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June 2000

Country Studies Education Reform and Management Vol. I No. I * June 2000



Education Reformsin Chile, 1980-98: A Lesson in Pragmatism

Francoise Delannoy













Education Reforms in Chile, 1980-98: A Lesson in Pragmatism

Fran9oise Delannoy

Country Studies Education Reform and Management Publication Series Vol. I No. I * June 2000

Table of Contents Aboutthe Author








Overview1 Chapter1.TwentyYears of EducationReform


Market-oriented Reform:Top-down,Big-bangSystemChange(1980-90)7 PromotingEquityandQualityin the Early1990s:Bottom-up CulturalChange 13 FromIncremental Changeto Full-scaleReform:LinkingTop-downandBottom-up24 Factors Chapter2. ReformImpactandUnderlying


Quality:All ChildrenAre LeamingMore 39 Equity:DespiteProgress,Stilla Frustrated Commitment43 Reforns CompareWth Thoseof OtherCountries? Chapter3. HowDo ChileanEducational


Choiceand Demand-side Financing53 Decentralization andAccountability 55 Chapter4. Lessonsfrom the ChileanExperience


Successes61 Conclusion








About the Author FrangoiseDelannoy,an EducationSpecialistat the WorldBank,has workedextensivelyon reformsin LatinAmerica,AfricaandEastAsia. Priorto joiningtheWorldBank,Ms.Delannoytaught at the secondary andtertiarylevelsin Franceandin the UnitedStates.In 1996shewasseconded to the ChileanMinistryof Education to supportthe launchingof the FullSchoolDayreform.Sheis currentlyworkingon teacherissuesin the LatinAmericanand CaribbeanRegionof the World Bank.


Acknowledgements Thispaper-one productof my 18-monthsecondment to Chile-would not havebeenpossible withoutthe support,guidanceandtrustof manypeople.I wouldlike to thank,firstandforemost, MinisterJose-Pablo ArellanoandCristianCox forallowingmeto cast"anoutsidersglanceinside theChileanreform"andto holda mirrorto itsdesigners andimplementers. Inthe Bank,I amespeciallygratefulto BarbaraBruns,whoseexactingstandards anddeeppersonalinvolvement were instrumental in the production of this paperand the balanceof the finalproduct.Anothermajor contributor hasbeenWilliamExperton, with his uniqueknowledge of Chile,longexperience as a practitioner andprofoundpersonalconvictions.Bothhaveprovidedinsightsandencouragement, anddeservemy heartfelt thanks.Thisworkwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe supportand understanding of my managers, XavierCollandJamilSalmi,whogavemethe intellectual "space" neededforsuchanendeavor. I amalsoprofoundly indebtedto the manycolleagues andfriendswho providedinput,comments andadvice,especiallyat the earlystagesof thiswork: BeatrizAvalos,MaranaAylwin(nowMinister),FelipeArteaga,CristianBellei,PatricioCanola,S.J., Jose Espinosa,MarcelaGajardo, GabrielGuerrero,Pablo Gonzalez,MarcelaGuzman,Juan-Eduardo Huidobro,Pedro Hepp, CeciliaJara,Mario-JoseLemaitre,MarioMarcel,SergioMartinic,IvanNunez,AlejandraPerez, PilarRomaguera, AlfonsoSanchoandJoseWeinstein. I wouldliketo paytributeto thelateArturoIsrael,my partnerfortheinstiutionalanalysisintegrated in thedocument,withwhomI conducted numerous stakeholder interviews with the publicandprivatesectors.Thepaperhasbeenconsiderably enrichedby thethoroughandthoughtfulcontributons of my peerreviewers:Josd-Joaquin BrunnerfromFundacionChile,AlejandraMizalafrom the Universityof Chile,ClaudioSapellifromthe PontificaCatholicUniversityof Chile,Emesto Schiefelbein fromSt. TomasUniversity, JohnSwope,S.J.,fromthe ResearchCenteron EducationalDevelopment in Santago,andwithinthe Bank,HarryPatrinosfromHDNED,VarunGauri, Indermit GillandJamilSalmifromthe LatinAmericaandCaribbean HumanDevelopment Department. My editors-rnainlyMichaelDrabbleandAmandaEnayati,and earlyon PatrickSupanchavedonetrulyheroicwork. I knowI amforgetting many,andI apologize to them. Of courseI remainentirelyresponsible foranyremaining errorsandomissions. Ona morepersonallevel,I wishto thankmy friendsandfamilyfor theirunflinching affectionand love. My secondment to Chilehasbeena greatleamingexperience andthewritingof thispaper, an excitingintellectual voyage.Mayit contribute,modestly, to makingthe richandcomplexChileanexperience accessible to otherWorldBankclients.I dedicateit to the studentsof Chile,to


Educaton RefonnsIn Chile, 1980-98

their teachers,and to all those who pragmatcally put the interest, welfare and leaming of these childrenaheadof any philosophicalpreferences. Seguncomo sea la escuela,asl sera la Naci6nentera. - Gabrela Mistral

FrangoiseDelannoy Latin Americanand CaribbeanRegion Human DevelopmentDepartment


Acronyms Survey Household National CASEN of Education Departments Municipal DAEM Providers Education ofPrivate Federation FIDE Schools FullyPaidPrivate FPPS Day FullSchool FSD Product GrossDomestic GDP Groups Professional Teachers' GPT LawonEducation Constitutional LOCE ofEducation Ministry MINEDUC Organizations Non-governmental NGOs andDevelopment Co-operation forEconomic Organisation OECD Test Admission University PM Development Education forMunicipal AnnualPlans PADEM Report Evaluation Performance PER Plans Improvement School-based PME University Catholic Pontifica PUC Quality of Educational fortheMeasurement System SIMCE to Schools ofMeritAwards System SNED Study MathandScience ThirdInternational TIMSS Organization andCultural Scientific Educational, UnitedNations UNESCO paraAmerica de laUNESCO deeducacion Regional Oficina UNESCO/OREALC Latinay el Carbe


Introduction educationreIn 1980Chile'smilitarygovemment(1973-90)launcheda profound,market-based, capidecentraliation, form. Its objectivewas to promotegreaterefficiencythroughadministrative and opencompetitionbetweenpublicand privatelyadfinancing,laborderegulation tation-based transitionadopteda schools. Tenyearslater,the firstgovemmentof the democratic ministered neweducationstrategyaimedat reorentingpublicinvestmenttowardgreaterqualityand equity andfundingframework.Thisfocushasbeen administrative mostof the previous whilemaintaining of the FullSchoolDay (FSD)resustainedanddeepenedin recentyearsthroughthe introduction at the timetheywereadopted,are as cutting-edge formin 1996. Thesereforms,'all recognized in a countrywhich,whileat thedoorstepof the OECD,is stillin manyways,a beingimplemented society. andinequitable highlystructured traditional, of the counnotonly in thevisionand persistence The reformwavesof the 1990sareinteresting and growingpoliticalsupporttheyhave but also in the unflinching trys educationpolicymakers, coalitiongovemment.Today,educationis-and is mobilizedfromthetop levelsof thedemocratic top priority,a comerstoneof the nation'sdevelopment presentedas-the Chileangovemment's and formalizing aspirationsto fightpovertyandto improveincomedistribution.By consolidating the processof changebegunin 1990intotheFSDreform,EduardoFreipositionedhimselfas "The coalitionto successin education. partiallytyingthefateof hiscenter-left EducationPresident," OverNew plusfour Chile'sbasiceducationsystemcompriseseightyearsof primaryschool(compulsory) Theaveragenumberof yearsof formaleducationis school(non-compulsory). yearsof secondary 972

Chileis at a relativelyadvancedstageof educountries, withothermiddle-income By comparison achievedin the mid-1960sin basiceducationaldevelopmentuniversalcoveragewas practically educa87 percentin secondary cation;the enrollmentratio3 todayis 30.3percentfor pre-school, tionand26 percentin tertiaryeducation.

(1)the qualified: willbedatedorotherwise discussed or reform eachphaseofchange 1 Toavoidconfusion,

and(3)the1996FSDreform.TheChilean of 1990-96; process" (2)'the change reforms; 1980pro-market twoandthreeformphases twowavesof reform-the1980sandthe1990s--with onlydistinguish authorities inga continuum. survey) 1998. (Household 2 CASEN


Education Refonns In Chile, 1980-98

Chart 1: Variation of Enrollments by Type of School (%) 80 l==


ElrPublic/municipal DAg9+t'1 * Private . ' NSsw3D+6t subsidized <l





0oFully private "Corporations"


0 1981



Source:Divisionof Planning andBudget,MINEDUC. Note: Publicschools weretransferred to municipal govemments overthe 1981/86 period,witha slowdown dueto the fiscal crisis.The'corporaciones,"createdin1987,aretechnicaUvocational schoolsmanaged by industrial firms. Percentages have beenroundedandmaynotaddup. The Chilean education system features a high degree of private sector participation. Out of a total 10,600 schools (1998), parents have the option of placing their children in (a) public schools managed since 1980 by the municipalities (55.1 percent of 1998 enrollment); (b) private schools subsidized by the govemment on the basis of enrollment (34.1 percent); (c) fully private schools (9.2 percent); and (d) private technical-vocational schools run by private businesses or corporations (1.5 percent) (Ministry of Education 1998).

Since 1990 the Chilean government has considered education as a priorty and has significantly increased its funding for the sector. In 1997 real public spending on education was equivalent to 160 percent of the 1982 level, up from 73 percent in 1990. In 1997 total education spending equaled 6.4 percent of GDP, with public spending on education accounting for 3.5 percent of GDP. This compares favorably with most OECD countries.

1990 1991 1992 Public Spending on 2.6 2.7 2.9 Education/GDP 11 PrivateSpending on 2.0 2.0 2.2 Education/GDP Total Spending on 4.6 4.7 5.1 Education/GDP I I Source:Divisionof Planning andBudgetMINEDUC.

1993 3.0

1994 3.1



1995 3.1 I

_5_6 5


l4__ 5_6_


1996 3.4 I


1997 3.5 I





6.2 l

1998 3.9 II





6.4 l

7.0 l

Chileanstabstcs refer to 'coverage" and do not distinguishbetweengross and net enrollmentratios. Overage is not a problemin Chile. 3




Analytical Framework This paper identifiesin the periodunder review(1980-1998)three overlappingcycles of reformin education:


During the 1980s the militarygovemmentintroducedmarket-orientedreforms, relying mainly

on formal rules such as mandatesand structuralchange. Responsibilityfor school management was decentralizedto municipalgovemmentsand a system of capitationgrants allowed-parental choice of publicor privateschools. But these sweepingchanges in system govemancewere not accompaniedby public informationor consultationto gain acceptance,by trainingto create the necessarycapacity,or by resourcesto inducethe desiredbehavioralchanges.


While the democraticcenter-leftcoalition govemmentsof the 1990s have introduced some

changesin formal rules (e.g.,the 1991 TeacherStatute),this was not their main strategy. The approachintroducedby the administrationsof PatricioAylwin4 during 1990-94and EduardoFrei during 1994-99 aimed at creating a new cultureof school autonomyby relying more on incremental changes in informal rules, behaviors,values and inducementsthrough training, technical assistance, symbolicand economicrewards,and improvementsin teachers'social status. The risk was that this "change"at the schoollevel might not have gone to scale. *

The Full School Day5 initiativeannouncedby PresidentFrei in May 1996 has pulled a collec-

tion of looselyarticulatedmodemizationpackagesinto a cohesivereform. It also generatedsocial demandfor greater impact,efficiencyand sustainabilityfor which the Ministryof Educationand the systemwere not fully prepared. The challengetoday is modemizingthe ministryand other sectoral agenciesso as to institutionalizethe new schoolculture(i.e., deepeningit and bringingit to scale), while simultaneouslyrespondingto evolving societalexpectations. Institutionalmodemizationis essential in order to maximizebenefitsfrom nearly a decade of growing public investmentin human capital. The Chileanstory offers insightinto how one educationsystem has struggledto achieve intemal consistencyand effectivenesswithin the contextof significantpoliticaland economictransition.The govemment has attempted to reconcilethe market-basedstrategies of the military era with its democraticconcemsthat all Chileansbe equippedto participatein the country'seconomicand social development.The process of integrationhas fueled remarkableinnovationtempered by the PatricioAylwinwas a Christian electedpresidentafterthe Pinochetgovemment, first democratically EduardoFrei,Jr. In January2000,RicardoLagos(a socialist)waselected as washissuccessor, Democrat, to succeedFrei. 4The


EducationReformsin Chile, 1980-98

countrystillseekingsocialcohesion.Thus,withinthe Chilean of an industrializing cautiousness educationsystemonefindsbothmuchthatis cuttingedgeandsomethatis highlytraditional.The change. andeducational experimentin socialengineering resultis a fascinating

1980s Top-down

1990-96 MainlyBottom-up

Tools Preferred

1996on 'macro"structures Integrating culture with"micro'school & information IncentivesAccountability Rules, MandatesInformal Rules, Formal



andEquity Quality

Period Direction


across performance Improved Iall dimensions


Institutions Modem

School Culture

Structure System


Thispaperexaminestwodecadesof basiceducationreformin Chile, withan emphasison instituthefortionaland politicaldimensions.Chapter1 centerson howthe govemmenthasreoriented govemingthebehaviorof teachers,parentsand administramaland informalrulesand incentives tors in an effortto producefirst,greatersystemefficiency,and later,betterleamingoutcomes of policyinchangeswereintroducedthrougha combination amongstudents.Theseinstitutional and systemreform.Chapter1 also capacity-building strumentssuchas mandates,inducements, discussesthe politicsof educationreformin Chile. In doingso, it examinesthe mainstakeholders at each reformstage,their positionsand actionsvis-a-visthe reformand how theiractionsimpactedreformoutcomes. changesandpedagogical thatinstitutional In Chapter2, attentiontumsto theimpactandoutcomes innovationshavehad on the educationsystemparticularlyin regardto quality,equity,and efficiency. This sectiondiscusseswherepolicyinterventionsalone or in combination-appearto havebeenmosteffective.Chapter3 highlightslessonsfromChile'sexperiencethat arerelevant in othercountries. specialists andeducationdevelopment for policymakers The mainfindingsof this reportarethreefold.First,the Chileanreformprocessof the 1990sis modelssuchas (1) a verticaladminisfairlyuniquein combiningelementsof differenteducational pedagogystrategy;and network-based withan openand horizontal trativeandfinancialframework (2) effortsto reconcilea marketapproachwith a concemfor equityand solidarity.The strengthof marketpoliciesis thattheyfocusattentionon results. However,in a still developingcontext,effimaynot sufficeto raisequalityor equity,or maytake ciencyand structuralreformsby themselves too longto achievethe desiredimpact. Boostingstudentleamingrequiresdetailedattentionto by by2002.By1998theFSDhadbeenadopted schools double-shift aimsat eliminating s TheFSDreform to 18percentof totalstudentenrollment. schools,amounting about50percentof govemment-subsidized or the reformof The paperdoes not discussthe formaland informalinitiativesintroducedin pre-school, in 1998. introduced highereducation




school and classroomprocesses. Improvingequity requires targeted approachesto protect the vulnerable. Second, shifting gears from mere educationalchange (1990-1996)to a full-fledgedsustainable reform(i.e., FSD reform)requireslinkingthe micro cultureof the schooVclassroom with the macro level (i.e., system). This is needed to ensure that individualschoolsdemand enough of their students and serve nationalas well as local educationalgoals; and conversely,that the system provides schools and parents with the guidance and support they need. This requiresintegrating fragmented structuresand programs,and creating institutions/organizations that promote autonomy (clear rules of the game), but balanceit with accountabilitymechanisms(e.g.,voice, choice, exit, standards,assessment,M&E) and leaming(research,informationand communication,training). Third, implementingan educationalreformas complexand ambiffousas the 1996 Full School Day initiativerequireschangingbothformal and informalrules,structuresas well as culture. The move to a single shift-with its major physicaland organizationalplanningimplications-and the introductionof a new curriculum-with its formidableteachertrainingrequirements-strained the system, alreadystretchedby a multplicityof programsand innovations. The challengeis to work differently-in teams, partnershipsand networks;leamingto be selective; reachingto the outside world to confrontchallengesand get new ideas; and demandingsupport from the system while beingaccountableto it for results.


Twenty Years of Education Reform

Market-oriented Reform:Top.down,Big-bangSystemChange(1980-90) Context of Eduardo Frei,Sr.,hadpractically universalized primaryeducaInthe late1960sthegovemment tion(by introducing double-shifts) andreplacedit withan 8 yearbasiceducationcycle. It simultaneouslyexpandedsecondaryand highereducation,modemizedthe curriculumand improved teachertraining.At thebeginning of the 1970sthegovemment of SalvadorAllende,a socialist,undertookto broadeneducational opportunities andto launcha curricularand institutional reformreflectingsocialistpoliticalandculturalbeliefs.Thisreformwas neverimplemented dueto the acute socio-political conflictwhicheruptedin 1973. The militarycoupof 1973markeda radicaldeparturefor Chilein manyrespects.Calleduponby politicalcentristsandconservatives to restoreorderamidstthe economicand socialcrisisgeneratedby thesocialistexperiment of President Allende, the militarygovemment soonundertooka far moreambitious effortto reshapeChileansociety.Thecountry'slongstanding democratic traditon cameto an end as GeneralPinochetmovedquicklyto suppressanyoppositionandconsolidate themilitary'spolitical control.Soonthereafter, theregimelaunched a radicalneo-liberal agendafor restructuring the state-led economy.Bytheendof thedecade,themilitarygovemmenthadcrafted a comprehensive "modemization" programacrosssevenareas,includinglaborpolicy,education Officially, these"NewOrder"reformsweredrivenby efficiencyconandregionaldecentralization. cems:the searchfor greaterresponsiveness to localneedsthroughmarketmechanisms.However,therealsowasa strongunofficial agenda-de-politicizing Chileansocietyby fragmenting organizedlaborand limitingits power.All theseeventsunfoldedagainstthe backdropof a severe fiscalcrisis(1982-85) whichsloweddown somereforms(suchas the "municipalization" of the schoolsystemas vill be seenbelow)andforcedgovemmentspendingreductions, particularly in the socialsectors.Bythe late1980s,however, a drasticprogramof marketreformshad restored fiscalstabilityand putthe economy on a stellargrowthpath(7 percentperyearduring1987-97).


E"ducatonReformsIn Chile, 1980-1998

Core EducationIntatives Focusingon legalandstructuralchange,thereformsintroduced by the militarygovemmenttumed Chileintoa laboratory for4Chicago economics" in a contextof powerconsolidation. Theroleof the statewas redefinedfromall-knowing andencornpassing (the"Estadodocente"or 'teacher State") to subsidiary(i.e.,"the rightsof privateagentsoughtto supersedethe state'sprerogatives wheneverpossible").Thefollowinginitiaiveswereenactedduringthisperiod: Decentralization:administration of primaryand secondaryschoolswas transferredto the morethan300 municipalities.Localgovernments weregivenresponsibility for contracting, hiring andfiringteachers,andformaintaining infrastructure, whilethe centralministryretainedits regulao

tory,qualityassurance andcurriculum settingfunctions. *

Finance:the govemmentintroduced a systemof schoolfinancingbasedon averagemonthly 7 studentaKtendance (i.e.,capitationgrants) to bothpubliclyandprivatelymanagedschools. *

Competition: privatelyadministeredschoolswere encouragedto competewith public schoolsfor studentenrollments.In addition,industrialgroups(e.g.,agriculture,forestryand mining)were givenincentivesto managetechnical/vocational schools. Studentsand parentswere permittedto seekmatriculation at anysubsidized school,irrespective of location. * Labor Deregulation:teacherswerestrippedof theirspecialcivil servantstatusand made subjectto privatesectorlaborlawswhichallowedfor localdetermination of wagesand prohibited laboraction. * StudentAssessment:in 1988the government introduced the SIMCE,Sistemade Medicion de la Calidadde la Educacion (Systemfor theMeasurement of Educational Quality).Developed in collaborationwith the CatholicUniversityand basedon an earlierpilot in 1981,SIMCEwas a groundbreaking effortto providestudentachievement dataon a nationalscale.

