Page 30

The Hinckley Journal of Politics

than ideal state capacities, but may be conducive to actual spillover violence producing more instability, which can also increase the risk of terrorism. Spillover conflict from the Syrian Civil War has poured into Lebanon on multiple occasions (Masi, 2015). Jordan, however, has a very different border situation. For example, the U.S. government has paid nearly half a billion U.S. dollars for a program aimed to build a security wall on Jordan’s northern border with Syria and Iraq (Arkin, 2016). These payments have thus far gone toward a high-tech border radar system that functions as a virtual wall between Jordan and Syria with the intent to finish the construction of a physical wall in the near future (Arkin, 2016). While borders have a mixed effect on the risk of terrorism, this type of border security and aid is not equally available to all states facing a similar risk. The wall indicates stronger state capacities, military organization, and prevents conflict spillover. Turkey is in the process of building a “token” wall along the border with Syria, yet it does not approach the level of Jordan’s new border security system (Afanasieva, 2014). Yet Turkey has experienced less terrorism incidents than Lebanon in certain years (and especially less if one considers population size as a ratio to incidents), despite a porous border. A Rand Corporation study found Lebanon to have the greatest risk of conflict spillover from the Syrian Civil War, which is directly related to border management and security (Young, Stebbins, Frederick, & Al-Shahery, 2014). Ultimately, borders do not seem to influence the number of terrorism incidents directly but may help to maintain state capacities by limiting conflict spillover. Thus, regarding Hypothesis 2, it may be possible to reject the null hypothesis. Being in close proximity to a conflict zone does not automatically increase the amount of terrorism a country experiences. However, if state capacities are weak, then geographic proximity may play a role in increasing terrorism incidents. Countries in Focus: Numbers of Refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan The following section reports numbers of terrorism incidents and fatalities, refugees, refugee-like persons, and total persons of concern as reported by the Global Terrorism Database and the UNCHR data sources (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism START, 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). A detailed analysis of the three states’ differing capacities and characteristics, as they relate to the threat of terrorism, is presented afterward. Table 1: Lebanon Asylum Seekers/Refugees and Terrorist Incidents (Syrian Migrant Origin) Year

Refugees (incl. refugeelike situations)

Asylumseekers (pending cases)

Others of Concern

Total Population

Terror Incidents

Terror Fatalities

2010

64

141

2011

124

367

2012

126939

242

5331

10

1

127181

15

9

2013

85124

332

851616

121

190

205 4840

2014

1147494

417

1992

2017

1149903

204

114

Table 2: Jordan Asylum Seekers/Refugees and Terrorist Incidents (Syrian Migrant Origin) Year

Refugees (incl. refugeelike situations)

Asylumseekers (pending cases)

Total Population

Terror Incidents

Terror Fatalities

2010

198

287

485

2011

193

2618

2811

0

0

2012

238798

2013

585304

491

239289

2

2

0

585304

2

0

2014

623112

0

623112

3

1

Table 3: Turkey Asylum Seekers/Refugees and Terrorist Incidents (Syrian Migrant Origin) Year

Refugees (incl. refugeelike situations)

Aslyumseekers (penind cases)

Returned Refugees

Others of Concern

Total Population

Terror Incidents

Terror Fatalities

9494

51

25

2010

9

65

2011

19

205

74

2012

248466

200

68573

317239

190

244

2013

585601

110

140756

726467

42

82

2014

1557899

250

1558149

90

38

9270

Overall, this data suggests that refugees are not correlated with terror incidents. Rather, the successive state capacities help to determine the different outcomes of the actualized risk of terrorism in the three states analyzed. I have already discussed border management as a risk of terrorism determinant. Next, I discuss regime stability as it underpins much of state capacity. Lebanon’s regime is and has been unstable for several decades since the end of its civil war in 1990. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Lebanon was unable to elect a president for over a third of the duration of the conflict (Middle East Monitor, 2016). The Turkish regime is also generally unstable. As recently as the summer of 2016, there was almost a successful military coup in the country, indicating deeper divisions and wavering state capacities (Shaheen, 2016). While these events of leadership and regime change are not directly responsible for increased risks, they demonstrate the overall status of regime stability in Turkey and Lebanon. In contrast, Jordan has seen few challenges to its regime stability in the past decade. Even during the tumultuous Arab Spring, Jordan experienced relatively few and limited protests. In addition to overall state stability, state capacities also depend on whether a state is facing an internal threat of terrorism. Specifically, terrorists and/or destabilizing crimes by Hezbollah and other terrorist groups in Lebanon, terrorism crimes from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party in Turkey, and violent attacks in Jordan from Al-Qaeda affiliates and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) all represent dif-

17

Profile for mlusty

Hinckley Journal 2017  

The Hinckley Journal of Politics is the only undergraduate-run journal of politics in the nation and strives to publish scholarly papers of...

Hinckley Journal 2017  

The Hinckley Journal of Politics is the only undergraduate-run journal of politics in the nation and strives to publish scholarly papers of...

Advertisement