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Contents PUBLISHER / UITGEWER ......................................................................................... 5 AIM / DOEL ................................................................................................................ 5 FRONT PAGE / VOORBLAD: GENL-MAJ RJ ‘BOBBY’ PALMER ............................. 5 ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS ......................................................................... 5 WELCOME / WELKOM .............................................................................................. 6 REDAKSIONEEL ....................................................................................................... 6 Humty Dumpty: Uit die mond van kinders en suigelinge......................................... 7 DIE GLORIE VAN ONS GESKIEDENIS .................................................................... 9 GENL JV VAN DER MERWE ................................................................................... 12 Om te lewe, om te sterwe, ons vir jou Suid-Afrika – Johan van der Merwe ......... 12 MNR AP STEMMET: GEWESE HOOF: TAK STRATEGIESE KOMMUNIKASIE: SSVR: DINK OOK TERUG ...................................................................................... 15 PENSKETSE VAN ONS KOMMISSARISSE ............................................................ 17 1910 – 1928: Kol. Sir T.G. Truter, KBE, CMG ...................................................... 17 1928 – 1945: Kol. I.P. de Villiers, CB, MC, KPM .................................................. 17 1940 – 1945: Brig. R.C.G. (George) Baston, KPM. (wrnde kommissaris) ........... 18 1945 - 1951: Genl.maj. R.J. Palmer. CVO, KPM, DSO: ...................................... 18 1951 – 1954: Genl.maj. J.A. (Jan-Kamas) Brink ................................................... 19 1954 – 1960: Genl.maj. C.I. Rademeyer .............................................................. 19 1960 – 1962: Lt.genl. H.J. Du Plooy ..................................................................... 20 1962 – 1968: Genl. Johannes Marthinus Keevy ................................................... 21 1968 – 1971: Genl. J. P. GOUS ........................................................................... 21 1971 – 1973: Genl. G.J. Joubert ........................................................................... 22 1973 – 1975: Genl. T.J. Crous .............................................................................. 22 1975 – 1978: Genl. G.L. Prinsloo ......................................................................... 22 1978 – 1983: Genl. M.C.W. Geldenhuys .............................................................. 23 1983 – 1987: Genl. P.J. Coetzee .......................................................................... 24 1987 – 1990: Genl. H.G. de Witt ........................................................................... 24 1990 – 1994: Genl. J.V. van der Merwe ............................................................... 25 1982: NOG ‘N KOMMISSARIS: LT.GENL. JH VISAGIE, SDE, SMO....................... 29 ONTSTAAN VAN EN TRANSFORMASIE VAN POLISIEMAGTE – EERS NET DIE MANNE EN TOE LATER DIE VROUE: BRIG. FANIE BOUWER ............................ 31 Die Kaap van Goeie Hoop .................................................................................... 31 DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE IN THE CAPE COLONY........................................... 31

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1786...................................................................................................................... 31 1790: First mention of Police ................................................................................ 31 1792: Wijkmeester ................................................................................................ 32 1812: Police Ruiters, Fieldcornets & Fieldcorporals ............................................. 32 1870: Police Dress................................................................................................ 33 RORKE'S DRIFT MEDAL......................................................................................... 34 Rorke's Drift Medal awarded to the servant of a VC-winning officer who was immortalised in the film Zulu sells for £132,000 .................................................... 34 1904: SENEKAL POLISIESTASIE: via DES ROOS ................................................. 39 THE BRITISH NO 106 INSTANTANEOUS, DIRECT ACTION, PERCUSSION FUSE, SIMPLE BUT RELIABLE: RICHARD HENRY .......................................................... 41 WORLD WAR ONE: VC MEDAL ............................................................................. 47 Medals of Somme VC Hero who led Group of 30 Men who kept the enemy at bay for two days Sell For £288,000 ............................................................................. 47 “DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER”: ALLUVIAL CLAIM LICENCE .................................. 51 1931: DIE MOORD OP “TAKKIE” MOLLER: BLOEMFONTEIN .............................. 53 Dink u die storie eindig hier? ................................................................................ 56 1931 (circa) ONGEIDEENTIFISEERDE LYK ........................................................... 57 6 SEPTEMBER 1939: SUID-AFRIKA VERKLAAR OORLOG .................................. 58 1939 – 1945: WAR PICTURES / OORLOGFOTO’S ................................................ 60 FISANTEKRAAL AIRFIELD: PHIL BECK ................................................................. 63 PROF HERMAN GILIOMEE: DIE LAASTE AFRIKANERLEIERS: TAFELBERG .... 66 Die verskriklikste botsing van belange denkbaar .................................................. 66 Swart mense word Suid-Afrikaanse burgerskap geweier ..................................... 66 1961 NAMUTONI: SUIDWES-AFRIKA: GENL. JV VAN DER MERWE ................... 67 1961: Lt.-Kol. (kmdt.) PHS Henning in nuwe blou SAP-uniform .......................... 68 RHODESIA: OPERATION MIRACLE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1979 ................................. 69 By Historian, Author and Copy-Editor Gerry Van Tonder ..................................... 69 SPEURDERHOOFKONSTABEL JORDAAN ........................................................... 87 1990: NONGQAI ARGIEF: BESTRYDING VAN ONLUSTE ..................................... 88 MR MANDELA AND THE QUEEN MOTHER / MNR MANDELA EN DIE KONINGIN SE MOEDER ............................................................................................................ 94 ‘n Stukkie (onsamehangende) polisiegeskiedenis oor mnr Mandela en die onderhandelinge ................................................................................................... 94 Fanie Bouwer sê: .................................................................................................. 96 ‘n Ander siening van die onderhandelinge: ........................................................... 97 3


HISTORY IS WRITTEN BY THE VICTORS: CM WILLIAMSON .............................. 98 AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM ....................................................................................... 98 Spy: Uncovering Craig Williamson by Jonathan Ancer. Some comments by Craig Williamson ............................................................................................................ 99 OPERATION DAISY: SUPERSPY CRAIG WILLIAMSON: RS 167 ....................... 101 Introduction: Hennie Heymans ........................................................................... 101 Here is one of RS 167’s reports .......................................................................... 103 POLISIEPRAATJIES .............................................................................................. 108 Interessante lewe................................................................................................ 108 Dit was ‘n voorreg om polisieman te wees! ......................................................... 108 Goeie opleiding ................................................................................................... 108 Karakter en inbors .............................................................................................. 109 Byname in die Mag ............................................................................................. 110 Humor in die polisie ............................................................................................ 110 The wah .......................................................................................................... 110 ‘C’ vir Sydenham ............................................................................................. 110 He’s out on a rape ........................................................................................... 111 BSAP: TERRY SCHWARTZ THINKS BACK ......................................................... 111 BRIEWEBUS .......................................................................................................... 129 Kol Len Els: Karateka40 ..................................................................................... 129 Pastoor Danie van Tonder: Bekendstelling van Boek ......................................... 130 Tubby Ueckerman skryf: ..................................................................................... 130 Bernard Heymans wil weet? ............................................................................... 132 ‘Piet-Patu’ van Zyl ............................................................................................... 132 Paul Els: Walvisbaai ........................................................................................... 132 Hanlie van Straaten: Generaal Mike Geldenhuys word 92 ................................. 132 Oud-kommissaris Chris Botha: Stellenbosch ...................................................... 133 Andre van der Merwe: Staatslykshuis, Soweto ................................................... 134 SLOT / END ........................................................................................................... 135

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PUBLISHER / UITGEWER The Nongqai is compiled and published on ISSUU by Hennie Heymans a retired Brigadier of the late South African Police Force. He lives in Pretoria, ZA. He is passionate about our police-, military- and national security history and holds a MAdegree in National Strategic Studies.

Tel. No. 012-329-4229 E-mail: heymanshb@gmail.com AIM / DOEL Our goal is to collect and record our national security history for publication in the Nongqai for future generations. Ons doel is om die nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis in die Nongqai aan te teken en so vir die nageslagte bewaar.

FRONT PAGE / VOORBLAD: GENL-MAJ RJ ‘BOBBY’ PALMER In the centre of the front page is Maj-Gen RJ Palmer, post-war police commissioner. The front page is based on an old series of Nongqai covers used in days gone by. The cover was artistically improved and adapted by Glenn Elsden, a Lieut-Col (ret) of the SA Police based at Forensics. Contact details: Elsden Design Services email: glenn.elsden@gmail.com

ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS • • • •

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Photographs of police stations. (Please share your photographs with us.)1 Southern African Uniforms and badges. Police Heroes and a “Police Who is Who”. Police Commissioners: We are preparing a booklet on the various SA Police commissioners. Should you have any photographs or anecdotes please share with us. Kommissarisse van polisie: Ons is besig om inligting van ons onderskeie polisiekommissarisse in te samel. Ons begin by kol. sir TG Truter en werk ons pad deur die geskiedenis totdat genl. JV van der Merwe die SAP oorhandig het aan nuwe nasionale kommissaris van die SAPS, genl. George Fivaz. Ons het besluit om brig. George Baston by die reeks in te sluit aangesien hy vir bykans vyf jaar as die kommissaris waargeneem het. Police History: We collect eyewitness reports from policemen about cataclysmic events in our history e.g. Cato Manor, Sharpeville, Pondoland, etc. We have large collection of digital recordings from police officers.

Dankie aan Des Roos vir ou Senekal-polisiestasie se foto’s – HBH.

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Boipatong: We would like to hear from policemen who were involved at Boipatong. Ons sal graag van lede wil hoor wat by die Boipatong-voorval betrokke was. Speurdiens: Ons kry bitter min feite verslae van speurders oor opspraakwekkende misdade.

WELCOME / WELKOM Welcome to our world! We live in an interesting world! We are passionate about what we are doing! It was a great pleasure to compile this edition; I sincerely hope you would enjoy the content from our various sources.

REDAKSIONEEL My gade vra waarom ek so baie geld op my stokperdjie spandeer? Ek vertel haar dat elke man ‘n stokperdjie het. (Ek kon gholf gespeel het.) Nou “mors” ek geld op ‘n nuwe rekenaar en boeke. Ek publiseer twee elektroniese tydskrifte; die NONGQAI en die SAS-SAR. Laasgenoemde tydskrif belig ons spoorweggeskiedenis in Suider-Afrika met die klem op die spoorweg se rol in nasionale veiligheid. Ek ontmoet daagliks die mees interessantste mense, ook skrywers, akademici en navorsers. Vandag seker drie ure met ‘n uitgewer, wat koffie kom drink het, gesels. Die persoon se moeder was ‘n kommunis en hulle het Rusland besoek. Die gewonde Russiese troepe wat per trein van Afghanistan gekom het, het ‘n blywende indruk gelaat. Wanneer mense eerlik gesels en dinge deel; word mens se begrip van jou vorige loopbaan aansienlik verhelder. Kol. Terry Schwartz het my bekend gestel aan ‘n Rhodesiese-weermag-webwerf. Ek het die eienaar, Gerry van Tonder, in die VK gekontak en ons het “groot” vriende in die kuberruimte geword. Deur die toedoen van brigadier Johan Giliomee het ek kontak met prof Herman Giliomee van Stellenbosch gemaak. Intussen wag ek op die professor se nuutste boeke. Die professor het ook vir ons lesers se inligting, van sy skerpsinnige en raakvat indrukke oor die SA geskiedenis met ons gedeel. Nou die dag het Lappe Loubser – oudjoernalis van Die Burger - kom koffie drink. My mond het oopgehang. As daar iemand in Suid-Afrika is wat ook die binnekring geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika goed ken, is dit Lappe. Ek wens hy wil ‘n boek skryf oor alles wat hy eerstehands gesien en ervaar het. Ek het ook na die gesprek met hom ‘n ander prentjie oor die onderhandelinge en wat alles agter die skerms gebeur (en nie gebeur) het. Ek wonder wie ken die hele storie? Die polisie as eerste linie van verdediging in ou Brits suidelike Afrika se optrede is nou met die geskiedenis verweef. Daar is omtrent nie ‘n voorval van belang waarin die polisie nie ‘n rol gespeel het nie. (Snaaks, ook in die ou ZAR, as ons die geval van konst. Jones en mnr. Edgar in ag neem.) 6


Neem die moord op nege polisiemanne in Cato Manor, dit het die Mag geruk! Ons het tydens die 1922 Randse Rooi-opstand [“Red Revolt”] laas soveel manne op een dag verloor. ‘n Enkele maande later vind die mees kataklismiese voorval in ons land se geskiedenis plaas. 69 Mense, baie onder dwang aanwesig, word te Sharpeville deur die polisie doodgeskiet. Alles het eintlik te Cato Manor gebeur – die polisie te Sharpeville het die gebeure te Cato Manor onthou en almal weet wat daarop gevolg het. Die kataklismiese voorval is wêreldwyd in die internasionale politieke aanslag teen die NP-bewind in Suid-Afrika tot vervelens toe, teen die land gebruik veral in die VN en in verskeie sanksie- en boikotveldtogte. A great deal of history starts and ends with police involvement. Take the case of Walvis Bay; the last to leave at 23:59 was the South African Police when they handed the station over to the Namibian Police. Daar is twee soorte mense, die wat saam met jou stem en die wat nie saam met jou stem nie. ‘n Minderheid staan neutraal. So weer, word ‘n oudlid van die veiligheidstak aangeval. Daar is niemand wat die belange van so ‘n lid werklik beskerm nie. Ek praat oor Craig Williamson wat weer die onderwerp van ‘n negatiewe boek is.

Humty Dumpty: Uit die mond van kinders en suigelinge As kind, ek was sowat vier jaar oud, was ek ingeskryf by die Assegai Nursery School, Wentworth, Durban. Die onderrig taal was Engels. Daar het ek die volgende rympie geleer: “Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, Humpty Dumpty had a great fall; All the king's horses and all the king's men Couldn't put Humpty together again.” So gaan dit ook vandag, nie die oudpresident nie, ook nie sy generaals of die troepe of die veiligheidspolisie kan die gebreekte “eier” weer herstel nie. Dit is iets wat ons moet aanvaar en ons moet leer om aan te pas en te oorleef. Ons moet ‘n nuwe paradigma ontwikkel. Illustrasie deur WW Denslow, 1904. Die gedig het vir die eerste maal in 1797 verskyn. Wat het die geskiedenis vir my geleer? Daar is die amptelike geskiedenis in beton vas gegiet. Dan is daar die ander geskiedenis, soms die ware geskiedenis, wat in die harte, vrese en gedagtes van mense is, wat nooit geopenbaar word nie. Wat het bv. alles op die dag net voor die skietery gebeur? So lees ons van ‘n boere kryger tydens die Anglo-Boere-oorlog wat ‘n skoot vroegtydig aftrek tydens ‘n hinderlaag, ‘n konstabel tydens ‘n voorstellingsparade wat tydens ‘n skouspel sy skoot vroegtydig 7


afskiet. So vertel majoor X vir my dat hy en ‘n groep lede ‘n prominente opponent wil arresteer in ‘n buurland. Hy buk om sy skoenriem vas te maak en die prominente opponent skiet ‘n kollega in die skouer. Dit is geskiedenis wat nooit in die anale opgeteken sal word nie. Voorts het die geskiedenis my geleer dat daar altyd meer as een weergawe is: Die amptelike weergawe – soms gerugsteun deur ‘n kommissie van ondersoek maar tog nie die juiste weergawe is nie, want nie alles word in so verslag vervat nie. So ‘n kommissie van ondersoek het gewoonlik ‘n doel en om die doel na te streef word baie goed uitgelaat! Die vraag gewoonlik is: Is dit die waarheid? Is dit die volle waarheid? Wat word weggesteek? Is die feite juis? Wie is die opsteller van die verslag? Waarom is die verslag opgestel en waarom is dit uitgereik? Wat is die storie agter die storie? Was die ouens maar skrikkerig en het hulle te vroeg begin skiet of het daar ‘n skoot afgegaan en het almal toe begin skiet? Sulke geprivilegeerde inligting kan miskien alleen na die afsterwe bekom word bv.: Wat het in die lede se mediese leggers gestaan en wat het hulle vir die sielkundiges gesê? Vir die dominee? Wat is in die kantien bespreek – ironies genoeg, soms kom die ware storie juis in Bacchus se geselskap uit! Dit geld ook vir politieke-geskiedenis! Neem maar die skietery by Marikana: Sal ons ooit alles weet? Onthou skryf u storie, soms kan ons net op die geskrewe weergawe terugval want dit is al wat daar is! Wat die uitleg en tikwerk betref moet ek bieg dis my eie werk. Die polisie het my leer dril, perdry en skiet met geweer, handwapen en Sten-geweer. Hulle het my nooit leer tik nie. Elke polisieman moet maar self tik, veral op ‘n klein stasie. Ek het ‘n nuwe rekenaar en gebruik nou Windows 10 en ‘n nuwe “Paint Shop”program. Dit sukkel maar: Alhoewel dit gaan asof dit ‘n tarentaal is wat mieliepitte van ‘n sinkdak af oppik, gaan ek aan met die “job”. Daar is niemand wat die tydskriffie kan proeflees of my op my foute wys nie. Ek is seker die Afrikaanse speltoetser wys nie al die foute uit nie. Dankie aan kol Len Els, SC, wat sekere berigte hierin met sy regs bril deurgelees het en daarna die nodige aanbevelings gedoen het waarvoor ons dankbaar is.

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DIE GLORIE VAN ONS GESKIEDENIS

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1970-artikel verskaf deur mev. Marie Geldenhuys.

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GENL JV VAN DER MERWE Nongqai het met genl. Johan van der Merwe in verbinding getree en hom versoek om asseblief elke maand vir ons lesers ‘n bydrae in die vorm van ‘n artikel of enkele gedagtes neer te pen en in te stuur. Dink maar net indien ons vir oud-pres SJP Kruger gevra het om sy gedagtes na die oorlog met ons te deel, kon ons soveel meer insig gekry het in die probleme van die verlede, ten einde die hede beter te begryp. Gelukkig het ‘n ZARP en latere eerste hoof adjunkkommissaris van die polisie en sekretaris van polisie, luit-kol HC “Manie” Bredell, enkele gedagtes van die ou president in Clarens verwoord. Vandag het ons rekord daarvan! Dink net indien ons onderhoude met genl. CR de Wet kon voer, hoe interessant sou dit nie gewees het nie. Tans is ek besig om alles waarop ek my hande oor Jan van Riebeeck kan lê, met oorgawe te lees! Gelukkig het Oom Jan baie geskryf – wat ‘n man was hy nie! Wonder wat sal hy sê as hy hoor die Kaap nie meer Hollands is nie!! Soos genl. De Wet, het genl. Johan van der Merwe ook ‘n boek geskryf maar mens kan nie ‘n leeftyd in een boek vas lê en neer pen nie – dis waarom Jan van Riebeeck so baie geskryf het en waarom daar so baie oor hom geskryf is. Met tyd verander mens se insigte, beskouings en vertolkings. Genl. Van der Merwe kan nog so baie nog vertel – sonder skroom, smaad, of hoon. Daar is nog wavragte vol herinneringe en ook wat ons, in baie gevalle, te doen gestaan het. Die polisie was onder baie druk; tog het die polisie sy taak en roeping vervul; gesorg dat wet en orde geskied, dat onderhandelings kon plaasvind en het die polisie gehelp om te keer dat ‘n staatsgreep plaas vind. So van staatsgrepe gepraat: Genl. Van der Merwe het in die voorste linie by die staatsgreep in Bophuthatswana opgetree! Daardie storie moet weer vertel word!

Om te lewe, om te sterwe, ons vir jou Suid-Afrika – Johan van der Merwe As lede van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiemag het ons daarna gestrewe om ons land en sy mense te dien. Die twee slotversies van “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” het ons strewe en oortuigings verwoord: In die songloed van ons somer, in ons winternag se kou, In die lente van ons liefde, in die Ianfer van ons rou, By die klink van huw'liks-klokkies, by die kluitklap op die kis – Streel jou stem ons nooit verniet nie, weet jy waar jou kinders is. Op jou roep se ons nooit nee nie, se ons altyd, altyd ja: Om te lewe, om te sterwe - ja, ons kom, Suid-Afrika. Op U Almag vas vertrouend het ons vadere gebou: Skenk ook ons die krag, o Here! om te handhaaf en te hou – Dat die erwe van ons vaad're vir ons kinders erwe bly: 12


Knegte van die Allerhoogste, teen die hele wêreld vry. Soos ons vadere vertrou het, leer ook ons vertrou, o Heer – Met ons land en met ons nasie sal dit wel wees, God regeer Die Polisiemag was sedert 1960 in ‘n stryd teen revolusie en terreur gewikkel wat hoë eise aan ons lede gestel het en talle het hulle lewens opgeoffer om die waardes wat ons nagestreef het te beskerm. Die stigting van die United Democratic Front in 1983 onder leiding van dr. Allan Boesak het ‘n nuwe fase in revolusionêre oorlogvoering ingewy waar verskillende organisasies, vakbondleiers, gemeenskapsleiers, kerkleiers en akademici landwyd ingespan is om burgerlike ongehoorsaamheid en versetoptredes aan te moedig en te organiseer. Dr. Boesak, visepresident van die SARK en voorsitter van die Wêreldbond van Gereformeerde Kerke (WBGK), en dr. Naudé, sekretaris-generaal van die SARK, het in hulle onderskeie hoedanighede 'n leidende rol in die bedrywighede van die SARK gespeel. Daar was voortdurend wisselwerking tussen die verskillende lede van die SARK. Drr. Boesak en Naudé se invloed was deurslaggewend. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke en al sy lede kon landwyd onder die dekmantel van kerklike bedrywighede protesoptogte en versetaksies reël. Kerkleiers het met groot skynheiligheid ‘n beroep gedoen dat dit vreedsaam moet geskied wel wetende dat dit op geweld sal uitloop. Grootskaalse onrus en geweld het gevolg. ‘n Noodtoestand moes noodwendig in verskillende distrikte afgekondig word. In ‘n stadium is ongeveer 70 000 politieke aktiviste ingevolge die Noodregulasies aangehou. Mnr. P W Botha is gedurende 1990 deur mnr. F W de Klerk as president opgevolg. Mnr. De Klerk was op daardie tydstip die minister van Opvoeding en Beplanning en sy kennis van die veiligheidsmagte en die veiligheidstoestand in die land beperk. Vanweë sy akademiese agtergrond het hy uit die staanspoor ‘n goeie verhouding met die Nasionale Intelligensiediens aangeknoop. Hy het egter, hetsy vanweë onbetroubare inligting of eie persepsies, ‘n hewige wantroue in die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag gehad en het ook bedenkinge oor die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiemag gehad. Dit moet derhalwe aanvaar word dat nadat hy as president ingehuldig is, hy hom grootliks op die inligting en aanbevelings van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens verlaat het. Op 2 Februarie 1990 het mnr. De Klerk tydens die opening van die parlement aangekondig dat die onwettigverklaring van die ANC, SAKP en ander organisasies opgehef word en dat alle politieke gevangenes vrygelaat sal word. Dit het vanselfsprekend mnr. Mandela ingesluit. Die polisie en die weermag is nooit oor hierdie aangeleentheid geraadpleeg nie. Genl. Jannie Geldenhuys wat toe die hoof van die Weermag was, het langs my gesit en het na hierdie afkondiging gevra wat dit beteken? Ek het hom ingelig dat die ANC en ander organisasies nou op gelyke voet met al die ander politieke organisasies is. Die vrylating van mnr. Mandela en ander politieke gevangenes het daarna gevolg. Voorsiening is ook gemaak vir die terugkeer van ANC-leiers en lede wat na die buiteland uitgewyk het. Daar is nooit rekening gehou met die moontlikheid dat die onderhandelinge mag misluk nie. Dit het noodwendig ‘n toestand geskep waar mnr. De Klerk en sy kabinet geen ander staatkundige uitweg gehad het as om met die 13