A prerequisite for a marketapproachto educationis a goodassessment systemwhichprovidesparentswith timely,objective,reliableand relevantinformation on studentachievement as a basisfor schoolchoiceand

accountability. Following protracted negotiations between theMINEDUC andthePontifica Catholic University (PUC)an assessment systemwasintroducedin 1981underthe nameof PeriFomance Evaluation Program (PER). Suspendedin 1984due to costconcemsandfor lackof consensuson managerialresponsibility, it wasreinstated in 1988underthenameof SIMCE.In 1990thefocusinthe useof SIMCEresultsshiftedfrom

comparison between typesof schools to stimulate competition to correcting inequities throughtargeting.In 1990themanagement ofSIMCE wasfullytransferred toMINEDUC, a decision criticized bysomewhofeared a lackofobjectivity. Today'sSIMCEis administered aKtemately to 41 and8hgraders (thegradesmarking the endof twosubcycles).Theentirecohortistestedin Spanish, mathematics, student self-image andperceptions. In10perItmaybeusefulto clarify theconcepts ofcapitation grantsandvouchers.Intheory, theformerarepaidto schools andthelatterdirectyto students. Inpractice (andbycontrast with,say,scholarships), payments are almostnevermadetofamilies undereithersystem.Inthisdocument, bothtermsareusedinterchangeably. 7


Chapter 1

cent of the schools,tests also are administeredin naturalscience,historyand geography. Since 1988,1011 gradershave been tested three times (1993,1994 and 1998)in Spanishand mathematics. SIMCE results are used as inputs into school performanceevaluations(SNED8) Its strategicmeaning for teachers makes issues of legitimacyimportant. The test provideshelpful insightsfor the revisionof the universityadmission test (PM). SIMCEis widelysupportedby the public. Its developmentand implementationhave allowedthe formingof an interdisciplinaryteam combiningstaff from the ministry,PUC and consultants. Its use by supervisorsand teachers has becomemore systematicas its reportshave becomesimpler, more user-friendlyand more rapidly produced. SIMCEhas servedas a diagnosticinstrumentto preparethe new curriculumand pedagogical material. It has beengiven increasingnationalpublicity,and its cost has remainedunder US$5 per student. The indicatorsbeing monitorednow indude percentagesof correctanswers and studentsreachingthe target levelof 70 percent. SIMCE has had is share of problems,however. For many years,teachers blockedthe publicationof school results,deprivingthe authoritiesof a key instrumentof market policy. The public release of school-levelresuits only began in 1995. Only in recentyears(1996)has the comparabilityof the tests from one year to the next been ensured through the techniqueknown as equating,making it difficultto evaluate changes in schools'performanceduringthe 1980s and early 1990s. The practiceof testing 4" gradersone year and 8h graders the next does not permitfollowingup the same cohort to monitor the impact of remedialactions. SIMCEhas featuresof a low-stakestest (for the students)but has high stakesfor the schools-because of its weight in the SNED since1995. Some observersassert that this has led to perversebehaviorssuch as directorsunder-reportingthe socioeconomicstatusof theirstudentsto inflatethe school'svalue-added,or asking weak performersto stay home on the day of the test to maintaina high averagescore. Some analysts have suggestedseparatingmore clearly the schoolaccountabilityfunction,which requires a census base, from the systemassessmentfunction,which could be sample-based.Othershave questionedthe independence of the SIMCE sinceit was absorbedinto the ministry. Desprtethesecritiques,over the yearsSIMCE has gainedwide acceptance. It remainsa pioneerandone of the more technicallyadvancedand influentialstudentassessmentsystemsin Latin America. The MINEDUC is continuingto refinert furtherin orderto addressthe above issues,test the higher-orderand problem-soMng skills emphasizedby the new curriculumand bettermeasureother factorssuch as student,family and school characteristics. Implementation


and Politics

Throughout the military period, reform implementation largely took the form of legal mandates and political coercion. Given its tight control of the political arena, the govemment did not have to seek public consensus or the support of key education stakeholders. The weakening of the national teachers' union and repression of dissident teachers eliminated a traditionally powerful stakeholder. Municipal govemments, a key actor in the decentralization scheme, were institutionally weak and

politicallycompliant. Parentalvoicewas only possiblethroughofficialchannelsin parents'centers.

Asa result,thesweepingsectoralchangesintroduced in theearly1980sweredesigned by central technocrats withlitte inputfromimplementers.

of SNEDonpp.22-23. 8 Seediscussion


Educatfon Reforms in Chile, 1980-1998

Major Outcomes

EducationEnrollments Durng the militaryperiod, primary enrollmentscontinuedat near-universallevels, while secondary and tertiary enrollmentincreasedsharply.



-~~~~ 0 c(Basic)~



1960 2 80 1970 4 93 1980 12 95 1990 18 95 1992 _ 98 1997 30 (1996) _Source:Planning andBudgetDivsion,MINEDUC Fullseriesnotavailable for recentyears



Tertiary 414

509 65_ 78 80 87

11 20 _ 28 (1995)

The dropout rate registereda sharp decline-from 8.0 percent in 1981 to 2.7 percent in 1982 for basic education and has continued its overall decline since to reach 1.6 percent in 1997. Improvementin the dropout rate has been slower in secondaryeducation-from 8.3 percentin 1981 to 6.2 percentin 1982and 5.8 percentin 1997(see Annex Table C). Decentralization

While conceptually and politically ambitious, the govemments "municipalization"policy-which was temporarilysuspendedduring the fiscal crisis-remained incomplete in several important respects: â&#x20AC;˘

The fact that municipalmayorswere appointedcentrally undercutthe ostensibleobjectiveof introducinggreater community"voice." Given the politicallandscape,most parentsand teachers were unwillingto challengethe competenceand authorityof school principals,who sometimes were military personnel.This was compoundedby the fact that chairmen of parents' 9 centerswere notfreely elected but appointedby a nationalcoordinator.


Transferringschool administrationto municipalgovemments,while leaving the responsibility for pedagogicalaspects to the ministryand its province-basedsupervisors,left schools dependentupon two-largelydisconnectedchainsof authority. The responsibilityfor infrastructure decisionswas placed at the regional level. This created for the schools a conflictinggovem-

9 Thispractice,althoughlaterabandoned, hashada lastngimpactonthe modusoperandiof thesecenters,

slowingdowntheirdevelopment as effective participation channelsandaccountability mechanisms.


Chapter 1

ance structure,with long-lastingeffects. Overall,the system suffered(and continuesto suffer) from a lack of articulationof responsibilityamong variouslevelsof administration;and Exacerbatedby a longtraditionof politicalcentralization,municipalgovemmentsassumedresponsibilityfor schooladministrationwith relativelylittlecapacity and limited information. The central govemment did not provide municipal administratorswith training or adequate resources;this markedthe genesis of fiscal deficitsin municipalbudgetswhich were to be particularlydevastatingfor poorermunicipalites. PublicSpending for Education The distributionof publicspendingimprovedin favor of pre-schooland primaryeducaton (from 57 to 78 percentof the totalduringthe decade),due to the introductionof cost recoveryin highereducation and an explicitreallocationof spendingto basic and pre-schooleducation. However,total educationspendingfell sharplyduringthe period, initiallydue to the fiscal crisis and subsequently as a matterof policy. Between1982and 1990,ministerialspendingdeclinedby 27 percentin real terms,the capitationgrant, the main sourceof fundingunder the new decentralizedsystem,by 25 percent,and teachersalariesby 20 to 40 percent. Competition The capitationgrants paidto schoolson the basis of attendanceacted as a powerfulincentivefor schoolsto developstrategiesto improvestudentretention. Sharp competitionfrom privateproviders developedrelativelyquickly. The opening of the system stimulateda proliferationof privatesubsidizedschools(from 1,700to 2,700 in 6 years). As a resultChilewas able to smoothlyabsorb the pressurefor secondaryschool expansionwhich resultedfrom the achievementof universal primaryenrollmentin the mid-1960s. Therewas a majorshift of studentsto the privatesubsidized sector,whoseenrollmentgrew by 93 percentbetween1980 and 1985,whilethe municipalsystem (public sector) lost some 344,000 students(see Chart 1). The private sector growth occurred overwhelminglyin the principalurban areas. Deregulation of the TeacherLaborMarket With the decentralization,teachers became municipalor privateemployeessubject to locallydeterminedsalaryand workingconditions. The deregulationweakened the 90,000 member national teachers'union. Althoughthe union was formallyreplacedby an educators association,teachers lost controlover nationaleducationpolicy and were facedwith a fragmented,uncertainlabor market.


Educab'onReformsIn Chile, 1980-1998

Evaluationof StudentPerformance Although initiallyintendedto inform parentalchoiceregardingschoolquality, SIMCE results were not distributedto schoolsduringthis period. Thiswas due in part to resistancefrom teachersand in part to the concemamong the politicalright that unfavorableSIMCE scores would be damaging in the 1988 plebisciteand 1990 general election. Data that were publishedwere aggregatedby types of school, fueling criticismthat theywere beingused morefor ideologicalpurposesto document the superiorityof privatesubsidizedschoolsthan to promoteschoolimprovement With the decline in public spending on education,especiallysalaries, the absence of targeted mechanismsto make i economicallyattractiveto serve specialneeds,disadvantaged,or ruralstudents in a competitiveenvironment,and teachersdemoralizedby the abruptchangein their status, the segmentof the educationsystem attendingto the most vulnerablechildrendeteriorated. Various evaluationsconductedat the beginningof the 1990sshowedthat: *

40 percent of 4 gradersfrom the poorest half of the populationcould not understandwhat theywere reading;


the repetitionrate averaged7.8 percentfor basicand 12 percentfor secondaryeducabion;


the fime requiredto completethe schoolcycleswas 10.3years for the 8 years of basic educationand 5.4 yearsfor the4 years of secondaryeducation;and,


netsecondaryenrollmentraffoswere 96.7 percentfor the richestquintile,but only 73.6 percent for the poorestquintile.

Legacy of the Reform The military govemmentshould be credited for having establishedthe foundabonsof a universal capitaffongrant system which has endured and been contnuously improvedsince. However,its autocraticand repressivemethodsalienatedthe educationestablishment.The dramatic events of the 1980s left teachers traumatizedand the nation even more sharply divided than in 1973.The atmosphereof fear reinforcedsilo-thinkingand generatedlastingdistrustbetweengovemmentand teachers.This led to mediocreimplementationas the key actors-the teachers-not only did not "own" the reforms,but rejectedthem both in substanceand style. The strategyof the 1980swas simple:to changethe system by relyingalmost exclusivelyon mandates and applying textbookmarket principles. It providedautonomy, not in municipalmanagement, as mayors were appointedby the center, but in the form of schoolchoice for parentsand curricularflexibilityfor schools. It createdexit optionsfor parents throughthe capitationgrantsystem, but no real voice mechanism. The main accountabilityinstrumentswere the physicalcontrol




of studentattendanceand the monitoringof SIMCE results.The reform focusedon macro levers rather than the micro social processesoccurringin schools and classrooms,the locus of educational change. In line with the govemment'smarket philosophy,the new decentralizedresponsibilities were not definedin detail. However,the principlethat "one leams by practicing"assumesa degree of capacitywhich was not presentat the local levels. Whetherby designor oversight,the absence of teacher training and capacity-buildingactivitiesto prepare the municipalauthoritiesfor their new roles is striking. Assessment resultswere not made availableto parents to guide their choices,or serve as a tool for schoolsor the system to leam and correct their deficiencies.The re10 form fragmentedgovemance, which subsequentlywas to become a major impedimentto im-

provingquality. The transiton period betweenthe 1988 plebiscite,which put a end to the military regime (55 percent of "no" votes),and its actual steppingdown in 1990was marked by intensenegotiationof the terms of peacefulcohabitationbetweenthe armedforces and the democrats. On its last day in office (March10, 1990),the Pinochetgovemmentpasseda ConstitutionalLaw on Education(LOCE) designed to "lock up" its reforms by makingany amendmentsubject to a politicalquorum, which was and remains largelyunattainable.

Pmroflng Equty and Qualityin the Ealy 1990s:Bottom-up Culhurl Change Context

After two decadesof politicalpolarizationand radical institutionalchange, in 1990 the Chilean people were eager for reconciliationand moderation. From the outset, the newly-electedcenter-left coalition adopteda new politicalparadigm:"Continuitywith Change." The govemment'spromise was to reconcilethe inherited market policieswhich successfullyhad extractedthe countryfrom the fiscal crisisof the mid-1980s with a concemfor greaterequity and solidarity,all under a modem state. At the beginningof the period,concemsotherthan education,such as the transitionto democracy, the ability of the multipartycoalitionto govem effectively,and its capacityto maintainfiscal, monetary and financialdisciplinein the face of legitimateas well as populistdemands in the social sectors, rankedmuch higherin the publicagenda.

tO Theschoolsreportto the Municipal Departments of Education (DAEM)(or to semi-autonomous Municipal Management Corporations) for administrative andfinancialmatters, andto thede-concentrated Provincial Departments(DEPROV) for pedagogical matters.Buta growingnumberof DAEMsare increasingly involvedin educational processes aswell.


Education Refomrs in Chile, 1980-1998

During the transition,the educationsector benefitedfrom the multplicityof independentresearch outfits that had contnued to functionthroughoutthe 1980s. These organizatons,funded by foreign sourceswith high qualitystandards,had becomethe centers of intellectualoppositionto the regime and had had a decadeto think about a model that would integrateresearchfindingsand transcendthe "welfareversus neo-liberal"view of the state. The Ministryof Educationabsorbed some of these researchersinto its leadershipto prepareits secondround of educationreforms. New Focus and New Definitions Workingwith his new team, EducationMinisterLagos," a socialist,understoodthe importanceof educationfor a modem state, and the need to transcendthe theme of access (already universalized in basic education). With the restorationof democracy,the govemments strategywas reoriented towardsequity and quality. However,in anticipabonof XXI century "informationage," both conceptswere redefinedby the ministry: *

Equity did not refer to the delivery of a homogeneouspackageof educabonalgoods and services,but meantattendingto the needs of an increasinglydiverse schoolpopulationand targefingcompensatorysupport to the most vulnerablein pursuit of equal educabonalopportunity.


Quality no longer meantthe accumulaton of factual knowledge,but the mastery of higherorder skills (criticalthinking,abstractreasoning,information-processing, communicating),atutudes (teamwork,autonomy,adaptability)and values (tolerance,solidarity). These skills were seen as essentialfor all Chileansto live in a democrabcsocietyand competeglobally, as well as for the poor to be able to take advantageof the opportunitiesofferedby a market economy.

Operationally,the conceptsof equity and qualitywere translatedas follows:

fundedschool-based Competitively proiects Supeivision Wholeschool,'integral" School Teamwork;reachingout to community Classroom Curricular & pedagogical flexibility Policy

Targeting thepoorest10percentandrural multi-gradeschools

schools Focusedonlowest-performing Indusionof all children

Individualized attention to students'needs

J.E.Huidobro, 1997 Sourme:

of ChileinJanuary2000. ' RicardoLagoswaselectedPresident


Chapter 1

This changeof strategywas accompaniedby a new modusoperandibased on the followingguiding principles(Cox 1998): *

the centerof attentionmovedtowardsprocessesand results;


the systemwas to be regulatednot throughbureaucraticrules,but mainlythroughsupport,incentives,and the use of evaluationand information;


the functioningof organizations,hithertoclosedand inwardlooking,was to becomemoreopen and network-based;


the implementationmodelwas no longera top-downblueprintbut a bottom-up,experiential and incrementalprocessadaptedto local needs;and


sectoraldevelopmentwas to cease beingdriven by local pressuresand interestsand instead to follow a nationalstrategicvision.

Buildingon school-basedinnovationand experimentationcenteredon pedagogicalprocesses,the main strategywas to encouragethe emergenceof a new culture relyingmainlyon changesin informalrules and inducements.This processestablishedthe intellectual,technicaland experimental foundationsfor the full-fledgedreformwhich was to come in 1996. Of course,deeplyingrained culturalbiases such as a centralizedcontroland a process(ratherthan results)orientationwould provedifficultto modify.

Core Education Initiatives To promoteequity and quality,the new democraticgovemmenttook the followingpolicy initiatives: *

Equity: the govemmenttook significantstepsto target resourcestoward low-incomecommu-

nities and children. Some additionalfundingand strong pedagogicsupport initiativeswere designed specificallyfor rural studentsand the poorest10 percent of the primary schoolpopulation (the "P-900"program),and allvulnerablechildrenbecameeligiblefor schoolfeeding. *

Quality: improvingoverall educationalqualitywas seen by the govemmentas the comer-

stone of future economicgrowth,povertyalleviationand social cohesion. Considerableattention and resourceswere devotedto enrichingthe classroomenvironment,as well as to "micro-level" school-basedplanningand improvementstrategies,teacher networks,in-servicetraining, and informaton technologyfor students. This was to be referredto as "upgradingthe (football)field from mud to turf."


