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PUBLISHER / UITGEWER Published by Hennie Heymans, Pretoria, ZA. E-mail: heymanshb@gmail.com Tel: 012-329-4229.

WELCOME / WELKOM Welcome to this very interesting edition. We enjoyed compiling your interesting reports and articles. Your contributions made this a very interesting edition and we hope you will derive much pleasure from reading it. Baie dankie aan ons lesers wat hierdie interessante uitgawe moontlik gemaak het. Ons hoop u gaan die tydskrif net so baie geniet soos ons wat dit passie saamgestel het.

AIM / DOEL Our goal is to collect and record our national security history for publication in the Nongqai for future generations. Ons doel is om die nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis in die Nongqai aan te teken en so vir die nageslag te bewaar.

FRONT PAGE / VOORBLAD The front page is based on an old series of Nongqai covers used in days gone by. The cover was artistically improved by Glenn Elsden, a former member of the SA Police based at Forensics. Contact details: Elsden Design Services e-mail: glenn.elsden@gmail.com

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ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS • • • •

Photographs of police stations. Uniforms and badges. Police Heroes and a “Police Who is Who”. Police Commissioners: We are preparing a booklet on the various SA Police commissioners. Should you have any photographs or anecdotes please share with us. Kommissarisse van polisie: Ons is besig om inligting van ons onderskeie polisiekommissarisse in te samel. Ons begin by kol. sir TG Truter en werk ons pad deur die geskiedenis totdat genl. JV van der Merwe die SAP oorhandig het aan nuwe nasionale kommissaris van die SAPS, genl. George Fivaz. Ons het besluit om brig. George Baston by die reeks in te sluit aangesien hy vir bykans vyf jaar as die kommissaris waargeneem het. Police History: We collect eyewitness reports from policemen about cataclysmic events in our history e.g. Cato Manor, Sharpeville, Pondoland, etc. We have large collection of digital recordings from prominent police officers.

VIRUAL POLICE MUSEUM / VIRTUELE POLISIEMUSEUM

Besoekers per dag aan ons museum. Ons het ʼn eie webwerf met ʼn virtuele polisiemuseum gehad. Weens die swak randdoller wisselkoers het ons besluit om die projek te staak totdat ons ʼn langtermyn borg kry of totdat ons een of ander vorm van ʼn “SAP-GESKIEDNIS VERENINGING” kan stig. Een man kan nie alles doen nie! Om oudlede te kan kry – daar was eens so baie selferkende professionele en trotse lede in Blou - sal net welkom wees om passievol te help met die projek. Die polisie het nie eens meer ʼn rugbyklub in Pretoria nie. Hoe gaan ons die ou rugbyspelers van vanmelewe vereer en huldig? Gaan ons hulle vergeet? Ek wonder of daar nie akademici of ʼn navorsingsinstituut is wat in die geskiedenis van die polisie belangstel nie sodat ʼn omvattende databasis oor die SAP opgerig kan word. Vanuit ʼn nasionale strategiese oogpunt het die polisie skitterende werk 3


gelewer en dit is lofwaardig dat die polisie in wese altyd getrou was aan die uitvoerende gesag – afgesien van eie politieke oortuigings. (Ons is deur rebellie, opstand, revolusie, oorloÍ en magsoorgawe en tog het ons getrou gebly aan ons eed en roeping.) Indien ons nie die spreekwoordelike moue gaan oprol en begin om ons geskiedenis te bewaar nie, kan ek u verseker, dat niemand dit vir ons gaan doen nie.

Marlene Swanepoel, kuratrise van die SAPS-museum en Petro Heymans Vertel u vriende van die NONGQAI; ons soek meer deelnemers aan ons geskiedenis-projekte. So het ons bv. die verhaal van die eerste Russies-opgeleide PLAN-vegter wat deur konst. Gawie Botha gearresteer is, vir die nageslag gereed!

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Contents PUBLISHER / UITGEWER......................................................................................... 2 WELCOME / WELKOM .............................................................................................. 2 AIM / DOEL ................................................................................................................ 2 FRONT PAGE / VOORBLAD ..................................................................................... 2 ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS ......................................................................... 3 VIRUAL POLICE MUSEUM / VIRTUELE POLISIEMUSEUM .................................... 3 1897 (circa) STAATSARTILLERIE: RUITER.............................................................. 9 1897 (circa): WETSTOEPASSING: HONDEVANGER JOHANNESBURG .............. 10 1897 (circa): MARKET: JOHANNESBURG.............................................................. 10 BLOEMFONTEIN ..................................................................................................... 11 •

1897 (circa): BLOEMFONTEIN ................................................................... 11

1897 (circa): Bloemfontein Tronk ................................................................ 11

1900: THE BOER IN PEACE AND WAR ................................................................. 12 •

Rinderpest ...................................................................................................... 13

Boer Mounted Police ...................................................................................... 13

BOEK & FILM: “THE BOER WHORE” ..................................................................... 15 1901: DIE BOERE NEEM VANRHYNSDORP IN ..................................................... 16 1910: GENL LOUIS “LEWIES” BOTHA.................................................................... 20 •

Sy verwoeste plaasopstal ........................................................................... 20

Krygsraad .................................................................................................... 21

Mev. Annie Botha ........................................................................................ 22

Genl. Botha, perde en standbeelde............................................................. 23

1910: UNIE VAN ZUID-AFRIKA: GENL BEYERS .................................................... 28 Christiaan Frederik Beyers (23 September 1869 – 8 December 1914) ................ 29 1911: HOVE’S DRIFT .............................................................................................. 30 1911: GOEWERMENT HOUSE: PRETORIA ........................................................... 31 DAGGA .................................................................................................................... 31 •

1919 : Ik Wil Geen Dagga Hebben: Sammy Marks ..................................... 32

Culture: Caroline King Cannabis ................................................................. 33

Legalisation of marijuana in South Africa: Felli Kay .................................... 34

SAP (circa 1920): CEREMONIAL UNIFORM AT FUNERAL.................................... 37 1925: AIR MAIL VIA SAAF ....................................................................................... 38 5


Col Sir Pierre Van Reyneveld & Maj H Meintjes ................................................... 39 WE LOOK BACK: NONGQAI 1931 .......................................................................... 40 Divisional HQ: Bloemfontein: Free State ............................................................... 40 Major H Meintjes, SAAF, now Member of SAP ..................................................... 40 1931 Ford Victoria................................................................................................. 41 Commendation: Force Order 15 (G) 1931: ........................................................... 41 •

No. 8291 Mounted Constable AJ Swart ...................................................... 41

No 11842 Mounted Constable CS Klue ...................................................... 41

No 11186 Mounted Lance Sergeant CPJ Baard ......................................... 41

1935: Identification Parade ................................................................................... 42 1935: UDF/ UVM Dist 6, Bloemfontein .................................................................. 42 CID/KOD: “Just Checking” .................................................................................... 43 1938: Korporatiewe Geheue: SAP-hondemeesters in die buiteland ........................ 43 •

Palestina ..................................................................................................... 43

Kenya .......................................................................................................... 44

UN CHILDREN’S FUND / VN KINDERFONDS ........................................................ 45 1953: OPENING: PARLIAMENT / PARLEMENT: SAP MOTOR CYCLE ESCORT / MOTORFIETSE ....................................................................................................... 45 INFO WANTED: ALEXANDRA'S 1986 SIX-DAY WAR ............................................ 46 INLIGTING VERLANG: WIE KEN VIR VETERAAN I.S. COETZER (SAP & VALSKERMSOLDAAT)? .......................................................................................... 46 •

1973: India Kompanie, Binga, Rhodesie ..................................................... 49

1974: Gholf Kompanie, Rushinga ............................................................... 49

SERS JJ ERASMUS (SAP PORT NATAL & SAP KOLLEGE) ................................. 49 MAJ. JJ VAN ROOYEN & KAPT. JJ VAN ROOYEN (PA & SEUN) ........................ 52 •

Maj. JJ Van Rooyen .................................................................................... 52

Kapt JJ van Rooyen (Pel 43 van 1974) ....................................................... 53

PARATUS DESEMBER 1980 .................................................................................. 53 •

Staatsbegrafnis: Pres JJ Fouchè ................................................................ 53

Brig. “Witkop” Badenhorst en SWAPO ........................................................ 54

Misdaadbekamping: SAW & SAP ............................................................... 56

KOEVOET: LUIT FRANS CONRADIE ..................................................................... 57 •

Scope 16 Dec 1983 ........................................................................................ 57 6


PEACE MONITORS 1994: GAVIN TISCHENDORF ................................................ 65 UNIFORMS: GENL JV VAN DER MERWE & NASIONALE KOMISSARIS GEORGE FIVAZ ....................................................................................................................... 66 KOL VICK McPHERSON ......................................................................................... 67 UIT DIE KOERANTE ................................................................................................ 67 •

SAP Rugby.................................................................................................. 67

Misdaad ...................................................................................................... 68

Bedryf van Inligting...................................................................................... 69

Kommentaar................................................................................................ 73

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY...................................................................... 73 RESENSIES VAN LESERS: KOEVOET: THE MEN SPEAK ................................... 74 BESOEK AAN SAPS-MUSEUM .............................................................................. 76 •

DB Pratt: Aanval op dr. HF Verwoerd ......................................................... 76

Dimitri Tsafendas moord op dr. Verwoerd: Die dolk .................................... 77

AP Stemmet vertel die volgende staaltjie .................................................... 78

Luitenant Vaughan Sharp ........................................................................... 80

Kommissarisse van Polisie ................................................................................... 82 •

Kol. sir TG Truter......................................................................................... 82

Genl.maj. IP de Villiers ................................................................................ 83

Genl.maj. RJ Palmer ................................................................................... 85

Genl.maj. JA Brink ...................................................................................... 85

Ander items ........................................................................................................... 86 •

SAP Rangtekens ......................................................................................... 86

Ou Polisiemanne 1693 & 1913.................................................................... 86

Teëls en argiefstukke .................................................................................. 87

RANGE, RANGTEKENS EN UNIFORMS ................................................................ 87 Enkele gedagtes oor Polisierange en –uniforms - HBH ........................................ 88 •

Adjunkkommissaris ..................................................................................... 88

1953: Militarisering van die polisierange ..................................................... 88

Mark Naude’s reply ..................................................................................... 90

Attachments ................................................................................................ 90

SAP: Vocabulary of Stores and Clothing Items. .................................................... 95 BRIGADIER-GENERAL AND BRIGADIER RANKS ................................................. 98 7


Brigadier-General and Brigadier Ranks and Associated Insignia in the Union Defence Force and South African Defence Force: Compiled By M Naudé ........... 98 Brigadier Rank and Insignia in the South African Police: Compiled By M Naudé 105 DST (AMI) BYMEKAARKOMS. .............................................................................. 108 LET ME TAKE A WALK IN YOUR GARDEN: MJJ VAN RENSBURG ................... 109 HUMOUR IN UNIFORM ......................................................................................... 110 •

Top this one for a speeding ticket ............................................................. 110

Stolen Car ................................................................................................. 111

SERVICE DELIVERY AND CORRUPTION ........................................................... 113 THE SACP'S SECRET MOSCOW PAPERS ......................................................... 117 A POEM TO WHICH I CAN RELATE: JEF ‘JEFFERS’ MANNING ........................ 130 KUM-A-KYE: THE REGIMENTAL MARCH OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA POLICE .................................................................................................................. 131 1950: OUTSTANDING BSAP PERFORMANCE .................................................... 131 BSAP 1890 - 1980.................................................................................................. 131 Greetings / Groete .................................................................................................. 132

IPA Hoofkantoor: “Pilot” en Doreen Loots voor die hoofkantoor afgeneem so paar jaar gelede (2012) – HBH. 8


1897 (circa) STAATSARTILLERIE: RUITER

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1897 (circa): WETSTOEPASSING: HONDEVANGER JOHANNESBURG

Photo: Nico Moolman

1897 (circa): MARKET: JOHANNESBURG

Wagons Bringing Wool To Early Morning Market (Johannesburg). 10


BLOEMFONTEIN •

1897 (circa): BLOEMFONTEIN

1897 (circa): Bloemfontein Tronk

Photo: Nico Moolman 11


1900: THE BOER IN PEACE AND WAR THE BOER IN PEACE AND WAR

AUTHOR OF

BY ARTHUR M. MANN 'THE TRUTH FROM JOHANNESBURG'

WITH SIXTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS

London John Long 6 Chandos Street, Strand 1900 The following photos were scanned from the above book for the interest of our readers. By looking at the photos we can a minute idea what problems faced our colleagues in days of old. Horse sickness and rinderpest were great problems those days as it affected transport. By then the railways had connected the harbours with some inland towns but in some cases transport between towns depended on horses, oxen, mules and donkeys. 1890s African rinderpest epizootic In the 1890s, an epizootic of the rinderpest virus struck Africa, considered to be "the most devastating epidemic to hit southern Africa in the late nineteenth century". It killed more than 5.2 million cattle south of the Zambezi, as well as domestic oxen, sheep, and goats, and wild populations of buffalo, giraffe, and wildebeest. This led to starvation resulting in the death of an estimated third of the human population of Ethiopia and two-thirds of the Maasai people of Tanzania. The virus is thought to have been introduced into Eritrea in 1887 by Indian cattle brought by the Italians for their campaign against Somalia. It spread throughout the Horn of Africa, and crossed the Zambezi in March of 1896. 1

1

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia

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• Rinderpest

Shooting Rinderpest oxen: Those were the days before Onderstepoort was established.

• Boer Mounted Police

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Wagon on Pontoon over a River.

Wagons Crossing a River.

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BOEK & FILM: “THE BOER WHORE”

Nico Moolman en Petro Heymans saam met Ian Roberts Nico Moolman, Ian Roberts en Zelmari Botha in Pretoria met egte ABO-klere uit Winburg Konsentrasie kamp. Die rok en kappie is deur Oud-pres CR Swart se moeder gedra en aan Nico Moolman deur sy dogter, Mev. Dalena Visser, geskenk. Ian se hoed is gedurende die ABO deur oom Lombard van Heilbron gedra en is deur Piet Lombard geskenk. Die historiese kledingstukke gaan in die film “The Boer Whore” gedra word.

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1901: DIE BOERE NEEM VANRHYNSDORP IN

Boer neem Vanrhynsdorp in op 19 Januarie 1901.

Kommandant Myburgh en sy verkenners te Vanrhynsdorp.

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Kommandant Nieuwoudt en veldkornette in Vanrhynsdorp

Die Oberholzer-broers almal lede van Onbekende offisier in Britse uniform. genl Hertzog se kommando Geen verdere besonderhede nie.

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Kommandant Chas. Nieuwoudt – let op die karwats.

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Let op die Boer se netjies klere! – let op die karwats.

Boerverkenners, weereens is almal netjies aangetrek! – let op die karwatse. Die Boere is lief vir hul perde. 19


1910: GENL LOUIS “LEWIES” BOTHA •

Sy verwoeste plaasopstal

Genl Louis Botha se opstal word die lug ingeskiet!

Die verwoeste opstal!

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•

Krygsraad

Colenso-distrik: Genl Botha hou krygsraad in die skaduwee van bosse en seile.

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Mev. Annie Botha

Mev. Annie Botha – voorheen mej. Emmet. Hier in Riviera, Pretoria, is ‘n groot staat na die dame vernoem.

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• Genl. Botha, perde en standbeelde

“Bles” die generaal se ros. Die perd was die Boer se gunsteling vervoermiddel. Daar was fietse en voetgangers en manne wat op waens en perdekarre gereis het – maar die perd was by uitstek die Boer se vervoermiddel. Die perd was getrou en het saam met die Boer swaargekry – veral in die winter. Benewens genl Loui Botha, was genl De Wet ook ‘n perdeliefhebber sy bekende perd was “Fleur”.

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Majoor Louis Esselen, genl Louis Botha se aide-de-camp, op die rug generaal se gunsteling perd. [Kommentaar deur Hennie Heymans: Ek dink die perd op die vorige foto se naam is “Charlie”.] An aide-de-camp - French expression meaning literally “helper in the [military] camp” is a personal assistant or secretary to a person of high rank, usually a senior military, police or government officer, a member of a royal family, or a head of state. This is not to be confused with an adjutant, who is the senior administrator of a military unit. The first aide-de-camp is typically the foremost personal aide. In some countries, the aide-de-camp is considered to be a title of honour (which confers the postnominal letters ADC or A de C), and participates at ceremonial functions. The badge of office for an aide-de-camp is usually the aiguillette, a braided cord in gold or other 24


colours, worn on the shoulder of a uniform. Whether it is worn on the left or the right shoulder is dictated by protocol. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aide-de-camp]

Die generaal, toe eerste minister, op “Dapper” se rug. Hierdie foto is by die ou SAP Depot geneem. Regs verskyn die kommissaris van polisie op sy perd se rug. Die stafoffisier links is onbekend. Ek vermoed die foto hierbo is geneem na afloop van sy segetog in Duits-SWA. Ek het iewers gelees dat hy die SAP-lyfwag van 100 man tydens ʼn parade in die SAP Depot hartlik bedank het. Die stafoffisier kan identies met maj. Louis Esselen wees.

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Die foto van genl Louis Botha is in Kaapstad naby Tuynhuis – Foto: Hennie Heymans.