ANC/SAKP-alliansie tot vergelyk te kom nie. Die ANC/SAKP-alliansie het dit besef en tydens die onderhandelinge terdeë uitgebuit. Na die Boipatongvoorval het hulle hulle van die onderhandelinge onttrek. Mnr. De Klerk en sy kollegas moes verskeie toegewings maak en ondernemings wat tydens die referendum aan kiesers gegee is, verloën. Onder andere het mnr. De Klerk te kenne gegee dat alvorens ‘n nuwe Grondwet aanvaar sou word, dit eers by wyse van ‘n referendum aan die bestaande kiesers vir goedkeuring voorgelê sal word. Dit het nooit gebeur nie. Die Grondwet wat uiteindelik aanvaar is, het verskeie wesenlike gebreke veral vir sover dit die beskerming van gevestigde eiendomsreg betref. Dit is so bewoord dat regstellende stappe onbepaald toegepas kan word en dat daar nie werklik plek vir blankes in die staatsdiens, die polisie en die weermag is nie. Meer as ‘n miljoen blankes is gedwing om die land te verlaat. Die eensydige vervolging van oudlede van die polisie jeens beweerde misdrywe wat tydens die konflik van die verlede plaasgevind het, vind nog steeds plaas. Voormalige lede van die veiligheidsmagte is deur mnr. De Klerk en sy kollegas op ‘n skandelike wyse in die steek gelaat. Dit is ‘n onbetwisbare feit dat indien die blankes tydens die referendum geweet het dat die bedeling waarmee ons tans worstel gaan volg, baie min ten gunste van onderhandelinge sou gestem het. Die vraag is egter of daar ‘n ander keuse was? Hoe het dit gebeur dat Suid-Afrika met die magtigste weermag en polisiemag in Afrika sonder skoot of slag die mag aan die ANC/SAKP-alliansie oorhandig het? My persoonlike mening is dat ons noodwendig met die ANC/SAKP-alliansie sou moes onderhandel. Ofskoon die veiligheidsmagte die veiligheidsituasie onbepaald sou kon beheer, het ekonomiese sanksies en isolasie, veral op sportgebied, op daardie tydstip sy tol geëis. Ons sou waarskynlik in ‘n baie beter posisie gewees het om gedurende die tydsbestek van mnr. John Vorster te onderhandel, want die verhouding tussen die getal blankes, kleurlinge en Indiërs in verhouding met die swart bevolking was toe baie beter. Daar is egter geen wyse waarop enige politieke leier die blankes in daardie stadium sou oorreed het om tot onderhandelinge in te stem nie. Ek het die indruk gekry dat mnr. De Klerk in so ‘n mate deur die charisma van mnr. Mandela beïndruk is dat hy vas oortuig was dat hulle deur onderhandelinge ‘n regering van magsdeling tot stand sou bring waar hy en sy kollegas nog steeds ‘n deurslaggewende rol sou kan speel. In plaas daarvan om vooraf deeglik te beplan en alle moontlikhede noukeurig te oorweeg, het hy skynbaar op advies van ‘n klein groepie raadgewers hals-oor-kop besluit om die revolusionêre organisasies se onwettigverklaring op te hef, politieke gevangenes vry te laat en onderhandelinge aan te knoop. Hy het sodoende in ‘n drukgang beland wat hom en sy kollegas gedwing het om tot elke prys die onderhandelinge te laat slaag. Die ANC/SAKP-alliansie het dit besef en terdeë uitgebuit. Mnr. De Klerk het later erken dat hy hom terdeë met mnr. Mandela misgis het, maar het nooit erken dat die wyse waarop hy die onderhandelinge aangeknoop het, ‘n flater was nie. Ek was by geleentheid teenwoordig toe van mnr. De klerk se kollegas heftig uitgevaar het oor die onredelike toegewings wat die ANC/SAKP-alliansie verwag het. Op mnr. De Klerk se vraag of hulle wil breek het daar ‘n doodse stilte neergedaal toe die besef tot hulle deurgedring het dat daar nie vir so ‘n moontlikheid voorsiening gemaak is nie. Indien mnr. De Klerk alvorens hy op onderhandelinge besluit het, deur middel van die Staatsveiligheidsraad noukeurig beplan het hoe om dit aan te pak, sou baie van die 14


probleme waarmee ons tans worstel waarskynlik voorkom kon gewees het. Die groot getal blankes wat die land verlaat het, sou waarskynlik nog ‘n heenkome in die land gehad het. Ek het tydens die onderhandelinge by herhaling gewaarsku dat oudlede van die polisie na die verkiesing aan die pen gaan ry. Mnr. Kobie Coetsee en ook mnr. Fanie van der Merwe, wat saam met mnr. Mac Maharaj die Tussentydse Grondwet opgestel het, het net gelag en gesê ek sien spoke. Mnr. Fanie van der Merwe het opgemerk dat die ANC so besig sou wees om te probeer regeer dat daar nie tyd vir sulke twak sal wees nie. My vrese is inderdaad bewaarheid en oudlede van die polisie word sedert 1994 deur eensydige vervolgings en grootskaalse propaganda, wat hulle dade verdraai en buite verband aanhaal, getreiter. Eugene de Kock word as die staat se sluipmoordenaar uitgebeeld en veral RSG en die SABC doen klakkeloos mee. Al die voorvalle waarby Eugene de Kock betrokke was is volledig tydens die amnestieverhore geboekstaaf. Hy was aan kruisverhoor deur verskeie regspanne, wat senior advokate insluit, blootgestel. Daar is geen enkele geval geboekstaaf waar hy in opdrag van die regering opgetree het nie. “Staat” het ‘n wye betekenis en kan ook die bevelstruktuur van die polisie insluit. Daar het enkele gevalle voorgekom waar Eugene de Kock en sy eenheid in opdrag van hoër gesag lede van Umkhonto WeSizwe uitgewis het wat op die punt gestaan het om die land binne te kom om dood en verwoesting te saai. Ek het in die verlede by herhaling persone wat die aantygings maak gevra om feite te verstrek, maar niemand het dit nog ooit gedoen nie. Dit geld ook vir die ander gevalle waarby oudlede van die veiligheidstak betrokke was. In al die gevalle is bevind dat sodanige dade in die loop van en binne die omvang van hulle pligte en binne die omvang van hulle uitdruklike of versweë bevoegdheid geskied het en dat daar geen kwaadwilligheid, kwaadgesindheid of nydigheid gewees het nie en dat dit beslis ook nie in eie belang plaasgevind het nie. Die vraag is of daar vir die blanke ‘n toekoms in hierdie land is. Myns insiens gaan die wetsontwerp op grondhervorming wat pas gepubliseer is, ‘n bepalende rol in hierdie opsig speel. Ek het egter geen twyfel in my gemoed dat die twee slotreëls van “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” beslissend is: “Soos ons vadere vertrou het, leer ook ons vertrou, o Heer – Met ons land en met ons nasie sal dit wel wees, God regeer”

MNR AP STEMMET: GEWESE HOOF: KOMMUNIKASIE: SSVR: DINK OOK TERUG

TAK

STRATEGIESE

Nog ‘n hooggeplaaste amptenaar is mnr AP Stemmet, vir jare die Hoof van die Tak: Strategiese Kommunikasie en adjunk-sekretaris van die Sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad. Nongqai het hom ook genader omdat hy nog so baie het om te vertel. Ons dank aan “AP” dat hy so nou en dan “stories” uit die verlede met ons sal deel. Die nageslag het eintlik ‘n reg om te weet wat in die verlede gebeur het. Beste Hennie, jy ontstel my geweldig op hierdie Sondagmiddag. 15


Ontstel omdat Genl. Van der Merwe soos gewoonlik die spyker op sy kop slaan. (Sien berig hierbo.) Soos jy weet is ek 'n gelowige mens en kan ek nooit ver-regsgesind wees nie, maar ek vind dit deesdae moeilik om nog te glo in die laaste twee reëls van Die Stem. Ek stap juis die laaste week weer en dink aan die generaal se treffende toespraak verlede jaar na aanleiding van die Kerkstraatbom, Mei 1983. Dinge kon so anders in die RSA gewees het as mense nie persoonlike eer en selfs rokpante bo landsbelang gestel het nie. Die tyd is nog nie ryp dat ek skryf nie. Soos jy weet, het ek dit verlede jaar oorweeg maar toe vir jou en “Jy Weet Wie” geskryf het dat ek vir sy tweede boek wag en dan moontlik sal reageer. Ek hoop ek leef lank genoeg daarvoor. Miskien moes ek hom nie gewaarsku het nie. Ek wil graag vrae vra oor oa: 1) Hoekom is daar nie uit 'n posisie van mag onderhandel nie. Ons veiligheidsmagte was tog die sterkste in Afrika. Met hul hulp was die Nasionale Veiligheids bestuurstelsel 'n magtige wapen. Moes ons generaals nie sterker opgetree het om die swak politieke leiers tot besinning te bring nie???? Hulle moes besef het dat daar nie ander leiers was nie en dat die politieke leiers net hul eie toekoms en beursies in gedagte gehad het. 2) Hoekom is kinders gestuur om sonder leiding, grootmense se werk te doen? Ons onderhandelaars was pateties swak, naïef en wou toe al almal terwille wees. Hulle probeer dit selfs nou nog regverdig. 3) "Rapid Results" is deur onderhandelaars as belangriker as ons land se toekoms gestel. 4) Hoekom is kundige onderhandelaars wat opgelei was in Onderhandelingsvaardighede nie gebruik nie. Hulle was beskikbaar. 5) Hoekom is mense wat opgelei is in Toekomsstudies nie as adviseurs gebruik nie? By een van ons interdepartementele kursusse is selfs die scenario van 'n swart regering voorsien. 6) Hoekom is ons bewese vaardighede in Sielkundige Oorlogvoering ( ja, kom ons noem dit by sy naam!!) nie gebruik nie. Die ANC het dit met sukses teen ons gebruik en ons "onderhandelaars" ore aangesit. Cyril lag nou nog! 7) Hoekom is slegs een inligtinginstansie (intelligensie) gebruik? Hoekom is die TNV 2 vooraf nek omgedraai? So kan ek aangaan. AP Stemmet.

2

Die SSVR se Tak Nasionale Vertolking – HBH.

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PENSKETSE VAN ONS KOMMISSARISSE 1910 – 1928: Kol. Sir T.G. Truter, KBE, CMG Theodorus Gustaff Truter: Hy word allerweë as die grondlegger van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie beskou. Sy agtergrond:

• • • • •

• Het gedien as soldaat en later as offisier in die Second Regiment of Light Horse tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog. • Slaag laer die staatsdienseksamen in die regte en word later magistraat (landdros). • Is reeds in 1910 aangestel as die eerste hoofpolisiekommissaris van die Unie van Suid-Afrika. • Was lid van die krygsraad wat kmdt. Jozef Johannes (Jopie) Fourie op 19 Desember 1914 in Pretoria verhoor en laat teregstel het. Het 'n belangrike rol in die onderdrukking van sowel die Bulhoekopstand (1921) as die Randse staking van 1922 gespeel. Hy het ná aftrede, gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-45), as hoofbeheerbeampte van die administrasie van die Suid-Afrikaanse interneringskampe diens gedoen. Hy was 'n veelsydige sportman wat onder meer aan rugby, perdesport en roei deelgeneem het. Het ook belang gestel in die Padvinderbeweging en was president van die organisasie in Pretoria. Hy was lank president van die Pretoriase Landboutentoonstelling en ook lid van die Pretoriase Publisiteitsvereniging. Gedurende 1917 het hy die CMG. 3 ontvang, terwyl hy op 3 Junie 1924 tot KBE. 4 verhef is. Hy het die ererang van generaal-majoor geweier.

1928 – 1945: Kol. I.P. de Villiers, CB, MC, KPM

• Gedurende Desember 1927 word in The Nongqai aangekondig dat maj. I.P. de Villiers, L.L.B., M.C., die pos van adjunk-kommissaris van polisie aanvaar het. • Hy is een van Gill Kollege in Somerset-Oos se bekende alumni.5 Hy het homself as regsgeleerde bekwaam. • Verwerf as soldaat in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog die M.C.6. • Ná ‘n kort tydperk as adjunk-kommissaris van polisie word hy bevorder tot kommissaris met die rang van kolonel. • Hy het die mag met ‘n ysterhand regeer en was ‘n streng militaris. Gou het hy bynaam Mussolini7 gekry. Die Tweede Wêreldoorlog breek uit. ‘n Polisiebrigade word beskikbaar gestel aan die Unie Verdedigingsmag (UVM). Hy word toe as generaal-majoor aangestel en onderskei hom op die slagveld, veral by Bardia en Sollum. Hy

3

Die orde van St. Micheal en St. George - HBH “Knight Commander of the British Empire” - HBH 5 Potgieter, D.J. (red.) 1972. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa. Cape Town: Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery (Nasou). 6 Militêre Kruis 7 Benito Mussolini – die Italiaanse Fascistiese leier van daardie tyd. 4

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verwerf die onderskeiding C.B.8 Hy het verskeie ordes, dekorasies en medaljes ontvang waaronder die King’s Police Medal.

1940 – 1945: Brig. R.C.G. (George) Baston, KPM. (wrnde kommissaris) Dit sal ‘n erge versuim wees om die waarnemende kommissaris tussen 1940 en 1945, ons eerste polisiebrigadier, brig. G.R.C. (George) Baston9, uit ons “galery van kommissarisse” weg te laat. Gedurende die betrokke tydperk is kol. I.P. de Villiers, wat as kommissaris aangestel is, aan die Unie Verdedigingsmag (UVM) toegewys en het brig. Baston as kommissaris waargeneem. Naas die Eerste Wêreldoorlog en die 1914rebellie, was die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ook ‘n uiters moeilike tydperk in ons land se geskiedenis.

• Gebore in Skotland, kom hy na Suid Afrika en sluit in 1901 by die SA Constabulary aan en in 1906 is hy reeds ‘n hoofkonstabel.10 Gedurende 1913 is hy ‘n eersteklas-hoofkonstabel en gou volg sy aanstelling as sub-inspekteur.11 Hy vorder redelik vinnig deur die range en word ‘n hoofadjunkkommissaris. Gedurende 1941 neem hy die leisels by genl.maj. I.P. de Villiers oor en in September 1942 word hy aangestel in die nuwe polisierang van brigadier. Hy was dus die eerste persoon in die polisie wat die rang van brigadier gedra het. Tydens sy aftrede word ruiterlik erken dat hy bevel gevoer het in ‘n uiters moeilike tyd. Hy word met die “King’s Police Medal” vereer. Hy word bestempel as iemand wat totaal apolities was wat geen vooroordele teenoor mense gehad het nie.

1945 - 1951: Genl.maj. R.J. Palmer. CVO, KPM, DSO: •

Genl. Bobby Palmer was alombekend as die “smiling

cop”.12 Ná die oorlog het baie nuwe probleme op die polisie gewag. Die mag moes uitgebrei word en werwing moes gedoen word om die talle probleme die hoof te bied. Kommunisme het gedurende die oorlog uitgebrei en genl. Palmer het die veiligheidsafdeling uitgebrei om dié euwel te bekamp. • •

1911 en genl. Palmer is ‘n berede konstabel (trooper) in die “British South Africa Police” (Rhodesië.) Gedurende 1913 sluit hy by die “Orange River Colony Police” aan. Hy word polisieman in die SAP en toe die oorlog uitbreek, dros hy om by die Britse

8

SAP Magsorder 2/1945 par 2. In een boek word hy verkeerdelik “Kerneels” genoem – HBH. 10 Adjudantoffisier 11 Luitenant 12 Geskrif - lt.kol. Stompie du Pont. 9

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gevegsmagte aan te sluit. Ná sy tweede probeerslag (as droster) is hy in Engeland waar hy homself as vlieënier in die “Royal Flying Corps” (RFC) bekwaam. Hy is die eerste Suid-Afrikaanse polisieman om die onderskeiding te behaal en in opdrag van die kommissaris dra hy vleuels op sy uniform. In 1924 word hy as offisier aangestel en dien hy met onderskeiding in verskeie sleutelposte, onder andere as bevelvoerder van die kollege, bevelvoerder van die hondeskool en adjunk-kommissaris (afdelingskommissaris) van die Westelike Provinsie. Die oorlog breek uit en hy word aangestel as luitenant-kolonel in die UVM en dien as bevelvoerder van 'n polisie-eenheid. Tydens die oorlog onderskei hy homself weer veral op die slagveld en word hy brigadier in die UVM. Hy verwerf die “Distinguished Service Order” en twee balkies.

1951 – 1954: Genl.maj. J.A. (Jan-Kamas) Brink

• • •

• Gebore op 24 September 1894 in Griekwastad. • Hy sluit op 16 Februarie 1913 by die polisie aan. • Gedurende 1940 was hy ‘n majoor en as sulks die distrikskommandant van Kaapstad. • Op 1 Augustus 1951 word hy aangestel as kommissaris. • Hy het na die geestelike weerbaarheid van ons lede omgesien en was die eerste kommissaris om met ‘n kapelanediens te begin met die aanstelling van ds. Harpir Martins • Hy beywer hom om polisiemanne se salarisse en pensioene te verbeter. Hy het die polisie gemoderniseer en byvoorbeeld radiokommunikasie verbeter. Die polisie het voorkomingsmaatreëls tydens die Van Riebeeckfees in Kaapstad ingestel en die fees het glad verloop. 13 Hy tree af op 23 September 1954.

1954 – 1960: Genl.maj. C.I. Rademeyer • • • • • •

13 14

Gebore op Fouriesburg op 6 September 1903 Op 7 Mei 1925 sluit hy by die polisie aan. Op 8 November 1926 word hy aangestel as speurderkonstabel. Op 24 September 1954 word hy as kommissaris aangestel. Hy tree af op 31 Julie 1960. Hy is die eerste speurderkonstabel om kommissaris te word14.

Geskrif – lt. kol. Stompie du Pont. Onderhoud op 8 Februarie 2013 met me. M. Swanepoel, argivaris van die SAPD museum - HBH

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• Die moord op polisielede by Bergville asook die instel van bek-en-klouseer-kordonne is van die hoogtepunte in sy ses jaar as kommissaris. Polisielede, waaronder genl. Hennie de Witt, is aangewend om die epidemie die hoof te bied. • Die Sharpeville-voorval vind op 21 Maart 1960 plaas terwyl hy kommissaris is. Die ongelukkige voorval word sedertdien vir politieke doeleindes uitgebuit om as voorbeeld te dien van die sogenaamde wrede apartheidsdade. • Die eerste aanslag op die lewe van dr. Hendrik French Verwoerd vind ook tydens sy dienstermyn plaas.

1960 – 1962: Lt.genl. H.J. Du Plooy

• •

• • • •

15

• Hy sluit gedurende 1926 by die polisie aan. (Hy het in 1922 tydens die sogenaamde Rooi Opstand aan die Rand ‘n broer verloor.) • Du Plooy was aanvanklik verbonde aan die reken- en betaalmeester se kantoor, maar het die drang om speurder te word. • Gedurende 1929 word hy ‘n tweedeklas-speurdersersant en twee jaar later ‘n eersteklas- speurdersersant. Gedurende 1935 verwerf hy kommissierang en dien hy as distrik- en afdelingspeuroffisier by verskeie sentra in Suid-Afrika. Gedurende 1942 word hy die Transvaalse speurhoof. Soos reeds uitgewys, is dit ‘n moeilike tydperk, nog meer vir lede van die mag wat teen ander lede optree. Genl. Du Plooy verrig sy taak sonder enige politieke bybedoelings en keer in die proses verskeie Afrikanerlede aan vir misdade gepleeg tydens die oorlog. Hiervoor word hy met die KPM vereer. Gedurende die Britse koninklike besoek in 1947 is hy in bevel van die veiligheidsmaatreëls en hy word deur die koning vereer met die MVO.15 Gedurende 1945 word hy aangestel as hoof van die spesiale afdeling (voorloper van die veiligheidstak). Hy en ander lede besoek Scotland Yard en die Britse Geheimediens in 1948. Hy skakel met die Britse koningshuis. Alhoewel die Nasionale Party gedurende 1948 aan bewind kom, bly hy in sy pos. Gedurende 1950 word hy die stafoffisier van die speurhoof. Hy doen baie vir lede sodat hulle hulself akademies kan bekwaam. Hy verwerf bekendheid vir die Du Plooy-lesings vir bevordering. Teen alle verwagting (ook teen sy eie verwagting) word hy as kommissaris aangestel. Hy is die tweede speurder wat dié hoogste sport bereik. Met Republiekwording op 31 Mei 1961 is hy die kommissaris en teenwoordig tydens die inhuldiging van adv. C.R. Swart as eerste staatspresident.

Member of the Royal Victorian Order.

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1962 – 1968: Genl. Johannes Marthinus Keevy • Genl. Keevy is nog een van Gill Kollege se bekendste alumni.16 • Johannes Marthinus Keevy sluit gedurende 1929 by die polisie aan. • In 1934, vyf jaar ná aansluiting, verwerf hy die kommissierang. • Verwerf BA (Ekonomie). • Hy het baie gedoen om landsveiligheid te verseker. Tydens sy termyn het die Rivoniasaak en die inhegtenisneming van adv. Bram Fischer groot berusting gebring. • Was die laaste luitenant-generaal om kommissaris te word. • Op 23 September 1968 open genl. J.M. Keevy die nuwe polisiemuseum in Pretoria.17 • Oorlede op 72.

1968 – 1971: Genl. J. P. GOUS Johannes Petrus Gous is op 28 Junie 1909 op Calvinia gebore. • In 1931 verwerf hy sy BA-graad aan die Universiteit van Stellenbosch. • Hy sluit op 18 Februarie 1932 by die polisie aan. • Van 1932 tot 1935 werk hy as ‘n wetinstrukteur by die polisiekollege in Pretoria. • Op 1 Oktober 1946 word hy offisier. • Gedurende 1961 stel hy die nuwe leuse vir die polisie vas: Ons beskerm en ons dien (Servamus et Sarvamus) • Hy was die eerste kommissaris om welsynsbeamptes in die polisie aan te stel. • Hy het die stigting van Sanab goedgekeur. • Op 1 Oktober 1968 word hy as kommissaris aangestel. 18

16

Potgieter, D.J. (red.) 1972. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa. Cape Town: Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery (Nasou). 17 http://www.saps.gov.za/children/museum/museum_bibliography.htm 18 Onderhoud op 8 Februarie 2013 met me. M. Swanepoel, argivaris van die SAPD museum - HBH

21


1971 – 1973: Genl. G.J. Joubert • Ons negende kommissaris was genl. G.J. Joubert. Hy was ‘n speurder en het diep spore in die polisie getrap, veral op die gebied van opleiding, sport en kultuur. Hy was ‘n imposante figuur en ‘n goeie spreker. • As brigadier het hy saam met genl. H. J. van den Bergh die moord op dr. Verwoerd ondersoek. • Die vrouepolisie het gedurende 1972 tot stand gekom. • Joubert was die kommissaris toe die kerkgebou by die polisiekollege op 24 Julie 1973 in gebruik geneem is.19 • Hy was die derde speurder om kommissaris te word.

1973 – 1975: Genl. T.J. Crous • Gebore op Queenstown in 1915. • Sluit gedurende 1934 by die polisie aan. • Verwerf kommissierang op 12 September 1950. • Hy was afdelingskommissaris in Suidwes-Afrika voordat hy kommissaris geword het. • Op 28 Februarie 1975 neem hy namens die mag afskeid van ons eerste uniform- polisiekapelaan, genl.maj. (ds.) M.V D. Cloete. 20 • Verlaat die Mag met pensioen op 31 Mei 1978. 21

1975 – 1978: Genl. G.L. Prinsloo

• •

• Hy was ‘n skoolvriend van adv. B.J. Vorster. In hul jong dae het hulle saam loseer; ampshalwe moes genl. Prinsloo die bedrywighede van sy skoolvriend en medeloseerder aan hoofkantoor rapporteer.22 • Was ‘n voormalige hoof van die veiligheidstak en die eerste veiligheidshoof van die nuwe bedeling om as kommissaris aangestel te word. Sy aanstelling het ‘n nuwe patroon daargestel en ná hom, met die uitsondering van genl. Hennie de Witt, was alle kommissarisse van die polisie veiligheidsmanne. Die Soweto-onluste vind tydens sy dienstermyn plaas. Hy was ‘n hoogs intelligente, maar baie onpretensieuse offisier. Hy was vriendelik maar ietwat ingetoë. Sy bynaam was Klaasvakie omdat dit baie gelyk het of hy aan die slaap is. Hy het dit geweet en het eenmaal gesê: “Julle dink ek slaap! Maar ek is wawyd wakker!” Hy het ‘n landbouhoewe gehad en het as stokperdjie met skape geboer.

Geskrif – lt.kol. Stompie du Pont. Geskrif – lt.kol. Stompie du Pont. 21 Geskrif – lt. kol. Stompie du Pont. 22 Mededeling kol. John Wagenaar. 19 20

22


Die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (SAW) en Militêre Inligting het by geleentheid die polisie se veiligheidstak genooi vir voorligting. Ná die weermag se voorligting met kaarte en dies meer het hulle genl. Prinsloo gevra wat hy dink. Sy antwoord was: “Dis mooi en dis indrukwekkend. Ek wil egter nie weet waar die terroriste was nie, maar waar hulle is of sal wees!”

1978 – 1983: Genl. M.C.W. Geldenhuys •

Ten tye van die polisie se 100-jarige feesvierings beklee

genl. Mike Geldenhuys die ereposisie van doyen van die SuidAfrikaanse Polisie. Hy het diep spore in die polisie getrap en het in die uniform-, speur- en veiligheidsdiens asook in die Republikeinse Intelligensiediens (RI) gedien. Hy was ook die eerste nasionale hoof van RI in Johannesburg. Voor sy aanstelling as hoof van die veiligheidstak was hy die adjunkhoof van die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid. •

As die seun van ‘n plaaskneg sluit hy by die polisie aan en eindig sy suksesvolle loopbaan met verskeie medaljes en dekorasies. Nadat hy uitpasseer het as voetman, word hy speurder in Soweto. Later word hy speurder in Johannesburg en ondersoek hy selfs ‘n saak in Engeland. Weens die feit dat daar geen speurdersposte beskikbaar was nie, sluit hy weer by die uniformtak aan en word

hy

‘n

eersteklas-sersant

in

Johannesburg.

Hy

word

hierna

stasiebevelvoerder op Utrecht en later hoofkonstabel op Newcastle. Na ‘n jaar slaag hy na kommissierang en word hy in Durban gestasioneer. Gou word hy aangestel as die stafoffisier van afdelingsinspekteur kol. Johan Verster. Omdat hy so goeie offisier is, word hy as kaptein en distrikskommandant op Keetmanshoop aangestel. •

Die binnelandse stryd teen die staat en die regering het in felheid toegeneem en genl. Keevy het besluit om die veiligheidstak uit te brei. Lt.kol. H.J. van den Bergh is aangestel as veiligheidshoof. Dit is juis sy destydse hoof in Durban, lt.genl. Verster, wat kapt. Mike Geldenhuys by lt.kol. Van den Bergh aanbeveel het. Hy word aangestel as veiligheidsbevelvoerder van die Oos-Kaap.