Education Reforms in Chile, 1980-1998


Greater transparency:the government'suse of SIMCE and other evaluationdata became

more open,withassessmentresults increasinglysharedwith the public. As data becamemore reliable,performancescoresbeganto be linkedwith resourceallocaton. *

Fiscal Priority:as educationemergedas a politicalcenterpiecefor the democratc coalition,

increasingstate resourceswere investedin the sector. The shareof privatefundingfor educaton also grew, reflectingthe philosophyof mixed public/privatefinancingto broadenthe resourcebase for educationby tappingthe willingnessto pay of the moreaffluent.12 *

New Teachers'Statute: In 1991 thegovemmentand the teachers'union agreed upona new

legalframework,which largelyreversedthe labor policiesof the Pinochetera. As a resuft,teachers were assuredof tenure and centrallynegotiatedwages. The law was accompaniedby a significantpay increase(125 percentin real terms between1990-1998). Focus on the Classroom Accustomedto traditionalteachingmethods,starvedof basic resources,and antagonizedby the treatmentgivento teachersduringthe 1980s,the schoolsystem was not immediatelyready,technicallyor psychologically,for pedagogicalinnovations.Therefore,the MINEDUCstrategyconcentrated on the schoolsand classrooms,improvingtheir materialconditionsand giving them gradual exposureto new processes. At their core, these processessoughtto cultivatea greatersense of school autonomyand a commitmentto "meaningfulleamingfor all" regardlessof studentbackground. The govemment'sinitativesto improveequity and qualitywere channeledthrough two innovative programssupportedby the World Bank: Mejoramientode la Equidady de la Calidadde la Educaci6n Bbsica(MECEBasica) initiatedin 1991 and a parallelprogramfocusedon secondaryeducation (MECE Media) initated in 1994 These programsfirst addressed infrastructureneeds and next providedschoolswith basicmaterialsuch as textbooks,then graduatedthem to more sophisticated inputssuch as schooland classroomlibraries. Perhapsthe most dramaticexamplecan be seen in the numberof textbooksdistrbuted, which increasedfrom 2 million to 7.3 million during 1989-97. Initiallythe books were selectedby the ministrybut after a few years schoolswere given


Chapter 1

the freedom to choosefrom a wide range of centrally-procuredpublicationsand materials. All of these inputs had been neglectedduringtheprevious8 years, initiallydue to the fiscalcrisis, then in the drive for cost-cuttingefficiency. The MECE programsintroducedprocesschangesthat emphasizedcommunitybuilding,consensual planningand targetingof the disadvantaged.This includedthe followingmeasures: Building ProfessionaUCommunity Networks *

In rural areas, multi-gradeteachers meet twicea month in "microcenters"to receive training,

discusstheir individualor commonpedagogicalproblemsand sharesolutions. The meeUngstake placeon a rotatingbasis in the schoolsforminga cluster,with technicalsupportfrom a ministerial support network,while motherstend the schoolchildren. The one-dayprogramis half-structured, half unstructured. *

In P-900 schools,2-hourweekly workshopsbring togetherall teachers,with technicalsupport

from the network,to diagnosetheir problems,generateremedialstrategies,leam to develophigher expectationsfor their students,and build on their culturalbackgroundlexperence.This is complemented twice a week by leaming workshopswhich bring together at-risk youth and community workersto helpthe formerimprovetheir self esteem,correcttheir academicdeficiencies,and connect their school and life experiences. Finally,pupilsconductsmall projects in the communityto applyconceptsthey have leamedin school. *

In secondaryschools,in order to promotereflectionand continuousleaming,teachers'profes-

sional groups (GPTs)meet once a week with technicalassistancefrom universitiesand NGOsto plantheir pedagogicalwork, shareexperiences,keep a teamjoumal and work from a menu of activities.To link schoollife withyouth cultureas a way of fightingsocial issuesconduciveto dropout, with the help of communityvolunteersinterestedschoolsconductweekly extracurricularactivities in the arts, environment,sports,preventivehealth,etc.

privateschoolsfor thefirsttimeto chargefees,accomfinancing" lawallowedsubsidized 12 In 1993a "shared reductionof the govemment capitationgrantspaidto theseschools.Fees panyingthis witha prop6ttional grant,beyondwhichschoolswererequiredto revertto private couldbe upto fburtimesthebasiccapitablon from8 percentin 1993to 32percentin 1996,and theproportion of fee-paying students status.Thisincreased grants. of 9 percentof thecapitabon drovetheshareof privatefinandngof theschoolsystemto theequivalent andsegregatonby makingsome Thisdecisionhasbeencritcizedas leadingto greatersocialsegmentation To correctthis,the 1997legislabackgrounds. schoolsunaffordable toyoungpeoplefromlowsocioeconomic schools,requiring the tax rebateofferedto the fee-charging ton establishing the FullSchoolDayeliminated fundfor needystudents.(MINEDUC amountto a scholarship theminsteadto allocate2/3of thecorresponding 1999)


EducationReformsIn Chile, 198011998

School-based Improvement Plans To encouragethe schoolsto take a more proactiverole, MINEDUC initiatedfundingon a competitive basis for "school-basedimprovementplans' (PMEs). For the first time in Chile's educational development,individualschoolcommunitieswere giventhe opportunityand the resourcesto diagnose their own problemsand formulateand implementinnovativesolutions. To date, half of the country'sbasic schoolsand a one thirdof its secondaryschoolshave implementedsuch plans. School Networksthrough Technology In a further effort to enrich the school and to modemizethe cuniculum, a nationvide schoolcomputernetwork,ENLACES("Linkages")was installed. The network'sobjectivesare to createa broaderleamingcommunitythroughexchangeof experiences,promotetechnology-basedinnovation and provideteachersand pupils with opportunitiesto leam differently-horizontally,and interactively,via technology. The govemmentsgoal is to connectall 1,300secondaryschoolsand 50 percentof primaryschoolsby the year 2000. So far coveragehas been concentratedin urban areas, and the use of computershas beenof a morepersonalthan educationalnature.

Year 1992-1994 1995 1996 1997

Primary Schools 55 121 311 935

Secondary Schools 0 62 162 482

Total 55 183 473 1417









2000* *Planned




TargetedSupportfor RuralSchools By the early 1990s,the govemmentrealizedthat schoolsin ruralareas sufferedsystematc disadvantages under the capitationgrant system, due to low populationdensity and de facto lack of schoolchoice. The MECE-Ruralprogramdelivereda speciailydesigned modularcurriculumwith high quality self-pacedmaterialsfor studentsand trained teachers in multi-gradeteachingtechniques. It also helpedteachersmobilizecommunitysupportfor the schools. Finally,as mentioned earlier, it developeda networkof "microcenters"to breakthe isolabonof ruralteachers. These innovationprocessesare at the core of the culturalchange happeningin ChileanSchools. The MECE programseach created, like Russiandolls, a microcosmfor the reformto come,with, for instance,special materials,paidteacher bme assignedto team pedagogicalwork, supportnetwork and school-basedinnovabons,all with a strong institutionalidentity. Becausein 1990 it was next to impossibleto introducechangein the MINEDUC,the preparationand implementabonof


Chapter 1

the MECE programswere entrustedto specially-createdunits inside the ministry,composedof younger, more educatedand committedconsultants. The zeal and focus of this relativelysmall group made i possibleto introducereal change in the Chilean schools. However, these very qualites and their organiation by program-outside the line structureof the ministry-ong slowed down cross-disciplinaryfertilization,more functionalorganiation of the ministry,the development and projectionto the outsideworld of a sharedvision, and appropriationof the reform by outside stakeholders. TargetedSupportforAt-risk Schools A similarlytargeted approach,the P-900 program,was developedfor disadvantaged(non-multigrade) schoolsin more densely populatedareas. Speciallydesigned materials,teacher training and communitymobilizationwere also featuresof P-900.

Implementation Strategles and Politkicsof the Reform It is importantto understandthe uniquepoliticalcontextunder which the democraticgovemment crafted its educationstrategy. Thougha significantmajorityof Chileanshad supportedthe transition to democracy,they remainedideologicallydivided. Conservativeswere wary of any attempts to undo the structuraland market reformsof the Pinochetgovemmentand their influencein Chilean politicswas protectedby the 1990Consbtuton. As the same time, socialistswere rediscovering their voice after almost two decadesof repression. All partieswere averse to overt conflictor any hint of unilateralmandates. These elementscreateda climatewhere intricateconsensusand controlledconsultabonwere imperafivesin policyformulation. In education, the transition period was characterizedby patient, incremental and consultative "change"processes.The word "reform"was carefullyavoidedbecauseto the left, it elicitedpainful memoriesof arbitrarydictatesand to politicalconservatives,it suggestedpolicy reversal.To overcome these divisions,the newly-electedgovemmentof EduardoFrei began a process of nabonal consultationwhich culminatedin the 1994launch of a NabonalCommissionon the Modernizabon of Education(see Table 1.7). This strategyis illustratedby the govemment'sdecisionto maintain the status-quoin favor of the administratveand financialdecentralizationintroducedby the former administrabon.The progressiveleft adoptedan attitudeof politcal compromiseand pragmatism. Maintainingthe DecentralizedManagementof the SchoolSystem Duringthe transitionto democracy,a heated intemaldebatetook placein the ranks of the govemment coaliton as to whetherto re-centralizethe managementof the schoolsystem-as advocated by the teachers' union-or to maintainthe municipalframeworkadoptedduring the 1980s. Ult-


Education Refom.s in Chile, 1980-1998

mately,the coalitiongovemmentchoose not to engage in any restructuringof educationgovemance (i.e., municipalization)or finance(capitationgrants)for three centralreasons: *

There were strongsupportersof the decentralizedstructurewithin the centristwing of the coa-

lition who believed that current arrangements,while not perfect, were a sound foundation for a modem educationsystem; *

Broader politicaldebates on decentralizationwere taking place beyondthe educationsector, particularlyregardingmunicipalelectionsand finance. Until these culminated,adjustmentsin any specific sector seemed impractical. Furthermore,some members of the govemment coalition couldsee the democraticpotenbalof the municipalmanagementof schools;and *

Significantadjustmentsin educationgovemance or finance would have required a constitutonal amendmentto the 1990 LOCE. This would have entailed a difficult batte with opposition conservatives,a battlethe new democraticgovemmentdid not wish to take on. The capitation grant system and publicJprivatecompetition mechanismswere also maintained, largelyfor the same reasons. It was believedthat, once combinedwith increasedinvestmentand with general and targeted processinterventions,these mechanismscould restorequalityand close the equity gap, which had worsenedduringthe 1980s. Enrolling Teacher Support for Reform The main govemmentstrategywas to createa new school culture through changesin classroom environment, professionalinducements and transparent performance information. School improvement included extensive efforts to rebuild the social fabric through teacher networks and communityparticipationin schoolrenewal. A key additionalfactorwas the govemmentdecisionto start the process of healing govemment-teacherrelabonsby satsfying the newly reestablished teachersunion's demandsfor higherpay and a new regulatoryframework. Teacher salaries,which had declinedby 20-40 percentin real terms duringthe 1980s,rose by 125 percent(real terms)from 1990-1998.This is to be comparedwith increasesof 30 percentfor other workers,74 percentfor publicsector personnel,and some 40 percentfor other professions. Teachers had been radicalizedby the deregulationof their labor market a decade before. Under pressure,the new govemmentremovedthe professionfrom the (privatesector) Labor Code which had govemed it since the "municipalization"of the school system (1980)and made it subject to a new Teachers'Statute(1991). The statutewas a markedpolicyreversal in the followingways:


Chapter 1


teachers regainedjob stability in the most radical form: teacher life tenure and no transferwithoutteacherconsent,even amongschoolsin the same municipality;


centrallydetermined,rigid conditionsof service (number of working days, maximum workinghours,leave,etc.);


centrally negotiated salary increases and new wage structure-giving slightly less weight to seniority, and introducinga system of bonuses for hardship, in-service training,and experience;and


teacher recruitmentremaineda municipalresponsibilitybut salary negotiationswere re-centralized,restoringthe powerof the teachers'union. Table 1.4: Changes in Teacher Salaries Relative to Other National Indicators



Wagefor Whole Economy

Year 1990







1991 116.1 109.0 107.4 1992 126.1 127.1 113.5 1993 134.0 141.2 124.4 1994 160.5 164.5 135.0 1995 176.0 180.7 142.7 1996 189.9 193.8 149.5 1997 206.6 211.5 161.3 1998 225.1 221.3 173.7 Var.%90198 125.1 121.3 73.7 Var.%93198 68.0 56.7 39.8 Source: Finance Division, MINEDUC, Ministry ofFinance, National Institute ofStatistics *Teachers withcontracts of30weekly hours Average salary forallpublic sector workers

100.0 105.2 110.6 113.6 115.0 117.2 n/a 17.2

The new Teachers'Statutewas seen by then EducationMinisterRicardoLagos as the repayment of a political"debt" and the price to pay for long term buy-inby the teachingcorps to the new govemments educationpolicies,includingmaintenanceof the municipalmanagementof schoolsand of the capitationgrant system. With these arguments,he enlistedthe support of PresidentAylwin to win over the oppositon within the Cabinet. Indeed, duringthe next six years, there were less than two weeks of nationalteacherstrikes. However,this stepwas deploredby many, not only in the right-wingopposition,for the rigidityit introducedinsectoralmanagement. The adoptionof the Teachers'Statutein 1991generatedseveremanagerialobstaclesfor the municipalities,which jeopardizedtheir financialviabilityand limitedtheir abilityto competewith private subsidizedschools. The Teachers' Statute made it practicallyimpossibleto adjust the teaching body to changing enrollmentlevels, leavingthe municipalauthoritieswith the challengeof a fixed cost structure-due to centrallydeterminedsalaries and job tenure of teachers-but a variableincome level, the attendance-basedcapitationgrants. A compensatoryfund was createdto help municipalitieswith excess teachersor a large proportionof seniorteachers financethe impact on


EducationReformsin Chile, 1980-1998

their budget. From a market theory perspective,this was a serious distortion in the operationof competitionbetweenmunicipaland privatesubsidizedschools.

RewardingSchoolPefformance The need to restoresome flexibilityin teacherdeploymentand to begin linkingteacher compensabon to performanceled to the introductionin 1995of the Annual Plansfor MunicipalEducabonDevelopment (PADEM) and in 1996 of the System of Merit Awards to Schools (SNED). The PADEMs were an effortto temperthe vagariesof the short-term,compebbvefunding approach by bringingtogether,througha planningexercise,the perspectivesof educatorsand financialphysical planners. They also allow the municipalgovemmentsto downsize their teachingpersonnel, if so required by a decline in enrollments. Simultaneously,the PADEMs serve as a vehicle for implementing the SNED. Facing protractedstikes in 1996 and 1998, the govemment announcedits intentionto contnue raising teacher salaries, subject to macro feasibility,but to link funding increases to improvementsin the teaching quality, through a new system of school-based merit awards. The municipalgovemmentsactively support the idea and the number of teachers acceptng it has been growing. In additon to providing salary rewards to teachers,the SNED aims at stmulating and rewarding school practceswhich contributeto improvementsin studentleaming. The design of the SNED incorporateslessonsleamedfrom world-wideexperiencewith merit pay, which suggestthat (Mizala1999):


financial rewards are more effectivewhen directed at the entire teaching team in a school

ratherthan individualteachersbecausethis encouragescollaborativework; *

a merit-pay scheme should also address potentialperverse effects such as the "free-rider"

problem,discriminabonagainstdisadvantagedstudents,etc.; o

the eligibilitycriteria and the evaluation system should reflect the desired teacher behaviors

and schoolcharacteristics;and, o

the system should be perceivedas fair, transparentand sociallyacceptable.

The SNED, which is administeredevery other year, evaluatesschool performancebased mainly on students'scores in the SIMCE (65 percent) and four other variables. The prior existenceof SIMCE kept the costs of establishingthe SNED reasonable. An important feature of the SNED design is that in each of the country's 13 regions, schools compete within homogenousgroups (i.e., other schools with similar geographic and socioeconomic characteristcs). The best-


Chapter 1

performing schools each year-representing up to 25 percent of enrollments-win the award. Schools may win repeatedly. The SNED awardwas equivalentto about U.S. $460 per teacherin 1998 (or slightly under one month's salary) and distributedas follows: 90 percent to be shared within the entire schoolteam in the form of a salary bonusespro-ratedto the workloadand the remaining10 percentto be used as the schooldirectordecides. Awards are based on an index composed of six variables-the weighting system was modified followingan in-depthevaluationof the first round of awardsin 1996.


Table 1.5: SNEDVariables and Weights Weight Indicators 96-97

Effectiveness Value-added Capacityfbr initiative

SIMCEscoresin Math& Spanish AverageSIMCEscoregain Creationof teachercouncils

Weight 98-99

40% 30% 6%

37% 28% 6%







Particdpation in microcentromeetings Pedagogicalactivities

Improvements inwork-

Studentcouncil Schooldevelopment plan Teacherworkshops FullStaffing

ing conditions

Replacementof absentteachers

Equalityof opportunities Studentretentionrate rate Studentgraduation Differentalgroupings Integration projects Absenceof discriminatorypractces

Integration of teachers andparents

of educational workby parAcceptance andcreaents,guardiansandstudents,

I_I I tonof parents'centers (1999) R.W.McMeekin of MeritAwardsto Schools," Source:'Chiles System

The SNED is gaining acceptance,mainlyamong school directors,and more slovly among teachers, althoughthe union has not objected.

Creatinga Lasting Politcal Consensusfor the Refonn Finally,the implementabonof the govemment'seducaton change processover this period benefited from a strongpoliticalcommitmentand a stable technicalteam. Politicalcommitmentto educabon was establishedearly by Minister Lagos (March 90-September92), who helped elevate educaton to the top of the nationalagenda. Lagosalso was instrumentalin shiftingthe attentionof the public away from quantitativeconcemstoward equity and qualityin educationalopportunibes. He effectivelyand urgentlycommunicatedthat educationhad to change if the nabon'ssocial and economicambitionswere to be met. As a politician,he also undertookvisible actions to illustrate the change,thus buyingtime to tackle big substantiveissues.


Education Reformsin Chile, 1980-1998

Despitea changein leadershipin 1994 (EduardoFrei, a ChristianDemocrat led the Coalitionto its second electoralvictory) and three ministerialchanges between 1990 and 1996-Jorge Arrate (September 1992-March1994), Emesto Schiefelbein(March 1994-September1994) and Sergio Molina (September1994-October1996)-the spirit and substanceof the reformscontinued. Jorge Arrate advanced the fledgling equity and quality initiativesof the Lagos administration. Emesto Schiefelben is remembered as the intemationallyconnected expert who forcefully denounced "frontal"teachingand put leaming and the classroomat the center of attention. Sergio Molina is thought of as the man of dialoguewho skillfullynegotiatedwith the teachers' union the revision of the Teacher Statute and introducedthe PADEM and SNED. Each of them broughtparticulartalents and new inflectionsto the steeringof the reform, butwithout changingits generalorientationor core design. The stabilityin objectiveshelpedto solidifyadvancesand leam from missteps,creating a solid foundationfor the FullSchool Day Reformof 1996. a

by President One of the definingmomentsof the decadefor the educatfonsectorwasthe establishment of Education on the Modemization Frei,Jr., shortlyafterhiselectionin 1994,of a NationalCommission socialistand academicJosledby "bom-again" (chairedby MinisterMolina),anda TechnicalCommittee, reprepersonalities of 18,prominent of 32,andthecommittee consisted JoaquinBrunner.Thecommission lifeinthecountry. andallwalksof intellectual senfingtheentirepoliticalspectrum facingChileanEducationinthe of the"Challenges diagnosis systematic a comprehensive Theyconducted the 10 keynational one inthe 13regions,andone invotving two consultations, XXI century"and organized the nationalpolice, (suchas the CatholicChurchand freemasonlodge,leadinguniversities, institutions with5 recommendations: Theyconcluded providers). privateeducation * * * * *

for allthehighestpriority Theneedto makequalityeducation education secondary Theurgencyof reforming theteachingprofession of strengthening Thenecessity schoolautonomyinorderto raiseeffectiveness of increasing Thedesirability from4.5percentto 8 percentof GDP for education to increasetotalspending A nationalcommitment

Agreewereendorsedby allpoliticalpartiesin a formal"Framework Mostof thereporrsrecommendations drovetheintrosignedinJanuary1995.Thisagreement of ChileanEducation" mentfor the Modemization above).It alsomarkedthe peakof thenationalconsensuson ductionof PADEMsand SNED(discussed whathad to be done:as reality-polificalor otherwise-settledin andconcretechoicesweremade,some wouldlaterdissent. opposition, espedallyintheright-wing stakeholders,

Refonn:UnidngTopdown andBottom-up Changeto Fulnscale FromIncremental Context

In the aftermathof the 1994 BrunnerCommissionReporta broad politicalconsensusemergedthat the educationexperimentslaunched in 1990s should be deepened. In addition,the newly elected president,EduardoFrei Jr., was searchingfor a social policy initiativewhich would define his presidency.


Chapter 1

In July of that year, Finance MinisterAninat announcedan 'historic opportunity'for educationreform in Chile. He referredto the exceptionalset of circumstancesChilewas facing: a leadership genuinelysupportiveof educationaldevelopment;a sustainedeconomicgrowththat made it possible to fund a substantialincreasein educationalinvestment;and a set of policiesat an advanced stage of development. Coming from the most influentialmember of Frei's cabinet,Aninat's comments were indicativeof both education'sprioritywithin the politicalagenda and the close partnership betweenthe Presidencyand the Ministriesof Finance and Education.This partnershipextended to the more operationallevel as top technocratscame togetheras an informaltask force to 13 discuss reformparametersand strategies. Throughout1995 this high-levelgroup met frequently

and privatelyto discusshowthe opportunitymightbe capitalizedupon. By March of 1996 a reform design had been developedby the intemal task force and was presented by MinisterAninat to five ministersand the president. At its core was a proposalto extend 4 the lengthof the schoolday, effectivelyendingdouble shift school management'1 Over the next two months, the plan was critiquedand intemal inconsistenciesironed out. On May 21, 1996,

PresidentFrei announcedthe Full School Day reform which MinisterAninat and then Education Minister Sergio Molina presentedjointly to the public the next day. The initiativehad been prepared in secrecy and took most people by surprise,triggering many vocal reactions. It was the most significant move in Chile's education policy since the municipalizationdecision of 1981. Given the considerablefiscal implications,the Budget Director,Jose-PabloArellano, became Minister of Educationin October1996. Unlikethe transitionfrom a military to democraticgovemment, which involved a changed in policies,the FSD marks a new threshold in terms of growth, depth and pace, butthe philosophyremainedthe same.

