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This publication is an unofficial translation based on Fennovoima’s original application. The original application was submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in January 2009.


TO THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT

Application for a Government Decision-in-Principle Regarding the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant as referred to in Section 11 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)

January 2009


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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Fennovoima Ltd hereby submits its application for a Government decision-inprinciple regarding the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Finland. According to the National Climate and Energy Strategy, Finland needs new electricity generation capacity in order to ensure adequate self-sufficiency and competitiveness in energy supply. In the building of new capacity, priority is to be given to power plants that do not cause greenhouse gas emissions. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant project meets the needs of Finnish society, Finnish businesses and Finnish households. Industry, trade and service businesses in Finland need electricity at a reasonable and stable price to ensure their competitiveness and their potential for investment and employment. Fennovoima will improve the functioning of the electricity market by increasing supply and by introducing several new actors into the electricity production sector. The increased competition will benefit all Finnish end users of electricity. Finland’s energy supply is based on a decentralized and diverse production system. One particular strength of the Fennovoima project is that it will decentralize Finland’s nuclear power production geographically, in terms of ownership and in terms of organization. The nuclear power plant investment will have a significant impact on the community where the power plant is located and its economic area. A nuclear power plant at a completely new site will generate long-term industrial activity and help consolidate the business structure and economy of the surrounding region. The three alternative sites shortlisted for the nuclear power plant are in the municipality of Pyhäjoki in North Ostrobothnia, in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää in Itä-Uusimaa and in the municipality of Simo in Lapland. The alternative sites fulfill the requirements for constructing the nuclear power plant and are suitable for the project. Fennovoima fulfills the requirements set for applying for a decision-in-principle. The new nuclear power plant can be built safely and in compliance with Finnish regulations. The company, backed by its major industrial shareholders, has the necessary expertise and resources to build the power plant as planned and to prepare the appropriate plans for nuclear fuel management and nuclear waste management. The nuclear power plant project has been launched because there are compelling social and business reasons for it. The price of electricity is an important competition factor for the metal industry, food industry, building product industry and retail trade companies involved in the project and also for local energy companies.


Application

Contents

Application ........................................................................................................................ 4 Applicant ..................................................................................................................... 4 Project.......................................................................................................................... 4 Site ............................................................................................................................... 4 Purpose of the nuclear facilities and planned useful life ......................................... 5 Grounds for the project .................................................................................................... 5 FulďŹ lling electricity needs and securing competitiveness ........................................ 5 Increasing competition in the electricity market...................................................... 5 Balanced development of Finland ............................................................................. 6 Ensuring security of supply ........................................................................................ 6 Supporting the National Climate and Energy Strategy ........................................... 7 Implementation of the project ......................................................................................... 7 Timetable, manner of implementation and plant alternatives................................. 7 Safety ........................................................................................................................... 8 Suitability of sites and environmental impact of the project ................................... 8 District heating production ....................................................................................... 9 Available expertise ...................................................................................................... 9 Financial resources ................................................................................................... 10 Nuclear fuel management ........................................................................................ 10 Nuclear waste management ..................................................................................... 11

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Application Fennovoima hereby submits its application to the Finnish Government for a Government decision-in-principle concerning the construction of a nuclear power plant in Finland as referred to in section 11 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987).

Applicant The applicant is Fennovoima Ltd (hereinafter ‘Fennovoima’ or ‘the company’), a Finnish limited liability company whose business identity code is 2125678-5 and whose domicile is in Helsinki. The Trade Register extract, Articles of Association and shareholder register of the company are appended to this application as supplement 1A. Fennovoima operates on the cost price principle. The company shareholders will be entitled to the electricity generated by the nuclear power plant, and will cover the production costs, in proportion to their holdings in the company. The majority holding, 66% of Fennovoima shares, is owned by Voimaosakeyhtiö SF and the minority holding, 34%, by E.ON Nordic AB. The owners of Voimaosakeyhtiö SF are trade and industry companies operating in Finland such as Boliden, Kesko, Outokumpu, Ovako, Rautaruukki and SOK, and local energy companies such as Imatran Seudun Sähkö, Jyväskylän Energia, Kuopion Energia, Lahti Energia, Turku Energia and Vantaan Energia. E.ON Nordic AB belongs to the E.ON Group, which is one of the leading nuclear power plant operators in Europe. There are 64 companies in all that are direct or indirect shareholders in Fennovoima and thereby entitled at cost price to the electricity produced by Fennovoima. These companies are collectively referred to as ‘Fennovoima shareholders’ in this application.

Project The purpose of the project is to build a new nuclear power plant in Finland, with a thermal output of 4,300 to 6,800 MW and a rated electricity output of 1,500 to 2,500 MW. The intention is for the nuclear power plant to begin electricity production by 2020. The nuclear power plant will consist of a single plant site with one or two light water reactor type nuclear power plant units, the buildings and storage facilities required for nuclear fuel management and nuclear waste management of the nuclear power plant, and a final repository for the final disposal of low level and medium level reactor waste generated in the operations of the nuclear power plant, the volume of the nuclear waste stored there being no more than 36,000 m3.

Site There are three alternative sites for the nuclear power plant: Hanhikivi in the municipality of Pyhäjoki, Gäddbergsö in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää and Karsikko in the municipality of Simo. Fennovoima will select one of these alternative sites for the implementation of the project and will build the nuclear power plant at a single plant site.


Application

Purpose of the nuclear facilities and planned useful life The nuclear power plant will be used for producing energy. The planned useful life of each nuclear power plant unit is 60 years. The repository for the final disposal of low level and medium level nuclear waste generated in the operations and decommissioning of the nuclear power plant will be used for the final disposal of low level and medium level nuclear waste.

Grounds for the project Fulfilling electricity needs and securing competitiveness The total electricity needs of the 64 Fennovoima shareholders in Finland amount to approximately 25 TWh per annum, almost 30% of Finland’s total electricity consumption. The Fennovoima shareholders have very low self-sufficiency in electricity procurement in Finland and are largely dependent on market-priced electricity. Marketpriced electricity is expensive, and its price fluctuations are considerable and difficult to predict. In order to safeguard their international competitiveness and their investment and employment potential in Finland, the Fennovoima shareholders need to be sure of the availability of electricity at a reasonable and stable price. Fennovoima was set up to respond to this demand. The price of electricity is an important competition factor, for instance, for the production of the Outokumpu plant in Tornio and the Boliden plant in Kokkola. The nuclear power plant will satisfy at least 12 TWh of the electricity needs of the shareholders and for the majority of them will secure reasonable self-sufficiency with regard to electricity in Finland for the long term.

Increasing competition in the electricity market Several published expert assessments and reports by the Nordic competition authorities state that there are problems on the electricity market. The problems are partly due to the special characteristics of the electricity market and are particularly related to the electricity wholesale market and electricity production. The centralized ownership of electricity production is considered a significant cause of these problems. Studies and polls show that Finns are increasingly displeased with the results so far achieved through deregulation of the electricity market and with how the market works. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will improve the functioning of the wholesale market by increasing the electricity supply and by bringing several new operators to the electricity sector. The number of companies owning nuclear power production capacity will increase by about 30. The energy company shareholders in Fennovoima have some 900,000 customers in Finland’s retail markets. The competitiveness of small and medium-sized local energy companies will be enhanced by their own nuclear power production. It is advanta-

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

geous for consumers that many local energy companies price their retail sales on the basis of their own actual costs, not on the basis of the market price of electricity.

Balanced development of Finland In terms of its size, duration and requirements, the Fennovoima nuclear power plant construction project is a major investment. At the construction phase, the project will employ thousands of people in Finland. The permanent economic impact on both the immediate locality and the surrounding region as a whole will be considerable. A nuclear power plant at a completely new site will generate long-term industrial activity and help consolidate the business structure and economy of the surrounding region. Establishment of a new nuclear energy company will provide hundreds of permanent jobs for decades ahead. Because of the long-term nature of nuclear power production, the region will be well placed to diversify its range of services. All of the alternative Fennovoima nuclear power plant sites are located in Government-defined development areas, as specified by Finnish Government Resolution. The project is an example of cooperation allowing the companies to focus on long-term development of their operations in Finland and their respective local strengths. The Fennovoima project will contribute to the balanced development of Finland without drawing on central government budget funds. Implementation of the Fennovoima project, particularly at Pyhäjoki or Simo, supports the realization of Governmental regional policy objectives. The project will enhance the international competitiveness of the region and will reduce the developmental disparity between this region and the rest of the country. For example, the Lapland working group appointed by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy added support for the Fennovoima nuclear power project to its list of recommendations in October 2008.

Ensuring security of supply Electricity is of key importance to national security of supply. Finland’s current dependence on imports and centralization of products are risks for security of supply. Construction of new nuclear power capacity will improve Finland’s security of supply by reducing dependence on imported electricity and on fuels that cause emissions of greenhouse gases. Finland’s energy supply is based on a decentralized and diverse production system. The strategic importance of nuclear power production has been emphasized by the emission trade and targets set for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. In Finland also, nuclear power’s share of electricity production is increasing. Because nuclear power is produced in very large-scale power plant units, sufficient decentralization of these units becomes an integral aspect of national risk management. One particular strength of the Fennovoima project is that it will decentralize Finland’s nuclear power production geographically, in terms of ownership and in terms of organization.


Application

Supporting the National Climate and Energy Strategy Fennovoima considers that by increasing the production of electricity at a reasonable and stable price in Finland, the project will reinforce the national energy supply in accordance with the objectives of the National Climate and Energy Strategy. The nuclear power production of Fennovoima will be speciďŹ cally aimed at meeting the electricity needs of companies operating in Finland, Finnish households and Finnish agriculture. Increased supply will decrease the market price of electricity. Lower prices will beneďŹ t all Finnish end users of electricity. A more detailed report on the general signiďŹ cance and necessity of the project is given in supplement 2A to the application.

Implementation of the project Timetable, manner of implementation and plant alternatives Fennovoima has the goal of beginning electricity production at the nuclear power plant in 2020 at the latest. The main factors in the progress of the project are the licensing processes required by nuclear energy legislation, construction legislation and environmental legislation and the management of the design and construction of the nuclear power plant. The possible methods of implementation in a nuclear power plant project range from a turnkey project, where the agreement is concluded with a single principal contractor, to a model where the plant owner is responsible for overall planning and project management and the project consists of numerous small procurements. Fennovoima will select a manner of implementation that is balanced with regard to risk management. The company will pay particular attention to project management and quality management. They are of paramount importance in ensuring the safety of the project and its completion as planned. The manner of delivery of the plant will be selected and the delivery agreements concluded so that Fennovoima will be able to monitor the quality of the design and implementation of the plant at all phases of the project. The company has shortlisted three alternatives for the nuclear power plant unit to be used in the project: the Franco-German Areva EPR and SWR 1000, and the Japanese Toshiba ABWR. The company has conducted a feasibility study for each of these unit alternatives together with the supplier, establishing the safety features of the unit and the key factors involved in adapting the units to Finnish safety and building regulations. The feasibility studies indicate that any of the alternative units can be built safely and in compliance with Finnish regulations. All alternatives can be designed to produce district heat in addition to electricity. Several new nuclear power plant projects have been launched worldwide in recent years. This has increased the demand for nuclear power plants. Finland is a relatively small and challenging market. The participation of E.ON in the project will make Fennovoima more attractive to power plant suppliers.

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Safety Fennovoima will be the owner of the nuclear power facilities incorporated in the nuclear power plant and the holder of its construction and operation licenses. The company will be responsible for safety at all phases of the project. Fennovoima will implement the project as required by the Nuclear Energy Act, so that the nuclear power plant will be safe and will not cause injury to people, or damage the environment or property. Safety will take precedence in all decision-making in the company. Quality management requirements will correspond with the safety significance of functions, and the project plan and project management will be based on best practices and experience. An uncompromising safety culture forms the foundation for the design, construction and use of the power plant. Plant safety shall be ensured through the principle of defense in depth, i.e. by means of successive independent protection systems encompassing both the operational and structural safety of the plant. The plant will be designed and used so that it fulfills the requirements for nuclear safety and the use of radiation. The safety principles to be observed at the nuclear power plant are described in supplement 4A to this application, and the technical principles of the alternative units are described in supplement 4B.

Suitability of sites and environmental impact of the project Fennovoima considers on the basis of studies conducted that all three alternative sites entered in the application fulfill the requirements for constructing the nuclear power plant and are suitable for its placement. An environmental impact assessment has been conducted for the alternative sites pursuant to the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) and is appended to this application as supplement 3A. The report contains the information required in section 24 of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) concerning the design principles observed by Fennovoima to avoid environmental damage and to restrict the burden on the environment caused by the project. The company submitted the environmental impact assessment report to the liaison authority, the Ministry for Employment and the Economy, on October 9, 2008. The hearing period for this report expired on December 22, 2008. The assessment procedure will be completed when the liaison authority issues a statement on the report and its adequacy. The company obtained the shortlist of three alternative sites through a complicated selection procedure. The selection of sites is based on the general principle given in the STUK YVL 1.10 Guide (Requirements for siting a nuclear power plant) whereby a nuclear power plant should be located in a sparsely populated area and far away from large population centers. The selection also takes into account the impact of local circumstances on plant safety and security and emergency preparedness arrangements. Fennovoima owns land suitable for use as the nuclear power plant site at all three alternative sites. The company has ensured in consultation with Fingrid, the national transmission system operator, that all alternative power plant types can be connected to the national grid at all alternative sites.


Application

Fennovoima has sought close and transparent interaction with all sectors of society in the communities at the alternative sites. The company has an office and personnel in all three communities. The municipalities in question have actively contributed in support of the preparation of the Fennovoima project. Reports on the ownership and occupation of the alternative sites, settelement , other activities , town planning arrangements, suitability for the purpose and restrictions on the land use are given for each alternative site in supplements 3B, 3C and 3D to this application.

District heating production Fennovoima has explored the technical requirements for district heat production for each power plant alternative, and for heat transfer and district heat consumption at all alternative sites. All alternatives can be designed to produce district heat in addition to electricity. In this case, the amount of residual heat released into the environment with the cooling water discharged will be significantly reduced. On the other hand, district heat production will reduce the electricity output of the nuclear power plant by about 1 MW per every 4 to 5 MW of district heat. District heat produced at the nuclear power plant can replace district heating produced with emission-generating production within reasonable transfer distance of the Power Plant. Among the Fennovoima shareholders, Porvoon Energia, Vantaan Energia and Keravan Energia are significant producers and distributors of district heat within technically feasible transfer distance of Ruotsinpyhtää. If the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is built in Ruotsinpyhtää, Fennovoima is prepared to offer district heat to energy companies in Helsinki and its vicinity. If this solution were implemented, the level of greenhouse gas emissions in the Helsinki area in particular could be considerably reduced.

Available expertise Together with E.ON, Fennovoima has access to sufficient expertise for implementing the project in compliance with safety requirements and other objectives set. Fennovoima will determine the requirements for the key safety and operating design features in the nuclear power plant and will ensure that these requirements are complied with. The Fennovoima project organization will employ 150 to 200 people at the procurement and licencing phases and about 300 people at the construction and commissioning phase. The expertise required of the project organization principally consists of project management and quality management, together with power plant construction and industrial construction. Fennovoima began the development of the project organization and management system at the preparation phase of the project. For key tasks at the preparation phase, the company has recruited nuclear energy experts with solid experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants and the management of extensive and demanding projects. The organization will be strengthened periodically in accordance to the plans to be presented to the authorities.

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

E.ON is a Fennovoima shareholder and also the owner or co-owner of 21 nuclear power plant units in Europe. In nine of these, E.ON is the responsible licensee. The company employs some 4,000 people in its nuclear operations. The company’s expertise covers all aspects of the life cycle of a nuclear power plant. E.ON is committed to the implementation of the Fennovoima project and to ensuring the availability of the required expertise. E.ON’s expertise in all the areas required for implementation of the project is at Fennovoima’s disposal. Fennovoima plans for project implementation and the expertise available to the company are given in supplement 1C to this application.

Financial resources The foundation of the Fennovoima project is a diverse shareholder base with 64 shareholders who require electricity for their operations in Finland in the long term. Fennovoima operates on the cost price principle. Shareholders will be entitled to take delivery of electricity generated by the nuclear power plant at cost price in proportion to their ownership in the company. At the same time, Fennovoima shareholders are responsible for all of the company’s costs incurred in nuclear energy production as per the Articles of Association. Fennovoima shareholders have an important role in Finnish industry and commerce. They represent the metal, food and energy industries, the retail trade and the service sector, among others. Fennovoima shareholders directly employ a total of about 90,000 people in Finland. The local energy companies that are Fennovoima shareholders are typically owned by municipalities and cities. The shareholder base may be broadened and diversified even further, for example by offering shares to private individuals. As a Fennovoima shareholder, E.ON supports the implementation of the project through its high-quality nuclear expertise and its substantial financial resources. E.ON is prepared to participate in significant construction of new production capacity and increased electricity production in the near future. The investment program for 20082010 published by the company totals some EUR 50 billion. Fennovoima has the financial resources to implement the project safely. Taking into account the great electricity needs and significant financial resources of the Fennovoima shareholders and the economic viability of nuclear energy, Fennovoima and its 64 shareholders consider that the project can be financed at all phases in a way that is satisfactory to all parties. The financial resources of Fennovoima, the profitability of the project and the preliminary project financing plan are described in more detail in supplement 1B to this application.

Nuclear fuel management The nuclear fuel management of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant, from uranium ore extraction to the manufacturing of nuclear fuel rods, will be organized in the same way as with the nuclear power plants already in operation in Finland. There are no obstacles to the implementation of nuclear fuel management in full accordance


Application

with Finnish law and international agreements regarding the safeguarding of nuclear materials. Nuclear fuel constitutes a minor share of the total cost of nuclear power production. Fluctuations in the price of natural uranium will have only a negligible impact on the production costs of nuclear energy or the profitability of the project. Natural uranium and nuclear fuel management services are available on the global market. The known exploitable sources of uranium are such that the supply of natural uranium on the global market will pose no restrictions on the operations of the nuclear power plant during its proposed useful life. The Fennovoima project has no connection with the uranium prospecting projects currently under way in Finland. Fennovoima will monitor the safety and quality of the design, production, and storage of the nuclear fuel according to international best practices. The plans for how to organize the nuclear fuel management for the nuclear power plant are described in more detail in supplement 5A to this application.

Nuclear waste management Fennovoima has the plans required in the Nuclear Energy Act and access to the appropriate methods for providing for nuclear waste management at the nuclear power plant. It is estimated that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will generate between a maximum of 36,000 m3 of low level and medium level nuclear waste, and spent nuclear fuel equivalent to between 2,000 and 3,600 tons of uranium. It is estimated that final disposal of low level and medium level nuclear waste at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will begin in 2030 and the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 2050 at the earliest. Nuclear waste management at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be implemented using the same methods as at nuclear power plants already in operation in Finland. In the management of low level and medium level reactor waste, the company has access to methods similar to those used at nuclear power plants already in operation in Finland. The project will enhance the further development of these methods and related expertise in Finland. In 1983, the Government determined that a single site in Finland should be chosen as the final repository for spent nuclear fuel. Olkiluoto in Eurajoki was chosen as this site in a decision-in-principle adopted by the Government in 2000. Fennovoima plans to develop and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel together with other Finnish operators that have a nuclear waste management obligation. Waste management cooperation in the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel will increase the safety of the operations in Finland and reduce costs significantly. If cooperation is not achieved for reasons not due to Fennovoima, the central government can, under the Nuclear Energy Act, order the parties with a nuclear waste management obligation to cooperate and so ensure the fulfillment of the overall good of society. As far as the organization of nuclear waste management is concerned, Fennovoima is essentially in the same position as the other parties applying for a decision-inprinciple. The plans made by Fennovoima and the methods available for organizing nuclear waste management at the nuclear power plant are outlined in supplement 5B to this

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

application. How the project relates to the operations and nuclear waste management of other nuclear power plants currently in operation or being planned in Finland is described in supplement 2B.

With reference to the above, Fennovoima considers that the project fulfills the criteria for approval of the application and adoption of a positive decision-in-principle.

Helsinki, January 14, 2009

Yours faithfully, FENNOVOIMA OY

Juha Rantanen Chairman of the Board

Tapio Saarenpää CEO


Application

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Shareholders of Fennovoima Ltd

Kiuru Schalin Oy AGA Ab

Tapio Keckman Alajärven Sähkö Oy

Matti Tikkakoski Atria Oyj

Pekka Tuokkola Boliden Harjavalta Oy

Harri Natunen Boliden Kokkola Oy

Heikki Lehtonen Componenta Oyj

Håkan Buskhe E.ON Nordic AB

Ingvar Kulla Esse Elektro-Kraft Ab

Osmo Hyvönen Etelä-Savon Energia Oy

Henri Nieminen Finnfoam Oy

Timo Toikka Haminan Energia Oy

Stefan Storholm Oy Herrfors Ab

Mikko Kangasniemi Hiirikosken Energia Oy

Aimo Sepponen Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy

Arto Junttila Itä-Lapin Energia Oy

Markku Pernaa Jylhän Sähköosuuskunta

Juha Lappalainen Jyväskylän Energia Oy

Anne Salo-oja Kemin Energia Oy

Jussi Lehto Keravan Energia Oy

Matti Halmesmäki Kesko Oyj

Mauri Kaleva Koillis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy


Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

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Hannu Aalto-Setälä Kokemäen Sähkö Oy

Vesa Pirtilä Kotkan Energia Oy

Ronny Abbors Kruunupyyn Sähkölaitos

Kyösti Jääskeläinen KSS Energia Oy

Esa Lindholm Kuopion Energia Oy

Pekka Karhumäki Kuoreveden Sähkö Oy

Olli-Pekka Marttila Köyliön-Säkylän Sähkö Oy

Janne Savelainen Lahti Energia Oy

Markku Impola Lankosken Sähkö Oy

Heimo Muumäki Lehtimäen Sähkö Oy

Pertti Leppänen Leppäkosken Sähkö Oy

Wulf-Dietrich Keller Mondo Minerals BV

Pekka Savela Myllyn Paras Oy

Esa Muukka Mäntsälän Sähkö Oy

Heikki Koivisto Nurmijärven Sähkö Oy

Heikki Markkanen Omya Oy

Risto Kantola Oulun Seudun Sähkö

Veijo Tanskanen Outokummun Energia Oy

Juha Rantanen Outokumpu Oyj

Kimmo Väkiparta Ovako Bar Oy Ab

Hannu Aalto-Setälä Paneliankosken Voima Oy

Arto Tiainen Parikkalan Valo Oy

Ole Vikström Pietarsaaren Energialaitos

Patrick Wackström Porvoon Energia Oy


Application

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Pasi Syrjälä Rantakairan Sähkö Oy

Marko Haapala Rauman Energia Oy

Tapio Jalonen Rovakairan Tuotanto Oy

Mauri Törmä Sallila Energia Oy

Martti Haapamäki Seinäjoen Energia Oy

Arto Hiltunen SOK

Roald von Schoultz Tammisaaren Energia

Risto Vaittinen Oy Turku EnergiaÅbo Energi Ab

Tony Eklund Uudenkaarlepyyn Voimalaitos

Jarmo Lahtinen Vakka-Suomen Voima Oy

Pekka Laaksonen Valio Oy

Timo Honkanen Valkeakosken Energia Oy

Pertti Laukkanen Vantaan Energia Oy

Simo Pikkusaari Vatajankosken Sähkö Oy

Jouko Kivioja Vetelin Sähkölaitos Oy

Erkki Ammesmäki Vimpelin Voima Oy

Jan Wennström Ålands Elandelslag

Markku Rautiainen Ääneseudun Energia Oy

Sakari Tamminen Rautaruukki Oyj


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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima


Supplements

Supplements to the Application Information about Fennovoima 1A Fennovoima Ltd Trade Register extract, Articles of Association and shareholder register 1B Description on the financial resources of Fennovoima, the economic viability of the nuclear power plant, and the overall financing plan for the project 1C Description on the planned implementation and organization of the project and expertise available to Fennovoima. General significance of the nuclear power plant project 2A Description of the general significance and necessity of the project 2B Description of the significance of the project from the standpoint of the operation and nuclear waste management of other nuclear facilities in Finland Alternative sites for the nuclear power plant 3A Assessment report pursuant to the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) 3B Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki 3C Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää 3D Karsikko in Simo Safety of the nuclear power plant 4A Description of the safety principles that will be observed on the nuclear power plant 4B Outline of the technical principles of the planned nuclear power plant Nuclear fuel and nuclear waste management of the nuclear power plant 5A General plan for nuclear fuel management of the nuclear power plant 5B General description of Fennovoima’s plans and available methods for nuclear waste management of the nuclear power plant

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Ydinvoimalaitoksen periaatepäätöshakemus • Fennovoima


Liite 4a

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Information about Fennovoima Supplement 1A Fennovoima Ltd trade register extract, articles of association and shareholder register


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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

In accordance with section 24, subsection 1(1), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for the decision-in-principle submitted to the government must be supplemented with the applicant’s trade register extract, and in accordance to subsection 1(2), a copy of the articles of association and shareholder register. Supplement 1A of the application submitted to the government by Fennovoima includes the following documents as required by the aforementioned Decree: 1. 2. 3.

Fennovoima Ltd trade register extract, issued December 1, 2008 A copy of the Fennovoima articles of association issued December 1, 2008 A list of Fennovoima Ltd’s shareholders, issued December 1, 2008.

The document created from this application does not contain the Fennovoima Ltd extract from the trade register.


Supplement 1a

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Ydinvoimalaitoksen periaatepäätöshakemus • Fennovoima


Liite 4a

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Information about Fennovoima Supplement 1B Feasibility study on the ďŹ nancial resources of Fennovoima, on the economic viability of the nuclear power plant and on the ďŹ nancing plan for the project


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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Contents

Summary .......................................................................................................................25 Introduction ..................................................................................................................26 Financial resources of Fennovoima .............................................................................26 Mankala principle...................................................................................................26 Ownership structure of Fennovoima ....................................................................27 Fennovoima shareholders and their financial status ............................................28 Economic viability of the project ................................................................................30 Costs of nuclear energy and other options for producing electricity .................30 Importance of predictability and price stability ...................................................33 Strategic decentralization of electricity procurement ..........................................34 Financing plan outline for the project ........................................................................34 Preliminary cost estimate of the project................................................................35 Project phases and financing sources ....................................................................35 Financing of nuclear waste management and decommissioning .......................36 Insurance required under the Nuclear Liability Act ............................................37 Presentation of Fennovoima shareholders ..................................................................38


Supplement 1b

Summary

Fennovoima Ltd is an energy company founded in 2007. Its purpose is to build new nuclear energy production capacity in Finland and to produce electricity at a moderate price for its 64 shareholders. All of the company’s resources are aimed at the preparation and planning of the project for a new nuclear power plant. Fennovoima operates on the cost price principle. Shareholders will be entitled to take delivery of electricity generated by the nuclear power plant at cost price in proportion to their ownership in the company. Under this principle, Fennovoima shareholders are responsible for all of the company’s costs incurred in nuclear energy production as per the articles of association. The majority holding, 66%, is owned by Voimaosakeyhtiö SF, which in turn is owned by local energy companies such as Imatran Seudun Sähkö, Jyväskylän Energia, Kaakon Energia, Kuopion Energia, Lahti Energia, Turku Energia and Vantaan Energia, and companies in trade and industry that are consumers of electricity in Finland, such as Boliden, Kesko, Outokumpu, Ovako, Rautaruukki and SOK. The minority holding, 34% of Fennovoima shares, is owned by E.ON Nordic AB. E.ON is the second largest producer of nuclear power in Europe. Fennovoima shareholders have an important role in Finnish industry and commerce. They represent the metal, food and energy industries, the retail trade and the service sector, among others. The trade and industry shareholders in particular are substantial employers. Fennovoima shareholders directly employ a total of about 90,000 people in Finland. The local energy companies that are Fennovoima shareholders are typically owned by municipalities and cities. The nuclear power plant project has been launched because there are compelling business reasons for it. In terms of production costs, nuclear electricity is competitive, stable and predictable. The good delivery reliability and stable production costs of the nuclear power plant, coupled with the shareholders’ constant electricity needs, validate the viability of the project. The project is central to the shareholders’ strategic decentralization of electricity procurement and strengthens their operating conditions in Finland. An overall financing plan has been drafted for the project in which the preliminary overall cost estimate is EUR 4 to 6 billion. Capital expenditure for each phase, risk factors and prevailing circumstances will be taken into account in financial planning. Besides design, construction and use, the Fennovoima financing plan covers nuclear waste provision for nuclear waste management, decommissioning and provision for nuclear damage as required under the Nuclear Liability Act. Fennovoima has the financial resources to implement the project safely. Taking into account the substantial electricity needs and significant financial resources of the Fennovoima shareholders and the economic viability of nuclear energy, Fennovoima and its 64 shareholders consider that the project can be financed at every phase in a way that is satisfactory to all parties.

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26

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Introduction According to section 24, subsection 1, paragraph 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application to be presented to the government for a decisionin-principle must be supplemented with a description of the applicant’s financial resources and the economic viability of the nuclear facility project, and an overall financing plan for the nuclear facility project pursuant to paragraph 6. This feasibility study provides the information referred to in the above-mentioned legal provisions about the financial status of Fennovoima and the financing plan and economic viability of the project. A nuclear power plant project is an extremely substantial investment in terms of economic impact and duration. When making a decision-in-principle regarding a nuclear power plant, it must be ensured that the applicant has the financial resources for implementing the planned project in accordance with safety requirements. A significant proportion of the nuclear power plant project’s total costs will arise before operation of the nuclear power plant begins. The Nuclear Energy Act prescribes that the licensee entitled to use nuclear energy shall be obliged to ensure safe use of nuclear energy and be responsible for nuclear waste arising in the operation of the plant. The Nuclear Energy Act requires that the safety of the use of nuclear energy must be maintained at as high level as practically achievable, and that for further safety enhancement, measures shall be taken which can be regarded as justified when taking into consideration operating experience and the results of safety research as well as the advancement of science and technology.

Financial resources of Fennovoima Fennovoima Ltd is an energy company founded in 2007. Its purpose is to build new nuclear energy production capacity in Finland and to produce electricity at a moderate price for its 64 shareholders. All of the company’s resources are aimed at the preparation and planning of the nuclear power plant project. Fennovoima has no other business. Fennovoima operates under the cost price principle. When the nuclear power plant is completed, the company’s shareholders will be entitled to electricity generated by the plant in proportion to their ownership.

Mankala principle As a company, Fennovoima Ltd does not seek to generate profit but will instead sell the electricity produced by nuclear energy to its shareholders at cost price. This mode of operation is generally referred to as the Mankala principle. Under this principle, Fennovoima shareholders are responsible for all of the company’s costs incurred in nuclear energy production as per the articles of association. The annual fixed costs of Fennovoima and any loan repayment installments will be charged to the shareholders in proportion to their holdings in Fennovoima. Shareholders are responsible for a percentage of the fixed costs and any loan repayment installments of Fennovoima proportional to their holdings, regardless of whether they have made use of their share of the electricity produced at the nuclear power plant.


Supplement 1b

27

Variable costs will be charged to shareholders in proportion to how much of the electricity produced at the nuclear power plant they have used. A broad and diverse shareholder base combined with the Mankala principle guarantees Fennovoima a robust and stable financial base which is not exclusively dependent on the fluctuations of the price of electricity in Finland and the Nordic countries. The financial status and resources of the 64 Fennovoima shareholders are of decisive importance in evaluating the financial resources of the company.

Ownership structure of Fennovoima Fennovoima has one share series and two owners. The majority holding, 66%, is owned by Voimaosakeyhtiö SF, which in turn is owned by local energy companies such as Imatran Seudun Sähkö, Jyväskylän Energia, Kuopion Energia, Lahti Energia, Turku Energia and Vantaan Energia, and companies in trade and industry that are consumers of electricity in Finland, such as Boliden, Kesko, Outokumpu, Ovako, Rautaruukki and SOK.

66 %

34% Voimaosakeyhtiö SF

45 %

E.ON Nordic AB

55 %

Boliden Harjavalta Oy

Jyväskylän Energia Oy

Rauman Energia Oy

Boliden Kokkola Oy

Kuopion Energia Oy

Oy Turku Energia Ab

Kesko Oyj

Lahti Energia Oy

Vantaan Energia Oy

Outokumpu Oyj Ovako Bar Oy Ab Rautaruukki Oyj Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta SOK Majakka Voima Oy Oy Aga Ab Atria Oyj Componenta Oyj Finnfoam Oy Mondo Minerals B.V. Omya Oy Myllyn Paras Oy Valio Oy

ESV Tuotanto Oy Etelä-Savon Energia Oy Haminan Energia Oy Keravan Energia Oy KSS Energia Oy Mäntsälän Sähkö Oy Nurmijärven Sähkö Oy Porvoon Energia Oy Kaakon Energia Oy Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy Parikkan Valo Oy Outokummun Energia Oy Katternö Kärnkraft Oy Ab Esse Elektro-Kraft Ab Oy Herrfors Ab Koillis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy Kruunupyyn sähkölaitos Pietarsaaren energialaitos Tammisaaren Energia Uudenkaarlepyyn Voimalaitos Valkeakosken Energia Oy Vetelin Sähkölaitos Oy Ålands Elandelslag

Pohjois-Suomen Voima Oy Itä-Lapin Energia Oy Kemin Energia Oy Kotkan Energia Oy Keskusosuuskunta Oulun Seudun Sähkö Rantakairan Sähkö Oy Rovakairan Tuotanto Oy SPS Tuotanto Oy Kokemäen Sähkö Oy Köyliön-Säkylän Sähkö Oy Lankosken Sähkö Oy Leppäkosken Sähkö Oy Paneliankosken Voima Oy Sallila Energia Oy Vatajankosken Sähkö Oy Vakka-Suomen Voima Oy Voimajunkkarit Oy Alajärven Sähkö Oy Hiirikosken Energia Oy Jylhän Sähköosuuskunta Kuoreveden Sähkö Oy Lehtimäen Sähkö Oy Seinäjoen Energia Oy Vimpelin Voima Oy Ääneseudun Energia Oy

Figure 1B-1 Ownership structure of Fennovoima.


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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

The minority holding, 34% of Fennovoima shares, is owned by E.ON Nordic AB, which is domiciled in Sweden. E.ON Nordic is part of the international group E.ON AG. The complete ownership structure of Fennovoima is illustrated in Figure 1B-1. Voimaosakeyhtiö SF was founded to administer the majority holding of Fennovoima shares. The local energy companies own directly and through intermediate companies a total of approximately 55% and electricity-using industrial, retail and service sector enterprises in Finland a total of approximately 45% of Voimaosakeyhtiö SF’s shares. The holding of Voimaosakeyhtiö SF in Fennovoima is divided among 63 companies, all of which are entitled to the electricity produced at cost price and all of which are proportionally responsible for the costs of the nuclear energy production, according to the Mankala principle. The shareholder base of Voimaosakeyhtiö SF can be further expanded and diversified. The possibility of the participation of small-scale customers, for example, may be considered.

Fennovoima shareholders and their financial status Fennovoima shareholders have an important role in Finnish industry and commerce. The trade and industry shareholders are substantial employers. Fennovoima shareholders directly employ a total of about 90,000 people in Finland. The history and future plans of the shareholders in Finland demonstrate exemplary commitment to the prosperity and development of Finnish society. The Fennovoima shareholder base consists of companies and corporations operating in various sectors. They represent the metal, food, chemical, building product and energy industries, the retail trade and the service sector (Figure 1B-2). The food industry, energy industry and retail trade are typically stable sectors. Atria, Myllyn Paras and Valio are shareholders operating in the food industry. In addition to shareholders operating in stable sectors, the diversity of the shareholder base is also a factor which makes Fennovoima financially robust and less susceptible to cyclical fluctuations. Fennovoima’s shareholders vary greatly in terms of ownership structure, company form and size. The shareholder base comprises an even spread of customer-owned businesses, municipally-owned companies and municipal federations, cooperatives, family businesses and listed companies (Figure 1B-2). Local energy companies that are Fennovoima shareholders are typically publicly owned, i.e. owned in effect by municipalities and cities. The Finnish government is a significant minority shareholder in Outokumpu and Rautaruukki, both of them listed companies. The energy companies that are Fennovoima shareholders have a total of about 900,000 electricity customers around Finland. The home communities and operating areas of local energy companies, within which they have a statutory responsibility for reliability of electricity supply to small-scale customers, cover a large portion of Finland (Figure 1B-2). The production facilities, offices and workplaces of the shareholders representing trade and industry are located all around the country. E.ON, the minority shareholder, supports the Fennovoima project with its highquality nuclear power expertise and considerable financial resources. E.ON is one of the world’s largest energy companies, and the second largest producer of nuclear power in Europe. Major international credit rating agencies have awarded good credit ratings to the company1. E.ON is prepared in the years to come to participate in signifi-


Supplement 1b

Shereholder sectors

Home communities of energy company shareholders

Shareholder ownership base

Energy

Munucipally-owned companies

Metal industry

Municipal companies

Food industry

Listed companies

Trade and services

Cooperatives

Chemical industry

Family businesses

Building materials industry

Customer-owned businesses Privately owned companies

cant construction of new production capacity and increased electricity production in various countries. The investment program for 2008-2010 published by the company totals some EUR 50 billion. E.ON has three subsidiaries in Finland: Kainuun Energia Oy, Karhu Voima Oy and E.ON Suomi Oy, which are engaged in electricity distribution, district heating, electricity production and retail sale of electricity. These companies have a total of about 90,000 electricity customers. Kainuun Energia and Karhu Voima are based in Kajaani, while E.ON Suomi is based in Helsinki. The 64 Fennovoima shareholders constitute a financially robust and stable shareholder base. Viewed as a whole on the basis of financial statements for 2007, the financial position of the 64 Fennovoima shareholders may be described as follows: – The combined net sales of the shareholders were more than EUR 100 billion2, and their operating profit was about EUR 13 billion. – The combined assets in the shareholders’ balance sheets were in excess of EUR 160 billion. Table 1B-1 shows a selected summary of the combined profits, assets, cash flow and solvency of the shareholders. This information is compiled and presented for the three last calendar years. Fennovoima shareholders have undertaken substantial investments in the period 2005–2007. Investments in 2007 totalled nearly EUR 13 billion. The combined investments of the shareholders in the years 2005–2007 on average amounted to more than EUR 8 billion per year (Figure 1B-3). In spite of its magnitude, the impact of the Fennovoima project would be below 10% of the shareholders’ combined investments in a comparable period. 1) Moody’s: A2 and Standard & Poor’s: A 2) The E.ON Group accounts for about 2/3 and the other shareholders for about 1/3 of net sales.

29

Figure 1B-2 Industrial sectors and types of ownership represented in the Fennovoima shareholder base, and where the local energy companies are domiciled.


30

Table 1B-1 Combined financial statement information for the 64 Fennovoima shareholders 2005–2007.3

Figure 1B-3 Combined investments of Fennovoima shareholders in 2005–2007.

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

2005

2006

2007

Net sales (EUR billion)

82.8

99.0

103.9

Operating profit (EUR billion)

12.4

14.5

12.8

Balance sheet total (EUR billion)

145.8

150.0

160.6

Shareholders’ equity (EUR billion)

57.6

62.9

66.1

Cash in hand (EUR billion)

5.1

1.8

3.6

Investments (EUR billion)

5.4

7.0

12.8

Equity ratio (%)

39.5 %

41.9 %

41.1 %

Operating profit (%)

15.0 %

14.7 %

12.3 %

EUR billion 15

10

5

0 2005

2006

2007

Economic viability of the project Costs of nuclear energy and other options for producing electricity Nuclear energy is one of the most capital intensive forms of electricity production. Hydroelectric energy and wind energy are also highly capital intensive. It is characteristic of the production costs of nuclear energy that nuclear fuel accounts for a relatively small part of the costs and correspondingly capital expenditure for a relatively large part. Because of its cost structure, nuclear energy is suited specifically for the production of base load power. The production costs of nuclear energy can be divided into three categories: capital expenditure, nuclear fuel procurement costs and power plant operating and maintenance costs. Capital expenditure costs consist of depreciation on fixed assets and costs of borrowed capital and equity. The procurement costs of nuclear fuel consist of mining and enriching the raw uranium, uranium conversion and refinement and the cost of fabricating the nuclear fuel elements. The power plant operating and maintenance 3) The figures have not been adjusted even though there are certain differences in the financial statement principles employed (e.g. IFRS and FIN GAAP).


Supplement 1b

31

costs consist of, for example, the costs of operating personnel and annual outages. The costs of nuclear waste management and decommissioning of the plants are included in the operating and maintenance costs. The costs of emissions trading will not encumber nuclear power production. Carbon dioxide emissions generated over the entire useful life of the nuclear power plant are very small in relation to the amount of energy produced. Measures taken to limit emissions of greenhouse gases and the emissions trading system introduced in the EU have enhanced the cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy compared to other forms of electricity production generating carbon dioxide emissions. The price level of emission rights has a highly significant impact on the relative profitability of nuclear energy. Several studies on the costs of nuclear energy have been conducted in recent years. These studies have often compared the costs of nuclear energy with those of other forms of electricity production. The most recent of these reports written in Finland is the production cost comparison published by the Lappeenranta University of Technology in 20084. Figure 1B-4 shows a summary of the findings of the Lappeenranta report5. The comparison illustrates the cost structures of various forms of electricity production and an estimate of the real costs per unit of electricity produced (EUR per MWh). As shown in Figure 1B-4, more than three quarters of the production costs of wind power consists of capital expenditure. In the comparison carried out by the Lappeenranta University of Technology, the unit cost with wind energy is quite competitive compared to most other forms of production.

Figure 1B-4 Comparison of the cost structures of various forms of electricity production and the real costs per unit of electricity produced.

Production cost €/MWh

100

75

50

25

0 Nuclear power

Wind

Peat

Coal

Gas

Wood

Fuel

Emission right EUR 60/tCO2

Use and maintenance

Emission right EUR 23/tCO2

Capital expenditure

4) Sähkön tuotantokustannusvertailu. [Electricity production cost comparison] Lappeenranta University of Technology: Tarjanne R., Kivistö A. Research Report EN B-175, Lappeenranta 2008. Lappeenranta University of Technology has updated the fuel price assumptions used in the study to correspond to the level in August 2008. 5) Principal assumptions: real interest rate 5%; operating time: wind energy 2,200 h/year, other forms of production 8,000 h/year; possible public subsidies not deducted from production costs; costs estimated at August 2008 prices.


32

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

The competitiveness of wind energy is weakened by its dependence on the weather and the relatively low utilization rate of wind power plants. The production output of wind power varies depending on the wind conditions, and is therefore not a cost-efficient source of base load power. In order to increase wind power capacity significantly, electricity consumption or other electricity production would have to adapt sufficiently to the fluctuations inherent in wind energy production. This need to adapt will give rise to significant needs for change in the power system. For their part, changes will increase the overall costs of wind power for society as a whole. In separate electricity production using natural gas, the majority of the cost structure is taken up by fuel costs. Although natural gas combustion emits substantially less carbon dioxide per unit of electricity produced than burning coal or peat, the cost structure of electricity production using natural gas is unstable and susceptible to fluctuations in the price of natural gas. The fact that Finland is completely dependent on natural gas from Russia contributes to price uncertainty. Factors relating especially to the procurement and pricing of natural gas weaken its relative position. Separate electricity production using natural gas is not a competitive solution for the production of base load power in Finland. The capital expenditure involved in electricity production using wood-based fuels is of the same order as that of nuclear energy production. Neither form of production is encumbered by the necessity to purchase emission rights. However, with wood-based fuels the fuel costs per unit of electricity produced are substantially higher than in nuclear energy production. Lower emissions and an increased use of renewable energy will increase the demand for wood-based fuels, and this can be expected to have the effect of increasing their price. So far, the use of wood-based fuels for electricity production in Finland is almost entirely limited to industrial processes and to combined heat and power (CHP) production in connection with district heating. The competitiveness of wood-based fuels is highest when integrated into forest industry production processes or when used in CHP production by local energy companies, keeping fuel transportation distances and costs within reason. The cost structures of the electricity production alternatives based on burning coal and peat are fairly similar. Capital expenditure is slightly higher for peat than for coal. The combustion of both coal and peat causes significant carbon dioxide emissions per unit of electricity produced. Emissions’ trading has sharply increased the overall costs of electricity production based on burning coal and peat, thus weakening their competitiveness with regard to new investments. In the future, carbon dioxide emissions from coal burning can be reduced through capture and storage processes, but at the same time the efficiency of coal-fired power plants will deteriorate and capital expenditure as well as operating and maintenance costs will increase. Estimates of the additional costs of capture and storage of carbon dioxide vary enormously according to plant site. The strengths of coal compared with natural gas and peat are delivery reliability and price stability. So far, there is only one supplier of natural gas in Finland. Peat production is susceptible to weather conditions. Two rainy summers in succession, in 2007 and 2008, demonstrated peat production’s susceptibility to weather conditions. In the winter of 2008–2009, several local energy companies and others using peat for CHP production are obliged to use other fuels such as coal and oil to augment the insufficient availability of peat. Regarding the use of coal and peat, particularly the emissions trading system and its


Supplement 1b

33

future, emission rights price trends and the costs of carbon dioxide recovery constitute uncertainties so great as to render the competitiveness of new coal-fired or peat-fired power plants inadequate for base load power production in Finland. Figure 1B-5 shows a comparison of the competitiveness of various forms of electricity production in relation to the average Nord Pool market price6. The margin for each form of production is calculated by deducting the estimated overall production costs from the market price of electricity. Several studies and Fennovoima own calculations show that the production costs of nuclear energy are competitive in relation to the overall costs of alternative forms of energy production. The Fennovoima shareholders have launched this project to build a nuclear power plant because there is a strong economic argument to be made in its favor.

Margin EUR/MWh

20

Figure 1B-5 Comparison of the margins of various forms of electricity production, i.e. the difference between the market price and production costs of electricity

0

-20

-40

-60

Nuclear power

Wind

Peat

Emission right EUR 23/tCO2

Coal

Gas

Wood

Emission right EUR 60/tCO2

Importance of predictability and price stability The price of electricity has fluctuated strongly over the last ten years. There is great uncertainty about future price trends. The wholesale electricity market offers comparatively good potential for hedging against price fluctuations with a perspective of a few years. By comparison, it is practically impossible to secure a stable and competitive price for the longer term, especially for small and medium-sized users of electricity. Uncertainty about electricity price trends makes investment decisions more difficult for industrial users of electricity. Profitability estimates on new investment projects with long payback periods are susceptible to variations in assumptions about electricity price trends. Fennovoima shareholders are undertaking long-term investments in Finland that will increase the use of electricity. The time scale of these investments is considerably longer than the hedging possibilities offered by the electricity market. From the point of view of Fennovoima shareholders, the only technically and economically sustainable solution for securing the long-term availability of stable-priced electricity is investing in emission-free electricity production that they themselves will own. 6) The market price of electricity used here is the average of Nord Pool SPOT prices in Finland’s price region between Nov 2007 and Oct 2008. The costs of various forms of production are based on the study carried out at Lappeenranta University of Technology.


34

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

The Fennovoima project is a long term investment. The service life of the planned nuclear power plant is 60 years, during which it will produce electricity at a stable and predictable cost level. The stable production costs of nuclear energy, the substantial electricity needs of Fennovoima shareholders and the significance for competitiveness of efficient electricity procurement are factors in favor of the economic viability of the project.

Strategic decentralization of electricity procurement Cost trends in all forms of electricity production involve factors for uncertainty. By decentralizing electricity procurement to different forms of electricity production overall risks relating to procurement can be kept at a reasonable level and thus secure the operating conditions for a business in various future scenarios. Because of tightening emission restrictions, it may be assumed that future investments in electricity production in the EU will primarily involve emission-free forms of production. The majority of Fennovoima’s shareholders endeavor to control risks relating to electricity procurement and invest in carbon dioxide emissions-free modes of production. The shareholders are engaging both in independent projects and in various extensive joint projects. Fennovoima’s shareholders involvement includes joint projects relating to the construction of wind farms currently at the planning and preparation phase. Decentralization of electricity procurement is important for Fennovoima shareholders. In current circumstances, it is economically justified for them to invest in several emission-free forms of electricity production. Because the majority of Fennovoima shareholders own very little nuclear energy production relative to their electricity needs or none at all, the Fennovoima project is very important for them from the perspective of strategic decentralization of electricity procurement, and as such will strengthen their operating conditions.

Financing plan outline for the project The foundation of the Fennovoima project is a diverse shareholder base with 64 shareholders who require electricity for their operations in Finland over the long term. Because a nuclear power plant requires substantial capital expenditure and its construction and commissioning phase lasts for several years, the parties financing it must be committed to the implementation of the project and have the necessary financial resources to make this commitment. Committing to the Mankala principle and thereby to meeting all the costs resulting from nuclear energy production over the entire useful life of the nuclear power plant is a demonstration of the determination of Fennovoima shareholders. The planned useful life of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant, used as a basis for financial estimates in the project, is 60 years. The construction and commissioning phase of the project is estimated to last 6-8 years, depending on the size of the plant. Under the implementation plan and overall timetable drawn up by Fennovoima, electricity production at the nuclear power plant will begin by 2020. Capital expenditure will be at its highest when the power plant is completed and electricity production begins.


Supplement 1b

The Fennovoima financing plan outline covers the design and construction of the nuclear power plant and also nuclear waste management, decommissioning and insurance as required under the Nuclear Liability Act.

Preliminary cost estimate of the project During 2008, Fennovoima has carried out feasibility studies with two major nuclear power plant suppliers on three power plant design alternatives on the market: the ABWR unit of Toshiba, and the EPR and SWR 1000 units of Areva NP. In addition to the feasibility studies, Fennovoima has carried out studies on the suitability of alternative sites located in Pyhäjoki, Ruotsinpyhtää and Simo. The site studies include preliminary estimates of the overall costs of ancillary projects required for the project, such as transportation connections and power lines. The preliminary overall cost estimate for the project, based on studies conducted by Fennovoima, is EUR 4 to 6 billion. This estimate includes: – Costs of construction; – Costs of machinery and equipment; – Costs of ancillary projects; and – Interest costs during construction. Fennovoima is continuing design work in the project together with the chosen nuclear power plant suppliers. The final cost estimate will be finalized when design work has progressed sufficiently, the manner of implementation chosen and binding tenders received from the power plant suppliers. Factors influencing the final cost estimate include the type and size of the power plant, economic conditions in the construction industry, and the manner of implementation chosen.

Project phases and financing sources The Fennovoima project will be implemented in phases. These phases, as detailed in the implementation plan in Supplement 1C of the application, are the preparation phase, the procurement phase, the licensing phase, the construction and commissioning phase, and the operations phase. Capital expenditure, risk factors and current circumstances will be taken into account separately for each phase in financial planning. External funding, such as loans from financial institutions, will not be used for financing the preparation, procurement and licensing phases of the Fennovoima project. The phases will be funded from capital invested in Fennovoima by its shareholders. At the construction and commissioning phase, estimated to start in 2013, and in the actual operations of the completed nuclear power plant, the capital invested by shareholders will be augmented from other cost-competitive funding sources such as loans. Fennovoima and its shareholders will make a binding agreement on funding for the construction phase once the manner of implementation has been chosen and the final cost estimate has been completed. Serious problems emerged in the international financial market in 2007. During 2008 the problems came to a head in the form of a credit crunch. The lack of confi-

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

dence which has spread to the financial markets has significantly hindered funding. The availability of debt financing for companies’ investments has also fundamentally weakened. The governments of several countries have considered it necessary to support financial institutions, thereby securing, among other things, a foundation for investments which are necessary for society as a whole. The necessity of curbing climate change and reducing carbon dioxide emissions is being widely acknowledged. This has further increased the interest of financial institutions in providing funding for projects which are sustainable in terms of the climate and thereby economically solid. In this context, general acceptability of additional construction of nuclear energy capacity has increased around the world. The general acceptability of nuclear energy both internationally and particularly in Finland, together with the stable political environment, supports the feasibility of funding the project. Taking into account the substantial electricity needs and significant financial resources of the Fennovoima shareholders, together with the economic viability of nuclear energy, Fennovoima and its 64 shareholders consider that the project can be financed at all phases in a way that is satisfactory to all parties.

Financing of nuclear waste management and decommissioning The licensee of a nuclear power plant (construction license or operating license) has a nuclear waste management obligation. A licensee with this obligation is responsible for all costs incurred from the appropriate management of nuclear waste generated in the operations of the nuclear power plant, even after the power plant is no longer in operation. The licensee is also responsible under this obligation for the appropriate decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. In Finland, the funds required to pay for nuclear waste management and decommissioning are collected on an annual basis from the licensee while the nuclear power plant is in operation. The funds needed for nuclear waste management of all nuclear power plants operating in Finland are collected in compliance with a uniform procedure and deposited in the national Nuclear Waste Management Fund. This ensures that the money required to pay for nuclear waste management is secure for society and available in all circumstances. Fennovoima estimates that the total annual cost of nuclear waste management at the planned nuclear power plant throughout its useful life will be EUR 30 to 50 million on average at current prices. The waste management cost estimate includes the costs of storage, transportation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the costs of reactor waste management including final disposal, the costs of decommissioning the nuclear power plant, and the costs of research, development, administration, taxes and other nuclear waste management measures. Waste management will account for less than 10 percent of the overall production costs of electricity produced at the nuclear power plant. Fennovoima’s annual costs of nuclear waste management and decommissioning will be included in the cost price that shareholders will pay for the electricity they use. Fennovoima shareholders will finance the costs of nuclear waste management and decommissioning in full.


Supplement 1b

Insurance required under the Nuclear Liability Act The provisions of the Nuclear Liability Act regarding indemniďŹ cation arising from nuclear damage will be applied to the nuclear power plant once it begins operations. Pursuant to the Nuclear Liability Act, Fennovoima is, as the licensee and operator of the nuclear power plant, obliged to indemnify damage caused as a result of an incident arising at the plant. Liability for damages rests with Fennovoima, independent of whether the damage was caused by an action of Fennovoima. Under the current Nuclear Liability Act, the maximum liability for the licensee and operator of a nuclear power plant for damage caused by a single incident is about EUR 200 million. Fennovoima is required to obtain liability insurance or other indemnity as required in the Nuclear Liability Act and, subject to approval by the Insurance Supervisory Authority for each nuclear power plant unit, to ensure that indemniďŹ cation can be paid under all circumstances. The current amount of liability insurance or other indemnity is about EUR 240 million7 per power plant unit. A reform of nuclear liability legislation is ongoing. The Act concerning the amendment of the Nuclear Liability Act (493/2005) was enacted in 2005, and its entry into force will be enacted separately by a government decree. It is not precisely known when the new Act will enter into force. With the amended Nuclear Liability Act, the liability of an operator of a nuclear facility located in Finland for nuclear damage arising in Finland caused by a single nuclear incident will be unlimited, and the amount of liability insurance or other indemnity required under the Act will rise to EUR 700 million per nuclear power plant unit. Fennovoima will take out a liability insurance policy or other indemnity as required in the Nuclear Liability Act and subject to approval by the Insurance Supervisory Authority before the planned nuclear power plant is started up.

7) According to the Nuclear Liability Act in force, the maximum amount of liability is 175 million special drawing rights allocated by the International Monetary Fund. The liability insurance or other indemnity required for each nuclear power plant unit is 210 special drawing rights. At the exchange rate of December 2008, 175 million special drawing rights equate to about EUR 200 million, and 210 million special drawing rights correspond to about EUR 240 million.

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38

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Presentation of Fennovoima shareholders This chapter contains a brief presentation of all 64 Fennovoima shareholders8. They are given in alphabetical order. Alajärven Sähkö Oy is engaged in the retail sale and transmission of electricity and is owned by its customers.

in producing electricity, district heating and energy solutions. Oy Herrfors Ab produces, sells and distributes electricity and district

Oy Aga Ab produces and markets industrial and special gases and related technology and services. In the production of industrial gases, electricity is used for cooling and compression and for running various pumps and blowers. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled EUR 170 million. AGA belongs to The Linde Group, the leading gas supplier in the world. AGA employs some 400 people in Finland.

heating to customers in Maksamaa, Oravainen, Teerijärvi, Ylivieska, Alavieska and part of Pedersöre. Herrfors belongs to the Katternö Group owned by energy companies in Central Ostrobothnia.

Atria plc is a listed company in the food sector, engaged in meat processing and ready meals. Energy is an important resource in Atria’s high quality production, required for instance to power cold storage equipment. Atria net sales in 2007 totaled approximately EUR 1,300 million. The company employs some 6,000 people, of which about 2,400 in Finland.

tion and sales company in the Imatra area, owned principally by its household and corporate customers and municipalities in the area.

Boliden Harjavalta Oy belongs to the Boliden Group of Sweden. Based in Harjavalta, the company engages in copper processing and nickel concentrate smelting and also manufactures copper cathodes in Pori. The industry is highly energy intensive; the company needs electricity for melting copper and for electrolytic copper production. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled EUR 140 million, and personnel numbered just over 400. Boliden Kokkola Oy is the second largest zinc plant in Europe and the fourth largest in the world. Boliden Kokkola belongs to the Boliden Group. Zinc production is highly energy intensive despite the fact that the plant has an efficient and environmentally friendly production process. The electrolytic stage in particular consumes much electricity. Boliden Kokkola is the largest private sector employer in the town of Kokkola, with a personnel of about 600. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled approximately EUR 270 million. Componenta plc is an international metal industry group listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Componenta manufactures metal industry components and assemblies. Component manufacture requires a great deal of energy due to the properties of iron and aluminum; working iron requires a temperature of more than 1,500 degrees Celsius. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled approximately EUR 640 million. Componenta has some 5,100 employees, about one fifth of which are employed in Finland. Its headquarters and most of its production units are located in Finland. E.ON AG (E.ON Nordic AB) is the world’s largest privately owned energy company, engaged principally in the production and sale of energy. The E.ON Group has some 35 million customers and operates in more than 20 countries. Its main market areas are Central Europe, the UK, the Nordic countries, Russia and the USA. The Group’s net sales in 2007 totaled EUR 68 billion, and it has 88,000 employees. The company is listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. E.ON Nordic AB is, together with its subsidiaries, the fourth largest electricity producer in the Nordic countries. The Finnish members of the E.ON Group are E.ON Suomi Oy, Kainuun Energia Oy and Karhu Voima Oy, which between them have about 90,000 electricity customers. E.ON aims to acquire more customers and to invest in electricity production and renewable energy projects in Finland. Esse Elektro Kraft Ab is a privately owned company engaged in pro-

ducing, transmitting and selling energy in South Ostrobothnia. Etelä-Savon Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Mikkeli and engaged in producing, transmitting and selling electricity and district heating in the Mikkeli area; it also sells electricity nationwide. Finnfoam Oy is a Finnish family business that manufactures heat insulation. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled approximately EUR 50 million. The company employs about 40 people. Haminan Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of

Hamina engaging in the maintenance and operation of electricity, natural gas, district heating and telecommunications networks and

Hiirikosken Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the Munici-

pality of Vähänkyrö engaging in electricity production, sales and distribution. Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy is an electricity production, distribu-

Itä-Lapin Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Kemijärvi

and the Municipalities of Salla, Pelkosenniemi and Savukoski engaging in the administration of shares in electricity production. It is a subsidiary of Koillis-Lapin Sähkö Oy. Jylhän Sähköosuuskunta is an electricity cooperative in Kauhava en-

gaging in the production, sales and transmission of electricity. The cooperative is owned by 1,100 private individuals in Kauhava. Jyväskylän Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Jyväskylä engaging in the electricity, district heating and water business. Kemin Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Kemi whose services include electricity transmission and district heating sales. Keravan Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Ker-

ava and the Municipality of Sipoo. It is principally engaged in electricity and district heating production and distribution. Kesko plc (Kestra Kiinteistöpalvelut Oy) is a retail trade conglomerate operating in the Baltic Sea area, with net sales totaling EUR 9.5 billion in 2007. In Finland, Kesko and K shopkeepers employ some 40,000 people. Kesko is active in the food, hardware, department store, agricultural and machinery retail trade. Kesko is a major consumer of electricity, accounting for about 1% of Finland’s total electricity consumption. The company’s energy needs stem from the maintenance of properties and the operating of cold storage equipment. Koillis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy sells and distributes electricity in an area at the junction of South Ostrobothnia, Central Finland and the Tampere Region. It is municipally owned by the municipalities of Virrat, Ähtäri, Alavus, Töysä, Keuruu ja Kihniö. Kokemäen Sähkö Oy is a company in Kokemäki engaging in electricity sales and distribution. Kotkan Energia Oy is an energy company wholly owned by the City of Kotka; its main products are district heating, electricity and industrial steam. Kotkan Energia also sells natural gas to industry. Kruunupyyn Sähkölaitos is the electricity utility of the Municipality of Kruunupyy, procuring and distributing electricity in the Kruunupyy area. KSS Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Kouvola

and engaging in the production, sales and transmission of electricity and district heating. Kuopion Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Kuopio, supplying its customers with electricity and district heating. Kuoreveden Sähkö Oy is a local electricity company that sells and

produces electricity for customers in its area and is responsible for electricity transmission. Köyliön-Säkylän Sähkö Oy produces and sells electricity in the municipalities of Säkylä, Köyliö and Eura. The company has some 200 shareholders. Lahti Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Lahti

and engaging in the procurement and distribution of electricity, district heating and natural gas to its customers.

8) If the holding entitling to electricity at cost price is fully owned by a subsidiary of a shareholder, the name of the subsidiary is given in parentheses after the name of the parent company.


Supplement 1b

Lankosken Sähkö Oy is a local electricity producer owned by its cus-

tomers and municipalities; it also distributes and sells electricity in its network area in northern Satakunta and Ostrobothnia.

39

engaging in the production, distribution and sales of electricity to consumers in Simo and Kuivaniemi. Rauman Energia Oy is an energy company owned by the City of Rau-

Lehtimäen Sähkö Oy manages electricity distribution and sales in its

ma, providing electricity and district heating services.

network area in Lehtimäki.

Rautaruukki plc supplies metal-based components, systems and as-

Leppäkosken Sähkö is a group of mainly privately owned companies

semblies for the construction and mechanical engineering industries. The company has a wide range of metal products and services. The manufacture and refining of iron and steel consume significant amounts of electricity. Rautaruukki operates in 25 countries and has about 15,000 employees, of which about 7,500 in Finland. The company’s net sales in 2007 totaled EUR 3.9 billion, of which about 60% came from Finland and the other Nordic countries. The company’s shares are listed. The company uses the trade name ‘Ruukki’.

in the Tampere Region, selling and distributing electricity, district heating and natural gas to its customers. Mondo Minerals BV is a leading producer of talc. The company owns

and operates talc mines and production facilities in Finland. The Mondo Minerals Group is the largest supplier of talc to the paper and paint industries in Europe and the second largest worldwide. The Group’s net sales in 2007 totaled approximately EUR 130 million, and it has about 200 employees. Myllyn Paras Oy produces and markets flours, flakes, groats and pas-

ta, and also frozen dough and bakery products. The family-owned company has two plants in Hyvinkää. It employs just over 100 people, and its net sales in the financial period that ended in summer 2008 totaled EUR 40 million. Mäntsälän Sähkö Oy is a company owned by the Municipality of Män-

tsälä engaging in the production, transmission and sales of electricity, district heating and natural gas in the Uusimaa region. Nurmijärven Sähkö Oy (Nurmijärven Sähkönmyynti Oy) is a local en-

ergy company owned by the Municipality of Nurmijärvi engaging in the sales of electricity and district heating. Omya Oy is the Finnish subsidiary of the international Omya Group,

which manufactures and markets high grade calcium carbonate and other industrial raw materials. The company’s products are used as paper filler and coating and as functional components in plastics, rubber, paints and glues. The products are also suitable for the construction material industry, the process industry and agriculture. Omya is a privately owned company that employs 80 people in Finland. Keskusosuuskunta Oulun Seudun Sähkö is a central cooperative

formed by twelve electricity cooperatives and three other organizations. Its purpose is to produce electricity that its member cooperatives in the Oulu area then sell to their customers. Outokummun Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Outo-

kumpu; its services include electricity supply, network services and heating supply. Outokumpu plc is an international listed company that manufac-

tures stainless steel. The manufacture of stainless steel is energy intensive even though the production facilities are modern, because smelting the raw materials in an electric arc furnace requires a lot of electricity. In Finland, Outokumpu also produces the most important additive to stainless steel, ferrochromium, and it aims to expand this production. Ferrochromium production is highly energy intensive, 30% to 35% of its production costs being accounted for by the cost of electricity. The net sales of Outokumpu plc in 2007 totaled EUR 6.9 billion, of which 95% came from outside Finland. Outokumpu employs 8,100 people worldwide, of which about one third in Finland. Its largest shareholder is the Finnish government with a holding of about 40%. Ovako Bar Oy Ab belongs to the Ovako Group. Ovako manufactures

long special steel elements for the vehicle and mechanical engineering industries. Its main market areas are the Nordic countries and Europe. Special steel is manufactured by smelting recycled steel in electric arc furnaces. Ovako Group net sales in 2007 totaled EUR approximately 1.5 billion. Ovako has 4,300 employees.

Rovakairan Tuotanto Oy is an electricity production company owned

by the City of Rovaniemi and the Municipalities of Kittilä and Sodankylä. Sallila Energia Oy is a privately owned energy company that procures, distributes and sells electricity in its operating area in Kanta-Häme. Seinäjoen Energia Oy is a corporation owned by the City of Seinäjoki

engaging in the production and sales of electricity and district heating. Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta (SOK) and its subsidiaries and

22 regional cooperative stores form the S Group retail trade conglomerate. The S Group is engaged in the supermarket trade, service stations and vehicle fuel sales, department stores and specialist stores, the hotel and restaurant sector, the vehicle and vehicle component trade and the agricultural trade. The S Group has more than 1,500 stores and service points in Finland. The maintenance of a geographically broad and extensive service network requires considerable amounts of electricity. The retail sales of the S Group in 2007 totaled EUR 10.5 billion. The S Group employs more than 36,500 service professionals. Tammisaaren Energia is a utility owned by the City of Tammisaari engaging in the sales of electricity nationwide, the transmission of electricity in the city center of Tammisaari and the production, sales and transmission of district heating in Tammisaari and Karjaa. Oy Turku Energia – Åbo Energi Ab is an energy corporation owned by

the City of Turku; its core business consists of electricity and heating production, transmission and sales. Uudenkaarlepyyn Voimalaitos is a utility owned by the City of Uusi-

kaarlepyy engaging in the production and sales of electricity and heating. Valio Oy is a company owned by Finnish dairy producers engaging in the processing and marketing of mainly milk-based products. Valio’s net sales total approximately EUR 1.7 billion, of which two thirds comes from Finland. The delivery of high quality products to customers requires electricity for refrigeration and for the operation of process equipment. Valio employs some 3,500 people in Finland. Valkeakosken Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Valkeako-

ski engaging in the delivery of electricity, district heating and natural gas and related services to its customers in the Valkeakoski area. Vantaan Energia Oy produces, distributes and sells electricity, district

heating and natural gas in Vantaa. Vantaan Energia is owned by the City of Vantaa (60%) and the City of Helsinki (40%). Vatajankosken Sähkö Oy is an energy company owned by the Municipalities of Karvia and Kankaanpää engaging in the sales of electricity in northern Satakunta and district heating in Kankaanpää.

Paneliankosken Voima Oy is a mainly privately owned company that

Vetelin Sähkölaitos Oy is a municipal electricity producer and distributor owned by the Municipality of Veteli.

produces, distributes and sells electricity at Panelia.

Vimpelin Voima Oy is a mainly privately owned electricity company

Parikkalan Valo Oy is a customer-owned company that sells and trans-

in the municipality of Vimpeli engaging in electricity transmission and sales and electrical contracting.

mits electricity in and near Parikkala. Pietarsaaren Energialaitos is an energy utility owned by the City of Pietarsaari, engaging in the distribution of electricity in Pietarsaari and neighboring municipalities and in the production of district heating in Pietarsaari.

Vakka-Suomen Voima Oy (VSV Energiapalvelu Oy) engages in the

production and sales of electricity. The majority of the company’s shares are owned by private shareholders. Ålands Elandeslag distributes and sells electricity in rural areas and

Porvoon Energia Oy – Borgå Energi Ab is a company owned by the City

on islands in Åland. The cooperative is owned by 10,000 customers.

of Porvoo, engaging in the production, distribution and sales of electricity, district heating and natural gas.

Ääneseudun Energia Oy is a company owned by the City of Äänekos-

Rantakairan Sähkö Oy is a company in Simo, owned by its customers,

ki whose core business consists of electricity sales and transmission and the district heating and water business.