Nadat hy ‘n sukses van die taak gemaak het, word hy in Johannesburg aangestel as die hoof van die nuutgestigte Republikeinse Intelligensiediens. Later word hy adjunkhoof van die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid. Weereens word hy 23


geïdentifiseer as hoof van veiligheid en word hy in opdrag van adv. B.J. Vorster na die polisie terug verplaas. Ná diens in die veiligheidstak word hy kommissaris. •

Hy word allerweë as ‘n goeie offisier beskou en het in spanverband verskeie suksesvolle misdade opgelos, spioene aangekeer en terroriste gestuit. ‘n Boek het oor hierdie briljante offisier verskyn.

1983 – 1987: Genl. P.J. Coetzee • Genl. Johann Coetzee is op 3 Maart 1928 in Smithfield in die Vrystaat gebore. Sy moeder was 'n vrou van Duitse afkoms wat in die dorpie Konstanz gebore is. Sy het musiektalent gehad en op 'n plaas naby Molteno in die Oos-Kaap skoolgehou en musieklesse onderrig. Sy het ook die generaal tuis onderrig totdat hy in std. 1 (gr. 3) amptelik skool toe is. Dit is sonder twyfel deur haar invloed dat die generaal sy liefde vir boeke en die filosofie ontwikkel het. •

Genl. Johann Coetzee het gedurende 1947 by die polisie aangesluit.

Hy is later oorgeplaas na die speurtak waarna hy een van die nuwe geslag veiligheidsmanne geword het. Was die hanteerder van die bekende spioen Gerard Ludi. Later het hy die plaaslike hoof van die Republikeinse Intelligensiediens in Durban geword. Daarna die veiligheidshoof in Johannesburg. Hier word hy die hanteerder van die bekende spioen, maj. Craig Williamson. Op akademiese gebied het hy ‘n meestersgraad.

• • • •

1987 – 1990: Genl. H.G. de Witt • Ná sy opleiding in die polisiekollege was hy in Pietermaritzburg gestasioneer. Hier was hy en kollega Attie Coetzee goeie polisierugbysplers en het hulle as die tweeling bekend gestaan. • Soos in die geval van genl. Keevy, is genl. Hennie de Witt afkomstig uit die geledere van die kwartiermeester waar hy

24


as kwartiermeester diens gedoen het. Hy was ook aan die inspektoraat verbonde. •

Vanweë die hoë veiligheidseise wat aan die pos van kommissaris gestel word, is genl. Johann Coetzee, wat sy junior was, as kommissaris aangestel. Ná die aftrede van genl. Coetzee word genl. De Witt as kommissaris aangestel.

Hy was nie alleen ‘n baie goeie rugbyspeler nie, maar was ook gewild en geliefd onder die polisiebeamptes. Hy was ook ‘n goeie sanger wanneer die geleentheid opgeduik het! As sersant het hy diens gedoen in Namakwaland, ‘n streek waarvoor hy baie lief was.

Het ook afgedeelde diens op die bek-en-klouseer-kordonne gedoen.

Was ook ‘n afdelingskommissaris in Port Natal.

Genl. De Witt sal onthou word as die vader van Weesgerus, die Weduwee- en Weesfonds se vakansie-oord by Nylstroom (nou Modimolle) in Limpopo. Die geskiedenis van die oord is by genl. De Witt self bekom23. Genl. De Witt-hulle het met die destydse stadsklerk van Nylstroom gaan gesels oor die moontlikheid van grond vir ‘n nuwe hondeskool, toe die idee

van

‘n

vakansieoord vir polisiebeamptes geopper is.

1990 – 1994: Genl. J.V. van der Merwe • Genl. Johan Velde van der Merwe sluit as ‘n sestienjarige seun by die mag aan. Hy is by die beredepolisie ingedeel. Hy was aanvanklik ‘n lid van die uniformtak en gedurende 1964 word hy as offisier na die veiligheidstak oorgeplaas. • Hy het gou ‘n kundige op grensbeheer geword. • Deur harde werk het hy deur al die range gegaan en het sy matriek asook 'n B.Juris-graad verwerf. • Nadat hy as die afdelingsbevelvoerder in die Vrystaat aangestel is, het hy die verantwoordelikheid as afdelingsbevelvoerder in Suidwes-Afrika aanvaar. Dit was ‘n veeleisende en uitdagende pos waar hy met groot onderskeiding gedien het.

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Hennie Heymans was bevoorreg om teenwoordig te wees met die 10de verjaarsdag van die “Hennie de Witt – Weesgerusoord” en het self met genl. De Witt oor die ontstaansgeskiedenis gepraat.

25


Hy het gevorder tot veiligheidshoof en later die hoof uitvoerende adjunkkommissaris. Hy was die eerste suiwer uniformtaklid om hoof van veiligheid te word.

Generaal Johan van der Merwe was tydens sy diensloopbaan nooit ‘n dag afwesig wees siekte nie. [Dis voorwaar ‘n rekord! Is daar nog sulke lede waarvan u weet?]

As laaste kommissaris van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie, het die meeste laste van die verlede op sy skouers geval. Ná die dood van genl. Johann Coetzee en genl. Hennie de Witt, moes hy en genl. Geldenhuys die belange van oudlede wat in die spervuur van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie gekom het, beskerm. Die twee generaals het die Liefdadigheidstrust vir Oud-polisielede gestig om oudlede in nood geestelik, moreel en finansieel, te ondersteun.

Bostaande is ons poging oor ons kommissarisse wat sover geboekstaaf is. Indien u oor enige kommissaris ‘n bydrae wil maak, is u welkom en ons sal dit onder u naam byvoeg. Ek het nog ‘n klomp ander inligting in ou Nongqai’s gekry wat ek later sal byvoeg. Ons het sover geen inligting oor genl. George Fivaz nie. Indien u elke kommissaris se “geskiedenisverslag” deurlees sal u sien dat die Voorsienigheid altyd die “regte man op die regte tyd” as kommissaris aangestel het. Genl. Mike Geldenhuys Genl. Mike Geldenhuys het 92 jaar oud geword op 7 April. Ek het hom geskakel waar hy nou te Nigel woon en geluk gewens. Hy het my naam en my boodskap neergeskryf. Hy vertel hy sit met potlood en papier by die foon en noteer sorgvuldig elke gelukwensing. Hier en daar het hy laat val wie almal gebel het. Op versoek van genl. Geldenhuys het ek en Hanlie van Straaten ‘n boek oor sy lewe saamgestel. My opinie van genl. Geldenhuys is dat hy ‘n besonder goeie en knap polisieman was – iemand wat nie bang vir werk was nie! Baie keer as ek diensoffisier was sou hy bel om meer besonderhede te bekom oor TV-nuusuitsendings. In baie gevalle het ek die inligting ter hand gehad. Een geval wat ek besonder goed onthou is toe iets in Wes-Kaap gebeur het en toe die kommissaris skakel verwittig ek hom ek “het reeds die Kaap gevra” en wag vir hulle antwoord. Toe was sy reaksie: “Daardie man moet spring, ek skop nou-nou sy gat!” Erk het nog enkele anekdote oor genl. Geldenhuys wat ek later sal plaas. Genl. Hennie de Witt Genl. Hennie de Witt is ‘n ou Nataller maar hy is op Karos gebore. Sy gade, Mollie, was die dogter van ‘n polisieman wat te Ladysmith, Natal, gestasie was. Toe ek te Pietermaritzburg gestasie was, was ons kantore te Loopstraat. In die “ou” dae was die kaserne ook in Loopstraat in dieselfde gebou as polisiestasie. Bokant die 26


vensters was sinkplaatskerms om die son te keer. Een het ‘n duik in en die manne vertel Hennie de Witt het daar uitgespring en die duik gemaak. Oor ‘n drankie het genl. De Witt gesê dis nie hy nie, maar sy vriend Attie Coetzee. My Oupa Malan, in lewe van Cedarville, het twee neefs gehad; ‘n Webb-tweeling, wat berede polisiemanne te Alexandraweg was. Hulle was bekende “perde-manne” en die een het bv. die jaarlikse polisiebal met sy wit polisieperd geopen. Ek het genl. De Witt gevra of hy hulle geken het. Sy antwoord was bevestigend en hy het geantwoord: “Ja, die een het later by die mark gewerk en vir my gesê dat ek nog die kommissaris van polisie gaan word!” Gedurende die 1980’s het ek op die Gesamentlike Veiligheidstaf gedien as lid van die SSVR. Die land was aan die brand en die UDF het die pot geroer. Ek was beïndruk met genl. De Witt se verskeie TV programme. Hy het werklik vertroue ingeboesem. Hy het die publiek gerusgestel – amper soos pres. Ronald Reagan van die VSA. Genl. Johann Coetzee Genl. Johann Coetzee en ek se paaie het in Durban gekruis. Hy was ‘n jong kaptein by “Pretoria Agencies” in Durban. Ons as gewone stasiepolisiemanne het die “snaakse ouens” opgemerk wat saans tydig en ontydig by hul kantore was. Laat in die nag. ‘n Senior konstabel op die stasie het plegtig verklaar: “Dis privaat speurders”. Maar so, a.g.v. polisie-rompslomp, loop ek Johann Coetzee by die polisiemotorhawe raak. Hulle het ongewone polisievoertuie gery en hy is toe enigste persoon wat toe met die SAP Motorhawe te Wentworth geskakel het. So het ons mekaar altyd by die Brightonstrand swembad raakgeloop en sy twee kindertjies was klein. Hy het in Merle Court, Marinerylaan, gewoon. As jong polisieman het ek gou twee en twee bymekaar gesit en so nog ‘n lid, ene “Duifie” van der Heever (later ‘n brigadier en afdelingspeurhoof) ontmoet. My vriend was die apteker, Duifie se gade het in die apteek gewerk en so het ek gehoor van die “snaakse geheime polisie” wat saans op dakke rondloop en gevaarlike werk doen. Eendag woon ek ‘n klagte by te Welfrereweg en die klaer is net te “slim vir woorde” – weet alles van polisiewerk! Toe is hy ook een! Later het ek mnr Basie Smit wat toe in Higgnettweg gewoon het, se diaken geword. Ek het nooit geweet dat hy ook ‘n lid van Republikeinse Intelligensiediens in Durban was nie. Eers later het hy ons DSO in Durban-Suid geword. Hy het my vertel dat hy op daardie stadium die jongste DSO in die land was. Een middag by die swembad sê Johann Coetzee vir my: “O, ek het jou by die hof gesien vandag!” Ek antwoord toe dat ek hom nie daar gesien nie. “Ek was daai pilaar wat daar gestaan het!” Dit het my as jong polisieman vreeslik beïndruk. Toe Johann Coetzee ‘n brigadier was, was ek en hy saam op ‘n projek betreffende Mosambiek se geheime polisie, SNASP. Ek het baie in sy geselskap verkeer. Veral na-ure. Hy het altyd vir my ingeroep en gesê: “Ou kappie jy moet vir ons ‘n mooi keurige verslag opstel vir die kommissaris en die minister.” Dit was die gevreesde kommissaris/minister memo’s wat op blou papier opgestel is vir kennisname, kommentaar en goedkeuring van die sy edele die minister. 27


So swets ou brigadier Duveen Botha eendag. Ek vra: “En nou brigadier, waarom so omgekrap?” Toe wys sy my ‘n stapel kompol/minister-memo’s wat teruggestuur is van kompol se kantoor. Sy was ‘n skoolhoof en selfs sy het gesukkel dat die verdomde blou papiere gladweg kon deurgaan na bowe! Nadat Craig Williamson in Genève ontbloot is, is brig. Coetzee daarheen. Ek het brig Coetzee by die lughawe gaan haal na sy terugkoms uit Switserland. Hy het my vertel hoe hy en Craig “ontsnap” het. Hy het Switserland per trein, in die derde klas verlaat. Hy vertel dat geen polisie of teen-spioenasie hom daar sou soek nie. Hy het per Duitse paspoort gereis, hy het my vertel sy moeder was van Duitse afkom en hy het ook vir ‘n Duitse paspoort gekwalifiseer. Die manne by intelligensie – die sogenaamde RS-manne – het na Johann Coetzee in korrespondensie verwys as “Coco”. Dit is afgelei van Colonel Coetzee. Later in my loopbaan het ek die bekende / berugte joernalis John Martin Horak hanteer. Hy en genl. Coetzee was “persoonlike” vriende. Toe ek die veiligheidshoof uitvra oor sy vriendskap met Horak, het die generaal geantwoord dat Horak en mev Coetzee eintlik vriende is. Nie te min, toe ek Horak en ander agente oorgeneem het, het ek hulle leggers getrek en alhoewel Horak ‘n “geheime” polisievoertuig tot sy beskikking gehad het, het hy nie oor ‘n bestuurderslisensie beskik nie. Toe ek die feit bevraagteken was sy reaksie: “Maar Johann het gesê ek kan so voortgaan.” Ek het sy draadjie net daar geknip en hom saam met AO Botha na die toetsgronde gestuur om ‘n lisensie te bekom. Horak, genl. Coetzee en ek het baie aande gaan uit-eet en werk gepraat. (Horak het bedags voltyds by ‘n koerant gewerk.) Ons kollega Horak, nou oorlede, het by die ANC aangesluit en dit is iets wat hy tot sy voordeel benut het. Baie polisiemanne se name is in die naamlyste, wat in die twee of drie boeke oor die Afrikaner Broederbond verskyn het, vervat. Genl. Coetzee se naam kom nie in die boeke voor nie. Inligting wil dit hê dat John Horak gereël het dat die generaal se naam nie geplaas word nie.

28


1982: NOG ‘N KOMMISSARIS: LT.GENL. JH VISAGIE, SDE, SMO.

Lt.-genl. JH Visagie en die hele spoorwegpolisie is na die SA Polisie oorgeplaas. In die SA Polisie was hy die hoofadjunkkommissaris van die Tak: Vervoerpolisiëring. Indien ek reg onthou het persoonlik nooit na Wachthuis verskuif nie, maar in Johannesburg agter gebly.

29


30


ONTSTAAN VAN EN TRANSFORMASIE VAN POLISIEMAGTE – EERS NET DIE MANNE EN TOE LATER DIE VROUE: BRIG. FANIE BOUWER [Sien: Nongqai Vol 7 No 11Mk2 :P 40 – 41] Die Kaap van Goeie Hoop So was hier in die Kaap ook allerhande polisiemagte/strukture soos ratelwagte en burgerlike dienste beskermings-eenhede in die 1700’s en 1800’s onder bevel van wykmeesters en veldkornette. Daar is van polisiebeamptes verwag om enige probleme waarmee hulle gekonfronteer is te kon hanteer en dat hulle nie net bloot die wet moes toepas nie. Die wykmeesterstelsel kan as die eerste stap tot desentralisasie van polisiedienste beskou word, Hoewel die wykmeester se pligte wat hoofsaaklik tot die voorkoming van brande beperk was, moes hy ook eiendomsmisdade voorkom. Verder moes hy aan die fiskaal (seker die eerste tipe DK) verslag doen oor gevaarlike persone en vermeende misdadigers in sy wyk, werkloses opspoor en toesien dat sy wyk ordelik en netjies voorkom. Die ratelwagte, burgerwagte en wykmeesters het na die Britse besetting van die Kaap in 1806 steeds voortbestaan. Verder tot wat brig. Bouwer hierbo geskryf het, wil ek die volgende tot die ontwikkelingsgeskiedenis van die polisie aan die Kaap byvoeg. Ongelukkig het ek (HBH) die stuk in Engels opgestel:

DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE IN THE CAPE COLONY 1786 This sudden increase in numbers necessitated a strengthening of the town’s poor policing arrangements. Up to this date the Fiscal had three sergeants of police in his employ, the first known as d’onder schout, the 'under-bailiff' and the others as geweldiges or forcers. He had also ten constables, and nineteen under-constables, the latter Kxffirs or men picked from among the prisoners on Robben Island. The native police were supposed to keep order among the slaves. At first, they were armed with swords but so many prisoners narrowly escaped with their lives that the authorities provided staves in their place. An executioner and assistant, both paid by the Company' lodged in the Slave House. [Laidler, PW: A TAVEREN OF THE OCEAN, Cape Town – no date, p 10524.] 1790: First mention of Police "Police" are first mentioned in 1790; but some time elapsed before the system was in working order. The enforcement of municipal regulations was then better catered for.

24

According to http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/207077 the book was published in 1952 – HBH.

31


1792: Wijkmeester In 1792, the Commissioner-General divided the town into twenty-three wards, and for each ward two respectable burghers were appointed to act as ward-masters. Various writers refer to them indiscriminately as police or [106] aldermen; but their duties included the enforcing of cleanliness in the streets and in public places, maintaining order and giving directions at fires. Each man so appointed was, required to have a board with his rank "Wijkmeester" painted on it affixed to his house. A dark-coloured great-coat was the uniform worn during hours of watch. Before going on duty, the ward-masters were inspected, armed, and given rattles and lighted lanterns, which they carried concealed beneath their coats. Each was in his ward by ten o’clock, and paraded backwards and forwards during the night, springing his rattle and making an outcry in case of need. AII watchmen were exempted from burgher taxes and received a salary of twenty-five rix-dollars a month. [Laidler, PW: A TAVEREN OF THE OCEAN, Cape Town – no date, p106 – 107. 25] 1812: Police Ruiters, Fieldcornets & Fieldcorporals

Source: The African Court Calender, Government Printing Office, Cape Town, 1812.

25

According to http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/207077 the book was published in 1952 – HBH.

32


I could also find two “police riders�.Source: The African Court Calender, Government Printing Office, Cape Town, 1813 1870: Police Dress In 1870, even the police wore top-hats and tailcoats, and the night-rider patrolled the streets in a long black riding-coat fastened at the waist from which hung a huge cavalry 33


sabre, while from his saddle hung two pistol holsters. [Laidler, PW: A TAVEREN OF THE OCEAN, Cape Town – no date, p 18126.] Bibliography:

RORKE'S DRIFT MEDAL Rorke's Drift Medal awarded to the servant of a VC-winning officer who was immortalised in the film Zulu sells for £132,000 •

Charles Robson was one of the people who helped defend Rorke's Drift in 1879 • He was the personal servant to Victoria Cross hero, Lieutenant John Chard • Mr Robson was awarded a Zulu War medal which was now sold for £132,000 By Abe Hawken for Mailonline Published: 15:39 GMT, 2 March 2017 | Updated: 16:24 GMT, 2 March 2017 26

According to http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/207077 the book was published in 1952 – HBH.

34


Charles Robson (pictured) was awarded the Zulu War medal which has now been bought for £132,000 A medal awarded to one of the defenders of Rorke's Drift, which was immortalised in the film Zulu, today sold for a record £132,000. Driver Charles Robson was the personal servant to Victoria Cross hero Lieutenant John Chard, who was played by Stanley Baker in the classic 1964 movie. The pair were part of the 140-strong British garrison which successfully defended the Rorke's Drift mission station in 1879. Lt Chard was the commanding officer and organised the epic defence which saw them defy all odds to see off the 4,000 marauding Zulu warriors. For 12 hours the British repelled the spear-carrying tribesmen with accurate shooting and brutal hand-to-hand combat. The Zulus eventually retreated with 350 of their number killed compared to 17 British. Lt Chard was awarded the Victoria Cross - the highest award for valour in the face of the enemy - as was Lt Gonville Bromhead, who was played by Michael Caine in the film. Robson received the Zulu War medal which today sold for a hammer price of £110,000. With fees added on the overall price paid by the private telephone bidder was £132,000. The staggering sum is a record for a non-VC Rorke's Drift medal. It easily beat the existing record of £84,000 paid for the Zulu War Medal of private Michael Minehan last December.

35


A spokesman for London auctioneers, Dix Noonan Webb, said: 'The extra price reflects the fact that the defence of Rorke's Drift is still regarded as one of the most heroic episodes in British Military History.

Mr Robson was awarded a Zulu war medal (pictured) and it has now sold for a staggering ÂŁ132,000 Lieutenant John Chard was played by Stanley Baker (pictured, left next to Michael Caine) in the classic 1964 movie, Zulu 'Medal collectors tend to like a great story behind their medals and stories don't get much better than Rorke's Drift. It remains one of the most epic actions in military history.' Robson, from Tooting, south London, joined the Royal Engineers aged 18 in 1873 and was detailed to be Lt Chard's batman and groom three years later. The pair was transported to South Africa at the start of the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879. When they arrived, the duo were ordered to go to Rorke's Drift along with four Royal Engineers and repair a pontoon bridge.

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Mr Robson received the medal (left) after he was part of the 140-strong British garrison which successfully defended the Rorke's Drift mission station in 1879 which was portrayed in Zulu (right) After completing the task the four servicemen were ordered back to the main British camp at Isandhlwana. Hours later the camp was attacked by the Zulus resulting in the slaughter of 1,350 men, a huge disaster for the British army. Several riders who escaped rode on horseback to Rorke's Drift 10 miles away to inform the men the Zulus were coming. Seventy-five minutes later 4,000 warriors appeared over the hills and attacked the mission station. Robson helped build the defensive walls before taking up a position from where he had a clear field of fire to where his master's wagon was parked. RORKE'S DRIFT: BATTLE CONSIDERED ONE OF BRITAIN'S GREATEST VICTORIES WAS PART OF A WIDER BLOODY CONFLICT THAT COST 8,000 LIVES

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The name of Rorke's Drift led to the much-loved film starring Stanley Baker (left) who played Lieutenant John Chard It was on January 22 1879, on the Natal border with Zululand, in South Africa, that the tiny British garrison of 140 men - many of them sick and wounded - fought for at least 12 hours to repel repeated attacks by up to 4,000 Zulu warriors. The defence was rewarded by Queen Victoria's government with no fewer than 11 Victoria Crosses. The name of Rorke's Drift led to the much-loved film starring Stanley Baker and Michael Caine. The movie, which is still celebrated more than 50 years after it was made, saw Baker play Lieutenant John Chard, while Caine played his right-hand man, Lieutenant Goville Bromhead. After fighting day and night the Zulus eventually retreated after 351 of the men died and 500 were wounded. It was part of the wider Anglo - Zulu war took place during 1879. The conflict began because the Zulu kingdom presented an obstacle to British imperial ambitions in southern Africa. The British invasion of Zululand began on January 11 1879, with the British objective being an eventual federation in Africa. The battle of Isandhlwana erupted on the 22nd of January 1879, 11 days after the British started their invasion. 20,000 Zulu warriors attacked 1,800 British, colonial and native troops and 400 civilians. The Zulus, who had more numbers, overwhelmed the British, killing over 1,300 troops, while around 1,000 Zulu soldiers were killed. The battle of Rorke's Drift started almost immediately after, ending on the 23rd. The Battle of Ulundi on the 4th of July 1879 effectively ended the Zulu-Anglo war, with the defeat of the Zulu forces by the British when over 5,200 British and African soldiers razed the capital of Zululand after defeating the main Zulu army. The war ultimately ended with a British victory, and Zulu independence. As the battle developed Lt Chard made a note of where Robson was placed. He wrote: '...the Zulus were wrecking the camp and my wagon in spite of the efforts of my batman, Driver Robson, who had directed his particular attention to keeping the Zulus off this wagon in which were, as he described it, our things.' 38


Lt Chard and Robson returned home to Britain nine months later to a hero's welcome. They took in an unofficial tour of the country and had an audience with Queen Victoria at Balmoral. Robson left the army in 1894 and died in London in 1933 aged 78. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4275470/Rorke-s-Drift-medal-sells-132000.html (Retrieved 2 March 2017.)

1904: SENEKAL POLISIESTASIE: via DES ROOS

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THE BRITISH NO 106 INSTANTANEOUS, DIRECT ACTION, PERCUSSION FUSE, SIMPLE BUT RELIABLE: RICHARD HENRY Artillery, king of the battle field King Louis XIV of France had the motto Ultima Ratio Regum (the final argument of kings) engraved on all French guns. Napoleon Bonaparte had very high regard for his artillery. Brig-General LA Marshall stated “Artillerymen have a love for their guns which is perhaps stronger then the feeling of any soldier for any other weapon or equipment”. We should however recognise that the gun in its self seldom hurt anyone – apart from riding over ones foot! No, the damage and destruction is caused by the projectile or shell and a most important aspect of this is the FUSE. Artillery fire and the machine-gun are recognised as the decisive weapons of the First World War 1914-1918. More than 850 million shells were fired by all combatants during the ‘war to end all wars’. At the start of the war most shells were Shrapnel and High Explosive (HE) but as the war progressed, Smoke, Gas and Anti-Tank were are used for the changing 41


circumstances. Each of these required a fuse to ensure the shell exploded at the right time.

Introduction to fuses Fuses have fine precision mechanisms and are often made in brass or aluminium to prevent rusting. The interior of a fuse shows the human genius. This inoffensive device with its mechanical mechanism and fine tolerance machining, is the mastermind behind the explosive effect. It triggers the initial detonation of a small charge at precisely the right time, while in flight (time fuse) or on impact (percussion fuse). Engineers made multiple modifications to the fuses of the First World War in order to make them more effective or reliable. British fuses from the end of the 19th century were numbered from1-19 for percussion fuses, from 22-50 for time fuses and 51 and above for time and percussion fuses. This system worked well until 1913 when someone gave the new direct action (percussion fuse) the â„– 44 designation. Thereafter the exception became a common practice.

British First World war fuses At the start of the First World War, the British realised that they needed a more sophisticated fuse than the â„– 44 fuse. The â„– 100 Graze Percussion Fuse was designed and went into production in just ten days. The first one was available by the beginning of 1915, proof that necessity is the mother of invention. Naturally it was not perfect, but it remained in British service from 1915 -1917. Improvements were made 42


and incorporated in to the № 101 and further safety features were incorporated into the №s 102,103 108 and 109. The above series of graze percussion fuses often failed to detonate in the soft mud on the Western Front. The mud absorbed the impact of the shell and the deceleration was not fast enough to trigger the firing mechanism. The № 44 direct action fuses also failed to detonate as the ground was not hard enough to deform the dome head and depress the firing pin onto the detonator.

