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Radical Cities y

Rebel Democrac

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Radical Cities

What does it mean to be radical today?

engagĂŠe | 3


Relocating Radical Democracy Theory



| Daniel Mullis


Radical Democracy and Municipal Movements. A conversation with Jeremy Gilbert



What Do Cities Have to Do with Democracy?

| Clive Barnett

Vom Recht auf Stadt zur radikalen Demokratie

| Jeremy Gilbert

Movement Parties: New Breed of Radical Democratic Politics?

| Marina Prentoulis, Lasse Thomassen

Praxis of Rebellion


Transformation findet Stadt: präfigurativ urban rebellieren


Täglicher Widerstand?

Von Freiräumen



| Paul Sörensen

| Team Sowieso, blackpenimages

| Miriam Nessler

Wimmelbild “Recht auf Stadt”

| Markus Wende, Marc Amann


| Ne da(vi)mo Beograd - Don‘t let Belgrade d(r)own

Taking back the city


Eye to eye with freedom


Für ein konfrontatives Miteinander

| Luiza Margan

| Gabu Heindl

Theorizing Municipal Movements

Why is municipalism thriving?


[Un]settling the City


Against Radical Tourism. A conversation with Paolo Mossetti on Naples


Movements post-hegemony: how contemporary collective action transforms hegemonic politics


The circular horizon of municipal movements: Democracy, capital and radical politics


| Norma Tiedemann

| Friederike Landau, Nikolai Roskamm

| Paolo Mossetti

| Alexandros Kioupkiolis

| Alessio Kolioulis, Rahel Sophia Süß

Mapping Radical Cities Not fortresses but living rooms: How Cities of Shelter could work in the UK


Jenseits der neoliberalen Smart City: Commons und demokratische Alternativen


La Rèvolution Est en Marche. Challenging France’s Neoliberal Colonialism in Paris.


“City Air Makes You Free”. Urban Resistances And Counter Power in Bologna




Alternativer Zukünfte erfinden. Die munizipalistische Bewegung in Barcelona


Let me include you


| Pearl Ahrens

| Evgeny Morozov, Francesca Bria

| Cosimo Lisi

| Maurilio Pirone

| Anton Brokow-Loga, Gunnar Grandel

| Andreea Zelinka

| Zuzanna Zajac

engagée | 5

Po l i t i c a l A c t i v i s m A r t


M a g a z i n e B l o g

T h e o r y

é v e n t s

engagée M

it dem Anspruch analyti-

engagée ist theorieaffin und praxisvernarrt

engagée is a self-published journal for politi-

sche Schärfe und politische

und niemals verlegen, unterschiedliche

cal theory, activism and art, which promotes

Involviertheit zu verbinden,

Standpunkte zu verhandeln. Ziel ist es,

emancipatory practices and philosophical

erscheint engagée seit Mai 2015 2-mal

Bedeutungen zu verschieben und kriti-

interventions. The editorial process is open

jährlich als Printmagazin. Auf inhalt-

sche Öffentlichkeiten zu erzeugen, um

and collaborative and aims to connect politi-

licher Ebene werden gesellschaftliche

neue Denkweisen zu ermöglichen.

cal struggles and knowledge production. en-

Zusammenhänge reflektiert und emanzipatorische Perspektiven verhandelt. Auf organisatorischer Ebene wagt engagée mit der offenen Redaktion ein partizipatives Experiment jenseits bloßer Vernetzung.

Der Name des Magazins ist inspiriert von Jean-Paul Sartres Begriff littérature en-

gagée features also a blog and organises events where activists, researchers and artists meet.

gagée (dt. engagierte Literatur). engagée,

The aim of engagée is to foster and promote philo-

im Sinne von „immer schon in einer be-

sophical work that intends to make a constructive

stimmten gesellschaftlichen Situation en-

contribution to current political and social prob-

In Zeiten vermeintlicher Alternativlosig-

gagiert bzw. eingelassen sein“, hebt her-

lems. It does so by going beyond conventional

keit spürt engagée das Undenkbare auf.

vor, dass wir uns nicht einfach aus diesen

academic formats, avoiding a theory/practice

Als Experimentierfeld für gemeinsamen

Verhältnissen herausversetzen können.

divide and collecting different forms of contribu-

Gedankenaustausch ist engagée ein Raum

Der Untertitel „politisch-philosophische

tions such as philosophical essays, literature and

für kollektive und experimentelle Aus-

Einmischungen“ zielt auf das strategische

socially engaged art. engagée focuses on build-

drucksformen, die über das eigene Den-

Moment, das es notwendig braucht, um

ing international networks to share experiences,

ken hinaus versuchen, Veränderungen

Brüche und Diskontinuitäten mit dem

foster knowledge production and cooperation


Status quo herbeizuführen.

with local activist groups, researchers and artists.

