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Nongqai Vol 8 No 7 CONTENTS PUBLISHER / UITGEWER .............................................................................................................. 6 AIM / DOEL ...................................................................................................................................... 6 ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS ............................................................................................... 6 WELCOME / WELKOM ................................................................................................................... 7 1954–1960: Genl.maj. C.I. Rademeyer ............................................................................................ 8 GENL CR DE WET: NICO MOOLMAN ............................................................................................ 9 BRIGADIER HA MOUTON: POLICE LEGEND.............................................................................. 10 Karools Mouton: Tin-kursus 1974: SAP Kollege & Maleoskop (HBH) .................................... 12 ONS NUWE WEBTUISTE: OUD-SAP-LEDE................................................................................. 13 OUR NEW WEBSITE: FORMER SAP MEMBERS TRUST ........................................................... 14 Lt-kol. Glenn Elsden: Webmeester skryf ................................................................................. 14 Versoek................................................................................................................................... 15 2


NEWS REELS: YOU TUBE: DIE POLISIE IN DIE KALKLIG / THE POLICE IN THE LIME LIGHT15 ALLEGED CORUPTION: OLIVER TAMBO AIRPORT .................................................................. 16 'TOIVO YA TOIVO A MAN OF STRONG BELIEFS AND CONVICTIONS' .................................... 17 HERMAN ANDIMBA TOIVO YA TOIVO ........................................................................................ 18 NO FOOD FOR DURBAN'S POLICE HORSES ............................................................................ 18 PERSVERKLARING DEUR DIE STIGTING VIR GELYKHEID VOOR DIE REG: HEROPENING VAN DIE GEREGTELIKE DOODSONDERSOEK NA DIE DOOD VAN AHMED TIMOL ............... 18 PRESS RELEASE BY THE FOUNDATION FOR EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: REOPENING OF THE INQUEST OF AHMED TIMOL ......................................................................................... 20 125TH ANNIVERSARY: ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLCE ................................................. 22 DIE STAATSGREEP IN BOPHUTHATSWANA: JOHAN VAN DER MERWE: OUDKOMMISSARIS VAN POLISIE ...................................................................................................... 23 Agtergrond: Adv Len Els, SC .................................................................................................. 27 Hoof: Bophuthatswana Weermag: generaal Jack Turner: Len Els ......................................... 27 Foto - Londen 1989. ............................................................................................................... 28 LATE 1960*: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE ............................................................ 29 LATE 1960*: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE ............................................................ 30 c.1963-67: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE ............................................................... 31 SAP MEETS PORTUGUESE FORCES ........................................................................................ 33 DIE MAANBEKRUIPERS!!! NO 37424 (B) KONST G BOTHA ...................................................... 34 Operasionele foto’s in Buitepos-patrolliewyk .......................................................................... 35 MY TAAL: MJJ VAN RENSBURG ................................................................................................ 42 ALLEGATIONS OF NEW ‘SECURITY POLICE’ SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO – SAVE SA .......... 43 EQUAL JUSTICE FOR RICH AND POOR CROOKS AND CRIMINALS ....................................... 45 SAW-HISTORIKUS: SERS-MAJ PAUL ELS WORD VEREER...................................................... 46 Wel en Wee van die Militêre Veterane: Berig 10/2017:........................................................... 47 OPERATION VULA: DR A TURTON ............................................................................................. 48 Biographical detail of Dr Turton .............................................................................................. 48 Operation Vula in Strategic Context ........................................................................................ 49 Dr. Anthony Turton Former Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer ........................................ 50 Understanding the Role and Significance of NIS Overall ........................................................ 50 Understanding the Impact of the Cold War on Intelligence Cooperation Globally ................... 51 Understanding the Relationship between NIS and other Services in the context of Terrorism52 Understanding the Evolution of Operational Capabilities in the NIS relevant to Vula ............. 53 Standard Operational Procedures for Strategic Special Operations run by CDCO-NIS ......... 55 Understanding Operation Vula from a Strategic Perspective .................................................. 56 Summary of the Significance of Operation Vula ..................................................................... 57 Photos..................................................................................................................................... 58 3


POLISIEGESKIEDENIS/ POLICE HISTORY ................................................................................. 61 Eerste Vroue Kommissaris: Riah Phiyega / First Woman Police Commissioner .................... 61 A Jaundiced Eye ..................................................................................................................... 61 Phiyega A Huge Disappointment - ISS ................................................................................... 63 Police spooks threaten to strike .............................................................................................. 64 Suspended Generals Phiyega and Mdluli earn R11.5 million – Zakhele Mbhele .................... 66 5 125 unsolved murder cases in Gauteng – Fikile Mbalula..................................................... 68 STAATSLYKSHUISE ..................................................................................................................... 70 Gauteng Premier should have stepped in early to alleviate mortuary crisis ............................ 70 Court Orders Autopsies as Gauteng Mortuary Strike Continues ............................................. 72 50 bodies stuck at Pinetown mortuary for months - DA .......................................................... 73 Drivers, cleaners conducted post-mortems in Gauteng since 2006 ........................................ 74 Too few military medics to assist in Gauteng mortuary strike – Jack Bloom ........................... 75 Why has Gauteng Health Avoided Court Action to stop Mortuary Strike? - Jack Bloom ......... 76 On the misreporting of the mortuary strike .............................................................................. 77 KEBBY'S R8 MILLION STRONG-ARM FOR MKMVA CONFERENCE MUST BE PROBED BY AG ....................................................................................................................................................... 82 STAATSDIENSPENSIOENFONDS ............................................................................................... 82 FF Plus sets the ball rolling to protect public service pension funds ....................................... 82 PIC and the GEPF: An overview ............................................................................................. 83 The Public Investment Corporation and the Government Employees Pension Fund – an overview.................................................................................................................................. 83 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FUND (GEPF) AND ROLE OF GEPF MONITORING ASSOCATION ............................................................................................................................. 88 GEVANGENISDIENS / KORREKTIEWEDIENSTE ....................................................................... 90 ANC concerned about the financial state of the Department of Correctional Services ........... 90 DWELMS [WAAR IS SANAB?] ...................................................................................................... 91 We Cannot Allow Drugs to Steal the Hope of Our Youth ........................................................ 91 SPOORWEGPOLISIE? ................................................................................................................. 94 Train vandals must be treated like murderers, rapists and treasonists - union ....................... 94 RUSSIA: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH JEWS? ................................................................................... 95 WHY THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN NOVEL TO BE BANNED UNDER APARTHEID LAW IS ALSO ONE OF THE WORST EVER WRITTEN ............................................................................ 96 ONLUSTE / UNREST .................................................................................................................... 99 Gavin Tischendorf het Afdeling Binnelandse Stabiliteit - Internal Stability Division ABS/ISD se foto gedeel. ......................................................................................................... 99 SOWETODAG 1976 SE LESSE VIR VANDAG ........................................................................... 101 BRITAIN: POLICE CHIEFS 'TO CONSIDER ARMING BEAT BOBBIES WITH PISTOLS' IN A BID TO TACKLE TERRORISTS ON THE STREETS ......................................................................... 102 4


1988: GESKENK AAN MIN ADRIAAN VLOK .............................................................................. 103 1967: ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING: ACTING US AMBASSADOR’S DAUGHTER: BARRY TAYLOR....................................................................................................................................... 105 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH COSTER ICD, OBE, SSAS ..................................................... 109 Part I: Enlistment and Training .............................................................................................. 109 by historian, author and copy-editor Gerry van Tonder ......................................................... 109 GEN KEITH COSTER: BLOEMFONTEIN.................................................................................... 128 NO 35895 KOL JH PIETERS: 80 NIE UIT NIE ............................................................................ 128 CORPORAL MICHEAL LAMB: BRITISH ARMY .......................................................................... 129 GESKIEDENIS: BRIGADIER FANIE BOUWER .......................................................................... 131 SAP IN RHODESIË ..................................................................................................................... 133 •

Enige kommentaar op die onderwerp is welkom. ................................................................. 134

SOWETO 1976 ............................................................................................................................ 134 HEROES AND ‘JUST WARS’ COME AND GO – HBH ................................................................ 137 BESPREKING ONTSTAAN: STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAAD ......................................................... 139 ARGIEF: DIE VLAKPLAASEENHEID: GENL JV VAN DER MERWE .......................................... 141 ALTYD GETROU! ........................................................................................................................ 170 NEXT MONTH ............................................................................................................................. 170 SLOT / END ................................................................................................................................. 170

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PUBLISHER / UITGEWER The Nongqai is compiled by Hennie Heymans (HBH) a retired Brigadier of the late South African Police Force and the e-magazine is published on ISSUU. Hennie lives in Pretoria, ZA. He is passionate about our police-, military- and national security history and holds a MA-degree in National Strategic Studies. Any opinions expressed are my own.

Tel. No. 012-329-4229 E-mail: heymanshb@gmail.com

AIM / DOEL Our goal is to collect and record our national security history for publication in the Nongqai for future generations. / Ons doel is om die nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis in die Nongqai aan te teken en so vir die nageslagte bewaar.

ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS • • • • •

• • •

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Photographs of police stations. (Please share your photographs with us.) Southern African Uniforms and badges. Police Heroes and a “Police Who is Who”. Police Commissioners: We are preparing a booklet on the various SA Police commissioners. Should you have any photographs or anecdotes please share with us. Kommissarisse van polisie: Ons is besig om inligting van ons onderskeie polisiekommissarisse in te samel. Ons begin by kol. sir TG Truter en werk ons pad deur die geskiedenis totdat genl. JV van der Merwe die SAP oorhandig het aan nuwe nasionale kommissaris van die SAPS, genl. George Fivaz. Ons het besluit om brig. George Baston by die reeks in te sluit aangesien hy vir bykans vyf jaar as die kommissaris waargeneem het. Police History: We collect eyewitness reports from policemen about cataclysmic events in our history e.g. Cato Manor, Sharpeville, Pondoland, etc. We have large collection of digital recordings from police officers. Boipatong: Ons sal graag van lede wil hoor wat by die Boipatong-voorval betrokke was.1 Speurdiens: Ons kry bitter min feite verslae van speurders oor opspraakwekkende misdade. Die Waarheid- en versoeningskommissie: Ons as oudlede het baie repliek om te lewer op die WVK se duisende bladsye op die internet. Honderde lede se reputasies word aldaar geskaad en word inligting – sonder om in dit konteks te plaas – gepubliseer. Daar is selfs inligting wat glad nie waar is nie! [Adv. George Bizos het in sy eerste boek talle lede van die SA Polisie swart gesmeer. In sy tweede boek skryf hy, dit kan aanvaar word dat hy die waarheid geskryf het want niemand het ooit enige beswaar teen bewerings geopper nie.] Manne, indien ons nie op die WVK se skryfsels gaan reageer nie, gaan die nageslag dit as die evangelie aanvaar. (Maj. Craig Williamson het reageer en ons gaan sy optrede in die verlede in konteks aanbied.) Nie-wit lede van die polisie: Ons neem nie-wit lede van die polisiemag – as ‘n groep – onder die loep. Ons kyk na die verskillende uniforms vir Swart-, Bruin en Indiër-lede. Ons kyk na

Ek het ‘n lid opgespoor wat by Boipatong diens gedoen het, maar hy wil nie op skrif gaan nie.

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die opleiding van nie-wit lede, dis iets wat die Nasionale Party (NP) in die 1950’s begin het. Vir jare was die Swart-lid van die Mag niks anders as ‘n hulp-polisieman deur die NP-beleid – daar is verskeie uitsprake deur adv. CR Swart is die Swart-lede later volwaardige lede van die SAP. Onder die NP-bewind is hulle vir die eerste keer opgelei! Onthou skryf u storie, soms kan ons net op die geskrewe weergawe terugval want dit is al wat daar is!

WELCOME / WELKOM Baie welkom by hierdie uitgawe. Om die redakteur en samesteller van hierdie blad te wees is inderdaad ‘n groot voorreg. Steeds ontmoet ek die mees interessante mense en kom ek in aanraking met historiese, maar vertroulike, interessanthede. Mense deel baie historiese items en foto’s maar ongelukkig kan (of mag) mens nie alles publiseer nie. Baie historiese items is “van die rekord af” en ek is ook getuie van “vertroulike kommunikasie” tussen verskeie persone. Baie vriende is oud of nie lus om te skryf nie. Ek het egter een reël: Skryf en ek publiseer met u magtiging, maar ek is nie lief vir “hoor-sê”-geskiedenis nie. Bron draai later om en sê: “Dis nie wat ek bedoel het nie” of “jy het my verkeerd verstaan.” So al ek maar wag totdat ‘n kollega eendag die ware storie oor minister Jimmy Kruger se bekende uitlating: “Dit laat my koud” skryf. Sit ek en dink ons het so baie om voor dankbaar te wees. Ons moet ons dankbaarheid vier deur ander oudlede by te staan. Ons weet nie hoe gelukkig ons is, totdat ons hoor hoe sleg dit met ander van ons oudkollegas gaan nie. Party het siektes, ander het weer ander nood soos eensaamheid of armoede agv omstandighede buite hul beheer. Soos die Boere na die tweede vryheidsoorlog verkeer baie van ons oudlede en soldate vandag ook in die verknorsing. Ons moet daardie mense help en ondersteun. Baie veterane kry ook nie werk nie en sukkel om hul omstandighede te verbeter. Mens staan ook verstom as mens sien wat vandag in die pers en media geopenbaar word oor die sogenaamde staatskaping. As lid van die polisie het ek gesien hoe daar in die verlede kriminele sake suksesvol teen NP-ministers ondersoek was. Ek onthou nog die gevalle en die name. Die kommissaris van polisie het teen hulle opgetree. Vandag is dit hier ‘n biljoen en daar nog ‘n biljoen en niemand is bekommerd nie! Wat my bekommer is die nasionale kommissaris en vervolgingsgesag wat niks sê nie. Spesiale ondersoekspanne moes al lankal die korrupsie en bedrog ondersoek het. ‘n Kollega het egter vir my insig laat kry in die greep wat vakbonde op die SAPS het en gebrek aan dissipline wat die polisie eintlik futloos maak. Dis eintlik skrikwekkend. Diefstal van die spoorweg se infrastruktuur duur onverpoos voort. Weer is ‘n lang stuk treinspoor gesteel en ‘n aankomende trein het ontspoor. Die lokomotiewe het die Phelopepha2 – die gesondheidstrein – gesleep toe hulle ontspoor het. Dis eintlik ondenkbaar dat iemand ‘n deel van ‘n operasionele treinspoor kan steel. Die “Friends of the Rail” hier in Pretoria laat dikwels hul stoomtrein na Cullinan reis. Die spoor is ook al ‘n paar keer gesteel en die historiese lokomotief het ontspoor. Agv misdaad ry die trein deesdae net van Hercules na Rayton (op die hoofspoorlyn.) My buurman is verbonde aan “buitelandse sake”. Ons gesels tydens sy tuisverlof en hy sê dat SuidAfrika steeds ‘n wonderlike land is, probleme ten spyt. Hulle dien tans in ‘n ander Afrikaland. Ek stem saam – ten spyte van al die plae wat die land tref, bly die RSA ‘n fantastiese land! Ons het so baie om voor dankbaar te wees! VOORBLAD / FRONT PAGE 2

http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/healthcare-trains-locomotive-derails-after-piece-of-tracks-was-allegedlystolen-20170617

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Major General CI Rademeyer appears on the front cover. He was the Commissioner of Police from 1954 to 1960.

Van links na regs: Genl. Rademeyer, luit. LG Snyman, hoofkonst. N “Bokkie” Breedt en konst. Rademeyer. Konst. Rademeyer word in die geledere van die SA Polisie verwelkom deur sy vader. 1954–1960: Genl.maj. C.I. Rademeyer • • • • • • • • •

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Gebore op Fouriesburg op 6 September 1903 Op 7 Mei 1925 sluit hy by die polisie aan. Op 8 November 1926 word hy aangestel as speurderkonstabel. Op 24 September 1954 word hy as kommissaris aangestel. Hy tree af op 31 Julie 1960. Hy is die eerste speurderkonstabel om kommissaris te word3. Die moord op polisielede by Bergville asook die instel van bek-en-klouseerkordonne is van die hoogtepunte in sy ses jaar as kommissaris. Polisielede, waaronder genl. Hennie de Witt, is aangewend om die epidemie die hoof te bied. Die Sharpeville-voorval vind op 21 Maart 1960 plaas terwyl hy kommissaris is. Die ongelukkige voorval word sedertdien vir politieke doeleindes uitgebuit om as voorbeeld te dien van die sogenaamde wrede apartheidsdade. Die eerste aanslag op die lewe van dr. Hendrik French Verwoerd vind ook tydens sy dienstermyn plaas.

Onderhoud op 8 Februarie 2013 met me. M. Swanepoel, argivaris van die SAPD museum - HBH

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GENL CR DE WET: NICO MOOLMAN

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BRIGADIER HA MOUTON: POLICE LEGEND By Prof FA (Alex) Mouton

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Hendrik Albertus, or ‘Karools’ as he was known to fellow policemen, was born on 10 June 1927 in the Karoo Hamlet of Brandvlei, the only son of a poor and struggling small farmer. For the Mouton family, every day was a challenge to deal with grinding poverty. The situation was aggravated when his father died when he was a little boy. He, however, had the loving support of his mother who had a profound influence on his life. Her values of decency, integrity, self-discipline, ambition, and especially the desire to serve your God, and fellow man, would be leading lights in her son’s life. As he was needed on the farm he had to leave school early. The struggling existence on the farm led to Mouton’s decision to join the South African Police in 1947. On the completion of his basic police training at the Police depot, as it was then known, his first task as a constable was to line the streets of Johannesburg, and then of Krugersdorp, for the visit of the British royal family. After the departure of the royal family he was posted to Marshall Square in Johannesburg. This posting was a severe cultural shock. As a young Karoo man who until then had hardly heard a word of English spoken, he found himself in the heart of a city that was predominately English-speaking. As a green constable, his duties were limited to foot and bicycle patrols, vehicle patrols were still a rarity in the late 1940s. It was while stationed in Norwood in 1949 that he and Constable J.D. Vosloo, both on bicycles, chased a car thief. They eventually caught up with the thief when he stalled the car. In the ensuing struggle the criminal bit Mouton’s thumb to the bone, but was eventually arrested. The heroics of the two constables was noted by the press and was given some prominence in the then Afrikaans daily newspaper Die Vaderland (27 October 1949). As a result of the wound to his thumb Mouton was booked off as medically unfit for 21 days. He found that the pain he had to endure had the advantage that it was treated by a young nurse, Annie Johnson, who would become his wife. Mouton’s early police experience in Johannesburg with its crime and violence had a profound influence on him. He realised that he was good at his duties, and that being a policeman protecting society was his calling. Determined to be a good policeman he set out to do his duties to the utmost of his abilities, and to work his way up the ranks. His experiences as a young constable on the beat left him offended by incompetent, time serving, sloppy, and dishonest policeman in positions of authority, and he was determined to eliminate such behaviour from the force by setting an example for the good. As he moved into positions of authority he became known as a strict disciplinarian, setting the highest standards of performance and behaviour for himself, and those under his command. This included fitness demands. As a young man, he was an above average amateur boxer and would remain active in sport for his entire career. He played his last rugby game in 1971 at the age of 44 for one of East London police’s lower teams. He joked that he only stopped playing rugby as the young constables in the team used the opportunity to punch him in loose scrums.

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Another aspect of Mouton’s career was that his dedication to the ideal of protecting society was not just limited to the ruling white minority, but especially to the black majority, then without any political rights. He was colour blind when it came to the victims of crime, and loathed those who abused position of authority over the helpless and poor. In the areas of his jurisdiction there was no place for bullying or brutal policemen, or even exploitative farmers and businessmen. As the district commander in East London in the 1960s he was outraged by the low wages paid to black farm workers. On more than one occasion he warned farming associations that crime on farms was the result of the low wages for workers, and said that he personally would have resorted to crime if he was one of them. Farmers, to prevent crime, had to improve the treatment of their workers. In the late 1970s he told a Durban factory owner, who insisted that the police had to use force against strikers, that he would not allow his constables to be stoned by workers who do not receive proper wages. A big part of Mouton’s latter career was in the police’s counter-insurgency units fighting against Swapo in Namibia, and liberation movements in Zimbabwe, the then Rhodesia. (He would spend 18 months on active duty in Namibia and Zimbabwe.) Here again he set the highest standards for discipline and training in the companies under his command. He never wavered in his belief that training and discipline save lives. As usual he also led from the front, participating as a company commander in long-distance foot patrols, one such patrol covering 90 kilometres. In December 1971 he joined the headquarters of the counter-insurgency unit in Pretoria. As part of the headquarters staff he played a leading role in the training of policeman in counter-insurgency, and the supervision and inspection of these forces. He this period he became known as ‘Karools’, a reference to his hardy Karoo youth. After a period as deputy-commissioner in Durban ‘Karools’ Mouton retired from the police in 1982. Settling in George he and Annie have had an active retirement, walking nearly every hiking route in the country. By 2011 he calculated that they had walked 22 000 kilometres. He recently celebrated his 90th birthday and is still in good health. On the 5th of August, he and Annie are celebrating their 67th wedding anniversary.

Karools Mouton: Tin-kursus 1974: SAP Kollege & Maleoskop (HBH) Gedurende 1974 was “Karools” een van die senior-offisiere wat ons opgelei het in teen-insurgensie (Tin). Ek kan glad nie onthou wat sy rang op daardie stadium was nie, ook kan ek nie die range van my mede-kursusgangers onthou nie. Ons groep het net uit offisiere bestaan, met die rang van luitkolonel tot luitenant. Ek onthou Adriaan de la Rosa, Isak Pretorius, “Kallie” Westraat, JC van Niekerk (later genl. te Afdeling Port Natal), Vic Stewart, Okkie Vermeulen, “Barries” Badenhorst, “Macruse” du Preez, Herklaas Meyer, Renzo Regnani, “Blackie” Swart, en “Pat” Gough net om ‘n paar te noem. 12


Maleoskop was toe, soos hy nou weer daarna uitsien, woes en leeg. Ons het in tente geslaap of in die bos en ons varkpanne in ‘n dam gewas. Daar was ‘n dubbeldekkerbus wat as kantien gedien het. Die instrukteurs het lekker kos gekry. Ons meel was werklik met wurms besmet en is terug Pretoria toe om na Kwaggaspoort se hondekamp te gaan. Dit was staatsrantsoene en dit het hondekos geword. So was dit in daardie dae! Staatsgeld en staatseiendom is opgepas. Onluste het op die myne te Welkom uitgebreek en ons is daarheen onder bevel van Karools. Na die onluste is ons weer terug op kursus. Ek het die “lugkontak-offisierskursus” baie geniet. Die bekende Harvard-vliegtuie was toe ook in Tin-operasies gebruik – veral in die Portugese gebiede. Hulle was ook gebruik saam met helikopters en spuitvliegtuie daar oor die lugruim te Maleokop. Later jare het Maleoskop geblom; ek het Maleoskop besoek om lesings te gee en ek het verskeie ‘spanboue’ en kursusse daar ondergaan. Johan Gijsbers en Wynand van der Merwe is die BO’s wat ek kan onthou. Maleoskop is pragtig opgebou met teerpaaie en daar was baie wild op. Genl. TM Bisschoff (afgetree) was een van Maleoskop se bure. Hy was my DK en ek het altyd by die Generaal ingeloer as ek te Maleoskop gekom het. Johan Gijsbers het my vertel die plaas was lank voor die tweede wêreld oorlog vir die polisie aangekoop. Die SAP sou perde daar teel. Die oorlog het meganisasie meegebring. Lede van die Mag wat in Tin opgelei is, het ‘n bosveldplaas nodig gehad. Almal is in die kollege en op ‘n plaas naby Rustenburg opgelei. (Ons groep is sommer op die kaal stuk grond, aan die oorkant van die pad, voor die Voortrekkermonument in sekere “bos”-taktieke opgelei.) DOW het toe aan die SAP genoem dat die SAP eintlik reeds ‘n plaas besit, nl. Maleoskop. Die SAP het dadelik die plaas beset vir Tin-opleiding. Toe meneer J Selebi die nasionale kommissaris van polisie geword het, het hy die baie mooi ontwikkelde instelling met eie water- en rioolwerke aan die plaaslike stam oorhandig wat dit geëis het. Die stam weer, het Maleoskop verkoop aan ‘n mynbougroep. Die pragtige bronsbeelde is na die SAPS museum verwyder en daar bewaar. Ongelukkig het die beeldegroep onder die hande van koperdiewe deurgeloop. Ek onthou brigadier Mouton as een van die grondleggers van Tin-opleiding in Suid-Afrika: Een van die pioniers wat ‘n fondament daargestel het vir die volgende geslag om daarop voort te bou. Brigadier Mouton ons salueer u!

ONS NUWE WEBTUISTE: OUD-SAP-LEDE Ons wil graag deur hierdie webtuiste die geskiedenis bewaar en dit wat vir ons mooi en kosbaar was in die verlede met al ons ou kollegas deel. Ons strewe te alle tye na die waarheid en in ‘n wêreld waar propaganda en persepsies die toneel oorheers is dit soms ‘n moeilike stryd. Die wel en wee 13


van ons ou kollegas bly vir ons van groot belang en indien enigeen van hulle graag ‘n bydrae wil maak kan hulle met ons webmeester by die volgende adres skakel: http://www.samirror.com/

OUR NEW WEBSITE: FORMER SAP MEMBERS TRUST We would like to preserve the history through site and share what have been delightful and precious in the past with all our old colleagues. We strive always for the truth and in a world where propaganda and perceptions dominate the scene, it is sometimes a tough battle. The weal and the woe of our old colleagues are of great importance to us and if any of them would like to contribute, they can contact our webmaster at the following address: http://www.samirror.com/

Lt-kol. Glenn Elsden: Webmeester skryf Goeiemore Generaal en Hennie Die webwerf is gepubliseer! TUISBLAD: http://www.samirror.com JUSTITIA: http://www.samirror.com/justitia.html BENEVOLENCE: http://www.samirror.com/benevolence.html Fondsinsamelingsprojek - Eugene de Kock: http://www.samirror.com/eugene-fundraising.html NONGQAI: http://www.samirror.com/nongqai.html HISTORICAL: http://www.samirror.com/historical.html CONTACT US: http://www.samirror.com/contact-us.html Inligting in voltooide kontakvorm sal outomaties na my e-posadres gestuur word. Sosiale-media-deel knoppies is onderaan elke blad geplaas. (Hennie – u weet wat om te doen met die Facebook knoppie :-) Ek sal mettertyd ‘n volledige uiteensetting gee van al die webblaaie. Daar is tans 44 bladsye geplaas op die webwerf.. Onthou, ons spasie is onbeperk! Mag julle ‘n geseënde dag geniet! 14


Versoek Ons versoek lesers om vir ons digitale afskrifte van foto’s, verslae en diensbriewe ens. te stuur, asb., sodat ons dit kan bewaar.

NEWS REELS: YOU TUBE: DIE POLISIE IN DIE KALKLIG / THE POLICE IN THE LIME LIGHT Ek het baie gewonder hoe dit in die ou dae I wondered how it was to be a policeman in the moes gewees het om ‘n polisieman te wees? old days? In my search, I found some news films on You-tube in which the SA Police were portrayed. Especially the 1922 film shows how In my soektog het ek ‘n paar nuusfilms gekry the mounted police dispersed white strikers waarin die polisie uitgebeeld word. Veral die while using pick handles.4 1922 film toon aan hoe die polisie blanke stakers te perd met pikstele uiteen gedryf het. During the opening of parliament, the police and the military have traditionally played a major Tydens die opening van die parlement het die role; especially regarding security and polisie en die weermag van oudsher af ‘n groot ceremonial tasks. rol gespeel; veral wat sekerheid en seremoniële take betref. The 1939 film is very interesting because it shows a new concept in policing. Phone booths Die 1939 film is baie interessant omdat dit ‘n were erected in Johannesburg. The police could nuwe konsep in polisiëring vertoon. Telefoon- be contacted free of charge. A constable on hokkies is oor al in Johannesburg opgerig. Die beat would then see a light flashing on the roof polisie kan vandaar gratis geskakel word en die of the phonebooth on his beat if there was a konstabel op rondtediens sien dan ‘n lig wat complaint to respond to. He then phones in and flikker op die telefoonhokkie se dak wat in sy is notified of the complaint. (I have only read rondte geleë is. Hy skakel dan in en word van about this in old Nongqai’s. The film explains die klagte op sy rondte verwittig. (Ek het nog the concept very well. The project did not last net hiervan gelees.) Die film verduidelik die long. konsep baie goed. Die projek het nie lank geduur nie. During the 1948 opening of parliament, motorcycles were used because the Force had Tydens die 1948 opening van die parlement is been mechanized after the war. It was motorfietse gebruik omdat die mag na die apparently not a PR-success. The horses were oorlog gemeganiseer het. Dit was klaarblyklik brought back for the parliamentary opening. nie ‘n sukses nie. Die perde is weer teruggebring vir die parlementsopening.

More than 50 years ago, TWO Ginger During at SAP King’s Rest told us over a cup of tea, how they as young men used pick handles to disperse the mobs during the 1922 Red Revolt on the Rand. 4

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1922 • Riots on the Rand (1922) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBxpyPDSEVE 1926 • South Africa's Parliament (1926) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ieRycD7f4Rs 1934 • Cheers all the Way! (1934) (Visit to South Africa by Prince George – Royal Mounted Escort.) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoI6yuHbs8g 1937 • Slum Clearance in Johannesburg (1937) – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJDq_rcw8Zw 1939 • Police! (1939) (Johannesburg) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4SdXeolNPY 1947 • Royal Family In South Africa (1947) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Je8eaBCYjCA • Royal Tour 1947 (1947) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoI6yuHbs8g 1948 • Opening of Parliament in Cape Town (1948) (motorfietse) – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PADeXyHc2Ug 1960 • Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd (1960) – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Mhk2UNzbeQ 1961 • South Africa Inaugurates First President AKA Republic Day South Africa (1961) – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Fi2qni83UM •

South Africa Republic (1961) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncncKcl3dLE

ALLEGED CORUPTION: OLIVER TAMBO AIRPORT The above article was splashed on Facebook; the following excerpt for your information, “””””””””” Prince Osei Tutu (Ghanaian businessman visiting his girlfriend) had no option than to empty his wallet to satisfy some unscrupulous immigration officials. He also ended up paying an amount of US $100 as he had the rest of his money hidden elsewhere. Lydia Adutwumwaa (a tourist from Ghana) who had met all conditions to travel to South Africa was denied entry and sent back to Ghana because she did not understand the “language” when she was asked to pay for an entry stamp. I’m sure you understand this “language”. Another tourist is currently serving a year ban from entering South Africa for overstaying his VISA after he refused to pay the requested bribe of US$ 200 (his US$20 offer was not accepted). This is how corrupt and enraging immigration officers at the O.R. Tambo International Airport can be. They have no shame and demand monies as if it's legitimate or legal and they do it without 16


flinching, and even give orders with gusto, without considering the visitor’s status. They do not care about the consequences of their absurd acts; neither do they care they could be challenged and dismissed. From all indications, there’s absolutely no visible discipline there. Officials at the O.R. Tambo Airport are always finding means to extort monies from travellers. Extorting money from travellers is the norm at the OR Tambo Airport as other officers look on and smile while you are being spoken to in 'figures'. Many have lost interest in visiting South Africa as immigration officers welcome them with unplanned bills from whoever they get in contact with. I know for sure that South Africa tourism sector alone generates much revenue and plays a major role in driving their economy. There are so many people out there that I’m convinced have fallen victims to these demands and threats of corrupt immigration officers who haven’t been bold enough to voice their experiences. It’s disgusting and very pathetic. Like many others, I spent over US $3,000 during my 10-day stay. So just imagine the loss if the country drives visitors away through bribery and corruption right at the border. One cannot fail to perceive the air of hostility that envelops the atmosphere at the airport on arrival and departure. So, the question is, who at all is accountable for these corrupt practices?””””””””””””””””””””””””” http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/entertainment/Corruption-Ghanaian-travel-bloggerexposes-O-R-Tambo-International-Airport-South-Africa-534696?channel=D1

'TOIVO YA TOIVO A MAN OF STRONG BELIEFS AND CONVICTIONS' Africa | 10 June 2017, 09:45am ANA Reporter

Windhoek – Namibian freedom fighter and struggle icon Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, who died on Friday5, was a man of strong beliefs and convictions, the African National Congress said. The 93-year-old former Robben Island prisoner died in Windhoek on Friday. The ANC said Ya Toivo was a loyal friend of the South African people, a freedom fighter, hero and icon of Namibia’s struggle for self determination. "A man of strong beliefs and convictions, Cde Toivo dedicated his life to the fight against oppression by the then South Africa authorities, rejecting apartheid South Africa’s reduction of sovereign Namibia into its colony," the ANC said in a statement.

Picture: @benedicklouw/Twitter

5

9th of June 2017 – HBH.

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"He was Namibia’s longest serving Robben Islander, having served 16 years on the Island with other luminaries of the African peoples’ struggles following conviction for contravening South Africa’s Terrorism Act. His life was the personification of solidarity, the quest for self-determination and unyielding commitment to the liberation of his people." Ya Toivo was a founding member of the South Western African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its predecessor the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO). He also advocated for the rights of African and black mine workers in South Africa and Namibia and was banished from South Africa for smuggling taped testimonies to the United Nations (UN) about the harsh experiences of Black mine workers. After he was released from Robben Island in 1984, Ya Toivo committed himself to building a democratic Namibia and served as the secretary general of Swapo in various portfolios in Government. "South Africa has lost a true friend in Comrade Toivo ya Toivo and we send our deepest condolences to our fraternal organisation, SWAPO, the people of Namibia and Comrade ya Toivo’s family on his passing," the ANC said. "Comrade Toivo has left an indelible mark in the history of our region and the continent. Ours is to emulate his life’s work and continue to fight for the realisation of his vision of freedom for oppressed peoples of the world and of a continent at peace with itself." African News Agency http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/toivo-ya-toivo-a-man-of-strong-beliefs-and-convictions-9708166

HERMAN ANDIMBA TOIVO YA TOIVO Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo was for a while, a member, of the SA Railways Police. (Const Gawie Botha, retired, knew the late Subject in SWA and has promised a few notes. Also, Chris Kantewa promised to send a few notes.)

NO FOOD FOR DURBAN'S POLICE HORSES News | 9 June 2017, 3:53pm SIBONISO MNGADI http://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/no-food-for-durbans-police-horses-9627065 Comment: We learnt from the British, during and after the Anglo Boer War: “First look after the horses, then the men and then finally care for the officers.”

PERSVERKLARING DEUR DIE STIGTING VIR GELYKHEID VOOR DIE REG: HEROPENING VAN DIE GEREGTELIKE DOODSONDERSOEK NA DIE DOOD VAN AHMED TIMOL Die geregtelike doodsondersoek na die dood van Ahmed Timol word na 45 jaar heropen met regter Billy Mothle as voorsitter. Volgens mediaberigte is daar verskeie bewerings oor hoe Timol tydens sy aanhouding deur die veiligheidstak gemartel is en uiteindelik van die 10de verdieping van John Vorsterpleingebou afgegooi is. Die volgende besonderhede is oor Timol bekend:

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Hy het gedurende 1966 die onderwys bedank en onder voorwendsel dat hy op ‘n pelgrimstog na Mecca vir die “Hajj” gaan, die land verlaat. In Saudi Arabië het hy dr. Yusuf Dadoo en Maulvi Cachalia, albei geharde lede van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie, ontmoet. Hulle het hom albei aangevuur om intens by die stryd van die ANC/SAKP betrokke te raak. Timol het Saudi Arabië gedurende 1967 verlaat waar hy ‘n onderwyspos aanvaar het en met Rajani Palme Dutt kennis gemaak het. Laasgenoemde lid was ‘n lid van die kommunistiese party van Groot-Brittanje. Hy het ‘n lid van die SAKP/ANC-alliansie geword en ook by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) aangesluit. Daarna het hy na Moskou vertrek waar hy saam met Thabo Mbeki by die Lenin Instituut opleiding ontvang het. Na voltooiing van sy opleiding aan die Lenin Instituut het hy na Londen teruggekeer waar hy deur Jack Hodgson, ‘n geharde kommunis, verder opgelei is. Mnr. Ronnie Kasrils, gewese Minister van Intelligensie, het in sy getuienis voor die amnestiekomitee in 2001 waar hy om amnestie gevra het, die volgende besonderhede verstrek: “After completing military training in the Soviet Union and spending time at a MK camp in Tanzania, I was deployed to London. I was part of a command consisting of Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Slovo, Jack Hodgson and myself. Our task was to assist in building the underground in South Africa and this involved recruiting and training cadres, smuggling material into the country and directing operations. These were mainly propaganda operations but also involved setting up infrastructure for MK. Some cadres involved were Alex Moumbaris, Tony Holiday, Ahmed Timol, Raymond Suttner, David and Sue Rabkin, Tim Jenkin and Steve Lee”. Timol is op 22 Oktober 1971 tydens ’n padblokkade in Coronationville, Johannesburg, in besit van SAKP-pamflette betrap. Hy is aan die veiligheidstak in Johannesburg oorhandig, wat hom ingevolge die bepalings van Art. 29 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid aangehou het. Hy was ’n lid van die ANC/SAKP en is daarvan verdink dat hy by ondergrondse bedrywighede betrokke was. Volgens inligting waaroor die veiligheidstak beskik het, het hy aan die spits gestaan van die SAKP se ondergrondse bedrywighede in Suid-Afrika. Op 27 Oktober 1971, tydens ondervraging deur lede van die veiligheidstak op die tiende verdieping van John Vorsterplein in Johannesburg, het Timol onverwags na die venster gestorm, dit oopgemaak en uitgespring. Hy het hom doodgeval. Die lykskouing is deur dr. Nicolaas Jacobus Scheepers, toe die senior staatspatoloog in Johannesburg, gedoen. Dr. Jonathan Gluckman het vir die naasbestaandes van Timol die lykskouing bygewoon en dr. Hieronymus Koch het die Polisie verteenwoordig. Tydens die lykskouing is beserings aan die liggaam van Timol opgemerk wat reeds besig was om te genees. Die patoloë kon nie die presiese tyd waarop die beserings opgedoen is, bepaal nie. Dokters Scheepers en Gluckman het gemeen dat dit tydens aanhouding deur die veiligheidstak opgedoen kon gewees het. Dr. Koch het egter skerp verskil en bevind dat die wyse waarop die beserings reeds genees het, daarop dui dat dit voor aanhouding opgedoen moes gewees het. Tydens die WVK-verrigtinge het mev. Hawa Timol, ma van mnr. Ahmed Timol, voor die komitee vir die growwe skending van menseregte getuig dat toe sy die lyk van haar kind ontvang, hy aangerand was, sy gesig vol bloed en die kis met bloed gevul was Mev. Timol het met behulp van ’n tolk in haar moedertaal, Goedjarati, getuig. Dit is moeilik om te bepaal of haar getuienis oor die lyk van haar seun beeldspraak was, of die tolk verkeerd getolk het en of dit doelbewuste leuens was. Soos die bevindings van die lykskouing en die geregtelike doodsondersoek toon, is mev. Timol se getuienis indien dit letterlik verstaan word, flagrante leuens. Die geregtelike doodsondersoek is deur landdros J.J.L. de Villiers van Johannesburg gehou met D.W. Rothwell en A.L.T. Beukes as staatsaanklaers. Advokate I.A. Maisels SA en G. Bizos, asook 19


opdraggewende prokureurs M.S.H. Cachalia en M.A. Loonat het die Timolfamilie verteenwoordig het.. Landdros de Villiers het bevind dat Timol selfmoord gepleeg het, enersyds uit vrees dat hy gedwing mag word om inligting oor die ondergrondse bedrywighede van die SAKP en die lede wat daarby betrokke was, bloot te lê, en andersyds omdat hy geweet het dat lang gevangenisstraf waarskynlik op hom wag. Landdros De Villiers het ook bevind dat volgens al die getuienis wat aangebied is, die beserings aan die liggaam van Timol wat nie deur die val veroorsaak is nie, waarskynlik voor sy aanhouding opgedoen is. Die landdros het verder bevind dat daar geen getuienis is dat Timol deur die lede van die veiligheidstak aangerand of mishandel is nie. Dit is baie moeilik om te bepaal hoe enige geregtelike doodsondersoek na 45 jaar enige geloofwaardige bevinding kan maak wat van die aanvanklike bevinding verskil. Daar moet met die volgende feite rekening gehou word: ➢ Al die lede van die veiligheidstak wat by die voorval betrokke was, is reeds oorlede. ➢ Dr. Jonathan Gluckman en verskeie van die ander sleutelgetuies is reeds oorlede. ➢ Tydens die geregtelike doodsondersoek het twee ervare en bekwame advokate, I A Maisels en George Bizos, die familie verteenwoordig. Hulle sou sonder twyfel die bevinding van die landdros op hersiening na die Hooggeregshof geneem het as hulle enigsins gronde gehad het om dit te doen. ➢ Dit het tydens die geregtelike doodsondersoek duidelik geblyk dat die veiligheidstak geen motief hoegenaamd gehad het om Timol te vermoor nie. Hy was ‘n waardevolle bron van inligting en almal was terdeë daarvan bewus dat sy onnatuurlike dood op ‘n geregtelike doodsondersoek sou uitloop waar elke handeling van die veiligheidstak onder die vergrootglas sou kom. ➢ Daar het tydens die amnestieverhore geen voorval op die lappe gekom waar lede van die veiligheidstak enige persoon in die loop van hulle werksaamhede weens kwaadwilligheid, kwaadgesindheid of nydigheid vermoor het nie. Geen geloofwaardigheid kan aan die getuienis wat voor die komitee vir die growwe skending van menseregte afgelê is, geheg word nie. Die betrokke komitee se werksaamhede het onder die leiding van eerwaarde Desmond Tutu en dr. Alex Boraine gestaan wat in growwe verontagsaming van nadruklike riglyne wat deur die appèlhof neergelê is, uit die staanspoor geweier het om die audi alteram partem reël toe te pas en getuies aan kruisverhoor te onderwerp. Hulle het botweg geweier om volgens die uitspraak van die appèlhof, lede van die polisie wat daarvan beskuldig is dat hulle aangehoudenes gemartel het, toe te laat om hulleself te verweer.