Genl Botha in Pretoria voor die Uniegebou

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Beeld van genl Botha deur Coert Steynberg

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1910: UNIE VAN ZUID-AFRIKA: GENL BEYERS

Genl. Christiaan Beyers was prokureur, kryger en 'n leier in die rebellie van 1914. Hy is in 1869 naby Stellenbosch gebore en verhuis in 1889 na die Transvaal, waar hy prokureur en 'n burger van die ZAR word. Hy sluit hom by die Boeremagte aan tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog en vorder tot by die rang van generaal. Ná die Vrede van Vereeniging hervat hy sy beroep as prokureur in Pretoria. Hy word later speaker van die Transvaalse parlement tydens Verantwoordelike Regering. In1912 word hy aangestel as kommandant-generaal (bevelvoerder) van die Uniale Weermag. Die volgende jaar besoek hy Europa en ontmoet daar vir keiser Wilhelm II van Duitsland. Kort ná sy terugkeer kruis hy swaarde met generaal Louis Botha, wat hy gereken het té veel waarde geheg het aan oorsese verpligtinge. Beyers knoop daarom onderhandelinge aan met generaal Koos de la Rey en andere wat teen die regeringsbeleid gekant was. Sy ontevredenheid met die regering word op die spits gedryf toe hy in September 1914, ná die uitbreek van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog,

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bedank as bevelvoerder van die weermag. Generaal Jan Smuts het hom van hoogverraad beskuldig. Beyers raak by die Rebellie betrokke en verdrink dieselfde jaar nog in die Vaalrivier terwyl regeringstroepe hom agtervolg het.

Christiaan Frederik Beyers (23 September 1869 – 8 December 1914) As a young man, he went to the Transvaal, where he took a prominent part on the Boer side in the South African War, winning high distinction in the field and bearing the rank of general when peace was made in 1902. Beyers had much influence, as soldier and statesman, among the Dutch-speaking people of South Africa, and was, with Generals Botha and Smuts, though in a less degree than they, one of the recognized leaders of the Transvaal Boers. When responsible government was granted to the Transvaal, Beyers became speaker of the Lower House. He showed in the speaker's chair remarkable gifts. He was acute, tolerant and rigidly impartial, thus making a deep impression upon English-speaking South Africans, who would have supported his claims to be the first speaker of the first South African House of Assembly, had they been pressed by Louis Botha, the first Prime Minister. Instead, Beyers was made commandant general of the Citizen Forces of the Union Defence Force of South Africa, and in that capacity paid a visit to Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1912. A man of fine physique, of passionate nature, and of profound religious convictions, Beyers, as commandant general of South Africa, was entertained with marked attentions during his visit to Germany by Kaiser Wilhelm II. When World War I broke out, he set himself in almost open opposition to the policy of the Botha government. For some months, this opposition smouldered. Then, at a moment when the South African expeditionary force was being mobilized for the invasion of German SouthWest Africa, and when rebellion was already smouldering among the irreconcilables of the South African Dutch, Beyers resigned his post as commandant general in a letter addressed to General Smuts, then Minister of Defence, and published in Het Volk, an anti-government journal. In this letter he declared that he had always disapproved the Government's intention to invade German South-West Africa and that this disapproval was shared by the great majority of the Dutch-speaking people of the Union. General Smuts replied in a stern letter declaring that the war was a test of the loyalty to their pledged word of the Dutch-speaking people, and accepting Beyers' resignation. A few weeks later Beyers took the field as a leader of the Boer Rebels against the government, only to be overwhelmed by the government troops under the command of General Botha, to be driven from pillar to post as a fugitive, and to be wounded and consequently drowned on 8 December 1914, while trying to escape from his pursuers by crossing the Vaal River. His body was recovered two days later, and with his death the rebellion was brought to an end.

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1911: HOVE’S DRIFT

[NGR foto 1911]. Min mense in Pretoria weet waar die plek is. Dit is net ten weste van die ou SAP lykshuis in Dr. Savageweg langs die ou Pretoria Algemene Hospitaal – die hospitaal het nou ʼn nuwe naam. Verder aan met die spruit, na links, kry mens die nasionale dieretuin. Pretoria gister en vandag [Pretoria News, 1988-02-26] : “... The drift was situated where Prinsloo Street and Bloed Street today join Dr. Savage Road, south of the H.F. Verwoerd Hospital. Hove’s Drift was well known to travellers in the olden days, and was named after a Mr. Hove who had a mill at the drift. The ruins of the mill can be seen on the left of the picture. The area on the right held a British camp during the South-African war. The first bridge built over the Apies at this spot was known as Hove’s Bridge. Today a modern structure carries heavy traffic to the city’s northern suburbs (picture below) /.../ Text by staff writer Daan de Beer.).../”http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/21275/Pta%201304.pdf?sequence=1

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1911: GOEWERMENT HOUSE: PRETORIA

Hierdie is die ou Goewerneurs-generaal en staatspresidente woning langs Libertas.

DAGGA (Ons bepleit nie dat die rook of gebruik van dagga gewettig moet word nie. Self rook ek nie. Ons delf maar net in die geskiedenis oor daggarokery. Die medisinale waarde van dagga moet egter nie onderskat word nie. Ons kyk ook wat ander oor die onderwerp sê.) Op versoek het Nico Moolman die volgende brief aan my gestuur. Sien hieronder “1919: Ik Wil Geen Dagga Hebben: Sammy Marks.” In vanmelewe se dae was dagga eers net so bekend soos biltong en beskuit. Ons leef in ʼn interessante wêreld! Ek het bietjie gaan lees oor dagga. Dagga is ʼn baie ou en bekende dwelm. Sedert Jan van Riebeeck is die dwelm bekend aan die vroeë inwoners aan die Kaap. Dagga was tot voor 1928 wettig verbou en verkoop. Die dagga, aldus Nico Moolman, het Sammy Marks weer aan die mynwerkers verkoop. Nico Moolman ken die familie Van Heerden van Heilbron. Aanvanklik het die Van Heerden-familie dagga geruil vir boustene. Brig. Piet Fabricius het vertel hoe die arbeiders te Kamfersdam, Kimberley, wat die wilde perde vir die polisie moes inbreek, eers ‘n paar skywe dagga gerook het waarna die ruiter soos ʼn neet geklou het. Konst. ML Stassen het my eenmaal op nagdiens vertel hoe sekere mense wat hout gekap het, eers dagga vir krag gerook het.

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Hasjisj (Engels – Hashish) is ʼn bekende dwelm en die woord vir sluipmoord in Engels “assassination” kom waarskynlik van die word hasjisj af.2 •

1919 : Ik Wil Geen Dagga Hebben: Sammy Marks

Aftasting ontvang van Nico Moolman.

2

The word assassin is often believed to derive from the word Hashshashin and shares its etymological roots with hashish. It referred to a group of Nizari Shia Persians who worked against various Arab and Persian targets. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination)

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• Culture: Caroline King Cannabis SA's hidden history Culture: Fri, 10 Jun, 2011, Caroline King There was a time when dagga was as traditional to South Africa as biltong, boerebeskuit and witblits. It fascinated Jan van Riebeeck, missionaries extolled its virtues and it remained a favourite "sun downer" until the first quarter of the last century. A fascinated audience learnt this at a recent talk in the Grahamstown Friends of the Library's regular Monday evening lecture series. Hazel Crampton, author of the The Sunburnt Queen - the story of a shipwrecked child and her descendants, traced through contemporary oral histories and reports from the Eastern Cape - shared her discoveries about the cannabis sativa plant's past in South Africa - information she encountered while researching ancient trade routes. Colloquially known as dagga, the plant has been smoked or consumed to produce a kind of high for probably thousands of years, but it is now an illegal substance in most countries. Dagga is not indigenous to South Africa, but to central Asia, and its spread across continents is thought to be linked to the spread of Islam. Arabic and Indian traders brought the plant along the trade routes, and once here, it was thought that tribes spread it further across the country. There were references to dagga-smoking in the histories of the Khoi, San, Sotho, Tswana "and everything in between", said Crampton. The first written account pertaining to dagga in South Africa was in the journal of Dutch settler Jan van Riebeeck, in 1658, when he wrote about a southern Xhoi group smoking "dacha" and the effects it had on them. Crampton also came across recipes for old boere remedies that required dagga. Tea was made from the leaves to alleviate high blood pressure, and the smoke was used to treat open wounds and poisonous bites. Apparently many missionaries on the African continent often indulged in smoking dagga, which was documented in their journals, and Crampton said the plant was still being used as a "sun downer" until the first World War. There was even a time when dagga was "as traditional to South Africa as biltong, boerebeskuit and witblits", she said, but cannabis culture changed in 1928, when the plant was made illegal. From the 1930s to the 1950s there was a flourish of reprints of the writings of missionaries and explorers to avoid embarrassment, and their accounts were edited to make it appear as if they had been using leonitis leonorus, which is dagga's legal cousin, wild hemp. During question-time after the talk, members of the audience that filled every seat in the room behind the Hill Street Library, seemed to be more concerned with questions relating to dagga itself than how it came to be in our country. http://www.grocotts.co.za/content/cannabis-sas-hidden-history-10-06-2011 33


• Legalisation of marijuana in South Africa: Felli Kay 16 October 2015, 12:54 The legalisation of marijuana in South Africa as of late has been a controversial topic. Around the world many countries are slowly becoming more accustomed to the idea of marijuana as a non-harmful substance and it is high time policy in South Africa embraces it and ease the laws against the possession and consumption of marijuana. “Cannabis is to date a genetically pure plant, occurring globally, which offers massive medicinal, industrial, agricultural, ecological, and socio-economic benefits to the man on the street.” (George, 2015) In 2010 the UN World Drug Report states that between 119 million people to 224 million people above the age of 18 used marijuana. (UN, 2010) In this paper I look to give reasons and recommendations for why government must review the law/policy of marijuana in South Africa. The cannabis industry is widespread in South Africa with many diverse users of it, the government should look for ways to take control and ownership of this natural plant instead of criminalising what has been proven to pose no more of a threat than smoking a cigarette does. I will explain in detail why I recommend that government starts the process of decriminalising cannabis and takes control of its use and production for medical and commercial purposes. I write this paper from the perspective of the South African political party: “The Dagga party of South Africa”. The main goal of this organisation is the legalisation of Marijuana in South Africa. It was formed in 2009 but failed to take part in the 2014 national elections because of shortage of funds. (Gaye, 2014) However, it is registered and recognised political party by the Independent Electoral Committee. One might be tempted to outright dismiss the whole point of this paper but what one fails to do is look beyond the generalization that cannabis is a harmful drug. In South Africa there has never been a marijuana related death since forever, so why do people perceive it to be bad and why is it illegal? Unqualified reports and studies have led people to believe marijuana kill brain cells, this is an argument that scholars at Cambridge University does not accept: “our results indicate that there might be decrements in the ability to learn and remember new information in chronic users, whereas other cognitive abilities are unaffected.” (Grant, 2003) The problem this paper aims to tackle is that government is losing out on potentially millions in gross domestic product by criminalising the possession and use of cannabis. Dagga was made illegal in South Africa in 1928 which distorted what had become as traditional to South Africans as biltong. (King, 2011) The longer 34


government procrastinates on the legalisation of weed, the more will fall under the black market and that increases the amount of crime in the country as compared to if one could simply walk into a pharmacy or supermarket and purchase their desired or government regulated amount of weed over the counter. Marijuana currently is not treated like other substances, for instance, alcohol or cigarettes, the government cannot claim taxes on cannabis because they do not have structures in place like the SA breweries to regulate and control how much of the substance can be consumed, where, when and how. The current policy in place against marijuana is the law in terms of the Illicit Drug(s) and Trafficking Act 140, of 1992, it prohibits the possession and dealing of cannabis in its entirety inside our borders (Steynvaart, 2014). This act means that anyone found in possession of marijuana is subject to prosecution to the full extent of the law. This law’s downfall is when people that use it for religious, medicinal and recreational activities get arrested and prosecuted. This policy or law has been successful when you look at it from the non-modern and uninformed perspective that cannabis is bad for one’s health, but it has been discovered and proved that this is not the case. The policy has been unsuccessful in it’s main aim which was to deter people from using cannabis, instead we have seen the use of cannabis increase in south Africa and in 2009 the country was named Marijuana capital of the world, “South Africans are the world dagga smoking champions. A report from a UN agency shows that around eight percent of South Africans use the recreational drug, twice the global average of four percent” (Hartley, 2009). A solution that is currently on the table is for the government to make the possession and consumption of cannabis legal and then implement laissez faire and let cannabis circulate in the same way it has been, but now without the threat of prosecution. In my opinion this option would not be the best, even though it would cost the government no money, it would bring out a state of anarchy where every Tom, Dick and Harry can now sell cannabis. Also there would be the risk of children coming into contact with the substance. The best solution is for the government to nationalise and take ownership of all sorts of marijuana in the country and then formalise and create a safe way of obtaining marijuana, be it from a pharmacy or supermarket or even over the counter. This now would allow the government to place a heavy levy much like sin tax on marijuana. The government could even invest money into research to find a way that you can control the high you get from smoking the plant. Recommendation

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The legalisation of Marijuana has been long overdue. The continued criminalisation of it only results in higher figures of crime in the country when there is actually nothing that goes against or is in breach of the bill of rights in our country as marijuana does not harm others, barely even oneself. I recommend that the government does away with the prohibition of weed in our borders in the act 140, of 1992. The government need to introduce marijuana farming into the agricultural system and this will create employment, boost the gross domestic product and also at the same time make hundreds of thousands of people happy and high. References 1. Gaye, D. (2014, August 17). Dagga Party misses deadline. Eyewitness News. 2. George, D. (2015, February 09). Cannabis in South Africa today 2015. News24. 3. Grant, I. (2003, July 01). Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society. Retrieved from Cambrideg Journals: Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=154103& fileId=S1355617703950016 4. Hartley, R. (2009, February 20). Times Live. Retrieved from South Africa is the marijuana capital of the world: retrieved from http://blogs.timeslive.co.za/hartley/2009/02/20/south-africa-is-the-marijuana-capitalof-the-world/ 5. King, C. (2011, June 10). Grocot's mail. Retrieved from Cannabis: SA's hidden history: retrieved from http://www.grocotts.co.za/content/cannabis-sas-hiddenhistory-10-06-2011 6. Steynvaart, J. (2014, February 20). News24. Retrieved from Dagga Legislation the constituional conundrum: retrieved from http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/Dagga-legislation-the-constitutional-conundrum20140220\ 7. UN. (2010). World Drug Report. Bron: http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/Legalisation-of-marijuana-in-South-Africa20151016 afgelaai 3 Februarie 2017.

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SAP (circa 1920): CEREMONIAL UNIFORM AT FUNERAL

Photo: Nico Moolman

Let op die hoofkonstabels dra Sam Browne’s en offisiere nie. Die offisiere dra ook spore by die seremoniële uniform. Die offisiere se helms was wit. (Ek weet voet hoofkonstabels het ook ʼn wit helm gedra. Die hoofkonstabels in die foto is almal beredemanne.) 37


1925: AIR MAIL VIA SAAF

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Col Sir Pierre Van Reyneveld & Maj H Meintjes

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WE LOOK BACK: NONGQAI 1931 Divisional HQ: Bloemfontein: Free State

Major H Meintjes, SAAF, now Member of SAP

So far the role and duties of Maj. Meintjes in the SAP is a mystery – HBH.

40


1931 Ford Victoria

Commendation: Force Order 15 (G) 1931: •

No. 8291 Mounted Constable AJ Swart

No 11842 Mounted Constable CS Klue

No 11186 Mounted Lance Sergeant CPJ Baard

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1935: Identification Parade

1935: UDF/ UVM Dist 6, Bloemfontein

Robey Leibbrandt se vader staan in die middelste ry, heel links. Hy het tydens die Anglo Boere-oorlog saam met genl. Smuts in die Kaap Kolonie geveg.

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CID/KOD: “Just Checking”

1938: Korporatiewe Geheue: SAP-hondemeesters in die buiteland •

Palestina

43


Kenya

Let op die word “Mau Mau-misdadigers” – HBH. 44


UN CHILDREN’S FUND / VN KINDERFONDS

Na die gebeure by Sharpeville en SAP-optrede in SWA selfs tot 1989, was die VN en die SAP nie meer sulke “goeie vriende” nie.

1953: OPENING: PARLIAMENT / PARLEMENT: SAP MOTOR CYCLE ESCORT / MOTORFIETSE

• •

Does anybody have photos of this event? Het iemand dalk foto’s van die spesiale gebeurtenis? 45


INFO WANTED: ALEXANDRA'S 1986 SIX-DAY WAR Ons is op soek na inligting oor die sogenaamde “Alexandra's 1986 Six-Day War”. Die polisie word beskuldig dat hulle begrafnisgangers met traanrookgranate bestook het na afloop van ʼn begrafnis. Die getuienis is in Oktober 1996 voor die WVK gelewer. Ons stel belang in die rol van MK tydens die ses-daagse oorlog.