Core Education Initatives The FSD reformincludesfour programmaticpackageswhich became knownas the four pillars of the reform. The programswere conceivedto generate synergy over time. However, the FSD componentquickly drew universalattention,with its directand visibleconsequenceson the education budget,the organizationof the educationsystem and its impacton teachers,pupilsand school communities,as well on women'sdaily livesand families'functioning.

betweenpoliicians(Presipartnership the exceptional illustrates Thegenesisof theHistoricOpportunity Aninatof FinanceandMolinaof Education)andtechnicians(J-P.Arellano,thenBudget dentFrei,Ministers M.MarfromEducation, Minister,C.Cox,JE HuidobroandP. Gonzalez Education Directorandsubsequently fromFinance)whichmaybeoneof themainfactorsbehindthe successof theChilean cel andJ. Espinosa refomm. accessto educationinthe 1960s,thusperhapsshedFrei'sfatherhadachieveduniversal As president, 14 quality. dingsomelighton hisson'sdesireto bringthelegacyto newheightsby universalizing 13



The Four Pillarsof the 1996 Full SchoollDay Reform * Extendingthe School Day: The FSDreformextendedthe schoolweekfrom30 to 38 hours in primaryeducationand from36 to 42 hoursin secondaryeducation.Morethansimplyaligning time-in-school with that of the OECDcountries,the FSD reformwas intendedas an organizing principlefor full schoolrenewal.The ideawas lo enrichthe teaching/leaming processby giving studentsmoretimefor studiesand extra-curricular activitiesand teachersmoretimefor planning their lessons,engagingin teamwork,pursuingtheirprofessional development, and conferring with parents.Thegradualmovefromdoubleto singleshiftingis supportedby a majorprogramof infrastructuredevelopment (20,000classrooms) and schoolfeedingfor the mostvulnerablechildren (over600,000).By the end of 1998some50 percentof schoolshadjoinedthe program,representing18 percentof nationalenrollments.All municipaland private-subsidized schoolsare expectedto adoptthe FSDreformby 2002,unlesstheycandemonstrate superiorperformance. * A NewCurriculumFramework:A nationalframeworksetsobjectives forabout70 percentof whatchildrenaresupposedto know;schoolshaveautonomyoverthe remaining30 percent.The new curriculumemphasizes the masteryof higherorderskillsand competencies requiredby a "knowledgesociety'(criticalthinking,abstractreasoning,problem-solving, informationprocessing, communication, negotiation, etc.)as wellas "trarsversal'leamingobjectivessuchas the relationshipbetweenmanandhisenvironment, andmoralvaluessuchas toleranceandsolidarity.




-Language& CommunicaionFocus ongrammar & lierature Foaus onlinguistic andcommunication skills IMathematics Abstract mathematical reasoningApplied mathematics -History & SocialSciences Knowledge ofhistory Understanding thepresent initshistoric context Philosophy Knowledge ofdiscipline Reflecton onthemeaning of life& human relabons Science Training scientsts Science literacy forall -Technology IManualwork Design, production & ublization processes Art i Technical approach Expressiveness & appreciation ofart Physical Educaton ITrainingathletes Fitness fora higher quality oflife Source:J.E.GarciaHuidobro (1997)

Thedisciplinary contentstressesthepractical,to equipyoungpeopleto confrontthe dilemmasand challenges of today'sworld. Thenabonalframeworkemphasizes the coreknowledgerequiredfor nation-building and intemational competitiveness, whilelocalvariationsreflectdiverseneedsand priorities.Alreadybeginning in 1995,the so-called"Curricular Plans"in basiceducationhad given an opportunityfor schoolsto developtheir own programs. Mostof the schoolswhich availed themselves of thisoptonwereprivateorprivate/subsidized.




Teacher Professionalism: A batteryof monetary,professionaland symbolicincentivesaim

at renovatingteacher practice (i.e., improvingtheir ability to pursue diverse teaching strategies adapted to different students'needs, a characteristicwhich also implies continuous professional developmentand performanceevaluation),and promotinginteractiveteachingmethodsand pupils' autonomy. Incentivesincludethe doublingof salaries in real terms since 1990; team and valueadded basedmerit pay (throughSNED);premiafor excellencein teaching(beginningin 1997);exposure to bestteachingpracticesworidwidethrougha programof studytours (3,000beneficiaries); scholarshipsto attractgood studentsinto the profession(300 per year); competitivefundingto reorient teacher educationin 17 universities(out of 35 applicants)and align it with the requirements of the reform;and in-servicetrainingprogramsto 're-tool" some 25,000 teachers. *

SecondarySchoolInnovation:A competitivelyfunded"flagship"program,the "Montegrande

Project,"involving51 secondaryschools (out of 1,300)with a high proportionof needy students, supportsthe formationof a networkthat will modeland disseminatein an "organic"way innovative teaching, leaming and managerialpractices. Each selected school receives US$100,000plus US$100per studentper year. These changes, introducedby the FSD reform, were added to existingprograms such as MECE and ENLACES. A key challengearising from the May 1996 announcementwas that all the elements of the FSD reforrnwhich previouslyhad been moving independentlynow had to be inteMidentities" grated to achievesynergy. The multiplicityof parallelprogramswith strong institutional complicatedthis task. Reordentingthe Use of Assessment Data To foster equityand qualityin education,the govemmentdecidedto rely moresystematicallyon an improvedstudent assessmentsystem. The education team saw assessment,embodiedin the SIMCE,both as a tool to inform parentalschoolchoice, as had the military govemment,and, what was new, as a central instrumentto ensure that decentralizationwas not synonymouswith inequity. The govemmentinitiatedeffortsto disseminateSIMCE resultsmore widelyvia the press and in-house publications. SIMCE data also were used as the basis for targeting resourceson the lowest-performingschools. Implementation Strategies and Politics of the Refonn Communicatingthe Reform'sObjectives The announcementof the FSD reformtook the countryand even the ministry by surprise. Externally, therewas bewilderment,becausesince 1990 MINEDUCofficials had insistedthat what was happeningwas cautiouschange, not reform, due to the unpalatablememoriesthe termn" reform"


|EducationRefoms In Chile, 1980-1998

elicited in educationcircles. The teachers' union complainedabout not having been involved and in reaction organizedtheir own six monthsconsultationwhich culminatedin a National Congress (October1997). Although the overall tone of the event had a traditionalindustrial-unionoutlook,it was the first time the union reflectedabout themes other than conditionsof services and salaries. and most Intemally,only a handfulof officials knew about the forthcomingpresidential-statement foundout throughthe media,givingthem a sense of not belongingto this definingmoment. The lack of intemal communicationsput central MINEDUCstaff in the awkward positionof being unableto explain to outsidersthe overall significanceof what they had been working on for years. Evenwithin the MECEgroup, becauseof the fragmentedorganizationof the ministry,where separate teams had been working in parallelon separate programs(e.g., P-900, MECE rural, MECE Media,etc.),a year after the launchingof the reform,few officials belowthe top level had a clear vision of the whole. In the monthsfollowingthe announcement,the ministry itself seemed surprised to see the Full School Day componentstealingthe show, while it was only one part of the overall reformpackage. Such inconsistencieswere not substantivelysignificant,but were exploitedby the polifticalopposition. At ground level, schoolshad been bombardedsince 1991 with programsthat were well-designed and reflecteda carefullycrafted,incrementalstrategy. However,schools had never been provided with an overarchingvision of how these pieceswould become integrated. As each programcame with a packageof resources,the temptationhad beento adopt all of them, but insofaras personnel were trained separatelyfor each, and they followed different procedures,they appeared to the schoolas a superimpositionof requirements,generatinga sense of overloadand fragmentationas well as allowinga sense of reform fatigue to emerge. Thus, it could be said that despite (or because of) five years of constantchange,the overall systemwas neither preparednor organizedfor a developmentof the magnitudeof the FullSchool Day Reform. For the first seven months followingthe FSD reform'sannouncement,the ministry was without a communicationsstrategy. The Cabinetand the design team, busyas they were with the technical aspectsof the reform and satisfiedthat their productwas as good as could be (given the considerable amount of homework-desk literaturereviewsand study tours-done), failed to communicate to the general public and key education stakeholdersin simple, coherent and relevant societal terms,what the reformwas reallyall about. When the MINEDUCfinally launcheda communicationcampaignon the reform'sobjectives,poor coordinationon Its markefingstrategy limitedits overall impact. Repeatedchanges in the content of messagescreated confusion. Messageswere not tested and targeted for dfferent audiences.



While the situationslowlyimprovedas the spectrumof messageswas reduced,the ineffectiveness of the campaign remainedtied to the ministry'sindecisionregardingwhich messagewas most important(e.g.,shouldthe focus be the new cuniculumor the right to educationfor all?) GainingLegislativeApproval Because of the FSD reform's significantbudgetary,curricularand constitutionalimplications,its implementationrequired legislativeapproval. This marked one of the first times that education policy moved out of the executive branch to be openly debated in the legislature. Over a whole year, the discussionin Congresswent back and forth twice betweenthe finance and education commissions. Debatesaboutthe educationreformwere held in plenarysessionsof the upper and lowerchambersof Congressand culminatedbeforethe Constitutionaltribunal. Both chambersinvited the teachers'union,the Associationof MunicipalGovemments,and the Federationof Private EducationProvidersto testify. The key points debatedwere: Financingof the refonn:it was agreed that in order to financethe incrementalcosts,the tax on value-added,scheduledto be reducedto 17 percent in 1997,would be maintainedat 18 per*

cent. This was initiallyopposed by the conservativeOppositionwhich favored altemative sources of funding(savingsand salesof publicenterprises)as recommendedby the BrunnerReport Resource allocationmechanism:the FSD reform implied a huge increase in physicalcapacityand to allowthis, the draft bill proposeda competitivefundingsystem to fund the necessary


investmentin infrastructure. Oppositionpartiesand representativesof private subsidizededucation wanted additionalfunds to be distributedcompetitivelyvia an increasein the capitationgrant. The left objectedto publicfinancingof constructionof private(often denominational)schools. Ultmately,this concernwas resolvedby demandingfinancialguaranteesfrom privateprovidersand a pledgethat theywould operateas schoolsfor 50 years. Revision of the sharedfinancing mechanism:in order to promote equity,the tax rebate to which privatesubsidizedschoolschargingfees were previouslyentitledwas eliminated;2/3 of the *

correspondingamount had to be used to fund scholarshipsfor needy students. Furthermore,the law provided for advanceinformationto parentson proposedfee adjustmentsfor the following3 years. Compulsorynature of the FSD reformn:private providersand the right-wingopposition objected to the proposal that the FSD reform be compulsoryfor all schools receivinggovemment *


EducationRefomnsIn Chile, 1980-1998

subsidies,arguingthat this was a violationof the sacred principleof "Freedomof Education"which gives private administratorsthe right to decide how to organizetheir schools and to parents the right to choose.The compromisewas that exceptionswould be grantedwith proofof superiorperformance. *

Increase in the capitationgrant: the amount of the per student grant was increasedmore

than proportionallyto the numberof hoursof instructionunderthe new regime, in order to free time for technical teamwork by the teachers. One option was to reduce teachingtime from 75 to 70 percent,anotherwas to increaseteachers'contractsby two hours per week. The latter option was selected,leaving schoolsadministratorsto decide how to organizestaff time. *

Inclusionof first and secondgrades: althoughthe initialplan was to limit the FSD reformto

grades 3-8, eligibilitywas extendedto the first two grades in light of the major potentialbenefitsof includingyoungerchildrenfrom the most vulnerablegroups. The lawwas finally approvedon October7, 1997,and the Rules elaboratingon the modalitiesof its implementation,a few weeks later. GeneratingStakeholderSupport Becausethe govemment had developedthe FSD reformproposalin a quiet manner, the battle for stakeholdersupport took place parallelto the legislativedebate. While many domestic educabon observerswere supportiveof the reform,they describedthe ministryas "defensive"or "reactive"in its operabngstyle. A lingeringreluctanceto share work-in-progress(with the notableexcepton of the secondarycurriculum)manifestedMINEDUC'suneasinesswith other education stakeholders and was interpretedby stakeholdersas a "lack of trust' or "patemalism." Two key partners of MINEDUC,the teachers'union and the Associationof ChileanMunicipalities,are also plafformsfor politicianswith nabonalambitons, introducingperverseeffectsin the dialogue. The MINEDUC'slack of a communicatonstrategyand limitedpartcipation largely explain why the govemment was slow in getting political mileage from a reform which outside Chile attracted a considerableamountof favorableattenton. Anotherfactor in this rocky beginningis the normal resistanceto far-reachingchange. Given the broad nature of the reform, nearly all educabonstakeholderswould be impacted,and nearlyall had concemswith one or more elementsof the reform. These concemsare summarized in Table 1.9.


Chapter 1

Table 1.9: FSD Reform: Stakeholder Analysis

Who Teachers

HowMuch Power Ultimateimplementers of thereform.Unless theyintemalize it,it won'thappen.

Areasof Focus Survivalindassroom,theirpupils, pedagogy

Teachers' Union

A traditonalunion,with left-wing leadership. Hasthepowerto call strikesandhasdoneso regularly at thetimeof bi-annual salarynegotiations(exceptduring 1991-96).

Workingconditions, Resistance to thereforrfibecausetheyhad salaries, status notbeenconsulted. Giventheopportunity to (dignity") consultonearlieroccasions (BrunnerReport) theyhadnotseizedit. Organized ownnatonal Congress whereeducational matters werediscussed forthefirsttime. Haveas manyor moreareasof contention withMunicipalities whoaretheiremployers, e.g.,on teacherevaluaton, jobstability,"historic debts."A fewmodem,youngerunionists opento changeinthedirectionof professional associations. In general, considerthatthe govemment hasnotpaidbackits"debt"to


In Chile,theydo not represent a vocalpoliticalforce.

Welfare& safetyof Fromthebeginning theyhaveapproved of the theirchildren for FSDreformbecauseit wouldkeepchildrenoff lowersocioecothestreets.Buttheyhavenotstoodupin nomicgroups,aca- defenseof it. demicperformance for highersocio-


Theconsultation onthe secondary curriculum wasthefirstbmestudents'opinionwas

Positionvis-A-visthe 1996Reform An estimated 30 to 50percentof teachersare veryenthusiastc aboutthereform,which treatsthemas professionals withautonomy. Anotherthirdis positivebutpassive.The remainderagainstor not interested.


economic groupS Relevance of educabonto youth culture,modemlife & labormarket

Surveyof secondary studentsshowedpositivereaction, aflthough moreso onthelinkage withyouthculturethanon preparabon for labormarket.

Freedom ofeducaUonalchoicefor parentsandprivate providers

Althoughinitiallyamongthosewhocriticized thereformfor beingimprovised andtooambitious,andMINEDUC for nothavingshared thedraftFSDBillwiththeminadvance, they soonsawwhatwasinit forthemandstarted intensively trainingpersonnel andgettingorganizedto meetthechallenges.Duringthe legislafive debate,theyfiercelydefended themselves againstwhattheyseeas govemmentinterference intothe management of privateschools.Theyagreethatthereform and MINEDUC ingeneralaregoinginthe rightdirectionand havepromptlyseizedthe opportunifies offered(e.g.,therightto develop owncurriculum) To a large extentthe views of the Church coincidewiththoseof FIDEand theright-wing opposition.The Churchhas beencriticalof the "moralrelativism" of the cuniculum,especiallywithreference to sexualeducation.


FIDE(Federabonof Private Educabon Providers)

FIDEmembersaccount for42 percentof enrollments,distributed betweenfullyprivate(9 percent)& private/subsidized (33 percent)schools.They haveaccessto rightwingpolificians andto resources.Strongsay in educational policy.

The Catho- TheCatholic Church licChurch controls% of allprivate schools.Althoughnonmonolithic, it is frequentlyreferred to as thelargestnongovemmental political


force in Chile.


Education Refomis in Chile, 1980.1998

"Improvisation"in the Implementationof the FSD Reform Physicalimplementatfonof the FSD reform had not been planned,partly for lack of time and partly becausethis was considereda decentralizedresponsibility.The only existingtool for decentralized planningwhich could have servedas a vehicle for FSD reform implementationwas the PADEM. But only in a few municipalitieshad the (still new) PADEMs truly integrated--theperspectivesof physical plannersand financial officers on one hand, with educators and outside stakeholderson the other hand. Thus, only as the reformentered implementationdid it become apparentthat the system was not preparedor organizedfor it and that its implementationcapacitywas insufficient. Furthermore,the originallyplanned reform implementationand coordination unit (in the ministry) did not materialize. An ExecutiveSecretaryfor the FSD reform was appointed, but was not made responsiblefor the otherthree programs,and as such was not giventhe resourcesor the authority to be fully effecfive. There was no mechanismto anficipateand rapidly resolve the unavoidable problems, mainlywith the infrastructureand school feeding programs,that emerged in the early phasesof implementafion. Delays In Modemizationof the Ministry Despite a global plan launched by the Frei administrafionin 1995 to modemize govemment and public management'5,interviewsconductedin and outside the MINEDUC in 1997 revealedthat, althoughthe ministrywas widely recognizedas havinga strategicvision, it was much weaker on the "nuts and bolts" of physicalimplementation.Specificissues identifiedwere:






weak information,communicafionand participation;


under-developedEducationalManagementInformationSystem (EMIS)and research;


outdatedhuman resourcepolicy;and


insufficientuse of modem technologyin.ministerialmanagement.