That darn barbed wire Barbed wire was used during the First World War to defend trenches, slow down attacking troops and channel the enemy into a pre-determined killing zone. A million miles of wire was laid on the Western Front. The combination of barbed wire and the machine –gun was deadly. The destruction of the barbed wire entanglements was thus of utmost importance to the infantry just before an attack on the enemy trenches. The gunners were convinced that they could blow the barbed wire apart with shell fire. After numerous unsuccessful attacks where the wire was supposed to be cut, the authorities concluded that both №s 44 and №100 fuses on the 18 Pr shells had failed to destroy the vast belts of barbed wire set up in front of the trenches. The artillery then tried using shrapnel shell which emitted over 200 lead balls from the shell on detonation. Surely this would cut that darn wire. The fault lay in the fact that shells with №s 44 and №100 fuses were not sensitive or fast enough to detonate on striking the barbed wire. The shells penetrated the ground first and then exploded, blowing up a shower of earth but not cutting the wire. № 106 instantaneous, direct action percussion fuse to the rescue A new very sensitive, instantaneous, direct action percussion fuse was developed and known as the № 106. It was tested during the Battle of the Somme (mid 1916) and approved for use by the British artillery batteries in early 1917. This fuse detonated on impact and cut the wire. The infantry was happy! The inner workings of the № 106 fuse The fuse was screwed into the neck of a British Quick Firing 18 Pr Field Gun shell. It could also be used with the below listed guns. The fuse could be placed on a High Explosive (HE) Shrapnel, Gas or Smoke shell. The gunner removed the protective steel or brass screw cap to expose the direct action striker mechanism and a protective copper tape. The striker, a steel hammer, covered by an aluminium head, was attached to a steel spindle, which acted as a percussion pin on the detonator below it. The softer aluminium cap absorbed forces of a glancing blow and prevented the spindle from bending or breaking. The copper tape prevented the steel hammer from moving downwards onto the detonator.

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On firing the shell, the driving band would engage with the rifling in the barrel and impart a spin to the shell. This spinning (centrifugal force) unwound and released the copper tape. During British artillery barrages in support of the infantry, soldiers advancing towards the German trenches were often aware of copper tape falling from the sky as the shells flew overhead. To prevent the air resistance from moving the hammer back onto the detonator, a fine copper shearing wire was employed. On impact, this wire was easily sheared, and the resulting instantaneous detonation set off a quantity of loose explosives which exploded into the magazine of the fuse base. The fuse magazine filed with explosives sent a flame into the main explosive in the body of the shell. From January 1918, an improved â„– 106 E fuse with a safety centrifugal shutter which was only opened when the projectile was spinning between 1300 and 1700 revolutions per minute was introduced. This safety shutter prevented the flame from the detonation going down the fire chamber and into the body of the shell until precisely the right time.

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An example from the Ammunition Collection The Museum’s example is a steel № 106 Mark III fuse. It was made by P.B.O (Platt Brothers of Oldham) of Hartford Works, Wernerth, Oldham, Lancashire, England, in November 1918, too late to be used in the First World War.

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The Platt family started as blacksmiths in 1770. By 1821 Henry Platt had established himself in Oldham as a manufacturer of cotton spinning machinery. By 1879 the Platt Brothers were the largest maker of cotton- processing machinery in the world. At the end of the 19th century, Platt Brothers were the largest engineering company in the world employing 15 000 people in a factory of size 340 000 m2. During the First Wold War, Platt Brothers, who had extensive knowledge and expertise in casting, forging and machining, made both № 36 (Mills Bombs) hand grenades and № 106 fuses and other munitions. From the beginning of 1917 the № 106 fuse had become the main fuse of the British and British Commonwealth armies and millions were manufactured for all types of shells fired from the following British guns. Quick Firing 18 Pr Field Guns Breech Loading 3,7 inch Howitzer Breech Loading 60 Pr Field Guns Breech Loading 6 inch Field Guns Quick Firing 4.5 inch Howitzer Breech Loading 6 inch Howitzer Breech Loading 8inch Howitzer Breech Loading 12 inch Howitzer Breech Loading 15 inch Howitzer. Although millions of these fuses were made, most were blown apart when the shell exploded. Stocks of this Mk III fuse as well as the later № 106 E were used in the Second World War 1939-1945. The South African industry manufactured 1 675 662 № 106 E fuses during WW2 with the South African Mint making the lion’s share of them. Naturally, of the millions of № 106 fuses made and fired, some failed to explode. Some lie as potentially dangerous duds (or to use the correct term ‘blinds’) on the battlefields today, often to be uncovered by the farmer’s tractor and blown up by the local authorities. [13/02/2017].

WORLD WAR ONE: VC MEDAL Medals of Somme VC Hero who led Group of 30 Men who kept the enemy at bay for two days Sell For £288,000 • • •

The medal was bought by the millionaire Conservative Peer Lord Ashcroft It will now go on public display with the rest of Lord Ashcroft's collection Sanders received the VC on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916

By Daily Mail Reporter Published: 23:14 GMT, 2 March 2017 | Updated: 23:14 GMT, 2 March 2017

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The Victoria Cross won by a hero of the Somme who led his men in a gallant defence after they were accidentally left behind enemy lines has today sold for ÂŁ288,000. The prestigious gallantry award and other medals of Corporal George Sanders were bought by the millionaire Conservative peer Lord Ashcroft, who owns the world's largest collection of VCs. Cpl Sanders' medal will now go on public display with the rest of Lord Ashcroft's collection at the Imperial War Museum.

The Victoria Cross, left, won by hero of the Somme Corporal George Sanders, pictured right, has sold for ÂŁ288,000 The brave corporal was one of nine British servicemen to receive the VC on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Although his unit had achieved their objective of occupying German positions, the slaughter of nearly 20,000 Allied soldiers led to orders to retreat. But the group didn't get the message and instead held their ground. With all the officers and NCOs killed, it fell on Cpl Sanders to take charge, rousing the men and organising their defence. He and a band of 30 comrades repelled repeated German attacks over two days with little ammunition and no food or water. Not only did the men stand firm but they also managed to rescue some British soldiers who had been captured by the Germans. The 19-strong group were later relieved and Cpl Sanders was recommended for the highest award for gallantry.

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The prestigious gallantry award and other medals of Corporal George Sanders were bought by the millionaire Conservative peer Lord Ashcroft He was sent back to England in November and received a hero's welcome in his home city of Leeds before being presented with the prestigious decoration the next day by King George V at Buckingham Palace. After returning to the Western Front, Cpl Sanders was promoted to Captain and was awarded the Military Cross for bravery during an overwhelming German assault at Kemmel Hill in April 1918. He was shot in the arm and leg in the action and was last seen stood on top of a pill box rallying his men and firing his revolver at the enemy 20 yards away. After the action he was listed as missing and it wasn't until three months later he was able to write to tell his family he was alive and being held prisoner by the Germans. His Victoria Cross and Military Cross were passed down through the family over the years and were sold for the very first time at London auctioneers Dix Noonan Webb. The medal group had been given a pre-sale estimate of £220,000, but sold for a £240,000 hammer price. With all the fees added on the total price paid was £288,000. Of the nine VCs awarded on the first day of the Somme, six are in museums with the other three held privately. A spokesman for Dix Noonan Webb said: 'This is a very happy outcome to the sale. 'The Victoria Cross and other awards won by George Sanders will now go on display in London where they will be seen by visitors from all over the world.' Auctioneers Pierce Noonan said: 'The courage and powers of leadership shown by Sanders are almost beyond belief. 'He must have realised that the British offensive had halted and had no idea of when, or even if, his small group would be relieved.

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'But he organised the defences and told his men that it was their duty to hold on when many lesser mortals might have decided to surrender. 'It was astonishing gallantry from a young corporal who had been in the Army for just over 18 months.

Cpl Sanders' medal will now go on public display with the rest of Lord Ashcroft's collection at the Imperial War Museum 'Sanders was one of nine men who won the BVC on July 1, 1916 and one of only three to survive the war.' Capt Sanders, from New Wortley, Leeds, enlisted in the Territorial Force Battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment and went to France in April 1915 when he was aged 21. At the Somme his battalion were held in reserve while the Ulster division went over the top in the first wave. His unit were ordered forward at 9am and they supported the Ulstermen against the formidable German strongpoint of the Schwaben Redoubt. After the band of 30 men were left behind the young corporal set about organising their defence. After the war Capt Sanders worked at the Meadow Lane Gasworks in Leeds and during the Second World War was the commanding officer for the Home Guard at the works. He died in 1950 aged 55 following a long illness. 50


His medal collection, which was sold along with an archive of documents and photographs, included the VC, MC, 1914-15 Star, British War Medal, Victory Medal and George VI Coronation Medal. Share or comment on this article http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4276778/Medals-Somme-VC-hero-sell-288000.html (3 March 2017)

“DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER”: ALLUVIAL CLAIM LICENCE

Receipt issued by the Mining Constable

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Mervyn Emms-Collection via Elsmarie Wellmann.

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1931: DIE MOORD OP “TAKKIE” MOLLER: BLOEMFONTEIN In die verloop van ‘n week lees ek die boek “INSIDE INFORMATION”27 deur die bekende, ook voormalige hoof van staatsinligting, Piet Meiring. (Hy het ‘n hele reeks boeke geskryf en ek geniet sy boeke.) Nou lees mens maar vir ontspanning en nie vir eksamendoeleindes nie. Daar is altyd ‘n “toring” boeke langs my bed en ook op my lessenaar. Ek lees in die hoofstuk: “CRIME DOES NOT PAY” en in die jare is Piet Meiring verbonde aan ‘n Bloemfonteinse koerant, Die Volksblad. Ek lees ook verskeie boeke gelyk – dit hang af waarvoor ek lus is om te lees. Omtrent ‘n week nadat ek die hoofstuk gelees het en ek was nog nie klaar met die boek nie kom ek op historiese foto’s af wat Nico Moolman vir my gestuur het. Nou is dit ‘n gesukkel om te onthou waar ek van die moord gelees het aangesien die foto’s juis op die moord betrekking het. Dis mos “lekker” om die storie en die foto’s “bymekaar’ te bring. Persona dramatis: • • • • • • • • •

Kaptein Binnie (SAP: Bloemfontein.); Johan Frederik “Takkie” Moller, in lewe klerk van die meester van die hooggeregshof; Die moordenaar: Stephanus Louis van Wyk – oom van die oorledene; Voorsittende regter: Sir Etienne de Villiers; Die registrateur van die regter: Adv. Bram Fischer; Advokaat: Nico Grobler; Prokureur-generaal: WG Hoal; Deskundige getuie vir die verdediging: dr Nico Diedericks, later staatspresident; en ‘n Jurie en ‘n lewendige gehoor in die hof. Die regter moes hulle tydens die verhoor ‘n paar keer tot orde roep.

Mens kan sien dat die howe in die ou dae uitvoering gegee het aan die slagspreuk: Justice must be seen to be done! Wat se vermaak was daar in die dertigs van die vorige eeu? Geen TV en geen radio, daar is wel koerante en tydskrifte. Sport wedstryde en kultuur bedrywighede kry baie aandag. Maar in die ou dae het die mense ook die hof bygewoon. Kyk geniet:

Vrystaat: waar die moord plaasgevind het 27

Meiring, P: INSIDE INFORMATION, Howard Timmins, Cape Town, 1973 (pp 44 – 52).

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Die gat waarin die vermoorde Moller gevind is, Bloemfontein. (Let op al die spore op die misdaadtonmeel.)

Die beskuldigde, Van Wyk, tydens die voorlopige ondersoek

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Moller-moord 'n studie van die beskuldigde, Van Wyk en sy regsverteenwoordiger in die hof, terwyl hul op die koms van die jurie wag.

Moller-moord: 'n toneel in die hof van die beskuldigde, Van Wyk . 55


Die beskuldigde en die speurders. (Alle foto’s via Nico Moolman.)

Dink u die storie eindig hier? Kyk wat kry ek op die internet: Murder The conviction of Stephanus Louis Van Wyk by a Pretoria jury yesterday on the charge of murdering Cyril Grigg Tucker, the Carolina farmer, recalls the trial 56


at Bloemfontein in October last, when Van Wyk was acquitted on a charge of murdering his nephew, J.F. Moller. The “jackal pit murder,” as it was popularly referred to, created a profound sensation in the Free State, and the lonely veld grave in which Moller’s battered body was discovered became linked with the stories of buried moneys which have weaved themselves into a strange pattern in the records of Van Wyk’s two trials. Wednesday, May 13, 1931 http://archiver.rootsweb.ancestry.com/th/read/SOUTH-AFRICA-EASTERNCAPE/2011-06/1307550692 (Afgelaai op 21 April 2017.) In die boek Murderers' Row: An International Murderers' Who's Who, lees mens dat hy later gebieg het dat hy wel sy neef JF Moller vermoor het. Hy is gehang op 12 Julie 1931. Ek kon geen uitgewysde saak opspoor nie.

1931 (circa) ONGEIDEENTIFISEERDE LYK

‘n Foto van ‘n selfmoord slagoffer en die polisieman wat die lyk regop hou sodat ‘n foto geneem kan word. (Via Nico Moolman). Deel asb. die Nongqai met u vriende – ons kort altyd “nuwe” lesers, inligting, foto’s en stories. 57


6 SEPTEMBER 1939: SUID-AFRIKA VERKLAAR OORLOG

Genl. Hertzog het so baie vir Suid-Afrika beteken, dink maar aan die “Act of Westminster” wat Suid-Afrika, Kanada, Australië en Nieu Zeeland vrygeweste in die Gemenebes gemaak het; die bevordering van Afrikaans op gelyke voet as Engels, die vorming van die Verenigde Party saam met genl. Smuts – alles om samewerking tussen die Afrikaners en Engelse te bevorder. Hy het Suid-Afrika eerste gestel en wou in die oorlog neutraal wees.

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Dit is moeilik om ‘n 78-jarige koerant wat verkrummel te skandeer maar tog kan mens die geskiedenis en drama van daardie tyd inadem. Die Smuts-kamp het die oorlog sien kom. Nadat genl. Hertzog in die parlement verslaan is, is daar nie soos gebruiklik ‘n verkiesing gehou nie. Die goewerneur-generaal, mnr. Patrick Duncan, het genl. 59


Smuts gevra om ‘n kabinet saam te stele en die Unie was in die oorlog. (Via Elsmarie Wellmann: Mervyn Emms-versameling.)

1939 – 1945: WAR PICTURES / OORLOGFOTO’S

V.l.n.r.: Genl. sir Pierre van Reyneveld, veldmaarskalk JC Smuts en genl. Brink (?) Onder: V.l.n.r.: Genl. sir Pierre van Reyneveld en onbekend (via Jonathan Pittaway)

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1940: SONS OF ENGLAND Net voor en tydens die tweede wêreld oorlog loop die gemoedere weer tussen Afrikaners en Engelse hoog. [Tydens die 1914 Rebellie het die Engelssprekende SuidAfrikaners ook gemobiliseer – verlede maand is daaroor berig.] Die Afrikaners het die 1838 Groot Trek herdenk en daaruit het die Ossewabrandwag (OB) voortgevloei en alles wat daarmee gepaard gegaan het. Dr. DF Malan se gesuiwerde Nasionale Party het sy lede verbied om aan die OB te behoort. Op sy beurt het die Engelssprekende Suid-Afrikaners ook hul mense gemobiliseer – soort van wigte en teenwigte.

Dick King versus Piet Retief? (Via Elsmarie Wellmann: Mervyn Emms-versameling.) As gebore Durbaniet was die Sons of England organisasie aan my bekend, ek het laas in die 1970’s van die organisasie iets gehoor of gelees. 61


1942: POW FOOD PARCELS / KOSPAKKIES VIR KRYGSGEVANGENES

Op 20 Junie 1942 het Tobroek in generaal Erwin Rommel se skoot geval toe genl. HB Klopper oorgegee het. ‘n Paar soldate het daarin geslaag om te vlug en weer by die geallieerde magte aan te sluit. Hier het die polisiebrigade almal krygsgevangenes geword. Vir ‘n geruime tyd in die 1960’s was konstabel Bekinkosi Cele my wabemanning te SAP King’s Rest. Hy was ‘n ware Zulu-kryger, fier, trots en dapper. Hy was nog van die soort polisiemanne wat ‘n knopkierie gedra het. Op sy bors was die medaljes van die tweede wêreldoorlog. Hy het diens gedoen in die mediese korps as ‘n baardraer – of soos hy gesê het: “stretcher bearer”. Ons was ‘n netjies aflossing en hy was uitstaande wat netheid betref het. Knope, lyfband, stewels en helmet se kenteken het geblink. Dit onthou ek van hom! Hy was voorbeeld en rolmodel vir almal. Na so ‘n paar maande het ons vriende geword nadat ons saam in ‘n paar gevegte met dronk matrose betrokke was. Veral op nagdiens het ons lekker oor die oorlog gesels. Hy vertel in Zulu dat toe die Duitsers toeslaan het hy net die wildernis ingevlug en later by ons magte aangesluit. Sy staaltjies oor bv. die vlieënde “German kosaans” sal ek altyd onthou. Tydens my loopbaan het ek baie met polisiemanne gepraat wat in die tweede wêreldoorlog diens gedoen het. Party was in die polisiebrigade en ander weer het eers na die oorlog by die polisie aangesluit. Oom Fred Geldenhuis wat ‘n MM verwerf het, het my baie stories oor honger vertel. Hy is onlangs oorlede en het altyd sout byderhand gehad want daar was in die krygsgevangenekampe ‘n groot behoefte aan sout. Oom “Doppies” Baartman (Durban V-tak) en kaptein Alberteyn (Kompol x302) het ook hul wedervaringe gedeel. Beide het as voetgangers aan die groot hongermars na die weste oor Duitsland, deelgeneem. Die kospakkies, wanneer hulle dit ontvang het, het baie vir manne in die krygsgevangenekampe beteken. Sommige manne, soos Oom At de Villiers – ook bekend as “Jerseybul” - van Harrismith was uiters maer en verswak en het eers in Engeland aangesterk voor repatriasie na Suid-Afrika.

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FISANTEKRAAL AIRFIELD: PHIL BECK I wonder how many Durbanville residents remember or even know of Fisantekraal airfield? It seems that the airfield was founded in early 1943 by the SAAF for the purpose of training young pilots to fly the Lockheed Ventura Bombers purchased from the USA. I understand that the decision by SAAF to use this piece of land in the Durbanville / Fisantekraal area as an airbase was because the crosswinds were more suitable for the heavy Lockheed bombers to lift-off from the runway and because of the easy access to the coast. When Fisantekraal airfield was originally built, there were four runways. Only two are currently being used but from the air outlines of the other two can still be seen. Squadrons 22, 23 and 29 played an important role by being the air-wing division of the West Coast Command. Aided by information received from the Radar stations along the coast their aim was to search for and destroy the German U-boats stalking the shipping lanes used by the Allied troop-ships and merchant vessels. Fisantekraal airfield was also the home base for the Advance Flying Squadron until 1951 when the unit was transferred to the Ysterplaat airfield. SAAF closed the airfield in early 1963 and handed it over to Durbanville Municipality. Mr Del Colussi later leased the airfield from the Government and registered a company “Fisantekraal Lugdienste”. On 1st April 1974, the flying school opened its doors with Mr Alan Stuart training aspirant pilots and a club was formed called the “Stellenbosch Flying Club.” This club later moved to Stellenbosch which is flourishing today. Sadly, a shortage of funds caused the closure of Fisantekraal Lugdienste. Today C.T. Flight Training Centre operates from Fisantekraal Airfield. On 6th June 2012, the last large plane to take off from Fisantekraal Airfield was a DC3 with a filmcrew as passengers. Nowadays the only traffic here consists of fixed-winged light planes and helicopters.

Phil send us the following photographs:

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27 Sqn at Fisantekraal

27 Sqn Venturas

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SAAF Lockheed PV1 Ventura. Below: Fisantekraal.

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PROF HERMAN GILIOMEE: DIE LAASTE AFRIKANERLEIERS: TAFELBERG Ons lesers is gelukkig om oor die volgende paar maande ‘n kykie in prof Giliomee se nuwe boek te kry. Die vergunning is afkomstig van Erika Oosthuysen verbonde aan Tafelberg Uitgewers. Hier volg dan die eerste uittreksel uit Herman Giliomee se boek: Die Laaste Afrikanerleiers - ’n Uiterste toets van mag uitgegee deur TAFELBERG

Die verskriklikste botsing van belange denkbaar Nadat die polisie op 21 Maart 1960 69 swart mense wat in Sharpeville teen die paswette betoog het, doodgeskiet het, het Verwoerd aan sy bankmaat in die parlement gesê: ‘Nou gaan ons groot probleme kry.’ Die protesgolwe daarna was die eerste groot uitdaging aan die wit regering. Die ANC-leier, Albert Luthuli, het sy pas verbrand en mense gevra om weg te bly van die werk af. Die wegblyaksie was ’n groot sukses: Feitlik die hele swart bevolking het daaraan deelgeneem en baie besighede wat van swart arbeid afhanklik was, is tot stilstand gedwing. Baie wit mense was beangs. Aandeelpryse het drasties gedaal en kapitaal het uit die land gevloei. Uit die buiteland is die skietery en die hardvogtigheid van apartheid skerp veroordeel. Dit alles het die land op die rand van internasionale isolasie gebring. Die regering het vinnig en genadeloos gereageer. Op 30 Maart het hy ’n noodtoestand afgekondig en oor die volgende paar weke is meer as 18 000 mense aangehou. Op 8 April is die ANC en die Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) verbied. En toe, op 9 April, het ’n versteurde wit man Verwoerd in die kop geskiet en hom ernstig gewond. Die Sharpeville-slagting en sy gevolge het sommige NP-politici die grondslag van die apartheidsbeleid ernstig laat heroorweeg, maar skaars was Verwoerd weer op sy pos of hy het die opstand in partygeledere doodgedruk (sien Hoofstuk 2). [p. 75]. Die SAKP, saam met Mandela – met die goedkeuring van die ANC – was die eerste komponent van die Congress Alliance wat ’n gewapende stryd begin het. Vir [ p 80] dié doel het hy Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) gestig, ’n ondergrondse guerrilla-organisasie. Die eerste lid was Mandela, wat, volgens die historikus Stephen Ellis, ’n SAKP-lid was. Mandela kon dalk eerder ’n medereisiger gewees het as ’n formele lid. Hy was die tussenganger wat SAKP-besluite aan die ANC oorgedra het. Twee swart SAKP-lede het na Beijing gereis waar hulle Mao Zedong geraadpleeg het. Soos ’n onlangse studie opmerk – dit het getoon in hoe ’n mate die ‘gewapende stryd ingegrif was in die politiek van die Koue Oorlog’. Mandela het geïnteresseerd gebly in dialoog met die Afrikanernasionaliste. In 1961 het hy besluit MK moet sy eerste aanvalle op 16 Desember doen – die dag waar op ’n Voortrekkerkommando 123 jaar tevore ’n groot Zoeloe-leër verslaan het. Dit sou die dialektiek van Afrika- en Afrikanernasionalisme demonstreer.” [p. 81].

Swart mense word Suid-Afrikaanse burgerskap geweier Vorster het drakoniese sekuriteitswette deurgevoer en gewaarsku dat hy met al die middele tot sy beskikking teen ‘agitators’ sou optree. Met hierdie wette het die veiligheidspolisie die ANC en alle ander organisasies wat ’n eenheidstaat en universele stemreg met geweld wou afdwing, probeer vernietig. In die NP se leierskapsverkiesing van 1966 was Vorster die antikommunistiese regtervleuel se 66


kandidaat. Hulle het sy aanvalle op kommuniste en liberale as ondermynende elemente toegejuig. [p 93]

1961 NAMUTONI: SUIDWES-AFRIKA: GENL. JV VAN DER MERWE Genl. Van der Merwe skryf: Die foto is op 8 Maart 1961 op Namutoni toe nog SWA geneem. Van links na regs:

Genl. Keevy toe 'n brigadier; Kommandant Henning van SAW Genl. Vic Verster toe 'n kaptein Kapt. Tom Laas die vlieënier – Lugmag Luit. Herman mede-vlieënier Sers. De Beer Korporaal Walker. Kommentaar deur Hennie Heymans van regs na links: • Kommandant PHS Henning28 – later SAP kwartiermeester en later generaal; • Genl. Vic Verster toe 'n kaptein; en • Genl. Keevy toe 'n brigadier. Ek het ook ander foto’s waarop sommige van dieselfde lugmagpersoneel verskyn.

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Die SAP het in die Erasmus-era ook vir ‘n ruk die range kommandant en veldkornet gebruik - HBH

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Hier is nog ‘n foto gedateer uit my argief van genl. Vic Verster te Namutoni:

1961: Lt.-Kol. (kmdt.) PHS Henning in nuwe blou SAP-uniform

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RHODESIA: OPERATION MIRACLE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1979 By Historian, Author and Copy-Editor Gerry Van Tonder In spite of previous Rhodesian Security Forces successes against Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) bases in the Manica Province of Mozambique, it became evident from reconnaissance missions that camps had again been established in a 60km radius from the town of Chimoio, not far from the Rhodesian border town of Umtali. Within this area, in what was now called the Chimoio Circle, and to the east of the Chimoio–Tete Road, aerial photographs revealed a large sprawling complex of five ZANLA camps. The whole 64 square kilometre area, named New Chimoio, was heavily fortified, with an extensive system of trenches and bunkers protected by heavy weaponry and anti-aircraft guns. ZANLA and their advisors had chosen a prominent ‘bald’ kopje to site a large force of men and anti-aircraft weapons to defend the camps below from air-strikes by the Rhodesian Air Force. The kopje was nicknamed Monte Cassino by the Rhodesians.