40

Ydinvoimalaitoksen periaatepäätöshakemus • Fennovoima


Liite 4a

Information about Fennovoima Supplement 1C Report on the planned implementation and organization of the project and Fennovoima’s available expertise

41


42

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Contents

Summary ......................................................................................................................43 Introduction ..................................................................................................................44 Implementation of the project ....................................................................................44 Project success factors ............................................................................................44 Preparation phase ...................................................................................................47 Procurement phase .................................................................................................49 Licencing phase ......................................................................................................50 Construction and commissioning phase ..............................................................51 Operation and decommissioning ..........................................................................52 Fennovoima organization and competence ................................................................53 Project organization development.........................................................................53 Organization at the various phases of the project ................................................54 Using E.ON’s expertise .................................................................................................56 Commitment to the project...................................................................................56 Expertise and resources ..........................................................................................56 Practical implementation of cooperation .............................................................60 Other expertise available to Fennovoima ....................................................................61 Using the expertise of other shareholders .............................................................61 Using outside expertise...........................................................................................62


Supplement 1c

Summary

Fennovoima has access to sufficient expertise for building a nuclear power plant in compliance with the safety requirements and the set objectives. Fennovoima has the goal of beginning electricity production at the nuclear power plant in 2020 at the latest. The main factors that play the role in the progress of the project are the licensing processes required by nuclear energy, construction and environmental legislation and the management of the design and construction of the nuclear power plant. Fennovoima will select a method of implementation that is balanced with regard to risk management. Balanced distribution of implementation risks between Fennovoima and other parties will ensure that the project is realized as planned. The type of contract for the delivery of the plant will be selected and concluded so that Fennovoima will be able to monitor the quality of the design and of the implementation of the project during all phases of the project. A significant part of the required technological expertise will be provided by the international power plant suppliers responsible for the delivery of the principal components of the reactor and turbine island, independently from the procurement method. Expertise essential for the safety and the operation of the power plant will be acquired by Fennovoima in the course of the project implementation. The Fennovoima project organization will employ 150 to 200 people during the procurement and permitting phases and 270–330 people during the construction and commissioning phases. Most of the expertise needed in the project organization involves normal project management and quality management, and power plant construction and industrial construction. Sufficient expertise is available on the job market. The project organization responsible for implementing the project will become the operating organization of the nuclear power plant during the commissioning phase. The safety of the nuclear power plant will be ensured by transferring the accumulated design, construction and operating expertise to the operating organization. The operating organization will comprise 300 to 500 employees. For the current preparation phase of the project, the company has recruited nuclear power professionals with extensive experience in the preparation, design and construction of a nuclear power plant. The organization will be strengthened periodically in accordance with Fennovoima plans. Fennovoima’s shareholder E.ON is the owner or co-owner of 21 nuclear power plant units operating in Europe. In nine of these, E.ON is the responsible licensee. E.ON’s nuclear organization employs some 4,000 people. The company’s expertise covers all aspects of the life cycle of a nuclear power plant. E.ON is committed to the implementation of the Fennovoima project and to ensuring the availability of the required expertise. E.ON’s expertise in all the areas required for implementation of the project is at Fennovoima’s disposal.

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44

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Introduction

In accordance with section 24(1)(3), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application to be presented to the government for a decision-in-principle must be supplemented with a description of the expertise available to the applicant. The purpose of the present report is to provide the information referred to in the above point of law concerning the expertise available to Fennovoima for the design, procurement, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of the nuclear power plant specified in the application. Under section 7f of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), Fennovoima is responsible for the nuclear power plant specified in the application being built in compliance with safety standards and for the safe use of the nuclear power plant. Ensuring safety requires that Fennovoima has the appropriate and sufficient expertise available during each phase of the project. The government decree on general provisions regarding the safety of a nuclear power plant (733/2008) specifies in chapter 7 the requirements concerning the organization and the personnel of a nuclear power plant. Similar requirements regarding the management system of a nuclear power plant are given in the YVL 1.4 Guide (Management systems for nuclear facilities) of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The principal requirements concern an advanced safety culture, safety and quality management, the management system and responsibilities, and expertise. The requirements apply to the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. In the design and construction of a nuclear power plant, crucial technical choices and decisions are made that will affect the safety and quality of the plant far into the future. The party responsible for the nuclear power plant project, Fennovoima, must have access to a wide range of high-quality expertise in project management and nuclear power plant technology. In order to implement the project successfully, the responsible party must correctly interpret Finnish safety regulations and convey their demands to the supplier of the nuclear power plant or the suppliers of systems and components. This report is based on preliminary plans drawn up by Fennovoima about how the project will progress and how it will be implemented. Fennovoima will submit to STUK, as required in the YVL 1.1 Guide (Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities), general plans for the facility’s implementation organization, the suppliers of the facility and its most important systems and components, as well as quality management of the implementation.

Implementation of the project Project success factors Management and safety culture Successful implementation of the project means that the nuclear power plant will be designed and constructed so as to meet the requirements for safety, quality, scheduling and cost imposed by various parties. The principal organization and expertise factors relevant for the success of the project are:


Supplement 1c

– an advanced safety culture where safety is always given priority; and – project planning and project management based on best practices and experience. Fennovoima will obtain for its organization the expertise required for safe and high quality implementation of all crucial areas at each phase of the project. These areas include nuclear and radiation safety; nuclear power, power plant, construction and environmental technology; quality management; and project planning and project management. Leading experts in these areas will participate in decision-making in the project. Fennovoima is developing robust practices to support an organizational culture conducive to safety. The company’s process-integrated management system defines chains of command and responsibility and supports transparent decision-making. The management system is described in Supplement 4A to this application. All suppliers to the project are required to do the same and to require the entire supply chain to agree to the same safety and quality commitments. Contractual relationships between Fennovoima and the suppliers to the project will be established in a manner that ensures cooperation and proactive behavior. It is not feasible to transfer all project risks contractually from Fennovoima to other parties. Any risks realized may affect Fennovoima, as Fennovoima is ultimately responsible for the project and its safety. Therefore Fennovoima is assigning sufficient resources to risk identification, monitoring and management instead of delegating these to other parties. Quality management Fennovoima will prepare and introduce a quality system compliant with the ISO 9001 standard, an environmental system compliant with the ISO 14001 standard and an occupational safety and health system compliant with the OHSAS 18001 standard. To ensure the availability of the special expertise required for implementing the project, the Fennovoima management system incorporates plans for the recruitment, training and development of experts. As the commissioning of the nuclear power plant approaches, the Fennovoima organization will change from a project organization to an operating organization so that the safety and production goals set for the nuclear power plant can be achieved from the start of the operating phase. For this purpose, recruitment and training of operating personnel and training of personnel in the project organization for operating duties will begin while construction is still ongoing Schedule and phases of the project Construction of the nuclear power plant is an extremely important project, and Fennovoima estimates that it will last at take ten years from project preparation to commercial operation. Fennovoima has the goal of beginning electricity production at the nuclear power plant in 2020 at the latest. Fennovoima has received preliminary estimates from plant suppliers as to how long construction will take. The time required for construction and installation of one nuclear power plant unit is between four and five years depending on the type of plant chosen. Commissioning will begin in 2018–2019, and commercial use will begin in 2019–2020, depending on the type of plant and the supplier. If the nuclear power plant is to consist of two nuclear power plant units, construction of the second unit is

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46

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

planned to begin within one to two years of the construction of the ďŹ rst. This will ensure the optimum use in the construction of the second unit of expertise and resources acquired in the construction of the ďŹ rst. It is not of crucial relevance to the project timetable whether there are pre-existing industrial installations, such as earlier nuclear power plants, at the site of the nuclear power plant. The preparation and design phases for the new nuclear power plant will in any case take so much time that the necessary preparations for the site of the new plant can be carried out without delaying the project. At a completely new site, existing installations will pose no limitations on construction. The main factors that play a role in the progress of the project are the licensing of the nuclear facilities, the construction and environmental legislation and the management of the design and construction of the nuclear power plant. Recent experiences in Finland have shown that the timely management of the design and construction of a nuclear power plant is vital for the uninterrupted progress of the project. The Fennovoima project is subdivided into phases as shown in Table 1C-1 on the basis of the decision-making milestones provided for in the nuclear energy legislation (decision-in-principle, construction license, operating license). The preliminary timetable for the project is shown in Figure 1C-1.

Table 1C-1 Phases of the Fennovoima project and their principal content.

Phase

Content

Preparation

Investigating site options Environmental impact assessment Feasibility studies for plant options Planning preparation Pre-planning Application for decision-in-principle Decision-in-principle (government and parliament)

Procurement

Licensing

Choice of site Procurement of plant Basic design Planning and building permit procedure Application for construction license Detailed design Construction license (government)

Construction and commissioning

Preparation of plant site Construction Application for operating license Trial run and commissioning Operating license (government)

Use

Normal use Continued improvement of safety Periodic safety review Renewal of operating license Periodic safety review (STUK) Operating license (government)

Decommissioning

End of use Licensing processes related to decommissioning Dismantling the plant


Supplement 1c

Preparation

Procurement

Permits

47

Construction and commissioning

Use

Planning Selection of plant site

Preparation of plant site

Pre-planning / project planning Basic design Detailed design Plant contract

Construction work

Beginning main casting

*)

Installation

*)

Commissioning

Decision-in-principle

Building permit

Environmental permit and water permit

Construction license

Operating license *)

Commercial use

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

*)

2019

2020

*) Depends on the type of plant and the supplier

Preparation phase The outline of the preparation phase is shown in Table 1C-1. During the preparation phase, Fennovoima has drawn up a general plan of the quality control system and its development. The design and procurement modules of the quality management system will be introduced during this phase. Alternatives for project implementation The procurement of the nuclear power plant can be approached in different ways. The methods of implementation differ from one another according to how the scope of delivery, duties, responsibilities and risks are shared between the main power plant supplier, the suppliers of the component systems and Fennovoima. The method of implementation will affect the overall price of the plant and what expertise, resources and organization are required of Fennovoima for the successful execution of the project. In any case, the responsibility for ensuring the safety of the plant remains with the licensee as referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act, i.e. with Fennovoima. FulďŹ lling this responsibility requires the company to have signiďŹ cant expertise of its own, regardless of which procurement method is chosen. Fennovoima has explored the applicability of various implementation alternatives and contractual models to the project. The following are considered the most feasible:

Figure 1C-1 Preliminary schedule for the Fennovoima project.


Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

48

– A turnkey model where Fennovoima concludes an agreement for the delivery of the entire plant with one supplier or supplier consortium. The supplier is responsible for the entire plant, comprising the nuclear power plant technology, the turbine plant and the construction work. Fennovoima agrees separately on the delivery of components such as preparation of the site and infrastructure development. – A turnkey model where Fennovoima concludes agreements on the deliveries referred to above but also on the separate delivery of construction work and certain auxiliary systems with third-party contractors and suppliers independent of the supplier consortium. – A component delivery model, where Fennovoima is in charge of general planning and concludes separate agreements for several major component systems. In large construction projects involving several major international companies, it is usual for the developer to employ a technical expert organization specializing in project management of large projects. The responsibilities of Fennovoima concerning timetables and overall costs are the larger the more parts there are in the procurement of the nuclear power plant and the more contractual connections there are in the project. Managing procurement as Figure 1C-2 Alternatives for project implementation

Manner of delivery

Fennovoima participation increases

Turnkey delivery (including construction)

Turnkey delivery (without construction)

Component delivery

Plant

Plant

Plant

Reactor plant

Turbine plant

Ancillary systems

Reactor plant

Turbine plant

Ancillary systems

Construction

Reactor plant

Turbine plant

Ancillary systems

Construction

Fennovoima responsibility

Risks

• Lowest procurement risk • Minimal lack of integration

• Moderate risk (construction and ancillary systems not critical)

• Cost and timetable risks assumed by Fennovoima • Limited performance guarantees

Costs

• Highest price due to reservations • Prices are rising due to the market situation

• Moderate price • Own procurement increases competition

• Low cost (competitive tendering for components) • Maximum local sub-contracting

Resources

• Simplest project organization • Least amount of duties for Fennovoima organization

• More resources for the basic organization (construction and own systems)

• Many different resources (design/ management/control/monitoring)

Transfer of information

• Information transfer to satisfy basic requirements • Not much practical experience

• Somewhat extensive transfer of information • Some level of practical experience

• Extensive and comprehensive information transfer • Practical experience in various areas

• No direct impact on planning (through agreement and QA)

• Limited scope for influence (construction and system design)

• Great potential for influence • Increased Fennovoima control of big picture

Impact on planning

Decreasing Fennovoima procurement risk


Supplement 1c

several separate component systems can result in a lower total cost, and there is more potential for influencing the implementation of the plant. Figure 1C-2 shows a comparison between the principles of the various manners of implementation. The method of implementation also affects the degree of domestic origin of the project. As Fennovoima participation increases, the potential for improving the degree of domestic origin in the project improves. The method of implementation will be selected following the interaction with the suppliers during the procurement phase. The implementation mode is intended to strike a balance between risk management and a high degree of domestic origin. Pre-planning The alternatives for the nuclear technology component system supplier for one or more nuclear power plant units for the Fennovoima project, established at the preparation phase, are the Franco-German consortium Areva NP with the plant options EPR and SWR-1000 and the Japanese company Toshiba with the plant option ABWR. Pre-planning at the preparation phase involves technical design and project planning. During the pre-planning phase, Fennovoima will agree on the definition of the schedule and on the method of implementation, and will also make preparations for project management and particularly for the management of technical design requirements, the division of duties and the management of interfaces. The extent and depth of Fennovoima technical design will depend on the method of implementation. The greater the number of components that the procurement is divided into, the more Fennovoima will invest in project planning and project management.

Procurement phase The outline of the procurement phase is shown in Table 1C-1. During the procurement phase, Fennovoima will prepare and introduce the quality management system. Plant procurement Under section 15 of the Nuclear Energy Act, before Parliament has made its decision, the applicant shall not initiate measures to be laid down by decree which, because of their economic significance, might impede parliament’s or the government’s possibilities to decide at its discretion. Such measures include, for instance, concluding an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant or any key component, device or structure thereof; this means that the plant delivery agreements cannot be finalized until the decision-in-principle has been ratified. Basic design During the basic design phase, the pre-planning work from the feasibility studies of the preparation phase will be extended to plant safety design, circumstances observed in detailed study of the site of the future plant, and the organization and timetable of the construction phase. The progress of the design of the nuclear power plant and key achievements are illustrated in Figure 1C-3. The course and timing of the basic design depends crucially on the choice of plant alternative and method of implementation. The objective of the basic design is to carry

49


Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

50

Figure 1C-3 Nuclear power plant design progress and key achievements.

Detailed design • • • • • • • • • • • •

System descriptions PI and automation schematics Piping drawings and documents Equipment placement plans Architectural and structural drawings Construction documents SPs for equipment and steel structures Manufacturing material for SI FSAR and PSA for operating license Commissioning programs Final design material User instructions

Basic design • • • • • • •

Process descriptions and flow charts Equipment and system specifications Placement and layout plans Principal circuit diagram Automation architecture Procurement documents PSAR, PSA and safety classification document for construction license

Pre-planning • Plant description and TSAR • Site plan and plant layout • Requirements and scope of delivery for plant suppliers • Environmental impact assessment report • Descriptions and plans for decision-in-principle

TSAR = Topical Safety Analysis Report PSAR = Preliminary Safety Analysis Report FSAR = Final Safety Analysis Report PS = Probabilistic Safety Assessment SP = structural plan SI = structural inspection Items in blue are documents to be submitted to the authorities.

the plant design to a phase enabling application for a construction license. Fennovoima will design and introduce technical assembly management at the basic design phase. Together with the management of requirements, this will ensure seamless transfer of technical information for project implementation and for the future operation of the power plant. The design inspections required by Fennovoima constitute an essential part of the handling and inspection process for the plans drawn up at the basic design phase.

Licencing phase Application for construction license Fennovoima aims to apply for a construction license on the basis of the basic design work for the nuclear power plant so that no issues regarding systems, structures and equipment essential to the safety of the plant remain to be handled after the construction licensing process. Fennovoima will ensure that the preliminary safety analysis report prepared jointly with the suppliers is completed on time and fulfills the requirements. Applying for a construction license on the basis of a design which is essentially unfinished would translate into problems with the progress of the project. According to STUK Guide YVL 1.1, the construction of a nuclear facility shall not begin, as far as the structures affecting nuclear safety are concerned, before the government has granted the construction license required by the Nuclear Energy Act. Beginning the formwork and reinforcing work of the safety-classified concrete structures at the building site is considered by Fennovoima to be construction of this kind.


Supplement 1c

The project’s planning procedure and its timetable is described in more detail for each alternative site in Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D to the application.

Construction and commissioning phase During the construction and commissioning phase, the designers, contractors and suppliers are responsible for carrying out the work. Fennovoima will ensure through efficient and safety level conscious quality management and project management that the quality of the design and of the implementation fulfills the set requirements. Fennovoima will begin training of the plant operating personnel during the construction and commissioning phase in accordance with detailed recruitment and training plans to be drawn up jointly with the reactor plant supplier. Detailed design In the detailed design of the nuclear power plant, the power plant supplier and the component system suppliers draw up documents for implementation. Because this is partly done when the construction phase has already begun, it is important to ensure compatibility with earlier phases and between the various areas of design. This will eliminate the need for inconvenient alterations that may have repercussions on the timetable and on the cost of the project. The detailed safety documents for the plant as referred to in section 36 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, such as the final safety description for the plant, will be drawn up during the construction phase. Detailed design will generate a large number of documents; Fennovoima will provide sufficient expertise for inspecting these. For handling of documents and drawings at each phase, efficient methods will be introduced for receiving, evaluating, inspecting, storing and distributing the design and working materials in an appropriate way. Fennovoima will establish procedures for the production and processing of design materials to avoid having to discuss the same materials several times with the authorities. The aim is to achieve a one-step procedure where the documents required for submission to the authorities are drawn up on the basis of requirements and model materials laid down by Fennovoima and approved in one step. The documents are prepared so that the relevant authority can approve them in one process. An advanced document management system will be introduced and harmonized with comparable systems for the suppliers and the authorities. Construction During construction, the suppliers themselves will engage in quality assurance on site through a variety of inspections and tests. This is to ensure that implementation conforms to designs and fulfills the set requirements. The equipment in the nuclear power plant will be manufactured and installed during construction. Fennovoima, the responsible supplier and the authorities will inspect the manufacturing and installation plans before work begins. All parties will monitor the work. This monitoring will in turn be supervised by the authorities. Any deviations from the production and installation plans will be reported, and a procedure for handling deviations will be agreed upon with Fennovoima and with the authorities if required.

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Preparing application for operating license Operating a nuclear power plant requires a license as referred to in section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act (operating license). Fennovoima aims to submit an application for the operating license on the basis of detailed planning and implementation of the nuclear power plant. Fennovoima will ensure that the final safety analysis report prepared jointly with the suppliers is completed on time and fulfills the requirements. Commissioning The commissioning of the nuclear power plant will begin with equipment testing, continue with the powering up of systems and conclude with a trial run of the entire plant for each phase. Functional and other requirements set for equipment and systems will be tested using analyses and trials specified in the commissioning and trial programs drawn up by the suppliers and inspected by Fennovoima. The test and inspection reports prepared during the commissioning will lay the foundation for the tests and inspections during the plant operation. The commissioning is also an important phase in the training of the operating personnel of the plant.

Operation and decommissioning Safe use and continuous improvement of safety During the operating phase, Fennovoima is responsible for ensuring that everything related to the use of the nuclear power plant is safe and fulfills the requirements. The management staff of the plant and the plant’s key functional units such as the operations unit, maintenance unit, safety unit and technical support unit report directly to the responsible plant manager. Each unit has a responsible director who is also a member of the plant’s management team. In the operation of the plant, Fennovoima will in many respects draw on the best practices established at E.ON’s nuclear power plants. Such cooperation can yield significant benefits, for instance in safety and in quality management. The best practices of E.ON nuclear power plants and nuclear energy functions can be used in this context. One example of the synergic benefits is the procurement of nuclear fuel, which is described in Supplement 5A to this application. Through E.ON, Fennovoima has direct access to an extensive operational experience and the design history of most types of nuclear power plants in Europe. Fennovoima is the only Finnish power company with access to this valuable resource. Once Fennovoima converts the project organization responsible for implementing the project into an operating organization, it will be given the necessary information on the design, construction and commissioning of the plant and the expertise necessary for operating the plant safely and efficiently by the vendor. This will ensure the transferring of the experience and knowledge acquired during the implementation of the project to the operations of the plant. The government decree on general provisions regarding the safety of a nuclear power plant (733/2008) requires that operating experiences at nuclear power plants must be compiled and the results of safety studies monitored, and both must be evaluated with a view to identifying potential for improving safety. The aim of continuous improvement of safety is an important part of the advanced safety culture required of the Fennovoima operating organization.


Supplement 1c

Operating license renewal and periodic safety review The operating license for a nuclear power plant is granted by the government. The validity of operating licenses for current nuclear power plants in Finland has varied from a few years to the 20 years or so of the operating licenses currently in force. Under section 24 of the Nuclear Energy Act, a license to operate a nuclear power plant may only be granted for a fixed term. Applying for an operating license for a nuclear power plant is a procedure which is essentially the same for both new and existing nuclear power plants. The processing of an operating license application involves, under section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act, an evaluation of occupational safety, population safety and environmental protection, nuclear waste management and the competence of the operating organization. An operating license is also subject to the conditions of the overall good of society, safety, nuclear waste management and physical protection and emergency planning and readiness arrangements referred to in sections 5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. So far, renewing the operating license for a nuclear power plant in Finland has taken between two and four years. The operating organization of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant has the capacity for preparing the documents required for the operating license application mostly by itself, because the application will be based on the documents referred to in section 36 of the Nuclear Energy Decree that must be continuously maintained. STUK Guide YVL 1.1 states that if a license is granted for a significantly longer term than ten years, STUK requires that the licensee carry out a periodic safety review of the facility and request its approval from STUK within about ten years of receiving the operating license or of conducting the previous periodic safety review. In terms of the work involved or the expertise required, a periodic safety review does not materially differ from a renewal of the operating license.

Fennovoima organization and competence Project organization development Fennovoima has recruited the key persons for the preparation phase and has drawn up a resource plan for the entire project. The project organization will be developed at the procurement and permit phases with a view to the needs of construction. The Fennovoima project organization will be expanded continuously and in good time as the anticipated needs of the future phases dictate. Future operating personnel will be recruited and trained during the construction and commissioning phase, and the future operating organization will be set up. There is sufficient expertise available on the job market to satisfy Fennovoima’s needs. The Fennovoima project organization consists of Fennovoima personnel and experts appointed by Fennovoima shareholders, particularly E.ON, to the project, and further of outside consultancies. Fennovoima will employ a design and project management consultant to improve the competence and expertise of its own organization in the implementation of the project. The design and project management consultants potentially usable in the Fennovoima project are large, experienced and international engineers’ offices that offer a wide range of design and project management services in the nuclear energy sector.

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Organization at the various phases of the project Preparation phase The key functions at the preparation phase of the Fennovoima project are project design, implementation design, site studies and pre-planning for the plant. The present organization of Fennovoima is consistent with these functions. The responsible managers at Fennovoima in charge of the preparation phase so far are: – Tapio Saarenpää, CEO (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1986, MBA 1996): 19 years of experience in nuclear safety, nuclear power technology and project management, including preparation of the Olkiluoto 3 project, and as managing director of Rauman Energia Oy. – Juhani Hyvärinen, Executive Vice President, Nuclear Engineering (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1988, D.Sc.(Tech.) 1996): 20 years of experience in nuclear safety and nuclear technology systems, including work as office manager at STUK. Internationally recognized nuclear safety expert. – Timo Kallio, Executive Vice President, Construction (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1980): 15 years of experience in nuclear power plant construction technology and construction management, including construction management on the Olkiluoto 3 project. – Mika Alava, Chief Financial Officer (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1996): 14 years of experience in power plant and infrastructure projects, with focus on accounting and financing. – Kristiina Honkanen, Executive Vice President, Environmental Affairs (M.Sc. (Tech.) 1982): 12 years of experience in environmental legislation, chemical safety and environmental management; e.g. environmental manager at M-Real plc. – Pasi Natri, Executive Vice President, Public Affairs (M.Pol.Sc. 1982): Extensive experience of decision-making in the public sector and of central government. – Kai Salminen, Nuclear Safety Manager (M.Sc.(Tech.) 2001): 8 years of experience in nuclear safety and nuclear power plant licensing, including heading the licensing project for the Loviisa nuclear power plant. – Juha Miikkulainen, Regional Manager (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1996): 10 years of experience in nuclear power technology and nuclear power plant automation projects, including reactor automation licensing in the Olkiluoto 3 project. – Juha Matikainen, Design Manager, Construction (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1994): 17 years of experience in construction technology and design work on major industrial projects. – Karri Huusko, Development Manager, Construction (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1996, certified project manager): 12 years years of experience in power plant projects, including three years of experience in the nuclear energy sector, e.g. project management and monitoring in the Olkiluoto 3 project. – Marjaana Vainio-Mattila, Environmental Manager (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1996): 5 years of experience in nuclear power plant environmental matters such as permits and environmental management; e.g. environmental expert at TVO. – Jarmo Tuominen, Senior Expert (M.Sc.(Tech.) 1972): 36 years of experience in power plant projects, of which 20 years in the design, project management and commissioning of nuclear power plants; e.g. design and commissioning of the Loviisa nuclear power plant, verification of the design of Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3, and consultation on Olkiluoto 3. The Fennovoima organization also includes experts, whose number will be increased at the preparation phase together with E.ON.


Supplement 1c

55

Procurement and permitting phases The key functions in organizing the design and procurement phase in the Fennovoima project are the completion of project planning, procurement planning, choice of site and preparation of plant site, basic design of the nuclear power plant and preparation of the application for a construction license, and management of other licensing processes. The provisional project organization structure at the procurement and permit phases is shown in Figure 1C-4. At this point, in 2010–2014, the personnel requirement for conducting the project is estimated to increase to about 150-200. An estimate of the personnel required per function in the organization at the design and procurement phase is given in Table 1C-2. The actual number of personnel required will depend in part on the chosen method of implementation.

Project manager

Administration and accounting

Communications

Quality management

Project planning

Safety

Environment

Power plant technology

Construction

Construction and commissioning phase Once the construction and commissioning phase begins, new functions will be needed in the project organization as the orientation of the project shifts from design to implementation. At this phase, the focus in the project organization will be on construction project management and supervision, official procedures, planning and inspection of the manufacture and installation of equipment and systems, and preparation of the application for the operating license and management of other licensing processes. At the construction phase, in 2015–2018, the personnel requirement of the organization will increase to 270–330. An estimate of the personnel required per function in the organization at the construction phase is given in Table 1C-2. The actual number of personnel required will depend on the implementation mode.

Figure 1C-4 Provisional Fennovoima project organization structure at the procurement and permit phases.


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Table 1C-2 Personnel requirement estimated by Fennovoima for the procurement and permit phases and for the construction and commissioning phase.

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

Function

Procurement and permit phases

Construction and commissioning phase

15

20

Project management

20

25

Quality management

15

30

Safety

10

30

Environment and occupational safety

10

15

Power plant technology

45–70

80–110

Construction

35–60

70–100

150–200

270–330

Administration, accounting and communications

Total

Operation and decommissioning The organization of Fennovoima during the operation phase will consist of 300–500 employees. The personnel complement of the operating organization will depend on the type of plant and the number of nuclear power plant units, and also on which percentage of the design work concerning the operation of the plant and the continuous improvement of safety is outsourced, for instance from the supplier of the nuclear technology component system or the turbine component system. It is the intention of Fennovoima that the operating personnel of the nuclear power plant will also handle its decommissioning, the operating organization being converted into the decommissioning organization towards the end of the useful life of the plant.

Using E.ON’s expertise Commitment to the project E.ON is the only Fennovoima shareholder that is an internationally active nuclear operator. The Finnish founding shareholders of Fennovoima chose E.ON as their partner in the project because the nuclear energy expertise of E.ON is necessary in supplementing and developing Fennovoima’s own expertise throughout the project. E.ON is, as Fennovoima’s largest single shareholder, committed to ensuring the expertise required for implementing the Fennovoima project by placing E.ON’s expertise in all the areas relevant for the project at the disposal of Fennovoima. The use of E.ON expertise and experience in the implementation of the project is entered into the Fennovoima’s shareholder agreement. Participation in the Fennovoima project is a key part of E.ON’s strategy regarding new nuclear power projects. Fennovoima and E.ON have entered into substantial cooperation already during the preparatory phase of the project. Continuation of this cooperation will be ensured contractually, defining the framework of the cooperation in accordance with the policies entered in the shareholder agreement.


Supplement 1c

57

Expertise and resources E.ON Group E.ON is the world’s largest privately owned energy company. E.ON employs about 80,000 employees in 31 countries. In Europe, E.ON operates more than 200 major electricity production facilities with a combined capacity of about 61,000 MW. E.ON aims to increase its electricity production capacity to about 90,000 MW by 2015. Right now, E.ON is in the process of building 15 new power plants in Europe, Russia and the United States. The major new building projects currently ongoing in Europe are shown in Figure 1C-5. E.ON is also pursuing the construction of a new nuclear power plant in the UK. E.ON Kernkraft E.ON’s nuclear division, E.ON Kernkraft GmbH (EKK), runs the largest privately owned fleet of nuclear power plants in Europe. E.ON is the owner or co-owner of 21 reactors operating in Europe. For nine of these, E.ON is the responsible licensee. In addition, 4 units are being decommisioned; also under E.ON’s supervision and ownership. The company employs some 4,000 people in its nuclear energy division. The company’s expertise covers all aspects of the life cyFigure 1C-5 Ongoing E.ON new power plant construction projects in the EU. Malmö Gas CHP 440 MW To be commissioned 2009 Maasvlakte 3 Coal 1,100 MW To be commissioned 2012

Oskarshamn (extension) Nuclear 430 MW To be completed 2008/12

Wilhelmshaven 50+ Coal 500 MW To be commissioned 2014

Ratcliffe Coal 2,000 MW Blir klar 2013

Datteln 4 Coal 1,100 MW To be commissioned 2011

Kingsnorth Coal 1,600 MW To be commissioned 2013

Staudinger 6 Coal 1,100 MW To be commissioned 2013

Grain CCGT 1,275 MW To be commissioned 2009

Malzenice CCGT 400 MW To be commissioned 2010

Antwerpen Coal 1,100 MW To be commissioned 2015

Göynü 1 CCGT 400 MW To be commissioned 2010

Livorno Ferraris CCGT 800 MW To be commissioned 2008

Irsching 4 CCGT 530 MW To be commissioned 2011

Irsching 5 CCGT 845 MW To be commissioned 2009

Under construction Planned


Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

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Figure 1C-6 Sites of E.ON nuclear power plants.

SWEDEN NORWAY

Power plant

Type

Net rated electricity output

Oskarshamn 1 Oskarshamn 2 Oskarshamn 3

BWR BWR BWR

473 MW 598 MW 1 152 MW

Brokdorf Unterweser

PWR PWR

1 370 MW 1 345 MW

Grohnde

PWR

1 360 MW

Grafenrheinfeld

PWR

1 275 MW

Isar 1 Isar 2

BWR PWR

878 MW 1 400 MW

E.ON main offices Plants where E.ON is the majority owner and licensee

DENMARK

Plants where E.ON has a minority holding E.ON plants being decommissioned

GERMANY

cle of a nuclear power plant: from uranium and nuclear fuel procurement to nuclear waste management and decommissioning including design and operations. The service record of the company’s nuclear power plants is at the top of its field. The annual average of the capacity factors of E.ON nuclear power plants is consistently over 90%. Since 1980 E.ON’s nuclear reactors established world records 5 times in electricity production, and its reactors delivered more electricity than any other reactor in the world 19 more times Moreover, these results were achieved with 6 different power plants, a testimony of E.ON’s effectiveness in transferring best practice across the group. Figure 1C-6 shows the sites of existing E.ON nuclear power plants. E.ON has been developing its nuclear power expertise since it built its first eight nuclear reactors in Germany in the early 1970s. The most recent unit built by the company, the Isar 2 pressurized water reactor unit rated at 1,475 MW, was completed in 1988. In the 1990’s E.ON played a leading role in the collaboration of German power companies and power plant suppliers in the development of the new light water reactors such as the type EPR and the SWR 1000. E.ON has a thorough knowledge of the history and grounds for selection of the design solutions in these plant types. In Sweden, E.On Kärnkraft Sverige AB (EKS) has a majority holding in Oskarshamn Kraftgrupp AB (OKG), which is the licensee of the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant and the organization responsible for its operation. OKG and EKS are shareholders in


Supplement 1c

the nuclear waste management company Svenska Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB), which is developing and implementing a solution for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel based on the KBS-3 method. This is the same method that Posiva plans to use for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. In April 2008, E.ON, Areva and Siemens launched a project to complete the basic design of the SWR 1000 reactor type. E.ON has made considerable investments in the reliability of its nuclear power plants, for instance by replacing and modernizing automation systems in its facilities. Since the 1980s, E.ON has been conducting voluntary and extensive periodic safety reviews, and made changes and improvements to further enhance safety at its power plants. The company is currently making plans to extend the useful life of its power plants. To improve safety and to extend the useful life of the plants, the company will replace the reactor protection systems, increase the number of redundant safety systems, and enhance the safety features of the plants against both internal and external threats. E.ON has a nuclear safety policy applying to all its nuclear power functions, monitored and developed by the company’s internal nuclear safety council (E.ON Nuclear Safety Council, ENSC). Fennovoima observes the key principles of this nuclear safety policy. Setting up the ENSC is an example of E.ON’s efforts in emphasizing the importance of an advanced safety culture in all operations. The safety and quality of the company’s operations are maintained and developed through certified quality management and occupational safety and health systems. Center of Competence – Nuclear The Center of Competence – Nuclear of E.ON Kernkraft is important for the Fennovoima Project, because the Center’s 150–200 experts are at the disposal of Fennovoima. The duties of the Center of Competence are divided into three units according to the various phases of the life cycle of a nuclear power plant. The most important of the units of the Center of Competence for the early phases of the Fennovoima Project is ‘New nuclear power plant projects’. The units of the Center of Competence and the organization of new nuclear power plant projects are shown in Figure 1C-7. The duties of the operating unit in the Center of Competence include responsibilities for coordinating the use of all of the operating nuclear power plants of EKK and the following issues: nuclear safety and exchange of experiences, operating monitoring systems, radiation protection, environmental protection and safety arrangements, occupational safety, and management and monitoring systems. The decommissioning unit of the Center of Competence is responsible for planning the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in the E.ON Group and for monitoring the plants being decommissioned. At the moment, the Stade and Würgassen power plants in Germany and Barsebäck in Sweden are being decommissioned. E.ON is also participating in the decommissioning of the Gundremmingen A nuclear power plant unit in Germany. E.ON Engineering (EEN) The E.ON Group has its own design team, the E.ON Engineering Group, whose services comprehensively cover power plant design and project management. EEN employs about 1,100 experts. Its key areas of expertise are project management, analyses, plant design, electrical design and piping design.

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Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

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Center of Competence – Nuclear

Reactor and nuclear waste management Nuclear fuel management Procurement Organization/HR/IT Communications Legal affairs

Decommissioning

System design

Use

Licensing

New nuclear development

Strategy

Supervision

Project development

Plant design

International regulation

Project planning/QA

• Nuclear power strategy development • Selection of target countries and markets • Project launches • Assessment of plant sites • Supplier strategy

• Plant design expertise • Technical support for projects • Participation in drawing up of the European Utility Requirements • Research (new plant concepts, fourth generation reactors)

• Licensing strategy development • Licensing support for projects and regulatory matters • Monitoring international regulations • Harmonization of safety standards

• Project and organization planning • Resource and HR planning • Project assistance and background support • Project support and quality assurance • Organization of experience feedback • Reporting

Figure 1C-7 Organization of the E.ON Center of Competence – Nuclear.

Its main strength is in the design and construction of major power plants as decentralized projects and acting as a project integrator in implementation projects. New power plant projects implemented by E.ON rely on the company’s existing, tried and tested and standardized project and quality management system. This system forms the foundation for the Fennovoima project, and Fennovoima will further develop it to adapt it for the nuclear power plant to be built in Finland.

Practical implementation of cooperation Fennovoima will draw on the expertise and resources of E.ON at all phases of the project. At the procurement and permit phases, E.ON will participate particularly in the plant procurement and basic design processes and in the preparation of the construction phase. Fennovoima and E.ON will jointly recruit some of the personnel required and will also organize supplementary training at E.ON units and nuclear power plants as needed. The Center of Competence – Nuclear plays a key role in the integration of E.ON expertise and resources into the Fennovoima project. At the preparation phase of the project, some 60 E.ON experts have participated in the feasibility studies of the plant options considered by Fennovoima, the nuclear fuel and nuclear waste manage-


Supplement 1c

ment studies, the evaluation of alternative plant sites and the environmental impact assessment. During the construction phase, E.ON’s expertise in the implementation of major power plant projects will help Fennovoima complete the nuclear power plant successfully and as planned. During the commissioning and operation phases, Fennovoima can draw on E.ON’s expertise in the operation of its own power plants for support. Fennovoima is the only power company in Finland that, through one of its shareholders, already has first-hand experience of decommissioning nuclear power plants.

Other expertise available to Fennovoima Using the expertise of other shareholders Fennovoima will draw on the expertise of its shareholders in the implementation of the project. Ensuring the quality and reliability of nuclear power plant design and implementation requires a variety of know-how and experience in fields related to nuclear technology and power plant technology. The company shareholders are presented in Supplement 1B to this application. Outokumpu Outokumpu plc has a long tradition in stainless steel product and application development and possesses in-depth expertise in the use of stainless steel in demanding conditions in the process and energy industries. The company has two research centers of its own, one in Tornio and the other in Avesta, Sweden. The company also cooperates closely with universities and research institutions. The energy industry is one of the biggest users of Outokumpu pressure equipment materials. Outokumpu delivers materials compliant with the American ASME/ASTM standards and the EN standards based on the European Pressure Equipment Directive to the energy industry. Outokumpu’s extensive expertise has been called on in numerous deliveries of materials to nuclear power plants in the form of pipes and other pressure equipment materials. In 2008, the company signed an agreement on the supply of Duplex steel to nuclear power plants under construction in China. Since 2007, Outokumpu has been involved in the FinNuclear project, a national project to explore the potential for strengthening and delivering Finnish technology and expertise to projects in Finland and abroad. Rautaruukki plc Rautaruukki is an expert in and manufacturer of strong, wear-resistant steel grades. Steel structures, building components and entire buildings are also part of Rautaruukki’s core competence and production program. Other shareholders The following shareholders have expertise relevant for the implementation of the project: – AGA: gas systems and engineering, welding technology – Ovako: metallurgy, special steels, steel pipes and bars

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– Componenta: mechanical technology and mechanical equipment design – Several energy and power companies: infrastructure and district heating systems, electricity distribution.

Using outside expertise Fennovoima will also make use of outside expertise in its project, the quality and volume of which depend on the method of implementation of the project. The decision between whether to enhance the company’s own project and operating organization or to employ outside expertise will be taken on a case-by-case basis so that Fennovoima will have sufficient in-house expertise in the key areas of the project and also the capacity and the ability for guiding and monitoring outside experts. The procedures suitable for the evaluation, selection and guiding of outside expertise depend on how critical the expertise is for the safety, quality, environmental impact, timing and cost of the project. So far, Fennovoima has made use of the expertise of the following organizations in the project: – Pöyry plc: environmental impact assessment, pre-planning of plant sites, and land use planning – Atkins plc: project planning – Platom Oy: nuclear waste management planning – Finnish Meteorological Institute: weather data – Finnish Institute of Marine Research: sea level studies – University of Helsinki Department of Seismology: earthquake research – Karna Research and Consulting: studies on ice phenomena – WSP: explosive load reports – Suomen YVA Oyj: coolant modeling – Brenk Systemplanung GmbH: accident modeling


Supplement 1c

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Ydinvoimalaitoksen periaatepäätöshakemus • Fennovoima


Liite 4a

General signiďŹ cance of the nuclear power plant project Supplement 2A Description of the general signiďŹ cance and necessity of the project

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Contents

Summary .......................................................................................................................67 Introduction ..................................................................................................................68 Fulfilling electricity needs and securing competitiveness ..........................................68 Electricity needs among Fennovoima shareholders .............................................68 Energy conservation ...............................................................................................70 Increased use of renewable energy ........................................................................71 Reasonable electricity self-sufficiency ....................................................................72 The significance of own nuclear power production ............................................72 Increasing competition in the electricity market .......................................................74 General confidence in the electricity market ........................................................74 Functioning of the electricity market and price trends .......................................75 Centralization of electricity production in Finland .............................................79 The effect of the project on the performance of the electricity market ..............80 Balanced development of Finland ...............................................................................81 Economic overview of the alternative plant sites .................................................81 Impact on the economy and employment............................................................83 Site of the plant in Northern Ostrobothnia or Lapland ......................................86 Improving security of supply .......................................................................................86 Electricity infrastructure as a vital function of society .........................................87 Current state of electricity delivery security .........................................................87 Strengthening security of supply through nuclear power ...................................88 Impact of the project on security of supply ..........................................................89 Implementing the national climate and energy strategy ...........................................90 Ensuring availability of energy ..............................................................................91 Reversing the growth of the end use of energy ....................................................92 Increase of the production and use of renewable energy.....................................93 Setting emission reduction goals for sectors not covered by emission trading ................................................................................................93


Supplement 2a

Summary

Finland needs new electricity generation capacity in order to ensure adequate self-sufficiency and competitiveness in energy supply. In the building of new capacity, priority is to be given to power plants that do not cause greenhouse gas emissions. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant project meets the needs of Finnish society, Finnish businesses and Finnish households. The total electricity needs of the 64 Fennovoima shareholders in Finland amount to almost 30% of Finland’s total electricity consumption. Electricity is needed by industry, trade, services, farms and households. The Fennovoima shareholders have very low self-sufficiency in electricity production in Finland and are largely dependent on market-priced electricity. Reasonably priced electricity production is important for the competitiveness and investment potential of the Fennovoima shareholders in Finland. A new, own nuclear power plant will reduce their dependence on expensive market-priced electricity and will ensure reasonable electricity self-sufficiency for them in the long term. The shareholders are also investing in bioenergy, wind energy and small-scale hydroelectric power. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will improve the functioning of the wholesale market by increasing the electricity supply and by bringing several new operators to the electricity production sector. The number of companies owning nuclear power production capacity will increase by about 30. All Finnish end users of electricity will benefit from the increased competition. The energy company shareholders in Fennovoima have some 900,000 small-scale customers in the retail markets in Finland. The competitiveness of small and medium-sized local energy companies will be particularly enhanced by their own nuclear power production. The benefit for consumers is that many local energy companies will be pricing their retail sales on the basis of their own actual costs, not on the basis of the market price of electricity. A nuclear power plant in a completely new site will generate long-term industrial activity and help consolidate the economy of the surrounding region. Establishment of a new nuclear energy company will provide hundreds of permanent jobs for decades ahead. The region where the power plant is located will be well placed to diversify its range of services. All of the alternative Fennovoima nuclear power plant sites are located in governmentdefined development areas, as specified by Finnish government resolution. The Fennovoima project will contribute to the balanced development of Finland without drawing on central government budget funds. The project is an example of cooperation which allows shareholders to pursue long-term development of their operations and to focus on their respective local strengths. Nuclear power improves Finland’s security of supply by reducing dependence on imported electricity and on fuels that cause emissions of greenhouse gases. The Fennovoima project will enable the decentralization of nuclear energy production in Finland geographically and in terms of ownership and organization. Fennovoima considers that by increasing the production of electricity at a reasonable and stable price in Finland, the project will reinforce the national energy supply in accordance with the objectives of the National Climate and Energy Strategy. Specifically, the production of electricity by Fennovoima will meet the electricity needs of companies and households in Finland.

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Introduction This report discusses the general significance and necessity of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project as required in the Nuclear Energy Decree for an application for a decision-in-principle to be submitted to the government. The following points relevant for political decision-making have been taken into account in the discussion of the significance for society and necessity of the Fennovoima project: business policy and the competitiveness of businesses operating in Finland, competition policy, regional policy and employment, supply security and electricity delivery security, and climate and energy policy. Each of these areas has a separate chapter in the report. A report describing the significance of the Fennovoima project with regard to the operation and nuclear waste management of the country’s other nuclear power plants is presented in Supplement 2B of the application.

Fulfilling electricity needs and securing competitiveness Electricity needs among Fennovoima shareholders The total electricity needs among Fennovoima shareholders in Finland amount to approximately 25 TWh per annum, almost 30% of the entire electricity consumption of Finland (Figure 2A-1). Electricity is needed by industry, trade, services, farms and households. The various industry sectors are widely represented among Fennovoima shareholders. Fennovoima shareholders are for the most part dependent upon electricity procured on the energy market. The shareholders procure 17–20 TWh of electricity annually. Their own electricity production in Finland fulfills less than one third of their electricity needs. In order to secure their international competitiveness, their prerequisites for domestic investment and their very existence, Fennovoima’s shareholders must have guaranteed access to electricity at a reasonable price. The only technically and economically feasible solution to this problem is to increase their own electricity production.

Figure 2A-1 Energy consumption in Finland and the share of Fennovoima shareholders in it in 2007, as well as the distribution of electricity procurement among Fennovoima shareholders.

Electricity needs in Finland 2007

Filling the electricity needs of Fennovoima shareholders 2007

Fennovoima shareholders

Purchased electricity

c. 30 % Own production Others

0

5

10 TWh/year

15

20


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Electricity needs stem from the consumption of industry, the public sector, agriculture and households. Among Fennovoima shareholders, the major industrial consumers of electricity are companies operating in the metal, food, chemical and building material industries, such as AGA, Outokumpu, Ovako, Rautaruukki and Valio. Major shareholders in the service sector with significant electricity needs include central retailers Kesko and SOK. Fennovoima shareholders representing industries and the services are almost entirely dependent on electricity procured from the market. Today, this electricity covers more than 90% of their electricity needs. With regard to agriculture and households, the electricity needs stem from the consumption of approximately 900,000 customers who are served by local energy companies around Finland that hold shares in Fennovoima. The largest energy companies among Fennovoima shareholders, by number of customers, are Turku Energia, Vantaan Energia, E.ON and Lahti Energia, which have a total of about 350,000 private customers in Finland. E.ON has about 90,000 customers in Finland, 10% of the combined customer base of the Fennovoima shareholders. The greater part of these customers is small-scale electricity consumers and consequently covered by the obligation to deliver provided for in the Electricity Market Act. According to the obligation to deliver, an electricity retailer within the area of responsibility of a distribution system operator must deliver electricity at reasonable prices to consumers and other users of electricity. In practice, a local energy company acts as the representative of its consumers in procuring electricity from the electricity market and redistributing it to its consumers. As a consequence of the terms of delivery applied to the retail sale of electricity, local energy companies bear some of the price and volume risk involved in the procurement of electricity for small-scale consumers. For the smallest of these companies in particular, these risks may be financially significant and are heightened in an environment where the market price of electricity is susceptible to major fluctuations. Figure 2A-2 shows the electricity needs of Fennovoima by user group. As the figure shows, the distribution of electricity needs among Fennovoima shareholders is largely similar to the distribution of electricity needs in Finland as a whole. Industry is in both cases by far the largest user group in terms of the amount of electricity used.

Electricity needs of Fennovoima

Electricity needs in Finland

shareholders by user group 2007

by user group 2007

26%

26% 42% 54% 20%

32%

Industry Agriculture and households Trade, services and public sector

Figure 2A-2 Electricity needs of Fennovoima shareholders and in Finland as a whole by user group in 2007.


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Fennovoima shareholders have been preparing significant production investments in Finland during 2007–2008 which will result in the electricity needs of Fennovoima shareholders accounting for an increasing percentage of the total electricity consumption in Finland. Examples of these projects are shown in Table 2A-1. In the next few years growth will be focused on expansion projects, largely in northern Finland.

Table 2A-1 Examples of Fennovoima shareholder investment projects in Finland.

Shareholder

Investment project

AGA

Air gas plant in Tornio

Boliden

Updating of casting line and expansion of production capacity in Kokkola

Outokumpu

Expansion of ferrochromium production capacity in Tornio

SOK

Launch of a service centre in Kajaani

Valio

Plant expansion in Seinäjoki and dairy expansion in Jyväskylä

Energy conservation The government agreed in the National Climate and Energy Strategy in 2008 that a strategic goal for Finland is to stem the growth of final energy consumption and turn downwards the trend of demand. In order to achieve this goal, energy use must be made more efficient in housing, construction and traffic in particular. It is also important to strive actively to limit the development of electricity needs, in order to slow down growth and stabilize consumption by 2020. The expected development of electricity needs in Finland is affected by changes to the economic structure, global structural changes in the forestry sector, and significant investment in energy efficiency improvements. Future trends in electricity needs in industry vary by sector, and different industrial sectors have differing capacities and aims for investing in production expansion in Finland. Measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy efficiency will also change the current distribution of electricity needs. For example, the use of electricity in transport must be increased in order to attain the climate goals set. The majority of Fennovoima’s shareholders is investing heavily in energy conservation, but without new nuclear power capacity of their own, achieving a satisfactory level of electricity self-reliance at a competitive price is for most not a realistic scenario. Fennovoima’s shareholders are engaged in systematic voluntary rationalization of electricity use, for instance, and the retail trade shareholders have set for themselves a goal of a 9% reduction in energy consumption by 2016. Significant savings have been achieved through this improvement in energy efficiency. The total improvement in energy efficiency resulting from measures taken by the shareholders in 1998–2007 amounted to approximately 0.8 TWh per annum. Measures to improve energy efficiency will be more difficult to achieve in future, especially in industry, as the most significant technically and economically sound savings measures have already been implemented. At the moment, Fennovoima shareholders are implementing or have decided on measures to improve efficiency amounting to approximately 0.2 TWh per annum.


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Increased use of renewable energy At the moment, the electricity production of Fennovoima shareholders’ in Finland mainly involves types of generation that cause greenhouse gas emissions. Only approximately 2 TWh, or less than one third, of the annual electricity production is based on emission-free production, i.e. renewable energy sources and nuclear power. The majority, 70% of production, is still based on fossil fuels – coal, natural gas and peat. The amount of electricity produced by Fennovoima shareholders and the use of fossil fuels vary on an annual basis due, for example, to weather conditions. During rainy years, more hydroelectric power is generated, while more fossil fuel is required during cold and dry years. Figure 2A-3 shows the distribution of Fennovoima shareholders’ electricity production by production mode.

Fennovoima shareholders’ electricity

Finland's electricity production

production by energy source 2007

by energy source 2007

22% 38%

Figure 2A-3 Electricity production by Fennovoima shareholders and in Finland as a whole, by production mode, in 2007.

32%

8% 70% 30%

Nuclear energy Renewable energy Fossil fuels causing CO2 emissions

Number of projects

35

Figure 2A-4 Fennovoima shareholders’ current renewable energy projects in 2008.

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Wind energy

Hydroenergy

Bioenergy


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Alongside the nuclear power project, Fennovoima’s shareholders are working on several projects to increase their renewable energy production in Finland (Figure 2A4). These investments are intended to increase the shareholders’ own electricity generation and improve self-sufficiency in electricity procurement, as well as to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by promoting the use of renewable energy sources instead of fossil fuels. A total of 25 Fennovoima shareholders are involved in wind energy projects being prepared and implemented in Finland. There are 11 shareholders involved in hydroelectric power projects and 23 in bioenergy projects. Small and medium-sized energy companies have an extensive tradition of decentralized power generation and of using renewable energy sources. In order to achieve the climate targets set in the National Climate and Energy Strategy, it is vital that local energy companies remain functional and prepared to invest, creating potential for a significant increase in the use of wood chips, pellets and field energy.

Reasonable electricity self-sufficiency The electricity balance of Fennovoima’s shareholders in Finland shows a considerable deficit, as seen in Figure 2A-5. The shareholders compensate for this deficit by procuring electricity on the market to an amount of about EUR 1 billion per year. None of the Fennovoima shareholders is among the major producers of electricity in Finland. Lahti Energia, Rautaruukki and Vantaan Energia are medium-sized electricity producers in the Finnish context. These three companies account for a total of about 3 TWh per year, which is less than 4% of Finland’s entire electricity production. E.ON currently produces about 0.3 TWh of electricity per year in Finland, or about 0.4% of Finland’s total. Right now less than 3% of Fennovoima’s shareholders’ electricity needs in Finland are covered by shares in nuclear power. If Fennovoima builds a nuclear power plant in Finland, about half of the combined electricity needs of its shareholders can be secured through price-stable nuclear power for the decades to come. However, despite the construction of a nuclear power plant, a large portion of the shareholders’ electricity needs in Finland will still have to be covered by electricity procured on the electricity market. Figure 2A-5 shows the electricity balances of Finland’s major electricity producers as a comparison to Fennovoima shareholders’ electricity needs. The figure shows that upon completion, Finland’s fifth nuclear power plant, which is currently under construction, will make Fortum Oyj and TVO’s other major nuclear power shareholders more self-sufficient with regard to electricity in Finland, or even give them a surplus. This is true especially for Fortum and Helsingin Energia. Fortum, UPM-Kymmene Oyj, Helsingin Energia, Stora Enso Oyj and M-real Oyj own a total of 75% of the production at TVO’s Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). In addition, Fortum owns the entire Loviisa nuclear power plant (Loviisa 1 and 2).

The significance of own nuclear power production Fennovoima’s shareholders have a real need and interest in investing in their own emission-free electricity production in Finland. The electricity needs stem from the


Supplement 2a

15 Positive selfsufficiency 10

Figure 2A-5 Comparison of the electricity balances of Fennovoima shareholders and Finland’s major electricity producers in Finland once Finland’s fifth nuclear power plant, currently under construction, has been completed. 1

5 TWh/year

73

0 -5 -10

-15 Negative selfsufficiency Fennovoima shareholders

Fortum

UPMKymmene

Helsingin Energia

Stora Enso

M-real

shareholders’ existing operations, i.e. industry, services, agriculture and housing, not on estimates of an increase in operations or in the customer base. The electricity needs of the shareholders represent a considerable percentage of Finland’s total electricity consumption and are of a stable and permanent nature. Electricity self-sufficiency based on reasonably and stably priced nuclear power is vital for the competitiveness and investment potential of Fennovoima´ shareholders in Finland. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant, together with bioenergy, wind energy and hydroelectric power investments, will reduce the dependence of the shareholders on market electricity, whose prices fluctuate considerably and unpredictably. A nuclear power plant owned by the shareholders will secure them reasonable self-sufficiency with regard to electricity in Finland over the long term. In future years, the strategic and economic importance of having own emission-free electricity production will increase more than ever with the limiting of alternatives available for electricity production brought about by EU emission reduction targets. If the market price of electricity continues to rise, it will materially diminish the operating potential of Fennovoima shareholders in Finland if they do not have nuclear power of their own

1) Fennovoima has commissioned a report on the ownership arrangements of electricity production in Finland and the electricity consumption of the major users. The electricity balances were obtained by deducting own use and retail sales of electricity from the annual electricity production. The electricity balances are primarily based on actual production, sales and consumption figures for 2007. Average annual figures are also used for hydroelectric power and condensing power production. Company-specific data for retail sale and consumption of electricity are based on the companies’ annual and environmental reports for 2007 and evaluations based on these. For electricity production, the estimated annual output of Olkiluoto 3, under construction and estimated to be completed in 2012, has been included in the balances. Like the existing plants, the Olkiluoto 3 unit is expected to produce approximately 8,000 TWh of electricity annually and replace some of the current electricity imports. Other potential new investment in electricity production, power plant closures or changes in electricity consumption have not been factored in.


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Increasing competition in the electricity market Several published expert assessments and reports by the Nordic competition authorities state that there are problems on the electricity market. The problems are partly due to the special characteristics of the electricity market and are particularly related to the electricity wholesale market and electricity production. The centralized ownership of electricity production is considered a significant cause of these problems. In Finland, the major part of emission-free hydroelectric power and nuclear power generation is controlled by a handful of companies. Studies and polls show that citizens are also displeased with the results so far achieved through the deregulation of the electricity market and with how the market presently works.

General confidence in the electricity market

Figure 2A-6 Trends in Finnish attitudes towards energy from 1998 to 2007: “I believe open competition is not a good idea in the energy sector, which should be controlled and monitored by the government.”

% of respondents fully agreeing or somewhat agreeing

Attitudes among Finns with regard to energy have been systematically researched for the past 25 years. An annual research series has monitored the opinions among Finns on energy policy issues. The results of the latest study were published in April 20082 The studies show that Finns are rather critical about how the electricity market works. This dissatisfaction has increased over the past ten years, i.e. the entire period that households have been involved in the deregulated electricity market. Today, nearly two out of three Finns consider that open competition in the energy sector is not a good idea (Figure 2A-6). Only one out of five Finns still believe in open competition. Upon a closer inspection, the findings show that these opinions are not motivated by political or ideological agendas. The criticism is related to problems observed in the performance of the market. An important indicator of the performance of the market from the point of view of the consumers is, naturally, the price of electricity. Only one out of four Finns believe that competition has lowered the price of electricity used in their own household. On the contrary, half of all consumers believe that competition does not lower the price.

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1998

2) Energiateollisuus ry.

2001

2004

2007


Supplement 2a

The findings of the study indicate that the electricity producers’ perceived desire for profit is clearly considered the most important reason for the increasing price of electricity. Almost nine out of ten consumers consider this a very important or rather important reason for the price increase. Another structural problem mentioned is the lack of competition and the low number of operators on the market.

Functioning of the electricity market and price trends Electricity market development The Electricity Market Act entered into force in 1995, deregulating the electricity market in Finland. The reform deregulated electricity production and the sale and procurement of electricity. At the same time, clear ground rules were laid down for electricity transmission and distribution, which remained subject to permit as what is known as a ‘natural monopoly’. It was hoped that the new Electricity Market Act would increase competition and thereby improve resource allocation translating into lower costs for consumers3. Deregulation of the market was phased in. Since 1998 everyone, even small-scale users of electricity, has had the option of choosing from which energy company they procure their electricity. For the time being, the electricity retail market is national, which means that a Finnish household may only procure electricity from an energy company operating in Finland, not from one in Sweden or Norway. The wholesale electricity market mainly involves major producers and retail sellers of electricity, and a large group of industrial users. Wholesale prices are determined and largely also implemented on the Nord Pool power exchange. Pricing on the power exchange is based on sealed daily bidding on procurement and sales, on the basis of which a price is set for each hour of the following day. In theory, the price for each hour is determined by the production most expensive in its variable costs that is needed to meet the demand for that hour. Transmission capacity between the Nordic countries is available to the power exchange in calculating electricity transmissions between regions to optimize the price hour by hour. The concept of the Nordic electricity market is based on this arrangement. If electricity transmission corresponding to optimum supply and demand cannot be achieved, i.e. if it exceeds the available transmission capacity between regions, the system recalculates the prices by region. This produces regional prices, which are determined only by sales and procurement bids and available transmission capacity within each region. There are eight price regions in the Nordic countries; Finland as a whole is one of them. The EU has set the goal of achieving a European internal electricity market. Progress is being made in phases. First, deregulation and electricity market legislation was enacted at the national level. The second phase will be to link the national markets into regional markets. Finally, the regional markets will be merged. The Nordic countries have been among the most active parties in developing a regional wholesale market. There is also a clear aim at developing closer relations with central Europe. At the end of 2008, the major electricity producers in the Nordic market included Vattenfall with a market share of 23%, Fortum (12%), Statkraft (12%), E.ON (9%), Dong (5%), UPM-Kymmene (3%), E-CO (3%) and Helsingin Energia (2%). 3) Finnish Competition Authority, Competition review 10/2008.

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In 2007, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition published a report on the development of the electricity and natural gas markets in Europe. In this report, the Commission highlighted a major competition problem in the electricity wholesale markets: the markets are largely national in geographical terms, and also heavily concentrated. Electricity market reports by the competition authorities In recent years, the Nordic competition authorities have cooperated closely to assess the performance of the electricity market. The first comprehensive joint study was completed in 2003. The steep increase in electricity prices in 2006 led to a new study and the conclusions drawn based on the previous study were reassessed in light of the new development. The results of the latter were published in the fall of 2007. With regard to Finland, the authorities’ views concerning the current state of the electricity market are also discussed in the Finnish Competition Authority’s yearbook 2007 and in the competition review of October 2008. The report jointly prepared by the Nordic competition authorities, published in the fall of 2007, states that the development and integration of the electricity market are still in progress. It is noted that the problems highlighted in the 2003 report still persist. When assessing the market development for the period 2003–2007, the competition authorities establish that an undesired trend toward centralization is represented by, for example, the strengthening of Vattenfall’s market position due to the company’s corporate acquisitions in Denmark, and Statkraft’s ever stronger position in Norway, where the company is by some way the largest electricity producer. The general conclusions drawn in the report point to increased electricity needs in relation to minor investments in production having led to a greater shortage of supply. New production capacity will be needed in the years to come. In their report the competition authorities state that a flexible electricity production structure is a prerequisite in a competitive market and essential in order to ensure security of supply. The report contained the following recommendations for improving the performance of the market with regard to electricity production: – Power plants owned jointly by large electricity producers are fairly common. For competitive reasons these should be avoided or in other ways restricted as far as possible. Power plants which are jointly owned by major energy producers and whose operations require a degree of cooperation between those companies are particularly problematic. – Investments in new production capacity generally increase competition. Investments by new operators are more useful with regard to increasing competition and making it more efficient. Investments in new production by existing operators do not necessarily improve competition. – On a functional market, the price level is the most important indicator for initiating investment. The prerequisites for investment should be supported by stable, predictable and long-term regulation. In Finland, the Finnish Competition Authority has deemed it necessary to look into whether the electricity market problems require that the authorities intervene on the basis of the Act on Competition Restrictions. The Competition Authority has also explored other means of strengthening competition in the electricity market. In the same context, the Competition Authority has also presented its own assessment of the problems that affect Finland in particular and of the required measures.


Supplement 2a

According to the Competition Authority’s assessment, it is extremely difficult to enter this sector. To operate successfully in electricity production requires a significant proprietary production capacity. Despite the considerable improvement in the profitability of nuclear and hydroelectric power production since the introduction of the emission trade, no significant additional investments have been made in new capacity. Regulation makes it impossible to undertake large-scale investment in hydroelectric power. A survey of Finland’s unused hydroelectric power resources published in 20084 notes that the potential for building new hydroelectric power capacity outside protected ar-eas and Natura areas is only about 0.6 TWh per annum, which is less than 1/20 of the output of a single new nuclear power plant unit Moreover, most of this potential actually exists at sites which are already developed, being available through machinery upgrades. Therefore, from the point of view of a new player entering the market, the only possibility for investing in hydroelectric power would be to obtain permits to build in protected areas or Natura areas. Another major problem according to the Competition Authority is the centralization of the electricity market. The Competition Authority states that this centralization is a problem particularly in the wholesale market, i.e. in electricity production. Problems caused by the centralization further obstruct entry into the market. Based on its own assessment, the Competition Authority concludes that to ensure competition in the future, it is essential that the market is not centralized any further. Existing problems caused by centralization must also be minimized with the help of active measures. In its recommendations, the Competition Authority emphasizes that market entry must be facilitated. No further hindrances should be put in place for new investments. According to the Competition Authority, new companies that seek market entry should be given equal opportunities in comparison with the traditional operators to take part in, for example, the construction of additional nuclear power capacity.

Independent expert assessments In recent years, the state and performance of the electricity market in Finland have also been assessed by independent experts commissioned by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Employment and the Economy). Professor Mikko Kara’s report was published in December 2005 and the report of Matti Purasjoki Lic. Sc.(Econ.) in September 2006. The view presented in Mikko Kara’s report with regard to the future of the electricity market is rather disquieting. Kara’s assessment of the price development is of an increasing trend, due to the fact that there has not been sufficient investment in new production. Kara also considers that the development of electricity prices is difficult to predict and fluctuates strongly. According to his assessment, one of the electricity market’s biggest problems is that electricity production is focused around a small number of companies, which gives them a lot of authority on the power exchange. In his report, Matti Purasjoki focused on assessing the performance of the electricity wholesale and retail markets, as well as on solving potential problems. Purasjoki’s report also contains tangible suggestions which should be used to attend to the obvious problems. 4) Voimaa vedestä 2007, Finnish Energy Industries, Ministry of Employment and the Economy.

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According to Purasjoki’s report, the electricity market cannot perform as desired if the principal quality of the market is scarcity of production capacity. When the sector was deregulated in the 1990s there was sufficient production on the electricity market to enable an open and transparent competition for market shares. The electricity producers ceased taking an interest in investments and, according to the report, we have now entered a period of scarcity, which will not be corrected in the near future. Several explanations have been given for this. According to Purasjoki, electricity producers do not invest because scarcity of supply ensures them the best prices and profits. The centralization and oligopolistic nature of the electricity market are highlighted in Purasjoki’s report as a very real problem. This problem is not unique to Finland and the Nordic market; it is present all over Europe. In every country there are between one and three important operators, one or two of which are domestic. In addition to the large companies, smaller producers exist on the market, but according to Purasjoki’s report their prospects for challenging the large producers are insignificant. Small and medium-sized operators cannot compete on price, as their costs per unit are clearly higher than those of the large producers. The report states that factors promoting ‘collusive oligopoly’ are present in electricity production, such as the homogeneity of production and technologies, the intensive nature of trade on the power exchange and obstacles facing new market entrants. A third potential problem according to Purasjoki’s report is the strategic inequality of different types of production, combined with the marginal pricing used on the wholesale market. Strategic inequality means the possibility to adjust the amount of energy offered to the market. Of the two types of electricity production with the lowest variable costs, i.e. nuclear and hydroelectric power, only the latter can be materially adjusted. Companies that own hydroelectric power can affect the electricity price much more than companies whose production capacity consists mainly of other sources of energy. According to Purasjoki, this situation strengthens the oligopolistic nature of the market and is a problem particularly in areas where the ownership of hydroelectric power is centralized, such as in Finland. Purasjoki’s report contains suggestions for required measures, which in the case of electricity production are as follows: – “Only in markets with a sufficient supply can one expect that competition will ensure the selection of the most advantageous production methods, efficiency and a reasonable price level. In order to steer clear of the problems associated with an oligopolistic market structure, independent operators must be acquired for new investments.” – “Fortum has implemented an excellent strategy for its shareholders, at the expense of the electricity customers. Fortum’s market power must be restricted, and this should be accomplished through political decision-making, as market power cannot be restricted with the help of our Nordic competition legislation.” Actual price trends From the point of view of the electricity consumer, the emission trade that started in 2005 has substantially exacerbated price trends. Major electricity producers who have plenty of nuclear power and hydroelectric power capacity of their own, benefit from pricing the electricity generated by their coal and natural gas power plants as high as possible. There are two clear reasons for this:


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1. limited supply increases the electricity price on the power exchange, which gives a better profit on the production of their own hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, and 2. regardless of whether emission rights have been issued to the producer partly or completely without compensation, the producer transfers the value of the emission rights to the price of the electricity sold; alternatively, the producer can just not produce the electricity and instead sell the emission rights on the European emission rights market. The second emission trading period started at the beginning of 2008. According to the Energy Market Authority reports, this has been followed by a steep price increase. This hit the service sector, small and medium-sized industry and households in particular, as these users typically have limited potential for reducing their electricity consumption and, in the short term, have no potential at all for replacing electricity with other sources of energy. Figure 2A-7 shows electricity wholesale and consumer price trends from 1998 to 2008. Figure 2A-7 Electricity wholesale and consumer price trends in Finland from 1998 to 20085.

7,0

6,0

cents/kWh

5,0

4,0

3,0

2,0

1,0 1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Retail price, apartment house

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Market price

Centralization of electricity production in Finland Additional construction of both nuclear power and significant hydroelectric power requires consideration and approval by the Finnish government. New production capacity cannot be built based on demand. Instead, an increase in supply always requires political decision-making. The situation is the same in all Nordic countries. In the near future, the importance of national needs and solutions will become significant in other electricity production investment too. National targets for the use of renewable energy have been introduced in the EU, and Member States are introduc-

5) The market price is the quarterly average calculated from the Nord Pool SPOT price for Finland’s price area, and the consumer price is the quarterly average for delivery requirement prices (assuming a flat with a consumption of 2,000 kWh per year).


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ing various subsidy schemes to attain their respective renewable energy targets. There are many electricity-producing companies in Finland, but ownership of the strategically and economically superior production methods, i.e. hydroelectric and nuclear power, is centralized. There is far less centralization in CHP production and other condensing power production. Figure 2A-8 shows an estimate of the percentages of various operators in Finland’s annual electricity production once the fifth nuclear power plant unit now under construction is completed. As the figure shows, the total share of the five largest nuclear power shareholders of nuclear power production in Finland will amount to as much as 85%, and about 70% of hydroelectric power production. 40

TWh/year

Figure 2A-8 Distribution of electricity production in Finland among major operators by production mode once the fifth nuclear power plant now under construction is completed6.

