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SPECIAL REPORT

Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military

AVCTS – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military Training to Counter IEDs From Counter Insurgency to Counter Terrorism Support Programmes and Training for Counter IED The Future of Training for C-IED Sponsored by

Published by Global Business Media


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

SPECIAL REPORT

Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military

Contents Foreword

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Mary Dub, Editor

AVCTS – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military

AVCTS – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military From Counter Insurgency to Counter Terrorism Support Programmes and Training for Counter IED The Future of Training for C-IED

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AVCTS

Training to Counter IEDs

Sponsored by

Published by Global Business Media

Published by Global Business Media Global Business Media Limited 62 The Street Ashtead Surrey KT21 1AT United Kingdom Switchboard: +44 (0)1737 850 939 Fax: +44 (0)1737 851 952 Email: info@globalbusinessmedia.org Website: www.globalbusinessmedia.org Publisher Kevin Bell Business Development Director Marie-Anne Brooks Editor Mary Dub Senior Project Manager Steve Banks Advertising Executives Michael McCarthy Abigail Coombes Production Manager Paul Davies For further information visit: www.globalbusinessmedia.org The opinions and views expressed in the editorial content in this publication are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of any organisation with which they may be associated.

Introduction UNDERSTAND PREPARE PREVENT Summary

Training to Counter IEDs 8 Mary Dub, Editor

The Central Importance of JIEDDO The Strategic Concept of JIEDDO The Current and Future Role of JIEDDO A Realistic Assessment of the Future of JIEDDO

From Counter Insurgency to Counter Terrorism

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Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

The Boston Marathon Bombing The Insidious Threat from New Types of Network Working Within Western Societies The Weaknesses in these Diffuse Networks The Concept of Leaderless Jihad

Support Programmes and Training for Counter IED

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Mary Dub, Editor

UAVS and the Counter IED Campaign Sky Warrior UAV The Sand Dragon UAV Airborne Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) NIITEK QinetiQ’s Dragon Runner Robot

The Future of Training for C-IED

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Material in advertisements and promotional features may be considered to represent the views of the advertisers and promoters. The views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily express the views of the Publishers or the Editor. While every care has been taken in the preparation of this publication, neither the Publishers nor the Editor are responsible for such opinions and views or for any inaccuracies in the articles.

Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

© 2014. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. Full details are available from the Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

References 16

Stand Off Detection of IEDs Quasar Federal Systems New Advances in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles The ARES VTOL Facing an Adaptive and Innovative Enemy

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

Foreword T

HE IMPROVISED explosive device (IED) has

and training to counter the high and rising level of

been the scourge of modern security forces

casualties IEDs have caused in Iraq and Afghanistan.

in the 21st century. Such has been their lethality

The complementary work of counter terrorist forces

in Afghanistan and Iraq and on the streets of

working in civilian centres in the densely populated

our cities, that every soldier and policeman has

cities of Western Europe, North America and Asia is

received some level of training to alert him or her

the theme of the third article.

to the danger they present. Much of the knowledge

Training to confront the threat posed by IEDs has

generated about IEDs has been drawn from lessons

always been the central concept behind effective

learned in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan. There

tactics to deal with the risk to life. In colloquial terms

have also been improvements in procedures as a

the phrase is to “look left of the boom.” This popular

result of attacks on transport networks in the UK

phrase covers the whole range of strategies needed to

and sporting and other events in the United States

see what has enabled the placing of the IED in the field.

and the capitals of Europe. JIEDDO, the (Joint

As always, new technologies have been introduced to

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organisation)

help the security forces. These technologies are the

headquartered with the United States Army has

subject of this piece.

taken the lead in training and developing strategies to confront the threat.

Finally, as has become the tradition with Special Reports, the editor attempts to peer into the future.

This Special Report opens with an article that

Even more than usual, in the face of drawdown of

examines IED training and support programmes

allied forces from Afghanistan, the future of training

for the modern military and describes the C-IED

for counter IEDs is uncertain. However, such a

principles developed by Allen-Vanguard Counter

realistic perspective needs to be qualified by the

Threat Solutions (AVCTS). These fall under three main

success of the effects of training to counter IEDs,

headings – UNDERSTAND, PREPARE and PREVENT.

such that the formidable task force assembled

Each of these principles is described in detail in the

represent an impressive team of conceptual thinkers,

article, not only as they affect militaries, but also as

trainers and purveyors of new insights. So there

regards their broader applications including mandated

can be little doubt that their value in the new conflicts

peacekeeping, post-conflict operations, commercial

to come will not be in doubt.

impact and the requirements of government, nongovernment and other organisations operating in high threat locations. The second piece in the Report focuses on the central importance of JIEDDO’s efforts to lead thinking

Mary Dub Editor

Mary Dub is the editor of this Special Report. She has covered the defence field in the United States and the UK as a television broadcaster, journalist and conference manager.