PRESS RELEASE BY THE FOUNDATION FOR EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: REOPENING OF THE INQUEST OF AHMED TIMOL The inquest into the death of Ahmed Timol will be reopened after 45 years with Judge Billy Mothle as chairman. According to media reports there are several allegations about Timol's torture during his detention by the security branch and how he eventually was thrown out of the 10th floor of John Vorster Square Building. The following details are known regarding Ahmed Timol: During the December 1966, Ahmed resigned as a schoolteacher and left South Africa on the pretext of going on a religious pilgrimage to Mecca for the Hajj. In Saudi Arabia, he met Dr. Yusuf Dadoo and also Maulvi Cachalia, both hardened members of the ANC/SACP-party. Both inspired him to become intensely involved in the struggle of the ANC/SACP-party. 20


In April 1967, Timol departed for Saudi Arabia and arrived in London where he took up a teaching post and met Rajani Palme Dutt The latter was one of the members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Timol became a member of both the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Umkhonto we Sizwe. He left for Moscow where he as well as Thabo Mbeki were trained at the Lenin Institute. After the completion of his training he returned to London where he received further training from Jack Hodgson, a hardened communist. Mr. Ronnie Kasrills, a former minister of Intelligence, testified as follows during his application for amnesty: “After completing military training in the Soviet Union and spending time at a MK camp in Tanzania, I was deployed to London. I was part of a command consisting of Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Slovo, Jack Hodgson and myself. Our task was to assist in building the underground in South Africa and this involved recruiting and training cadres, smuggling material into the country and directing operations. These were mainly propaganda operations but also involved setting up infrastructure for MK. Some cadres involved were Alex Moumbaris, Tony Holiday, Ahmed Timol, Raymond Suttner, David and Sue Rabkin, Tim Jenkin and Steve Lee�. Timol was apprehended on October 22, 1971 at a roadblock in Coronation Ville, Johannesburg, while in possession of SACP pamphlets. He has been handed over to the Security Branch in Johannesburg. He was detained in terms of the provisions of Sec. 29 of the Internal Security Act. He was a member of the ANC / SACP and was suspected of being involved in underground operations. According to information in the possession of the Security Branch, he was then at the forefront of the SACP's underground operations in South Africa. On 27 October 1971, during interrogation by members of the Security Branch on the tenth floor of John Vorster Square in Johannesburg, Mr. Timol unexpectedly stormed to a window, opened it and jumped out. He fell to his death. The autopsy was performed by the then senior state pathologist in Johannesburg, Dr. Nicolaas Scheepers. Dr. Jonathan Gluckman appeared for the Timol family and dr. Hieronymus Koch represented the police. During the autopsy, visible injuries to the body of Mr. Timol was noticed which were on the mend. The pathologists could not determine the exact time at which the injuries were sustained. Doctors Scheepers and Gluckman believed that the injuries could have been sustained whilst he was detained by the Security Branch. Dr. Koch, however, differed sharply and found that the manner in which the injuries had already healed indicated that it should have been sustained before his detention. During the TRC proceedings, Mrs. Hawa Timol, mother of Mr. Ahmed Timol, testified before the committee for gross human violations and stated that when she received her child's body, he was assaulted, his face covered in blood and his coffin filled with blood. Mrs. Timol testified by using an interpreter in her mother tongue, Guajarati. It is difficult to determine if her testimony about the body of her son was imagery, or the interpreter misinterpreted or whether it was deliberate lies. As the findings of the autopsy and the judicial inquiry show, Mrs. Timol's testimony is blatant lies if it is literally understood. An Inquest was held by Johannesburg Magistrate J.J.L. de Villiers, with D.W. Rothwell and A.L.T. Beukes as Public Prosecutors, and Advocate I.A. Maisels QC and Advocate G. Bizos, and instructing attorneys M.S.H. Cachalia and M.A. Loonat presenting the Timol family.

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Magistrate De Villiers found that Mr. Timol had committed suicide, on the one hand, for fear of being forced to expose information about the SACP's underground operations and the members involved, and on the other hand because he knew that long imprisonment is likely to be awaiting him. Magistrate De Villiers also found that according to all the evidence presented, the injuries to the body of Mr. Timol, not caused by the fall, has probably been sustained before his detention. The Magistrate further found that there is no evidence that Mr. Timol has been assaulted or abused by members of the Security Branch. It is very difficult to determine how any inquest after 45 years can make any credible finding that differs from the initial finding. The following facts must be considered: ➢ All members of the security branch involved in the incident have already died. ➢ Dr. Jonathan Gluckman and several of the other key witnesses have already died. ➢ During the inquest, two experienced and competent advocates, I A Maisels and George Bizos, represented the family. They would undoubtedly have taken the magistrate’s findings to the Supreme Court on review if they had any grounds for doing so. ➢ It was clear during the inquest that the security branch had no motive at all to kill Timol. He was a valuable source of information and everyone was aware that his unnatural death would result in an inquest where every act of the security branch would be placed under the magnifying glass. ➢ No incident came to light during the amnesty hearings where members of the security branch killed any person in the course of their duties due to personal malice, ill-will or spite. No credibility can be attached to testimony before the committee for the gross violation of human rights. The proceedings of the latter committee were conducted by Reverend Desmond Tutu and Dr. Alex Boraine, who refused to apply the audi alteram partem rule and subject witnesses to cross-examination in gross violation of emphatic guidelines laid down by the appeal court. They refused to allow, as directed by the appeal court, members of the police accused of torturing detainees, to defend themselves.

125TH ANNIVERSARY: ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLCE

The members say: “Saluting you, Commissioner Paulson, for your many years of service to us at the RCMP.” (The RCMP earned the “Royal” for service in the Anglo-Boer War – HBH.)

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DIE STAATSGREEP IN BOPHUTHATSWANA: JOHAN VAN DER MERWE: OUD-KOMMISSARIS VAN POLISIE In die vroeë oggendure van 10 Februarie 1988 ontvang ek ʼn telefoonoproep van brig. Wikus Loots, afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstakke in Wes-Transvaal. Hy berig dat daar ʼn staatsgreep in Bophuthatswana was en dat Rocky Malebane-Metsing in beheer van die land is. Pres. Lucas Mangope en verskeie ander amptenare is skynbaar in aanhouding. Volledige besonderhede kon nog nie bekom word nie en lede van die veiligheidstak probeer om meer inligting te kry. Ek (foto) het dadelik met die Weermag geskakel en gereël om genl. Jannie Geldenhuys, (foto) hoof van die Weermag, op die lugmagbasis Waterkloof in Pretoria te ontmoet. Ek het ook mnr. Adriaan Vlok, Minister van Wet en Orde, oor die voorval ingelig en hy het gevra dat genl. Leon Mellet, sy persskakelbeampte, my vergesel om hom op die hoogte van sake te hou. Reëlings is ook getref dat die taakmag van die Polisie hulle gereed hou om onmiddellik na Bophuthatswana te vertrek. By die lugmagbasis Waterkloof het ons genl. Geldenhuys, mnr. Derek Auret van Buitelandse Sake en ʼn lid van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens ontmoet. Niemand het presies geweet wat aangaan nie en daar is besluit dat ons met ʼn Puma-helikopter na Bophuthatswana sou vlieg. Voor ons vertrek het dit my bygeval dat die operasionele kamer by die Uniegebou nog nie ingelig is nie. Hulle moes die Staatspresident op die hoogte hou van enige sake van veiligheidsbelang. Dr. Theo de Jager van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens was in beheer van die operasionele kamer. Ek het genl. Mellet gevra om dr. De Jager in te lig terwyl ek met die taakmag reël om ons te vergesel. Ek het later by dr. De Jager gehoor dat die oproep hom in een van die grootste verknorsings van sy lewe gedompel het. In sy haas het genl. Mellet bloot gesê “Metsing” het ʼn staatsgreep uitgevoer en generaals Geldenhuys en Van der Merwe is op pad soontoe. Voor dr. De Jager nog kon vra waar die staatsgreep was, het genl. Mellet die gesprek beëindig. Dr. De Jager het nog nooit tevore van “Metsing” gehoor nie en nie die vaagste benul gehad waar die staatsgreep plaasgevind het nie. As Nasionale Intelligensie meer geweet het, sou hulle hom onmiddellik laat weet het om mnr. P.W. Botha in te lig. Wat moet hy nou vir mnr. Botha sê?

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Kapt. Tertius Ehlers, (later 'n kommodoor in die Vloot) mnr. Botha se private sekretaris, het net sy kop geskud toe hy die storie hoor en gesê: “Dit is moeilikheid soek. Mnr. Botha gaan jou afslag.” Dr. De Jager was deeglik daarvan bewus, maar as iemand mnr. Botha sou bel oor die voorval en hy weet nie daarvan nie, sou die duiwel los wees. Dr. De Jager het besluit om maar die bul by die horings te pak en mnr. Botha ingelig oor die staatsgreep waarvan hy eintlik niks weet nie. Mnr. Botha se antwoord het hom nog meer laat sweet: “Toe maar, ek skakel gou doktor Barnard. Hy behoort te weet wat aangaan.” Dr. Niel Barnard was sy veiligheidsraadgewer. Dr. De Jager het benoud verduidelik dat dr. Barnard niks van die voorval sal weet nie, anders sou Nasionale Intelligensie hom (dr. De Jager) ook ingelig het. Mnr. Botha gaan egter ongesteurd voort en vra sy veiligheidsraadgewer uit oor die staatsgreep. Dié weet van niks, soos dr. De Jager met goeie rede vermoed het. Hy moes maar beteuterd staan en luister hoe mnr. Botha op geen onduidelike wyse sy misnoeë te kenne gee. Onderweg na Bophuthatswana het ons eers met die Puma-helikopter in Zeerust geland, waar ons met die bevelvoerders van die veiligheidstak en leërtroepe oorleg gepleeg het. Daarvandaan is ons na Mmabatho, waar ons die situasie uit die lug verken het. Ons kon geen militêre bedrywighede bespeur nie en het besluit dat dit veilig is om by die Suid-Afrikaanse ambassade te land. Die taakmag het ons in 'n ander helikopter vergesel en het ook daar geland. Kapt. Du Preez Smit en adjt.off. Fred Williams van die veiligheidstak op Zeerust was ook teenwoordig. Die Suid-Afrikaanse ambassadeur, mnr. Gerrie Wessels, het ons ingelig dat Rocky MalebaneMetsing, die opposisieleier in Bophuthatswana, en lede van die weermag ’n staatsgreep uitgevoer het. Pres. Mangope, brig. Riekert, minister van verdediging, brig. Jack Turner, hoof van Bophuthatswana se weermag, en genl. Phuthego Seleke, kommissaris van polisie, is gevange geneem en word in die Onafhanklikheidstadion aangehou. Die parlementêre kantore en radiostasie is deur die rebelle beset. Ek het die kantoor van die kommissaris van polisie geskakel, waar brig. Lucky Sekame, tweede-inbevel van Bophuthatswana se polisie, geantwoord het. Volgens hom het hy in die afwesigheid van die kommissaris bevel van die polisie oorgeneem. Ek het hom gevra om na die ambassade te kom, maar hy het botweg geweier. Volgens hom verkies die polisie om neutraal te bly. Ek het hom ingelig dat die staatsgreep op hoogverraad neerkom en dat dit ernstige gevolge vir hom sal inhou as hy weier om saam te werk. Brig. Sekame het egter steeds geweier om sy samewerking te gee. Terwyl genl. Geldenhuys en die bevelvoerders van die leërtroepe oor optrede beraadslaag het, het ’n ambassadelid laat weet dat ʼn brig. Turner dringend met een van ons oor die telefoon wil praat. Ek het die oproep beantwoord en brig. Turner het vertel dat die vier van hulle wat by die 24


Onafhanklikheidstadion aangehou word, na ʼn kantoor in die stadion gevlug het en daar skuil. Die kantoor het traliedeure en hulle is voorlopig redelik veilig daar. Ek het genl. Geldenhuys oor die situasie ingelig en aanbeveel dat ons dadelik na die stadion vertrek. Ek het geen twyfel gehad dat ons taakmag die rebelle maklik sou oorrompel nie. Trouens, ek het geen verset verwag nie. Die taakmag was ʼn gedugte eenheid en landwyd bekend. Ons het ook die leërtroepe agter ons gehad. Ons is met Ratels en pantservoertuie na die stadion, waar ʼn Ratel die geslote hoofhekke platgestoot het. Lede van die taakmag het die stadion binnegestorm en die rebelle sonder slag of stoot oorrompel. Pres. Mangope en die ander is kort daarna bevry. Almal was ongedeerd, behalwe brig. Turner wat tydens die ontsnapping in die voet gewond is. Ek en genl. Mellet, kapt. Du Preez Smit en adjt.off. Fred Williams is toe na die radiostasie, waar ons brig. Sekame by die lyk van een van die rebelle aangetref het. Hy het verduidelik dat die rebel hom verset het en dat hy verplig was om hom dood te skiet. Ek het sy storie nie geglo nie en die polisiekommissaris, genl. Seleke, versoek om die voorval deeglik te laat ondersoek. Ek het vermoed dat brig. Sekame die rebel koelbloedig doodgeskiet het om te “vergoed” vir sy vroeëre weiering om saam te werk. Ons het daarna die parlementêre kantore ontset en seker gemaak dat Bophuthatswana se weermag en polisie in volle beheer van die situasie was. Later die aand het pres. P.W. Botha, genl. Magnus Malan, Minister van Verdediging, en mnr. Pik Botha, Minister van Buitelandse Sake, in Mmabatho aangekom. Pres. Botha het pres. Mangope verseker dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering hom nie in die steek sou laat nie.

Die taakmag storm!

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Die polisie het die manne aangekeer.

Eerste foto deur HBH, tweede foto mev M Geldenhuys en die laaste drie foto’s bekom vanaf mnr. Jonathan Pittaway. 26


Agtergrond: Adv Len Els, SC Die 'breins' agter die coup was Metsing (leier van die opposisie in die parlement) en AO Phiri (bevelvoerder van die VIP Protection Unit). President Mangope en talle ministers is as gyselaars aangehou - maklik, want die VIP Protection Unit het hul huise bewaak... Phiri is tot 18 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens hoogverraad. Metsing, vermom as 'n non, het na Engeland gevlug via Oliver Tambo Lughawe. Insult to injury - hy vlug met sy skelmpie, Phiri se vrou... Ek en die PG, Johan Smit SC, het die verhore in 2 gesplit daar die feite verskil het. Hy kla die militêre beskuldigdes aan en ek die politieke beskuldigdes - 7 parlementslede. Metsing se getuienis is op kommissie in Londen aangehoor. (Sien foto op volgende bladsy.)

Hoof: Bophuthatswana Weermag: generaal Jack Turner: Len Els Die voormalige HBW (Hoof Bophuthatswana Weermag) generaal Jack Turner het onlangs sy lang stryd teen kanker finaal verloor. In die 80's was ek die adjunk prokureur-generaal van Bophuthatswana. Ek kla in 1989 sewe beskuldigdes (die sogenaamde politieke betrokkenes) in die hooggeregshof aan op 'n aanklag van hoogverraad na die mislukte staatsgreep in Bophuthatswana. Die verdediging het 'n hogerige regsspan uit Londen ingevoer wat my nogal 'n harde tyd gegee het. Bygevolg het die verhoor nege maande geduur. Al sewe die parlementslede is uiteindelik aan hoogverraad skuldig bevind en tot sewe jaar gevangenisstraf elk gevonnis. Na afloop van die saak kom sien Turner my op kantoor. Die rede hoekom die staatsgreep aanvanklik suksesvol was, was dat die Bophuthatswana weermag nie 'n teeninligtingskomponent gehad het nie: hul is met die broek op die knieë gevang. Turner het geweet dat ek 'n burgermag offisier by die SA Direktoraat Teeninligting was. Hy versoek my om die wetgewing op te stel om 'n Bophuthatswana teeninligtingseenheid op die been te bring. Die SA wetgewing kon nie net op Bophuthatswana ingeënt word nie daar Bophuthatswana 'n Handves van Menseregte gehad het. Die wet moes so geskryf word dat dit nie met die Handves bots nie. Turner spreek my deurgaans as advokaat aan. Ek lig hom beleefd in dat ek nege maande laas op kantoor was en dat daar kruiwaens vol agterstallige werk op my wag. Stel voor hy kom sien my weer oor so ses maande.

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'n Week later ontvang ek 'n oproepinstruksie van SA Teeninligting vir 'n 30 dae kamp ... gesekondeer aan die Bophuthatswana Weermag! Die volgende dag bel Turner. Nou is ek nie meer advokaat nie: "Kaptein, wanneer klaar jy by my in?" 'n Soldaat maak 'n plan. Salute en RIP Jack.

Foto - Londen 1989.

L-R: Dawie Joubert (staatsadvokaat); Johan Smit SC (PG); Mocki Freedman (Regter); kapt. Tim Slabbert (Ondersoekbeampte - afgetree as kolonel).

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LATE 1960*: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE

Commandant General

Lieutenant General

Combat General

Brigadier

Colonel

Commandant

Major

Captain

Lieutenant

Second Lieutenant

Warrant Officer Class I

Warrant Officer Class II

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Staff Sergeant

Sergeant

Corporal

Lance Corporal

*Replaced the ‘early 1960’ scheme which only lasted two months

LATE 1960*: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE

Commandant General

Lieutenant General

Combat General

Brigadier

Colonel

Commandant

Major

Captain

Field Cornet

Asst Field Cornet

Warrant Officer Class I

Warrant Officer Class II

30


Staff Sergeant

Sergeant

Corporal

Lance Corporal

*Replaced the ‘early 1960’ scheme which only lasted two months

c.1963-67: SA ARMY RANK INSIGNIA: MARK NAUDE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

General

Brigadier

Lieutenant General

Colonel

Combat General

Commandant

Major 31


Captain

Field Cornet

Asst. Fd. Cornet

SA Army Rank Insignia – c.1963-67: WARRANT OFFICERS

Warrant Officer Class I

Warrant Officer Class II

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

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Staff Sergeant

Sergeant

Corporal

Lance Corporal

SAP MEETS PORTUGUESE FORCES Early days. The meeting took place in the days before the Casspir ….

Photo (via Face Book) received from Sgt-Maj Paul Els.

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DIE MAANBEKRUIPERS!!! NO 37424 (B) KONST G BOTHA Gedurende 1964 terwyl ek in die S.A. Polisie was en te Buitepos-polisie wyk, gestasioneer was, distrik Gobabis, was ons as lede van die mag se pligte 90% grenspatollie ry met 4x4 F250 Ford en Landrovers, teen Bechuanalandgrens/SWA-grens vandag genoem Botswana-grens met Namibië. Noordwaarts het ons beweeg tot by Andara in die Caprivi en Suidwaarts tot Unieseinde6! Ek en ʼn Herero-konstabel het hierdie grens patrollies gedoen, en hy kon ook vlot die Heikum Boesmantaal praat. "TrekBoesmans" was daardie jare nog volop teen die grens en van af Rietfontein-blok tot in Andara was daar nie eers ‘n grensdraad tussen Namibië en Botswana gewees, die het maar eers later jare begin ontstaan. So het ek deur my leermeester Frederik, Herero-konstabel, baie geleer van die veld en die "Trek Boesman”-gemeenskap. Ons patrollies het soms 14 dae lank weg van die polisiestasie gewees, as reën en modder ons voorgekeer het, of defekte aan ‘n voertuig wat ons nie self kon herstel! Voor sononder het ons altyd van die tweespoor grens pad af beweeg en kamp gemaak vir die nag en dan daar as jy weer sien, staan die Boesmans hier by jou in die kamp...ons het altyd ‘n voorraad "Skaaplekroltabak"7 en sout saamgebring vir hierdie veld mense en dit verruil vir geloofbare inligting oor die beweging van "vreemde mense" wat destyds Namibië uitgegaan het vir opleiding in Rusland, China en ander plekke in opleiding in terreur dade! My nommer-3 swartpot word vol mieliepap gemaak en met die pot-lisensie wat aan ons uitgereik was, het ons altyd ‘n vet springbokooi geskiet en dus genoeg vleis gehad, met die gevolg met kampvuur en genoeg kos het die Boesmans as gaste ons aande altyd vermaak, met hulle jagstories en hul ondervindinge oorvertel aan my deur Frederik as tolk! Een aand vra die "Grootjagter" leier van die Boesmans vir my deur die tolk so met die geselsery of ek al die "Klippe van die maan" gesien het, waar Frederik toe aan my tolk en verduidelik dat hy praat van diamante! Wat sal hulle weet van diamante en hoe kan hulle diamante bekom, want nêrens in Ek ken die plek as Union’s End – HBH. In die veiligheidstak het ons ook roltwak (pruimtwak?) uitgedeel en die veiligheidstak te Oudtshoorns het die roltwak jaarliks vir alle veiligheidsafdelings bestel – HBH. 6 7

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geskiedenis is hier teen die grens van Botswana of Namibië diamante! Die "Grootjagter" verduidelik toe dat hulle dit op tel en wys toe fisies vir ons hoe hulle te werk gaan om die diamante te kan sien, maar dit geskied net in die nag met volmaan, dan lê hulle op hulle maag en kruip vorentoe in die sand teen die maan se skynsel op, dan is dit die enigste manier hoe die "Klippe van die maan" diamante blink en so maak hulle dit bymekaar en verruil dit aan die Botswana inwoners vir lewensmiddele!

Gawie Botha Hierdie storie het ek nie geglo nie en dit afgelag as ʼn mite wat nie kon bestaan nie... EN IN 1971 MAAK DIE GROOTSTE OOPGROEF DIAMANT MYN IN DIE GANSE WERELD OOP IN "ORAPA", BOTSWANNA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Ook het ek uit die verhaal geleer van die Boesmans en dit ook so ondervind, dat as jy in volmaan in die veld stap en jy gaan sit op jou hurke bevoordeel met jou sig na die maan dan sien jy sulke stukkies gebreekte bottel of glas baie makliker raak as wat die maan van agter af sou geskyn het....en elke keer wanneer ek dit opmerk in die veld met volmaan, dan onwillekeurig gaan my gedagtes terug na daardie aand wat ek gehoor het van die "Klippe van die Maan" en die "Maanbekruipers!.... DAAR HET EK ‘N TOETS GEDOP EN KON MESKIEN NOU ‘N BILJOENER GEWEES HET!

Operasionele foto’s in Buitepos-patrolliewyk 35


Let op die boogsnare wat om die nek gedra word.

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MY TAAL: MJJ VAN RENSBURG Ek is gebore uit jou boesem, Geskool en geleerd in jou wysheid. Ek hoor jou en sien jou onsigbaarheid. Ek bemin jou en verstaan jou. Ek lees jou in die Bybel se suiwerheid. 42


Jy my taal! Kom uit verligte eeue. Jy! as moeder was in die Hemel beplan En God het jou in suider Afrika gestempel. Jy is en bly ‘n edele. Geen mag sal jou ooit verban. Al praat ek soms deurmekaar, Jy is altyd my kitaar se snaar. Al hakkel of stamel ek Al is ek doof, blind of stom Is my taal in my bloed se hoofaar. My taal is die strykstok van die viool En die klawers van die klavier. My taal speel musiek in die wind, Hy’s die lied van die aandwind. Hy is ‘n lid van die Engele koor Die meester van die Afrikaanse gehoor My taal het ’n hart vol gedigte. Ver oor die wêreld is daar van hom gerugte. Hy skilder die Namibwoestyn En die na son met skarlaken wyn Maar ons vyand het vir hom ‘n lappie asyn. My taal is ‘n dromer en ‘n reisiger Hy is die diep filosoof en onderwyser. Hy ken die huil en die lag soos die Prediker. Hy is fyn besnaard in die vloek en skel. Hy is ‘n regter, ‘n hereregter. Ek sien my taal in die vloei van die Tugela. Ek hoor hom kreun uit die potblou berge. Daar kom donker wolke van gerugte. Die vyand se swaard hang oor ons bloubloed taal. God alleen! Weeg alles in Sy skaal. MJJ van Rensburg April 2017.

ALLEGATIONS OF NEW ‘SECURITY POLICE’ SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO – SAVE SA Save South Africa | 12 June 2017 Organisation says report that Crime Intelligence could be used to gather 'covert intelligence' in the build-up to ANC elective conference is concerning 43


Save SA calls for probe into allegations of new ‘Security Police’ 12 June 2017 The Save South Africa campaign is writing to the Inspector General of Intelligence, Dr Isaac Dintwe, to request an urgent investigation into reports that SAPS Crime Intelligence could be used to gather “covert intelligence” in the build-up to the ANC’s December elective conference. According to City Press, the use of police to spy on “anti-Zuma forces” was discussed at a meeting between acting national police commissioner, Lieutenant General Lesetja Mothiba, and representatives of the Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans’ Association (MKMVA) earlier this month. At the same meeting, they reportedly also earmarked former Gauteng crime intelligence boss Patrick Mokushane to become acting national head of crime intelligence. We call on General Mothiba to urgently confirm or deny that this meeting took place. The reports are alarming. They are totally unacceptable on a number of levels: - Firstly, it is inappropriate for the acting police commissioner to consider using police personnel to conduct political intelligence. The police should focus on crime (of which there is more than enough) and the numerous allegations against named perpetrators of crime in government and the private sector (of which there are also more than enough). - Secondly, the ANC conference is a political event and not a state function, and the police’s role should be to ensure the safety of delegates, guests and property. It should have no other role. - Thirdly, it is completely out of order for an acting police commissioner to discuss policing matters and strategic appointments with members of MKMVA. They must have no role at all in the appointment of police officers or in their intelligence activities. If MKMVA members want to be police officers, they should join the SAPS. It’s unlawful and deeply concerning that an acting head of police could consider using apartheid-era tactics to “defend” the head of state against “enemies” who are doing nothing more than exercising their hard won constitutional right to protest and freedom of expression. It is equally concerning that these reports emerged at the same time that Zuma was calling on the MKMVA conference to unite and close ranks against “antagonistic forces” in civil society. It is further confirmation that Zuma is beginning to resemble isolated apartheid-era leaders like PW Botha with his ominous sabre-rattling threats against his growing number of critics. Crime Intelligence must stay well away from political and civil society protest. They must resist every attempt to turn them into post-apartheid Security Police. We are aware that similar concerns have been raised by other civil society organisations recently, and call on Dr Dintwe to investigate these allegations as quickly as possible -- to avoid further suspicion around an already-contaminated criminal justice system and a slide into apartheid-style “policing”. Crime Intelligence is already one of the most damaged units in the SAPS. It cannot afford more controversy, and we believe the possible appointment of Patrick Mokushane should also be reconsidered to ensure public confidence in the impartiality, integrity and independence of the criminal justice system. 44


Issued by Save South Africa, 12 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/allegations-of-new-security-police-should-belooke?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=8ea916acc2EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_12&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-8ea916acc2130042309

EQUAL JUSTICE FOR RICH AND POOR CROOKS AND CRIMINALS Douglas Gibson | 14 June 2017 Douglas Gibson says the short arm of the law in SA does not reach the politically connected Parties must pledge equal justice after 2019 South Africa does not have equal justice for rich and poor. A year ago, South Africa’s total prison population, including pre-trial and remand prisoners, was 161,984. It seems odd, therefore to question the operation of justice and the Rule of Law. All these prisoners were arrested and brought before the courts by the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the prosecuting authority. So then, is our system of Justice working satisfactorily? The answer, when one looks closely at the situation is, “No, it is not.” At the level of the poor, the deprived, the un- or under-educated, which describes most of those involved in crime, the system operates more or less properly. Of course, thousands of criminals are never caught and punished because of inadequacies in crime detection and prosecution. The crime rate is escalating and pathetic leadership at national level is partly to blame. But there is an important class of criminal that does not fear being held to account, detected, tried and if found guilty, punished. These people are the politically connected, the educated, and the friends of those in power. Perhaps this has always been the case but the Travelgate revelations first signalled the post 1994 rot. Crooks escaped real punishment because they were politically powerful. Eighty members of parliament, not all from the ANC, but by far the majority from that party, were implicated in defrauding the public by abusing travel vouchers and claims for travel. Many of them were asked to repay monies deemed to have been misused. Thirty were charged criminally and many agreed to a plea bargain with the state, signed admissions of guilt and were fined. The saga went on for four years until the last ANC MP pleaded guilty. Gareth van Onselen wrote that Travelgate was a huge scandal that would become defined by cover-ups, political protection and ultimately, reward for those found guilty. Travelgate crooks became ministers, deputy ministers, mayors and chairpersons of parliamentary portfolio committees at inflated salaries. In the ANC the old saying, “Who says crime doesn’t pay?” became the signal to many others, with Travelgate setting the scene for corruption in public life. It stretched the envelope so that it soon extended to the public service, to state entities and right into the cabinet. The ANC, committed to acting against corruption, failed consistently to take any action. The only real fear of miscreants was that the media or the opposition would discover the facts and that public embarrassment would follow. Few had any fear that they would be jailed or punished, or even fired, if caught. They could often expect the protection of the presidency and promotion to higher office. While South Africans suspected the rot, it was only with the publication of the Public Protector’s report on state capture that the extent of the lawlessness, the greed and the exploitation of public office for personal gain started to glimmer through. This has now been vastly expanded by the revelation two or three weeks ago of the existence of more than 100,000 emails implicating the 45


Gupta family interests and their beneficiaries in the presidency, the cabinet, in parliament, in state owned enterprises and in public life generally. The enormity of the cache of emails and the damning evidence they provide has not elicited meaningful and determined action on the part of our justice system. The head of the National Prosecuting Authority who was so voluble and anxious to institute a cooked-up prosecution against the former minister of finance has been strangely silent about the Gupta emails. Does he not think there should be an investigation? The minister of justice has not concerned himself about the matter. The Hawks seem not to be doing anything much. The SAPS have done nothing. The minister of finance has queried how the emails were obtained and has denied that he has done anything wrong. This despite compelling evidence that he appointed to the boards of state owned enterprises many nominees of the Gupta family enabling them to capture these entities with the aim of improperly gaining enormous financial advantage at the expense of the people of South Africa. This minister is certainly not the only one. Several members of the cabinet were quite definitely in the pay of the Guptas or indebted to them. None of them is suspended or fired or charged with offences. Nothing happens. Nothing will happen because the president and some of his family have been captured by the same people. It is now left to the DA and the EFF to take action against the accused. Perhaps Gerrie Nel and Afriforum will help do the job the state should be doing. It is time that our people realised that justice and the Rule of Law cannot and should not only be used to hold poor and disadvantaged criminals to account; they must also apply to the rich and the powerful. If justice continues to provide a special deal for the politically connected, the justice system and the Rule of Law will be fatally compromised. Project 2019 is the combined effort by opposition parties to rid South Africa of the ANC government. I want each of the opposition parties to make a pledge now to restore and strengthen the Rule of Law under the coalition government that will succeed the ANC. This should be one of the main policy issues of Project 2019. It should pledge equal justice for all. It should promise to ensure the justice system will investigate criminal conduct by all politicians and civil servants, ANC and others, as well as by directors of state owned enterprises. Where there is a decent case, prosecution must follow so that the guilty are held fully to account and punished for the millions, or billions, they have stolen from ordinary South Africans. Douglas Gibson is a former opposition chief whip and a former ambassador to Thailand This article first appeared in The Star. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/equal-justice-for-rich-and-poor-crooks-andcrimina?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=4bc8de3db2EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-4bc8de3db2130042309

SAW-HISTORIKUS: SERS-MAJ PAUL ELS WORD VEREER Die SA Weermagvereniging het op sy onlangse Algemene Jaarvergadering, op 27 Mei 2017, ‘n EreToekenning aan Paul Els gemaak vir sy bydrae tot die bewaring van ons MilitĂŞre Erfenis. Paul is 46


besig om sy 16de boek, wat handel oor Walvisbaai, te skryf. Die toekenning is gemaak uit waardering vir sy onbaatsugtige, akkurate en professionele neerlê van militêre geskiedenis wat ons almal baie na aan die hart lê. Tydens ‘n onlangse funksie op 5 Junie 2017 het die EBO Trust ook ‘n skenking aan Paul gemaak om so hulle waardering te wys en om ‘n bydrae te maak tot die uitstekende werk wat Paul doen. Weereens baie Geluk Paul. Jou bydrae word opreg waardeer. Johann du Preez Ondervoorsitter: SA Weermagvereniging

Genl. Gert Opperman (SAW Afgetree) wens Sers.Maj Els geluk. Wel en Wee van die Militêre Veterane: Berig 10/2017: 27. SAW Vereniging (SAWV) se Ere-toekenning aan Paul Els 47


* Johann du Preez is die Ondervoorsitter van die SAWV en verklaar dat “… die SAWV Algemene Jaarvergadering van 27/05/2017 ‘n ere-toekenning aan Paul gemaak het vir sy bydrae tot die bewaring van ons Militêre Erfenis. Die toekenning is gemaak uit waardering vir sy onbaatsugtige, akkurate en professionele neerlê van militêre geskiedenis wat ons almal baie na aan die hart lê. Paul is nou besig om sy 15de boek te skryf, wat oor Walvisbaai handel. Geluk Paul. Jou bydrae word opreg waardeer”. * Paul verklaar dat hy sy “... dank teenoor die SAWV wil uitspreek vir die toekenning wat aan my gegee is. Ek doen beroep op al die Militêre Veterane om by die SAWV betrokke te raak, al woon U net die etes by. Kom kuier saam met jou ou makers”. 28. Skenking deur die Ebo Trust aan Paul Els Tydens ‘n funksie op 05/06/2017 het Gert Opperman van die EBO Trust ‘n skenking aan Paul gemaak om hulle waardering te toon en om ‘n bydrae te maak tot die uitstekende werk wat Paul doen. Na die geleentheid het twee makkers die volgende boodskappe aan Paul gestuur: * Gert van Niekerk van die Geskut “Baie geluk met die welverdiende erkenning wat jy van die Ebo Trust ontvang het. Hierdie benadering tot geskiedskrywing gee vir 'n mens insigte wat nie in die tradisionele teks aangeteken word nie. Dit dokumenteer ons belewenisse, sentimente en waardes wat die nageslag weerbaar sal maak teen die afbrekende aanslag van die nuwe bedeling waaraan hulle onderwerp word”. * PW de Jager van die Kavallerie “Die erkenning bevestig die waardering wat ons almal het vir die entoesiasme waarmee jy wyd ons militêre verlede vir die nageslag help bewaar. Gert Opperman se waardering spreek boekdele namens ons almal vir die groot waarde wat jy verleen. Ek bevestig my dank soos ek al by ’n paar geleenthede in die verlede gedoen het”.

OPERATION VULA: DR A TURTON Biographical detail of Dr Turton Anthony Turton, a 12th generation African and direct descendent of a member of Jan van Riebeek’s original party, served in various capacities in the security forces of South Africa. Initially deployed as a crew commander in an armoured unit, he later became the unit specialist in mine warfare and IED’s (Improvised Explosive Devices). He was recruited into a deep cover offensive counter espionage (CE) unit (O61/01) in the National Intelligence Service (NIS). This gave him direct exposure to offensive CE operations run on foreign hostile soil. After the Pretoria car bomb detonated, a Special Operations (SO) unit was created within the Chief Directorate Covert Operations (CDCO) of the NIS designated K43.

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The K43 mission was the unharmed capture of the MK Chief of Staff, code named Billy, with the sole intention of bringing him home to stand trial for terrorism. This unit was based on the successful Mossad operations to counter the Munich Olympics Massacre, and to capture Adolf Eichmann to stand trial for crimes against humanity. Within K43 a combination of CE and SO skills were merged into a potent team of professionals operating under deep cover in foreign hostile environments. This became the crucible from which a range of SO’s were launched, mostly from another covert unit designated K32, all with strategic impact. These included, but are not limited to: the intelligence support to the negotiations that allowed the SADF to withdraw from Angola; the implementation of UN Resolution 435; the establishment of the first covert contact with Nelson Mandela and the subsequent protection of the CODESA process; the monitoring of Russian willingness and capacity to intervene in South Africa as the USSR collapsed in 1989; and the deep penetration small team SO into Mozambique designed to stop the flow of weapons to the armed faction of the IFP that threatened to derail CODESA.

Anthony became a founding member of the South African Secret Service (SASS), where he served as Deputy Divisional Head C13 (Techno-Economic Intelligence) and as Divisional Head C11 (Covert Operational Support). He obtained his Doctorate at the University of Pretoria and is recognized across a range of international security services for his insight into water as a national security risk. Today he specializes in strategic level risk mitigation for investors exposed to the financial insecurity of failing infrastructure, most notably water resources and water services. He is a professional speaker with a range of commercial interests in consulting and technology companies, and he holds a professorship at the Centre for Environmental Management at the University of Free State.

Operation Vula in Strategic Context

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Dr. Anthony Turton Former Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer Background: 1) When South African security forces were first committed to an active role in the Rhodesian Bush War, the SAP component of the SA force had two officers that played a very important role. I will not name them because of possible retribution, but both understood the value of good intelligence about guerrilla forces before they infiltrate into a target area. This spawned two intelligence-related initiatives that became deeply ingrained in the SA intelligence community from that time onwards. 2) Central to this was the distinction between tactical and strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence is of value to a combat or counter insurgency team, tasked with the responsibility of neutralizing a threat once it is in theatre. Strategic intelligence is of value in understanding the enemy in order to pre-empt tactical infiltrations, but also to be used at a later date to achieve specific objectives that might not be relevant at the time of the initial operational action. 3) Tactical intelligence is acted upon typically in the form of a hot pursuit operation. Typically, these are defensive actions. Strategic intelligence impacts on tactical issues in the sense that from time to time it is better to go onto the offensive, so a pre-emptive strike might be considered to disrupt the capacity of the enemy to operationalize a planned infiltration (e.g. Operation Reindeer/Skeptic etc). 4) Arising from the early Rhodesian Bush War experience was a special focus on penetrating communications lines as this is the Achilles heel of all effective covert operations. 5) One of the two policemen noted above saw an opportunity one day, which he seized with gusto. This tactical opportunity grew over time to become one of the most significant strategic operations ever run by the Chief Directorate Covert Operations of the National Intelligence Service (CDCO – NIS) under the code name of Operation Cruiser. More on this below.

Understanding the Role and Significance of NIS Overall 1) NIS grew out of the demise of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) as a result of two defections and the so-called Info Scandal. 2) The Simonstown Agreement assigned specific roles and responsibilities to NIS, including inter alia the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the development of a sophisticated technological capability to develop a range of intelligence related technologies in the face of growing international sanctions. 3) The organ within NIS responsible for technology was the Chief Directorate Technology (T1), which in turn was broken down into a range of highly specialized groups, including code breakers (similar to GCHQ in Britain) and interception capabilities (similar to the NSA in the USA). 4) During this period of time (1945 – 1989) the Cold War was the dominant driver at global level and SA intelligence developed a sophisticated Counter Espionage capability, running in close cooperation with the British MI5, the West German BND and the American FBI. This evolved over time to an independent Chief Directorate within NIS called O6. This was broken down operationally into an offensive leg (O61) that was tasked with the active penetration of all African security forces responsible for counter espionage (typically African countries housed these in the Police units). The defensive leg was about security vetting, sweeping for surveillance devices in embassies and other sensitive offices of state, and a range of other specialized functions including concealment. 50


5) During the Cold War, all intelligence services cooperated within one of the two major blocs. In this context, despite the growing comprehensive sanctions against SA, this never impacted the liaison between Counter Espionage units all active against Warsaw Pact countries. 6) O6 was highly successful in a number of anti-Soviet counter espionage operations, leading to the capture of a number of Russian KGB and GRU spies, some of which were sleepers busy with legend development en route to their final target counties (USA and GB). This included, but was not limited to, Yuriy Loginov (1967); Major Alexei Kozlov (1981); and Commodore Dieter Gerhardt (1983). 7) When Sapper Johan van der Mescht was captured in Owamboland by PLAN in 1977, this counterespionage liaison channel was used exclusively to arrange a spy swap. In terms of this agreement, O6 gave up one of its captured KGB spies (Major Alexei Kozlov) in return for van der Mescht. Given the larger liaison capabilities that existed, the deal was expanded to include a number of BND spies that had been captured by the KGB. To sweeten the deal and to coax O6 into agreeing to include the BND spies in the exchange, a highly sophisticated interception technology system was given to T1. This was capable of intercepting amongst other things, all telephone communications between the ANC HQ in Lusaka, the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) in Tanzania, all other ANC facilities in Africa and the major centre of ANC/SACP operations in London. This system was in full operation throughout the Operation Vula period. (The author had the task of demonstrating this very system to senior ANC and PAC members during the amalgamation of the statutory and non-statutory forces in 1994, when a telephone conversation between Lusaka and London was captured in real time to the absolute dismay of the non-statutory members).

Understanding the Impact of the Cold War on Intelligence Cooperation Globally 1) Irrespective of the overt political situation within and between countries, the Cold War drove a high level of cooperation between all services that viewed the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries to be a threat to their national security. 2) The Russian offensive intelligence capability was centred on an ethos of infiltrating so-called illegals into target NATO countries. These illegals were the cream of the crop, recruited into the KGB at a very young age, and schooled intensively in the trade-craft needed for effective functioning as an illegal. These illegals can be considered the fighter pilots of the intelligence world, because of the massive amounts of cash and other investments made into their training and long-term operational support. 3) A KGB illegal typically took on a legend identity early in their operational career. A legend identity consisted of a real person who had a birth record, but who died before something like an identity card or driver’s license was issued. Alternatively, if the records had been destroyed, which was a common occurrence during the latter part of WWII bombing, then such a candidate was also considered as a source of legend identity. This meant that no photo existed in any record system of such a person. The legend identity was built up by claiming the birth certificate of the deceased and ascertaining if there was no death certificate. Typically, this happened if a person was born say in Germany, but immigrated to a developing country with their parents but died in that third country. The KGB illegal then built this legend into a real person by assuming the name and the parents, but constructing a plausible history including identity documents, drivers licences, bank credit cards etc. There was a robust technical support facility within the KGB to assist with all of this delicate and technically complex work. The bottom line is that the KGB illegal was cycled through different countries before their final deployment into their target country. It was in this context that the cooperation between services was critical, because the idea was to identify an illegal before they were in their final target country, and then actively turn them to become a double agent.

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4) The significance of all this to Operation Vula is that a high level of cooperation existed between NIS and a range of foreign services even though there were comprehensive sanctions against SA at that time. 5) Of greater significance was the role played by sophisticated interception facilities like the NSA, GCHQ and T1. This interception was based on a number of key elements, some of which are listed below. 6) All KGB illegal communication was done in a sophisticated way based on a robust encryption system known as a One Time Pad (OTP). The OTP system was simple but secure, and it was so exclusive to espionage that for any person to be found in possession of an OTP by any Western service led to an automatic charge of espionage. But as with all communication systems with agents in the field (the core problem being solved by Tim Jenkins in Operation Vula), there is one inescapable truth – encrypted communications take place from Point A to Point B, so even if one cannot read the message, the mere fact that encryption protocols were used, attracts attention by a range of counter espionage services that generally cooperate. This is relevant today in the investigation by the FBI into alleged Trump administration contact with the Russians. 7) All clandestine communication for all KGB illegals was done by means of radio transmission using Morse code (known by the abbreviation for Continuous Wave as CW) in character groups of five. The first string of any CW packet of data was not encrypted and consisted on the code name of the person for which the communications were intended. The reason was another inescapable truth about clandestine encrypted communications – if the first string is encrypted using an OTP, then nobody could identify their message because they did not have access to the specific OTP used in the first place. For this reason, all KGB communications were sent out on known frequencies using HF radio at known times. This allowed the interception agencies to capture all communications even if they only had encrypted data and were unable to read it at first. It gets complex at this stage so I will not expand much more beyond stating that all services cooperated in sharing this data if it was relevant to their own national security. Historic communications could be requested if a Russian spy suddenly became relevant to a given cooperating partner and all communications then on record would be subject to increased attention. The frequency of communications to each agent was significant, as was the length of each packet, because this provided an indication of an increase or decrease in operational activity and hence triggered an increase in active counter-espionage measures. Once an increase in activity was detected, that agent’s communications were then prioritized by the NSA, GCHQ and T1 (in the case of SA) and the code-breakers would sink their teeth into cracking the code to read the communications. 8) So, in the context of Operation Vula, Tim Jenkins was literally up against every counter espionage agency in the non-communist world, all of which would be attracted to the communication by virtue of the fact that it was encrypted in the first place and then transmitted across an insecure public telephone network using an acoustic modem. 9) In fact, encryption would trigger an interception automatically if a telephone system was used in the early days of internet traffic, because the NATO forces had developed a system known as Echelon that was a pre-cursor to what all the current fuss is about with the Snowden revelations about GCHQ and NSA.

