CURRENT AFFAIRS
EU army Unity in difference Precisely one hundred years ago, a devastating war ravaged Europe, costing millions of human lives, dividing families and states apart. Deep and long lasting rifts were torn into the fabric of European transnational relations. In the context of such a historical landmark, the current discussion concerning the formation of a united European army, as proposed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker, seems oddly anachronistic. Indeed, the last one hundred years have seen remarkable changes in the rapports between European states. Instead of further dividing the European community, two world wars and countless casualties highlighted the necessity of, and ultimately gave rise to, increased inter-European communications, dialogue and cooperation. The Treaty of Rome in 1954 became the foundation for a unified European policy, and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 set the groundwork for a united European security policy. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to form a united European army that is uniting the military of EU member states and coordinating the military expenditures more closely. JeanClaude Junker’s plan for a European army has the support of MPs across Europe and even the German chancellor– but as support grows, so does opposition. Many see such developments as a prelude to a more militaristic EU foreign policy, or potentially even as the direct preparation for a war with, for example, Russia. A joint European army would also bring a whole set of practical and ideological problems with it. Austria prides itself on its neutrality, while Germany has for historical reasons issues with fighting wars on foreign
soil. Yet under a joint leadership, such individual concerns may be left unheard. Furthermore, how can such a united operation be supported equally by all member states when some member states, such as the Commission President’s home state of Luxemburg, only possess a negligible military force? Considering past problems seen with combined European armaments projects such as the Euro-Fighter, it is highly questionable whether the EU even has the required capacity to organise and manage such a large-scale cooperation. A further problem would be the new position of this European army in the context of the NATO alliance. New chains of command would have to be considered and implemented, and new response strategies developed to incorporate such a newly formed international army, all of which would cause a short-term drop in efficiency, readiness and response time of NATO. So why do we continue to proceed down such a path? Why should efforts be made to form a united European army, in the face of such obvious drawbacks? The EU is a conglomeration of states, states willing to mutually sacrifice, to a degree, their national sovereignty and political monopoly to a higher supranational entity. As history has proven, this mutual agreement ultimately breeds mutual trust. What could strengthen this bond more than a unified military? Trust is the basis on which a military unification would be built, and trust is what it would breed – something we must consider a rare and valuable commodity in the current climate of global conflicts and challenges. It is this gain that ultimately outweighs what are essentially short-term
logistical counter arguments. The necessity of such a step becomes readily apparent now, in the face of the recent Russian aggression against Ukraine. Few of us would have believed little more than a year ago in the sudden recurrence of border disputes on the European continent itself, showing how frighteningly precarious and unstable peace can be, even in our own backyard. No EU member state alone would have the strength to withstand a full-blown Russian invasion. While the probability of that may appear negligible, one ought to remind themselves that the images of Russian tanks in the Donbas region may have seemed similarly far fetched not too long ago. Each year, the EU member states invest 195 billion Euros in the defence industries, more than India, Russia or even China. But as long as these investments are used to fund parallel armies, there is a substantial collective loss due to parallel research and development. A Leopard 2 tank produced by German company KMW is thus used by the German Bundeswehr, while the French forces use Nexter’s LECLERC as their main battle tank. Both tanks essentially boast the same features, but each one was separately designed, developed and financed, from start to finish. Had there been a united Franco-German project for such a battle tank, millions of Euros could have been saved. In the same vein, the total savings achieved by a joint European military development, would evidently be astronomical and the comparative cost-effectiveness of a united European army thus guaranteed. Existing projects such as the EuroFighter have paved the way, and highlighted the problems, for an coordination on this level. While the development of a European army would by no means be a simple step, we must not forget that our American allies are withdrawing from the European stage, as they turn to confront the rising threat of China in the Pacific Ocean. Increasingly, it is up to Europe and the EU member states to ensure the security of the peace we have worked so hard to establish throughout the last century. In the end, there are enough problems and challenges in the path of this project, to make any attempt at setting a date for its implementation futile in the immediate future. Nevertheless, as the Ukrainian crisis has shown, military strength remains a pivotal factor even into the 21st century. For this reason it is vital that we, as Europeans, do not neglect military considerations, however tasteless they may seem to us, however arduous and strewn with difficulties the path to their development may be.
Benjamin Clement
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