Other

35

M-real

30

Stora Enso

25

Helsingin Energia UPM-Kymmene

20

Fortum

15 10 5 0 Nuclear power

Hydropower

Wind power

Combined heat and power production

Other condensing power

If we omit from the comparison the forest industry companies that, at least for the time being, produce electricity mainly for their own consumption in Finland, the dominant position of Fortum is further emphasized. As a nuclear power producer, Fortum is almost six times bigger than Helsingin Energia, which is the second largest owner of nuclear power in Finland among the electricity retailers. As a producer of hydroelectric power, Fortum is almost 13 times larger than the second largest retailer.

The effect of the project on the performance of the electricity market With regard to general interest, it is important to solve the problems that exist in the electricity market. The government program of spring 2007 states that the government cooperates with the other Nordic countries to develop a common electricity market. According to its action plan, the government strives to improve the performance of the electricity market by increasing the transparency of the electricity trade and encouraging new operators to enter the market. The government decision process with regard to the construction of nuclear power facilities is an important step in defining electricity market conditions for decades to come. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will improve the functioning of the whole6) Electricity production figures are based on baseline data and assumptions given above in Figure 2A-5.


Supplement 2a

sale market by increasing the electricity supply and by bringing several new operators to the electricity and nuclear power sector in Finland and the Nordic countries. The ownership base of nuclear power production will become broader and more diverse as the number of companies owning nuclear power production in Finland will increase by about 30. At the same time, the relative market shares of Finland’s largest electricity producers will decrease, because out of Fennovoima shareholders only Vantaan Energia is currently ranked among the top ten electricity producers in Finland. With the project, E.ON is estimated to become Finland’s fifth largest electricity producer after Fortum, UPM-Kymmene, Helsingin Energia and Stora Enso, while Vantaan Energia is estimated to rise to seventh place. When the power plant goes on stream, E.ON’s share would be equal to about 4% of Finland’s total electricity production and that of Vantaan Energia to about 2%. Fennovoima electricity production is divided up among a large group of shareholders, and on the Nordic scale the impact of the project on the market shares of individual companies is negligible. Out of all Fennovoima shareholders, only E.ON ranks among the top ten electricity producers, being the fourth largest in the Nordic countries after Vattenfall, Fortum and Statkraft. E.ON’s Nordic market share, currently about 9%, will increase by about one percentage point. The project will also have a significant positive impact on the electricity retail market in Finland. The competitiveness of small and medium-sized local energy companies will be particularly enhanced by their own nuclear power production, safeguarding their operating potential. For local energy companies, supplying their customers with reasonably priced energy is their principal objective. What is essential for consumers is that some local energy companies will be competing for customers and pricing their retail sales on the basis of their own actual costs, not on the basis of the market price of electricity.

Balanced development of Finland In terms of its size, duration and requirements, the Fennovoima nuclear power plant construction project is a unique investment. During the construction phase, the project will employ thousands of people in Finland, and the economic impact on both the immediate locality and the surrounding region as a whole will be considerable.

Economic overview of the alternative plant sites All of the alternative Fennovoima nuclear power plant sites are located in government-defined development areas, as specified by Finnish government resolution (January 25, 2007) (Figure 2A-9). Pursuant to the Regional Development Act (2002), development areas consist of the least developed areas of the country with respect to their level of development and development needs. The purpose of the Act is to create the preconditions for economic growth, industrial and business development, and a higher employment rate that will guarantee regional competitiveness and well-being on a basis of competence and sustainable development. The Act is also aimed at reducing developmental imbalance between regions, improving living conditions, and promoting balanced regional development.

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Figure 2A-9 Alternative Fennovoima sites and their economic zones.

Tervola

Tornio

1 Kemi-Tornio economic zone

Keminmaa

2 Raahe economic zone Kemi

Simo

3 Loviisa economic zone

1 0

10

Ii

20 km

2 0

10

0

20 km

10

20 km Lapinjärvi

Raahe

Pyhäjoki

Siikajoki

Liljendal Ruotsinpyhtää Loviisa Pyhtää

Vihanti

Pernaja Kalajoki

Merijärvi Oulainen

3

Alavieska

The municipality of Pyhäjoki and economic zone of Raahe The municipality of Pyhäjoki has some 3,500 permanent inhabitants, and the economic zone of Raahe, which covers eight municipalities, some 56,000. The population stood at around 53,600 in the early 1980s and continued to rise until the early 1990s. After this, the number of residents began to fall in all the municipalities, although the decrease has leveled off in recent years. The economic and employment structure of the Raahe economic zone is characterized by its strong dependency on the metals company Rautaruukki, which is reflected in the proportion of jobs within the industrial sector. The economic structure also shows a dramatic decrease in employment within the mining and industrial sector. In the past five years, more than 1,000 jobs have been lost in the Raahe economic zone within this sector. The economic structure is being gradually diversified, and new jobs have also been created in the trade and services sector. The biggest single employer within the economic zone is Rautaruukki, which employs some 3,500 people. Rautaruukki also generates additional employment in the area through its subcontractor chain. The financial status of the municipalities within the Raahe economic zone is, in general, poor. Some municipalities have a positive annual margin, but the figures are nevertheless below the national average. Tax revenue is slightly above the national average in Raahe, but clearly below this level in the other municipalities. The municipalities within the Raahe economic zone belong to the government-defined Support Area II development area. The Municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää and economic zone of Loviisa In 2006, the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää had on average 2,900 permanent inhabitants, and within the entire economic zone of Loviisa some 24,000. The majority of the


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population resides in the town of Loviisa and the municipality of Pyhtää. Industry is the second biggest employer within the economic zone of Loviisa, after social services. The structural focus of the Loviisa economic zone is on small and medium-sized industrial enterprises within the energy, electricity, packaging, metal and plastics industries. One of the largest industrial employers in the Loviisa economic zone is the Loviisa nuclear power plant owned by Fortum, with some 450 employees. The financial status of the municipalities within the Loviisa economic zone is relatively good. The annual margin for all municipalities within the economic zone was positive in 2006 and, with the exception of Pyhtää and Loviisa, the loan stock per inhabitant was clearly below the national average. In terms of annual margin and tax revenue, the economy of the town of Loviisa, in particular, is comparatively stable. Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää belongs to Support Area II as defined by the government. Municipal mergers have been a predominant topic of recent debate within the Loviisa region. The municipalities of Loviisa, Ruotsinpyhtää, Liljendal and Pernaja are scheduled to merge at the beginning of 2010. The municipality of Simo and economic zone of Kemi-Tornio In 2006, permanent inhabitants of the municipality of Simo totaled on average 3,600, and within the entire economic zone of Kemi-Tornio some 70,000. The majority of the population is concentrated in the towns of Kemi and Tornio. The population of Kemi and Tornio averaged 22,800 and 22,300 respectively in 2006. The immediate vicinity of the two medium-sized towns raises the eligibility of the population base of Simo within the Kemi-Tornio economic zone above the other proposed sites for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. The economic zone of Kemi-Tornio is one of the most industrialized areas in Finland. The area accounts for 90% of Finnish Lapland’s and 8% of Finland’s total export revenue. Industry in the region is based around the metal and forest industries. The Kemi-Tornio economic zone also has additional weight as Lapland’s commercial centre, and recent investments have further reinforced this position. The largest industrial enterprise within the Kemi-Tornio economic zone is Outokumpu, whose plants provide employment for about 2,500 people. The municipalities of the economic zone of Kemi-Tornio were more indebted in 2006 and in poorer financial condition than Finnish municipalities on average. The municipalities of the Kemi-Tornio economic zone are included within the government-defined Support Area II development area.

Impact on the economy and employment Significance of a new plant site The construction and operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will have a significant impact on the business activities, service industry and labor market of the plant site and its surrounding economic zone. Construction of the plant at a totally new site requires versatile infrastructure development both at the future plant site and in its immediate surroundings. Examples of infrastructure investments include new road connections to the plant site and a new harbor for sea transportation of heavy power plant components. The costs of these ancillary projects typical of developing a new site will benefit the community where the construction is being undertaken and the economic zone surrounding it.

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Implementation at a separate new site means that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will require more operating personnel and external services compared to an additional nuclear power plant unit constructed in connection with existing nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant’s operating personnel, Fennovoima will also offer significant employment through the company’s other functions, such as maintenance, technical services and administration. Most of these jobs will be expert appointments requiring above average education and training. The regional economic impact of the Fennovoima investment is described in a separate report in which the employment and tax effects are assessed as shown in Figure 2A-10. The report takes into consideration the employment effects of ancillary projects in addition to the nuclear power plant investment itself.

Figure 2A-10 Assessment of employment and tax revenue impact of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant.

Investment Employment impact

Tax impact

Direct impact Companies that plan and build investments

Indirect impact: Intermediate product inputs + Compound impact

Indirect consumer impact

Companies that supply intermediate product inputs and services

Property tax Labor

Municipal tax Labor

(sub-contracting, building materials and supplies, transportation services, other services)

Trade and services companies

Corporate tax

Labor

Consumption

Employment effects within Finland The employment effects within Finland during the construction of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project include the procurement and installation of machines and equipment, construction engineering and other construction-related services. Indirect employment effects include, for example, subcontracting, construction materials and equipment, and transportation services. The total employment effect within Finland of the construction phase of the Fennovoima power plant is estimated at 21,000–39,000 person years. This equates to an average of 3,500-4,900 persons employed within Finland each year throughout the entire six- to eight-year plant construction phase. This estimate is based on the assumption that the degree of domestic origin is between 35% and 45%. During operation, the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is estimated to employ 400– 500 persons, of which about 100 will be in external services. These outsourced but essential services include cleaning, guarding, rescue services, catering and transportation services. There will also be a substantial need for temporary employees during the annual maintenance outages, about 1,000 people. The Fennovoima project supports the production investments of Fennovoima shareholders in Finland by securing an important input: the availability of reason-


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ably priced electricity. The knock-on effects of the new shareholder investments thus generated will be extremely substantial, considering the broadness and diversity of the shareholder base. Effects on the municipal economy and economic and employment structure The tax revenue of the selected region will increase significantly due to real estate, municipal and corporate taxation. The growth in municipal taxes and corporate taxes will benefit the surrounding economic zone as a whole, whereas the real estate tax revenue will remain primarily within the community where the plant is located. Real estate tax revenue in particular will be of major significance to the community, even when tax revenue equalization is taken into consideration. The annual real estate tax revenue will bring a strong annual margin compared to other municipalities and the ability for the municipality to plan its own economy and future. The municipality will be able to invest its increased tax revenue in boosting the quality and extent of its service provision. The improved level of services will in turn attract new inhabitants to the municipality. The municipality can also use its higher tax base to reduce its municipal tax rate, which would be channeled to the benefit of its inhabitants. On the other hand, as a counterbalance to the higher tax revenue, the region must invest, for example, in the production of services and infrastructure construction. New real estate developments require municipal engineering investments. As the number of inhabitants increases, additional services must be produced and facilities such as day care centers, schools and leisure services built. The long term effects on the municipal economy of a nuclear power plant at a new site are shown in Figure 2A-11. These effects will be essentially similar regardless of which site is ultimately selected. The construction phase will generate demand within the construction and metal industries and for the provision of a range of services. The position of these industries within the economic structure of the region will be strengthened, and the role of service provision enhanced. The construction site will generate immediate demand, for example, for cleaning, catering, security and transport services and indirect demand Property tax revenue in the municipality of the site: EUR 140-180 million Municipal tax revenue in municipalities in the economic zone: EUR 160-200 million Employment impact in the economic zone: 28,000-36,000 person years

0

10

20 km

0

10

0

20 km

Raahe

Siikajoki

Tornio Pyhäjoki

Keminmaa

Simo

Kalajoki Ii

7) 2008 values.

20 km

Lapinjärvi

Tervola

Kemi

10

Vihanti

Merijärvi Oulainen

Alavieska

Liljendal Ruotsinpyhtää Pyhtää Loviisa Pernaja

Figure 2A-11 Estimated economic and employment effects of the Fennovoima project in municipalities in the surrounding areas over the entire useful life of the nuclear power plant 7


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for trade, hotel and restaurant services. Demand for social and public services and for leisure services will also increase during the construction phase. During the operational phase, migration to the area of permanent plant employees and their families will increase demand for the provision of public services. The increased population and purchasing power will boost the economy within the economic zone.

Site of the plant in Northern Ostrobothnia or Lapland When assessing the implementation potential of a nuclear power plant at a separate new site, the long-term operation of the plant and its significance in terms of its stabilizing impact on the economic structure of the region must be taken into account. Establishment of a new nuclear energy company will provide hundreds of highly secure, permanent jobs for decades ahead. The long-term nature of nuclear power production provides reliable opportunities for the expansion and diversification of the local and regional service industry. In terms of employment effect and additional regional tax revenue, the Fennovoima project offers a unique contribution to the Finnish economy. The construction of the nuclear power plant at a new site and in a new community will require ancillary investment which will contribute to the positive economic impact of the construction phase both regionally and nationally. Implementation of the Fennovoima project, particularly at Pyhäjoki or Simo, supports the realization of governmental regional policy objectives. The project will enhance the international competitiveness of Northern Finland and northern Finnish businesses and will reduce the developmental disparity between this region and the rest of the country. For example, the Lapland working group appointed by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy added support for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project to its list of recommendations. The Fennovoima project will contribute to the balanced development of Finland without drawing on central government budget funds. The project is an example of cooperation by an extensive group of businesses to reinforce their potential for longterm operational development and their reliance on local strengths.

Improving security of supply In general, security of supply means the capacity to maintain the basic activities that are indispensable for safeguarding the population’s living conditions, for sustaining the functioning of critical infrastructures, and the material preconditions for maintaining national preparedness and defense in case of serious disturbances and emergency situations. The purpose of security of supply measures is to analyze the threats and risks that endanger the economy and to put means and measures in place to safeguard vulnerable sectors and activities. The objective is to safeguard society’s basic economic functions even during distur-bances and under emergency conditions8. From the perspective of security of supply, electricity is highly important for employment and the economy and for society as a whole. Finland’s current dependence


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on imports and centralization of production are risk factors that must be taken into account when assessing future investment in electricity production.

Electricity infrastructure as a vital function of society The structural development of the economy and increased mutual interdependence have resulted in enhanced sensitivity to external disturbances. The spectrum of threats against modern societies is extensive, covering all scenarios from functional disorders of banking and financial systems to widespread pandemics. On November 23, 2006, the government adopted a decision-in-principle confirming the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. This decision-in-principle describes the vital functions and the threats to their continuity. There are nine specific threat models, the first of which on the list is the disruption of the electricity infrastructure. A threat model involves a disruption in the security environment that can put the safety of society, the survival of the population or the independence of the country at risk. The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), the Finnish authority that supports, guides and coordinates the development of security of supply, has set the following goals for Finland’s energy supply: – undisrupted availability of energy; – competitive price; and – environmental friendliness.

Current state of electricity delivery security A key socio-economic characteristic of Finland is its high dependence on imported energy, which stands at some 70% of the country’s total energy consumption. Finland is also currently dependent on imported electricity, being one of the three most heavily import-dependent countries in Europe together with Latvia and Serbia. Finland’s electricity production capacity has fallen short of peak load demand in recent years. In addition, a large proportion of Finnish electrical power consumption is met by electricity imported from Russia. According to NESA, Finland’s total electricity production capacity must not be allowed to fall below its current level, and vital reserve capacity should be ensured. The government confirmed this minimum goal for securing domestic electricity production in deciding on Finland’s goals for security of supply in August 2008. The monitoring of issues related to electricity delivery security has been assigned to the Energy Market Authority. The Authority cooperates with other authorities to monitor trends in the balance of electricity supply and demand in Finland. The Authority noted in its annual monitoring report released in October 2008 concerning electricity delivery security: 1. 1. In wintertime in 2008–2012, Finland’s electricity production capacity is estimated to be insufficient to meet peak load demand. The resulting power shortage will be filled by electricity imports. The shortage is estimated to be at its greatest in winter 2008–2009, at about 2,000 MW. To ensure sufficient supply of electric8) National Emergency Supply Agency.

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ity between 2008 and 2012, it is important that in wintertime Finland’s own electricity production capacity and electricity transmission connections between Finland and neighboring countries are usable as reliably as possible and to their full capacity. 2. Some of the heating production capacity in Finland is relatively old. About 4,000 MW worth of the current condensing power production and CHP production machinery was taken into use more than 30 years ago.

Strengthening security of supply through nuclear power Undisturbed supply Nuclear power plants typically have a very high capacity factor. Nuclear power plants are designed for the production of a continuous of supply of low-price electricity, socalled base load power, whereby, with the exception of annual maintenance outages, the plants are kept in continuous year-round operation. A power plant availability study conducted by the Energy Market Authority in 2008 shows that the lowest forced outage factors among Finnish electricity production facilities are to be found at hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, about 1% and 2%, respectively. The forced outage factors of CHP production and wind power are significantly greater, about 5%. The national security of supply of fuels is ensured by emergency stockpiling. Of all the fuels used for generating electricity, nuclear fuel and the interim products in its production process are the easiest to stockpile. The price, volume and weight per energy unit of nuclear fuel are considerably lower than for any other fuel. According to the instructions issued by the authorities regarding the emergency stockpiling of nuclear fuel, nuclear power plants in Finland must at all times have enough fuel in storage to produce electricity for at least seven months. Typically, nuclear power plants stock far more fuel than required. Competitive price As an example, the European Commission acknowledged in its statement to the European Council and European Parliament on January 10, 2007 that nuclear power is currently one of the cheapest low-carbon energy sources available within the EU. Additionally, the costs of nuclear power production are relatively stable. Because of its cost structure, new nuclear power capacity can be built without public money. Environmental friendliness Nuclear power causes no greenhouse gas emissions, which Finland has committed to reducing. Therefore nuclear power carries no financial encumbrances due to climate policy or carbon dioxide emissions that would complicate investment decisions because of the uncertainty involved. Nuclear power also causes no emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide or particles harmful to human beings or the environment.


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Impact of the project on security of supply Construction of new nuclear power capacity improves Finland’s security of supply by reducing dependence on imported electricity and on fuels that cause emissions of greenhouse gases. Finland’s energy supply is based on a decentralized and diverse production system. The strategic importance of nuclear power production has been emphasized by the emission trade and targets set for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in Europe. In Finland also, nuclear power’s share of electricity production is increasing. Because nuclear power is produced in large-scale power plant units, sufficient decentralization of these units becomes an integral aspect of national risk management. A specific strength of the Fennovoima project is that it will decentralize Finland’s nuclear power production geographically, in terms of ownership and in terms of organization. Figure 2A-12 shows how the relative dependence of Finland’s electricity production on a single power plant will be reduced when Fennovoima builds a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 2012

2020

13%

30%

28%

9%

8%

If construction of nuclear power capacity in Finland were only continued at the same site as the fifth unit now under construction, dependence on that single power plant site and the organization operating it would become extremely high. The island

Figure 2A-12 Geographical location of nuclear power plants in operation and under construction in Finland and their outputs (TWh) as a percentage of Finland’s total electricity production in 2012; and balancing effect of the Fennovoima project in 2020.


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of Olkiluoto would then account for more than 40% of Finland’s entire electricity production. Further development of the nuclear power industry and its reliable operating and safety culture will serve to foster appreciation of the industry in the public eye. Expansion of Finland’s nuclear power capacity supports this goal. By offering new alternatives to both present and future nuclear power experts, Fennovoima increases the general awareness and attractiveness of the nuclear power industry within Finland. Competitive electricity prices are crucial to Finland’s security of supply. The primary objective of the Fennovoima project is to ensure the supply of stably and moderately priced electricity to a substantial number of local energy companies and industrial, trade and service sector companies. The project will directly improve the operating potential of businesses in these sectors which are important to society. Therefore the positive impact of the project on security of supply is not limited to energy supply but will also support Finland’s current security of supply system based on the cooperation of the public sector and the business sector in other important areas too, such as food supply and critical basic industry.

Implementing the national climate and energy strategy This chapter discusses the impact of the Fennovoima project on the implementation of the National Climate and Energy Strategy adopted by the government. In summary, we may note that through increasing the production of reasonably and stably priced electricity in Finland, the Fennovoima project will support the national energy supply in accordance with the objectives set in the strategy. The nuclear power production of Fennovoima will be specifically aimed at meeting the electricity needs of companies operating in Finland, Finnish households and Finnish agriculture. The project further supports the government’s other climate and energy policies. EU climate policy objectives will have a major impact on the climate and energy policies of Member States in the near future. Finland is no exception. The key objectives adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament in December 2008 for the EU energy and climate strategy and draft legislation9 are. – Greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced worldwide by 50% by 2050 to limit the global temperature rise to two degrees in the long term. This will require industrialized countries to reduce their emissions by 60–80%. – The EU will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by unilateral commitment, by at least 20% by 2020. This goal will be set at 30% if an international treaty can be achieved committing other countries to reduce their emissions too. – The use of renewable energy will be increased in the EU so that it will account for 20% of the end use of energy by 2020. The overall EU goal has been distributed among the Member States as national requirements. For Finland, the percentage of renewable energy should be 38%. – The intention is to improve energy efficiency by 20% by 2020. The energy efficiency objective is indicative, not binding. 9) The Commission issued communications on the EU energy and climate strategy, defining the EU’s climate and energy policy goals, in January 2007. The European Council confirmed the goals set, and in January 2008 the Commission submitted draft legislation for measures aiming at curbing emissions and promoting renewable energy. The European Council adopted the Commission’s submission with amendments in December 2008. European Parliament confirmed the Council’s decisions also in December 2008.


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In order to prepare for the measures required to attain the EU climate goals, Matti Vanhanen’s 2nd government in Finland has drawn up a long term National Climate and Energy Strategy. The Strategy is intended to serve as a basis for government statements in EU negotiations, for preparation of domestic policy measures, and for decision-making. The Strategy was submitted to Parliament as a report in November 2008. The Strategy defines delivery security and competitiveness in energy supply together with sustainable environmental solutions as Finland’s national objective. The EU strategy has similar objectives. In preparing the Strategy, estimates and visions of trends in Finland’s energy consumption and emissions were drawn up extending to the year 2050. Based on these estimates, the government stated that Finland will not attain the national goals agreed at the EU level without new climate and energy policy measures. To enable attainment of the goals, the government has adopted the following strategic policies: 1. ensuring availability of energy, 2. reversing the growth in the end use of energy, 3. increasing the production and use of renewable energy, 4. setting emission reduction goals for sectors not covered by emission trading. The report submitted to Parliament included government proposals for key measures in addition to the strategic outlines.

Ensuring availability of energy The National Climate and Energy Strategy observes that Finland’s acquisition of electricity must be based on the availability of sufficient and reasonably priced electricity with good delivery reliability while supporting other climate and energy policy goals. It further observes that production capacity in Finland must be diverse and decentralized, and it must be able to cover peak consumption. Production capacity that does not cause greenhouse gas emissions will be prioritized. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will increase electricity production in Finland by at least 12 TWh per year without causing any greenhouse gas emissions. New, costcompetitive nuclear power capacity will significantly increase the supply of electricity in Finland and on the Nordic market. The increased supply will push the market price of electricity down, and this will benefit all users of electricity in Finland. Increasing nuclear power production will also improve Finland’s self-sufficiency and reduce dependence on imported fuels causing greenhouse gas emissions: coal, natural gas and oil. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be placed at a new site, which decentralizes production geographically, promotes development of the national grid and improves delivery reliability of electricity. Preparation for further construction of nuclear power The Fennovoima project extensively supports Finland’s preparation for further construction of nuclear power. It will diversify the structure of the sector in Finland and further improve international nuclear energy expertise. Finland is and remains a small market area, and although the level of expertise available here is high, the Fennovoima project will bring to Finland in-depth experience-based operating information and

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expertise that has not hitherto been available from other sources. Through E.ON, Fennovoima is well connected to major European players with extensive experience in and first-hand information on the construction, design and use of several of the plants that have served as models for the nuclear power plant designs currently on the market. For example, E.ON played a leading role in representing German power companies in the 1990s when the key technical features of the EPR and SWR 1000 power plant types were designed. The Fennovoima project will increase the potential of Finnish sub-contractors and contractors for participating in nuclear power projects launched and being planned elsewhere in Europe. A good track record by Finnish operators in the Fennovoima project will add to their chances for participating in E.ON projects, for example in the UK.

Reversing the growth of the end use of energy In the Strategy, the government set the goal of gradually reversing the growth of the end use of energy so that total consumption would be about 310 TWh in 2020. The vision is that by 2050 end use would be no more than about 200 TWh. In order to achieve this goal, energy use must be made more efficient in housing, construction and traffic in particular. Reducing end use is related to the requirement to increase the use of renewable energy nationally. If the overall end use of energy in Finland is reduced, the 38% goal for renewable energy can be attained with a more moderate investment in renewable energy. Electricity produced with nuclear power, competitive in price, can support significant enhancement of energy efficiency, for instance in housing and transport. Electricity is an extremely refined form of energy, and because it is well regulated it is also highly efficient. Measures for reducing the end use of energy should be primarily aimed at fossil fuel consumption, and the new nuclear electricity should be used to reduce the use of fuels whose efficiency with regard to enduser consumption is substantially poorer. As an example of energy efficiency attainable through the use of electricity we may mention replacing fossil fuels in transportation. Replacing internal combustion engines partly or wholly with electric motors in cars will substantially reduce the overall end use of energy. The savings achieved would be in the order of 60% per transport fuel energy unit. The overall savings potential is significant when we consider that fossil fuels amount to about 20%, or just over 50 TWh per year, of the total energy consumption of transportation in Finland.

Increase of the production and use of renewable energy The National Climate and Energy Strategy notes that the goal given to Finland for increasing the use of renewable energy is challenging. It is said in the conclusions of the Strategy that attaining this goal will require an increase in bioenergy, waste fuels, heat pumps and wind energy. However, not even the combined potential of these is enough; it is estimated that in order to increase the percentage of renewable energy to


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the goal level of 38%, the overall consumption of energy must be reduced. The Strategy notes that increasing the use of renewable energy will require more efficient subsidy and control systems and a change in structures. The feed-in tariff system is to be introduced as a new means for promoting this. Increasing nuclear energy production will not complicate the attainment of the national goal for renewable energy, because the goal is defined as a percentage of the end use of energy. The production of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will not add to Finland’s overall end use of energy; instead, it will enable a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a greater energy efficiency, as explained above. Most sources of renewable energy have limited availability. This is true even of bioenergy, which is to play a major role in attaining Finland’s goals. Because of the limited sources of bioenergy and because of how the EU calculates, it is by no means irrelevant how Finland’s bioenergy potential is used. For example, using wood-based fuels to heat homes is efficient for attaining the goals, because the entire energy content of those fuels, 100%, counts towards renewable energy. If, however, a comparable volume of wood-based fuels were used for separate production of electricity, no more than 40% of its energy content would count towards Finland’s renewable energy. As far as attaining the renewable energy goal is concerned, it is feasible to meet the need for separate electricity production with nuclear power and to use bioenergy primarily in applications where it can promote goal attainment as efficiently as possible. These include home heating, district heating production and second-generation biofuel production.

Setting emission reduction goals for sectors not covered by emission trading The EU sets national emission goals for sectors not covered by emission trading, unlike in the emission trading sector. In Finland, these accounted for about 45% of all greenhouse gas emissions in 2006, about 35 million tons of CO2 equivalent. The greatest source of emissions by far outside the emission trading sector is transportation, which alone accounts for almost 40% of these emissions. The next greatest sources of such emissions are agriculture and oil heating. The National Climate and Energy Strategy assumes that emissions outside emission trading must be reduced by 16% by 2020, i.e. to about 30 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year. Preparations will be made to further accelerate the reduction in emissions after 2020 so that by 2050 overall emissions would only be about 10 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year. Attaining the goals will require fundamental changes in the long term. Initially, measures will principally be aimed at transportation and heating; in both, replacing current energy sources with electricity is an essential part of the solution. Replacing fossil fuels in transportation with electricity produced using nuclear power will be particularly effective for Finland, because it will both reduce the CO2 emissions eating away at the emission quotas and reduce the end use of energy, which in turn makes it easier to attain the 38% goal. Also, increasing the use of electricity in transportation will help attain the separate 10% biofuel goal, because electricity, being an efficient form of energy, will decrease the overall consumption of energy in transportation. It is highly recommendable to replace oil heating with a ground heat pump. Increas-

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ing the use of electric ground heat pumps will generate significant emission reductions outside emission trading, and part of the energy thus produced counts towards the percentage of renewable energy. No national emission reduction requirements or goals have been set in the National Climate and Energy Strategy for energy production or other industrial sectors falling under emission trading. Finland has a low level of emissions from both the energy-intensive industries and energy production compared with many other countries. However, more than half of all the greenhouse gas emissions in Finland are caused by energy production. Further construction of nuclear power can help replace separate production of electricity using fossil fuels in Finland and further reduce the emissions from energy production. The added nuclear energy capacity will be of the greatest importance to Finland between 2020 and 2050, at which point the majority of the greenhouse gas emissions cuts are meant to be made. With nuclear energy, Finland can secure adequate self-sufficiency in electricity in a manner that is as sustainable as possible for the climate and for Finland’s economy (Figure 2A-13). 1000 g CO2-equiv/kWh

Figure 2A-13 Comparison of greenhouse gas emissions from various types of electricity production, based on a life cycle model. 10

800 600 400 200 0 Coal

Natural gas

Solar Hydroenergy energy

Bioenergy (forest)

Wind energy

Nuclear energy

Maximum Minimum

10) Electricity and heating life cycle studies in decision-making, World Energy Council, Energiafoorumi.


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General signiďŹ cance of the nuclear power plant project Supplement 2B Report on the signiďŹ cance of the project with regard to the use of other nuclear power plants in Finland and nuclear waste management

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Contents

Summary .......................................................................................................................99 Introduction ................................................................................................................100 Impact of the project on the operations of other nuclear facilities in Finland .....................................................................................................100 New operator ........................................................................................................100 Ensuring expertise ................................................................................................101 Cooperation to further improve safety ...............................................................101 Other impacts .......................................................................................................102 Impact of the project on other nuclear power plant projects planned in Finland .....................................................................................................102 Significance of the project for Finland’s nuclear waste management .....................103 Low and medium-level nuclear waste management ..........................................103 Spent nuclear fuel management ..........................................................................104 Management of nuclear power plant decommissioning waste .........................109


Supplement 2b

Summary

The founding of Fennovoima and the project launched by the company mark the entry of a new operator into the sector and an opportunity for drawing on the expertise of a major international nuclear energy company in Finland. The operating potential of the nuclear energy sector will improve with a larger number of operators. With the Fennovoima project, more expertise will be acquired. Best international practices will be introduced in Finland, and cooperation to improve safety will be expanded. Fennovoima will draw on the extensive nuclear energy expertise of the E.On Group in implementing the project. At E.ON, nuclear energy expertise and best practices are developed in an organization of some 4,000 employees. This is larger than the number of people employed in the entire nuclear energy sector in Finland. E.ON’s participation in the construction of the new nuclear power plant will benefit Finland’s nuclear energy sector as a whole. Cooperation in the area of safety both nationally and internationally is common in the nuclear power sector. Sectoral cooperation, self-control and self-supervision are in the interests of all operators. Nuclear power plant operators conduct extensive peer reviews of one another, exchange experiences and engage in safety research together. The Fennovoima project will diversify this cooperation. Nuclear waste management at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be undertaken using the same methods as at the nuclear power plants already in operation in Finland. In the management of low-level and medium-level reactor waste, the company has access to methods similar to those used at nuclear power plants already in operation in Finland. The project will enhance the further development of these methods and related expertise in Finland. In 1983, the government adopted a decision-in-principle regarding the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel at a single site. Olkiluoto in Eurajoki was chosen as this site in a decision-in-principle adopted by the government in 2000. Fennovoima plans to develop and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel together with other Finnish operators that have a nuclear waste management obligation. Waste management cooperation in the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel will increase the safety of the operations and reduce costs significantly. The central government unequivocally has the authority to force parties with a nuclear waste management obligation to cooperate, if cooperation cannot be achieved otherwise to be in the interests of society as a whole. Fennovoima is essentially in the same position as TVO and Fortum with regard to the organizing of nuclear waste management when the decisions-in-principle concerning the construction of new nuclear power plant units are decided on. The project will have a beneficial effect on the operations of the other nuclear power plants in Finland and on the organization of nuclear waste management. Fennovoima considers that cooperation with other nuclear energy operators in Finland will improve the safety of nuclear power plants and nuclear waste management and reduce their overall costs.

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Introduction According to section 24(1)(4) of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), a description of the general significance of the nuclear facility project and of its significance from the standpoint of the operation and nuclear waste management of other nuclear facilities in Finland must be appended to the application for a government decisionin-principle. The purpose of this report is to provide the information required in the provision referred to above concerning the significance of the Fennovoima project to the operation and nuclear waste management of nuclear power plant units in operation, under construction and being planned in Finland. A report on the general significance and necessity of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is given in Supplement 2A to the application. For ensuring the safety of nuclear energy use it is important to estimate how the construction of a new nuclear power plant will affect the operations and nuclear waste management of nuclear facilities already in operation. For the nuclear power plants in operation it is significant how the project will affect the potential for their safe use. The role of a new operator in the nuclear energy sector, its measures to ensure the availability of expertise and its engaging in cooperation to further develop safety in the sector are factors that will also affect other nuclear power operators. It is important for the safety and costs of nuclear waste management how the new nuclear power plant will relate to and affect nuclear waste management solutions already in place.

Impact of the project on the operations of other nuclear facilities in Finland New operator At present, nuclear power generation in Finland is concentrated with Teollisuuden Voima plc (hereinafter TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (hereinafter Fortum), a fully owned subsidiary of Fortum plc. Fortum owns about 25% of TVO. These two operators have been key players in the development of Finnish nuclear energy since the 1970s. There are four nuclear power plant units in operation in Finland at two sites: Two boiling water reactor units owned and operated by TVO at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, and two pressurized water reactor units owned by Fortum at Hästholmen in Loviisa. In addition, TVO has been constructing a new pressurized water reactor unit at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki since 2003. On the basis of operating licenses currently valid, the operating units at Olkiluoto are expected to remain on stream at least until the late 2010s, and those in Loviisa until the late 2020s. A repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland is planned to be built at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. The design and construction of the repository is the responsibility of Posiva Oy (hereinafter Posiva). Posiva is a company owned by TVO and Fortum whose purpose is to manage the spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste from operating nuclear power plant units in Finland. The foundation of Fennovoima and the project launched by the company mark the entry of a new operator into this well-established sector. Fennovoima has been actively involved in the sector with the aim of establishing close relationships with other operators and key interest groups. It is the specific purpose of the company to


Supplement 2b

further strengthen the safety and social acceptability of the nuclear energy sector. Fennovoima considers that more operators in the nuclear energy sector, which is of vital importance to society, will improve its operating potential, particularly in ensuring safety and expertise.

Ensuring expertise As the project progresses, Fennovoima will set up its own organization as described in Supplement 1C to this application. The Fennovoima project organization will employ 150 to 200 people at the procurement and permit phases and 270–330 people at the construction and commissioning phase. Once the plant goes on stream, the Fennovoima operating organization will employ 300 to 500 persons. Fennovoima requires that the experts it employs in key nuclear safety and radiation safety duties have prior experience in the nuclear energy sector. A large percentage of the experts required by the Fennovoima project organization can be recruited and trained from outside the Finnish nuclear power sector due to the duration of the project and its forward-weighted personnel planning. Prior to the commissioning phase, Fennovoima will convert the project organization responsible for implementing the project into an operating organization which will be given the necessary information on the design, construction and commissioning of the plant and the expertise necessary for operating the plant safely and efficiently. The project will not have a detrimental effect on the operations of the other nuclear power plants in Finland. It is important for the successful implementation of the project that the expertise of the international E.ON group is available during its implementation. E.ON is the largest private energy company in the world and the owner or co-owner of 21 nuclear power plant units in Germany and Sweden. Its nuclear energy functions represent the cutting edge in nuclear power plant safety and usability. At E.ON, experts and best practices develop in an organization which, with about 4,000 experts, is larger than the entire Finnish nuclear power sector. In addition to its own expertise and that available through E.ON, Fennovoima has made signiďŹ cant use of outside expertise at the preparatory phase of the project and will continue to do so at later phases. The collaboration of Fennovoima experts and E.ON experts enables expansion of the sector in Finland, which in turn will increase the number of senior experts in Finland and thereby improve the operating potential of the sector.

Cooperation to further improve safety Cooperation in the area of safety both nationally and internationally is common in the nuclear power sector. Cooperation within the sector, self-control and self-monitoring are in the interests of all operators, because major safety incidents are detrimental to everyone in the sector. Examples of cooperation in the sector are extensive peer reviews conducted by nuclear power plant operators on each other, the exchanging of user experiences, and joint safety research. With the Fennovoima project, an entirely new operator has entered the nuclear power sector in Finland and has taken an active role in the further development of

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the sector. Ever since it was founded, Fennovoima has been participating, for example, in commenting on the draft Regulatory Guides on Nuclear Safety (YVL Guides) published by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Fennovoima has also been proactive in establishing transparent relationships with key players in the sector – the monitoring authorities, operators, research organizations and subcontracting and consulting organizations. As the project progresses, Fennovoima will be participating in the Finnish national research programme on the safety of nuclear power plants as a funding provider and appointing experts to the programme steering group. Overall, the project will have a positive impact on the safety of the other nuclear power plants in Finland. The project will create potential in the nuclear energy sector for further development through application of the best practices of a major international energy company.

Other impacts The project involves the procurement of the nuclear fuel required for the nuclear power plant as explained in Supplement 5A. Each operator obtains from the international market the nuclear fuel required in whichever way they consider best. Even combined, the procurement of nuclear fuel by the nuclear power plants in Finland constitutes only a small percentage of the worldwide market in nuclear fuel. The Fennovoima project will have no impact on the nuclear fuel procurement of the other nuclear power plants in Finland. The project also has no connection with the uranium prospecting projects currently under way in Finland. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be what is known as a base load station, meaning that under normal operations it will continuously generate electricity at full capacity. Supplement 2A demonstrates that there is a future need in Finland’s electricity generation system for a significant amount of base load power, and the Fennovoima project will thus not affect how the other nuclear power plants in Finland are run. Fingrid plc, the company responsible for the Finnish national grid, has investigated the connecting of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant to the national grid. The nuclear power plant will be connected to the national grid through a secure connection ensuring that it will fulfill all operating requirements even in case of disruption in the transmission network. The connecting of the nuclear power plant to the national grid will not compromise the operations of the other nuclear power plants in Finland.

Impact of the project on other nuclear power plant projects planned in Finland Several applications for a decision-in-principle concerning the building of a nuclear power plant have been submitted to the government. Even if the government were to adopt a decision-in-principle concerning more than one project and if Parliament were to confirm this, not all projects would necessarily start immediately. Fennovoima shareholders have an existing need for the electricity to be produced by the nuclear power plant, and there are no reasons for delaying the project. Fennovoima was founded for the explicit purpose of implementing the project, and the company has no other ongoing or planned nuclear energy projects. Fennovoima


Supplement 2b

has no other functions with significant requirements for resources, so it can focus fully on the implementation of the project. The progress of other nuclear power plant projects in parallel will have no impact on the capacity of Fennovoima to implement the project as described as regards expert resources, because the company has access to E.ON nuclear power expertise where necessary, as described in Supplement 1C to this application. However, simultaneous nuclear power plant projects could cause each other delay because of the licenses and official processes required by the Nuclear Energy Act and other legislation.

Significance of the project for finland’s nuclear waste management Low and medium-level nuclear waste management It has earlier been considered in Finland that it is safe and feasible to manage low and medium-level nuclear waste on site at each nuclear power plant. TVO and Fortum each have a repository for plant waste in use at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki and at Hästholmen in Loviisa, respectively. The low and medium-level waste generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be managed on site as detailed in Supplement 5B to this application. The repository for plant waste will be built on the plant site. The repository may also be used for the disposal of radioactive waste generated elsewhere if the quality of the waste is compliant with the operational conditions of the plant, and if the quantity is minimal. Such radioactive waste is generated, for example, by hospitals. The management of plant waste from the nuclear power plant will not have a detrimental effect on the management of plant waste from the other nuclear power plants in operation in Finland. The plans and methods available to Fennovoima for management of plant waste from the nuclear power plant are essentially the same as those used by the other nuclear power plants in Finland, so the Fennovoima project will support the further development of these methods and related expertise here in Finland. For extremely low-level plant waste, one option is for Fennovoima to build a repository in the soil as shown in Supplement 5B to the application. This method of final disposal has not yet been used in Finland. It is, however, used in many other countries that use nuclear energy. The Fennovoima approach for final disposal of extremely lowlevel plant waste and the required expertise supports other nuclear power plants in operation or being planned in Finland regarding the development of similar solutions.

Spent nuclear fuel management Spent nuclear fuel storage Spent nuclear fuel removed from the reactor building of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be stored in the spent nuclear fuel store on the plant site. The storage is described in more detail in Supplement 5B to the application. The storage of spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plant will have no impact on the nuclear waste management of the other nuclear power plants in Finland.

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Preparation for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland Managing spent nuclear fuel is an important part of the obligations set in the nuclear power generation license. The waste management obligation as specified in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) means that a licensee shall be responsible for all nuclear waste management measures and their appropriate preparation, as well as for their costs. Nuclear waste management comprises all measures necessary to recover, store and handle nuclear waste and dispose of it permanently (final disposal). Regarding spent nuclear fuel, the key social issue in Finland ever since the introduction of nuclear power has been how to provide for final disposal. After the first nuclear power plant units were started up, in the early 1980s, international centralized final disposal solutions were considered the primary approach, because it was considered that the total volume of spent nuclear fuel generated by nuclear power plants in Finland would remain insignificant. Accordingly, agreements were negotiated for the irrevocable disposal of spent nuclear fuel abroad. In 1983, the government adopted a decision-in-principle setting out the long-term objectives for the conducting of research, investigations and planning required for the nuclear waste management of the nuclear power plants operating in Finland. This decision-in-principle gave the timetable shown in Table 2B-1 for the preparation of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. What is remarkable about this decision-inprinciple is its scope: it set goals for nearly 40 years in the future. All of the decisions taken over the past 25 years have upheld the essential content of the government decision-in-principle of 1983 concerning the selection of a single repository site. In 1983, there were already two licensees in Finland generating spent nuclear fuel. The government’s decision on a single final disposal site for spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland is a significant policy decision indicating that it is not feasible to construct repositories individually for each operator. Spent nuclear fuel from the Loviisa nuclear power plant was irrevocably taken to the Soviet Union and later Russia between 1981 and 1996, a total of about 330 tons of uranium. In 1994, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended to stipulate that nuclear waste generated in Finland must be managed in Finland, and as a result TVO and Fortum (then Imatran Voima Oy) decided to conclude a cooperation agreement on spent nuclear fuel management. At the time, it was considered economically the most feasible solution to provide for a joint final disposal facility.

Table 2B-1 Key objectives of the decision-in-principle adopted by the government in 1983 regarding final disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

Year

Objective

1983

Government decision-in-principle on the objectives for conducting research, investigations and planning required for nuclear waste management

1985

Study on several areas provisionally considered suitable for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel

1992

Preliminary repository site studies, on the basis of which the best suited areas are selected for detailed study

2000

Detailed repository studies leading to the selection of a single final disposal site, for which a technical repository plan is drawn up

2010

Necessary plans completed for construction license

2020

Final disposal begins


Supplement 2b

Selection of Olkiluoto in Eurajoki as the repository site Under the objectives set, Posiva Oy applied in 1999 for a government decision-inprinciple stating that constructing a repository for spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland at Olkiluoto in the municipality of Eurajoki would serve the overall good of society. This application initially concerned a repository with a capacity of 2,600 to 9,000 tons of uranium. Posiva later made the application more specific, stating that it was only applying for a decision-in-principle concerning spent nuclear fuel from the four nuclear power plant units currently in operation in Finland, totaling some 4,000 tons of uranium. On 21 December 2000, the government adopted a favorable decision-in-principle, later ratified by Parliament, on the matter, stating that it will serve the overall good of society if the final repository for spent nuclear fuel generated in the operations of Finland’s current nuclear power plants, as it is described in the application with regard to its essential operating principles and safety safeguards, is constructed at Olkiluoto in the municipality of Eurajoki. The decision-in-principle is unit-specific, not operatorspecific. The wording of the decision-in-principle is such that it takes a favorable view of Olkiluoto in Eurajoki as the site for the repository for final disposal referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act. In the preamble to the decision-in-principle of 2000, the government considers that it is acceptable and technologically and economically feasible to concentrate the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland at one site. This statement regarding a single repository site can be considered an important precedent. For the nuclear waste management of the OL3 nuclear power plant unit currently under construction, the government adopted a decision-in-principle in 2002, later ratified by Parliament, under which the expansion of the repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel to be built at Olkiluoto will serve the overall good of society. The government used financial grounds and the feasibility of the measures required before final disposal of spent nuclear fuel to justify the decision-in-principle. The contents of the preambles to the decisions-in-principle of 2000 and 2002 are relevant with regard to any new decisions-in-principle to be adopted concerning the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Fennovoima joining spent nuclear fuel management processes The management of spent nuclear fuel from the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be organized essentially in the same way as at the nuclear power plants currently operating in Finland. The processing and storage of spent nuclear fuel on site at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will have a positive impact on Finnish nuclear waste management. The project will boost expertise in handling methods and storage in Finland. In accordance with previous decisions-in-principle adopted by the government, Fennovoima plans to develop and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel together with other Finnish operators that have a nuclear waste management obligation. The company also owns land at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki in the area where Posiva plans to build the repository for final disposal. Fennovoima acquired this land to contribute to the future final disposal of all the spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland in a single repository. Fennovoima will prepare for the costs of nuclear waste management as specified in the Nuclear Energy Act regardless of how the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel from

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the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will actually relate in detail to the solutions of other licensees under the waste management obligation. The principles of the provision for costs are described in more detail in Supplement 5B of the application. The government made a policy statement with the decisions-in-principle of 2000 and 2002 to the effect that it is not necessary to construct repositories in the final disposal facility for a larger amount of spent nuclear fuel than will be generated by the nuclear power plants currently in operation or being constructed in Finland. On this basis, the capacity of the repository was provisionally set at a maximum of 6,500 tons of uranium by decision-in-principle. Extension of the repository requires a separate decision-in-principle for the spent nuclear fuel of each new nuclear power plant unit. Fennovoima considers that constructing a shared final disposal facility for all licensees under the waste management obligation will increase nuclear waste management safety and reduce the overall costs incurred from these operations in Finland.

Capacity of the repository The maximum capacity of the spent nuclear fuel repository to be constructed at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki is determined by government decisions-in-principle. The capacity confirmed by decision-in-principle is based on capacity need estimates submitted by Posiva, TVO and Fortum. The capacity determined by a decision-in-principle may not be larger than the capacity considered in the environmental impact assessment, which in turn is limited, ultimately, by the technical capacity of the bedrock (Figure 2B-1). The most recent and most accurate estimates of the amount of spent nuclear fuel that will be generated over the useful life of the nuclear power plant units in operation and under construction in Finland is given in the application for a decision-inprinciple concerning the extension of the final disposal facility submitted by Posiva in April 2008. According to the application for a decision-in-principle submitted by Posiva, Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 and Loviisa 1 and 2 will between them produce a total of spent nuclear fuel equivalent to 5,530 tons of uranium over their useful lives. The environmental impact assessment of the repository which has so far been carried out considered the construction of the facility scaled for a specific amount of spent nuclear fuel. The assessment considered a volume of spent nuclear fuel that is greater than the anticipated combined volume of spent nuclear fuel generated by the nuclear power plants in operation and under construction, as Table 2B-2 shows. The purpose of this is to prepare for extensions of useful life and the construction of new nuclear power plant units. The environmental impact assessment of the repository conducted in 1997–1999 allowed for 9,000 tons of uranium. In early 2008, Posiva launched an environmental impact assessment procedure concerning the extension of the capacity of the repository to 12,000 tons of uranium. According to Posiva, the purpose of the assessment concerning the extension is to prepare for the needs of the seventh power plant unit of its owners. On June 26, 2008, Fennovoima issued a statement on the Posiva assessment procedure, proposing that the capacity considered in the assessment should be increased to 18,000 tons, because the final disposal should be considered on the basis of its maximum anticipated extension. The final disposal capacity technically possible at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki is determined by the characteristics of its bedrock and the actual final disposal solutions. Given that the final disposal method is the same, it is irrelevant for the capacity of the


Supplement 2b

107

Figure 2B-1 Determining the capacity of the repository.

Capacity assessed in the EIA procedure

Bedrock capacity

Capacity confirmed in the decision-in-principle Estimated capacity need

bedrock who produced the spent nuclear fuel that is stored in it. The planning of the underground areas under Olkiluoto island and the adjacent water areas will take into account the facilities planned for the repository in the bedrock. The underground area subject to planning comprises some 1,400 hectares in the municipality of Eurajoki and 250 hectares in the town of Rauma (Figure 2B-2). The final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel from one nuclear power plant unit will require about 50 hectares of underground area. The final placement of the repository facilities in the bedrock in the planning area will be determined by faults in the rock, for instance. On the basis of the plans described above and the information on the geological properties of the bedrock at Olkiluoto published by Posiva, there is no reason to assume that the bedrock at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki would not be sufficient to accommodate the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel from the Fennovoima nuclear power plant in addition to that from all other nuclear power plant units in operation and under construction in Finland. The Fennovoima project joining the repository planned at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki would not cause any disruption to the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plants of TVO and Fortum currently in operation and being planned. Year

Capacity considered in EIA procedure, tU

Estimated capacity need, tU

Capacity confirmed by decision-in-principle, tU

1999

9,000

about 4,000

0

2000

9,000

about 4,000

4,000

2002

9,000

about 6,500

6,500

2008

9,000

5,530

2010

12,000

6,500

1

3

5,530–14,130

2

1) Estimate given by Posiva in its application for a decision-in-principle, April 2008 (Supplement 6, page 1). 2) Fennovoima estimate. The minimum value assumes that no new nuclear power plants will be built. The maximum assumes the implementation of the Fennovoima project at its largest extent (4,000 tU), the Olkiluoto 4 unit of TVO in accordance with the Posiva application for a decision-in-principle (2,500 tU), and the Loviisa 3 unit of Fortum of the same size as Olkiluoto 4. 3) Capacity according to the Posiva environmental impact assessment program.

Table 2B-2 Spent nuclear fuel repository capacity at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki in tons of uranium (tU)


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Figure 2B-2 The planned area for the spent nuclear fuel repository in Olkiluoto.

Mandatory waste management cooperation It is the aim of Fennovoima to conclude an agreement on the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plant with Posiva or its owners. Waste management cooperation in the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel will increase the safety of the operations and reduce costs significantly. There is no case to be made for building more than one repository for spent nuclear fuel in Finland. If this were to be done, Finland would be the only country in the world to plan parallel repositories. There are strong grounds for cooperation, and section 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act allows the Ministry of Employment and the Economy to order the parties with a waste management liability to undertake waste management measures jointly. Section 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act unequivocally gives the central government the power to order other parties with a nuclear waste management liability to cooperate in the future with Fennovoima if that is the only way to ensure cooperation for the overall good of society in the final disposal of all spent nuclear fuel that has been and will be generated in Finland. Fennovoima is essentially in the same position as TVO and Fortum with regard to the organizing of nuclear waste management when the decisions-in-principle concerning the construction of new nuclear power plant units are decided on.

Management of nuclear power plant decommissioning waste When the operations of the nuclear power plant end, it will be decommissioned. The management of the radioactive waste generated in the decommissioning will be organized essentially like the management of low and medium-level plant waste. The radioactive decommissioning waste will be stored in the plant waste repository of the nuclear power plant. Decommissioning waste management is described in more detail in Supplement 5B to this application.


Supplement 2b

Preparations for decommissioning of the nuclear power plant are begun from day one of plant operations in the form of advance planning and economic measures, as speciďŹ ed by law. In planning for decommissioning, Fennovoima can call upon the ďŹ rst-hand experience of E.ON in the controlled decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Practical decommissioning experience can also be utilized in the planning of the decommissioning of the nuclear power plants currently operating in Finland. The nuclear power plant units currently in operation in Finland will be decommissioned before the decommissioning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant begins. The expertise acquired in this work will be used in the planning and implementation of the decommissioning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. The decommissioning of the nuclear power plant will not have an adverse effect on the waste management of the other nuclear power plants operating in Finland.

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Liite 4a

Alternative sites for the nuclear power plant Supplement 3A Assessment report pursuant to the act on environmental impact assessment procedure (468/1994)

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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................113 The project and its justification .................................................................................114 Implementation options to be assessed...............................................................114 Project options ......................................................................................................115 Project schedule and the design stage .................................................................116 Environmental impact assessment procedure...........................................................116 Statements on the assessment program and other participation .......................116 Project description ......................................................................................................117 Technical description............................................................................................117 Nuclear safety........................................................................................................119 Licenses required by the project ..........................................................................120 The project’s environmental impact ..........................................................................121 Land use and the built environment ...................................................................123 Construction of the nuclear power plant ...........................................................124 Radioactive emissions...........................................................................................124 Other emissions ....................................................................................................124 Water system and the fishing industry ................................................................124 Soil, bedrock and groundwater............................................................................129 Flora, fauna and protection sites ..........................................................................129 Landscape and cultural environment..................................................................130 Traffic and safety ...................................................................................................130 Noise......................................................................................................................133 Impact on people and society ..............................................................................134 Impact of the use of chemicals ............................................................................135 Impact of waste management ..............................................................................135 Impact of decommissioning the power plant.....................................................135 Impact of a nuclear accident ................................................................................136 Impact of the nuclear fuel production chain......................................................137 Impact on the energy market ...............................................................................138 Environmental impacts crossing Finland’s borders ...........................................138 Impact of the zero-option ....................................................................................139 Prevention and reduction of adverse environmental impacts ...........................139 Feasibility of the project .......................................................................................141 Monitoring program for environmental impacts ...............................................141


Supplement 3a

Summary

According to section 24, subsection 1, paragraph f of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for the decision-in-principle submitted to the government must be supplemented with an environmental impact assessment report pursuant to the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) and a report on the design criteria adopted by the applicant to avoid environmental accidents and to minimize the impact on the environment. The environmental impact assessment report can be found in Supplement 3A to the application. Chapter 10 (“Prevention and mitigation of damages�) of the report describes the design criteria which the applicant will adopt to avoid environmental accidents and to minimize the impact on the environment. Fennovoima has completed the environmental assessment for the project in 2008. The environmental impact assessment report was submitted on October 9, 2008 to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, who acts as a contact authority in the project. The assessment report hearing ended on December 22, 2008. The assessment procedure is concluded by a statement issued by the contact authority on the report and its sufficiency. Supplement: Environmental Impact Assessment Report for a Nuclear Power Plant, October 2008. ISBN 978-952-5756-03-6.

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The project and its justification In January 2008, Fennovoima Ltd (hereinafter Fennovoima) launched an environmental impact assessment procedure (EIA) regarding the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Finland. Fennovoima is studying the construction of a power plant consisting of one or two reactors with an electrical output of 1,500–2,500 MW to one of the following municipalities: Pyhäjoki, Ruotsinpyhtää or Simo. Fennovoima’s parent company is Voimaosakeyhtiö SF which has a 66% shareholding, and is owned by 48 local energy companies operating in Finland as well as 15 industrial and retail companies. The minority shareholder is E.ON Nordic AB with a shareholding of 34%. Fennovoima is to produce electricity for the needs of its owners at cost price. Energy production must be increased in order to secure the operational requirements for and expand the operations of Finnish industry and commerce. In 2007, about 90 TWh of electricity was used in Finland (Finnish Energy Industries 2008a) and the demand for electricity is estimated to continue growing. Fennovoima’s shareholders account for nearly 30% of all electricity consumed in Finland. One of the main purposes of the project is to increase competition in the electricity market. Furthermore, the project’s impact on the regional economy will be significant. The new nuclear power plant will increase carbon dioxide emission free energy production, reduce Finland’s dependence on imported electricity and replace coal- and oil-operated power plants.

Implementation options to be assessed The alternative location sites for the nuclear power plant are: – The Hanhikivi headland in the municipality of Pyhäjoki. The distance to the center of the municipality of Pyhäjoki is less than 7 kilometers. The northeast part of the Hanhikivi headland is located in the town of Raahe. The distance to the center of Raahe is about 20 kilometers. − The Kampuslandet island and the Gäddbergsö headland in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää. The distance to the center of the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää is approximately 30 kilometers. − The Karsikkoniemi headland in the municipality of Simo. The distance to the center of the municipality of Simo is approximately 20 kilometers. During the EIA program stage, the alternative sites inspected also included Norrskogen in Kristiinankaupunki. Fennovoima Ltd completed the investigations for these alternative in June 2008. The impacts of the alternative cooling water intake and discharge locations will be assessed for each site. The main alternative for the project to be analyzed in the environmental impact assessment is a nuclear power plant with electric power of 1,500–2,500 MW. The power plant can also be constructed in a manner suitable for combined district heating production. The nuclear power plant will consist of one or two light-water reactors (pressurized-water or boiling water reactors) and a disposal site for low- and medium-level waste produced by the reactors.


Supplement 3a

115

Figure 3A-1 Alternative site locations for the nuclear power plant.

The project includes the disposal of spent nuclear fuel created by the nuclear power plant operations in Finland according to the requirements of the Nuclear Energy Act.

Project options Fennovoima was specifically established to prepare, design and implement a nuclear power plant project to cover its owners’ needs for electricity, and its plans do not include other alternative power plant projects. According to the estimates of Fennovoima’s owners, other means cannot be used to achieve the required electrical power, delivery reliability and price. The report describes the energy saving actions of Fennovoima’s shareholders. They have engaged in systematic improvements in the efficiency of the use of electricity voluntarily and have achieved considerable savings. However, these means have not and will not be able to achieve such reductions in energy use that the nuclear power plant project would be unnecessary. By implementing all of the energy saving actions that have been decided or are under consideration, energy savings only equaling the annual production of a power plant of about 24 MW could be achieved. The zero-option under inspection is that Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant project will not be implemented. In the zero-option, the shareholders’ increasing demand for electricity would be covered by increasing imports of electricity and/or through other operators’ power plant projects.


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Project schedule and the design stage Preplanning for the nuclear power plant has been carried out in the alternative locations during 2008. Fennovoima’s objective is to start construction work at the selected plant site in 2012 and start energy production at the new nuclear power plant by 2020.

Environmental impact assessment procedure The Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA, 85/337/EEC) issued by the Council of the European Community (EC) has been enforced in Finland through the EIA Act (468/1994) and Decree (713/2006). Projects to be assessed through the environmental impact assessment procedure are prescribed by the EIA Decree. According to the project list of the EIA Decree, nuclear power plants are projects to which the assessment procedure is to be applied. Fennovoima submitted the EIA program concerning its nuclear power plant project on January 30, 2008 to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, which acts as the coordinating authority. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy requested statements on the EIA program from different authorities and other stakeholders, and citizens had the opportunity to present their opinions. The EIA program was placed on public display from February 5 to April 7, 2008. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy issued its statement on the EIA program on May 7, 2008. The environmental impact assessment report (EIA report) has been drawn up on the basis of the EIA program and related opinions and statements. The EIA report was filed with the coordinating authority in October 2008. Citizens and various stakeholders have the possibility to present their opinions on the EIA report during the time determined by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The EIA procedure will end when the Ministry of Employment and the Economy issues its statement on the EIA report. One of the goals of the EIA procedure is to support the project design process by producing information concerning the project’s environmental impacts at as early a stage as possible. Participation of citizens, which is an essential part of the EIA procedure, aims to ensure that various stakeholders’ views of the project’s impacts are also taken into account at a sufficiently early stage. During the EIA procedure, Fennovoima has launched technical preplanning for the project in all of the alternative sites and land use planning in two municipalities. Preplanning has been performed in close cooperation with environmental experts who carry out the assessment work. The EIA report and the stakeholder interaction that materialized during the EIA procedure, as well as the collected data, act as an important support for the more detailed further design and land use planning for the project.

Statements on the assessment program and other participation The requested organizations submitted a total of 69 statements on the assessment program to the coordinating authority. The submitted statements mainly considered the program to be appropriate and comprehensive. A total of 153 opinions on the EIA program were submitted, of which 35 were from Finnish organizations and associa-


Supplement 3a

tions, four from foreign organizations and associations and 113 from private individuals from various countries. The statements and opinions discuss the project-related factors very widely. The cooling water impact assessment has been requested to include the impact of warm water that increases eutrophication and impacts on migrating fish. In addition, the impact of the nuclear power plant and the surrounding safety zone on nearby residents and their everyday lives has raised plenty of interest. The statements and opinions have also dealt with the impact of radioactive emissions, the possibilities of reducing the emissions and the project’s impact on the regional economy and the value of nearby properties. Various opinions suggested that the environmental impact assessment should be supplemented by taking into consideration the entire lifecycle of the project, including the environmental impacts of the processing of uranium, decommissioning the plant units, nuclear waste management and transportation. The opinions also discussed the social significance of the project and the need for assessing alternative energy production methods. The aim has been to take into account the questions, comments and views presented in the statements and opinions as comprehensively as possible in the drafting of the EIA report and associated surveys. A monitoring group consisting of project-related stakeholders has been established in each of the municipalities being considered. The groups have met three times during the EIA procedure. During the public display of the EIA program, Fennovoima and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy organized open public events in all of the municipalities. Furthermore, other events concerning nuclear power and Fennovoima’s project have been organized in the municipalities. Fennovoima has also established offices in all of these municipalities where information about nuclear power and Fennovoima’s project has been available for everyone interested in the project. Information about the project has also been provided in Fennovoima News which was distributed in the region of each of the municipalities as a supplement to local newspapers. In addition, Fennovoima publishes the Sisu magazine distributed to stakeholders.

Project description Technical description The alternative plant types inspected in the project are the boiling water reactor and the pressurized-water reactor. Both of the reactor types are light water reactors that use regular water to maintain the chain reaction, to cool the reactor and to transfer heat from the reactor core to the power plant process.It is possible to add an intermediate circuit at the low pressure end of both plant types to obtain sufficiently high temperature thermal energy from the process for district heating use. The heat created in the fission of uranium atom cores used as fuel in the nuclear reactor heats the water in order to produce high-pressure steam. The steam rotates the turbine, which, in turn, drives the electric generator. A boiling water reactor operates at a pressure of approximately 70 bar. Fuel heats up water in the reactor, and the steam coming from the reactor is led to rotate the turbine. The steam returning from the turbines is led to a condenser, where it releases its remaining heat into water pumped from the water system and condenses into water. The cooling water and the steam returning from the turbine and condensing into wa-

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Figure 3A-2 The operating principle of a boiling water reactor.

Figure 3A-3 The operating principle of a pressurized water reactor.

ter are not brought into direct contact with each other. The boiling water reactor has a more simple steam generation process than the pressurized water reactor. On the other hand, the steam is slightly radioactive when the plant is running and no one can stay close to the turbine during operations. In a pressurized water reactor, fuel heats the water, but the high pressure (150–160 bar) prevents the formation of steam. The high-pressure water coming from the reactor is led to steam generators where the water in a separate secondary circuit is vaporTable 3A-1 The preliminary technical description of a planned nuclear plant.

Description

Option 1 (one large unit)

Option 2 (two smaller units)

Electrical power

1,500–1,800 MW

2,000–2,500 MW

Thermal power

about 4,500–4,900 MW

about 5,600–6,800 MW

about 37%

about 37%

Uranium oxide UO2

Uranium oxide UO2

about 3,000–3,100 MW

about 3,600–4,300 MW

Annual energy production

about 12–14 TWh

about 16–18 TWh

Cooling water requirement

55–65 m /s

80–90 m3/s

Efficiency Fuel Thermal power released in cooling to the water system

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ized, and this steam is led to rotate the turbine and electrical generator. Because of the heat exchanger, the steam in the reactor system and turbine plant is kept separate. As a result, water in the secondary circuit is not radioactive. The nuclear power plant is a base load plant, which will be used continuously at constant power, except for a few weeks’ maintenance outages at 12–24-month intervals. The plant’s planned operational lifetime will be at least 60 years. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be primarily designed as a condensing power plant. The preliminary technical parameters of the planned nuclear power plant are shown in the table beside. Preliminary technical specifications of the planned nuclear power plant Of all the light reactor types available on the market, Fennovoima has selected the following three reactor options suitable for Finland for closer inspection: – EPR by Areva NP, a pressurized water reactor of about 1,700 MWe, − ABWR by Toshiba, a boiling water reactor of about 1,600 MWe, and − SWR 1000 by Areva NP, a boiling water reactor of about 1,250 MWe.

Nuclear safety According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), nuclear power plants must be safe and they must not cause any danger to people, the environment or property. The regulations of the Nuclear Energy Act are specified in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988). The general principles of the safety requirements for nuclear power plants applicable in Finland are prescribed in the Finnish Government decisions 395397/1991 and 478/1999. Detailed regulations concerning the safety of nuclear energy, safety arrangements, preparations and the supervision of nuclear materials are issued in the nuclear power plant guides by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK, YVL Guide, see www.stuk.fi). Legislation concerning nuclear energy is currently being revised. Safety is the central principle when designing a new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The safety of nuclear power plants is based on following the defense in depth principle. Several simultaneous and independent protection levels will be applied to the design and use of the power plant. These include: – the prevention and observation of operational malfunctions and faults − the observation and management of accidents − the reduction of the consequences of the release of radioactive substances. Nuclear power plants are designed so that the failure of operations at one protection level does not result in any danger to people, the environment or property. In order to guarantee reliability, each of the levels is to be built on several supplementary technical systems, as well as limitations and regulations related to the use of the power plant. Tested technology will be applied to the design of the nuclear power plant and all processes are designed to be naturally stable. The capacity of the power plant’s safety systems is designed to be manifold in relation to the need so that the systems can be divided into several parallel subsystems. Safety planning ensures that radioactive substances contained in the plant, fuel in particular, can be prevented from spreading as reliably as possible in all situations. Radioactive fuel is prevented from spreading into the environment using several technical spreading barriers within each other. Each of these barriers must be sufficient to independently prevent the spreading of radioactive substances into the environment.

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Figure 3A-4. Design principles of safety systems.

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The nuclear power plant will be constructed so that it is protected against outside threats, such as extreme weather conditions, different flying objects, explosions, burning and poisonous gases and intentional damage. The nuclear power plant will follow a high safety culture and developed quality assurance measures. The objective is to protect the plant from failures and employees from radiation. Supervision of the use and safety of nuclear energy is the responsibility of STUK and the safety of the nuclear power plant will be monitored through different authority inspections. When applying for a decision-in-principle, STUK will prepare a preliminary safety assessment for Fennovoima’s application, assessing how these reactor options inspected by Fennovoima meet Finland’s nuclear safety requirements. The detailed implementation of the safety solutions for the plant option selected will be described in great detail when Fennovoima applies for a construction permit for the nuclear power plant. The structures implemented in construction and the results obtained from test operations will be assessed as a whole when Fennovoima applies for the operating permit for the nuclear power plant.

Licenses required by the project According to the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the construction of a nuclear power plant with a noticeable general significance requires a decision-in-principle issued by the Finnish Government and ratified by Parliament concerning the fact that the construction of the nuclear power plant will be in accordance with the total benefit of the society. The decision-in-principle requires a recommending statement concerning the location of the nuclear power plant to be issued by the planned location municipality of the nuclear power plant. A binding decision on the project investment cannot be made until Parliament has ratified the decision-in-principle. The construction permit will be granted by the Finnish Government if the requirements for granting the con-


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Other clarifications to be appended to the decision-in-principle application

EIA program

National Land Use EIA report

Guidelines Regional Land Use Plan

Decision-in-principle pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act – Preliminary safety assessment from the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority – Approval from the location municipality – Decision-in-principle from the Government – Ratification from the Parliament

Permits pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act

Permits pursuant to the Water Act

Construction licence pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act from the Government

Local Master Plan Local Detailed Plan

Building permit

Construction of the infrastructure and the plant

Operating licence pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act from the Government

Commissioning of the power plant

Monitoring and potential renewal of permits

struction permit for a nuclear power plant prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act are met. The operating permit will also be granted by the Finnish Government if the requirements listed in the Nuclear Energy Act are met and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy has stated that the preparations for nuclear waste management costs have been organized as required by law. In addition, the project will, at different stages, require licenses pertaining to the Environmental Protection Act, the Water Act and the Land Use and Building Act.

The project’s environmental impact For the environmental impact assessment, a report of the current status of the environment and the affecting factors have been conducted in each of the alternative sites and municipalities on the basis of available information and reports made for the EIA

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Figure 3A-5 License procedure in the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant.


