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Relations internationales

EYES ON EUROPE

job creation, investment boost and education for a skilled workforce‌ Next to these giants a multitude of lobby groups on both sides of the Atlantic also support the TTIP from the European Service Forum >˜` Ă•VÂœÂ?>ÂˆĂŒ] ĂŒÂœ ĂŒÂ…i Ă•Ă€ÂœÂŤi>˜ i˜iĂ€ÂˆV i`ˆVˆ˜iĂƒ Association and Confederation of British Industries ­ "]{Ž° One would think that with all these lobby groups the multitude of interests should be well represented during the negotiations. Sadly this is not the case for in the 560 encounters the European Commission’s trade department has had in preparation for the TTIP negotiations, 4% were with public interest groups against the 92% coming from private sector lobbies. The reason behind this would be a system of favouritism for involving corporate lobbyists ­ "]{Ž°

both markets. However, criticized for being too generalist, the CEPR does not pay attention to competitiveness in each sector. Some specialists do enviĂƒÂˆÂœÂ˜Li˜iwĂŒĂƒvĂ€ÂœÂ“ĂŒÂ…i//*Â?ˆŽiVÂ…i>ÂŤiĂ€1-ĂƒĂ•ÂŤÂŤÂ?ˆiĂƒ] which would lower production costs. However, a risk remains: the TTIP framework could not induce competitiveness due to a low possibility of trade increase leading to EU industries relocating to the VÂ…i>ÂŤiĂ€­ *]{Ž°

But even within this 92% of corporate lobby groups there are differences of impact. With Agribusiness and Foods being the biggest of them all, they’re closely followed by the multiple business sectors, Telecoms/IT and Pharmaceuticals with Health Technologies, Chemicals and Express/Logistics at the end of ĂŒÂ…iĂƒÂŤiVĂŒĂ€Ă•Â“­ "]xŽ°

@ Flickr, France Ecologie Energie

We can also see a difference in impact from the various sectoral lobby groups, with European lobbies supplanting American corporate groups while both of them dwarf inter- and transnational lobby groups, which remain marginalized in the discussions.

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As stated above the impact of each different lobby group varies greatly but the imbalance between commercial and environmental/social lobbies is even deeper. Amongst the 25 top ‘stakeholders’ of the TTIP it has been shown that none of them are trade unions and environmental or consumer groups. The discussions have proven to be very industry dominated with about 74% of the TTIP. For that matter, meetings are mostly held with big businesses (CEO, xŽ°

ON COMPETITIVENESS BETWEEN EU AND US INDUSTRIES The prospect of an increase in industry competiveness is one of the major driving motors of the TTIP. According to the Centre for Economic Policy ReĂƒi>Ă€VÂ…Â˝Ăƒ ­ *,Â˝ĂƒÂŽ >ĂƒĂƒiĂƒĂƒÂ“iÂ˜ĂŒĂƒ ­Óä£ÎŽ] ĂŒÂ…i ˆ˜VĂ€i>Ăƒi in imports could lead to an increasing competition between industries and thus, to a better growth in

According to the CEPR, TTIP could allow an increasing of 0.5% and 0.4% in EU and US GDP by 2027, ĂœÂ…ÂˆVÂ…V>˜LiÂŤĂ€ÂœwĂŒ>LÂ?iĂŒÂœ>Â?Â?iVœ˜œ“ˆVÂ?iĂ›iÂ?ĂƒvĂ€ÂœÂ“ industries to household disposable incomes. Yet the

*, ĂƒÂŤiVˆwiĂƒ ĂŒÂ…>ĂŒ ĂŒÂ…i ÂˆÂ“ÂŤ>VĂŒ ĂœÂœĂ•Â?` Li > VÂœÂ˜ĂŒÂˆnuous growth for both economies only if the negotiations succeed. The possible gains of the TTIP on both transatlantic markets would seem, for policymakers, to be a longterm solution to promote economic growth without ˆ˜VĂ•Ă€Ă€ÂˆÂ˜}>``ÂˆĂŒÂˆÂœÂ˜>Â?`iLĂŒ­"]{Ž° Ă•ĂŒiĂ?ÂŤiĂ€ĂŒĂƒ from FEPS underline that the already existing debt threats the European growth which is less dynamic than the American growth. Considering the cost of labour and a decrease in EU innovation, market supplies are dropping whilst the debt overhang is liÂ“ÂˆĂŒÂˆÂ˜}VÂœÂ˜ĂƒĂ•Â“ÂŤĂŒÂˆÂœÂ˜`i“>˜`ĂœÂˆĂŒÂ…>`iy>ĂŒÂˆÂœÂ˜>ÀÞˆ“pact. Due to the two issues, the FEPS challenges the Li˜iwĂŒĂƒ Âœv //*] ĂœÂ…ÂˆVÂ… VÂœĂ•Â?` Â?i>` ĂŒÂœ > vĂ•Ă€ĂŒÂ…iĂ€ `iĂŒiĂ€ÂˆÂœĂ€>ĂŒÂˆÂœÂ˜ĂŒÂ…i`iLĂŒĂ‰ *Ă€>ĂŒÂˆÂœ­ ,Ć‚ ]{ÂŽ.

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Eyes on Europe #23 - La COP 21 a-t-elle été écologiste ?  
Eyes on Europe #23 - La COP 21 a-t-elle été écologiste ?  
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