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

AVCTS – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military AVCTS

The following editorial outlines three principles employed by Allen-Vanguard Counter Threat Solutions (AVCTS) when conducting C-IED Consultancy and training support for military and government agencies.

Introduction The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become synonymous with events in Afghanistan and Iraq; the image of an EOD operator at work in such theatres has even been captured in an Oscar winning film (the Hurt Locker). However such a depiction is associated with but one facet of Countering the IED threat; defeating the device. In reality the C-IED effort is far more wide ranging and diverse than just device-focused activity and includes a multitude of other key processes ranging from preventative operations to technical and tactical intelligence collection efforts including post-attack investigation and exploitation of evidence left at the bomb scene. Those that operate in the international C-IED arena will be aware of NATO’s holistic approach consisting of three mutually supporting pillars of activity; Attack the Network (AtN), Prepare the Forces (PtF) and Defeat the Device (DtD). All three pillars are underpinned by Understand and Intelligence (U&I), a continuous understanding of the threat posed gained through intelligence collection and analysis. Allen-Vanguard Counter Threat Solutions (AVCTS) has been the lead contractor for the NATO C-IED programme since its inception in 2006 and as such understands modern military requirements and the development of capabilities based on the NATO C-IED model. AVCTS also understands that IEDs do not only affect militaries in the traditional sense but takes a wider perspective including mandated peacekeeping and post conflict operations, commercial impact and the requirements of government, non government and other organisations operating in high threat locations.

AVCTS has learnt from its experiences with NATO programmes and has developed C-IED principles, which, although meeting military requirements, can be applied to any entity faced with an IED or other threat. The principles devised have been given the headings: UNDERSTAND, PREPARE and PREVENT. Although aligned to NATO C-IED doctrine, AVCTS has applied this model to clients that require support and training over a range of threats that may not typically be IED related but can be described as asymmetric. For example, to a commercial company operating in West Africa, the IED threat is just one risk to evaluate from a wide spectrum of threats that could impose a detrimental material and financial effect on business continuity. In the paragraphs below AVCTS examines these three principles, primarily focusing on C-IED, but with the understanding that the same processes can be applied to many of the threats faced in the modern world.

UNDERSTAND Before an organisation can PREPARE for and therefore PREVENT through mitigation, a damaging occurrence, the threat needs to be fully understood in context of the operation and the resources available to overcome it. There are numerous sources that can provide information on the IED threat. One of the main issues is in understanding what is relevant and pertinent to the particular end user. In some respects, the COLLECTION phase of the intelligence cycle has never been so well served and modern militaries can provide a whole range of information across several platforms to the tactical commander who has to plan a patrol WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 3


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

AVCTS has learnt from its experiences with NATO programmes and has developed C-IED principles, which, although meeting military requirements, can be applied to any entity faced with an IED or other threat

UNDERSTAND – POST SCENE INVESTIGATION TRAINING (PHOTO SHOWS AN AVCTS RUN WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE TRAINING COURSE)

in a high threat IED environment. However, this can, in reality, lead to ‘information overload’ and so structured ANALYSIS of the data allows more focused intelligence support at the appropriate level of DISSEMINATION. Add to this the issues of security classification restricting information exchange and it is clear that UNDERSTAND has to be conducted by those with the ability to DIRECT their collection and analysis assets to fully support the end users requirements, be that background information for exercise planning, threat specific intelligence for a national level briefing or real-time ‘FLASH’ reports on emerging threats to deployed elements of the organisation. One significant change to the UNDERSTAND principal in modern times is the increasing use of open source materials by western security services to support their homeland and overseas security efforts. This has been necessary due to the unprecedented expansion of the World Wide Web and the individual’s freedom to search, filter and store vast quantities of stored data. Once collected, this sometimes sensitive material can then be disseminated, with much fewer restrictions than those placed upon official sources, where classified material is controlled and protected by strict caveats. Since 2000 the AVCTS Threat Intelligence and Analysis (TI&A) department has been a market leader in the exploitation of web based information and has possibly accrued one of the largest databases on IED and related information outside official sources. Already used in assisting governments and organisations to understand the IED threat and its effect, whether technical or tactical and providing a range of reporting including the timely notification of changes to the threat picture, this capability is an example

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of the application of the intelligence cycle within UNDERSTAND. There are elements of the modern operational environment for which traditionally militaries did not prepare or train. Whilst an IED itself is a tangible threat, military personnel now have to be cognisant of the circumstances and context of its use. This broadens the UNDERSTAND piece beyond the purely physical or technical threat and encompasses other areas such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The Patrol Commander now has to attempt to assess atmospherics and ‘pattern of life’ within his geographical areas of interest. The expansion of social media is another prime source of information which can be utilised to support operations, and therefore training, at all levels. A capability to monitor, linguistically interpret, analyse and then disseminate intelligence gained from an increasingly fertile array of open sources, can be critical to understanding the threats and consequently conduct successful operations. One example of AVCTS effort in this regard is the preparation for the London 2012 Olympics, for which AVCTS personnel were embedded into the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) Intelligence Cell, to provide this service. As modern militaries prepare more frequently to operate in environments where Other Government Departments, Non-Governmental Organisations and civil responders may also be present, understanding how other sources of intelligence can be accessed and how this information can be effectively exchanged, is something that must be considered in any training and support programme.