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procedure. The available environmental information and impact assessment always include assumptions and generalizations. Similarly, the available design information is preliminary at this stage. This causes inaccuracies in inspection work. Furthermore, any uncertainties related to the assessment methods have been assessed. However, any uncertainties related to all of the said factors are known fairly well and they have been taken into account when assessing the impacts. As a result, the significance and magnitude of environmental impacts has been identified reliably and the conclusions do not include any significant uncertainties. The project’s environmental impacts have been inspected by comparing the changes caused by the project and the different options to the current situation and assessing the significance of the changes. For the impacts related to the nuclear power plant’s construction stage, the following stages and functions have been inspected separately: – Construction work for the power plant − Construction of the navigation channel and harbor quay − Building cooling water structures − Construction of road connections − Construction of power lines − Transportation and commuter traffic. The following have been inspected with regard to impacts during operations: – Impacts of cooling water and wastewater − Waste management − Transportation and commuter traffic − Irregular and accident situations − Combined effects with other known projects − Impacts crossing the boundaries of Finland Furthermore, the following have been described with regard to environmental impacts: – Acquisition chain for nuclear fuel − Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel − Decommissioning of the power plant The assessed impacts include: – Impact on land use and regional structure − Impact on water systems and the fishing industry − Impact of radioactive and other emissions − Impact on flora, fauna and protected sites − Impact on the soil, bedrock and groundwater − Impact on the landscape and cultural environment − Noise impacts − Impact on living conditions, comfort and health − Impact on the regional economy − Impact on traffic and safety


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Land use and the built environment The area of the power plant site which covers the central power plant functions will be about 10 hectares. The plant site will be specified in each municipality as design and planning proceed. The plant activities in the preliminary plans, excluding cooling water intake and discharge structures, harbor quay, and accommodation and parking areas, are expected to require an area of about 100 hectares at each alternative location. Ground area will also be required for new road connections to be built. The power line leading to the plant will restrict land use on a strip 80–120 meters wide depending on the column type. The construction of the nuclear power plant will restrict land use in the plant’s safety zone, but enable new constructions in settlements and villages and along roads. STUK will define the safety zone for the plant later, but, in the inspection work, it has been assumed to extend to a distance of about five kilometers from the plant. Pyhäjoki The holiday homes located on the west coast of the Hanhikivi headland and some of the holiday homes located on the southwest coast of the headland will be removed through the construction of the nuclear power plant and the southwest coast cannot be used for recreational purposes. The new road connection will not cause any significant changes in land use. The Hanhikivi historical monument will remain accessible. The significance of Raahe as a strong industrial region will become stronger, which may improve the conditions for the development of land use. Ruotsinpyhtää Most of the current holiday home areas in the Ruotsinpyhtää location may be preserved. The use of the areas for recreation or outdoor activities will be restricted. On the Kampuslandet island, the new road route will not be in conflict with current land use. In the Gäddbergsö headland, the new road connection will mainly follow the layout of the existing road. A large part of the nuclear power plant’s safety zone is already included inside the safety zone of the Hästholmen plant, so there will be no significant changes in land use restrictions. The construction of the nuclear power plant will strengthen the position of the Loviisa region as a center for energy production, which may improve the conditions for the development of land use. Simo The holiday homes located on the south coast of Karsikkoniemi will be removed through the construction of the nuclear power plant. The current Karsikontie road can be used as a road connection. New road connections may be necessary for current land use and any rescue routes but they will not affect land use. The construction of the nuclear power plant will restrict the building of new residential areas indicated in the middle of Karsikkoniemi. The significance of the Kemi-Tornio region as a strong industrial region will become stronger, which may improve the conditions for the development of land use.

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Construction of the nuclear power plant In the case of one unit, the construction of the nuclear power plant will take about six years and about eight years in the case of two units. During the first construction phase of approximately two years, the necessary roads, as well as excavation and civil engineering work, for the power plant and other buildings will be completed. The actual plant construction work and the partly parallel installation work will take about 3–5 years, and commissioning of the plant will take about 1–2 years. Impacts related to the construction site functions include dust, noise, landscape impacts, impacts on flora and fauna, and impacts on the soil, bedrock and groundwater. The construction site functions create local dust, and its impact on air quality will mostly be restricted to the construction site. The construction stage will also create impacts on people’s living conditions and comfort. The impacts on the regional economy will mainly be positive as economic operations increase in the region.

Radioactive emissions Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant will be designed so that its radioactive emissions fall below the set limit values. The plant’s radioactive emissions will be so low that they will not have any adverse impact on people or the environment.

Other emissions Traffic during construction will increase emissions significantly in all of the alternatives. However, traffic will only be especially frequent during the fourth or fifth year of construction. In other construction years, traffic volumes and emissions will be considerably lower. Construction-related traffic emissions are not estimated to have any significant impacts on air quality in the areas surrounding the alternative location sites. In all of the options, traffic to the plant runs mostly along highways or motorways. The traffic volumes on these roads are fairly high, and traffic during the nuclear power plant’s operating stage will not cause a significant change in the volumes and, as a result, in traffic emissions and air quality. The nuclear power plant’s traffic emissions can be assessed to have an impact on air quality mostly along smaller, less operated roads leading to the nuclear power plant. The current air quality is assessed to be good in all of the location sites. The nuclear power plant’s traffic emissions will not reduce the air quality so significantly that it would have adverse impacts on people or the environment. The emission volumes of reserve power and heat production will be very small and will not have an impact on the air quality of the alternative sites.

Water system and the fishing industry The conduction of the cooling water used at the power plant to the sea will increase the water temperature close to the discharge site. The extent of the warming sea area will be defined by the size of the power plant and, to some extent, by the chosen in-


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take and discharge options. The power plant’s impact on the sea temperature and the differences between the different intake and discharge options were assessed using a three-dimensional flow model for each municipality. Figure 3A-6 Cooling water intake and discharge sites in Hanhikivi headland, Pyhäjoki. The blue circles refer to bottom intakes, the blue arrow refers to shore intake and the red arrow means the discharge site.

Figure 3A-7 Temperature increase in the surface layer as a June average value (bottom intake I2 – discharge D1).

Pyhäjoki Three different intake sites and one discharge option were studied in Pyhäjoki. Two of the intake alternatives are for bottom intake (I1 and I2) and one for shore intake (I3). A temperature increase of more than five degrees centigrade will be limited to the area surrounding the cooling water discharge site. The temperature increase can mainly be observed in the surface layer (at a depth of 0–1 m). In winter, the thermal load of cooling water keeps the discharge site unfrozen and causes ice to thin out mainly to the north and east of Hanhikivi. The unfrozen area or thin ice area (thickness less than 10 cm) is about 8 km2 for the 1,800 MW power plant option and about 12 km2 for the 2,500 MW power plant option.


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Proliferation of aquatic vegetation and phytoplankton will increase in the impact area of cooling waters. In Pyhäjoki, the sea area is open and there are only few nutrients available, because of which the impacts are assessed to be minor. According to the assessments, cooling water discharge will not cause anoxia in deep waters or significantly increased flowering of blue-green algae. The project will not have an impact on water quality. Possible adverse impacts on fishing include the build-up of slime in nets and, in the summertime, hindering whitefish fishing especially on the fishing ground north of Hanhikivi. In winter, the unfrozen area of water will hinder ice fishing but, on the other hand, it will extend the open water fishing season and attract whitefish and trout to the area. The impacts of cooling water will mainly be restricted to a distance of a few kilometers from the discharge site and they will not have a wider impact on the condition of the Bothnian Bay. Figure 3A-8 Cooling water intake and discharge sites in Ruotsinpyhtää. The blue arrows show shore intakes, the blue circle intake from the bottom (tunnel) and the red arrows show the discharge sites. The purple arrow indicates the existing Loviisa plant’s intake and discharge location.

Ruotsinpyhtää Three different intake and discharge sites were studied in Ruotsinpyhtää. One of the intake alternatives is for bottom intake (I1) and two are for shore intake (I2 and I3). The modeling also took into account the effect of cooling water from the existing nuclear power plant in Loviisa. A temperature increase of more than five degrees centigrade will be limited to the area surrounding the cooling water discharge site. The temperature increase can mainly be observed in the surface layer (at a depth of 0–1 m). The smallest warming area will be caused by the discharge site (D3) directed to the open sea area south of Kampuslandet, whereas the largest area will be caused by the discharge site (D2) directed to the shallow area east of Kampuslandet. The smallest areas to warm up will be reached by using the bottom intake option


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Figure 3A-9 Temperature increase in the surface layer as a June average value (bottom intake I1 – discharge D3).

(O1) and shore intake west of Kampuslandet (O2). Shore intake west of Kampuslandet (O3) will result in the largest area to warm up. In winter, the uniform area of thin or nonexistent ice cover will expand. The unfrozen area or thin ice area (thickness less than 10 cm) varies from 3 to 5 km2 for the 1,800 MW power plant option and from 4.5 to 5.5 km2 for the 2,500 MW power plant option. Proliferation of aquatic vegetation and phytoplankton will increase in the impact area of cooling waters. Due to eutrophication, flowering of blue-green algae may increase locally, particularly if the mostly shallow sea area east of Kampuslandet is chosen as the discharge site. The project may have local adverse impacts on the oxygen level near the bottom of basin areas. The impacts will be smaller if the option (D3) directed towards the open sea is chosen as the discharge site. In bottom intake, nutrient concentration may increase slightly at the discharge site and intensify the impact of thermal load to some extent. Possible adverse impacts on fishing include the build-up of slime in nets and decreased catching efficiency of traps in the affected area of cooling waters. In winter, the unfrozen area of water will hinder ice fishing but, on the other hand, it will extend the open water fishing season and attract whitefish and trout to the area. The impacts of cooling water will mainly be restricted to a distance of a few kilometers from the discharge site and they will not have a wider impact on the condition of the Gulf of Finland. Simo Three different intake sites and two discharge sites were studied in Simo. Two of the intake alternatives are for shore intake (O1 and O2) and one for bottom intake (O3). A temperature increase of more than five degrees centigrade will be limited to the area surrounding the cooling water discharge site. The temperature increase can mainly be observed in the surface layer (at a depth of 0–1 m). The discharge option (D1) directed towards the open sea area southwest of Karsikko will cause a smaller warming area than the option west of Karsikko (D2). The bottom intake option (I3) will cause the smallest warming area during summer. There is not much difference between the shore intakes (I1 and I2) with regard to the warming area. In winter, the uniform area of thin or nonexistent ice cover will expand. The unfrozen area or thin ice area (thickness less than 10 cm) varies from 7 to 9 km2 for the 1,800 MW power plant option and from 9 to 13 km2 for the 2,500 MW power plant option.


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Figure 3A-10 Cooling water intake and discharge sites in Karsikko, Simo. The blue ball refers to bottom intake, the blue arrows refer to shore intake and the red arrows indicate discharge sites.

Figure 3A-11 Temperature increase in the surface layer as a June average value (bottom intake I3 – discharge D2).

Proliferation of aquatic vegetation and phytoplankton will increase in the impact area of cooling waters. The discharge site directed to the open sea (D1) is assessed to cause minor eutrophication. In discharge to the more sheltered and already nutrientrich Veitsiluoto Bay, eutrophication will probably increase relatively more. Cooling waters are assessed not to cause anoxia in hypolimnion. Possible adverse impacts on fishing include the build-up of slime in nets and decreased catching efficiency of traps in the affected area of cooling waters. According to assessments, cooling waters will not have an impact on fish migration. In winter, the unfrozen area of water will hinder ice fishing but, on the other hand, it will extend the open water fishing season and attract whitefish and trout to the area. The impacts of cooling water will mainly be restricted to a distance of a few kilometers from the discharge site and they will not have a wider impact on the condition of the Bothnian Bay.


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Soil, bedrock and groundwater The most significant impact on soil, bedrock and groundwater will be caused during the nuclear power plant’s construction stage. Construction work will be planned so that there will be as few adverse impacts as possible. During construction, all earthmoving, excavation and dredging masses are to be utilized on the site in different landfills and landscaping work. The foundation waters and rain waters drained from the construction site will contain more solids and any oil and nitrogen compounds than waters normally drained from tarmac-covered yards. The quality and volume of water drained to the sea from the construction site will be monitored. The project will not have any adverse impacts on usable groundwaters.

Flora, fauna and protection sites Noise and other operations during the construction stage may disturb fauna close to the power plant site. Construction work will cause some of the living environments to change permanently. The project’s design and implementation will take into account the natural values of the regions, if possible. Construction work is to be scheduled so that they will cause as little damage as possible to nesting bird stocks. Protection sites or areas for protected species will be avoided when locating buildings and other infrastructure. Pyhäjoki The Hanhikivi area is rich in bird species. The planned plant site will be located in an area where the avifauna mainly consists of forest species. The Hanhikivi headland is on the route of migrating birds and acts as a staging area for many species. Power lines will increase the risk of migratory bird collisions. There are a few occurrences of endangered and otherwise noteworthy plant species at the Hanhikivi headland. If the habitats of the species outside the construction areas are retained, the occurrence of the species in the area would probably not deteriorate. The Hanhikivi headland area would change and nature in the area would become so fragmented that the area’s significance as a model of uninterrupted succession development, i.e. slow change in flora and fauna in the uplift area, would clearly deteriorate. The project area includes the nature conservation area of Ankkurinnokka and several habitat types defined in the Nature Conservation Act. The overgrowing of protected shore meadows may intensify. The closest Natura area is located about two kilometers away, south of the area. The project is assessed not to have significant adverse impacts on the protection criteria of the Natura 2000 area. Ruotsinpyhtää The observed bird species can mostly be deemed regular species for coastal and inland archipelago areas. The area does not include any habitat entities of major significance to bird species. The project is assessed not to cause any major adverse impacts on the avifauna. Power lines will increase the risk of migratory bird collisions. Most of the natural characteristics of the area are mainly common for the shore area, and the forests are highly managed. Therefore, the project’s impacts on biodiversity would remain relatively low.

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There are no nature conservation areas or habitat types in accordance with the Nature Conservation Act in this area. The closest nature conservation areas are approximately three kilometers to the northwest and southwest. According to assessments, the project will not have an impact on the nature conservation areas. The closest Natura area is approximately 1.5 kilometers south of Kampuslandet at its closest. The project is assessed not to have significant adverse impacts on the protection criteria of the Natura 2000 area. Simo The birdlife at Karsikkoniemi is versatile due to the versatile habitat structure of the area. The areas which would change the most are located in the inner parts of the Karsikkoniemi headland where there are no significant sites considering the avifauna or other animals, except for the Lake Karsikkojärvi, and in the Laitakari and Korppikarinnokka area which are significant for avifauna. Power lines will increase the risk of migratory bird collisions. There are plenty of occurrences of endangered and otherwise noteworthy plant species at Karsikkoniemi headland. Construction may destroy some of the occurrences from the area. There are no nature conservation areas in the assessment area. There are a few habitat types in accordance with the Nature Conservation Act in this area. The overgrowing of protected shore meadows may intensify on the western shore of Karsikkoniemi. The closest Natura area is located at Ajos headland, approximately 3.5 kilometers from the assessment area. A slight heat impact from the cooling waters may occasionally extend to the area. The project is assessed not to have significant adverse impacts on the protection criteria of the Natura 2000 area.

Landscape and cultural environment The nuclear power plant will alter the landscape considerably. The pictures on the next pages illustrate the impact of the nuclear power plant on the landscape in the alternative locations, both for the one-unit and two-unit alternatives. In Pyhäjoki, the character of the surroundings of the Hanhikivi antiquity and the position of the Takaranta seashore meadow would change. In Kampuslandet, Ruotsinpyhtää, the nuclear power plant would impact the cultural landscapes of provincial value and the surroundings, scenery and position in the overall setting. In Ruotsinpyhtää, the nuclear power plant would be located in the vicinity of the existing nuclear power plant. In Karsikkoniemi, Simo, the landscape is in a state of change, and the nuclear power plant would be placed as an annex to the Kemi industrial zone. The landscape status of a nationally important fishing village will change.

Traffic and safety The increase in traffic at the nuclear power plant’s construction stage will be notable in all of the options. However, traffic will only be especially frequent in the fourth or fifth year of construction. As a result, any adverse traffic impacts will only cover this limited period.


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Figure 3A-12 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Pyh채joki (and Raahe) (1 unit).

Figure 3A-13 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Pyh채joki (and Raahe) (2 units).

Figure 3A-14 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Kampuslandet, Ruotsinpyht채채 (1 unit).


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Figure 3A-15 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Kampuslandet, Ruotsinpyhtää (2 units).

Figure 3A-16 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää (1 unit).

Figure 3A-17 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää (2 units).

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Figure 3A-18 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Karsikkoniemi, Simo (1 unit).

Figure 3A-19 Photomontage: The nuclear power plant in Karsikkoniemi, Simo (2 units).

At the operating stage, the nuclear power plant’s traffic will only have a minor impact on traffic volumes on the main routes in the alternative sites. The planned improvement projects for routes leading to the alternative sites will improve traffic safety, and according to assessments, nuclear power plant traffic will not reduce the traffic flow and safety.

Noise The noisiest stage during the construction of the nuclear power plant will be the first years of construction when functions that cause significant noise include the rock crushing plant and concrete mixing plant. During the operating phase, the most significant noise impact will occur in the immediate vicinity of the turbine hall and the transformer.


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Simo During the construction phase, the daytime guide value of 45 dB(A) will be exceeded on a few dozen existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant. The night-time guide value of 40 dB(A) will be exceeded on a maximum of 10 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant and on a few holiday properties close to the road. The holiday homes located on the south coast will probably be removed with the implementation of the project. Pyhäjoki The daytime guide value will be exceeded on about 15 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant and on 10 holiday properties near the road. The nighttime guide value will be exceeded on about 15 to 20 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant. Some of the holiday residences on the west and southwest coast will be removed with the implementation of the project. Ruotsinpyhtää During the construction phase in the Kampuslandet location, the daytime guide value will be exceeded on about 20 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant and on 10 holiday properties near the road. In the Gäddbergsö location, the daytime guide value will be exceeded on less than 20 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant and on about 30 holiday properties near the road. During the operating phase in the Kampuslandet location, the night-time guide value will be exceeded on no more than about 10 existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant. In the Gäddbergsö location, the night-time guide value will be exceeded on a few existing holiday properties in the vicinity of the power plant.

Impact on people and society The nuclear power plant project will have significant impacts on the regional economy, employment, the property market in the surroundings of the location site, the population, industrial structure and services. During the construction phase, the project’s municipal tax revenue will be EUR 2.8 to 4.5 million in the economic areas, and property tax revenue in the location municipality will be determined by the stage of completion of the nuclear power plant. The employment impact of the construction stage on the economic area will be 500–800 man-years. During the operating stage, property tax revenue in the location municipality will be EUR 3.8 to 5.0 million a year and municipal tax revenue EUR 1.9 to 2.4 million a year in the economic area. In the economic area, employment impact will be 340–425 man-years annually. The arrival of new residents, boosted business and escalated building activity will increase tax revenue. The population and residence bases will grow and, as a result, the demand for private and public services will increase. A number of people will move close to the nuclear power plant during the construction stage and the demand for services will increase. The accommodation of a large group of employees in a new municipality may also include negative impacts. Increased traffic and noise caused by construction work may have a local impact on comfort. Normal operation of the nuclear power plant will have no radiation-related, detectable impact on the health, living conditions or recreation of people living in the vicin-


Supplement 3a

ity. Access to the power plant area will be prohibited and the area cannot be used for recreational purposes. Warm cooling water will melt or weaken the ice and, as a result, restrict recreational activities on ice during the winter, such as fishing or walking. The opinions of those living and operating in the surrounding areas of the location sites on the nuclear power plant site were identified through group interviews and resident surveys. The opinions varied greatly and groups for and against the project have been established in the areas. Opposition is often based on risks and fears associated with nuclear power plants, and on the belief that nuclear power is ethically questionable. The supporters emphasize its positive economic impacts and environmental friendliness.

Impact of the use of chemicals The use of chemicals and oils at the nuclear power plant will not cause any adverse environmental impacts under normal conditions. The risks of chemical accidents will be taken into account in the design of the plant. The probability of an accident where a dangerous volume of chemicals or oils can enter the atmosphere, water system or soil is low.

Impact of waste management Regular waste created at the nuclear power plant will be sorted, sent for treatment, utilization and final disposal in a manner required by waste legislation and environmental license decisions. Waste handling at the plant will not cause any significant environmental impacts. Sufficient facilities for the handling and disposal of low- and medium-level power plant waste will be built at the nuclear power plant. The facilities will contain systems for the safe handling and transportation of waste and the monitoring of the amount and type of radioactive substances. The disposal facilities for low- and medium-level waste can be built in underground facilities and the disposal facilities for very low-level waste can also be built in facilities located in the ground. Once the use of the final disposal facilities is terminated, the connections will be sealed and will not require any supervision afterwards. Any radioactive substances contained in the waste will become safe for the environment over time. Careful planning and implementation will help to eliminate significant environmental impacts caused by the treatment and final disposal of operating waste. Spent nuclear fuel will be transported to a repository located in Finland by sea or road.

Impact of decommissioning the power plant The new nuclear power plant’s estimated operating life is at least 60 years. As a result, the decommissioning of Fennovoima’s plant is estimated to begin in 2078 at the earliest. The most significant environmental impacts of decommissioning will arise from the handling and transport of radioactive decommissioning waste generated during

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dismantling of the controlled area of the plant. The most radioactive portion of such waste will be treated and disposed of similarly to operating waste. As many of the dismantled contaminated plant parts and equipment as possible will be cleaned so that they can be released from the radiation authority’s control and either recycled or disposed of at a general landfill site. The plant’s systems will be sealed so that radioactive substances cannot spread into the environment. The majority of waste generated through the nuclear power plant’s dismantling operations is not radioactive and can be treated similarly to regular waste. Environmental impacts in the plant area and nearby roads caused by the dismantling, treatment and transportation of the nuclear power plant’s non-radioactive structures and systems include dust, noise and vibration. Furthermore, in road sections with only a little traffic, the emissions of increasing traffic will have an impact on air quality. Decommissioning can be performed so that the power plant site will be released for other operations or some of the buildings will be left at the site and utilized for other purposes, or energy production or other industrial operations will be continued at the site.

Impact of a nuclear accident Nuclear power plant incidents and accidents can be categorized using the international INES scale into Categories 0–7 which illustrates the severity of nuclear power plant incidents. Categories 1–3 indicate incidents that reduce safety and Categories 4–7 refer to different types of accidents. An accident is considered to be at least in Category 4 if any civic defense measures must be started outside the plant. In order to assess impacts caused by a nuclear power plant accident, the spreading of radioactive emissions caused by a serious reactor accident (INES 6) have been modeled as an example case, as well as the resulting fallout and radiation dose for the population. Using the modeling results, the environmental impacts caused by an accident of Category 4 on the INES scale have also been assessed. It is not justified to include an assessment of an accident more serious than INES Category 6 in an environmental impact assessment because the occurrence of such an accident must be practically impossible in order to grant a construction and operating license for a nuclear power plant in Finland. According to the limit value set by the Government Decision (395/1991), the caesium-137 emission caused by the modeled accident is 100 TBq. The model includes such a number of nuclides that corresponds to more than 90 percent of the radiation dose caused. The spreading calculation of radioactive emissions is based on the Gaussian spreading model and its versions suitable for short and long distances. The spreading of a radioactive emission and radiation dose calculation have been modeled at a distance of 1,000 km from the nuclear power plant. Impact of a serious accident According to the Government Decision (395/1991), a serious reactor accident, i.e. an accident caused by the melting of the fuel core, shall not cause direct adverse health effects to the population in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant or any long-term restrictions on land use.


Supplement 3a

The likelihood of a serious nuclear accident is extremely low. In the event of such an accident, the impacts of a radioactive release on the environment will strongly depend on the prevailing weather conditions. The most important weather factor for impacts is rain, which will effectively flush down the radioactive substances included in the emission cloud. If the weather conditions are unfavorable, the impacts of the emission in the areas where rain occurs will be higher but the total impact area will, on the other hand, be smaller than in case of typical weather conditions. The season also has an impact on the contamination of food products. Following a serious accident (INES 6), it is not likely that the use of agricultural products will be restricted in the long term. Short-term restrictions on the use of agricultural products may apply to areas within a 1,000 km radius of the plant without any protective measures aimed at livestock or food production.In case of unfavourable weather conditions, restrictions on the use of various kinds of natural produce may have to be issued in areas affected by the greatest fallout. For example, long-term restrictions on the consumption of certain mushrooms may be required in areas up to 200–300 kilometres of the accident site. Under the threat of a serious accident, the population will be evacuated, as a protective measure, from an approximately five kilometer wide safety zone surrounding the facility. In unfavorable weather conditions, protection may be necessary indoors within a maximum of 10 kilometers. The use of iodine tablets may also be necessary according to guidelines issued by the authorities. Serious accidents will have no direct health impacts. Impact of a postulated accident In the event of an INES Category 4 accident, no protective measures will be needed in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant. The INES Category 4 includes postulated accidents that are used as design criteria for the design of nuclear power plants’ safety systems.

Impact of the nuclear fuel production chain A nuclear power plant uses about 30–50 tons of enriched uranium as fuel per year; 300–500 tons of natural uranium will be required to produce this amount of fuel. The impact of the fuel acquisition chain will not be directed at Finland. The arising impacts will be assessed and regulated in each country according to local legislation. The environmental impacts of uranium mining operations are associated with the radiation of the uranium ore, radiation effect of the radon gas released from the ore, tailings and wastewater. Any environmental impacts from the production steps of conversion, enrichment and fuel rod bundles are related to the handling of dangerous chemicals and, to a lesser extent, the handling of radioactive materials. The environmental impacts of the different stages of the production chain, starting from mines, are increasingly prescribed by international standards and audits carried out by external parties, in addition to legal regulations. In the fuel production chain, the intermediate products and fuel assemblies transported from the mines to the power plant are slightly radioactive at most. The transportation of radioactive materials will be carried out in compliance with national and international regulations on transport and storage of radioactive materials.

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Impact on the energy market The Nordic electricity market is very dependant on hydroelectricity production which has a significant impact on the price of electricity. Using the new nuclear power plant intended for the production of basic power, the price fluctuation caused by hydroelectricity can be reduced because the role of hydroelectricity in the formation of the price of electricity will be reduced. It has been calculated that the construction of the sixth nuclear power plant unit will reduce the market price of electricity on the stock exchange, as well as the price to be paid by consumers. The new nuclear power plant will improve the maintenance reliability of electricity production by reducing Finland’s dependency on fossil fuels and imported power.

Environmental impacts crossing Finland’s borders The only transboundary impact during normal operation of the nuclear power plant will be the regional economic impact in the region of Haparanda. The impacts of an extremely unlikely serious nuclear power plant accident would likewise extend outside Finland’s borders. Impact on regional economy Especially at the Simo location, the direct and indirect employment-related impacts of the project would extend to Haparanda and the surrounding areas in Sweden due to the proximity of the national border. Even today, cooperation between Tornio and Haparanda is extensive, and many basic municipal services and leisure activity facilities are shared. The training and recruiting of labor is also at least partly planned jointly. Depending on circumstances such as the actions taken by the municipality itself (such as training and supplying workforce, supplying services, supplying housing), there may be significant benefits for Haparanda. Impact of a serious nuclear power plant accident The impacts of a serious nuclear power plant accident have been illustrated from the area surrounding the plant up to a distance of 1,000 kilometers. The exact layout of the studied area around each alternative plant location is illustrated in the figure below. With regard to local agricultural products used as food, the fallout in typical weather conditions will be so small that long-term restrictions are not required on their use. Without any protective measures aimed at livestock or food production, short-term usage restrictions of no more than a few weeks may be necessary in areas up to 1,000 kilometers from the power plant site until concentrations of I-131, which is significant to the buildup of radiation doses, have decreased sufficiently. The half-life of I-131 in agricultural products is about 8 days. In case of an accident during unfavorable weather, it is also probable that restrictions on the use of various kinds of natural produce will have to be issued in areas affected by the greatest fallout. For example, long-term restrictions on the consumption of certain mushrooms may be required in areas up to 200–300 kilometres from the power plant site. The modeled serious reactor accident in the example does not cause any immediate health impacts on the surrounding population in any weather conditions. To limit


Supplement 3a

139

Figure 3A-20 Zones of a 100, 500 and 1,000 kilometer radius surrounding the alternative locations. The plant sites from north to south are Simo, Pyhäjoki and Ruotsinpyhtää.

the thyroid radiation dose, children should take iodine tablets when recommended by authorities within a distance of 100 kilometers from the accident site in all weather conditions. This impact could therefore extend to the northeastern corner of Sweden in the case of the Simo location, or the northern coast of Estonia in the case of the Ruotsinpyhtää locations. No other civic defense measures would be necessary in other countries. In addition to a serious accident, the impacts of a postulated accident (INES 4) have been assessed. Its impacts would not cross Finland’s borders.

Impact of the zero-option If a new nuclear power plant is not built in Finland, its production will probably be substituted mainly by imported power. The rest of the electricity will be produced in Finland by utilizing the existing or new power production capacity which would mostly consist of separate electricity production and, to a small extent, of combined power and heat production. If the Fennovoima project is not implemented, the current status of the environments of the inspected location sites will possibly be affected by other projects, functions and plans.

Prevention and reduction of adverse environmental impacts An environmental management system will be used to connect the nuclear power plant’s environmental issues with all of the power plant’s functions, and the level of environmental protection will be improved continuously. At the construction stage, adverse noise impacts or other disturbances in the immediate vicinity of the plant can be reduced by scheduling as many of the particularly noisy or otherwise disturbing actions to be carried out in the daytime and communicating their schedule and duration. In addition, the location of the functions and temporary noise protection can be used to reduce the adverse noise impact of the con-


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struction site significantly. The biological adverse impacts caused by construction work on water systems close to cooling water structures or routes and the harbor quay and navigation channel can be reduced by scheduling the construction work to take place at the most biologically inactive time. Social impacts during construction can be reduced by decentralizing the accommodation of the workers to nearby municipalities in addition to the location municipality. The impacts caused by cultural differences can be reduced through training organized for foreign employees. The impact of power lines on land use, the landscape and natural resources can be reduced by taking the impact into account as well as possible in the design of the power line route and in the column solutions. The impacts caused by the construction of roads can be reduced through thorough design of the road routes and construction work. The only means available to significantly reduce the thermal load to the water systems is so-called combined production, i.e. a power plant that would produce electricity and also district heating or industrial steam. Implementing the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project as a combined electricity and heat generation plant is possible from a technical viewpoint, and also possibly feasible from an economical viewpoint if the thermal energy demands is high enough. Fennovoima will study the future district heating demand, production methods and their environmental and climatic impacts at various sites, especially in the Helsinki Metropolitan area. Local impacts in water systems from the use of cooling water can be alleviated by means of a variety of technical solutions. The location and shape of the affected area of cooling waters can be influenced through the placement of the intake and discharge structures. Fish can be prevented from being driven into the cooling water intake system through different technical measures and through design of the cooling water intake systems. Impacts during the nuclear power plant’s operating stage on nature and animals can be reduced particularly by taking into account the birdlife of the area during operation. The risk of birds colliding with power lines can be reduced by improving the visibility of the power line using bird warning spheres. The location of the power plant in the landscape can be improved by selecting the correct surface materials and colors, planning building locations carefully and adding plants. The impacts on the nearby traffic volumes and safety can be reduced through different technical solutions that improve the traffic flow and safety and by organizing bus transport for the personnel to the worksite. Noise impacts can be reduced by placing buildings that prevent noise and functions that cause noise from spreading and selecting building materials and technologies that dampen noise. Emissions of radioactive substances can be reduced through appropriate technical measures and they will be monitored continuously through measurements and sampling. Waste and wastewater generated during the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant will be treated appropriately. The objective is to minimize the volume of waste generated. The majority of the waste generated will be utilized by recycling or by using it in energy production.


Supplement 3a

The chemical storage will be built according to the requirements set by the Chemicals Act and related regulations. Any leaks will be prepared for through structural means. Any chemical damage will be prevented using safety instructions and by training the personnel. Fears related to nuclear power plants can be alleviated by providing information about the risks and impacts related to nuclear power in an active, appropriate and clear manner. The nuclear power plant’s design will prepare for the possibility of operational malfunctions and accidents. An up-to-date contingency plan will be prepared for the nuclear power plant and its surroundings, and there will be drills in its use at regular intervals. A decommissioning plan for the nuclear power plant will be drawn up at the initial stages of plant operation. One of the primary objectives of the plan is to ensure that dismantled radioactive components will not cause any harm to the environment.

Feasibility of the project As a result of the environmental impact assessment, none of the project’s implementation options were identified to have such adverse environmental impacts that they could not be accepted or reduced to an acceptable level. Thus, the project is feasible. However, the impacts of the different options differ from each other with regard to certain impact types and these differences should be taken into account when selecting and developing the project’s implementation options.

Monitoring program for environmental impacts The environmental impacts of the nuclear power plant project must be monitored in accordance with the monitoring programs approved by the authorities. The monitoring programs define the specific details of load and environmental monitoring and reporting to be performed. The release of radioactive materials from the nuclear power plant will be monitored through continuous measurements and sampling. In addition, the radiation measurements in the power plant area and its vicinity will ensure that the radiation dose limits defined in regulations issued by the authorities will not be exceeded. The monitoring of the project’s regular emissions includes the following subfields: – Monitoring cooling water and wastewater − Monitoring water systems − Monitoring the fishing industry − Monitoring the boiler plant − Waste records − Noise monitoring. The project’s impact on people’s living conditions, comfort and well-being has been assessed and the information obtained will be used to support design and decisionmaking, and to reduce and prevent any adverse impacts.

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Alternative sites for the nuclear power plant Supplement 3B Hanhikivi in Pyh채joki


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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................145 Introduction ................................................................................................................146 Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki as the site of the plant ...........................................................147 Power plant site.....................................................................................................147 Settlement in the immediate vicinity ..................................................................148 Principal activities in the immediate vicinity .....................................................150 Protective zone and emergency planning zone ..................................................150 Ownership and possession of the site ........................................................................151 Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements ...........................152 Town planning required by the project ..............................................................152 Valid planning ......................................................................................................153 Planning in preparation .......................................................................................154 Effects on land use ................................................................................................157 Suitability of the site for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant.............................................................................................158 Classification of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability ......................159 Safety-related issues...............................................................................................159 Environmental impact and limiting of the effects .............................................163 Society-related issues ............................................................................................163 Construction and operation related factors ........................................................164 Estimate of the suitability of Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki as a site ............................166


Supplement 3b

Summary

Based on the assessments and the existing information Fennovoima considers that Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki fulfills all the requirements regarding the siting of a nuclear power plant and thus it is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. The municipality of Pyhäjoki has taken part in the Fennovoima project and thus been supportive in its preparation. The municipality of Pyhäjoki is located in Northern Ostrobothnia in the Province of Oulu. Hanhikivi is located in the northern part of the municipality of Pyhäjoki on the Hanhikivi headland, approximately seven kilometers from the centre of Pyhäjoki. The northeast part of the Hanhikivi headland extends up to the town of Raahe. The town center of Raahe is about 20 km away. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Hanhikivi that would prevent the planning and execution of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations. In the Hanhikivi area, Fennovoima is in possession of a total of 305 hectares of land and water area. It is planned that the nuclear power plant be built in the middle and northern parts of the Hanhikivi headland. The balance of plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover an area of 10–15 hectares. The land held by Fennovoima is sufficient for the construction of a nuclear power plant. There are no factors at Hanhikivi or its vicinity that would render the site unsuitable for its purpose in terms of the planning, construction or safety of a nuclear power plant. The planned plant site has no existing industrial infrastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for constructing a nuclear power plant with all the requisite functions. Together with Fingrid, Fennovoima has ensured that all alternative plant types can be connected to the Finnish national grid at Hanhikivi. Implementation of the project requires that the planning for the planned site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant. Drawing up the plans required for the project is in preparation at all three levels of planning for the Hanhikivi area. Fennovoima estimates the planning to be complete and to acquire legal force during 2012. Planning the Hanhikivi area for a nuclear power plant will change the land use at the plant site and in the vicinity. The plant site will be designated as an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. A protective zone and an emergency planning zone around the nuclear power plant will be defined in the planning in accordance with the instructions of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone.

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Introduction In accordance with section 24, subsections 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented for each nuclear facility with an outline of the ownership and occupation of the site planned for the nuclear facility, a description of settlement and other activities and town planning arrangements at the planned nuclear facility site and in its immediate vicinity, an evaluation of the suitability of the planned site for its purpose taking into account the effects of the local conditions on safety, arrangements for safety and emergency preparedness as well as the effects of the nuclear plant on the immediate vicinity. The purpose of this feasibility study is to provide the information defined in the above mentioned section of law regarding the alternative site of the project at Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki. According to section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the government shall consider the decision-in-principle in relation to the overall good of society and take into account the benefits and drawbacks arising from the nuclear power plant, paying particular attention to the suitability of the intended site of the nuclear power plant and its impact on the environment. According to section 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act the assessment of the suitability of a site is affected, for example, by whether the nuclear plant site is appropriate for the planned use regarding safety and also, whether environmental protection has been appropriately taken into consideration in the planning of the operations. The environmental impact of the execution of the Fennovoima project has been evaluated in an environmental impact assessment report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) and is attached here as Supplement 3A of the application. The information gathered for the Environmental Impact Assessment Report partly forms the basis of the source material for this feasibility study. The information has been complemented with new information obtained as the planning has proceeded as well as with separate reports concerning the factors affecting the safety of the site. In addition to licenses required by the nuclear energy legislation, the planning for the land use as required by the Land Use and Construction Act (132/1999) is required for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. The environmental permit procedure prescribed in the Environmental Permit Procedures Act (735/91) applies to the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. Section 11 of the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008) requires that the effects of the local conditions on safety as well as safety and emergency preparedness arrangements must be considered in the selection of a nuclear power plant site. The site must be such that the detrimental impacts and threats arising from the plant to the surroundings are minimal and that heat removal into the environment can be reliably executed. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 (Safety Criteria for Siting a Nuclear Power Plant) presents the requirements for human and environmental safety regarding the siting of nuclear power plants. In conjunction with the application for a government decisionin-principle, Fennovoima will submit to STUK a separate report on the effect of the local conditions on the safety of the nuclear power plant, which will be more extensive than the one attached here.


Supplement 3b

147

Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki as the site of the plant Hanhikivi is located in the northern part of the municipality of Pyhäjoki, on the Hanhikivi headland, less than 7 kilometers from the centre of the municipality (Figure 3B-1). The northeast part of the Hanhikivi headland extends up to the town of Raahe; the distance to the town centre of Raahe is approximately 20 km. Pyhäjoki is a coastal municipality on the Gulf of Bothnia, situated between the municipalities of Raahe and Kalajoki in the southwest corner of Northern Ostrobothnia in the Province of Oulu. There are approximately 3,500 inhabitants in the municipality of Pyhäjoki. The town of Raahe borders the municipality of Pyhäjoki to the north. There are approximately 22,600 inhabitants in the town of Raahe. Raahe is the second largest town in Northern Ostrobothnia after Oulu and the third largest town in the Province of Oulu. The economic zone of Raahe covers 8 municipalities and has approximately 56,000 inhabitants. In addition to Pyhäjoki and Raahe, the economic zone of Raahe includes the municipalities of Alavieska, Merijärvi, Siikajoki and Vihanti and the cities of Kalajoki and Oulainen.

Simo

0

10

Figure 3B-1 The location of the Hanhikivi headland in the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the economic zone of Raahe.

20 km Raahe Siikajoki

Pyhäjoki Hanhikivi Pyhäjoki

Kalajoki

Vihanti

Merijärvi Oulainen Alavieska

Ruotsinpyhtää

Power plant site It is planned that the nuclear power plant is built in the middle and northern parts of the Hanhikivi headland. The central functions of the nuclear power plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover 10–15 hectares. The preliminary power plant site area is illustrated in Figure 3B-2. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 defines the requirements for the siting of nuclear power plants. A plant site, where only nuclear power plant related operations are allowed,


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will be defined for the nuclear power plant in accordance with the Guide YVL 1.10. The plant site will be fenced off and is in its entirety possessed by Fennovoima. Fennovoima is in charge of all the activities that will take place at the plant site and may remove unauthorized people from the area or prevent people from entering the site area if necessary. The preliminary plant site is illustrated in Figure 3B-2. The plant site will be defined in more detail as the design and land use planning of the nuclear power plant progresses. The plant site will be defined in detail in connection with the initial consideration of the construction license application for the nuclear power plant.

Figure 3B-2 Plant site on Hanhikivi headland in Pyhäjoki

Settlement in the immediate vicinity Permanent settlement The immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant site at Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki is sparsely populated. There is no permanent settlement on the Hanhikivi headland, and within a 5 km radius from the nuclear power plant site there are approximately 140 permanent residents (Figure 3B-3). The closest of the more densely populated areas is a village called Parhalahti approximately 6 km away, with just over 400 permanent residents. There are approximately 11,300 inhabitants within a 20 km radius of the nuclear power plant site. The central area of the municipality of Pyhäjoki as well as the town centre of Raahe is within this area, as is a part of Raahe’s built-up area. Villages in the vicinity include Parhalahti, Piehinki and Yppäri. Leisure dwellings Virtually all of the settlement in the coastal region of Pyhäjoki consists of leisure dwellings. The area of the Hanhikivi headland has fewer leisure dwellings than the rest of the coastal area of Pyhäjoki. The leisure dwellings on the Hanhikivi headland itself are confined to the west coast of the headland; the east coast is, for the most part, a nature reserve. There are a few dozen leisure dwellings within a 5 km radius of the nuclear power plant site. Within a 20 km radius there are a few hundred leisure dwellings.


Supplement 3b

Population by 1 km x 1 km squares (December 31, 2007)

149

Figure 3B-3 Distribution of population in the vicinity of Hanhikivi within a 5 and 20 km radius in 2007 (Source: Statistics Finland).

Development of population growth The municipality of Pyhäjoki has some 3,500 permanent inhabitants, and the economic zone of Raahe, which covers eight municipalities, some 56,000. The population of the economic zone was around 53,600 at the beginning of the 1980s, after which it began to rise until the beginning of 1990s (Table 3B-1). After this, the number of residents began to fall in all the municipalities. During the past few years the falling trend has leveled off and, for example, the population of Kalajoki has increased.

1985

1990

1995

2000

2006

Pyhäjoki

3,691

3,747

3,876

3,645

3,454

Alavieska

3,044

3,061

3,068

2,965

2,841

Kalajoki

9,150

9,357

9,455

9,143

9,238

Merijärvi

1,416

1,469

1,435

1,384

1,269

Oulainen

8,220

8,276

8,455

8,235

8,094

Raahe

24,334

24,190

23,919

23,242

22,404

Siikajoki*

6,426

6,560

6,538

6,115

5,818

Vihanti

4,005

3,892

3,828

3,596

3,305

Total

60,285

60,550

60,571

58,324

56,421

* The areal division of 2007 is used in the Table, i.e. the municipalities of Siikajoki and Ruukki are considered a single municipality, Siikajoki.

The population of Pyhäjoki has decreased in the 2000s by a few dozen per year. The largest population cluster of the economic zone is in the town of Raahe, where in 2006 there were approximately 22,400 inhabitants. The distance to Oulu and Kokkola from Pyhäjoki is approximately 100 km. There are approximately 130,000 inhabitants in Oulu and 37,000 in Kokkola. According to the population estimates, the population in the Raahe economic zone will decrease somewhat in the coming decades (Table 3B-2). The estimated decrease in the population of Pyhäjoki by the year 2040 is approximately 620 people. It is estimated that the population of Raahe will also decrease to some degree.

Table 3B-1 Population in the economic zone of Raahe 1985-2006 (Source: Statistics Finland).


150

Table 3B-2 Population estimates for the Raahe economic zone 2010-2040 (Source: Statistics Finland).

Ydinvoimalaitoksen periaatepäätöshakemus • Fennovoima

Pyhäjoki

2010

2020

2030

2040

3,288

3,083

2,961

2,831

Alavieska

2,756

2,637

2,589

2,540

Kalajoki

9,364

9,684

9,893

9,905

Merijärvi

1,217

1,194

1,188

1,167

Oulainen

7,973

7,856

7,849

7,755

Raahe

22,247

22,196

22,012

21,554

Siikajoki

5,868

6,074

6,220

6,268

Vihanti

3,138

2,940

2,850

2,759

Total

55,851

55,664

55,562

54,779

Principal activities in the immediate vicinity The main forms of land use in the immediate vicinity of the Hanhikivi headland are forestry and outdoor activities. There is no industrial activity in the immediate vicinity. The majority of the basic services and retail trade are located in the central area of the municipality of Pyhäjoki, as well as in the centre of Raahe. Workplaces are also mainly situated in the built-up areas. There are no extensive farming areas in the vicinity of the Hanhikivi headland. Highway 8 runs on the east side of the Hanhikivi headland, approximately 5 km from the planned site of the nuclear power plant. A local road runs from the village of Parhalahti to the Hanhikivi headland along the southwest coast. The road provides access to the Tankokarinnokka fishing harbour and the leisure dwellings on the southwestern and western coast of the headland.

Protective zone and emergency planning zone A protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be defined for the nuclear power plant. The protective zone extends to approximately 5 km, and the emergency planning zone to approximately 20 km, from the power plant (Figure 3B-4). The purpose of these zones is to ensure that the siting of the nuclear power plant is taken into consideration in the town planning as well as in the planning of the rescue operations. Within the protective zone, certain limitations regarding functions and land use apply. The number of permanent and vacation residents in the protective zone and leisure activities should be kept at such a level that an appropriate rescue plan can be prepared for the area. The conditions of the plant sites of existing nuclear power plants in Eurajoki and Loviisa were used as a starting point in drawing up the Guide YVL 1.10 in 2000, and based on this, the amount of permanent residents should be kept to a maximum of 200. Implementing the guide in the assessment of new nuclear plant sites has not been taken into account in preparing the guide. Applying the requirements of the guide to a new nuclear plant site requires consideration by the authorities. It is highly unlikely that an accident resulting in a significant radioactive waste being emitted into the environment would occur at the nuclear power plant. However, this scenario will be considered in the planning of the rescue operations. Evacuating the whole protective zone quickly will be the protective measure used in the protective zone.


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151

In the emergency planning zone, outside the protective zone, protective measures of different levels will be used depending on the situation, for example, seeking protection indoors, consuming iodine tablets or evacuation. Actions in the emergency planning zone will be taken in a threatening situation in an area which, according to the weather, would be affected by the possible release. Fennovoima will draw up a preliminary emergency preparedness plan for the nuclear power plant in connection with the construction license application for the plant, which is based on analyses of the temporal progression of possible accidents, releases and variation in weather conditions. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, will approve the emergency preparedness plan, and it will be delivered to the local emergency services and other parties. The local emergency services will be responsible for drawing up detailed rescue plans for the protective zone as well as the emergency preparedness zone. The authorities bear the responsibility for the implementation of the rescue measures. In the case of the Hanhikivi site, the requirements set out in the Guide YVL 1.10 are fulďŹ lled. Figure 3B-4 The protective zone and emergency preparedness zone in Hanhikivi, Pyhäjoki, following the directive distances speciďŹ ed in Guide YVL 1.10.

Ownership and possession of the site The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the middle and northern parts of the Hanhikivi headland on the plant site shown in Figure 3B-2. In the Hanhikivi area, a total of 305 hectares of land and water area1 is in the possession of Fennovoima as of December 20, 2008. The majority of the middle and northern land area on the Hanhikivi headland is possessed by Fennovoima. Fennovoima is in possession of the land either by outright ownership or by lease. All 1) Includes the land of the Piehinki village community (about 16.85 ha), which the village community at its meeting on December 1, 2008 decided to lease to Fennovoima.


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Figure 3B-5 Areas owned or governed by Fennovoima on the Hanhikivi headland in Pyhäjoki and in the nuclear power plant support area and on the road route as of December 20, 2008.

the leases for the area are in the form of a two-part contract containing a binding precontract for the purchase of the land. Figure 3B-5 shows the land possessed by Fennovoima on the Hanhikivi headland as of December 20, 2008. The area possessed by Fennovoima is sufficient to accommodate a nuclear power plant on the Hanhikivi headland. Outside the plant site Fennovoima also possesses some areas in the planned support zone and on the road route. Fennovoima continues to acquire land and water areas in the vicinity of the site. The company aims to acquire at least the land included in the town planning for the nuclear power plant and its supportive operations through voluntary contracts.

Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements Town planning required by the project Execution of the project requires that the planning for the site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant in the regional land use plan, the local master plan and the local detailed plan. The planning process for the Hanhikivi area in Pyhäjoki has been launched at all three levels of planning at the beginning of 2008. In the following section, a brief description of the relevant information of the valid planning as well as of the changes to planning in progress will be given. The valid planning has been described in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the project, which is included as Supplement 3A of the application, as well as in the participation and assessment plan and the planning draft drawn up in conjunction with the planning procedure.


Supplement 3b

Valid planning Regional land use plan The currently valid regional land use plan for Northern Ostrobothnia was ratified by the Ministry of the Environment on February 17, 2005, and it took effect after the Supreme Administrative Court decision on August 25, 2006. The Hanhikivi headland region is marked as an important area with respect to the diversity of nature due to the different species and nature types of the coastal uplift area. Among its other attributes, the Hanhikivi headland possesses a bedrock deemed nationally important in relation to the protection of nature and landscape, and the area also contains traditional biotopes of regional value. In the south and southeast of the Hanhikivi headland, outside the planned plant site, lies a nature reserve and Natura area. The erratic boulder of Hanhikivi that is situated in the northern part of the headland, at the border of the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe, is a nationally significant prehistoric monument. The area of sea along the Pyhäjoki-Raahe coast has been reserved for an extensive wind power plant site in the valid regional land use plan. Valid local master plans and the local detailed plans of the municipality of Pyhäjoki The legally effective local shore master plan preparations for the Pyhäjoki sea shore are in progress. The proposed local shore master plan regarding the sea shore at Pohjankylä, Eteläkylä and Yppäri has been set on public display in the spring of 2008. As a result of the assessment procedure of the nuclear power plant, some changes were made in the planning schedule, and the sea shore at Parhalahti was excluded from the planning work for the local shore master plan. The village of Parhalahti has a valid component local master plan with legal effect. A small part of the Parhalahti sea shore is still covered by an old Parhalahti component local master plan without legal effect, which was validated on December 16, 1988. A small area named Mustaniemi at the southern end of the Hanhikivi headland has a valid local shore detailed plan. There is no valid local detailed plan for the Hanhikivi headland in the municipality of Pyhäjoki. The valid local master plans and the local detailed plans of the town of Raahe A regional land use plan regulates the land use on the Hanhikivi headland together with the Raahe local master plan validated by the town council in 1979, the III zone as well as the local shore master plan of the southern shore area of Raahe, the review of which will commence in 2009. The local shore detailed plans of Tyvelänranta and Piitana are valid in the local shore master plan zone for the southern shore area of Raahe. Other component local master plans in the vicinity are Piehinki, to the north of the area covered by the component local master plan for the nuclear power plant site and, covering a vast area east of the site, the Raahe gold mine with legal effect, which became pending 2007. The component local master plan for Haapajoki-Arkkukari became pending 2007. Inspection of the local shore master plan of the southern shore area of Raahe will become pending 2009 due to demand for year-round vacation residences.

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There is no valid local detailed plan for the Hanhikivi headland in the town of Raahe.

Planning in preparation Regional land use plan for the nuclear power plant The Board of the Council of Oulu Region has, for the Fennovoima project, launched preparations for the drafting of the regional land use plan for the nuclear power plant on April 7, 2008. The participation and assessment plan of the regional land use plan was on public display from August 4 to 27, 2008. The Council of Oulu Region drew up a draft of the regional land use plan, illustrated in Figure 3B-6. According to current information, the actual draft of the regional land use plan for the nuclear power plant will be set on public display in January 2009. The draft of the regional land use plan for the nuclear power plant includes the plan symbol EN-yv in the Hanhikivi headland area denoting an area for an energy service facility, which is reserved for the nuclear power plant and its supportive operations. The regional land use plan draft includes markings for the necessary road connections, harbor functions, a directive navigation channel, the protective zone as well as the general location of the necessary power lines route.

Figure 3B-6 An extract of the draft of Hanhikivi regional land use plan for the nuclear power plant November 25, 2008. (Source: Council of Oulu Region).


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Local master plan and local detailed plan for the nuclear power plant site At the beginning of 2008, the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe set in motion the preparation of a local master plan and a local detailed plan for the Hanhikivi region and the nuclear power plant. The planning is in its draft phase. The drafts of the component local master plan for the nuclear power plant and of the local detailed plan of the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe were on public display from November 14 to December 15, 2008. The component local master plan covers the Hanhikivi headland and its surrounding areas as illustrated in Figure 3B-7. In the municipality of Pyhäjoki, the planning zone of the component local master plan borders with the town of Raahe and highway 8, and in the south and southwest with Pohjankylä. In the east, the planning zone joins the area covered by the component local master plan for Parhalahti. The component local master plan for Parhalahti will be revised in connection with the pending planning. The aim is not to alter the content of the component local master plan for Parhalahti. In the town of Raahe, the planning zone of the component local master plan covers the Hanhikivi headland and the protective zone required by the nuclear power plant. In the component local master plan, the nuclear power plant is situated on the Hanhikivi headland so as to enable locating the other activities in the area with as little disturbance as possible in relation to the plant site. The most valuable areas as regards Figure 3B-7 The boundaries of the component local master plan for the nuclear power plant site area at Hanhikivi (Source: The municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe).


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natural conditions have been excluded from the planned construction. The component local master plan includes alternative route reservations for roads from highway 8 leading to the nuclear power plant. The final road connection will be decided on later as the planning proceeds and the technical and also possible other factors influencing the choice of the road route become clear. A new shipping channel is marked in the component local master plan as well as an area reservation for building power lines for the plant site. The local master plan draft includes the plan symbol EN-1 designating an energy supply area, a total of approximately 133 hectares, which allows the siting of a nuclear power plant in the area. The plan symbol EN-2 in the component local master plan denotes an area which allows the construction of the nuclear power plant support facilities as well as residences relating to construction work and maintenance and other activities. The zones EN-1 and EN-2 are designated to be included in a local detailed plan. The local detailed plan for the Hanhikivi nuclear power plant site aims to provide planning-related preconditions for siting the nuclear power plant in the Hanhikivi area. Construction of buildings and structures needed in energy production related research and development is allowed in the energy supply zone marked with the plan symbol EN-1 in the component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts for the nuclear power plant area (Figures 3B-8 and 3B-9). Temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel is also allowed in this zone. The component local master plan and the local detailed plan include the plan symbol Ma-enk marking an indicative area where the bedrock can be used for an underground final disposal facility for low and medium-level nuclear waste from the nuclear power plant. The component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts include an area of water marked with the plan symbol W1 designating an area that may, in the case of special and industrial areas, be used for the purposes of the nuclear power plant and Figure 3B-8 An extract of the component local master plan for the Hanhikivi nuclear power plant site, draft October 24, 2008. (Source: The municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe).


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Figure 3B-9 An extract of the local detailed plan for the Hanhikivi nuclear power plant site, draft October 24, 2008. (Source: The municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe).

where jetties and other constructions and devices needed by the nuclear power plant can be built in accordance with the Water Act. The local detailed plan indicates other necessary functions required by the nuclear power plant, such as temporary residential area, harbor functions as well as areas designated for road and traffic purposes. Reservations for power lines have been drawn up for the area covered by the local detailed plan, and alternative routes for connecting roads and a site for a visitor centre have been proposed. The component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts include nature reserves and natural monuments as defined by the Nature Conservation Act. The Sm symbol is used to indicate the area where the Hanhikivi erratic boulder, restricted by the Antiquities Act, is located. The majority of the land marked in the local detailed plan draft with the symbols EN-1 and EN-2 is in the possession of Fennovoima.

Effects on land use Plant site The planning of Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki will have an impact on land use in the vicinity of the plant. The plant site will be turned into an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. Currently, the intended plant site does not have any specific land use operations. The leisure dwellings on the southwestern coast will be removed, and the southwestern coast will no longer be available for recreational use. Instead, the land use on the north-eastern coast, which is an important area in terms of both nature reserve and recreation, will, for the most part, remain the same. Access to the nationally significant Hanhikivi prehistoric monument, the erratic boulder, will improve as the road connections improve.


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Road connections The planned new road connection leading to the nuclear power plant will not have significant effects on the land use in the area. There are preparations for siting industrial service areas along the new road connection. Power line route The power line route leading to the plant will restrict land use on a strip 80–120 meters wide, depending on the column type. No such activity is permitted in the power line clearing that may render using the power line dangerous. The plant’s 400 kV and 110 kV power line will be built up to the national grid connection point on the Kopsa-Merijärvi line approximately 20 km away. Fingrid plc has submitted a report for the purposes of the regional land use plan on connecting the plant to the national grid. Other areas Construction of the nuclear power plant will have an effect on the urban structure of Pyhäjoki and Raahe by limiting land use in the protective zone of the plant and enabling new land use in the suburbs and villages as well as along the road connections. Building new and dense residential areas, hospitals and other facilities where a large number of people frequent is not permitted in this zone. It is also not allowed to site any significant production operations in the protective zone that might be affected by a nuclear accident. Existing residential buildings may be restored or replaced by new, similar buildings. Leisure dwellings or activities may be situated in the protective zone, as an appropriate rescue plan will be drawn up for the zone. The building of new residential areas or other residence-related communal functions, such as hospitals, day-care centers and schools, is prohibited or restricted in an area starting from the north side of the Parhalahti village and continuing towards the Hanhikivi headland. Vacation residential activity will remain a possibility, as well as outdoor activities, recreational activities, agriculture and forestry. The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone. The planning-related boundaries for the protective zone will be drawn up in connection with preparing the local master plan for the area. Constructing the plant will improve the land use opportunities outside the protective zone, especially in the villages and suburbs of the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe by providing new land use opportunities for building work and residential areas as well as new services. The reputation of the Raahe region as a strong industrial district will strengthen, thereby improving the preconditions for land use development.

Suitability of the site for the construction and operations of a nuclear power plant Fennovoima has selected the three alternative sites presented in the application through a complicated selection procedure. Fennovoima made a survey of some 40 potential sites all around Finland during 2007. The preliminary assessments revealed the relevant technical factors influencing the suitability of each of the sites, such as the characteristics of the bedrock and soil, the availability of cooling water, transportation connections and arrangements for the grid connection.


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On the basis of surveys and preliminary assessments, Fennovoima initiated an environmental impact assessment procedure for five sites, of which Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää and Karsikko in Simo are listed in this application as alternative sites.

Classification of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability The significance of various factors in the evaluation of the suitability of the sites is presented in Table 3B-3. – A critical factor is a factor which renders the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose mitigation to an acceptable level is impossible in practical terms. – A significant factor is a factor which on its own does not render the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which nevertheless has to be taken into account as a very significant factor in the overall evaluation regarding the selection of the site. – A planning factor is a factor which does not make the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which has to be taken into account as a site specific, special feature from the beginning of the planning of the project. Table 3B-3 shows the factors classified as relating to safety, environment, society, construction and operations.

Safety

Critical factor

Significant factor

Planning factor

Population and activities

Aviation activity

Extreme sea level

in the vicinity

phenomena

Heat removal arrange-

Extreme meteorologi-

ments

cal phenomena

Characteristics of the bedrock and soil Physical protection and emergency preparedness Environment

Non-acceptable detri-

Nature reserves

mental environmental

Limitation of environmental effects

effects Society

Approval of the com-

Scenic and histori-

munity

cal sites Land use and

Municipality and its resi-

planning

dents Construction and

Infrastructure

operation

Safety-related issues In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, the government decision-in-principle regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant is made at a very early phase of the project. In assessing the factors affecting the safety of the site, it should be taken into account that it is possible to influence most safety-related factors significantly with basic and detailed planning carried out after the decision-in-principle, as well as with the construction and operations of the plant.

Table 3B-3 Factors used in the evaluation of the suitability of a site for the project and the significance of the factors in the evaluation of the project.


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Fennovoima has evaluated the alternative sites in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10. According to the guide, the essential factors affecting the safety of the site relate to external threats and radioactive emissions from the plant. As for the selection of the external events, the requirements concerning the selection of the site defined in the IAEA Guide NS-R-3 have also been applied. Population and operations in the vicinity In Finland, a nuclear power plant cannot be located near a population cluster or near operations for which no adequate rescue operations can be planned. The nuclear power plant site must be such that the regulations for limiting the exposure to radiation and radioactive emissions in normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situations can be met. The size and distribution of the population in the vicinity of the Hanhikivi headland are presented in sections “Population in the vicinity” and “Central operations”. The normal operation of the nuclear power plant does not pose a danger to the population or operations in the vicinity. Also, there are no operations in the vicinity that pose a danger to the nuclear power plant. An appropriate plant site, protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be defined for the nuclear power plant. The size and distribution of the population as well as the other operations in the vicinity of the Hanhikivi headland are such that it is possible to plan effective rescue operations in the case of an emergency. The radioactive emissions as well as the radiation doses resulting from these and their effect on health in the case of normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situation have been assessed in the project’s EIA Report. In normal operation and in operational malfunction the effects of radioactive emissions on the population and the environment are insignificant. It is possible to design, construct and operate the nuclear power plant on the Hanhikivi headland in such a way that the prescribed limit values as defined in the Government Decree (733/2008) are lower than required. Organisation of heat removal Regarding the safe operation of the nuclear power plant it is vital that the cooling of the nuclear reactors contained in the plant is ensured in all circumstances. For this reason, the heat removal arrangements of a nuclear power plant are taken into specific consideration in the selection of the site as well as in the design and construction of the plant. Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki is located by the sea. The heat removal of the nuclear power plant will be arranged primarily by pumping cooling water from the sea with a rate of 60-100 m3/s in normal operation into the condenser of the nuclear power plant unit or units. In the very unlikely event of the cooling water intake from the sea being prevented, the reserve cooling water tanks will be dimensioned so as to last a minimum of 36 hours without any danger of the reactor overheating. The cooling water is led into the plant either by shore intake or through an intake tunnel further out to sea. In the location and planning of the cooling water intake the extremely low sea level is taken into consideration. The amount of cooling water required by the plant is insignificant in relation to the water volume surrounding the Hanhikivi headland.


Supplement 3b

The forming of pack ice in the Hanhikivi headland area is a phenomenon that may affect the nuclear power plant’s heat removal arrangements in winter. The strain caused by pack ice on the cooling water intake and discharge structures needs to be taken into account in the design of the plant to ensure the cooling of the plant in extreme conditions. Fennovoima has carried out a survey on the strain caused by pack ice on the cooling water structures as well as the possible structural design measures to prepare for the pack ice. In the nuclear power plant suitability assessment, the pre-design of the plant or the surveys executed, no factors emerged that would suggest that heat removal from the plant cannot be reliably executed. Reliable and safety regulations compliant heat removal is ensured in the basic design carried out prior to applying for the construction license in accordance with the principles presented in Supplement 4A of the application. Regarding the heat removal arrangements, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. Characteristics of the bedrock and soil The geological characteristics of the soil have a critical impact on the construction of nuclear power plant related buildings as well as on the construction of the final disposal facilities for reactor waste in the final disposal plant. In 2008, Fennovoima commissioned a survey from the Geological Survey of Finland and the Geological Department of the University of Helsinki on the bedrock characteristics of the Hanhikivi headland. In addition, subsoil explorations were carried out by boring in the area by order of Fennovoima. The subsoil explorations will continue in 2009 in order to gather sufficient information for the technical design of the nuclear power plant facilities and the final disposal facility of the plant waste. There are no known exploitable ore deposits in the area. According to the estimate of the Geological Survey of Finland it is unlikely that there would be any significant ore deposits in the area. The nearest ground water areas of any regional significance are situated more than 10 km from the Hanhikivi headland and the project poses no threat to these areas. The bedrock in the Hanhikivi area is conglomerate of approximately 1,900 million years of age, and its structural carrying capacity is good. The Hanhikivi headland is a solid rock segment where fissures are rare or non-existent. The fine-grained rock type and smooth fissures of the bedrock as well as the other geological characteristics are taken into consideration in the planning and the construction solutions of the final disposal facility for reactor waste. The Hanhikivi headland is low-lying, and for this reason the baseline level of the buildings needs to be raised by moving earth. The Hanhikivi headland is located on the inner part of the continent on the Fennoscandia shield, where the average level of seismic activity is low. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand an earthquake considerably stronger than could occur on the Hanhikivi headland. The geological surveys of the bedrock and soil characteristics of Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki have not identified any factors that would preclude the execution of the project. Regarding the soil characteristics, Hanhikivi is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. Physical protection and emergency preparedness The nuclear power plant site needs to be such that it is possible to protect the plant from illegal activities and also so that arrangements for limiting nuclear accidents may be effectively executed.

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The execution of safety and emergency preparedness arrangements is explained in more detail in Supplement 4A of the application. A plant site, as illustrated in Figure 3B-2, will be defined around the nuclear power plant, and one of the functions of the plant site is to help protect the plant against illegal activities. Fennovoima will prepare the physical protection plans and procedures of the nuclear power plant for the event of emergency situations in cooperation with the police. To ensure the effectiveness of physical protection, the safety plan and other information concerning physical protection remains largely confidential. The population of and the operations in the vicinity of the Hanhikivi headland, as well as the safety measures taken to protect the population in the vicinity are covered in sections “Settlement in the immediate vicinity”, “Central activities in the immediate vicinity” and “The protective zone and the emergency preparedness zone” of this report. The local emergency services are responsible for drawing up and executing the rescue plans. The emergency preparedness of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be planned and implemented in cooperation with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK and the emergency services authorities, so that the effects of possible nuclear damage caused by the operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be effectively contained. The safety and emergency preparedness arrangements can be planned and executed appropriately on the Hanhikivi headland. Extreme sea level and meteorological phenomena The extreme meteorological and sea level phenomena need to be explored in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant site, as they affect the operation and safety of the plant. The Finnish Institute of Marine Research has studied the sea level variation in the Hanhikivi headland region. The average sea level, as well as limit values for the sea level which are reached no more than once in a thousand years, were determined in the study. The sea levels examined range from the present time to the estimated end of the service life of the nuclear power plant, the year 2075. Concerning the year 2075, the effects of such factors as uplift and climate change on the sea level have been taken into account in addition to other factors. The Finnish Meteorological Institute has, upon Fennovoima’s request, carried out a preliminary assessment to assign values for the following extreme meteorological phenomena in the region of the Hanhikivi headland: – low and high temperatures in the following time periods: momentary, 6 hours, 24 hours, and 7 days; – wind speed: 10 minute median wind and 3 second gust of wind – precipitation: 24 hours and 7 days; and – the heaviest snow load. Concerning the extreme meteorological phenomena, the limit values which at the median level are reached no more than once in a thousand years were assessed. The assessment also explored the effects of climate change on the limit values. As a dimensioning factor, the strain caused by tornados, i.e. very strong whirlwinds affecting a small area, is taken into account in relation to buildings, structures and devices important for the safety of the nuclear power plant.


Supplement 3b

The results obtained from the preliminary assessments regarding the sea level and meteorological phenomena in Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, together with the other information available to Fennovoima, confirm that the extreme phenomena do not place such demands on the design of the nuclear power plant that would technically be extremely difficult or impossible to meet. Extreme phenomena are taken into account in the design by setting an extreme phenomenon raised by a sufficient safety margin as the basis for design, with a recurrence level rare enough in practice for the elimination of the safety risk caused by the such a phenomenon, while acknowledging the uncertainty relating to its magnitude. Aviation activity According to the Aviation Act, a no-fly zone for the area surrounding a nuclear power plant may be ordered by government decree, inside of which the flying of any aircraft is prohibited. The main purpose of the flight prohibition zone is to prevent aviation in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant in order to eliminate unnecessary risks and disturbances. There is no aviation activity in the vicinity of Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki that would pose a danger to the safety of the plant. The nearest airports are located 70 km away in Oulu and 105 km away in Kokkola-Kruunupyy. Construction of a nuclear power plant in Hanhikivi would have no effect on the operation of these airports. Under Finnish regulations, the nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft without significant consequences in the vicinity of the plant. In the case that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is built in Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, an appropriate no-fly zone will be defined for the airspace surrounding the plant.

Environmental impact and limiting of the effects The environmental impact of the project has been evaluated in an assessment procedure complying with the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994). The procedure contains an assessment of the effect of the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant on, for example, the environment, population and society. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report is included as Supplement 3A of the application, and the environmental effects of the project and the limiting of such effects will not be covered in this report in any more detail. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report reveals that the execution of the project at any of the alternative sites would not have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report contains a preliminary plan for measures to limit the environmental effect of the project at its various phases. Based on the assessments made Fennovoima thus believes that regarding the environmental effects it is feasible to execute the project on the Hanhikivi headland. The alternative options evaluated in Hanhikivi concerning the plant and cooling water arrangements differ in some aspects as to their environmental effects, as do the other options related to the execution of the project. The differences will be carefully considered as the planning and implementation of the project proceeds in order to effectively limit the environmental effects of the project.