[01] The flying column passes through the Honde Valley en route to Mozambique Based on initial estimates of 1,000–2,000 insurgents housed in the camps, Combined Operations (ComOps) made the decision to mount a ground and air attack on the ZANLA complex, using a flying column of 100 troops from the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment. Canberra bombers would initiate the attack, with Hawker Hunters and field guns of the Rhodesian Artillery providing heavy support as 69


the assault progressed. One hundred paratroopers from 2 Commando, 3 Commando and Support Commando of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) would be dropped east of the camp to put stop groups in place.

[02] The troops assemble at Ruda near the Mozambique border As a ploy to draw attention away from the real reason for this large gathering of troops, vehicles and aircraft near Umtali, RLI troops were deployed in mock fire force operations in the neighbouring TTLs, firing live ammunition to authenticate their presence. It was, however, to prove a very costly deception, when a K-car carrying the officer commanding 3 Commando, Major Bruce Snelgar SCR (Posthumous), flew into powerlines. Bruce Snelgar, the pilot, Air Lieutenant Paddy Bate and his tech Flight Sergeant Gary Carter all perished as Alouette R5705 crashed into the ground. Under cover of darkness on 26 September 1979, the column, under the command of Captain Richard Passaportis of the Selous Scouts, left Nkomo Barracks near Salisbury (now Harare) for Ruda Base Camp in the Honde Valley, just 1km from the Mozambique border. The convoy, which would pass through the Mutasa TTL, comprised Unimogs, Eland armoured cars with 90mm guns, Crocodile and Puma armoured troop carriers, 25-pound artillery pieces, and the Selous Scouts own armoured vehicle, the ‘Pig’. A bulldozer would be in place to assist with crossing the Gairezi River (see my note at the end of this article) into Mozambique. Large numbers of troops and helicopters had also assembled at Lake Alexander just north of Umtali.

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[03] Rhodesian troops take a breather at position ‘Madison Square’ Overall command of the operation would rest with Lieutenant Colonel Brian Robinson (Rhodesian Special Air Service) and Wing Commander Norman Walsh (Rhodesian Air Force) of ComOps, from a Dakota overflying the area. At night, Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly (CO Selous Scouts) would take over from his command centre on a nearby kopje. ComOps Tactical Headquarters would be based at the Grand Reef airbase, Forward Air Field, FAF 8. It was planned that the flying column, together with the artillery, would enter Mozambique early the following day and set itself up at a burnt-out store, codenamed Madison Square, ready to follow the Canberra bombing run at 0700 hours. At this point near the target, the artillery would also be unlimbered and be ready to support the air force strike. At the designated hour, however, the column with the important artillery support was still waiting to cross the Gairezi River. The crossing onto Mozambique soil proved very problematic. Successive vehicles, weighed down with troops and war materiel, bogged down while attempting the river crossing. Eventually, the bulldozer had to individually drag each vehicle across, with the Puma APC-towed field guns being particularly awkward and resulting in them falling well behind in the column. The twenty vehicles of the column had by this time become very fragmented, and as Canberras of No. 5 Squadron were dropping their payloads over New Chimoio at the scheduled time of 0700 hours, most of the convoy was still stuck at the river crossing. By mid-morning, forward elements of the column had reached Madison Garden, but it was only by 1400 71


hours, seven hours after the air force bombing runs, that the main body of the convoy finally arrived at this staging post.

[04] Rhodesian Eland armoured cars delayed at the river crossing into Mozambique.

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[05] An army cameraman in front of the command ‘Pig’ at position ‘Hotdog’

[06] Troops of an RLI stop group below Monte Cassino

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From Madison Square, the flying column of Selous Scouts struck east, heading towards the road that would take them north to the camp. Arriving at the foot of Monte Cassino late that afternoon, the men were to spend an eventful night as the column was subjected to RPG-7 and 75mm recoilless-rifle fire. While clearing trenches to secure their position, Trooper Gert O’Neill of the Selous Scouts was killed. The RLI stop groups, already in place, had an equally lively night, as fleeing insurgents stumbled into their ambush positions. Come the following morning, further anti-aircraft defensive positions were identified on adjacent features, codenamed hills 761 and 774, the latter given the title Ack-Ack Hill. Flying through a cloud of flak, a Hunter strike from No. 1 Squadron dropped sixteen 1,000lb Golf bombs on enemy positions, including Hill 774, which flanked Monte Cassino.

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[07] The command armoured vehicle ‘Pig’ at the forward base ‘Hotdog’

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[08] Rhodesian Air Force Alouette IIIs and journalists at the Hotdog landing zone This allowed the Rhodesians to capture the hill which the defenders had vacated, taking their heavy weaponry with them. From this strategic point, Lieutenant Chris Gough and his men were able to direct mortar fire and Hunter strikes onto Monte Cassino. On day three, Lieutenant Simon Willar’s call-sign, with close-support from Hunters clearing his way, skirmished north towards Monte Cassino, clearing spot heights of ZANLA and neutralising their heavy weapons.

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[09] A ZANLA Russian-made 14.5mm anti-aircraft weapon at Monte Cassino After the successful questioning of an enemy capture, Captain Peter Stanton reported to Lieutenant Colonel Tufty Bate of the RLI that information gleaned from the insurgent had provided a clear picture of what the Rhodesians could expect at the top of Monte Cassino. With this in mind, further discussions were held with Richard Passaportis, leading to an infantry assault at 1000 hours. Two Selous Scouts troop call-signs led by lieutenants Chris Gough and John Barnes, together with an RLI troop from 3 Commando commanded by Captain Bobby Harrison, began the challenging ascent. Chris Gough took the steep direct route, while the other two call-signs slowly made their way up the trench-latticed western route. Heavy supporting mortar fire was brought to bear on the top of the kopje immediately prior to the arrival of the Rhodesian troops. Elements of the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment had at this time also secured the adjoining Ack-Ack Hill.

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[10] A Rhodesian soldier stands by the entrance to a bunker on Monte Cassino The exhausted troops reached the top of Monte Cassino, finding it totally deserted. The Rhodesians now had strategic control of the base. Three soldiers were seriously wounded during the assault, and Trooper Ted Mann of the Selous Scouts was killed when a captured weapon he was trying to disarm exploded in his hands. Chris Gough and his men walked into a scene on top of Monte Cassino devastated by air and ground bombardments, littered with weaponry, supplies and other war materiel. The smell of dead insurgents permeated the hot air, but few bodies were actually found.

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[11] Rhodesian troops inspect a captured Russian anti-aircraft weapon

[12] An anti-aircraft weapon carriage stripped by the retreating terrorists 79


Evidently, most of the insurgents had withdrawn in what appeared to be a relatively orderly manner. Twelve 44gal. drums of sadza (maize-meal porridge, the staple of central and Southern Africa) attested to the fact that the base must have housed several thousand insurgents and camp followers. The occupants had been drilled to evacuate eastwards to pick up the road to Chimoio. There were numerous anti-aircraft emplacements scattered among a vast and elaborate system of trenches and bunkers, the weapons ranging from the Russian 12.7mm to 37mm. Large stocks of ammunition, tinned goods, food and medical supplies were also found.

[13] Unimog-mounted 81mm mortar in firing at ZANLA on Monte Cassino 80


[14] Rhodesian Artillery 25-pounder bombarding ZANLA positions That night, an RLI call-sign, Romeo One, positioned at a road block on the main road to Chimoio, saw a column of tanks and troop carriers approaching towards their position. As the Russian made tanks, backed up by what appeared to be a company of FRELIMO (Mozambican army) infantry came closer, Reid –Daly, alerted to this fresh threat by radio, suggested to Passaportis that Major Winkler move his Eland armoured cars into a protective cordon around Richard Passaportis Pig-based HQ, at Hotdog. Reid-Daly then guided the artillery onto the FRELIMO convoy. After five ranging rounds of gunfire, the next ten shells from the old British 25-pounders landed in quick succession among the attackers. The tanks immediately responded with some wild firing as they turned to flee the area. This was met by another salvo of shellfire from the Rhodesian guns, one round scoring a direct hit on a tank. The FRELIMO rescue bid ended in a rapid withdrawal back towards Chimoio. Aerial reconnaissance the following morning showed the FRELIMO column limping home, but before an air strike could be brought in, the convoy had camouflaged-up in an area of thick bush, only moving out again when darkness fell.

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[15] A ZANLA zig-zag trench found on top of Monte Cassino

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[16] Rhodesian troops prepare to recover a captured Scania truck from Monte Cassino On Sunday, 30 September, the Rhodesians retired, leaving behind a few Selous Scouts call-signs to monitor enemy activity. A few days later, on 3 October, a large and heavily armed FRELIMO column was sighted. The Scouts’ call-sign, remaining concealed, reported that the column had fired with anti-aircraft guns on the now vacant Monte Cassino with great accuracy. As the enemy column moved north towards Cruzamento, concern grew that their objective was to carry out an attack on the Rhodesian security forces base at Ruda, in retaliation for the attack on New Chimoio.

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[17] War materiel captured on Monte Cassino

[18] A wrecked Land Rover believed to have belonged to ZANLA commander Rex Nhongo 84


Rhodesian Air Force aircraft were scrambled to deal with the threat. At about 1300 hours, low-flying Canberra’s flew over the convoy, dropping Golf bombs. Canberra R5203, crewed by flight lieutenants Kevin Peinke and ‘JJ’ Strydom, only released half of their bombs, so the pilot decided to turn and do a reverse run, but this fateful decision would cost them their lives as the enemy, seeing the aircraft turn and come back, had sufficient time to concentrate ground fire at the vulnerable bomber. The stricken aircraft, having lost both engines, had been coaxed to glide back across the border. Sadly, they did not make it, the Canberra crashing just short of the border, killing both men on board.

[19] A Rhodesian soldier displays a ZANLA flag found at Monte Cassino A while later, Hunter R1821, flown by Air Lieutenant Brian Gordon, was also hit by ground fire, causing the aircraft to crash and kill the pilot. Whilst it was difficult in the thick haze for other aircraft to find the wreckage of the Hunter, it is known that FRELIMO had discovered the site, as they had recovered what they could to display in a museum in Maputo.

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[20] Rhodesian troops head home, mission accomplished

[21] Captured Russian anti-aircraft weaponry on display in Salisbury

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All the photographs that appear in this feature article are original Rhodesian Ministry of Information photographic prints, which form part of the author’s library. Four bibliographic sources used in the research: • Reid-Daly, Lt Col Ron, Pamwe Chete. (Covos Day, 2001) • Salt, Beryl, A Pride of Eagles. (Covos Day, 2001) • Binda, Alex, The Saints. (30 Degrees South, 2007) • Petter-Bowyer, Peter, Winds of Destruction. (30 Degrees South, 2005) The author did find slight variations from one source to the next, but none was really significant. There seems to be a question over whether the FRELIMO tanks were T34s or T-54s, so the model is not mentioned. All literature gives the name of the river which the flying column crossed into Mozambique as the Gairezi. This river, however, is much farther north near Troutbeck. In Petter-Bowyer’s account of the operation, he refers to the Honde River, as does Prof Richard Wood. Having studied maps, the author is also of the belief that it was in fact the Honde River.

SPEURDERHOOFKONSTABEL JORDAAN Is daar miskien iewers iemand wat speurderhoofkonstabel Jordaan geken het? Vermoedelik van Bloemfontein. Hier verskyn sy foto op ‘n ou glasnegatief – foto verskaf deur Nico Moolman.

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1990: NONGQAI ARGIEF: BESTRYDING VAN ONLUSTE [Geplaas met vergunning van genl. Van der Merwe. Dankie Chris van Vuuren!]

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Kommentaar: Anders as vandag, was toegang tot rekenaars gedurende die 1990’s beperk. Vandag kan ons enige wet of verordening vinnig beskikbaar hê. Ons was in die “ou dae” aangewese om die oortredings in die werklike wette, regulasies en verordeninge na te slaan. Baie stasiebevelvoerders het die regsboeke slegs gedurende kantoorure beskikbaar gestel. Baie keer is lede onder opleiding bv. te Maleoskop en word hul opleiding onderbreek deur lede na ander sentra te stuur waar om onluste daar te voorkom en dan geld ander plaaslike verordeninge. In daardie dae het selfone nie kameras gehad nie. Daar was slegs een video per eenheid beskikbaar en glo dit as u wil, soms wanneer die videokamera nodig was, het die kamera nie gewerk nie. Tog, het ons in baie gevalle suksesvol van die videokamera gebruik gemaak. Wat belangrik is, is die videograaf moet altyd naby die bevelvoerder wees en onderhoude, bevele en tonele afneem. Sommige lede van die publiek dink die polisie kon sommer voor die voet doodskiet. Dit is nie waar nie. Vandag leef ons in die polisieman se paradys: Hy kan alles afneem op sy eie selfoon wat baie beter as ‘n sakboekie is. In die buiteland het lede van sommige polisiemagte voltyds persoonlike kameras op hul lyf. Wat ‘n wonderlike middel vir bewysreg!

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MR MANDELA AND THE QUEEN MOTHER / MNR MANDELA EN DIE KONINGIN SE MOEDER “The President (of France) was slightly nervy in her presence, unlike Nelson Mandela — who startled her by prostrating himself in front of her with his face buried in the carpet while she stood there patiently acknowledging this gesture of deep respect. On that occasion, I struggled to know what to do. There was nothing in the equerry Blue Book about this. But eventually, after about four minutes, the Queen Mother decided it had gone on long enough. ‘Come on,’ she said. ‘Let’s go and have some tea.’ And off they went. I know that Mandela made a huge impact on her.” Source: Adapted from Behind Palace Doors by Colin Burgess (John Blake, £8.99). © Colin Burgess 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4434378/The-Queen-Mother-thirstierirrepressible.html

‘n Stukkie (onsamehangende) polisiegeskiedenis oor mnr Mandela en die onderhandelinge Deur Hennie Heymans Tydens my loopbaan in die veiligheidstak was ek vir omtrent twee jaar in Natal te Pietermaritzburg onder die bevel van luit-kol JG “Sterk-Hans” Dreyer gestasioneer. In die tydperk het ons twee groot ondersoeke hanteer: die van Zeph Motopeng (PAC) en die saak teen Harry Gwala (ANC). Ons teenstanders was op hul knieë. Met die skryf van die boek KOEVOET: The Men Speak het ek genl. Dreyer se inset vir die boek bekom en ‘n paar keer het ons lekker gesels, veral as die generaal op die verlede reflekteer. Na die hewige stryd in Suidwes-Afrika reflekteer-sê-vra die generaal: “Ek wonder hoe dit in die land sou gewees het, indien mnr. Mandela en dr. Verwoerd alreeds in 1960 met mekaar gepraat het. Hennie, jy weet ons het ‘n lêer gehad op die “All in Africa Conference” wat in 1960 te Pietermaritzburg plaas gevind het. Jy weet toe ek in ‘Maritzburg gekom het, het ek die hele legger deurgelees. Daarin het mnr. Mandela vir dr. Verwoerd geskryf en vir ‘n onderhoud gevra. Die onderhoud is nie toegestaan nie.” Ek daarna het baie oor genl. Dreyer se woorde gedink. In my navorsing oor die geskiedenis van die veiligheidstak het ek in die Rivonia-verhoor bevestiging gekry vir genl. Dreyer se vraag. In die verhoor het mnr. Fred Barnard, persoonlike sekretaris van dr. Verwoerd, getuig dat die brief van mnr. Mandela wel ontvang was, maar omdat dit aanmatigend was het dr. Verwoerd besluit om nie daarop te antwoord nie. 94


Bestudeer ons die geskiedenis sal ons vind dat 1960 die waterskeidingsjaar in ons landsgeskiedenis was. Dinge in Suid-Afrika kon so baie anders gewees het. Na my verplasing van Pietermaritzburg terug na veiligheidshoofkantoor het ek vir ‘n honneursgraad in strategiese studies ingeskryf. Ek moes ‘n taak doen oor die strategie en die Anglo-Boere-oorlog. Ek het die taak (en vak) verskriklik interessant gevind. Genl. JC Smuts, toe die staatsprokureur, het die eerste skriftelike nasionale strategie in Suider-Afrika geskryf. Nogal ‘n tydlose werkie want die beginsels in sy strategie vervat is ewigdurende waarhede. Na die taak ingehandig is, het ek op my eie vergelykings met die huidige situasie in Suid-Afrika getref. Dit was hier in die 1980’s. Ek het toe met my groepshoof, brig. Piet Goosen, hieroor gaan gesels. Hy het geduldig na my geluister. Ek het voorgestel dat ek dink die tyd ryp is om nou met die SAKP/ANC-alliansie te gaan praat oor presies “wat” hulle wil hê. Ons kan nie ontken dat ons opponente het, wat ook hul eie doel en doelstellings het. Ek het uitgewys dat ons mnr. Mandela en sy manne veilig op Robbeneiland het. Ons het geweet wat die ouens dink. Dat die polisie die PAC onder mnr. Zeph Motopeng en die jongste ANC bedrywighede onder Harry Gwala aan bande gelê het. Die land is rustig na die 1976 Soweto-opstand en ons sit stewig in die saal. Ek het uitgewys dat Rhodesië in ‘n haglike posisie was toe hulle in Lancaster-huis met Lord Soames moes onder handel, hulle kon vroeg in die stryd ‘n baie beter uitslag gekry het indien hulle bv. alreeds op die HMS Fearless ingestem het tot samesprekings. Leer ons dan niks uit die geskiedenis nie? Dit het vir die brigadier soos “hoogverraad” geklink en hy het nie die saak verder gevoer nie. Ek wonder ..... Nou kom ek by die koningin-moeder en mnr. Mandela “made a huge impact on her”. Mnr. Mandela het selfs ook op dr. Niel Barnard ‘n geweldige impak gemaak, daarvoor hoef mens net na die dr. Barnard se jongste boek, Die Geheime Revolusie, se omslag te kyk. Punt is, ons as SAP en veiligheidstaklede, het die SAKP/ANC-alliansie se lede persoonlik geken, ons het ook bv. die AWB of NUSAS se lede ook geken. Ons (en ons vaders) het al die betrokkenes goed geken (hulle weer het ons geken) en tydens ondervraging met die neerpen van hul elle lange verklarings, het ons mos geweet wat hulle wou gehad het. Ons almal het met teruggekeerde opgeleide terroriste gesels. Waarom het ons so lank gewag voordat ons onderhandel het? En toe ons eers aan die onderhandel was, waarom het ons alles verloor? Ja, ons het alles verloor – die universiteite, ons koshuise, ons skole, ons koerante, ons word bedreig in ons huise en op die plase – ja, alles wat Afrikaans is - ons het nou 95


regtig alles verloor wat dierbaar was. Ek kyk nie eens meer televisie nie. Ek moet bieg, ek voel soos ‘n vreemdeling in ons eie land. Natuurlik kon dit so baie anders gewees het. Nou as die Britse koningin-moeder in Londen van mnr. Mandela, die SAKP-Mkonto weSiswe se No 1 soldaat gehou het, wat was met dr. Verwoerd verkeerd? Dr. Verwoerd was ongetwyfeld intelligent; maar was hy wys? Waarom het dr. Verwoerd nie al in 1960 begin met die onderhandelingsproses nie? Was die “tyd nie ryp” nie? Wanneer is die tyd ryp? Dink maar aan die feite vervat in die “winde van veranderinge”-toespraak deur mnr. Harold McMillan. Dink maar aan al die ongevraagde raad wat deur ons vyande geuiter al die jare was! Onthou hy wat niks wil weggee nie, verloor later alles en so gaan die geskiedenis homself weer herhaal, eendag wanneer “die tyd ryp” is.

Fanie Bouwer sê: Dagsê Hennie Eerstens, ten opsigte van die indruk wat Mandela op ander gehad het - hoog en laag - ook op ander presidente van hierdie wêreld én die koningin van Engeland én ook ander konings: Hy het 'n buitengewoon sterk persoonlikheid gehad, met 'n 'presence', 'n selfbeeld én 'n selfvertroue wat jy by geen ander leier in die wêreld teëgekom het nie. Behalwe dat hy hoogs intelligent was, was hy hierdie lang, groot en imposante figuur, met 'n besondere en unieke charisma en welsprekendheid. Ek wil so vêr gaan om te sê dat hy die enigste van sy soort in die wêreld was in sy tyd. As gevolg van hierdie eienskappe, kon hy met konings en presidente van die wêreld met die grootste gemak omgaan, juis as gevolg van hierdie buitengewone karaktertrekke. Ek is doodseker dat hulle almal dadelik baie beïndruk ('in awe') was met hom, en selfs dalk 'klein' gevoel het in sy teenwoordigheid. Ek het geen twyfel hieroor nie. Daarby was hy ook 'n denker van formaat, met ook 'n ysere wil en deursettingsvermoë. Wat dr. Verwoerd betref: Hier was ook 'n buitengewoon, unieke en intelligente leier 'n leier wat presies geweet het wat hy wil bereik. Niemand in die SA'se leierskap kon enigsins met hom vergelyk word nie Het hy dalk langer geleef, kan ons vandag net raai wat se beleidsverandering hy teweeg sou gebring het soos die tye en winde van verandering na ons kant gespoel het. Dít is 'n groot jammerte van ons geskiedenis. Hoe dit ook al sy, in sy tyd was hy vol selfvertroue wat sy politieke idees betref, en het dit baie goed gegaan met die Nasionale party, die SA'se ekonomie en SA in sy geheel. Of daar dinge was hom gepla het oor die toekoms (en die swart bevolking) van SA, weet ons nie. 96


Jy sal ook weet dat slim Jan Smuts nie 'n plan met die swartes van SA gehad het nie, en destyds aangedui het dat volgende geslagte daarmee sal moet deel. Hoekom het dr. Verwoerd nie geantwoord op Mandela se brief nie? Ons kan vandag net raai, nie waar nie? Ek wil egter 'n paar raaiskote waag. Van dit het ek hierbo kortliks aangeraak. Die ander is: Het hy dalk gedink dat die NP se volgelinge enige oorweging van Mandela se voorstelle/gesprek sou verwerp? Ek dink so. Ons Afrikanermense het 'n blinde, hardvogtige geloof aan die ideologie van apartheid gehad destyds. Hulle is ook geleer om swartes te haat en te verafsku. En die beleid van apartheid het dus natuurlik logies en korrek geklink. 'n Alternatief was té erg om enigsins te oorweeg daardie tyd seker. Met ander woorde, waarom die kitaar se wysie verander terwyl alles in harmonie is en almal saam dans? So het hulle daardie tyd geredeneer en gedink, meen ek vandag. Wanneer is die tyd ryp in die politiek op 'n gegewe tyd? Niemand weet gewoonlik op daardie oomblik nie, want die toekoms is maar altyd duister en donker én onseker, nie waar nie? Sou dit goed en reg gewees het as dr. Verwoerd met mnr. Mandela gesels het? Met agterna-kennis, dalk ja. Wie sal weet? Ek wens egter hy het. En toe, uiteindelik, toe die NP moes onderhandel a.g.v. wêrelddruk, sanksies en erge binnelandse oproer, was hulle in so 'n slegte posisie, op die agtervoet en ongeloofwaardig, dat hulle geensins in 'n posisie van mag kon onderhandel nie. Die gevolg was 'n swak - ja swak! - grondwet, wat vir die witman vandag niks beteken nie. Vra die boere op die plase. En ander. En dié grondwet word nie eers deur sekere leiers gerespekteer nie. So ja, die vraag of dr. Verwoerd uit 'n posisie van mag destyds met mnr. Mandela moes gesels het, sal vandag én in die toekoms, met ons agterna-kennis, net 'n debatsvraag bly. Die gode het egter anders besluit ... Groete Fanie Bouwer

‘n Ander siening van die onderhandelinge: ‘n Uittreksel van: Leon Lemmer: ‘n Sielkundige ontleding van Afrikaners “The British – represented by Milner and Chamberlain – did not want peace; they wanted war” (5562). Die voorstel van FW Reitz, gesteun deur Louis Botha, dat die Britte die Witwatersrand met sy goud en Uitlanders kon kry, is deur die Britte verwerp; “refusing the option of a state within a British protectorate” (7525). Die Vrystater Abraham Fischer het voor die oorlog die situasie soos volg opgesom: “We have 97


honestly done our best and can do no more – if we lose our independence … leaves us at least the consolation that we did not sacrifice it dishonourably” (5602). Kan dieselfde enigsins van die Nasionale party se grondwetlike onderhandelings in 1992/94 gesê word? Ek dink nie so nie. Dit was gewoon ‘n skandalige, mandaatlose, algehele magsoorgawe. In teenstelling daarmee was die Boere-bittereinders se standpunt: “To die with honour is preferable to surviving in dishonour” (5696). Aan die einde van die oorlog was die leiers van die Boere steeds “spiritually undefeated” (7454). Dit geld ook die Bittereinders. Maar kan dit ook van die meerderheid hedendaagse Afrikaners gesê word? .../” http://praag.co.za/?p=43564&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+praag+%28Pro-Afrikaanse+Aksiegroep%29 (Afgelaai 23 April 2017.