Understanding the Relationship between NIS and other Services in the context of Terrorism 1) During the 1960’s and 1970’s there were a number of known terror groups operating globally. In the context of Operation Vula these included the armed wing of the PLO (very active in those days 52


in terms of aircraft hijacking and the infamous Munich Olympics Massacre) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 2) The birth of the Armed Struggle after the Sharpeville Incident saw two militant groups emerge – MK and APLA. 3) Linkages were forged between these South African “freedom fighters” and other groups operating at the international level. (This is still evident today with the ANC government increasing support to the Palestinian cause by seeking to isolate Israel). 4) The linkage between MK, the IRA and PLO attracted the interest of a number of intelligence services, including the Israeli Mossad (foreign service), Shin Bet (domestic service), the British, Americans and Germans. 5) The transfer of technology from those organizations to MK was closely monitored and was clearly evident in the Pretoria Car Bomb for example. Both the PLO and IRA had made extensive use of car bombs and this expertise was fast tracked into MK at the time. 6) Therefore, a paradoxical situation existed in Britain whereby the ANC/SACP were given official protection by the government as exiles, while the relationship between the armed wing of the ANC/SACP alliance – MK – was closely monitored by a range of counter terrorism agencies including MI5, FBI and Shin Bet. 7) The instant that MK started to develop encryption systems they became a target of these agencies, and thus had to match their collective technical capacity if they were to ever be successful in their objective.

Understanding the Evolution of Operational Capabilities in the NIS relevant to Vula 1) As noted above, the early operational experience of two key South African police officers in the Rhodesian Bush War triggered the interest in developing a sophisticated intelligence system in South Africa capable of neutralizing any MK or APLA infiltration into the country on the same scale as happened with ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in Rhodesia. This triggered Operation Cruiser some time later. 2) After the Treason Trials that convicted a number of senior ANC and PAC members for their role in the development of an armed struggle capability in their respective political parties, the assumption within the then security forces in South Africa was that the SACP had been effectively neutralized. 3) After the travails of BOSS/DONS and the subsequent creation of NIS, this assumption was challenged when it became evident that the SACP had not been neutralised as originally thought. This gave rise to Operation Olyfberg, which was tasked to assess the current operational capacity of the SACP as well as identify where they were concentrated and who they consisted of. 4) Operation Olyfberg yielded startling results when it became evident that the SACP was alive and well and living in London under the protection of the British Government and with the full support of the CPGB (Community Party of Great Britain). 5) The data from Operation Olyfberg became the foundation of a major covert operational initiative to infiltrate the SACP by whatever means possible in order to monitor their actions and neutralize them as an effective threat as far as possible. 6) One of the many initiatives launched by the NIS at that time was Operation Daisy (not the same as the SADF operation by the identical name). Daisy was a joint operation run by the remnants of BOSS (before the emergence of NIS) and the SAP Special Branch. The intention was to infiltrate 53


as many agents possible into the SACP ranks using the known KGB approach of sleepers and illegals. Major Craig Williamson and Karel Edwards were both involved in different elements of Operation Daisy that were later exposed. However, a significant portion of Operation Daisy was not exposed and some of those agents went on to become highly successful intelligence assets. One of these was later handled by the author during Operation Spaghetti/Hardekool. 7) After the Pretoria Car Bomb was detonated on 20 May 1983, the State Security Council (SSC) gave instructions to all of the security agencies reporting to it to develop plans for consideration as an appropriate response. The NIS response was the creation of a Special Operations unit within the CDCO known as K43 in which the author served. The mission given to K43 was to locate the MK Chief of Staff and develop a plan for his capture in order to be brought back to SA and placed on trial for terrorism. In this regard K43 reached out to the Israeli Mossad in order to gain the necessary operational skills that they had mustered in their response to two classic operations run by them – the capture of Adolf Eichmann and the neutralization of the PLO unit that had conducted the Munich Olympic Massacre. 8) K43 was a highly specialised counter terrorism intelligence unit, the existence of which was not known to anyone other than a select few in the national security decision-making hierarchy. The author was recruited into this unit in part because of his operational experience in offensive counter espionage operations when he served with O61/01. Each member of K43 was hand-picked for specific skills, but consistent with the Mossad experience, all had come from the military or paramilitary units where they had been tested under harsh conditions. All came with a track record of success in some portion of the national security force apparatus. 9) The first thing that K43 did was dig up the Operation Olyfberg files in order to do a target analysis of all key SACP members that were relevant to MK and thus linked in some way or other to the Pretoria Car Bomb. Key elements in this investigation were Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils, as well as any other person that could lead K43 to either of these two individuals. 10) Extensive use was made of the considerable data yield from Operation Cruiser, which at that time was mature. Cruiser can be thought of as providing the same type of strategic advantage as the capture of the so-called Enigma encryption machine gave to GCHQ and thus the Allied High Command during WWII. In our own context Cruiser enabled NIS to read all of the messages relevant to MK operations, which is why MK never became the same type of effective fighting force inside SA as ZANLA and ZIPRA did in Rhodesia. 11) Learning from the Operation Cruiser experience, a new special operation was launched by K43 with similar intentions, but focussed specifically on the SACP only in London. This was called Operation Hardekool, which became very successful in a short space of time, because it became evident that the SACP members had grown accustomed to the safety of London and were thus very lax in the application of operational security. 12) Operation Hardekool expanded rapidly, but was tasked with the specific responsibility of developing a secure access route to Joe Slovo and the MK high command in order to execute the mission given to K43 – the capture of the MK Chief of Staff and his safe return to SA where he would be placed on trial like Adolf Eichmann was by the Israeli Mossad. For this reason, it continued despite an element being compromised when Harold Wolpe made a public statement saying that he had evidence of technical surveillance, triggering a debate in the House of Commons. That portion of Hardekool was simply shut down, but the rest continued. 13) Operation Hardekool then changed to Operation Spaghetti as the activities expanded. The operational management problem that arose was how to manage the masses of data being yielded from the lax personal security of the SACP membership that was now placed under intensive close54


in surveillance. Windfalls from this included evidence of money flows, personal love affairs and plotting by the SACP against non-communist members of the ANC living in exile in London (and elsewhere). 14) This surveillance revealed the existence of a CPGB safe house located on Anson Road in London. The safe house consisted of six apartments, one of which was occupied by the CPGB, but the other five were allocated to the SACP. The Anson Road safe house thus became an object of intense surveillance, revealing the movements of key MK leaders who were also from SACP. These included Joe Slovo, Ronnie Kasrils, and a number of other leaders not directly active in MK activities of any great relevance to the K43 mission. 15) During this time of intense surveillance in London (and elsewhere) Tim Jenkins was developing the technical capability of Operation Vula, and this was picked up as background “chatter” by means of Operation Spaghetti. In effect Operation Vula was the logical response to the success of Operation Cruiser and was thus an attempt to bypass the MK communication systems that had been penetrated by the CDCO-NIS, but Tim Jenkins did not know this at the time. The chatter was limited because of the high level of security insisted on by Jenkins, but fortunately for NIS, this commitment was not shared by the few in the know.

Standard Operational Procedures for Strategic Special Operations run by CDCO-NIS 1) The standard operational procedure (SOP) for any special operation (SO), specifically where it involved the penetration of a secure communications system, was to protect that access at all costs, even if it meant the loss of life. 2) This rather harsh approach must be understood in the context of the strategic objective as it existed at that time. If intelligence was yielded that a bombing was about to occur, and in all cases, that bombing was prevented, then over time MK commanders would realize that their systems had been penetrated. This would cause new systems to be developed with the resultant loss of access. The loss of access would be counterproductive, so balance was always maintained to enable some operational successes to be claimed by MK, simply to protect the long-term strategic access that had been achieved at great operational cost and risk. This does not mean that foreknowledge did not trigger counter-action. The best example of this is again found in the Pretoria Car Bomb, where the premature detonation killed the two MK operatives Freddie Shangwe and Ezekial Maseko. The probable reason for this was an earlier special operation in response to the Wimpy Bar bombings, during which access was gained to MK explosives caches, tampering with the fuses. This meant that what was considered to be a slow acting fuse in fact became a fast acting fuse, designed specifically to deter the laying of bombs by destroying the bombers. While this has not been confirmed in the Pretoria Car Bomb case, it bears all of the hallmarks of the strategy used at the time to counter the threat, while also protecting long-term strategic penetration. (The families of the victims of the bombing might not agree, so this is an emotive and complex issue that needs to be dealt with in respect and sensitivity). 3) For this reason, there was a natural tension between strategic-level SO’s run by the CDCO-NIS and tactical intelligence efforts driven by the SADF-SF and SAP. The tactical demands were such that the intelligence would be used to neutralize the threat, but NIS typically wanted to keep the penetration safe in order to gain maximum strategic advantage from that compromised network over time. 4) The SOP for NIS-CDCO SO’s was thus never to allow the enemy to know that their networks had been penetrated and thus compromised. For this reason, it could never be known that NIS was aware of Operation Vula, because that would limit future operational benefits that could be derived. This is a critical element in understanding Operation Vula from a strategic perspective. 55


Understanding Operation Vula from a Strategic Perspective 1) During the build up to what later became known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the CDCO-NIS ran a special operation that penetrated both the Cuban and the Angolan decision-making hierarchy. This yielded valuable intelligence that was used in the subsequent negotiations that saw the SADF disengage from operations in Angola and what was then known as SWA with dignity. 2) This triggered a strategic focus on the internal security situation inside SA where hardened operational units like 32 Bn and 1 & 2 Para were needed inside the East Rand Townships, simply because the SAP could not contain the level of military weaponry being encountered. 3) Central to this was the notion of a negotiated peace, which evolved over time to become known as CODESA. 4) One key element of this was a strategic engagement between NIS and Nelson Mandela then still in prison. In order to secure this secret engagement a decision was made to move Nelson Mandela off Robben Island onto the mainland. The purpose of this was to prevent the media from getting wind of Dr Niel Barnard’s increasingly frequent visits to Mr Mandela. 5) Arising from the successful yield of Operation Spaghetti, reinforced by the strategic intelligence yield from the Cuban/Angolan operation, the future relevance of the SACP became questionable in terms of the South African power calculus. In this regard, the actions of what was then known as the Special Working Group (SWG) inside CDCO-NIS became focussed on understanding the tensions between the ANC and SACP in exile. This triggered another special operation designed to better understand whether the Russians would come to the aid of any non-Russian communist party, when the USSR started to disintegrate. The author was directly involved in this action, but it is not dealt with further in this document, because it is not directly relevant to Operation Vula. 6) It must be remembered that at this time the country was in severe internal upheaval with localized theatres of operation resembling civil war. The significance of this was that MK was not driving the internal process, because of the success of Operation Cruiser in neutralizing the infiltration of MK cadres in sufficient quantity to create a de facto presence inside the country. Ronnie Kasrils drafted an internal report dealing with this matter, also intercepted, which served to confirm the success of Cruiser. The internal insecurity situation was actually being driven by the UDF and spontaneous efforts at the self-mobilization of localized militias, most notably aligned with the IFP. Importantly MK was not in control and the SACP was not actually driving the internal process as they had anticipated they would. This critical nuance is seldom noted in most popular analyses of the country at that time. 7) When these secret talks had proceeded to the point where it became imperative that the engagement initiative should be expanded to other senior members of the ANC, the issue of how to do this arose as an operational problem to be solved by the team. 8) One solution was the so-called Dakar Safari, which was a special operation run by CDCO-NIS to test broader opinion about the possibility of a negotiated settlement. 9) Another solution was a highly focussed special envoy led by Mike Louw of the NIS to engage with ANC leadership in exile. 10) What was lacking was direct engagement with the SACP faction, and it is here that Operation Vula became strategically important, because in effect it gave a credible linkage between Mr Mandela in prison and the SACP leadership in exile. This is an example of the long-term benefit of not closing down a penetrated and compromised communication network prematurely. Thus, what was claimed by Mac Maharaj in his statement to the eNCA documentary entitled “The Vula Connection” as a stunning operational success was just that, because at that moment in historic 56


time it was vital for the SACP leadership to believe that they had a secure line of communication with Nelson Mandela in prison. That was the strategic success of Operation Vula – it allowed Mr Mandela to communicate with the SACP and MK leadership in a way that they felt comfortable with.

Summary of the Significance of Operation Vula 1) The very need for Operation Vula arose from the highly successful Operation Cruiser that prevented the infiltration of MK units into SA in sufficient numbers to ever resemble the de facto situation experienced in the Rhodesian Bush War where ZANLA and ZIPRA forces could declare “liberated areas”. 2) Operation Vula made use of encrypted data communications sent via telephone lines using acoustic modems that would have been routinely captured by Echelon then in existence, to intercept all encrypted messages that could be used by terrorist groups or criminal syndicates. Both the IRA and PLO were considered to be terrorist groups, so they were automatically targeted. The MK linkage to these organizations made them a target by default. 3) When Operation Vula began to escalate into an arms build-up inside South Africa, it was already too late to become tactically relevant. On the contrary, the build-up of weapons and internal forces during the negotiations associated with CODESA delegitimized the ANC by providing evidence that they were not negotiating in good faith – exactly what they were accusing the SA government of at the time of the Third Force revelations by the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry. 4) By the time the SAP saw fit to act on Operation Vula with the arrest of Siphiwe Nyanda, there was no longer a strategic need to leave the secure communication system between Nelson Mandela and the SACP ranking hierarchy in place, as the negotiations process had become self-sustaining. 5) Operation Vula is a prime example of human ingenuity in that it was highly innovative in the use of emerging technology. For this every credit must be given to Tim Jenkins who worked with vigour, focus and integrity to solve a complex problem. 6) On the flip side of the same coin Operation Vula reveals the traditional vulnerabilities of communication with covert forces in the field from a remote leadership. Ultimately the Achilles heel of all clandestine communications is the vulnerability to interception with SOP’s of most sophisticated counter-espionage or counter-terrorism agencies being such that they will continue to monitor without the users ever knowing that the operational integrity of their so-called secure system has been compromised. 7) Ultimately it comes down to the capacity of either side to mobilize the technological ingenuity needed to communicate effectively. For MK that meant the technological capacity of Tim Jenkins as well as the somewhat advanced capacity of the IRA (which was significantly penetrated at this time) and the PLO (also effectively neutralized as a fighting force to be replaced by Hammas and Hezbollah post-Vula). For NIS it meant the capacity of T1, supported by the combined capacities of all partner services with an interest in countering communism and/or terrorism as a threat towards western democracies. 8) Therefore, while Operation Vula was a good example of the triumph of human ingenuity in times of conflict, it was not the major success that the need for the creation of an MK mythology dictates. This information was shared with the journalist during the research phase of what became known as “The Vula Connection”, but was edited out for reasons unknown. This leaves “The Vula Connection” as the only narrative about the event, which would allow it to become an entrenched mythology if not challenged by accurate facts provided by credible sources.

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Photos

T38 Xangongo – operational deployment in Angola at Xangongo with a shot out Russian tank and my Eland callsign 23Bravo.

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Quarto Rodos – With Afonso Dhlakama during the SO tasked to end the flow of weapons across the border to the armed faction of the IFP.

RENAMO 7 – The K32 small team with the Renamo Commanding General and the Commander of Dhlakama’s personal body guard unit. 59


RENAMO 6 – me with the Renamo Chief of Staff (whom I taught how to read and write English), a senior officer from their signals unit (whom I trained in covert communications) and the commander of the Presidents Body Guard (on whose judgement my life depended daily given that we were operating under deep cover without support from RSA).

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POLISIEGESKIEDENIS/ POLICE HISTORY Eerste Vroue Kommissaris: Riah Phiyega / First Woman Police Commissioner OPINION

Riah Phiyega: The Police Commissioner with the Tin Heart William Saunderson-Meyer | 16 June 2017 William Saunderson-Meyer on the suspended SAPS chief, whose term of office finally came to an end this week

A Jaundiced Eye Monday was Riah Phiyega’s last day as the National Police Commissioner. Well, sort of. There was no goodbye office party, with coffee and cookies. There were no nostalgic farewell speeches with loyal subordinates surreptitiously knuckling away a tear. Because Phiyega has been suspended from her job for the past 20 months, she hasn’t had the schlepp of battling through the Pretoria traffic to turn up at her Wachthuis office and actually work. Another positive for her has been that this unintended vacation has, naturally, been on full pay. Despite the suspension, Phiyega does have some bragging rights. She is, for example, the only commissioner since George Fivaz, a career policeman appointed in 1994 by President Nelson Mandela, to complete the statutory five-year term.

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Jackie Selebi, a political appointment by President Thabo Mbeki, had his office unexpectedly truncated by a 15-year jail sentence for corruption. Bheki Cele, a political appointment by President Jacob Zuma, survived barely two years before being fired after a board of inquiry into claims of corruption found him unfit for service. Phiyega, too, was found by a board of inquiry to be unfit for office, following the death from police fire of 34 miners at Marikana. Earlier, the Farlam commission of inquiry into the Marikana incident found that she her evidence to the commission had been misleading. One would know none of this from the SA Police Service (SAPS) website’s history of the service, which is a marvellous example of how to airbrush inconvenient truths. Maybe airbrushing is too subtle a description. SAPS’s official account of its past is industrial-scale propagandistic spraypainting. To start with, this history commences in 1994. Presumably this is to avoid recounting the sullying incidents dating back to the force’s actual formation in 1913, lest we start drawing embarrassing analogies with the present day. More specifically, Selebi’s appointment – a disaster not only for SAPS but for Interpol, the international police agency of which he was head until charged – is noted with the unintentionally comical observation that he marked the beginning of a “new era” for the SAPS. As it turned out, a new era, indeed, but not as was intended. Selebi’s subsequent abrupt departure is not even mentioned, never mind the reason for it. Similarly, with Cele. Phiyega’s personal Waterloo, the Battle of Marikana, is never mentioned. Nor, obviously, the Farlam Commission, or the board of inquiry, or her suspension. Phiyega’s name occurs only twice. Once, to record her appointment as commissioner, with the police minister assuring her of “all necessary support to ensure that we collectively continue to deal a blow to crime”. The second mention is a 2013 speech commemorating the police service’s centenary. Her speech – which the SAPS history breathily describes as “inspirational” – is actually a perfunctory introduction to the main speaker, the minister of police. Despite its brevity, it does have its own moments of unintended hilarity. “Nothing will deter us,” boasts Phiyega without a blush, just a year after Marikana, “from ensuring that our women and men in blue conduct themselves at all times in a manner which is beyond reproach. At the same time we must tackle crime and criminals with vigour yet within the confines of the very laws which we are Constitutionally bound to uphold.” These are remarkable words from a woman who has never shown the faintest public sign of contrition for Marikana. For she and Marikana have become synonymous. If one googles “Phiyega”, the search engine’s auto-complete instantaneously couples her name to the massacre. It must surely, at some level, hurt that it is for this tragedy that she will go down in history? To be ignominiously shuffled from the stage, always to be remembered as the one who presided over the unthinkable, the first police massacre under an African National Congress government – a massacre eerily echoing the 1960 Sharpeville killings by the guardians of the apartheid state – must be an emotional burden, no matter how brazen a face she puts on it. 62


On the other hand, perhaps this insouciance is not act and there indeed is no burden. Phiyega was an ANC deployee, not a through-the-ranks public servant. Politicians are not renowned for being finely attuned to feelings of shame and remorse. As she put it when introducing the minister, presumably with a straight face, “We can never change history. In fact we must carefully preserve history so that we can celebrate the fact that injustices of the past have been rectified.” Trust us, Phiyega, we will. South Africa will remember. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/riah-phiyega-the-police-commissioner-with-the-tin?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017.

Phiyega A Huge Disappointment - ISS 2017-06-12 19:50 Amanda Khoza, News24 Johannesburg - Former national police commissioner Riah Phiyega was a huge disappointment, Institute for Security Studies senior researcher Johan Burger said on Monday. Her lack of policing experience was one of her biggest problems, he said, reflecting on her five-year term, which began in June 2012 and ended on Saturday. Before being appointed police commissioner, she was a group executive at Absa and Transnet. Repeated warnings about appointing non-police staff to the position were ignored, Burger said. Not only did she fail, she also caused much damage to policing. "When she was appointed, the minister at the time said she was bringing a wealth of management experience to policing," said Burger. 'Unthinkable' Phiyega replaced Bheki Cele. He was fired in 2012 after the Moloi board of inquiry found him guilty of gross misconduct in his dealing with a lease for police office space. Cele replaced Jackie Selebi who was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 15 years' jail in August 2010. Selebi died on January 23, 2015 at the age of 64, while out on medical parole. Burger said one of the biggest mistakes Phiyega made was to compliment officers involved in the shooting of 34 miners during a strike at Lonmin's platinum mine in Marikana, North West, in August 2012. "That is unthinkable. It was the most irresponsible thing, even if you believed that your policemen acted lawfully and in self-defence. The mere fact so many people were killed and so many were wounded, it is a massive tragic thing. "As police commissioner, I would expect you to show shock and say whatever happened there will have to be properly investigated and tell those officers that it is a tragic thing that has happened." 63


Burger said she misled the Farlam commission of inquiry, which investigated the Marikana violence. She hid a decision to implement the "tactical option", taken at a meeting of senior police the day before the shooting on August 16 2012. In addition, she failed to discipline former police crime intelligence head Richard Mdluli, despite a court ruling instructing her to do so. Transparent appointment Phiyega closed ranks and refused to co-operate with organisations like the ISS. "When Bheki Cele came, we had an open relationship with the police. Even when we were critical of the police, he always encouraged members to continue working with the police." When Phiyega was suspended on full pay in October 2015, her replacement Lieutenant-General Khomotso Phahlane introduced some welcome changes. He allowed the ISS access to crime statistics three days before they were released to the public, giving the organisation more time to analyse them, Burger said. Burger called for the appointment of a police commissioner to be done transparently and in consultation with other interested parties. This would make it difficult for the president to manipulate the process. At the moment, only the president was responsible for appointing a commissioner. "By the time that that person is appointed it is too late to come forward with information that can get them disqualified." Ideally, the best candidate should be from the police's ranks. They should have suitable policing experience, be qualified, and have integrity. Their priority should be the Constitution and the people of South Africa, Burger argued. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/phiyega-a-huge-disappointment-iss-20170612 – 19 June 2017.

Police spooks threaten to strike 2017-06-18 06:03 Abram Mashego Turmoil is brewing within the police’s crime intelligence unit, with operatives threatening to go on strike or disobey new acting head Major General Patrick Mokushane’s orders. Mokushane, appointed acting head of crime intelligence on Monday, gave all crime intelligence officers until tomorrow to vacate the unit’s headquarters in Erasmuskloof, Pretoria, and be deployed to police clusters around the country. 64


“We are left with no choice but to defy his orders. By deploying us to the clusters and placing us within clusters he is blowing our cover,” said one officer. Crime intelligence officers operate in a strictly confidential environment in which their identities and the role they play in information gathering is kept top secret. Part of their responsibilities is to infiltrate syndicates and provide information support to police about planned crimes. “The manner in which we have been deployed is inhumane... How does one get a week’s notice to relocate?” asked another. SA Policing Union president Mpho Kwinika said the union was challenging the decision and had declared a conflict with the employer. “We advised management that they cannot just deploy members without proper consultation. The transfer will not happen,” Kwinika said, adding that deploying officers to clusters exposed them to some of their colleagues who shouldn’t know who they are. But another source within crime intelligence, who is close to Mokushane, said all the new acting head wanted was for operatives to be out and about and doing their jobs. “They have to be on the ground and serve the public ... We cannot have operatives based at head office while criminals are busy ruling the streets,” he said. Another senior source within crime intelligence said the unit was being restructured and members from the rank of constable to warrant officer, who left the SA Police Service (SAPS), were now being re-enlisted. This is being done to create jobs for non-statutory force (NSF) members – former members of the military wings of liberation movements before 1994. These people are being brought in, the source said, to handle “sensitive investigations”. These, City Press reported last week, are expected to include politicians and members of nongovernmental organisations who oppose President Jacob Zuma, as well as journalists, in the run-up to the ANC’s December elective conference. The source said newly appointed acting police commissioner, Lieutenant General Lesetja Mothiba, last week signed the “document that will allow a number of the MKMVA [Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans’ Association] members to be re-ranked into high-ranking managerial positions in the police, starting from full colonel upwards. "The cost to the police budget is estimated to be R10bn.” The insider said this was being done at the insistence of the MKMVA, which has complained that its members were sidelined. The NSF component has a number of senior managers without any portfolio in the police. 65


SAPS spokesperson Major General Sally de Beer said the re-enlistment process was being done to “improve capacity in different SAPS environments, focusing on the commercial crime units, organised crime units, detective units at police stations, family violence, child protection and sexual offences units, forensic social workers, intelligence gatherers, crime information officers, police stations, 10111 centres, K9 units, public order policing, mounted units and generic support”. Attempts to reach Mokushane on his cellphone were fruitless. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-spooks-threaten-to-strike-20170617 – 19 June 2017.

Suspended Generals Phiyega and Mdluli earn R11.5 million – Zakhele Mbhele Zakhele Mbhele | 28 June 2017 DA says millions have been wasted on paying individuals who were clearly not fit for their jobs in the first place Suspended Phiyega and Mdluli earn R11.5 million 28 June 2017 Replies to DA Parliamentary Questions have revealed that, since their suspensions in October 2015 and May 2011, former National Police Commissioner, Riah Phiyega, and suspended Head of Crime Intelligence, Richard Mdluli, received a combined R11.5 million for sitting at home and contributing nothing to the fight against crime in South Africa. Phiyega has received almost R3.2 million, including half a million rand as a cash allowance, an almost R300 000 ‘head of department’ allowance and over R330 000 in employers pension contribution. Mdluli netted R8.3 million, including a basic salary of almost R5 million, a non-pensionable cash allowance of nearly R1.4 million, an employee pension contribution of almost R800 000 and a motor car allowance of over R700 000. Astoundingly, this massive amount to Mdluli also includes what is referred to as a “service bonus” of more than R400 000 – which now may as well be called a 'couch potato bonus' given his six-year suspension. South Africans live in fear each and every single day. Yet millions of rand of public funds have been wasted on paying two individuals, who were clearly not fit for their jobs in the first place, to stay at home and twiddle their thumbs. This is unacceptable. The disciplinary proceedings must be sped up and concluded with the utmost urgency so that no more money is wasted.

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It is absolutely imperative that we have fit and proper leadership in the police so that these millions, that could have been spent on our severely under-resourced police, are not wasted on failed SAPS leadership. Text of replies: 36/1/4/1/201700100 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WRITTEN REPLY QUESTION 1044 DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: 5 MAY 2017 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 15- 2017) 1044. Mr M H Redelinghuys (DA) to ask the Minister of Police: (1) (a) On what date did the suspension of the former Head of Crime Intelligence, Richard Mdluli, take effect, and (b) what is the total amount that SA Police Service has paid to the specified person since his suspension to the latest available date, including (i) salary, (ii) benefits, (iii) bonuses and (iv) any other payments; (2) (a) what internal steps have been taken to finalise the matter of the specified person and (b) in each case (i) on what date and (ii) what was the outcome of the steps taken? NW1174E REPLY: (1)(a) 2011-05-08 (1)(b)(i)(ii)(iii) The Head of Crime Intelligence Richard Mdluli received the following remuneration and benefits for the 2011-05-08 to 2017-04-30. Basic Salary: R4 985 795, 27 Non Pensionable Cash allowance: R1 392 536, 16 Motor Car Allowance: R 717 741, 94 Service Bonus: R 413 957, 25 (1)(b)(iv) Employee Pension Contribution: R 797 584, 39 PSCBC Employers Contribution: R 64, 83 SSSBC: R 181, 00 Total: R8 307 860, 84 (2)(a)(b)(i)(ii) An internal disciplinary process has been initiated, functionaries have been appointed and the process is underway. *** 36/1/4/1/201700099 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WRITTEN REPLY QUESTION 1043 DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: 5 MAY 2017 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 15- 2017) 1043. Mr M H Redelinghuys (DA) to ask the Minister of Police: (a) On what date did the suspension of the National Police Commissioner, Ria Phiyega, take effect and (b) what is the total amount that SA Police Service has paid to the specified person since her suspension to the latest available date, including (i) salary, (ii) benefits, (iii) bonuses and (iv) any other payments? NW1173E REPLY: (a) The suspension of the National Police Commissioner took effect on 2015/10/14. 67


(b)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) The National Commissioner, Ria Phiyega, received the following remuneration and benefits for the period, 2015/10/14 to 2017/04/30. Basic Salary: R2 095 802,70 Non Pensionable Cash allowance: R 562 541,23 Head of Department Allowance: R 299 224,08 Employer’s Pension Contribution : R 335 130,47 PSCBC Employer’s Contribution: R 22,07 SSSBC Employer’s Contribution: R 64,00 Total: R3 292 784,55 Issued by Parliament, 27 June 2017 ENDS Issued by Zakhele Mbhele, DA Shadow Minister of Police, 28 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/suspended-phiyega-and-mdluli-earn-r115-million-za?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=df360e4895EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-df360e4895130042309 – 29 June 2017.

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5 125 unsolved murder cases in Gauteng – Fikile Mbalula Fikile Mbalula | 28 June 2017 Police minister says 136 originate from hijackings, 602 from robberies FOR WRITTEN REPLY QUESTION 868 DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: 31 MARCH 2017 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 12- 2017) 868. Mrs A M Dreyer (DA) to ask the Minister of Police: 1. (a) What is the number of unsolved murder cases in each district in Gauteng and (b) how many of these cases relate to (i) hijacking, (ii) taxi violence, (iii) burglary and (iv) random robbery; 2. whether there exists a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the SA Police Service and each metro police department within Gauteng in relation to crime fighting in their jurisdictions; if not, why not; if so, will he provide Mrs A M Dreyer with a copy of each MOU? NW934E REPLY: (1)(a)(b)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) (a) (b)(ii) (b)(iv) Unsolved (b)(i) (b)(iii) Cluster Taxi Random Murder Hijacking Burglary Violence Robbery Cases 1 Ekurhuleni Central 208 0 1 0 183 2 Ekurhuleni East 122 4 0 4 13 3 Ekurhuleni North 407 52 0 70 191 68


4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Ekurhuleni West 387 JHB Central 561 JHB East 164 JHB North 121 JHB West 221 Sedibeng 198 Soweto East 118 Soweto West 145 Tshwane Central 118 Tshwane East 168 Tshwane North 667 Tshwane West 937 West Rand 583 Provincial 0 Investigation Unit (PIU) Taxi TOTAL 5 125

1 12 5 0 5 7 7 1 1 3 1 4 33 0

3 0 2 2 8 4 8 0 0 0 3 6 2 71

0 8 0 2 1 4 6 2 5 15 0 8 44 0

3 6 15 6 13 11 31 17 1 15 5 5 87 0

136

110

169

602

(2) There is no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between any of the three Metro Police Departments (MPDs) and the South African Police Service (SAPS) in Gauteng. There are three fully established MPDs in Gauteng, namely: Johannesburg MPD; Ekurhuleni MPD; and Tshwane MPD. The SAPS has, however, established a National Forum for MPDs, which includes all of the MPDs in the Gauteng Province. The Forum, chaired by the Divisional Commissioner: Visible Policing on behalf of the Acting National Commissioner, convenes on a quarterly basis. The Forum is attended by the Provincial Commissioners in whose provinces MPDs have been established, namely Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The purpose of the Forum is to coordinate joint operations between the SAPS and the various MPDs, informed by the identified crime threats and tendencies in the relevant jurisdictions. Senior members of the various MPDs also attend Provincial Joint Intelligence and Operational Structure (Prov JOINTS), during which integrated operations are planned. The Forum also coordinates the quality assurance of entry-level qualifications for MPD members, while additional, specific training is provided by the SAPS, including: drill and physical training, management and leadership training, crowd management training and general policing training (predominantly using a “train-the-trainer� approach). The SAPS in Gauteng is also supported by the Gauteng Traffic Police who also mobilise the smaller Municipal Police Departments to provide a joint integrated approach to policing. The Gauteng Law Enforcement Agencies Forum (GLEAF) was established in 2015. This forum coordinates and drives joint interventions between the SAPS and other law enforcement agencies. The forum accounts for all joint operations within Gauteng and guides the need for specific interventions at all levels. The forum is chaired and headed by the Deputy Provincial Commissioner Policing: Gauteng and consists of all SAPS Operational Heads and Police Chiefs. The forum is an effective operational command structure that has yielded good results. The following priority committees were established: 69


Bad Buildings; By-Law Management; Counterfeit Goods; Taxi Violence; Road Safety; and Illegal Mining. The above-mentioned committees plan and execute joint, integrated operations, addressing specific problems and report monthly to the GLEAF on actions executed, successes and future interventions. Several discussions and planning sessions were held during 2016/17 and a MOU will be facilitated during May 2017, after considering the inputs received. The SAPS and MPDs have, in partnership with the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for Community Safety, compiled the following strategies that drive the joint integrated approach to policing in Gauteng: The Gauteng Safety Strategy; and The Gauteng Integrated Policing Strategy. Issued by Parliament, 27 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/5-125-unsolved-murder-cases-in-gauteng--fikilemba?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=df360e4895EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-df360e4895130042309 – 29 June 2017.

STAATSLYKSHUISE Staatslykshuise word nie meer die polisie – soos in die ou dae – geadministreer nie. Van oudsher het die polisie die staatslykshuise met gepaardgaande lykskouings geadministreer. Die funksie is na gesondheid afgewentel. POLITICS

Gauteng Premier should have stepped in early to alleviate mortuary crisis – Jack Bloom Jack Bloom | 15 June 2017 DA says there has been extra anguish in Muslim and Jewish communities who are required to bury bodies on the same day

Gauteng Premier should have stepped in early to alleviate mortuary crisis 15 June 2017 The Gauteng Provincial Government needs to be held accountable for its terrible mismanagement of the week-long strike at state mortuaries that has caused extreme trauma to families unable to bury their loved ones. 70


Amongst the heart-tending stories is that of Mrs Colleen Duister who has been trying to bury her 3year-old daughter whose body has not been released from the Germiston mortuary. I know of family from foreign countries who are in the country for a limited period of time trying to get the bodies of relatives for burial in their home country. There has been extra anguish in the Muslim and Jewish communities who are required to bury bodies on the same day. There has been poor contingency planning and failed efforts to provide security for pathologists trying to work on the bodies at the mortuaries. The underlying cause of the strike by the pathology assistants has simmered on for more than 10 years following the transfer of the mortuaries in 2006 from the police to the Gauteng Health Department. They claim that they are underpaid and doing work for which they are not qualified. There have been various strikes over this issue, including in December last year. Health MEC Gwen Ramokgopa has not impressed with her handling of this issue. Gauteng Premier David Makhura should have stepped in at an early stage to coordinate efforts to provide security at the mortuaries, and resolve the dispute as soon as possible. His absence from this crisis is notable. The delay in bringing in medical staff from the defence force means that the backlog of bodies will take a number of days to clear. I hope that sense prevails and that order is soon restored in this very sensitive matter. Issued by Jack Bloom, DA Gauteng Shadow MEC for Health, 15 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/gauteng-premier-should-have-stepped-in-early-toal?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017. POLITICS

Court orders autopsies as Gauteng mortuary strike continues - Jack Bloom Jack Bloom | 18 June 2017 DA MPL notes that Muslim families religiously required to bury within 24 hrs of death

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Court Orders Autopsies as Gauteng Mortuary Strike Continues Desperate families have secured court orders to force postmortems at Gauteng state mortuaries so that they could get bodies for burial as the strike by about 180 forensic assistants drags on with no end in sight. I know of three court orders brought by Muslim families who are religiously required to bury within 24 hours of death. It is tragic that the court has to step in because of the pathetic mishandling of this strike by the Gauteng Health Department. Families were hopeful that the backlog of more than 200 bodies would be speedily cut when military health personnel were brought in to assist last week, but this turned out to be only 7 people. Pathologists have heroically worked without assistants over this long weekend, but new bodies are coming in all the time and they cannot cope. As there is no fridge space, bodies are being piled on top of each other. Unions claim that the assistants are not striking but are "working to rule" by only doing what is in their job descriptions, but this is false. I have established that their duties explicitly include the following as contained in a recent job advert for a Grade 1 Forensic Pathology Officer: "Assist in rendering an efficient Forensic Autopsy process (which includes evisceration, scribing and typing) in accordance with set standards and guidelines by assisting the Forensic Pathologists in autopsies." (See job advert here.)8 The Department needs to get tough with forensic officers who are striking illegally, some of whom have incited angry relatives against pathologists who fear for their safety. The Department has already agreed to danger pay and to the reversal of the Occupational Specific Dispensation (OSD) which was disastrously implemented in 2009 and resulted in a pay cut for forensic officers. There is no reason for this strike as remaining grievances can be addressed in the Bargaining Chamber, but the problem is that the Department has low credibility because of previously unfulfilled promises in this matter. Premier David Makhura has been inexplicably missing from this crisis. He needs to co-ordinate efforts to ensure that security is established at the 10 mortuaries and that other health workers are used to assist pathologists to speed up autopsies. An urgent court order should be brought against the illegal strikers who disrespect the dead and are causing incredible anguish to relatives waiting more than ten days in some instances to bury loved ones. Statement issued by Jack Bloom MPL, DA Gauteng Shadow Health MEC, 18 June 2017

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https://press-admin.voteda.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Forensic.pdf

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http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/court-orders-autopsies-as-gauteng-mortuary-strike?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017.

50 bodies stuck at Pinetown mortuary for months - DA 2017-06-21 16:43 Mxolisi Mngadi, News24 Durban - Fifty bodies have been lying in the Pinetown mortuary since January this year, without post-mortems being conducted on them, the Democratic Alliance in KwaZulu-Natal revealed on Wednesday. The bodies, which have also not been claimed by relatives, are now in an advanced state of decomposition, DA KwaZulu-Natal spokesperson on health, Dr Imraan Keeka, said in a statement. "This has been confirmed to the DA via two sources, one based at the mortuary and another from a facility that will be possibly involved in completing the post-mortems over the next few days," said Keeka. Keeka said the findings come amid speculation that the backlog has been caused by the mortuary's resident pathologist being frequently absent. "According to both sources, the KZN's health department supposedly intends bringing in forensic pathologists from other facilities to assist with the backlog," he said. It is also not the first time that there have been problems at the Pinetown mortuary. 'Will come back to haunt him' In March this year, mortuary workers at this, and several other facilities, embarked on a strike over their working conditions, causing a severe backlog in autopsies and burials. "The same happened in May, with the result that the MEC (Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo) rushed in to perform post-mortems himself. At the time, the DA warned him that, unless he dealt with workers' grievances, they would continue to come back to haunt him," Keeka said. The DA will call for an urgent oversight visit by the province's health portfolio committee to the Pinetown mortuary instead of the routine oversight visit to the Fort Napier Mortuary the committee will conduct on Friday, Keeka said. "We will also submit a written parliamentary question to MEC Dhlomo about the circumstances at this mortuary and will call for answers around the delays in burials, which we believe could also be as a result of the department’s current financial status," he said. On Monday, the DA called for Dhlomo's dismissal following the recent findings of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) into the oncology crisis in the province. Violated rights 73


The 68-page report found that Dhlomo and his department had "violated the rights of cancer patients to have access to treatment". The commission found that the health department, both nationally and in KwaZulu-Natal, had failed to take reasonable measures to progressively realise the right to have access to healthcare services in in the province. The KwaZulu-Natal health department was not immediately available for comment. In Gauteng, untrained staff members have been conducting post-mortems for the province's health department since 2006, the health portfolio committee heard on Tuesday morning. The revelations were made when the director general of the national health department, Malebona Precious Matsoso, briefed the committee on the ongoing strike by forensic staff in Gauteng, chairperson Mary-Ann Dunjwa told News24 on Wednesday. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/50-bodies-stuck-at-pinetown-mortuary-for-months-da20170621 - 21 June 2017.

Drivers, cleaners conducted post-mortems in Gauteng since 2006 2017-06-21 12:20 James de Villiers, News24

SANDF and Gauteng health officials attend a briefing to discuss the military's deployment to provincial forensic services. (Gauteng Department of Health) Cape Town - Untrained staff have been conducting post-mortems for the Gauteng health department since 2006, the health portfolio committee heard on Tuesday morning. Lees verder op / Read further ………………………………………….. 74


http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/drivers-cleaners-conducted-post-mortems-in-gautengsince-2006-20170621 - 21 June 2017

Too few military medics to assist in Gauteng mortuary strike – Jack Bloom Jack Bloom | 20 June 2017 DA says pathologists are struggling to keep backlog of autopsies from growing as about 40 new bodies come in every day Too few military medics to assist in Gauteng mortuary strike 20 June 2017 The Gauteng Health Department announced last week that military staff would be used at the ten Gauteng state mortuaries hit by strike action, but only 10 military medics are assisting, which is too few to cut the backlog of more than 200 bodies. Pathologists are struggling to keep the backlog of autopsies from growing as about 40 new bodies come in every day. The Department's efforts to ameliorate the effects of the strike and to end it have been feeble. Again, this shows that the ANC is too weak to act against union allies.