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

UNDERSTAND – THREAT INFORMATION IS NOW AVAILABLE AT ALL LEVELS (PHOTO SHOWS AVCTS THREAT PORTAL COMPATIBLE WITH MULTIPLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES)

PREPARE A full understanding of the potential threats a nation, agency, company, organisation or even an individual may have to face is critical when preparing to counter them or put in place viable mitigation. However, a full understanding of what that particular organisation actually needs and can support is also fundamental. Whilst a new piece of equipment or a short training course may suffice in some instances, developing an enduring counter threat capability based on sound concepts and doctrine requires a broader view and comprehensive approach. Most militaries employ the ‘Defence Lines of Development’ (DLoDs) model as a framework for capability development and this can provide a useful checklist at all levels. The UK MOD model is described through the acronym TEPIDOIL (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Doctrine and Concepts, Organisation, Infrastructure and Logistics) whilst the NATO capability development model follows the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability) process. By using either of these or other similar models, PREPARE can be much more focused and comprehensive. For example, the decision to equip a new ‘Bomb Squad’ should not just rely on selecting likely items from a trade catalogue. To identify the correct items commensurate with threat requires questions such as the following be asked and adequately answered: l ‘What is the actual threat we face?’ l ‘What SOPs are we working to?’ l ‘Who has responsibility for them?’ l ‘What training is currently in place and how will it be continued?’

‘Against what criteria are our personnel selected?’ l ‘What is the maintenance and support regime?’ l ‘Who else will they need to work with?’ l ‘What is the operating environment?’ By addressing these points (not exhaustive) the resultant understanding gained of an organisation’s needs will reveal a solution that is useable, sustainable and appropriate to the capability and operational remit. Consideration of the DLoDs is not only applied at the strategic or operational levels. By applying this type of ‘checklist’ across all areas ensures a much more accurate result. Even training, which can be a five-hour explosive hazard awareness module on a Hazardous Environment Operations course for journalists through to a four-week Advanced IEDD course for specialist EOD operators, needs to take into account the threat, the resources and situation of those requiring the training in order to PREPARE appropriately and efficiently in terms of cost but with effective knowledge and awareness transfer. The NATO C-IED Programme, for which AVCTS has had the privilege of being the lead contractor since 2006, is an example of a comprehensive approach to capability development. By writing framework doctrine, designing training programmes, delivering ‘Train the Trainer’ (T3) packages and advising at all levels, to name but a few areas of work, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) has developed a much improved C-IED capability across the Alliance and partner nations. By preparing NATO for future operations, where IEDs and other related threats may be present, this programme has had major impact on the C-IED Training and

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

The IED threat is a growing phenomenon and affects all who live, work and operate in countries where the IED is employed as a weapon

PREPARE – STRATEGIC LEVEL REQUIREMENT IDENTIFICATION (PHOTO SHOWS C-IED CONCEPTS BRIEFING BY AVCTS TO NATO STAFF OFFICERS)

Support Programmes for many modern militaries. The IED threat is a growing phenomenon and affects all who live, work and operate in countries where the IED is employed as a weapon. While NATO and other nations may have developed a capability as a result of their involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, others have not, possibly because of their resources, but as likely because the global threat has grown exponentially in recent times through political and religious disagreement, often leading to confrontation and violent struggle between the state and national and international extremist groups. The fundamental significance of the UNDERSTAND, PREPARE and PREVENT C-IED principles in today’s operating environment, is resonant with all organisations exposed to the threat from IEDs. Challenges in overcoming the threat and in developing mitigation are considerably wider in aspect than just conventional military applications and sensitivity needs to be adopted in interpreting doctrine or best practice to those unfamiliar with the NATO or other C-IED models and not requiring a military approach or solution. AVCTS believes that the principals of C-IED can be applied to any force or organisation given an understanding of the threats faced, the operational intent, and the capabilities and capacity of the incumbent agency.

