they should do is not the main goal. Instead, research should tell what readers should think.14 In the case of history, the life story of a historical figure or the story of a community is able to tell its connection to larger historical movements.15 In terms of methodology, a work of academic value generally refers to, for the sake of originality, using new and significant evidence or providing novel interpretations of original evidence.16 Some historians also propose that historical research should concentrate primarily on original sources from 13. Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian (1931),” 19-20. 14. Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, The Craft of Research, 3rd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 51-53. 15. Wood Gray, Historian’s Handbook: A Key to the Study and Writing of History, 2nd ed. (Boston: H. Mifflin, 1964), 10. 16. Gray, 10.

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/ Journal archives. Leopold von Ranke is a renowned advocate of such methodology. He dedicates historical research to rebuilding the past wie es eigentlich gewesen ist (as it actually happened).17 In the preface of his Histories of the Latin and German Nations, Ranke pointed out that his research relied heavily on written documents and oral narratives, including memoirs, correspondence, reports from embassies, and eyewitnesses’ accounts.18 Given a broad definition of history, can ‘Reasons of the 1953 East German uprising from a political science perspective’ and ‘Significance of Interpretation Service in the Legislative Council since 1972’ be valid topics for historical research? In actuality, it is not unheard of for historians to complain that they find it harder than ever to seek undiscovered sources or those which have not been used. To keep their work original, some historians recommend their peers to introduce perspectives from other disciplines.19 The Annales school is a case in point. Its proponents, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, call for the historical investigation on how societies and economies interact with the development of civilizations in the journal they established, Annales d’histoire économique et sociale.20 The advice of borrowing perspectives from other disciplines does not lack opponents. Some historians insist on following traditions to do history. At

17. Gray, 3. 18. Leopold von Ranke, “Preface to the First Edition of Histories of the Lain and German Nations (1824),” in The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, ed. Adam Budd (UK: Routledge, 2009), 173. 19. He Ping 何平 and Xiao Wei 肖薇, “Jian Yi Li Shi Lun Wen De Xie Zuo Gui Fan 簡議歷史論文的寫作規範 [A Brief Discussion on the Norms of Writing a History Essay],” History Teaching, no. 8 (2014): 2. 20. Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, “Preface to Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 1 (1929),” in The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, ed. Adam Budd (UK: Routledge, 2009).

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2017 - 2018 / the same time, many historians do not object that historical development is progressive in nature, a premise which is under heavy fire from post-modernists.21 History itself cannot escape from this premise. For instance, political history was ubiquitous in the 19th century. Historians like James Harvey Robinson opened up the possibility of ‘new history’ - the study of the social, intellectual, and scientific progress of humanity.22 Especially in the training for would-be historians, let’s say in university, history undergraduates should not be confined to the archetype. That is to say, flexibility should be given to undergraduates to explore different perspectives of viewing the past. At the end of the day, it is university education which we are talking about. It should encourage students to acquire knowledge and obtain new insights, instead of limiting them to do so. Returning to my first proposed topic concerning the East German uprising in 1953, it may offer some insights about the pattern of authoritarian states in dealing with popular insurrections. My second proposed topic is able to reveal a change in the colonial government’s attitude towards its rule in Hong Kong after the 1967 riots. Giving a title to this piece of writing is more difficult than I have expected. This essay begins by asking what history is. Firstly, it addresses the question in the public realm, prompting us to ask how important history is to every individual in the community. Then it leads us to consider the potential consequences of distorting history and the impacts of post-modernism. This essay then explores perceptions of history by the professionals, such as what 21. Seixas, “Does Postmodern History Have a Place in the Schools?,” 29. 22. James Harvey Robinson, “The New History (1911),” in The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, ed. Adam Budd (UK: Routledge, 2009), 184-87.

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/ Journal constitutes a good research and how students should do their research. It is far from an epistemological writing on history. On that account, I believe it will be most appropriate to say that this writing is some of my reflections on the subject.

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Bibliography Becker, Carl. “Everyman His Own Historian (1931).” Chap. 2 In The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, edited by Adam Budd, 19-29. UK: Routledge, 2009. Bloch, Marc, and Lucien Febvre. “Preface to Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 1 (1929).” Translated by Adeline Amar and Adam Budd. Chap. 23 In The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, edited by Adam Budd, 188-89. UK: Routledge, 2009. Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. The Craft of Research. 3rd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. Gray, Wood. Historian’s Handbook: A Key to the Study and Writing of History. 2nd ed. Boston: H. Mifflin, 1964. Hayter, Alethea. “The Rise and Fall of Clio.” The Spectator, 18 July 1998, 38. He, Ping 何平, and Xiao Wei 肖薇. “Jian Yi Li Shi Lun Wen De Xie Zuo Gui Fan 簡議歷史論文的寫作規範 [A Brief Discussion on the Norms of Writing a History Essay].” History Teaching, no. 8 (2014): 14-18. Kelly, Catriona. “History and Post-Modernism.” Past & Present, no. 133 (November 1991): 209-13. Lateiner, Donald. The Historical Method of Herodotus. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1989.

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/ Journal Lowenthal, David. “Dilemmas and Delights of Learning History.” Chap. 4 In Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives, edited by Peter N. Stearns, Peter Seixas and Sam Wineburg, 63-82. New York: New York University Press, 2000. Ranke, Leopold von. “Preface to the First Edition of Histories of the Lain and German Nations (1824).” Translated by Wilma Iggers. Chap. 20 In The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, edited by Adam Budd, 172-74. UK: Routledge, 2009. Robinson, James Harvey. “The New History (1911).” Chap. 22 In The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources, edited by Adam Budd, 184-87. UK: Routledge, 2009. Seixas, Peter. “Schweigen! Die Kinder! Or, Does Postmodern History Have a Place in the Schools?.” Chap. 1 In Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives, edited by Peter N. Stearns, Peter Seixas and Sam Wineburg, 19-37. New York: New York University Press, 1990. Spiegel, Gabrielle M. “History and Post-Modernism.” Past & Present, no. 135 (May 1992): 194-208. Stone, Lawrence. “History and Post-Modernism.” Past & Present, no. 135 (May 1992): 189-94. “History and Post-Modernism.” Past & Present, no. 131 (May 1991): 217-18.

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2017 - 2018 /

Acknowledgements We would like to express our utmost gratitude to each and every contributor:

Professor David M. Pomfret Mr. Law Cheuk Lem Monty Mr. Wong Kang Shing Mr. Raymond Yang Ms. Fung Yat I Mr. Lau Barney Pok Lai Mr. Ng Cheuk Hang Mr. Leung Yu Hang, Thomas Mr. Chu Ho Ting, Justin

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/ Journal

Editorial Board Editor-in-Chief Lee Kin Yeung

Editors Hu Shek Pang, Frank Chan Ho Wing, Zoe Tang Lap Hang, Ray Jim Yee Lok, Constance Man Ka Wing, Aki Lui Ying Hei, Bosco Wong Wai Yin, Jonathan Tse Wing Sun, Vincent 78


JOURNAL II

Address - 1A09 Fong Shu Chuen Amenities Centre Email - hiso@connect.hku.hk Facebook - History Society, Arts Association, Hong Kong University Students’ Union Instagram - @hisoaahkusu

COPYRIGHT © 2018 HISTORY SOCIETY A.A.H.K.U.S.U. SESSION 2017-2018

HISO 1718 Journal II  

Prose, Acknowledgements and Editorial Board.

HISO 1718 Journal II  

Prose, Acknowledgements and Editorial Board.

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