These managerialshortcomingsexplain some of the difficulftesfaced by MINEDUC in the early implementationof the FSD reform.

manhumanresources a fiveprongedstrategyaimedat improving developed commission 15A modemization reguand probity,strategicmanagement, and thequalityof services,transparency agement,dient-orientation andcommunication. lation,decentralization,


Chapter 1

Table 1.10: Consultation on the New Secondary Education Curriculum

and announcethe conception generatedby thesecrecywhichhad surrounded Awareof the opposition to helpshapeotherelementsof beganinvitingstakeholders mentof theFullSchoolDay,thegovemment theReformwhichstillrequireddefinition. educationcurrculum.Thepreviouscurricuonthesecondary Oneexamplewasthe nationalconsultation by the BrunnerCommislumdatedbackto the 1960s.It badlyneededmodemiation,as recommended education (LOCE).The govemment's Lawon Education sionandprovidedfor inthe 1990Constitutional revisionand insteadoptedto create and upfrontapproachtocurriculum teamdecidedto avoida top-down renovation.As for basiceducation, changesat schoollevellinkedto pedagogical conditonsfor curricular framework a curricular theirowncurriculum.In 1996-1997, schoolsweregrantedtheoptionof developing wasdevelopedby teamsof teachers,academics, for SecondaryEducationbasedon OECDguidelines foundational of the economicsector.Centeredon individualleaming,it emphasized and representatives to preparethem fastleamingworkersand displaysa practicalorientation to produceadaptable, disciplines and betterfor the realityof thelabormarket.It reducedbytenfoldthenumberof technicalspecialiations and values that ensured objectives" 'Transversal flexibility. and versatility promote to families, occupational rigor,positivesattitudes, selfesteem,intellectual respectandsolidarity, suchas discipline, behaviors art. areas,including aretaughtthroughalldisciplinary wellascomputerscienceandtechnology in the sensethatthis time The ensuingdialoguemarkedan importantdeparturefrompast"consultation" to influmid-waythroughthedesignprocessand actuallyhadtheopportunity wereconsulted stakeholders to some100key to a sampleof teachers, for comments wassubmitted enceit. Thedraftof thecurriculum union,thepoliticalparties,thearmy,free masonry, Church,theteachers' (theCatholic Chileaninstitutions was frominstitutions schoolsystem.Theresponse andto theentiresecondary thechamberof commerce) moderatebutindudedall the key actors.The rateof approvalwas high,withone importantexcepton: streamsremaineddespitethe ministry's strongparentaland businesssupportfor thevocational-technical was of thecurriculum obsolete.Mediadiscussion intemationally positionthatsuchstreamswerebecoming expertsto ensure witha reviewby a panelof intemational culminated livelyduringthisperiod.Theprocess and Basic metworlddassstandards.TherevisedCurricularMinimalObjectives that thenewcurriculum graduallyuntil2002. in May1998andis beingintroduced wasapproved Document Contents

Statusof the FSDReformAfter TwoYears Despitea rocky beginning-including a teacherstrike as MinisterJ.P. Arellano beganhis tenure at the end of 1996,protracteddebate in the Congress,daily articles in the media (which is largely 16 controlled by the Opposition),and universitystudentunrest in May-July 1997 -by mid-1998 no-

table progresshad been achieved. * *

The Full SchoolDay Legislationand regulationswere approved,as was fundingfor the reform New curriculumobjectivesfor secondaryeducationwere endorsed by the Higher Councilfor Educabon


The SNED weightingswere revisedin light of experienceto better promote teacherteamwork and school linkageswith the community


The FSD bill introduced a scholarshipfund for needy students attending private subsidized schoolswith sharedfinancing

amountof the Ministersenergyoverthis periodand led to a Studentprotestsabsorbeda considerable notdiscussedin this report. Thesereformsaim at imreforms education higher of package broad-ranging of institutions. andtheefficrency of programs, finance,therelevance provingtheequityof highereducation 1B


EducationRefonns in Chile, 1980-1998


Initial implementationproblems inducedmore cooperativeplanningat the sub-nationallevel, particularlyin the areasof infrastructureand schoolfeeding


Missteps in the communications arena led to more comprehensive surveys of key stakeholders(teachers, parents,the ministerialbureaucracy)and clearer outreachand communicationsstrategies

In temmsof informalrules, organizationalculture and leaming,MINEDUC acquiredgreater credibility by respondingto people's concems, especiallythe need for better infrastructureand school feeding planning as well as demands emanating from teachers. This contributedto slowly rebuildingthe trust destroyedduringthe 1980s. For instance,there was progressin intemal thinking on issues such as schoolautonomy, new style supervision,and quality assurance. Stakeholder surveyshave been exploitedas inputs into strategicand tacticalthinking. As a result of these factors, ideas such as teacher evaluationor school autonomy,which at the beginningof the decade were rejected by teachers,are now increasinglyaccepted.

Stocktaking Lookingback at the entire decadeit is particularlynoteworthythat, in additionto introducingmany innovations,the govemmentnot only kept the capitationgrant system but continuouslyimproved on it by making informationpublic,restoringthe value of the grant which had declined by 32 percent in real terms from 1981-91,and beginningto differentiatethe value of the voucher to reflect the higherper-studentcosts in rural areas. Another remarkabletrend is the extent of the efforts to improve equity. In additionto P-900 and MECE-Rural,duringthe 1990s: *

The capitationgrant to rural schoolsincreasednearly tenfold to reach nearly 21 billion pesos (approximatelyUS$ 41 million);


A subsidyfor studentswith leamingdifficultieswas created in 1995 and by 1999 reached2.7 billionpesos (US$5.3 million);


Allocations to special education increased six-fold to 28.5 billion pesos (US$ 56 million) in 1999;


Scholarshipswere grantedto indigenous,low-incomeand distinguishedstudents;


Pre-schooleducationcoveragedoubledto half a millionchildren(albeitstll low);


School-feedingprogramsreachedalmost 1.2 millionchildren;and


School healthprogramsbenefited1.7 millionchildren.


Chapter 1

TheDebateAround the Policy Choices of the Center-left Coalition Voucher advocatesin Chile argue that the goals of increasedquality and equity set by the democratic govemmentin 1990 did not need to be pursuedthroughthe centrally-driven,direct interventions (provisionof textbooks,ENLACES,PMEs, P-900,schoolfeeding, etc.) underthe MECEprograms. Increasesor differentiatedincreasesin the capitationgrantcould have achievedthe same policy ends and, by allowingschools to choose their input and process mixes, might even have achievedthe same ends more efficiently.From this perspective,some economists argue that the ministry'sdirect interventionprogramsin effect underminedthe voucher system, ratherthan complementingit. Unfortunately,there is no way to establishempiricallywhether a differentated, more flexibleand portablevoucher scheme,leadingto a differentmix of inputs and processes,would have yielded betteroutcomesthan those which have in fact beenachieved. It can be noted,however,that even the most highly decentralizededucation systems in existencetoday in other countries provide some direct core supportto schools. Researcherswho have extensivelystudiedschool reformsin Chicago (US), for one example, strongly conclude that decentralizing decision making to the schools was not enough; complementarycore support provided from the central administration was an essentialelementof the improvementsregisteredin studentleamingoutcomes". It is clear that politicaleconomy factors were important,and maybe predominant,in the Chilean choiceof strategy in 1990. After a decadeof controversyover market-orientedreformsthat diminished the direct role of the state, the new govemmentwas eager to be perceivedas "different"engagingdirectly on prioritysocial issues,deliveringtangiblegoods,and visibly working to aid the impoverished. Direct and targeted interventionprograms such as MECE, school feeding, etc. served these objectives. But ministrystaff also had technicalrationales. In the early 1990s,and to some extent still, there was less than completeconfidenceamong techniciansthat schools'discretionaryresourceswould be allocated to inputs or activities known to make a differencein the classroom, such as welldesigned teacher professionaldevelopmentand high-qualitytextbooks. In the (somewhatpaternalistic?)view of the ministry, all schools might not have access to responsibleand competitive providers of quality-enhancinggoods and services. More concentratedtechnical capacity and possible economiesof scale made it more efficient for some issues to be handled with technical leadershipfrom the ministry.

See Bryk (1998).


EducationRefonnsin Chile, 1980-1998

MINEDUC staff point to the experiencewith textbooks.Giving schools'carte blanche"in this area would have run the risk that less-informedschoolswould under-spendon books,or buy low-quality books. Prescribingwhich books to use, but leaving the actual purchaseto schools would neither guaranteeadequatespendingon books nor perrniteconomiesof scale in procurement. The strategy actually followed-to finance textbooks directly through a centralized bidding process with publisherswhile leaving schoolsa wide range of books to choose from in order to meet their students needs-is widely acknowledgedto have generatedeconomies of scale, resulted in greatly improvedpublishers'standardsand protecteda reasonablemeasureof pedagogicalautonomyfor the schools. Although voucher advocatesin Chile argue for even more autonomy at the school level, most of the ministry's programsduring the 1990s in fact appear as creatve attempts to balance"supplydriven" and "demand-driven"approaches. Incrementalfunding for school-levelquality improvement was not channeledthroughthe voucher, but it was channeledthrough competitively-funded PMEs. In lieu of prescribinga single formula for improving school quality, the ministry invited schoolsto submit innovatve proposalswhich were evaluatedand rewarded competitively. By establishingthe "rules of the game" and funding proposals selectively,the minisbtydid "control the process"and restrictschools'flexibilitysomewhat,but this should be balanced against the advantages the PME system generated,of bettercentralawarenessof the school-levelinnovabonsgoing on and greaterdiffusionof the best ideas. As the system has matured over time, in some areas the Chilean authoritiesopted explicitlyfor augmentingthe capitationgrant insteadof direct interventon. This has been the case in the latter part of the 1990s for the fundingof salary increases,additionalteacher bme to accommodatethe Full School Day, teacher pedagogicalteamwork, supplementaryattention to at-risk students and for school repairs. Ultimately,in Chile duringthe 1990s,both forms of financing have grown proportionately,as illustratedby the table below:





1990 1998

31 80

117 248

Source:Divisionof BudgetandPlanning

Balancingsupply and demand approaches is difficult. The MECE team, while broadly praised, has been critcized for doing too much "hand-holding"and giving the schools overly detailed prescripbons.On the other hand,the progressmade in terms of schools" growingself-confidenceand taking inibativespeaks for itself. The bottom line seems to be


ChapterI that the selectionof a "thirdway" in Chile,combiningmarketand directedapproaches,has producedresults.


Reform Impact and Underlying Factors

the successesand remainingchallengesfacingthe Chileaneducation Thischapterdocuments factors,it systemafterthreewavesof reformspanningtwentyyears.In analyzingthe underlying atthe interplaybetweenthe marketpoliciesof the 1980s,whichhavebeenexlookspragmatically of the 1990s,whichare relativelyless known contributions haustivelystudied,andthe successive outsideeducators'circles. Qualt: All Children Are Leaming More The qualityof an educationsystemis to bejudgedby whatit does,not with its mostaffluentbut students.In additionto tryingto booststudentleamingin absolute with itsmostdisadvantaged since1990havefolloweda policyof "positivediscriminagovemments terms,the twodemocratic gainsin averageleaming tion"in favorof the morevulnerable.Dataevidenceacross-the-board and bethatthe gapsbetweenprivateandmunicipal, outcomes.Buttheyalsoshow,importantly, tweenruraland urbanschoolshavebeenclosing.Chile'sexperiencein the 1990sprovidesencan opportunities educational programsaimedat equalizing couragingevidencethatwell-designed makea differencein a relativelyshortperiod. appearsto havebeenmostrobustat Averageleamingoutcomeshaveimproved.Improvement the grade4 level,wherethe studentpopulationhasbeenmoreor lessstableat nearlyuniversal (AnnexTableA presentsresultsatotherlevelsas well.) participation. Table2.1: Grade4 AverageStudentLearningOutcomes,1988-96

1988 TypeofSchool 49.25 Municipal Private-subsidized.56.35 FullypaidPrivate 76.15

1990 56.70 58.80 80.05

1992 63.85 70.15 86.05

1994 64.43 70.66 85.07

1996 68.00 73.65 85.85


The achievementgap betweenpublicand privateschoolsis narrowing,especiallyin the early grades,e.g.,from26to 17pointsbetween1988and1996for grade4 and from24 to 20 pointsfor level. grade8. Thistrendhasbeenweakerat thesecondary 39

EducationRefonnsin Chile, 1980.98

Municipalschoolscontinueto have the lowest absoluteresults. In both math and Spanish,private and private-subsidizedschools stil register stronger achievementscores. However,as shown in Table 2.2, much of this differenbaldisappearswhen the lower socioeconomicstatus of municipal school students is controlledfor. These findings of Camoy and McEwan (1999) are in line with previouswork by Mizalaand Romaguero(1998).




(Non-voucher) I Non-religious ICatholic Rawdifference instudent achievement (overmunicipal schools) Mathscore l 3.2 <10.0 ___________


Spanishscore I Difference adiustin for household factors* Mathscore ISpanish score I Source: Camoy& McEwan (1999)



0.9q -0.8

2.7 3.2


(Non-voucher) 18.0 18.6 4.7

*Householdfactorsinclude parents' yearsof educatonandmonthly familyincome. Forfulldetails, seeAnnexTableB.

There has been notableprogressin ruraleducation,wherethe achievementgap relabveto the natonal average has shrunk from more than 30 percentagepoints to about 10 percentagepoints duringthe 1990s.


00E ..







68 34

72 60

67 34

71 61



NationalAverage RuralAverage Mathematics NationalAverage RuralAverage

Source:SIMCE;B. Carlson(2000).

The gap betweenthe most at-risk,non-multi-gradeschoolsin low-incomeareas (whichparticipate in the P-900 program)and the rest of the system is alsodeclining,althoughit is difficuftto compare achievementsof P-900schoolsto otherschoolsbecausethe formerhave a tendencyto enter and exit the program.



P-900vs. National Average P-900vs.NationalMunicipal Average P-900vs. Private-Subsidized SchoolsAverage Source:SIMCEdata





17 12 25

9 6 19


The percentageof studentsreachingthe target scoreof 70 percentcorrect answers has increased, and increasedfasterthan averagescores, furtherevidencingan improvementin the distributionof leamingoutcomes. Table 2.5: Proportion of Grade 8 Students Answering 70 percent of Questions Correctly


Discipline Mathematics Spanish History& Geography NaturalSciences




23.52 30.89 23.05 30.43

27.46 29.25 35.86 33.61

35.58 43.19 40.92 37.79


TheseData Interpreting A passionate and often ideological debate has raged around the interpretation of student achievementdata in Chile. Indeed,it is importantto underscorethat while raw achievementtrends are fairly robust,they are subject to importantmeasurementlimitations. For example,the degree of difficultyof the SIMCE may be too low in a given grade. Furthermore,the techniqueknownas "equating"(which ensures that results are comparablefrom one measurementto the next) has only been introducedin the SIMCEfor the pastfew years, and many believethat the 1996test was substantiallyeasier than the 1988 test. This is illustratedby the fact that the scores of fully paid privateschools (FFPS) (Table2.1) which did not benefitfrom any special program, increasedby nearly 10 pointsduringthe period, puttinginto perspectivethe incrementsregisteredby subsidized schools. Using the FPPS scores as a base index=100,the performanceof the two types of subsidizedschoolscan be rapidlyre-calculatedas follows: Table 2.6: Adjusted Grade 4 Student Learning Outcomes of School Type

Year 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996

Private-Subsidized 74 74 82 83 86

Municipal 65 71 74 76 _ 79

Private 100 100 100 100 100

SIMCE Source:

These adjustednumbersshow that while progressin closingthe gap in studentleaming outcomes may not have been as-strongas the raw scoreswould suggest,it is neverthelessimpressive. Another way of benchmarkingprogress is provided by intemationalcomparisons. Pending the results of the repeat round of the Third IntemationalMath and ScienceStudy (TIMSS-R),in which Chile participatedin 1999, the table belowwhich summarizesthe results of UNESCO/OREALC's first LatinAmericanRegionalComparativeAssessment(1998)gives a sense of the relativelevel of


EducationReformsIn Chile, 1980-98

achievementof Chileanpupils,competingfor secondand third positionswith Braziland Argentina, just above Colombia,butwell belowCuba.

. ii*:


.;!!I5 .




0 ~~~.







. !1!!-


Lan uage Group 1 2

Grade3 Cuba(343) Argentina(263) Chile(259) Brazil(256)


(242) Venezuela Colombia(238) Bolivia(232) Paraguay(229) Mexico(224) Republic Dominican (220) (216) Honduras

Grade4 Cuba(349) Chile(286) Argentina(282) Brazil(277) (265) Colombia Mexico(252)

Grade3 Cuba(351) Argentina(251)

Grade4 Cuba 353) Brazile Argentina(269) Chile(265) Colombia(258) Mexico(256)

Brazil(247) Chile(242) (240) Colombia Bolivia(240) Mexico(236) Paraguay(232) Republic Dominican (225) (220) Venezuela

Paraguay(248) Bolivia(245) Republic Dominican (234) (231) Honduras (226) Venezuela


(249) Venezuela (238) Honduras Bolivia(233) Republic Dominican (232)

___ __ __ ___ ___ __ _ ___ ___Honduras


(1998) Source:UNESCO/OREALC

Discemingthe relative leamingimpactof the variousreform componentssuch as decentralization, competition,new pedagogicalprocesses,targeted programs and increased educational investment remains a major challenge. Comparingstudent achievementby type of school has been a focus of attention,as policymakersand researchersseek to determine to what extent competition and private managementhave driven quality. This is complicatedby the difficultyof controllingfor studentssocioeconomiccharacteristics. Recent analyses comparing the performanceof all three types of schools (municipal, privatesubsidizedand private) have estimated initialoutcomes so as to control for differencesin innate abilities, socioeconomiccharacteristicsand other variables. One of the most recent studies covering the entire universe of schools participatingin the 1996 SIMCE showed that fully private schools and subsidizedprivate schoolsscored respectively19 points and 4.5 points higher than municipal schools (raw scores), but that most of these gaps disappearedwhen socioeconomic 1998)."3The superiorachievement of subsidifferenceswere accountedfor (Mizala& Romaguera dized private schoolsceasedto be statisticallysignificant,at least for grade 4, when students'socioeconomicstatus, a family "vulnerability"measure,and school characteristics(geographicloca-


An analysisof valueaddedusinga proxy,a well designedsample,a wellspecifiedmodel,and appropriate betweenmudifferences significant showedno statistically characteristics controlfor students'socoeconomic schools. nicipaland private-subsidized


Chapter 2

tion, numberand experienceof teachers,gender,existenceof a pre-schoolprogram)were taken into account.19In Chileas everywhereelse, socioeconomicfactorscarry considerableweightas a determinantof leamingoutcomes. On the other hand, schoolswith comparablevulnerabilityindices show large variationsin scores. In generalthe data show that larger schoolstend to be associated with better results,although with a wide variancewhich may be attributed to the quality of teaching. Similarly,there is a positivecorrelationbetweenthe homogeneityof the studentpopulation and a school'sachievementresults.

Equity: Despite Progress, Still a FnI:nted


Primary and secondaryschool participationand completionrates are relatively high across all income groups in Chile compared with most developingcountries. Moreover the govemment through carefully targeted programs has successfullyraised achievementsamong lower-income and rural students. Howeverit is soberingto note that, even as averageyears of schoolinghave increasedfor all incomegroups, between1992 and 1996the gap in coveragebetweenthe highest and the lowest quintiles has increasedat two levels: modestlywith respect to pre-school-where the participationrates, at less than 50 percent for the most affluent, remain comparativelylow by intemationalstandards-and strikinglyfor highereducation,the level of attainment reachedby 60 percentof the rich but lessthan 10 percentof the poorest.

,I 1992 Pre-Basic 19.4 92.2 Basic Secondary 73.6 7.8 Higher Level

1996 22.3 96.5 75.3 8.5

1992 21.1 1 .