HISTORY IS WRITTEN BY THE VICTORS: CM WILLIAMSON "History is written by the victors" is a quote most often attributed to Sir Winston Churchill. But the truth is that history is written by those who record it and, at the end of the day, history is no more than the recorded experiences of individuals. This is why it is so important that all of us document our experiences. It doesn't matter how widely what we record is publicised, what is important is that it be recorded and placed on a shelf somewhere for some researcher to find sometime in the future. What we lived through was our history in real time. This is why what you are doing with The Nongqai is so important. Any police officer and anyone who has ever worked with or studied politics, intelligence or national security matters knows that there are always multiple versions of any event. We must expect that the recording of any history will be as full of conflicting opinions and disagreements as was the making of that history. This is very true in our case. South Africa has experienced bitter conflict and all sides in that conflict have their versions of what happened and why it happened. Unfortunately, many people can't be bothered or don't have the time to seek out the facts and form their own conclusions. They prefer a simple story in which their side was the good guys and the other side was bad. So, in recording our experiences, we are laying down the raw material which will be available to those who, in the future, are curious and clever enough to work through the conflicting range of facts and pseudo-facts and prejudiced information and who will be able to cut away all the axe-grinding and airbrushing and be able to figure things out. I see a book like "Spy: Uncovering Craig Williamson" as one side’s version of history. Its full of quasi-facts and loudmouth prejudice and it's one version of history served up for those who prefer the simple story in which only the other side were bad.

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM

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Spy: Uncovering Craig Williamson by Jonathan Ancer. Some comments by Craig Williamson In recent years, amongst the books and memoirs dealing with the general political struggles of South Africa over the past 50 years or so, there have been more and more books published, specifically on the secret and sometimes not so secret political and physical war which was fought between the former SA government and its security forces and the ANC/SACP and other revolutionary forces. Many of the books have clearly been published mainly to boost reputations and to manufacture a role in history which is often propaganda and a sham. But some books such as Thula Simpson's uMkhonto we Sizwe: the ANC's Armed Struggle or Amin Cajee's Fordsburg Fighter: Journey of an MK soldier and others such as those by Fanele Mbali and Stanley Manong have the clear ring of the unvarnished and unspun truth. It is honest books like these latter examples which history needs. Books in which the anger and fear and lies and spin and propaganda of the past have been filtered out by time, leaving the unvarnished truth, good and bad. Unfortunately, Jonathan Ancer's Spy: Uncovering Craig Williamson cannot be put in this category. To me the most telling quote from this book is the following from p 108: "Nearly a quarter of a century after the country’s first democratic election in 1994, former enemies have reconciled and many people who committed terrible atrocities have been forgiven by their victims and their victim's families. However, a lot of bitterness is still directed at former spies." Bitterness is the best summary of the contents of this book. Many of the quoted protagonists are so bitter in their descriptions of me that they and the author are blinded to the blatant contradictions in much of what they have to say. This is unfortunate and even sad because this book could have been fascinating. It has two major failings: Firstly, the black and white student left and intelligentsia played an undeniable role in the political resistance in SA from the early-70's. There were NUSAS, SASO, BPC, BCM, Wages Commission and trade union work, the Shipping Research Bureau, End Conscription Campaign and much more. After school and university, the committed moved onto other levels, including the armed struggle. There was a fascinating degree of ideological conflict - ANC/SACP, PAC, Black Consciousness, AZAPO and even believers in old fashioned liberal democracy. And State Security operators were there, embedded with them. Security Branch, BOSS, MI. But, instead of examining these dynamics the book sinks into a painful swamp of people feeling sorry for themselves because their "enemy" lied and spied and even attacked them. What on earth did they expect?? Secondly, the book fails because it clearly runs away from any examination of how I 99


operated undercover for so long. We read a litany of 20/20 hindsight opinions that I was a "spy", which were apparently "reported" up the chain of command to the ANC/SACP. But there is no examination of how I survived this "suspicion" for 9 years. There is absolutely no examination of why I was apparently "vouched" for on so many occasions by senior people. The author doesn't even probe the contradictions in the versions given by the people he interviewed. It’s almost glossed over. Too much potential for embarrassment perhaps? Any warfare is an ugly and nasty thing and a revolutionary war is probably worst, because of the personal nature of a society fighting itself. This book is an opportunity lost. It relies mainly on a collection of one-sided and often fatuous, superficial, inaccurate and bitter anecdotes by people who appear to believe that waging revolution should be a one-way process. The reality is that people like me did not serve in the Security Forces because we wanted to fight a war or because we suffered from any personality, psychological or intellectual deficit. History and circumstances thrust us into war and people died. The same applies to our former enemies. Unfortunately, an honest book about that has still to be written. (E-mail from Craig Williamson dated 29 March 2017). An interesting aspect of the book is that it reveals a total naivete about the process of intelligence operations. Obviously, that was the case during the time the book covers, because I probably wouldn't have survived if it were otherwise. But, I would have thought that reflection over the past 25 years would have brought about a better understanding, amongst them, of why their armed struggle failed. For example, the author and his collaborators on the book obviously do not understand that I was just one cog in the intelligence machinery running operations against them. In my operation, yes, I was the main undercover agent involved, but I was run and supported by numerous other agents and a whole range of analysts and planners. This wasn't just a one-man operation which "unfortunately " succeeded because an evil "spy" betrayed his comrades trust. It was a complex and drawn out operation over a number of years which involved numerous people and agencies. The various "comrades " accounts of their experiences of being "interrogated" by me also reveal that they still don't understand what my purpose was. I was never an "interrogator ". I was never an investigating officer. I never took a statement. I was always an intelligence officer. My purpose in speaking to these people was intelligence driven. I wanted to elicit information. I wanted to probe for recruitment possibilities. I wanted to leave the impression that we knew more than we did. To get information was first prize but to sow suspicion and despondency and confusion was almost as important. It seems that they still don't get that. No wonder they didn't do so well in the secret war. (E-mail from Craig Williamson dated 2 April 2017). Perhaps my review should have been as follows: Once upon a time there was a fair land ruled by trolls. For many years, the pink resistance tried to overthrow the trolls but the evil trolls used everything in their power to thwart the pink resistance - even magic spy trolls. 100


One particularly bad and ugly magic spy troll went to school with some pink resisters but somehow got his other school mates to support and vote for him even though the pink resisters didn't like him. After school, the bad magic spy troll even worked openly for the troll security forces. Then one day a troll security boss decided to send the bad magic troll to be a spy amongst the pink resistance. The bad magic troll went to university where many pink resisters were organising. He joined them and magically got them to accept him and elect him to higher and higher pink resistance positions. He was soon working full time for the pink resistance and was even recruited into their secret army. Then one day he was sent abroad to work with the leaders of the pink resistance who were working on international support for the overthrow of the Troll regime. All this time he was using his evil magic to make sure that the pink resisters didn't realise that he was actually a troll. Every time that any pink resister told anyone that the troll was indeed a troll, the evil spy troll used his magic powers to blind everyone to the truth. But, one day another spy troll defected to the pink resistance and exposed the evil spy troll who rushed home to troll security where he continued his evil work. Until, one day the troll leader decided that, because the whole world wanted the pink resistance to be given a chance to rule the fair land, the troll regime would agree and would let the pink resistance rule and show the world what a good job they could do. And they didn't all live happily ever after! (E-mail from Craig Williamson dated 3 April 2017).

OPERATION DAISY: SUPERSPY CRAIG WILLIAMSON: RS 167 Introduction: Hennie Heymans Major Craig Williamson was one of our top police spies. I was a desk officer at “A” Section, Security Branch Head Quarters (SBHQ) in Pretoria. It was quite fascinating to work at “A” Section because I was an inquisitive officer and working there satisfied my curiosity. The work was very interesting! We knew beforehand what happened in South Africa and what will be in the news that evening or in the papers. We also had many newspapermen working for us. We also had many other sources, spies, agents, informers and a plethora other sources. When one makes an academic study of ‘the field of intelligence’ one is surprised at how wide the field really is! There are many covert and overt sources. From personal experience, I also know that many African policemen were instructed to desert and join the opposition. I have sometimes at night thought about these men 101


and wondered what happened to them. Returned and arrested insurgents became, what we called, Askari’s. (Thinking back to those days: We had far too much desk work and too little time to think!! We were not allowed to think like Chief Inspector Endeavour Morse.) Each of the 19 police divisions had hundreds of paid informers. It must be remembered that the former South African Police covered, during the tenure of Gen Hendrik van den Bergh, the whole of the sub-continent and elsewhere. After the Bureau for State Security was established during 1969 we only had policemen left in Rhodesia and Swaziland. However, each little town or border post had a police station and each station commander knew he had to contact his local security branch if something interesting cropped up. One must remember that we also had the civilian and military intelligence divisions. The farmers at large were all connected to the commando. We went for an overlap – there were no gaps! Having many sources of information one gets used to “secrets” and then one day one gets “pure gold” on your desk and that is what happened with the reports of RS 167. I did not know who he was, but RS167’s reports were good. Outstanding! Various desks at SBHQ were supplied with copies of his reports. At the various desks, we had to bring our suspect files, organisation files and memorandums up to date. RS 167 wrote his reports in Genève and he left them in a DLB where an agent then picked them up. The secret agent then sent the reports – and here I presume – through the diplomatic pouch to South Africa. I presume that the reports, and there were many, were then handed to SBHQ via an intermediary service. I read many of RS 167’s reports – like I read the reports of WWR 10 or any other source. There was just something extra in the reports: They were clear, concise, coherent and presented intelligent manner. This operation – called Operation Daisy - was top secret and although many of us were privy to some of the information, there were only two officers who really knew what was going on. One officer, Major Piet Rossouw, was intimately involved and he dropped a word or two when we received RS167’s reports. Not all stuff went through the intermediary service, some went via the DLB via SAP secret couriers. I know from personal experience that even some of the civilian intelligence people wanted to know more about this operation, but even they were not given any information. I also know of a “spy versus spy” operation where one of our own RSAintelligence agencies “illegally” tried to get information about this operation. The less said about this matter the better.

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Later I went for intelligence training on “Daisy Farm” where the instructors were Captains Derek Brune and Vic McPherson. Later when Craig moved to South Africa we met and we became good acquaintances. Craig was involved in the establishing of Daisy Farm. Later I had a foreign operative who lived there for a while.

Here is one of Mr. Joe Slovo’s reports on the activities of RS 167 First page 5 and then pages 1 – 4:

"Thomas" is Thomas Nkobi -ANC Treasurer General. “OT” is Oliver Thambo “JS” is Joe Slovo “Christie” is prof Renfrew Christie. Should one read this report carefully, one shall see that RS 167 was a major role player in the field of intelligence. One will also there is a lot of damage control in the report.

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POLISIEPRAATJIES Interessante lewe Nou die aand skakel en van my kollegas, ons het saam deur die range gekom en was lank saam aan dieselfde onderafdeling verbonde. [Ons het altyd lekker gesels wanneer dit teetyd was. Ons oud-stasiehase het ledegeld aan die teeklub betaal maar nooit gereeld tee gedrink nie. Wie se skuld was dit? Die publiek sin! Ons het gespring om altyd klagtes flink by te woon. Maar te hoofkantoor kon jy darem die koppie koffie klaar drink. ] Hy het as luitenant-generaal afgetree. Ons het seker ’n jaar laas gesels en die gesprek het voort gegaan asof ons geen onderbreking in ons vriendskap of skakeling gehad het nie. Dis kollegialiteit! Sy beskouing van die kontemporêre situasie getuig van insig. Nou die oggend skakel ʼn oudlid van die mag, hy was aan die polisie by lykshuise betrokke en doen vandag, as adjunk-direkteur by die Departement van Gesondheid, steeds diens by staatslykshuise. Wat ʼn interessante gesprek van amper ʼn uur! Oor die nuutste tegnologie en die deernis waarmee hulle naasbestaandes hanteer en lyke fotografeer. In die polisiegeskiedenis is die lykshuis en die lykshuisopsigters reeds van die begin van moderne polisiëring aan die polisie verbonde gewees. As DK het ek weekliks lykshuise inspekteer en in Soweto het ons die grootse polisielykshuis in die suidelike halfrond gehad. In Soweto was ek hoof van fisiese dienslewering met die groot staatslykshuis ingedeel in my pligstaat. Daar was ʼn vroue-kaptein, ek wonder baie keer wat van haar geword het, aangesien sy in 1991 – 1992 toe ek daar was in Soweto, reeds ʼn deeglike studie oor goggas en lyke gemaak het. Vandag werk forensiese patoloë en selfs entomoloë (die ouens wat goggas ken) voltyds by lykshuise.

Dit was ‘n voorreg om polisieman te wees! Goeie opleiding Ons is deur van die beste instrukteurs opgelei in die wet, noodhulp en skietkuns. Later is teeninsurgensie en bestryding van onluste ens. tot die verskillende kurrikula bygevoeg. Party van ons is selfs geleer om met die lugmag se vliegtuie te gesels! Vir my was die vliegtuie altyd blitsig oor en dan het mens amper gehakkel omdat mens net so vinnig soos die vliegtuig vlieg, wou praat. Ek gaan wandel met my gade en dan dink ek aan dinge soos bv. hoe goed ons met die .303 kon dril. As majoor Snyman vir jou kyk dan dril jy en daai geweer praat! Ek dink aan wyle kaptein Bokkie Breedt wat tydens ʼn lesing oor saluut en eerbetoon vra: •

“Jy ry op ʼn perd en ʼn man kom by jou verby en hy salueer, wat maak jy?”

“Salueer terug, kaptein!” •

Jy ry op ʼn fiets en ʼn man op ʼn fiets kom verby en hy strek vir jou, wat maak jy?” 108


“Salueer terug, kaptein!” •

“Jy hang aan ʼn ‘donnerse kite’ en ‘n man val verby jou en hy salueer, wat maak jy?

“Salueer terug, kaptein!” So is ons met fyn humor opgelei; daardie instrukteur of dosent met die vonkel in die oog is die goeie een! Paul Bothma wat ons as jong offisiere opgelei het in stokkie- en swaarddril. So nederig en bedraad maar tog professioneel.

Karakter en inbors Dit is jou keuse of jy ʼn man van eerlikheid en inbors wil wees. So dobbel die ouens en sodra die polisie op die toneel kom spaander die dobbelaars! Ons ouens het maar net die geld opgetel, die geld getel en inskrywing in die sakboekie gemaak en later by die klagtekantoor ingehandig. So stap ek en ek dink aan die manne en offisiere wat my beïndruk het. Daar was mense soos luit.-kol. TM Bisschoff (later generaal); hy het geen nonsens gevat nie! As ouderling ry hy kerk toe en “vang” ʼn kaptein wat sonder sy hemp, gras sny! Groot kommer vir die offisier. Majoor Frikkie Engels (later generaal) het almal sonder pet aangetree. Hy was in bevel van die hoofsaaklik Durban-SAP-peloton wat op 26 Augustus 1966 met Swapo slaags geraak het. Kol. Patrick James Dillon (later generaal) was oorhoofs in bevel – nog ʼn yster! Seker een van Durban se beste AK’s was kolonel CC von Keyserlingk – in daardie dae was daar net een brigadier in Pietermaritzburg vir Natal, Port Natal en die Transkei-afdeling. Insgelyks was daar net een kapelaan in Durban, ds. Jansen, vir die drie afdelings. Toe die berugte en bekende Goosen oorlede is, het die AK gelas dat die polisie en die kapelaan vir Goosen moes begrawe. Die kolonel het later brigadier in Johannesburg geword en later LV vir Umhlatuzana. Wat ʼn man! No. 22504 AO Willie Marais – was my derde stasiebevelvoerder – wat ‘n man. Hier by 06:00 stap die Oubaas in en dam die registers by. Alles is reg of word reggemaak! Hy is bygestaan deur spesiale-graad-hoofsersant Taylor Xaba. (Ek het nogal dopgehou maar ek het nooit gesien dat hy offisier geword het nie.) Die sersant het al die dossiere en S29’s ingevul en hy het my gewys hoe om te maak as daar ʼn dossier weg was – iets wat amper nooit gebeur het nie. In Durban was die hoof van die veiligheidstak majoor FMA Steenkamp (ook later generaal). Wat ʼn man! Eerlik en opreg. Hy was ʼn deurwinterde moord-speurder. Hy het die moord wat deur Clarens Gordon van Buuren gepleeg was ondersoek! Sy gelyke bestaan nie! Na dekades het ek steeds ‘n brief wat hy geskryf het. Die slot kom min of meer op die volgende neer:

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“Manne byt vas, doen die ondersoek behoorlik en intelligent. Moet nie moedeloos word nie, onthou die Voorsienigheid het jou vir die taak gekies. Hy is getrou en regverdig en sal jou nie in die steek laat nie.”

Byname in die Mag Elke lid van die mag het ‘n bynaam. Die Zulu-lede gee gou vir jou ʼn bynaam wat raakbeskrywend is! So het hulle die Afdelingskommissaris, kol CC von Keyserlingk, “Umoba” genoem. Umoba is suikerriet. Die AK het altyd gesê: “If you don’t want to do police work, go and chop sugar cane!” My Vader en sers. Coert Scheepers het ook Zulu-byname gehad, ongelukkig kan ek nie die woorde spel nie spel nie. Maar in Afrikaans en in Engels het lede ook baie byname gehad: Genl. “Sterk Hans” Dreyer se bynaam in Pietermaritzburg was “Yassar Arafat” met sy swart Ford wat die “Swart Kameel” genoem was. Genl. Steenkamp het amper ʼn trek na “Haelie Selassi” gehad en dit was sy bynaam. In Soweto was een brigadier se bynaam “Gadaffi”. Die eerste hoofkapelaan, genl. “Doepie” Cloete, se bynaam was Kajafas. Ons het AO “Kxffer” Botha gehad en oral was hy as ‘Meneer Kxffer’ bekend. Selfs swart lede het so van hom gepraat. Dan was daar Luit. “Swart-Gous” Gous. SAO “Kippie” Geyser was alom so bekend. Orals was ‘n “Skippie” Scheepers, ‘n “Tiny”, ‘n “Blackie”, ‘n “Pine”, ‘n “Vên”, ‘n “Wessie” van der Westhuizen – (konstabel Danarajh het altyd van ‘sargant Van-da-hoestuisen’ gepraat), en natuurlik “Papie” Papenfus (sy van is al as “pap-en-vleis” uitgespreek deur ʼn swart lid wat op soek was na hom in hoofkantoor) en ‘n “Nobby” Clark. Ek kom in Pretoria en hier praat hulle van “Keffie-kat” Smit, “Suiker” Brits, “Vuile” van Rensburg, “Kalfie” Broodryk, “Rivonia” van Wyk, “Katmuis” Conradie en vele ander. Party byname kan ongelukkig nie hier gepubliseer word nie.

Humor in die polisie The wah “Good morning Constable” “Morning Sir” “May I please speak to the Charge Office Sergeant” “Sorry, hies out wif da wah!” (Jammer hy is uit met die wa!) ‘C’ vir Sydenham Voor ons die Alfa-, Bravo- Charlie-alfabet gebruik het, het ons sommer enige naam vir ʼn letter gebruik. So spel konstabel Abel oor die lug: “S vir siek en C vir Sydenham”.

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He’s out on a rape Oom Danie van Tonder werk in die AK te Utrecht en genl Mike Geldenhuys is die 1/sersant en stasie bevelvoerder. Die LV daag by die stasie op en vra waar die SB is. Die SB is toe uit om ʼn ernstige verkragtingsaak te ondersoek en in Engels antwoord die konstabel: “He is out on a rape!” (Bedoelende ‘n ‘rape case’).

BSAP: TERRY SCHWARTZ THINKS BACK Tomorrow, 21 March 2017, will mark 56 years, since 5 Squad 1961, came together. 22 young men assembled at the B.S.A. Police Depot, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, and were attested. They were Anthony Hall, Dennis Poole, Phillip Cunliffe Steel, Brian Dawson, Joseph Eglington, Peter Gallagher, Ronald Hill, Eric Hutt, Peter Moore, Ian Whittle, and Michael Werner, all from UK. Peter Maloney and Edward Bodington from Southern Rhodesia. George Stewart, David Holmes, David Marks, Brian Mcdermid, Anthony Wilson, Michael Bothma, Robert Haywood, Christie Wilkinson, and Terrence Schwartz all from South Africa. Chief Inspector Ron Trangmar was the Depot Chief Inspector, his 2pm parade, some days he hid unseen, in the shade of the trees of the Green Square until he made his appearance. "Standstill, this is my parade!” he would bellow, followed by, "it has come to my notice.........this will cease immediately" Staff Sgts Tackie Macintosh (liked) and Gerry Winchcombe, were foot drill/PTinstructors, while Insp Langham and Staff Sgt Smudge were equitation instructors. We mounted and dismounted, we rode, we marched, and some ran with 303s above our heads, we were inspected, clean brass shines white we were told. We went "Behind the Guard". After depot, we went on our ways, some stayed for a few years, to pursue other careers, some longer, some still in contact, some no longer with us, viz. Mick Eggles, Dave Marks, Pete Gallagher, Brian McDermid, and lastly, recently, my roommate Peter Ernest Moore. Remembering all with much fondness. Nelson Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders: A Reconsideration of Power in the Apartheid Era: Hermann Giliomee University of Stellenbosch Samevatting. Na die 1948 verkiesing het NP-leiers verwag dat die party vir `n lang tyd die politieke toekoms van Suid-Afrika sou dikteer. Tot die middel-1980’s het hulle nie die uitdaging wat die African National Congress gebied het met erns bejeën nie. Die 111


rede hiervoor was dat hulle nooit behoorlik besef het in hoe snelle swart bevolkingsgroei wit heerskappy ondermyn het nie. So vroeg as 1959 het die historikus Arnold Toynbee daarop gewys dat, anders as in geval van die Spanjaarde en Portugese, die Britte en Nederlanders in hul onderskeie kolonies nie in staat was om toegang tot die politieke stelsel vir ondernemende swart of gekleurde mense te bied nie. Dit het hulle verhinder om vroegtydig ʼn kreatiewe politieke respons tot die griewe van die onderworpenes te vind voordat dit te laat was. Vroeër in sy loopbaan was Nelson Mandela bereid om groot kompromieë aan te gaan ten einde swartes vir swartes seggenskap te verkry. In die loop van die jare tagtig het hy egter begin om onverbiddelik op meerderheidsregering aan te dring. Alhoewel die NP in die referendum van 1992 beloof het om so ʼn stelsel teen te staan, het FW de Klerk meerderheidsregering stilswyend aanvaar en dit eers op 17 November 1993 aan die kabinet voorgelê nadat Mandela kategories geweier het om van daarvan af te sien. So ʼn magsoordrag is nie uniek nie en kenmerk inderdaad die einde van koloniale regimes wat deur Brittanje en Nederland tot stand gebring is. Soos in die geval van dekolonisasie het die beëindiging van wit heerskappy gespruit uit die oortuiging van ʼn bepaalde politieke leiers dat die politieke orde wat deur hulle beheer is moreel onverdigbaar was - Herman Giliomee29 Introduction A key generalisations of political analysts and commentators states that a government based on an ethnic, racial or religious group does not give up power unless it is defeated militarily or has run out of money to pay the security services. A poll conducted in 1988 among whites in the Witwatersrand area, the biggest urban conglomeration, confirmed the resistance to transfer power. It listed five political preferences for a new constitution. Only 3 per cent of Keywords: Apartheid; Afrikaners, civilisations, demography, culture, Bantustans, power-sharing, majority rule, minority rights, constitution, Parliament, winner-takes-all, decolonisation, the Afrikaners and 11 per cent of the white English-speakers endorsed the option of “A single mixed parliament with the majority in control.”30 The NP government built up what was regarded as the most formidable defence force in Africa. But in the end white-ruled South Africa needed a political solution, not military victories. Its demographic base constituted its fatal weakness. The most important social fact of the apartheid period was the fourfold increase of the black population from just over 8 million to over 31 million. During this time the white population grew from two and a half million to a mere four and half million. Taking only the demographic factor into account the end of white supremacy was inevitable; yet there was no reason to anticipate a sudden collapse of the government’s resolve to insist on power-sharing when it started to negotiate an inclusive democratic system in the early months of 1990. The need for a political solution was stressed as early as 1959 in a remarkable article by the historian Arnold Toynbee. It in 1959 in Optima, a journal published by Anglo 29

Hermann Giliomee is a Research Fellow at the Department of History , University of Stellenbosch H Giliomee and L Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation-building (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1989), p.156. 30

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American Corporation. At that time Toynbee was among the most cited historians in the world. In his twelve volume A Study of History he argued that the critically important factor in the rise and fall of 26 civilisations in world history was the success, or failure, of creative minorities and perceptive leaders in responding to challenges. Although no longer much cited nowadays, Toynbee made a remarkably prescient forecast in the Optima article. This article starts with Toynbee’s warning in the article about the consequences of a failure to adapt timeously to South Africa’s political system. It goes on to analyse the changing nature of the ANC’s challenge to white power in which Nelson Mandela played such an important role. The main questions that will be addressed will be: Why did the white government fail to engage the real black political leaders at a time when the economy was still vibrant and the political system quite stable? What missed opportunities were there? How could things have been different? History’s warning Toynbee’s Optima article was written against the background of the rapid decolonisation of Africa by the European colonial powers that had started two years before. He pointed out the contrast between the empires founded by the Spanish and the Portuguese on the continent of South America and the British and Dutch in Africa. The Spanish, for instance, also exploited the native peoples, but the division between first-class and second-class citizens did not follow racial lines. Barriers to the top were not racial, and hence not impermeable. The result was continued Spanish predominance even after independence. So too the people of European descent (or predominantly European descent) in the former Portuguese colony of Brazil continued to play a dominant role in many sectors. In stark contrast stood the colonies that the Dutch and the British founded in Africa (and one could add the British in North America). Political upward mobility for subordinate races was exceptionally difficult and intermarriage virtually ruled out. He pointedly observed that in South Africa of the 1950s there was no easy way of entry into the dominant caste for an able and adaptable black person.31 Toynbee stressed the importance of demography. If the dominant minority was ahead in technology and culture, the struggle would be more drawn out and more morally complex than in the case of a clear-cut military struggle. But, he wrote, “the dénouement may be more tragic.” Sooner or later, Toynbee stated, ruling minorities had to accept the status of ‘an unprivileged minority’ living under a majority they consider culturally inferior. The alternative was to hold on to their present supremacy by sheer force against a rising tide of revolt. Toynbee warned that holding on against the tide was fatal for a minority. ‘Even if its belief in its own cultural superiority was justified, numbers would tell in the long run, considering that culture is contagious, and that an ascendancy based on cultural superiority is therefore a wasting asset.’ He expressed sympathy with the dilemma of

31

Toynbee, “History’s Warning to Africa”, Optima, 9 (2), 1959, pp. 56-59.

