objectives. Magellan’s returns looked good when measured against the S&P 500 Index, an inappropriate benchmark that included no small cap stocks. The appropriate benchmark for Magellan would have been a blended index of both small cap and large cap equities. In the mid-1990s, Jeffrey Vinik took over the fund’s helm. He made a famous market call in November 1995, bailing out of $10 billion worth of technology stocks. This is visible in Figure 6-4 by the disappearance of the blue section (Large Growth) in 1995. He put a lot of that money into cash and bonds. During the next six months, Magellan’s value barely moved, as the Large Growth index grew by 11.3%. As a result, investors suffered from lower returns and higher capital gains taxes. Figure 6-4 illustrates the style drift of Fidelity’s Magellan fund from January 1, 1982. The scale on the vertical axis represents the fund’s relative exposure to different styles, and the different colors represent different investing styles. In 1995, the fund looked like a large value fund (green), but by 2000 and 2009, it would have been seen as a large growth fund (blue). This ongoing shift causes the fund’s investors to unknowingly be allocated to risks different from what they thought. To expand the analysis, let’s look at two additional mutual funds whose exposure to different styles drifted over time. Figure 6-5 displays the style drift of the actively managed Vanguard Explorer Fund, which is designated by Vanguard as a small growth fund. Note that the tan zone is a small growth index, and the brown is a small value index. The fund experienced a spike in exposure to small value in the early
Published on Jun 1, 2015
This book reveals the potential land mines and pitfalls of active investing and educates readers on the benefits of passive investing with i...