There is no doubt that this is an illegal strike rather than a "go slow" or "work-to-rule" as the job description of forensic pathologist officers explicitly details that they assist with autopsies under direction of pathologists, which is what has happened now for many years. They have genuine grievances about pay and working conditions, but the Department has already conceded on this and other issues can be sorted out through the bargaining chamber. It is also unclear who represents the 180 striking workers as both NEHAWU and Hospersa have issued statements on their behalf. I visited the Hillbrow Mortuary yesterday and some workers said they were not represented by any union. A court order against the strike is long overdue to ensure that families get the bodies of their loved ones for burial as soon as possible. Issued by Jack Bloom, DA Gauteng Shadow Health MEC, 20 June 2017

POLITICS

Kebby's R8m strong-arm for MKMVA conference must be probed by AG - Kobus Marais Kobus Marais | 18 June 2017 DA MP says deputy minister a known Zuma-cheerleader who seems to act with impunity as a result 75


Why has Gauteng Health Avoided Court Action to stop Mortuary Strike? - Jack Bloom Jack Bloom | 22 June 2017 DA says the reason the strike has gone off for so long is because forensic assistants are still getting paid and there is no pressure on them to settle. Why has the Gauteng Health Department avoided court action to stop mortuary strike? 21 June 2017 I welcome signs of progress in the Public Health Bargaining Council that the strike in Gauteng mortuaries could be over by this weekend, but the question remains as to why the strike in an essential service was not halted right at the beginning by court action by the Gauteng Health Department. The Essential Services Committee established under section 70 of the Labour Relations Act designates both Forensics and Mortuaries as essential services where strikes are prohibited and grievances should be settled by arbitration. The striking Forensic Pathologist Officers are not justified in refusing to do "out-of-scope" work as part of their job definition is that they assist with autopsies under supervision. I doubt the union's claims that drivers and cleaners were doing postmortems and that this was a reason for the strike. According to a recent job advertisement for a Grade 1 Forensic Pathology Officer, they should "Assist in rendering an efficient Forensic Autopsy process (which includes evisceration, scribing and typing) in accordance with set standards and guidelines by assisting the Forensic Pathologists in autopsies." Gauteng Health MEC Gwen Ramokgopa has wrongly agreed with unions that this is not a strike but a "work to rule". The reason the strike has gone on for so long is because the forensic assistants are still getting paid and there is no pressure on them to settle. I suspect that tough action against NEHAWU was avoided for political reasons as it is a COSATU union that still supports the ANC. Meanwhile, relatives of the deceased have suffered immense trauma by the delay in releasing bodies for burial. Pathologists working without assistants have been heroes, but they are becoming exhausted and the backlog of more than 200 autopsies will take some time to clear. The Gauteng Health Department should hang its head in shame for mishandling this strike which could have been averted with forceful action rather than pathetic appeasement. Issued by Jack Bloom, DA Gauteng Shadow Health MEC, 21 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/why-has-gauteng-health-avoided-court-action-tosto?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=88b2cabbcbEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_22&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-88b2cabbcb130042309 – 23 June 2017. 76


OPINION

On the misreporting of the mortuary strike Professor Gert Saayman | 23 June 2017 Prof Gert Saayman says there appears to be a poor understanding of the role of assistants There have been many recent media reports pertaining to the strike action by forensic officers at medico-legal mortuaries in Gauteng. It is clear from most of these reports that there is a severe lack of knowledge regarding the practice of forensic death investigations. In particular, there also appears to be a very poor understanding pertaining to the scope and nature of medico-legal autopsies and specifically, the roles and functions of the medical practitioners responsible for such autopsies - and those of their assistants. Pathologists are specialist medical doctors who have undergone further postgraduate training after completing their medical degree. Forensic pathologists have specifically specialised in the field of pathology which deals primarily with the pathology of traumatic injury, poisonings and other nonnatural causes of death. It takes a minimum of thirteen years of undergraduate training, vocational experience and postgraduate study, with multiple intensive examinations, before one can qualify as a forensic pathologist. The doctor can then register with the Health Professions Council of SA (HPCSA) as a specialist forensic pathologist. Thus, it is grossly inaccurate to refer to forensic officers and those who function as assistants to forensic pathologists, as being forensic pathologists - as has been repeatedly done by ill-informed reporters, union representatives and even government officials recently. For centuries, both internationally and locally, doctors/pathologists have conducted autopsies with the help of assistants who are not medically qualified. The role of such assistants is to aid with preparing the body, positioning and presenting it for the pathologist, to assist with specified dissection procedures, to eviscerate organs and to clean body cavities, return tissues to the body and to reconstitute the body, by sewing up thereof, washing the body and making it available to undertakers - who will then further prepare the body for burial or cremation. Such assistants (who are not doctors) who work with bodies and do certain dissection procedures are not unique to the field of forensic pathology, but are also found in anatomy departments at medical schools, at undertakers premises and funeral parlours (where private autopsies are performed in preparation for cremations or where organs are removed for example, for referral to specialist medical centres for subsequent examination with a view to establishing whether the deceased’s family qualify for compensation for occupational diseases). When a radiographer (for example) prepares x-ray plates of a patient or performs a CT-scan, he/she does not claim to be a radiologist (a specialist medical practitioner); when a nurse inserts a catheter for a patient or administers an injection, that does not make him/her a doctor. When a scrub nurse or sister assists a surgeon in performing an operation, that does not make of her a surgeon and she cannot claim to have “performed the operation�. None of these functions detract from the duties and relative value of the service provided by the assistant - but they do not warrant the person in question being promoted to a medical specialist or doctor. 77


There are numerous other examples of medical professionals who require the assistance of persons who are not medically or otherwise qualified, but who work with human tissue: such persons are found also in university departments of anatomical pathology, police forensic laboratories, human tissue laboratories, funeral undertakers (where they are also responsible for embalming bodies and cosmetic reconstitution of traumatised or decomposed bodies, etc.). Performing these auxiliary functions does not make of them doctors, transplant surgeons or pathologists. In much the same way, it is a reductionist and simplistic representation to contend that the mere cutting open of or removal of tissues or organs from a body, constitutes the “conducting of a post mortem examination”. To conduct a post mortem examination means that due regard is had for the full medical history and circumstance of death, to plan and strategize regarding the scope and nature of the examination required for that particular case, taking into account the relevant occupational health perspectives and risks (for example specific contagious disease which may be present), the need for specialized dissection procedures according to the nature of the pathology which is expected and ensuring that the correct evidentiary and diagnostic specimens are collected for further microscopic, toxicologic and other examinations. Above all, the pathologist must inspect and examine organs and tissues and - having due regard for a myriad of pathological conditions and injury manifestations - must record and interpret these findings, ultimately integrating the sum total of findings ranging from medical history, macroscopic autopsy manifestations, specialist laboratory and toxicology findings, microscopic examinations and more, before arriving at a diagnosis or conclusion. South African forensic pathologists are recognised internationally for having been well trained and being highly competent - and many of these locally trained pathologists now occupy posts as senior pathologists or heads of medical examiner or coroner offices in Canada, the USA, Australia and the UK, to name but a few. South Africa has a massive annual burden of non- natural deaths which require forensic medical examination - having arguably the highest non- natural death rate in the world (at least for countries not at war or beset by famine). There are only approximately fifty to sixty qualified specialist forensic pathologists in South Africa. However, there are several hundred-other qualified medical practitioners with postgraduate training and diplomas in forensic pathology, which do not make them specialist pathologists but equip them and make them valuable professionals responsible for conducting medico- legal autopsies. These specialist forensic pathologists and other medical practitioners are responsible for conducting the approximately 70 000 - 80 000 medico-legal autopsies which have to be performed annually in South Africa. It is to be expected that these medical practitioners will require the support of assistants in the capacity which has previously been described. Despite the fact that these assistants contribute to the medico-legal investigation, it should be stressed that the doctor / pathologist at all times is responsible for the overall and direct control of the autopsy process, with direct supervision and instructions to assistants, from beginning to end. The pathologist must observe all anatomical or tissue pathology, injuries and other relevant findings, and must ensure that these findings are recorded, that appropriate specimens are collected, preserved, packaged and dispatched and ultimately must prepare a technical medical report which will serve the judicial process and withstand scrutiny in a court of law, where thorough questioning by legal counsel is encountered (often also assisted by other medical experts). It is absurd to suggest that the non-medically trained assistants at such autopsies have been responsible for “conducting the autopsies” or that they would be capable of orchestrating the totality of such a required examination, and of compiling the technical medical reports required for subsequent legal processes.

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In conducting such medico-legal autopsies, it is of course inevitable that the pathologist / doctor will need to rely on the support and input of forensic officers as assistants, and it is recognised that all parties contribute to the eventual proper investigative process. Pathologists must also trust the contribution and input of forensic officers: for example, upon admission to medico-legal mortuaries, the bodies of decedents are recorded at a built-in weighing station and body length measured, before later (usually the following day) being presented to the doctor / pathologist with these recorded measurements. The doctor / pathologist must rely upon these independently observed and recorded observations of the forensic officer / assistant, although clearly at all times retains the responsibility and discretion to query inappropriate measurements in respect of mass, body length, etc. Similarly, forensic officers assist with for example, the radiographic scanning of bodies in those facilities which have such equipment, by positioning the body and assisting in the operation of the radiographic apparatus. It remains the responsibility of the attending medical practitioner / pathologist to subsequently review the radiographic images in order to assess and diagnose possible pathological or other features. The results and findings provided by doctors / pathologists in their post mortem reports are always subject to review and scrutiny by the judicial process and in the courts. As in any other discipline or profession, inexperience and inadequate training may compromise the quality of reports generated by doctors, but this does not mean that there is a need for full scale review of reports which have been submitted to the courts. The suggestion that numerous post mortem examination reports are grossly inaccurate because the autopsy was in fact “conducted” by the doctor’s assistant, is to say the least, misleading and incorrect. Every person who has applied for a position as a forensic officer (assistant) within the respective provincial departments of health knew full well and in advance what the scope and nature of their expected duties would be: in particular, they knew that they would be expected to assist with dissection and evisceration duties - this has been standard practice for decades. No person applies for a job which entails working with and dissecting dead bodies and is unaware of the nature of the duties which will be expected of them! Forensic officers who assist at autopsies receive initial and ongoing vocational in-house training by pathologists and senior colleagues in order to better equip them to perform these services. It is indeed so that there is currently no structured postgraduate or tertiary academic course for forensic officers or dissection assistants - although a registered SAQA qualification has been developed and advised by pathologists. Prior to 2006 the medico-legal laboratories were administered by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and all dissection assistants were SAPS officers – an arrangement and service which was thus rendered for probably more than a hundred years. None of these SAPS officers were formally medically trained in any way, other than being supervised and given in-house vocational training and guidance by the medical practitioners with whom they worked. When the mortuaries were transferred from the SAPS to the Department of Health in 2006, many of these SAPS officers chose not to transfer to the Department of Health, but to remain within the police service. It was thus necessary for the Department of Health to employ many new forensic officers, a substantial number of which at that time had no prior specific experience of working in mortuaries. As such, it is possible that some of these forensic officers had previously worked as drivers or as assistants at funeral parlours, etc. However, only those who were appointed as forensic officers were called upon to specifically assist pathologists or doctors with the autopsy and/or dissection procedures. 79


After the transfer of mortuaries to the department of Health, a tertiary level SAQA registered qualification was indeed developed in 2007, to better equip and qualify forensic officers to assist and contribute to the full range of services required in the medico-legal investigation of death, beyond just the support functions at the autopsy: these would include the appropriate protocols required in investigating bodies at death / crime scenes, proper transportation to the mortuary, identification procedures pertaining to the bodies (for example, the taking of fingerprints), improved awareness of occupational health issues, to name but some. It is unfortunate that no tertiary level academic institutions in the country have found it to be a viable qualification, probably because of the expected relatively low intake of such student numbers. It would indeed be preferable or feasible for the Department of Health to employ persons who have relevant higher qualifications (such as bachelors’ degrees in biomedical sciences and/or anatomy) to render these services - if the available monetary resources would allow for that. Clearly, the cost of employing such persons with higher educational qualifications and skills would substantially impact upon the budget requirements for the forensic pathology service. Unfortunately, resource constraints in South Africa and competing needs for other health care services - such as management of infectious diseases, mother and child care, vaccination services, etc. - compete directly with fiscal allocations in this regard. In adequately resourced countries like the USA, Canada and the UK, it is possible to employ only qualified graduates to render these services - but this is probably not feasible in SA at this time. Over the past decade or more, the Forensic Pathology Service (FPS) in South Africa has been dramatically improved upon with multiple new mortuaries having been built, some of which are state of the art facilities of an international standard (such as the facility in Bloemfontein and the new facility under construction in Cape Town). n addition, the budget allocation for forensic pathology services has been more than quadrupled, with more staff, vehicles, equipment and general infrastructure. This includes the installation of highly sophisticated radiological equipment at a number of mortuaries, such as the multi-million rand Lodox Statscan apparatus. Dedicated and custom-made vehicles are now used to transport bodies and FPS staff are now professionally attired and equipped - at scenes and in the mortuaries and are being issued with protective equipment. Budget constraints and supply logistics problems beset the FPS as it does most other state departments, but overall there has been a significant improvement in the level of the service rendered since the take-over by the health department. There are still many aspects which require upgrades and improvements in this service, not least of which are the training and service conditions of forensic officers / assistants, better training of doctors, and diagnostic services such as toxicology, etc. Forensic pathologists and forensic officers certainly work under adverse conditions and undeniably, in a resource constrained environment. The work they perform is often not of a pleasant nature and due recognition should be given to the fact that they are exposed to physical dangers, psychological trauma and the stressful environment of working with emotionally traumatised and bereaved families. All efforts to improve on the physical environment and vocational skills required for the rendering of a legally prescribed medico- legal investigation of death service, must be welcomed and proactively sought by all parties concerned. But in presenting the case for better resource allocation and improved working conditions, it is essential that there is accountability and objectivity - and for responsible reporting and dissemination of accurate information by the media and officials. 80


Irresponsible statements and media reports - the likes of which we have seen lately - will undoubtedly discourage other medical professionals to enter this field of service and will furthermore demotivate the few existing specialists and trainee specialist, or encourage them to seek other pastures, as many of their colleagues have done. Professor Gert Saayman Head: Clinical Department, Forensic Pathology Service (Pretoria) Head: Department of Forensic Medicine, University of Pretoria Chairman: National Forensic Pathology Service Committee http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/on-the-misreporting-of-the-mortuarystrike?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=7d33f14406EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-7d33f14406130042309 – 29 June 2017.

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KEBBY'S R8 MILLION STRONG-ARM FOR MKMVA CONFERENCE MUST BE PROBED BY AG The DA notes with deep concern the allegations that Deputy Minister of Military Veterans, Kebby Maphatsoe, forced the Departments Director General, to release R8 million for the recent MKMVA elective conference after the initial request was rejected because there was no evidence that 637 of the delegates were in fact bona fide military veterans. The DA will therefore write to the Auditor General, Kimi Makwetu, to request that he institute an urgent investigation into these allegations. We cannot allow ANC political appointees to continue to abuse their offices to divert public funds for political events. Kebby Maphatsoe is a known Zuma-cheerleader and seems to act with impunity as a result. Should the AG find that this R8 million was diverted illegally, we will ensure that Maphatsoe is held accountable for this gross abuse of office to the full extent of the law. Statement issued by Kobus Marais, DA Shadow Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, 18 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/kebbys-r8m-strongarm-for-mkmva-conference-must-be?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017.

STAATSDIENSPENSIOENFONDS POLITICS

Ball Rolling to Protect Public Service Pension Funds – Anton Alberts Anton Alberts | 15 June 2017 FF Plus says Ramaphosa to consider recommendation that funds need to be protected against plundering by implementing legislative mechanisms FF Plus sets the ball rolling to protect public service pension funds 15 June 2017 Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa has undertaken to consider the recommendation of the FF Plus that public service pension funds need to be protected against plundering by implementing legislative mechanisms, says adv. Anton Alberts, chairperson of the FF Plus. Yesterday in parliament, adv. Alberts painted a picture of the problems concerning the public pension funds for the deputy president. Adv. Alberts also explained that this picture makes it clear that pensioners have reason to fear that their funds might get plundered, just like what happened with the Transnet funds. 82


According to adv. Alberts, the government’s pension funds are not subject to the Pension Funds Act and they are also not protected by a pension fund ombudsman as is the case with private funds. Adv. Alberts explained to deputy president Ramaphosa that this means that public service pensioners have to take legal action if there are any problems with their funds. That is an expensive and lengthy process, especially for people who are already struggling financially. Adv. Alberts referred to the situation at Transnet in particular as those funds have been plundered to such an extent that pensioners now have to live on an average pension of only R2 500 per month, which is less than the basic minimum wage. Deputy President Ramaphosa said that the recommendation is positive and a good idea and then he asked that adv. Alberts submit a written proposal on the matter so that it can be evaluated properly. He also said that it is important that pensioners have the assurance that their funds are being correctly administrated and protected. He also said that the amount of R2 500 that Transnet pensioners are currently receiving needs to be investigated in terms of the Transnet fund’s own provisions. “The FF Plus is happy with the deputy president’s response. We are convinced that he realises the seriousness of the matter and that he will consider the written proposal favourably so as to benefit every person that is currently dependent on a public pension fund as well as every person that may be dependent on these funds in the future. “Should the recommendation not be accepted, the FF Plus will attempt to change the law with a private member’s bill,” says adv. Alberts. Issued by Anton Alberts, FF Plus chairperson, 15 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/ball-rolling-to-protect-public-service-pensionfun?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017. OPINION

PIC and the GEPF: An overview Charles Collocott | 15 June 2017 Charles Collocott looks at the need for transparency and the framework within which they invest The Public Investment Corporation and the Government Employees Pension Fund – an overview This Brief by Charles Collocott considers the overall structures of the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), with a focus on transparency and the framework within which they invest. The need for transparency has been highlighted since the PIC invested over R 1 billion in Independent Media in 2013. The framework for investment is of particular 83


interest since the National Treasury has recently stated that the PIC could possibly become the equity partner in loss-making South African Airways. 14 June 2017 The Public Investment Corporation Established in 1911, the Public Investment Corporation (SOC) Limited (PIC) manages assets of over R1.857 trillion. It is a registered financial services provider, wholly owned by the Government. The Minister of Finance is the shareholder representative. The PIC invests funds on behalf of the following public-sector entities: % of assets under Clients management Government Employees 88.2% Pension Fund (GEPF) Unemployment Insurance 6.7% Fund (UIF) Compensation 1.9% Commissioner(CC) Compensation Commissioner 0.9% Pension Fund (CP) Associated Institutions 0.7% Pension Fund (AIPF) Other 1.6% According to the PIC, “[all] investment decisions are directed by detailed client mandates, which are negotiated individually with each client [including benchmarks] in line with their investment profile and risk appetite. These client mandates comply fully with the requirements of the Financial Services Board (FSB), with which the PIC is registered as an approved financial services provider.” [1] Three Acts of Parliament govern PIC operations: 1. The Public Investment Corporation Act, 2004, which defines the PIC as a government-owned corporation that is subject to the Companies Act. 2. The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act, 2002, which governs the South African financial services sector. The PIC is registered as a financial services provider with the FSB. 3. The Public Finance Management (PFMA) Act, 1999, which requires that the PIC’s annual financial statements be audited by the Auditor-General. The PIC is therefore accountable to Parliament for its financial management. The PIC website further states that “[beyond] these parliamentary acts, the PIC is accountable to the millions of South Africans on whose behalf we invest.” The main investment objective of the PIC is to “achieve strong long-term capital returns above clients’ benchmarks, supported by robust risk management while contributing to the broader social and economic development of South Africa and the rest of Africa.” [1] The Chairman of the PIC has in the past been the Deputy Minister of Finance. Thus it is today, with the current Deputy Minister, Sfiso Buthelezi, serving as Chairman. His previous chairmanship was as Chairman of Prasa 2009 - 2016. According to a recent news article, before Buthelezi’s appointment to the National Treasury, Treasury conducted and concluded a comprehensive investigation into Prasa and recommended that Buthelezi be criminally charged. [2] The PIC’s Asset Management Divisions 1. Fixed Income 84


The PIC invests only in instruments listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa and holds more than 42% and 50% of Government and SOE bonds respectively. For example, the PIC holds around 80% of Eskom’s bonds maturing in 2023 and 2026, and over 30% of Eskom’s bonds maturing in 2033 and 2042. Concerns have been raised recently about the PIC buying Eskom bonds in private placements since 2014 instead of public auctions. This was after demand from other buyers started to fall away. As a result of the absence of market forces, it is difficult to know if the yield (price) paid by Eskom is market related. [3] 2. Listed Equities The PIC is according to its own account one of the largest institutional investors in South African equities, often reported to hold around 12.5% of the market capitalization (cap) of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). However, according to the PIC’s most recent annual report released 31 March 2016, 48.03% of the PIC’s R1.857 trillion in assets was invested on the JSE, and on that date the JSE market cap was near R 15.260 trillion. Thus the PIC in fact owned 5.8% of the JSE in March last year and not 12.5%. Approximately 80% of the GEPF’s equities portfolio is managed internally by the PIC on a ‘passive’ enhanced index basis. The remaining 20% is managed externally by active asset managers. The GEPF mandate allows up to 10% of equities to be invested outside of South Africa. Currently PIC claims 5% is invested offshore and the remaining 5% will be invested in the rest of the Africa. 3. Properties This includes property asset management, development and acquisitions. Among the companies in which PIC Properties invests includes: - Pareto Limited, owns premier shopping centres around the country, - V&A Waterfront, and - Airports Company South Africa (ACSA). Property made up 5.22% of the PIC’s assets, or R96.94 billion, according to their 2016 Annual Report. 4. Isibaya Fund Isibaya was established in 1999 to invest in projects located across Africa. The focus areas are: - Private Equity - all sizes: early stage venture capital, small, medium and large unlisted companies. - Developmental Investments - large-scale and long term infrastructure projects. - Isibaya provides finance to private and public sector organisations or to intermediaries (such as fund managers). It may co-invest with other institutions having with similar objectives Isisbaya makes up 2.96% of the PIC’s assets, or near R55 billion with the size of the Isibaya Fund more than doubling since 2014. Isibaya Portfolio exposure at 31 March 2016 Financial services 18% Renewable Energy & 18% Energy Efficiency Mining and industrial 16% Healthcare 10% Affordable housing 8% Telecommunications & 8% Media Road & Air 5% infrastructure Education 4% Transport & logistics 4% Petroleum 4% 85


Agriculture & Agro2% Processing Consumer Goods 2% Property 1% The PIC Annual Report sets out the different asset classes as a percentage of assets under management, but specifics aren’t available (except for the names of the largest property investments). In October 2016 the PIC provided Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance with a detailed list of its Isibaya Fund investments, but there has been no indication that such disclosure will be regular. Due to the rules governing exchange listed investments, details of the PIC’s listed investments are easier to obtain. For example, all JSE listed companies are required to disclose the details of any shareholder holding 5% or more of the company’s shares. The Government Employees Pension Fund The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF or Fund) was established in 1996 and has over 1.2 million active members, 400 000 pensioners and beneficiaries, and assets worth more than R1.6 trillion. The Fund increased to this level from R552 billion in 2006. GEPF is governed by the Government Employees Pension Law (or GEP Law), to manage and administer pensions and other benefits for government employees. A Board of Trustees governs the Fund and is accountable for administrative and investment performance. It also determines the investment policy in consultation with the Minister of Finance. The Board approves the annual financial statements, and these are presented to Parliament by the Minister. The Board consists of equal numbers of representatives from members/pensioners and those nominated by the employer (i.e. Government). Government is responsible for meeting the Fund’s obligations, provided any change in investment policy is subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. The GEPF’s investment strategy is determined by the magnitude and time profile of liabilities, i.e. pension payments. GEPF’s assets are managed primarily by the PIC. As opposed to the PIC, specifics of GEPF’s investment holdings are disclosed in full detail within GEPF’s Annual Reports. The strategic and actual allocation of the GEPF is as follows: Asset Asset allocation as at Asset class allocation 31 March 2016 (%) range (%) Cash and 0-8 1 money markets Domestic 26 - 36 33 bonds Domestic 3-7 5 property Domestic 45 - 55 53 equity Africa (ex-SA) 0-5 1 equity Foreign bonds 0 - 4 2 Foreign equity 1 - 5 5 The Fund shows an annualized return of 11.1% over the three years ended 31 March 2016.

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In terms of the GEP law and the Fund’s rules, an actuarial valuation has to be carried out at least every three years. The most recent Annual Report, dated March 2014, shows that its liabilities are 121.5% funded (including a reserve of R252 billion). Independent Media Group In 2013 the Irish owners of the Independent Media Group (the old Argus group) sold the business to Sekunjalo Investments. At the time it was understood the the PIC financed most of this purchase in the form of loans to Sekunjalo and took for itself a 25% equity stake. The prudence of this investment has received wide speculation in the press since 2013. There has however been no clarity on the issue due to a lack of information provided by the PIC. All that has been disclosed is an aggregate amount of R 1.275 billion invested by the PIC in Independant Media as presented Parliament in October 2016. This amount invested includes both an equity investment of R 166 333 000 and a loan of just over R 1.1 billion. SAA Comments recently about the GEPF or PIC as potential equity partners in state-owned entities (such as South African Airways) have raised the danger of pressure to fund ventures in order to assist Government. These would likely not be sound investments for pension funds. SAA has incurred operating losses during the past five years and it admits that “[cash] flow will remain a critical issue until the airline receives an equity injection to reduce its expensive reliance on debt funding.” [4] SAA’s debt service cost in 2016 was R 861 million versus the operating profit before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation of R 351 million. Poor SOE governance was a major reason for South Africa’s sovereign credit downgrade, with SAA’s poor governance being well publicized. However, Minister of Finance Malusi Gigaba “has expressed full confidence in SAA chairperson Dudu Myeni and the airline’s board of directors” [5] signaling little positive change to be expected given that SAA is under Treasury’s control. SAA’s key financial indicators for 2016 are dismal when compared to other airlines: Air New SAA Qantas Zealand Profit 1.2% 10.1% 29.5% margin Debt to -2.53 4.12 2.44 equity ratio The negative R 10 964 million equity position (as a result of substantial historical losses) is a major red flag for any prudent investor and the only reason SAA can be classified as a going concern is because of debt it has been able to raise thanks to government guarantees totaling R 19.1 billion. So far, no pension funds have been directed at bailing out the ailing airline. Conclusion It is important for the PIC and GEPF to be completely transparent. While GEPF does disclose its investments (which make up 88% of the PIC’s assets), the value of PIC investments not regularly disclosed is significant and the PIC should consider providing detailed presentations on a regular basis to achieve and maintain good governance. In terms of GEPF’s rules, any member or pensioner has “the right to communicate directly with the Fund in regard to any matter which affects him or her personally” [6]. If there is concern on the part 87


of members or pensioners about potential changes to the investment mandates, members can approach the Fund directly. Finally, is it appropriate that a maximum of 14% of GEPF funds may be invested internationally? The limit placed on other unit trust investments suitable for pension funds is 25%. It is accepted that part of Government’s approach to public pension funds is not only to benefit pensioners but at the same time to assist South Africa’s economy to develop. However, more extensive offshore investment allowances would provide additional risk balancing for GEPF and still channel most investment into South Africa. It may be timeous for this statutory limit to be revised or, at least, be revisted. Charles Collocott, Researcher, Helen Suzman Foundation. This article first appeared as an HSF Brief. Notes [1] www.pic.gov.za/ [2] See here [3] See here [4] South African Airways Group Integrated Annual Report for the Year Ended 2016 [5] See here. [6] Section 22, Rules of the Government Employees Pension Fund, Schedule 1 to the Government Employees Pension Law 1996. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/public-investment-corporation-and-governmentemplo?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 – 19 June 2017.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FUND (GEPF) AND ROLE OF GEPF MONITORING ASSOCATION [Kol Albert van Driel & kol Andries van Vuuren.] Introduction GEPF, which is functioning under the 1996 Law and Rules (as amended), now 21 years in existence, is the largest pension fund in Africa and one of the largest in the world. It has more than 1.2 million serving members and in excess of 420 000 pensioners. GEPF has a history of predominantly successful service delivery to its members, pensioners and beneficiaries. GEPF assets have been declared at Rl.6 trillion in the 2016 Annual Report.

GEPF organisation structure With 16 Trustees (Chairperson and Vice-Chair) and fiduciary responsibilities, supported by a Principal Executive Officer for internal management and administration. Pension administration managed by Government Pension Administration Agency (GPAA), which functions under jurisdiction of Dept. of Finance (But funded by GEPF). On the other hand, the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) manages GEPF investments based upon an agreed and formal mandate, aligned with an Investment Policy Statement (IPS). Role of GEPF Monitoring Group (MON GP) 88


The purpose of the GEPF Mon Gp is to meticulously monitor investments/projects by GEPF/PIC to determine if they are in the best interests of members, pensioners and beneficiaries; and in so doing deliver reports related to negative variances or poor returns. GEPF Trustees and GEPF Mon Gp have an agreement to cooperate amicably, which was determined at a joint meeting (including a PIC representative) on 27 Oct 2016. The Mon Gp already has a network of support organisations, and is actively working on cooperating with institutions that are focusing on a "Better South Africa for the benefit of all its people". The GEPF Mon Gp believes in a policy of 'Inclusivity' whereby it is working for the guarding of the interests of all members, pensioners and beneficiaries of GEPF. Beleggings-beleidsverklaring (BBV) van die staatsdiens-pensioenfonds (SPF) Die BBV van die SPF word geskoei op o.a. die VN Kode se Beginsels vir Verantwoordelike Beleggings (VNBVB), asook op die Suid-Afrikaanse Kode vir Verantwoordelike Beleggings (KVBSA); Eng afkorting – ('RISA') . Hierbenewens speel die omgewings-, sosiale- en bestuurskwessies ook 'n groot rol by die bepaling van gewenste beleggings en voldoeningsvereistes ten opsigte van beleggings (OSB in Afrikaans en ESG in Engels). Die oogmerk is om volhoubare sakepraktyke vir die langer-termyn te vestig. As sodanig poog die SPF om die Ontwikkelings- Beleggingsbeleid {OBB) te vestig en uit te bou. Die Strategiese Bate-toewysings was op 31 Maart 2016 soos volg: Kontant + Geldmarkte - 1% Binnelandse effekte - 33% RSA – Eiendom - 5% RSA Aandele - 53% Afrika aandele - 1% Buitelandse effekte - 2% Buitelandse aandele - 5% Die SPF se OBS rus op vier pilare: Ekonomiese infrastruktuur; Sosiale infrastruktuur; Volhoubare projekte;en Ondernemings-ontwikkelings-projekte

Die rol van die OBK Die OBK is per definisie 'n staatskorporasie wat onder die voorsitterskap van die adjunk minister van finansies funksioneer 'n Hoof Uitvoerende Amptenaar (HUA), Dr Dan Matjila staan aan die hoof van die OBK. Raadslede word deur Tesourie aangestel gebaseer op relevante kwalifikasies en ervaring. Verskeie funksionele komitees bestaan ten einde verantwoordelikhede vir Tegniese Funksies te behartig bv. risiko- analises, beleggings, evaluasie/monitering ens. Tydens die 2015/16 Finansiële jaar was beleggingsopbrengs van 4% bereik.

Isibaya Beleggings en Beleggings in Afrika Sommige Isibaya beleggings was teleurstellend, en het kommerwekkende negatiewe groei getoon bv "Rezorite Health and Rehabilitation Fund" (-55.02%), RTI Holdings (-54.07%), en "Kleoss Fund 1" (- 41.18%}. Hoewel sommige projekte wat deur die SOP d.m.v. die Afrika lnfrastruktuur Ontwikkelingsfonds gefinansier word wel goed presteer, is daar kommer oor die CAMAC projek wat deur hulle in Nigerië bedryf word; ‘n (aflandige olieprojek) met 89


R3miljard investering wat nie na wense presteer nie. Conclusion Independent Actuarial valuator Howard Buck certified on 11October 2016 that GEPF had the capacity to Fund its accrued liabilities fully, and with 46.6% contingency reserves available on a best estimate basis. Over the past ten years the pension adjustments for retired members were always above the 75% of CPI and regularly close to 100% of CPI; and a few times exceeded the 100% mark of CPI.

GEVANGENISDIENS / KORREKTIEWEDIENSTE POLITICS

Financial state of Dept of Correctional Services worrying – ANC Nonceba Mhlauli | 15 June 2017 Party says ongoing mismanagement, lack of accountability and possible corruption at the DCS is quite disturbing

ANC concerned about the financial state of the Department of Correctional Services 15 June 2017 The ANC Study Group on the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is concerned with the lack of proper financial management and accountability in the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). SCOPA had a follow up hearing with the DCS yesterday evening to account on matters relating to irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure following the departments failure to provide SCOPA with the necessary answers in their hearing last week. In last night’s meeting, it emerged that an alarming number of accruals have skyrocketed to the amount of R134m to suppliers and that the department appears to be bankrupt. The Auditor-General (AG) has in the past raised serious concerns about the financial state of the department of which in our view appears to have been ignored with no attempt at putting in place corrective measures. The department was also not able to inform SCOPA on their progress on investigations of irregular expenditure amounting to approximately R494m. The Commissioner Mr Zach Modise also seems to have ignored concerns raised by the Presidency in a letter that was addressed to the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) on issues relating to the department. The ongoing mismanagement, lack of accountability and possible corruption at the DCS is quite disturbing. We therefore reiterate our call that the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services comrade Michael Masutha act against the Commissioner and his officials. 90


The most disappointing development from this hearing was our inability as parliamentarians to properly probe the financials of the department as we were informed of an interdict against the Minister and department on a matter relating to a tender to a private company. Such develops affects parliaments ability to conduct proper oversight. We look forward to the speedy resolution of this legal matter in order to ensure that those found to have been involved in any wrongdoing are held accountable. Issued by Nonceba Mhlauli, Media Liaison Officer, 15 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/financial-state-of-dept-of-correctional-servicesw?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 - 19 June 2017.

DWELMS [WAAR IS SANAB?] POLITICS

We can't allow drugs to steal the hope of our youth - Mmusi Maimane Mmusi Maimane | 17 June 2017 DA leader says nothing destroys life of a child like the effects of drug addiction

We Cannot Allow Drugs to Steal the Hope of Our Youth Note to editors: The following was delivered by DA Leader Mmusi Maimane in eThekwini today after leading a march of thousands of young South Africans to the Phoenix Police Station, to commemorate Youth Day. My fellow South Africans, There is a good reason why we are at our most hopeful when we are young. It is because the world needs the optimism of youth to propel it forward. As we get older, we slowly start to lose the ability to imagine a future of infinite possibilities. But when we are young the sky is the limit. We can dream of becoming anything, of achieving anything and of changing anything. Nelson Mandela once said: “Whenever I am with energetic young people, I feel like a recharged battery.” He knew why it was worth protecting young people’s vibrancy. The biggest wrong that we can do in society is to allow the spirit of youth to be stolen from our young people. And that is precisely what we do when we allow our children to fall under the spell of drugs and the evil people who distribute them. 91


Nothing destroys the life of a child like the effects of drug addiction. Nothing steals their youth faster than growing up in a culture of drug abuse, violence and gangsterism. Here in Phoenix you know all about the dangers of drugs and gangs. You see and you feel these dangers every single day. Some of you have already lost children to these dangers. Many more of you are watching helplessly as your boys and girls are targeted by these predators who bring these things into your community. You warn them. You plead with them. But the temptation is often too big for any parent to prevent. I am a father myself. I have two beautiful children whom I want to shield from everything that could possibly threaten them. But I know there is only so much I, or any parent, can do to keep them out of harm’s way. The fight against the people who sell drugs in our communities – and who use children to sell them to other children – is a battle that can only be won if we all stand together and fight it on all fronts. And by “all” I mean parents, grand-parents, brothers and sisters. I mean teachers and principals, preachers and social workers. I mean politicians, police officers and doctors. We must investigate, arrest and prosecute the criminals who come and sell drugs to our children. We must offer those who got themselves caught up in drug abuse a way out through rehabilitation and reintegration into society. We must warn those not yet trapped about the dangers of drugs and gangs. We must offer young people healthy alternatives to this lifestyle. And we must build a society and an economy where every child has hope for a better future – where there is so much more to look forward to than the quick thrills of drugs and crime. At the DA, we understand just how important it is to look after our children. We take the fight against drugs and gangs very seriously in the metros and the province where we govern. We have been calling for the re-establishment of a national specialised anti-drug unit ever since it was disbanded by the ANC government in 2003. During this time drug busts have steadily declined while drug-related crimes have sky-rocketed. What we finally got, a year after President Zuma promised to re-introduce such a unit in his 2016 SONA speech, was 40 people sitting in the Hawks. It is hardly surprising that this understaffed office has made no impact at all in the fight against drugs. So where the DA governs, we have done it ourselves. We cannot wait around for the ANC, while our children are dying. The City of Cape Town’s Gang and Drug Task Team is raiding drug dens, busting dealers and fighting to take back the streets from gangsters. In cities like Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, where we have been in government for almost a year now, many of our new initiatives are already reaping rewards.

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In Tshwane Mayor Solly Msimanga launched an Anti-Drug Unit in the Metro Police, in Nelson Mandela Bay Mayor Athol Trollip launched a brand new Metro Police Force and in Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba launched a K-9 Narcotics Unit. All three of these units have already had success in combatting the drug trade in these DA-run cities. Earlier this year the Johannesburg K-9 Unit made a drug bust in Glenvista where TIK, Kat and drug chemicals worth R10 million were seized. These drugs were destined to supply hundreds of dealers across the city. Mayor Mashaba has also committed to a pilot project whereby selected clinics in drug-affected parts of Johannesburg will offer rehabilitation services to these communities. This is in line with what we already offer in Cape Town, where six outpatient rehab clinics offer a free 16-week treatment programme, with no waiting period. The City of Cape Town also has a 24hour drug helpline. But locking up dealers and treating addiction is just half the battle. The other half is making sure our children are not tempted into the world of drugs and gangs in the first place. And this must start with quality education. The struggle of ’76 was for an education that frees us and gives us choices in life. Today this is still our struggle. Again, this is not something government should do alone. We believe there is great value in privatepublic partnerships in education – what we refer to as charter schools. We must explore every possible avenue that places the needs of the child at the centre of our education system. Where we govern we understand that schools should empower our children and not the unions. Which is why the Western Cape runs the best education department in the country – something Minister Motshekga agrees with. At the same time we need to transform our cities into growing economic hubs, where job opportunities offer young South Africans a way out of poverty and desperation. In the South Africa we want to build, this would include a post-school internship programme where young people can learn the skills and gain the work experience to set them up for life. But more immediately, we need to offer our children an alternative to spending their days on the street where they are easily pulled into a dangerous lifestyle. And this is where having a caring government in your city over an extended period really pays off. The DA-run City of Cape Town now offers over 180 youth interventions aimed at keeping young people off the streets while developing crucial life skills. These initiatives include sports development programmes, afterschool and holiday programmes, apprenticeships, leadership development courses, computer skills courses, career workshops, book clubs, maths tutorials and many, many more. You see, it’s one thing to talk about cherishing our youth and protecting them from the dangers of drugs and gangs. But talk is cheap. You need to look at actions. My fellow South Africans What you want for your children is the same things I want for mine. 93


I want them to grow up knowing they are safe, knowing they are loved and knowing that they are an important and valuable part of society. I want my children to carry on believing in dreams. I want them to take their time in reaching adulthood. And once they get there, I want them to have the opportunities to make the most in life. I know this is what you want for your children too. And I assure you, under a DA government, they will have the best possible chance at achieving this. Thank you. Issued by the DA, 16 June 2017 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/we-cant-allow-drugs-to-steal-the-hope-of-ouryouth?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=e4e7914d14EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-e4e7914d14130042309 - 19 June 2017.

SPOORWEGPOLISIE? Train vandals must be treated like murderers, rapists and treasonists - union 2017-06-19 09:10 Jenni Evans, News24

Coaches burn near Koeberg railway station in Cape Town (Theo Layne, Cape Town Fire and Rescue) Cape Town - People caught vandalising transport infrastructure deserve to spend the rest of their lives in jail, the United National Transport Union (Untu) has said. 94


This comes as vandalism caused delays on Metrorail's Cape Town commuter lines on Monday morning. "Untu has no choice but to demand from the legislature to impose life imprisonment for these crimes - similar to that imposed for offences of premeditated murder, gang rape, serial rape and treason," said Steve Harris, Untu general secretary. Untu said the serious damage to the economy and the risk to people's lives that flows from continuing vandalism and theft warrants stricter sentencing, however felt magistrates seem loathed imposing the maximum sentence of 30 years that the Criminal Matters Amendment Act allows. On Monday morning Metrorail in the Western Cape again reported delays of up to 50 minutes due to vandalism. The transport company said last week it was already down 66 coaches since March 2016, which hampers its ability to provide its usual service. "The result is that the situation has completely gotten out of hand. Our railway lines have become a war zone, but our criminal justice system simply turn a blind eye," says Harris. The latest incidents include: - Railway tracks stolen on the line between Machadodorp and Carolina on Saturday causing a derailment; - Two weeks ago, cable theft contributed to two Metrorail trains colliding near the Elandsfontein station in Gauteng. One commuter was killed and over 50 were injured; - In March, sleepers were stolen from the tracks between Cullinan and Pretoria, leaving nearly 500 people stranded;- Eight coaches were set alight at Cape Town station last Monday due to an electrical fault; - Last Thursday a coach was set alight at Muldersvlei near Stellenbosch; - Last Friday a coach was torched near Koeberg railway station. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/train-vandals-must-be-treated-like-murderers-rapistsand-treasonists-union-20170619

RUSSIA: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH JEWS? The commanding officer at the Russian Military Academy (the equivalent of a 4-star general in the U.S.) gave a lecture on 'Potential Problems and Military Strategy'. At the end of the lecture, he asked are there questions? An officer stood up and asked, "Will there be a third world war? And will Russia take part in it?" The general answered both questions in the affirmative. Another officer asked, "Who will be the enemy?" The general replied, "All indications point to China". 95


Everyone in the audience was shocked. A third officer remarked, "General, we are a nation of only 150 million, compared to the 1.5 billion Chinese. Can we win at all, or even survive?" The general answered, "Just think about this for a moment: In modern warfare, it is not the quantity of soldiers that matters but the quality of an army's capabilities. For example, in the Middle East we have had a few wars recently where 5 million Jews fought against 150 million Arabs (odds of 30 to 1), and Israel was always victorious." After a small pause, yet another officer from the back of the auditorium asked: "Do we have enough Jews?

WHY THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN NOVEL TO BE BANNED UNDER APARTHEID LAW IS ALSO ONE OF THE WORST EVER WRITTEN by Jennifer on Jul 25th, 2016;| Published in the Sunday Times

Rosa Lyster conducted a forensic-detective-style search for the author of the forgotten book An Act of Immorality, which despite its pseudo-liberal credentials she believes is one of the worst local novels ever written In 1963, the state tried to take control of South African literature. While other legislation was already being used to censor “undesirable� material, the 1963 Publications and Entertainment Act was the first to make statutory provision for the control of locally produced work, allowing the apartheid state to operate one of the most comprehensive censorship systems in the world. It is difficult to communicate the scale of the endeavour, except to describe it as a kind of mania. The censors tried 96


to read everything, were suspicious of everything, wrote dense and detailed reports on everything, in an attempt to neutralise the perceived threat of literature. They failed, ultimately. But they tried. The first South African novel to be banned under the new legislation was titled An Act of Immorality, published by Trans-World in 1963, and written under a pseudonym: Des Troye. The book jacket advertises it as “A Startling Expose of Sex Across the Colour Line”, featuring a lawyer who “prosecutes offenders of the Immorality Act by day” and “by Night, under neurotic compulsion … breaks the immorality act.” The author is described as “a Johannesburg Attorney who holds a degree in psychology … He writes under the pen-name ‘Des Troye’ to avoid victimisation and publicity”.