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minorities: voluntary abdication in favour of a majority “whom one feels to be one’s inferior is a very hard alternative for human pride to accept.”32 “Knowing our enemies” Within the camp of the victorious Afrikaner nationalists there were contrasting perspectives of the unexpected National Party victory in the 1948 election. Privately Eben Dönges, who as Minister for the Interior would introduce most of the apartheid laws, told a foreign journalist that for him and his colleagues the policy of apartheid was there to protect the present and next two generations against the dangers posed by the growing black and coloured population.33 By contrast, NP leader D.F. Malan said after 1948 election: “Today South Africa belongs to us once more. South Africa is our own for the first time since Union, and may God grant that it will always remain our own.”34 By that he meant the Afrikaner nationalists’ own. Among leaders of the African National Congress, the oldest and most prestigious black organisation, there were mixed feelings about the 1948 election result. Albert Luthuli, a future winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, said that with blacks little more than spectators of the political game, it was irrelevant which white party won. Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, future ANC leaders, disagreed. Mandela recounts that Tambo said: “I like this. Now we know exactly who our enemies are and where we stand.”35 In 1950 Hendrik Verwoerd, an ex-professor of sociology, became Minister of Native Affairs in the National Party government and he went on to serve as Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966. He would make it made it his business to tell blacks exactly where they stood. Shortly after becoming a cabinet minister Verwoerd met with members of the defunct Natives Representative Council, which included some ANC stalwarts. He ruled out direct representation of blacks in Parliament or in the provincial councils, but offered blacks what he called the greatest measure of self-government in the urban black townships. To provide services for the townships blacks would have to be educated and trained to be sufficiently competent in many spheres. The black leaders attending the meeting rejected the proposal, insisting on representation on all levels of government. This was a turning point in which South Africa failed to turn. Had the leaders accepted the offer the black city councils could have been used in the same way that the black trade unions were in the 1980s. They used their legalised status effectively in ways the government had never anticipated. Verwoerd now embarked on a rigid policy of restricting black political rights to the eight black reserves, later depicted in the apartheid ideology as national homelands. These reserves in total made up 13 per cent of the land mass of South Africa. Politically linking even settled urban blacks to their respective homelands remained the policy until negotiations for a democracy began in the late 1990’s. The NP government had Toynbee, “History’s Warning to Africa”, pp. 55-56. J Hatch, The Dilemma of South Africa (London, Dennis Dobson, 1953), p. 93. 34 J. Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. x. 35 N Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Randburg, MacDonald Purnell, 1994), p.105. 32 33

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made the fatal error of excluding the urban blacks, the most advanced black stratum, of any significant representation. Mandela, already an outstanding leader in the early 1950s, helped to steer the ANC into an activist but non-violent form of politics. It included boycotts, stay-at-homes, passive resistance and protest demonstrations. The state finally crushed the movement by charging 157 of the leaders, Mandela included, with treason. The trial, which started in 1956, dragged on for five years before all the accused were acquitted. At the same time the cunning of history was at work. In the courts there was no segregation of the accused. The 157 accused all were seated alphabetically and had frequent opportunities for talking during breaks. Previously there was relatively little mixing on leadership level between the ANC, which was exclusively black, and the South African Communist Party, whose leaders were almost exclusively white. Mandela had long insisted on the ANC remaining an exclusively black organisation and had kept his distance from the white communists. The experience in court changed him. Here for the first time he encountered whites as committed as he and his allies to a democratic South Africa. He remained loyal to his communist allies through the rest of his career. He indeed briefly became a communist himself. Appealing to government From the beginning of his career Mandela admired British political institutions, in particular the British parliament. He saw those institutions as the cornerstone of a new political order in a free South Africa. In 1960 Mandela on trial for treason proposed that the black population be allowed to elect sixty representatives in the South African Parliament, which was slightly less than a third of the total number of seats at that time. He also suggested that the measure could be reviewed after every five years.36 This was exactly the kind of measure Toynbee had in mind for whites if they wished to prevent a situation in the future where the ruling elite would be forced to capitulate without power and without honour. But apart from the fact that the white electorate was quite unprepared for it there was another problem. In the dominant white group there was a division between the Afrikaners, forming 55 per cent of the electorate, and the English community, which was economically and culturally dominant. The “winner-takes-all� electoral system, which today is still used in both Britain and the United States, is unsuitable for a deeply divided society, like South Africa. It does not reward moderation but encourage the biggest ethnic group to mobilise separately and to become increasingly radical in defending its power. In South Africa there was not only a sharp division between white and black but also between the two white communities. If Mandela’s proposal of bringing sixty representatives into parliament was implemented it would almost certainly have set up a black-English alliance that would mean the political death knell for the Afrikaners.

36

T Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 68-70.

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The killing of 70 black South Africans by the police at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, followed by black protests in several cities and a capital flight, triggered the first serious crisis for white rule. In April 1960 the government banned the ANC and other organisations and imprisoned numerous activists. It called a referendum on a republic in which only the whites, forming only one fifth of the population, would participate. After a yes vote the government decided to proclaim the republic on 31 May 1961. On 20 April 1961 Mandela wrote to Verwoerd on behalf of a several black organisations, stating that his government, representing only a minority, was not entitled to take such a decision without obtaining the express consent of the African people. Blacks feared the proposed republic under a government which, in Mandela’s words, “was already notorious the world over for its obnoxious policies.” The danger existed, he wrote, that the government would now “make “even more savage attacks on the rights and living conditions of the African people.” This situation could be averted only by the calling of a sovereign national convention representative of all South Africans to draw up a new non- racial and democratic Constitution.”37 Three weeks after the republic had been proclaimed, Mandela again wrote to Verwoerd. He stated that no constitution or form of government could be decided without the participation of the black people forming an absolute majority of the population. He demanded a National Convention of elected representatives of all adult men and women. The body should have sovereign powers to determine, in any way the majority of the representatives would decide, a non-racial democratic constitution.38 Verwoerd’s office failed to reply to Mandela’s two letters. When he stood trial later Mandela pressed Verwoerd’s secretary to admit that the failure to reply to his letters would be considered “scandalous” in “any civilised country”. The secretary replied that the letters remained unanswered because the tone was aggressive and discourteous. Mandela later acknowledged that “there may have been something in this.”39 But the demand for calling a national convention was also problematic from a white point of view. The majority would be able to write the constitution. After the ANC had been banned on 30 March 1960 Mandela along with some other leading figures decided to form an armed body, later called Umkhonto we Sizwe, to embark on a campaign of sabotage and armed struggle to force the government to the negotiating table. They had to face the fact that Albert Luthuli, the incumbent ANC president was firmly opposed to the ANC embarking on an armed struggle. There was a meeting between Mandela and Luthuli to resolve the issue. In his published autobiography, Mandela acknowledges that the outcome of his clash with Luthuli was very messy since the latter retained his commitment to non-violence. 37

www.nelsonmandela.org., Nelson Mandela to Hendrik Verwoerd, 20 April 1961. www.nelsonmandela.org., Nelson Mandela to Hendrik Verwoerd, 26 June 1961. 39 Lodge, Mandela, pp.104-05. 38

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According to Mandela, Luthuli agreed that “the military body should be a separate and independent organ, linked to the ANC and under the overall control of the ANC, but fundamentally autonomous.” Mandela goes on to state that he enlisted some members of “white Communist Party”, which had already resolved on the course of violence and had executed acts of sabotage.” 40 The question whether it was the ANC or the SACP who made the decision to start the armed struggle, and Mandela’s role, remained dormant until Mandela’s death on 5 December 2013. Then the whole issue blew up. The South African Communist Party issued a statement in which it stated that Mandela had once been a member of the party’s central committee. At the same time, two important works by professional historians appeared. The one was by the British historian Stephen Ellis, holder of the Desmond Tutu chair in the University of Amsterdam, entitled External Mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Jonathan Ball, 2014). The other one was by two Russian historians, Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson, The Hidden Thread; Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era (Jonathan Ball, 2014). According to Ellis, the SACP conference that resolved to take up arms took place in a posh white suburb and only eight or nine of 25 delegates in attendance were black Africans.41 Filatova and Davidson wrote that Mandela was present as a member of the SACP’s central committee. Using the ANC’s distinction between members of the SACP, i.e. communists, and members of the ANC proper, or nationalists, the two historians conclude there was no nationalist present when the SACP decided to embark on an armed struggle. The two historians add: ‘The fact that the armed struggle was originally a decision by the SACP, not the ANC, is confirmed by documents from the Moscow archives.’ There also appeared a study entitled “The Road to Democracy” under the chairmanship of an ANC minister. It clearly states that it was the executive of the tiny, almost exclusively white Central Committee of the South African Communist Party that took the original decision to embark on the armed struggle. 42 The controversy intensified when the Mandela Foundation released the 627 page original manuscript of Mandela’s account of his life, which was smuggled out of jail. It now appears that some very interesting passages was expurgated from the prison manuscript in producing the printed version of Mandela’s autobiography A Long Walk to Freedom (1994). There is now little doubt that Mandela was a member of the SACP executive during the period 1960-62. During his tour through Africa in 1962, just before his imprisonment, he met several leaders of Africa states. He discovered that most of them rejected communism. When he returned to South Africa, Mandela projected himself as a nationalist. Joe Slovo, SACP leader, complained: ‘We sent Nelson off to Africa as a Communist and he came back an African nationalist.’43

40

Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p.260. S Ellis, External Mission, pp.16-17; Rian Malan, “The Real Story of Nelson Mandela and the Communists”, The Spectator blogs 10 December 2013. 42 Cited by Filatova and Davidson, The Hidden Thread, p.299. 43 Ellis, External Mission, p.33. 41

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From the early 1960s to the early 1990’s both the ANC and the SACP heavily depended on Soviet Union support. In 1965-66 the ANC received $560 000 and the SACP $112 000 from this source.44 On Robben Island Mandela never gave an indication of communist leanings. A fellowinmate, Neville Alexander, who frequently debated issues with him, was convinced that Mandela did not subscribe to the so-called National Democratic Revolution, the key SACP doctrine. This sets out the party’s plan to establish a socialist society under ANC rule through a two-stage revolution. In Alexander’s view the ANC’s predominantly bourgeois leadership had no intention other than serving the interests of the capitalist class.45 The unexpurgated prison manuscript was completed and smuggled out of prison in the mid-1970s. At that point Mandela had distanced himself from some of the SACP members on Robben Island. The differences - which were partly personal, especially with Govan Mbeki, a hard line Stalinist - were particularly on how to deal with the Bantustans. Mandela, however, does not come across as a liberal democrat. He states that he believes in dialectical materialism and yet depicted anti-communism as a sickness, contracted from going to missionary schools or listening to government propaganda. He argues that force could be used in the battle against the government, even if the black majority were against it. The state’s security agencies from the early 1960s received intelligence that the SACP had succeeded in infiltrating the ANC and that Mandela from 1960 to 1962 was a member of its executive. The question is how did that affect the treatment of ANC or SACP aligned prisoners? Mandela himself commented on this in his unexpurgated memoirs: “In comparison with the wave of detentions since 1963 that in 1960 was like a picnic. To the best of my knowledge and belief no individuals were then isolated, forced to give information, beaten up, tortured, crippled and killed as has been happening since 1963. Speaking comparatively, the security police still had a number of men who carried out their duties according to the law and who resisted the temptation of abusing their powers. Apart from keeping us in confinement, withholding newspapers so as to prevent us from knowing what was happening outside, the atmosphere was generally free of the brutalities and acute tensions that characterize the subsequent detentions.”46 Piet Swanepoel, a senior security policeman to whom Mandela refers favourably in this context, recently stated that knowledge of the Communist influence on the ANC triggered a “greater harshness” on the part of the security officers in their effort to dispel this influence.47 Torture of detainees and deaths in detention had become common. Considering Mandela’s release

44

R.W. Johnson, The First Man, The Last Nation (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2004), p. 109. N Alexander, An Ordinary Country (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002) pp.46-49. 46 www.nelsonmandela.org, manuscript of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography, p.302. 47 Interview of Piet Swanepoel by author, 29 January 2014. 45

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The second prime minister during Mandela term in jail was John Vorster, who served from 1966 to 1978. Like other NP leaders Vorster believed that Mandela was a communist and that the ANC, as well as the SACP, was a proxy of the Soviet Union. Initially the Vorster government enjoyed so much latitude that little thought was given to substantial reform or the release of Mandela and some of his colleagues from prison. The economy was booming. During the 1960s it grew at an average rate of 5,9 per cent per year. From the mid-1970s the tide turned against the white regime in Southern Africa. The economy became bogged down by the sudden jump in oil prices together with a slump in commodity prices and growing demands from a much more assertive black work force. The collapse of the dictatorship of Portugal in 1974 was the start of rapid withdrawal of Portugal from its Southern African colonies. Soviet-aligned regimes came to power in Mozambique and Angola. A South African attempt to intervene in Angola misfired badly. The Soviet government airlifted some 30 000 Cuban troops to the country. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned Vorster that due to opposition in the American Congress the Ford administration would not be able to counter further Soviet intervention in southern Africa. In June 1976 a major uprising erupted in Soweto, near Johannesburg, and quickly spread to townships across the country. The political isolation of the white community was starkly exposed. The situation was so serious that on 8 August 1976 the Vorster cabinet had on its agenda the issue of the release of Nelson Mandela, which was by then twelve years in jail.48 There is no record of the decision. What would have happened if Mandela were indeed released in 1976? Neville Alexander records that in 1971 he and Mandela debated using the apartheid channels, flawed as they were.49Two years earlier, in 1974, Mandela had written a secret memorandum, entitled “Clear the obstacles and confront the enemy”, that was smuggled out. In this document Mandela confronted the fact that the government of the Transkei, which was the putative homeland of most Xhosa, had opted to take the apartheid style independence in 1976. In terms of a 1971 law, Mandela who was born in the Transkei, would lose his South African citizenship. Undeterred, Mandela wrote in his 1974 memorandum that the ANC faced an entirely new development: the independence of the Transkei, which was sure to be followed by other Bantustans. Mandela wrote: “The Transkei will have an independent legislature, judiciary and executive and may control its foreign relations” and then added: “For the first time since conquest the people will run their own affairs. Now Africans will be able to be judges, magistrates, attorneys-general, inspectors of education, postmasters, army and police officers, and they will occupy other top 48 49

Email message from Jamie Miller to author, 7 February 2015. Alexander, An Ordinary Country, p. 47.

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positions in the civil service. Would it not be far better to consider independence as an accomplished fact and then call upon the people in these so-called free territories to help in the fight for a democratic South Africa?”50 If a free Mandela had pushed for this policy of recognising the Transkei’s independence the strains in the ANC may well have become too great to contain. A major split may well have occurred in the movement, putting South Africa on a quite different course than one it took between 1976 and 1990. PW Botha’s offers to Mandela In 1978 Vorster resigned. He was succeeded by P.W. Botha, who had transformed the South African military into a formidable military force. Botha believed South Africa was facing a so-called “total onslaught” the aim of which was to subvert and ultimately overthrow white rule. In this an important role would be played by the ANC, which Botha also considered a Soviet proxy. Botha firmly believed that Mandela was still a communist51. He had, however, become receptive to the advice of National Intelligence that Mandela had become the main icon of the worldwide anti-apartheid struggle and that it was counter-productive to keep him in jail. In 1985 Botha offered to release Mandela provided he foreswore violence as a political instrument unconditionally. This was the sixth such offer since he was imprisoned. As before Mandela refused. He did not believe that the ANC was capable of overthrowing the state but he was quite certain that eventually the government would be compelled to negotiate for the simple reason that blacks formed a growing demographic majority. Like Toynbee predicted 25 years earlier, he thought that the government would only with great reluctance embark on negotiations. He resolved to do anything possible to prod government on this way. One way of making it easier for government to negotiate a democracy was to reduce the total number of blacks that could vote. By the early 1980s there were already 8 million out of approximately 22 million blacks who were considered citizens of socalled independent states and as such considered disenfranchised by government. Early in 1986 Mandela told a journalist, Benjamin Pogrund, that he was prepared to consider recognising the independence of the Bantustans. As Pogrund states, this was “an unusual and significant view contrary to that of the ANC in exile.” When Pogrund asked whether he could report this view to a cabinet member Mandela said yes.52 Initially Mandela also seemed flexible over a controversial issue like minority rights. Like the Bantustan option, it was abhorred by the ANC in exile, which would not budge from the first past-the-post electoral system coupled with the rule of the-winner-takes-

www.politicsweb.co.za “Nelson Mandela and the Bantustans”, 14 May 2012 re-publication of Nelson Mandela, “Clear the obstacles and confront the enemy”, ca 1974. 51 Email message form N Barnard to author, 26 February 2015. 52 Letter from B Pogrund to editor, Mail & Guardian, 13 February 2015. 50

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all. Yet Mandela even after his release said he was flexible over all the fundamental issues, including minority rights.53 A major uprising A major uprising broke out in 1984 and the turmoil did not subside until the government proclaimed a nation-wide State of Emergency in 1986. Thousands were detained without trial. In his ill-fated “Rubicon speech”, held on 16 August 1985, Botha rejected the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela, which had become the focus of the worldwide campaign against apartheid. He made it appear as if Mandela and his comrades in the early 1960s were motivated solely by communist convictions. There was no reference to grievances widely considered legitimate and he presented no evidence that Mandela was indeed a communist. More than anything this speech and the rejection of the demand for Mandela’s release destroyed the government’s credibility as an agent of substantial reform. President Botha had to accept that the state was no longer able to force blacks into the institutions the government had unilaterally created. It had become necessary to talk to the leadership of the ANC, which the government’s secret polls showed enjoying the support of at least sixty percent of the population. Mandela knew from the early 1960s that overthrowing white rule by means of insurrection was impossible and that only in negotiations could whites be persuaded to cede power and live under a democratic system in which their rights were guaranteed. To prepare himself for such negotiations he learnt Afrikaans in prison and studied Afrikaner history. He told his Afrikaner interlocutors in prison that he saw similarities between the Afrikaner struggle for freedom against overwhelming odds in the very first years of the twentieth century and the black struggle for freedom. In 1988 Botha instructed Dr. Niel Barnard, head of the National Intelligence Service, assisted by three other senior civil servants, to discuss the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Forty-eight such meetings took place. Barnard reported back to Botha after each session. When Barnard’s team raised the issue of Mandela’s alleged sympathy for communism and his refusal to break with the Communist Party, Mandela replied that while in his youth he had found aspects of communism attractive, he was not a communist. Yet he refused to break with the SA Communist Party, the ANC’s main ally: ‘If I desert them now, who have been in the struggle with me all these years, what sort of ally would I be to you or to the government?’ He answered his own question: ‘[People] would say that Mandela is a man who turns the way the wind blows; he is not to be trusted.’54 It was a shrewd answer that was difficult to counter.55

53

Weekly Mail, 16 February 1990.

54

Interview with M Louw by P Waldmeir, 29 May 1995, manuscripts collection, University of Stellenbosch. 55 For an account of these talks see N Barnard, Geheime Rewolusie: Geheime van `n Spioenbaas (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2015), pp.176-84.

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The officials also explored other issues. Was the ANC genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement? Mandela made it clear that majority rule was non-negotiable, but added that the new system had to be balanced and that it had to ensure white domination would not be replaced by black domination. ‘Minorities have a legitimate interest in security,’ he said.56 Mandela kept pressing for a meeting with the president and Botha finally agreed. The meeting finally took place on 5 July 1989 in the president’s office. Prior to the meeting Mandela wrote to Botha that One of the key points in future negotiations would be ‘the [ANC] demand for majority rule in a unitary state and the concern of white South Africa over this demand, as well as the insistence on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean the domination of the white minority by blacks … The most crucial task which will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile these two positions. Such reconciliation will be achieved only if both parties are willing to compromise.’57 On 5 July 1989 the meeting between Botha and Mandela took place in the president’s office. Botha had suffered a stroke a few months earlier. To all accounts he was no longer the same man as before. By meeting Mandela, Botha clearly wanted to signal to his cabinet that he was still in charge. In his autobiography Mandela wrote about the meeting with Botha: “He completely disarmed me, He was unfailingly courteous, deferential and friendly.” When I interviewed Mandela early in 1992 he told that a stranger would not be able to tell who the prisoner and who the president was. “We met as equals”, he recounted.58 Mandela told me, along with several other people, that one the greatest disappointments in his life was having to negotiate with De Klerk rather than Botha. Mandela after 1994 continued to speak highly of Botha, while frequently criticising De Klerk, sometimes unfairly. The main reason was that Mandela and De Klerk were competitors for electoral support and the international limelight. Another reason was the difference in age. Mandela and Botha were of the same age while De Klerk was nearly twenty years younger. As Minister of Defence before he became leader, Botha embodied the military’s toughness and discipline. De Klerk, by contrast, could easily be mistaken for a professor of law, which he nearly became, or modern day bureaucrat. We shall never know all that was said at the meeting between Botha and Mandela because Barnard gave orders that the tapes of the meeting had to be destroyed. Botha was furious when he discovered it but it was clearly the sensible thing to do because Mandela had not been informed that the meeting was taped. Barnard’s account of the meeting based on his notes showed that the meeting was very cordial and that no NBarnard, ‘NIS wou sonder middelman na ANC gaan’, Die Burger, 18 February 1992. H Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-making in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 1998), p.447. 58 Interview with N Mandela by author, 1 March, 1992. 56 57

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substantial issue was discussed, except the release of one of Mandela’s fellowprisoners. 59 Botha did not discard his original views about the armed insurrection that Mandela had plotted in 1960. Interviewed in 1995, he said that Mandela “was led into this affair by the communists and international forces.” He seemed to suggest Mandela was manipulated by these forces. He told the interviewer that he had warned Mandela against the dangers of international Marxism and Communism. 60 It would be unwise to describe Botha’s musings as those of an anachronistic Cold War warrior. A shrewd observer like Niel Barnard, head of National Intelligence, stated earlier this year: “Mandela totally underestimated the influence of the SACP. He adds “They [the Communists] were cunning enough to wait till his disappearance before they tightened their iron grip.”61 The SACP currently enjoys the kind of influence in cabinet they could only dream about before 2007 but the quality of leadership is far inferior to what it was under Joe Slovo, and it has become financially dependent on Cosatu. R.W. Johnson calls the SACP leadership “a predatory elite which rules and despoils South Africa.” 62 The Institute of Race Relations, the oldest and most respectable liberal think tank in South Africa, published its finding that 40 per cent of the cabinet are members of the South African Communist Party. No cabinet member questioned the report. Recently the executive director of the institute published a column under the title “So word SA tree vir tree na sosialisme gelei.” (How South Africa is being led step by step to socialism”).63 The support for socialism in ANC ranks is not strange. Black South Africans were the last substantial community in the world to receive their freedom, the Soviet Union was long the only ANC backer, and communists were the only ANC allies in South Africa when the struggle against white supremacy entered a new phase in the early 1960s. At present the ANC government is in a serious bind. An influential economist sums up the situation well. “The government is in a cleft between trying to pursue marketfriendly policies on the one hand and appeasing socialist and left wing elements on the other, who see the private sector as the enemy.”64 De Klerk’s abandonment of power In August 1989 the National Party won the general election and De Klerk was elected as president. Two months later, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. De Klerk later wrote that he immediately considered it as a golden opportunity to negotiate what he considered a balanced settlement with the ANC. He calculated that without the substantial Soviet support that the ANC had enjoyed since the early 1960s the ANC 59

Barnard, Geheime Rewolusie, pp. 215 -20. N interviewed by P Waldmeir, 1 March 1995 61 Email-message from N Barnard to author, 26 February 2015. 62 R.W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? The Looming Crisis, (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2015) pp. 72-73. 63 Rapport, 29 March 2015. 64 A Jammine quoted in “Business Times”, Sunday Times, 10 May 2015. 60

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would find itself off balance for a long while and would be compelled to modify significantly its demand for majority rule. When he first met Mandela in December 1989 De Klerk observed that the inclusion of group rights in a new constitution would ease the concern of minorities over majority rule. But it was a new ball game and Mandela’s stand was now much tougher. He told De Klerk that the ANC had not fought apartheid for 75 years to accept a disguised form of it.65 Mandela knew that both power sharing and minority or group rights were anathema to the ANC in exile and he would not concede group rights easily. When De Klerk set out to negotiate he did not intend to drop his insistence on group rights. Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to South Africa, who often met De Klerk portrayed his stance between early 1990 and mid-1992 as follows: “ He talked about some form of power-sharing, and was, he said, in a hurry in his search for a solution. The ship he had launched would never be turned around, but he insisted that he was not about to commit suicide.” De Klerk also dismissed the idea that individual rights enshrined in a constitution provided sufficient protection. 66 Protests again flared up and the country was soon in an acute state of instability resulting in a higher death toll than in the 1980s. In his dual role of presiding over the transition and leading the National Party in the negotiations De Klerk had put himself in a very difficult position. During the 1980s he resented the way in which he and some other ministers had been side lined in the discussions about the state’s response to uprising. He told Barnard, chief of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) “I intend to restore civilian government in its full glory”. He acted as if it could be done immediately. De Klerk did not seem to rely on the assessments and advice of the heads of the security services and intelligence agencies. Barnard believes that De Klerk thought “he had enough political acumen to handle everything personally, which was a great error of judgement.” In 2007 General Chris Thirion, former Deputy Head of Military Intelligence, wrote in an open letter to De Klerk. “If I think of De Klerk, I think of a president who did not trust his security forces.” 67 Mandela’s persistent allegations that government forces were responsible for most of the violence is not born out by the exhaustive study of Anthea Jeffery and the court records on which she based it.68 There was some involvement by elements of the security forces but the ANC, together with Inkatha, a primarily Zulu organisation, were

65

P Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of a New South Africa, (New York, Norton and Co., 1997), p. 148. 66 R Renwick, Mission to South Africa: Diary of Revolution (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2015), p.127. 67 H Giliomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power, (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2012), p.368. 68 A Jeffery, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2009).