PREVENT The third element of the AVCTS approach to C-IED is PREVENT. In order to ensure a potential threat does not manifest itself or if it 6 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM

does, will not have a significant impact, there needs to be a relationship between PREPARE and UNDERSTAND. Synergy between all the components of a counter threat capability is essential with training and education being key areas that enable the PREVENT capability. Development of a preventative capability can and usually does take the form of training courses and exercises, but if the capability is to be embedded within an institution, training and education must be considered at all levels of the organisation’s structure, from tactical through to strategic applications. PREVENT does not just mean stopping a threat entirely, although this should be the aim, but also reducing its effectiveness through employment of considered mitigation measures. For an IED attack, as an example, this could range from improvements in vehicle protection at the tactical level to a government press release at the strategic level. PREVENT is not just reactive or defensive but should also be proactive. Recognised C-IED doctrine has AtN as a pillar of activity, the concept being to reach out and take measures to PREVENT an IED being deployed. This concept has now expanded to Counter Threat Networks (C-TN) which at the higher level encompasses the IED within a broader threat context and consideration. Therefore, if training and education are to be the principal components in developing a preventative capability, access must be at all levels of responsibility from the individual to cross-government and beyond. By fully understanding the threat, preventative measures may then be developed and employed. For example, the provision of


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

PREVENT – TRAINING, EDUCATION AND PRACTISE (PHOTO SHOWS AVCTS PROVIDING ADVISORY AND TRAINING SERVICES TO MILITARY ENGINEERS)

training and education to organisations on ammunition, explosive management and safety may not just lessen the prospect of unplanned explosive events, but also reduce the availability of conventional munitions to violent extremist groups. Focusing on the explosive device will greatly inform the technical and tactical preventative measures, but there also needs to be an understanding of the broader circumstances of the how and why the IED is present in order to identify and develop other PREVENT strategies and activities aimed at preventing the perpetrator from using IEDs at all.

Summary The immediate and localised effect of IEDs can be highly damaging and so reducing their impact is essential. For some nations and organisations the necessary counter measures and mitigation needs to be in place with a degree of urgency. C-IED has a broad perspective and application and must not be considered as no more than the provision of specialist equipment and training. Neither must the threat be taken out of context, UNDERSTAND allows a measured, appropriate and cost effective approach to PREPARE and PREVENT capability development in meeting an identified requirement, while not suffering wastage of effort or mismatching of resources. Understanding the threat means gaining an appreciation of the other areas which may need to be incorporated into PREPARE and PREVENT contingencies. Specialists and experts are invaluable for developing key areas within a response, but these ideally need to be coordinated and focused by those with a broader

perspective and understanding of the overall concept, context and requirement. The experience, knowledge and flexibility of AVCTS allows the development of tailored programmes to individual customers’ requirements relating to their specific threat, whether C-IED or otherwise. AVCTS principles of UNDERSTAND, PREPARE and PREVENT can be applied across all areas of responsibility within an organisation and in all situations. Each element can be looked at individually. However it is more likely that an effective counter threat solution will be premised on a combination of the elements in order to develop a comprehensive solution where UNDERSTAND, PREPARE and PREVENT are interlinked components within an operational concept, sympathetic to the activity and resources of the organisation facing the threat. Allen-Vanguard Counter Threat Solutions http://cts.allenvanguard.com cts-info@allenvanguard.com UK: +44 (0)1793 786 350 85-88 Shrivenham Hundred Business Park Majors Road Watchfiled Wiltshire SN6 8TY US: +1 (703) 412 9394 1225 South Clark Street Suite 504 Arlington VA, 22202 WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 7


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

Training to Counter IEDs Mary Dub, Editor

“We have proven time and time again that the best IED detection system out there is a well-trained soldier. We’ve proven this capability…and I think [the leadership] recognizes that.” Navy Cmdr. Jack Downes, JIEDDO integration branch chief 30 January 20121

At the height of the campaign in 2010, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were causing 368 ISAF deaths a year, and many more serious injuries

T

HE IMPROVISED explosive device has proved to be a highly effective weapon of war for use by insurgents without a modern army against the technological sophistication of western armed forces. Such is its effectiveness that it has been the leading cause of death and disability among ISAF forces in Afghanistan. It has also had a horrific impact on Afghan civilians. At the height of the campaign in 2010, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were causing 368 ISAF deaths a year, and many more serious injuries. This year, ISAF, writing in the spring of 2014, only 2 deaths have been reported and 9 serious injuries2. The reasons why there has been this significant reduction are complex.

The Central Importance of JIEDDO The impact of the number of casualties caused by IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a need to take action. In reaction to the growing threat posed by

AVCTS STUDENT GATHERING FORENSIC EVIDENCE

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IEDs deployed by the Iraqi insurgency in 2003, Gen. John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command at the time, asked the Department of Defense (DoD) to initiate a “Manhattan likeProject” to glean the expertise of all Services involved directly with countering IEDs. Ultimately, this led to the founding of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), on February 14, 2006. As specified in its foundational document, JIEDDO’s mission is to focus, that is to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ (CCDRs’) and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.3

The Strategic Concept of JIEDDO The key concept behind JIEDDO’s work was not just to address the improvised explosive device itself, but what came to be known as “left of the boom”, that is all the component activities and


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

IED CONCEALMENT

acquisitions, which made the IED possible. The RAND report on JIEDDO explains the actual technique. To execute this mission, JIEDDO was given broad authority to identify threats, generate and validate requirements, develop solutions, and apply resources along three lines of operation (LOOs): Attack the Network (AtN), Defeat the Device (DtD), and Train the Force (TtF). While TtF directly involves training, all the LOOs involve training to some degree. The goal is speed and relevance.4 The key issue here is the central importance of training. This educative process was initially performed by the US Armed Forces, but subsequently has been passed on to Afghan National Forces and private military companies working alongside ISAF armed forces.