INLIGTING VERLANG: WIE KEN VIR VETERAAN I.S. COETZER (SAP & VALSKERMSOLDAAT)? (Via Paul Els & I Coetzer) Goeie dag, My naam is Ivan Coetzer en ek is opsoek na soveel moontlike inligting rakende my oorlede pa se diens in SAW en SAP. My rede vir die versoek is omdat ek besig is om ons familie stamboom te doen en sal wil graag my pa se verlede beter leer ken. Hier is alle inligting wat ek tans het, ek hoop dit sal help. Volle Name en van: Ivan Stefanus Coetzer noemnaam “Fanie”. ID nommer: 490308 5044 080. Polisiekollege: Peloton 42: 1972. Valskermopleidingsentrum: Kursus 44V 02/10/1967 - 24/11/1967. Dan is daar die volgende bordjies wat hy het (foto’s aangeheg): SAP - India Kompanie, Binga, 1973. SAP - Golf Kompanie, Rushinga, Februarie tot Mei 1974. SAP - Quebec Kompanie, Bare, Oktober 74 - April 1975. PATU.3 Ek onthou van die verhale dat hy was in die weermag, polisie (stedelik en grens), “parabats” en taakmag. Ek hoop julle kan my help en dit sal baie gaaf wees om sy diens rekords te kan sien. Vriendelike groete Ivan Coetzer

3

PATU - Police Anti-Terrorist Unit

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47


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1973: India Kompanie, Binga, Rhodesie

1974: Gholf Kompanie, Rushinga

• •

PATU 1974 – 1975: Quebec Kompanie, Bare

SERS JJ ERASMUS (SAP PORT NATAL & SAP KOLLEGE) Goeiemôre my ou kollega, Vertrou dit gaan nog goed daar by julle. Hennie, jy sal seker onthou dat toe ons ’n rukkie gelede daar by julle gekuier het, ek jou o.a. vertel het dat ek daarvan oortuig is dat dié sers. ‘Rassie’ Erasmus waarna in 49


die Nongqai Vol 7 nr. 7, p 38 & 39 verwys word, en wie voorheen ’n instrukteur in die Polisiekollege was, gedurende die winter van 1972 saam met my grensdiens verrig het in Juliet Kompanie te Kazangula, Rhodesië. Ek het die aangehegte skyfie-foto wat ek destyds van hom en sy luislang in ons basis geneem het, uiteindelik opgespoor en moes dit toe eers laat skandeer. Ongelukkig is sy gelaatstrekke nie baie duidelik op die foto nie, maar vir wat dit werd is stuur ek dit graag vir jou. Sers. Rassie was destyds ’n fikse, skraal man, taai soos ’n ratel, absolute militaris en ’n groot staatmaker in my peloton. Ek wonder wat van hom geword het en of hy nog leef. Ten slotte, mag jy en Petro ’n baie geseënde Kersfees hê en mag elke dag van die nuwe jaar net voorspoed, vrede en vreugde vir julle inhou. Groete, Johan Giliomee

JJ van Rooyen Kaapstad het inligting oor sy Oupa en sy Vader ingestuur. Hier is die sersant Erasmus na wie ek oorspronklik verwys het:

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Vergroting van AO JJ Erasmus wat hier onder op die troepfoto van peloton 43 verskyn. Hy was ʼn goeie polisieman en het gedurend 1964 by ʼn groot parade as parade sers.-maj. opgetree in Pietermaritzburg bestaande uit pelotonne polisie van Durban en Pietermaritzburg. In daardie dae het Afdelings Natal, Port Natal en Transkei slegs een brigadier en een kapelaan gehad. Die brigadier was brig. Jenkins en hy was in Pietermaritzburg gesetel. Na 53jaar onthou ek steeds vir ‘Sant Rassie – HBH.

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MAJ. JJ VAN ROOYEN & KAPT. JJ VAN ROOYEN (PA & SEUN) •

Maj. JJ Van Rooyen

52


Kapt JJ van Rooyen (Pel 43 van 1974)

PARATUS DESEMBER 1980 •

Staatsbegrafnis: Pres JJ Fouchè

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Brig. “Witkop” Badenhorst en SWAPO

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55


•

Misdaadbekamping: SAW & SAP

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KOEVOET: LUIT FRANS CONRADIE (Via Paul Els)

• Scope 16 Dec 1983 Theuns Steyn: Perched high in the roaring, pitching, open-topped armoured Casspir truck, Theuns Steyn had never felt so hot, uncomfortable and vulnerable in his life. But his heart went out to old Smiley down there, jogging along in takkies and shorts, staring – as he had stared for hours – at the endless sand and reading the treacherous story there of a gang that would kill if it was not killed. Theuns thought to himself, marvelling: “Smiley’s advice helped design this damn great bakkie! It weighs such a great lot because of the steel plating along the chassis to take the blast of landmines. “And he’s belting away through bush that he knows the enemy as held, with nothing between him and a landmine but the soles of his takkies…” Theuns Steyn, young constable in the SAP but far, far away from any duty he had imagined doing when he put on the blue and brass, shifted his position in the bucking Casspir, but there was no comfort for his bones and muscles – just a change of aches. “I’m thankful for that”, his mind rambled on to itself. “You get your mind off your discomfort by putting it on the threat”. It helped him watch more keenly the straggling bush, the shapeless unplanned path ahead, the occasional patch of shade that could contain a terrorist.

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“Smiley, bless him – he can’t look round to spot trouble and shoot it out: too busy checking that spoor. Go for it, man … It’s your job to lead us to the gang, my job to help make sure you survive in one piece, and they don’t. Theuns moved the heavy automatic rifle he was keeping above the level of the protective steel parapet of the vehicle. He might as well keep the thing pointed outwards, ready to fire, as Smiley always told them. Smiley was right about that. Hell, Smiley was always right. Theuns felt a grin cracking the mask of dust and sweat that stiffened his unshaven face. You could put up with a lot on the orders of your lieutenant when that officer was right and made the whole painful, bloody, often frightening job a worthwhile success. This was a Kill of Die job, and Smiley made sure which way it came out for this men. Smiley was the nickname of Frans Conradie, even in his schooldays. Then, too, he had been among the very few combining natural athletic skills – developed to winner status through unrelenting effort and practise – with the kind of Personality that makes other people look there for leadership. “He wasn’t bossy”, the legend goes. “Never threw his weight about of bullied – he didn’t have to. Even school kids would do what Smiley Conradie wanted, because it always turned out more fun, as well as the right thing to do. “But even as a school kid he was into the books too, starting his lifelong habit of being able to get the sort of book that would show how to tackle a real-life situation better than you could handle it on your own – good as you might be. “He wouldn’t pick a fight, but if someone needed straightening out it was Ou Smiley you could count on”. After school he looked for the right job for a natural leader. In the job Frans Conradie set his heart on there was security for his future wife and kids, plenty of room for promotion without one hand washing the other, and all the scope an active body could wish. In the protracted bush war that took place in Zimbabwe he was one of the double volunteers who helped build for South Africa’s elite fighting men the same world-wide reputation that brings more fame to the better-publicised SAS of Britain. Those super-warriors, similarly, have volunteered, first, to get into the army, and then volunteered again to be trained for the toughest unit in it. Smiley Frans Conradie volunteered fir for the SAP, and then for the picked force that served in Zimbabwe. He was to become one of the ultra-warriors later on when he volunteered a third time – for the myth-shrouded Koevoet. What happened in Zimbabwe earned him, in the hardest way, his place, his promotion and his reputation.

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Many of his experiences from his schooldays on must stay on the secret list because the enemy is still being fooled and foiled, trapped and destroyed, with tactical methods that would not work so well and might not work at all on they were talked about. But when civilians chance to see a clear incident within the confusing shocks and horrors of war, and an outstanding man among outstand men attracts tales to himself, here is the sort of yarn that grows partly from guesswork and partly from stark truth.. Up in the bitterly contested northeast of Zimbabwe, Smiley Conradie was still getting started in his chosen career when his patrol was ambushed by a far larger group. “The patrol knew the group was big by counting the flashes among the surrounding trees in that mountainous and wooded area”, the legend goes. “But the infiltrators were well-hidden behind thick trunks and boulders. Had their aim been more accurate and their shooting properly co-ordinated – in short, if they had been better trained – they could have been deadly. “As it was, the tiny squad of local troops and South African constables had to do something creative – the ambushers could simply wait them out, otherwise. They would get relief and supplies from headquarters while the patrol, far from home base, would gradually run out of ammunition.. “But Smiley had already learned the ancient military art of scrounging. Whenever you over run an enemy position it’s your job and your duty to check over whatever has been left behind by those who have died or fled. “For one thing, the intelligence boffins can learn a lot from the debris; for another, you can fill up your stores at the enemy’s expense”. It is said, by some who sound as if they know that on this occasion Frans Conradie spotted a chunk of guncotton, that particularly effective explosive. After checking with the patrol leader Constable Conradie popped it into his backpack, “You never know when it might come in handy…” he said. ?………. Remembered his souvenir and signalled to the corporal leading the patrol. Getting the nod, he stealthily unbuckled his pack and gingerly pulled out the explosive. With a skill born of long sunny hours of cricket, he pitched the lump in amongst the enemy where the muzzle-flashes were close-packed. For an instant the enemy fire slacked. “Grenade” was the thought in all their minds. But a grenade is of little use in a forest where the soft floor of leaves and rich soil will allow most of the metal fragments to explode downwards, and thick trunks may stop many of the rest. The enemy fire resumed, fierce as ever, and the little patrol could do nothing more than keep its head down, snapping off the occasional calculated round or brief burst of automatic, to discourage any idea in the terrorists’ head of risking a charge.

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Was it stalemate? If so, time was on the enemy’s side. The patrol could not win a waiting game. The sun climbed, reached its noonday position and shone downwards, piercing the canopy of branches and leaves. Time was again on the enemy’s side: as the heat mounted, the patrol would run out of water, while the terrorists had chosen this ambush site partly because a small strem ran right through it. Cool, fresh, sweet mountain water – for Africa! About the middle of the afternoon, Frans checked his watch and nodded to the corporal in charge of the group. The corporal raised on a crooked twig the only white object he had among his camouflaged belongings, a letter from his girlfriend, and called out in Shona, then Chinyanja, Fanagalo… The terrorist commander, Moscow trained, jeered at the invitation to parley. But his rank an file, mostly raw farm workers pressed into service by threats to their families, could make out what the NCO was offering, and their fire slackened. “So cautiously”, the story builds, “the terrorist commander emerged from behind the biggest and thickest boulder, shouting to his men to cover h im as he stood to shout from a safe distance a demand for the corporal to surrender. “Frans Conradie shouted back that he couldn’t hear in all that noise. A good trick: now the enemy commander could notbe sure of the direction in which the patrolleader lay hidden. His head turned from side to side. “The corporal has earlier arranged with Smiley Conradie; got to his knees so he could just be seen but was not a promising target. He called for the enemy commander to approach, and moved about as if leaving cover himself. “The commander naturally hesitated. Voices arose from behind him, calling him a coward and urging him to talk to the handful of men ahead. There were threats to shoot him and arrange a ceasefire over his corpse. He took a doubtful step forward”. He was not standing alongside the chunk of guncotton Smiley Conradie had pitched into position. As it had not exploded, lacking detonator, the enemy had come to disregard it over the hours it lay there harmlessly. But in the sun, guncotton “sweats”, and what it sweats if pure nitro-glycerine. Frans Conradie fired into it, the explosion of the unstable liquid blew the enemy commander apart, and his superstitious band, who had never seen anything like it, took to their heels at top speed. Many another tale is told. The big story, though, is true an vital. The bush war was the supreme training ground. And the supreme fighters South Africa gained from it were to be formed into another legend where young Frans Conradie, mature inside and a master of his craft, would find fulfilment. 60


But first he needed to challenge presented by the best that there already was. Everyone in the know then knew this was No 1 reconnaissance Commando, talked of – in awed tones – simply as Recce. Having proved himself, Frans applied and was admitted to the crack unit. Few were. And few who started the selection course would come out with high marks. Frans Conradie did, to such affect that his schoolday nickname spontaneously revived as he took all that could be dished out – and smiled. “Some people actually enjoy jumping out of aeroplanes”, recalls someone who certainly does not. “For them, I suppose it’s a game. I believe they are short of imagination – which is just as well when you think that imagination could reduce their value. “Frans had plenty of imagination, and I don’t think he would mind my saying he never got to think of jumping as fun. It was more like an unwelcome aspect of a job he loved as a whole. “He jumped. That’s all there was to it”. “Well, no, maybe that’s not all. He was never someone who just did the job to hand. There was always more to it.” “The best jumpers, the specialists, went in for what they call HALO – High Altitude Low Opening. That is, you jump from a plane helluva high, and you wait helluva long before you pull the ripcord. “People see sportsmen doing that, it makes riveting advertisements and entertaining James Bond spectacle. But in the military sphere it has an extremely important function that we don’t talk about. It was to make himself an even better fighter that Frans Conradie got so good at it”. They don’t talk, either, about the four or five years Frans served with Recce. Anyway, not for print. Just in admiration when brave men pay sincere tribute to one of the bravest. And then it was time for him to volunteer again. Brigadier Hans Dreyer was another who never threw his weight around, and he had a lot more weight to throw. It is one of the key ranks in any force, brigadier. He is the man plugged totally into the planning and authority and responsibility of the generals at the top of the structure; but must also be plugged in equally completely with what is happening in the actual regiments and battalions where the colonels and their officers make the plans into working reality. Dreyer, as Security Chief for Natal, had not come easily by his nickname of “Sterk Hans”. Perhaps that job, though demanding and rewarding, did not call completely on his ability. However it was, he got the task of creating the mysterious K.

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When the history of our time is written, Operation K will place Brigadier Sterk Hans Dreyer where the Chindits place Orde Wingate, the LRDG places David Sterling, the Irgun Zvei Leumi will place a leader still classified. The scale of his achievement with Operation K will never fully be known. It has already attracted criticism, as did Colonel Keyes’ commando, Otto Skorzeny’s unique glider troops, Roberts’ Rangers. And it gets the job done where other ways, other men, other criteria do less. Such a outlet, such an opportunity, drew Frans Conradie as if he had been born for it, formed for it, aimed for it all his days. The group for which he now volunteered was devised as a superb single weapon to break open the situation in South West Africa. There, a massive military set-up kept SWAPO and its allies reluctant to mount a hefty conventional drive. That would mean concentrating men and equipment in just the sort of un-missable target that the SAAF and the Territory Force would wallop out of sight. SWAPO was compelled, therefore, to invest its resources in small groups. When these were lucky they could move about and commit their sabotage and murders on too small a scale to justify organising a large and comprehensively equipped unit to smash them. What was needed, South African overall strategy recognised, as something quick, stron, hard, handy – like a crowbar, say, K is for Koevoet. The justification for this top-level thinking, and for Brigadier Dreyer’s formidable managerial accomplishments, is perhaps to be found in the disclosure that this comparatively small force is more used in the war against SWAPO than all the conventional units in the area. It means they have to be good, and that means their officers have to be the best. Frans Conradie’s commission in the SAP did not, in the fullest sense, make him an officer. The commission, rather, was formal recognition of the trust and confidence freely given him by the men he led. They made him an officer. During 1981, when he was 30, the modest force he commanded as Lieutenant killed almost 100 terrorists and captured a number still secret. He led only dozens, including perhaps half dozen whites and a good proportion of ex-SWAPO members proud to serve now with Koevoet, but in its handful of vehicles or on foot or prone in firing positions it took out another 60 terrorists during the following year. These were especially significant. Most of them were the trainees of East German or Cuban Communist “experts” who stocked SWAPO basis in southern and central Angola with what were supposed to be good fighters. Up against really good fighters, they went down; and the word spread back, undermining morale.

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In the 10 years of his most vigorous service, Frans Conradie clashed physically, head-on, with enemy trying to kill him, well over 100 times. The average cost to the enemy on each occasion was three men lost. He himself was hit once and even then his professionalism won out: he was wearing – in accordance with orders – a complex of webbing gear including bulky ammo pouches, and the bullet spent itself harmlessly on this stout canvas instead of entering between his ribs. “He’d learned tracking in the Zimbabwean bush and advanced his ability to read spoor with help of Bushmen”, recalls one of his admirers. “Frans would start running down a spoor at first light, and still be at it when the sun set. His stamina was the focus of many a yarn, but if you had watched him slogging away for fifty kilometres yourself you would know the yarns were never quite fiction. “I remember.. it was July, this year. And Smiley Conradie’s mob came on mess of tracks that would mean nothing to most people. He read them, and reckoned there were three SWAPO up ahead, on e carrying something the weight of a man –his footprints went into the sand so deep he must be carrying such a load. “Lieutenant Conradie got his group of fifty into motion right away, and off he went. Near the Angolan border the three split up, he said, and he was going after the one with the load. If he needed us, we would hear a grenade and should come running”. But Conradie took out that SWAPO on his own, and brought back valuable documents from the heavy pouch on his target’s shoulders. Then he took off along the hardly visible spoor of the second man, returned with the dead SWAPO’s belt-buckle for his extensive collection of terrorist souvenirs and slipped away in the bush a third time, to complete his bag. “On another level”, the admirer continues, “this trained instincts told him the enemy unit he had found was too heavy for him –and too heavy for his group. “He came trotting back to the Casspir that was his, the one with the cannon, and radioed the SAAF. Frans knew exactly what information they needed, he was great at air-ground co-operation, and in minutes they were airborne. Conradie had also given them our own precise location, so their rockets came nowhere near us as they wasted the enemy”. The cannon was not strictly on the Casspir at all. Line Nelson with his blind eye and many another military hero known when to bend the rules, Frans had added greatly to the spirit as well as the firepower of his group by a stroke of authorised scrounging. “Some of his pals in the SAAF showed him an old Vampire that had been retired from the active list, and Frans immediately asked what would happen to its 20mm cannon. He had a feeling for weapons, the tools of his trade, and he could imagine the effect of a thing like that where machineguns might be to light. 63


“The transfer was arranged with pleasure on both sides – he wasn’t called Smiley for nothing – and Frans consulted the armourers to get the cannon mounted where it would do the most good. The barrel turned out too long for rapid traversing by hand, it wouldn’t swing freely from side to side, so he simply sawed a bit off. That solved the problem”. More than once a group of SWAPO figured out how to ambush the Koevoet penetrators, working on the basis of the rate and power of the standard mounted machineguns. “Frans had a knack of going into ambushes where the enemy expected him to go round or dig in, and that cannon enabled him to hit them long before they were expecting to be hit - and harder, too”. One important result was a high kill rate costing South Africa few deaths. That’s the name of the soldiering game. In an 18-month period from January 1981 Koevoet killed more that 630 terrorists for a loss of 15 of their own. Important to Frans Conradie, too, were the girl he married and his three children. Adri kept in touch with his work – and her mind, sometimes, off the risks – in her job at Koevoet HQ in Oshakati. So far as possible she made sure that when he was away from the battle he could have peace and quiet and relaxation among his books, his records, the comrades he would joke and drink with. For even out of his natural element – fighting – he somehow needed contact with it. The company of soldiers gave him that. But then again, they were his family, too... “One of the things he would boast about”, says a friend, “Though as quiet and even shy about his own achievements, was his record of three years’ action without losing a man. “Then, when he was away from his group on other duties for a while, he learned that in a contact he had lost one of the trackers who had been with him from the start. “Unsmiling, for once, Frans handed over to a good man and ran for his four-wheeldrive bakkie. He drove a hundred exhausting kilometres through an area that could well have been mined, and got to where his tracker lay in a sick bay. There was a sheet over the man’s face.. “Frans reverently drew it back and kidded the cold forehead. He was heard to whisper, ‘Totsiens, ou Maat”. The odds had caught up with Lieutenant Frans Conradie’s group while he was out of his element, and last September they caught up with him too – when he was away from his element. Driving back to duty from a weekend at home, his senior NCO beside him, he felt the vehicle overturn and was pinned to his seat as the NCO scrambled out.