1996 26.8 98.4 81.0 5.11

1992 23.4 97.8 83.0

IllIIV 1996 30.0 99.0 89.3 21.5

1992 28.0 98.4 88.8 23.6

1996 36.8 99.4 95.3 34.7

1992 43.1 99.4 96.7 41.1

V 1996 48.4 99.7 97.2 59.7

Survey,1992& 1996 Source:Household

This pattem of low participationon the part of the poor,even in a robustlygrowingeconomy,is one of many factors contributingto an overall lack of improvementin income distributionduring the 20 1990s, althoughpovertyincidence(basedon a povertyline of income under $2.60/day) has been

halvedto 23 percentduringthe period. To be fair, however,educationreformscannot be expected

analysesof SIMCEresultsby type of successive Accordingto the authors,one reasonwhy historically, is thattheywere biasedinterpretations, school haveshownwidelydifferentresults,leadingto ideologically Thefindings,theyargue,arehighlysensitiveto thedesignof thesampledueto thevariancein sample-based. schoolshave lowerachievescoresby typeof school,location,size,etc. In ruralareas,private-subsidized ones. mentsthanmunicipal 1987Economy: in a High-growth and IncomeDistribution 20 SeeVol.II, AnnexI, page16of "Chile-Poverty '9



Education Reformsin Chile, 1980-98

to have short-termimpacton such slow-changingeconomicindicatorsas incomedistribution.This maytake one or two generations. But given relativelyequal opportunitiesat the basic educationlevel,how are income inequalityand the gap in educationalattainmentperpetuatedin Chile? Severalfactors seem to be at play. First, the dropoutrate betweenbasic and secondaryeducationis high in the poorestincome quintile,as confirmedby the fact that %4 of youthfrom that group are not in secondaryschool. A secondfactor is trackingat the secondarylevel: in recentyears, the proportionof studentsopting for the "technical-professional'stream over the general academic stream has increased rapidly, from 27 percentin 1989 to 46 percent in 1998.The overwhelmingmajorityof these studentsare from lower-incomefamilies.The five areas of specializationin this track-commercial, industrial, technical,agriculturaland maritime -mphasize relab'velylow level skills and effectivelypreclude students from continuing into the more prestigious universities. De facto, these students are trackedinto low wage occupabonsor, for the 20 percentwho continueinto tertiary education,into second-ratetechnicaltrainingprograms. A third factor is the persistentlyhigher repetitionand dropout rates in secondary schoolsserving the lower income groups. The retenton rate for secondary educabtonis 89 percent in private schoolsbutonly 57 percentin municipalschools. It is interestingto note that, while in Chile publiceducationspending is better targeted than in most counbties(with 60 percentof the total going to the 40 percentneediestchildren,see Annex Table C), in practicethe impact may not be commensuratedue to a variety of cultural and administrative barriers.As for the Full School Day Reform,from an equity perspectiveit will have two contradictory effects: on the one hand it will benefit comparabvelymore children from poor socioeconomic backgrounds.On the other hand,with its investmentcost of US$1.5 billion and annual recurrent cost increase of over US$300 million,it is creatng additionalpressureon educationalspending. This is due to the need to build additionalfacilities,feed a larger numberof studentsat school, retrain and hire large numbersof teachers.


Bulgaria(1994195) Chile(1996) Colombia (1992) SouthAfrica(1994) Source: WorldBankDatabase

|Share of PoorestQuintile

Shareof RichestQuintile

21.00/o 6.5% 14.0% 35.0%


34.0% 23.0% 14.0%


Chapter 2

A Strong Suit Efficmencyu Under the military govemment,publicspendingfor educationdeclinedfrom 4.0 percentof GDP in 21 1981 to 2.6 percentin 1990. Despitethis, studentintake grew by 42 percent in highereducation , the secondary enrollmentratio increased by nearly 15 points, pre-school enrollmentsexpanded, and nearly all studentscompletedbasic education. Clearlythe numberof studentseducatedper unit of public spending increasedgreatly over this decade. But whether or not this constitutesincreased efficiencydepends upon what happenedto quality. The general assessmentis that on average qualityeither declined slightly or was stagnant. Thus, there are some grounds for concluding that the market-orientedreformsinitiatedby the militarygovemmentwere successfulin improvingthe efficiencyof publicspendingon education. Table 2.10: Public Spending per Pupil by Level of Education (in 1,000sof 1997 Pesos) Adult Secondary Special Preschool Basic Year 164 148 149 142 223 1983 118 117 134 131 190 1987 III 117 137 135 204 1990 77 1150 331 158 205 1992 102 249 515 241 290 1996 Division Budget&Planning MINEDUC, Source:

Higher 1,599 1,040 998 937 897

Part of the story is the mobilizationof privateeducationspending,especiallyin highereducation, where it funded most of the enrollmentexpansionin the 1980s(throughthe introductionof cost recovery and student loans at public universities). Between 1990 and 1997, private education spending increasedfurther(from 2 percentto 3.2 percentof GDP) mainlyin higher educationand also as private-subsidizedschoolswere permittedto seek financialcontributionsfrom parents under the sharedfinancingarrangement. However,while averagequalitymay have remainedstable in the 1980s, this was achievedat the cost of equity: the dispersionin SIMCE scores widened,as subsidizedprivate schoolsserving a better informed,better-offpopulationgrabbed the opportunitiesoffered by the capitationgrant system, while their municipalcounterpartsserving the most vulnerablechildren did not benefit from any compensatoryprograms. The resultingachievementgap is what led the democraticgovemmentsof the 1990s to re-orient prioritiestowards quality and equity. This commitment,combined with a fast growing economy, made it possible to more than double real public educationspending, which from 1990-97 rose from 2.6 percentto 3.4 percent of GDP. As documentedearlier,the programs supportedby these 21 And doubledbetween1982and 1994.


Education Reforms In Chile, 1980-98

funding increases have resulted in sustainedabsolute and relative quality improvements.The question is to what extent a different policy mix-a greater private sector role, more reliance on performanceincentives,more stringentstandards,narrower targeting-could have had more impact per dollar while still being politicallyfeasible? At the macro level, there are no good assessments of the cost-effectivenessof the systemto allowthe questionto be answeredwith accuracy. The most recentestimatesof rates of retum to educationin Chile are not surprisingfor an upper middle income country. They illustratethe importance,from an efficiencyas well as equity perspective,of (1) improvingthe quality of secondaryeducabonin general and the relevanceof secondary technical-professional educationto the skill requirementsof the modem labor market; and (2) ensuring that a higher proportionof youth (presently30 percent) reach tertiary educationto ameliorateincomedistributon,labor productivity,and longterm growth prospects.

Country Chile (1998)

Private ROR

Basic* Secondary Tertiary

5% 9% 20%

OECD(1994) Primary* Secondary Tertiary

n/a 12.4 12.3

Sources:University of Chile,OECD(1998) *Basiceducation in Chilespanseightyears,while'primay schoolinOECDlastssixyears.

School Choice: What Can We ConcludeFrom Chile's Experience? One of the most controversialpoliciesat the time of the militarygovemmentwas the introductionof school choice, based on the theory that competitionwould drive efficiency and quality gains. Evaluatingthe policy is complicatedby the fact that during the 1980s, its adoptioncoincided with the restructuringof the system and a fiscalcrisis, and that during the 1990s whatever positiveimpact competitioncould have on achievementwas enhancedby other inputs (materials,improved pedagogy,targeted interventons,sharedfinancing).What has worked or not, and why? To What Extent Has Competion Increased Quality? Studentachievementand other data from the 1980s-the only periodwhen 'pure" competitionaffects can be observed-show no evidencethat averageschoolqualityimproved,at any level of the education system. And basically stagnant average quality masked a growing leaming gap between studentsfrom the private-subsidizedand municipalsectors. Scoresimprovedfor the former, but for the latter experienceda continuousdecline. The gap has been steadily closingduring the



1990s,especiallydurng the second half of the decade, leadingmany to concludethat the source of progressis the combinedeffect of competition,increasedinvestmentand targetedprograms.22 Are Private-Subsidized Schools More Effective? Students in private-subsidizedschoolstest higherthan studentsin municipal-schools. However, researchshows that the studentswho attendprivate-subsidized schoolscome from higher-income and better-educatedfamilies. Espinolanotes that 70 percentof municipalschool studentscome from the two lowest-incomequintilesversus45 percentfor the private-subsidizedschools(see Table 2.12). This suggeststhat private-subsidizedschoolsare able to select studentsto a much greater extent than municipalschools can. Althoughall schoolsare legally required to admit all students,there is evidencethat both private-subsidizedschoolsand elite municipalschoolswhich 23 face excess demand practicescreening. Private-subsidizedschoolssince 1993 can ask for fi-

nancialcontributionsfrom families,which can createa barier for lower-incomestudents. Camoy& McEwan (1999)found that controllingfor studentbackground,studentsin (non-religious)privatesubsidizedschoolsperform no better on SIMCE tests than studentsin municipalschools. However, they also found that studentsin religious(Catholic)private-subsidizedschools performsignificantly better than students in both non-religiousprivate-subsidizedschools and municipal schools. Even after controllingfor student backgroundcharacterstcs, the Catholic schools'performanceedge diminishedbut did not disappear.






(lowest-scoringquinbile) 32.9 23.2 18.9

27.3 22.3 20.6

22.0 24.9 20.2

14.0 20.2 23.1








V (richest) % of schools

3.7 20.0

8.3 20.0

10.8 20.0

16.2 20.0

61.0 20.0

100 100

I (poorest) 11

(highest-scoringquintile) 3.8 | 9.4 17.2

I 100 100 100

Source: Fundaci6n Nacional paralaSuperad6n delaPobreza, 1996 data A recentstudyby the University of Chile(Bravo,Contreras& Sanhueza1999)usesPER(1982-84) and SIMCE(1988-97) resultsto analyze, inan equityperspective, thegapin studentleamingbetweensubsidized and privateschoolsfollowingtheintroduction of thecapitabon system.A numberof techniques areappliedto reduce(althoughnottotallyeliminate) someof theweaknesses linkedto thedesignof thesampleandthedifflicultyof thetestovertime. By analyzing thetestsscoreson a percentilebasis,thestudyfindsthat averages obscured hugedifferences, withsomeyearsshowingsimultaneously a risein theaveragescoreanda decline in thelowestscores.Inequityindicators worsened throughout the 1980sand startedimproving subsequently. Thedistribution of scoresshowa highconcentration of goodscoresin prvateschoolsgrowingovertimeas betterstudentshavemigratedthereand of poorscoresin publicschoolsbeingconstantovertme despitethis exodus.Inequityamongschoolstendedto increasein theeariyyearsof the periodandto dedinecontinuouslyin thelastyears,although thesetrendsarenotstatistically significant.Finally,theperformance gap betweenpublicand privateschoolsdiminishes whensocioeconomic and geographic factorsare takeninto account;inthe1990sit becomesinsignificant andinthesecondhalfofthe 1990s,negative. 22


Education Reforms in Chile, 1980-98

Are Private-SubsidizedSchoolsMore Efficient? The evidenceis mixed. This was probablythe case in the 1980s,when private-subsidizedschools had essentiallythe same per student resources(through the capitationgrant) as their municipal counterparts. Student-teacherratios in private-subsidizedschoolsare typically higherthan in municipalschools,for example,althoughthis is also due to the fact that relativelymore of the latterare located in rural areas where populationdensity is low. There has been littleanalysis of the extent to which spendingper studentin private-subsidizedschools has increasedas a result of the 1993 shared financing reform (allowing parental financial contributionsto private-subsidizedschools, which are only partiallyoffset by reductionsin the capitationgrant). In 1999 parentalcontributions were equivalentto 37 percentof the amount of the grant. This kind of spending differential,coupled with evidenceof a moreadvantageousstudentpopulation,could imply that private-subsidized schoolsare actuallyless efficientthan municipalschoolsin absoluteterms. However,they would still representa moreefficientuse of publiceducationresources.

Typeof School FullyPrivate Private-Subsidized* Municipal

Per Student Cost (Pesos)

110,500(average) U to 48,000 26.000**(average)

Source:P. Gonzalez, inUNDP'20/20," 1999 *Anestimated1350private-subsidized schoolsor 15percentof the subsidized sectormobilizeadditional fundingfrom parents(1999) Brokendownas follows:capitation grant=20,000 pesos;otherpublicexpenditures=6,000 pesos.Theexchangerate in 1998wasuS$1=460pesos

Mizala and Romaguerodistinguish between the concepts of allocative and technical efficiency. Their studies concludethat private-subsidizedschools have greater allocative efficiency because they are not subject to the lack of control over staffing issues and the option of deficit financinginherent to the municipal education management and financial system. The private-subsidized schools also have higher technical efficiency, i.e., given comparable inputs, they also achieve slightly better results. How exactlyand why (school leadership,student/teacherratio, more interaction with parents,moretesting,etc.), though, is still a subjectof speculationand an agenda item for research. Has PrivatizationEased the Pressureon GovemmentResources? Yes. This was clearlythe case duringthe fiscal crisis of the 1980s,when public spendingon education declinedsharply. It is also true in the 1990s,when privateeducationfunding (as a shareof

Gaud(1998)foundthat 28percentof studentsin thesubsidized sectorof Santiagohadtakenteststo be admittedintheircurrentschools.Fees,lackoftransparency inenrollmentprocedures, in-school rulesandthe costof uniformsaredefactoscreening devices. 23 V.


Chapter 2

GDP) continued to grow, even though public spending on the sector increased (as a share of GDP) as a result of a strongly performingeconomy and govemment commitment to education. Chile's education policies,which have successfullymobilized considerableprivate investmentin human capitalformation,have clearlymadeit possiblefor the countryto achievemore in education per unit of publicexpenditure. This should not be construedas a policy recommendationto deliberatelyreduce public fundingin order to stimulate increasedprivate financing. Basic education is fundamentallya public good which in all countries is largely financedout of public resources, whoever actually providesthe service.

WhatCriteriaHaveGuidedParents'Choice? The theory underlyingschool choice models is that informedparentswill make rationaldecisions betweencompetingpublic/privateschoolsbasedon qualityas measured by achievementscores. The reality in Chile hasdivergedfrom this theory in at leastthree importantrespects. First,in practice, objective student achievementinformationhas not always been availableto guide parents' choice. For most of the 1980s,studentachievementscores were not reported by school or made publiclyavailable. Second,as has been pointedout by many critics,in many (and especiallyrural) 24

areas, low populationdensity effecfivelyprecludesa choice of schools.

And third, even in areas

where parentsfaced a diversityof schools, surveysand focus group studies have found that factors such as schoolstatus, peereffects,or "frills"notdirectly linkedto teachingquality, but perhaps suggestingan environmentricher in social capitaland potentiallyhigherachieving peers, have influenced parents' decisions.(Camoy & McEwan 1999; Gaud 1998). This does not necessarily mean that parentshave madea "bad"choice,given the constraintsthey face. But it does suggest that the most rationalbasisfor a parent'schoiceof school-school productivity(or a school'sability to produceimprovementsin studenttest scores per unit of cost) or "value added"--may not always predominate.

Has CompetitonIncreasedEducaVonalChoiceand Diversity? In Chile the evidencesuggeststhat marketizationof educationduringthe 1980s did not serve the rural areas, the poor or groupswith specialneeds. Nor, interestingly,does marketizafionseem to have stimulated significant innovationin educationdelivery. Initiatives such as "schools for the arts" or secondarymagnetschools(the 'Montegrande" program)have come from the govemment duringthe 1990s,not the subsidizedprivatesector. Many analystshave notedthat schools'efforts

couldputlow-performing However,thechoicetheoristsarguethat this is a designissue,as govemment munidpalschoolsupfor bidsby NGOsor entrepreneurs. 24


EducationRefoms In Chile, 1980-98

to differentiatethemselvesand developmarketnichesconcentrateheavilyon cosmetic,ratherthan substantve,factors. Private-subsidized schoolsappearkeenlyaware of parentalpreferencesfor a traditionaltype of educationand such visiblefactorsas an Englishname or uniforms.Gaud (1998) notes that private-subsidizedschoolsare in many ways more similarto municipalthan to fully private schools, becausethe constraintsare culturaland institutional,not just bureaucratic. Can Chile'sSchoolChoiceModelbe Replicated? As pointed out by Winkler and Rounds (1993), a numberof conditionsfacilitatedthe intrbduction of schoolchoicein Chile. To what extent would they be found elsewhere? First,the countryhad a tradibonof public supportto privateschools(dabngback to the 1950s);although this is a relatively common situationworldwide. Second,the policy was designedand implementedin an authoritarian settingthat did not permitpoliticalopposition. The suggeston that it could not be emulatedin a democrabccontext is belied by examplesof countriessuch as Colombia,the Netherlandsor New Zealand, but bome out by the difficultiesexperiencedby Mexico as it seeks to introduce market reforms into higher education. Third, local managerialcapacity was comparatvely better than in most other industrializingnations. Finally, the country enjoyed a low incidence of corrupbon,a relativelystrongaudit capacity and good statsticaland assessmentsystems. In summary,the Chileancase confirmsthe experiencein other countries that while competitionis healthy and can promote increasesin efficiency, in and of itself it will not necessarily increase quality or equity. For these goals, complementaryinstruments(or incentives)designed to change classroom practicesand focus ressourceson the most vulnerableare needed. Furtherimproving the vouchersystem could help. Butexclusiverelianceon a marketapproach is unlikelyto work. Insfftutional Modernization: The Oft-Postponed Challenge Although President Frei launched a 'reinventng govemmenf inibatve in 1995, due to more pressingprioritiesand a lack of politcal readiness,the modemizationof educabonalinstitutionshas repeatedlybeen postponed. TheDecentralizatfonAgenda:A Matterof Alignment Comparedto many countries,the Chileandecentralizationprocesscould be considereda success. The introductionof Regionaland MunicipalPlansis a case in point. However,the sophistcabonof the FSD reformcallsfor moresmoothlyfunctioninglocal institutions. One of the issuesis a persistentdeficit in municipaleducabonbudgets,a sourceof frction with the central govemment It can be attributedto three factors:an inadequateanalysisof the fiscal and skills requirementsof decentralizationin 1980; insufficientattention to the developmentof local


Chapter 2

leadershipand managementcapacity,as trainingwas suspendedin the 1980s and concentrated on pedagogy in the 1990s; and the expenditureincreasestriggered by the Teacher Statute in 1991. A second issue is that the "municipalization"process of the early 1980s also created for the schoolsa split govemance structure,which has been a source of inefficiencyand of confusion. Roles and responsibilitieswere not alwaysclearlydefined,resultingin administrativeduplicationas well as 'empy' layers. Finally, the educationaldecentralizationprocesshas been describedas incompleteor asymmetrical. It was stoppedat the municipallevel in 1980,25and the decision-makingpowerstransferredto the schoolsduring the 1990s are concentratedin the cunicularand pedagogicalspheres. Teachers are managed by municipalgovemmentsand only a tiny percentageof mayors has agreed to delegate financial managementto schools as authorized by law. Indeed, repeated quality initiatives26 proposedby MINEDUCwhich requireschool-levelflexibilityhave been frustratedby the resistance of local govemmentsto "letfinggo," by the weak capacity of school directors,and the failure to managethe teachingforce. Qualityis a holisticconcept,and the splitgovemanceas well as the lack of opportunitiesfor integratingmanagerialand pedagogicalconcems may limit the scope for full school renewaland slowdown the emergenceof a classof modem schoolmanagers. Institutional Fragmentation: From Walls to Bridges The use of the projectformat to un-bundlemanageriallycomplex tasks, 'silo thinking"reflectinga hierarchicaltradition,and strong program identity,reinforcedby the lack of a common language betweendifferentprofessionalgroups,all have contributedto the existenceof a compartmentalized educationsystem and ministry.This has been at odds with the team-and network-based,crossdisciplinaryand participatoryapproachesadvocatedin the 1990s.Overcomingthese cultural barniers became criticalwfth the need to create synergybetweenthe many, old and new, components of the all-encompassingFSD reformin 1996. Weak Informaton, Communicatfon and Paflcipation Until recentlythis fragmentationwas exacerbatedby a poor flow of information,both intemal and extemal.SIMCE scoresonly became publicin 1995. It took many monthsfor the messagesof the 1996 reformto be communicatedclearly in terms of the societalchangesannouncedin the Brun-


of the schoolsystemwas a transitorysteptowardsfull the municipalization Forthe militarygovemment,


levelextracurricular of secondary andtheoperation of resourcecenters Examplesindudetheestablishment acfivities.