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Society-related issues Large industrial undertakings have an effect on society and on their location in many different ways. Nuclear power particularly raises many questions and causes anxiety, a lot of which is to do with the safety of the plant. It is desirable and expected that a wide public debate will take place regarding the nuclear power plant project. Fennovoima is a part of Finnish society. The company appreciates open and democratic decisionmaking that is based on collaboration. Fennovoima has engaged in a wide and open interaction with the local residents and communities at the alternative site localities as well as in conjunction with the environmental impact assessment process. Fennovoima has engaged in a wide and open interaction with the local residents and communities at the alternative site localities as well as in conjunction with the environmental impact assessment process. The Finnish municipal elections held in October 2008 were perfectly timed as far as the Fennovoima nuclear power project was concerned. In the elections the local residents could have their say regarding the possible placement of the nuclear power plant in their municipality. As a result of the election, the municipal council is in a good position to express their view as to the siting of the nuclear power plant when the Ministry of Employment and the Economy enquires about the council’s opinion in the matter in 2009. Fennovoima has actively sought interaction with citizen groups as broadly as possible. The company has arranged several public hearings for the citizens in Pyhäjoki during the preparation of the project. On these occasions, the project has been presented and the audience’s questions answered. The usual questions are concerned with the project itself, the safety of nuclear power plants, the environmental effect of the plant, the acquisition of nuclear fuel and the effects of radiation on health. During the environmental impact assessment there have been public hearings and follow-up groups, where the locals and various associations alike have been able to bring valuable local knowledge to be considered in the assessment. The effects of the project on the landscape and the historically significant sites are covered in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. The project’s preconditions and effects relating to land use and planning have been described earlier in this report. Regarding the historical sites, the Hanhikivi prehistoric monument needs to be taken into account in relation to the Pyhäjoki site. However, the Hanhikivi erratic boulder does not prevent the execution of the project on the Hanhikivi headland, as the importance of the Hanhikivi erratic boulder as well as its accessibility have already been included in the planning of the plant site as described in this report.

Construction and operation related factors The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant causes some changes in the infrastructure of the plant site and the surrounding areas. New infrastructure needed in the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the town of Raahe, or infrastructure to be improved, include road connections, power line routes, water management and sea transportation arrangements. Infrastructure outside the plant site will be built during the execution of the project.


Supplement 3b

Developing the infrastructure will have a positive effect on the region’s economic life and operating potential. There is no previous industrial infrastructure at Hanhikivi. Due to this, Fennovoima will be able to plan the nuclear power plant and all its operations according to the best current knowledge and know-how. Construction site Constructing a nuclear power plant is an extremely extensive project. The construction will take an estimated six to eight years, and there will be up to 3,500-5,000 people working on the building site, depending on the number of units. Parking space and accommodation allocated for some of the construction workers will be built on the plant site or in its immediate vicinity. Road connections A new road connection, less than 5 km long, leading to the plant site from highway 8, will be built. The planned new road connection will not have significant effects on the land use in the area, nor will it cause significant disturbance to the residents in the area. The different road route options are presented in the local master plan and the local detailed plan. Power line routes In order to connect the nuclear power plant to the national grid, at least two 400 kV power lines and one 110 kV power line will be needed. In the case of two separate nuclear power units, it is possible that as many as four 400 kV power lines and two 110 kV power lines will be needed. Fingrid Ltd is in charge of the environmental impact assessment of the power line route, the application for licenses as well as the building of the power line from the national grid connection point to the switchyard at the plant site. Fennovoima and Fingrid have ensured that every alternative nuclear power plant considered can be connected to the national grid from the Pyhäjoki site. Depending on the column design, the power line route will run along a power line clearing 80-120 m wide. According to the plan, the power line connection will, for the most part, run through areas of forest and bog. There are no nature reserves by or in the vicinity of the power line routes. The regional land use plan, local master plan and the local detailed plan all include reservations and routing required by the power line connections. Water management There is no operational water management network in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant with sufficient capacity to obtain and manage the water required by the plant. The primary option for obtaining the fresh water required by the plant is a centralized water supply from the municipal water plant. In the Pyhäjoki region, Raahen Vesi Ltd obtains the majority of water from the ground water zone of Vihanti, which could also provide water to meet the requirements of the plant. The length of the required pipeline is estimated to be 25-30 km. Secondary options to meet the fresh water requirements of the nuclear power plant are ground water intake from the possible other ground water deposits, by purifying

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the fresh surface water, or by removing the salt from sea water. Regular drinking water and industrial waste water management and purification will require a separate water management facility. Sea transportation arrangements During the construction phase, large and heavy transportation will take place by sea. A quay for unloading and loading the cargo will be built on the west side of the plant site, which is well connected with deeper water. The quay will be available for similar use during the operational phase of the plant when necessary. The quay to be built will be approximately 100 m long and 30 m wide. The sea bed will need to be dredged and blasted. The shipping channel leading up to the harbor will be approximately 1.5 km long and 5.5-6 m deep. The dredging masses resulting from digging the navigation channel will be used, among other things, for filling in the loading bay and for a possible breakwater.

Figure 3B-10 Preliminary distribution of the plant operations at the Hanhikivi plant site, draft December 20, 2008.

A B C

Reactor building Turbine building Radioactive waste processing building D Access building / Office building E ja F Emergency generators G Switchgear building I 110kV switchyard J 400kV switchyard K Office and administration building L Interim storage for spent fuel M Visitor center and training center U Fire station (+fire water pumping station and tanks) V Gatehouse W Gas turbine Y Waste water processing plant VLJ Final disposal repository for reactor waste Port Quay for loading and unloading of transports by sea

The infrastructure of the plant site The nuclear power plant and its support operations will cover an area of approximately 235 hectares (the EN-1 and EN-2 zones in the local detailed plan illustrated in Figure 3B-9). The preliminary location of the the nuclear power plant related buildings and structures in the plant site is illustrated in Figure 3B-10. The building required by the nuclear power plant and its support operations can be comfortably placed within the planned plant site on the Hanhikivi headland. Distribution of the plant operations will be defined in more detail as planning and town planning proceed. The plant site and the distribution of the buildings and structures in the area will be defined in detail in connection with the construction license for the nuclear power plant and the municipal construction permit.


Supplement 3b

Estimate of the suitability of Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki as a site According to the assessments made, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. There are no factors at the Hanhikivi headland or in its vicinity related to the planning, construction or safe operation of the plant that would render the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose lowering to an acceptable level would be practically impossible. Also, the planned plant site has no existing industrial infrastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for planning a nuclear power plant with all its operations. Planning the physical protection measures together with the rescue authorities and Fennovoima’s right of possession at the planned plant site are favorable factors in protecting the plant against illegal activities. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Hanhikivi which would prevent the planning and implementation of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations in order to limit nuclear accidents. An Environmental Impact Assessment Report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure has been carried out for the project. As a result of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report no implementation option evaluated for the EIA report was found to be such that it would have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level.

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Supplement Liite 4a 3c

Alternative sites for the nuclear power plant Supplement 3C Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää

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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................171 Introduction ................................................................................................................172 Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää as a nuclear power plant site ...................................173 Power plant site and plant site .............................................................................173 Settlement in the immediate vicinity ..................................................................174 Principal activities in the immediate vicinity .....................................................176 Protective zone and emergency planning zone ..................................................176 Ownership and possession of the site ........................................................................177 Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements ...........................178 Town planning required by the project ..............................................................178 Valid planning ......................................................................................................178 Planning in preparation .......................................................................................179 Effects on land use ................................................................................................182 Suitability of the site for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant .................................................................................................183 Classification of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability ......................183 Safety-related issues...............................................................................................184 Environmental impact and limiting of the effects .............................................187 Society-related issues ............................................................................................188 Construction and operation-related factors ........................................................189 Estimate of the suitability of Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää as a site ...............191


Supplement 3c

Summary Based on the assessments and the existing information Fennovoima considers that Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää fulfills all the requirements regarding the site of a nuclear power plant and thus it is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. The municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää has taken part in the Fennovoima project and thus been supportive in its preparation. The municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää is located in the region of Itä-Uusimaa in the Province of Southern Finland. Gäddbergsö is a headland in the southern part of Ruotsinpyhtää, about 15 km from the central village. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö which would prevent the planning and execution of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations in order to limit nuclear accidents. In the Gäddbergsö area, Fennovoima is in possession of a total of 1,978 hectares of land and water area. The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the middle part of the Gäddbergsö headland. The balance of plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover an area of 1015 hectares. The land held by Fennovoima is sufficient for the construction of a nuclear power plant. There are no factors at Gäddbergsö or in its vicinity that would render the site unsuitable for its purpose in terms of the planning, construction or safety of a nuclear power plant. The planned plant site has no existing industrial infrastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for constructing a nuclear power plant with all the requisite functions. Together with Fingrid, Fennovoima has ensured that all alternative plant types can be connected to the Finnish national grid at Gäddbergsö. Implementation of the project requires that the planning for the planned site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant. Drawing up the plans required for the project is in preparation at all three levels for the area. Fennovoima estimates the planning to be complete and to acquire legal force during 2012–2013. The construction of the nuclear power plant at Gäddbergsö will change the land use at the plant site and in the vicinity. The plant site will be designated as an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. A protective zone and an emergency planning zone around the nuclear power plant will be defined in the planning in accordance with the instructions of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone. Gäddbergsö is completely enclosed within the protective zone of the Hästholmen nuclear power plant in Loviisa.

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Introduction In accordance with section 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e) of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented for each nuclear facility with an outline of the ownership and occupation of the site planned for the nuclear facility, a description of settlement and other activities and town planning arrangements at the planned nuclear facility site and in its immediate vicinity, an evaluation of the suitability of the planned site for its purpose taking into account the effects of the local conditions on safety, arrangements for safety and emergency preparedness as well as the effects of the nuclear plant on the immediate vicinity. The purpose of this feasibility study is to provide the information defined in the abovementioned section of law regarding the alternative site of the project at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää. According to section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the government shall consider the decision-in-principle in relation to the overall good of society and take into account the benefits and drawbacks arising from the nuclear power plant, paying particular attention to the suitability of the intended site of the nuclear power plant and its impact on the environment. According to section 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act the assessment of the suitability of a site is affected, for example, by whether the nuclear plant site is appropriate for the planned use regarding safety and also, whether environmental protection has been appropriately taken into consideration in the planning of the operations. The environmental impact of the execution of the Fennovoima project has been evaluated in an Environmental Impact Assessment Report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) and the assessment report has been submitted to the government as Supplement 3A of the application. The information gathered for the Environmental Impact Assessment Report partly form the basis of the source material for this feasibility study. The information has been complemented with new information obtained as the planning has proceeded as well as with separate reports concerning the factors affecting the safety of the site. In addition to licenses required by the nuclear energy legislation, the planning for the land use as required by the Land Use and Construction Act (132/1999) is required for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. The environmental permit procedure prescribed in the Environmental Permit Procedures Act (735/91) applies to the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. Section 11 of the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008) requires that the effects of the local conditions on safety as well as safety and emergency preparedness arrangements must be considered in the selection of a nuclear power plant site. The site must be such that the detrimental impacts and threats arising from the plant to the surroundings are minimal and that heat removal into the environment can be reliably executed. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 (Safety Criteria for Siting a Nuclear Power Plant) presents the requirements for human and environmental safety regarding the siting of nuclear power plants. In conjunction with the application for a government decisionin-principle, Fennovoima will submit to STUK a separate report on the effect of the local conditions on the safety of the nuclear power plant, which will be more extensive than the one attached here.


Supplement 3c

173

Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää as a nuclear power plant site Gäddbergsö is located on the headland of Gäddbergsö in the southern part of the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää, some 15 km from its central village (Figure 3C-1). Ruotsinpyhtää is a municipality in the region of Itä-Uusimaa in the Province of Southern Finland, located on the coast of the Gulf of Finland between the town of Loviisa and the municipality of Pyhtää. There are approximately 2,900 inhabitants in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää. The Loviisa economic zone, which consists of six municipalities, has a population of about 24,000. In addition to Ruotsinpyhtää and Loviisa, the economic zone includes the municipalities of Lapinjärvi, Liljendal, Pernaja and Pyhtää. On January 1, 2010, Ruotsinpyhtää, Liljendal and Pernaja will merge into the town of Loviisa. At the same time, the villages of Haavisto and Vastila in the northeastern part of Ruotsinpyhtää will be transferred to Pyhtää and the region of Kymenlaakso.

Figure 3C-1 The location of Gäddbergsö in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää and the economic zone of Loviisa. Simo

Pyhäjoki 0

10

20 km Lapinjärvi

Liljendal Ruotsinpyhtää Pyhtää Loviisa

Ruotsinpyhtää

Pernaja

Gäddbergsö

Power plant site The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the middle part of the Gäddbergsö headland. The central functions of the nuclear power plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover 10–15 hectares. The preliminary power plant site area is illustrated in Figure 3C-2. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 defines the requirements for the siting of nuclear power plants. A plant site, where only nuclear power plant related operations are allowed, will be defined for the nuclear power plant in accordance with the Guide YVL 1.10. The plant site will be fenced off and is in its entirety possessed by Fennovoima. Fennovoima is in charge of all the activities that will take place on the plant site and


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may remove unauthorized people from the area or prevent people from entering the site area if necessary. The preliminary power plant site area is illustrated in Figure 3C2. The plant site will be defined in more detail as the planning and town planning of the nuclear power plant progresses. The plant site will be defined in detail in connection with the initial consideration of the construction license application for the nuclear power plant.

Figure 3C-2 The power plant site at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää

Settlement in the immediate vicinity Permanent settlement The vicinity of Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää is sparsely populated. There are a few individual homes inhabited around the year in the southern part of Gäddbergsö. There are approximately 70 inhabitants within a 5 km radius of the nuclear power plant site (Figure 3C-4). Within a 20 km range there are about 11,900 permanent residents. This area extends to the municipalities of Ruotsinpyhtää, Pyhtää, Pernaja and Lapinjärvi and also includes the town center of Loviisa. Leisure dwellings There are leisure dwellings at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää and on nearby islands. Also, there is an almost uninterrupted chain of leisure dwellings on the shores of Klobbfjärden, an inlet north of Gäddbergsö. There are nearly 200 leisure dwellings within 5 km of the Gäddbergsö headland. Within 20 km, there are more than 1,000. Population The municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää has some 2,900 permanent inhabitants and the economic zone some 24,000 (Table 3C-1). The majority of the population live in the town of Loviisa and the municipality of Pyhtää. Loviisa had a population of 7,400 on average in 2006 and Pyhtää about 5,100.


Supplement 3c

Population by 1 km x 1 km squares (December 31, 2007)

175

Figure 3C-3 Distribution of population in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö within a 5 and 20 km radius in 2007 (Source: Statistics Finland).

1985

1990

1995

2000

2006

Ruotsinpyhtää

3,394

3,354

3,268

3,020

2,917

Lapinjärvi

3,409

3,317

3,189

3,035

2,941

Liljendal

1,423

1,537

1,507

1,462

1,453

Loviisa

8,727

8,447

7,847

7,604

7,387

Pernaja

3,653

3,642

3,811

3,792

3,960

Pyhtää

5,375

5,453

5,455

5,265

5,140

Total

25,981

25,749

25,076

24,176

23,797

Table 3C-1 Population in the economic area of Loviisa 1985-2006 (Source: Statistics Finland 2008).

In 1985, the average population of the economic area was about 26,000, but after that it turned into a decline due to both natural attrition and migration. Pernaja was the only municipality to show clear population growth. In recent years, however, the decline has halted, and Ruotsinpyhtää has even shown a slight increase in population. The nearest larger towns to Ruotsinpyhtää are Kotka (55,000) about 25 km away and Porvoo (48,000) about 40 km away. The Helsinki metropolitan area, with its population of more than one million, is about 100 km from Ruotsinpyhtää. According to the population estimates, the population in the economic area will increase by about 10% by the year 2040 (Table 3C-2). Loviisa and Ruotsinpyhtää are specifically estimated to enjoy a population growth of about 10%.

2010

2020

2030

2040

Ruotsinpyhtää

2,962

3,099

3,215

3,255

Lapinjärvi

2,963

3,051

3,172

3,236

Liljendal

1,416

1,394

1,412

1,420

Loviisa

7,421

7,651

7,929

8,025

Pernaja

4,229

4,683

5,028

5,244

Pyhtää

5,152

5,180

5,202

5,127

Total

24,143

25,058

25,958

26,307

Table 3C-2 Population estimates for the Loviisa economic zone 2010-2040 (Source: Statistics Finland 2008).


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Principal activities in the immediate vicinity The immediate vicinity of Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää is primarily forestry land, apart from Hästholmen in Loviisa to the west of Gäddbergsö, the site of the nuclear power plant operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy. There are a few individual homes inhabited round the year in the southern part of Gäddbergsö. There are leisure dwellings along the shores and on the islands in the area. Most of the basic services and shops in the vicinity are located in the built-up areas and villages of Ruotsinpyhtää and adjacent municipalities, more than 10 km from Gäddbergsö. There is a road connection to Gäddbergsö from highway 7, from an intersection to the east of Loviisa and the archipelago road branching off it. Highway 7 runs to the north of Gäddbergsö, about 12 km away.

Protective zone and emergency planning zone A protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be defined for the nuclear power plant. The protective zone extends to approximately 5 km, and the emergency planning zone to approximately 20 km, from the power plant (Figure 3C-4). The purpose of these zones is to ensure that the site of the nuclear power plant is taken into consideration in the town planning as well as in the planning of the rescue operations. Within the protective zone, certain limitations regarding functions and land use apply. The number of permanent and vacation residents in the protective zone and leisure activities should be kept at such a level that an appropriate rescue plan can be prepared for the area. The conditions of the plant sites of existing nuclear power plants in Eurajoki and Loviisa were used as a starting point in drawing up the Guide YVL 1.10 in 2000, and based on this, the amount of permanent residents should be kept to a maximum of 200. Implementing the guide in the assessment of new nuclear plant sites has not been taken into account in preparing the guide. Applying the requirements of the guide to a new nuclear plant site requires consideration by the authorities. It is highly unlikely that an accident resulting in a significant radioactive waste being emitted into the environment would occur at the nuclear power plant. However, this scenario will be considered in the planning of the rescue operations. Evacuating the whole protective zone quickly will be the protective measure used in the protective zone. In the emergency planning zone, outside the protective zone, protective measures of different levels will be used depending on the situation, for example, seeking protection indoors, consuming iodine tablets or evacuation. Actions in the emergency planning zone will be taken in a threatening situation in an area which, according to the weather, would be affected by the possible release. Fennovoima will draw up a preliminary emergency preparedness plan for the nuclear power plant in connection with the construction license application for the plant, which is based on analyses of the temporal progression of possible accidents, releases and variation in weather conditions. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, will approve the emergency preparedness plan, and it will be delivered to the local emergency services and other parties. The local emergency services will be


Supplement 3c

177

responsible for drawing up detailed rescue plans for the protective zone as well as the emergency preparedness zone. The authorities bear the responsibility for the implementation of the rescue measures. Gäddbergsö is completely enclosed within the protective zone of the Hästholmen nuclear power plant in Loviisa. An appropriate rescue plan exists for the area. In the case of the Gäddbergsö site, the requirements set out in the Guide YVL 1.10 are fulfilled.

Figure 3C-4 Protective zone and emergency preparedness zone in Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää, following the directive distances specified in Guide YVL 1.10.

Ownership and possession of the site The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the middle part of the Gäddbergsö headland, at the plant site shown in Figure 3C-2. In the Gäddbergsö area, Fennovoima is in possession of a total of 1,978 hectares of land and water area as at December 20, 2008. Fennovoima is in possession of the majority of the land on the headland of Gäddbergsö. Fennovoima has leased this land. All the leases for the land are in the form of a twopart contract containing a binding pre-contract for the purchase of the land. Figure 3C-5 shows the land possessed by Fennovoima at and around Gäddbergsö as at December 20, 2008. The area possessed by Fennovoima is sufficient for locating a nuclear power plant at Gäddbergsö. Fennovoima continues to acquire land and water areas in the vicinity of the site. The company aims to acquire at least the land included in the town planning for the nuclear power plant and its supportive operations through voluntary contracts.


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Figure 3C-5 Land in the ownership or possession of Fennovoima at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää.

Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements Town planning required by the project Execution of the project requires that the planning for the site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant in the regional land use plan, the local master plan and the local detailed plan. At Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää, the town planning process will be launched at all levels of planning in the first half of 2009. The following is a brief description of the plans in force and the plan amendments sketched out by Fennovoima. The plans in force are described in the environmental impact assessment appended to this application as Supplement 3A.

Valid planning Regional land use plan and sub-regional plan The Regional Council of Itä-Uusimaa adopted the new regional land use plan for the region on November 12, 2007. A complaint has been filed against the decision, and the plan has thus not yet acquired legal force. Parts of the southern shore of Gäddbergsö are designated as valuable archipelago landscape in the regional land use plan. A geologically valuable outcrop is identified at the southwestern tip of Gäddbergsö. The Gäddbergsö headland is completely enclosed within the protective zone of the Hästholmen nuclear power plant in Loviisa. Valid local master plans and local detailed plans The municipal council of Ruotsinpyhtää approved the component master plan for Gäddbergsö-Vahterpää on December 21, 1998, and the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed it on July 3, 2001. Amendment of the component master plan was begun in summer 2008. The current Gäddbergsö-Vahterpää master plan contains reservations for leisure dwellings, agricultural land and forestry land. There is no valid local detailed plan for Gäddbergsö.


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179

Planning in preparation Regional land use plan for nuclear power plant The Regional Council of Itä-Uusimaa will decide in January 2009 on launching the drawing up of a phased regional land use plan to prepare for the land use decisions required for the potential placement of a nuclear power plant in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää. The phased regional land use plan is expected to proceed to the draft phase during 2009. In evaluating the suitability of alternative sites, Fennovoima drew up preliminary land use plans for the area. In the regional level land use draft prepared by Fennovoima (Figure 3C-6), the EN-1 symbol indicates an energy supply area reserved for the nuclear power plant and its support functions at Gäddbergsö. The regional land use plan draft includes markings for the necessary road connections, harbor functions, a shipping channel, the protective zone as well as the general location of the necessary power lines.

Figure 3C-6 Extract from the draft regional land use plan prepared by Fennovoima, November 21, 2008.

Local master plan and local detailed plan for a nuclear power plant The placement of a nuclear power plant at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää will require a change to the component master plan and the drawing up of a new local detailed plan for the area. The municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää will decide on the beginning of the planning work required for the nuclear power plant project in the first half of 2009. In evaluating the suitability of alternative sites, Fennovoima drew up preliminary land use plans for the area. The nuclear power plant in the component local master plan is situated at Gäddbergsö so as to enable siting of the other activities in the area with as little disturbance as possible in relation to the plant site. The most valuable areas as regards natural conditions have been excluded from the planned construction. The component master plan draft includes the plan symbol EN-1 denoting an en-


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ergy supply area, which allows the siting of a nuclear power plant in the area. The plan symbol EN-2 in the component local master plan denotes an area which allows the construction of the nuclear power plant support facilities as well as residences relating to construction work and maintenance as well as other activities. The zones EN-1 and EN-2 are designated to be included in a local detailed plan. There is an area reservation included in the component local master plan for building power lines for the plant site and a new shipping channel. Access is provided through a tunnel to Kampuslandet Island for the construction and maintenance of cooling water structures. A bridge is planned as an alternative solution to the tunnel. In the component master plan and local detailed plan drafts prepared by Fennovoima (Figure 3C-8), the plan symbol EN-1 denotes an energy supply area where buildings and structures for research and development of energy production may also be built. Temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel is also allowed in this zone. The component local master plan includes the plan symbol Ma-enk marking an indicative part of the area that can be used for an underground ďŹ nal disposal facility for low and medium-level nuclear waste from the nuclear power plant. Figure 3C-7 Extract from the land use component master plan draft prepared by Fennovoima, November 21, 2008.


Supplement 3c

181

Figure 3C-8 Extract from the land use local detailed plan draft prepared by Fennovoima, November 21, 2008.

The component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts include an area of water marked with the plan symbol W1 designating an area that may, in the case of special and industrial areas, be used for the purposes of the nuclear power plant and where jetties and other constructions and devices needed by the nuclear power plant can be built in accordance with the Water Act. The alternative cooling water intake and outlet locations for the nuclear power plant are shown with blue and red arrows in the land use component master plan draft. The local detailed plan indicates other necessary functions required by the nuclear power plant, such as temporary residential area, harbor functions as well as areas designated for road and traffic purposes. The local detailed plan area includes the necessary reservations for power lines. Nature protection areas and sites pursuant to the Nature Conservation Act are indicated in the land use drafts. The land in the EN-1 and EN-2 zones shown on the land use local detailed plan draft is almost wholly in the possession of Fennovoima.


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Effects on land use Plant site Designating Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää as a nuclear power plant site in the local detailed plan will affect land use in its vicinity. The plant site will be turned into an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. The land use at the plant site will change. The site is currently not designated for any specific land use, so this will not be a significant change. At Gäddbergsö it will be generally possible to retain the existing leisure dwellings, at least those that are more than 1 km away from the site. However, a handful of leisure dwellings and one permanent home must be removed from the shore at the proposed plant site. Road connections The planned road connection to the Gäddbergsö nuclear power plant will not cause significant land use changes, as the road will principally follow the course of the existing road. A new road connection will be built in the southern part of the Gäddbergsö headland for the construction and maintenance of the cooling water structures. A replacement road encircling the plant site will be built to provide access to the leisure dwellings in the northern part of Gäddbergsö. A new road connection from Reimarsintie will be needed for access to the cooling water intake or outlet locations on Kampuslandet Island. The course of this road does not conflict with current land use. Power line route The power line route leading to the plant will restrict land use on a strip 80–120 meters wide, depending on the column type. No such activity is permitted in the power line clearing that may render using the power line dangerous. The power line to the power plant will branch off from the current 110 kV power line Porvoo-Ahvenkoski and the 400 kV power line Tammisto-Kymi in the national grid. The new power line will be about 17 km long. Other areas Construction of the nuclear power plant will limit land use in the protective zone of the plant and enable new land use in the suburbs and villages as well as along the road connections. Building new and dense residential areas, hospitals and other facilities where a large number of people frequent is not permitted in this zone. It is also not allowed to situate any significant production operations in the protective zone that might be affected by a nuclear accident. Existing residential buildings may be restored or replaced by new, similar buildings. Leisure dwellings or activities may be situated in the protective zone, as an appropriate rescue plan will be drawn up for the zone. The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone. The planning-related boundaries for the protective zone will be drawn up in connection with preparing the local master plan for the area. Building the power plant at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää will strengthen the status of the Loviisa area as an energy production cluster and make the area more attractive and its land use potential greater particularly for businesses that stand to benefit from the nuclear power plant.


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Suitability of the site for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant Fennovoima has selected the three alternative sites presented in the application through a complicated selection procedure. Fennovoima made a survey of some 40 potential sites all around Finland during 2007. The preliminary assessments revealed the relevant technical factors influencing the suitability of each of the sites, such as the characteristics of the bedrock and soil, the availability of cooling water, transportation connections and arrangements for the grid connection. On the basis of surveys and preliminary assessments, Fennovoima initiated an environmental impact assessment procedure for five sites, of which Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää and Karsikko in Simo are listed in this application as alternative sites.

Classification of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability The significance of various factors in the evaluation of the suitability of the sites is presented in Table 3C-3. – A critical factor is a factor which renders the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose mitigation to an acceptable level is impossible in practical terms. – A significant factor is a factor which on its own does not render the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which nevertheless has to be taken into account as a very significant factor in the overall evaluation regarding the selection of the site. – A planning factor is a factor which does not make the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which has to be taken into account as a site specific, special feature from the beginning of the planning of the project. Table 3C-3 shows the factors classified as relating to safety, environment, society, construction and operations.

Safety

Critical Factor

Significant Factor

Population and operations

Aviation activity

Planning Factor Extreme sea level

in the vicinity

phenomena

Heat removal arrange-

Extreme meteorological

ments

phenomena

Characteristics of the bedrock and soil Safety and emergency preparedness arrangements Environment

Non-acceptable detrimen-

Nature reserves

tal environmental effects Society

Limitation of environmental effects

(The overall good of so-

Scenic and historical

ciety)

sites Land use and planning

Construction and operation

Infrastructure

Table 3C-3 Factors used in the evaluation of the suitability of a site of the project and the significance of the factors for the evaluation.


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Safety-related issues In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, the government decision-in-principle regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant is made at a very early phase of the project. In assessing the factors affecting the safety of the site, it should be taken into account that it is possible to influence most safety-related factors significantly with basic and detailed planning carried out after the decision-in-principle, as well as with the construction and operation of the plant. Fennovoima has evaluated the alternative sites in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10. According to the guide, the essential factors affecting the safety of the site relate to external threats and radioactive emissions from the plant. As for the selection of the external events, the requirements concerning the selection of the site defined in the IAEA Guide NS-R-3 have also been applied. Population and operations in the vicinity In Finland, a nuclear power plant cannot be located near a population cluster or near operations for which no adequate rescue operations can be planned. The nuclear power plant site must be such that the regulations for limiting the exposure to radiation and radioactive emissions in normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situations can be met. The size and distribution of the population in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää are presented in the sections “Population in the vicinity” and “Central operations” in this report. The normal operation of the nuclear power plant does not pose a danger to the population or operations in the vicinity. There are no operations in the vicinity that pose a danger to the nuclear power plant. The two existing nuclear power plant units at Hästholmen in Loviisa pose no danger to the new nuclear power plant to be built at Gäddbergsö. An appropriate plant site, protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be defined for the nuclear power plant. The size and distribution of the population as well as the other operations in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö are such that it is possible to plan effective rescue operations in the case of an emergency. The radioactive emissions as well as the radiation doses resulting from these and their effect on health in the case of normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situation have been assessed in the project’s EIA Report. In normal operation and in operational malfunction the effects of radioactive emissions on the population and the environment are insignificant. It is possible to design, construct and operate the nuclear power plant at Gäddbergsö in such a way that the prescribed limit values as defined in the Government Decree (733/2008) are lower than required. Organisation of heat removal Regarding the safe operation of the nuclear power plant it is vital that the cooling of the nuclear reactors contained in the plant is ensured in all circumstances. For this reason, the heat removal arrangements of a nuclear power plant are taken into specific consideration in the selection of the site as well as in the design and construction of the plant. Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää is located on the sea. The heat removal of the nuclear power plant will be arranged primarily by pumping cooling water from the sea with


Supplement 3c

a rate of 60-100 m3/s in normal operation into the condenser of the nuclear power plant unit or units. In the very unlikely event of the cooling water intake from the sea being prevented, the reserve cooling water tanks will be dimensioned so as to last a minimum of 36 hours without any danger of the reactor overheating. The cooling water is led into the plant either by shore intake or through an intake tunnel further out to sea. In the location and planning of the cooling water intake the extremely low sea level is taken into consideration. The amount of cooling water required by the plant is insignificant in relation to the water volume surrounding Gäddbergsö. Significant quantities of oil are shipped along the Gulf of Finland. The risk of an oil spill in the sea off Gäddbergsö and the drifting of oil to Gäddbergsö from a spill further off will be taken into account in the heat removal and oil spill response planning for the power plant. In oil spill response planning, it could advantageous to cooperate with the Loviisa nuclear power plant operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy. In the nuclear power plant suitability assessment, the pre-design of the plant or the surveys executed, no factors emerged that would suggest that heat removal from the plant cannot be reliably executed. Reliable and safety regulations compliant heat removal is ensured in the basic design carried out prior to applying for the construction license in accordance with the principles presented in Supplement 4A of the application. Regarding the heat removal arrangements, Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. Bedrock characteristics The geological characteristics of the soil have a critical impact on the construction of nuclear power plant related buildings as well as on the construction of the final disposal facilities for reactor waste in the final disposal plant. In 2008, Fennovoima commissioned a survey from the Geological Survey of Finland and the Department of Seismology of the University of Helsinki on the bedrock characteristics of the Gäddbergsö headland. In addition, subsoil explorations were carried out by boring in the area by order of Fennovoima in spring 2008. The subsoil explorations will continue in 2009 in order to gather sufficient information for the technical design of the nuclear power plant facilities and the final disposal facility of the reactor waste. There are no known exploitable ore deposits in the area. According to the estimate of the Geological Survey of Finland it is unlikely that there would be any significant ore deposits in the area. The nearest ground water areas of any regional significance are situated about 1 km from the Gäddbergsö headland and the project poses no threat to these areas. The bedrock in the Gäddbergsö area is rapakivi granite approximately 1,650 million years of age, and its structural carrying capacity is good. The surface fissures on the Gäddbergsö headland are sparser than average. The potential horizontal faults in the area and other geological characteristics of the bedrock will be taken into consideration in the planning and the construction solutions of the final disposal facility for reactor waste. Gäddbergsö is located on the inner part of the continent on the Fennoscandia shield, where the average level of seismic activity is low. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand an earthquake considerably stronger than could occur on the Gäddbergsö headland.

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Geological surveys of the bedrock at the proposed sites have identified no factors that would preclude the construction of the repositories. In terms of its soil and bedrock properties, Gäddbergsö is a suitable nuclear power plant site. Physical protection and emergency preparedness The nuclear power plant site needs to be such that it is possible to protect the plant from illegal activities and also so that arrangements for limiting nuclear accidents may be effectively executed. The execution of safety and emergency preparedness arrangements is explained in more detail in Supplement 4A of the application. A plant site, as illustrated in Figure 3C-1, will be defined around the nuclear power plant, and one of the functions of the plant site is to help protect the plant against illegal activities. Fennovoima will prepare the physical protection plans and procedures of the nuclear power plant for the event of emergency situations in cooperation with the police. To ensure the effectiveness of physical protection, the safety plan and other information concerning physical protection remains largely confidential. The population and operations in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö, as well as the safety measures taken to protect the population in the vicinity are covered in various sections in this report. The local emergency services are responsible for drawing up and executing the rescue plans. The emergency preparedness of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be planned and implemented in cooperation with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK and the emergency services authorities, so that the effects of possible nuclear damage caused by the operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be effectively contained. The safety and emergency preparedness arrangements can be planned and executed appropriately on the Gäddbergsö headland. Extreme sea level and meteorological phenomena The extreme meteorological and sea level phenomena need to be explored in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant site, as they affect the operation and safety of the plant. The Finnish Institute of Marine Research has studied the sea level variation in the Gäddbergsö region. The average sea level height, as well as the limit values for the sea level which are reached no more than once in a thousand years, were determined in the survey. The sea levels examined range from the present time to the estimated end of the service life of the nuclear power plant, the year 2075. Concerning the year 2075, the effects of such factors as uplift and climate change on the sea level have been taken into account in addition to other factors. The Finnish Meteorological Institute has, upon Fennovoima’s request, carried out a preliminary assessment to assign values for the following extreme meteorological phenomena in the Gäddbergsö region: – low and high temperatures in the following time periods: momentary, 6 hours, 24 hours, and 7 days; – wind speed: 10 minute median wind and 3 second gust of wind – precipitation: 24 hours and 7 days; and – the heaviest snow load. Concerning the extreme meteorological phenomena, the limit values which at the median level are reached no more than once in a thousand years were assessed. The


Supplement 3c

assessment also explored the effects of climate change on the limit values. As a dimensioning factor, the strain caused by tornados, i.e. very strong whirlwinds affecting a small area, is taken into account in relation to buildings, structures and devices important for the safety of the nuclear power plant. The results obtained from the preliminary assessments regarding the sea level and meteorological phenomena, together with the other information available to Fennovoima, confirm that the extreme phenomena do not place such demands on the planning of the nuclear power plant that would technically be extremely difficult or impossible to meet. Extreme phenomena are taken into account in the planning by setting an extreme phenomena raised by a sufficient safety margin as the planning basis, with a recurrence level rare enough in practice for the elimination of the safety risk caused by such a phenomenon, while acknowledging the uncertainty relating to its size. Aviation activity According to the Aviation Act, a no-fly zone for the area surrounding a nuclear power plant may be ordered by government decree, inside of which the flying of any aircraft is prohibited. The main purpose of the no-fly zone is to prevent aviation in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant in order to eliminate unnecessary risks and disturbances. There is no aviation activity in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö that would pose a danger to the safety of the plant. The nearest airports are Helsinki-Malmi and Helsinki-Vantaa, about 80 km away. Construction of a nuclear power plant at Gäddbergsö would have no effect on the operation of these airports. Under Finnish regulations, the nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft without significant consequences in the vicinity of the plant. In the case that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is built in Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, an appropriate no-fly zone will be defined for the airspace surrounding the plant. This would most probably intersect the no-fly zone of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.

Environmental impact and limiting of the effects The environmental impact of the project has been evaluated in an assessment procedure complying with the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994). The procedure contains an assessment of the effect of the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant on, for example, the environment, population and society. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report is included as Supplement 3A of the application, and the environmental effects of the project and the limiting of such effects will not be covered in this report in any more detail. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report reveals that the execution of the project at any of the alternative sites would not have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report contains a preliminary plan for measures to limit the environmental effect of the project at its various phases. Based on the assessments Fennovoima thus believes that it is feasible to execute the project at Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää.

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The alternative options evaluated in Gäddbergsö concerning the plant and cooling water arrangements differ in some aspects as to their environmental effects, as do the other options related to the execution of the project. The differences will be carefully considered as the planning and implementation of the project proceeds in order to effectively limit the environmental effects of the project.

Society-related issues Large industrial undertakings have an effect on society and on their location in many different ways. Nuclear power particularly raises many questions and causes anxiety, a lot of which is to do with the safety of the plant. It is desirable and expected that a wide public debate will take place regarding the nuclear power plant project. Fennovoima is a part of Finnish society. The company appreciates open and democratic decisionmaking that is based on collaboration. Fennovoima has engaged in a wide and open interaction with the local residents and communities at the alternative site localities as well as in conjunction with the environmental impact assessment process. Fennovoima has gathered valuable local information to support the decisions regarding the nuclear power plant and has from the first made an effort to create a constructive and mutually beneficial collaborative relationship with the local community. The Finnish municipal elections held in October 2008 were perfectly timed as far as the Fennovoima nuclear power project was concerned. In the elections the local residents could have their say regarding the possible placement of the nuclear power plant in their municipality. As a result of the election, the municipal council is in a good position to express their view as to the siting of the nuclear power plant when the Ministry of Employment and the Economy enquires about the council’s opinion in the matter in 2009. The municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää will merge with Liljendal, Loviisa and Pernaja at the beginning of 2010. Fennovoima has actively sought interaction with citizen groups as broadly as possible. The company has arranged several public hearings for the citizens in Ruotsinpyhtää during the preparation of the project. On these occasions, the project has been presented and the audience’s questions answered. The usual questions are concerned with the project itself, the safety of nuclear power plants, the environmental effect of the plant, the acquisition of nuclear fuel and the effects of radiation on health. During the environmental impact assessment there have been public hearings and follow-up groups, where the locals and various associations alike have been able to bring valuable local knowledge to be considered in the assessment. The effects of the project on the landscape and the historically significant sites are covered in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. The project’s preconditions and effects relating to land use and planning have been described earlier in this report.


Supplement 3c

Construction and operation-related factors The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant causes some changes in the infrastructure of the plant site and the surrounding areas. New infrastructure needed in the municipality of Ruotsinpyhtää, or infrastructure to be improved, include road connections, power line routes, water management and sea transportation arrangements. Infrastructure outside the plant site will be built during the execution of the project. Developing the infrastructure will have a positive effect on the region’s economic life and operating potential. There is no previous industrial infrastructure at Gäddbergsö. Due to this, Fennovoima will be able to plan the nuclear power plant and all its operations according to the best current knowledge and know-how, without disturbing other operations in the area. Construction work Constructing a nuclear power plant is an extremely extensive project. The construction will take an estimated six to eight years, and there will be up to 3,500-5,000 people working on the building site, depending on the number of units. Parking space and accommodation allocated for some of the construction workers will be built on the plant site or in its immediate vicinity. Road connections Construction of the nuclear power plant will require improvement of the archipelago road that begins from highway 7 over a distance of about 7.4 km and strengthening of a bridge on the road. The new road to the plant site from Reimarsintie comprises some 2.5 km of new construction, and some 4 km of other new roads must be built at Gäddbergsö and on Kampuslandet. Also, an access tunnel or bridge some 220 m long will be built between Gäddbergsö and Kampuslandet. Power line routes In order to connect the nuclear power plant to the national grid, at least two 400 kV power lines and one 110 kV power line will be needed. In the case of two separate nuclear power units, it is possible that as many as four 400 kV power lines and two 110 kV power lines will be needed. Fingrid Ltd is in charge of the environmental impact assessment of the power line route, the application for licenses as well as the building of the power line from the national grid connection point to the coupling at the plant site. Fennovoima and Fingrid have ensured that every alternative nuclear power plant considered can be connected to the national grid from the Ruotsinpyhtää site. Depending on the column design, the power line route will run along a power line clearing 80-120 m wide. According to the plan, the power line connection will, for the most part, run through areas of forest and bog. Water management The raw water required by the power plant can be acquired from Loviisan Vesi Oy, whose water intake capacity is sufficient to cover the needs of the additional power plant. The water pipelines can be laid on the sea bed and linked to the municipal water network at the Vårdö headland about 14 km from the power plant.

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Sea transportation arrangements During the construction phase, large and heavy transportation will take place by sea. A quay for unloading and loading the cargo will be built on the west side of the plant site, which is well connected with deeper water. The quay will be available for similar use during the operational phase of the plant when necessary. The quay to be built will be approximately 100 m long and 30 m wide. The sea bed will need to be dredged and blasted. Also, the existing shipping channel must be dredged over a distance of about 500 m between Björkholmen and Lindholmen so that it can accommodate transports to the nuclear power plant. The dredging masses resulting from digging the navigation channel will be used, among other things, for filling in the loading bay and for a possible breakwater. The infrastructure of the plant site The central operations of the nuclear power plant as well as the plant itself are located in an area that covers approximately 150-200 hectares. The general placement at the plant site of the buildings and structures that make up the nuclear power plant is shown in Figure 3C-9. The nuclear power plant and the support buildings it requires can easily be accommodated at the plant site at Gäddbergsö. Distribution of the plant operations will be defined in more detail as planning and town planning proceed. The plant site and the distribution of the buildings and structures in the area will be defined in detail in connection with the construction license for the nuclear power plant and the municipal construction permit. Figure 3C-9 Preliminary distribution of the plant functions at the plant site, draft December 20, 2008.

A B C

Reactor building Turbine building Radioactive waste processing building D Access building / Office building E ja F Emergency generators G Switchgear building I 110kV switchyard J 400kV switchyard K Office and administration building L Interim storage for spent fuel M Visitor center and training center U Fire station (+fire water pumping station and tanks) V Gatehouse W Gas turbine Y Waste water processing plant VLJ Final disposal repository for reactor waste Port Quay for loading and unloading of transports by sea

Estimate of the suitability of Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää as a site According to the assessments made, Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. At Gäddbergsö or in its vicinity, no such safety-related factor exists which would render the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose lowering to an acceptable level would be practically impossible. Also, the planned plant site has no existing industrial in-


Supplement 3c

frastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for planning a nuclear power plant with all its operations. Planning the physical protection measures together with the rescue authorities and Fennovoima’s right of possession at the planned plant site are favorable factors in protecting the plant against illegal activities. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Gäddbergsö which would prevent the planning and execution of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations in order to limit nuclear accidents. An Environmental Impact Assessment Report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure has been carried out for the project. As a result of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report no implementation option evaluated for the EIA report was found to be such that it would have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level.

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Supplement Liite 3d 4a

Alternative sites for the nuclear power plant Supplement 3D Karsikko in Simo

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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................195 Introduction ................................................................................................................196 Karsikko in Simo as a nuclear power plant site ........................................................197 Power plant site and plant site .............................................................................197 Settlement in the immediate vicinity ..................................................................198 Principal activities in the immediate vicinity .....................................................200 Protective zone and emergency planning zone ..................................................200 Ownership and possession of the site ........................................................................202 Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements ...........................203 Town planning required by the project ..............................................................203 Valid planning ......................................................................................................203 Planning in preparation .......................................................................................205 Effects on land use ................................................................................................207 Suitability of the site for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant .................................................................................................208 ClassiďŹ cation of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability ......................209 Safety-related issues...............................................................................................209 Environmental impact and limiting of the effects .............................................213 Society-related issues ............................................................................................214 Construction and operation related factors ........................................................214 Estimate of the suitability of Karsikko in Simo as a site ....................................216


Supplement 3d

Summary

Based on the assessments and the existing information Fennovoima considers that Karsikko in Simo fulďŹ lls all the requirements regarding the siting of a nuclear power plant and thus it is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. The municipality of Simo has taken part in the Fennovoima project and thus been supportive in its preparation. The municipality of Simo is located in the region and Province of Lapland. Karsikko is located on the Karsikkoniemi headland, about 20 km from the central village of Simo. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Karsikko that would prevent the planning and execution of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations. At Karsikko it is possible to attain the safety level required in the Guide YVL 1.10 of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, regarding the siting of a nuclear power plant. In the Karsikko area, Fennovoima is in possession of a total of 371 hectares of land and water area. The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the southern part of the Karsikkoniemi headland. The balance of plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover an area of 1015 hectares. The land held by Fennovoima is sufficient for the construction of a nuclear power plant. There are no factors at Karsikko in Simo or in its vicinity that would render the site unsuitable for its purpose in terms of the planning, construction or safety of a nuclear power plant. The planned plant site has no existing industrial infrastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for constructing a nuclear power plant with all the requisite functions. Together with Fingrid, Fennovoima has ensured that all alternative plant types can be connected to the Finnish national grid at Karsikko. Implementation of the project requires that the planning for the planned site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant. Drawing up the plans required for the project is in preparation at all three levels for the Karsikko area. Fennovoima estimates the planning to be complete and to acquire legal force during 2012. The construction of the nuclear power plant at Karsikko will change the land use at the plant site and in the vicinity. The plant site will be designated as an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. A protective zone and an emergency planning zone around the nuclear power plant will be deďŹ ned in the planning in accordance with the instructions of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone.

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Introduction In accordance with section 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e) of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented for each nuclear facility with an outline of the ownership and occupation of the site planned for the nuclear facility, a description of settlement and other activities and town planning arrangements at the planned nuclear facility site and in its immediate vicinity, an evaluation of the suitability of the planned site for its purpose taking into account the effects of the local conditions on safety, arrangements for safety and emergency preparedness as well as the effects of the nuclear plant on the immediate vicinity. The purpose of this feasibility study is to provide the information defined in the above mentioned section of law regarding the alternative site of the project at Karsikko in Simo. According to section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the government shall consider the decision-in-principle in relation to the overall good of society and take into account the benefits and drawbacks arising from the nuclear power plant, paying particular attention to the suitability of the intended site of the nuclear power plant and its impact on the environment. According to section 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act the assessment of the suitability of a site is affected, for example, by whether the nuclear plant site is appropriate for the planned use regarding safety and also, whether environmental protection has been appropriately taken into consideration in the planning of the operations. The environmental impact of the execution of the Fennovoima project has been evaluated in an Environmental Impact Assessment Report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) and the assessment report has been submitted to the government as Supplement 3A of the application. The information gathered for the Environmental Impact Assessment Report partly forms the basis of the source material for this feasibility study. The information has been complemented with new information obtained as the planning has proceeded as well as with separate reports concerning the factors affecting the safety of the site. In addition to licenses required by the nuclear energy legislation, the planning for the land use as required by the Land Use and Construction Act (132/1999) are required for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. The environmental permit procedure prescribed in the Environmental Permit Procedures Act (735/91) applies to the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. Section 11 of the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008) requires that the effects of the local conditions on safety as well as safety and emergency preparedness arrangements must be considered in the selection of a nuclear power plant site. The site must be such that the detrimental impacts and threats arising from the plant to the surroundings are minimal and that heat removal into the environment can be reliably executed. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 (Safety Criteria for Siting a Nuclear Power Plant) presents the requirements for human and environmental safety regarding the siting of nuclear power plants. In conjunction with the application for a government decisionin-principle, Fennovoima will submit to STUK a separate report on the effect of the local conditions on the safety of the nuclear power plant, which will be more extensive than the one attached here.


Supplement 3d

197

Karsikko in Simo as a nuclear power plant site Karsikko is located on the Karsikkoniemi headland, about 20 km from the central village of Simo (Figure 3D-1). The Karsikkoniemi headland extends to the southeast corner of the town of Kemi. Simo is a municipality in the region and Province of Lapland on the coast of the Bothnian Bay at the mouth of Simo river, between the town of Kemi and the municipality of Ii. There are approximately 3,800 inhabitants in the municipality of Simo. The economic zone of Kemi-Tornio has a population of about 70,000. In addition to Simo, it includes the municipalities of Ii, Keminmaa and Tervola and the towns of Kemi and Tornio.

0

10

20 km

Tervola

Figure 3D-1 The location of Karsikko in the municipality of Simo and the Kemi-Tornio economic zone.

Tornio

Simo

Keminmaa Kemi

Pyhäjoki Karsikko

Simo Ii

Ruotsinpyhtää

Power plant site The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the southern part of the Karsikkoniemi headland. The central functions of the nuclear power plant as well as the plant itself will be located at the power plant site, which will cover 10-15 hectares. The preliminary power plant site area is illustrated in Figure 3D-2. The STUK Guide YVL 1.10 defines the requirements for the siting of nuclear power plants. A plant site, where only nuclear power plant related operations are allowed, will be defined for the nuclear power plant in accordance with the Guide YVL 1.10. The plant site will be fenced off and is in its entirety possessed by Fennovoima. Fennovoima is in charge of all the activities that will take place at the plant site and may remove unauthorized people from the area or prevent people from entering the site area if necessary. The preliminary power plant site area is illustrated in Figure 3D-2.


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The plant site will be deďŹ ned in more detail as the planning and town planning of the nuclear power plant progresses. The plant site will be deďŹ ned in detail in connection with the initial consideration of the construction license application for the nuclear power plant. Figure 3D-2 The plant site at Karsikko in Simo.

Settlement in the immediate vicinity Permanent settlement The immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant site at Karsikko in Simo is sparsely populated. On the Karsikkoniemi headland itself, there are individual homes inhabited year round. The houses are located in the northern parts of the area and along the coast; the interior of the headland is largely uninhabited. There are approximately 1,250 inhabitants within a 5 km radius of the nuclear power plant site (Figure 3D-3). The nearest built-up areas are the town districts of Hepola, Rytikari and Ajos in Kymi and the village of Maksniemi in Simo. Within a 20 km range there are about 31,100 permanent residents. This area includes not only the aforementioned built-up areas but also the town center of Kemi. Leisure dwellings Virtually all of the settlement in the coastal region of Karsikkoniemi consists of leisure dwellings. On the Karsikkoniemi headland, leisure dwellings are located on the western, southern and eastern shores of the headland and on nearby islands. There are a few dozen leisure dwellings within 5 km of the nuclear power plant site. Within a 20 km radius there are a few hundred leisure dwellings. Population In 2006, permanent inhabitants of the municipality of Simo totaled on average 3,600, and within the entire economic zone of Kemi-Tornio some 70,000. The majority of the population is concentrated in the towns of Kemi and Tornio. In 2006, the average populations of Kemi and Tornio were 22,800 and 22,300, respectively.


Supplement 3d

Population by 1 km x 1 km squares (December 31, 2007)

Simo

199

Figure 3D-3 Distribution of population in the vicinity of Karsikkoniemi within a 5 and 20 km radius in 2007 (Source: Statistics Finland).

1985

1990

1995

2000

2006

4,305

4,272

4,161

3,908

3,609

Ii1

7,937

8,206

8,536

8,459

8,925

Kemi

26,483

25,470

24,816

23,828

22,801

Keminmaa

8,729

9,115

9,407

8,979

8,878

Tervola

4,487

4,205

4,106

3,924

3,669

Tornio

22,251

22,789

23,215

22,668

22,298

Total

74,190

74,055

74,240

71,765

70,179

The population of the Province of Lapland took a sharp downturn after the recession of the 1990s, and the population of Simo has declined steadily in recent years. In 2007, net migration in Lapland amounted to 545 people. At the end of 2007, the population of the Province of Lapland was about 184,000, of which about one third lived in the Kemi-Tornio economic zone. Apart from Kemi and Tornio, the cities nearest to Simo are Oulu (130,000) about 80 km away and Rovaniemi (58,000) about 100 km away. Also, on the Swedish side of the border the town of Haparanda (7,200) is about 30 km away and the town of Luleü (about 73,000) is 115 km away. Population predictions indicate that the population of the economic zone will grow slightly in the coming decades (Table 3D-2). This is mainly due to population growth expectations in Ii and Tornio. Ii is expecting a population increase of about 30% by 2040, while in Tornio the expectation is slightly more moderate. Excluding Ii, the population of the economic zone is expected to decline slightly. The population of Simo is expected to decrease by 430 by 2040, representing about 12% of the municipality’s current population.

1) The areal division of 2007 is used in the Table, i.e. the municipalities of Kuivaniemi and Ii are considered a single municipality, Ii.

Table 3D-1 Population of the KemiTornio economic zone in 1985-2006 (Source: Statistics Finland 2008).


200

Table 3D-2 Population estimates for the Kemi-Tornio economic zone 2010-2040 (Source: Statistics Finland 2008).

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

2010

2020

2030

2040

Simo

3,484

3,340

3,254

3,177

Ii 2

9,585

10,820

11,513

11,844

Kemi

22,135

2,1281

20,928

20,546

Keminmaa

8,832

8,956

9,051

8,988

Tervola

3,519

3,269

3,161

3,092

Tornio

22,508

23,112

23,558

23,587

Total

70,063

70,778

71,465

71,234

Principal activities in the immediate vicinity The main forms of land use in the immediate vicinity of Karsikkoniemi are forestry and outdoor activities. There are leisure dwellings on the shores of the headland and on nearby islands. The interior of the headland is uninhabited and largely in its natural state. Most of the basic services and shops in the vicinity are located in the built-up areas of the municipality of Simo and the town of Kemi, the town district of Hepola and the village of Maksniemi. Highway 4 runs to the north of Karsikkoniemi, about 5 km from the nuclear power plant site. The central village of Simo is along the highway. Karsikontie, the road leading to Karsikko, joins the highway directly.

Protective zone and emergency planning zone A protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be deďŹ ned for the nuclear power plant. The protective zone extends to approximately 5 km, and the emergency planning zone to approximately 20 km, from the power plant (Figure 3D-4). The purpose of these zones is to ensure that the siting of the nuclear power plant is taken into consideration in the town planning as well as in the planning of the rescue operations. Within the protective zone, certain limitations regarding functions and land use apply. The number of permanent and vacation residents in the protective zone and leisure activities should be kept at such a level that an appropriate rescue plan can be prepared for the area. The conditions of the plant sites of existing nuclear power plants in Eurajoki and Loviisa were used as a starting point in drawing up the Guide YVL 1.10 in 2000, and based on this, the amount of permanent residents should be kept to a maximum of 200. Implementing the guide in the assessment of new nuclear plant sites has not been taken into account in preparing the guide. Applying the requirements of the guide to a new nuclear plant site requires consideration by the authorities. The requirements of the YVL guide can be deviated from according to rules of application adopted by STUK itself if the level of safety referred to in the guide can be achieved by other means. The Guide YVL 1.10 allows for an unspeciďŹ ed amount of vacation residence or leisure activities in the protective zone if an appropriate rescue plan can be drawn up for the zone. Therefore an appropriate rescue plan that allows for the 2)The areal division of 2007 is used in the Table, i.e. the municipalities of Kuivaniemi and Ii are considered a single municipality, Ii.


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Figure 3D-4 Protective zone and emergency preparedness zone in Karsikko in Simo, following the directive distances speciďŹ ed in Guide YVL 1.10.

number of people in the zone and the requirements for rescue measures achieves the level of safety referred to in the guide even if the indicative number of residents in the protective zone is exceeded. It is highly unlikely that an accident resulting in a signiďŹ cant radioactive waste being emitted into the environment would occur at the nuclear power plant. However, this scenario will be considered in the planning of the rescue operations. Evacuating the whole protective zone quickly will be the protective measure used in the protective zone. In the emergency planning zone, outside the protective zone, protective measures of different levels will be used depending on the situation, for example, seeking protection indoors, consuming iodine tablets or evacuation. Actions in the emergency planning zone will be taken in a threatening situation in an area which, according to the weather, would be affected by the possible release. Fennovoima will draw up a preliminary emergency preparedness plan for the nuclear power plant in connection with the construction license application for the plant, which is based on analyses of the temporal progression of possible accidents, releases and variation in weather conditions. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, will approve the emergency preparedness plan, and it will be delivered to the local emergency services and other parties. The local emergency services will be responsible for drawing up detailed rescue plans for the protective zone as well as the emergency preparedness zone. The authorities bear the responsibility for the implementation of the rescue measures. With the Karsikko site, the indicative value for the number of permanent residents in the protective zone speciďŹ ed in the Guide YVL 1.10 will be exceeded, because according to information received from the Lapland Rescue Services, about 1,250 people live within 5 km of the nuclear power plant site. The Hepola district of the town of Kemi has


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a population of about 1,400 and the village of Maksniemi in Simo has a population of about 1,000; both lie partly within the protective zone. The Rytikari and Ajos districts of Kemi are also nearby. A total of about 3,000 people live within 8 km of Karsikko. In estimating the suitability of a site, it must be investigated whether efficient rescue plans can be drawn up to ensure the safety of the population in case of any conceivable incident at the power plant. The population living in the Karsikko protective zone is mainly concentrated in the district of Hepola in Kemi and in the village of Maksniemi in Simo; these homes are easily accessible, and the rescue services have experience of industrial facilities in the area. Therefore it is possible to provide for rescue services in such a manner that the level of safety referred to in the Guide YVL 1.10 can be achieved. The rescue planning for the protective zone must involve the district of Hepola and the village of Maksniemi in their entirety at the very least in order to provide for a sufficient level of rescue operations as to secure the safety of the population living in the vicinity.

Ownership and possession of the site The nuclear power plant is planned to be built in the southern part of the Karsikkoniemi headland, at the plant site shown in Figure 3D-2. In the Karsikko area, Fennovoima is in possession of a total of 371 hectares of land and water area as at December Figure 3D-5 Areas in the possession of Fennovoima at Karsikko in Simo as at December 20, 2008.


Supplement 3d

20, 2008. Most of the land in the southern part of Karsikkoniemi and on the nearby island of Laitakari is in the possession of Fennovoima. Fennovoima is in possession of the land either by outright ownership or by lease. All the leases for the area are in the form of a two-part contract containing a binding pre-contract for the purchase of the land. Figure 3D-5 shows the land possessed by Fennovoima on the Karsikkoniemi headland as at December 20, 2008. The area possessed by Fennovoima is sufficient to accommodate a nuclear power plant on the Karsikkoniemi headland. Fennovoima continues to acquire land and water areas in the vicinity of the site. The company aims to acquire at least the land included in the town planning for the nuclear power plant and its supportive operations through voluntary contracts.

Current situation of town planning and planning arrangements Town planning required by the project Execution of the project requires that the planning for the site includes a site reservation for the nuclear power plant in the regional land use plan, the local master plan and the local detailed plan. The planning process for the Karsikko area in Simo has been launched at all three levels of planning at the beginning of 2008. In the following section, a brief description of the relevant information of the valid planning as well as of the changes to planning in progress will be given. The valid planning has been described in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the project, which is included as Supplement 3A of the application, as well as in the participation and assessment plan and the planning draft drawn up in conjunction with the planning procedure.

Valid planning Regional land use plan and sub-regional plan The sub-regional plan for western Lapland confirmed in 2003 is in force in Karsikko. In this plan, most of Karsikkoniemi is allocated to agriculture and forestry. Housing is indicated at Maksniemi in Simo and at Hepola in Kemi. The plan also includes a reservation for industry in the middle of Karsikkoniemi, with the option for the placement of a heavy industrial facility. The regionally significant fishing port of Maksniemi is located on the southeastern shore of Karsikkoniemi. The plan shows a reservation for vacation dwellings, 0.4 sq.km in size, at Leuannokka in the eastern part of the headland. A reservation for the course of a ski-doo route circumscribes Karsikkoniemi. On June 16, 2005, the Ministry of the Environment confirmed the regional land use plan for wind energy for the sea and coastal areas of Lapland. In areas suitable for wind energy production, this plan cancels the wind energy production area reservations allocated in the regional land use plan for western Lapland. Local master plans and local detailed plans The local master plan for Karsikkoniemi in Simo was approved on May 7, 2007, but because of the revision of the master plan on May 9, 2008, the municipal board of

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Simo overturned its decision of August 20, 2007 enforcing the master plan. The master plan acquired legal force by decision of the Rovaniemi Administrative Court on September 4, 2008. In the master plan, the southern shores of the headland are mainly allocated to vacation dwellings. The northeastern part of Karsikkoniemi is reserved for low-rise housing. The vacant areas on Laitakari Island are allocated to hiking and recreation. Otherwise, the unused shore areas are designated as agriculture and forestry land with special environmental value. The interior of the headland is allocated to agriculture and forestry. There are several reservations of areas important for biodiversity in the Karsikkoniemi master plan, such as the shore meadows at Sauvalaisenperä and Papinkari, the dunes and beach of Röyttänhiekka, the broken rock area at Laitakari, the rocky outcrops of Munakallio and the shore of Teponlahti valuable for local birdlife. The master plan also singles out Karsikkojärvi, a lake in the interior of Karsikkoniemi which as a result of the coastal uplift has an overgrown marshy shore and as such is highly valuable in terms of biodiversity. The principal shore areas in Simo are covered by the Merenrannikko master plan drawn up in 1995-1997. The municipal council of Simo approved the Merenrannikko master plan on March 26, 1997, and the Lapland Environmental Center confirmed it on July 1, 1998 with the exception of a portion of the shore of Karsikkoniemi, regarding which it was found that the land use allocated for this area in the master plan was contrary to the sub-regional plan. The master plan covering the southern parts of Kemi acquired legal force on October 2, 2006 and, for the portions on which complaints were filed, on March 18, 2008. This plan allocates low-rise housing or rural housing areas to the southern Satamakangas area, and the Aaltokangas area bordering on Simo is designated as agriculture and forestry land, partly with specific recreational potential or special environmental values. The plan incorporates the ski-doo route specified in the sub-regional plan. The Karsikko power plant site does not have a valid local detailed plan. Figure 3D-6 Extract of the draft of the Kemi-Tornio regional land use plan for a nuclear power plant, October 13, 2008. (Source: Regional Council of Lapland).


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Planning in preparation Regional land use plan for nuclear power plant The Board of the Regional Council of Lapland has, for the Fennovoima project, launched preparations for the drafting of the regional land use plan for a nuclear power plant on February 4, 2008. Information on the participation and evaluation plan for the regional land use plan was published, and the plan was placed on public view in spring 2008. The draft regional land use plan for a nuclear power plant was on public display from November 3 to December 31, 2008. In the draft regional land use plan for a nuclear power plant concerning the KemiTornio area (Figure 3D-6), there is an area marked EN-1 in Karsikko in Simo, denoting an energy supply area reserved for the nuclear power plant and its support functions. The regional land use plan draft includes markings for the necessary road connections, harbor functions, a shipping channel, the protective zone as well as the general location of the necessary power lines. Local master plan and local detailed plan for a nuclear power plant At the beginning of 2008, the municipality of Simo and the town of Kemi launched a local master plan and local detailed plan process for Karsikkoniemi and the nuclear power plant planned there. By the end of 2008, this had progressed to the draft phase. The Karsikkoniemi draft component master plan for a nuclear power plant and the

Figure 3D-7 Extract from the component master plan for a nuclear power plant for Karsikkoniemi, draft October 16, 2008 (Source: Municipality of Simo and town of Kemi).


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Simo draft local detailed plan for a nuclear power plant were on public display from November 3 to November 28, 2008. The component local master plan covers Karsikkoniemi and its surrounding areas. Karsikkoniemi is located at the southeastern corner of the municipality of Simo, and the northwestern portion of the headland is within the area of the town of Kemi. The local master plans for a nuclear power plant cover an area on both sides of the border between Simo and Kemi, just under 20 km west of the central village of Simo and about 15 km south of the town center of Kemi. The nuclear power plant in the component local master plan (Figure 3D-7) is situated at Karsikonniemi so as to enable locating the other activities in the area with as little disturbance as possible in relation to the plant site. The most valuable areas as regards natural conditions have been excluded from the planned construction. The local master plan draft includes the plan symbol EN-1 designating an energy supply area, a total of 193 hectares, which allows the siting of a nuclear power plant in the area. The plan symbol EN-2 in the component local master plan denotes an area which allows the construction of the nuclear power plant support facilities as well as residences relating to construction work and maintenance as well as other activities. The zones EN-1 and EN-2 are designated to be included in a local detailed plan. The draft component master plan also includes reservations for power lines to be built to the plant site, a shipping channel and a rerouting of the ski-doo route to the north of the ďŹ shing port towards Hepola.

Figure 3D-8 Extract from the local detailed plan for a nuclear power plant for Karsikkoniemi, draft October 16, 2008 (Source: Municipality of Simo).


Supplement 3d

Construction of buildings and structures needed in energy production-related research and development is allowed in the energy supply area marked EN-1 in the draft component master plan and draft local detailed plan for a nuclear power plant. Temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel is also allowed in this zone. The draft component master plan includes a civil engineering zone marked ET, where the power line switchyard can be built. The power line for the proposed wind farm at Suurhiekka could join the power line route to the nuclear power plant. The draft component local master plan and local detailed plan include the plan symbol Ma-enk marking an indicative part of the area which can be used for an underground final disposal facility for low and medium-level nuclear waste from the nuclear power plant. The component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts include an area of water marked with the plan symbol W1 designating an area that may, in the case of special and industrial areas, be used for the purposes of the nuclear power plant and where jetties and other constructions and devices needed by the nuclear power plant can be built in accordance with the Water Act. The alternative cooling water intake and outlet locations for the nuclear power plant are shown with blue and red arrows in the draft component master plan. The draft local detailed plan indicates other necessary functions required by the nuclear power plant, such as temporary residential area, harbor functions as well as areas designated for road and traffic purposes. Reservations for space for power lines have been drawn up for the area, and alternative routes for connecting roads and a location for a visiting centre have been proposed. The component local master plan and the local detailed plan drafts include nature reserves and natural monuments as defined by the Nature Conservation Act. The land covered by the draft local detailed plan is almost completely in the possession of Fennovoima.

Effects on land use Plant site The planning of Karsikko for a nuclear power plant will have an impact on land use in the vicinity of the plant. The plant site will be turned into an area reserved solely for industrial activities, and access to the site will be restricted. The land use will change in the southern part of Karsikkoniemi. The site is currently not designated for any specific land use, so this will not be a significant change. The leisure dwellings on the southern shore will be removed from the area between the fishing port and the quay to be built for the nuclear power plant on the western shore. Road connections A permanent road connection will be built to Laitakari Island, at least assuming the alternative cooling water intake location proposed to be placed there is built. The areas near Puntarniemi and Paavonkari in the northern part of Karsikkoniemi, currently partly in a natural state and suitable for recreation, have been allocated to leisure dwelling construction. The as yet unbuilt residential areas indicated on the earlier plans cannot now be built at all, at least not to the extent originally envisioned. Karsikontie is an existing road that can be used as the road connection to the power plant. For rescue access, an additional new road will be built to the north and west of

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the plant site and towards Hepola. Building these connections will have no significant land use impact. In Hepola, the new rescue access route will run along an existing local road. Power line route The power line route leading to the plant will restrict land use on a strip 80–120 m wide, depending on the column type. Also, the separate power line to the wind farm at Suurhiekka will require, if built, an additional width of 16 m to 32 m to the power line route, depending on how it is designed. No such activity is permitted in the power line clearing that may render using the power line dangerous. The power plant’s 400 kV power line will be built to an access point to the national grid about 22 km away on the Keminmaa-Pikkarala power line, and the 110 kV power line similarly to an access point about 12 km away on the Kittilänjärvi-Simo power line. Fingrid plc has submitted a report for the purposes of the regional land use plan on connecting the plant to the national grid. Other areas Construction of the nuclear power plant will have an effect on the urban structure of Simo and Kemi by limiting the land use in the protective zone of the plant and enabling new land use in the suburbs and villages as well as along the road connections. Building new and dense residential areas, hospitals and other facilities where a large number of people frequent is not permitted in this zone. It is also not allowed to site any significant production operations in the protective zone that might be affected by a nuclear accident. Existing residential buildings may be restored or replaced by new, similar buildings. Leisure dwellings or activities may be situated in the protective zone, as an appropriate rescue plan will be drawn up for the zone. The planning-related boundaries for the protective zone will be drawn up in connection with preparing the local master plan for the area. The nuclear power plant will not restrict land use outside the protective zone. Construction of the plant will improve land use opportunities outside the protective zone. Particularly in the built-up areas of Simo and Kemi, it will yield new land use opportunities for building workplaces, residential areas and services. The construction of the plant will have a significant impact on the entire Kemi-Tornio area, including the Province of Norrbotten on the Swedish side and particularly the town of Haparanda. The reputation of the area as a strong industrial district will strengthen, thereby improving the preconditions for land use development.