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Frans bled to death, the SAAF flew out his body, escorted by his closest friends, and at his home in Rustenburg the rifle shots, the bugle, and the saluting generals accorded him full military honours. A couple of lines in the media said he was gone. There is no way of measuring what a fine man gave us, and what we have lost in him. There never is.

PEACE MONITORS 1994: GAVIN TISCHENDORF Goeiedag Brig. Hennie Ek het nou iets onthou van 1994 van net voor die 1994-verkiesing in Kagiso toe ek by eenheid 5 was. We used to have these (I think they were Wits-Vaal) Peace Monitors driving around behind our vehicles from time to time. I trust all is well your side and keep up the good work. The latest Nongqai is as good as always, we are sharing it around. Sterkte Gavin Tischendorf (NZ)

Do you remember those ‘peace monitors’ from 1994 that used to follow our vehicles? We went out to the Zulu hostel as there were complaints of shooting from inside the hostels; it was nightshift probably around 21:00. We arrived at the hostels with two Nyala vehicle and a white Toyota corolla with two ‘peace monitors’ they were following us around (I think both were French). After we had stopped we heard plenty of AK fire from the hostel, we parked our idling Nyala on the side of the road and switched of all lights so as to blend in with the dark. We are standing in the dark behind our vehicles and the rounds are flying over our heads, deciding what can be done as we cannot just enter these hostels.

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The ‘peace monitors’ had also stopped behind us and switched off their cars lights, but they left the hazard lights on flashing brightly. We shouted for them to switch off those flashing lights, but got no response from them. I ran over to the Toyota while shouting to switch off those lights, only to find these peace monitors lying under their car I switched off the hazard lights myself. Lights are not your friend when shots are flying around; after the shooting had stopped we left the area after patrolling for bodies, the shooting was just another case of political rivalry (ANC and IFP). These ‘peace monitors’ disappeared after the shooting.

UNIFORMS: GENL JV VAN DER MERWE & NASIONALE KOMISSARIS GEORGE FIVAZ

Uniforms bekom vir die SAPS-museum.

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KOL VICK McPHERSON Ons is besig om Vick se outobiografie te skryf, mens kan nie alles onthou wat in jou lewe gebeur het nie. Stuur enige foto’s of staaltjies na Hennie Heymans by heymanshb@gmail.com

UIT DIE KOERANTE •

SAP Rugby

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Misdaad

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• Bedryf van Inligting The proof the Royal Navy captured the Nazi's Enigma code machine: Moment British sailors raided a U-Boat and helped turned the tide of WWII against Hitler • • • •

New pictures have shown HMS Bulldog approaching a Nazi U-boat in Atlantic The British sailors then launched a raid on the boat capturing Enigma machine It was captured by Sub Lt David Balme and was cracked by code breakers The images prove the Enigma machines was captured by British and not Americans as suggested by a Hollywood movie

By JENNIFER NEWTON FOR MAILONLINE PUBLISHED: 09:56 GMT, 21 January 2017 | UPDATED: 13:50 GMT, 21 January 2017 This is the moment a British Navy officer launched a raid upon a stricken Nazi Uboat that saw the top secret Enigma machine seized bringing an end to the Second World War. The never before seen pictures see HMS Bulldog approaching the German vessel close to Greenland to capture it and two other warships. And they prove it was indeed British forces that captured the Enigma machine and not the Americans as suggested in Hollywood film U571 starring Matthew McConaughey and Jon Bon Jovi.

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New pictures have emerged showing some of the crew of HMS Bulldog launching a raid on a Nazi U-Boat during World War Two

The British destroyer captured the enemy vessels and during the raid managed to seize an Enigma code machine

The machine's capture by brave young officer Sub-Lieutenant David Balme then enabled Bletchley Park code breakers to crack the code, helping to bring an end to the war When the raid party from HMS Bulldog boarded the U-Boat 1941, they would find the Enigma machine perfect intact, along with vital code books. But its capture by brave young officer Sub-Lieutenant David Balme then enabled Bletchley Park code breakers to crack the code, helping to bring an end to the war. 70


He was terrified to board U-110 scaled three ladders to the top of the boat’s conning tower before snatching the machine. SHARE THIS ARTICLE Share The new images captured by the crew of the Bulldog are featured in a new book by historian Peter Hore, about the capture of the machine. And he told the Mirror: 'Balme's bravery changed the course of the Battle of Atlantic which, until then, the Germans were winning. 'The capture of the machine and the codes enabled the British to re-route convoys to avoid U-boats and to send out hunting groups, which whittled away their numbers.

HMS Bulldog pictured before the war. The destroyer took part in the Battle of Atlantic during the war 'By 1943 the Battle of the Atlantic was almost won and thousands of fresh American and Canadian troops were able to cross with very few losses to help win the war in Europe.' Sub Lieutenant Balme died last year aged 95 and was later credited with helping to shorten the war by two years. His significance in the Allies victory was not revealed until the Seventies, when the secrecy shrouding Bletchley Park and the code-breakers' work finally began to lift.

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Sub Lieutenant Balme died last year aged 95 and was later credited with helping to shorten the war by two years He was presented with a Bletchley badge and a certificate signed by then Prime Minister David Cameron and local MP Julian Lewis. Mr Balme lived in Lymington , Hampshire, before moving to a nursing home in nearby Milford on Sea where he died. In 1999 he condemned a Hollywood attempt to re-write history after it was revealed that a ÂŁ55million film shot in Rome and Malta suggested that the Enigma device was captured by an American destroyer in the Mediterranean. The film, called U571 used the 1941 raid as the inspiration but suggested it was American forces that captured the Enigma machine, and it was condemned by the Prime Minister Tony Blair.

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An original Enigma code machine, that was cracked by code breakers at Bletchley Park to help end the Second World War And speaking at the time, Mr Balme said: 'He said: 'Rome and Malta make for better scenery than Greenland and Scapa Flow but Enigma was among the greatest British triumphs of the war. 'It's wrong to pretend the Americans were responsible. People don't like that sort of thing.' Read more: Amazing moment Navy officer captured the Enigma code that help Britain win World War 2 revealed - Mirror Online Share or comment on this article http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4142758/Navy-destroyer-launches-raid-NaziU-Boat.html (Retrieved 21 January 2017) • Kommentaar Daar is slegs drie bronne van inligting, nl. koverte, overte en tegniese bronne. Hierdie “Enigma”-operasie het die verla die Britte ‘n groot voorspring tydens WO2 verleen. Tot in die 1980’s was baie van hierdie inligting beperk gewees.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Die Sentrale inligtingsagentskap in die VSA alom bekend as die CIA het pas 1000de artikels en verslae op die internet vrygestel. Ek het ʼn paar artikels en verslae deurgelees. Daar is ook ʼn paar onvleiende verslae/opmerkings oor die polisie. Ek het ʼn paar afgelaai maar ongelukkig is al die verslae in .pdf-formaat.

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RESENSIES VAN LESERS: KOEVOET: THE MEN SPEAK Good morning Jonathan. Hope you are well. Just a quick word of thanks – received the book from Postnet yesterday. I must say it is a magnificent piece of work. I only read a few chapters, but to my mind you have compiled the definitive work on SAP counterinsurgency. My sincere thanks and congratulations. Your composition should be on the bookshelf, of each and every police official who served in the SAP, irrespective where or in what capacity. Once again – thank you and well done. Regards. Rudolf

Dear Jonathan Hennie Heymans brought me a copy of the book published by you on Koevoet. It is indeed a magnificent work which surpasses all expectations and will be a precious collection for the future. My sincere and heartfelt thanks. Regards Johan van der Merwe

Dear Jonathan, I have received the book today and of course I started reading it immediately. What a book! I really do not know how to thank you. If I give you my background you will understand my interest in the subject of the book. I was a former public prosecutor, magistrate, legal draughtsman, parliamentary officer in the days of Dr Verwoerd and Mr John Vorster, became Under Secretary for Justice before I was transferred to Mr P W Botha's Dept of the Prime Minister and was appointed 2 i/c of the Secretariat of the Security Council. Secretariat was actually a misnomer. There was only one "secretary", taking the minutes of the State Security Council, on our staff. The others were experts in their various disciplines.. We were more of a “think tank" for the Govt. We were able to give expert advice within hours where other govt departments would take weeks if not months. You can ask Hennie Heymans how we could achieve this. I was lucky to have people like him and other experts of the staff. My interest in the "bush war" comes from my lifelong hobby, the military.. In between my tasks in the Department of Justice I made time to play a role as a soldier. Eventually I completed almost 55years service in the army. This enabled me to take 74


part in the first invasion into Angola, Ops Savannah, although only on what I regard as on a limited scale. On a later occasion I took part in the border war as armour commander in Ovambo. The war terminology and the area where it was fought is therefore nothing strange to me and I feel quite at home in your book! My experience as a soldier helped me a lot to carry out my duties at the Secretariat. Thank you again A P Stemmet

Hi Jonathan, I am happy to say that the book has arrived. It was at the Post Office when I checked yesterday morning. Congratulations, it will have a special place in my study. Thank you for the acknowledgements on page 2. I am sure you will be receiving many positive feedbacks from the readers. It is a sturdy book with an eye-catching cover, so I do hope that it will do well in the market. Best wishes for this year and best of luck for any new projects. Jac Twee terroriste in SA se visier: PRAAG

Twee vermeende terroriste is onlangs in en na Suid-Afrika in afsonderlike voorvalle vasgetrek, het die Valke Sondag gesĂŞ.

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In die eerste voorval, is ‘n vermeende ekstremis, wat reis op ‘n paspoort van die Verenigde State van Amerika via Turkye, by die OR Tambo op 16 Desember gevang, het Media24 berig. “Hy was reeds gemerk deur Interpol,” het die Valke se woordvoerder Hangwani Mulaudzi gesê. “Hy is toegang tot die land geweier en moes terug na Turkye.” In die tweede voorval, wat ook plaasgevind het verlede maand, is ‘n Irakse man wat probeer het om te vlieg uit Turkye na Suid-Afrika gekeer. Hy is deurgang geweier deur die Turkse owerhede. Hy is daarna in hegtenis geneem. “Hulle voel hy huldig ekstremistiese menings… [volgens] hul eie intelligensie,” het Mulaudzi gesê. Suid-Afrikaanse wetstoepassing wag nou vir ‘n verslag van Interpol oor die aangeleentheid om meer besonderhede te bekom. Die Sunday Times berig dat die Irakse man bedrywig was vir die Islamitiese staat en hy is ‘n bommaker. Die Irakse ambassadeur Saad Kindeel het volgens die koerant gesê dat die man “nie wou kom na Suid-Afrika om vir ISIS te werf nie, maar om ‘n spesifieke teiken wat later aangeval sou word, te identifiseer”. Intussen het Mulaudzi gesê gesê dat Suid-Afrikaanse amptenare waaksaam bly en skakel met ander wetstoepassingsagentskappe om die bedreigings van terrorisme die hoof te bied. “Suid-Afrika is nie immuun teen hierdie voorvalle nie.” Hy het gesê interne bedreigings van terroriste-aktiwiteit kon ook nie geïgnoreer word nie. http://praag.co.za/?p=42394&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+praag+%28Pro-Afrikaanse+Aksiegroep%29 (Afgelaai op 17 Januarie 2017)

BESOEK AAN SAPS-MUSEUM • DB Pratt: Aanval op dr. HF Verwoerd Op 9 April 1960 het David Beresford Pratt vir dr. HF Verwoerd by die Randse Paasskou geskiet. Hier is die dosie waarin Pratt vuurwapen gebêre was. So beskryf Wikipedia die historiese voorval: “On 9 April 1960, Pratt shot South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd twice, at point blank range, with a .22 pistol. Verwoerd, who had been opening the Union Exposition in Milner Park, Johannesburg, was rushed to hospital, and within two months had made a complete recovery. Pratt was arrested at the scene and taken to the Marshall Square police station, and then to the Forensic Medical Laboratory. He appeared for a preliminary hearing in the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court on 20 and 21 July 1960, once it was clear that the Verwoerd's injuries were not fatal. 76


Pratt claimed he had been shooting 'the epitome of apartheid'. The court accepted the medical reports submitted to it by five different psychiatrists, all of which confirmed that Pratt lacked legal capacity and could not be held criminally liable for having shot the prime minister. On 26 September 1960, he was committed to a mental hospital in Bloemfontein. On the first of October 1961, his fifty-third birthday, and shortly before his parole was to be considered, he committed suicide.”

• Dimitri Tsafendas moord op dr. Verwoerd: Die dolk Toe dr. Verwoerd op 6 September 1966 vermoor is, was ek ʼn konstabel te SAP King’s Rest. Ek was die middag by die Universiteit van Natal. ʼn Linksgesinde student vra my waarom ek so bekaf lyk en sê feitlik in dieselfde asem dat indien haar eersteminister gesterf het, sy ook treurig sou wees. Dit was ʼn groot skok gewees. Die land as geheel was geskok. Later as lid van die veiligheidstak, te hoofkwartier, het ek toegang gehad tot Tsafendas se leggers. Natuurlik het ek al die leggers gelees asook die deeglike kommissie van ondersoek, want ek wou vasstel of daar enige kommunistiese betrokkenheid by dr. Verwoerd se moord was. Ek het baie oor Tsafendas gelees – ook op die internet - en ek het met lede gepraat wat by was toe Tsafendas vir dr. Verwoerd vermoor het. Genl.maj. DK Genis het vir my die foto’s van die lykskouing op dr. Verwoerd getoon. (As majoor was hy een van dr. Verwoerd se lyfwagte.) Ek wou ʼn spesiale uitgawe van die NONGQAI oor die 77


moord op dr. Verwoerd uitbring. Trouens, ek het my navorsing voltooi en ek het besluit dit sal geen goeie doel dien om teen mense wat verskeie samesweringsteorieë aanhang, te argumenteer nie. Party mense kan net nie oortuig word om die gebeure objektief, eerlik en billik te betrag nie. Ek het met senior en junior beamptes, regslui en polisiemanne gesels. Ek het verskeie stories en anekdote gehoor. Terloops, ek het Tsafendas se leggers deurgelees en behalwe vir beskuldigings dat hy ʼn kommunis is, GEEN tasbare bewyse gekry dat hy wel ʼn kommunis is nie. Ek dink hy weet soveel van kommunisme as ʼn kat van saffraan! Dit was destyds ʼn ou laai van mense om iemand sommer as ʼn “kommunis” te bestempel, die polisie het dan vir jare met so ʼn lêer gesit, van tyd tot tyd moes die legger aandag kry en die saak kon nooit bewys word nie. Dit moet onthou word dat ons as polisie in alle moordsake (en onnatuurlike sterfgevalle) alle feite voor die hof moet plaas. Dit is gebiedend – ons het nie ʼn keuse nie – die inligting moet voor die hof gebring word. Wilde bewerings word oor die moord gemaak wat aan die belaglike grens. Mens wonder dan waarom is daardie “inligting” nooit aan die SAP of aan die kommissie van ondersoek oorhandig nie? Gideon Joubert, ʼn man van integriteit was as brigadier mede-ondersoekbeampte in die saak, hy het later kommissaris van polisie geword. Dit moet ook onthou word dat die hof slegs met bewese feite werk en dat alle getuienis die toets van kruisverhoor moet deurstaan. ʼn Onbewese of ongetoetste bewering is nie ʼn feit nie – al klink dit hoe mooi of moontlik in ʼn teorie. Mense wat nog nooit ʼn moordsaak ondersoek het, ontpop as deskundige ondersoekbeamptes en dis vanuit hul gemakstoele vir ons dan “fiksie op” wat in ʼn kleed van geregtigheid getooi is. •

AP Stemmet vertel die volgende staaltjie

Dinsdag, 6 September 1966. Ek was parlementere beampte van Justisie. Die sekretaris van justisie het opdrag gegee dat ek om 14:15 in die parlement moes wees om na dr. Verwoerd se toespraak in die bespreking van sy begrotingspos te luister sodat ons gereed kon wees om ons minister, mnr. John Vorster, voor te berei, sou hy later aan die debat moes deel neem. Ek het besluit om 'n bietjie later as sy toespraak eers aan die gang was oor te stap parlement toe. My kantoor was in Marksgebou reg oorkant die parlement. Om 14.15 het ek die parlement se klokkies hoor lui. Toe het alle hel losgebars. Sirenes! Nog sirenes! Polisiemanne wat rondhardloop. Telefone wag lui. Teleksmasjiene wat kletter. Wat gaan aan? My laksheid het my gered. So nie sou ek ongeveer 3 meter van dr. Verwoerd se bank gewees het. Dankie Vader dit is 78


my gespaar. Die bloedkol het daar gelê. Vir jare nog. Niks kon dit uit die Volksraad se groen matte kry nie. Die spoke van die verlede haal 'n mens in. In 1998 (dus 32 jaar later) worstel ek in heeltemal 'n ander hoedanigheid, om ʼn moeilike stuk wetgewing deur 'n parlementere komitee te loods. Dit was in die ou Volksraadsaal wat nou 'n komiteekamer is. Toe ek afkyk uit die sitplek waar mense sit wat die komitee toespreek, sien ek dat die bloedkol nog altyd daar is. Wel dowwer maar steeds daar. Jare later haal die spoke van die verlede my steeds in..Ek sien gereeld op televisie debatte wat in daardie komiteekamer plaasvind. Elke keer sit die getuie in daardie bank. Dan kom die gebeure onwillekeurig terug. AP Stemmet

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Petro Heymans en Marlene Swanepoel (kuratrise) hou die dolk vas, mens kan nog sien waar die bloed aan die lem vaskleef. • Luitenant Vaughan Sharp SO paar Nongqai’s terug het ons oor lt. Sharpe geskryf. Ek het verdere navorsing gedoen terwyl mev. Marlene Swanepoel die boek gehad wat Sharp geskryf het toe hy speurder-sersant was. Hier is die boek:

Intussen het ek ʼn foto van lt. Sharp bekom toe hy as offisier aangestel is. Saam met hom op die foto verskyn in die voorste ry van links na regs: Luitenante Smidt, Theron, Kruger (later generaal en tweede in bevel van die veiligheidstak) en Lowies (hy was die latere lt.genl. JJ Viktor se seksiehoof by die voorloper van die handelstak te Marshallplein.) 80


In die middelste ry: Luitenante Van der Westhuizen, Buitendag (lyfwag dr. Verwoerd), Jooste en Genis. Agter is luitenante: Edelstein (een van die min Joodse offisiere in die Mag), Pattle4 (sy broer, as lid van die lugmag, was ʼn legende tydens WO2) en Vaughan Sharp.