All these have elements that are intended to minimize chances of program duplication and to ensure added value6. The central issue is whether JIEDDO is duplicative and actually has an independent role in its own right after drawdown and in the face of deep budget cuts. The RAND report comes to a validating conclusion that JIEDDO does offer added value and, while they may have strong similarities to other services programs, their central and overarching focus on countering improvised explosive devices gives them a strong place. They also provide a central location for work on C-IED with coordinating and integrating functions.

The Current and Future Role of JIEDDO

While it may be easy to find reasons to continue JIEDDO’s activities on full funding after drawdown, the fear that its role may be coming to an end was very cogently expressed by Cder Downes at a technology conference in 2012: “JIEDDO is in a unique position…right now it’s exceptionally resourced to combat IEDs, but it’s highly predictable that, come 2014, when the armed fighting in Afghanistan and overseas contingency operations funding are cut dramatically, there won’t be a lot left for JIEDDO to help anyone continue to sustain this fight.7” To add an alternative view, while JIEDDO as a programme may be threatened by cuts this may provide an opportunity for the private sector to step in.

With the drawdown of ISAF forces from Afghanistan on track for a “zero option” of minimal US forces in the countries after 2014, in the absence of a bilateral agreement with President Karzai5, the future of JIEDDO and other training forces is being actively reassessed. In addition to training and the role outlined above, JIEDDO also performs a number of broader functions that are related to capability development. To a degree, these are similar to processes performed by the Services. Like the Services, JIEDDO assesses plans, develops requirements, submits proposals to budget processes, and fields training solutions.

A Realistic Assessment of the Future of JIEDDO

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

From Counter Insurgency to Counter Terrorism Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

It was the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013 targeting spectators and attendees of the city’s annual marathon race that re-awoke the United States to the threat

T

HE UNDERLYING rationale of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan at the beginning of the campaign was to protect Western countries from the impact of what was seen as the threat from violent Islamic militant groups based in the area with an intention to undermine Western democracy. The classic examples of this are of course, the events of 9/11 on the Eastern seaboard of the United States, but also the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in July 2005. However, the insidious spread of violent radical jihadist idealism, still presents a current and present danger to Western democracies. Managing this threat has become the everyday business of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States and various interior and home office ministries in Western European countries. And it is dealing with this new and constantly changing threat of IEDs in modern Western urban society that is the current challenge.

The Boston Marathon Bombing It was the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013 targeting spectators and attendees of the city’s annual marathon race that re-awoke the United States to the threat. The attack on runners and supporters with IEDs made from a pressure cooker, were similar to those described on the jihadist Al Qaeda website ‘Inspire’. The fear and destruction caused by the IEDs forced the West to realise that the threat from IEDs had not gone away. Indeed it became clear that the enemy was innovative, cunning and adaptive. The use of a pressure cooker as an explosive device was not new. They had been used in the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, 2010 Stockholm bombings (failed to explode), the 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt (failed to explode). On Canada Day 2013, pressure cooker bombs failed to explode at the Parliament Building in Victoria, British Columbia. The advantage of pressure cooker IEDs is that they are relatively simple to assemble from easily available components and, importantly, because of the

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contained nature of the cooker, a small amount of explosive is able to create disproportionate destruction with deadly metallic shrapnel.8 The use of this domestic cooking device was not in any way new as the Department of Homeland Security had issued an alert about their potential use as IEDs 9 years previously in 20049. What was new was the type of insurgents that used them and their choice of occasion.

The Insidious Threat from New Types of Network Working Within Western Societies Dr Jeffry Bale, for the Institute for Strategic Studies at the US Army War College,10 has described how radical Islamic networks with a potential for violence are structured. Western military forces and security and intelligence agencies are justifiably concerned about two phenomena that continue to affect their on-going asymmetric conflicts with jihadist terrorist organizations: 1) the increasing diffusion and application of expertise acquired by jihadists in fabricating “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs), and 2) the extent to which local jihadist cells in the West may or may not be connected to veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions.11 Bale argues that those linked to well established terror networks and trained veterans are more likely to be successful in manufacturing successful IEDs. Although he does acknowledge the potential of lone individuals also being able to create significant problems because they can operate “under the radar” of security forces.