Suitability of the site for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant Fennovoima has selected the three alternative sites presented in the application through a complicated selection procedure. Fennovoima made a survey of some 40 potential sites all around Finland during 2007. The preliminary assessments revealed the relevant technical factors influencing the suitability of each of the sites, such as the characteristics of the bedrock and soil, the availability of cooling water, transportation connections and arrangements for the grid connection.


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On the basis of surveys and preliminary assessments, Fennovoima initiated an environmental impact assessment procedure for five sites, of which Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, Gäddbergsö in Ruotsinpyhtää and Karsikko in Simo are listed in this application as alternative sites.

Classification of the factors used in the evaluation of suitability The significance of various factors in the evaluation of the suitability of the sites is presented in Table 3B-3. – A critical factor is a factor which renders the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose mitigation to an acceptable level is impossible in practical terms. – A significant factor is a factor which on its own does not render the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which nevertheless has to be taken into account as a very significant factor in the overall evaluation regarding the selection of the site. – A planning factor is a factor which does not make the site unsuitable for its purpose, but which has to be taken into account as a site specific, special feature from the beginning of the planning of the project. Table 3D-3 shows the factors classified as relating to safety, environment, society, construction and operations.

Safety

Critical factor

Significant factor

Population and activities in

Aviation activity

Planning factor Extreme sea level

the vicinity

phenomena

Heat removal arrange-

Extreme meteorological

ments

phenomena

Characteristics of the bedrock and soil Safety and emergency preparedness arrangements Non-acceptable detrimen-

Nature reserves

Environment

tal environmental effects

Society

Approval of the commu-

Scenic and historical

nity Municipality and its

sites

residents

Land use and planning

Construction

Limitation of environmental effects

Infrastructure

and operation

Safety-related issues In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, the government decision-in-principle regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant is made at a very early phase of the project. In assessing the factors affecting the safety of the site, it should be taken into account that it is possible to influence most safety-related factors significantly with basic and detailed planning carried out after the decision-in-principle, as well as with the construction and operation of the plant. Fennovoima has evaluated the alternative sites in accordance with the STUK Guide

Table 3D-3 Factors used in the evaluation of the suitability of a site of the project and the significance of the factors for the evaluation.


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YVL 1.10. According to the guide, the essential factors affecting the safety of the site relate to external threats and radioactive emissions from the plant. As for the selection of the external events, the requirements concerning the selection of the site defined in the IAEA Guide NS-R-3 have also been applied. Population and operations in the vicinity In Finland, a nuclear power plant cannot be located near a population cluster or near operations for which no adequate rescue operations can be planned. The nuclear power plant site must be such that the regulations for limiting the exposure to radiation and radioactive emissions in normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situations can be met. The size and distribution of the population in the vicinity of Karsikko are presented in sections “Population in the vicinity” and “Principal operations” of this report. The normal operation of the nuclear power plant does not pose a danger to the population or operations in the vicinity. Also, there are no operations in the vicinity that pose a danger to the nuclear power plant. An appropriate plant site, protective zone and an emergency planning zone that are in accordance with the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 will be defined for the nuclear power plant. The size and distribution of the population as well as the other operations in the vicinity of Karsikko are such that it is possible to plan effective rescue operations in the case of an emergency. The radioactive emissions as well as the radiation doses resulting from these and their effect on health in the case of normal operation, operational malfunction and emergency situation have been assessed in the project’s EIA Report. In normal operation and in operational malfunction the effects of radioactive emissions on the population and the environment are insignificant. It is possible to design, construct and operate the nuclear power plant at Karsikko in such a way that the prescribed limit values as defined in the Government Decree (733/2008) are lower than required. Organisation of heat removal Regarding the safe operation of the nuclear power plant it is vital that the cooling of the nuclear reactors contained in the plant is ensured in all circumstances. For this reason, the heat removal arrangements of a nuclear power plant are taken into specific consideration in the selection of the site as well as in the design and construction of the plant. The Karsikko site is located on the sea. The heat removal of the nuclear power plant will be arranged primarily by pumping cooling water from the sea with a rate of 60-100 m3/s in normal operation into the condenser of the nuclear power plant unit or units. In the very unlikely event of the cooling water intake from the sea being prevented, the reserve cooling water tanks will be dimensioned so as to last a minimum of 36 hours without any danger of the reactor overheating. The cooling water is led into the plant either by shore intake or through an intake tunnel further out to sea. In the location and planning of the cooling water intake the extremely low sea level is taken into consideration. The amount of cooling water required by the plant is insignificant in relation to the water volume surrounding Karsikkoniemi. The forming of pack ice in the Karsikkoniemi headland area is a phenomenon that may affect the nuclear power plant’s heat removal arrangements in winter. The strain caused by pack ice on the cooling water intake and discharge structures needs to be tak-


Supplement 3d

en into account in the design of the plant to ensure the cooling of the plant in extreme conditions. Fennovoima has carried out a survey on the strain caused by pack ice on the cooling water structures as well as the possible structural design measures to prepare for the pack ice. In the nuclear power plant suitability assessment, the pre-design of the plant or the surveys executed, no factors emerged that would suggest that heat removal from the plant cannot be reliably executed. Reliable and safety regulations compliant heat removal is ensured in the basic design carried out prior to applying for the construction license in accordance with the principles presented in Supplement 4A of the application. Regarding the heat removal arrangements, Karsikko in Simo is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. Bedrock characteristics The geological characteristics of the soil have a critical impact on the construction of nuclear power plant related buildings as well as on the construction of the final disposal facilities for reactor waste in the final disposal plant. In 2008, Fennovoima commissioned a survey from the Geological Survey of Finland and the Department of Seismology of the University of Helsinki on the bedrock characteristics of the Karsikkoniemi headland. In addition, subsoil explorations were carried out by boring in the area by order of Fennovoima in spring 2008. The subsoil explorations will continue in 2009 in order to gather sufficient information for the technical design of the nuclear power plant facilities and the final disposal facility of the reactor waste. There are no known exploitable ore deposits in the area. According to the estimate of the Geological Survey of Finland it is unlikely that there would be any significant ore deposits in the area. The nearest ground water areas of any regional significance are situated about 3 km from the Karsikkoniemi headland and the project poses no threat to these areas. The bedrock in the Karsikko area is granite-gneiss approximately 2,500 million years of age, and its structural carrying capacity is good. The surface fissures on the Karsikonniemi headland are rarer than average. The fine-grained rock type and smooth fissures of the bedrock as well as the other geological characteristics are taken into consideration in the planning and the construction solutions of the final disposal facility for reactor waste. Karsikko is located on the inner part of the continent on the Fennoscandia shield, where the average level of seismic activity is low. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand an earthquake considerably stronger than could occur at Karsikko. The geological surveys of the bedrock and soil characteristics of Karsikko have not identified any factors that would preclude the execution of the project. In terms of its soil and bedrock properties, Karsikko is a suitable nuclear power plant site. Safety and emergency preparedness arrangements The nuclear power plant site needs to be such that it is possible to protect the plant from illegal activities and also so that arrangements for limiting nuclear accidents may be effectively executed. The execution of safety and emergency preparedness arrangements is explained in more detail in Supplement 4A of the application. A plant site, as illustrated in Figure

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3D-1, will be defined around the nuclear power plant, and one of the functions of the plant site is to help protect the plant against illegal activities. Fennovoima prepares physical protection planning and procedures for the event of emergency situations in cooperation with the safety authorities. To ensure the effectiveness of physical protection, the safety plan and other information concerning physical protection remains largely confidential. The population and operations in the vicinity of Karsikkoniemi, as well as the safety measures taken to protect the population in the vicinity are covered in various sections in this report. The local emergency services are responsible for drawing up and executing the rescue plans. The emergency preparedness of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is planned and implemented in cooperation with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK and the emergency services authorities, so that the effects of nuclear damage caused by the operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be effectively contained. The safety and emergency preparedness arrangements can be planned and executed appropriately at Karsikko. Extreme sea level and meteorological phenomena The extreme meteorological and sea level phenomena need to be explored in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant site, as they affect the operation and safety of the plant. The Finnish Institute of Marine Research has studied the sea level variation in the Karsikkoniemi region. The average sea level, as well as limit values for the sea level which are reached no more than once in a thousand years, were determined in the study. The sea levels examined range from the present time to the estimated end of the service life of the nuclear power plant, the year 2075. Concerning the year 2075, the effects of such factors as uplift and climate change on the sea level have been taken into account in addition to other factors. The Finnish Meteorological Institute has, upon Fennovoima’s request, carried out a preliminary assessment to assign values for the following extreme meteorological phenomena in the Karsikkoniemi area: – low and high temperatures in the following time periods: momentary, 6 hours, 24 hours, and 7 days; – wind speed: 10 minute median wind and 3 second gust of wind – precipitation: 24 hours and 7 days; and – the heaviest snow load. Concerning the extreme meteorological phenomena, the limit values which at the median level are reached no more than once in a thousand years were assessed. The assessment also explored the effects of climate change on the limit values. As a dimensioning factor, the strain caused by tornados, i.e. very strong whirlwinds affecting a small area, is taken into account in relation to buildings, structures and devices important for the safety of the nuclear power plant. The results obtained from the preliminary assessments regarding the sea level and meteorological phenomena, together with the other information available to Fennovoima, confirm that the extreme phenomena do not place such demands on the planning of the nuclear power plant that would technically be extremely difficult or impossible to meet. Extreme phenomena are taken into account in the planning by


Supplement 3d

setting an extreme phenomenon raised by a sufficient safety margin as the planning basis, with a recurrence level rare enough in practice for the elimination of the safety risk caused by such a phenomenon, while acknowledging the uncertainty relating to its size. Aviation activity According to the Aviation Act, a no-fly zone for the area surrounding a nuclear power plant may be ordered by government decree, inside of which the flying of any aircraft is prohibited. The main purpose of the no-fly zone is to prevent aviation in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant in order to eliminate unnecessary risks and disturbances. The nuclear power plant site at Karsikko is located about 16 km from Kemi-Tornio airport and is within its controlled airspace. The southern approach to the airport and adjacent areas are close to Karsikko, but a feasible no-fly zone could nevertheless be defined around the plant site. The no-fly zone of the nuclear power plant at Karsikko would be smaller than the zone specified for current nuclear power plant sites in section 4 of the relevant Government Decree (929/2006). There are no existing sites in Karsikko that would require protection by defining a no-fly zone. Setting a no-fly zone smaller than that of other nuclear power plants in Finland would not constitute a safety risk for the nuclear power plant to be built at Karsikko. It is highly unlikely that an aircraft would accidentally crash into a nuclear power plant. A deliberate crash, on the other hand, would not be prevented by a no-fly zone however large. In any case, the nuclear power plant will be designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft without significant consequences in the vicinity of the plant.

Environmental impact and limiting of the effects The environmental impact of the project has been evaluated in an assessment procedure complying with the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994). The procedure contains an assessment of the effect of the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant on, for example, the environment, population and society. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report is included as Supplement 3A of the application, and the environmental effects of the project and the limiting of such effects will not be covered in this report in any more detail. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report reveals that the execution of the project at any of the alternative sites would not have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report contains a preliminary plan for measures to limit the environmental effect of the project at its various phases. Based on the assessments made Fennovoima thus believes that regarding the environmental effects, it is feasible to execute the project at Karsikko. The alternative options evaluated at Karsikko concerning the plant and cooling water arrangements differ in some aspects as to their environmental effects , as do the other options related to the execution of the project. The differences will be carefully considered as the planning and implementation of the project proceeds in order to effectively limit the environmental effects of the project.

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Society-related issues Large industrial undertakings have an effect on society and on their location in many different ways. Nuclear power particularly raises many questions and causes anxiety, a lot of which is to do with the safety of the plant. It is desirable and expected that a wide public debate will take place regarding the nuclear power plant project. Fennovoima is a part of Finnish society. The company appreciates open and democratic decisionmaking that is based on collaboration. Fennovoima has engaged in a wide and open interaction with the local residents and communities at the alternative site localities as well as in conjunction with the environmental impact assessment process. Fennovoima has engaged in a wide and open interaction with the local residents and communities at the alternative site localities as well as in conjunction with the environmental impact assessment process. The Finnish municipal elections held in October 2008 were perfectly timed as far as the Fennovoima nuclear power project was concerned. In the elections the local residents could have their say regarding the possible placement of the nuclear power plant in their municipality. As a result of the election, the municipal council is in a good position to express their view as to the siting of the nuclear power plant when the Ministry of Employment and the Economy enquires about the council’s opinion in the matter in 2009. Fennovoima has actively sought interaction with citizen groups as broadly as possible. The company has arranged several public hearings for the citizens in Simo during the preparation of the project. On these occasions, the project has been presented and the audience’s questions answered. The usual questions are concerned with the project itself, the safety of nuclear power plants, the environmental effect of the plant, the acquisition of nuclear fuel and the effects of radiation on health. During the environmental impact assessment there have been public hearings and follow-up groups, where the locals and various associations alike have been able to bring valuable local knowledge to be considered in the assessment. The effects of the project on the landscape and the historically significant sites are covered in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. The project’s preconditions and effects relating to land use and planning have been described earlier in this report.

Construction and operation related factors The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant causes some changes in the infrastructure of the plant site and the surrounding areas. New infrastructure needed in the municipality of Simo and the town of Kemi, or infrastructure to be improved, include road connections, power line routes, water management and sea transportation arrangements. Infrastructure outside the plant site will be built during the execution of the project. Developing the infrastructure will have a positive effect on the region’s economic life and operating potential. There is no previous industrial infrastructure at Karsikko. Due to this, Fennovoima will be able to plan the nuclear power plant and all its operations according to the best current knowledge and know-how.


Supplement 3d

Construction work Constructing a nuclear power plant is an extremely extensive project. The construction will take an estimated six to eight years, and there will be up to 3,500-5,000 people working on the building site, depending on the number of units. Parking space and accommodation allocated for some of the construction workers will be built on the plant site or in its immediate vicinity. Road connections Karsikontie, the road leading from highway 4 to the plant site, must be widened over a distance of almost 5 km. Also, a new road about 1 km long must be built from Karsikontie to the plant site. For rescue access, an additional new road will be built to the north and west of the plant site and towards Hepola. A permanent road to Laitakari Island will be built for the construction and maintenance of cooling water structures if the alternative cooling water intake site planned there is implemented. Power line routes In order to connect the nuclear power plant to the national grid, at least two 400 kV power lines and one 110 kV power line will be needed. In the case of two separate nuclear power units, it is possible that as many as four 400 kV power lines and two 110 kV power lines will be needed. Fingrid Ltd is in charge of the environmental impact assessment of the power line route, the application for licenses as well as the building of the power line from the national grid connection point to the coupling in the plant site. Fennovoima and Fingrid have ensured that every alternative nuclear power plant considered can be connected to the national grid from the Karsikko site. Depending on the column design, the power line route will run along a power line clearing 80-120 m wide. Also, the separate power line to the wind farm at Suurhiekka will require, if built, an additional width of 16 m to 32 m to the power line route, depending on how it is designed. According to the plan, the power line connection will, for the most part, run through areas of forest and bog. There are no nature reserves by, or in the vicinity of, the power line routes. The regional land use plan, local master plan and the local detailed plan all include reservations and routing required by the power line connections. Water management The fresh water required at the power plant can be acquired from Kemin Vesi Oy, which in turn acquires its raw water from Meri-Lapin Vesi Oy. Groundwater intake plants in Tervola supply 90% of the raw water. The remaining 10% comes from Kemin Vesi Oy’s own groundwater intake plant in Ajos. The length of the water pipelines required is about 6 km. Sea transportation arrangements During the construction phase, large and heavy transportation will take place by sea. A quay for unloading and loading the cargo will be built on the west side of the plant site, which is well connected with deeper water. The quay will be available for similar use during the operational phase of the plant when necessary. The quay to be built will be approximately 100 m long and 30 m wide. The sea bed will need to be dredged and blasted.

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A shipping channel some 500 m long and 5.5 to 6 m deep will be built from the quay to the shipping channel leading to Veitsiluoto. The dredging masses resulting from digging the navigation channel will be used, among other things, for filling in the loading bay and for a possible breakwater. The infrastructure of the plant site The nuclear power plant and its support operations will cover an area of approximately 335 hectares (the EN-1 and EN-2 zones in the local detailed plan illustrated in Figure 3D-8). The general placement at the plant site of the buildings and structures that make up the nuclear power plant is shown in Figure 3D-9. The nuclear power plant and the buildings required for its support functions can easily be accommodated at the planned plant site at Karsikko. Distribution of the plant operations will be defined in more detail as planning and town planning proceed. The plant site and the distribution of the buildings and structures in the area will be defined in detail in connection with the construction license for the nuclear power plant and the municipal construction permit.

Figure 3D-9 Preliminary distribution of the plant operations at the Karsikko plant site, draft December 20, 2008.

A B C

Reactor building Turbine building Radioactive waste processing building D Access building / Office building E ja F Emergency generators G Switchgear building I 110kV switchyard J 400kV switchyard K Office and administration building L Interim storage for spent fuel M Visitor center and training center U Fire station (+fire water pumping station and tanks) V Gatehouse W Gas turbine Y Waste water processing plant VLJ Final disposal repository for reactor waste Port Quay for loading and unloading of transports by sea

Estimate of the suitability of Karsikko in Simo as a site According to the assessments made, Karsikko in Simo is suitable as a nuclear power plant site. At Karsikko or in its vicinity, no such safety-related factor exists which would render the site unsuitable for its purpose or whose lowering to an acceptable level would be practically impossible. Also, the planned plant site has no existing industrial infrastructure that would limit the possibilities Fennovoima has for planning a nuclear power plant with all its operations. Planning the physical protection measures together with the rescue authorities and Fennovoima’s right of possession at the planned plant site are favorable factors in protecting the plant against illegal activities. There are no population clusters or operations in the vicinity of Karsikko which would prevent the planning and implemen-


Supplement 3d

tation of effective emergency preparedness and rescue operations in order to limit nuclear accidents. The readiness and rescue provisions required for the safety level speciďŹ ed in the STUK Guide YVL 1.10 can be planned and implemented for people living in the immediate vicinity of the Karsikko site. An Environmental Impact Assessment Report required by the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure has been carried out for the project. As a result of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report no implementation option evaluated for the EIA report was found to be such that it would have any such detrimental environmental effects which could not be either approved of or be lowered to an acceptable level.

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Liite 4a

Nuclear power plant safety Supplement 4A Description of observed safety principles

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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................221 Introduction ................................................................................................................222 General principles of nuclear energy use ..................................................................222 The overall good of society ..................................................................................222 Licensing and responsibility for safety ................................................................223 General safety principle .......................................................................................223 Nuclear waste management .................................................................................224 Physical protection and emergency preparedness arrangements ......................225 Safety priciples ............................................................................................................226 Technical safety principle .....................................................................................226 Defence-in-depth safety principle........................................................................226 Radiation safety principles ...................................................................................232 Chief nuclear safety requirements .............................................................................233 Provision for operational failures and accidents.................................................233 VeriďŹ cation and assessment of safety ...................................................................235 Construction and operation ................................................................................236 Decommissioning.................................................................................................237 Nuclear materials and nuclear waste ...................................................................237 Personnel ...............................................................................................................238 Management system .............................................................................................238 Responsible manager ...........................................................................................239


Supplement 4a

Summary

The level of safety of the Fennovoima project shall be kept as high as practically achievable. The minimum safety level shall be in compliance with current legislation, government-prescribed general safety regulations, detailed safety regulations prescribed by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and other regulations applicable to its operations. However, Fennovoima’s objective is to achieve a safety level that clearly surpasses the statutory minimum level. Pursuant to section 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the use of nuclear energy must be safe and must not cause injury to people, or damage to the environment or property. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be built and operated in accordance with this requirement. Management of nuclear waste generated by the plant can be implemented in accordance with the general safety principle in the manner presented in Supplement 5B. The plant’s safety and emergency preparedness arrangements can be planned and implemented at each of the alternative plant sites in compliance with current laws and regulations. Once a building licence for the plant is granted, Fennovoima will assume full responsibility for the safety of the nuclear power plant and its nuclear waste management. The starting point for the safety planning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is full compliance with the nuclear safety principles and regulations prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act and in government decrees concerning general safety regulations. The project will achieve the minimum safety level by observing the general principles of nuclear energy use and the safety principles and regulations prescribed in chapters 2 and 2a of the Nuclear Energy Act. Plant safety will be ensured in practice through the principle of defence in depth, i.e. by means of successive independent protection systems encompassing both the operational and structural safety of the plant. The plant will be designed and used so that it fulfills the principles of entitlement, optimization and limitation regarding radiation use prescribed by the Radiation Act. In accordance with the limitation principle, neither the radiation exposure of individuals nor the limit values set for the release of radioactive materials will be exceeded during normal plant operation or in the possible event of operational failure or accident. In connection with the application for a decision-in-principle, Fennovoima submits to STUK an appraisal of its ability to implement the Fennovoima project in accordance with Finnish regulations. The appraisal is based on feasibility studies drawn up jointly with the plant suppliers for each alternative plant type in connection with preparation of the decision-in-principle application, the results of which are described in more detail in Supplement 4B of the application. Based on the feasibility studies commissioned for the plant options, each of the project’s plant options can be implemented in compliance with Finnish safety regulations. The design safety of each nuclear facility of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be assessed in more detail in connection with the construction licence application in accordance with section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act.

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Introduction In accordance with section 24, subsection 1(6), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented with a description of the safety principles to be observed at each nuclear facility included in the scope of the project. This report provides the above-mentioned information with respect to the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project. Section 6 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) requires that the use of nuclear energy shall not cause injury to people, or damage to the environment or property. The power plant licencee is responsible for ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy. In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, in the consideration of a decisionin-principle, nuclear energy use is considered safe if the use meets the requirements set by legislation and government regulations. The nuclear power production process uses and generates large quantities of radioactive material. Nuclear power plant safety primarily involves designing, building and operating the plant in such a way that ensures that the danger caused by these radioactive materials is kept at an acceptable and as low as practically achievable level. The general principles of nuclear energy use are prescribed in Finland by the Nuclear Energy Act. Continuous observation of safety principles is a fundamental precondition for the construction and operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. Detailed regulations governing the observance of safety principles are given in government decrees and in the nuclear power plant guides, i.e. YVL guides, published by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The government has effective legislation-backed means at its disposal for ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy at all phases of operations and for intervening if any actions are suspected as being in conflict with set requirements. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant consists of one or two nuclear power plant units and a final disposal facility for the low and medium-level nuclear waste generated by their operations. This report presents the principles and key requirements that shall be observed in order to ensure the safety of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant units. The safety principles observed by the nuclear waste final disposal facility are presented in Supplement 5B of the application. The safety principles observed in the planning, construction and operation of nuclear power plants are based on the Nuclear Energy Act. The principles are universally applicable to the Fennovoima project and will be observed irrespective of the chosen plant type or plant site. The technical operating principles of the Fennovoima project’s alternative plant types are presented in more detail in Supplement 4B of the application, and the safety factors of the alternative plant sites in Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D.

General principles of nuclear energy use The overall good of society In Finland, nuclear energy use is governed by the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987). The Act is frequently updated, the latest amendment having been passed on May 23, 2008 by the Act on the Amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act (342/2008). The general principles concerning nuclear energy use are defined in chapters 5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act.


Supplement 4a

The general principle of the Nuclear Energy Act regarding safeguarding the overall good of society is preserved in its original form. Based on section 5 of the Nuclear Energy Act, use of nuclear energy must be, in considering its universal effects, in accordance with the overall good of society. No definitive description of the overall good of society is given in the Nuclear Energy Act or other legislation. Consensus regarding the aspects to be included within this scope must therefore be achieved after due consideration of their appropriateness in accordance with the government bill (HE 16/1985) which preceded the Nuclear Energy Act. The objective of the overall good of society requirement is to enable, particularly in connection with application for a decision-in-principle, broad consideration of the social effects of the use of nuclear energy, so that use of nuclear energy will only be embarked upon if the benefits to society of doing so outweigh the drawbacks. The Fennovoima project’s adherence to the overall good of society is addressed extensively in the application and its Supplement 2A.

Licensing and responsibility for safety The use of nuclear energy is subject to licence in Finland, and a licence to build and operate a nuclear power plant is granted by the government. A license can be granted if the plant fulfills the general principles defined in chapters 5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act The licence decision defines, for example, the nature and scope of operations and the period of validity of the licence, as well as any possible terms of licence. The licencee is unequivocally obliged to assure the safety of nuclear energy use during all phases of operations. The sphere of nuclear energy use also includes the construction and waste management of the nuclear power plant. If the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is granted a construction license as referred to in section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act, Fennovoima will become the licencee as defined by the Act. Plant operations may not commence until the plant has been granted an operating licence in accordance with section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act. All nuclear energy use must be continuously in accordance with the general principles of the Nuclear Energy Act. The government has the right to change the terms of the operation licence or to withdraw the licence as necessary in order to safeguard the implementation of the general principles of the Act.

General safety principle Pursuant to section 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the use of nuclear energy must be safe and must not cause injury to people, or damage to the environment or property. This requirement is known as the general safety principle. Nuclear energy use must not be in conflict with this principle. Safety is given first precedence over all other objectives of the Fennovoima project. Fulfillment of the requirements prescribed by current laws and regulations is an absolute minimum requirement for the construction and operation the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. According to the government bill (HE 16/1985) preceding the Nuclear Energy Act, the safety of the use of nuclear energy is treated as a legal question in the consideration of the overall good of society. This means that use of nuclear energy shall

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be deemed safe if it meets the requirements of current laws, decrees and regulations. The safety regulations of the Nuclear Energy Act are specified as general safety regulations. These regulations are presented in the following reformed government decrees which came into force in 2008: – Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008); – Government Decree on General Regulations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (734/2008); – Government Decree on General Regulations for the Emergency Preparedness of Nuclear Power Plants (735/2008); – Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility for Reactor Waste (736/2008). The task of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is to issue detailed regulations concerning the safety of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act. The regulations are issued as YVL guides which the licencee is obligated to observe. STUK may also approve a procedure or solution which deviates from the YVL guides if the procedure or solution otherwise fulfills the required safety level specified in the guides. There are some 70 YVL guides in total, including general instructions as well as specific instructions concerning plant systems, pressure equipment, construction engineering, other structures and devices, nuclear materials, radiation protection and nuclear waste management.

Nuclear waste management Section 6a of the Nuclear Energy Act requires that nuclear waste generated in Finland in connection with nuclear energy use must be duly handled, stored and permanently disposed of in Finland. The licencee is also responsible for all waste management measures required for the management of nuclear waste generated by its operations, for the due conditioning and treatment of this waste and for the waste management costs incurred. Final disposal of the low and medium-level waste generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be managed on site as detailed in Supplement 5B to this application. Fennovoima’s nuclear waste management plans and available methods enable the final disposal of reactor waste in full accordance with the requirements prescribed by the Nuclear Energy Act and the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility for Reactor Waste (736/2008). Spent nuclear fuel generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be disposed of at a common national final disposal facility to be built at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. This plan is in accordance with the policy laid down by previous government decisions-in-principle. Fennovoima’s plans and available methods for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel are presented in Supplement 5B of the application. An estimate of the significance of the project with regard to the waste management plans of Finland’s other nuclear power plants is presented in Supplement 2B of the application. Fennovoima’s plans are based on methods which have been proven in Finland to be safe and appropriate for the implementation of nuclear waste management.


Supplement 4a

Management of the nuclear waste generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be implemented safely and in accordance with the relevant nuclear waste management regulations. To ensure adequate financing for nuclear waste management, Fennovoima has an obligation as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act for financial provision for all future costs of the plant’s nuclear waste management.

Physical protection and emergency preparedness arrangements In accordance with section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act, sufficient physical protection and emergency planning as well as other arrangements for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting nuclear energy against illegal activities are a prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy. Physical protection refers to the necessary measures put in place within the plant and its surroundings to protect against unlawful possession or use of nuclear energy. The physical protection measures and arrangements are implemented by the power plant licencee in cooperation with the safety authorities in order to protect the plant and its nuclear materials, such as nuclear fuel, from illegal possession and activities that may cause nuclear damage. The regulations concerning physical protection also include the transportation of nuclear materials. Physical protection comprises an essential part of nuclear power plant safety and nuclear materials transport safety. Fennovoima prepares physical protection planning and procedures for the event of emergency situations in cooperation with the safety authorities. To ensure the effectiveness of physical protection, the majority of Security Plan and other information concerning physical protection remains confidential. Emergency preparedness refers to measures and arrangements implemented by the power plant licencee together with the emergency services authorities in order to minimize the damage to the power plant environment in the event of an accident. The emergency preparedness of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is planned and implemented in cooperation with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK and the emergency services authorities, so that the effects of nuclear damage caused by the operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be effectively contained. Emergency preparedness can be planned and implemented at each of the alternative plant sites in compliance with current laws and regulations. The actions of the plant’s own preparedness organization and the emergency services authorities are closely coordinated so that the measures performed within the plant, on the plant site, and in the protection zone and emergency planning zone are appropriate and effective. To ensure the harmonization of procedures, Fennovoima participates in the establishing of emergency plans in accordance with section 9 of the Rescue Act (468/2003). The emergency preparedness procedures shall be rehearsed together with the authorities prior to commissioning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. Throughout the service life of the nuclear power plant, joint emergency exercises between the authorities and the nuclear power plant will be carried out under the direction of the local State Provincial Office at intervals of at least three years in accordance with section 7 of the Ministry of the Interior Decree (774/2001). The establishment of a Security Plan and drafting of a Preparedness Plan will be commenced in connection with the preparation of the construction license applica-

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tion for each nuclear facility of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant, so that STUK approval for the plans can be sought as prescribed by Government Decrees (734/2008) and (735/2008).

Safety principles Technical safety principle Section 7a of the Nuclear Energy Act requires that the safety of the use of nuclear energy must be maintained at a level as high as practically possible, and that for further safety enhancement, measures shall be taken which can be regarded as justified considering operating experience and the results of safety research as well as the advancement of science and technology. The Fennovoima project’ s alternative plant designs each represent progressive technology in which plant safety is as high as practically achievable. The plants are based primarily on proven technology, and experiences gained from the construction and operation of older generation nuclear power plants. Furthermore, developments in science and technology have been taken into consideration in their development. As part of the preparation of the application for a government decision-in-principle, Fennovoima has, together with the plant suppliers, carried out feasibility studies for each alternative plant type, in which the key technical and safety properties of each plant design are assessed. On the basis of the feasibility studies, Fennovoima has ensured that all of the alternative plant types can be implemented with minor modifications to comply with Finnish regulations. A general description of the technical operating principles of the alternative plant types examined by Fennovoima is presented in Supplement 4B of the application. Additionally, in connection with the application for a decision-in-principle, Fennovoima will submit to STUK detailed reports on each alternative plant design as required by Guide YVL 1.1 (Regulatory Control of Safety at Nuclear Facilities).

Defence-in-depth safety principle Fulfilling the general safety principle requires the implementation of effective protection methods against the dangers caused by radioactive materials. Of all safety principles stemming from the general safety principle, the defence-in-depth principle referred to in section 7b of the Nuclear Energy Act is the most central. According to the defence-in-depth safety principle, the safety of a nuclear facility must be secured with successive, independent barriers. The principle encompasses both structural and operational plant safety. Structural safety The uncontrolled release into the environment of radioactive materials generated by the nuclear power plant’s operations is structurally prevented by means of technical release barriers. The radioactive material technical release barriers are schematically illustrated in Figure 4A-1. The barrier order, from innermost to outermost, is as follows:


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– Nuclear fuel. The nuclear fuel pellets consist of ceramic uranium dioxide which, due to its chemical and physical properties, effectively withholds radioactive materials. The fuel pellets are packed in mechanically durable gas-tight protective cladding. – Nuclear reactor coolant circuit. The nuclear reactor’s coolant circuit, i.e. primary coolant circuit, is an airtight structure surrounding the nuclear fuel which consists of the reactor pressure vessel and main circulation piping and pressure equipment directly connected to these. The primary coolant circuit is a pressurized, mechanically durable interface which prevents the release of radioactive materials into the environment. – Containment building. The nuclear reactor’s coolant circuit and vital safety equipment and systems are surrounded by a containment building. Functionally, the containment building consists of an inner and outer containment structure. The inner containment building is pressure-proof and gas-tight. Its purpose is to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the environment in the event of an accident involving loss of integrity of the fuel/reactor coolant circuit. The outer containment building is a massive structure designed to protect the inner containment building from external threats.

Outer containment building

Inner containment building

Nuclear reactor coolant circuit

Nuclear fuel

Functional safety Pursuant to Section 7d of the Act, nuclear facility planning must include preparedness for the possibility of operational failure and accident. The risk of accident must be lower the more serious the potential consequences of the accident are to people, the environment or property. Accident prevention must be the primary objective. The defence-in-depth principle is the leading safety principle in nuclear power plant planning. The functional aim of the defence-in-depth principle is:

Figure 4A-1 Nuclear power plant technical release barriers against radioactive materials.


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– to prevent and mitigate the impact of potential human and mechanical failures on safety; – to protect radioactive material release barriers by averting threat factors to the plant and to the barriers themselves; and – to protect the public and the environment from harm in the event that the release barriers are not fully effective. Functional implementation of the defence-in-depth safety principle is based on safety functions defined for the nuclear power plant. Safety functions refer to all key safety functions of the plant that are aimed at preventing the occurrence or development of abnormal operations (transients) or accidents or minimizing their consequences. The plant’s principal safety functions are reactor shutdown, residual heat removal from the reactor, and ensuring the integrity of the containment building. The safety functions are successive, so that a failure of a single function cannot cause harm to people or the environment (Figure 4A-2). The principle is applied to technical systems as well as to planning of the actions and procedures of the organization and its workforce. The safety functions can be classified according to five different levels of protection based on their primary safety objective. The levels of defence-in-depth protection applied in the safety planning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant units – and where applicable of the nuclear waste final disposal facility – are based on InternaFigure 4A-2 Levels of defence-in-depth protection.

Mitigation of consequences Containment building failure

Control of severe accidents Multiple failure of independent safety systems

Control of accidents Failure of an entire safety system

Control of abnormal operation Failure of an individual device

Normal operation


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229

tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations. Table 4A-1 shows the levels of protection and the civil defence objective, essential safety measures and reliability requirements applied to each level. Civil defense objective

Essential safety measures

Government Decree( 733/2008)

Reliability requirements Guides YVL 2.2 and 2.8

Level 1 – Prevention of abnormal operation and failures No civil defence measures

Safety margins

Normal operating limits are

required

High-quality design, manu-

defined in the plant’s technical

facture, construction and

specifications

operation Level 2 – Control of abnormal operation No civil defence measures

Reactor shutdown

Failure anticipated to occur

required

Ensuring primary coolant

a maximum of once during the

circuit integrity

service life of the plant

Reactor residual heat removal Level 3 – Control of accidents No extensive civil defence

Keeping the reactor in sub-

A maximum of one in a hun-

measures required

critical state, emergency

dred failures leads to a seri-

cooling of the reactor, and

ous accident.

residual heat removal Ensuring the power supply to safety systems Containment building isolation Level 4 – Control of severe accidents No major release of radioac-

Ensuring the integrity of the

A maximum of one in a thou-

tive materials

containment building

sand accidents leads to a se-

Control of damaged or molten

vere accident

reactor core Level 5 – Mitigation of consequences No acute health effects or

Minimization of radioactive

A maximum of one in twenty

long-term restriction on the

material emissions

severe accidents leads to a

use of extensive geographi-

Emergency preparedness

major release of radioactive

cal areas

and response

materials

The progress from one level to another of an incident arising from abnormal operation or failure requires the failure or defective operation of the safety systems which govern the safety functions. The reliability of technical safety systems and other safety functions is vital to plant operational safety. Numerous methods are available for ensuring sufficient operational reliability of safety functions. The most important of these are presented in brief below.

Table 4A-1 Levels of defense-in-depth protection of the Fennovoima plant.


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– Inherent safety features. In ensuring safety functions, full use is made of inherent safety features that are attainable by design. An inherent feature refers to a systematic behavior which takes place based on natural laws and without external control. An example of an inherent safety feature is the design of the reactor core such that the combined effect of the physical feedbacks of the reactor inhibits the increase in reactor power. – Passive, i.e. direct acting, safety systems. If inherent safety features cannot be relied on to ensure a safety function, the design objective is to implement the function using devices or systems which do not require an external power supply in order to carry out or control its functions. Being thus non-dependent on an external power supply, the operational reliability of the safety function is enhanced. An example of a passive safety system is the initiation of reactor emergency shutdown (scram) in a pressurized water plant by dropping the control rods into the reactor core by force of gravity. – Parallel systems (redundancy principle) (Figure 4A-3). Systems intended for ensuring safety functions are implemented so that the system consists of at least two parallel subsystems designed to execute the same function. Depending on the importance of the system in question, the number of parallel subsystems is one or two more than is needed to perform the safety function. Use of parallel subsystems considerably increases the reliability of the safety function. It is highly unlikely that more than one subsystem will fail due to random cause. – Physical separation. Parallel subsystems performing a common safety function are located in separate buildings or parts of buildings or are otherwise physically separated from each other to safeguard against simultaneous failure of all subsystems due to common mode failure in the event of fire, explosion, flood or other external factor. – Diverse systems (diversity principle) (Figure 4A-3). In ensuring safety functions, safety systems which are based on the use of different operating principles, manufacturing methods or physical parameters are used, particularly in situations in which the reliability of operation of similar parallel systems suffers from so-called common mode failure. Causes of common mode failure include, for example, errors in device design, testing or maintenance. The environmental conditions of devices can also cause common mode failure. It is vital to the reliability of active safety systems that require an external power supply that the plant has several power supply systems which are independent of each other. – Fail safe. Devices involved in the execution of a safety function are designed such that in the event of failure of a device, the device in question switches to the most favorable state with respect to safety. – Automation. Automation is used extensively to ensure safety functions. It is used for rapid and reliable detection of operational failures and accidents, and to prevent the severity of incidents from increasing further. During normal plant operation, the task of automation is to maintain the specified operational conditions of the plant and to monitor possible deviations from these conditions. If such a deviation is detected, the automation raises an alarm, identifies the fault situation, initiates the relevant control systems and attempts to return the plant to its normal operational state. If it is not possible to prevent development of the failure into an accident, or if the source incident leads to a direct accident, the automation initiates the plant protection and safety systems in order to minimize the accident. – Resistance to accident conditions. The occurrence of extreme conditions during


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accidents is taken into consideration in the design specifications of the safety systems. The structures, devices and systems of the nuclear power plant are designed to withstand accident conditions. If the resistance to accident conditions cannot be ensured directly from the design data, it is verified empirically. – Safety classification. The nuclear power plant safety functions and related safety systems, structures and devices are classified on the basis of their safety significance in accordance with Guide YVL 2.1 (Nuclear Power Plant Systems, Structures and Components and their Safety Classification). The safety classification defines the required quality standard for design, manufacture, installation, inspection, testing and use, where the quality requirements are the strictest for the most significant systems, structures and devices with regard to safety. – Standards and norms. Standards and norms regarding the established methods of implementation shall be utilized in the design and construction of the nuclear power plant. Standards and norms are established in accordance with the best available knowledge. They often crystallize the results of years of research and practical implementation work. Use of standards and norms enables improved management of the quality and delivery chain and reliability.

100 %

Diverse systems

Centrifugal pump

FAULTY

FAULTY

100 %

UNDER MAINTENANCE

UNDER MAINTENANCE

100 %

or

FUNCTIONING

FUNCTIONING

Parallel systems

FUNCTIONING

Modern probabilistic analysis methods are also utilized in the nuclear power plant design. In probabilistic safety assessments, the plant is modeled initially on the reliability of individual devices and functions. The reliability of more complex systems and of the entire plant can then be measured based on this model. The analyses enable balanced observation of the defence-in-depth safety principle, i.e. the application of reliability improvement measures and methods especially at points where they will be most effective at reducing the plant’s total risk.

50 %

50 %

50 %

50 %

Physical separation

Displacement pump

Figure 4A-3 The principles of redundancy, diversity and separation applied to ensure the reliability of safety functions.


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Radiation safety principles Pursuant to section 7c of the Nuclear Energy Act, radioactive material emissions arising from nuclear energy use must be restricted in accordance with the principle prescribed in section 2(2) of the Radiation Act (592/1991). The maximum values for radiation exposure of individuals arising from the operation of the nuclear facility or from other nuclear energy use are prescribed in the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008). Section 2 of the Radiation Act prescribes that, in order to be considered acceptable, the use of radiation and practices involving exposure to radiation must meet the following criteria: – the benefits derived from the practice exceed the detriment it causes (principle of entitlement); – the practice is arranged so that the resulting exposure to radiation hazardous to health is kept as low as is reasonably achievable (principle of optimization); and – no person shall be exposed to radiation exceeding the maximum values prescribed by decree (principle of limitation). Entitlement principle The Fennovoima project fulfills the entitlement principle regarding radiation use. This conclusion is based on the benefits to society as described in more detail in the application and Supplement 2A thereof. In comparison to these benefits, the minor drawbacks caused by the operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant are negligible. The benefits and drawbacks of implementing and not implementing the project are comprehensively evaluated in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report presented as Supplement 3A of the application. Optimization principle The operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be implemented in accordance with the principle of optimization prescribed in the Radiation Act. A key criterion of the plant design is the minimization of the radiation exposure of workers and people within the plant environment through technical solutions and administrative measures, to keep the exposure as low as reasonably achievable during operational failures, accidents and during normal use. The same design criterion is also applied in the implementation of the plant’s nuclear waste management. In accordance with the principle of optimization, in the planning of measures to minimize radiation exposure the overall effectiveness of a given measure is evaluated with regard to its radiation protection as well as with regard to the non radiation exposure related health effects caused by implementing the measure. The total health effects caused by the operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be kept as low as possible. Limitation principle Pursuant to section 8 of Government Decree (733/2008), the limit for the collective dose commitment per individual, arising from normal operation of a nuclear power plant in any period of one year, is 0.1 mSv. The limit value can be compared with the average annual committed dose of other Finnish sources of 3.6 mSv. The limit value is independent of the number of nuclear power plant units and other nuclear facilities belonging to the nuclear power plant. On the basis of the limit value, STUK approves


Supplement 4a

the radioactive material emission limits for the normal operation of the nuclear power plant. Radiation monitoring of nuclear power plants in Finland shows that the exposure of inhabitants within the immediate plant vicinity to radiation from plant operations is under a hundredth of the prescribed maximum value and under a thousandth of the level of exposure caused by other radiation sources. All of the plant alternatives being considered by Fennovoima utilize best available modern technologies to minimize the radiation effects of normal plant operation. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will achieve at least the same radiation safety level as existing nuclear power plants operating in Finland. Fennovoima will draw up an environmental radiation monitoring program prior to commissioning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. In addition to continuous monitoring of radiation levels, the environmental radiation monitoring program involves regular sampling of, e.g., food chains, household water and water bodies within the plant environment. The local environmental conditions and the location of the local population are taken into consideration in radiation monitoring program planning. The environmental radiation monitoring program shall be initiated in good time prior to commissioning of the plant, so that the subsequent effects of the plant’s operations on the environment can be determined. The results of the environmental radiation monitoring program will give reliable indication whether the plant operation is in accordance with the limits for radiation exposure prescribed in the licence terms, in legislation and in governmental regulatory guidelines. According to the Radiation Decree (1512/1991), the effective dose caused to a worker by radiation work shall not exceed an average of 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year reckoned over a period of ďŹ ve years, nor 50 mSv in any one year. Exposed workers include persons whose work tasks require working within the controlled area of the plant. The controlled area refers to the area within the nuclear power plant within which special safety regulations are enforced with respect to radiation protection and prevention of the spread of radioactive materials. Access to the area is controlled. The design and operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant shall be executed in such a way that ensures the radiation exposure of plant workers is lower than the prescribed limit values.

Chief nuclear safety requirements Provision for operational failures and accidents Section 7d of the Nuclear Energy Act requires nuclear facility planning to include preparedness for the possibility of operational failure and accidents. The risk of accident must be lower the more serious the potential consequences of the accident are to people, the environment or property. In accordance with the principle of limitation, sections 9 and 10 of Government Decree (733/2008) prescribe annual dose commitment limit values for radiation exposure of the population in the vicinity of the plant caused by abnormal operation and accident of the nuclear power plant. In the event of a severe accident, instead of the annual dose commitment limit, section 10 of Decree (733/2008) sets a requirement for the effects on the population and on the use of land and water areas in the

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vicinity of the plant, and sets a limit for the release of the cesium-137 isotope. Table 4A-2 shows the annual dose commitment limits and severe accident control requirements for different incident categories. In addition to the radiation exposure limit values, the acceptance criteria presented in Guide YVL 2.2 (Transient and Accident Analyses for Justification of Technical Solutions at Nuclear Power Plants) which are used, for example, to ensure nuclear fuel cooling, also are applied to abnormal operations (transients) and accidents. When observing the defence-in-depth safety principle in the nuclear power plant design, it is ensured that the frequency of occurrence of the event is lower the more severe the possible consequences of the accident are. Table 4A-2 shows the annual individual dose commitment limits and the likelihood of occurrence of the source incident per incident category. The consequences and probability of occurrence determine the risk caused by the nuclear power plant’s operations to people, the environment and property per incident category.

Table 4A-2 The maximum individual dose commitment and incident frequency per incident category.

Incident category

Annual dose commitment limit

Likelihood of occurrence

Government Decree

Government Decree

Guide YVL 2.2

(733/2008)

(733/2008)

Normal operation

0.1 mSv

Abnormal operation

0.1 mSv

(anticipated operatio-

– More than once per 100 years

nal transient) Category 1 postulated

1 mSv

accident Reference value

Less than once per 100 years

The Finnish average individual annual dose commitment is approximately 3.6 mSv.

Category 2 postulated

5 mSv

accident Extension of postulated

Less than once per 1,000 years

20 mSv

Less than once per 10,000 years11

Requirements

Design objective

Government Decree

Guide YVL 2.8

accidents

(733/2008) Severe accident

No acute health effects

Less than once per 100,000 years

No long-term restrictions on the use of extensive geographical areas Atmospheric release of cesium-137 under 100 TBq. Very severe accident

Selection of plant site

Less than once per 2,000,000 years

Mitigation of radiation hazard

1) Incident frequency is indicative; extension of postulated accidents not specified in Regulatory Guide YVL 2.2


Supplement 4a

The feasibility studies conducted for the plant design alternatives examined by Fennovoima show that each plant design can be implemented in accordance with the radiation exposure limit values and requirements presented in Table 4A-2. In practice, the reality for modern nuclear power plants is that the decrease in the likelihood of incident occurrence is outpacing the growth in the severity of their consequences. As a result, the share of severe accidents of the plant’s total risk is minor.

Verification and assessment of safety According to section 7e of the Nuclear Energy Act, compliance with requirements concerning the safety of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant must be reliably demonstrated. The safety of the plant as a whole must be regularly assessed. If compliance with safety regulations is not verifiable directly from the plant’s design, compliance with nuclear power plant safety regulations and the technical design of the plant’s safety systems will be ascertained and demonstrated by experimental and calculation methods. Experimental methods are employed to demonstrate that the key safety phenomena and factors affecting these phenomena are correctly understood and that their behavior can be reliably predicted using calculation methods. The calculation methods used are required to be qualified for their purpose of use. For safety verification purposes, a plant model describing the entire operations of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant and a probabilistic safety assessment model will be created. The plant model will enable reliable analysis of the development and consequences of various abnormal operations and accidents. The probabilistic safety assessment model will enable assessment of the risk balance of the plant’ s safety planning. In addition to the models, supplementary strength analyses of structures and devices, cause and effect analyses and calculation models describing the dispersion of radioactive materials shall be used for safety verification. The safety assessments and calculation models will be maintained and revised on the basis of operating experience, the results of experimental research and the advancement of calculating methods. The analyses used for safety verification shall be performed so that compliance with safety requirements can be demonstrated also in extremely unfavorable conditions. Sufficient safety margins will be used when determining the permitted operational conditions of the plant and in the design of safety systems. This provides for defective operation of systems and for uncertainty factors contained in the results of the safety assessments that form the basis of plant design. The sensitivity of the results of safety assessments to changes in key uncertainty factors is always separately evaluated in order to be able to ensure the consistency of plant behavior in relation to minor changes in initial conditions. The key safety assessments of the nuclear power plant are presented in the plant’s Preliminary Safety Analysis Report prepared in connection with the construction licence application. The report forms the basis of the final Safety Analysis Report for the plant, which is drawn up in connection with operating licence application. The Safety Analysis Report will be continuously updated in accordance with section 112 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. STUK Guide YVL 1.1 requires that the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report must include a description of the nuclear facility’s safety principles and design basis, as well as other design criteria and how these are met, a detailed description of the facility and the site, a description of the facility’s operation, a description of the facility’s behav-

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ior in transient and accident conditions, a summary of the results of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), and a report on environmental effects of the facility’s operation. The final Safety Analysis Report must include descriptions of the commissioning and operation of the plant. Additionally, the Safety Analysis Report must contain topical reports, the purpose of which is to describe in detail on what kinds of experimental research and theoretical analyses the facility design is based. Topical reports to be submitted concern, e.g., the fuel, reactor, reactor pressure vessel, safety systems and containment. When the decision-in-principle is made, STUK provides a statement regarding the nuclear power plant project and a preliminary safety assessment stating whether any factors have arisen indicating a lack of sufficient prerequisites for constructing a nuclear facility as prescribed in section 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act. Plant safety will also be comprehensively assessed as the project progresses in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, i.e. during the licencing procedure in connection with the construction and operating license applications, and at regular 10-year intervals as specified in Guide YVL 1.1. STUK also continuously monitors the safety of plant construction and operation.

Construction and operation Section 7f of the Nuclear Energy Act prescribes safety having highest priority in nuclear power plant construction and operation, and specifies the construction licence or operating licence holder as being responsible for plant safety. Fennovoima will be responsible for plant safety at all phases of the project. The safety of people, the environment and property is given first precedence over all other objectives. The overall design safety of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be assessed in conjunction with the construction licence application for each specific nuclear facility. In each case, the initial safety assessment will be conducted by Fennovoima in compliance with Finnish regulations and the company’s own safety requirements. The relevant plans will then be submitted to STUK for inspection and approval. In connection with consideration of the construction licence application, STUK will issue a safety assessment of the plant stating whether the requirements prescribed in the YVL guides and legislation have been met. The construction of structures affecting the nuclear safety of the nuclear power plant must not be commenced prior to the granting of a construction licence. In connection with the operating license application, an assessment will be conducted to verify that the plant has been built in accordance with safety requirements. Operation of the nuclear power plant may be commenced only after affirmation by STUK that the plant is safety regulations compliant. Operation of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be in full compliance with STUK approved technical specifications. The technical specifications will be drawn up separately for each nuclear facility and will define, e.g., the following: – the limits for key process variables with regard to safety to be observed in all operational conditions of the plant; – the limitations imposed on plant operation due to possible device failure or deviation in process parameter values; – requirements regarding regular safety tests and inspections to be carried out in


Supplement 4a

order to ensure the functionality of systems and devices; – the minimum staffing requirement for the nuclear power plant in different operational conditions; and – the nuclide-specific limit values for radioactive material releases. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will undergo developmental improvements during its operational service life which may call for future development of existing safety regulations. In addition to fully meeting current safety regulations, Fennovoima’s objective is to continuously improve the safety of the plant based on operating experience, safety analyses and scientific and technological advances. In this respect Fennovoima benefits considerably from its access via the E.ON Group’s nuclear energy functions to a diverse wealth of expertise across all areas of nuclear power plant operation.

Decommissioning Pursuant to section 7g of the Nuclear Energy Act, nuclear facility planning must include provision for plant decommissioning. A decommissioning plan must be outlined and regularly updated and presented to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy at three-year intervals, unless otherwise stipulated in the licence terms. In accordance with section 9 of the Nuclear Energy Act, provision for managing the cost of plant decommissioning falls within the licencee’s waste management obligation. Plant decommissioning is taken into consideration in the design of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant so that the amount of waste generated for final disposal and the radiation exposure of workers during dismantlement can be minimized, and so that the release of radioactive materials to the environment can be effectively prevented. The plant decommissioning plans shall be drawn up and decommissioning related contributions to the National Nuclear Waste Management Fund shall be paid in accordance with the requirements set by nuclear energy legislation and government regulations. Fennovoima has ready access to the required plant decommissioning planning expertise, as E.ON is currently conducting the controlled decommissioning and dismantlement of the Stade and Würgassen nuclear power plants in Germany.

Nuclear materials and nuclear waste Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy Act requires the nuclear power plant to have sufficient facilities, equipment and other arrangements in place to assure the safe handling, treatment and storage of the nuclear materials needed by the plant and of the nuclear waste generated by its operations. Appropriate facilities will be designed and built at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant for the safe handling and storage of unspent nuclear fuel, other nuclear materials and nuclear waste generated by the plant. The power plant will also include connected buildings and storage facilities located on the plant site required for the nuclear fuel and waste management of the nuclear power plant unit(s). The principal buildings related to the nuclear waste management of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant are the spent nuclear fuel storage facility and the low and medium-level nuclear waste final disposal facility.

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Personnel Pursuant to section 7i of the Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee entitled to use nuclear energy must have a sufficient number of competent and appropriately qualified personnel for all activities related to the safe operation of the nuclear facility. Fennovoima shall ensure by means of recruitment, work orientation and training, that it has an appropriate organization and sufficient expertise at each phase of the project to ensure safety. In addition to its own personnel, Fennovoima is able to draw on the expertise of E.ON nuclear energy personnel, and also has access to significant external expertise. Sufficient competency and qualification of plant personnel shall remain a key priority throughout the entire project. After completion of the construction phase, the project implementation organization will take over as the plant operation organization, thus ensuring the effective transfer of plant expertise. During the construction phase, the shift managers and main plant control room operators shall be trained and qualified and STUK approval sought in accordance with Guide YVL 1.6 (Nuclear Power Plant Operator Licensing). The planned implementation and organization of the project and Fennovoima’s available expertise are presented in Supplement 1C of the application.

Management system Section 7j of the Nuclear Energy Act requires that the plant’s management system takes into particular consideration the influence on the maintenance and development of plant safety of the ideas and attitudes held by the plant management and personnel regarding safety, as well as systematic procedures and their regular assessment and development. Fennovoima emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sound safety culture as a precondition for successful implementation of the Fennovoima project. A sound safety culture within the Fennovoima project means that safety always has highest priority in all decision-making, that quality management requirements correspond with the safety significance of functions, and that the project plan and project management are based on best practices and experience. Maintaining and developing the safety culture is an integral part of the Fennovoima safety policy, which is in turn part of the company’s integrated management system. During the design and procurement phase of the project, an integrated management system as required by Guide YVL 1.4 (Management Systems for Nuclear Facilities) shall be established for the plant (Figure 4A 4). The management system ensures that safety-significant factors are taken into consideration by combining systematic safety and quality management procedures. In addition to Guide YVL 1.4, development of the integrated management system shall be implemented on the basis of IAEA Safety Standards Series GS-R-3 concerning management systems and the ISO 9001 quality management standard. Fennovoima also incorporates environmental management, occupational health and safety management and data security management within the integrated management system in accordance with the due standards.


Supplement 4a

Nuclear Safety Management YVL 1.4 ja IAEA GS-R-3 Quality Management ISO 9001

Integrated Management System

Figure 4A-4 Fennovoima’s Integrated Management System principle. Occupational Health and Safety Management OHSAS 18001

Data Security Management ISO/IEC 17799

Environmental Management ISO 14001

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Acts, decrees and Government resolutions

Responsible manager On the basis of section 7k of the Nuclear Energy Act, the licencee must appoint a responsible manager and deputy for the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant. The appointed responsible manager must provide a notice of consent, fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed in Guide YVL 1.7 (Functions Important to Nuclear Power Plant Safety, and Training and Qualification of Personnel), and be approved by STUK. Fennovoima will appoint a responsible manager and deputy manager for the Fennovoima project at latest in connection with its construction licence application. The task of the responsible manager is to ensure that the regulations, licence terms and STUK regulations concerning the safety of nuclear energy use, physical protection and emergency preparedness and safeguarding of nuclear materials are observed. The responsible manager’s position and authority within Fennovoima shall be such that the person appointed to the task is able to fulfill the duties of this appointment.


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Liite 4a

Safety of a nuclear power plant Supplement 4B General description of the technical operating principles of a nuclear power plant

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Contents

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 243 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 244 Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant options .............................................................. 245 Technology and safety of the nuclear power plant options ..................................... 246 Light Water Reactor Technology ............................................................................ 246 Toshiba ABWR......................................................................................................... 248 Areva NP’s EPR ....................................................................................................... 257 Areva NP’s SWR 1000 ............................................................................................. 265 Building two identical nuclear power plant units ................................................ 274 Related requirements from Fennovoima other than safety technology .............. 275 Electricity generation and other utilization of thermal energy ............................... 276 Straightforward electricity generation (condensate mode) .................................. 276 Electricity generation combined with district heating ......................................... 276 Utilization of waste heat.......................................................................................... 278


Supplement 4b

Summary

The design principles of the plant options examined by Fennovoima meet Finnish safety requirements as well as other requirements Fennovoima has set for the nuclear power plant. The feasibility assessments indicate that Fennovoima has the capability to construct a nuclear power plant in such a way that is safe to use and that it will not cause harm to people, environment or property. Fennovoima has examined several alternative plant choices, based on LWRs supplied by different manufacturers. The presented plant options represent proven technology and their key operating principles are equivalent to the nuclear reactors currently operating in Finland. Regarding the safety solutions, the plants represent the most advanced technology currently available. The feasibility studies commissioned by Fennovoima regarding the plant options have not found any issues that would indicate that the plant options, Toshiba’s ABWR, Areva NP’s EPR or Areva NP’s SWR 1000, could not be built to comply with Finnish regulations. The conclusion is valid for both one-unit and two-unit nuclear power plant. The plant options differ in the details of the operating principles of their safety systems. Of the plant options, the safety functions for the ABWR and the EPR are principally based on active systems that require external power sources. The design for the SWR 1000 widely capitalizes on passive safety functions, which function without external power. In all plant options, the safety systems, whether new types or passive, have been empirically proven to be reliable and working as designed. The planning of each plant option for the Fennovoima project will continue so that a construction licence, as described in section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), will only be applied for after the design has reached a phase detailed enough so a safety assessment can be conducted. Irrespective of the plant option to be constructed, the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be equipped for combined heat and power operation. It is possible to utilize the waste heat generated by the plant, which is discharged to the sea along with the condenser water. The prospects for the technical and economic implementation and the environmental impacts of combined heat and power production and the utilization of waste heat will be the subjects of a separate study during the later phases of the project.

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Introduction In accordance with section 24, subsection 1(6), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must, for each nuclear facility project involved in the scope of the project, be supplemented with a general description of the technical operating principles of each planned nuclear facility. The purpose of this report is to provide the information intended under the abovementioned legal provision regarding Fennovoima Ltd’s nuclear power plant project for its nuclear power plant unit or units. The technical operating principles for the final disposal facility for low and medium-level plant waste included within the scope of the nuclear power plant have been described in Supplement 5B of the application. Section 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) requires that the use of nuclear energy must be safe and must not cause injury to people, or damage to the environment or property. When reaching a decision-in-principle regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant, the government must establish whether sufficient prerequisites for the fulfillment of the general safety principle actually exist. Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the Fennovoima project will be subject to a government decision-in-principle from a very early stage. Pursuant to section 15 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the applicant of the decision-in-principle shall not, prior to the decision-in-principle being reached, enter into measures which, due to their economic significance, may make the prospects of the parliament and the government resolving the matter, using their free discretion, more difficult. Against this background, it is also not feasible, at the decision-in-principle phase, to require the availability of detailed plans for the nuclear power plant, since, in practice, the initiation of detailed planning calls for a binding and financially significant contract with the manufacturer of the nuclear power plant. The use of the three-step licensing procedure provided for by the nuclear energy legislation ensures that safety will be evaluated at an appropriate level of accuracy at each phase of a nuclear power plant project. At Fennovoima, the preparations for the application for a decision-in-principle were preceded by feasibility studies, completed for the different nuclear power plant options, the core issue of which was the study of the compliance of each prospective plant’s safety solutions in principle with the Finnish safety regulations. The purpose of the these feasibility studies was to ascertain that none of the nuclear plant options contains any aspects that at a later phase of the project might completely prevent the construction of the said plant in Finland or result in major alterations in the realization of the plant. At the actual licensing phase of the nuclear power plant, i.e. when applying for the construction licence, as intended by section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act, and the operating licence, as intended by section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the planning and construction of the plant will be reviewed in considerably more detail than during the decision-in-principle phase to ensure that the plant will be realized in compliance with Finnish regulations. This document will present Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant alternatives, Toshiba’s ABWR as well as Areva NP’s EPR and SWR 1000, including a general outline of the technical principles for implementing each option’s key safety functions. In addition, the document provides a short description of the possibilities of utilizing the waste heat generated by the nuclear power plant.


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Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant options Fennovoima wishes to construct a nuclear power plant comprising one or two nuclear power plant units, equipped with light water reactors, with a combined thermal output of between 4,300–6,800 MW and combined electrical output of between 1,500– 2,500 MW. Fennovoima’s power plant options, which were subject to feasibility studies and presented in its application for a decision-in-principle, are Areva NP’s EPR and the SWR 1000 as well as Toshiba’s ABWR (see Table 4B-1). Prior to initiating the feasibility studies for its nuclear power plant options in spring 2008, Fennovoima reviewed all commercially available light water reactor types. For inclusion in its feasibility studies those alternative nuclear power plants were chosen, which, based on a preliminary safety assessment, are most easily realizable in compliance with the safety and building regulations in force both in Finland and in Europe. Toshiba ABWR

EPR

SWR 1000

Manufacturer, Country [of origin]

Toshiba Japan

Areva NP France–Germany

Areva NP France–Germany

Thermal Power (MW)

4,300

4,590

3,370

about 1,600

about 1,700

about 1,250

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)

Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)

Primary Safety Systems

Active

Active

Passive

Reference Plant, Country

Hamaoka 5 Japan

Olkiluoto 3 Finland

Gundremmingen C Germany

Electricity Output (MW) Reactor Type

As its plant options, Fennovoima chose light water reactors, because the LWR technology is one of the most conventionally and widely used technologies throughout the world, and because, as a result of long-standing development activity, it is highly developed both in its safety and operating characteristics. Most plant suppliers offer LWRs and they provide the complete package both for supply of plant and for complying with the authorities’ procedures. For example, the key safety requirements, stipulated in the Government Decree (733/2008), effective in Finland together with the YVL guidelines issued by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland, which further specify these requirements, are drawn up specifically with LWRs in mind. To function, active safety systems require external power, in most cases electricity, the supply of which is ensured using various reserve capacity arrangements. Self-powered, or passive, safety systems use gravity or energy stored in the system itself, such as gas pressure, to function without needing external power. In some cases, starting a passive system requires an active control function, such as an automatic safety system that triggers an electric actuator which opens a valve. Above all, a nuclear power plant unit or units are designed for condensate mode i.e. to exclusively generate electricity. In all plant options, a maximum of 37% of the thermal energy generated by the reactor can be converted to electricity. It is technically also feasible to construct a nuclear power plant in such a way that some of the plant’s waste heat will be utilized or that a proportion of the energy generated by the plant will be used for the supply of municipal district heating. These will be examined under “Electricity generation and other utilization of thermal Energy” below.

Table 4B-1 Technical information for Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant options


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The non-utilizable heat energy generated by the reactor will be discharged to the sea using a condenser. Fennovoima will choose the plant to be constructed prior to applying for a construction license, pursuant to section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act. A final decision on the technical solutions for the nuclear power plant is made only during the negotiations of the delivery contract. The final solutions may differ in details from those presented in the feasibility study. In any case, Fennovoima will make sure that the safety features of the plant remain acceptable or are improved.

Technology and safety of the nuclear power plant options Light Water Reactor Technology The energy generation of a nuclear power plant is based on the splitting of atomic nuclei in self-sustaining chain reactions i.e. fission. In fission, the heavy atomic nucleus, for LWRs generally the uranium isotope U-235 contained in the nuclear fuel, splits after being hit by a neutron. Typically, two to three neutrons are released in a fission reaction, which may in turn trigger new fission reactions. A nuclear power plant uses uranium dioxide as its nuclear fuel. A small amount, c. 3-5%, of the nuclear fuel uranium is of the isotope U-235 and the remaining 95-97% of the isotope U-238. Water has two functions in LWRs. It acts both as the neutron moderator required for maintaining the chain reaction and as a coolant which removes heat from the nuclear fuel. The neutrons which are released as the atomic nuclei split are fast, and are unable to trigger new fissions effectively. The water contained in the reactor will moderate the neutrons in such a way that will thus facilitate their hitting the fissile atomic nuclei and will sustain the chain reaction more effectively. The energy released during fission and other nuclear reactions will bind itself to the surrounding nuclear fuel as thermal energy and will pass from within the nuclear fuel into the water, which acts as a coolant. There are two basic types of light water reactors, pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). In each reactor type, the thermal energy generated by the nuclear reactor will be converted into electricity using a conventional steam power plant process, where the saturated steam generated from high pressure water expands in a turbine and creates mechanical work. This mechanical work generated by the steam gives the turbine’s rotor rotational energy, which is converted into electricity using a generator. Moist low-pressure steam is exhausted from the turbine and this is condensed into water in a condenser that uses sea water as coolant. Inside the condenser, sea water will warm up by about 12°C. In a boiling water reactor, the feed water coming from the condenser is pumped into the reactor, reaching boiling point in the reactor core. The steam produced in the reactor is transferred directly to the turbine. The live steam pressure of modern BWRs is typically 7.0–7.5 MPa. The basic process of a BWR is more straightforward than that of a PWR. The water circulating in the BWR will become radioactive as a result of the effect of the neutron radiation. Since the turbine is a part of the closed water-steam reactor loop, the radiation level of the turbine plant while the nuclear reactor is in operation is elevated compared to the environment. The water-borne radioactivity in the reactor loop will disappear almost immediately following the shutdown of the reactor,


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so work at the turbine plant is possible while the reactor is shut down. In a pressurized water reactor, the reactor’s cooling water circulates in its own, closed-loop primary coolant circuit, at around double the pressure of the live steam. Consequently, the water in the primary coolant circuit does not boil. The steam to be fed to the turbine is generated in the secondary circuit of large heat exchangers, also known as steam generators, connected to the primary coolant circuit. In modern pressurized water reactors, the pressure of live steam in the secondary circuit is between 7.0–7.5 MPa. A PWR has a more complex structure than that of a BWR, since, in addition to the reactor itself, the primary coolant circuit also requires other large and structurally complex parts. On the other hand, radioactive substances do not normally reach the turbine plant, since the steam and water circulating in the turbine plant are not exposed to the neutron radiation of the reactor core. BWRs and PWRs are currently available in output capacities corresponding to both 1,000-1,250 MW and 1,400-1,800 MW electricity outputs. There are basically no significant safety differences between the light water reactor types. The safety of an LWR nuclear power plant is more dependent on its safety systems than on whether the reactor is a PWR or a BWR. For LWRs, the defence-in-depth safety principle, which is described more closely in Supplement 4A of the application, is implemented both functionally and structurally. The functional in-depth safety provisions include prevention of faults and operational disturbances, management of disturbances, accidents and severe accidents as well as mitigation of impacts. The structural in-depth safety provisions refers to the containment of radioactive substances within several, mutually independent so-called release barriers; of particular importance are the gas-tight cladding tube containing the nuclear fuel elements, the reactor coolant circuit and the containment building. The integrity and leak-tightness of each of these during incidents and accidents are protected by means of safety functions. Maintenance work at the nuclear power plant is carried out using fully developed tools and equipment. The photo shows the tensioning device for the reactor pressure vessel closure head studs.