4

Squadron Leader Marmaduke Thomas St John Pattle DFC* (3 July 1914 – 20 April 1941), usually known as Pat Pattle, was a South African-born Second World War fighter pilot and flying ace (an aviator credited with the destruction of five or more enemy aircraft in aerial combat) of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Born in 1914 in South Africa, Pattle applied to join the South African Air Force at 18 and was rejected. He travelled to the United Kingdom and joined the RAF in 1936, on a Short Service Commission (SSC). Pattle was a pilot in 1937 and was posted to 80 Squadron based in Egypt upon the outbreak of war in September 1939. In June 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of the Axis Powers and he began combat operations against the Italian Air Force, gaining his first successes during the Italian invasion of Egypt. After the Italian invasion, his squadron was sent to Greece in November 1940, where Pattle achieved most of his victories. Pattle claimed around 20 aircraft shot down and in March 1941 was promoted to squadron leader. After the German intervention, and in fourteen days of operations, Pattle claimed victories 24–50. Pattle claimed five or more aircraft destroyed in one day on three occasions,

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Kommissarisse van Polisie •

Kol. sir TG Truter

which qualified him for Ace in a day status. Pattle achieved his greatest success on 19 April 1941, claiming six victories. The following day, having claimed more aerial victories than any other Western Allied pilot, he took off against orders, while suffering from a high temperature, to engage German aircraft near Athens. He was last seen battling Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters. His Hurricane crashed into the sea during this dogfight and Pattle was killed. Pattle was a fighter ace with a high score, and is sometimes noted as being the highestscoring British Commonwealth pilot of the war. If all claims made for him are correct, his total could be more than 51. It can be stated that his final total was at least 40 and could exceed this value. Logbooks and semi-official records suggest this figure, while personnel attached to his squadron suspect the figure to be closer to 60. A total of 26 of Pattle's victims were Italian; 15 were downed with Gloster Gladiators, the rest with Hawker Hurricanes. He is considered to be the highest-scoring ace on both Gladiator and Hurricane (35 victories) fighters. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_Pattle afgelaai 4 febraurie 2017.)

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Genl.maj. IP de Villiers

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Beste Deon, Kan u miskien die mantel identifiseer & vir my asb die korrekte benaming gee? Baie groete Hennie, Hennie, Die mantel is die van ’n Knight d.w.s. Ridder van die Order van St. John. Hy is as Ridder gedurende 1943 aangestel [The London Gazette: no. 36315. p. 114. 4 Januarie 1944]. Die afkorting is KStJ. – (klein ‘t’.) – en dis die 2e klas van die Orde. Sy ander eerbewyse is CB – derde klas van die “Order of the Bath” en die MC. LW. Die ridders van die orde van St. John kry nie die titel ‘Sir’ nie. Die eerste klas is die “Bailiff Grand Cross of the Order etc.” [Grand beteken ‘Groot’ nie ‘Smart’ nie.] Beste groete en beste wense vir 2017. Deon Nota: Maj.-Gen. Isaac Pierre De Villiers was born on 20 August 1891 in Somerset East in the Eastern Cape. He attended South African College School in Cape Town and studied Law at the UCT. He became an attorney. During World War 1 Maj.-Gen. De Villiers served in the UDF in German South West Africa and in the Royal Artillery and Europe Front. For gallantry he was awarded the Military Cross. [The London Gazette: (Supplement) No. 31093. p. 56. 31 December 1918.] Note. All SA soldiers in Europe and German East Africa were placed in the British Army for financial and political convenience. After the war he practised as an attorney and was appointed the Commissioner of the SA Police in 1928. ["Isaac Pierre de Villiers". Dictionary of South African Biography. III. Human Sciences Research Council. 1987. p. 656. ISBN 0-7969-04200.]. Early in World War 2 De Villiers volunteered for military service and was appointed General Officer Commanding 2nd South African Infantry Division between 1940 and 1942. Between 1942 and 1945 Maj. Gen De Villiers was appointed to command Coastal Command which with the SANF was responsible for South African coastal and seaward defence. Maj. Gen De Villiers retired from both the SAP and UDF in 1945. For his war time services he was made Companion of the Bath, a military Order. [The London Gazette: no. 35697. p. 3945. 8 September 1942.]. DFS Fourie Professor of Strategic Studies Mark Naudè writes:

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Many thanks for the photos. I found the photo of Colonel Truter's Full Dress tunic most interesting as I've only seen it in black and white before and taken from a distance. As far as General de Villier's cloak is concerned it is for a Knight of the Order of St John of Jerusalem. Several high ranking officers in the UDF and SADF were Knights of St John including Lt-Gen George Brink, Maj-Gen Everard Poole, Brig Jack Bester etc.

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Genl.maj. RJ Palmer

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Genl.maj. JA Brink

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Ander items •

SAP Rangtekens

Manlike lede •

Vroulike lede

Ou Polisiemanne 1693 & 1913

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Teëls en argiefstukke

SAP-kenteken in teëls

Argiewe: Wonderlike argiefstukke

RANGE, RANGTEKENS EN UNIFORMS 21 January 2017 Thank you. That was an interesting read! I am always pleasantly surprised to learn of more people with similar interests. My copies from the 1934 dress regulations didn't have the amendment so I will adapt my drawings. I also have the 1923 regulations so will draw up the gorgets based on those regulations as well. The articles on the uniforms were quite interesting. I can now add a few more dates and details to what I already know. I disagree however with the description of staff gorgets and cap bands having been light blue before changing to 'Orange, Sealed Permanent Force Shade' (i.e. dark orange/chilli red). The shade of blue worn by the Defence Force staff officers was actually the same shade as worn later by SAP senior officers. Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners in the SAP originally did not wear blue cap bands and gorgets. It was only in the late 1930s, after the army changed from blue to orange/red cap bands and gorgets for officers of the Staff Corps that the SAP top brass started wearing the blue bands. I will dig out some photos of some examples. Armed with a few more dates, I may now attempt to draw up rank charts for the Erasmus era when the ranks seemed to keep changing. Hopefully our discussions over the police 'civilian' rank structure will lead to more information becoming available about Chief Inspectors and the like. Contemporary General/Force Orders and Nongqai articles are likely to be quite helpful. There are also some old police regulations in the archives in Pretoria, where I did some digging a decade ago but I only got so far in the time I had available. Regards: Mark Naude

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Enkele gedagtes oor Polisierange en –uniforms - HBH • Adjunkkommissaris Oorsprong van die woord “adjunkkommissaris” in die SA Polisie: Die kommissaris van polisie is die rekenpligtige amptenaar. (Gedurende 1913 was daar ook ʼn sekretaris van polisie, hy was lt.kol. HC Bredell.) Die kommissaris was te hoofkwartier bygestaan deur assistentkommissarisse van polisie en die offisiere wat bevel gevoer het oor die provinsies5 (of dele van provinsies) en latere afdelings soos Witwatersrand en later die Transkei en Noord-Kaap het bekend gestaan as adjunkkommissarisse. ʼn Adjunkkommissaris was in Engels ʼn “Deputy Commissioner” en die kommissaris se regterhand te hoofkwartier was ʼn assistentkommissaris (“Assistant Commissioner”). So was die adjunkkommissaris: Afdeling Natal bv. in Engels bekend as “Deputy Commissioner: Natal Division”. Die range in die polisie was siviel en adjudant-offisiere en offisiere was agtereenvolgens bekend as hoofkonstabel, sub-inspekteur, inspekteur, hoofinspekteur, assistentkommissaris, adjunkkommissaris en kommissaris. • 1953: Militarisering van die polisierange Alhoewel die polisie ʼn paramilitêre organisasie was word nou opgemerk dat vanaf 1953 slegs militêre range vir offisiere gebruik word.

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Aanvanklik was daar een adjunkkommissaris vir Transvaal. Later is die provinsie in twee dele nl. Witwatersrand en Transvaal verdeel. Daar was toe ʼn adjunkkommissaris vir Witwatersrand en Transvaal aangestel. Met die bevolkingsaanwas is die Transvaal later verdeel in Witwatersrand, WesRand, Oos Rand, Noord-Transvaal, Oos-Transvaal, Verre-Noord-Transvaal en heel laaste het Soweto ook ʼn eie afdeling geword. Later het afdelingskommissarisse ʼn nuwe posbenaming gekry nl. streekkommissaris (Regional Commissioner). - HBH

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Let op die pettuite (oogskerm) vertoon geen geborduurde akkerblare soos vir brigadiers en generaals. Vir ʼn kort tydperk na minister FC Erasmus minister van justisie geword het, is die rang van assistentveldkornet (luitenant), veldkornet (kaptein) en kommandant (luitenant-kolonel) gebruik. In die Erasmus-era was daar ook die volgende “militêre” aanstellings, bv.: • • • •

Adjudant-generaal Kwartiermeester-generaal; Speurder-generaal Kapelaan-generaal 89


Inspekteur-generaal

Die hoofkonstabel se rang het hier in die 1960’s na AO verander. Hoofkonstabel was as “meneer” aangespreek. Vir ʼn ruk was AO’s ook as “meneer” aangespreek en later is die aanspreekvorm gewysig na “adjudant”. Later het die Mag uitgebrei en die pos van die adjunkkommissaris is verander na afdelingskommissaris6, die kommissaris is toe bygestaan deur adjunkkommissarisse en assistentkommissarisse. Met militarisering het die range agtereenvolgens luitenant, kaptein, majoor, luitenant-kolonel, kolonel, brigadier (assistentkommissaris), brigadier (adjunkkommissaris) generaal-majoor (adjunkkommissaris), luitenantgeneraal (adjunkkommissaris) en generaal geword. In die 1980’s het die polisie en die weermag nouer saamgewerk en minister Adriaan Vlok was instrumenteel dat die polisie die beleid van die SAW gevolg het deur slegs een brigadiersrang in te voer. Dit het meegebring dat wanneer ʼn kolonel na brigadier bevorder word, hy ʼn aansienlik salarisverhoging ontvang het. Die brigadier was nou gelykstaande met ʼn direkteur in die staatsdiens en hy was nie meer ʼn assistent of adjunkkommissaris nie. Met verdere uitbreiding het daar ook die aanstelling van bv. hoofadjunkkommissaris en senior-hoofadjunkkommissaris gekom. • Mark Naude’s reply Thank you. That's very interesting that Asst. & Dep. Comm. could be of the same rank in those days. I think some UK police forces also had it so that the Deputy Commissioner (or Deputy Chief Constable as the case may be) was an Asst. Comm. (or ACC) that was selected to be the Deputy Commissioner (or DCC) but did not necessarily 'outrank' their colleagues. •

I'll work on some updated rank charts when I get a chance.

In the meantime here are some photos of 'Staff Blue' items.

Regards Mark

Attachments

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Gedurende 1964 toe ek by die Mag aangesluit het, was die posbenaming “afdelingskommissaris” reeds in gebruik.

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Cap of Brig-Gen Sir Duncan McKenzie (ex Natal Militia and WW1 UDF General Officer) photographed in Durban more than ten years ago. Notice the blue cap band.

Two gorget patches that were listed on an auction site a while ago. The one on the left is an SAP Colonel's gorget from the 1950s or 1960s while the one on the right is an SA Staff Corps gorget from the 1913-1934-era. The Staff Corps of the UDF & SAAF switched to dark orange ('red') gorgets with the 1934 Dress Regulations. The Police then adopted the same blue for their senior officers.

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Lt-Col HF Trew in the 1920’s. Note no gorget patches worn despite being a Deputy Commissioner in the SAP at the time. [He was then Deputy Commissioner: Western Cape. – HBH.]

Maj.-Gen. Brink as Commissioner of SAP in the 1950s wearing the drab uniform. Note colour of gorgets and cap band.

Postcard of General Louis Botha from WW1-era wearing what appears to be the early open necked version of Blue Undress with blue Staff Blue gorgets and cap band. [I added a photo fropm my archive. Note the same photo but with different shirts. The General then had no medals. The Sam Browne was made especially for Gen. Botha by a SA Police saddler attached to the Quartermaster - HBH.]

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Brig.-Gen. Sir Duncan Mackenzie portrait - note blue gorget patches. [Note the Brigadier’s badge of rank – baton and crossed sword.]

General Jan Smuts' forage cap with Staff Blue band (as per 1923 Dress Regulations).

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Forage cap worn by FM Jan Smuts during WW2 with dark orange cap band (as per 1934 Dress Regulations).

Maj Gen KR van der Spuy's Mess Dress with Staff Blue facings (i.e. 1923 Dress Regulations).

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Maj Gen KR van der Spuy's later Mess Dress with dark orange waistcoat etc.

SAP: Vocabulary of Stores and Clothing Items. For those interested in SA Police uniforms and badges of rank it is usefull to refer to the old SAP Regulations and the booklet VOCABULARY OF STORES AND CLOTHING ITEMS.

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• •

BA is seker “Badges Arm”? BR is seker “Badges Rank”?

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BRIGADIER-GENERAL AND BRIGADIER RANKS Brigadier-General and Brigadier Ranks and Associated Insignia in the Union Defence Force and South African Defence Force: Compiled By M Naudé Good afternoon The article about Brigadier-General and Brigadier in the UDF/SADF is attached. I've sent it in Word format so that you can edit is as required (e.g. you may not necessarily want to use all the photos). My spell check programme is also out of order so I can't guarantee that the spelling is all in order. I'll start on the police one soon but that probably won't be completed in time for this edition. Regards Prior to the First World War, Brigadier-General was the highest rank attainable within the Union Defence Force. The rank insignia for a Brigadier-General consisted of a crossed sword and baton device. The cap badge was the same as for other general officers and gorgets with oakleaf pattern were worn in Service Dress and Undress. During the First World War the Defence Force and its ranks expanded soon expanded. Major-General JC Smuts succeeded Brigadier-General CF Beyers as Commandant-General of the Active Citizen Force in 1914. Commandant-General was then an appointment rather than a rank. Louis Botha served as Commander-inChief with the full rank of General. Various Brigade Commanders held the rank of Brigadier-General. After the war, the Army shrunk again (there was no Air Force or Navy yet) and Brigadier-General J J Collyer served as the first Chief of the SA General Staff. In 1921 the British Army replaced the rank of Brigadier-General with ColonelCommandant. A Colonel-Commandant was to wear a crown and three Bath star pips. They did not have the status of a General Officer anymore and wore the same cap badge and gorgets as Colonels (i.e. Royal Crest as cap badge). In 1928 Colonel-Commandant was replaced by Brigadier retaining the same insignia. South Africa was not as hasty to do away with its Brigadiers-General. Perhaps it was due to the small size of the Union Defence Fence at the time. The Chief of General Staff ranked as a Brigadier-General or at most Major-General during the 1920s and early 1930s. The SA Forces caught up with the changes to some degree in 1937 introducing Colonel-Commandant as a rank but at the same time retaining Brigadier-General. To avoid confusion, it should also be noted that some First World War documents refer to various officers as e.g. “Colonel-Commandant van Deventer”. This usage in the German South West campaign was again more accurately referring to an 98


appointment rather than a rank. If someone was a Colonel-Commandant in the South African Forces in the First World War it meant they were commanding a ‘Wing’ i.e. a group of commando units acting together. By 1940, Colonel-Commandant had been replaced by Brigadier although BrigadierGeneral was also still in use. This may have had something to do with a number of Brigadiers-General having come out of retirement to serve in the Second World War (e.g. Collyer, Wakefield, etc.). Perhaps it was considered too rude do “downgrade” them to Brigadier and allow them to lose their status as General Officers? By the end of the war Brigadier-General had disappeared as a rank in the SA Forces. In 1952 the 5-pointed star replaced the Bath Star as rank insignia in South Africa. Brigadiers now wore three miniature 5-pointed stars under the Crown. The cap badge worn by Army and Corps of Marines Brigadiers and Colonels was also modified. The lion was changed to the crest of the South African Coat-of-Arms (a lion holding a bundle of four rods). The Air Force also introduced a new cap badge for Brigadiers and Colonels when they adopted blue-grey uniform. The design consisted of an eagle within a wreath of protea under a crown embroidered on a sky blue background. In 1957-58 the Crown was replaced in South African rank insignia by the pentagonal Castle design. That arrangement remained until the SADF came to an end in 1994. A new cap badge for Army Brigadiers and Colonels was introduced around 1960 with an “upside down” Castle instead of the crown. The Air Force already adopted a new cap badge in 1959 worn by all ranks up to Brigadier although different officer lasses wore them on different coloured backgrounds. Brigadiers and Colonels wearing theirs on sky blue with a sky blue cap band. In 1963 Brigadiers and Colonels regained their “scrabled eggs” on the peak of their caps that had been done away with as an economy measure during the Second World War. The new peak embellishment consisted of a protea design rather than the row of oakleaves worn prior to the war. In the early 1970s there was a brief experiment to introduce a new Kalahari Sand uniform with different coloured gorgets for different divisions of the Defence establishment. Brigadiers were to wear a gorget design that had twisted braid (similar to the pattern worn by Deputy Chief Constables in some English police services). The uniform was only worn by a few senior Permanent Force officers before being abandoned. A further minor modification came about in the late 1970s with a distinction between ‘Staff Qualified” and “Non-Staff Qualified” Brigadiers and Colonels in the Army. Those who had attended the Senior Command and Staff Duties Course (also known as the ‘Red Lanyard’ course) were allowed to wear the coveted Chilli red lanyard as 99


well as a cap badge with a wreath around the “upside down Castle” badge on their cap or a Military ry Bronze beret. Their gorgets were distinguished by a line of gold Russia braid. The ‘Non-Staff Staff Qualified” officers continued to wear Chilli red gorgets with a line of Chilli red braid and the “upside down Castle” without a wreath on their caps or beret (the the latter in their Corps colour). The rank of Brigadier was initially retained by the new Defence Force and in 1995 but the Castle rank insignia was replaced by a 9 9-pointed pointed star. The former cap badges were retained. In 2003 the rank of Brigadier was don done e away with and Brigadier-General General was reintroduced. To add the the confusion the old rank insignia for Brigadier-General General that had been in use om 1912 to the 1940s was not reintroduced. Instead the “new” Brigadier Brigadier-General General rank adopted the insignia previously worn by a Major-- General. RANK INSIGNIA

Brigadier-General 1912-1940s

Colonel-Commandant 1937-40

Brigadier 1940-52

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Brigadier 1952-58

Brigadier 1958-95

Brigadier 1995

PHOTOGRAPHS

Brigadier-General General Sir Duncan Mac Mac- Brigadier-General General Francis S. Dawson was kenzie probably the highest ranking South African rican to become a PoW in the First World War. Dawson was no ‘Chatteau ‘Chat General’. He was captured at Marriers Wood in 1918 where he had been shooting a rifle along with his men until they ran out of ammunition. In earlier days he commanded the Cape Mounted Riflemen.