The Weaknesses in these Diffuse Networks Dr Bale’s monograph highlights the potential linkages that lead to threat levels in Western nations, but he also highlights the weaknesses of groups or indeed lone individuals. He quotes research by Kenney that shows that members of the jihadist cells whose activities he examined had often failed to master basic tradecraft skills, both in regard to technical and operational matters. Consequently,


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

AVCTS TRAINING SUPPORT TO MILITARIES

they frequently made serious errors when planning and carrying out their attacks. There were many reasons for this, including the general problems posed by incomplete information, bounded rationality, inaccurate and biased references, and organisational inertia. There were problems as well intrinsic to the jihadist milieu, particularly ideological fanaticism and religious fatalism. As a consequence, individual members and entire jihadist cells often ended up learning the wrong lessons or adopting inferior practices. Bale also makes the distinction between the ‘imported’ terrorist threat from veteran networks, and ‘home grown’ ones. Veteran jihadists from Muslim countries sometimes manage to obtain political asylum or guest worker status in European countries but then continue pursuing their extremist aims in another country. The threat of ‘home brewed’ jihadism is posed by second and third generation European Muslims, usually the descendants of foreign immigrant workers. Finally, there is a third group, the ‘home grown’ jihadist who has

converted to Islam and ends up embracing extremist doctrines.

The Concept of Leaderless Jihad In popular newspapers when writing about jihadism, there is an established shorthand inaccuracy – the idea of a leader-centric jihad that issues instructions in someway analogous to the western army structure. However, considerable research points to a leaderless structure where al-Qa‘ida has transmogrified from an actual, relatively delimited organization into the organizational expression of a diffuse ideological current that nowadays serves to inspire hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people across the Muslim world. This makes any concept of attacking the network much more problematic and pushes countering IEDs into the much more amorphous and difficult territory of promoting ideas and seeking to rebut false arguments. This is an area where the training of a soldier or police officer on the ground enters much more difficult territory.

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

Support Programmes and Training for Counter IED Mary Dub, Editor

These robots have been enhanced by some of the most sophisticated sensors available, to monitor disturbances to the earth, or view over the hill, or around a wall to detect the presence of an explosive device before it causes damage

C

OUNTERING IMPROVISED Explosive Devices has harnessed some of the most creative minds in the West to confront the effectiveness of a simple assembly of components. This has required the soldiers on the ground to be enabled by some of the most recent examples in robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles. These robots have been enhanced by some of the most sophisticated sensors available, to monitor disturbances to the earth, or view over the hill, or around a wall to detect the presence of an explosive device before it causes damage. To protect soldiers working on counter insurgency operations many of them have been trained to use these latest technologies.

UAVS and the Counter IED Campaign Avnish Patel, of the British Royal United Services Institution has assessed some of the most effective counter IED technologies available. Airborne surveillance has been vital to US C-IED operations for some years. It is exemplified by Task Force (TF) ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralise), which has been the benchmark for the conduct of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) C-IED operations since its inception in 2006. Initially set up to eliminate road- side bombs in Iraq, ODIN was reconfigured for Afghanistan, where it searches for IEDs by patrolling major roads and supply routes. Attached to the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade as part of Task Force Falcon, Task Force ODIN-Afghanistan (TF ODIN-A) operates joint manned and unmanned missions, and coordinates with ground forces to neutralise targets, as well as to provide warning of enemy activity, including the planting of IEDs.12

Sky Warrior UAV One of the key components of the Task Force ODIN is TF ODIN-A – this is Sky Warrior, a Predator/I-Gnat derivative. The extended-range, multipurpose UAV that is manufactured by General Atomics is part of the ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability; it can provide electro-optical/infrared or 12 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM

synthetic aperture radar payloads. Its main utility is to capture full-motion video to provide division commanders with instant, actionable intelligence, as well to as provide troops with knowledge and an awareness of the terrain around them.

The Sand Dragon UAV A new development is the Sand Dragon UAV. This small, autonomous, runway-independent and rotary-wing UAV is able to detect IEDs. It has high-definition, electro-optical sensors and is able to detect unintentional electromagnetic emissions. This new generation of UAVs is being designed as part of convoy and route-patrol protection, flying in advance to monitor roads and tracks. The Sand Dragon Tier II UAV for the Route Surveillance Programme is a US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) initiative to develop innovative technologies and integrate new unmanned systems for operating in an irregular warfare environment. In particular, there is a need for a medium-altitude, long-endurance small tactical UAV that is runway independent (rail-launched and net-recovered), equipped with a heavy fuel engine (JP-5/JP-8) with a minimum of 45lb/500W sensor payload, and command and control via a ground station.

Airborne Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) Northrop Grumman’s ASTAMIDS system is a lightweight, multi-capability (multi-spectral, electro-optical and infrared imaging) sensor that provides a reconnaissance, surveillance programme when attached to a MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV3. It also has target acquisition capabilities via laser-guided munitions and target-acquisition.