Education Refonnsin Chile, 1980-98

ner Report.The design of the FSD reform, emphasizingthe substantive,was based on expert inputs and the concept of participationremained"front-end"i.e., formalisticand controlled unti the 1997 consultaYonon secondaryeducationcuriculum. Today there is growingconcem that under radical interpretationsof the "Freedomof Education"concept by privateproviders,school admission and operatingrules are hardly transparentand children's"Right to Educaton" is not enforced forcefullyenough. Informationavailabilityremains asymmetricalbetween schools and parents. Most observersagree that these deficienciesunnecessarilyslowed down inital publicembrace of the FSD reformand its impact. "Soft" QualityAssuranceand AccountabilityMechanisms Chile alreadyhas, or is in the processof establishing,most of the elements of a quality assurance framework: national curriculum, universal student assessment, educational statistics, EMIS, teaching standards, accreditationprograms, growing use of client surveys. The on-going challenge is to move from the concept of educational'accounting"-reporting

assessment results,

complyingwith rules-to a culture of educabonal"accountability"in which all stakeholdersproactvely keep their eyes on the goal, systematicallycross multiplesources of information,focus on intra as well as inter-schooldifferences,demandimprovement(in the case of parents) and take action to that effect (teachers).At both ends of the politicalspectrum,there is stil nostalgiaand fingerpointing.A culturethat celebrateand rewards successes is already in place but there is room for increasingthe "demandingness"of the system.


How Do Chilean Educational Reforms Compare With Those of Other Countries? to datein Chilein a broaderintemational Thissectionlooksat theeducationreformsimplemented financing;and (ii) decentralicontext,focusingon two policyclusters:(i) choiceanddemand-side 27 zabonandaccountability.

Chdice and Demandcle


and Chileare the only two nationsin the The Netherdands Universalvs. TargetedCoverage: worldwith a universalcapitationgrantsystem,i.e.,applyingto allstudentsandto publicas wellas privateschools.As in Chile,in the Dutchsystempublicandprivateschoolsaregovemment-funded on an equalfooting.Theroleof theprivatesectorin Hollandis moreextensivethanin Chile,with 70 percentof theschoolsprivatelyadministered. financingsystemsin existenceacrossthe worldare limitedin scope,usually All otherdemand-side targetedto poorchildren,groupswithspecialneedsor differentatedby typeof school.In the U.S., for instance,the numberof childrenin voucherprogramsamountto only0.1 percentof the total (0.5 percentif charterschools,anothermarketapproachto education,are included),although thereis growinginterestin bothof theseapproacheson the partof innercity parents.The two Program (Ohio)Scholarship publiclyfundedvoucherexperiments-theCleveland best-researched students.Thiswas alsothe case scheme-focuson low-income and the Milwaukee(Wisconsin) educabonvoucherprogram(sincedisbanded).Othertargetedpopulaof Colombia'ssecondary tons havebeengirls,especiallyin ruralareas(e.g.,Pakistan),particularethnicgroups(e.g.,Mexin Spain. agegroupssuchas pre-schoolers ico),orvulnerable schools(i.e.,paIn NewZealandcapitationfundingis availableto publicschoolsand"integrated" teacherqualificastandardsregardingthe curriculum, rochialschoolsthatcomplywith govemment to 30ReviewOffice,etc.) Fundingequivalent inspection by the Educabon tionsandremunerabon, 40 percentof the capitationamountis availableto elite,strictlyprivateschoolswhoalso agreeto


EducationReformsin Chile, 1980-98

some degree of compliance.Schools that refuseto apply the nationalcurriculumare not eligible. An interestingfeature of the New Zealandfunding formula is that the capitationamount a school gets is adjustedfor the averagesocioeconomicstatus of studentsin that geographicarea. Manyother OECD countriesprovidefundingassistanceto privateschools,but this is usuallyunder contractualarrangementsrather than as an automatic capitationgrant. These include Australia and Canada,Englandand France,Japanand Poland. Payment to ParentsRather Than Schools: This is, in theory, the differencebetweena voucher and a capitationgrant system. A voucher, being portable,offers more flexibilityto recipientfami-

lies. In practice,underbothmodelsthefundsareusuallypaidto the schools,exceptin the caseof scholarshipsdesignedto keep childrenin school(Brazilfor poor children,Indonesiafor junior secondary students,Moroccoand Mozambiquefor girls). Sweden is one of the few known cases of grants to families rather than to schools at the basic education level. There, in principlethe money follows the student, although the degree of enactment varies from one municipalityto the next. In the municipalityof Nacka, for instance, parents are providedwith a voucherto be handed over to the school of their choice and with a directoryof each school'slocation,aims, pedagogy,organization,and opportunitiesfor participationin the decision-makingprocess.Schools compete proactivelyfor clients, especiallyas the voucher has to be renewedat regularintervals. If Chile wishes to move in the directionof greater differentiationin the amount of the capitation grant basedon students'socioeconomiclevels,a relevant model might be New Zealand. The targeting of schools in that country is based on a grid crossing Census and Intemal Revenuedata (not data generatedby the educationsystem)and taking into account family income, ethnic characteristics,and otherquality of life variables.Schoolsare classifiedon the basis of where the average numberof inhabitantsin their geographicarea fall in this decile index, irrespectiveof the actual studentpopulationmakeup in the school. The ratingsremain fixed for the entire intercensalperiod. While the targetingis not perfect(a high-incomechild could attenda low decileschool and bring to that school a high capitationgrant),the reportingis fairly accuratebecauseit is based on data collected for purposes other than determiningeligibilityfor education grants. Transactioncosts are low, as are the risks of informationdistortion,and the system is transparentbecausethe unit value of the grant is clear and stable for a numberof years.


Edge& Jantzi(1999);andOECD(1993). Basedmainlyon Patrinos(2000);Leithwood,


Chapter 3

StudentSelecton Process: Onecriticismof the Chileanchoice model is that 'private subsidized schoolshave improvedtheir scoresby selectingbetterstudentsratherthan by changingtheir practices" and that 'it is the schools,ratherthan the parents,who can choose." This has contributedto a "rightto education"problemfor childrenfrom lower socioeconomicstatus,who may not be able to meet a desired school's test standards. The Milwaukeescheme has addressed this equity challengeby providingthat if a school is oversubscribed,studentswill be randomlyselectedfrom the applicants.If it is not oversubscribed,the subsidizedschoolis requiredto accept all who apply, with only minimum exclusions.In recent tests, voucher students in Milwaukee scored 11 points higherin mathematicsthan their counterpartsin urbanpublicschools. School Eligibility Cdteria: Some countries regulate access to their demand-sidefinancing schemesby type of schools: in Scotland,for instance,studentscan choose only betweenpublic schools, while in some UnitedStates,the choiceprogramis restrictedto public and non-sectarian schools. Other nations,like Chile,establishcriteriaand supportany school meetingthem, regardless of their religiousorientation.This is the case for Australia,for Denmark-where two-thirdsof the studentsare in privateschools-the Netherlandsand NewZealand. Consequencesof Under-perfonnance:One argumentin favorof marketizationis that, in theory, failing schools, like firms, will not be allowed to continueoperating. Some nations have taken strong measuresto that effect. In England,the local councilsput failing schools up for bids by the private sector. In the Netherlands,emphasisis on a 2-3 year "accompaniment"of the corrective process.In the US, 31 States have sanctionprovisionsin effect academicallybankruptschoolsor districts first receive technicalassistanceand on-site monitors or conservators.If they fail to improve,they may be taken over by the State authorities,lose their local govemance,or face closure or "reconstitution"with new directors,new faculty, reassignedstudents,and financial penalty.The impactof these measuresover the short and mediumterm is a hotlydebatedtopic.


and AccountaWlity

While educationaldecision-makingis some times decentralizedfor ambiguousor non educationrelatedreasons e.g., fiscalcrisisin the centralgovemmentor powerconsolidation-many nations with centralizedsystems have moved in this directionbecauseit is recognizedthat decisionsthat are "owned" by the stakeholderswill be better implemented. Experiencesuggeststhat devolution (the transfer of decision-makingpower to lower levels of govemments)works marginally better than deconcentration(transferringthese decisionsto local units of the education ministry).As we have seen,the Chileandecentralizationcontainselementsof both.


EducationReformsin Chile,1980-98

Locus of Decision-making. In Chile, the managementof schools,their financialresourcesand personnel,is vested in municipalgovemments.Schools have curricularand pedagogicalautonomy; as seen before,by lawthey can also be delegatedthe right to managetheir budget,but very few mayorshave taken that step. Many,includingin the ChileanMINEDUC,feel that decentralization is incomplete. By comparison,in 1991,out of 14 nationssurveyedby OECD, Irelandand New Zealandwere by far the most decentralizedsystems,with three-fourthof the decisionsmade at school level (salary decisionsand standardsremaina centralresponsibility).In four Nordicnationsand threefederative countries(includingthe U.S.), three-fourthof decisionswere made either at the schoolor the intemmediate level. The intermediaryand national levels still played an important role in countries such as Spain and France.The intermediarylevels had no role in Portugal butwere the key players in Switzerland.In most countries,private schools enjoyed a much higher level of decisionmakingthan publicschools. School-based Management School-basedmanagementis the most radical form of decentralization, when a majorityof decisionsin all traditionalareas-govemance and choice, finance,currculum and pedagogy,resourcemanagementand can be made by and in the school. As can be seen from the table below, Chile's model is less decentralizedthat those of many other natons/regions.A similar LAC table would show that severalother nations (e.g., El Salvador,Minas Gerais in Brazil, Nicaragua)enjoy similar higher degrees of school-leveldecision-makingpower than in Chile. Decentralizationand marketapproachesplacegreaterskill requirementson administrators,school managersand teachersand assumescertainconditionswhich are not always present in less developednations.For instance,givingschoolstheir own budgetto purchasetechnicalassistancein replacementof the old inspectionservice,as done in Australia,New Zealandand the UnitedKingdom assumesto existenceof providers. Chile is closer to that situationthan most less-developed countries. Additionally,the impact of school-basedmanagementon student leaming has been shown-at least in the United States-to dependon the degree to which staff decisions are explicitlymotivated by a searchfor studentleamingimprovementand not mainlyby other goalssuch as teacher welfare.


Chapter 3


*Govemance -Schoolcouncilselected -Coundisselectschooldirector *Choice -Parentsselectschool -Schoolsetsadmission re-

Country Chile


The NewZealand U.S. Chicago Nethedands






i X

** _

if* X






i X*

i i



i i

i if



i V



*Finance -Fundingfollowsstudents *Pedagogy -Setthenon-corecurriculum -Choosepedagogical approach *Resourcemanagement -Developschoolimprovement plan -Allocatenon-personnel budget -Selectionof textbooks


*Pelsonnelmanagement -Hireandfireschooldirector K X -Hireandfireteachers X -Setteachersalaryscale -Assignteacherresponsibilities V -Schoolspurchase professional development

.Infomiaton -Independent publicauditor inspection -Publictestscores -Publicmeasureof valueadded

*Incentives job securitylinkedto -Director studentperformance -Teacher job affectedby stu-




i i

i i

i i










i K/ X




i _





i i


i i



dent performance Source:VariousLACSHD documents Legend: /- yes;x - no;- notapplicable *Authorzedby lawbutseldomdoneinpradice "Amongpublicschoolsonly -Fundingfbrmulatakesintoaccount thenumberofstudents ****Among publicandprivateschools fortheNetherands, NewZealand andChicago

Decentralization and Accountability. Unless school autonomy is balancedwith accountability, there is a risk that schools may be complacentand/or serve the goals of the communityonly and not those of the natiop as well. Furthermore,with global competitionand the concem for efficiency in the use of tax money,accountabilityis likely to endure. The Chileanschool model, perhapsbecause the powers it gives to the schools are moderate,does not make full use of accountability mechanismsintroducedin otherparts of theworld.


Educaffion Refonrs in Chile, 1980-98

Advancedforms of school-basedmanagementcan be found in Australia and New Zealand under the name of 'new managerialism"which combinesit with deregulationand delegation.These reforms emphasizea shift from processto outputcontrols,managementand institutionaldesign,and organizationaldifferentiaffonof schools. School directorsare accountableto the authoritiesfor efficientlymeetingthe goalsagreedwiththe schoolboard of trustees. Market Approachesto Accountability. Chile was a pioneer in breakingthe monopolyof public schools by introducingcompetitionfrom the private sector,opening boundariesacross municipal systems, alteringthe fundingsystem, publishingschool results; in 1996 it also introducedthe concept of magnet schools through the "Montegrande"projectwhich funds on a competitive basis secondaryschools with a particular innovativepedagogicalor managerial"theme." A number of countries (Australia, England and the Netherlands,Canada,the US, New Zealand and parts of Asia) have gone furtherin encouraginga diversificationof the supply of schoolingservices through the creation of charter schools, academies and other specialized educationalfacilites. In these schools, the "customer' determines what the informaton should be. For instance, charter schools-public schools which are freed from certainregulabonsagainst a commitmentto deliver agreed results-may well emphasizespecific values as part of their promise of deliveringquality outcomes.This has the advantageof "pullingtogether' the participabngcommunities. ProfessionalAccountabilityand the StandardsMovement Another strong reform movement believesthat teachersand schooladministratorsare key to the improvementof school outcomes. The thrust of it is that the authoritiesagree to lessen regulationson teachingwhile the profession agrees to tighterqualitycontrol of teachercompetenceat entry throughthe accreditabonof teacher procedures,and voluntaryadvancedcertificapreparabonprograms,rigorouslicensing/certificabon ton for experiencedteachers.Thus, teachersdefinethe meaning of quality and take responsibility for ensuring it as befitsa modem professionalassociation. This movementis particularlyrobustin countriessuch as Australiaand the US, where the teachingprofessionhas reacheda level of maturity not yet present in Chile. While these reforms are close to those of Chile in the 1990s in the emphasis they place on teachers, the initiative in Chile was taken by the govemment,while the Union remained traditional in its corporabstposture. This has begun to change lately, although MINEDUChas remainedin the lead role, involvingthe Union in the definitionof teachingstandards with Australiantechnicalassistance. TheManagementApproach. Found in Englandas well as other parts of the world such as some U.S. states or Canadian provinces, this approach focuses less on structural changes than on value-added,on makingschoolsmorestrategicin their goalsand more data-drivenin the meansto reach them. The tools used are controls:control of inputs such as teacher competenciesand the



(national)curiculum; controlof processesthrough programspecifications,performanceappraisal systems, merit-pay and a variety of planningstrategies;control of outputsthrough the setting of studentstandardsand testingto ensureconsistencyacrossor withinjurisdiction.School inspection by autonomousbodies as found in the United Kingdom,Scotlandand New Zealand representattempts at controlling/monitoringall three dimensions,based on multiple indicators. In England, standardsand accountabilityare foundat every level of the system, and accountabilityis based on parentalempowermentand "whole school' inspections. Some reformersin Chileare advocatingsimilar approaches,althoughback home they have been surroundedby controversy.Mobilizingparentsas "watchdogs' on school govemance boards has been difficultin England;in Chile, while feasible,for the historicalreasons mentionedearly in this report, it would require a determinedand sustainedeffort. As for extemal inspecffons,although recognizedas bracing,they have been criticizedas being too cut off from the realityof schools. In Englandone finds a strikingcontrast betweenthe dynamism of the reform movementand teachers' low morale and level of anxiety; this can be tracedto the blame placed on teachers by the Thatcher govemmentand concurrentimage deterioration,the rapid changes in the teachers' culture where autonomyhas been replaced by accountabilityand reform overload. Not unlike the democraticgovemmentsof Chile,the BlairAdministrationis trying to preservethe positiveaspects of the previousadministrafionwhile regainingthe trust of the profession.


K Lessons from the Chilean Experience

Successe andopadoptedby Chilein the 1980sand 1990swere philosophically Theeducationstrategies amongdeveloperationallyverydfferent. However,all haveeamedChilethe labelof "innovator" countriesin the areasof educationfinance,managementand pedagogy. ing and industrialized Thecumulative thecountryfollowedan unusualstrategyof changewithincontinuity. Furthermore, andmostambitiousreformsequenceshasgenerated impactof one of theworld'slongest-running someof the keylessonsothercountries foodforthought.Thissectionsummarizes considerable canderivefromChile'sexperience. Lesson1: PolicycontinuityInthe pursuitof core educationgoals paysoff buildon previous abilityto reassessandcontinuously an impressive Chilehasdemonstrated launchedrefbrmsthatcharacterizes of previously policies,in contrastto thewholesalerepudiation *

in mostothercountries. changesof govemment Duringthe pastdecade,therehasbeena highdegreeof stabilityin the educationtechnical administrations. teamacrossthetwodemocratic *

educationministershavesteadilypursuedthecoregoalsof quality,equityandef* Successive datato assessprogressobjectively. ficiency,usingevaluation the educationagendawiththe coremacEducationministersalsohavebeenableto integrate policyagendaandto gainnationalpoliticalsupportfor increasesin educationspendroeconomic *

ing progressis the counto Chile'seducational factorwhichalsohas contributed An exogenous from 1987-97,with real per capitaincome perfommance try's strongfiscaland macroeconomic growthaveraging7 percentperyear. Thisallowedthegovemmentto undertakecostly,long-term *


EducationReforms In Chile, 1980-98

investments in humancapitalformationandto maintain thiscommitment evenwhenclimatevagariesandtheAsiancrisisof 1997putpressureon fiscalresources. * Finally,in partbecauseof the progressit hasbeenableto demonstrate, the educationsector alsohas enjoyedhighlyvisiblepoliticalsupportfrom boththe presidencyand the Ministryof Financethroughout the 1990s:in the publicdiscourse, in theflowof resources, in dailyeventsshowcasingeducation andin weeklyvisitsto the mosthumbleschools. Lesson 2: Structural refonns of system govemance-school choice and decentralization-are not enough *

Chile'sboldstructuralreformof educationsystemgovemancein the 1980sconstitutesthe

longest-running and largest-scale test of a capitationgrantor vouchersystemyet implemented anywherein the world. Althoughthe politicalcontextfor thisexperimentis clearlynottransferable to othercountries,Chile'sexperience with demand-side financingof publicand privatelymanaged schoolsdoespermitsomecautiousconclusions: *

The introduction of schoolchoiceappearsto havepositivelystimulatedsystemefficiency (averagestudentleamingachievement overthe decadewas stable,despitea sharpdrop in unitcosts)and parentalsatisfaction (some30 percentof studentsexercisedchoiceand shiftedfrommunicipalto privatesubsidized schoolsoverthedecade).


It is impossible to saywhetherschoolchoicein andof itselfis veryeffectivein stimulatng improvements in schoolquality,becauseit is difficultto extrapolatewhatmighthavehappenedto averageschoolqualityand studentleamingoutcomesin Chileif govemment spendingon primaryandsecondary educationhadnotdeclinedprecipitously followingthe 1981reform.Thereis interesting evidencefromsurveys,however,thatfactorsotherthan studentachievement influence(or distort)parents'choiceof schools. Thissuggeststhat the compebitve pressuresgeneratedby a choicesystemmaynot necessarily maximize schoolacademicquality.Thisisa cruciallyimportant areaforfurtherresearch.


In the absenceof compensatory actions,schoolchoicesystemscanadverselyaffectequity,becausechoiceis notuniversally availabledefacto. Chileanparents,especiallyin rural areas(wherethe population densitywas too low to makemultipleschoolseconomicallyviable),oftenhadno real altemative to municipalschools,evenif thesewereunderperforming.


The legalsystemwas well establishedin Chile,and corruptionwas low. Govemment auditcapacitywas strong.Thesearenecessary conditions for successin implementing a capitationfundingsystem.