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Brigadier Piet de Waal served as Deputy Chief of Staff, U.D.F. and was later on General Eisenhower’s staff during the Second World War. During the 1950s he was Naval and Marine Chief of Staff and the only Brigadier in the SA Corps of Marines.

Brigadier B F Armstrong was the highest ranking South African to be captured during the Second World War. He was captured at Sidi Resegh where he had commanded the ill-fated fated 5 SA Brigade.

Cap badge 1940s

Brigadier Pieter Grobbelaar was Army Chief of Stall in the 1950s. Note the 1950s cap badge and the SA titles.

His career started in the Natal Police, later absorbed into the SA Mounted Riflemen. emen. He served in the Royal Artillery in the First World War and was in charge of the Garrison Artillery in the Cape during the 1930s. Prior to the Second World War he was OC Cape Command. He was Adjutant-Genera Genera in 1940 and after his escape as PoW was OC Witwatersrand Command when this photo was taken. He is wearing the typical Service Dress uniform of the period.

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Cap badge as worn c. 1954 1954-58

Lieut.-Gen. Jack Dutton as a Brigadier. Dutton was seconded to 1 Royal Tank Regiment in the Korean War. He commanded both 1 SSB and 2 Armoured Car Regiment during the 1960’s 1960 and as a Brigadier he was the first Director: Armour in the SADF.

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Gorget patches c. 1934-1958 The smaller one was worn on the Battle Dress jacket and khaki Bush jacket. The large one was worn on the both the drab and light khaki Service Dress jackets as well as on Undress Blues (when worn). The owner of the larger one must have been Gunner as the button is artillery rather than Staff Corps.

‘Staff Qualified’ (left) and ‘Non-Staff’ cap badges and gorgets

SADF Colonel or Brigadier cap with post- Staff Corps beret 1963 Protea-pattern peak and ‘Staff Qualified’ badge (post c.1978). 104


Hello again I've just realised I made a mistake in a photo caption to the article. Brigadier Armstrong was the highest ranking PoW at the time of his capture in 1941 but after Tobruk (1942) of course the highest ranking PoW was Major-General Klopper. Regards

Brigadier Rank and Insignia in the South African Police: Compiled By M Naudé Good evening An article on SAP Brigadier-insignia is attached as well as some illustrations of gorget patches. To save time I haven't looked for any photos of Brigadiers and insignia of the more recent era. I am sure you will have plenty that you could add. I also don't have the date that Brig. Baston was promoted to Brigadier although some cryptic notes I made more than a decade ago suggest 1942 which is what I've put in the article. If you have more accurate information in this regard please feel free to correct the article accordingly. Regards Prior to the Second World War there were no Brigadiers in the South African Police. For many years the Commissioner wore the same rank insignia as a Colonel in the Army or Air Force i.e. a crown and two bath star ‘pips’. In 1940 the 6th South African Infantry Brigade was formed from members of the Police and Railways Police. As armed police, the SAP and SARP could provide a pool of pre-disciplined, para-military trained personnel. FW Cooper, formerly Quartermaster of the SAP, was appointed as Brigade Commander with the rank of Brigadier. Although known as “The Police Brigade” the formation was in fact part of the Union Defence Force (not he SAP) and Brigadier Cooper’s rank was thus an army one. In similar fashion Brigadier RJ Palmer who had commanded a battalion in the 6th SA Brigade rose to become a Brigadier in the 6th South African Armoured Division. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Commissioner of Police, Colonel IP de Villiers was appointed as a Major-General in the Defence Force. De Villiers was no stranger to military life. He had been an artillery officer during the First World War and was awarded the Military Cross for Gallantry. In 1928 he had been appointed as Deputy Commissioner: Headquarters straight from civilian life as a lawyer. The temporary departure of General de Villiers led to the appointment of Colonel GRC Baston as acting Commissioner. In that capacity he was promoted to Brigadier in 1942 - the first Brigadier serving in the South African Police.

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Once the war ended, Brigadier Palmer, who had by then twice been awarded the DSO, returned to the Police. He retained his rank and became Police Commissioner in 1945. He retired as a Major Major-General in 1951. The rank insignia of a brigadier originally consisted of three miniature Bath star ‘pips’ under a Crown. The collar gorget patch was staff blue with a central black line between two gold lines. The cap badge was initially the voided gilt officers pattern (see photo of Brigadier Baston) worn on a Staff Blue ca cap p band. The peak of the blue undress cap (which was often worn with a white or khaki cover in daytime) had a single row of gold oak leaves. In 1952 the 5-pointed pointed star replaced the Bath Star as rank insignia in South Africa. Brigadiers now wore three miniat miniature 5-pointed pointed stars under the Crown on their shoulders. The oak leaf peak was apparently not worn with the Drab uniform of the mid-1950s. In 1957-58 58 the Crown was replaced in South African rank insignia by the pentagonal Castle design. That arrangement re remained until 1995. When new cap badges were introduced, Brigadiers wore the eight pointed gilt star with the circlet and coat-of of-arms arms in coloured enamel. The gorget for Brigadiers remained the same until 1971 when an aloe design was implemented. The rank of Brigadier was discontinued when the SAP ceased to exist. RANK INSIGNIA

Brigadier 1940-52

Brigadier 1952-58

Brigadier 1958-95

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PHOTOGRAPHS

Brigadier GRC Baston was the first Police Brigadier SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE GORGETS C. 1942-45 SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE KRAAGPATTE C. 1942-45

Brigadier Brigadier

Colonel Kolonel

Lieutenant-Colonel Luitenant-kolonel

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SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE GORGETS 1945-71 SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISE KRAAGPATTE 1945-71

General Officers Generale Offisiere

Brigadier Brigadier

Colonel & Lieutenant-Colonel Kolonel & luitenant-kolonel

DST (AMI) BYMEKAARKOMS. At van Wyk en Cor van Niekerk reël 'n bymekaarkoms van alle lede wat by Direktoraat Spesiale Take (DST) van Afdeling Inligting betrokke was, hetsy in die hoofkwartier of by een van die buitebasisse soos Rundu, Boa Fe, Sasha en opleidigsbasisse. Dit sluit alle dissiplines in soos dokters, verpleegsters, loggies, tiksters, registrasieklerke, seiners, vlieëniers, ens. Dit word gereël vir 11h00 op 06 Mei 2017 by Chatterleys (1 Vindhella str, Valhalla) regoor die ingang na LMB. Swartkop. Bring R50 saam vir kos en nog geld om in die kontantkroeg te blaas, Versprei asb die storie. Laat weet asb vir At of Cor voor 22 April 2017 as u gaan bywoon. At van wyk : 0824562491 ofsuzettevwyk@gmail.com Cor van Niekerk : 0827009275 ofcorvanniekerk@gmail.com

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LET ME TAKE A WALK IN YOUR GARDEN: MJJ VAN RENSBURG

LET ME TAKE A WALK IN YOUR GARDEN Hide me in the mist of your garden Lest Your Holiness consume me! Show me Your prayer garden of Gethsemane. Please show me that Heavenly garden. Lord ! You created earth On a Heavenly architecture. You planted Eden with Heavens seed, Untouched by hands of man. Adam was a caretaker of agriculture With the secrets of Your title deed. Lord! You transferred from heaven A little farm to earth And called it the garden of Eden. It was a paradise in holy birth. My desire to see for once, The beauty of your creation 109


Consumes the very essence of my soul, But, magnifies the illness of my sins. In Your garden, you placed a shrine And called it a day of Sabbath. Lord ! You picked this Commandment From a cluster tree of Ten Commandments. Like the golden crown on Thy Head The Sabbath of memory and rest Would be forever over eternity Lord ! maybe You took Eden home Because of earths tornados of sin Maybe Eden was only on loan. It was never to be for the next of kin! Maybe one day the Angels Will bear be to your Eden. They will explain the magnificence Of the Ten Commandments The very fibre of Your mighty universe. It is only this earth who rejects them. Today Lord, I knock at the gate of Eden For only one invitation/ I promise to tread softly and quietly And will be an audience to the Angel choir. Lord! Can you save this man of flesh and blood? Just touch me and heal me Of all my humanity. I have no more tears to lay before Thee. Teach me redemption in Your cluster tree. Lord ! , let me take a walk in Your garden. MJJ van Rensburg January

2017

HUMOUR IN UNIFORM • Top this one for a speeding ticket Two California Highway Patrol Officers were conducting speeding enforcement on I15, just north of the Marine Corps Air Station at Miramar. One of the officers was using a hand held radar device to check speeding vehicles approaching the crest of a hill. The officers were suddenly surprised when the radar gun began reading 300 miles per hour. The officer attempted to reset the radar gun, but it would not reset 110


and then turned off. Just then a deafening roar over the treetops revealed that the radar had in fact locked on to a USMC F/A-18 Hornet which was engaged in a low flying exercise near the location. Back at the CHP Headquarters the Patrol Captain fired off a complaint to the USMC Base Commander. The reply came back in true USMC style: ~ ~~ Thank you for your letter. We can now complete the file on this incident. You may be interested to know that the tactical computer in the Hornet had detected the presence of, and subsequently locked on to your hostile radar equipment and automatically sent a jamming signal back to it, which is why it shut down. Furthermore, an Air-to-Ground missile aboard the fully armed aircraft had also automatically locked on to your equipment location. Fortunately, the Marine Pilot flying the Hornet recognized the situation for what it was, quickly responded to the missile system alert status and was able to override the automated defence system before the missile was launched to destroy the hostile radar position. The pilot also suggests you cover your mouths when cussing at them, since the video systems on these jets are very high tech. Sergeant Johnson, the officer holding the radar gun, should get his dentist to check his left rear molar. It appears the filling is loose. Also, the snap is broken on his holster. Thank you for your concern. Semper Fi •

Stolen Car

The proud owner of a magnificent 1956 Chevrolet convertible, wrote to say he had restored the car to perfection over the last few years, and sent this: On a very warm summer afternoon he decided to take his car to town. It needed gas, as the gauge was practically on empty, but he wanted ice cream, so he headed first to his favourite ice cream shop. He had trouble finding a parking space and had to park the car down a side street. He noticed a group of young guys standing around smoking cigarettes and eyeing the car rather covetously. He was a bit uneasy leaving it there, but people often take interest in such an old and well-preserved car, so he went off to enjoy his ice cream. The line at the ice cream shop was long and it took him quite a while to return to his car. When he did, his worst fears were realized‌ his car was gone. He called the police and reported the theft and then went back and bought a quart of 111


pistachio ice cream. About ten minutes later the police called him to say they had found the car abandoned near a gas station a few miles out of town. It was unharmed and he was relieved. It seems just before he called, the police had received a call from a young woman who was an employee at a self-service gas station. She told them that three young men had driven in with this beautiful old convertible. One of them came to the window and prepaid for 20 dollars’ worth of gas. Then all three of them walked around the car. Then they all got in the car and drove off, without filling the tank. The question is why would anybody steal a car, pay for gas that they never pumped and then abandon the car later and walk away? They couldn't find where to put the gas!

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OPINION

Save us from the corrupt among us Paul Hoffman | 19 January 2017 Paul Hoffman on the surprising consensus on the extent of the problem

SERVICE DELIVERY AND CORRUPTION It is reported in the media that the Secretary General of the African National Congress, Gwede Mantashe, told a town hall meeting in Evaton on 3 January, 2017 that: “Corruption is not curing (sic). This practice is stealing. If it is real, abantu must be arrested. It’s simple.” Corruption is real. The Anti-Corruption Task Team reported to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts last year that in the last six year R250 billion has 113


been stolen, misappropriated, irregularly spent and paid out without authority in the government procurement system. This is a staggering sum. There would be huge dents in the challenges around funding education, health-care and housing were the government to take action to recover the stolen funds and to put a stop to the continuation of the looting of state coffers. Mantashe went on to concede to his lively audience that: “At this stage we cannot say that it is a perception. There are people in the ANC who loot the state, and when you loot you destroy the ability of the state to deliver services.” This truism drew loud applause. A keen appreciation that corruption is a human rights issue has come to Evaton, hence the enthusiasm of the crowd. The problem is that the rate at which the state is being looted is accelerating rapidly each year and now exceeds R46 billion annually according to the most recent report of the Auditor General. “Abantu” stealing from the state are however not being arrested in sufficient numbers. Some are apparently being regarded as “royal game” and above the reach of the law. The rate at which the Hawks have effected arrests on all priority crimes, including corruption, has in fact decreased from a total of 14793 in 2010/11 to 5847 in 2014/15 with shrinking numbers in the intervening years. The total number of convictions in 2010/11 was 7037 while in 2014/15 this number was down to only 1176. In the period April to September 2015 (the latest available figures) a pitiful 1038 arrests were effected by the Hawks and only 288 convictions secured. These figures speak of gross dysfunction at the coalface of the criminal justice administration. In the meantime, the Auditor General has investigated looting by public servants and has handed 3000 “slam-dunk” dockets over to the National Prosecuting Authority with a request that the public servants involved in the corrupt activities uncovered by him be arrested and charged. This is the very process that Mantashe advocates. The problem is that in the last two years the NPA has, according to its latest annual report, secured a measly 151 convictions of public servants. At this rate it will take 20 years to work off the backlog of dockets awaiting attention, assuming (without any justification for doing so) that corruption magically ceases overnight. Experience teaches that the impunity that comes with a 20 year backlog is more likely to encourage increasing numbers of public servants to involve themselves in the looting because there are no consequences of any kind let alone an arrest. It does not help to lay charges. No investigation follows. The Nkandla “Secure in Comfort” report of the Public Protector contains a great deal of prima facie evidence of theft, fraud and corruption. The complaints to the police about the Nkandla debacle have gone nowhere since 2013. Initially the dockets were kept away from the Hawks by top management in the police. Then, after the Constitutional Court widened the powers of the Hawks and the head of the Hawks, General Anwa Dramat, promptly called for the dockets, he was immediately suspended and eventually pressured to resign. There is no suggestion that the dockets have ever reached the Hawks or have ever 114


been investigated. Dramat now faces trumped up charges of kidnapping, which were known to all and sundry before he was paid his golden handshake to resign. The charges are based on the same factual matrix as those of defeating the ends of justice that were brought against Robert McBride and other IPID officials and had to be ignominiously withdrawn for want of evidence late last year. Despite this set back, the NPA soldiers on against Dramat and his co-accused in the related kidnapping or “rendition” to Zimbabwe case. No discernable progress has been made on the complaints concerning the goings on at Nkandla. Even the loyal opposition parties, the DA and EFF, do nothing to correct the obvious error in the Constitutional Court judgment on Nkandla. The correction in question will relieve taxpayers of a debt of many millions of rand. This is not an isolated instance. Read the story of the career of General Johan Booysen, head of the Hawks in KZN for many years, and weep. Jessica Pitchford’s book “Blood on their Hands” leaves the reader in no doubt that the chief activity of the Hawks these days is political intrigue and the protection of crooked politicians, their friends and business associates. This is how Booysen sees it: “If the last thing I do is to expose those destroying the criminal justice system, I’ll be happy. I’m not the only one who thinks Jiba [a reference to Nomgcobo Jiba, DNDPP, since struck from the roll of advocates for her mendacity] and her cabal have blood on their hands. It’s now widely acknowledged that they are protecting themselves and their cohorts from prosecution. Complacency will allow people like her and Richard Mdluli [suspended Crime Intelligence chief appointed 2009, suspended 2011, re-appointed March 2012, suspended May 2012 to the present] to capture vital state institutions to advance their own financial and other interests. That’s why I won’t back off. Many people turn silent when faced by injustice, but it’s apathy that creates the breeding ground for the evil monsters that will in the end devour us all… The Irish statesman Edward Burke once said: for evil to triumph, good men must do nothing.” If any doubt remains, the content of “Rogue” by Johann van Loggerenberg and Adrian Lackay of SARS erases all thought of propriety and functionality on the part of the leadership of the Hawks. Justifying his decision to write the forward to the book, retired Justice Johann Kriegler puts it thus: “Ultimately, though, I was motivated by a personal sense of outrage at what these dirty tricks said about the rule of law in our country. For, however opaque and perverted this Kafkaesque tale, there was a discernable pattern – discernable across a number of public institutions – where key individuals, experienced, reputable and independent-minded public servants, have been cynically shunted aside, or out. Typically, the process starts with some or other alleged transgression, relatively trivial and/or outdated. That then triggers well-publicised suspension and disciplinary proceedings with concomitant humiliation, harassment and, ultimately, dismissal, constructive or actual. Then, with breath-taking speed, a hand-picked acting successor steps in and cleans out senior management; and when you look again there is a brand new crop of compliant and grateful faces.

