Nongqai vol 8 no 7

Understanding Operation Vula from a Strategic Perspective 1) During the build up to what later became known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the CDCO-NIS ran a special operation that penetrated both the Cuban and the Angolan decision-making hierarchy.

This yielded valuable intelligence that was used in the subsequent negotiations that saw the SADF disengage from operations in Angola and what was then known as SWA with dignity.

2) This triggered a strategic focus on the internal security situation inside SA where hardened operational units like 32 Bn and 1 & 2 Para were needed inside the East Rand Townships, simply because the SAP could not contain the level of military weaponry being encountered.

3) Central to this was the notion of a negotiated peace, which evolved over time to become known as CODESA. 4) One key element of this was a strategic engagement between NIS and Nelson Mandela then still in prison. In order to secure this secret engagement a decision was made to move Nelson Mandela off Robben Island onto the mainland. The purpose of this was to prevent the media from getting wind of Dr Niel Barnard’s increasingly frequent visits to Mr Mandela.

5) Arising from the successful yield of Operation Spaghetti, reinforced by the strategic intelligence yield from the Cuban/Angolan operation, the future relevance of the SACP became questionable in terms of the South African power calculus. In this regard, the actions of what was then known as the Special Working Group (SWG) inside CDCO-NIS became focussed on understanding the tensions between the ANC and SACP in exile. This triggered another special operation designed to better understand whether the Russians would come to the aid of any non-Russian communist party, when the USSR started to disintegrate. The author was directly involved in this action, but it is not dealt with further in this document, because it is not directly relevant to Operation Vula.

6) It must be remembered that at this time the country was in severe internal upheaval with localized theatres of operation resembling civil war. The significance of this was that MK was not driving the internal process, because of the success of Operation Cruiser in neutralizing the infiltration of MK cadres in sufficient quantity to create a de facto presence inside the country. Ronnie Kasrils drafted an internal report dealing with this matter, also intercepted, which served to confirm the success of Cruiser. The internal insecurity situation was actually being driven by the UDF and spontaneous efforts at the self-mobilization of localized militias, most notably aligned with the IFP. Importantly MK was not in control and the SACP was not actually driving the internal process as they had anticipated they would. This critical nuance is seldom noted in most popular analyses of the country at that time.

7) When these secret talks had proceeded to the point where it became imperative that the engagement initiative should be expanded to other senior members of the ANC, the issue of how to do this arose as an operational problem to be solved by the team.

8) One solution was the so-called Dakar Safari, which was a special operation run by CDCO-NIS to test broader opinion about the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

9) Another solution was a highly focussed special envoy led by Mike Louw of the NIS to engage with ANC leadership in exile.

10) What was lacking was direct engagement with the SACP faction, and it is here that Operation Vula became strategically important, because in effect it gave a credible linkage between Mr Mandela in prison and the SACP leadership in exile. This is an example of the long-term benefit of not closing down a penetrated and compromised communication network prematurely. Thus, what was claimed by Mac Maharaj in his statement to the eNCA documentary entitled “The Vula Connection” as a stunning operational success was just that, because at that moment in historic 56