An Act of Immorality sold 40,000 copies on publication, breaking previous records on South African sales by 25,000 units. In late 1963, an American film crew entered South Africa illegally through Swaziland in order to make a film of the book, drawing the attention of the Security Branch. Further scrutiny followed about six months later, when An Act of Immorality was submitted to the censorship board by the Police Commissioner. The novel was quickly banned. Censors’ reports describe it as “an attack on the National Party” and on apartheid. Attached documents reveal that the offices of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the National Commissioner of Police were engaged in a joint effort to unmask Des Troye, who they had identified only as a white Johannesburg-based lawyer who might be working at the Johannesburg Magistrate’s Court. It is unclear, in these memos, whether this information has been gathered from analysis of the novel itself, or from other sources of intelligence. What is clear is that they badly wanted to find out who he was. This is the first half of the story of An Act of Immorality. I have told it to a few people, and the response is always the same: they cannot understand why they haven’t heard it before. It’s such an interesting story, after all: anonymous author, 40,000 copies sold, first South African novel to be banned. The most interesting thing about Act though is that almost no one seems to know anything about it, even the people who should know. I can offer myself as a test case: I am in the process of completing a doctoral thesis about literary censorship during apartheid, and all I knew that the book was that it existed, and that it was long out of print. I had never read it, and I had no idea of the author’s real identity. It’s not just me – in wider discussions of literary censorship, the novel is mentioned only in passing, and only the pseudonym is provided. Peter McDonald, the author of The Literature Police (Oxford University Press) and an authority on the subject of apartheid censorship, didn’t know who Des Troye was, either. I asked him about it over email, shortly after I became interested in the case. He replied saying that he hadn’t been able to get to the bottom of it, and encouraged me to do some more digging. I started with the book itself, which I read over two days in the National Library, sitting with all the people rustling their newspapers and doing their maths homework. I’m not sure what I expected it to be like. Earnestly liberal, maybe. Probably a bit racy, with some bad sex scenes and an implausible plotline. I didn’t think it was going to be good. I did not anticipate how bad it actually is. An Act of Immorality is a very bad book. It begins with the sentence “It was afternoon, a warm, sensual afternoon”, and it is all downhill from there. Characters are coarsely drawn; description is weak; plot twists are produced at the last moment; whole characters exist only to illuminate the nobility of the protagonist, Johannes Burger, an obvious stand-in for the author; and dialogue is comically bad. It urgently needs an edit. The tone moves awkwardly between laboured raunchiness and long stretches in which characters have impossibly unlikely conversations about psychology. Remember the psychology thing, because it becomes important later. Open Act at any page, and you will find something to cringe at. It’s not a sin, though, to be a bad writer. The real problem is that it is also a horrible book. The novel continually expresses views which are repellent, while also presenting its protagonist as an exemplar of liberal humanity. On the 97


one hand, it weighs against the Immorality Act, calling it “an act of death”, and provides countless scenes of the damage the act wrought. On the other, it contains many sentences like these: “It was obvious to all present, even to the most ignorant African onlooker, that here was a man different from other men”; “[e]ven the most illiterate non-white in the gallery could see that Johannes was a man of conviction”; “her voice, poise and attire were extremely sophisticated for a black woman”. The protagonist’s desire for black women is described as a “neurotic compulsion”, and it is strongly implied that the root of this “compulsion” is his sexual abuse at the hands of his mother. It is further intimated that both parents were driven to suicide by their own “neurotic” desire for black men and women. White people’s desire for black people is continually depicted as pathological, the product of a troubled mind, and the root cause of the suicide of at least four white people in the novel. It is literally what kills them. The novel was banned on the grounds that it was “a slashing attack on the Immorality Act and apartheid,” but it could almost have been used as state propaganda. Reading Act made me understand why the author had been so coy about his identity. I went back to the censor’s report hoping to find something, some clue about who he was. I found it: a typed memo at the back of a file I had looked at probably 20 times before, and yet somehow failed to properly see: “It may be mentioned that the ‘Sunday Express’ of the 29th September contains a report to the effect that an American film company is secretly filming the novel. The department has notified the SAP, and will be advised as to the authenticity of this statement. According to the Press report, the author is Mr Simon Meyerson.” I can’t think of a more vivid example of the lunacies of the apartheid state than the fact that three state offices, between them, were apparently in doubt as to the identity of someone whose full name, occupation, and photograph had recently been published in a national paper. The secret of Des Troye’s identity was never a secret at all. Ordering the microfilm from the National Library, I expected to find a small piece somewhere towards the back of the paper. It was on the front page. A screaming headline: SEX BOOK IS FILMED SECRETLY ON RAND: AMERICAN UNIT “SHOOTS” “ACT OF IMMORALITY” The article describes the author in the same terms used on the book jacket and states that “until today, his identity has remained a well-kept secret”. The writer goes on: “I am now able to disclose that the author is Mr Simon Meyerson, a 27-year-old student at the University of the Witwaterstrand”. The subsequent interview of Meyerson makes for revealing reading. The writer of the article, Gordon Winter (subsequently revealed to be an apartheid spy), quotes Meyerson as insisting that the book was not “political” and instead was an interrogation into “the underlying psychological reasons … why people broke the Act in spite of its disastrous consequences.” In a follow-up report a week later, Meyerson insisted again that his motives were not political. Discussing an upcoming trip to London in order to negotiate world film rights for the novel, Meyerson stated: “I … wish to tell [the Minister of Information] that I do not intend being a bad ambassador for South Africa when I go to London on Thursday.” It is difficult to say what he was thinking when he gave this interview. Also, it is important to remember that the writer of this article was an apartheid spy – he might have quoted Meyerson unsympathetically, or out of context. It is difficult to say. It looks very bad, though, especially the part about being an ambassador for the apartheid state. Where is Meyerson now? An online search found a psychologist of the same name and age, also born in South Africa, who has an LLB and now lives in London. He did not respond to repeated email requests for comment, so it might be him, or it might not. Nowhere in this Meyerson’s biography or list of achievements is there any mention of An Act of Immorality.

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Whoever wrote the book has succeeded in obscuring this part of his past. There is, in fact, very little remaining evidence that the book existed at all. It has fallen almost entirely from view. The question as to why this has happened might be easy to answer: this is a horrible story, and one that we would prefer not to remember. Follow Rosa Lyster @rosalyster http://bookslive.co.za/blog/2016/07/25/why-the-first-south-african-novel-to-be-banned-underapartheid-law-is-also-one-of-the-worst-ever-written/ 20-06-2017.

ONLUSTE / UNREST Gavin Tischendorf het Afdeling Binnelandse Stabiliteit - Internal Stability Division ABS/ISD se foto gedeel. 1992 Boipatong: South Africa's founding myth SAIRR Website comment - 23 April 1999 On 17th June 1992, at a crucial stage of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) negotiations, armed Zulu hostel residents – enraged by persistent attacks on Inkatha Freedom Party supporters – fell upon the Vaal Triangle township of Boipatong and massacred some 45 men, women and children. At the time, ANC supporters alleged that South African security forces had both engineered and taken part in the massacre. In the latest edition of Frontiers of Freedom (Second Quarter 1999), Rian Malan raises the question of whether this version of the massacre – a version that radically changed the course of the negotiations – holds water. He explains why he doubts the accuracy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's findings on the massacre. Although ANC politicians alleged that the Boipatong massacre was carried out by 'third force' police and soldiers, these allegations failed to stand up either in court or in the Waddington or Goldstone inquiries, or indeed during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's own hearings. Nevertheless, the truth commission's report simply repeats the original allegations and presents them as fact. The massacre, in which Zulu residents of the KwaMadala Hostel fell on Boipatong and slaughtered some 45 men, women and children, is invariably cited as the cause of the breakdown of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) negotiations. But this, says Malan, is untrue. 'The talks actually died a month earlier, as the result of a deadlock deliberately engineered by Cyril Ramaphosa', then secretary general of the ANC. 'At the time, the ANC was pushing for majority rule while the National Party held out for checks and balances,' writes Malan. 'The twain could not meet, so the ANC decided to force a stalemate and return to mass action.' But township response 'fell painfully short' of the massive Leipzig-style demonstrations ANC militants had envisaged, Malan says. The spark that rekindled passions in South Africa and abroad was the Boipatong massacre. 'Before Boipatong, F W de Klerk was riding high,' writes Malan, 'buoyed up by his referendum victory and his rising status in the eyes of foreigners.' After Boipatong, he was 'just another racist', held responsible worldwide for the massacre. By September l992 De Klerk and his negotiators were so deflated 'that they just caved in', says Malan. They made 'extraordinary concessions' to get negotiations going again. This raises the 99


question of whether the ANC's version of the massacre - a version that radically changed the course of the negotiations - is indeed the correct one. Malan shows how various investigations over the past seven years failed to come up with any credible evidence to corroborate allegations of police and army complicity in the massacre. Foremost among these was a marathon 1993 trial during which the state called some 120 Boipatong residents - someone from almost every house where death or serious injury was recorded. 'Not one,' says Malan, saw police vehicles assisting the attackers, or claimed that whites were present. This accorded with the evidence of five accomplices who agreed to testify against fellow hosteldwellers in return for immunity. To a man, they repudiated charges of police complicity, and dismissed reports about the participation of masked white gunmen as 'infamous lies'. In addition, writes Malan, each of the 14 convicted self-confessed killers who has thus far testified at amnesty hearings has described the attack as a Zulu affair, driven by vengeance in the face of persistent attacks. They, too, have strongly denied colluding with police or 'third force' elements. And yet, says Malan, midway through the amnesty proceedings, the truth commission came forth with a finding that baldly declared Boipatong a 'third force' operation. The massacre, said the commission's October report, was 'planned and carried out' by hostel dwellers in collusion with security forces, who were said to have ferried the Inkatha impi into battle in Casspirs. Also deemed true were sightings of 'white men with blackened faces' among the attackers. Malan set out to establish the basis for these findings, and arrived at some startling conclusions. There was no investigation of the massacre per se, he writes, and hence, no new evidence to shore up the commission's pronouncements, or justify the reversal of earlier verdicts. Instead, says Malan, the truth commission simply accepted 'phantasmagoric' accusations made by ANC-aligned sources in the massacre's confused and emotion-charged aftermath. Indeed, a large chunk of the report was copied word-for-word from a June l992 'Area Repression Report' published by the ANC-supporting Human Rights Commission. 'These ancient and largely discredited charges,' Malan writes, were simply adopted as fact, with Orwellian consequences for the Boipatong amnesty applicants. They are entitled to amnesty only if they tell the truth, but 'the truth' has already been established – largely without inquiry, says Malan – by the body that holds their fate in its hands. When the hearings resume on May 3, the Boipatong amnesty committee will hear evidence that belatedly attempts to validate the truth commission's findings of collusion and conspiracy. Notorious IFP gunfighter Victor 'Vaal Monster' Kheswa will be portrayed as a massacre ringleader, but Malan has unearthed proof that Kheswa was in emergency detention at the time. Ex-Murder and Robbery Squad Sergeant Pedro Peens, who is alleged to have paid Kheswa and provided 'four to six' Casspirs, has dismissed the new claims as 'absurd'. 'My research,' says Malan, 'raises serious questions about the TRC's adherence to its own founding legislation, which calls for even-handed evaluation of contentious claims. The commission's Boipatong finding – which was at best premature, and at worst, flat wrong – disregarded this principle almost entirely. And the result will be with us, in Archbishop Tutu's phrase, 'for generations'. https://www.nelsonmandela.org/…/04l…/05lv02139/06lv02143.htm https://www.nelsonmandela.org/…/04l…/05lv02139/06lv02146.htm

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SOWETODAG 1976 SE LESSE VIR VANDAG Junie 14, 2017 deur Flip Buys Dit is vandeesweek die een en veertigste herdenking van die Soweto-jeugopstande van 1976. Die kernles van hierdie stuk geskiedenis is dat ʼn taal nie op mense afgedwing moet word nie. Almal moet vry wees om die taal van hulle keuse in onderwys te gebruik. Maar omdat die 1976-opstand op die oog af teen Afrikaans as onderrigtaal was, kan verwag word dat die gebeure steeds teen Afrikaans as onderrigtaal misbruik gaan word. In 1976 was die swart jeug se kreet “Óns wil nie in Afrikaans leer nie”. Een en veertig jaar later is die radikale se kreet, “Júlle mag nie in Afrikaans leer nie”. Dis “óns wíl nie” teenoor “júlle mág nie”. Hierdie twee krete is wêrelde van mekaar verwyder. Die een was op die oog af ʼn stryd vir demokrasie, die ander ʼn stryd om oorheersing. Die 1976-geslag het in die naam van hulle eie vryheid geveg. Die 2017-geslag se radikales en Afrikaanse slappes veg teen Afrikaanse leerders en studente se vryheid om hulle taal en kultuur uit te leef. Dit blyk dat radikale soos mnr. Lesufi en min. Blade Nzimande die stryd teen Afrikaans bloot voortsit met staatsmag. Maar die les van 1976 vir 2017 is dat studente se reg op moedertaalonderrig gerespekteer moet word, anders lei dit tot swak onderwys, vervreemding en opstand. Politieke mag Die 1976-kreet was die voorspel van “Liberation before Education”. Dit het ʼn groot rol gespeel om die onderwys en indiensneembaarheid van ʼn hele geslag jong swartmense te ondermyn. Die gevolge hiervan is vandag nog te sien in die vorm van werkloosheid, ongelykheid en die voortgesette struggle-kultuur in skole. Vandag is die kreet “Transformation before Education”, waardeur radikale faksies en slap universiteitsbesture die volgende geslag wit en swart jongmense se toekoms ondergrawe. Hoewel die meeste swart studente net goeie opleiding wil kry, lyk dit of hulle aan die neus gelei word deur hulle studenteleiers en visielose universiteitsbesture. Daardeur gaan nog ʼn geslag jong swartmense die boot laat sink waarin hulle self moet vaar. Maar as ons kyk na wat die ANC se “1976-geslag” as vandag se regeerders intussen met die land gemaak het, blyk dit terugskouend dat 1976 meer oor mag as taal gegaan het. Nie oor politieke regte nie, maar oor politieke mag en ekonomiese voordele. Soos Breyten Breytenbach in sy kommentaar op dr. Van Zyl Slabbert gesê het: “Slabbert did not realise that the ANC is neither about building a new nation nor about reconstruction and development, but about divvying up the spoils of victory.” ʼn ANC-woordvoerder Smuts Ngonyama het dit reguit gestel: “Ek het nie gestruggle om arm te wees nie.” ANC-beheer Maar die feit is dat daar ʼn nuwe stryd teen Afrikaans, Afrikaanse skole en ʼn Afrikaanse leefwyse op die histories Afrikaanse skole en kampusse is. Soms word die stryd openlik teen Afrikaans en sy sprekers gevoer, soos die EFF by Tuks en mnr. Lesufi teen Afrikaanse skole. Meermale is die rassetransformasie van die universiteit die doel, en is perke op die toegang vir Afrikaanse studente en ʼn stadige dood vir Afrikaans die voorspelbare gevolg. Die volgende fase is “dekolonisasie”, wat in die praktyk die hernude kolonisasie en Afrikanisering van universiteite is. Dis belangrik om te besef dat die radikale se doel nie beperk is tot die afskaffing van Afrikaans nie, maar dat hulle werklike doel is om beheer oor skole en universiteite te kry. Die rede hiervoor is dat skole en universiteite van die min ruimtes in die samelewing is wat nog nie volledig deur die ANC beheer word nie. Beheer is vir hulle belangriker as die sukses van hierdie instellings. Die waarheid van hierdie stelling kan daarin gesien word dat daar ʼn regstreekse verband is tussen die mate van ANC-beheer en die prestasie van instellings. Die Wes-Kaap is die beste voorbeeld daarvan dat provinsies, dorpe én skole beter presteer as hulle nie onder ANC-beheer staan nie. Dieselfde kan van die wêreldgehalte Afrikaanse skole gesê word. Aan die ander kant is die verval van groot dele 101


van die staat die beste bewys daarvan dat ANC-beheer oor instellings rampspoedig kan wees. Die Afrikaanse geveg is dus nie net vir moedertaalonderwys nie, maar vir die vryheid van skole en universiteite om wêreldgehalte prestasies te lewer. Maar die ANC se hardnekkige pogings om sy magsgreep oor alle skole en universiteite te vestig, wys duidelik dat die stryd nie gaan om toegang vir swart kinders nie, maar in werklikheid teen Afrikaners as kultuurgemeenskap is. Vryheid deur moedertaal Die vraag is wat Afrikaanse jongmense se reaksie hierop moet wees. Die regte strategie is een van “Vryheid deur Afrikaans”, oftewel, “Vryheid deur Afrikaanse Onderwys en Opleiding”. Die rede is dat goeie onderwys en opleiding vandag éérs die sleutel tot sukses is. Dit maak jong Afrikaners betreklik vry van drakoniese rassewette, en is die oorsaak dat werkloosheid onder jong wittes teen 12% steeds ʼn breukdeel van die werkloosheid onder swart jongmense van 43% is. Met goeie onderwys en opleiding kan en gaan Afrikaanse jongmense altyd vir hulself kan sorg – deur werk te kry of deur selfindiensneming – soos ʼn klein besigheid. Hulle moet net moed hou, want ʼn ekonomie werk uiteindelik nie op grond van ras nie, maar van kennis, vaardighede en harde werk. Maar ons jongmense moet besef dat Afrikaanse onderwys en opleiding nie verniet was nie. Al het jy dit verniet gekry, het jou ouers en grootouers dit teen groot koste en opofferings opgebou. Dis jou voorreg om dit nou te bewaar en weer vir die volgende geslag aan te gee, sodat hulle dieselfde kans op sukses kan hê as wat jy gehad het. Hierdie keer is die stryd nie soos in 1976 teen Afrikaans en ʼn onversetlike regering wat apartheid afdwing nie. Die stryd in 2017 is teen die afdwing van Engels en die uitsluiting van Afrikaanse studente deur ʼn onversetlike regering se omgekeerde apartheid.

https://www.afriforum.co.za/sowetodag-1976-se-lesse-vir-vandag/

BRITAIN: POLICE CHIEFS 'TO CONSIDER ARMING BEAT BOBBIES WITH PISTOLS' IN A BID TO TACKLE TERRORISTS ON THE STREETS Critics yesterday dismissed the notion of giving a sidearm to ordinary officers on the beat as 'hysterical'. It will be discussed by the National Police Chiefs' Council next month. • 811 comments • 1 video • 1.8k shares Click on: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4634348/Police-consider-arming-beat-bobbiespistols.html , to read the who item. Comment: One is reminded of the old adage by Sir Robert Peel: The police is the public and the public is the police. Times are chaning. The public determine the police they deserve. “Fire has to be fought with fire”. Un-armed civilian police are useless to combat terrorists. Maybe Britain should look to Ireland and the Continent for ideas on hard policing. The public have changed; one unarmed and respectful to the police. Do the public deserve para-military police for ‘hard policing’ and combating terrorism while un-armed civilian police may be deployed to perform duty in respect of ‘classical policing’ i.e. to serve as community police officers and detectives investigating criminal offences in those areas where the public are mainly law abiding.

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1988: GESKENK AAN MIN ADRIAAN VLOK

Vlnr: Luitenante Wollie Wolmarans, Bazil. Luit-genl (dr) Lothar Neethling en AO Gary Arntsen. Geskiedenis van foto: Geskenk aan Min Vlok SAP tydens die opening van forensiese wetenskap laboratorium te Silverton op 88/05/13. Wollie, het die goud- en gietwerk van handtekening gedoen. Gary en Wollie doen houtwerk van penhouer (38 special koper doppie). Bazil het minister se handtekening in spieĂŤlbeeld met Dremel-tool in teel graveer. Teel met handtekening-nog in sy besit. Geskenk (pen) was ‘n Mont Blanc. Interessant wees om te weet of minister nog geskenk in sy besit het?

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1967: ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING: ACTING US AMBASSADOR’S DAUGHTER: BARRY TAYLOR This is an incident which occurred in 1967 while I was stationed at Sunnyside CID. During the first couple of months of 1967 I took leave as well as unpaid leave and toured the US at my own expense. I did this to broaden my outlook on life and to see the world, as before I went to the US, I spent time in Germany and Iceland. Upon my return during May 1967 I returned to my post at Sunnyside CID. My commanding officer was Captain (name withheld) but we all knew him as Wikus. He originally came from Standerton as many of the police of that time, his English was not of the best. He was a wonderful officer and a real gentleman. On the 22nd of September 1967 he called me to his office and instructed me to accompany him to a complaint at a diplomat house, but did not indicate who the diplomat was or what the complaint was. At that time there was an instruction that any complaint at any diplomat house had to be attended by an officer and as Sunnyside CID serviced Arcadia and Brooklyn Police stations there were many diplomats residences in our police district. We arrived at the house in Mackenzie Str and Capt “Wikus” informed me that the person was a diplomat at the US Embassy. We entered the house and a distinguished gentleman introduced himself. Name known to me. He at that time was the acting Ambassador for the USA in South Africa as the Ambassador was on leave and in Washington for meetings. He introduced me to his wife and I noticed a small girl in their presence. The man informed us that the girl was his daughter, Tanya, and that she was 4 years old. The daughter was then requested to leave the room and the man explained to us that somebody, an unknown female, had called his wife and said that the daughter was going to be kidnapped and that they should take good care of her. As Capt. “Wikus” did not want to speak his Afrikaans-English he asked me to speak to the person and I asked his wife if she recognized the voice. She said that she had no idea who it could be. We spent about an hour there where after the Capt. asked to use the phone and called somebody. He returned and said that Brig. Joubert who at the time was head of the CID had said that I should spend a few hours at the house where after Capt. “Wikus” was collected by another detective. I sat speaking to the man and lady for a while and subsequently had dinner there. When I wanted to leave the gentleman asked me if I would leave my firearm with him. I was hesitant as it was a Police-issue pistol, but then relented and hoped for the best. The next morning early, I returned to the house and accompanied the daughter to the Loretta Convent in Brooklyn where the nuns were informed to please be careful who entered the grounds and that only the designated driver or her mother or I could collect her. This continued for a few days and then we thought that the threat had been a false one. A few days later the gentleman called me again and informed me that two people in the Embassy had received calls at home threatening to kidnap the child.

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I was subsequently requested to stay at the house for a few days and moved into a spare room in the huge house. I also interviewed the people who had received the calls but they had no idea who it was, who had called them. Both were the wives of embassy employees. These calls became more frequent but nobody could give me any information who the caller was but she time and again threatened to have the child kidnapped and killed. About five or six months in the investigation I was introduced by the Ambassador to a certain gentleman who was the Regional Security Officer (RSO) for the US Government in the Southern Sahara region. I briefed him re the investigation and handed the file as well as the statements to him. These calls continued for several more months and every once in a while, a name would come up of who it could be and the Security Branch would tap the telephone. I had the "privilege" to listen to the tapes and in one instance a telephone conversation was monitored of a person in Capital Park and he had a daughter who was in matric and she and her boyfriend would spend hours on the phone talking what teenagers spoke about. This was the worst of the investigation listening to her and her boyfriend discussing their love life and other friend’s love life. Her father was Portuguese and I think if he had known what was happening between her and her boyfriend he would have shot the boyfriend but I am digressing now. One evening there was a function at the house and all the important diplomats in SA as well as a few ministers and Army and Police Generals attended. When they left the gentleman said to me that he was considering asking for a reposting to another country as his wife's nerves were shot with the constant threat of the child’s life. The RSO of the Embassy and I just could not establish who the culprit was. One day, this was in August 1968 I received a call from a Sergeant in the US Air Force who asked me to come to his house. Upon my arrival, he and his wife informed me that they had an idea who the person was and I asked how did they know. He then called his servant, a lady from, at the time one of the Homelands, and she informed me that she had received a threatening call that afternoon and recognized the voice. I asked her who it was and she gave me the name of a lady and I could not believe this as this lady had also received several calls and her husband was a very senior diplomat in the US Embassy in Pretoria. I called the RSO and he also spoke to the person and the servant. He and I went to see the US Ambassador the next morning and informed him of our suspicions and showed him the statement of the witness. He was at first in total denial and said that this lady would not do such a thing but in the end, he asked us what would we like to do and the RSO suggested that her telephone be monitored. The Ambassador nearly fell of his chair and asked who would do this and when the RSO said that the Security Police would do this, he nearly had a heart attack. In the end he agreed to this as long as the tapes were supplied to the RSO on a daily basis by the Security Branch. Now those were the years before electronic exchanges and when you listened to the number being dialled you could count the clicks on the line and thus establish the number. E.g. eleven clicks was zero and two clicks was number one on the phone. Also at that time the US Embassy was on the eighth floor of Wachthuis and had an interleading door to the security branch division. We monitored the phone for about a week when we hit the jackpot. This lady called a certain person of the US community and threatened to kidnap the child. A few hours later she called a friend and 106


spoke to her and the next day she made another threatening call to a person and then continued using the phone for her private calls. The RSO and I took the recordings to the Ambassador explained the technical details to him and let him listen to the tapes. To say that he was upset was to put it mildly and he took the recordings and the tape recorder and informed me that he will take the matter further. A few days later I asked the staff officer of Brig. Joubert what has happened to the matter and he informed me that he did not know. The RSO also informed me that he had no further info re the matter. There was a lot of cooperation between the Security Branch and the RSO thereafter as he was very pro SA and is to this day. The irony of the matter was that I thought she was a very nice person and would never have suspected her. A few weeks later, this lady and her husband were escorted to a Pan Am flight by FBI agents and up to today I do not know what the outcome of the matter was. I was off the record informed that this lady had met her husband in Italy during the Second World War where she was fighting with the communist partisans against the Germans and he was in the US invading forces in Italy and they had got married. She was also according to my source an avowed communist Remember this was only 22 years after the Second World War. But her reason for the calls and the threats was that she wanted this person to leave SA as then she thought her husband could become the acting Ambassador. For this she destroyed his career and caused a lot of trauma for a family who were totally innocent. This RSO and I are friends up to today and he became a very senior member in the US Government Intelligence Services. We still regularly visit each other. He has retired and has recently moved to Montana after spending many years in Pensacola. He says he has returned to his Roots where he was born. Barry Taylor Thailand

Barry Taylor on the left and the RSO on the right. 107


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LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH COSTER ICD, OBE, SSAS Part I: Enlistment and Training by historian, author and copy-editor Gerry van Tonder (Gerry’s website: http://www.rhodesiansoldier.com/)

[01] Gen Keith Coster In August 2015, the late Lieutenant General Keith Coster’s son, Steve, approached me, wanting to know if I would like to take custody of his memoirs, personal photographs, records, documents and some items of uniform that had belonged to the general. It was their wish that the collection find a permanent home in a Rhodesian museum. Suffice to say, I very readily accepted their magnanimous offer. In return, I promised them that I would construct a fact file on the military life of the former commander of the Rhodesian army, so that a permanent record could be established. Fortuitously, Steve and Cindy’s daughter, Catherine Coster, was visiting her parents in the United States at the time, and was therefore able to bring the collection back with her to the UK where she lives. I did not wish to risk Catherine mailing this irreplaceable material to me, so I personally drove to London to pick up the box of neatly sorted and itemised photographs, papers and certificates. 109


Fortunately, I was able to access the general’s full South African service records to augment my fact file on him. General Coster’s life in uniform was, for me, a massive revelation, and I am certain the reader will enjoy his story as much as I enjoyed constructing it. It was indeed a rare privilege.

[02] The general’s swords. Lieutenant General Keith Coster ICD, OBE, SSAS, was a South African Air Force and army officer who rose to command the Rhodesian army from 1968 to 1972. Born on 19 April 1920 in Eshowe, Zululand, South Africa, he was educated at Maritzburg College, in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. After his matriculation at the school in 1936, he enlisted in the Special Service Battalion (SSB) of the Union Defence Force (UDF) (of South Africa), and was commissioned into the South African Air Force (SAAF) on 6 September 1939. While flying with No. 5 Squadron SAAF, he was shot down in 1942 over North Africa, and was a prisoner of war until May 1945. After the war, he transferred to the South African army, and during 1952, attended the Royal Army Staff College at Camberley in England. In 1955, he left the South African Permanent Force to join the Army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a major. With the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, he transferred to the Rhodesian Army where he eventually rose to the rank of Lieutenant General as Commander of the Army. After four years in this position, he retired from the Rhodesian Army in 1972, and returned to South Africa where he re-enlisted with the South African Army, joining the Directorate of Strategic Studies at Defence Headquarters. In 1979, he was seconded to the Secretariat of the State Security Council, remaining there until his retirement in June 1985.

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[03] Pre-war Lieutenant Coster. On 6 July 1937, Coster attested into the Special Service Battalion (SSB), the Royal Durban Light Infantry (RDLI), Union Defence Force (UDF).

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[04a, 04b, & 04c] Badges of the Royal Durban Light Infantry (left) and the Special Service Battalion. On 2 May 1938, Coster signed a contract with the South African Department of Defence for a commission in the South African Permanent Force, starting off as an officer cadet. A month later, he commenced officer training: Cadet Course 382G, South African Permanent Force S.A. Military College, Voortrekkerhoogte. Service No. 6056. Coster’s end of third term report, showed generally very good examination marks, especially in director, board, ammunition and gunnery 2nd paper. His personal overall average was 79.8% compared to the course average of 73.6%. After completing 21 hours 5 minutes solo flying, the officer commanding E Flight, Central Training School, stated that he ‘should make a good pilot’. Coster completed the pilot’s course on 4 September 1939, from where he was attached to Zwartkop Air Station (ZAS), Pretoria. At this time, and with South Africa’s entry into the Second World War, he was given a commission of second lieutenant.

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[05] Coster’s wings. On 16 September, Coster passed his flying test and qualified for his wings, before being posted to No. 5 Bomber/Fighter Squadron, SAAF, Young’s Field, Kenilworth, Cape Town. In October, he was transferred to Air Armament School, Wynberg, Cape Town, where he attended Armament Officers’ Specialization Course No. 1. In March 1940, Coster qualified as Specialist Armament Officer. He then became Officer-in-Charge of the Armament Instructors’ Course, before being appointed as the Assistant Armament Officer-inCharge of Armament Officers’ Courses. In June, he transferred to Zwartkop Air Station, Pretoria, to establish No. 1 School of Technical Training. In February 1941, Coster undertook his first cross-country night flight, before being posted to No. 21 Air School in Kimberley as Station Armament Officer. In June, now with the rank of captain, Coster was posted to Waterkloof Air Station, again as Station Armament Officer. In September, he was recalled to the Air Armament School in Cape Town to continue training air-gunners and bombaimers for squadrons in the North African theatre. That same month, Coster received his first instructional flight in a twin-engine Airspeed Oxford aircraft, and after 4 hours and 55 minutes of dual instruction, he went solo on Oxfords.

[06] Airspeed Oxford. On 29 January 1942, Coster was posted from No. 65 Air School to Mobile Air Force Depot (MAFD) in Pretoria, to which all air force personnel were posted before going north to Egypt. A week later, he was sent to No. 62 Air School at Bloemfontein for a comprehensive conversion course to 113


twin- and multi-engine aircraft. Early in March, Coster was posted to No. 71 Flight at Germiston to do a very short conversion course on Maryland two-engine bomber aircraft. In mid-April, he returned to MAFD, where hr boarded a Lockheed Lodestar transport aircraft for Egypt.

[07] Martin Maryland. In his WWII memoirs, Keith Coster wrote of his experiences at this time, prior to his going to war in the Western Desert: When the war broke out I was an officer-cadet at the South African Military College. Our cadet course had started on 2 May 1938 and was planned to last two years. We were training to be officers in the South African Permanent Force, and whilst our training included infantry, artillery and air force subjects, we could only become either artillery or air force officers if we passed the course and were commissioned as officers. Great Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, but South Africa only followed suit on 6 September. The South African prime minister at that time was Field Marshal J.C. Smuts who had, as a Boer officer, fought against Britain in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902.

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[08] Gen Jan Christian Smuts. We officer cadets had been out training on the day South Africa declared war, and we were summoned to return to the military college forthwith. We were told to go into one of the lecture rooms and sit down as the commandant of the college was going to address us. In came Lt-Colonel William Henry Evered Poole, accompanied by the Adjutant Capt F.J. Dyason. The colonel addressed us as follows, “I have two things to tell you today. Firstly, this morning the Royal Air Force bombed the Kiel Canal in Germany, and secondly, you are all commissioned as from today.” We were flabbergasted and could hardly believe our luck. One minute we were officer cadets earning five shillings (50 cents) a day, and the next minute we were 2nd lieutenants and our pay would go up to fifteen shillings (R1.50) per day! We all had a couple of beers to celebrate this fantastic stroke of luck, and no more work was done on that Wednesday, 6 September 1939. At that stage we were all very close to getting our ‘wings’ for flying, and for the next ten days we put in quite a lot of flying time. On 16 September, I did my flying test with Major S.A. Melville and qualified for my ‘wings’, which meant that I was considered capable of carrying passengers in the air. On 18 September, I, with a number of other young officers, caught the train to Cape Town where we would join No. 5 Bomber/Fighter Squadron. My original posting had been to Waterkloof Air Station near Pretoria, but one of my course mates, ‘Bossie Bosman ‘, begged me to change postings

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with him as he wanted to remain in Pretoria, so I went to Cape Town instead. This was one of those quirks of fate that changed my entire life. We arrived in the Cape on the morning of 19 September 1939, a beautiful sunny spring morning, and I thought that I had never been in a more perfect place. We were met at Cape Town station and taken out to the officers’ mess at Wynberg and allocated our rooms. I roomed with my best friend Billy Rhodes. We soon settled into a routine.

[09] Westland Wapiti. rom Monday to Saturday (we worked on Saturdays then), after an early breakfast, we were taken in a 3-tonner from the Wynberg officers’ mess down to an aerodrome known as Young’s Field in the Wetton area near the Kenilworth racecourse, where our flying duties started at 6am. Our first task was to convert to Westland Wapiti aircraft, which were the service aircraft with which No. 5 Bomber/Fighter Squadron was equipped. In order to get our ‘wings’, we had flown Avro Tutor biplanes, on which I went solo for the first time on 12 October 1939, after 11 hours and 50 minutes of flying instruction. I was then 18½ years old. Following our ab initio flying instruction, we later graduated to Hawker Hart biplanes and then Hawker Hartebeest, which were similar to the Harts, but more powerful. After 113 hours and 40 minutes of flying time, I qualified for my ‘wings’, as I said earlier.

[10] Avro Tutor.

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[11] Hawker Hart.

[12] Hawker Hartebeest. Anyway, to get back to the Wapitis, these were large, slow biplanes with radial engines, and had come into service soon after the end of the First World War. They had two open cockpits, fixed undercarriages, one fixed Vickers gun firing through the arc of the propeller, and one Vickers ‘K’ gun mounted on a ring round the rear cockpit, which was fired by the observer, the pilot being in the front cockpit. I first flew a Wapiti on 24 September 1939, with an instructor, and after 2 hours and 15 minutes, flew one solo. Our flying duties in No. 5 Bomber/Fighter Squadron were primarily to carry out coastal patrols to look for any signs of enemy (German or Japanese) shipping in the waters around Cape Town. We would fly east as far as Hermanus and west as far as Saldanha Bay. On one occasion, I was flying as observer with my great friend Dick Clifton, when we became aware that the floor of the Wapiti was awash with petrol. We hastily returned to Young’s Field and, on inspection, found a neat round hole in the main fuel tank, which we thought at first was a bullet hole, believing that we had been shot at from the ground. However, further inspection by the air mechanics proved it to have been caused by a nut which had become unscrewed on the engine cowling, and been diverted at right angles into the fuel tank by a small auxiliary propeller mounted on the side of the aircraft.

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[13] A flight of SAAF Wapitis. On another occasion, on 8 October 1939, when flying as ‘safety pilot’ to 2nd Lieutenant Doug Loftus (then a Coast Artillery Officer), we took off from Young’s Field in heavy mist and were unable to land there again. Instead, we made a landing on the beach at the Strand and remained there until we were able to ascertain that the mist had cleared back at base. We were given innumerable cups of coffee by the many Strand residents who flocked to the beach to see the ‘intrepid aviators’ and their plane. On 16 October 1939, our brief period of squadron service came to an end when me, Bill Rhodes, Dick Clifton and others were transferred to the Air Armament School as pupils on No. 1 Air Armament Officers’ course, which went on to the end of April 1940. On this very interesting course, we were taught all about bombing from the air as well as the theory and practice of air firing, both air-to-air and air-to-ground. We learned all there was to know, at that time, about the bombs and guns possessed and operated by the South African air force. We did a lot of work on the theory of bombing as well as doing the actual bombing (with 20-lb practice bombs) from a level altitude and by dive-bombing. We had an air-firing and bombing range off the coast in False Bay (not far from where Monwabisi is now) where we attacked targets out to sea. For air-to-air firing, we would attack a drogue: a fabric tube like a windsock towed at a safe distance behind another aircraft. Then the drogue would be dropped over the airfield and the number of bullet holes counted to see how successful the ‘attack’ had been. At the end of the course, we were re-classified as Specialist Air Armament Officers, and our function was to instruct other pilots, observers and air-gunners in the practical aspects of bombing and air gunnery. 118


[14] I recall that my first posting was to No. 65 Air School at Young’s Field as an armament instructor. One of the courses on which I instructed was a Squadron Armament Officer’s course attended by officers who had been in World War I. One of them was the head of the South African Fuel Research Institute, a very distinguished scientist, and another was Lawrence Green, a very well-known South African author. I said earlier that my posting to Cape Town, instead of to Pretoria, was to change my entire life. It did this in two ways. Firstly, it involved me in the air armament world, from which I was unable to escape until 1942. Had I been posted to Waterkloof Air Station in Pretoria, I would have gone ‘up North’ and served in East Africa, Eritrea and Ethiopia, which is what I desperately wanted to do, but no amount of interviews, requests and letter-writing would induce SAAF Headquarters to release 119


me from Air Armament. I was a trained Specialist Air Armament Officer, and I would perform that function until they had had their money’s worth from me. The other way in which my life was irrevocably changed was by meeting a Cape Town girl called Molly Stanley, then doing an education course at the University of Cape Town. Sometime in February 1940 – I cannot remember the precise date – a surprise party was given in a house in High Level Road in Seapoint, to which a number of young officers in the Wynberg mess were invited. We had to proceed to the statue in Church Square in Cape Town and pick up an equal number of university girls who would be waiting there for us. The girl ‘allotted’ to me was called Dell Jolley, whose father was a professor at UCT. That was all I knew at that stage. In due course, we found the girls and I took Dell Jolley to the party. How? You may well ask. Well, Bill Rhodes and I had jointly bought a 1932 Hillman Minx car for £37.10.0 (in today’s money that is R75). So we each took our ‘allotted’ girl to the surprise party. It was a bit of a squeeze in a Hillman Minx, but who cared? It turned out to be a good party, during which I met another of the varsity girls called Molly Stanley, to whom I took an immediate shine. We arranged that Dell would go home with the chap who had brought Molly, and that she would go home with me. When I dropped her off at Tudor Mansions early the next morning, I asked her for another date – the rest is history.

[15] Hawker Hind. To return now to the air armament world. After a couple of months as an instructor at the Air Armament School, I was instructed to report without delay to No. 1 School of Technical Training (1STT) at Zwartkop Air Station in Pretoria, where I was to establish a school for armourers. Two months after my 20th birthday, on 29th June 1940 I set up the school, scrounged a couple of NCO instructors, produced a syllabus, and I was in business. Armourers were young airmen whose job was to see to the actual arming of a service aircraft: to maintain its guns, provide the necessary ammunition, maintain the bomb-sights and mount and arm the bombs. An aeroplane is only a mobile platform for the armament, which it carries and delivers. Within a month, the Armourers’ School was up and running, but I was needed back in Cape Town, so I handed over to my successor and returned to No. 65 Air School. I remained there from 7 September 1940 to 6 May 1941. I note from my logbook of that period that I also flew Hawker Hinds and Hawker Audaxes, both similar to the Harts, Hinds and Hartbeest. 120


[16] Hawker Audax. In May 1941, I was posted to No. 21 Air School in Kimberley as station armament officer, and I recall that one of my tasks, apart from teaching pilots, observers and air gunners the principles of bombing and air gunnery, was to be appointed as OC of a train loaded with ammunition and bombs, travelling from Kimberley to Cape Town. I think I must have volunteered to do this as I was missing Molly Stanley and saw the ammunition train as a golden opportunity for a free ride to Cape Town. There had been a flood in Beaufort West where the train stopped for 30 minutes and I bought some tinned meat that must have been ‘blown’ because I got food poisoning and arrived in Cape Town as a hospital case. I also took the opportunity to become engaged to Molly. I was 21 years old! Kimberley did not last long and my next posting came in June 1941 to Waterkloof Air Station in Pretoria, again as station armament officer. I was by now a captain in the air force. I served at Waterkloof for three months before I was recalled once again to the Air Armament School in Cape Town to continue training air gunners and bomb aimers for squadrons up north. In the meantime, my flying had continued apace. Amongst other things I had started night flying which was different and very exciting and I note that in February of 1941 I did my first night flying cross-country from Young’s Field to Hopefield, Riebeek West and back to Young’s Field. However, the very first time I flew in the dark it was not at night at all. On 1st October 1940, I was the pilot of a Wapiti, one of six under the command of Major Tommy Theron, when we flew in formation from Young’s Field to Van Rhynsdorp on the occasion of an eclipse of the sun. Observers had come from all over the Commonwealth to see the eclipse as Van Rhynsdorp was deemed to be the best place in the world from which it could be seen. Our formation was about 2,000 feet above the town, when at the precise second predicted by the scientists, the sun was blacked out by the moon’s shadow and we were in instant and near-total darkness. It was an eerie feeling, but tremendously exciting and I shall never forget the experience. In March 1941, I had accumulated 230 flying hours, of which 170 were solo hours and 60 dual. At that point in time, I was assessed by Major Theron, the chief armament instructor, as average in air gunnery and as a pilot navigator, and ‘above average’ as a service pilot and in bombing. I resumed my duties as a specialist air armament instructor at No. 65 Air School on 18 September 1941, but by now my sights were set on getting back to general flying duties and getting into an 121


operational squadron in North Africa where the Allied Forces (British, South African, Australian and New Zealand) were confronting the German Afrika Korps.

[17] PzKpfw IVD, Afrika Korps Before the Germans invaded Africa, the only enemy had been the Italians, who had occupied large tracts of territory in the north-east of the African continent. South African forces had first gone up north to help the British forces to drive the Italians out of Africa altogether. Both ground and air forces were involved in this operation that was very largely successful, and in the latter half of 1941, the Axis forces – as the Germans and Italians were known – were confined to a strip of desert running along the southern Mediterranean shore between Tunisia and Egypt. The aim of the Axis forces was to take Cairo, cross the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez, and break out into the countries of the Middle East: Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In this they were opposed by the Allied forces, whose aim was to defend Egypt and, when they had built up sufficient strength to do so, to drive the Axis forces back to Tunisia and out of Africa altogether.

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[18] 1 SA Division, North Africa. (Courtesy Colonel Dudley Wall) Besides having two infantry divisions serving with British forces in the Western Desert – as the coastal strip was known – South Africa provided a number of fighter, reconnaissance and bomber squadrons as part of the Allied air forces opposing the German Luftwaffe, and it was into one of these squadrons that I aimed to get. The South African Air Force obviously intended me to become a bomber pilot because, shortly after I returned to Young’s Field from Waterkloof Air Station, I was assigned to twin-engine aircraft and had my first instructional flight in a twin-engine Airspeed Oxford aircraft on 25 September 1941. On 3 October, after 4 hours and 55 minutes of dual instruction, I went solo on Oxfords. While I continued to fly single-engine aircraft on armament instruction, I spent more and more time in the air in Oxfords.