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In the process, honourable women and men have been ground down, ignominiously kicked out, their reputations ruined and their life savings exhausted. Often even the most feisty individual has been driven to exhaustion, physical, emotional and, of course, financial. Examples of broadly the same pattern of administrative abuse are to be found in a whole range of parastatals: think, for instance, of South African Airways, Denel, Eskom and the SABC. And of numerous senior public servants – Vusi Pikoli, Mxolisi Nxasana, Glynnis Breytenbach, Anwa Dramat, Shadrack Sibiya, Johan Booysen and Robert McBride, to speak only of the criminal justice sector – who’ve been hounded out of office.” Even as ANC friendly a commentator as Professor Richard Calland in “Make or Break” has been constrained to remark: “Under Zuma, it just became easier to plunder. Almost by definition the right-wing nationalists are unconcerned by this because they are part of the rot. There is no crisis of conscience about the harm that has been done – to the ANC, to the government and to the country. On the left, however, there is a wailing and gnashing of teeth. There is angst and fretfulness, and, yes, at least in some quarters, a crisis of conscience. Some feel guilty that they were accomplices to this project of ‘state capture’ and the deepening of a culture of impunity and corruption in and around the ANC’s control of governmental power. Others grit their teeth and close their eyes and construct in their mind’s eye a narrative that justifies not only their original support for Zuma, but their continued presence in his cabinet.” Calland concludes that: “South Africans should not turn their backs on politics. They must engage and get involved. The choice is simple: be a bystander and, thereby, an accomplice to the downward spiral or, rather, be a protagonist, a contestant, …” It is difficult to discern whether Mantashe is having a crisis of conscience or whether he is waking up to the reality that the electoral support of his party is in jeopardy following the set-backs it suffered in the municipal elections last August. Either way, if he wishes to restore the credibility of the ANC, it will be necessary to address the issues around the dysfunction in the criminal justice administration. Jackie Selebi was convicted of corruption, his successor as chief of police, Bheki Cele, was found unfit for office after he was involved in trying to lease premises for SAPS at three times the going commercial rate. He has never been arrested or charged, instead he finds himself in the cabinet as a deputy minister. His successor, Riah Phiyega, has also been found unfit for office if leaks of her long awaited board of inquiry report are to be believed. There are proceedings pending concerning the fitness for office of the head of the NPA, Adv Shaun Abrahams, and the head of the Hawks, General Berning Ntlemeza. Two of the most senior prosecutors in the land have been struck off the roll of advocates because they are not fit and proper persons to enjoy that status. The Minister of Police, Nathi Nhleko, still believes there is a firepool at Nkandla, his predecessor, Nathi Mthethwa, has a garden wall paid for irregularly out of police 116


intelligence slush funds but does not regard himself as in any way liable. Dinah Pule, she of the red shoes, palpably a cabinet-based looter, has never been required to face criminal charges and has not been arrested. Mantashe needs to take cognisance of the fact that while cadre deployment in the public administration continues, while the 3000 docket backlog of Auditor General investigations remains unattended and while the Hawks are ineffective, the corruption of the ANC will continue until the state fails shortly after the goose that lays all the stolen golden eggs dies of malnutrition. What is needed is an Integrity Commission: an independent, specialist entity with dedicated professionals trained to deal with corruption and organised crime exclusively. Properly resourced personnel who enjoy security of tenure of office, led by persons of integrity and probity. An Integrity Commission will have the clout to stare down those who seek to influence it or interfere in its work. It will answer to parliament, not the executive. It will, if the Constitutional Court is right in setting its binding criteria for our anti-corruption machinery of state, save us all from the corrupt among us. Paul Hoffman SC is a director of Accountability Now and the author of “Confronting the Corrupt”. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/save-us-from-the-corrupt-amongus?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=6213ce9a20EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db996213ce9a20-130042309 (Accessed 20 January 2017)

THE SACP'S SECRET MOSCOW PAPERS OPINION

The SACP's secret Moscow papers: James Myburgh | 31 January 2017 James Myburgh on the striking new information that has emerged about the Party's influence on the ANC in the early 1960s The nature of the relationship between the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, at the time of the turn to the armed struggle in the early 1960s, was (for decades) at the centre of an intense propaganda war in the West between sympathisers and critics of the national liberation movement. At the Rivonia trial the State had charged that the ANC and SACP had not only “worked in close union” in the conspirators’ efforts to violently overthrow the existing

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order, but also that the “former was completely dominated by the latter. In fact, the aims and objects of the ANC were the aims and objects of the SACP.” The state further charged that, according to some of the documents found, “Moscow had promised and assured every sort and manner of assistance in their campaign, but its co-operation and involvement was not be to revealed or made public property because of possible international repercussions.” In his statement from the dock Nelson Mandela had responded by stating that “the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect.” He denied having been a member of the SACP (as did Walter Sisulu in his testimony) and claimed to be a great admirer of the institutions of Western democracy. This ‘line’ was one followed by many liberal Western sympathisers of the ANC over the following four decades. One of the most influential of these was Thomas G. Karis who, together with Gwendolen Carter, wrote an early and authoritative treatment of the liberation movement in the 1950s and 1960s.[1] In a 1986 article Karis stated: “African, Indian and white Communists have influenced the course of the ANC to an extent greater than their numbers, but they have not dominated or controlled the movement.” This would require believing inter alia “that young African nationalists such as Mandela, Tambo or Walter Sisulu had come to accept the discipline of a minor and doctrinaire party or were manipulated by it.”[2] Over the past decade however much information, contrary to this naïve Western view, started filtering out as old comrades – their battle long won (and lost) – started speaking more frankly about the role they and others (such as Mandela) had played in the Party in the late 1950s and early 1960s.[3] A further breakthrough in our understanding of this critical period in South African history has come with the surfacing in the archives of four documents which senior SACP leaders prepared for meetings in Moscow in the early 1960s. These are reported on in two academic journal articles published in late 2015 by Tom Lodge and the late Stephen Ellis, in the South African Historical Journal and Cold War History respectively. The documents The documents concerned were contained in the personal papers which SACP, MK and ANC veteran Ronnie Kasrils turned over to the Wits historical papers research archive in 2013. Limited references to the same documents can be found in the book ANC: A view from Moscow by the Russian academic and former Soviet official, Vladimir Shubin, who seems to also have had copies in his personal possession. These documents are the following: 1.) “The Political Situation in the Union of South Africa / The Situation in the South African Communist Party”, document(s) presented on behalf of the SACP Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by Yusuf Dadoo, Chairman, and Veli Pillay, Representative in Europe, Moscow 14 July 1960

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2.) “Some notes on the Communist Party of South Africa”, document prepared by the SACP’s leading theoretician and CC member, Michael Harmel, while part of the SACP delegation attending the International Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow in November / early December 1960 3.) “Notes on Some Aspect of the Political Situation in the Republic of South Africa”, by Moses Kotane, General Secretary of the SACP, Moscow, 9th November 1961 4.) An untitled memorandum which Ellis says was written by Michael Harmel and which post-dates October 1962. It appears to be the same document which Shubin says Arthur Goldreich and Vella Pillay presented to a Soviet delegation ahead of a meeting in Moscow in January 1963. It will be referred to as “the memorandum” in this article. Together this material describes in considerable detail, and from its own perspective, the role the Party had played in the Congress Alliance in the 1950s and in the turn to the armed struggle in the early 1960s. Origins of the SACP and influence over the Freedom Charter The (until then legal) Communist Party of South Africa had been dissolved in 1950 ahead of the Suppression of Communism Act of June 1950 finally passing into law. In his November 1960 paper Harmel says that towards the end of 1950 a group of “leading comrades gathered around Comrade Kotane in Johannesburg” had decided to build the Party up again on new lines, “lines which would enable it to work and survive in the new conditions” of illegality. A meeting held in Easter 1952 (?) in Johannesburg decided to form a new Communist Party underground. Brian Bunting, one Ngwavela, Moses Kotane, Bram Fischer, Yusuf Dadoo, Rusty Bernstein, Vernon Berrangé, and Michael Harmel were all in favour of the proposal with Sam Kahn the only attendee against, after which he left the meeting. This meeting decided to form district committees in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Durban and to prepare a programme and rules for a national conference, which was duly held in early 1953. The name of the party was changed to the South African Communist Party to distinguish it from the old entity. Harmel described the mode of operation of the Party as follows: “The membership is organised in groups of three or four. In the small districts each group is in direct contact with the district committee, through a member who attends the group meetings. In Johannesburg each group are in contact with a branch committee, and the branch committees in turn are represented on the district committees. Members are obliged to pay subs, attend group meetings and study classes in Marxism-Leninism, support Party policy and carry out practical work under Party guidance. Strict principles of democratic centralism are observed. It is a cardinal rule that no member may divulge his own or anyone else’s membership of the Party, or any other information about the Party, to any person, without the express decision of the district Committee.

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At national conference only part of the Central Committee is elected. Those elected co-opt the others. Thus, Conference members are not aware of the composition of the full C.C.” The main work of the party following its re-establishment was directed towards building a “united front of national liberation” – the alliance of democratic and trade union organisations known as the Congress Alliance. This had proved remarkably successful with the mass movement growing greatly in “strength, unity and political understanding.” The Freedom Charter unreservedly adopted at the Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955 by every section of the Congress movement, Harmel noted, “is identical in all its main provisions to the demands set forth in the immediate programme of the SACP adopted in 1953.” The “main draftsman” of the Charter, he wrote elsewhere in the document, was Central Committee member Rusty Bernstein who had served “as the delegate of the Congress of Democrats on the Drafting Commission.” The subsequent Treason Trial involved “nearly all” members of the Central Committee. A majority were among the 156 leaders arrested, while the few not arrested were actively involved in legal defence and the organisation of protests. In 1959 the first step towards the “emergence” of the Party was taken with the issuing of the first edition of the “African Communist.” Between the national conference in 1958 and the declaration of the State of Emergency on 30 March 1960 the Central Committee consisted of 15 members. The executive, which met once a week, consisted of seven people: Kotane (General Secretary), Dadoo (Chairman), Walter Sisulu, Fischer, Rusty Bernstein, Joe Slovo and Harmel. The other members were JB Marks, Dan Tloome, Ruth First, Brian Bunting, Fred Carneson, Ray Alexander, Raymond Mhlaba and MP Naicker. Between meetings the practical work was carried on by a Secretariat of three members composed of Kotane, Harmel and Sisulu. The police raids following the declaration of a state of emergency after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 – in which thousands were arrested - targeted every single member of the Central Committee, with the exception of Bram Fischer. However, Kotane, Dadoo, Ruth First, Harmel and Fred Carneson were able to evade capture, with Dadoo then leaving the country. The entire Johannesburg district committee of the Party was arrested, as well as about half the membership, and in Port Elizabeth the whole membership was in prison throughout the five months of the state of emergency. During the emergency Ben Turok, Bartholomew Hlapane, Bob Hepple and Joe Matthews (who was Basutoland based) were co-opted onto the CC. Although heavy casualties were suffered during this period, with 150 Communists arrested and kept in prison for five months without charge or trial, the Party “came out of the crisis period “a great deal stronger than it entered it”, according to Harmel. The emergency period saw important steps taken to correct weaknesses that had been exposed, “brought forward outstanding new cadres, and above all the implementation of the decision to emerge in our own name” (a decision taken at an extending Central Committee meeting in June 1960).

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Influence of the SACP over the Congress Alliance In its submissions to the CPSU in the early 1960s the SACP emphasised the “considerable” influence it had exercised over the Congress Alliance, which was comprised of five organisations: the ANC, the (white) Congress of Democrats, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People’s Congress and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). This was despite the Party’s small membership, which Kotane put at between 450 and 500 people. According to Kotane, following its re-establishment the Party had focused on recruiting “brave and reliable fighters” from four fields: former CPSA members, the trade union movement, national liberation organisations and the peace movement. This drive had yielded extraordinary results. As Dadoo and Pillay put it: “All important positions and direction in the Congress and in other organisations are occupied by members of our Party. In the African National Congress, this is particularly the case. The Secretary-General is a member of the Party and party members hold positions in the National-Executive and in the Provincial organs of this Congress. The policy of the African National Congress is therefore heavily influenced by our Party. This general position is equally true of most of the other mass democratic organisations in the country. The Party is strong in the SA Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, the Youth Congress and so on. Indeed it is true to say that the leading positions in these mass organisations are occupied by our party members.” Although the government had banned a number of party members from “occupying any position in the mass organisations, these comrades are nonetheless active in policy making work in these mass organisations.” The Emergency Committee appointed by the ANC NEC in preparation for the 1960 anti-pass campaign, in anticipation of government arrests, “is wholly comprised of comrades (some of whom have since been imprisoned.)” Furthermore “all the propaganda organs” of the mass organisations and SACTU “are edited and managed by Party members. The Party managed a weekly newspaper, New Age, which has been an influential and widely read propaganda organ in the mass organisations and among the non-white peoples. The journals Fighting Talk and Liberation too have been a great success. All these propaganda organs have now been declared illegal by the Government.” Kotane re-emphasised the extent of the Party’s influence in his report of November the following year: “Though illegal and functioning underground, the Party – through its members who in each particular case are formed into fraction or caucus – leads the non-white trade unions and the national liberatory and progressive movement in South Africa. All major policy decisions taken and campaigns conducted by these organisations either emanate from or have the approval of the Central Committee of our Party…. We have Party members in the leadership of all the five organisations which constitute the Congress Alliance. In three of these, as well as in the Federation of South African Women, Party members are in the majority in the top leadership.”

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In Dadoo and Pillay’s submission they had complained that the Party was operating under severe financial constraints following the imposition of the state of emergency. There had been declining donations from the Indian community and the Party’s funds had been stretched by the support provided to the families of detainees and by assistance to the ANC Emergency Committee. Shubin writes that the CPSU agreed to assist and $30 000 was then “allocated to the SACP in 1960 from the socalled ‘International Trade Union Fund for assistance to left workers’ organisations’.” In his paper Lodge says that it was this funding which probably enabled the SACP to purchase Lilieslief farm in Rivonia the following year. It was seemingly initially intended to be a hideout / meeting place for serving members of the SACP’s Central Committee only.[4]

The turn to the armed struggle In his report Kotane said that the “violent measures employed by the Government and its new methods and tactics of dealing with our demonstrations and strikes” had brought into question the wisdom and political correctness of persisting with the policy of non-violence. The Central Committee of the Party and the leadership of the Congress Alliance had decided to re-assess the slogan in the light of the political situation in the country and the “prevailing mood of the people.” Quoting an SACP document (date and authorship not provided) Kotane said that the Party had then decided that while not neglecting our public activities we should “rely more and more on our underground activities and to intensify preparations for such underground activities; and in future employ some elements of violence during our mass struggles, such as picketing and disruption of communications.” 122