NIITEK One way to reduce IED casualties is to detect them from a disturbance to the ground, because close approach might trigger the device. NIITEK Inc has been authorised to proceed with the development of novel sensors capable of detecting explosives by tracing their unique signatures from a distance. According to Juan Navarro, President of Chemring Sensor and


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

AVCTS EXERCISE PLANNING AND SUPPORT

Electronics, the NIITEK parent company, the current development is defined as a ‘proof-ofprinciple’ experiment. NIITEK and its academic and small business partners are confident that, with proper development, the technology can be transitioned into a system that could prove useful to the Department of Defense and domestic security and law enforcement. Traditionally, direct detection methods are placed into two categories – trace detection and bulk detection. Trace detection methods include optical absorption and fluorescence, light detection and ranging (LIDAR), and biosensors. Bulk detection methods include spectroscopic methods such as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR); imaging using ionizing (X-Ray, g−Ray); and electromagnetic sensing techniques detecting threats in the infrared (IR), terahertz (THz), millimeter (mm), and radar) spectral ranges.13

QinetiQ’s Dragon Runner Robot The Dragon Runner made by QinetiQ is a small rugged tracked robot. Dragon Runner was designed for areas that are too dangerous for or inaccessible to soldiers, particularly in urban environments. One feature of Dragon Runner is

a front-mounted, tilting camera, which provides a video feed that is relayed back to its master controller by a wireless modem. This provides soldiers with a view around corners and other obstructions that prevent them from seeing hidden enemies. It can also ‘see’ using the optical systems of enemy UAVs. In January 2010, under a contract worth £12m with QinetiQ UK, around 100 Dragon Runners were ordered by the British army to improve the ability of bomb disposal experts to find and deactivate improvised explosive devices on the front line in Afghanistan. The first in use were then already proving their worth against the threat of roadside bombs. The high value feature of the Dragon Runner is that the robot has four wheels, is 15 inches (38 cm) long, is less than a foot wide, and is 5 inches (13 cm) in height. The robot is robust and can be thrown over fences, up or down stairwells, from a moving vehicle at 45 miles per hour (70 km/h), or even from a third-story window. It does not matter how it lands because neither side is the right side up. It has proved of value to Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. Training soldiers to maximise the value from these types of devices is another key block to the destructive effect of IEDs.

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

The Future of Training for C-IED Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

The spread of violent political Islamism and the increasing societal drivers towards identification with violent groups will continue to provide a challenge

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T’S A brave writer that does not qualify writing about the future with a caveat about inevitable uncertainty. The challenge of countering Improvised Explosive Devices has always been to confront an adaptive, innovative and cunning opponent capable of threatening lives in a range of situations from roads in Afghanistan, to urban high-rise buildings in New York, transport networks in the UK or regional and international sporting events. Once ISAF troops on the ground are replaced by Afghan National Forces, the political remit of organisations like JIEDDO will experience a step-change. However the spread of violent political Islamism and the increasing societal drivers towards identification with violent groups will continue to provide a challenge. It is perhaps stating the obvious to argue that there will undoubtedly be a handover of responsibility for countering IEDs from armed security forces to civilian police forces. But in the short term, in North America and Western Europe, this is where the greatest demand for training may well be found.

Stand Off Detection of IEDs Undoubtedly one of the greatest technological tools a security force can use to protect civilians from terrorist activity is a device that enables the detection of hidden explosives from a distance. That is, one that can identify explosive devices hidden beneath difficult to penetrate materials. One of DARPA’s (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) projects has been to find Methods of Explosives Detection at Standoff. This is a programme to investigate a specific class of IEDs: those deeply embedded in substances such as mud, meat or animal carcasses i.e., opaque substances with high water content that cannot be safely and effectively probed with current technology. The technology would have to detect, but not necessarily image, explosives embedded at a depth of five centimeters or greater. To protect the health of the operators and people nearby, the tools developed may not use ionizing radiation, with the possible exception of x-ray backscatter. Some potentially valuable research areas include ultra-wide-band thermo14 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM

acoustic imaging, phase-contrast methods, nonlinear acoustics and mixed modality mechanisms.

Quasar Federal Systems Another favoured research project at DARPA is being developed by Quasar Federal Systems. QFS has developed and employed an integrated electric and magnetic field sensing system, providing ultra low noise, low frequency electromagnetic sensing and applications in mapping surface and subsurface objects. The $1.17 million contract from DARPA will evaluate the use of a combined MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) and Quadrupole Resonance (QR) modality for standoff explosives detection. Other contracts have been awarded to BAE Systems, the University of Arizona, Northeastern University of Massachusetts and the Stanford University of California.

New Advances in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles The use of helicopters to transport soldiers to forward operating bases was proved many times during the campaign in Afghanistan as the best way to avoid IEDs on the road. Helicopters bypass problems on the ground but present logistical challenges of their own. Helicopters carry their own risks and can subject flight crew to different types of threats. They are also expensive to operate. The supply of available helicopters does not always meet the demand for their services, as was the case with British forces in some parts of Helmand province. Helicopters allow the rapid delivery of diverse operational needs including resupply of goods, fire-team placement, and casualty evacuation. The new future concept is an unmanned reprogrammable rotorcraft to supplement manned helicopters.