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[19] Airspeed Oxfords. My next posting was on 29 January 1942, from No. 65 Air School to MAF Depot (Mobile Air Force Depot) in Pretoria, which was the unit to which all air force personnel were posted before going up to Egypt, or on return from Egypt. My next posting came on 3 February to No. 62 Air School at Bloemfontein, where I was sent to do a comprehensive conversion course to twin- or multi-engine aircraft. Molly did not come to MAF Depot with me, but joined me in Bloemfontein for the month that I spent there. We stayed in the Central Hotel. Between the 5th and the 27th February, I flew Oxfords virtually every day (and some nights), getting in 3 hours and 20 minutes dual, and 19 hours and 45 minutes solo, including a day and a night cross country. Major ‘Piggy’ Boyle signed my logbook to say that I had qualified as an Oxford pilot and that I was assessed as above average as a multi-engine pilot. His signature was dated 2 March 1942. At this time, I travelled from Bloemfontein to No. 71 Flight at Germiston to do a very short conversion course on Maryland two-engine bomber aircraft. It lasted only from 5 to 13 March, during which time I did 1 hour 55 minutes dual instruction and 5 hours solo on the Maryland. This was the fastest and most powerful aircraft that I had ever flown, and it was a very exciting aeroplane to fly, especially as there was no dual version of the aircraft. The first time you flew it yourself you were on your own. There was no instructor with you to pick up the pieces should anything go wrong. Fortunately it didn’t. I really enjoyed flying a Maryland.

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[20] SAAF aircrew with their Martin Maryland, Egypt. When I said goodbye to my wife Molly, I didn’t know that I would not see her again until June 1945. I returned to MAF Depot, and on 13 April I boarded a Lockheed Lodestar transport aircraft flown by the famous South African aviator, Captain Dougie Mail, whose flying exploits in the twenties and early thirties had thrilled me as a very small boy. Destination: Egypt.

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[21] SAAF Lockheed Lodestar at the South African Air Force Museum, Swartkop. (Courtesy NJR ZA) I will be featuring Part II of General Coster’s military life in the next edition of Nongqai. This will follow his journey – in his own words – after being shot down in North Africa, as a PoW in concentration camps all through Italy and Germany, including the famous Stalag Luft III camp. Coster was there at the time of the ‘Great Escape’ and had in fact drawn a number to also escape if his turn came around. In this excellent map drawn for me by my good friend, Colonel Dudley Wall, will be able to follow Coster’s journey, from Benghazi, through Italy and Germany, and finally his flight to England, a free man.

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[22]

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GEN KEITH COSTER: BLOEMFONTEIN

During March 2004, I was privileged to be on a train tour through South Africa. One of the passengers was my former colleague, Gen. Keith Coster. He was, during my sojourn at the Secretariat of the State Security Council employed as the Personal Staff Officer of Gen Andre van Deventer the then Secretary of the SSSC – HBH. NO 35895 KOL JH PIETERS: 80 NIE UIT NIE Die Nagsersant skakel vanaf Hermanus en deel mee dat Johan Pieters op 20 Junie, 80 jaar oud sal word. Ek het dadelik vir Johan dadelik geskakel en weer op sy 80ste verjaarsdag. Johan het afgetree naby Hermanus. Ons twee kom van Durban se dae af, saam. Hy was eers ‘n speurder en later veiligheidstak, Vryheid en ons het weer te veiligheidshoofkantoor saamgewerk. Johan Pieters het my twee ‘stories’ vertel, nl. dat Hermanus se regte naam Hermanuspietersfontein was. Die plek is later afgekort na “Hermanus”. Hermanus Pieters was een van sy voorsate. Ou Johan het vir my eendag ‘n lekker pak biltong van Vryheid saam gebring toe ek te Hoofkantoor was. Dankie. Die ander anekdote was: Daar was ‘n moord van ‘n swart man in Durban. Hy en die Zulu-kollega “woon die moord by” en doen wat speurders alles by so ‘n toneel moet doen. Hulle ry die aand terug polisiestasie toe en neem ‘n alternatiewe roete weg van die moordtoneel na die stasie. Op pad na die stasie ry hulle verby ‘n erf en die voorhekkie staan oop. Hulle hou stil en stap in en gaan na die 128


woonkwartier. Hulle klop en die inwoner maak oop en bieg onmiddellik dat hy die moord gepleeg het. Dit het die fiktiewe speurder luit Willem Dreyer – geskep deur Kas van den Bergh – seker lekker op die neus laat kyk. Die Nagsersant is natuurlik niemand ander as luit-genl. Hendrik Westraat nie. Hy het die bynaam gekry by die skoonmaker/kok in Namakwaland. Die dag toe die bevorderingseksamen se uitslae van konstabel tot sersant aangekondig word, is Hendrik Westraat se naam hoog op die lys van suksesvolle, nuwe sersante. Sy kollegas het toe skelm sersantstrepe op sy nagklere aangebring om hom so ‘n bietjie te spot. Die kok by die enkelkwartiere sien toe die strepe op die nagklere die volgende oggend en vra toe: “Is u die nagsersant?” Die bynaam het maar bly gekleef ... •

Die Nagsersant is een van die stigterslede van die polisie se bejaardesorgfonds en is die Wes-Kaapse verteenwoordiger. Kolonel Pieters is nie bietjie trots op die kombersie wat die BSF vir hom geskenk het nie! Ek kon nie ‘n foto van Johan Pieters bekom nie – ek en my kamera is in Pretoria.

CORPORAL MICHEAL LAMB: BRITISH ARMY

This is the photo of the barracks named after Mike in South Sudan. Letter of motivation below, sent by Mikes very good friend, Ben. 129


Sir, As requested please find below a brief symbiosis of Corporal Michael Lamb, RAMC 17.12.1984 06.02.2017. Born in Pretoria, South Africa. The youngest in a large family. Educated at Boys High in Pretoria and joined the British Army in 2005. After completing Combat Medical Technician training he was posted to 19 sqn, 16 close support regiment in the summer of 2006 and passed P Company in 2007. Cpl Lamb deployed on OP Herrick 8 as part of 16CS Regt. On return from OP Herrick 8 he attended and passed Black Serpent. In the same year, he was the recipient of the Trevallyan trophy. Cpl Lamb was posted to Medical Support Unit, 22 SAS as a squadron medic. He completed multiple operational tours in support of UKSF. Whilst at Hereford he also successfully completed Paramedic training and qualified as a state registered paramedic. After leaving the military Michael worked offshore and did bank work in Bristol for the NHS, where he had a flat. He met Barbara whilst travelling and spent time in Portugal, where she was originally from. Cpl Lamb was diagnosed with aggressive cancer in December 2016. He married Barbara just a couple of weeks before he died in a beautiful ceremony within the hospital chapel. He was so ill he had his stag do within his hospital room but this showed his strength and commitment even at the hardest of times. Michael died on the 6th February 2017 with his family around him. Like any good South African, he loved coffee, knives and biltong.9 Asking his friends to best describe Cpl Lamb, words such as airborne, generous, caring, professional and committed were at the forefront of their description of Michael. The one word that sticks out the most in my opinion is humble. He was a highly trained consummate professional medic who was at the top of his profession but he would help the most junior of soldiers without a second thought. A great soldier, leader and friend whoever had the honour to meet him. Moira, Micheal's mum was told about the naming dedication in Bentiu. She was so touched, it moved her to tears (and nearly me too) she asked me to pass on the following: " I am overwhelmed by everybody's love for Michael. It means the world to me and the family. I am missing him terribly. One of Michael's most amazing traits was the fact that he never ever felt sorry for himself. I came to England a little while after he did and I was scared-he said: "Get your ducks in a row and Do It Mom. When I got homesick, he would say: "Crack on Mom, - no time for crying old girl." When he got the cancer, and knew that he had only a little time left, he said "It is what it is Mom NO use crying about it."

9

We will excuse the author of this report. Michael also loved braaivleis! - HBH

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When he was told he had a brain tumour and that he may have a personality change he said "Thanks mate, then turned to me and said " Bit of a bummer Mom, can you cope with that one". He really was a very brave man. Thank you for honouring him." In his memory Sgt Ben Stewart, RAMC (2 PARA RAP) and 15 others undertook a stretcher carry with full weight. They walked half marathon distance Brightlingsea to Colchester on FRI 26 MAY 17. They raised £1200 for Macmillan Cancer, RBL and Team Breya (a soldier within 2 PARA daughter was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer earlier this year). On 29 JUL 17 I have had the privilege to be involved in helping to arrange a charity day (in conjunction with 16 Med family’s day) in Lamby's honour and hope to raise even more money for the previously mentioned charities. I hope you find the above agreeable and I hope I have done Cpl Lamb justice. I personally never met him but he has had such an influence within 16 Medical Regiment even before his sad death. Since his death he has become an excellent example to junior soldiers of what can be achieved but most importantly that his strength, humility and loyalty demonstrated strongest qualities in a airborne medic, soldier and friend. Kind Regards, Christopher King: Corporal: RAMC. Background The late Corp. Lamb is the son of Dr. Peter Lamb – “honorary police surgeon” – of Pretoria. Dr. Lamb is well-known in certain police circles. I am proud to say that Michael was also my friend. We enjoyed a few braai’s together! MHDSRIP. – Hennie Heymans

GESKIEDENIS: BRIGADIER FANIE BOUWER Ons ervaar geskiedenis deur woorde. Met ander woorde, deur storievertellings; deur die kronologie van gebeure en datums. Geskiedenis móét vertel word - vanuit alle hoeke en oogpunte, alhoewel geskiedenis egter net so subjektief kan wees soos die hedendaagse joernalistiek. Lees maar 2 verskillende koerante oor d.s. onderwerp en let op waaroor geskryf word en wat geïgnoreer word. Dít reflekteer natuurlik die joernalis se subjektiwiteit oor die onderwerp. Kan dit oor geskiedskrywery anders wees? In die nuwe orde van SA vandag, soos seker maar voorheen ook, gee die nuwe heersers met al groterwordende selfvertroue hulle eie perspektiewe oor die verlede. Daardeur herskep en herrangskik die huidige orde die geskiedenis dus - maar meesal ook om hulle mislukkings te probeer verbloem. So word sekeres se bydraes in die anale van die geskiedenis uitgewis en word die huidige politieke elite wat die nuutgevonde vrugte van vryheid selfs onwettig pluk, se eie geskiedenis opgehemel. En so is talle joernaliste ook besig om hulle misplaaste perspektiewe van die verlede doodeenvoudig as die waarheid te verkoop. Hulle glo húlle waarheid en aanvaar bloot dat die lesers en aanhoorders in vandag se tye dit sonder teëstribbeling moet aanvaar. Mettertyd kan dit dan die aanvaarbare narratief word. En dít mag nie toegelaat word nie. 131


Daardie van ons wat deel was van die werklike, onlangse (resente) geskiedenis - bv. die pre-1994 era - en sekere dinge werklik gesien, belewe en ervaar het, lees en luister met ongeloof na sekere mense en joernaliste se uitsprake en perspektiewe asook die verdraaiing van sekere feite van daardie tyd. Hier dink ek bv. aan enkele dinge uit my persoonlike ervarings soos Soweto 1976; die relatief goeie rasseverhoudinge van daardie tyd andersins; my dienstydperk in Transkei; die werksaamhede van die SAP wat 'n veilige en ordelike leefomgewing geskep het; die hoë standaarde in die staatsdiens en elders en so aan. Daar is baie meer voorbeelde. Foute was gemaak ja, maar tog. Dis mos onsinnig om net sekere feite te wil erken of andersins 'n verwronge weergawe te wil gee. Die situasie rondom geskiedenisvertelling en bespreking daarvan het intussen 'n aaklige en onaanvaarbare wending geneem. Dit is dat jy niks goeds van die verlede (en daar is baie) in die openbaar mag sê of dit mag verdedig nie. Doen jy dit, word jy as't ware in die verdoemenis verdryf deur politieke leiers en sekere mediaelemente. Ook dít sal teengestaan moet word. Ander se geveinsde sensitiwiteit mag nié die botoon voer nie. Sekere feite van die verlede staan vas en kan nie verander of ontken word nie. Ander dinge weer kan verskillende opinies tot gevolg hê. Ek het hier bo geskryf "vanuit alle hoeke en oogpunte". Dit is so omdat - met die storievertellery en storieskrywery uit almal se dalk subjektewe perspektiewe - kom die ware feite van die verlede ook gewoonlik na vore. Iemand het ook al gesê dat soos die jare aanskuif, raak die geskiedenisfeite ook dan duideliker en meer akkuraat. Daarom is dit goed en reg dat 'n internet publikasie soos hierdie (eNongqai) wat onder leiding van brigadier Hennie Heymans nou al vir baie jare ook die geskiedenis van SA se polisie (selfs meer as net dit ook) hier weergee - ook deur woorde; storievertellings; deur die kronologie van gebeure; datums én foto's. Dit het ons nie net ingelig nie, maar ook die lig vir ons laat skyn op 'n onbekende of selfs donker verlede. Toekomstige geslagte - en nuwe, aspirant-geskiedkundiges - sal ook dan kan put uit Hennie se jarelange arbeid en navorsing, sodat die geskiedenis hieromtrent nie verlore gaan nie. Saluut Hennie Heymans! - Brigadier Fanie Bouwer. Polisiegeskiedenis hier ter lande verkeer nog in sy babaskoene. Ons het ‘n 375 jaar periode om te dek. Polisiegeskiedenis en landsgeskiedenis is nou verweef met mekaar. Die politici bepaal die politiek van die dag terwyl die gedrag van die publiek die soort polisie wat aanwesig gaan wees bepaal. Kyk maar na die interessante verskuiwing van “the unarmed Bobby on the Beat” tot swaer gewapende en gepantserde polisie in Londen – kyk net hoe het die polisie van 1950 tot die jaar 2000 in Brittanje verander. Sedert oudsher was daar in suidelike Afrika ‘n simbiotiese verhouding tussen die polisie en die verdedigingsmag. Polisie was soldate en andersom (dink aan die CMR en die SABS/SAMR). 132


Ons het groot leemtes in ons polisiegeskiedenis. Lede is “bang om te praat”, neem as voorbeeld die coup de ‘etat in Bophuthatswana: Dit was ‘n gewone SAP-operasie (bygestaan deur die SAW) en geen lid van die SAP se spesiale taakmag is bereid om sy storie te vertel nie. Wat Boipatong betref wil niemand praat nie – ten spyte van direkte versoeke! - HBH

SAP IN RHODESIË Twee vrae asseblief – a. Weet jy miskien wat die outoriteit was wat die gevegsonderskeidings op die SAP vaandel goedgekeur het? Was dit die kommissaris of was dit die SA Weermag se Vaandelkomitee? b. ’n Vriend het gelees dat die 3e Bataljon Rhodesian Light Infantry eintlik SAP was. Maar soos ek onthou en gesien het, het die SAP in eie uniform en onder eie identiteit destyds daar opgetree. Daar was wel baie Amerikaners , S Afrikaners en ander vreemdelinge in die RLI gewees maar my herinnering is dat die SAP nie weggesteek is nie. Beste groete Deon DFS Fourie: Professor: Strategie Studies

Beste Deon Wat vraag een betref: Ek het die korrespondensie oor die vaandel gesien. 'n Kollega (kapt. Jefferson) het dit opgestel en vir my gewys. Eers was dit net 'n vaandel; later het die gevegsonderskeidings bygekom - ek verbeel my die SP het die vaandel & gevegsonderskeidings goedgekeur via kompol en die minister. Die SAP het nooit die SWA-veldtog van 1966 - 1989 op die vaandel geplaas nie. (Rhodesië is wel op die vaandel.) Die SAP, met inbegrip van Koevoet, was in groot en suksesvolle skermutselings betrokke. Ons het later ook 'n nasionale vaandel van die SP (mnr PW Botha) ontvang. Ek het in die Nongqai al oor beide vaandels geskryf. Tov vraag twee skryf lt-genl JG le Roux Stemmet soos volg: "Die SAP het openlik as SAP gefunksioneer. Selfs die voertuie het SAP nommer plate gehad. En die helikopters was met SAP kentekens en ‘SAPolice’ gemerk. Die SAP moes aan die toepaslike brigade van die Rhodesiërs rapporteer en ons het dikwels saam GOS vergaderings bygewoon. Al die magte betrokke het in noue samewerking met mekaar die aanslag afgeweer. " Ek kan net byvoeg:

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Toe ek in 1974 opgelei was in TIN om Rhodesië toe te gaan was daar twee ouens van die RLI te Maleoskop om te help met die opleiding. Party van my vriende was na SAP-opleiding weer deur die RLI in Rhodesië opgelei. Voor die SAP kamoefleerdrag het die SAP die Rhodesiese Kamoefleerdrag gedra. •

Enige kommentaar op die onderwerp is welkom.

SOWETO 1976 Hennie - ek het altyd so elke 10 jr. geskryf oor Soweto 76. (Dis nou weer amper die 16de). Anders raak mens gatvol daarvoor. Jy sal ook hierdie een onthou. Net om jou weer te herinner sommer. Sekere dinge wat ek hierin gesê het, en sekere vrae wat ek gevra het in my storie, het nie goed afgegaan by sekere van my oudkollegas nie. Ek vermoed dis het ingedruis in dit wat hulle wíl glo, asook hulle eie persepsies. Groete - Fanie – Uittreksel uit my skriftelike herinneringe van baie jare gelede. Volgens getuienis het die swart bewussynsleier en denker, Steve Biko, se denke en geskrifte ‘n besliste en oorheersende invloed op die jeug leiers van Soweto destyds gehad. Hy is die enkele persoon wat ‘n beslissende rol gespeel het om hulle denke sodanig te beïnvloed, te wete dat dit nie nodig is om onderdanig aan die witman te wees nie; dat hulle minderwaardigheidsgevoel teenoor witmense moet afskud: dat hulle moet trots te wees op hulle eie swartheid en dat hulle – die swartes – enige onderdrukking en diskriminasie moet teenstaan omdat hulle as menslike wesens op geen wyse ongelyk aan die witmense is nie. “Black is beautiful” was sy oproep aan sy mense. Biko – ‘n bewese intellektueel - kan tereg beskou word as die persoon wat die psige en denke van die swartes op so ‘n wyse beïnvloed het wat, méér as enigiemand anders, uiteindelik tot die radikale veranderinge in hierdie land tot gevolg gehad het. Só word daar oor hom geskryf. Die (beweerde) teenstand teen Afrikaanse opleiding in skole het sy oorsprong gehad op 30 April 1976 toe die Orlando-Wees Junior skool gestaak het en geweier het om skool toe te gaan. Dit het aanklank by ander skole gevind. Ene Teboho ‘Tsietsi’ Mashinini (wie kort daarna landuit gevlug het) het toe die leiding geneem onder die vaandel van die Soweto Students’ Representative Council, wat op die massabyeenkoms van 16 Junie daardie jaar besluit het. Selfs die ANC het nié daarvan geweet nie, alhoewel hulle die opstande vir hulle valse politieke doelwitte deesdae gebruik. Ek was ’n 23-jarige Adj.-Offisier en het 3 weke tydens daardie onrus dáár in Soweto gespandeer. Dit was veral oor daardie eerste dag waaroor ek baie nagedink het. Dit was die dag toe die skoolkinders in die strate gemarsjeer en betoog het. En ek wonder ook nog steeds of hulle inderdaad alleen verantwoordelik was vir die beplanning en uitvoering van die opstande? Of was dit so beplan dat dit die persepsie moes skep? Ek kan amper nie glo dat skoolkinders op hulle eie die politieke bewussyn – veral daardie jare gehad het om die Afrikaanse-kwessie onder die loep te neem, te bespreek en daarna tot openbare optogte te besluit en dit inderdaad uit te voer nie.

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Ek was maar daardie jare ‘n “foot soldier” en het nie ‘n oorhoofse veiligheidsbeeld van die situasie in Soweto gehad nie. Nog minder het ek insae tot enige intelligensie verslae (as daar was) gehad. Senior offisiere het seker wel insae gehad en beter geweet. Ons was besig met ‘n teeninsurgensie kursus – die sogenaamde ‘boskursus’ – op die plaas Maleoskop naby Groblersdal toe die onluste op 16 Junie 1976 in Soweto uitbreek. Dit was op ‘n parade byeengeroep en meegedeel word dat ons dadelik na Soweto gaan vertrek om te help om die opstand daar te onderdruk. Ek was ‘n jong adjudant-offisier, en op daardie stadium van my loopbaan was ek nog nooit in ‘n onluste-situasie betrokke gewees nie. Ek het ook nie opleiding vir so-iets ontvang nie. Ek het in my stilligheid gewonder wat presies daar aangaan; hoe dit lyk en wat ons gaan doen, met ander woorde, hoe gaan ons dit “onderdruk”? Ons was opgelei om terroriste te beveg – nie om onlusmakers te onderdruk nie. Ons is toe binne ‘n uur of wat daar weg in Land Rovers, Spoke (Die “spook” was ‘n tipe mynbestande voertuig) en oop Bedford trokke. Daar was nog nie Caspirs nie. Sommer so in ‘overalls’, boots en ‘n R1. Toe ons so teen laatmiddag Johannesburg op die hoofweë nader in ‘n ellelange konvooi, het die motoriste vir ons gewaai en party het die V-teken met die vingers aan ons gewys. Ek wonder nou nog wat hulle daarmee bedoel het? Ons het teen skemer in Soweto aangekom en by ‘n sekere polisiestasie, wat se naam ek nie meer kan onthou nie, aangekom. Dinge was maar taamlik chaoties. Dit het vir my voorgekom asof die hele Soweto aan die brand was. Die hele plek was onder rook. Geboue en motors het oral gebrand. Wat ek spesifiek kan onthou, was dat ‘n klomp van die inwoners vir dae lank sterk onder die invloed van drank was. Dit was die gevolg talle drankwinkels wat beroof en afgebrand is. ‘Gratis’ drank was dus vir baie beskikbaar wat wou hê. En sekeres van hulle het die geleentheid duidelik optimaal benut. Ons is opdrag gegee om die strate te patrolleer en die situasie maar te hanteer soos ons dit teëkom. Die ondervinding was vir my soos iets uit ‘n nare fliek. Talle persone was dood gemaak en het oral rond gelê. Behalwe die wat in skermutselings deur die polisie geskiet is, het van die inwoners mekaar ook om onverklaarbare redes dood gemaak. Daar was ook seker maar baie “old scores ge-settle”. As ‘n mens van die 1976 Soweto-onluste praat, dink ‘n mens outomaties aan groepe skoolkinders wat betoog teen die geforseerde aanbieding in Afrikaans (ek het nog steeds twyfel daaroor, aangesien dit maar net dalk as ‘n rookskerm gebruik kon gewees het) in hulle skole. Maar ek het geen skoolkinders sien betoog nie. Dit was seker kort voor ons daar aangekom het. Toe ons daar aankom, het misdadige en ander elemente alreeds die situasie oorgeneem en hulle eie ding(e) begin doen. In die hele tyd wat ek daar was – so ongeveer 3 weke – het ek nooit die naam Hector Pieterson gehoor nie. Volgens die media later was hy die eerste persoon wat in Soweto deur die veiligheidsmagte op 16 Junie 1976 dood geskiet is. Daar is bespiegelinge dat hy nie die eerste een was wat geskiet was nie, maar in sý geval was daardie bekende foto beskikbaar, wat wêreldwyd gepubliseer is. Hoekom sal die werklike feite dan nou in die pad van ‘n goeie foto (storie) staan, mag mens dalk vra? 135


Dit was ook ons taak om die lyke op te laai en na die polisiestasies te neem vir identifisering en lykskouings. Dit was nie ‘n aangename ervaring nie. Ek het ook in die geharwar gesien hoe lyke deur privaat mense opgetel en in motors weggery word. Ek het baie keer daarna gewonder wat van daardie lyke geword het en of daar ooit lykskouings daarop uitgevoer is? Ons kos- en slaapgeriewe was van die swakste denkbaar. Ons het ook “rat packs” (kospakkies) ontvang. Van die inwoners van Johannesburg het ook partykeer vir ons kos ingestuur. Die Polisie was beslis nie gerat gewees om iets op hierdie skaal te hanteer nie. Die logistiek was eenvoudig pateties. Ons was ontsettend besig gewees. Dag en nag. Ek het ‘n spieël na meer as ‘n week of wat vir die eerste keer gesien. Toe het ek al sommer ‘n redelike stoppelbaard gehad. Ek het in die tyd ook vir die eerste keer die Baragwanath-hospitaal gesien toe ons beseerdes daarheen geneem het. Oor my eie groep se konfrontasies ek gevolge, wil ek nie juis veel sê nie. Ek het baie nagedink oor die Soweto-onluste van 1976. En die uiteindelike gevolg ten opsigte van lewensverlies. Want dit was baie. Etlike honderde. Ek wonder nou nog of die werklike dodesyfer van die 1976 Soweto oproer bepaal kon word? Daar het n storie rond gegaan later dat die polisie goed kon skiet, maar nie goed kon tel nie. Ons het rug teen rug agterop daardie oop Bedford trokke se (middel) sitplekke gesit. Nooit was daar een keer ‘n skoot na ons gevuur nie. Ek aanvaar dat daar nie veel onwettige vuurwapens daardie tyd in Soweto was nie. Was daar wel gewees, sou daar seker maar heelwat polisie-sterftes ook gewees het. Ons sou “sitting ducks” op daardie oop Bedford trokke gewees het. Die Cape Argus koerant het ‘n paar dae gelede ‘n groot foto geplaas waar ‘n senior polisie-offisier op 16 Junie 1976 in gesprek is met groep skoolkinders in Soweto. Ek het weer aandagtig en met belangstelling na daardie foto gekyk. En opgelet na die kinders se “body language”. Hulle lyk kalm – eintlik vriendelik - en daar is geen aggressie te bespeur nie. En geen stok op klip in die hand nie. ‘n Mens kan net wonder waaroor die gesprek gegaan het? En wat onmiddellik daarna gebeur het? En was hierdie groep werklik ‘n gevaar vir die algemene veiligheid van die Staat? Ander sal beter weet as ek. Maar, in weerwil van dit alles: Kom ons dink onsself nou in die scenario in toe die eerste groep polisiemanne op die toneel aankom en die skoolkinders konfronteer. Kom ons plaas ons nou self in die posisie van ‘n duiwelsadvokaat. Kom ek vrae dan ‘n paar vrae. Terloops, op daardie stadium in Suid-Afrika was daar nog nie werklik goed opgeleide onlus-eenhede soos die latere Afdeling Binnelandse Stabiliteit (ABS) – soos dit later genoem is - met die nodige toerusting vir onlus- en skarebeheer nie. En dan wonder ek baie hoe ABS met hulle goeie opleiding en uitrusting daardie eerste konfrontasie sou hanteer het? Sou die volgende anders gewees het? Ek raai maar. Dan vra ek sommer die volgende vrae? Wie was die bevelvoerder? Watter soort mens was hy? Hoe het hy die situasie opgesom? Wat se ‘gevaar’ het die skoolkinders, daar gestel? Watter alternatiewe het hy oorweeg om die situasie te hanteer? Het hy ‘n harde benadering oorweeg? Het hy enigsins ‘n sagter benadering oorweeg? Wat het hy gedoen om die situasie, sê maar deur onderhandelinge, te ontlont? Indien nie, hoekom nie? 136


Kom ons vat die situasie ‘n stap verder. Het hy opgetree? Op watter tipe optrede het hy besluit? Het hy genoeg mannekrag gehad? Het hy op minimum of maksimum geweld besluit? Wat het hom laat besluit om uiteindelik op te tree? Watter middele vir doeleindes van minimum geweld, soos byvoorbeeld traanrook, rubberkoeëls, skokgranate, knuppels, sambokke, skilde, waterkanonne ensovoorts, het hy tot sy beskikking gehad om die situasie waarmee hy gekonfronteer was, te gebruik? Mý groep het byvoorbeeld net haelgewere en R1’s gehad. Hoekom is Hector Pietersen – en andere - byvoorbeeld daar reg aan die begin dood geskiet? En hoekom is die (ongewapende) kinders maar nie op daardie dag laat voortgaan om hulle punt – deur te marsjeer en te betoog - te maak nie? Moes die marsjeerder ten alle koste teen gegaan word? En nog verder: Wat was die reaksie van die kinders toe daar teen hulle opgetree word? Wat was die algemene publiek in Soweto se reaksie as gevolg van die polisie se optrede teen die skoolkinders? Het die polisie die massiewe gevolge voorsien, met ander woorde, dit wat ons die volgende dag en dae later daar gevind en beleef het? Ek sal bly wonder - wonder of ‘n meer taktiese, intelligenter benadering van onderhandeling of minimum geweld teenoor die skoolkinders (soos ons latere jare gedoen het), nie die gevolglike doellose, grootskaalse geweld en lewensverlies oral in Soweto sou verhoed het nie? Ook met dit raai ek – dis sommer weer so ‘n duiwelsadvokaat vraag. Ons sal seker nooit weet nie. En ek wonder wat die Cilliers-kommissie op hierdie punt bevind het? Het die Polisie se optrede daardie dag dalk ‘helde’ gemaak van die skoolkinders van Soweto? Die ANC het op ‘n stadium laat blyk dat die Soweto-opstande hulle onkant gevang het, met ander woorde dat dit ‘n skielike, maar spontane reaksie ‘deur skoolkinders’ was. Ek persoonlik is ook nie seker of dit nét skoolkinders was wat agter die beplanning betrokke was nie. Vir mý verstand is dit nogal moeilik om te aanvaar. Ek lees egter nou die dag dat Dr Mtsoko Pheko, president van die PAC, beweer dat sy party verantwoordelik was vir dié opstande. Hy sê dat 18 PAC leiers die enigste was wat aangekla en tronk toe gestuur daarvoor. Ek dink ook hý vat n vet kans. As bewys van die PAC se “vername rol” in hierdie verband, wys hy op die woorde van regter David Curlewis toe dié gesê dat die PAC-leier Zephniah Mothopeng doelbewus opgetree het om anargie en rewolusie te bewerkstellig; dat hy die onluste beplan en voorspel het, wat toe uiteindelik op 16 Junie plaasgevind het, sowel as in Kagiso die volgende dag. Of dít ook waar is, weet ek ook nie. Ter afsluiting: elkeen van ons wat as jong seuns daar was, het sy eie persoonlike ervarings gehad; sy eie persepsies gevorm en gewaarwordinge gehad. En so het politici dan later ook hulle eie politieke perspektief en propaganda op hierdie deel van ons land se geskiedenis probeer afvryf. Gawie: Ek het indringende gesprekke gehad met senior polisiemanne wat in Soweto gedien het – ook met kol Hein Killian. Dit is ons plig as polisie-geskiedkundiges om te verduidelik wat gebeur het. Eers na jare – wanneer rustigheid ingetree het – kan mens werklik die situasie vertolk. Die vertolking verander ook elke dekade. Ek sal volgende jaar my vertolking weergee, HBH.

HEROES AND ‘JUST WARS’ COME AND GO – HBH I have been pondering and mulling over heroes (and just wars and about our own revolutionary onslaught.)

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Firstly, I think our heroes change as times move on. In my eyes Pres. MT Steijn of the OFS was a hero, so was Gen CR de Wet. They will always remain heroes. In any time-frame Wolraad Woltmade is a hero, like Chaka or Msilikazi or Hendrik Witbooi or General French or Lord Kitchener or Danie Theron. Turning our attention to more recent times: Any policeman who saves the lives of others remains a hero in any time frame; let’s look at heroes in the Border War or in the Townships where it was AK47 against the R1. The majority will acknowledge (or despise) the hero. Some of our heroes are not regarded as heroes anymore. -

Is Lt-Gen HJ “Lang-Hendrik” still regarded as a hero? Is the “Rooi Rus” still regarded as a hero? Our highly decorated policemen and soldiers who were decorated for valour in SWA/Angola/London, are they still regarded as heroes or has the broad public opinion changed?

On the other hand: -

Are the perpetrators of the Church Street Bomb-attack heroes? Is Mr. Robert McBride a hero? Is the Vice Air Marshall who was OC RAF Bomber Command, who was responsible for bombing civilians in Dresden, during WW2, a hero?

Today a new pair of universal heroes have emerged – Mr Phillip Kgosana and Col IPS Terblanche who in 1960 avoided bloodshed in Cape Town Central! [Col Terblanche did not follow the minister’s direct instruction and was never promoted again. After he retired many years ago he was given a honorary rank of “Brigadier”.] De Waal Drive will be named after Kgosana. The majority of the people and scholars will approve this. Edwin Swales VC Drive in Durban has been renamed after a person who was sentenced to death, in a case where innocent bystanders were killed, yes, I am referring to Solomon Mhlangu. Major Swales will be a hero in any time frame because what he did was noble and heroic. Most Afrikaners, who were against the War with Germany, did not think Swales was a hero. Today public opinion has changed and most Afrikaners will think he is a hero. Solomon Mhlangu, is a hero today in certain circles but will never be an all-time, universal, hero. As time moves on, you will see that public attitudes change reinforced by the media and scholars. Being interested in police history I have found that some policemen who were hailed heroes will in a later time frame not be regarded as heroes, in spite of being decorated for bravery. Take as e.g. the massacre of police in Cato Manor, the Sharpeville- and Soweto-riots and the battle at Cassinga. Our attitudes are constantly changing. (Please I am not talking politics.) Look what is happening in the Southern USA – they are taking down the statutes of certain Southerners because the embarrass certain people. Attitudes change, in another two or three decades people will change sides and say Britain treated the two Boer Republics back in 1899 unfairly – Britannica had her eye on the Gold and the Anglo Boer War was an unjust war and there was no just cause fighting the Boer. Britain will/is slowly losing her stature in international politics. Look at her defence – no more Britannia rules the waves … No more colonies … etc Small army. (Even Turkey has a larger army than Britain - if we look at NATO.) 138


Why actually, did former Boer General Louis Botha in 1914 decided to invade German South West Africa? Vested interests: Britain was caught napping and the Kaiser’s men annexed GSWA. Later rich deposits of diamonds were found in SWA (now Namibia). The “reason for invading GSWA was to neutralise two radio stations in the territory”. The UDF won the battle and the diamond and copper merchants moved in. London gained by the move. Vested interests of the Empire! There are many examples in history. One day the general public and historians will “describe the Anglo-Boer War” as a shameful and unjust war – exactly what Ouma Heymans had said 60 years ago. [Most of my Uncles and Aunts have married English speakers and my family is all over the globe.] I have nothing against the British – my aim is only to show how our attitudes (like fashion) changes and public opinion plays a great part in accepting or rejecting these attitudes, myths and perceptions. The lesson is: In a diverse society, with different values, we must keep and cherish our own heroes the perfect example is Edwin Swales VC, Drive changed to Solomon Mhlangu Drive.

BESPREKING ONTSTAAN: STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAAD ‘n Gesprek oor die ontstaan van die staatsveiligheidsraad word vir belangstellendes hier neergepen. Die gedagtes kom van mense wat hoogswaarskynlik oor twee dekades baie oud sal wees en dan is die gesprek vergete. ‘n Jong navorser sal van nuuts af, navorsing moet doen. Ons het meeste leggers vernietig en die wette verval ook in onbruik. Meeste instruksies en voorskrifte het ook maar met verloop van tyd in die niet verdwyn. Net ons gebrekkige geheue bly oor.

Hallo Hennie,........./ Ek stel egter belang hoe die staatsveiligheidsraad tot stand gekom het en of dit ingevolge wetgewing of bloot op grond van ‘n administratiewe reëling deur die president of kabinet geskied het. Ek is nie seker of die staatsveiligheidsraad oor enige wetlike bevoegdhede beskik het nie. Volgens my kennis was dit bloot koördinerend en is besluite van die SVR deur die betrokke ministers aan die verantwoordelike departement oorgedra. Groete. Johan van der Merwe. Naamlose kollega wie se naam weens professionele redes verswyg word, word genader: Die Buro is gedurende 1969 gestig. Kan u miskien help - ek soek die wet vir genl. Van der Merwe en mnr Stemmet. Normaalweg kry ek wette maklik op die internet - die wet kruip vir my weg. Dankie, Hennie. Naamlose kollega wie se naam weens professionele redes verswyg word berig: Die Buro was in 1969 begin met die Staatsdiens Wysigings Wet, 1969 (sien http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-bureau-state-security-bossestablished ) , die Wet op Veiligheidsinligting en die Staatsveiligheidsraad, 64 van 1972 het die Buro behoorlik in diens geplaas. Nog wetgewing het eers in 1978 gekom met die Wet op die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid, 104 van 1978.Die wette is nie op die internet nie. Ek sal dit in die biblioteek by die kantoor moet trek (as dit nie intussen vernietig is nie).Ons sal dit wel êrens kry. Naamlose kollega wie se naam weens professionele redes verswyg word berig: Genl, ons sal na die wet self moet kyk. Die aanhef behoort meer lig te werp. Ek sal Maandag in die Biblioteek daarvoor kyk. 139


As u nog onthou, die statute was in sulke wynrooi bundels. Nie meer nie. Daardie bundels is op hope gegooi en wag om vir skeurpapier weggery te word. Miskien is dit reeds weg – hoop nie so nie. Ek hoop om die wet erns te kry. Ons kry ook nie meer die Hansard in die groter Justisie biblioteke nie. Daarin sou u waarskynlik meer sien oor die doelstellings. Ek onthou daai wynrooi wetsbundels - Butterworths, Durban? - ek moes een of twee keer wysigings doen vir die SB en Gardiner & Landsdowne was twee dik groen boeke! Ek dink mens het die bladsye vervang. Hennie. Hennie, jy is reg – net so. Baie dankie. Ek sal dit waardeer as jy sal seker maak. Sover ek egter kon bepaal het die Wet wat die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid tot stand gebring het niks met die stigting van die staatsveiligheidsraad te doen gehad nie. Die SVR was beslis nie op enige wyse aan die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid gekoppel nie10. Groete. Johan van der Merwe AP Stemmet berig: Vriende, Jul aanvanklike korrespondensie het my ongelukkig nie bereik nie. Moontlik ontvangsprobleme aan my kant. Die feite is soos volg : Die Staatsveiligheidsraad is ingevolge Wet 64 van 1972 geskep. Dit was 'n kabinetskomitee sonder uitvoerende magte. Al sy organe, Werkkomitee, SSVR, ander komitees, GBS’e en hul onderafdelings het dus ook nie uitvoerende magte gehad nie. Almal kon net koördinerende optree. Slegs staatsdepartemente kon uitvoerend optree. Onder mnr John Vorster, wat die wet op die wetboek geplaas het, het die SVR slegs enkele kere vergader. Mnr PW Botha het dit aktief gebruik en toe het dit elke 14 dae vergader. Die Eerste Minister moes die "besluite" aan die kabinet voorlê vir bekragtiging voordat dit bindend op departemente was. Ek glo egter dat mnr Botha dit nie altyd gedoen het nie en die kabinet soms slegs ingelig is wat besluit is... Dit het soms gebeur, en ek kan onthou dat dit enkele kere gebeur het, dat ministers beswaar gemaak het teen sulke besluite wat geneem is toe hulle nie by die SVR was toe die besluit geneem is nie. Een so 'n geval waarby ek betrokke was, was dr. Dawie de Villiers, toe hy Minister van Handel en Nywerheid was, wat beswaar gemaak het. Dit het egter nie dikwels gebeur nie aangesien ministers en ander persone wat volgens die wet nie lid van die SVR was nie gewoonlik gekoöpteer is wanneer nodig. Ons by die SSVR het geweet wat op die sakelys was en wie dus ingelig moes word om teenwoordig te wees. Ons het in Justisiehoofkantoor (onder wyle Mnr Dippenaar) saam met Butterworths die stelsel van vervanginsbladsye by wysigings, wat eenkeer per jaar uitgestuur is, ontwikkel. Voor dit is wette in vaste bladsye gedruk. Die rooi stelle is nog beskikbaar in sommige biblioteke en wette kan ook in Lawsa van Prof. Willem Joubert gevind word. Hoop dit help. Laat asb. weet as daar nog vrae is. Groete, AP Stemmet. Baie dankie AP. Dit stel dit baie duidelik en strook met die beskikbare inligting.

10

Genl – Ek was aan NI gesekondeer en by die SSVR geplaas. NI het ook die SSVR se begroting gedra. – HBH.

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Groete, Johan van der Merwe.