This document further expressed doubt over whether the Party could achieve its goals through non-violence, given the hostile attitude of the whole white population (including workers): “is it reasonable to expect that any fundamental political and social changes could come about peacefully in South Africa, in other words, cant the ruling class surrender power and wealth without a violent struggle?” The conclusion the Party reached, Kotane wrote, was that unless they got help from outside “the non-whites have no reason to believe that they can achieve their national liberation without a bitter and grim struggle and much sacrifice.” In December 1960 the Party held its national conference in a house rented for the purpose in Emmarentia, Johannesburg. According to Bob Hepple among the 25 people in attendance were Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Piet Beyleveld, Govan Mbeki, John Nkadimeng, Ben-Turok, MP Naicker, Fred Carneson, Moses Kotane, Bram Fischer, Joe Slovo, Michael Harmel, Ben Turok, Rusty Bernstein, Dan Tloome and Raymond Mhlaba. (It would appear that Mandela was co-opted onto the Central Committee immediately after the conference.) In the late 1962 / early 1963 memorandum the SACP said that at this meeting the Party had reviewed the experience and significance of the events during the State of Emergency earlier that year. These had revealed that the government “had passed from the stage where it was attempting to control and combat the people’s movement by parliamentary means; and had entered a period where resort would be had to open military-style rule whenever the government felt itself powerfully challenged.” Conference had thus concluded: “a. That the peoples’ movement could no longer hope to continue along the road of exclusively non-violent forms of political struggle, and to do so would lead to the paralysis of the movement in the face of new government tactics, and to the disillusionment and spread of defeatism among the people. b. That therefore steps should be taken to ensure that the whole people’s movement reconsidered its tactics of exclusive reliance on non-violent methods, and that a campaign of education and explanation be carried out throughout the movement to prepare for forcible forms of struggle when those became necessary or desirable. c. That the Party CC should take steps to initiate the training and equipping of selected personnel in new methods of struggle, and thus prepare the nucleus of an adequate apparatus to lead struggles of a more forcible and violent struggle.” Kotane’s report says that at some point – no date is given, but probably shortly after this conference decision – a sub-committee of the Central Committee was then charged with the task of: “- acquiring few pieces of small arms with which to train personnel; - finding a place where such training could be carried out; and - training people in the making and use of ‘home-made’ explosives.” Kotane says that at this early stage the Communist Party of China had offered military training to cadres selected by the SACP, and this offer had now been taken up. “We have decided to send five or six comrades for training in China, one is 123


already there, two I left in Dar-es-Salaam and two or three were still in South Africa.” (The cadres who ended up being sent to China were Andrew Mlangeni, Raymond Mhlaba, Joe Gqabi, Wilton Mkwayi, Steven Naidoo and Patrick Abel Mthembu). In December 1960 – the same month that the SACP had decided to turn away from violence and persuade the “people’s movement” to do the same – a group of black African leaders had met at a meeting in Orlando, Johannesburg, and decided upon holding an ‘All-In African Conference’ which would call for a national consultative conference of all the races. Anthony Sampson (1999) says that Mandela and Sisulu then went around the country making preparations for the conference, which was eventually held in Pietermaritzburg in March 1961, and which was addressed by Mandela (his banning order having expired shortly before.) Mandela had even approached Harry Oppenheimer in an (unsuccessful) effort to raise funds the conference from Anglo American. Sampson describes this campaign as an “attempt at peaceful organisation with other parties” but Stephen Ellis (2012) notes that a close analysis of this campaign “concludes that this initiative was actually intended to provide opponents of armed struggle with a paper trail that would justify their change of policy.” Kotane’s report provides support for the latter interpretation. It states that “The African leaders’ conference held on the 16th December, 1960, which called the Pieter Maritzburg conference was one of the efforts at combining the illegal and the legal work. The conference was suggested by our Party and, the resolution adopted unanimously by that Conference was drafted by our Central Committee.” The memorandum says that the correctness of the Party’s December 1960 decision was proved by the government’s aggressive response to the April 1961 strike against the proclamation of a Republic. “Despite the clearly peaceable intentions of the campaign and the repeated attempts made by the leaders of it to seek negotiation and discussion with the government, the government resorted openly to illegal and military-style methods to smash the campaign.” In these conditions, the memorandum states, the “old methods of non-violent struggle and non-violent action proved themselves to be ineffective and were seen by the masses to be incapable of meeting their needs. Government resort to open force remained unanswered and unrestrained by the people’s movement; terror and confusion spread amongst the people; and the strike call, though supported by thousands of the most advanced of the urban workers, failed to achieve the nationwide support which – in a different situation – would undoubtedly have followed. It was in the light of this graphic experience that the Party and the ANC pressed ahead with preparations to prepare their supporters and members of new methods of struggle.” The formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe The 1962/63 memorandum stated that following the adoption of the SACP’s December 1960 conference resolution (and in giving effect to "b.") “educational and propaganda work undertaken by our cadres in many fields has brought almost all politically active elements in the peoples’ movement to a single point of view – namely, that the former exclusive concentration on non-violent methods only no longer services the requirements of the movement, and that various forms of violent 124


political struggle are necessary and desirable as a complement to the normal forms of political activity which are still being undertaken.” The lead role in persuading first the ANC and then the other Congresses to abandon the principle of non-violence was taken by Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. In his 1976 prison manuscript Mandela writes that in June 1961 “the Working Committee of the ANC felt that resort to violence was inevitable and put the whole matter on the agenda of its National Executive which met in Durban that same month.” Despite “sharp differences” on the matter the NEC eventually “unanimously endorsed” the decision. This was then taken to a joint meeting of the Congresses the next evening which “lasted the whole night and in spite of disagreements we were able to reach a unanimous decision in the end.” He was then asked by the ANC to “take the initiative in the formation of the organisation that would wage acts of violence and in due course units were formed in various centres. In the meantime the Communist Party had formed its own units and in October the same year they cut telephone and electricity cables in Johannesburg and on the Witwatersrand. Later when MK was formed the CP dissolved its units and the members joined MK. I was chairman of the National High Command of the Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) and on the 16th December 1961 MK announced its existence amidst a spate of bomb explosions in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban.” The memorandum states that in 1961 the decision was taken by both the SACP and ANC “independently to set up a separate organisation as the beginning of a people’s fighting force, whose activities would be under the general direction and control of the established leading organisations of the people, but whose membership and apparatus would be entirely separated from those organisations.” Among the considerations influencing this decision was that the SACP was not “and under present conditions does not in the immediate future expect to be of a mass character. Any exclusively Party fighting forces, therefore, could not possible have the mass popular character which a peoples force of national liberation should rightly have.” The Party and the ANC had thus jointly assumed full responsibility for the formation of “a separate fighting organisation of a mass character” and that the “desirability of such a force being brought into being should be accepted by the legal partners to the United Front even though they themselves would not share in its control. Both the Party and the ANC, separately, therefore took decisions necessary to bring about such a state of affairs. By their two decisions, Umkonto We Sizwe (UWS) was established as a separate, fighting force of the peoples’ national liberation movement.” The memorandum states however that SACP members had dominated the leadership of MK following its inception: “The national leadership of UWS was composed of an equal number of men nominated by each of the two founding organisations. By virtue of the close fraternal links that exist between these organisations, and also by virtue of the positions and influence and leadership which individual Party members have won for themselves in 125


the ANC, the national leadership thus constituted consisted of five members of the Party, together with one completely reliable and trustworthy non-party man who we regard as a close Party supporter on the verge of Party membership.” According to Howard Barrell’s 1993 dissertation the initial high command was made up of five members: Nelson Mandela (commander in chief), Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Joe Slovo. In an article in Dawn magazine in 1986 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the formation of MK Slovo also put Andrew Mlangeni on the initial High Command (though he was one of the SACP cadres sent to China for training in late 1961). All six individuals were senior SACP members at the time, and the first five had attended the December 1960 SACP conference where the decision to turn to violence had been taken. Mlangeni had been nominated by the Party’s Johannesburg District Committee to attend as well, according to Hepple, but had been blocked by the Central Committee “because of what a commission appointed by the JDC later found to be wholly unfounded suspicions that he was a police informer (he was one of the Rivonia trialists in 1963).” Ellis and Lodge both suggest that the “sixth man” referred to in the memorandum was probably Joe Modise who had been co-opted onto the High Command by this time (after Mandela’s arrest) and who never ended up joining the Party. The control exerted by SACP members over the top leadership of MK extended down through the organisation. “This national leadership”, the memorandum stated, “has, in turn, nominated regional command groups in several main regions, again on the same basis of full agreement between the two founding organisations. In all cases, the effective control is in the hands of members of the Party. Regional commands have recruited selected personnel from the ranks of the Party, the ANC and other tried political activists who have the special characters and abilities necessary for this specialised work. They have been formed into small, disciplined and highly secret groups under the direct control of regional commands, and are subject to a strict code of military discipline.” (My emphasis) The Party seems to have kept a close eye on recruitment. Although members of MK were prohibited from disclosing their membership to any other person, “since recruiting is carried out only by decision of regional commands, Party District Committees are however aware of the facts as to which party members are to be approached to join UWS and are able to instruct them whether or not it is in the Party interests for them to do so.” According to the memorandum the low level operations by MK had already transformed the political climate of the country. As it put it: “Units of UWS have carried out a number of small scale operations, all of a sabotage nature, and with a gradually growing measure of success. These operations are becoming more numerous and more successful as the members acquire the skills and techniques which, generally speaking, were not available to them at the start. These operations have had a profound effect upon the political climate of the country. They have dissipated much of the gloom, despondency and defeatism which developed amongst the people after the crushing of the May 1961 Strike.” On the influence exerted by the SACP over MK the memorandum was unequivocal: 126


“The overall strategy and direction of policy of UWS remains at all times in the hands of the leadership of the Party. The national command of UWS, consisting in the main of members of the Party, acts only in terms of the overall political policy, main lines of strategy and general direction of the Party leadership.” The policy lines, under which MK operated, were contained in a resolution adopted at the Party’s national conference held in October 1962 (the same conference at which the Party’s programme the Road to South African Freedom had been adopted). This stated: a. In the light of the unyielding determination of the ruling minority to make no concessions to the national movement and to use the utmost state force to suppress the national aspirations of the majority, Conference believes that the national democratic struggle is likely to be driven to increasing reliance on violent struggle, leading towards a mass insurrection of the people against the ruling class. In this situation, the national democratic movement must prepare an army of freedom fighters dedicated to the completion of the national democratic revolution. b. Places on record its belief that at the present time, military and paramilitary forms of struggle do not constitute the main formers of struggle, but are still subsidiary and secondary to the traditional forms… c. Recognises the fact that the nature of the revolutionary struggle on which we are engaged is such that aims will best be achieved by the building of a firm united front of all groups and classes whose interests lie in the ending of white domination. And that therefore any military or paramilitary activities which are conducted as part of the political struggle must at all times be conducted in such a manner as to preserve the united front. “From this resolution”, the memorandum stated, “it will be clear that the general aim of the Party in this field of work is to develop a full-time peoples military force operating on guerrilla lines throughout the country, while at the same time developing and intensifying auxiliary activity of a sabotage character. UWS has already arranged the training in friendly territory abroad of a number of selected personnel from this country for both these purposes, and is embarked on a plan to expand their numbers considerably.” For the moment however, the memorandum noted, sabotage remained the main form of activity which MK was capable of conducting. “Its targets have, thus far, been installations of the government itself and in particular its repressive organs, thus clearly establishing in the people’s minds the political orientation of UWS.” The plan was however to soon target businesses and industrial concerns as well: “These operations are also to be extended against government-sponsored industrial establishments, and also against such foreign imperialist industrial establishments and local capitalist enterprises as are clearly important supporting props of the government itself and of the system of white supremacy generally.” Although the memorandum suggested that the prospect of a non-violent transition had not disappeared completely – especially if foreign capitalist support for the regime collapsed – the government had committed itself to an all-out military 127


campaign to beat back the opposition. “As time goes on, the prospects of peaceful transition in South Africa recede, and the prospects of a violent outcome become ever more likely. It is in the light of this developing situation that we are now anxious to make speedy improvements in our own preparations, and effect rapid improvements in the activities and scale of UWS.” The SACP’s request for help from the Soviets appears to have received a sympathetic hearing. Following their meeting in Moscow Vella Pillay and Arthur Goldreich met officials of the Czechoslovakian communist party in London in February 1963. According to Ellis’ paper (2015), which cites a 2007 Czech academic article, they submitted a request for “three tons of plastic explosives, 10,000 detonators, 500 machine guns, 300 pistols, 2,000 automatic rifles and military training for MK recruits”. The still evolving plans for the launching of guerilla warfare across the country were however thrown into disarray with the police raids on Liliesleaf farm and the capture of many of the conspirators in July 1963. Conclusion It is clear that the view of the relationship between the African National Congress and South African Communist Party in the early 1960s constructed by the defence team in the Rivonia trial, and propagated by the liberation movement’s Western supporters subsequently, is no longer tenable. As argued in a recent article Mandela’s Statement from the Dock was an extraordinary feat of political misdirection. For decades it has diverted the attention of Western academics, journalists and authors away from the SACP’s hugely influential October 1962 programme The Road to South African Freedom to which all the conspirators, as well as their lead counsel, had actually been committed. On the turn to the armed struggle too, it is clear from the above SACP documents that, contrary to Mandela’s denials, the Party exercised an absolutely dominant initial role. Very little of what Mandela said about this period – either in his 1964 Statement or 1993 autobiography - should be taken as fact until it has been independently corroborated. As Ellis drily notes: “Mandela’s insistence that he was not only the first chairman of Umkhonto we Sizwe’s national command but also the organisation’s real founder, and that the SACP played only a minor role, has to be reconciled with the fact that the armed force that came to be known as [MK] was originally conceived by a resolution of the Communist Party at its National Conference and that Party chieftains were adamant that they controlled it.” The debunking of all the old pretences and denials probably comes as something of a relief to all strands of political opinion in South Africa. Afrikaner nationalist and liberal concerns over the extent of communist penetration of the ANC were, in hindsight, certainly not hallucinogenic. Equally, the SACP can now finally claim full credit within the liberation movement for its role in launching the armed struggle, and shaping the ANC’s revolutionary 128


nationalist ideology, without having to continually throw bones of disinformation to the movement’s (non-communist) supporters in the West. Indeed, it has been the openness of old comrades – in interviews, memoirs, and in turning over documents to the archives – which has been key in clearing up the fog of misinformation that had settled over our understanding of the ANC and SACP in the early 1960s. If anyone is left looking gullible and ridiculous by these revelations it is the ANC’s Western liberal supporters and apologists. Bibliography • Tom Lodge, “Secret Party: South African Communists between 1950 and 1960”, South African Historical Journal Vol. 67 , Iss. 4, 2015 • Stephen Ellis, “Nelson Mandela, the South African Communist Party and the origins of Umkhonto we Sizwe”, Cold War History Vol. 16 , Iss. 1,2016 • Vladimir Shubin, “ANC: A view from Moscow” (Second Revised Edition), (Jacan: Johannesburg, 2008) • Stephen Ellis External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990, (Jonathan Ball: Johannesburg, 2012) • Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson, The Hidden Thread: Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2013) • Bob Hepple, Young Man with a Red Tie: A Memoir of Mandela and the Failed Revolution, 1960–1963 (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2013) • Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1995 • Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999) Footnotes:

[1] Tom Lodge, “Secret Party: South African Communists between 1950 and 1960”, South African Historical Journal Vol. 67 , Iss. 4, 2015. Lodge notes in his conclusion: “To an extent Karis’ observations were guided by the limitations of reliable information available at the time, but they also reflected the predispositions of liberal sympathisers of the ANC who maintained that the ‘independently minded African patriots’ who led the ANC were more than capable of prevailing in any collaboration they might undertake with communists.” [2] Thomas G. Karis, “South African Liberation: The Communist Factor”, Foreign Policy magazine Volume 65 • Number 2 1986 [3] See Stephen Ellis External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990, (Jonathan Ball: Johannesburg, 2012) and Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson, The Hidden Thread: Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2013) [4] Hepple says that only serving members of the SACP Central Committee were meant to know of this hideout. He was told by Joe Slovo, who took him there in 1961 despite this proscription (he was not a member of the CC at the time), “that the Party had got a substantial sum of money from abroad (he was not specific) and had to pay R24,000 for the house and farm. The Party had also bought a ship and a van.” 129


http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-anc-mk-and-thecommunists?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=252a3d051 b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_31&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99252a3d051b-130042309 (Retrieved 1 February 2017).(ook ontvang van Fanie Bouwer)

A POEM TO WHICH I CAN RELATE: JEF ‘JEFFERS’ MANNING A POEM TO WHICH I CAN RELATE I remember the corned beef of my Childhood, And the bread that we cut with a knife, When the Children helped with the housework, And the men went to work not the wife. The cheese never needed a fridge, And the bread was so crusty and hot, The Children were seldom unhappy, And the Wife was content with her lot. I remember the milk from the bottle, With the yummy cream on the top, Our dinner came hot from the oven, And not from a freezer; or shop. The kids were a lot more contented, They didn't need money for kicks, Just a game with their friends in the road, And sometimes the Saturday flicks. I remember the shop on the corner, Where biscuits for pennies were sold Do you think I'm a bit too nostalgic? Or is it....I'm just getting Old? Bathing was done in a wash tub, With plenty of rich foamy suds But the ironing seemed never ending As Mum pressed everyone's 'duds'. I remember the slap on my backside, And the taste of soap if I swore Anorexia and diets weren't heard of And we hadn't much choice what we wore. Do you think that bruised our ego? Or our initiative was destroyed? We ate what was put on the table 130


And I think life was better enjoyed. Author, Unknown... If you can remember those days... Continue to enjoy your Retirement [Received from Jeffers an “old boy” of SAP King’s Rest, BSAP & UK Police.]

KUM-A-KYE: THE REGIMENTAL MARCH OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA POLICE Directed & Arraigned by Supt M.A. Sparks. M.B.E., L.L.C.M., A. Mus. L.C.M. The tune Kum-a-Kye is based on an old American folk song ‘The Chisholm Trail’. This trail was used between 1860 and 1880 to move cattle from San Antonio Texas to Abilene Kansas where they were loaded onto rail wagons to continue the journey to the east coast. The cowboys would sit around the campfires in the evening adding ditties to the verses as they made them up. It is believed two of these cowboys later joined the BSA Company Police and accompanied the column into Rhodesia. The tune was sung around camp fires and local words and verses added over the years. In 1939 the Bandmaster, then Sergeant Max Sparks, arranged the tune so the band could play it. The band committee consisting of Depot Commandant and 2 other officers from PGHQ would meet from time to time and have the bandmaster wait outside until they called him in if they wanted to discuss an item with him. Questions arose over copyright of the tune. Letters were sent to London to see if the tune breached any copyright in existence. A record (old 78) was made and sent to London. This broke en route and another had to be dispatched. German torpedoes sank the ship carrying the second one. No record ever got to London and the music was never published. The band played from hand written parts photocopied over the years, until 1980 when it became politically incorrect to do so. https://www.facebook.com/GuyHalls1/videos/10211011211619916/ November 13, 2016 · [Received from Col Terry Schwartz (SAP) – himself a former BSAP member.]

1950: OUTSTANDING BSAP PERFORMANCE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvYAYOvD1Tk

BSAP 1890 - 1980 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5b8sNLA6mk

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Greetings / Groete Please keep in touch and take care! Wees asb. versigtig, drink u pille wat die dokter voorgeskryf het gereeld en baie groete! Hennie Heymans No. 43630

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Nongqai Vol 8 No 2  

Nongqai: AIM Our goal is to collect and record our national security history for publication in the Nongqai for future generations. (South...

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