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responsible for most of the over 20 000 deaths that occurred in the violence between 1984 and 1994. In March 1992 the De Klerk government held a referendum among white voters on whether the negotiations should continue. It exhorted voters to vote yes if they rejected the ANC’s demand for majority rule. Yet six months later this was exactly what it accepted. In May 1992 the ANC walked out of the negotiations and embarked on a programme of extensive mass action. When De Klerk and Mandela met again in September1992 Mandela secured virtually all the ANC’s objectives. It agreed that the final constitution would be drafted by a body elected on universal franchise, which the ANC was sure to dominate. Apart from the requirement to recognise some basic human rights, there were some other minor checks in what basically constituted a system of majority rule. One was the need to adhere to some vaguely phrased principles formulated by an unelected body that would draft an interim constitution. The other was substitution of parliamentary sovereignty with constitutional sovereignty. But even the constitutional protection was limited because the parliamentary majority would have the final say in the appointment of judges to the Judicial Services Committee, which would make recommendations to the executive. At a last count, the ANC-aligned members were double those of non-ANC members. De Klerk tried to get Mandela to agree to a system of shared decision-making in the government of national unity that would serve for five years, but he firmly rejected it. He said that the representatives of minority parties in the cabinet would be consulted during the first five years but that the majority would have the final say. There was also the matter of the NP’s promises to the white voters. In the 1989 election the NP leadership had promised that it would seek the voters’ endorsement for any deal that deviated radically from the NP’s 1989 election platform. It promised to bring about an inclusive democracy in which “groups” would be recognized as the basic components of the system. There would be power-sharing among them with no group dominating another, and self-determination for each group in its own affairs. De Klerk also promised a particular kind of referendum. In March 1990 he pledged: ‘After the completion of the negotiations the constitutional proposals would be tested in a constitutional manner among the electorate. And only with their support would a constitutional dispensation be introduced.’69 In the white referendum of March 1992 voters were only asked to endorse the negotiating process, but in the campaign NP speakers insisted that a yes vote represented a rejection of majority rule. In striking contrast a referendum was held in Northern Ireland in 1998 only after the constitution had been negotiated. A rightwing challenge

69

Die Burger, 31 March 1990.

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The security forces were baffled by De Klerk’s moves and was ready to re-establish control. But steeped in the tradition of military subordination to the authority of an elected government, the military did not resist the political leadership. The major unknown factor was an ex-Chief of the Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen, who was convinced that the ANC was still pursuing a revolutionary agenda and that De Klerk had caved in to their demands. Viljoen planned to disrupt the elections, have De Klerk removed as leader and restart the negotiations. Some believed that he could raise fifty thousand men from the ACF and also some Defence Force units.70 In a briefing, General George Meiring, Chief of the Defence Force, warned the government and the ANC of the ghastly consequences of Viljoen’s opposing the election. To dissuade Viljoen, for whom he said he had ‘the highest regard’, Meiring had several meetings with him. At one of them Viljoen said: ‘You and I and our men can take this country in an afternoon,’ to which Meiring replied. ‘Yes, that is so, but what do we do the morning after the coup?’ The white-black demographic balance, the internal and foreign pressures, and all the intractable problems would still be there.71 Although De Klerk and Viljoen shared a conservative political outlook for most of their respective careers, they strongly opposed each other during the negotiations. De Klerk rejected Viljoen’s demand for a carving out of a volkstaat (ethnic state) for the Afrikaners within the boundaries of the state, while Viljoen believed De Klerk had sold out. It was Mandela who grasped the need to engage Viljoen and to make a symbolic concession to him and his right wing followers. It would take the form of an article in the constitution granting self-determination to a cultural group. Viljoen formed a party, the Freedom Front, that won close to a half million votes in the first election. When Parliament met for the first time in a free South Africa Mandela broke ranks in the procession to greet Viljoen and to tell him how glad he was that they had found each other. Recently Viljoen told his biographer that he is sad that Mandela did not serve more than one term. If he did Afrikaners might be better off today.72 Power and regime change History is in many ways an account and interpretation of power -- how it is won and lost. Yet a good grasp of the basic qualities of power remain elusive. Leo Tolstoy remarked in the final chapter of his novel War and Peace: “The new history is like a deaf man replying to questions which nobody puts to him.” The “primary question” Tolstoy went on, is: “What is the power that moves the destinies of peoples?” He doubted whether “this power, which different historians understand in different ways”, was in fact “so completely familiar to everyone”.

70

J van Rooyen, Hard Right: The new white power in South Africa (London, I.B. Tauris 1994); D Welsh, 'Rightwing terrorism in South Africa', Terrorism and Political violence, 7 (1), 1995, pp. 239-64. 71 Interview of author with George Meiring, 11 November 2002. 72 D Cruywagen, Brothers in War and Peace: Constand and Braam Viljoen and the Birth of a New South Africa, (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2014), pp.224-25.

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History should be an antidote to the belief that superior political or military power determines the outcome of conflicts. In an article that appeared in the 21 November 2013 issue of the New York Review of Books Freeman Dyson, a renowned physicist, tells the story of a study in the early 1970s about how to end the war the United States was fighting in Vietnam. The study was commissioned by the RAND Corporation whose experts considered themselves the brains of the US military establishment. Working separately, two groups, one consisting of two economists and the other of several historians, reached completely different conclusions. The economists concluded that in a struggle to put down an insurgency what matters is not a sympathetic understanding of their struggle ‘but rather a better understanding of what costs and benefits the individual or the group is concerned with and how they are calculated’. To paraphrase: if the costs of an uprising become too high for the insurgents they will back down. As a result the oppressive regime will prevail.73 A group of historians who worked on the RAND Corporation’s project came up with a completely different answer. They looked at numerous cases of insurgency and asymmetrical wars, particularly the French colonial wars in Algeria and Vietnam, and the British colonial wars in Africa and Malaysia. In a study of six volumes they concluded that most of the wars lasted five to seven years and ended when one side lost the willpower to keep on fighting. This was a major insight but it was lost to the world. To this day the Army has suppressed the historians’ report.74 By the end of the 1980s the South African government was not desperate to start negotiations. It was rather the Fall of the Berlin Wall that provided the incentive for De Klerk attempting to get an agreement with the ANC while its main source of financial support, the Soviet Union, was in retreat. The business elite was concerned but its call for regime change was faint. Soldiers and policemen remained loyal and willing to continue to defend the state, but among army conscripts considerable unease had developed by the late 1980s about defending an unjust system. Nevertheless in a poll conducted in the late 1980s less than a third of English-speaking students and fewer than a tenth of Afrikaner students declared themselves prepared to accept a prospective ANC government.75 The economy was stagnating as a result of sanctions but there was no real fiscal crisis. Derek Keys, the Managing Director of General Mining who went on to serve as the last NP Minister of Finance, stated in 2010: “From a financial point of view, South Africa did not have to negotiate in 1990, but conditions were tightening … [The] situation was serious but it is not as if we had fallen off the precipice. The economy could go on.76 Fifteen years earlier Barend du Plessis, who was replaced by Keys, had made the same assessment.

73

Malcolm Gladwell, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits and the Art of Battling Giants, (London, Allen Lane, 2013), pp.197-213. 74 Freeman Dyson, “How to be an Underdog, and Win”, New York Review of Books, 21 November 2013, pp.22-23., 75 J Gagiano, “Ruling Group Cohesion”, Hermann Giliomee en J. Gagiano, The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Northern Ireland and Israel, (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1989), p.197. 76 Interview of author with Derek Keys, & October 2010.

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Chris Heunis, Botha’s Minister for Constitutional Affairs until 1989, offered this sober assessment: Sanctions had made it necessary for the government to negotiate but “there was no need to negotiate only about the hand-over of power.”77 Niel Barnard, the only person that saw both Botha and Mandela on a regular basis in the late eighties, believes that Botha would not have accepted majority rule, but would have said to Mandela: “Let’s govern together for ten years and let’s see how it goes.” He thinks there was a good chance that Mandela would have accepted it. 78 After De Klerk had abandoned his support for some of the pillars of apartheid in the late 1980s he made morality the key requirement of a negotiated settlement. In an interview I had with him two months after his momentous speech on 2 February he said that hanging on to power would be immoral.79 In a television program, broadcast in 2002, he agreed with Van Zyl Slabbert, ex-leader of the liberal opposition, that he could have been in power for at least ten more years. His main problem with that was that “it would have been “devoid of morality.”80 P.W. Botha did not share this view of morality and it is extremely doubtful that a clear majority of the white electorate would have given De Klerk and his party a yes vote in the referendum of March 1992 if it had known that majority rule would be the outcome of the negotiations. Why did the Afrikaner community nonetheless go along with the deal struck between the ANC and the government in September 1992? One answer would be that after the white referendum the tie between the government and its traditional electorate was cut. There was nothing any white group of voters could do to stop the process. In his doctoral dissertation, completed in 1999, the political analyst and pollster Lawrence Schlemmer looked at the polls of the preceding thirty years. He concluded that Afrikaners, much more than white English-speakers, had begun to stress their religious identification in preference to a class or ethnic identification. To be living an upright moral life had come to be seen as more important than to serve the Afrikaner community. 81 The Western world’s moral sanctions, much more than economic sanctions, had sapped the will to cling to power of many in the white community. Sooner or later, Toynbee argued, ruling minorities had to accept the status of ‘an unprivileged minority’ among a majority they once considered culturally inferior. Conclusion

77

Interview of author with Chris Heunis, 15 December 2002 Interview of author with Niel Barnard, 25 February 2015. 79 Interview of author with F.W. de Klerk, 2 May 1990. 80 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Charlottesville: Virginia University Press, 2003), p.635. 81 Lawrence Schlemmer, Factors in the persistence or decline of Ethnic Group mobilisation: A conceptual Review and Case Study of Cultural Group Responses among Afrikaners in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1999. 78

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For more than fifty years, from his speeches in the dock in the Treason Trial (19561961) and his letters to Hendrik Verwoerd (1961 to his presidency (1994 to 1995) Mandela cast a huge shadow over white politics. Very much along the lines Arnold Toynbee predicted in 1959, Mandela was convinced that growing black numbers, which doubled between 1946 and 1977 and doubled again between 1970 and 1996, would fatally undermine white supremacy. Yet he also knew that white fears of black power were great. To break the logjam Mandela made compromise proposals during the mid-1970s that would have severely strained ANC unity. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the Afrikaner leaders were foolish to waste these opportunities, partly because they believed he was still a communist. During the all-party negotiations (1991-1993) Mandela compromised by dropping the ANC demand for nationalisation but he remained firm on majority rule. The NP under De Klerk started the negotiations well, but abandoned most of their political demands in September 1992 in the hope of securing a stable coalition with the ANC. Some observers argue the negotiated settlement boils down to blacks winning political power and whites retaining their property, but, as recent developments show, retaining property in the absence of political power will be no easy task. Mandela served only one term as president. It is possible that in a second term he could have helped to consolidate a liberal democracy by rejecting the growing assault of property rights without which a vibrant democracy is impossible. But Mandela came too late and went too soon.

BRIEWEBUS Kol Len Els: Karateka40

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Len staan in die middel.

Pastoor Danie van Tonder: Bekendstelling van Boek Geagte brig. Hennie, Dit is lekker om weer van u te hoor en te sien die Nongqai kry nou sy tweede asem! Ek sal dit baie waardeer as u dit oorweeg om my jongste boek bekend te stel aan ons groot polisie familie, die boek is getitel: “Romanse agter die Rookskerm.” Die eerste uitgawe is gedruk Januarie 2017 en is vinnig besig om te versprei oor S.A. met positiewe terugvoer. Die inhoud is boeiend en dinamies met slaankrag en word beskou as ‘n treffer! Die buiteblad voor en agter met die inhoudsopgawe hierby aangeheg en toon 15 hoofstukke wat uit 105 bladsye bestaan met skrif duidelik leesbaar en word deur my as skrywer versprei. Vriendelike groete,

Tubby Ueckerman skryf: Brigadier Hennie, Ek het so pas u inleidingsartikel in die jongste Nongqai gelees en stem volkome saam met u afleidings en gevolgtrekkings wat u oor die ou polisiemag (SAP) en die nuwe 130


polisiediens (SAPD) gemaak het. Dit maak ’n mens hartseer om te sien wat geword het van die Polisie en sy lede. Daar bestaan geen meer trots op die roeping wat ons as polisielede gesien, beleef en ervaar het in die tyd wat ons gedien het nie. Ek was trots daarop om ‘n polisieman te wees; al het my eie broer my eendag vertel dat ek ‘n ongeskoolde arbeider was – dit het amper daartoe gelei dat hy sy grootste pak slae by my gekry het. Ons was egter op pad na ons ouers en ongelukkig het hy die kar bestuur en eers gestop toe ons by my ouers se huis gekom het, waar hy toe vir my weggehardloop het en my Pa my gekeer het. My broer was toe nog ‘n mediese student by Tukkies en ek het op daardie stadium by die kwartiermeester in Pretoria gewerk. Ek dwaal nou egter weer af van die rede hoekom ek hierdie skrywe aan u rig. Soos u weet, werk ek tans vir ‘n sekurteitsfirma in Joubertina in die Oos-Kaap in die gebied wat ook bekend staan as die Langkloof (of ook die bekende roete R62). Hier word grotendeels met appels geboer. Die area wat deur die firma gedek word, strek wyd. Die dorpe waar ons genoeg alarms het wat dit regverdig om reaksielede te hê wat aandag kan gee aan die alarms is Kareedouw in die ooste, Joubertina (wat insluit Krakeelrivier ongeveer 10km daarvandaan is), Misgund (wat eintlik niks meer as ‘n boere dorpie in die kleine is nie – area sluit in Louterwater – tussen Krakeel en Misgund – en Haarlem, reeds in die Wes-Kaap – ‘n klein kleurlinggemeenskap aan die westekant van Misgund) en dan Uniondale, ook in die Wes-Kaap, in die verre weste wat ‘n klein gemeenskappie genaamd Avontuur insluit. Die polisiedistrik strek vanaf Joubertina waar die groot Polisiestasie is tot by Misgund, waar ‘n substasie is. (Misgund stasie het egter geen voertuig nie en kan glad nie klagtes bywoon nie). Alle klagtes in die gebied word bygewoon deur die polisie in Joubertina (al met die R62 langs ‘n gebied wat ongeveer 50 km ver strek). In die tyd wat ek in Misgund was, is daar een weeksdag ‘n padblokkade voor een van die winkels gehou. Tydens die blokkade was daar nege polisievoertuie betrokke en ongeveer 25 polisie lede. Dit het aan my gewys dat Joubertina oor redelik baie voertuie beskik om hul daaglikse werk te verrig. Die rede hoekom ek hierna verwys is dat daar gedurende die nag, wanneer meeste van die misdaad insidente plaasvind, daar slegs een voertuig beskikbaar is om die hele gebied te dek. Wanneer ons ‘n positiewe alarm in die nag kry, maak nie saak waar nie, moet ons reaksie-eenheid tot langer as ‘n uur wag vir die polisielede om by die toneel op te daag (dit het al verskeie kere gebeur dat hulle glad nie opdaag nie en die klaer moet die volgende dag die saak by die Polisie aangee). Die klaer word dan ook versoek om die volgende dag ‘n klagte by die polisiestasie aan te meld. Geen verklarings (eerste aangifte van misdaad) word geneem nie! Ek het egter een aand by ‘n inbraak by ‘n bottelstoor, aangedring dat die klaer se verklaring onmiddellik geneem moet word – wat tot groot ontevredenheid gelei het. In die tyd wat ek nog ‘n stasie-polisieman was het ons altyd die klaer se verklaring op die toneel geneem en dan die ROM (Register vir die Ondersoek van Misdaad) dadelik geregistreer waarna die speurders die volgende dag die saak oorgeneem het (indien dit ‘n saak vir hulle was).

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Die bywoon van klagtes is hier so pateties dan selfs lede van die swart bevolking nie eers sake wil registreer nie aangesien hulle van mening is dat dit nie die moeite werd is nie, omrede daar niks van sal kom nie. Misdaad inligting bestaan nie; (hoe hulle misdaad daarsonder kan bekamp weet geen regdenkende polisieman nie). Ek het al van die polisie lede self gevra of hulle oor inligtingsbronne beskik, waarna hulle verbaasde antwoord was dat hulle nie weet waarvan ek praat nie.

Bernard Heymans wil weet? Bernard Heymans wil weet waarom die polisie nie “drones” kan gebruik om woonbuurtes en plase met inbegrip van boorde en wingerde vanuit die lug te patrolleer nie?

‘Piet-Patu’ van Zyl Peace in Mozambique: Widespread optimism in Zambézia: http://clubofmozambique.com/news/peace-in-mozambique-widespread-optimism-inzambezia/

Paul Els: Walvisbaai Paul Els is alweer besig met ‘n boek oor Walvisbaai. Indien u stories en foto’s het stel dit asb. beskikbaar aan Paul.

Hanlie van Straaten: Generaal Mike Geldenhuys word 92 Generaal Mike Geldenhuys, Kommissaris van Polisie (1978-1983) het op 7 April vanjaar sy 92ste verjaardag saam met sy eggenote Annatjie en ‘n paar vriende by sy huis in Nigel gevier. Maar die generaal is so oorval deur telefoonoproepe van gelukwense dat hy omtrent permanent langs die telefoon moes sit. Meer as dertig oud-kollegas en nagelate eggenotes van oud kollegas het geskakel om die generaal ‘n voorspoedige nuwe lewensjaar toe te wens. Aangesien Annatjie op 12 April verjaar, het die egpaar die Sondag saam met die kinders en kleinkinders gaan uiteet. Annatjie het op haar geboortedag ook vanuit oud- polisie geledere baie telefoonoproepe van gelukwense ontvang. Die egpaar wil graag almal wat hulle onthou het op hulle onderskeie verjaardae hartlik bedank vir die omgee. Dit word opreg waardeer. Bo: Generaal Mike en Annatjie Geldenhuys. 132


Oud-kommissaris Chris Botha: Stellenbosch Beste Hennie Baie dankie – ek het lekker gelees! Polisie-historiografie is al vir jare ‘n passie van my. Ek bestudeer dus die historiografie vanaf alle hoeke, wat vir my die eerlikste manier is om dit te doen. Ek was onthuts toe ek vir die eerste keer X (naam weerhou) se artikel oor Marius De Wit Dippenaar se “S.A. Polisie Gedenkalbum 1913-1988” gelees het. Nadat die stof gaan lê het, egter, het ek werklik begin om die epistemologie, metodologie en ontologie van polisiehistoriografie te ondersoek. En ek het baie geleer .. Ek het geleer dat die epistemologie, metodologie en ontologie van historiografie basies net twee uitdagings oplewer. Dit is die uitdaging van die historikus self (Winston Churchill: “history is written by the victors”) en die bronne wat deur die historikus gebruik word (die beskikbaarheid van bronne oor Afrika, uit Afrika, is beperk). In my groei het die bogenoemde my geleer dat alle moontlike bronne geraadpleeg moet word, (ook orale, antropologiese, argeologiese en vele ander bronne) en dat die historikus se eerlikheid nooit onder verdenking mag wees nie. Toe eers het ek ‘n klomp dinge begin verstaan. As voorbeeld: wanneer ek my nuutste navorsing oor polisiëring in Afrika met mense deel, is daar nog mense wat van hulle stoele afval as ek verduidelik dat daar geen verskil is nie tussen die kenmerke van koloniale polisiëring en die polisiëring in die Suid-Afrika van 2017 nie. En tog is dit so duidelik as mens dit met ‘n oop gemoed (eerlikheid) benader. Dit is natuurlik nie polities aanvaarbaar om dit te vertel nie, maar aan kritiek is ek darem al vir minstens drie dekades gewoond. Dit bring my by u werk en dus by Nongqai. Dit lyk vir my na ‘n eerlike poging om die geskiedenis van die voormalige SAP te beskrywe. U gebruik uiteenlopende standpunte en bring baie persoonlike inligting by. Laasgenoemde dra by tot die herwinning van die institusionele geheue, wat vinnig verlore gaan soos wat oud-lede van die toneel af verdwyn. Die eerlike deelnemende waarnemer kan ‘n groot bydrae maak tot hierdie herwinningsproses en die daaropvolgende verspreiding van die inligting. Baiekeer is dit slegs die groot momente wat in formele stukke beskryf word (soos die deelname van die SAP aan die Tweede Wêreldoorlog) terwyl dit juis die gedeeltes van daardie groot momente is (die ongeskrewe staaltjies tydens die SAP se deelname aan die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, en so meer) wat verlore gaan. Nongqai het baie van laasgenoemde. Daar kan altyd nog iets beskryf word wat iets kan toelig: as u dit met Nongqai kan bereik, word Nongqai ‘n waardevolle deel van die SAPhistoriografie – iets wat ek seker is dit reeds is. En dan, natuurlik, is Nongqai ‘n bron van polisie-historiologie oor Afrika uit Afrika .. As akademikus, twee punte (wat dalk alreeds aangespreek is, ek weet dalk net nie): 1. Nongqai se inhoud moet geredelik vir die akademikus beskikbaar wees, en die inhoud oor al die uitgawes moet verkieslik van ‘n indeks voorsien wees. Wat eersgenoemde betref, moet al die groot biblioteke dus toegang tot Nongqai kan hê,

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en moet navorsers weet waar om te soek. Laasgenoemde sal die navorser help om te fokus op die spesifieke tema wat ondersoek word; en 2. U sou natuurlik alle moontlike probleme in ag geneem het met die stigting van Nongqai, maar het niemand ‘n klagte gehad oor die naam nie? My gevoel is dus dat u baie hard werk om aan ‘n nodige behoefte te voorsien – en dit is ‘n bydrae waarop u trots kan wees. Ek sou graag wou sien wat u alles oor Craig in die hande gekry het. Met beste wense, Chris

Andre van der Merwe: Staatslykshuis, Soweto Goeie More,

Hier is ‘n foto van my wat geneem is na ‘n skietkompetisie by Boekenhout militêrebasis buite Pretoria, sal later ‘n beter een stuur. Bietjie agtergrond oor my: • • • • • • • •

Gebore in SWA, 51 jaar gelede Sluit 1983 aan by SA Polisie, Alberton, SAP Kollege 2de semester 1983, Maleoskop 1983/84. Word geplaas op Germiston, werk klagtekantoor, voetpatrollie, patrolliewa bemanning, later bestuurder en wyksersant. 1984 tydelike oorplasing na Opruk-eenheid in Katlehong- en Thokoza-areas, bestuurder van niesmasjien en rookmasjien, roepsein Oscar Delta 51 en 52 1985 Uniform Ondersoek-eenheid en lykhuis (Germiston) tot nou. Bevordering na onder-sersant 1990, sersant 1992 en inspekteur in 1999. 1994 SWAT kwalifikasie by Eenheid 6, Dunotter. 2006 word aangestel by Forensies as adjunk-direkteur vir Germiston.

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2007 word oorgeplaas na Soweto en is onlangs weens “restructuring” oorgeplaas na Forensiese hoofkantoor as die Provinsiale Infrastruktuur Bestuurder vir Forensies (bly op selde rang.) My kantoor is nog by Diepkloof in Soweto.

Is betrokke by die Lee Enfield Rifle Assosiation of South Africa wat hulle beywer om die ou Lee Enfield gewere se historiese waarde behoue te laat bly en gereeld skiet byeenkomste te hou. Is ook ‘n versamelaar van militêre- en polisie-memorabilia (kentekens, toerusting ens.) Speel nog so nou en dan rugby (Golden Oldies) Is tans besig om ‘n dokument saam te stel oor transformasie van die lykshuise vanaf Polisie na Gesondheid. Vriendelike Groete,

SLOT / END Geagte leser: Vir hierdie kwasiehistoriese dokument ons maak van verskeie bronne gebruik en bevat die dokument uiteraard uiteenlopende en diverse persoonlike menings van verskillende persone en die opsteller van die Nongqai kan nie in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid daarvoor verantwoordelik of aanspreeklik gehou word nie. Dear reader of this quasi-historical document: please note we make use of various sources and consequently it is obvious that the document contains various diverse and personal opinions of different people and the author of the Nongqai cannot be held responsible or be liable in his personal capacity. Hennie Heymans

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Nongqai vol 8 no 5  

Police- and National Security History of Southern Africa

Nongqai vol 8 no 5  

Police- and National Security History of Southern Africa

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