Lesson 3: Quality requires an explicit focus on the 9nner workings" of schoois *

Chile's experiencesuggests that govemancereforms can create stronger incentivesfor effi-

ciency and quality, but marketforces alone maytake some time to produceactual improvements, particularlyin system quality,and may never be sufficientin the case of vulnerablegroups. Complementarypoliciesand programsexplicitlyfocusedon the inner workingsof schoolsand playeda key role in stmulating more rapid and evenlydistributedimprovementsin school quality and student leamingin Chile. *

The micro changestrategyinitated in 1990focusedon the 'black box" of the classroom. Key

elementshave been: *

Systematc effortsto break teachers' isolabonand promote professionalexchangesand reflectionon practicethroughthe creaton of a variety of teacher networks. Chile has been notablysuccessfulin assistng teachersfrom differentschools to work together,especiallyin remoteruralareas


Programsto stmulate schoolpersonnelto work as a team to diagnosetheir problemsand identify possible solutions, such as the competitivelyfunded school improvement tests of studentleamprojects(PME),regular school-levelfeedback on standardized ing achievement (SIMCE), and whole-schoolevaluabonsand performance awards (SNED)


High-quality,continuousprofessionaldevelopmentopportunitiesfor teachers,designed by the ministry in collaborabonwith local universities,emphasizinga child-centeredapproach ("every studentcan leam"),encouragementof self-pacedleamingand higher order thinkingamongstudents,and the use of diversifiedteachingstrategies


Attentionto schools'capacity to absorbchange, reflected in such things as the shift over tme from direct provision of classroom materials to schools' independentselection of books from a ministry-approvedcatalogue,combininga needs-basedapproach with lowcost, centralizedbulk purchase. The 1996extensionof the schoolday is anotherexample of graduallyincreasingexpectationsbeing placedon the school system, as capacity improved.


Virtuallyall of the major programsdesignedby Chileaneducaton authoritiesin the 1990sare

in line with-and in some cases anticipated-education researchfindings from OECD counbies over the past decade. Similar approachesfocused on the "instructionalcore,"relationswithin the


Education Refomis in Chile, 1980-98

school, and the school's links with its communityare now being adopted in many other places. Chile's story providessome evidencethat the best way to generatequality is through a combination of adequate inputs and professionalleamingcommunities,organizedaround shared goalsto improvestudentlearning,differentiateteachingstrategiesand increaseaccountability.

Lesson 4: Welltargeted *

programs can Improve equity

Bearing in mind the limitationsof SIMCE, Chile's progressin closing the achievementgaps

between municipaland private subsidized,and between urban and rural schools in a relatively short space of years in the 1990sholds importantlessonsfor other countries. Most analysts credit the early introductionof programstailoredto the special needsof particularvulnerablegroups:formal and informalearly childhoodand pre-schoolprograms,MECE-Ruralfor multi-gradeschoolsin isolated ruralareas, P-900 for at-risk schools,and specialeducation,where real spending per child more than quadrupled.


These programs,which are complementedby free meals and snacks for poor childrento en-

hance readiness-to-leam,are holistic, seeking to provide the key ingredientsof quality: specially designed materials, pedagogicalpracticesemphasizingaKtentionto diversity, teacher networks, linkages to the community,and intensive,focusedsystem supportthroughspeciallytrained supervisors.They even includespecificactivitiesto compensatefor a culturallydeprivedenvironment. *

In the better-offprivate subsidizedschools which charge fees, scholarshipfunds were intro-

duced to mitigatesocial segmentation.


Although the agenda is far from completed,due to deep cultural barriers,administrativeand

social rigidities,the Chilean model of "positivediscrimination"ranks among the more thorough to date in the developingworld.

Lesson 5: Using student asessment increases program effectiveness *

and evaluation data to guide policymaking

Chile is exemplaryin the developingworid in the priorityeducation authoritieshave given to

regular, standardizedstudent assessment as a source of feedback on system performance. SIMCE has been used as a tool to track and correct gaps in leaming betweendifferentgroups or regions. It has played the role of a compass in the open and flexible approach to reform adopted duringthe 1990s and has become even more criticalto strengthenaccountabilityin the contextof the ambitious1996 Full School Day reform.


Chapter 4


The SIMCE has been continuouslyrefined. Its limitabonsin an increasinglycompetitiveand

complex environmentare recognizedby the Chilean authoribes. The SIMCE is presentlyunder review again, includingthe sensitiveoutsourcingoption. Its results are public, they allow interschoolcomparisonsas well as intra-schoolimprovement,and weigh heavily in the SNED system of merit awardsto schools.The countryalso participatedin the follow-upround of the Third InternabonalMaths & Science Study (TIMSS) and the UNESCO/OREALCstudy of leaming achievement across LatinAmerica,for benchmarkingpurposes. *

To complementthe SIMCE the govemmentregularlycommissionshigh qualityevaluations,

conductedby the most prestigiousnabonaluniversitiesand built into every program. Initally they were mainlyon a summativebasis,but more recentlythe ministryhas come to recognizethe advantagesof formativeevaluationsas inputs for mid-termprogramcorrections. *

This is well illustratedby the SNED, a system of biannualawards to the best performing

schools,which was subjectedto an in-depthevaluationafter each of its first rounds,in 1996 and 1998. The evaluationsgeneratedvaluableguidancefor the nextround. As a result,Chilecan now boast one of the most promisingperformancereward systems in the world: one that is based on fair competition,encouragesteamworkamongteachers,and servesas an incentivefor behaviors the reformwantsto promote,such as ensuringmoreequal leamingopportunitiesfor students. *

The SNED has been gainingacceptance,demonstrabnghow even as controversialan ap-

proachas merit awardsto schoolscan have an impacton outcomesif its design and implementation are systematcallyinformedby qualitynabonaland intemationaldata.

Lesson 6: Rethinking public and private roles can expand and help optimze Investment in education *

Chilehas gone fartherthan perhapsany countryin the worldto redefinethe roles of state and

market in education. The radicalstep taken by the militarygovemmentin 1981 to separatethe financingfrom the provisionof basic educationis uniqueamong developingnations (and only the Netherlandsamong OECD countrieshas a similarnationwidesystem of school choice). The impactthat these policieshave had on system efficiencywas discussedabove. A second majorimpact of Chile's"marketization"of education-particularlyin highereducation-is the mobilizationof substantiallyincreasedprivateresourcesfor educabon. *

Fees introducedin public highereducation in 1982 (accompaniedby means-testedstudent

loans) and the policyallowingsubsidizedprivateschoolsat the primaryand secondarylevelssince 1993to charge fees, have expandedtotal educationfinancingby tappingthe willingnessto pay of the better-off. The conbibutonof the privatesectorto educationfinance as a share of GDP today


EducationRefomis In Chile, 1980-98

is virtuallyequal to that of the govemment(3.2 vs. 3.4 percentof GDP), and sums to a very high (6.7 percentof GDP) level of total educabonspendingby intematonal standards(the average for middle-incomecountriesin LAC is 3 percentof GDP). Few analystsbelieve Chile's total education spendingwould be as high today in a publiclydominatedsystem. *

Chile's separationof educationfinance from provisionhas not meantan abdication-or even

diminution-of govemment responsibilitiesin education, however. Quite the contrary: much of Chile's success reflects an effective combinabonof state and private forces. The Ministry of Educaton plays a strong role in quality assurance and protectingthe vulnerable. It does this throughstewardshipof the nationalcurriculum(70 percentnabonal,with 30 percent local variation); ensuring ongoing assessment,evaluationand research;fundingtargeted programsto redress inequities;supportingteacher standards,certificaton and professionaldevelopment;and managing special programs to stimulate quality. The ministry does not hesitate to use centralized approacheswhen these offer significanteconomiesof scale, as in the purchase of high-qualitytextbooks, which has pushed down the unit cost to US$3 and continuouslyraised publishers' standards; or in the negotabonof specialrates with the Telecom system and of computer donations from the private sector for the ENLACES program,against a ministerialcommitment to provide software,trainingand maintenance.


One of the most importantlessons from Chile is that ideologicalsolubonsfrom either end of

the political spectrum are less effective in dealing with the complex challengesof quality, equity, and efficiencyin educaton than a willingnessto mix and redefinethe roles of the state and market in innovativeand pragmatc ways.

Unfinished Agenda Chile's reform experiencesof the last two decadesmerit widespreadattention,as there is much that othercountriescan leam. But Chileanauthoritiesand educationresearcherswould be the first to acknowledgethat their system is still far from perfect Indeed,as noted above, Chile's appetite for ongoing evaluationand progressiveinnovationis anotherkey driver of its educationalprogress. The ministry'scurrentinstitutonalfocus is on threechallenges: Creating a genuine "learning organization" to overcome Institutional fragmentation Just as it broke teacher isolabonby establishingprofessionalnetworks,the ministry is now engaged in the slow processof transformingitself into a "leaming organization"in order to overcome its institutionalfragmentabon.


Chapter 4

In recentyears, quietly, a variety of information-generating systems have been upgradedto complement the SIMCE: the ministerialManagementInformationSystem; the Inter and Intra-netsystem; Public InformationOffices; participationin the OECD and UNESCOindicatorsand statistics programs;setting up a KnowledgeManagementUnit and network;and conductingintemal and extemalsurveys.Thesetools are alreadyhelpingthe sectoralleadershipmake better informeddecisions. When fully operational,they will be accessibleto all ministry personneland eventuallyto 28 all schools,feedingthe nationalconversationon quality.

More than technical,however,the real challengeis about nurturingamong staff a culture of continuous enquiry, promoting vertical and horizontal,inter-unitand cross-disciplinaryexchangesof information,and improvingcommunication,so that educatorsunderstandthe concemsof economists (and vice-versa)and are ready to negotiatewith them. Ultimately,all the networks should link up to form a communityof practitionerscapable of consolidatingthe shared vision and taking on the job of continuouslypreservingand enrichingit. QualityAssurance

A "leamingorganization"is one of several strategicweaponsto achieve system-widecoherence. But it is not enough. The ministry'squality assuranceframeworkstill needs deepening.By the end of the 1980s,Chile had an accountabilitysystem that gave schoolssome degreeof autonomyin the use of resources, allowed parents choiceand exit decisions,providedsome aggregatemeasuresof system quality (SIMCE)and reliedon a system of physicalchecks by inspectorsfor the payment of the capitaton grants (vouchers)to schools.Duringthe 1990sschoolautonomyhas been increased,school-level performanceinformationmade publicly available,and an "accountabilitysupport' infrastructuretraining, information,technical assistance, positive incentives-developed at the ministry level. Less has been done in the way of "accountabilityinterventions."With mountingsocietaldemands for quality and equity, the ambitous 1996 Full School Day Reform, and recent concems with sustainability,Chilehas only startedthe path leadingfrom "educationalaccounting"to "educational accountability." The nextwave of reform, in the eyes of ministrystaff, should aim at raisingthe "demandingness"of the educationsystem further. This will requiretighteningexisting buildingblocks,such as accreditation, testing,and reviewof school developmentplansand school-basedprojects.It may require new instruments,such as comprehensive,qualitative,school-levelreviews, as in New Zealandand Theministryalsoneedsto reactivate educabonal R&D, which between1990and 1997wasallowedto dedinefrom9 to 2 percentof educational spending. 28


Education Refomis in Chile, 1980-98

the UnitedKingdom(but in a format that emphasizessupportover sanction). Standardswill have to be graduallyraised,ensuringthat they are both realisticand challengingenough to put the system on a continuousimprovementmode. And, ultimately,the govemmentwill have to face the difficult issue of what to do with persistentlyfailing schools, perhapsadopting variationsaround the approachesused in other decentralizedsystems (Chicago,Kentucky,the Netherlands,the U.K., New Zealand);these includeputting such schoolsunder the oversightof a distinguishededucator or under probation,and eventually"restructuring"them throughthe appointmentof new managers and teachers. For a system such as Chile's where a significantshare of the schools are legally private,"such steps-however necessary-is likelyto presentchallenges. Greater social control to reconcile public expectations for more democracy and more accountability One anomaly of Chile's education system is that while the system grants parents substantial "choice,"neither they nor the broadercommunitytoday enjoy a strong"voice" in the schools. The evidencefrom a multitudeof countriesaroundthe worldsuggeststhat direct parentand community involvementin school govemance is positivelycorrelatedwith school improvement(although,of course, these systems do not have school choice). School Councils are about to be piloted in Chile where,until now, directorsand teachers have resistedthe idea, parents have not been forthcoming and the municipalgovemmentshave done littleto build up democraticschool leadership. Experimentsin Latin America (El Salvador,Minas Gerais,Nicaragua)and elsewhere(Chicago,the Netherlands,the State of Victoria,Australia)suggest that a well-balancedschool level goveming body is healthyfrom a participationperspectiveand can strengtheneducationalquality, as long as directorsand councilmembersare properlytrained and have the informationthey need. A similar trend is to increasinglyinvolve another legitimatestakeholder-teachers--in quality assurance.As a first step, Chilehas invitedteachers-university academics, practicingteachers,and union representatives-to participatein the definitionof teaching standards. Experiencesworldwide-e.g., New South Wales (Australia),or Ontario(Canada), or the U.S., where teacher standards have been entirely developed by the professionitself-demonstrate that this avenue, although occasionallybumpy, is the most promisingone for a govemmentto progressfrom a confrontationalmode with an industrial-typeunion to a partnershipwith a professionalassociationinterested in issues of qualityalongwith the workingconditionsof its members. PoliticalAccountability Another facet of the accountabilitychallenge has to do with the fact that the mixed nature of the Chileaneducationsystem (with marketand social policy elements,vertical and horizontaltensions) has generatedconflictsbetweenpoliticaland economicsignals. As noted by Gauri (1998), the fact


Chapter 4

that a high proportionof childrenattend out-of-municipality subsidizedschools reduces the pressure on electedofficialsto improvethe qualityof those schoolsundertheir responsibility.The exit of the elite from the publicsystem(as in many othercountries)has furthercontributedto this failure to exercisevoice, becausetheir childrenare not affected. The fragmentedgovemancediscussed earlierhas inhibitedthe circulationof differenttypesof informationwhich should be crossedto optimize sectoral management. Aligningpolicies,instruments,institutionsand organizationson the statedgoalsis one of thegoldenrules of educationreforn.


Conclusion Theroadto reformin Chilehasbeenneitherstraight,norsmoothor painless.Butthe resultis one systemsin the develequitableeducation cost-effective andcomparatively of the mostinnovative, is in whatis taughtand howeducation changeshavebeenintroduced opingworld. Far-reaching studentasof a modemeducationsystem-transparency, delivered.Mostof the instruments in qualityinputs,attentionto classroom procsessment, a flexiblecurriculum, targeting,investment andschoolautonomy-arepresentin Chile'ssystem professional development esses,continuous andhavebeenpresentlongerthanin mostothercountries,includingsomeOECDcountries.And thesystemis stillevolving. communityis twofold.In areaswhereit hasbeen Thegiftof today'sChileto the worldeducation basedon comparative advanparticularly successful-mobilizing publicandprivateinvolvement tage,investingin the innerworkingsof schools,usingassessment to guidedecisionmaking-it andconcreteavenues changeis possiblein education offers,nota model,butproofthatsignificant of andthe modemization it. In areaswherethe agendais stillunfinished-equity for implementing contributions it is gropingwith aresubstantive institutions-itseffortsandthedifficulties educational to the intemationaldebateon such issuesas secondarylevel tracking,effectivegovemance, in a decentralized system,the roleof thestateandpublic regulationandenforcement mechanisms in theprocessof change. participation to be successfu-to havean impacton The keylessonfromthe Chileanstoryis that,ultimately, instruments requireslinkingmacro-level leamingfor all, go to scaleand be sustainable-reform structure) with the microlevel(schooland classroomproc(incentives, financingand govemance esses). Recognition that no singlesetof toolswilldo was the de factoagendaof the 1996FSD of quality,equityandefficiencyin educationrequires reform.Dealingwiththecomplexchallenges whatdoesnot,alwaysguidedby objecwhatworksanddropping developing pragmaticsolutions: Reinventing educationsystemsto meetthe needsof and performance. tivemeasuresof progress and innovative useof both bipartisanship a 21 g centuryglobaleconomyrequiresresults-oriented the publicandprivatesectors-actionsChilehaspioneered.The pragmatcstoryof twodecades world. systemsacrossthepost-modem reformin Chileholdslessonsforeducation of education


Annex Annex Table A: SIMCE Results 1988-1996 Grade 4

Secondar! Education Sciences/ Voc./Tech.

Grade 8


_______ _______

Type of School/ Discipline















Math Municipal Subs.-Private Private Voc./Tech.

48.30 54.70 73.30

56.20 63.20 80.10

63.70 69.60 85.30

65.41 71.39 86.44

67.80 73.10 85.60

51.54 56.19 76.03

48.48 54.47 72.10

52.88 57.63 74.73

54.28 59.94 77.51

59.49 65.34 80.86

39.92 47.04 63.51

42.97 51.58 67.90

37.87 37.96 48.12

39.64 40.79 40.10 43.97

Spanish Municipal Subs.-Private Private Voc./Tech.

50.20 58.00 79.00

Average Municipal Subs.-Private Private



57.20 54.40 80.80

64.00 70.70 86.80

63.44 69.93 83.69

68.20 74.20 86.10

52.99 58.85 76.73

51.80 56.99 72.61

55.12 61.11 76.80

55.85 61.11 74.63

62.15 68.41 80.39

50.72 58.27 69.56

57.97 66.49 75.51

50.85 50.36 67.19

56.38 57.44 61.90 59.97

56.70 58.80 80.05 I_ Not given the test

63.85 70.15 86.05

64.43 70.66 85.07

68.00 73.65 85.85

52.27 57.52 76.38

50.14 54.73 72.36

54.00 59.37 75.77

55.07 60.53 76.07

60.82 66.88 80.63

45.32 52.66 66.54

50.47 59.04 71.71

44.36 44.16 57.66

48.01 49.12 51.00 51.97

49.25 56.35 76.15

Annex Table B: Student Achievement,



Voucher Schools

Municipal Schools

Mother's schooling

Status and School Costs in 1994-96









Elite Private 14.2


Father's schooling



Monthly family


income ('000 pesos)

('000 pesos)





430 I

15.4 I



1117 I




731 I

Raw difference in student achievement (over munici pal schools) *Math score | 3.2








Differenceadjustingfor household factors *Math score




*Spanish score




| 0.6



06 0-



Difference adjustingfor household and school factors

eMathscore *Spanish score Source: McEwan and Carnoy (1999)


Education Refomis In Chile, 1980.98


Income Quintile

Level of Education




I. Preschool

Preschool (MINEDUC) Kindergarten Preschool (INTEGRA) Total





V 6.8


34.2 47.0

33.0 27.5

18.7 17.6

9.8 5.7

4.4 2.3-

100.0 100.0







Basic (MINEDUC) Basic (PAE) School







57.0 54.4

21.1 26.0

15.0 11.7

5.6 5.7

1.3 2.2

100.0 100.0

School books Dental care School health Total

38.8 42.0 46.3 38.2

26.9 29.5 26.0 26.3

17.4 15.0 15.1 17.6

12.0 9.0 8.3 12.5

4.8 4.6 4.2 5.3

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0







_ _









Ill.Secondary Science/ Humanities Vocational/ Technical Vocational/ Technical

100.0 I








Contributions from Firms Secondary (PAE) Total


























Student Aid



37.9 _










IV. Adult

V. Higher Total



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Country Studies are part of the Education Reform and Management (ERM) Publication Series, which also includes TechnicalNotesand Policy Studies. ERMpublications are designed to provide World Bank client countries with timely insight and analysis of education reform efforts around the world. ERM Country Studies examine how individual countries have successfully launched and implemented significant reforms of their education systems. ERM publications are under the editorial supervision of the Education Reform and ManagementThematic Group, part of the Human DevelopmentNetwork-Education at the World Bank. Any views expressedor implied should not be interpretedas official positions of the World Bank. Electronic versions of this document are available on the ERM Web site at EDUCATION REFORMAND MANAGEMENT TEAM Human DevelopmentNetwork-Education The World Bank 1818H Street, NW Washington,DC 20433 USA Knowledge Coordinator: ResearchAnalyst: WEB:

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Education Reform in Chile  

Education Reform in Chile

Education Reform in Chile  

Education Reform in Chile