The ARES VTOL ARES is a vertical take off and landing (VTOL) flight module designed to operate as an unmanned platform capable of transporting a variety of payloads. The ARES VTOL flight module is designed to have its own power system, fuel, digital flight controls and remote command-andcontrol interfaces. Twin tilting ducted fans would


SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

AVCTS TRAINING EXERCISE

provide efficient hovering and landing capabilities in a compact configuration, with rapid conversion to high-speed cruise flight.14 The potential uses of the ARES VTOL are ambitious. The DARPA ARES programme envisages cargo resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Compact configuration and the ability to use landing zones half the size typically needed by helicopters of similar size might permit VTOL operations from prepared, unprepared and ship-based landing sites.

Facing an Adaptive and Innovative Enemy Counter insurgency specialists and the JIEDDO task force know that the campaign in Afghanistan, which is now in drawdown, has prompted many lessons that have yet to be included into the taught precepts of rising echelons of soldiers and police in Afghan National Forces and elsewhere. As Army Lt. Gen. John D. Johnson, director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Organization, said at the end of 2013: “It’s a fact that we as a nation are reducing the size of our military and JIEDDO is a part of the downsizing. The requirement to change the scope of JIEDDO has nothing to do with how well this organization is performing its mission. It’s remarkable that when I asked them what else can JIEDDO do for you or what else they need from JIEDDO, in every instance they said JIEDDO is doing exactly what they need done. Frequently we’re providing them capabilities before they realize they needed it.” He added that “This is a mark of an organisation that anticipates, is engaged, truly understands the threat networks and rapidly provides materiel and non-materiel counter-IED capabilities for the troops in the fight. Deputy Defense Secretary Carter has decided that JIEDDO will remain the single, joint organisation leading the counterIED fight for the Defense Department. However, JIEDDO will need to resize and transform itself into a smaller, scalable organization capable of focusing not only on counter-IED but future threats as well.15

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SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTER IED TRAINING AND SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR THE MODERN MILITARY

References: http://defensesystems.com/articles/2012/01/30/soldier-technology-jieddo-challenges-priorities.aspx?admgarea=DS

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DOD’s counter-IED arm faces future challenges By Amber CorrinJan 30, 2012

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http://icasualties.org/oef/

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NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity Brad Martin, Thomas Manacapilli, James C. Crowley, Joseph Adams, Michael G. Shanley, Paul Steinberg, Dave Stebbins Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Dec 11, 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity

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Brad Martin, Thomas Manacapilli, James C. Crowley, Joseph Adams, Michael G. Shanley, Paul Steinberg, Dave Stebbins Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Dec 11, 2013 http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/03/stuck-between-a-rock-and-the-zero-option.html The RAND Blog COMMENTARY(U.S. News & World Report)

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March 13, 2014 Stuck Between a Rock and the ‘Zero Option’ by S. Rebecca Zimmerman NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity

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Brad Martin, Thomas Manacapilli, James C. Crowley, Joseph Adams, Michael G. Shanley, Paul Steinberg, Dave Stebbins Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Dec 11, 2013 7

DOD’s counter-IED arm faces future challenges By Amber Corrin Jan 30, 2012

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NATIONAL SECURITY A Short Recent History of Pressure-Cooker Bombs Authorities are now saying the explosive devices used in the Boston attack were fashioned from pressure cookers. Here’s the bomb’s nefarious history in counterterrorism circles By Michael Crowley @CrowleyTIMEApril 16, 2013

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Department of Homeland Security 2004 Bulletin on Pressure Cookers: Information Bulletin Title: POTENTIAL TERRORIST USE OF PRESSURE COOKERS

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Dr Jeffrey Bale JIHADIST CELLS AND “IED” CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND FUTURE THREAT TO THE WEST US Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa US: Strategic Studies Institute Monograph: November 2012

Dr Jeffrey Bale JIHADIST CELLS AND “IED” CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND FUTURE THREAT TO THE WEST US

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Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa US: Strategic Studies Institute Monograph: November 2012 12

Defence capability programmes – air UAVs and the Counter-IED CampaignAvnish Patel, military sciences project manager at RUSI, assesses a selection of the latest unmanned aerial vehicle counter-improvised explosive device technology www.rusi.org

13

DARPA http://defense-update.com/20130626_meds_darpa_remote_ieds.html#.U0LmO_ldWvM

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http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Aerial_Reconfigurable_Embedded_System_(ARES).aspx AERIAL RECONFIGURABLE EMBEDDED SYSTEM (ARES)

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Director discusses JIEDDO future, need for enduring counter-IED capabilities A.J. Bosker (October 10, 2013) WASHINGTON, Oct. 10, 2013 – Army Lt. Gen. John D. Johnson, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization director.

16 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM


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Special Report – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for Modern Military – Allen Vanguard  

Defence Industry – Special Report on Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military

Special Report – Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for Modern Military – Allen Vanguard  

Defence Industry – Special Report on Counter IED Training and Support Programmes for the Modern Military