ARGIEF: DIE VLAKPLAASEENHEID: GENL JV VAN DER MERWE DIE Vlakplaaseenheid het groot opslae tydens die WVK-verrigtinge gemaak. Die eenheid het in 1979 tot stand gekom en was die breinkind van kol. Johan Viktor. Hy was toe hoof van afdeling C1 by die hoofkantoor van die veiligheidstak in Pretoria. Kol. Viktor het by verskeie geleenthede saam met die Rhodesiese veiligheidsmagte gewerk en was besonder beïndruk deur hoe hulle lede van die vyand wat hulle gevang het, binne ʼn kort tydjie oorgehaal het om vir hulle te werk. Dit het hom opgeval dat dié persone die name en veral skuilname van hul kamerade buitengewoon goed kon onthou. In baie gevalle was hulle ongeletterd of skaars geletterd. Hy het voorgestel dat ʼn soortgelyke projek in Suid-Afrika begin word, maar het aanvanklik nie steun daarvoor gekry nie. Genl. Johann Coetzee, toe hoof van die veiligheidstak, het egter later die moontlikhede daarvan ingesien en goedkeuring verleen dat so ʼn eenheid op die been gebring word. Kol.Viktor en maj. Gawie Richter, ʼn lid van sy personeel by hoofkantoor, het dadelik na ʼn geskikte basis begin soek en by Vlakplaas uitgekom. Vlakplaas lê 20 km wes van Pretoria en grens aan die Hennopsrivier. Genl. Coetzee het die Departement van Openbare Werke oortuig om die plaas te huur en dit tot die beskikking van die Polisie te stel. Die plaas is in 1980 gekoop en as staatseiendom geregistreer. Terwyl kol. Viktor na ʼn geskikte bevelvoerder gesoek het, het kol. Johan van der Hoven vir kapt. Dirk Coetzee aanbeveel. Kol. Van der Hoven was afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak in Oos-Transvaal en kapt. Coetzee het onder sy bevel gedien. Kol. Viktor het beswaar gemaak omdat daar beweringe was dat kapt. Coetzee by oneerlike bedrywighede betrokke was. Brig. Jan du Preez, tweede-in-bevel van die veiligheidstak, het egter besluit dat kapt. Coetzee op Vlakplaas bevel moet voer en kol. Viktor moes daarby inval. Kapt. Coetzee het begin 1980 diens by die Vlakplaaseenheid aanvaar, maar is einde 1981 na die vuurwapenafdeling te Krugersdorp verplaas. Kaptein Jan Coetzee van die veiligheidstak te Krugersdorp het daarna tydelik as bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid waargeneem. Hy is gedurende die begin van 1983 deur maj. Jack Cronje vervang. Die projek is met min geld aangepak. Die aanvanklike oogmerk was om gevange lede van Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), die militêre vleuel van die ANC, en ander revolusionêre organisasies wat militêre opleiding ontvang het, oor te haal om vir die veiligheidstak te werk. Dit sou gevalle uitsluit waar moord of ander ernstige misdrywe betrokke is. Die lede sou gebruik word om te help om hul kamerade wat die land binnesypel, aan te keer. Hulle moes kies tussen samewerking met die veiligheidstak, waar hulle besoldig is en sekere voordele ontvang het, of gevangenisstraf. Weinig

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het dus geweier om saam te werk en die getal samewerkers het vinnig gegroei. Hulle het spoedig die naam “askari’s” gekry. “Askari” is ʼn Arabiese of Swahili-woord wat “vegter” beteken. Kol. Viktor is in 1981 deur kol. Willem Schoon opgevolg as hoof van afdeling C1. Kapt. Eugène de Kock, later kolonel, het in 1983 by die Vlakplaaseenheid begin werk. Kol. Jack Cronjé was toe bevelvoerder. Kapt. De Kock was in 1977 lid van die uniformtak op Ruacana in die destydse Suidwes-Afrika voor hy na die veiligheidstak op Oshakati oorgeplaas is. In 1979 is kapt. De Kock na Koevoet oorgeplaas, waar hy bekendheid verwerf het vir die welslae wat hy in gevegte teen Swapo-lede behaal het. Hy het hom egter die gramskap van genl. Hans Dreyer, bevelvoerder van Koevoet, op die hals gehaal omdat hy gedurende 1983 teenstrydig met opdragte opgetree het. Genl. Dreyer het hom dadelik na Suid-Afrika teruggestuur en aanbeveel dat hy nie weer in die veiligheidstak gebruik word nie. Genl. Frans Steenkamp, hoof van die veiligheidstak, het hom desondanks by die Vlakplaaseenheid geplaas. Dit ly geen twyfel dat kapt. De Kock oor besondere eienskappe beskik het nie. Hy was ʼn harde werker met besondere durf wat alles veil vir sy taak gehad het. Vanweë hierdie eienskappe is hy op 14 Maart 1982, terwyl hy aan Koevoet verbonde was, saam met enkele ander uitgesoekte lede van die veiligheidstak na Londen gestuur om die kantore van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie met springstof te vernietig. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiester vir uitmuntende diens, die hoogste toekenning in die Polisie, is hiervoor aan hom en die ander lede toegeken. Die Vlakplaaseenheid het in die beginjare as die teenterroriste-eenheid bekend gestaan. Omdat dit onder die C1-lessenaar geressorteer het, is dit ook soms die Cl-eenheid genoem. De Kock, toe bevorder tot majoor, het in Julie 1985 by kol. Jack Cronjé as bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid oorgeneem. Voormalige Koevoetlede het hulle by De Kock aangesluit en die eenheid het later oorwegend uit oud-Koevoetlede bestaan. Hulle was almal geharde vegters wat in Namibië daagliks in gevegte om lewe en dood gewikkel was. Dit was onvermydelik dat die geweld waaraan hulle in Namibië blootgestel was en die oorlogskultuur deel van hul werkwyse geword het. Die veiligheidsituasie in Suid-Afrika het in die tagtigerjare baie versleg en die Vlakplaaseenheid is al hoe meer as taakmag gebruik of het self so opgetree. Kol. De Kock is op 4 Mei 1994 in hegtenis geneem, strafregtelik verhoor en was tot in 2000 by amnestieverhore betrokke. Regter Willem van der Merwe het hom in Oktober 1996 in die Hooggeregshof in Pretoria tot twee lewenslange plus 212 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis. Die etiket van “Mr Prime Evil” is om sy nek gehang. Die voorvalle waarby hy en die lede van sy eenheid betrokke was, is kwaadwillig of onkundig deur die media en politici gebruik om ’n beeld te skep van ʼn moordbende van die Polisie. Hul dade is verdwerg deur die terreurdade van Umkhonto weSizwe en ander revolusionêre organisasies, maar is voorgehou as die toppunt van boosheid. 142


Tydens die staatkundige onderhandelinge is groot druk uit ANC-geledere op die Nasionale Party toegepas om van die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid ontslae te raak. Die Kabinet het dus aan die begin van 1993 besluit om hulle pakkette aan te bied. Dr. Robert Koch, ’n aktuaris van Kaapstad, is aangestel om ’n billike vergoeding vir elke geval te bepaal. Die vergoeding is daarna in oorlegpleging met die kantoor van die staatsprokureur, die Departement van Staatsbesteding, die Tesourie, die Kommissie vir Administrasie, wat die personeelsake van die staatsdiens gehanteer het en die Ouditeur-generaal, vasgestel. Die Kabinet het die vergoedingspakkette goedgekeur en die dienste van al die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid is op 30 April 1993 beëindig. Beweringe dat hulle buitensporige skeidingspakkette ontvang het om hul monde te snoer, is snert. Kol. De Kock was ontnugter en verbitter oor die manier waarop hy en die lede van sy eenheid deur die vorige regering in die steek gelaat is en het geglo die generaals het hulle ook versaak. Hy het tydens die amnestieverhore sy eenheid se dade so swart as moontlik geskilder. Hy het deurgaans beweer dat die vorige regering en die generaals die dade goedgekeur het. Ek het die indruk gekry dat hy die vorige regering en die generaals aan dieselfde verguising as wat hy self deurmaak, wou blootstel. Andersyds was dit ook ʼn desperate poging om die guns van die ANC te verwerf. Ek het begrip vir die frustrasie, teleurstelling en verbittering van Eugène de Kock en ander lede van die veiligheidsmagte. Hulle was vas oortuig daarvan dat hulle met die goedkeuring of medewete van die vorige regering en mense in gesagsposisies opgetree het. In baie gevalle het hulle hul loopbane op die spel geplaas of hul lewens in gevaar gestel om die belange van die vorige regering en hul bevelvoerders te beskerm en te bevorder. Die vorige regering het op aanbeveling van hul bevelvoerders medaljes vir uitmuntende diens of dapperheid aan hulle toegeken. Mnr. F.W. de Klerk en sy kollegas het tydens die staatkundige onderhandelinge en daarna al hul opofferings in die wind geslaan. In plaas van erkenning of dank vir hul optrede moes die oudlede van die veiligheidsmagte boet vir dade waarvoor hulle medaljes ontvang het. Volgens al die feite wat tydens die strafregtelike verhoor van kol. De Kock en die amnestieverhore aan die lig gekom het, het die vorige regeringsleiers en generaals net in sekere gevalle goedkeuring vir onwettige optrede deur lede van die veiligheidsmagte verleen. Sekere onwettige optredes is stilswyend goedgekeur. Die meeste voorvalle het in die geheim geskied en sou beslis nie die goedkeuring van die vorige regering of generaals weggedra het nie. Ek is by meer as een geleentheid gevra waar die persepsie vandaan kom dat die vorige regering die onwettige dade goedgekeur het, onder andere deur dr. Leon Wessels, gewese adjunkminister van Wet en Orde, 'n kommissaris van die Kommissie van Menseregte en tydens die skryf van die boek deeltydse dosent en ere-professor aan die Noordwes-Universiteit op Potchefstroom. Dr. Wessels het tydens die amnestieproses en ook daarna – onder meer tydens my, mnr. Adriaan Vlok en ander oudlede se verhoor oor die Chikane-voorval – alles moontlik gedoen om die lede van die veiligheidsmagte te 143


onderskraag. Daar is geen maklike of vinnige antwoord nie. Om enigsins te probeer verstaan hoe die persepsie ontstaan het, sal ’n klomp faktore oorweeg moet word: die opdragte wat uitgereik is, die subtiele wyse waarop die woord “eliminering” gebruik is, die kragdadige en dikwels roekelose standpunte van politieke leiers en ander gesagsdraers en die nadruklike goedkeuring wat verleen is om sekere onwettige dade te pleeg. Daar moet ook rekening gehou word met die druk wat uit alle oorde op die veiligheidsmagte, veral die veiligheidstak, geplaas is om die gemeenskap te beskerm teen die dood en verwoesting wat lede van Umkhonto weSizwe en ander revolusionêre organisasies gesaai het. Dit is egter jammer dat Eugène de Kock die kluts heeltemal kwytgeraak het en vorige politieke leiers en generaals links en regs swartgesmeer het. In die boek Into the heart of darkness – confessions of apartheid’s assassins deur Jacques Pauw word De Kock soos volg op bl. 79 aangehaal: “De Kock said three police generals, among them Johan van der Merwe, went to Taiwan on an official visit and wanted to take their wives along. The Vlakplaas secret fund provided money for their air tickets and expenses.” Kol. De Kock het ook tydens sy strafregtelike verhoor in 1994 dié bewering gedoen. Dit was ’n blatante leuen. Ek het dadelik toe ek daarvan hoor,’n volledige verslag met al die feite aan die staatsaanklaer, adv. Anton Ackermann, gestuur. Daar was in die tagtiger- en vroeë negentigerjare noue samewerking tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie en die polisiemag van Taiwan en ons het gereeld kennis oor polisiëring en opleiding uitgeruil. Toe ek in 1990 Kommissaris van Polisie word, het die Taiwannese polisie my en my vrou genooi om Taiwan te besoek, maar vanweë werksomstandighede kon ek toe nie gaan nie. Die Taiwannese regering het in alle gevalle waar polisielede en hul vroue Taiwan amptelik besoek, al die kostes gedra. Ek en genl. Hendrik de Villiers, hoof-adjunkkommissaris, vergesel van ons vroue, het Taiwan in 1991 amptelik besoek. Die besoek is deur die Minister van Wet en Orde, mnr. Adriaan Vlok, goedgekeur en die Taiwannese regering het al die reis- en verblyfuitgawes gedra. Ek het al die bewyse aan adv. Ackermann beskikbaar gestel, maar om die een of ander rede het hy dit nie gebruik om De Kock se leuen te weerlê nie. Kol. De Kock se pogings om die ANC se guns te wen, het hom tot dusver niks gebaat nie, hoewel hy beslis begenadiging en vrylating verdien. In September 1992 het mnr. F.W. de Klerk ingevolge die sogenaamde “Record of understanding” 175 ANC-lede vrygelaat wat hulle aan die mees afgryslike dade denkbaar skuldig gemaak het. Barend Strydom, die sogenaamde Wit Wolf, is saam met hulle vrygelaat. Indien die dade van hierdie vrygelatenes en die omstandighede waarin dit gepleeg is met dié van Eugène de Kock vergelyk word, is dit ’n kolossale onreg dat hy nog nie begenadig is nie.

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Vanweë die omvang van die voorvalle waarby kol. De Kock en ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid betrokke was, sal dit ’n boek beslaan om volledig daaroor te skryf. Ek beskryf dus net sekere voorvalle wat na my mening kenmerkend is van die dade wat hulle gepleeg het. IN 1984 het genl. Frans Steenkamp, hoof van die veiligheidstak, goedkeuring verleen dat die Vlakplaaseenheid vir Zweli Banzi Nyanda, ’n bevelvoerder van Umkhonto weSizwe en hoof van ’n eenheid wat as die Natal Machinery bekend gestaan het, in Swaziland doodskiet. Lede van dié eenheid was by verskeie terreurdade in Natal betrokke. Brig. Willem Schoon, hoof van afdeling C1 waaronder die Vlakplaaseenheid geressorteer het, het die opdrag aan kol. Jack Cronjé, bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid, oorgedra. Kol. Cronjé, vergesel van De Kock, drie ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid en twee lede van die veiligheidstak in Oos-Transvaal, het na Mbabane, hoofstad van Swaziland, gereis en daar in ’n hotel tuisgegaan. Hulle het in die loop van die nag op die huis in Mbabane waar Nyanda volgens inligting sou gewoon het, toegeslaan. Hulle het ’n skokgranaat deur ’n venster gegooi en die deur oopgeskop. Nyanda en nog ’n MK-lid, Keith McFadden, is doodgeskiet. Toe hulle die huis deursoek, het hulle op ’n vrou afgekom wat in een van die ingeboude klerekaste wegkruip. Hulle het op al die dokumente in die huis beslag gelê en na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer. Die vrou is ongedeerd agtergelaat. Onder die dokumente was roetes en adresse van teikens wat MK-lede wou aanval. Mnr. Louis le Grange, Minister van Wet en Orde, het op aanbeveling van genl. Johann Coetzee, Kommissaris van Polisie, medaljes vir dapperheid aan die betrokke lede van Vlakplaas en die veiligheidstak toegeken. Dit is in oorlegpleging met die Staatspresident, mnr. P.W. Botha, gedoen. Amnestie is in 1999 aan al die lede wat by hierdie voorval betrokke was, toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee kan by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac20086.htm gelees word.)

IN 1983 het die Politico-Military Council (PMC) van die ANC, wat die revolusionêre aanslag beplan en bestuur het, besluit om ’n sogenaamde “people’s war strategy” te ontwikkel. Daarvolgens sou die guerrilla-oorlogvoering verskerp en die massa by die revolusionêre stryd betrek word. Gemeenskapsleiers, werkers, kerke, akademici, die media en veral die jeug moes bereik word. Alle vorms van geweld moes gebruik word om die revolusionêre stryd uit te brei. Alle strukture en simbole van apartheid moes vernietig word en mense wat in die strukture dien, moes uitgewis word. In die uitvoering van die “people’s war strategy” is die kantore van raadslede in swart woongebiede afgebrand en vernietig en verskeie raadslede vermoor. Aan die begin van Julie 1985 is reeds 396 raadslede vermoor en die swart rade het nie meer bestaan nie. Die ANC/SAKP-alliansie het hulle 145


veral op die jeug begin toespits om dié aanvalle uit te voer omdat hulle in die algemeen meer roekeloos en wreed was. Moorde op swart polisielede en hul gesinne het toegeneem en hulle is stelselmatig uit die swart woonbuurte verdryf. Hulle is later in tente gehuisves. Sonder die hulp van die swart lede kon wet en orde nie in die swart woonbuurte gehandhaaf word nie. Volgens statistiek wat die Polisie bygehou het, is tussen 1973 en 1979 76 polisielede vermoor, en tussen 1980 en 1990 altesame 270 polisielede. Verskeie lede van Umkhonto weSizwe is later weens die moorde skuldig bevind. Die ANC-gevangenes wat mnr. F.W. de Klerk in 1992 vrygelaat het ingevolge die “Record of Understanding”, het talle moordenaars ingesluit. Hulle het gevangenisstraf van tussen 15 en 26 jaar vir die volgende moorde uitgedien: •

12 moorde waar mense lewend doodgebrand is, onder wie 2 polisielede, 1 munisipale

polisiebeampte en 3 babas. Die ander vermoordes was mense wat verdink is as informante; • 15 moorde waar mense lewend met die halssnoermetode verbrand is, onder wie 3 polisielede, die vrou van ’n polisielid en twee broers van polisielede. Die ander was vermeende informante van die veiligheidstak; • 14 moorde waar vermeende informante van die veiligheidstak op ander maniere doodgemaak is. Lede van die veiligheidstak aan die Oos-Rand het ʼn informant in die geledere van die South African Congress of Students (Cosas) gehad wat in Mei 1985 berig het dat ’n groep Cosaslede van KwaThema, ’n swart woonbuurt buite Springs, beplan om die wonings van swart polisielede en swart raadslede en hul gesinne aan die Oos-Rand met handgranate aan te val. Cosas het ná die Sowetoonluste in Junie 1976 tot stand gekom om die belange van swart studente te bevorder. Hulle het die ANC/SAKP-alliansie ondersteun en hul eerste president, Ephraim Mogale, was ’n ANC-lid. Volgens die informant sou hulle die handgranate by die ANC kry. Die informant het in die binnekring van die groep Cosaslede beweeg en sy inligting is as betroubaar geëvalueer. Ek was toe tweedein-bevel van die veiligheidstak met die rang van brigadier onder genl. Stan Schutte en was vir die uitvoerende sy van sake verantwoordelik. Ná oorlegpleging met lede van die veiligheidstak by hoofkantoor, waartydens ons alle moontlike optredes oorweeg het, het ek tot die slotsom gekom dat ons nie binne die gewone wetlike bevoegdhede

die

swart

polisielede,

raadslede

en

hul

gesinne

teen

die

beplande

handgranaataanvalle kon beskerm nie. As die Cosaslede aangekeer word, sou die informant teen hulle moes getuig. Dit sou sy en sy gesin se gewisse dood beteken het. Sonder sy getuienis het ons geen wetlike gronde gehad om hulle aan te hou nie. Dit was ook onmoontlik om die swart lede te beskerm omdat die Cosaslede die handgranate enige tyd in die hande kon kry. Ons kon nie daarop 146


staatmaak dat die informant ons betyds sou waarsku nie. Afsprake met informante moes uiters versigtig gereël word sodat dit geen agterdog wek nie. Ek het op die gedagte gekom om deur ʼn askari te reël dat die handgranate aan die Cosaslede verskaf word, maar dat die vertragingsmeganismes verwyder word. Myns insiens het dié optrede op noodweer neergekom – daar was geen ander manier om die swart lede en hul gesinne te beskerm nie. Ek het ’n memorandum opgestel waarin ek al die feite geskets het, asook my voorstel oor hoe om die situasie te hanteer. Die memorandum is aan genl. Johann Coetzee, Kommissaris van Polisie, oorhandig, wat dit aan mnr. Louis le Grange, Minister van Wet en Orde, besorg het. Mnr. Le Grange het die voorstel goedgekeur. Soos ek mnr. Le Grange geken het, sou hy dit nooit sonder oorlegpleging met pres. P.W. Botha goedgekeur het nie. Ek het daarna met kol. Jack Cronjé, bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid, gereël om my by die veiligheidstak se kantore in Springs te ontmoet. Die afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak aan die Oos-Rand, kol. Koos Delport, en ander lede van die tak was ook teenwoordig. Ek het my plan aan hulle verduidelik en gesê min. Le Grange het dit goedgekeur. Kol. Cronjé het onderneem om ’n askari beskikbaar te stel wat saam met lede van die veiligheidstak in Springs sou werk. Kapt. De Kock is ook by die operasie betrek. Ek sou reël dat handgranate waarvan die vertragingsmeganismes verwyder is, beskikbaar gestel word. Dit was vir my uiters belangrik dat die hele optrede op die beskerming van swart polisielede en hul gesinne gerig moes wees en ek het by herhaling beklemtoon dat die Cosaslede op geen wyse uitgelok moes word om die polisielede en hul gesinne aan te val nie. As hulle om die een of ander rede van hul moordplan afsien, moet hulle nie aangemoedig word om dit te doen nie. Ek het brig. Willem Schoon, hoof van C1, opdrag gegee om te reël dat die vertragingsmeganismes van ’n klompie handgranate verwyder word. Die veiligheidstak was in besit van ’n besending Russiese handgranate en vuurwapens wat in ’n wapenstapelpunt van MK gevind is. Brig. Schoon het met kapt. Paul Hattingh van die veiligheidstak se springstofafdeling geskakel om te hoor of hy kan reël dat die vertragingsmeganismes verwyder word. Kapt. Hattingh het egter gemeen die tegniese afdeling van die veiligheidstak kan dit beter doen. Brig. Schoon het daarna met kol. Wal du Toit van die tegniese afdeling gereël om die vertragingsmeganismes te verwyder. Kol. Du Toit het met die hulp van kapt. Hattingh en ander lede van die tegniese afdeling die vertragingsmeganismes verwyder. Twee askari’s van die Vlakplaaseenheid het onder die dekmantel dat hulle MK-lede is wat gestuur is om die Cosasstudente te help, die handgranate aan hulle oorhandig. Die studente wou toe ook ’n kleefmyn hê om ’n subkragstasie in die swart woonbuurt KwaThema op te blaas. Kapt. De Kock het

147


gereël dat die vertragingsmeganisme van ’n kleefmyn verwyder word en dit is met behulp van die askari’s aan die studente oorhandig. Die Cosasstudente het in die nag van 25/26 Junie 1985 op die huise van polisielede in swart woonbuurte in die omgewing van Springs toegeslaan. Elf van die studente is dood en sewe beseer toe hulle die handgranate wou gooi. Die kleefmyn het ontplof toe dit geaktiveer is voor dit by die substasie geplant kon word. ’n Student is in die ontploffing dood. Min. Louis le Grange het kort daarna tydens ʼn besoek aan die Oos-Rand die betrokke lede van die veiligheidstak persoonlik bedank vir hul optrede. Ek, brigadiers Schoon, Cronjé, Du Toit en al die ander lede wat genoem is, het in 2001 om amnestie gevra vir hierdie optrede, wat as die Zero-handgranaatvoorval bekend gestaan het. Die amnestiekomitee het uit regter S. Miller, voorsitter, en adv. Leah Gcabashe en mnr. Wynand Malan bestaan. Toe ek in my getuienis noem dat mnr. Louis le Grange as Minister van Wet en Orde die optrede goedgekeur het, het mnr. Malan my woord in twyfel getrek. Mnr. Le Grange was reeds oorlede en kon dit nie weerlê nie. Ek het die komitee verseker dat genl. Johann Coetzee en lede van die veiligheidstak in Springs dit sou bevestig. Regter Miller kon nie verstaan waarom ek opdrag gegee het dat die Cosasstudente nie uitgelok moes word om die polisie- en raadslede aan te val nie. Ek het weer verduidelik dat dit om die beskerming van die polisie- en raadslede en hul gesinne gegaan het en nie om die Cosasstudente uit te lok om ’n misdryf te pleeg nie. Daarop wou regter Miller weet waarom ek dit nodig geag het om die minister se goedkeuring te vra. Ek het verduidelik dat daar morele oorweginge was en dat ek dit daarom raadsaam geag het om goedkeuring te vra. Amnestie is aan al die lede van die veiligheidstak wat by die voorval betrokke was, toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee kan by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21058.htm gelees word.) In Mei 1997 het mnr. F.W. de Klerk in sy getuienis voor die WVK hom soos volg oor hierdie voorval uitgelaat: “Whoever authorised that was guilty of a very gruesome and totally unacceptable decision. It was wrong, it wasn’t part of the policy and whoever authorised it was acting against the interests of South Africa.” Ek sou baie graag by mnr. De Klerk wou weet wat hy in die bepaalde omstandighede sou gedoen het. Dit toon weer eens hoe min mnr. De Klerk selfs in 1997 geweet het van die stryd om lewe en dood waarin die polisie daagliks gewikkel was. LEDE van die veiligheidstak Noord-Transvaal het in 1985 onder bevel van kapt. Hendrik Prinsloo met ’n intensiewe ondersoek begin om MK-lede wat betrokke was by verskeie terreurdade, asook die moord op polisielede, op te spoor. Volgens inligting van ’n informant het Patric Mahlangu, ’n 148


aktivis van Mamelodi, ’n swart woonbuurt ongeveer 10 km oos van Pretoria, noue skakeling met MK-lede in Botswana gehad. Mahlangu het met behulp van MK-lede kitsopleiding aan persone in Mamelodi gegee om vuurwapens en handgranate te gebruik. Kapt. Prinsloo het met die hulp van maj. De Kock, wat by kol. Cronjé oorgeneem het as bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaasheid, twee askari’s wat voorheen MK-lede was, gebruik om met Mahlangu te skakel onder die voorwendsel dat die bevelvoerder van Umkhonto weSizwe in Botswana hulle gestuur het om Mahlangu te help. Hulle het inligting wat die informant aan kapt. Prinsloo verskaf het, gebruik om voor te gee dat hulle bewus is van Mahlangu se skakeling met MK-lede in Botswana en deel van die projek is. Dit het egter gebots met reëlings wat Mahlangu met MK-lede in Botswana gehad het en hy het dadelik onraad vermoed. Die twee askari’s het besef dat Mahlangu nie hul storie sluk en dat dit baie probleme gaan afgee as hy wegkom. Hulle het hom toe met geweld na Soutpan, ’n afgeleë plek naby Pretoria, ontvoer. Hier het hulle adjt.off. Martiens Ras van die Vlakplaaseenheid, onder wie se onmiddellike bevel hulle gewerk het, gebel. Adjt.off. Ras, vergesel van adjt.off. Snor Vermeulen, ook van Vlakplaas, het kort daarna daar aangekom en gesien dat die twee askari’s Mahlangu ernstig aangerand het. Kapt. Prinsloo is ontbied. Hy het besef dat sy informant en dié se gesin in ernstige gevaar verkeer. Mahlangu sou beslis al twee en twee bymekaar gesit en geweet het wie die veiligheidstak op sy spoor gebring het. Kapt. Prinsloo het sy afdelingsbevelvoerder, kol. Jack Cronjé, geskakel, wat opdrag gegee het dat Mahlangu doodgemaak moet word. (Kol. Cronjé is in Julie 1985 aangestel as afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak Noord-Transvaal.) Mahlangu is verwurg en sy liggaam met springstof langs ’n treinspoor opgeblaas om dit te laat lyk dat hy homself opgeblaas het toe hy die treinspoor wou saboteer. Amnestie is in 2001 aan al die oudlede en die askari’s wat by die voorval betrokke was, toegestaan.

(Die

bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

is

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21006.htm te lees.) Soos duidelik uit bogenoemde geval blyk, is die optrede nie deur die Staatsveiligheidsraad of enige generaal goedgekeur nie. Het die betrokke lede in die omstandighede egter ’n keuse gehad om anders op te tree? Daar was geen manier waarop hulle Mahlangu wettig kon aanhou sonder dat hy die identiteit van die informant en die Vlakplaasoperasie sou verklap nie. Net die geringste vermoede dat iemand in ’n swart woonbuurt met die polisie saamwerk, was ’n doodsvonnis. “Collaborators” is met die halssnoermetode om die lewe gebring. ’n Motorbuiteband gevul met petrol is om die lyf van die lewende slagoffer geplaas en aan die brand gesteek. Op 14 Augustus 1986 het kapt. Eugene de Kock en 10 lede wat onderskeidelik aan die Vlakplaaseenheid , die veiligheidstakke te Middelburg in die Oos-Transvaal, Piet Retief en Nelspruit verbonde was, saam aan 'n operasie in die Piet Retiefgebied deelgeneem. Volgens inligting wat die veiligheidstak te Piet Retief ontvang het, sou vier lede van Umkhonto we Sizwe op die punt gestaan 149


het om die RSA vanaf Swaziland binne te kom. Die informant wat die inligting verstrek het, Shadrack Maphumulo, sou die voertuig bestuur waarin die vier lede van MK sou reis.

Kaptein de Kock het gereĂŤl dat die informant sodra hulle die grens oorgesteek het, die informant op die Nerston-Amsterdampad sou stilhou onder die voorwendsel dat hy wil urineer. Die informant moes wegbeweeg van die voertuig en die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid en die ander lede van die veiligheidstak sou dan op die MK-lede toeslaan. Volgens die amnestiebevinding wat gedurende 2001 gelewer is, was daar uiteenlopende getuienis of die lede van Vlakplaas en die veiligheidstakke vooraf besluit het om die vier MK-lede te arresteer of dood te skiet of dat hulle tydens die optrede besluit het om hulle dood te skiet. Die amnestiekomitee het egter bevind dat hierdie aspek nie van wesenlike belang was om hulle in staat te stel om te bepaal of die optrede aan die vereistes vir amnestie voldoen het nie. ReĂŤlings is getref dat die lede op verskillende plekke stelling ingeneem het. Die voertuig het op die bestemde plek stilgehou en die informant wat die voertuig bestuur het, het weggestap. Volgens die amnestiekomitee was daar weereens uitlopende getuienis wat daarna gebeur het. Van die lede wat betrokke was het beweer dat twee van die MK-lede gewapen was en hulle het begin skiet. Drie MK-lede is doodgeskiet en die vierdie MK-lid is ernstig gewond, maar het tog daarin geslaan om weg te kom. Hy is die volgens dag deur lede van die Weermag gearresteer en aan die lede van die veiligheidstak oorhandig. Die informant Shadrack Maphumulo is ook doodgeskiet. Daar is aan al die oudlede amnestie ten opsigte van hierdie voorval toegestaan, maar amnestie is aan kapt. De Kock, kapt Chris Deetlefs van die veiligheidstak te Ermelo en adjt.off. Pine Pienaar van die veiligheidstak te Piet Retief ten opsigte van die doodskiet van die informant, Shadrack Maphumulo, geweier. Die amnestiekomitee het bevind dat kapt De Kock, kapt Deetlefs en adjt.off. Pine Pienaar besluit het om die informant ook dood te skiet, omdat hulle hom nie vertrou het nie en bang was dat hy in die toekoms 'n bedreiging mag inhou. Volgens die amnestiekomitee was die redes wat hulle aangevoer het waarom hy 'n bedreiging kon wees, nie oortuigend nie. Die redes wat hulle aangevoer het waarom hy 'n moontlike bedreiging kon wees, kon op ander maniere afgeweer word. Nie een van die lede aan wie amnestie geweier is, is egter ten opsigte van hierdie voorval vervolg nie. Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee kan by die volgende webadres gelees word : www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21148.htm. OP 12 Desember 1986 het kol. Ig Coetzee, later generaal, vergesel van kolonel Tiekie de Jager en maj. De Kock, my kom spreek. Ek was toe hoof van die veiligheidstak. Kol. Coetzee was 150


bevelvoerder van die Soweto-veiligheidstak, kol. De Jager een van sy bevelvoerders en maj. De Kock bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid. Die veiligheidstak in Soweto het ’n informant in die geledere van die September Machinery, ’n eenheid van Umkhonto weSizwe in Swaziland, gehad. Volgens die informant was die September Machinery verantwoordelik vir verskeie landmyn- en kleefmynvoorvalle in gebiede aangrensend aan Swaziland. Lede van die eenheid het die grens na willekeur op verskeie onbeheerde punte oorsteek. Dit was in daardie stadium algemeen bekend dat die ANC se National Consultative Conference, wat in Junie 1985 in Kabwe, Zambië, gehou is, besluit het dat daar voortaan geen onderskeid tussen sogenaamde “harde” en “sagte” teikens gemaak sal word nie, dit wil sê tussen lede van die veiligheidsmagte en burgerlikes. Die Kabwe-konferensie het onder meer ter sprake gekom tydens die amnestieverhoor van mnr. Aboobaker Ismail, wat aan die hoof van Umkhonto weSizwe se spesiale operasies gestaan het, mnr. Robert McBride, ’n MK-lid, en ander MK-lede. Die amnestiekomitee het in 2000 onder meer bevind: McBride (5th Applicant) was then instructed to reconnoitre other targets where personnel of the enemy security forces upholding and protecting the institution of apartheid gathered, whether as part of their duties or for social reasons. During such planning, it became quite evident that the issue of civilian casualties was of concern. In terms of the “new” policy, it was clear that the modus operandi was to endeavour to minimize civilian casualties but that it should not be regarded as a preventative factor. This was in accordance with the aforementioned decision taken at the Kabwe Conference

of

1985.

[Die

bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

is

by

die

webadres

http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21128.htm te lees.]

Tydens die samesprekinge op 12 Desember 1986 in my kantoor het kol. Coetzee vertel dat hy en die lede van sy tak wat die informant hanteer, die vorige dag samesprekinge met kol. Schalk Visser, afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal, en ander lede van sy afdeling gehad. Brig. Willem Schoon, hoof van C1, en maj. Eugène de Kock was ook teenwoordig. Die veiligheidstak in Oos-Transvaal was intens bekommer oor die toenemende landmyn- en kleefmynontploffings langs die grens met Swaziland waarin burgerlikes dood of vermink is. Glory Sedibe het aan die hoof van die September Machinery gestaan en het drie ander MK-lede onder sy bevel gehad. Kol. Coetzee en die ander lede was oortuig daarvan dat die enigste manier waarop burgerlikes in Suid-Afrika teen hul aanvalle beskerm kon word, was om die betrokke MKlede in Swaziland uit te wis. Hulle het in die woonbuurt Fountains in Mbabane, Swaziland, geskuil. 151


Nadat ek al die inligting sorgvuldig oorweeg het, het ek geen twyfel in my gemoed gehad dat dit noodsaaklik was dat die MK-lede wel uitgewis moet word nie. Op 13 Desember 1986 het brig. Willem Schoon, kolonels Ig Coetzee, Schalk Visser en Martiens van Wyngaardt in ’n gastehuis naby die Oshoek-grenspos tuisgegaan. Kol. Van Wyngaardt was lid van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal. In die tagtigerjare was daar ’n goeie verhouding tussen die regerings van Suid-Afrika en Swaziland en die veiligheidstak het die hartlike samewerking van die Swazilandse polisie gehad. As die operasie sou skeefloop, sou brig. Schoon en die ander senior lede met hul eweknieë in Swaziland skakel. Maj. De Kock is aangewys om bevel te voer oor die aanval op die MK-lede. Hy en twee van sy lede, kapt. Paul van Dyk en sers. Douw Willemse, bygestaan deur kolonels Tiekie de Jager, Willem Coetzee en Anton Pretorius van die Soweto-veiligheidstak, asook kapt. Chris Deetlefs en adjt.off. Freek Pienaar van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal, het Swaziland by verskillende grensposte binnegegaan en by die Royal Swazi Spa Hotel in Mbabane byeengekom. Hulle het ’n skets van die huis waar die MK-lede geskuil het, van die informant gekry. Laat die nag van 13 Desember 1986 het hulle die informant op ’n afgesproke plek ontmoet en hy het hulle na die huis geneem. Die lede het op verskillende plekke stelling ingeneem en die informant het aan die deur geklop. Toe een van die MK-lede oopmaak, is hy doodgeskiet. Die lede het die huis binnegestorm, waar hulle nog twee MK-lede doodgeskiet het. ’n Vierde MK-lid het ontvlug. Die bevelvoerder, Glory Sedibe, was nie daar nie. Daar is op al die dokumente in die huis beslag gelê en die polisielede het deur ’n onbeheerde grenspunt na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer. Die amnestieverhoor oor dié voorval was in 2000. Ek en die ander lede van die veiligheidstak wat by die voorval betrokke was, was gelukkig dat die komitee uit regter Andrew Wilson, adv. Chris de Jager en mnr. J. Sibanyoni bestaan het. Regter Wilson was ’n stoere juris wat die bepalings van die WVK-wet streng aan die hand van die riglyne in die slot van die Tussentydse Grondwet toegepas het. Oudlede van die veiligheidstak is baie dank aan adv. De Jager verskuldig vir die eindelose moeite wat hy gedoen het om in sy bevindings die onredelike bepalings van die WVK-wet wat vir lede van die veiligheidsmagte gegeld het, binne die konteks van die slotdeel van die Tussentydse Grondwet te plaas. Die komitee het onder meer soos volg bevind:

The ANC in their submissions to the TRC referred to thirty explosions during the period November 1985 to July 1987. [Dit is ontploffings waarvoor die ANC verantwoordelikheid aanvaar het.] According to the evidence before the Committee, the majority of these incidents occurred in the districts adjoining Swaziland. Three near Breyten, two near Davel, one in the Vryheid vicinity, two in the Volksrust area near the border and a few in the Nelspruit area. A number of civilians were killed, including women and children.

152


Amnestie is aan al die lede van die veiligheidstak wat by die voorval betrokke was, toegestaan. (Die bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

is

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac20087.htm te lees.) Dié bevinding staan in skril kontras met dié van die amnestiekomitee oor die Lesotho-voorval van 19 Desember 1985, waarvoor amnestie nie toegestaan is nie. (Inligting hieroor verskyn in die deel oor die WVK en die amnestieproses.) KORT ná die voorval het kapt. Chris Deetlefs van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal by die Swazilandse polisie gehoor dat hulle Glory Sedibe aanhou. Die rede vir sy aanhouding was nie bekend nie. Kapt. Deetlefs het by sy afdelingsbevelvoerder, kol. Schalk Visser, goedkeuring verkry om Sedibe te ontvoer en na Suid-Afrika te bring. Kapt. Deetlefs het met die hulp van maj. De Kock en ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid, asook ’n lid van die Swazilandse polisie, Sedibe uit sy tronksel in Mbabane ontvoer en na Suid-Afrika gebring. Hy is ná ondervraging oorreed om as askari vir die Vlakplaaseenheid te werk, waar hy waardevolle diens gelewer het. Sedibe het vlot Engels gepraat en was ’n goeie spreker. Mnr. Adriaan Vlok het van tyd tot tyd sakemanne en ander belangegroepe oor die veiligheidsituasie in Suid-Afrika ingelig. Glory Sedibe is by sulke geleenthede gebruik om inligting oor die bedrywighede van Umkhonto weSizwe te verskaf. Brig. Herman Stadler, hoof van die veiligheidstak se intelligensie-afdeling, het my vooraf oor die beplande ontvoering van Sedibe ingelig. Hoewel ek dit stilswyend goedgekeur het, was ek nie in so ’n mate daarby betrokke dat ek dit nodig geag het om amnestie te vra nie. Amnestie is in 2001 aan al die lede wat by die ontvoering betrokke was, verleen. Dit het later aan die lig gekom dat Sedibe die swaer is van mnr. Joe Modise, gewese bevelvoerder van Umkhonto weSizwe. Modise het ná die ANC se bewindsoorname in 1994 Minister van Verdediging geword. IN die loop van die tweede kwartaal van 1986 het die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NID) pres. P.W. Botha ingelig dat hulle oor betroubare inligting beskik dat die veiligheidstak deur die ANC geïnfiltreer is. Pres. Botha was uiters ontsteld en het onmiddellik genl. Johann Coetzee, Kommissaris van Polisie, ontbied en hom met die inligting gekonfronteer. Genl. Coetzee en dr. Niel Barnard, hoof van NID, het nie goed met mekaar klaargekom nie en genl. Coetzee was woedend oor die voorval. Hy het brig. Herman Stadler, kwaai oor die kole gehaal omdat die veiligheidstak nie van die infiltrasie bewus was nie. Brig. Stadler het verduidelik dat sy afdeling reeds geruime weet dat lede van Umkhonto weSizwe in Swaziland probeer om die veiligheidstak te infiltreer, maar geen verdere inligting het nie. Brig. Stadler het mnr. Koos Kemp, ’n senior NID-lid, gaan spreek. Dié was aanvanklik onwillig om volledige besonderhede te verstrek, maar het later wel genoem dat adjt.off. Vincent Malaza van die veiligheidstak op Nelspruit inligting aan die ANC oordra. Volgens mnr. Kemp het NID die inligting 153


van die veiligheidstak weerhou omdat hulle bang is die identiteit van hul informant in Swaziland word ontbloot. Mnr. Kemp het gevra dat daar nie teen adjt.off. Malaza opgetree word nie en dat brig. Stadler my nie moet inlig nie. Ek was hoof van die veiligheidstak en mnr. Kemp was waarskynlik bekommerd dat die samewerking tussen die veiligheidstak en NID verongeluk kan word. Brig. Stadler het geantwoord dat die veiligheidstak nie so werk nie en dat hy my sal moet inlig. Ek kon nie toelaat dat adjt.off. Malaza langer in die veiligheidstak dien nie en het opdrag gegee dat hy ondervra word. Brig. Stadler het dadelik in samewerking met kol. Schalk Visser, afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal, en die takbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak op Nelspruit, kapt. Gert Visser, adjt.off. Malaza ondervra. Die veiligheidstak op Nelspruit het Malaza gebruik om in Swaziland te werk en inligting oor die bedrywighede van Umkhonto weSizwe daar in te win. Ná intensiewe ondervraging het adjt.off. Malaza se rol as dubbelagent ontvou. Hy is deur NID in Suid-Afrika gewerf om vir hulle as informant in Swaziland op te tree wel wetende dat die veiligheidstak hom reeds in Swaziland gebruik. Hy het in die loop van sy werk met Jabulani Sidney Msibi, hoof van Umkhonto weSizwe se intelligensiediens in Swaziland, kennis gemaak en is ook deur hom as informant gewerf. Msibi het hom daarna met onskadelike inligting oor die ANC gevoer, wat hy aan die veiligheidstak en ook NID oorgedra het. Dit was vir brig. Stadler duidelik dat die NID-lid wat adjt.off. Malaza gehanteer het, onraad begin vermoed het. Uit vrees vir die gevaar wat Malaza se skakeling met die ANC vir Suid-Afrika geskep het en die verleentheid wat dit vir NID sou inhou as die veiligheidstak van hul onetiese optrede bewus word, het hulle met ’n omweg probeer om die situasie te red deur pres. Botha in te lig dat die veiligheidstak deur die ANC geïnfiltreer is. Kol. Visser en die ander lede van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal het besef dat hulle die bordjies kon verhang as hulle Msibi met die samewerking van adjt.off. Malaza kon ontvoer. Brig. Stadler het met brig. Schoon, hoof van C1, kontak gemaak, wat maj. De Kock van die Vlakplaaseenheid opdrag gegee het om met die ontvoering te help. Brigadiers Stadler en Schoon het saam met kol. Visser en ander lede van die veiligheidstak Oos-Transvaal, asook maj. De Kock en ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid, na die Oshoek-grenspos vertrek. Maj. De Kock en vyf lede van sy eenheid, kapt. Gert Visser, takbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak op Nelspruit, en nog ’n lid van die veiligheidstak het saam met adjt.off. Malaza Swaziland binnegaan. Brigadiers Stadler en Schoon en kol. Visser het by die grenspos gewag. Msibi het in Mbabane gewoon en die reëling was dat adjt.off. Malaza hom na ’n afgeleë plek op die Mbabane-Oshoekpad sou lok, waar die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid en die veiligheidstak hom sou gryp. Die eerste poging het misluk omdat Msibi volgens Malaza ander reëlings gehad het en nie saam met hom wou gaan nie. Malaza en die lede is terug na die grenspos, waar nuwe planne beraam is. Die volgende nag het die grypspan Swaziland weer saam met Malaza

154


binnegegaan. Dié keer het hy daarin geslaag om Msibi te oorreed om saam met hom te gaan. Hulle is op die afgesproke plek voorgekeer en Msibi is gevange geneem. Maj. De Kock het deur askari’s by sy eenheid inligting bekom oor ’n ander lid van Umkhonto weSizwe in Mbabane wat ook by terreurbedrywighede in Suid-Afrika betrokke was. Adjt.off. Malaza het ook dié lid geken en maj. De Kock het toestemming by brigadiers Stadler en Schoon gekry om Malaza te gebruik om die MK-lid te ontvoer. Maj. De Kock en lede van sy eenheid is weer saam met adjt.off. Malaza na Mbabane, maar hy het dié keer ontvlug en hom later by die ANC in Mosambiek aangesluit. Msibi is ingevolge Art. 29 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid in Pretoria aangehou. Ondersoek het aan die lig gebring dat hy ook twee ander informante van die veiligheidstak gewerf en inligting van hulle bekom het. Albei is in hegtenis geneem en Msibi het ingewillig om teen hulle te getuig. Nadat albei informante skuldig bevind en gevonnis is, is Msibi vrygelaat. Hy is later vermoor. Die ANC het die veiligheidstak van die moord beskuldig, maar dit is meer waarskynlik dat hy uit wraak deur lede van Umkhonto weSizwe vermoor is. Amnestie is toegestaan aan al die lede wat by Msibi se ontvoering betrokke was. Die amnestiekomitee het bevind dat daar geen getuienis was dat lede van die veiligheidstak Msibi vermoor het nie. ONMAGTIG om deur die gewapende stryd vordering te maak, het die ANC/SAKP-alliansie hom al hoe meer op die United Democratic Front (UDF) verlaat om die massas te mobiliseer en tot verset teen die bestaande orde aan te spoor. Die UDF is op 20 Augustus 1983 gestig en het uit ongeveer 90 organisasies bestaan. Op sy beurt het die UDF sy filiale – die Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), die National Education Crisis Committee en die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke (SARK) – gebruik om protesaksies, optogte en boikotte te reël. Dit het dikwels op bloedige geweldpleging uitgeloop. Die UDF het op allerlei onderduimse maniere oorsese geld bekom om die ANC/SAKP se ondermynende bedrywighede te bevorder. Hulle het aktiviste gehelp om in die buiteland militêre opleiding te ondergaan en MK-lede gehelp om Suid-Afrika binne te kom om terreurdade te pleeg. Cosatu het in 1985 tot stand gekom toe die meeste swart vakbonde besluit het om ’n oorkoepelende liggaam te stig. Sy hoofkantoor in Braamfontein, Johannesburg, het ʼn veilige hawe vir MK-lede en ander politieke aktiviste geword, asook die sentrum van waar ondermynende bedrywighede beplan is. Ek en mnr. Vlok, Minister van Wet en Orde, het besluit dat Cosatuhuis vernietig moes word. Ons het egter opdrag gegee dat alle moontlik voorsorgsmaatreëls getref moet word sodat geen lewe tydens die optrede in gevaar gestel word nie. Kol. De Kock en lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid het onder die bevel van genl. Gerrit Erasmus, afdelingsbevelvoerder van die Witwatersrand, Cosatuhuis 155


in die nag van 6/7 Mei 1987 met springstof vernietig. Niemand is tydens die optrede dood of beseer nie. Amnestie is aan my, mnr. Vlok en al die lede van die veiligheidstak toegestaan. (Die bevinding van

die

amnestiekomitee

kan

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/1999/ac990349.htm gelees word.) Die ondermynende bedrywighede het daarna na Khotsohuis, hoofkwartier van die SARK in Marshallstraat, Johannesburg, verskuif, tot groot ergernis van pres. Botha. Telkens wanneer die Staatsveiligheidsraad oor die veiligheidsituasie in die land ingelig is, moes mnr. Botha verneem van die onheilige rol wat Khotsohuis gespeel het. In Augustus 1988 het mnr. Vlok my ingelig dat pres. Botha opdrag gegee het dat Khotsohuis vernietig moet word. Mnr. Botha het later aangevoer dat hy bloot gesê het Khotsohuis moet “onbruikbaar” gemaak word. Kol. De Kock en lede van sy eenheid is weer eens onder bevel van genl. Erasmus ingespan om Khotsohuis met springstof te vernietig. Ook in dié geval is streng opdrag gegee dat geen lewe in gevaar gestel mag word nie. ’n Nagwag het beweer dat hy tydens die voorval beseer is, maar daar bestaan twyfel of dit wel so is. Ek is bewus daarvan dat pres. Botha die volgende oggend navraag gedoen het of Khotsohuis deur die Polisie of die Weermag vernietig is. Die Weermag het na bewering reeds probeer, maar nie geslaag nie. Amnestie is aan, my mnr. Vlok en al die lede van die veiligheidstak toegestaan. (Die bevinding van

die

amnestiekomitee

kan

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/1999/ac990242.htm gelees word.) Op 12 Oktober 1988 het kol. De Kock en lede van sy eenheid, bygestaan deur lede van die springstofeenheid en tegniese afdeling van die veiligheidstak in Pretoria, die kantore van die SuidAfrikaanse Katolieke Biskoppekonferensie in Khanyahuis in Pretoria aan die brand gesteek. Volgens betroubare inligting is die kantore gebruik om ondermynende lektuur ten gunste van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie te versprei en was daar ’n drukpers op die tweede verdieping. Die lede wat by die voorval betrokke was, het die gebou voor die tyd snags dopgehou en was oortuig daarvan dat daar snags niemand in die gebou was nie. Hulle het in die nag van 12 Oktober 1988 die eerste en tweede verdiepings van die gebou met brandstof besprinkel en dit aan die brand gesteek. Hulle was onbewus daarvan dat vyf mense in ’n kantoor in die gebou geslaap het. Die brandweer het die brand geblus en die vyf het ongedeerd daarvan afgekom. Ernstige skade is egter aan die gebou aangerig en die drukgeriewe vernietig. Daar was nie ’n drukpers nie, maar wel kopieermasjiene waarmee publikasies gereproduseer is. Amnestie is in 2000 aan al die betrokke oudlede van die veiligheidstak toegestaan.