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Irrespective of reactor type, for LWRs the key safety functions are the same: the shutdown of the reactor and management of its output, the cooling of the reactor together with its residual heat removal, ensuring the integrity of the containment building, as well as the monitoring, control and power required by each of these. Even after shutdown, a nuclear reactor generates residual heat, which is caused by the decay of radioactive elements in the reactor core. The residual heat generated amounts to a few per cent of what the reactor power was prior to shutdown, and it diminishes quickly after shutdown. The safety functions are designed in such a way that reliably ensures that safety is also maintained in situations of system failure or during equipment servicing or in the case of a human error. In the safety planning for a nuclear power plant, in addition to internal risks, precautions are taken against external hazards, such as transportation accidents involving oil and chemical spills as well as extreme sea level and weather conditions. These also take into account anticipated future developments, for example due to climate change. Safety planning also takes precautions against illegal acts, even up to a collision of a large airliner. Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D examine in more detail the safety aspects specific to plant sites that are independent of plant type. Next are described the plant options which were the subject of Fennovoima’s feasibility studies together with the implementation of their respective key safety functions. Much more extensive reports of the plant options have been created for the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) along with the application for a decisionin-principle as required by Guide 1.1 (Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities).

Toshiba ABWR Background The Toshiba ABWR (Advanced Boiling Water Reactor) is a BWR originally developed by Toshiba (Japan), General Electric (USA), Hitachi (Japan), Ansaldo (Italy) and Asea Atom (Sweden). The ABWR technology is quite well established, and a former version of the ABWR reactor was offered for construction in Finland at the beginning of the millennium. In its essential technical qualities, AWBR is equivalent to the latest BWRs operational in Germany, Sweden and Finland. Figure 4B-1 shows the general layout of an ABWR plant. In Japan, there are three ABWR plants in operation: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa’s nuclear power plant units 6 and 7, completed in the middle of the 1990s, as well as the Hamaoka 5, operational since 2005. Toshiba was the main contractor of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 and Hamaoka 5 nuclear power plant units. In Fennovoima’s feasibility study, the reference plant for an ABWR plant is Hamaoka 5. Compared to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Toshiba’s further developments include the plant’s control rod drive unit and the reactor coolant pump power electronics. The thermal output of Fennovoima’s ABWR is roughly 10% higher than Hamaoka 5’s, where the nominal thermal output is 3,926MW. If Fennovoima chooses the ABWR for the project, the nuclear power plant unit will be designed to fulfill all Finnish regulations. The feasibility studies indicate that this will require some changes, mostly to safety systems and to safety-relevant structures. By international comparison, Finnish regulations are demanding, particularly in terms of severe accidents, i.e. management of accidents resulting in the melt-down


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Figure 4B-1 The Toshiba ABWR plant.

of the reactor core and taking precautions against a plane crash. The conformity of the basic design of the nuclear power plant with Finnish regulations will be verified in conjunction with the handling of the construction licence application Basic Technology Structurally the reactor of the ABWR plant is a modern boiling water reactor. It is equipped with internal circulation pumps located inside the reactor pressure vessel. Other parts needed for the steam generation process are also located inside the reactor. The reactor core has 872 nuclear fuel elements and 205 control rods. The nuclear fuel elements have a square cross-sectional shape and contain 10x10 places for nuclear fuel rods. The control rods are equipped both with a fast-acting, hydraulic actuator for the deployment compatible with a reactor trip, and with electro-mechanical actuation for accurate movement and, hence, fine-tuning of the reactor’s power distribution. The reactor core is designed in such a way that the inherent feedbacks in the reactor power output are moderating to any changes in output. During all operational states, the core power remains stable and the safety margins associated with the heat transfer from the nuclear fuel are sufficiently high both in normal use and during incidents. The reactor and all pipes and parts directly attached to it are manufactured from carefully selected materials using the best manufacturing methods currently available. The reactor is located inside a primary containment building, which is an unprestressed, cylinder-shaped, massive reinforced concrete structure. The containment building is located inside a square reactor building. The reactor building acts as the outermost containment building. The electrical and automation equipment required for the power and control of the safety system process devices are located both in the reactor building and in a control building adjacent to the reactor building. The plant’s control room is sited in the control building. In the ABWR designed for Fennovoima, the reactor building, control building and turbine building are situated in a row in such a way that the turbine axis points towards the reactor. This arrangement ensures that a turbine blade or piece of rotor potentially breaking off the steam turbine as a result of a fault will not hit the safetycritical reactor and control buildings. The safety systems also include a separate sea water pumping plant, which will be located at the plant site in a way which is safe with regard to the plant. The ABWR’s key safety functions will be primarily implemented by using systems


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that require active i.e. external power, which have similar principles to those deployed in the latest BWRs currently in use. The safety systems are built using the redundancy principle, where each safety system has three parallel subsystems, each of which is capable on its own of completing the safety task designated. The subsystems are located in different areas of the plant, adhering to the principle of separation. Moreover, the ABWR designed for Fennovoima will be equipped with passive systems which use intrinsic phenomena, especially for the cooling of the reactor and the residual heat removal from the containment building. These systems in their own part implement the diversity principle in the design of the ABWR. The diversity principle is also implemented among the active systems by designing them in such a way that they can replace each other’s functions. The implementation of each safety function is described below. Reactor shutdown and power management The reactor shutdown and its power output management is mainly carried out using control rods, which are inserted in the core from below. The fast shutdown of the reactor i.e. the reactor trip is performed using fast-acting water hydraulics, which pushes the control rods into the reactor core in the space of a few seconds. The functioning of the hydraulics is based on the pressure of stored nitrogen gas and is hence partially passive (based on intrinsic phenomena). The fast reactor trip system is backed-up by two separate systems, one of which is to produce hydraulic power by a pump, and the other is the driving of the control rods into the reactor using electro-mechanical regulator units, which are normally used for carrying out minor control movements of the control rods. Both the auxiliary hydraulics and the electro-mechanical actuation are markedly slower than the gas-pressured hydraulics, but fast enough to shut down the reactor according to relevant acceptance criteria. The effectiveness of the control rods is designed so that the reactor will shut down and will remain sub-critical even if a single, faulty control rod remains completely outside the reactor core. Should, for some reason, the movement of the control rods in the reactor trip be completely prevented, the reactor will be automatically shut down by pumping boron-containing water into the reactor from separate storage tanks. Boron is an element which absorbs neutrons, and therefore, as it enters into the core, it shuts down the reactor. The pumping system for the boron solution consists of two, parallel, fullcapacity pumps (2x100%), i.e. the system’s capacity fulfills the single-failure criterion. The single-failure criterion refers to a requirement within the Finnish regulations, according to which the system must fulfill its function, even though any single device of the system were to be non-operational. The reactor’s output may also be adjusted by changing the main circulation flow. The changing of the flow is used in certain failure and accident incidents as an auxiliary aid function supporting the above-mentioned output control methods, as, for example, the stopping of the reactor coolant pumps reduces the output of the reactor. Cooling of the reactor and residual heat removal The cooling of the reactor and its residual heat removal are primarily carried out using active systems. In moderate incidents, the heat generated by the reactor can be directly transferred to the sea via the turbine plant’s condenser. In normal operation and moderate incidents, the reactor is also cooled by a residual heat removal system or secondarily by isolating condensers. As a safety measure complying with the diversity prin-


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Figure 4B-2 A general outline of the cross-section of the ABWR containment building.

Containment building

Upper dry well

Reactor

Wet well

Reactor core Condensation pool

ciple, the reactor pressure can be lowered, such that the reactor can be cooled by using a low-pressure emergency cooling system with a residual heat removal coupling. In incidents and during accidents, the heat generated by the reactor is transferred as steam via blow-off and relief valves into a condensation pool, which in turn is cooled using the heat transfer circuits of the low-pressure emergency core cooling system. Should a leak, occurring in a reactor pipe, be situated inside the containment building, steam and water will be released from it into the containment gas volume. The gas volume will become pressurized, which will result in a powerful steam ow through the underwater pipes of the condensation pool. As it ows into the condensation pool, the steam released from the reactor is condensed into water, and consequently the pressure of the containment building remains lower than the maximum limits set out in the design outline. The reactor’s pressure release system has been realized with relief and safety valves, of which there are 18 in the ABWR. The opening of the safety valves takes place automatically. In case the automation fails to function correctly, the safety valves will open at a slightly higher pressure, controlled by a mechanical control valve. Out of the safety valves, eight are equipped with a mechanical control system, with the help of which they can be opened irrespective of the reactor pressure and hence in a controlled way lower the reactor pressure close to that of the containment building. The steam blasting from the safety valves is discharged directly to the condensation


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pool, with each valve having its own pipe connection. The number of safety and relief valves has been chosen to meet the Finnish safety regulations. The reactor will be equipped with an emergency cooling system for accidents. An accident is an incident or fault, where reactor cooling is disturbed due to damage in the coolant loop or damage in the reactor itself. Among such faults considered is a break in any of the pipes attached to the reactor, although the probability for such a fault is very low, respective parts are produced to meet very stringent quality requirements. The emergency core cooling systems consist of high- and low-pressure electrically powered pumping systems. In the ABWR designed for Fennovoima, both consist of three full-capacity subsystems (3x100%), which guarantees that both systems on their own fulfill the failure criterion required in Finland, which is a random single-failure in one subsystem combined with simultaneous maintenance in another. The main source of water in the low-pressure emergency cooling system is the condensation pool. The high-pressure system obtains water initially from an external tank containing fully desalinated water, and only after the tank is empty does the system start to use water from the condensation pool. The suction strainers of the emergency core cooling system are sized to filter any insulation material and debris that come loose in conjunction with a leak, without a significant loss in pressure. If necessary, the strainers can be cleaned by temporarily shutting down the system and by flushing them with pressurized nitrogen. The emergency core cooling systems act as a back-up for each other. The high-pressure system is also capable of performing the function of the low-pressure system, and correspondingly the low-pressure system, together with the reactor’s depressurization system, can back up the high-pressure system. The low-pressure emergency core cooling system also doubles as a residual heat removal system: it is equipped with heat exchangers, in which the water is cooled via an intermediate circuit using sea water. In this way, the heat generated by the reactor, including the residual heat, is transferred from the plant to the sea. As a secondary method for the removal of residual heat from the reactor, the ABWR designed for Fennovoima is equipped with so-called isolating condensers. These are heat exchangers, which are located in a cold water basin outside the containment building, and which are deployed by opening an isolating valve. The heat is transferred to the heat exchangers from the reactor using natural circulation and then in turn to the pool water, which heats up and after a time starts to boil. The steam produced in this way is released into the atmosphere via a water separator. Isolating condensers are a passive safety system which fulfills the single-failure criterion set for the secondary systems. Ensuring the integrity of the containment building ABWR’s containment building consists of a primary containment building made from reinforced concrete, the integrity of which is ensured with a steel barrier plate. The containment building is not prestressed. The original design is based on a U.S. standard and materials that are available in the US, and thus does not fully comply with Finnish and European codes and standards, but requires changes. Fennovoima and Toshiba will collaborate in order to find the optimal way to ensure the feasibility of the ABWR’s construction in Finland. A cross-section of the ABWR containment building is in Figure 4B-2. By type, the containment building is a depressurization building. It is functionally formed of two rooms: the dry room, which contains the reactor, pipe system and oth-


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er process equipment associated with it, and secondly the condensation pool room, which contains cold water, the blow-off piping and the filter equipment required for the water feed for the emergency cooling. The pipes and ducts running through the wall of the containment building are equipped on both sides with isolation valves, which will be closed or will automatically close in the event of an incident or accident, unless the valve is a safety system valve used for incident management, and must remain open. In order to ensure the isolation function, the inner and outer isolation valves are different from one another. A random valve fault does not therefore prevent the isolation of the containment building. During incidents and accidents resulting from a pipe break in the reactor’s cooling system, the majority of the steam and water released into the containment building is discharged to the condensation pool, where the steam will be condensed to water. In this way, the pressure of the containment building remains within the design parameters. Some steam will also remain in the containment gas volume. The gas volume can also be cooled by a low-pressure emergency cooling system, which can be used to spray water into the containment building, if necessary. Two out of the three fullcapacity subsystems will be used in the spraying of the containment building, and the third subsystem will return the cooled water directly into the condensation pool. From the residual heat removal perspective, the system thus consists of three, parallel, full-capacity subsystems (3x100%). The primary final heat sink for residual heat is the sea and the secondary heat sink is the atmosphere. Each subsystem of the low-pressure emergency core cooling system is connected to its own intermediate circuit and each intermediate circuit to its own sea water circuit, so the residual heat transfer chain from the reactor and the containment building to the sea, as a whole, fulfills the failure criterion “a random single failure on one subsystem and simultaneous maintenance on another”. The subsystems are isolated Access to the reactor’s containment building is via an airtight personnel lock.


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from each other mechanically and electronically, which prevents hazards that can occur in the plant, such as fires or floods, from damaging more than one subsystem at a time. The containment building is also equipped with a passive cooling system, i.e. its condensers, which remove heat from the building’s gas volume. The system includes heat exchangers, located in a cold water pool outside the containment building, which receive a mixture of water vapor and uncondensed gases from the containment gas volume, condense the steam into water, and return the water to the containment building and the uncondensed gases to the gas volume in the condensation pool. The heat is transferred into the water pool, and when it boils, the generated steam is released into the atmosphere via a water separator. Thus the secondary final heat sink is the atmosphere. The condenser system of the containment building fulfills the failure criterion required for a secondary safety system: “a random single failure in a single subsystem”. Monitoring and control of the safety systems For the ABWR, the automated monitoring of the processes and the safety systems’ controls have been realized using a minimum of four subsystems in such a way that signals required for the start-up of all the key safety functions exist in each subsystem i.e. four-fold. Also logics included in the automation have been designed to have four parallel subsystems. The decision to start up a safety function is performed in the automation system if two out of four measurements indicate that the deployment criterion has been fulfilled. This voting logic has been selected, because it also enables periodic testing during normal operation one subsystem at a time without a fault in a single subsystem, even during the service test, preventing the function from being deployed or causing an unnecessary trigger. The automation technology used in the ABWR designed for Fennovoima is programable. The automated systems initiating a reactor trip and an automatic start-up for the safety systems have been separated from each other. These automated systems are implemented on different system platforms. Some of the control logics for the security systems are implemented on a microprocessor-based system platform, while others are implemented using field programmable gate arrays. This helps in achieving a high degree of diversity between different platforms. Power requirements of the safety systems The power required by the safety systems is normally supplied either directly from the plant’s own generator or via a separate transformer from the national grid. In circumstances when other power is not available, back-up power for the safety systems is produced using diesel generator sets. There are three large diesel generators, one for each subsystem of the safety systems. The capacity of the diesel generators takes into account all the process equipment such as pumps, blowers, valve actuators, automation and other electricity consumers of the key safety systems. Furthermore, the ABWR designed for Fennovoima will be equipped with a fourth diesel generator, which serves the fourth control subsystem. This diesel generator is smaller, since the power requirement of the control systems is smaller than the entire process systems. For the management of a serious reactor accident, the plant also has two small diesel generators to cover for the power requirements for the necessary monitoring and control measures. In addition to the diesel generators, the nuclear power plant will be equipped with a back-up reserve power system based on gas turbine technology, which has sufficient capacity to concurrently service all the subsystems.


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Management of a severe reactor accident A serious reactor accident is a chain of events that is caused by multiple and concurrent faults in systems and devices, and leads to a meltdown of the reactor core. A serious accident and its consequences is the worst accident type that can happen to an LWR. In the ABWR designed for Fennovoima, the management of a severe reactor accident consists of three specific safety procedures: the depressurization of the reactor, the cooling of the molten core at the bottom of the reactor pit in a so-called core catcher, and the residual heat removal from the containment building. The containment building is inerted with nitrogen during use, so that no danger for a hydrogen fire inside it exists. The depressurization of the reactor is achieved using mechanically controlled valves specifically designated for the task. Due to its high position, it is not possible to passively cool the ABWR’s reactor pressure vessel from the outside, so if the reactor core melts, it will overheat the base of the reactor pressure vessel and will be released to the reactor pit. In order to stabilize and cool the molten core, the pit will be equipped with a so-called core catcher, which is a shallow, heat-resistant vessel, into which the molten core will pour from the reactor vessel. The outside of the core catcher will be cooled by a gravity-powered flow from the condensation tank. To prevent a steam explosion, the core catcher cooling will start only after all of the molten core has flowed into the catcher. The core catcher protects the integrity and leaktightness of the containment building, because it entirely prevents the hot, molten core from coming into contact with the floor of the containment building, which is an important component preserving the integrity and leaktightness of the building. The physical and chemical phenomena occurring in core catchers are nowadays well understood, so there are no problems in principle involved with their detailed design. As far as the integrity of the containment building is concerned, the core catcher works much more reliably than the solution used in the more old-fashioned LWRs, for example in the ABWR’s earlier version which was also offered to Finland, where the molten Figure 4B-3 A photo montage of what the ABWR plant would look like in Karsikko, Simo.


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core was gathered directly on to the concrete floor of the containment building. The residual heat removal from the containment building takes place passively, using the cooling condenser of the containment building in the way described above. The cooling condensers are directly connected to the containment gas volume and therefore do not require any action to take place in order to start up. The ABWR proposed for Fennovoima has been designed to prevent the occurrence of a severe accident during a maintenance shutdown. During maintenance shutdown, a severe accident can only occur if the reactor’s coolant is rapidly lost. In order for this not to happen, the passage leading into the lower dry room has been equipped with a physical barrier (material lock), consisting of two consecutive doors, one of which will be kept shut at all times. In the event of a leak in the reactor base, the reactor core can be flooded and kept under water using the low-pressure emergency cooling. Preparedness for external hazards External hazards, such as severe weather phenomena, climate change, earthquakes, accidents associated with the transportation of chemicals in close proximity to the plant together with unlawful actions, including the deliberate crashing of a large passenger plane into the plant, have all been taken into account in the design of the plant. Fennovoima has, in collaboration with Finnish expert authorities and research institutes, defined planning criteria for the design of the plant buildings, which are with a high degree of certainty much more stringent than those events that can be expected to occur during the service life of the plant. The assessment of the impact of climate change is based on forecasts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which operates under the auspices of the UN. The ABWR proposed for Fennovoima will be designed to withstand external hazards in such a way that it can be constructed with sufficient safety margins at any of the proposed alternative sites. An assessment of the feasibility of the alternatives as sites for the nuclear power plant has been outlined by site in Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D of this application. Figure 4B-3 is a photo montage of what the ABWR plant would look like in Karsikko, Simo. Precautions against any unlawful actions will be taken using various structural and organizational safety arrangements. The potential crash of a large passenger plane is taken into account the design of the plant’s safety-critical buildings as a factor influencing the plant’s size, in compliance with Finnish regulations. Assessment of the prospects for building the ABWR in compliance with Finnish regulations The feasibility study for Toshiba’s ABWR did not come up with any aspects which would indicate that there are any reasons why the plant could not be built to comply with Finnish regulations. Toshiba’ ABWR represents a proven technology with a good deployment track record. The basic design principles of the ABWR are acceptable. The detailed technical solutions of this plant option are adaptable to meet the Finnish safety requirements as well as Fennovoima’s own requirements. The adaptation of the ABWR’s basic design to conform with Finnish regulations is still underway in terms of the automated safety platforms, the core catcher, the design measurements for the containment building and reactor building, and the design measurements to make those buildings withstand a plane crash. For these, the essential solutions in principle are already known and acceptable. The feasibility studies indicate that there are no reasons to suspect that the basic design


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cannot produce acceptable detailed solutions. Fennovoima will only apply for a construction licence for its nuclear power plant unit once the plant’s basic design is sufficiently complete to meet a thorough safety assessment.

Areva NP’s EPR Background Areva NP’s EPR (European Pressurized Water Reactor) is a pressurized water reactor which has been developed as a Franco-German partnership. The collaboration started off between the plant suppliers Framatome and Siemens, and later, after they merged into a joint partnership, continued as the Areva NP collaboration. There are EPR plants under construction in Finland (Olkiluoto 3) and in France (Flamanville 3). The basic technical solutions for the EPR have been adopted from large German and French pressurized water reactor types, the Konvoi and the N4. Hence, the EPR represents a well-established and proven technology. Features inherited from the Konvoi are, among others, quadruple safety systems and protection from a plane crash, and from the N4 the deployment of fully digitalized automation technology. In EPR, the solutions that were deployed in the reference plants have undergone further refinement to conform to today’s standards. Figure 4B-4 shows a general layout of the EPR plant. Should Fennovoima choose the EPR for the project, the nuclear power plant unit will be designed to comply with all Finnish regulations. A reference plant for the EPR is under construction in Finland in compliance with Finnish regulations, therefore there is no requirement to make any essential changes to the EPR’s safety designs. The EPR designed for Fennovoima, however, corresponds in its thermal output with the original basic design of the EPR i.e. 4,590 MW, which is slightly higher than that of Olkiluoto 3. For the EPR designed for Fennovoima, all the safety analyses influenced by the reactor’s thermal output will be redone, and the capacities of the safety systems modified if necessary. Should Fennovoima construct an EPR plant, its technical solutions can differ from those used in Olkiluoto 3 whenever necessary. In such cases, Fennovoima

Figure 4B-4 Areva NP’s EPR.


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will make sure that the level of safety offered by the new solution is higher than or at least the same as in the previous models of the plant. Basic Technology Structurally, the EPR’s reactor is a modern pressurized water reactor. When designing the reactor pressure vessel and core, the likelihood of pressure vessel embrittlement has, in particular, been minimized, as this is a typical aging phenomenon for PWRs. A socalled heavy reflector surrounds the reactor core, which evens out the reactor’s power output distribution and also reduces the neutron radiation load to which the pressure vessel is subjected. The reactor core has 241 nuclear fuel elements and 89 control rods. The nuclear fuel elements are square-shaped in their cross-sectional profile, each containing 17x17 places for nuclear fuel rods. The control rods are finger control rods, which are typical of PWRs, and used both for the rapid shutdown of the reactor and for adjusting the power distribution. When generating power, the control rods are supported in the upper part of the core or completely outside the core, using electromagnets. For the adjustment of power distribution, the control rods have additionally been equipped with an electromechanical actuation capable of fine-tuning the reactor’s power distribution. The reactor core is designed in such a way that the inherent feedbacks in the reactor power output are moderating to any changes in output. During all operational states, the reactor remains stable and the safety margins associated with the heat transfer from the nuclear fuel are sufficiently high during incidents. Four main circulation loops are connected to the reactor, each with a vertical steam generator and electric-powered reactor coolant pump. An independent pressure vessel called a pressurizer, intended for controlling the pressure of the primary coolant circuit, is connected to one of the main circulation loops. The reactor, the primary coolant circuit and all pipes and parts directly attached to it are manufactured from carefully selected materials using the best manufacturing methods currently available. The parts in the EPR’s primary coolant circuit are designed and manufactured to conform to the leak prevention principle. The reactor is located in a large, dry containment building. This means that the containment building is designed to withstand the energy released into it during accident without any factors that would lower the pressure. The containment building is a cylinder-shaped, massive, prestressed reinforced concrete structure with an elliptical cupola. The containment building is surrounded by a cylinder-shaped reactor building. This also acts as the outermost containment building. The reactor building is surrounded by four separate safety system buildings and the nuclear fuel building. Each subsystem of the safety systems is sited in its own safety system building. The safety systems’ equipment has been divided by subsystem, also in the containment building. The automation and auxiliary systems required for the control of the safety systems have also been located in the safety buildings. The power required for the safety systems is backed up by stand-by diesel generators, while the sea acts as the main heat sink; both the diesels and the sea water pumping plants for the safety systems have been divided into pairs located in different, geographically separated buildings. Consequently, external events cannot harm both buildings simultaneously. The reactor building, the nuclear fuel building and the middle two of the safety system buildings will be protected by a wall capable of withstanding a plane crash. The plant’s control room is located inside the building that can withstand a plane crash.


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Figure 4B-5 A general outline of the cross-section of the EPR containment building.

Containment building

Steam generator

259

Steam generator

Reactor

Cooling water pool

In the EPR, the reactor building, the middle safety buildings and the turbine building are situated in a row in such a way that the turbine axis points towards the reactor. This arrangement ensures that a turbine blade or piece of rotor potentially breaking off the steam turbine as a result of a fault will not hit the safety-critical reactor and control buildings. The EPR’s key safety functions will be primarily realized by using systems that require active i.e. external power, which have similar principles to those deployed in the latest PWRs. The safety systems are built using the redundancy principle, where each safety system has usually four parallel subsystems, two of which together are capable of completing the security task designated. The subsystems are located in different areas of the plant, adhering to the principle of separation. The active systems in the EPR are designed to conform to the diversity principle as they are designed in such a way that they can replace each other’s functions. The implementation of each safety function is described below. Reactor shutdown and power management The reactor shutdown and its power output management are mainly carried out using control rods. The reactor trip is performed gravitationally by cutting off the current to


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the electromagnets which support the control rods. The control rods will then gravitationally fall into the reactor core within a matter of seconds. The effectiveness of the control rods is designed so that the reactor will shut down and will remain sub-critical even if due to a fault a single control rod remains completely outside the reactor core. Should, for some reason, the movement of the control rods be completely prevented, the reactor will be automatically shut down by pumping boron-containing water into the primary coolant loop from separate storage tanks. The pumping system for the boron solution consists of two full-capacity subsystems, i.e. the system fulfills the single-failure criterion. In addition, the system includes a third full-capacity pump which can be connected to either subsystem. Cooling of the reactor and residual heat removal The reactor cooling and its residual heat removal are performed using active systems. In moderate incidents, the reactor is cooled via the steam generators either to the turbine plant’s condenser or alternatively by feeding steam into the atmosphere using the steam generator’s blow-off valves. During incidents, the water inventory of the steam generators is maintained using an emergency feed water system. Should the steam generators not be available, the primary coolant circuit can also be cooled using a method whereby water is fed using a medium-pressure emergency core cooling system into the reactor and vented out from the pressurizer’s blow-off valves. During normal circumstances and moderate incidents, the primary coolant circuit can also be directly cooled under low pressure by using a low-pressure emergency core cooling system with a residual heat removal connection. The system consists of a minimum of four half-capacity subsystems (4x50%), i.e. the system fulfills the failure criterion of a random single-failure and simultaneous maintenance. In more serious incidents and during accidents, specifically in cases of leaks in the primary coolant circuits, the reactor will be cooled using both a medium-pressure and a low-pressure emergency core cooling system. Part of the emergency core cooling system package also consists of high-pressure safety injection water accumulators which are pressurized using nitrogen gas, and are connected to emergency core cooling lines near the primary cooling circuit via check valves. The high-pressure safety injection Cleanliness is a major safety ingredient. Photo of the basement of the nuclear power plant turbine building.


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water accumulators are emptied without any further control measures when the pressure of the primary coolant circuit falls below the gas pressure in the vessels. Each of the medium- and high-pressure emergency core cooling systems consists of four subsystems. From a emergency core cooling perspective, each subsystem’s pumping capacity is sufficient in practice to perform its safety function (4x100%), so the emergency core cooling systems fulfill the failure criterion required of a primary safety function i.e. “random single-failure in one subsystem and simultaneous maintenance on another subsystem.” The pressure head of the pumps of the medium-pressure emergency core cooling system is purposefully selected to be lower than the opening pressure of the steam generators’ relief valves. This will prevent the primary coolant from entering into the environment via the steam generators in situations when the primary coolant circuit leaks to the secondary side of the steam generators. The high-pressure and low-pressure cooling systems both take their water from the cooling water tank situated in the lower part of the containment building. The emergency cooling water contains boron, as is always the case for PWRs. Water entering into the containment building following leaks in the primary coolant circuit drains back to the same tank. The suction strainers of the emergency core cooling system are sized to filter any insulation material and debris that come loose in conjunction with a leak without a significant loss in pressure. If necessary, the strainers can be cleaned by rinsing them with water fed from the minimum circulation lines. The medium-pressure and high-pressure systems act as back-ups to one another. If the medium-pressure system completely fails to function, the pressure in the primary coolant circuit is lowered so that sufficient emergency cooling is achieved even with a low-pressure system. The pressure of the primary coolant circuit is lowered either by using the relief valves in the steam generators or the relief valves in the primary coolant circuit, or both. The medium-pressure system, on the other hand, has sufficient capacity to fill the reactor and to maintain sufficient cooling independent of the lowpressure system. The residual heat is transferred to the final heat sink by evaporators. The final heat sink is either the atmosphere or the sea via the condensers. The residual heat can also be transferred to the heat exchangers which are a part of the low-pressure emergency cooling system, and from there to the sea via an intermediary circuit and a sea water circuit. Intermediate and sea water circuits are a part of the safety systems, and there are four of them, one for each subsystem of the safety system. The overpressure protection of the steam generators has been achieved using an electrically controlled relief valve and two safety valves, which in turn are controlled by spring-loaded control valves. The relief valve of the steam generators can be adjusted, and if necessary, used to perform a controlled cooling of the primary coolant circuit at constant rate. The overpressure protection of the primary coolant circuit has been achieved using three safety valves that are connected to the pressurizer, which are controlled using spring-loaded control valves. Furthermore, there are two parallel blow-off lines connected to the pressurizer, which, if necessary, are used to perform a manually operated discharge of the coolant and a depressurization of the reactor in order to manage a severe accident. Ensuring the integrity of the containment building The outer containment building of the EPR is a reinforced concrete structure that is designed to withstand a plane crash. The inner protective building is made out of prestressed reinforced concrete, and equipped with a steel sealing plate liner in order to

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ensure leaktightness. During normal use, the intermediate annulus between the outer and inner containment buildings is kept at underpressure compared to the atmosphere, so that the tightness of the containment building can be monitored and that any potential leaks from the containment building will take place via filtration systems. A crosssection of the EPR containment building is in Figure 4B-5. The pipes and ducts running through the containment building wall are equipped on both sides of the wall with isolation valves, which, in the event of an incident or accident, are closed or will automatically close unless the valve is a safety system valve used for incident management. In order to ensure the isolation function, the inner and outer isolation valves are different from one another. Two isolation valves will be installed in all systems, except for the suction lines of the emergency core cooling system which will have only one, as this flow route must be open in the event of an accident. The heat released to the containment building during incidents and accidents principally ends up in the gas volume of the inner, leaktight containment building. In the EPR, the containment gas volume is not directly cooled in accident situations. The lowpressure emergency core cooling system removes heat from the cooling water pool, resulting in the cooling of the containment building and depressurization after the accident. Monitoring and control of the safety systems The monitoring and control of the safety systems has primarily been achieved using programable automation. The automated safety system consists of four subsystems arranged in such a way that there is a minimum four-fold of signals required for the start-up of all the key safety systems, one for each subsystem, and the deployment decision will be taken if two of the four signals indicate that the deployment criterion has been fulfilled. This deployment logic has been selected, because it also enables periodic testing during normal operation one subsystem at a time without a fault in a single subsystem, even during the service test, preventing the function from being deployed or causing an unnecessary trigger. The sections of the safety automation system performing the start-ups for the reactor trip and the start-ups for the safety systems have been included in the same package. The safety automation is implemented using a system platform designed for safety systems. To cover for the simultaneous failure of programmable systems, back-up safety functions are also performed using a so-called hard wired back-up system, the implementation of which is independent of the computer equipment. Power requirements of the safety systems The power required by the safety systems is normally supplied either directly from the plant’s own generator or via a separate transformer from the national grid. Emergency power supply is ensured by equipping the plant, with both quadruple reserve power diesels and with double, structurally different emergency diesels. The actual stand-by power diesels are sized to support all safety functions. Each individual diesel serves all the electricity consumption, such as pumps, blowers, valve actuators and monitoring and control, for its own subsystem. The emergency diesels, on the other hand, are sized to mitigate the consequences of an accident and to maintain safety functions during a serious accident. Both reserve power diesels and emergency diesels are air-cooled, so they operate without problems even if the plant’s sea water cooling were to be completely interrupted, for example due to some external reason.


Supplement 4b

Management of a severe accident In the EPR, the management of a serious accident consists of four specific safety procedures: the depressurization of the reactor, the cooling of the molten core at the bottom of the reactor pit in the core catcher, the catalytic combustion of hydrogen and the residual heat removal from the containment building. The depressurization of the reactor during serious reactor accidents is performed at the pressurizer using two mechanically-controlled relief valves. Due to the high power density of the reactor core, it is not possible to passively cool the EPR’s reactor pressure vessel from the outside, so in the event of the failure of the safety functions intended for accident management, the molten reactor core overheats the base of the reactor pressure vessel and discharges into the reactor pit. The reactor pit acts as a buffer store, which accumulates all the molten core. It is lined with a sacrificial layer of material, which protects the load-bearing concrete structures, by mixing with the molten core and making it highly fluid. When the sacrificial material has worn away, the molten core will discharge under gravity from the reactor pit into an expansion area sited beside the pit, the base of which forms the core catcher. By area, the core catcher is a large, wide space which can be passively cooled from underneath by flooding it with water from the condensation pool. The molten core, spreading into the core catcher as a thin layer, is quickly solidified on its surface, which in practice eliminates the prospect of a steam explosion when the core catcher later becomes filled with water. The core catcher will only be flooded once the molten core has moved from the pressure vessel into the catcher. The core catcher prevents any of the hot liquid core coming into contact with the floor of the containment building. The EPR’s core catcher is the product of long-standing R&D work. In the event of a severe accident, hydrogen is released in the overheating core as the zirconium cladding tubes and other metals are oxidized by water vapor. This hydrogen is then discharged into the containment building and would cause a fire and explosion hazard, but in the EPR this is prevented by equipping the plant with passive catalytic hydrogen combustors i.e. recombiners. The catalytic oxidization of hydrogen begins spontaneously in the recombiners even with low hydrogen concentration, prior to the hydrogen-air mixture becoming ignitable. The number of recombiners is designed to be such that the establishment of an explosive hydrogen-air mixture becomes impossible. In the EPR, there is a sprinkler system in the containment building for the removal of residual heat, which consists of two parallel, full-capacity subsystems (2x100%). The system is both capable of spraying water into the gas volume of the inner containment building and of flooding the core catcher and the reactor vessel all the way up to the level of the primary coolant circuit. Over a period of time, by using the sprinkler system, boiling in the containment building can be avoided and the pressure of the containment building can be balanced with that of the outside environment, which is desirable in order to minimize any leaks from the containment building. Any severe reactor accident occurring during shutdowns is handled in the same fashion as one which occurs during power generation, except that in conjunction with a shutdown the passages, in particular the physical barrier (material lock), leading into the containment building are prepared for a sufficiently quick closure.

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Figure 4B-6 A photo montage of what the EPR plant would look like in Hanhikivi, Pyhäjoki.

Preparedness for external hazards External hazards, such as severe weather phenomena, climate change, earthquakes, accidents associated with the transportation of chemicals in close proximity to the plant together with unlawful actions, including the deliberate crashing of a large passenger plane into the plant, have all been taken into account in the design of the plant. Fennovoima has, in collaboration with Finnish expert authorities and research institutes, defined planning criteria for the design of the plant buildings, which are with a high degree of certainty much more stringent than those events that can be expected to occur during the service life of the plant. The assessment of the impact of climate change is based on forecasts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which operates under the auspices of the UN. Fennovoima’s EPR will be designed to withstand external hazards in such a way that it can be constructed with sufficient safety margins on any of the proposed alternative sites. An assessment of the feasibility of the alternatives as sites for the nuclear power plant has been outlined by site in Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D of this application. Figure 4B-6 is a photo montage of what the EPR plant would look like in Hanhikivi, Pyhäjoki. Precautions against any unlawful actions will be taken using various structural and organizational safety arrangements. The potential crash of a large passenger plane is allowed for in the design of the plant’s safety-critical buildings as a factor influencing the plant’s size, in compliance with Finnish regulations. Assessment of the prospects for building the EPR in compliance with Finnish regulations The feasibility study for Areva’s EPR did not come up with any aspects which would indicate that there are any reasons why the plant could not be built to comply with Finnish regulations. The safety systems in the EPR represent well-established and proven technology. The EPR’s reference plant, Olkiluoto 3, is under construction in Finland.


Supplement 4b

In conjunction with the Olkiluoto 3 project, the technology and safety solutions of the EPR’s reference plant have been adapted to comply with Finnish safety regulations. According to information received from TVO and the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland, the delays and technical problems associated with Olkiluoto 3 have been resolved in such a way as not to have an impact on the plant’s safety. The thermal energy output of the EPR, which was one of the subjects of Fennovoima’s feasibility studies, has been increased by 290 MW from that of Olkiluoto 3. The safety analyses which will be conducted prior to applying for the construction license, will ensure the adequacy of the design of the safety systems. The analysis results currently available show no indication that any essential design modifications would be required to the safety system due to the increased output power. Fennovoima will only apply for a construction license for its nuclear power plant unit once the plant’s basic design is sufficiently complete in all respects for it to meet a thorough safety assessment.

Areva NP’s SWR 1000 Background The SWR 1000 (Siedeswasserreaktor 1000) is a boiling water reactor, the development of which began in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s, as a joint project of plant supplier Siemens and German power companies. In terms of its basic BWR process, the SWR 1000 is essentially similar to other boiling water reactors that have been equipped with main circulation pumps built inside the reactor pressure vessel. Figure 4B-7 shows a general layout of the SWR 1000 plant. To improve the reactor’s inherent properties, the core of the SWR 1000 is somewhat shorter and situated lower in the pressure vessel than is usually the case with BWRs. This enables a greater natural circulation flow of the cooling water through the core and allows for a greater overall water quantity in the pressure vessel than in other BWRs. Both features are advantageous from a safety perspective. The SWR 1000’s primary safety systems are passive (i.e. they use intrinsic phenomena) and in this respect represent a considerable progress compared to more conventional safety technology. The plant is also equipped with electrical safety systems, but due to their secondary nature, they have been implemented in a more limited way than at those nuclear power plants that rely exclusively on external power. In the beginning of the 2000s, after Siemens and Framatome merged to become the current Areva NP, the development work for the SWR 1000 was resumed. In terms of individual systems, the functioning and sizing of the safety systems using intrinsic phenomena was ascertained by extensive and thorough tests as early as in the 1990s. Areva NP’s main focus as the work goes on will be on full-scale tests in which the simultaneous co-functioning of the essential parts of the various passive safety systems is demonstrated. The basic design for the SWR 1000 is currently underway as a joint venture between Areva NP and E.ON. One of the goals of the basic design is to fulfill the European safety regulations. The SWR 1000’s reference plant is Gundremmingen C, a BWR with a thermal output of 3,840 MW, commissioned in 1985. The process technology of the SWR 1000’s energy production is similar to that of Gundremmingen C, but the safety systems at Gundremmingen C are active i.e. use external power.

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Figure 4B-7 Areva NP’s SWR 1000.

Should Fennovoima choose to implement the project with SWR 1000, the primary intention will be to build two units. In the regulations governing nuclear safety, the criterion for the emission of radioactivity during normal use of a power plant concerns the entire plant, irrespective of the number of units. The units of the Fennovoima power plant will be built identical to each other but independent. Consequently, with regards to the safety design of the plant, the properties of a single reactor are considered. The units in the nuclear power plant are designed to fulfill all Finnish regulations. Basic Technology Structurally, the reactor of the SWR 1000 plant is a modern boiling water reactor. The reactor is equipped with an integrated main circulation pump located inside the reactor pressure vessel. Other parts needed for the steam generation process are also located inside the reactor. The reactor core has 664 nuclear fuel elements and 157 control rods. The control rods are equipped both with a fast-acting, hydraulic hydraulic actuation for the reactor trip, and with electro-mechanical actuation for accurate movement and, hence, finetuning of the reactor’s power distribution. The cross-sectional profile of the SWR 1000’s nuclear fuel bundle is square-shaped and contains 12x12 places for nuclear fuel rods. In cross-section, the nuclear fuel element is somewhat larger than current BWR elements. The reactor core is designed in such a way that the inherent feedbacks in the reactor power output are moderating to any changes in output. During all operation modes,


Supplement 4b

the reactor remains stable and the safety margins associated with the heat transfer from the nuclear fuel are sufficiently high during incidents. The reactor and all pipes and parts directly attached to it are manufactured from carefully selected materials using the best manufacturing methods currently available. The parts in the SWR 1000 primary coolant circuit are designed and manufactured to conform to the break preclusion principle. The reactor is been located in a depressurization containment building, as is almost invariably the case with BWRs. The containment building is a cylinder-shaped, massive, unprestressed reinforced concrete building, located inside a rectangular reactor building. Unlike other BWRs, the upper part of the containment building has been divided into ďŹ ve separate spaces, four of which each contain large water pools. During incidents, these pools in the upper dry room act as heat sinks and water sources for gravitational emergency cooling. A conventional condensation pool is located at the lower part of the containment building. The reactor building houses that process equipment of the safety systems which is not located inside the containment building, and simultaneously doubles as an outer containment building. The electrical and automation equipment required for the control and power supply for the safety systems is mainly located inside the reactor building, but in separate spaces from the monitored area. The central control room of the plant is sited next to the reactor building in a separate control building. In the SWR 1000, the reactor building and the turbine building are located in a line so that the turbine rotor axis points towards the reactor. This arrangement ensures that a turbine blade or piece of rotor potentially breaking off the steam turbine as a result of a fault will not hit the safety-critical reactor and control buildings. The safety systems also include two separate sea water pumping plants and two stand-by generators that support the functioning of electrically operated safety systems. They are protected geographically, meaning that they are located on different sides of the reactor building, so that an external event such as a plane crash can only cause the loss of one set of buildings. The outer wall of the SWR 1000 reactor building acts as a crash barrier and protects the containment building itself as well as all the safety systems inside the reactor building, including the automation systems. The building which houses the central control room is not protected against a plane crash. The destruction of the building will not have any effect on the functionality of the automatic or passive safety systems. The control of the plant can continue from an emergency control room which is geographically protected. The SWR 1000’s key safety functions will be provided primarily using passive systems i.e. systems that use intrinsic phenomena. The safety systems are built using the redundancy principle, where each safety system has usually four parallel subsystems, two of which together are capable of completing the security task designated. Adhering to the diversity principle, the functioning of these is backed up by active systems, which in their principles are similar to those in the latest BWRs already deployed throughout the world. The active safety systems in the SWR 1000 consist of two parallel subsystems, each of which is capable on its own of completing the safety task designated. Both passive and active subsystems are located in different areas of the plant, adhering to the principle of separation. The implementation of each safety function is described below.

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Reactor shutdown and power management The reactor shutdown and its power output management are mainly carried out using control rods. The fast shutdown of the reactor is performed using fast-acting water hydraulics, which push the control rods into the reactor core in the space of a few seconds. The functioning of the hydraulics is powered by the pressure of stored steam and is hence passive. The fast reactor trip system is backed up by the driving of the control rods into the reactor using electro-mechanical actuators, which are normally used for carrying out minor control movements of the control rods. The electro-mechanical actuation is slower than the gas-powered hydraulics. The effectiveness of the control rods is designed so that the reactor will shut down and will remain sub-critical even if due to a fault a single control rod remains completely outside the reactor core. Should, for some reason, the movement of the control rods be completely prevented, the reactor will be automatically shut down by pumping boron-containing water into the reactor, driven under steam pressure, from separate storage tanks. The feeding system for the boron solution consists of two parallel, full-capacity subsystems (2x100%), i.e. the system fulfills the single-failure criterion. The hydraulic pressure for the reactor trip hydraulics and the boron feed is produced using steam pressure, in order to prevent uncondensed gas entering the reactor under any circumstances. Non-condensable gas would particularly interfere with the functioning of emergency condenser, which functions passively. Cooling of the reactor and residual heat removal During normal use and moderate incidents, the cooling of the reactor and its residual heat removal are primarily carried out using active systems. In moderate incidents, the heat generated by the reactor can be directly transferred to the sea via the turbine plant’s condenser. In normal situations and during moderate incidents, the reactor can also be cooled directly while still maintaining low pressure, by deploying an electrically powered emergency core cooling system through a residual heat removal connection. During more serious incidents, the heat produced by the reactor is transferred to the pools in the upper dry room of the containment building, for a short period of time by using the relief valves and for an extended period using emergency condensers. Over time, the water in the pools starts to boil and the generated steam will be condensed using the containment building’s cooling condensers installed above the pools. The cooling condensers in the containment building are passive heat exchangers, which are cooled by cold water from the reactor room outside the containment building. During accidents, the heat generated by the reactor as steam is transferred via the relief and safety valves into the pools of the upper dry room. Should there be a leak in a pipe connected to the reactor inside the containment building, coolant and energy will be discharged from it into the containment gas volume of the containment building. The containment gas volume will become pressurized, which will result in a strong steam flow through the pipes running to the water of the condensation pool. As it flows into the condensation pool, the steam discharged from the reactor is condensed into water, and the overpressure in the containment building remains within the design parameters. Both the condensation pool and the pools in the upper dry room can be cooled using the heat-exchange circuits of the emergency core cooling system. Any remaining steam in the upper dry room of the containment building also condenses into the cooling condensers of the containment building.


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The steam turbine converts thermal energy into mechanical work. Photo of the low pressure steam turbine rotor.

Both the reactor’s emergency condensers and the containment building’s cooling condensers work without the need for valves, being brought directly into action by the process requiring cooling. The flooding of the reactor core required in the case of a major reactor leak takes place under gravity from the pools in the upper dry room following the reactor’s depressurization. The reactor’s pressure release system has been achieved using relief and safety valves, of which there are eight. There are two functionally diverse types of valves, four of each type. The opening of the relief valves takes place under automated control. In case the automation fails to function correctly, the safety valves will open at a slightly higher pressure, controlled by a mechanical control valve – in other words, the opening takes place in a functionally different way from automation. All of the safety valves are equipped with a mechanical control system, with the help of which they can be opened irrespective of the reactor pressure and, hence, in a controlled way, they lower the reactor pressure close to that of the containment building. The vapor blasting from the safety valves is discharged directly to the cooling pool of the upper dry room, with each valve having its own pipe connection. The number of safety and relief valves has been selected to be sufficiently high in order to be able to assume a simultaneous fault of several valves, as thus provided for in Finnish safety regulations. The opening of the relief valves takes place either by automatic control or by a passive starting device. Four have been equipped with a latch, which prevents the closing of a valve which has once been opened to allow depressurization even after equalization of reactor pressure with that of the containment building. In this way, depressurization will take place reliably during a severe accident. The passive emergency core cooling systems of the SWR 1000 consist of an emergency condenser, which functions as a high-pressure emergency cooling device, and gravitational flooding, which takes place from the dry room pools of the containment building following the reactor’s depressurization. In addition, the SWR 1000 has been equipped


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with a low-pressure, electrically operated pumping system. There are four emergency condensers, one in each pool of the upper dry room. The capacity of each condenser under full reactor pressure is around 70 MW, i.e. from the residual heat removal perspective the condensers clearly fulfill the fault criterion demanded of a primary safety system, being a random single failure in one subsystem combined with simultaneous maintenance on another. Also the reactor’s flooding system and the containment building’s condenser system are four-fold and by their nominal capacity a minimum of 4x50%, i.e. they fulfill the aforementioned failure criterion for primary safety systems. The SWR 1000 has also been equipped with an electrically operated, low-pressure emergency core cooling system with a 2x100% capacity. The system’s primary use is for the reactor’s residual heat removal, and when required, it can be used to flood the reactor core or to spray the containment building’s gas volume in order to condense steam. The low-pressure emergency core cooling system takes its water from the condensation pool via suction strainers. The suction strainers are designed to have a sufficient filtering capacity and cleaning procedure. The active emergency core cooling system has been classified as a safety system and backs up the functioning of systems that use intrinsic phenomena. It fulfills the failure criterion demanded of a back-up system, i.e. a random single failure. In practice, the active emergency cooling system starts first, and passive safety systems are only needed if the active system completely fails to function. For residual heat removal, the low-pressure emergency core cooling system has been equipped with heat exchangers, in which the circulating water it pumps is cooled via an intermediate circuit which uses sea water. There are two independent intermediary circuits, one for each subsystem of the emergency cooling system. In this way, the heat generated by the reactor, including the residual heat, is transferred from the plant to the sea. During normal use, residual heat is removed from the reactor by the active cooling system. Should it fail to function, the residual heat is removed by a passive emergency cooling condenser. The emergency cooling condensers in the SWR 1000 are located inside the containment building in the pools of the upper dry room. The emergency cooling condensers come into action naturally following a reactor trip, when the reactor’s boiling is reduced very much, which results in the lowering of the water level. The heat is transferred to the heat exchangers from the reactor using natural circulation and then from the heat exchangers to the pool water, which heats up and after a time starts to boil. Already before boiling point is reached, the heat can be removed from the pools to the sea using the residual heat removal function of the low-pressure cooling system. Should sea water cooling not be available, the water in the pools will boil and the steam generated from them will be condensed in the containment building’s cooling condensers. The heat then transfers into the pools of the reactor hall, and when they have finally heated to boiling point, the clean steam thus generated can be released into the atmosphere via a water separator. The amount of water in the reactor hall pools will last for three days when used for residual heat removal. Additional water can be supplied to the pools from the fire extinguishing water system. Ensuring the integrity of the containment building The SWR 1000’s containment building consists of a primary containment building made from reinforced concrete, the integrity of which is ensured with a steel barrier plate. The containment building is not prestressed.


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Functionally the containment building consists of two spaces: the dry well, which contains the reactor, the water pools of the upper dry well, the pipe system and other process equipment associated with the reactor, and the condensation pool, which contains cold water, the blow-off piping from the dry well to the condensation pool and the ďŹ lter equipment required for the water feed for the emergency cooling. An overow pipe for water leads from the upper dry well pools into the condensation pool, and a discharge pipe for noncondensable gases runs from the level of the containment building’s cooling condenser into the condensation pool. Figure 4B-8 shows a cross-section of the SWR 1000 containment building. The pipes and ducts running through the wall of the containment building are equipped on both sides of the wall with isolation valves, which will automatically close in the event of an incident or accident, unless the valve is a safety system valve used for incident management. In order to ensure the isolation function, the inner and outer isolation valves are different from one another. Exceptionally, the passive cooling system of the containment building will be equipped with only one isolation valve per line, so that no potential valve fault would prevent the functioning of the said system. In the event of a break of a pipe connected to the reactor, the heat released into the containment building will end up in the condensation pool, but some part will also arrive in the gas volume of the containment building. The emergency cooling condenser for the containment building cools the gas volume directly. The condenser starts auto-

Containment building

Figure 4B-8 A general outline of the cross-section of the SWR 1000 containment building.

Upper dry well

Flooding pools

Reactor

Wet well

Condensation pool Reactor core


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matically as soon as warm gas or steam comes into contact with the heat transfer surface. If necessary, the room’s atmosphere can be cooled by manually starting the lowpressure emergency core cooling system. Each subsystem of the low-pressure emergency core cooling system is connected to its own intermediate circuit and each intermediate circuit in turn to its own sea water circuit, so the residual heat transfer chain from the reactor and the containment building to the sea consists of two parallel, full-capacity (2x100%) subsystems. These have been separated from each other both mechanically and electrically, and located in different areas of the plant. Monitoring and control of the safety systems The monitoring and control of the safety systems has primarily been achieved using programmable automation. The automatic safety system consists of four subsystems. The measurements required for the start-up of all the key safety functions are at least quadrupled, each subsystem having its own signals. The decision to start up a safety procedure is performed in the automation system if two out of four measurements indicate that the deployment criterion has been fulfilled. This deployment logic has been selected, because it also enables service test runs during normal usage one subsystem at a time without a fault in a single subsystem, even during the service test, preventing the function from being deployed or causing an unnecessary trigger. The sections of the system performing the start-ups for the reactor trip and the start-ups for the safety systems have been included in the same package. The safety automation is implemented using a system platform designed for safety systems. In the SWR 1000 plants, the functioning of programmable automation is backed up by passive initiator devices, which, as a direct result of the falling water level in the reactor, initiate the key safety functions, i.e. the reactor trip, the isolation of the steam lines and the depressurization and flooding of the reactor. The heat transfer from the reactor to the containment building and from the containment building to the reactor hall will be started as a result of the inherent properties of the processes without any separate control functions. There are four passive initiator devices for each safety function, and they have been connected to single-fault-tolerant logics in such a way that a fault in a single device will neither trigger an unnecessary function nor prevent a necessary one. Power requirements of the safety systems The SWR 1000’s primary safety systems function entirely without external power. The power required by the secondary and auxiliary systems is normally supplied either directly from the plant’s own generator or via a separate transformer from the national grid. For the SWR 1000, reserve power is only required for the automatic safety system for monitoring and control purposes. The reserve capacity required by the safety automation system and the actuators is supplied from storage batteries, each subsystem having its own set of batteries. For electrically operated safety systems, the plant is also equipped with two full-capacity diesel generators, which are classified as safety systems. Management of a severe accident In the SWR 1000, the management of a severe accident comprises three specific safety procedures: the depressurization of the reactor, the cooling of the molten core inside the reactor pressure vessel and the residual heat removal from the containment building.


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The containment building is inerted with nitrogen during use to minimize the danger of a hydrogen fire. The reactor’s depressurization is performed using mechanically-controlled relief valves. The SWR 1000’s reactor pressure vessel is located relatively low down inside the containment building and the pressure vessel is large in size in comparison with the power density of the reactor core. These factors enable the cooling of the reactor pressure vessel from the outside. The reactor pit will be flooded with water from the water pools of the upper drywell by opening the flooding valves reserved for this procedure. The thermal insulation of the reactor pressure vessel has been designed in such a way that the water-steam mixture cooling the pressure vessel can flow uninterrupted along the side of the pressure vessel. Retaining the reactor core in the pressure vessel prevents the molten core from coming into contact with the structures of the containment building, and is an effective method of managing the molten core safely. The pressure vessel of the SWR 1000 is so large in relation to the power density of the core that a sufficient heat transfer margin is achieved even in the most critical part of the pressure vessel. The same proven technology is already in use in Finland at the Loviisa nuclear power plant. During a severe accident, the residual heat removal from the containment building takes place using intrinsic phenomena, using the cooling condensers of the containment building. These transfer heat into the water pool of the reactor room and are directly connected to the gas volume of the containment building, and therefore do not require any action to take place in order to start up. The SWR 1000 has been designed to prevent the occurrence of a severe accident during a maintenance shutdown. This could only happen if the reactor’s coolant is rapidly lost as a result of a leak in the base of the reactor pressure vessel. In order that the cooling water running into the lower dry well from a reactor bottom leak is not lost, the lower dry well has been connected to a water-tight stairwell and service pit, the upper end of which lies above the top of the reactor core. During a shutdown, the reactor room’s pool water will be sufficient to fill the lower dry well, passage and stairwell of the containment building so that the reactor core will be left several meters below the water level. Subsequently, residual heat removal is achieved by the water boiling. Preparedness for external hazards External hazards, such as severe weather phenomena, climate change, earthquakes, accidents associated with the transportation of chemicals in close proximity to the plant together with unlawful actions, including the deliberate crashing of a large passenger plane into the plant, have all been taken into account in the design of the plant. Fennovoima has, in collaboration with Finnish expert authorities and research institutes, defined planning criteria for the design of the plant buildings, which are with a high degree of certainty much more stringent than those events that can be expected to occur during the service life of the plant. The assessment of the impact of climate change is based on forecasts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which operates under the auspices of the UN. Fennovoima’s SWR 1000 will be designed to withstand any natural phenomena so that it can be built with sufficient safety margins at any one of Fennovoima’s potential plant sites. An assessment of the feasibility of the alternatives as sites for the nuclear power plant has been outlined by site in Supplements 3B, 3C and 3D of this application. Figure 4B-9 is a photo montage of what the SWR 1000 plant would look like in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää.

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Figure 4B-9 A photo montage of what the SWR 1000 plant would look like in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää.

Precautions against any unlawful actions will be taken using various structural and organizational safety arrangements. The potential crash of a large passenger plane is allowed for in the design of the plant’s safety-critical buildings as a factor influencing the plant’s size, in compliance with Finnish regulations. Assessment of the prospects for building the SWR 1000 in compliance with Finnish regulations The feasibility study for Areva NP’s SWR 1000 did not reveal any aspects which would indicate that there are any reasons why the plant could not be built to comply with Finnish regulations. In its basic solutions, the SWR 1000 represents tried and tested technology, the plant’s process technology has a good deployment track record and the verification by testing, to show that the new types of safety systems comply with the regulations, has been carried out properly. In its basic design principles, the SWR 1000’s technology meets Finnish safety requirements as well as other of Fennovoima’s own requirements. The basic design for the SWR 1000 is underway and Fennovoima is participating in this in order to ensure that the Finnish requirements will be taken into account at all design phases. Fennovoima will only apply for a construction license for its nuclear power plant unit once the plant’s systems designs are sufficiently complete in all respects for it to meet a thorough safety assessment

Building two identical nuclear power plant units One option in the project is to construct a nuclear power plant which consists of two SWR 1000 plant units. The building of the units would take place in parallel in such a way that the construction of the second plant unit would commence one to two years after the building of the first plant unit has commenced. This method of building was used in the construction of the current Finnish nuclear power plants Loviisa 1 and 2


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and Olkiluoto 1 and 2, and it is also a common method elsewhere in the world. In construction work, for many reasons, a difference of between 1-2 years in commencing the build is the most advantageous. On the one hand, it is sufficiently long to allow for the assimilation of the experience gained during the construction of the first unit into the development of the second, while on the other hand short enough to allow the building of both units using essentially the same designs. In well-managed projects, the time frame for large units of labour, such as key parts and installations, is typically such that with a difference of 1-2 years between the commencement of building of the units, the same contractors and teams can implement the same tasks in both units. Thus the experience gained from work in one unit benefits the construction of the other as directly as possible. Constructing two units partially in parallel will also provide benefits of scale both in terms of on-site construction and in the manufacture of significant sections of the plant. From the perspective of the national power grid’s fault tolerance, it is much more beneficial to construct nuclear power plants as several smaller units. The grid must keep functioning even after any unit suddenly detaches itself from the grid, and the grid must have enough reserve capacity to withstand the detachment of a second-largest unit. The need for reserve capacity is directly proportional to the size of the largest units. The two units built at the same plant site are attached to the national grid in such a way that an interruption of power generation in one unit will not disturb the functioning of the other unit. In addition to the actual plant units and any sections thereof, other infrastructure is required for a nuclear power plant, such as various storage rooms, maintenance workshops and offices. It will be cost-effective to provide these only once for the whole plant site, instead of building a dedicated infrastructure for each unit. Figure 4B-10 is an photomontage depicting the placement of two SWR 1000 plants in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää. Concerning safety, it is possible to implement interconnections of the safety systems Figure 4B-10 A photo montage depicting two SWR 1000 plants in Gäddbergsö, Ruotsinpyhtää.


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between identical units, which in the event of an incident or accident will help one plant unit support the other. These interconnections best lend themselves to be implemented for systems associated with the supply of stand-by electricity and the transfer of residual heat. The benefits and disadvantages of interconnections are considered in more detail during the basic design of the plant. In the case of a two-unit nuclear power plant, any potential detrimental interactions between the plants must also be taken into account. The plant sites must be planned in such a way that an incident or fault occurring at one unit, such as the breaking of a turbine blade, will not harm the other. Furthermore, the air supply for the plant units must be designed so that neither exhaust air nor any exhaust fumes from the stand-by supply systems of one would enter the air intake of the other. In Fennovoima’s view, the parallel construction of two SWR 1000 units is a feasible development method for a nuclear power plant in terms of safety, technology and economic considerations. As with all other plant options, Fennovoima is also prepared to construct a single-unit SWR 1000 power plant.

Related requirements from Fennovoima other than safety technology In the authorities’ official examination of the plant options associated with the decision-in-principle, the primary focus will be on the safety of the alternative plant choices, in the expertise of the applicant as well as other factors determined by the protocol. In addition to the extensively presented safety requirements above, Fennovoima has set requirements concerning technical and economical factors. The technical factors concern the design principles of the turbine plant and certain material choices of the reactor plant. Economical factors of the design cover for example the length of uninterrupted operating time and the availability of the plant. A preliminary treatment of these can be found in the feasibility studies. These factors do not have any safety effects which are not discussed above. A final decision on the technical solutions for the nuclear power plant is made only during the negotiations of the delivery contract. The final solutions may differ in details from those presented in the feasibility study. In any case, Fennovoima will make sure that the safety features of the plant remain acceptable or are improved. The practical implementation, organization and quality control of the plant project is discussed in more detail in Supplement 1C of the application. The scope of delivery of Fennovoima’s nuclear power plants will include, among other things, a training simulator for the training of plant controllers.

Electricity generation and other utilization of thermal energy Straightforward electricity generation (condensate mode) The primary purpose of Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant is electricity generation using a condensate power plant process. In the condensate mode, the properties of the low-pressure turbine generator of the plant correspond to those of conventional con-


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densing power plants, which constitute a key benefit from the perspective of managing malfunctions occurring within the power transmission grid. Fennovoima and Fingrid have conducted a preliminary investigation to verify that all Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant options can be attached to the national power grid at each plant site. The investigation covers both power transfer into the national grid in all usage situations and the malfunction management of the grid as specified in Fingrid system requirements.

Electricity generation combined with district heating In the planning for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant, preparations can also be made for the utilization of the waste heat generated by the plant either directly or as municipal district heating. At each site, the plant could be utilized to provide district heating for the requirements of the nearby towns, at Ruotsinpyhtää extending as far as the Helsinki metropolitan area. In many countries, nuclear power plants have supplied district heating or process heat for the needs of nearby areas, but the scale has only been from some dozen to a few hundred megawatts. In Finland, the Helsinki metropolitan area might need up to 2,000 MW of district heating. Figure 4B-11 Producing district heating with a BWR.

District heat to distribution

Waste heat to the sea

The temperature of the steam directed into the condenser of the nuclear power plant is too low for district heating. However, it is technically possible to connect a heat-exchange circuit to the low-pressure end of the turbine plant of either the PWR or the BWR, which extracts thermal energy from the process for district heating use at a sufficiently high temperature. For district heating purposes, it would thus be necessary to modify the nuclear power plant’s main steam turbine plant. There would be no requirement for any changes to the reactor and its safety systems. New extractions would possibly be required in the main steam turbine plant in its low-pressure turbines, together with an intermediate circuit for heat transmission from the turbine’s tapping points to the district heat exchangers. Providing for extensive district heat generation would probably lower the efficiency of straightfor-


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ward electricity generation, as it is difficult to optimize the design of the low-pressure turbine to be equally efficient in both condensate mode and large-scale district heat production. The BWR power plant process needed for district heating is presented in figure 4B-11. When designing a steam turbine, it must be ensured that its moment of inertia is sufficient from the perspective of managing faults in the electricity grid; for a turbine sized for straightforward condensate mode, this is achieved more easily. With the use of an intermediate circuit for heat transfer it is ensured that even during potential heat-exchanger leaks no substances will transfer from the nuclear power plant process to the district heating network. Consequently, district heat generation will not impact the nuclear or radiation safety of the power plant. According to studies commissioned by Fennovoima, each 4–5 MW of district heating reduces electricity output by approximately 1 MW. Even in the combined production of district heating and electricity generation, it is not technically feasible to transfer all the thermal energy that is sent to the sea from the condensing power plant into the district heating grid. Consequently, a 4,300 MW thermal output reactor, for example, which in condensate mode would generate 1,600 MW electricity and expend 2,700 MW of waste heat could in combined district heating mode supply 1,200 MW of electricity, 2,000 MW for district heating and 1,100 MW of waste heat. The feasibility of combined heat and power production is still under investigation, as are the required technical modifications to the plants themselves. The implementation of combined production is crucially dependent on the customers purchasing the heating and distributing it further. The technical implementation of combined heat and power production, its commercial viability compared to other alternatives and its environmental impacts, among other things in terms of the construction of the required heat-exchange circuit, will be separately established in conjunction with the project once the alternatives associated with district heat provision become clearer.

Utilization of waste heat The utilization of the waste heat generated by the nuclear power plant to keep ports or other areas ice-free during winter is feasible without any notable modifications to the actual nuclear power plant or its systems, because this usage does not set any conditions for the temperature of the water to be used. However, this utilization would require a pumping plant from the discharge outlet canal for the warm condenser water as well as a transfer pipeline with thermal insulation to the point of usage. With waste heat utilization, the distribution of waste heat to different areas of the sea can be controlled, and the detrimental impacts of the plant in its vicinity, especially on winter ice, can be reduced. At Simo, for example, the plant’s waste heat could be utilized as it is produced in order to keep the port of Ajos free of ice. Prospects for the technical implementation, its economic profitability in comparison with other alternatives as well as its environmental impacts, among others in respect of the required pipelines, will be studied separately once an understanding of the potential utilization of the waste heat has become clearer.


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Nuclear power plant fuel and waste management Supplement 5A General plan for nuclear fuel management


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Contents

Summary .....................................................................................................................283 Introduction ................................................................................................................284 Nuclear fuel procurement ..........................................................................................284 Fennovoima’s nuclear fuel procurement plan ....................................................284 Uranium requirement and adequacy of supply ..................................................285 Nuclear fuel production.......................................................................................286 Transportation and storage of nuclear fuel .........................................................291 Minimization of the environmental impact of nuclear fuel management .............292 Nuclear fuel management costs .................................................................................293


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Summary

The Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s nuclear fuel management will be implemented so that the design, production, transportation and storage of nuclear fuel are duly controlled to ensure quality and safety. The nuclear fuel supply is also ensured for the entire planned service life of the plant. The safeguarding of nuclear materials in connection with nuclear fuel management can be conducted in full accordance with Finnish law and international agreements. Fennovoima plans to procure the nuclear fuel required for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s operations from the global market in cooperation with E.ON. As the nuclear fuel to be used by the plant is the same as that already used by existing light water reactors, its design and manufacture is based on proven technology. The world’s currently known and exploited uranium resources are adequate to meet the supply needs of current nuclear power plants based on light water reactor technology for at least a century. In addition, the world’s untapped global uranium resources are estimated to be considerable. The global market supply of natural uranium required by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will not restrict the plant’s operations during its planned service life. Fennovoima takes the whole environmental impact life cycle of the plant’s nuclear fuel management into consideration. The environmental impact of the different phases of nuclear fuel management and the methods used to minimize their environmental load are described in detail in the project’s EIA Report. Nuclear fuel constitutes only a minor share of the total cost of nuclear electricity production. Changes in price of natural uranium thus have no significant impact on the production costs of nuclear power or on the profitability of new nuclear power plant projects.

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Introduction In accordance with section 24, subsection 1(6 g), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented with a general description of the applicant’s plan for implementing nuclear fuel management for each nuclear facility included in the scope of the project. This report provides the information referred to in the above-mentioned legislation regarding the nuclear fuel management of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. The procurement, transportation and storage of the nuclear fuel required for the operation of the nuclear power plant is a key factor with respect to the feasibility of the nuclear power plant construction project. Nuclear fuel management must be able to be implemented so that the supply of nuclear fuel to the nuclear power plant is ensured throughout the planned service life of the plant, and so that the design, production, transportation and storage of nuclear fuel is duly controlled to ensure quality and safety. Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the Fennovoima project is subject to a government decision-in-principle from a very early stage. The Nuclear Energy Act also makes provision for the fact that any prior implementation of economically binding and significant contracts may impede the ability of parliament and the government to make decisions regarding the decision-in-principle at their free discretion. Consequently, no contract arrangements regarding nuclear fuel management will be decided on during the preparation phase of the decision-in-principle application. This report provides the information required for decision-making regarding the decision-in-principle with respect to Fennovoima’s plans for nuclear fuel procurement for the plant, the plant’s uranium requirement and the adequacy of supply of uranium, and nuclear fuel production, transportation and storage. The report also provides a general description of environmental impact minimization with respect to nuclear fuel management, and an estimate of the share of nuclear fuel management of the total production cost of electricity produced by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant.

Nuclear fuel procurement Fennovoima’s nuclear fuel procurement plan Nuclear fuel management will be implemented in the same manner and using the same standard commercial channels as other existing plants within the nuclear sector. Fennovoima plans to procure the nuclear fuel needed by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant in cooperation with the international E.ON AG Group (E.ON). E.ON’s subsidiary E.ON Nordic AB is a co-owner of Fennovoima. E.ON is the owner or coowner of 21 nuclear power plant units operating in Europe. In nine of these, E.ON is the responsible licensee. E.ON’s experience in nuclear fuel procurement dates back to the early 1970s. E.ON’s reactors in Germany currently consume 1,200 tons of natural uranium per year, the equivalent of around 300 pressurized water reactor nuclear fuel assemblies. Fennovoima aims in its nuclear fuel management at long-term supply contracts with natural uranium producers, with suppliers offering conversion and enrichment services, and with nuclear fuel manufacturers. Nuclear fuel suppliers are required to be committed to Fennovoima’s and E.ON’s demanding environmental and quality


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objectives. Fennovoima ensures this commitment, as well as an affordable nuclear fuel supply, by pursuing long-term agreements and through cooperation with E.ON. Fennovoima will commence nuclear fuel procurement during construction of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant and at the latest two years before initial core loading of the reactor. Nuclear fuel for the first reactor core and the first reloads will be either procured as an inclusive part of the plant delivery or purchased separately on the global market. The chosen procedure will be decided in connection with the plant procurement agreement.