(Die

bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

kan

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac200215.htm gelees word.) In 1989 het lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid die huis van dr. R.A. Bulbulia, ʼn politieke aktivis, in Bakerton naby Springs met springstof beskadig. Brig. Zirk Gouws, bevelvoerder van die Oos156


Randse veiligheidstak, het kol. De Kock gevra om die huis te beskadig om dr. Bulbulia af te skrik. Kol. De Kock het 400 g springstof gebruik en geringe skade is aangerig. Niemand is beseer nie. ’N AMNESTIEKOMITEE onder voorsitterskap van regter Andrew Wilson, bygestaan deur adv. N. Sandi en mnr. J.B. Sibanyoni, het in 2000 bevind dat Pumelelo Moses Ntehelang,’n askari by die Vlakplaaseenheid, in 1989 deur kol. De Kock en ander lede van die eenheid aangerand en gemartel is en as gevolg daarvan gesterf het. Die komitee het getuienis aangehoor dat Ntehelang meer as veertien dae sonder verlof afwesig was. Kol. De Kock en die ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid het vermoed dat hy sy bande met die ANC hervat het. Op ’n dag in 1989 (geen presiese datum kon bepaal word nie) het kol. De Kock en verskeie lede van die eenheid drankies in die kantien op Vlakplaas geniet toe ’n lid rapporteer dat Ntehelang terug is. Hy is ontbied en dit was duidelik dat hy onder die invloed van drank was. Tydens ondervraging deur kol. De Kock het hy ’n minagtende houding aangeneem en parmantig geantwoord, waarop kol. De Kock het hom vererg en Ntehelang met ’n snoekerstok oor die kop geslaan het totdat die stok breek. Daarna het hy hom ’n klap gegee en Ntehelang het op die grond geval. Kol. De Kock het die kantien verlaat en na sy kantoor gegaan. Kort daarna het een van die lede hom kom roep en by sy aankoms in die kantien het hy vasgestel dat Ntehelang dood is. Hy het met adjt.off. Martiens Ras, ’n lid van die eenheid, gereël om die lyk te begrawe. Adjt.off. Ras het die lyk op ’n plaas van ’n vriend in Wes-Transvaal gaan begrawe. Amnestie is aan kol. De Kock en nege lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid vir hierdie voorval toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac20085.htm te lees.) DE KOCK en lede van die tegniese afdeling van die veiligheidstak het in 2001 aansoek gedoen om amnestie vir ’n voorval in die tagtigerjare toe hulle op versoek van die Afdeling Militêre Inligting van die Weermag ʼn pakketbom voorberei het. Dit sou aan ʼn adres wat die ANC in Swaziland gebruik, gestuur word. Volgens getuienis tydens die amnestieverhoor het kmdt. Jan Anton Nieuwoudt, ʼn senior offisier van Afdeling Militêre Inligting, De Kock genader met ʼn dokument wat hulle onderskep het. Dit is deur ʼn MK-lid in Swaziland aan ʼn adres in Suid-Afrika gestuur. Kmdt. Nieuwoudt het ʼn koevert aan De Kock oorhandig met die versoek dat ʼn ploftoestel in die koevert ingebou moes word. Hy sou self die adres op die koevert aanbring. De Kock het beweer dat hy sy bevelvoerder, brig.Schoon, genader het en dat dié goedkeuring verleen en die tegniese afdeling beveel het om te help. Lede van die tegniese afdeling het ’n ploftoestel in die koevert gebou en die koevert is weer aan kmdt. Nieuwoudt oorhandig. Hulle het later verneem dat ʼn bode van die ANC in Swaziland wat pos gaan haal en die koevert oopgemaak het, beseer is. Daar is nie tydens die amnestieverhoor bepaal of brig. Schoon wel die optrede goedgekeur het nie. Amnestie is aan die oudlede toegestaan. (Die

bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

is

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21049.htm te lees.) 157


KOL. DE KOCK en lede van sy eenheid het ook in 1990 probeer om Dirk Coetzee met ’n pakketbom in Lusaka, Zambië, om die lewe te bring. Dirk Coetzee was die eerste bevelvoerder van die Vlakplaaseenheid. Hy is in 1981 na die Suid-Afrikaanse Narkotiese Buro (Sanab) se tak op Krugersdorp oorgeplaas. Hy kon hom egter nie by Sanab aanpas nie en is na die Blitspatrollie oorgeplaas. In 1985 het hy hom aan verskeie departementele oortredings skuldig gemaak en genl. Johann Coetzee, die kommissaris, het opdrag gegee dat ’n landdros hom weens oortredings van die Polisieregulasies moet verhoor. Hy is skuldig bevind en die landdros het bevind dat hy ongeskik vir diens in die Polisie is. Hy het by die Minister van Wet en Orde, mnr. Louis le Grange, aanbeveel dat Dirk Coetzee oneervol ontslaan word. Coetzee het tydens die verhoor aangevoer dat hy ’n suikersiekteleier is en dat dit sy gedrag beïnvloed het. Genl. Coetzee het in die lig daarvan by mnr. Le Grange aanbeveel dat ’n mediese raad van ondersoek moet bepaal of Dirk Coetzee medies geskik vir diens is. Mnr. Le Grange het die aanbeveling goedgekeur en ’n mediese raad het bevind dat Coetzee ongeskik is vir verdere diens in die Polisie. Hy is op 31 Januarie 1986 as medies ongeskik ontslaan. Coetzee het Suid-Afrika in November 1989 verlaat en hom in Londen by die ANC aangesluit. Op 17 November 1989 het die Vrye Weekblad in ’n voorbladberig beweringe deur Dirk Coetzee geplaas oor moorde en ander onregmatige dade wat die Vlakplaaseenheid en lede van die veiligheidstak sou gepleeg het. Een van die beweringe was dat mnr. Griffiths Mxenge, ’n Durbanse prokureur en bekende aktivis en ANC-ondersteuner, in opdrag van brig. Johan van der Hoven, afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak in Natal, vermoor is. Mnr. Mxenge is op 19 November 1981 dood weens verskeie meswonde. Coetzee het in 1994 na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer en ’n verklaring oor die voorval afgelê. Mnr. Tim McNally, hoof van die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag in Natal, het in 1996 besluit om brig. Van der Hoven, kol. Andy Taylor, ook ’n lid van die veiligheidstak in Natal, Dirk Coetzee en twee gewese askari’s, David Tshikilange en Almond Nofamela, weens die moord te vervolg. Brig. Van der Hoven en kol. Taylor is op 15 Mei 1997 in die Hooggeregshof in Durban op aanklag van moord op mnr. Mxenge vrygespreek en Dirk Coetzee en die twee askari’s is skuldig bevind. Coetzee en die askari’s het dadelik om amnestie aansoek gedoen en die vonnisoplegging is uitgestel hangende die uitslag van die amnestie-aansoek. Op 4 Augustus 1997 is amnestie aan al drie toegestaan. Ná die eerste berig in die Vrye Weekblad het Coetzee kort-kort soortgelyke beweringe gedoen. Dit het ’n groot kopseer vir veral die veiligheidstak geword en die vertroue van die gemeenskap in die Polisie en die Regering ondermyn. Dit het gelei tot die aanslag op sy lewe. Kol. De Kock het in 2001 in sy amnestie-aansoek vir hierdie voorval aangevoer dat brig. (later generaal) Nic van Rensburg, hoof van C1 onder wie hy gedien het, hom in 1990 opdrag gegee het 158


om Dirk Coetzee om die lewe te bring. Hy het aanvaar dat genl. Van Rensburg die opdrag met die medewete van sy meerderes uitgereik het. Hy het met lede van die tegniese eenheid gereël om ʼn ploftoestel te maak wat per pos aan Coetzee gestuur sou word. ’n Ploftoestel is in die gehoorstuk van ʼn Walkman-kassetspeler ingebou. Dit is toe per pos aan Coetzee in Lusaka gestuur onder die voorwendsel dat dit van Bheki Mlangeni, ʼn prokureur in Johannesburg, af kom. Laasgenoemde was ’n bekende aktivis en voorsitter van die ANC-tak in Jabulani, ’n swart woonbuurt naby Johannesburg. Hy is deur die ANC aangestel om regshulp aan Coetzee te verleen en het van tyd tot tyd posstukke aan hom gestuur. Mlangeni het ook in opdrag van die ANC alle gevalle waar aktiviste vermoor is, ondersoek. Coetzee het uit vrees vir ’n aanslag op sy lewe deur die veiligheidstak kort-kort van woonplek verander en tussen Londen, Zimbabwe en Zambië beweeg. Die poskantoor in Lusaka het hom in Augustus 1990 van die pakket in kennis gestel, maar hy het onraad vermoed en geweier om dit in ontvangs te neem. Die poskantoor het die pakket na die afsender teruggestuur en mnr. Mlangeni het dit oopgemaak en die kassetspeler aangeskakel. Hy is in die ontploffing gedood. Genl. Van Rensburg het tydens die amnestieverhoor ontken dat hy opdrag gegee het dat Dirk Coetzee vermoor word. Amnestie is aan De Kock en die lede van die tegniese afdeling wat by die voorval betrokke was, toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21167.htm te lees.) TYDENS ’n amnestieverhoor in 2000 in Pretoria het kol. De Kock aangevoer dat brig. Nic van Rensburg van afdeling C1 hom in 1990 in die teenwoordigheid van brig. Willem Schoon opdrag gegee het om ’n Chand-gesin in Botswana uit te wis. Die gesin het uit die pa en ma, Sam en Hajira, en drie kinders van 17, 23 en 26 jaar bestaan. Hulle het Suid-Afrika in 1960 verlaat en naby die grens in Botswana gaan woon. Hul huis is as basis gebruik waarvandaan lede van Apla, die militêre vleuel van die Pan Africanist Congress terreuraanvalle op mense in Suid-Afrika geloods het. Die Chands het ook as gidse opgetree om Apla-lede te help om die grens na Suid-Afrika oor te steek. De Kock het ook aangevoer dat lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid ʼn paar maande vroeër met die Direktoraat Koverte Operasies van die Weermag geskakel het en dat ʼn lid van die direktoraat, Tony Oosthuysen, hulle ingelig het dat die Chands dubbel-agente is wat ook deur hulle hanteer word. Dit het hulle in staat gestel om die bewegings van Apla-lede wat die land binnesypel, dop te hou. Daar was egter gevalle waar Apla-lede hulle ontglip het. Volgens brig.Van Rensburg was dié Apla-lede ʼn groot bedreiging en die basis moes dus dringend vernietig word. Kol. De Kock het adjt.off. Martiens Ras opdrag gegee om die Chands se huis en omgewing te gaan verken. Kol. De Kock het ook by kol. Martin Naudé, hoof van afdeling C2 by die hoofkantoor van die veiligheidstak gaan navraag doen om meer agtergrond oor die Chand-gesin te kry. Dié afdeling het 159


terreurdade ondersoek. Kol. Naudé het hom ingelig dat die Chands kort tevore 76 swaar gewapende Apla-lede gehelp het om die grens onwettig oor te steek. Kol. De Kock en sewe lede van sy eenheid het daarna een nag in 1990 onwettig oor die grens na Botswana gegaan en die Chand-gesin doodgeskiet. Volgens kol. De Kock het hy onderweg na die huis in ’n sloot geval en sy knie seergemaak. Hy het gesukkel om te loop en die ander lede het na die huis gestorm en die gesin uitgewis. Al die lede wat betrokke was, het getuig dat hulle nie geweet het dat daar ’n minderjarige kind in die huis was nie. Genl. Van Rensburg en brig. Schoon het tydens die amnestieverhoor ontken dat hulle opdrag aan kol. De Kock gegee het om die Chands uit te wis. Brig. Schoon het reeds op 30 Oktober 1989 met pensioen uitgetree. Oudlede van die veiligheidstak het soms tydens amnestieverhore bevelvoerders en opdragte wat gegee is, verwar. Geen inligting oor die voorvalle is geboekstaaf nie en die oudlede moes op hul geheue staatmaak om besonderhede van gevalle wat 10 tot 25 jaar tevore plaasgevind het, op te diep. Kol. De Kock was gelukkig dat regter Andrew Wilson tydens dié amnestieverhoor voorsitter was. Hy is deur adv. A. Sandi en mnr. J.B. Sibanyoni bygestaan. Soos altyd het regter Wilson hom suiwer by die bepalings van die Tussentydse Grondwet gehou en nie soos verskeie ander amnestieskomitees in die polities verwronge vereistes van die WVK-wet vasgeval nie. Die amnestiekomitee het aan al die lede amnestie toegestaan en onder meer bevind: Both Van Rensburg and Schoon deny having had such a meeting and giving such an order to De Kock. For our purposes it is not necessary to make a finding on the matter. In our view it is clear that De Kock bona fide believed that he was acting on behalf of the South African Security Police when he carried out the operation. It was the duty of the Security Police to maintain law and order in the Republic of South Africa and the Vlakplaas Unit was created specifically to deal with insurgency and to counter any possible attack on the Security Forces and civilians. [Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac20089.htm te lees.]

OP 29 Januarie 1991 is ʼn askari, Neville Sikhakhane, deur lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid om die lewe gebring. Sikhakhane was ’n MK-lid wat hom in 1988 vrywillig by die Vlakplaaseenheid aangesluit het. Hy is in Natal geplaas om lede van die veiligheidstak daar te help met die opsporing van ander MK-lede. Dit het later aan die lig gekom dat hy gedros het nadat Umkhonto weSizwe hom na Quatro, ’n ANC-strafkamp in Angola, gestuur het omdat hy geweier het om hom aan dissipline te onderwerp. Die militêre opleiding wat lede van Umkhonto weSizwe ontvang het, was hoofsaaklik bedoel om hulle in staat te stel om landmyne en kleefmyne te plant en sluipmoorde uit te voer. Hul dissipline was in die algemeen swak en Sikhakhane se gedrag moes veel te wense oorgelaat het as hulle dit nodig geag het om hom na die strafkamp te stuur. Kol. De Kock en die ander lede van die veiligheidstak wat met die askari’s gewerk het, het hulle met ʼn ysterhand beheer. 160


Sikhakhane het die lede van die veiligheidstak in Natal hoofbrekens besorg. Sy optrede het ʼn ernstige veiligheidsrisiko ingehou en die afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak, brig. (later generaal) Bertus Steyn, het dit as so ernstig beskou dat hy besluit het Sikhakhane moet om die lewe gebring word. Hy het die hulp van kol. De Kock ingeroep. Kol. De Kock het drie lede van sy eenheid aangesê om van Sikhakhane ontslae te raak. Die drie Vlakplaaslede het Sikhakhane na ’n afgeleë plek op die Kranskoppad ongeveer 5 km van Greytown geneem, waar hulle hom met ’n AK-47geweer doodgeskiet het. Tydens die amnestieverhoor het kol. De Kock aangevoer dat hy onder die indruk was dat brig. Steyn die optrede met brig. (later generaal) Krappies Engelbrecht, wat as hoof van C1 by brig. Van Rensburg oorgeneem het, bespreek het. Genl. Steyn het egter getuig dat hy nie die voorval met brig. Engelbrecht bespreek het nie. Die amnestiekomitee het bevind dat kol. De Kock en die ander lede opgetree het in die bona fide-geloof dat Sikhakhane ʼn bedreiging ingehou het, en amnestie is aan almal toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/ac20090.htm te lees.)

IN 1992 het lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid na bewering ʼn lyk van ʼn persoon wat tydens ondervraging sou gesterf het, vernietig. Kol. De Kock het aangevoer dat ʼn sers. Andrejovic van die veiligheidstak op Springs hom gevra het om van die lyk van ʼn IVP-lid ontslae te raak wat tydens ondervraging sou gesterf het. Kol. De Kock wou nie self by die vernietiging van die lyk betrokke raak nie en sou gereël het dat ’n kleefmyn aan sers. Andrejovic verskaf word. Laasgenoemde sou die lyk met die kleefmyn opgeblaas het om dit te laat lyk of die oorledene ’n fout begaan het toe hy die kleefmyn hanteer het. Dit het later geblyk dat die oorledene ʼn mnr. Welcome Khanyile was. Volgens die amnestiekomitee kon sers. Andrejovic nie opgespoor word nie en het hy skynbaar die land verlaat. ʼn Odendaal, ook ʼn lid van die veiligheidstak, sou ook by die voorval betrokke gewees het. Hy het nie tydens die verhoor getuig nie. Die omstandighede het uiters vreemd voorgekom. Daar is nie tydens die amnestieverhoor genoem of gevra of ’n geregtelike doodsondersoek gehou is nie. Skynbaar is geen poging aangewend om te bepaal of Khanyile ooit in polisie-aanhouding was nie. Dit is nie duidelik hoe die identiteit van Khanyile vasgestel is nie. Daar is nietemin amnestie vir die voorval aan De Kock toegestaan. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21004.htm te lees.) De Kock en ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid het amnestie gevra vir verskeie ander voorvalle waar die besonderhede in hul getuienis nie deur onafhanklike getuies gestaaf is en daar ook nie bepaal kon word of die voorvalle werklik plaasgevind het nie. Dit sluit voorvalle in van poging tot moord, lykverberging en kwaadwillige beskadiging van eiendom. In een geval het die 161


amnestiekomitee self bevind dat die voorval geen growwe skending van menseregte is nie en dat ’n openbare verhoor nie nodig was nie. PERSOONLIKE belang, wraak of rassehaat het geen rol in enige van die voorvalle hierbo gespeel nie. Wat die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid ook al gedoen het, hoe moreel en wetlik verkeerd dit ook al mag wees, hul optrede het in die meeste gevalle uit hul werksomstandighede gespruit en hulle was oortuig daarvan dat dit in landsbelang was. ’n Mens moet in gedagte hou dat hulle oor ’n lang tyd in ’n maalstroom van geweld vasgevang was en verhard is deur die bloedige tonele wat mettertyd deel van hul lewe geword het. Hul optrede was egter nooit teen weerlose vroue en kinders gemik nie. Met die uitsondering van die Japie Maponya-voorval op 25 September 1985, die Lesotho-voorval op 19 Desember 1985, 'n voorval op 14 Augustus 1986 toe 'n informant op die NerstonAmsterdampad doodgeskiet is en die Nelspruit-voorval op 26 Maart 1992 is amnestie vir al die ander dade waarby Eugène de Kock betrokke was, aan hom toegestaan. (Volledige besonderhede oor die Lesotho-voorval verskyn in die deel oor die Waarheids-en-versoeningskommissie.) Japie Maponya is op 25 September 1985 deur maj. De Kock en lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid doodgemaak nadat hulle hom ontvoer het om inligting oor sy broer te bekom. Maponya se broer, Odirile Maponya, was een van Umkhonto weSizwe se bevelvoerders en is daarvan verdink dat hy betrokke was by die moord op adjt.off. Tshwane van die speurafdeling in Pretoria. In die amnestieverhoor hieroor het twee van die komiteelede bevind dat dit wel ʼn daad was wat met ʼn politieke oogmerk verband hou en in die konflik van die verlede gepleeg is, maar dat teenstrydige getuienis daarop dui dat ʼn volle blootlegging nie gedoen is nie. Amnestie is dus aan De Kock en die lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid geweier. (Die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee is by die webadres www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21272.htm te lees. Soos dikwels in die WVK-proses gebeur het, is die regters wat veronderstel was om die bevinding te teken, verkeerd aangegee. Regter J. Miller het voorgesit en nie regter Wilson soos vermeld word nie. Kyk mnr. Wynand Malan se minderheidsuitspraak.) Soos ons die bepalings van die Tussentydse Grondwet verstaan, het De Kock dus wel vir amnestie kwalifiseer. Mnr. Wynand Malan, ʼn lid van die betrokke amnestiekomitee, het in ʼn minderheidsuitspraak bevind dat die voormalige lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid en die veiligheidstak wel op amnestie geregtig is. In sy uitspraak het mnr. Malan die regsaspekte waarop amnestiekomitees hul bevindings behoort te grond, beklemtoon. Hy het onder meer opgemerk:

The Act, Section 20(1), enjoins the Committee to grant amnesty if it is satisfied that an applicant has complied with the provisions of Section 20(1)(a), (b) and (c). The Committee has consistently interpreted satisfied to

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suggest that an applicant’s version of events has to be reasonably possibly true. It has consistently found that there is no onus of proof on an applicant, not even on a balance of probabilities. It is therefore, if one has to refer to a measure of any kind, as I understand it, more or less akin to the principle of reasonable doubt in a criminal case. If the Committee can therefore not find that an applicant’s version is false beyond reasonable doubt, it should be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to amnesty.

The requirement of full disclosure of all relevant facts in my opinion has therefore to be interpreted as follows: • Relevant facts can only refer to facts that are material to an incident related to an application for amnesty; • What is material is that which the Committee deems necessary to be disclosed in order for it to be satisfied; • Full disclosure can only mean truthful disclosure of all relevant facts. It does not relate to accurate disclosure.

Mnr. Malan se uitspraak is sprekend van die stryd van enkele lede van die amnestiekomitees om reg en geregtigheid te laat geskied te midde van die ongenaakbare houding wat dikwels teen lede van die veiligheidstak aangeneem is. (Die minderheidsuitspraak van mnr. Malan is by die webadres http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21272b.htm te lees.) Op 26 Maart 1992 het lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid onder bevel van kol. De Kock vier mense op die KwaNyanazane-pad naby Nelspruit in 'n minibus doodgeskiet doodgeskiet. 'n Vyfde persoon wat 'n lid van die groep was, het met 'n ander voertuig gereis en is gevange geneem. Hy is na die Pengemyn geneem waar hy doodgeskiet is. Die lyk is met springstof vernietig. Tydens die amnestieverhoor in 2001 waar kol. De Kock en nege van sy lede amnestie gevra het, het hulle aangevoer dat die vyf oorledenes MK-lede was wat rooftogte in belang van die ANC uitgevoer het. Die amnestiekomitee het egter bevind dat die getuienis oorweldigend daarop dui dat hul weergawe nie waar is nie en dat die daad nie met enige politieke motief in die konflik van die verlede gepleeg is

nie.

(Die

bevinding

van

die

amnestiekomitee

is

by

die

webadres

http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21171.htm te lees.) Tydens die strafregtelike verhoor het adjt.off. Chris Geldenhuys, ’n Vlakplaaslid wat by die Nelspruitvoorval betrokke was, getuig dat die werklike motief vir die moord op die vyf MK-lede geldelike gewin was. Kol. De Kock en die lede het beplan om verskeie Russiese wapens in die MK-lede se voertuig te plant. Om die publiek aan te moedig om vorendag te kom met inligting oor terreurwapens, het daar het ’n vergoedingstelsel bestaan waarvolgens sekere bedrae betaal is vir inligting wat gelei het tot die opsporing van Russiese wapens. De Kock en sy manne wou ook R20 000 as vergoeding van die Polisie eis vir ’n denkbeeldige informant wat inligting sou verskaf het om die roofbende te ontmasker en op die wapens beslag te lê. Die bewering dat die MK-lede ’n roofbende was, was

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vermoedelik waar, hoewel dit nie bevestig is nie. Hulle het egter vir eie gewin geroof en nie om geld vir die ANC te bekom nie. Kol. De Kock is in Oktober 1996 in die Hooggeregshof in Pretoria tot lewenslank plus 80 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens die vyf moorde. Hy is altesame tot twee lewenslange plus 212 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens ses moorde (insluitend die moord op Japie Maponya), verskeie pogings tot moord en ander aanklagte. EK, genl. Mike Geldenhuys en genl. Johann Coetzee, albei vorige polisiekommissarisse, het op 18 Mei 2002 in ’n brief aan pres. Thabo Mbeki begenadiging vir Eugène de Kock gevra. Ons het hierin die agtergrond en omstandighede waarmee rekening gehou moet word as oor die dade van De Kock geoordeel word, geskets: GENERALS MIKE GELDENHUYS JOHANN COETZEE JOHAN VAN DER MERWE 18 MAY 2002

PRESIDENT T MBEKI CAPE TOWN Dear President Mbeki

REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL PARDONING OR REPRIEVE IN TERMS OF SECTION 84 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA WITH REGARD TO CONVICTIONS AND/OR TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT: COLONEL EUGÈNE DE KOCK.

Colonel Eugène de Kock is currently serving various terms of imprisonment as clearly set out in the representations of his legal advisor, Mr. Schalk Hugo. As former commissioners of police under whose command Colonel De Kock served during his career in the South African Police we, together with numerous former colleagues, wish to present the following factual information to you in support of the representations of Colonel de Kock:

Colonel De Kock served in the SA Police during a long period of political strife, conflict and violence. The ANC/SACP alliance, the PAC/APLA structures as well as various other organisations wished to overthrow the existing statutory dispensation by acts of violence and the previous government of necessity deemed it fit to employ all the resources at its disposal to counter this threat. During the period concerned an armed struggle also raged in Namibia (then South West Africa) and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). Members of the South African Police, especially the Security Branch, were utilised in Namibia to counter the armed struggle.

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Similarly, members were also deployed in Zimbabwe to support the government of Mr Ian Smith in combating the onslaught.

The armed struggle in these countries was not conducted according to the rules of “normal conventional warfare�, but consisted in the main of the strategies and tactics of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. These circumstances required the SA Police to have their own special training programs and operations. In a normal situation, the accepted and fundamental police strategy would always revolve around the identification and tracing of offenders or criminals, bringing them to justice in an open court. In a situation of guerrilla warfare, however, it was of greater concern to always ensure personal survival as well as the neutralising and destruction of any identified foe.

In the RSA the security situation gradually worsened and during 1985 the government of the day was required to declare a state of emergency and instituted regulations deemed necessary to maintain law and order. The same year the state of emergency was de-proclaimed, but once again declared during 1986 to remain in place until 1990. Despite the emergency regulations, the riotous and violent circumstances not only persisted throughout the country, but even increased. The government was forced to employ drastic measures to curb the onslaught. To facilitate this and co-ordinate projects and actions on behalf of the State, the Joint Management Committees (JMC’s) were created. Differing cultures and interpretations in the system ultimately led to confusion and misunderstandings regarding numerous projects. The SA Police, who was responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of law and order, were usually in the firing line and this lead to desperate steps to counter revolutionary activity. The Police were called upon to act outside the law or the maintenance thereof and amongst other things became engaged in the sabotage and destruction of certain buildings, as in the cases of Khotso House and Cosatu House.

Seen in its proper perspective and in retrospect there can be no doubt that this sort of scenario eventually led to the serious undermining and even destruction of the foundation of sound and normal policing, namely the will and desire to protect and serve, and to promote sound community relations. Similarly, the capability of the leadership corps of the SA Police to lead and command their junior members in the abhorrent circumstances in which they found themselves, became seriously eroded. In many instances, proper disciplinary measures were not instituted with regard to the misconduct of individuals because those involved disposed of important strategic information which, if it became known, would seriously embarrass the government. This resulted in the difference between right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, becoming blurred.

Colonel De Kock is a prime example of a policeman caught in this situation. For a number of years he was called upon to serve as a member of Koevoet in Namibia, where he commanded a fighting unit which was involved in combating and preventing armed incursions by Swapo elements on a daily basis. The aim was to neutralise and destroy the enemy. None of the parties involved in the conflict abided by the rules and regulations of the Geneva Convention, which applied to conventional warfare. After his re-deployment to the

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RSA in 1985, Colonel De Kock was posted to the Security Branch’s fighting unit and was tasked with the identification and location of members of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and other opposition forces. In this capacity he encountered violence and death almost on a daily basis. During this period numerous MK operatives were actively engaged in the elimination of members of the Police Force as well as their families. Scores of policemen and their relatives lost their lives or were seriously injured and/or were driven from their traditional homes and residential areas. This resulted in members of the Security Branch taking harsh action, and acts of violence by MK were matched by similar acts. Actions and investigations by the Security Branch often revolved around Colonel De Kock, as reflected in his amnesty applications and hearings.

Subsequent to the appointment of Mr. F.W. de Klerk as State President, the government initiated a new policy and direction. Once again, this lead to massive trauma for members of the SA Police. Virtually overnight, they were expected to welcome former enemies and accept them as normal citizens of the country and to drastically amend and adjust thought patterns which had been formed and shaped by decades of death, violence and strife. In addition, members of Mr. De Klerk’s government hastened to safeguard their political careers and to distance themselves from acts and operations of the past, including many projects which had not only been officially sanctioned but implemented at their specific request. The leadership corps of the South African Police, for a variety of reasons, was faced with the same dilemma.

Colonel De Kock and other members of his unit were immediately regarded as lepers, with many of his erstwhile colleagues trying to distance themselves from both the unit and its actions. It was apparent that there would be no place for them in the SA Police in a new dispensation. The Cabinet decided that steps should be taken to enable them to retire prematurely, with certain financial packages being offered. It is quite logical to assume that Colonel De Kock and his colleagues regarded these developments as yet another traumatic development and that they felt rejected, unwanted and left in the lurch.

The acts and deeds in which Colonel De Kock was involved must be viewed in the light of this very relevant background and weighed and judged accordingly.

With due regard to the information above we have no hesitation in recommending that Colonel E.A. de Kock be accorded an official PARDON in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act previously referred to. Very few people would have survived and been able to face the world at large if subjected to the same work exigencies and experiences as Colonel De Kock. It is therefore our earnest request that this application be accorded the most serious attention to finally heal the wounds of the past and achieve the peace and reconciliation that we, as former police officers, and indeed all the citizens of this country, desire and in fact deserve.

Mnr. Adriaan Vlok het soortgelyke vertoë tot pres. Mbeki gerig. Al die vertoë het op dowe ore geval en kol. Eugène de Kock het ten tyde van die skryf van hierdie boek steeds in die gevangenis gesit. 166


DIE voorvalle waarby Eugène de Kock betrokke was, is uitgebuit om die persepsie te skep dat dit algemeen voorgekom het en dat lede van die veiligheidstak duisende politieke aktiviste vermoor het. Dit is duidelik heeltemal uit verband geruk as die aantal voorvalle waarvoor lede van die veiligheidstak amnestie gevra het – wat oor ʼn tydperk van meer as 20 jaar strek – vergelyk word met die aantal mense wat in net een jaar dood is weens onnatuurlike oorsake waarby die polisie onder ANC-bewind betrokke is. Volgens ʼn verslag van die Onafhanklike Klagtedirektoraat, wat klagtes van onregmatige optrede teen lede van die SA Polisiediens ondersoek, het daar in 2003/2004 altesame 714 mense tydens polisie-aanhouding of polisie-optrede gesterf. In 2004/2005 was die getal 652 en in 2005/2006 was dit 621. Die voorvalle waarvoor lede van die veiligheidstak oor 20 jaar om amnestie aansoek gedoen het, beloop 200. Dit sluit ook gevalle in waar mense uit noodweer of omstandighede wat aan noodweer grens, doodgemaak is. Terwyl die SAUK en ander instansies steeds van tyd tot tyd na die Vlakplaaseenheid as ʼn moordbende verwys, word daar nooit ʼn woord gerep oor die afgrysliker en onmensliker dade wat lede van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie en ander revolusionêre organisasies gepleeg het nie. Die motorbomontploffings, landmyn- en kleefmynontploffings, halssnoermoorde waar polisielede en lede van hul gesinne of families op wrede en onmenslike wyse lewend verbrand is, word verswyg. Mnr. Aboobaker Ismail, wat aan die hoof van spesiale operasies van Umkhonto weSizwe gestaan het, asook ander senior bevelvoerders van Umkhonto weSizwe, het aanspreeklikheid aanvaar vir die meeste terreurdade wat in belang van die ANC gepleeg is. Hulle het tydens hul amnestieaansoeke aangevoer dat die dade onder die politieke gesag en leiding van die ANC en ingevolge die politieke beleid van die ANC geskied het. Die ANC het deurgaans ontken dat hy op die Kabwekonferensie besluit het dat burgerlikes voortaan ook as wettige teikens beskou sou word. Mnr. Ismail en verskeie ander lede van Umkhonto weSizwe het egter by herhaling getuig dat ofskoon die bedoeling nie was om hulle op burgerlikes toe te spits nie, die blote feit dat burgerlikes getref mag word, hulle nie daarvan moes weerhou om ʼn bepaalde operasie uit te voer nie. Die Kerkstraatbomontploffing is onder meer in opdrag van mnr. Ismail uitgevoer. Die feit dat burgerlikes teikens was, blyk duidelik uit die feit dat lede van Umkhonto weSizwe kleefmyne by Wimpy-restaurante geplant en ploftoestelle in openbare plekke gelaat het. Die polisie moes alles in die stryd werp om die gemeenskap teen sulke aanvalle te beskerm. Op 2 Julie 1988 het mnr. Lester Dumakude, ’n bevelvoerder van spesiale operasies van MK, ’n bom in ’n motor by die Ellis Park-rugbystadion in Johannesburg geplaas. Een persoon is in die ontploffing dood en 37 beseer, almal burgerlikes. Lede van Umkhonto weSizwe het tydens amnestieverhore vertel hoe hulle ’n kleefmyn laat ontplof het om die polisie na die toneel te lok en dat die tydmeganisme van ʼn ander kleefmyn so gestel is 167


dat dit sou ontplof sodra polisielede op die toneel is. Verskeie polisielede het in sulke ontploffings omgekom. ’n Kleefmyn het op 20 Januarie 1986 by ’n subkragstasie in Chamberlainweg, Durban, ontplof. ’n Tweede kleefmyn is so gestel dat dit ’n ruk later sou ontplof wanneer lede van die veiligheidstak na verwagting die toneel sou besoek. Kol. Bobby Welman van die veiligheidstak in Natal was op die toneel toe die tweede kleefmyn ontplof. Hy het nie naby die kleefmyn gestaan nie en is ook nie deur die skrapnel getref nie, maar die geweldige hitte van die ontploffing het sy longe geskroei. Ek het hom in die hospitaal in Durban besoek waar hy stadig besig was om dood te smoor. Ondanks sy intense pyn en die wete dat hy besig was om te sterf, het hy moedig geglimlag en gesê dit gaan goed. Hy is kort daarna oorlede. Mnr. Ismail het amnestie vir hierdie voorval gevra. Getuienis wat lede van Umkhonto weSizwe tydens amnestieverhore gelewer het, het die omvang van hul terreurdade aan die lig gebring. Motorbomme, landmyne, kleefmyne, handgranate en ander ploftoestelle is gebruik om polisielede, raadslede, onderwysers en in verskeie gevalle ook onskuldige vroue en kinders te vermoor. Onder die lede wat ʼn leidende rol in die terreurdade gespeel het, is mnre. Aboobaker Ismail, Robert McBride en Gordon Webster. (Die amnestiekomitee se bevinding ten opsigte van verskeie dade waarby hulle betrokke was, is by die webadres http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21128.htm te lees. Hoewel verdoemende getuienis tydens die amnestieverhoor gelewer is dat Gordon Webster onder andere vir die moord op kol. Bobby Welman aanspreeklik is, het hy nooit amnestie gevra het nie. Daar was ook nooit enige aanduiding in die openbaar dat die NVG beoog om Webster te vervolg nie.) ANC-ondersteuners het van 1984 tot 1992 altesame 505 mense met die wrede halssnoermetode om die lewe gebring. Die nasionale uitvoerende komitee van die ANC het dié barbaarse optrede oogluikend goedgekeur en geen ANC-ondersteuners het amnestie vir hierdie dade gevra nie. Die feit dat die ANC druk op pres. F.W. de Klerk geplaas het om lede vry te laat wat weens dié dade gevangenisstraf uitgedien het – soos in die “Record of understanding” ooreengekom – onderstreep hul aandadigheid aan hierdie barbaarse dade. Mev. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, lid van die NUK van die ANC, het die ANC se houding jeens die halssnoermoorde verraai toe sy in 1986 tydens ’n toespraak in Munsieville, ’n swart woonbuurt naby Johannesburg, gesê het: “Together, hand-inhand with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country.” Op 25 Julie 1993 is weerlose kerkgangers wat vrouens en kinders ingesluit het, in die St. James kerk, Kenilworth, Kaapstad met AK47-gewere en handgranate aangeval en 11 koelbloedig doodgeskiet. Talle is gewond. Dr. Alan Boesak het hom soos volg oor die voorval uitgelaat :

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We are horrified and deeply distressed by the savage attack on the congregation at St James's Church, Kenilworth yesterday evening. Not only is this a monstrous crime against humanity, but also a shameful desecration of a place of prayer and worship. This is the latest in a series of barbaric and vicious armed attacks that have taken place since the announcement of significant agreements at the World Trade Centre. This tragedy can only strengthen our belief that there are dark forces at work, determined to wreck all efforts to build peace and democracy in our country. We wish to express our deepest and most sincere sympathies with the families of the deceased in their grief. From the bottom of our hearts we wish them the strength and courage to endure a tragedy that goes beyond the personal and must affect our country as a whole. We call on the security forces to launch an immediate and urgent investigation into this terrible crime and to bring its perpetrators to justice. For the sake of all South Africans, it is absolutely crucial that the sinister forces behind these horrifying attacks are brought to book before they can do any more damage. Issued by Allan Boesak, Chairperson. Tydens die amnestieverhoor van die APLA-lede wat die aanval uitgevoer het, is die volgende bevinding gemaak : “APLA has publicly accepted responsibility for this attack and in its submission to the TRC it stated: "It should therefore not surprise anyone that targets like the St James Church, King Williams Town Golf Club, Heildeberg Tavern etc were selected. The leadership of the APLA takes full responsibility for all these operations. The APLA forces who carried out these operations followed the directives from their commanders and those directives were from the highest echelons of the military leadership. We do not therefore regret that such operations took place and there is therefore nothing to ask forgiveness for� Mnr. Letlapa Mphahlele, die president van die PAC, in wie se opdrag die aanval uitgevoer is, het aanvanklik weens hierdie moorde in die hof verskyn, maar die saak is uitgestel en het sedertdien in die niet verdwyn. Mnr. Mphahlele is tans 'n lid van die parlement.

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ALTYD GETROU! Jare gelede! AO Nico Visser word deur genl. Ronnie van der Westhuisen met die SAP-ster vir verdienste vereer. Uit die foto kan die leser duidelik sien dat AO Visser een van daardie goeie stasiebevelvoerders was wat die publiek getrou gedien het. Sulke AO’s was waardevol vir die Mag gewees want hierdie ervare, deurwinterde, polisiebeamptes kon hul stasies beheer en misdaad bekamp. Saam met die “ou” sersante het hulle die ruggraat van die Mag gevorm. Hulle het gou die nuweling in die Mag ingelyf. Naas die SAPkollege het hierdie manne ‘n reuse taak vervul om ons te maak wat ons was. [Ek was al ‘n majoor toe ek is ek nog katvoet vir my ou SB want hy het my altyd as een van “sy” seuns beskou!]

NEXT MONTH We look at African Officers of the SA Police Force and other SA Forces. Any articles, photos, comments and anecdotes will be appreciated.

SLOT / END Geagte leser: Vir hierdie kwasiehistoriese dokument ons maak van verskeie bronne gebruik en bevat die dokument uiteraard uiteenlopende en diverse persoonlike menings van verskillende persone en die opsteller van die Nongqai kan nie in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid daarvoor verantwoordelik of aanspreeklik gehou word nie. Dear reader of this quasi-historical document: please note we make use of various sources and consequently it is obvious that the document contains various diverse and personal opinions of different people and the author of the Nongqai cannot be held responsible or be liable in his personal capacity. Hennie Heymans: No 43630 (B)

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Profile for Hennie Heymans

Nongqai vol 8 no 7  

History of National Security in Southern Africa

Nongqai vol 8 no 7  

History of National Security in Southern Africa

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