Uranium requirement and adequacy of supply Uranium requirement of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant The planned 1,500–2,500 MW Fennovoima nuclear power plant has an annual nuclear fuel consumption of 30–50 tons of uranium dioxide fuel. In nuclear fuel production, uranium is enriched from the 0.7 percent U-235 isotope content of natural uranium to 3 to 4 percent. This means that a total of 220–360 tons of natural uranium is needed to produce the amount of nuclear fuel consumed annually by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. The planned service life of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is 60 years. During its service life, the plant will therefore consume approximately 14,000–22,000 tons of natural uranium, from which 2,100–3,600 uranium tons of nuclear fuel will be produced. Uranium availability on the global market An open global market exists for natural uranium, just as for any other key industrial commodity. Uranium, and in particular its U-235 isotope, has no economically significant application other than power production, and the production of and trade in natural uranium are closely tied to the needs of nuclear fuel production. Natural uranium production is distributed worldwide, with numerous producers of varying size operating on a competitive market. Furthermore, the majority of the world’s raw uranium is produced in politically stable countries. Global demand for natural uranium by nuclear power plants totaled around 66,500 tons in 2007. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) predicts global nuclear power production to increase by over 40 percent from its current level by 2030, raising demand for natural uranium to 110,000 tons per year. Global natural uranium production totaled around 41,000 tons in 2007. The biggest uranium producing countries in 2006 were Canada with a 23 percent share of global uranium production, Australia at 21 percent and Kazakhstan at 16 percent. Other major producers in recent years include Russia, Niger, Namibia and South Africa. The ten biggest natural uranium producer countries accounted for over 90 percent of total global natural uranium production in 2007 (Figure 5A-1). In addition to natural uranium, other sources of uranium used for nuclear fuel production include uranium decommissioned from military use, depleted uranium generated as a by-product of the enrichment process and uranium recycled from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel. In recent years, these uranium sources have annually provided for nuclear fuel production the equivalent of about 20,000 tons of natural uranium.

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Figure 5A-1 Known and estimated uranium reserves which can be exploited at reasonable cost, by producer country (source: IAEA).

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Adequacy of uranium resources in the long-term The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates the world’s currently known economically exploitable uranium reserves to be in the region of 4.7 million tons. The 2005 estimate of the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency puts the total uranium reserves of the Earth’s crust that are exploitable with current technology at around 15 million tons. In addition to this, according to the IAEA’s 2006 estimate, the world’s phosphorus deposits contain around a further 35 million tons of uranium. Estimates of the size of known uranium reserves have increased in recent years, mainly due to reassessment of these known reserves. Extensive uranium explorations around the world are also expected to find new exploitable deposits. Even so, the existing known reserves are sufficient to meet the uranium requirements of nuclear power plants, including the predicted future growth in demand brought by additional nuclear power production capacity. The global market supply of natural uranium required by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will not restrict the plant’s operations during the planned service life of the plant. Connection of the project with current uranium mine projects in Finland Fennovoima will procure the natural uranium required for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s operations from the global market in cooperation with E.ON. The natural uranium requirement of the power plant is very small compared to the global production of uranium. Neither the Fennovoima project nor Fennovoima’s shareholders have any connection with current uranium mining projects in Finland, and neither are these mining projects in any way dependent on the implementation of the Fennovoima project.

Nuclear fuel production The following phases are involved in the production of light water reactor nuclear fuel: i) mining of uranium ore and production of uranium concentrate, ii) conversion of uranium concentrate to uranium hexafluoride, iii) U-235 isotope enrichment of uranium hexafluoride, iv) conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride to uranium


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dioxide, vi) production of fuel pellets and rods, and vii) incorporation of fuel elements rods into fuel assemblies. The basic technique of light water reactor nuclear fuel production was established in the 1970s, and all of the technologies applied in each of the different phases of production are extensively tried and tested.

Natural uranium production Uranium is a relatively common element, occurring in varying degrees virtually everywhere around the world. Ordinary granite, for example, has an average uranium content of 0.0004 percent, and seawater a thousandth of this level. The purest known uranium ores occur in deposits in Canada which yield ore of over 20 percent uranium content. The minimum uranium content for economically proďŹ table exploitation of new deposits is currently 0.1 percent. Natural uranium production, i.e. the mining of uranium and production of uranium concentrate, are standard mining operations. In 2006, 41 percent of all natural uranium production was carried out in underground mines, 24 percent in open-pit mines and 26 percent by means of the in-situ recovery (ISR) method. Figure 5A-2 shows an example of an underground uranium mine. The share of uranium produced as a co-product of other metals production, such as copper and gold, of total natural uranium production was 9 percent. The chosen method of extraction for uranium production depends, for example, on the uranium content of the deposit and on the geological properties and groundwater conditions of the site. Construction of a brand new uranium mine is a lengthy process lasting many years, due largely to the extensive mine infrastructure that is needed.

Figure 5A-2 Underground uranium mine, Rabbit Lake, Canada.

Ventilation riser, fresh air

Ventilation riser, exhaust air Ramp

400m Ore belt

Ore belt


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Ore produced at the mine is transported to an enrichment plant where the uranium is extracted from the ore, typically by dissolution in sulfuric acid. 75–90 percent of uranium content of the ore is recovered. Uranium is recovered from the acid solution by extraction using various solvents, after which the uranium is precipitated by ammonia as Triuranium octaoxide U3O8. The end product of the enrichment process is uranium concentrate or “yellowcake”. The in-situ recovery method involves drilling holes into the deposit through which an acid or alkaline solution is pump-circulated. The uranium mineral dissolves in the circulated solution, which is pumped to a ground-level facility for processing either by means of a solvent extraction or ion exchange depending on the groundwater pH. The U3O8 compound obtained from the precipitation phase is dried at high temperature. The largest Western producer companies of natural uranium, Cameco, Rio Tinto and Areva NC, accounted for around half of total global production in 2007. The biggest single uranium mine in 2006 was Canada’s McArthur River, with an output of 7,200 tons, representing some 18 percent of global production. The next largest mines were Australia’s Ranger and Olympic Dam, both at around 10 percent, and Namibia’s Rössing at 8 percent of global production. Conversion and enrichment of uranium concentrate Natural uranium contains two uranium isotopes, U-235 and U-238. The proportion of U-235 isotope in natural uranium is 0.71 percent. In light water reactors, the U-235 isotope content must be raised to 3–5 percent in order to enable a self-supporting chain reaction. As uranium enrichment process occurs in gaseous form, the solid uranium concentrate is converted by means of chemical processes to uranium hexafluoride which gasifies readily in the conversion plant. The conversion of uranium concentrate is a purely chemical process which uses standard process technology. The result of the conversion is uranium hexafluoride, which forms a solid at room temperature and which is transportable in heavy-duty transportation containers. The technologies used for both conversion and transportation are thoroughly proven. A total of four conversion companies currently operate commercially worldwide, with conversion plants located in France, Great Britain, Canada, the United States and Russia. Fennovoima bases its selection criteria for provision of conversion service on the environmental impact of the operations as well as technical and financial aspects. The desired U-235 isotope concentration is achieved by means of gas diffusion or centrifuge. The gas diffusion method is being widely phased out, due principally to its high energy consumption. The more efficient centrifuge method (Figure 5A-3) is long established and is gaining ground as the dominant isotope enrichment method. Isotope enrichment is by far the most expensive phase of nuclear fuel production. During the enrichment process, 10–15 percent of the original uranium is converted to sufficiently enriched uranium, the remaining 85–90 percent becoming so-called depleted uranium. Depleted uranium can be used, for example, for the dilution of highly enriched uranium decommissioned from military use for re-use in commercial nuclear reactors. The radioactivity of depleted uranium is lower than natural uranium. There are four commercially operating enrichment companies worldwide. If global nuclear power production capacity is significantly increased, demand for enrichment capacity may exceed current supply. High capacity enrichment plants currently oper-


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Figure 5A-3 Isotope enrichment centrifuges.

ate, for example, in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Great Britain and Russia, with further capacity under construction in the United States. The competitiveness of the enrichment services market ensures that the capacity of enrichment plants will correspond to future demand for enriched uranium for nuclear fuel production. In addition, E.ON’s co-ownership of European enrichment company Urenco ensures that Fennovoima will be supplied with enrichment services even during market shortages. Enriched uranium hexafluoride is transported to the nuclear fuel plant in similar secure transportation packages as are used for transportation between conversion and enrichment plants. Nuclear fuel assembly production Nuclear fuel production uses standard, conventional technology. The degree of enrichment of light water reactor nuclear fuel is, even at its highest, too low to enable a nuclear chain reaction to occur in the nuclear fuel raw materials or in the ready nuclear fuel assemblies during manufacturing or transportation. At the nuclear fuel plant, uranium hexafluoride is converted to uranium dioxide. The uranium dioxide is compressed into cylindrical nuclear fuel pellets approximately 1 cm in diameter and 2 cm in length. The pellets are sintered at high temperature to enhance their properties. The pellets are ground to the desired dimensions in preparation for the subsequent production phases and inspected. The fuel pellets are packed in metal zirconium alloy cladding tubes, i.e. fuel rods. The nuclear fuel rods are filled with helium and their ends welded tight (Figure 5A-4). The gas tightness of each fuel rod is checked and other properties are inspected before the rod moves to the next phase in the production chain. Next, the fuel rods are assembled into rectangular nuclear fuel assemblies in which the rods are held in place by a lattice framework and end plates. Each pressurized water reactor nuclear fuel assembly typically contains 256–324 rods, and each boiling water reactor assembly around 100 rods. The basic structure of the nuclear fuel as-


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Figure 5A-4 Hand inspection of nuclear fuel rods.

sembly has remained unchanged since the 1960s, but continuous developments have been made regarding the detailed design of the elements. Nuclear fuel production technology has been intensively developed and improved throughout its long history. For this reason, no fundamental design alterations to the existing extensively proven technology are necessary with respect to the nuclear fuel used by any of the different Fennovoima nuclear power plant designs. There are currently five commercially operating nuclear fuel assembly manufacturers worldwide. Assemblies suitable for light water reactors are made, for example, in Sweden, Germany, Spain, France, the United States and Russia. Nuclear fuel for each of the plant alternatives proposed in Supplement 4B of the application can be purchased from a range of different manufacturers. Global nuclear fuel assembly production is currently at overcapacity, and the existing capacity margin is sufficient to accommodate growth in demand for fuel assemblies brought by the construction of new nuclear power plants. Additionally, as a result of the ongoing global expansion of nuclear power production further nuclear fuel production capacity is under construction in a number of countries. Furthermore, as the number of new nuclear power plant units planned for Finland is extremely low in comparison to the many dozens of units planned for construction worldwide, their relative impact on the global nuclear fuel production capacity will be negligible. Quality management of nuclear fuel production The nuclear fuel production of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is subject to stringent quality requirements. Nuclear fuel producers implement thorough quality management programs and procedures based on international standards to ensure that the nuclear fuel assemblies that they manufacture comply fully with all requirements. The quality management program encompasses, for example, the required tests and inspections to be performed on the fuel assembly and its materials and components, as well as on the tools used in the manufacture of fuel assemblies. It also includes detailed work process specifications for each phase of production. Quality assurance is based on quality monitoring both by Fennovoima and by external auditors and on adequate


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A pressurized water reactor has just been loaded with fresh fuel.

measures following the test and inspection results. This ensures that the work processes involved in each of the production phases, together with the related inspections, are performed in compliance with regulations and that the end product complies with the respective requirements. Nuclear fuel production must comply with the regulations of the buyer’s national nuclear safety authority. In Finland, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) oversees in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) that nuclear fuel is designed, manufactured, transported, stored, handled and used in accordance with prescribed guidelines and regulations. STUK requirements for the different phases of nuclear fuel management are specified in regulatory guides YVL 6.2 to YVL 6.8.

Transportation and storage of nuclear fuel The annual fuel consumption of nuclear power plants is low in terms of mass compared to power plants based on other fuel types. For example, per unit of electrical power generated, a coal-fired condensing power plant consumes around a 100,000 times higher fuel mass than a nuclear power plant. Correspondingly, the volumes of transported nuclear fuel are also very low. Transportation is nevertheless necessary at different phases of the nuclear fuel production chain and, depending on the geographical distribution of the production chain, the transportation distances can be lengthy. All of the intermediate products in the nuclear fuel production chain, from uranium ore to nuclear fuel assemblies, are very weakly radioactive. Nuclear fuel is transported by specialized transportation


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firms with the required skills and equipment and permits issued by the controlling authorities. National and international regulations regarding the transportation and storage of radioactive materials are based primarily on the standards and guidelines issued by the IAEA. The purpose of the regulations is the protection of people and the environment from radiation during the transportation of radioactive materials. The safety principle entails the focusing of protection measures on the transportation package itself, irrespective of the form of transportation used. Further to this, protection is based on control of the shipped radioactive materials, minimization of radiation levels, uncontrolled chain reaction prevention and heat damage prevention. The ease of transportation and storage and high energy density of nuclear fuel are favorable with respect to the stockpiling of nuclear fuel to unsure energy supply in emergency situations. According to the guidelines regarding stockpiling, nuclear power plants in Finland must have at any given time, collectively both in storage and already charged in the reactors, sufficient nuclear fuel to ensure at least seven months of electrical power production. Nuclear power plants typically store enough nuclear fuel for at least one year of operation. Nuclear fuel can also be easily stored to supply longer operating periods if necessary. E.ON also maintains buffer stocks of both raw uranium and ready fuel in order to enable optimal scheduling of fuel procurements.

Minimization of the environmental impact of nuclear fuel management The environmental impact of the different phases of nuclear fuel management and the methods used to minimize their environmental effects are described in general in the project’s EIA Report, which is included as Supplement 3A of the application. The environmental impact of the different fuel management phases do not deviate significantly from other large-scale mining, chemical industry or manufacturing industry activities. At each phase of nuclear fuel management, special consideration will be given to national and international radiation protection and nuclear safety regulations regarding the handling of radioactive materials. The safeguarding of nuclear materials also involves verification procedures executed by government authorities and the IAEA to ensure that the nuclear materials are used exclusively for non-military purposes. The same standard procedures are applied equally to all producers of nuclear power. Fennovoima takes the whole environmental impact life cycle of the plant’s nuclear fuel management into consideration. Environmental impact criteria and objectives are prescribed in the environmental management system drawn up for Fennovoima. Fulfillment of these set objectives and criteria is monitored. Fennovoima requires companies operating within the nuclear fuel production chain to implement a certified environmental management system or other verifiable indication that the environmental impact of their operations is monitored and at an acceptable level. Compliance with the respective national laws and regulations is a minimum requirement for all operations throughout the production chain.


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US dollars / pound

Figure 5A-5 Price development of raw uranium during the years 1969–2008 (source: E.ON).

70 72 74

76

78

80 82

84

86

88

90 92

94 96

98

00

02

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06 08

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Nuclear fuel management costs The price of natural uranium on the global market is determined by supply and demand. The price of uranium has been affected in recent years by uncertainty regarding the availability of military sources of uranium, fresh production by new largescale mines in the current producer countries, and increasing fluctuation on the raw materials market. The price of raw uranium rose considerably during 2002–2007, but has since fallen (Figure 5A-5). The price increase was brought about by extensive stockpiling by actors throughout the market in face of continued price escalation. The 2008 price drop is due principally to overheating of the uranium market, in the wake of which speculators have switched focus to other raw materials and commodities. The overall rise in the price of uranium in recent years has triggered extensive exploration operations for uranium deposits around the world and investment in new mining operations. Re-commissioning of old mines is also in the planning. The sustained higher price level of uranium on the global market has in turn brought an increase in the amount of economically exploitable uranium resources. Nuclear fuel constitutes a minor share of the total cost of nuclear electricity production. At the current price level, the share of natural uranium of the total nuclear fuel cost is under one third. Some two thirds of the total fuel cost is derived from uranium conversion and enrichment and fuel assembly manufacture. Changes in the price of natural uranium therefore have no significant impact on the production costs of nuclear power, or on the profitability of the new Fennovoima nuclear power plant project.


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Nuclear power plant fuel and waste management Supplement 5B General description of Fennovoima’s plans and available methods for nuclear waste management


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Contents Summary .....................................................................................................................297 Introduction ................................................................................................................298 Low and medium-level nuclear waste management ................................................298 Plant waste ............................................................................................................298 Estimated level of plant waste production ..........................................................300 In-plant recovery, storage and treatment .............................................................301 Final disposal on site ............................................................................................303 Spent nuclear fuel management ................................................................................307 Spent nuclear fuel.................................................................................................307 Estimated spent nuclear fuel production level ...................................................308 On-site treatment and storage ..............................................................................311 Transportation to the final disposal site ..............................................................312 Final disposal ........................................................................................................313 Development and implementation of final disposal..........................................316 Direct final disposal alternatives ..........................................................................317 Management of nuclear plant decommissioning waste ...........................................318 Decommissioning of the nuclear power plant ...................................................318 Estimated quantity of decommissioning waste ..................................................319 Final disposal ........................................................................................................319 Provision for the cost of nuclear waste management ...............................................320


Supplement 5b

Summary

Fennovoima has the appropriate methods at its disposal for implementing the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s nuclear waste management. Fennovoima’s waste management plans are based on methods proven in Finland to be safe and appropriate for nuclear waste management. Fennovoima estimates that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will generate between 17,000 and 36,000 m3 of final disposal packaged low-level and mediumlevel reactor waste, and spent nuclear fuel equivalent to between 2,000 and 3,600 uranium tons during its 60-year service life. Sufficient facilities, equipment and other arrangements will be designed and implemented for the plant to assure the safe handling, treatment and storage of the nuclear materials needed by the plant and of the nuclear waste generated by its operations. Low and medium-level waste generated by plant operations and plant decommissioning will be treated, stored and disposed of on site. Spent nuclear fuel from the plant will also be treated and stored on site. Additionally, a final disposal facility for low and medium-level nuclear waste will be built on the power plant site. The disposal facility will consist of underground repositories, possible shallow-ground repositories for extremely low-level waste, and other connected auxiliary buildings and installations of the facility. Surveys conducted by Fennovoima have identified no factors that would preclude the construction of a final disposal facility for low and medium-level reactor waste at any of the proposed sites. The final disposal facility is estimated to begin operation in 2030. Spent nuclear fuel generated by the plant is planned to be disposed of at a common national final disposal facility to be built at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, Finland. Construction of a common spent fuel disposal facility for the Finnish nuclear industry is regarded in the government decision-in-principle passed in 2000 as serving the general interest of society. Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is estimated to begin at the earliest in 2050. As such, should the government alter the planned Olkiluoto repository’s status as a common national spent nuclear fuel final disposal repository, Fennovoima would still have at least 40 years to design a repository that fulfills long-term safety requirements, to obtain the necessary permits and to build the repository before the planned final disposal commences. After commissioning of the plant, Fennovoima will fulfill its obligations for financial provision for the cost of nuclear waste management by paying National Nuclear Waste Management Fund contributions in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act. The accrued funds will be used to ensure that the plant’s low and medium-level nuclear waste, spent nuclear fuel and decommissioning waste are managed in a safe and socially approved manner.

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Introduction In accordance with section 24, subsection 1(6h), of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), an application for a government decision-in-principle must be supplemented for each nuclear facility project with a general description of the applicant’s plans and available methods for implementing nuclear waste management. This report provides the required information referred to in the above-mentioned legislation regarding the nuclear fuel management of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. According to section 9 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the licensee of the nuclear power plant is responsible for plant waste management. As such, it is the licensee’s obligation to manage the recovery, storage, handling and final disposal of all nuclear waste generated by plant operations. From the outset of the project, Fennovoima has continued to duly plan and prepare in advance for the fulfillment of its future waste management obligations. Fennovoima‘s plans and available methods for implementing nuclear waste management are based primarily on the plans and available methods implemented by other nuclear power plants currently operating in Finland. Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the Fennovoima project will be subject to a government decision-in-principle from an early stage. According to the stipulations of the Nuclear Energy Act, no contractually-based plans for implementing nuclear waste management can be requested of the applicant during the decision-in-principle phase. The Nuclear Energy Act also makes provision for the fact that any prior implementation of economically binding and significant contracts may impede the ability of parliament and the government to make decisions regarding the decision-in-principle at their free discretion. This report provides information on the quality and quantity of nuclear waste generated by the project, the technical methods available for implementing nuclear waste management, as well as the advance measures put in place for managing the cost of waste management. An estimate of the costs of the project’s nuclear waste management is presented in Supplement 1B of the application, and an estimate of the significance of the project with regard to Finnish national nuclear waste management plans is presented in Supplement 2B of the application. The report separately covers the management of low and medium-level nuclear waste of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant, the management of spent nuclear fuel and the management of nuclear waste generated during decommissioning. Management of low and medium-level waste and plant decommissioning waste is to take place on-site. With regard to spent nuclear fuel management, Fennovoima plans to use, along with all other nuclear power plants in Finland, Finland’s common final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, in which case final disposal will be at the planned final disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki.

Low and medium-level nuclear waste management Plant waste Plant waste includes radioactive waste accumulated during the operation of the nuclear power plant excluding spent nuclear fuel, plant decommissioning waste, and high-active metal waste.


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The radioactive constituents of the plant waste originate mainly from the activation and corrosion of the structural materials of the nuclear reactor and the release of radioactive materials into the primary coolant circuit water via fuel cladding tube damage. The radioactive carbon isotope C-14 present in the plant waste is generated by oxygen and nitrogen neutron reactions in the reactor, and radioactive hydrogen isotope H-3 in the reactor coolant and control rods. Plant waste is generated during normal operation of the nuclear power plant, for example during handling of radioactive fluids and gases, and during maintenance and repair work within the controlled area. The controlled area refers to the area within the nuclear power plant, within which special safety regulations are enforced with respect to radiation protection and prevention of the spread of radioactive contamination. Access to the area is controlled. According to the Fennovoima plan, all waste generated within the controlled area of the nuclear power plant is considered nuclear waste according to the regulatory Guide YVL 8.2 (Clearance of Nuclear Waste and Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities) of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). If the radioactivity of waste or other material within the controlled area is found to be so low that the danger presented requires no special protective measures, said waste can, in accordance with STUK-approved protocol, be classified as non-nuclear waste and exempted from regulatory control. Plant waste is divided into the categories presented in Table 5B-1 on the basis of activity concentration. Pursuant to section 22 of the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility for Reactor Waste (736/2008), extremely low-level waste may be disposed of in shallow-ground repositories as opposed to bedrock. Although the category is not recognized as yet in the STUK regulations, extremely low-level waste is presented as a separate category in Table 5B-1 below. Category

Average activity concentration

Extremely low-level waste

under 0.1 MBq/kg

Required radiation protection Can be handled without special radiation protection

Low-level waste

under 1 MBq/kg

Can be handled without special radiation protection

Medium-level waste

under 10 GBq/kg

Handling requires effective radiation protection

In addition to the average activity concentration of the waste, the origin, physical form and method of treatment are also significant factors in regard to plant waste management. According to the STUK Guide YVL 8.3 (Treatment and Storage of Low and Intermediate Level Waste at a Nuclear Power Plant), based on these factors the following can be identified as separate plant waste types within each waste category: – Untreated waste which is stored at the plant before treatment and final disposal; – Packed waste which has been conditioned and enclosed in containers for storage or final disposal; – Dry waste, i.e. maintenance waste, such as paper, plastic, insulation material, cloth, wood, small metal items and ventilation filters arising mainly from repair and maintenance work;

Table 5B-1 Classification of plant waste on the basis of activity concentration.


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– wet waste and wastewater, consisting mainly of ion exchange resins, evaporator waste, corrosion sludges, charcoal sludges and decontamination slurries; – Contaminated metal waste, typically consisting of large decommissioned equipment or machinery with surface radioactive contamination. – Activated metal waste, consisting of neutron radiation activated components and devices removed from inside the reactor vessel.

Estimated level of plant waste production The amount of plant waste generated by the nuclear power plant’s operations is dependent on the plant type. In volume terms, a pressurized water reactor equipped power plant typically produces around 40% less waste per unit power generated than a boiling water reactor equipped plant. Factors independent of the nuclear reactor type which affect the quantity of waste generated include, for example, the treatment and packing techniques used, the operational and administrative practices employed, the nature of the plant wastewater sewerage and treatment systems, the age of the plant and the quantity of large-scale maintenance work carried out. In order to minimize the amount of accumulated maintenance waste within the controlled area, the bringing of non-essential materials into the controlled area is restricted and working methods that create little waste or easily manageable waste are used as far as possible within the controlled area. According to the Fennovoima plan, the amount of treated and final disposal packaged plant waste is measured on a volume (m3) basis. Use of volume-based measurement of the quantity of plant waste is appropriate for waste that is classified according to activity concentration. The quantity, category, type and total activity concentration of the waste must be taken into consideration at all phases of plant waste management, final disposal included. Table 5B-2 shows the estimated quantity per concentration class of plant waste generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project. The estimates are based on a 60-year plant service life. Table 5B-2 Estimated output of concrete-boxed plant waste during the planned service life of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant (m3).

Extremely low-level waste

Low-level waste

11,620

1 x 4,900 MW thermal power boiling water reactor 2 x 6,800 MW thermal power boiling water reactors

1 x 4,900 MW thermal power pressurized water reactor

Mediumlevel waste

Miscellaneous plant waste

Total

560

4,040

540

16,760

16,200

4,700

4,040

770

25,410

22,100

6,520

5,700

1,100

35,420

The estimates presented in Table 5B-2 are based on the waste production levels of nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden employing wet waste cementation and baler or drum compactor-based waste compaction. The estimates are made on the assumption that the waste is packaged in steel reinforced concrete boxes for bedrock silo final disposal. In the case of extremely low-level and low-level plant waste, bedrock and shallow ground final disposal does not necessarily require concrete-boxing of the waste, in which case the waste final disposal volumes will be lower than those presented in Table 5B-2.


Supplement 5b

In-plant recovery, storage and treatment The Nuclear Energy Act requires the nuclear power plant to have sufficient facilities, equipment and other arrangements in place to assure the safe handling, treatment and storage of the nuclear materials needed by the plant and of the nuclear waste generated by its operations. The plant waste treatment and storage facilities are an integral part of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s unit(s), and as such are subject to the same permit procedures as the nuclear power plant units themselves. Characterization According to the Fennovoima plan, plant waste is characterized, i.e. its properties measured and determined, at as early a phase as possible after its production. During characterization, e.g., the physical, chemical and radiological properties of the waste are determined. This data is then applied in the planning of nuclear waste management measures. The plant waste characterization system is designed so that the data collected for a given waste batch at the different phases of waste treatment follows the batch through all phases of waste management, from recovery to final disposal repository. This process is carried out by means of a data logging system which enters the waste batch treatment data into a database. The characterization and auditing processes ensure that plant waste management is carried out in accordance with the set requirements for all phases of waste management. Dry waste The dry waste generated in the controlled area is preliminarily sorted and collected e.g. in plastic sacks at each work location. If subsequent treatment of the waste permits, the waste can also be containerized for final disposal directly at the point of waste production. The waste is then forwarded from the work locations to the plant’s waste treatment or storage facilities. Waste that is not sorted at the site of production is sorted at the waste treatment facility according to its material properties and on the basis of an activity measurement. Low-level waste is usually packed in final disposal containers manually. To reduce radiation exposure of the personnel, remote controlled devices are used as necessary for the packing of medium-level waste. Compaction is a widely used method of effectively reducing the volume of radioactive waste. Compaction can reduce the volume of radioactive waste by anywhere between half and one tenth of its original volume. Compaction does not affect the radioactivity of the waste. Non-compressible radioactive waste, such as thick metal, concrete and hard plastics can be chopped to improve the filling degree of the final disposal container. Wet waste and wastewater Wet plant waste is generated primarily from the treatment of radioactive fluids and gases. The waste is recovered in connection with the treatment processes. Wet waste and wastewater are stored in specially designed containers. To minimize the amount of wet waste produced, water use within the controlled area is restricted and cleaning methods that produce as little as possible secondary waste are used. The leading principle of wet waste treatment is that waste types that differ distinctly

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in terms of chemical composition, activity concentration or nuclide composition are handled separately. If only minor amounts of a given waste type are accumulated, the waste can usually be mixed with other waste if mixing does not complicate subsequent treatment of the waste or weaken its stability during final disposal. In the choice of the wet waste treatment method, the set requirements for operational safety and final disposal must be taken into consideration. Wastewater generated at the power plant is cleaned of particles and dissolved materials as necessary. Standard wastewater cleaning methods include, e.g., mechanical filtration, ion exchange filtration and evaporation. The waste products of wastewater cleaning include ion exchange resins, evaporator concentrates, sludges and other wet waste. The wet waste is either dried, solidified in a binder, or soaked in a suitable medium, before packing in an appropriate final disposal container. Drying involves heating of the waste by an external heat source. Both drying and solidification can also take place in the final disposal container. Extremely low-level wet waste can also be dewatered before packing for final disposal. Dewatering involves decanting and straining to remove waste-bound water. The binder used for solidification is, e.g., ordinary cement. The quality of the waste end product can be improved by using additives. Other solidification methods used include thermal compaction and solidification in bitumen or plastic. Contaminated waste oils generated by the nuclear power plant are collected in a collecting tank. For oil collection and transportation, transfer tanks which are suitable for the purpose are used. As waste oil contamination consists almost exclusively of solid-bound corrosion products and easily separated water-soluble materials, they can be easily mechanically cleaned. The cleaning of waste oil is carried out, for example, by separating the water from the oil by decanting or settling in a collecting tank. The decanted oil is then filtered, if necessary, with a particle filter. Contaminated waste oil can be cleaned to a sufficiently low radioactive material content to enable it to be exempted from regulatory control and delivered for recycling or energy recovery. Metal waste Metal waste generated in the controlled area is recovered in connection with maintenance and repair work. In order to reduce the radioactivity of metal waste, contaminated and activated metal waste can be stored on the plant premises in sufficiently radiation-protective reservoirs or storage spaces prior to further treatment. At this stage, the contaminated metal waste can be cleaned of any loose radioactive materials if i) cleaning does not cause significant radiation exposure to the personnel, and ii) cleaning significantly reduces the risk of spread of radioactive materials, or iii) cleaning wholly exempts the object(s) from regulatory control. The volume of metal waste can be reduced before packing and storage by chopping or compressing. In the chopping and packing of metal waste, special attention is paid to preventing the spreading of radioactive materials and to assuring the radiation protection of personnel. Special equipment is used where necessary for the treatment and transportation of active waste, such as remote-controlled devices and thick-walled transportation containers. Metal waste is decontaminated if necessary by removing radioactive surface materials. Possible decontamination methods include, e.g., ultrasonic cleaning, pressure cleaning and blast-cleaning, as well as chemical or electrochemical methods. Melting is also a viable method of treatment of radioactive metal waste. During


Supplement 5b

melting, the majority of the radioactive materials contained in the metal waste gather in the slag, which can then be separated and treated. Radioactive materials which do not migrate to the slag become mixed evenly throughout the molten metal. The end product of the melting process, e.g. metal bars, can be exempted from regulatory control and recycled. In addition to the slag, the filters used for flue gas scrubbing, which constitute secondary waste, must be processed and disposed of as nuclear waste. Studsvik Nuclear AB in Sweden, for example, operates a waste metal melting facility suitable for this purpose, to which low-level metal scrap generated at the Fennovoima nuclear power plant can be sent for melting. Up to 95 percent of metal waste delivered to Studsvik Nuclear’s melting plant is freed from regulatory control after melting.

Final disposal on site A final disposal facility for low and medium-level nuclear waste will be built on the power plant site. The total activity of the nuclear waste materials to be disposed of at the final disposal facility will be in excess of 1 TBq, and thus meets the definition of extensive final disposal of radioactive waste as specified in section 3 of the Nuclear Energy Act and section 6 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. In accordance with section 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act, a plant waste final disposal facility is a separate nuclear facility. The plant waste final disposal facility is intended for the final disposal of the low and medium-level nuclear waste generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant. The repository may also be used for the disposal of radioactive waste generated elsewhere if the quality of the waste is compliant with the operational conditions of the plant, and if the quantity is minimal. Such radioactive waste is generated, for example, by hospitals. The radioactive waste final disposal facility consists of underground repositories and other auxiliary facilities, buildings and constructions which are closely linked to the operation of the final disposal facility. The final disposal facility may also include shallow ground disposal repositories intended for the disposal of extremely low-level waste. All facilities, buildings and constructions linked to the radioactive waste final disposal facility are wholly located within the designated power plant site. Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) has, upon commissioning by Fennovoima, surveyed the bedrock characteristics of the alternative sites. Fennovoima will commence the detailed geological surveys and other studies required for the planning of the final disposal facility in accordance with the survey plan drawn up for the alternative plant sites in 2009. Detailed design planning of the final disposal facility based on best available technologies will be initiated in good time prior to commissioning of the plant. In addition to the detailed design planning of the nuclear power plant unit(s), planning will also take into account the experiences obtained during the first stages of operation regarding the amount and quality of waste generated. According to Fennovoima’s estimation, an application for a construction permit for the final disposal facility, as specified in the Nuclear Energy Act, will be submitted at the earliest by 2022. In connection with the construction permit application, a safety assessment concerning the final disposal facility will be presented to STUK. Construction of the final disposal facility is scheduled to commence in around 2024. Plant waste final disposal operations would begin in approximately 2030. Facilities will be provided in the nuclear power plant unit(s) plans for the safe interim storage of waste

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accumulated during the period between start-up of the nuclear power plant and the start of final disposal operations. Release barriers The plant waste ground-disposal facility is designed to ensure that during normal operation emissions from radioactive materials to the environment remain negligible. The design also takes into account potential operational failures and accidents. The long-term safety of the radioactive waste final disposal facility is based on the use of multiple mutually protective release barriers which prevent and slow down the release of radioactive materials from the facility. The release barriers are designed to ensure that long-term safety is not jeopardized by failure of an individual technical release barrier or reasonably predictable geological changes in the bedrock. Technical release barriers include e.g. waste matrices, waste containers, special repository structures, buffer materials, backfill and engineered barrier structures. In underground disposal, the bedrock serves as a natural release barrier. Technical release barriers are designed for a functional service life of at least 500 years. After this period the bedrock itself serves as a sufficient release barrier. Structure and operation of underground repositories The underground repositories will be built in bedrock at a depth of at least 30 meters. Geological surveys of the bedrock characteristics at the proposed sites have identified no factors that would preclude the construction of the repositories. The precise location, structure and operating and safety principles of the underground repositories are described in detail in the construction permit application for the radioactive waste final disposal facility. The underground repositories intended for final disposal may be of the silo or vault type (Figure 5B-1). In both types, the repository will be injection sealed and, where necessary, reinforced with sprayed concrete. If necessary, a steel reinforced concrete lining can be installed in the medium-level waste repository, and the space between its outer surface and the bedrock filled with a water-impermeable material such as a mixture of crushed aggregate and bentonite clay. The repositories will be kept empty of groundwater during their operational service life. Waste packages will be transported into the repository by carrier via the access tunnel and transferred to the final disposal site by carrier or overhead crane. Radiation protection and/or remote-controlled devices will be used for waste package transportation and transfer as necessary. The order of filling of the repositories is planned to ensure that the overall radiation level of each repository is as low as possible. A log will be maintained of all waste packages delivered to the final disposal facility. The package-specific log data includes, at minimum, the waste type, treatment and packing method, and structural and material properties that are of key importance in respect to safe final disposal, the package ID and repository location, as well as the activity of the most significant nuclides from the point of view of radiation safety, stating their estimated maximum overall activity limits within the repository. Fennovoima estimates the total required volume of underground repositories for final disposal of plant waste at approximately 38,000–55,000 m3 excluding the access tunnel and auxiliary facilities. The required volume depends on the chosen repository type and the packing method used. The required volume for possible separate shallow ground disposal repositories for extremely low-level waste will be approximately half


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Figure 5B-1 Layout of the plant waste final disposal facility’s underground repository facility

of the above figure. The above estimates do not include final disposal of waste generated from decommissioning of the nuclear power plant unit(s). Experiences gained from operational underground repositories worldwide demonstrate the safety of this method of final disposal. Of Finland’s two nuclear power plants, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is equipped with a silo-type low and medium-level nuclear waste final disposal facility, and the Loviisa nuclear power plant with a cavern/vault-type final disposal facility. The repositories at both plants are located at a depth of about 100 meters. Structure and operation of shallow ground repositories Shallow ground disposal can be an appropriate and efficient waste management solution option for extremely low-level waste. The method is permitted only for waste which will decrease in radioactivity within a 500 year period to a level that is negligible in terms of safety. The method used in Sweden, for example, involves the storage of the least active portion of dry plant waste on-site in a shallow ground repository. Shallow ground repositories for extremely low-level waste are currently operational, for example, in Morvillier in France and Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals in Sweden. Experiences gained from these facilities show this method of final disposal for extremely low-level waste to be technically viable and safe. Finland’s Olkiluoto nuclear power plant operates a surface final disposal site for waste that is exempted from regulatory control on a case-specific basis. According to the Fennovoima plan, extremely low-level waste for shallow ground


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disposal is to be treated at the plant in the manner described in the above section “In-plant recovery, storage and treatment”. Non-compressible waste would be packed, e.g., freight containers, steel boxes or steel drums. Compressible waste would be baled, bound and plastic-wrapped and, if necessary, packed into freight containers. Shallow-ground repositories are isolated from the biosphere by ensuring that the waste does not come into contact with groundwater, surface water, runoff water or rainwater. This can be achieved, for example, with the structure shown in Figure 5B-2, in which the waste is protected from above and on all sides by an absorptive layer, leveling course, weatherproof sealing layer, drainage course and protective outer shell. A watertight basement slab prevents water leakage from the repository, and possible leakage water is collected from the basement slab in a controlled manner for monitoring and, if necessary, purification purposes. To prevent entry of groundwater, surface water and runoff water into the repositories, the repositories are situated at a sufficient height and a drainage course is laid beneath the basement slab. The repository will be operational once the basement slab, supply routes and control systems, such as groundwater measurement, are installed. The repositories will be used in connection with scheduled waste transfers whereby the extremely low-level waste accumulated, e.g., over a 2–5 year period is transferred to the repository in a single transfer operation. Between final disposal transfers, the repository is temporarily closed by the sealing layer, drainage course and protective outer shell. Fennovoima has designed the shallow-ground repository as part of the final disposal facility and with a design capacity of approx. 13,000 m3. The volume capacity deviates from the estimated waste final disposal volumes presented in Table 5B-2 because extremely low-level plant waste does not require concrete-boxing for shallow ground final disposal. To accommodate this amount of waste, the repository would require an area of about 0.4 hectares. Figure 5B-2 Structure of a shallowground final disposal repository for extremely low-level plant waste.

The principal limiting factor regarding the capacity of the shallow ground final disposal repository is the overall radioactivity and nuclide-specific activity limits of the


Supplement 5b

waste stored within it. The total activity of the shallow-ground repositories will be limited to a maximum of 1 TBq, i.e. the limit set by nuclear energy legislation regarding extensive disposal of nuclear waste. The repository can be used as a safe final disposal site also for plant waste which is exemptible from regulatory control on grounds of its radioactivity level, but which has no reuse value and for which transportation and disposal at a public landfill site would be difficult or otherwise detrimental. Final disposal of this type of waste is not included in the shallow ground repository capacity estimate presented above. The other disposal alternative for extremely low-level waste is underground disposal. The cost of underground disposal is nevertheless high in proportion to the minor danger caused by extremely low-level waste to people and the environment.

Spent nuclear fuel management Spent nuclear fuel The energy generation of a nuclear power plant is based on the splitting of atomic nuclei in self-sustaining chain reactions i.e. fission. In fission, the heavy atomic nucleus, with light water reactors generally the uranium isotope U-235 contained in the nuclear fuel, splits into two lighter atomic nuclei, i.e. nuclides. These so-called fission products are radioactive. Nuclear fuel will be used in the light water reactors assessed by Fennovoima’s feasibility studies for four to five years. Nuclear fuel which has remained in the reactor for a long time contains a significant amount of fission products. The spent nuclear fuel also contains actinides, i.e. the heavy nuclides formed from the U-238 uranium isotope in the neutron radiation conditions of the reactor. A key actinide is plutonium, the isotopes of which are fissionable and participate in the reactor’s energy production. In addition to fission products and actinides, spent nuclear fuel contains nuclides which have become radioactive through activation. The nuclear fuel used in light water reactors is pure uranium dioxide, UO2. The uranium consists of 3–5 percent isotope U-235, and 95-97 percent isotope U-238. The phases of nuclear fuel production are described in more detail in Supplement 5A. In the fission reactions, part of the uranium decomposes or converts to other nuclides giving the typical spent fuel isotope content shown in Figure 5B-3. The level of radioactivity of the spent nuclear fuel depends on the amount of energy that was produced from it. The longer the fuel is kept in the reactor, the more radioactive materials accumulate in it as a result of the fissions and other nuclear reactions that occur in the reactor. Fresh nuclear fuel is only very weakly radioactive and can be handled manually without risk of harmful radiation exposure. Spent nuclear fuel is hazardous to people and the environment due to its high radioactivity. Spent nuclear fuel must be kept isolated from people and the biosphere until its radioactivity has returned to a safe level due to radioactive decay. The radioactivity of spent nuclear fuel initially drops rapidly. Figure 5B-4 shows the relative decay heat power of spent nuclear fuel, i.e. the thermal power produced by radioactive decay of the fuel after the nuclear chain reaction is stopped, relative to the heat power produced by the nuclear fuel in the functioning nuclear reactor. The cooling time refers to the period of time elapsed since the chain reaction was stopped.

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Figure 5B-3 Composition of fresh and spent nuclear fuel.

Unspent nuclear fuel

4 % U-235

0,9 % U-235 0,4 % U-236 3,5 % Fission products 1 % Plutonium

96 % U-238

94 % U-238

Spent nuclear fuel

The actinides contained in the spent fuel are extremely long-lived, and so controlled long-term storage of the spent nuclear fuel cannot be considered an adequate means of keeping the fuel isolated from people or the environment. Spent nuclear fuel must therefore be stored permanently, i.e. in a final disposal repository. In Finland, deep final disposal in bedrock is considered in terms of current technology as being an acceptable means of fulfilling the waste management obligation.

Estimated spent nuclear fuel production level The amount of spent fuel generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will depend on the following key factors: – the thermal power output of the plant; – the degree of “burn-up” of the fuel, i.e. the amount of energy extracted from the nuclear fuel; – the degree of enrichment of the nuclear fuel, i.e. its U-235 content; and – the number of unscheduled fuel changes. The highest safe thermal power of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant depends essentially on the design of its nuclear reactors. In Finland, the maximum allowable thermal power output for each nuclear power plant is determined by government decision-in-principle in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, and on the basis of the plant construction and operating licenses. The amount of spent fuel generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is not dependent on whether the plant is a pressurized water reactor plant or a boiling water reactor plant. The amount of spent nuclear fuel depends on how effectively the fissionable nuclides generated during the chain reactions and which are contained in the nuclear fuel are utilized in energy production. The principal variable describing the use efficiency of nuclear fuel is the degree of “burn-up”, i.e. the amount of heat energy produced in the nuclear reactor per initial unit of fuel weight. As the burn-up increases, the amount of fuel required to produce the same amount of energy decreases. In practice, achieving higher degree of burn-up requires a higher degree of enrichment. Use of high burn-up and enrichment levels affects the behavior of the nuclear


Supplement 5b

309

Cooling time (seconds)

Relative decay heat power

0,0

7

7

3*10

7

6*10

9*10

1,2*108

1,5*108

1,8*108

2,1*108

2,4*108

2,7*108

3,0*108

1

100 %

10-1

10 %

Reactor building fuel pool

Spent nuclear fuel storage facility

10-2

1%

10-3

0,1 %

10-4

0,01 %

10-5

0,001 % 0

1

2

3

Decay heat power

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Cooling time (years)

Cooling time (seconds) 109

1010

1011

1012

1013

Relative decay heat power

10-4 10-5 10-6

Final disposal in bedrock 10-7 10-8 10-9 10-10 10

100

1 000

10 000

100 000

1 000 000

Cooling time (years) Decay heat power Point of continuation of decay heat power curve (from the above chart)

reactor and the ďŹ nal disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. Raising the burn-up level of nuclear power plants operating in Finland from the nationally approved level requires STUK approval. Instances of unplanned nuclear fuel replacement also affect the amount of spent nuclear fuel that is generated. The faultless condition of the nuclear fuel is a fundamental precondition for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Possible faults in the nuclear fuel can lead to premature ďŹ nal removal of the fuel from the nuclear reactor, in which case the amount of spent nuclear fuel generated will be higher than anticipated. Due to stringent quality and safety requirements, fuel failures are extremely rare in practice. When they do occur, they tend to affect only a single fuel assembly

Figure 5B-4 Decay heat of spent nuclear fuel relative to the thermal power of nuclear fuel during normal operation.


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or a few assemblies at most, and so their effect on overall spent nuclear fuel production is minor. The quantity of spent nuclear fuel is measured in uranium tons. Uranium ton refers to the amount of spent nuclear fuel of which the combined total mass of uranium isotopes U-235 and U-238 was 1,000 kg prior to use of the nuclear fuel in the nuclear reactor for energy production. Spent nuclear fuel contains slightly less uranium than fresh nuclear fuel due to fissions and other nuclear reactions. In normal operating conditions, light water reactors are shut down once a year for refueling and maintenance, during which a third to one fifth of the spent nuclear fuel in the reactor is replaced with fresh fuel. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant will thus produce over a 3–5 year period one full reactor core’s worth of spent nuclear fuel. A lower annual amount of rechargeable nuclear fuel would require a higher average degree of burn-up. The maximum thermal power output of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant will be 6,800 MW. Fennovoima intends to operate the plant year-round at full capacity. The only exceptions to the operating schedule will be the annual refueling and maintenance shutdowns and limited restrictions on plant operations required by the plant’s technical safety specifications, such as during periodic testing of plant safety systems. At the Fennovoima nuclear power plant the degree of nuclear fuel burn-up will be designed to ensure that safe and efficient operations are achieved using a moderate amount of nuclear fuel. Table 5B-4 shows the estimated quantity of spent fuel generated by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project. The estimates are based on a 60-year plant service life.

On-site treatment and storage The on-site treatment and storage of the plant’s spent nuclear fuel is an integral practical aspect of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s operations. The treatment and storage of spent nuclear fuel observes principally the same nuclear and radiation safety principles and radiation exposure limits as for Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s main operations. The collective dose commitment limit per individual arising in any period of one year from normal plant operations, including handling and storage of spent fuel, is 0.1 mSv. The key safety criteria with respect to the treatment and storage of spent nuclear fuel include: – the integrity of the nuclear fuel assemblies and tightness of nuclear fuel rods is ensured; – the radiation protection arrangements are effective; – sufficient cooling of the nuclear fuel is ensured; and Table 5B-3 Estimated spent nuclear fuel output during the service life of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant..

Project

Amount of spent nuclear fuel (uranium tons)

One nuclear power plant unit, thermal power output: 4,900 MW

2,000

Two nuclear power plant units, thermal power output: 6,800 MW

3,600


Supplement 5b

– the formation of critical concentrations of nuclear fuel is prevented. The nuclear fuel pellets are packed in gas-tight protective cladding and arranged as nuclear fuel assemblies in the manner presented in Supplement 5A of the application. The handling of nuclear fuel in the nuclear reactor or its removal from the reactor causes no release of radioactive materials into the environment. The nuclear fuel assemblies are moved one at a time using a remote-controlled fuel charging machine. Spent nuclear fuel assemblies are transferred from the reactor to fuel pools located in the reactor building using a fuel charging machine. In the pools, the spent nuclear fuel is surrounded by several meters of water which serves as a shield against the radiation emitted by the spent nuclear fuel and as a coolant, removing the decay heat generated by the fuel. Spent nuclear fuel is typically stored in fuel pools in the reactor building or the nuclear fuel building for one to three years until the radioactivity and decay heat of the fuel (Figure 5A-3) have both fallen sufficiently enough to facilitate handling and transfer of the fuel to a separate spent fuel repository. The capacity of the reactor building’s fuel pools will be sufficient to accommodate the equivalent amount of spent nuclear fuel produced during approximately 10 years of normal plant operations. Once sufficiently cooled in the fuel pools, the spent nuclear fuel is moved by means of a purpose-designed spent fuel transfer container to a spent fuel repository which is located on the power plant site and is functionally connected to the power plant unit(s). The spent fuel will be stored on the power plant site until spent fuel final disposal operations commence. As planned, the spent fuel will be stored on site for at least 20–40 years. The radioactivity of the spent nuclear fuel will decrease during this storage period, therefore facilitating treatment and handling of the fuel prior to final disposal. The spent nuclear fuel storage facility will consist of either a pool repository or dry repository. In the pool type repository, the spent nuclear fuel will be stored in deep water in the same manner as in the reactor building and nuclear fuel building fuel pools. The pools used for the treatment and storage of spent nuclear fuel will be equipped with radioactivity monitoring and purification systems. In the dry repository, the spent nuclear fuel will be stored packed in thick-walled and airtight metal or concrete containers. The massive structure of the containers used mitigates the radiation emitted by the spent fuel and conveys the fuel’s decay heat to the outer surface of the container and thus to the outside air of the repository. Due to radiation shielding and radiation monitoring, personnel are, under normal operating conditions, able to work within the spent fuel treatment and storage facility. At all the stages of fresh and spent nuclear fuel management it is essential to ensure that the possibility of an uncontrolled fission chain reaction is eliminated, i.e. that the nuclear fuel is in a subcritical state. The nuclear fuel transfer containers, storage facilities, treatment equipment and final disposal canisters are all designed and built to prevent the formation of critical nuclear fuel concentrations. The air spaces surrounding the spent fuel treatment and storage facilities are equipped with air conditioning and filtration systems. The systems ensure that the levels of radioactive materials within the facilities and the surrounding environment present no danger and do not exceed the set operational limits. Suitable facilities and repositories for the treatment and storage of spent nuclear fuel will be designed and built for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant in accordance with nuclear energy legislation and government regulations. The safety solutions will

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be presented and their compliance with safety requirements described in detail in connection with the plant construction license application. The spent nuclear fuel interim storage capacity of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is designed to ensure that spent nuclear fuel produced by the plant can be stored safely on the plant site prior to its final disposal.

Transportation to the final disposal site Considerable experience of spent nuclear fuel transportation was obtained in Finland during 1981–1996 when a total of around 330 uranium tons of spent fuel from the Loviisa nuclear power plant was transported by road and railway to the former Soviet Union and Russia. The shipping of spent nuclear fuel ended in 1994 with the coming into force of the section 6a amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act, which effectively banned the import and export of nuclear waste. Experience of international road, rail and sea transportation of spent nuclear fuel nevertheless goes back several decades. The transportation methods used are widely practiced and safe. Transportation of nuclear waste within Finland is subject to license in accordance with the general dangerous goods transportation regulations and nuclear energy use related regulations. Nuclear waste transportation is also subject to the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act. A license to transport nuclear waste is granted by STUK in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988). Regulations concerning the transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear waste are presented in Guide YVL 6.5 (Transport of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Waste) published by STUK. The transportation license application includes information regarding, e.g., the quality and quantity of the waste to be transported, the transport method, route and time, physical protection and emergency preparedness arrangements and damage liability arrangements in case of nuclear damage. The spent nuclear fuel from the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is transportable from each of the alternative sites to the final disposal site by road, rail or sea transportation or a combination of these. Detailed transportation safety assessments shall be conducted once the location of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant and the methods of transportation have been chosen. The transportation of spent nuclear fuel from the Fennovoima nuclear power plant site to the final disposal site can be implemented ensuring that the total environmental effects and safety risks caused by transportation remain negligible. Spent nuclear fuel intended for road transportation will be packed in purpose-designed transportation containers in compliance with radiation protection requirements. The containers are designed and tested for resistance to external loading caused, for example, by possible impact, falling or fire. Each transportation container typically holds around 10 uranium tons worth of nuclear fuel. Road transportation will be carried out using vehicles and equipment that are compliant with dangerous goods transportation regulations. The same regulations will also be observed in the choice of road transportation routes. Sea transportation of spent nuclear fuel will involve road transportation during the loading of the transportation vessel. With respect to safety requirements, the same transportation container can be used for both road and sea transportation. This also eliminates the need to transfer the fuel from one container to another during transportation.


Supplement 5b

Final disposal Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy Act requires that nuclear waste is managed so that the radiation exposure limits set during final disposal are also not exceeded subsequent to final disposal. Permanent disposal of nuclear waste shall be planned with due regard to safety and so that no monitoring of the disposal site is required for ensuring long-term safety. In Finland, direct disposal in bedrock is regarded by government decision-in-principle as serving the general interest of society with respect to the management of spent nuclear fuel. Underground disposal is internationally regarded as the preferred method of long-lived high-level nuclear waste management due to the extremely stable conditions of bedrock repositories in comparison to aboveground repositories. Direct disposal means that the spent fuel is not reused as raw material, e.g., for the production of new nuclear fuel, but is permanently disposed of directly after interim storage on site. The safety regulations regarding underground final disposal of nuclear waste are prescribed in the Government Decree on General Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility for Reactor Waste (736/2008). The decree contains general regulations regarding the safe operation of final disposal related facilities and the long-term safety of final disposal. A general description of the method of underground final disposal for spent nuclear fuel is presented below. The method, known as the KBS-3 method, is based on the use of several successive radioactive material release barriers. Construction of a national final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, Finland, in accordance with the method presented below is regarded by the government decisionin-principle passed in 2000 as serving the general interest of society. Release barriers Protection from the radiation produced by the spent nuclear fuel can be achieved with sufficiently thick layers of retardant material. The central aim of spent nuclear fuel final disposal is to ensure long-term safety, i.e. to prevent for a sufficiently long period of time the release of the radioactive materials contained in the nuclear fuel into the environment. In the KBS-3 method, the radioactive materials contained in the spent fuel are isolated from the environment by means of several successive and mutually protective passive release barriers (Figure 5B-5). The release barriers are illustrated in the figure below. The release barriers are designed to ensure that the long-term safety of the final disposal facility cannot be jeopardized by failure of an individual release barrier or by reasonably predictable geological changes. A significant release of radioactive materials into the environment could only occur in the event of fundamental failure of all of the release barriers. The radioactive uranium dioxide pellets which form the core of each nuclear fuel rod are wholly encapsulated within in a tube of gas-tight protective cladding. The uranium dioxide fuel is a ceramic substance which effectively binds the solid radioactive fission products and actinides of uranium together. The first actual release barrier of the KBS-3 method is the final disposal canister. The canister’s thick copper cladding makes it extremely resistant to oxidization. The canister’s strong cast-iron insert gives it sufficient mechanical durability to withstand

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314

geological stresses within the rock. If the protective cladding around the nuclear fuel loses its tightness, the radioactive materials will remain contained within the final disposal canister as long as the copper outer cladding remains intact. In the predicted final disposal conditions, the copper cladding is estimated to remain functional for at least 100,000 years, and in extremely unfavorable conditions for at least 1,000 years. The second release barrier consists of a layer of bentonite clay between the final disposal canister and the bedrock. Bentonite is a non-toxic clay which is capable of absorbing substantial amounts of water. As it absorbs water the clay swells considerably and becomes extremely impermeable to water. This property of the bentonite clay layer significantly reduces the risk of exposure of the final disposal canister to possible groundwater seepage into the repository.

Fuel rod cladding tube

Spent nuclear fuel assembly

Bentonite clay

Aboveground repositories of the radioactive waste final disposal facility

Figure 5B-5 Radioactive material release barriers of the KBS-3 repository method. 500 m

Nuclear fuel pellet

Final disposal capsule

Bedrock

Underground repositories of the radioactive waste final disposal facility

If the final disposal canister and the nuclear fuel both lose their tightness, the bentonite clay will serve as a surrounding filter, significantly slowing the release of radioactive materials. Due to its above-mentioned properties, bentonite clay is used widely in the construction industry for sealing and watertightness. The clay is also used, for example, as a protective bedding layer for landfill sites to prevent leaching of toxic substances into the soil and surrounding environment. The third, final release barrier of the KBS-3 repository is the bedrock itself. The repositories are designed to be built at a depth of around 500 meters, which guarantees stable mechanical and chemical repository conditions over the extreme long-term. If all of the other release barriers become compromised, deep disposal will significantly slow the release of radioactive materials to the surface ground or to surface water systems. Sound Finnish bedrock is well suited to disposal of nuclear waste due to its high stability and water impermeability. The choice of precise location and depth of the repositories will be made based on the local characteristics of the bedrock. The main factors taken into consideration in-


Supplement 5b

clude the rock type and structural properties, hydrogeology, groundwater chemistry and the rock condition. Final disposal procedures Before the spent nuclear fuel can be transported into the bedrock repository for final disposal, it must be encapsulated at an encapsulation plant (Figure 5B-6) located on the final disposal site. At the encapsulation plant, the spent nuclear fuel assemblies are placed whole and structurally intact into a final disposal canister. A single disposal canister accommodates several nuclear fuel assemblies. In addition to the size of the nuclear fuel assemblies, the number of assemblies that can be contained in a single canister is limited by the decay heat produced by the spent fuel, as the surface temperature of the enclosed canister must not rise too high. The canister lid is sealed in place using a friction-welding method developed for this purpose which guarantees the same durability of the lid weld as the outer shell of the canister. The sealed canister is totally airtight. The quality of the weld is verified using non-destructive test methods. After welding, each canister is checked to ensure its outer surface is free of radioactive materials. In the repository, the canister is placed in a transportation device which transfers the canister to the deep repository tunnel system and to its ready bentonite clay lined deposition hole. The device then lowers the canister into the deposition hole. Finally, the deposition hole is capped with bentonite clay. The design and excavation of the underground tunnel, shaft and repository system are executed in a manner which facilitates and in no way endangers the final disposal operations. When deposition is completed, each repository tunnel is filled with a mixture of bentonite clay and aggregate derived from excavation of the tunnel system. Once all final disposal operations are completed, all of the underground shafts and tunnels of the facility will be filled in the same manner, and the entire final disposal facility closed down. The spent nuclear fuel final disposal operations are considered finally completed upon verification and approval by STUK. The waste management obligation of the licensee regarding the spent nuclear fuel expires after final disposal of nuclear waste has been carried out and the licensee has paid a lump sum to the State for the monitoring and control of the nuclear waste. Responsibility for management of the disposed nuclear waste thereafter transfers to the State.

Development and implementation of final disposal The KBS-3 method of spent nuclear fuel final disposal described above was developed by Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB) (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB) of Sweden, which is jointly owned by Sweden’s four nuclear power companies. As one of Fennovoima’ s owners, E.ON Nordic AB, is a co-owner of SKB, Fennovoima is well positioned to follow the developments of the KBS-3 model. Posiva Oy plans to use the same method for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel from Finnish power plants at the planned Olkiluoto facility in Eurajoki. Fennovoima plans to develop and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel together with other Finnish operators that are under a nuclear waste management obligation. Fennovoima regards the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel as a matter of vital

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Encapsulation plant Exhaust air plant Excavated material banking area

Figure 5B-6 Layout of a spent nuclear fuel final disposal facility.

Access tunnel Ventilation shafts

Lift shaft Bypass shaft Underground technical facilities Final disposal repositories

importance to society and considers cooperation between nuclear energy producers as providing the best guarantee of the safe final disposal of nuclear waste and efficient use of resources. Decisions made to date by the Finnish government have set a goal of establishing a single common site and method for the management of spent nuclear fuel produced by nuclear power plants in Finland. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant is scheduled to begin operations by 2020. Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the plant is estimated to begin at the earliest in 2050. If political decisions are taken in the future which alter the planned Olkiluoto repository’s status as a common national final disposal repository for spent nuclear fuel, Fennovoima would still have at least 40 years to design a repository based on the KBS 3 method or other method that fulfills long-term safety requirements, to obtain the necessary permits and to build the repository before the planned final disposal commences. Following the decision-in principle, the Nuclear Energy Act requires the licensee to ensure sufficient provision for the implementation of nuclear waste management. A precondition for the granting of a construction license and operating license for the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is that the plant’s methods for implementing nuclear waste management are sufficient and appropriate to the task. The multi-phased license procedure ensures that the implementation of nuclear waste management complies with regulations. The political decisions made in Finland since the 1980s related to the choice of


Supplement 5b

spent nuclear fuel final disposal method and single common final disposal site and the grounds for these decisions are described in Supplement 2B of the application.

Direct final disposal alternatives In accordance with section 26 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, for the decision-in-principle the Ministry of Trade and Industry must submit to the government a review of the methods of nuclear waste management that are currently applied and planned. Several alternatives to the planned direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel of nuclear power plants operating in Finland have been presented in different countries. These options are typically subject to the specific conditions, needs and legislation of the host country in question. The main alternatives are presented in brief below. Controlled long-term storage The properties of ordinary spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors is such that long-term storage over a period of decades can be safely implemented, for example, in pools or dry repositories. The safety of long-term storage can be guaranteed by maintaining suitable storage conditions in the repository, ensuring sufficient transfer of decay heat from the spent fuel to the environment, and by protecting the spent fuel from external threat factors. The radioactivity of the nuclear fuel falls during storage, thus facilitating subsequent handling and disposal. Long-term storage is used as a spent nuclear fuel management option for example in situations where no approved solution or schedule for the disposal of the waste has yet been achieved. Long-term storage may also be chosen as an interim solution while awaiting the development of applicable treatment methods, such as reprocessing or transmutation, with which the quantity and quality of high-level nuclear waste can be improved. One of the key drawbacks of long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel is the need for continuous monitoring. Long-term storage is only a temporary waste management solution. In the absence of decision-making regarding the final treatment and disposal of nuclear fuel, long-term storage can unnecessarily transfer the nuclear waste management burden on to future generations. Controlled long-term storage is not regarded as an acceptable method of nuclear waste management in Finland. Reprocessing and recycling Spent nuclear fuel contains high levels of fissionable isotopes which can be recycled and utilized for energy production in standard light water reactors. So-called fourth generation nuclear reactors may, in the future, have the capacity to utilize other actinides contained in spent nuclear fuel for energy production. The recycling of spent nuclear fuel requires reprocessing of the spent fuel. During reprocessing, desirable materials are chemically separated and recovered from the spent fuel. Although the quantity of disposable high-level nuclear waste is significantly reduced as a result, reprocessing does not totally eliminate the need for high-level nuclear waste disposal. Commercial spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants currently operate in France, Great Britain, Russia and Japan. Uranium and plutonium derived from reprocessed nuclear fuel are used, e.g. in France and Great Britain, for the production of so-called mixed

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oxide nuclear fuel. Fennovoima does not plan to engage in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel produced by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant’s operations or in the use of mixed oxide fuel. The delivery of spent nuclear fuel to reprocessing plants abroad is not possible as Finnish legislation forbids cross-border transportation of spent fuel. Transmutation In nuclear transmutation, spent nuclear fuel is irradiated to reduce the volume and hazard of high-level nuclear waste prior to final disposal. Transmutation splits longlived actinides into harmless nuclides. As a result, the radioactivity of the nuclear waste produced by the transmutation process decreases at a much faster rate than untreated spent fuel. Transmutation does not, however, totally eliminate the need for final disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The transmutation method is still currently in the research and development phase, and no transmutation plants capable of large-scale treatment of nuclear waste have yet been built.

Management of nuclear plant decommissioning waste Decommissioning of the nuclear power plant Decommissioning waste consists of radioactive waste generated during post-demolition of a nuclear power plant. After permanent operational shut-down, the plant’s structures, systems and equipment will still contain radioactive materials. These primarily originate from either migration of radioactive materials or material activation. Plant demolition can be carried out either immediately after plant closure or after a controlled delay period. Immediate decommissioning involves the demolition of all radioactive systems and the removal of all demolition materials as soon as possible after plant operations are terminated. In delayed decommissioning, demolition is delayed for an interim period to allow the level of radioactivity of the plant materials to decrease prior to demolition. The lower radioactivity facilitates the subsequent demolition operation. Decommissioning waste is classified using the same principles as for plant waste. However, during decommissioning large quantities of waste are generated which either do not meet the criteria of ordinary plant waste in terms of properties, or which constitute a minimal fraction of the total volume of plant waste. Such waste includes, e.g., activated steel and concrete, contaminated ferrite steel and other steel and contaminated concrete and insulation materials. Preparations for decommissioning of the nuclear power plant are begun from day one of plant operations in the form of advance planning and economic measures. Additionally, the power plant licensee is obliged to draw up a STUK-approved plant decommissioning plan which must be updated every five years. The decommissioning plan contains an estimate of the amount and quality of waste generated during decommissioning, as well as a description of the methods used to implement the decommissioning, including treatment and final disposal of decommissioning waste. The decommissioning plan provides an estimate of personnel radiation exposure levels.


Supplement 5b

Fennovoima has ready access to the required plant decommissioning planning expertise, as E.ON is currently conducting the controlled decommissioning and dismantlement of the Stade and Würgassen nuclear power plants in Germany. The planned service life of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is 60 years. If decommissioning is begun directly after permanent shut-down of the plant, decommissioning of the plant would commence at the earliest in 2080.

Estimated quantity of decommissioning waste As the final plant design has yet to be determined, the amount of waste generated by decommissioning of the plant can only be indicatively estimated in the absence of detailed structural and design information. Fennovoima’s speculative estimate for the total quantity of decommissioning waste is presented in Table 5B-4.

Final disposal The majority of decommissioning waste can be disposed of along with plant waste in the on-site final disposal facility. The final disposal facility’s repositories are designed to also accommodate the waste generated from decommissioning of the plant. Safety requirements may require the final disposal of highly activated metal decommissioning waste in separate repositories built alongside the plant waste disposal facility or in the spent nuclear fuel repositories. However, the significance of this metal waste is minimal with respect to overall nuclear waste management.

Provision for the cost of nuclear waste management According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the holder of the nuclear power plant’s construction or operating license, as the party with the obligation for waste management, is responsible for all costs arising from the appropriate management and preparation of nuclear waste generated as a result of the operations of the plant. Fennovoima’s estimate of the cost of nuclear waste management is presented in Supplement 1B of the application, under the section “Financing of nuclear waste management and decommissioning”. This report describes how Fennovoima will make provision for the cost of nuclear waste management in accordance with the regulations prescribed in chapter 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. The implementation of nuclear waste management at the financial expense of the licensee who is responsible for producing the waste guarantees that nuclear waste management is not left as an economic burden for future generations. To ensure this in Finland, a system of financial provision has been established by which the necessary funding for nuclear waste management is secured irrespective of the operational or financial status of the licensee who is responsible for waste management. The majority of nuclear waste management costs accumulate after the waste is produced. Plant decommissioning costs, in particular, only materialize after the plant has ceased operating. The licensee responsible for waste management is obligated to make financial provision for all nuclear waste management related costs, plant decommis-

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320

Table 5B-4 Speculative estimate of radioactive waste output during decommissioning of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant (m3).

Application for a government decision-in-principle • Fennovoima

1 x 4,900 MW thermal power pressurized water reactor

1 x 4,900 MW thermal power boiling water reactor

2 x 6,800 MW thermal power boiling water reactors

Plant waste

1,800

3,000

4,100

Activated steel

1,100

2,700

3,800

Contaminated ferrite steel

4,400

7,200

10,000

Other contaminated steel

2,000

3,300

4,600

600

1,400

1,900

Contaminated concrete

1,100

1,800

2,500

Contaminated insulation materials

270

400

600

11,270

19,800

27,500

Activated concrete

Total

sioning costs included. This obligation secures the provision of adequate funding for nuclear waste management, allocates the cost of waste management to the producer of the waste, and ensures that the cost of waste management is incorporated as an integral part of the electricity production costs of the plant. Funding for nuclear waste management is collected from the licensee responsible for waste management in proportion to the amount of nuclear waste they produce. The licensee fulfills its financial provision obligation by paying contributions each calendar year to the state budget independent National Nuclear Waste Management Fund administered by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. This ensures the availability of sufficient funds to cover the total waste management financing obligation of the licensee. The licensee’s total waste management financing obligation comprises the estimated future cost of management of all of the nuclear waste produced by the licensee to date. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy annually approves the total waste management financing obligation of the licensee responsible for nuclear waste management based on the nuclear waste management solutions presented by the licensee, which are subject to the conditions referred to in chapter 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act regarding the overall good of society, safety, nuclear waste management and physical protection and emergency planning arrangements. The waste management financing obligation varies annually due, e.g., to changes in the level of nuclear waste managed, improved nuclear waste management procedures, technical developments in nuclear waste management, and cost level variations. As a licensee, Fennovoima will fulfill its obligations for financial provision for the cost of nuclear waste management and to pay National Nuclear Waste Management Fund contributions and, in so doing, will ensure that the low and medium-level nuclear waste, spent nuclear fuel and decommissioning waste produced by the Fennovoima nuclear power plant is managed in a safe and socially approved manner.


Supplement 5b

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Lรถnnberg Painot Oy, Helsinki 2009

Profile for Fennovoima

Application for a Decision-in-Principle  

Application for a Government Decision-in-Principle Regarding the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant as referred to in Section 11 of the N...

Application for a Decision-in-Principle  

Application for a Government Decision-in-Principle Regarding the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant as referred to in Section 11 of the N...