Notes from é

Rebel Cities Radical Democracy


ities are a place of repression, injustice and exploitation. Within the neoliberal order, cities labelled as smart are often laboratories of policing and control, racial profiling and state violence. And yet, cities are also a prefigurative space for political struggles and emancipatory practices. From the anarchist tradition to the social movements of the 20th century, the urban may be seen as a field for interventions because of its interconnected nature and the possibilities of building autonomous networks. It is therefore not a surprise that today citizens, activists and politicians are reformulating an interest in urban and local governing. Throughout Europe and beyond, we observe new forms of government at the municipal and city level, which are experimenting with democratic practices and institutions. These initiatives tackle corporate power and increase access to common goods like water, energy, housing and healthcare. They also oppose privatisations, cuts in public services, the construction of physical and intangible borders and fight for digital sovereignty.

By combining the ideas of Radical Democracy and Rebel Cities, this first international double issue of engagée aims to introduce and elaborate the concept of “Radical Cities”.1 Thinking about the future of both urbanism and democracy, we ask: What do cities have to do with democracy? Different political initiatives by neo-municipalist movements and civic platforms use the term radical democracy to frame their activities. But what does radical democracy mean today? The programme of the radical theory of democracy can be briefly summarized as follows: democratic alternatives are possible and are necessary. This does not, however, tell us much about the practical effect of this theoretical tradition. Although the call for a new democratic horizon

1 Radical Cities: Across Latin America in Search of a New Architecture is a book by urbanist Justin McGuirk published by Verso in 2014. While the book explores the history of radical housing across a selection Latin America cities, there are no specific elaborations of the term Radical Cities in relation to radical democracy theory.

is ubiquitous, what is offered by certain existing radical theories of democracy seems rather timid. It remains unclear if these radical theories of democracy are anchored in people’s everyday practices and experiences, which we contend is necessary in order to provide adequate answers to the limits of the capitalist and neoliberal order, austerity politics, the upsurge of nationalist government and right-wing movements. Moreover, as the self-description of being a radical democrat seems to be missing we will ask:

How can a radical theory of democracy acquire political relevance under the present social conditions? If we agree that the radical theory of democracy cannot be left to a philosophical reflection, but must become practical – and spatial – in an experimental sense, how can we examine radical democracy as a critical and urban experimental activity? Do the current municipal movements serve as examples of an innovative and experimental spirit of democratic innovation, of the possibility of new radical democratic beginnings? Looking at the current forms of municipalism, existing literature often focuses on the celebration of successful stories, such as Naples, Barcelona, and Rojava. In this issue, however, we gathered through our network a different set of examples and took a different angle by asking:

To what extent municipal movements challenge the traditional notions of democracy, power and social change? What are the potentials and limits of their approaches and what are the obstacles that prevent the full realization of renewed radical democratic orders?

We rediscover that struggles for Radical Cities, as well as cities themselves, vary consistently. There is no “master plan” for municipalist movements, only local experiences and histories. At the same time, the issues tackled by these initiatives seem to respond to similar problems, with the shrinking space for democratic practices being an alarming common denominator. This is happening in Beograd, where finance-led regeneration projects meet a corrupted alliance of public and non-state actors, as well as in London, Paris or Bologna, where the demand for a municipal socialization of power challenge neoliberal forms of urban governance, at the basis of the social cleansing of popular areas of these cities. A growing democratic deficit is also coupled with the menace of basic needs in Southern European countries. If housing, healthcare, and economy break down, there seems to be a strong determination to build basic DIY social infrastructures. Naples is perhaps paradigmatic, given that social centres offer free breast screenings that would normally be provided by public hospitals, yet questions remain on the ability and the role of autonomous organisations in the provision of complex interventions at the scale and the quality needed. However, with this issue of engagée on Radical Cities we aim to highlight that, despite limits and deficits, municipal movements can be an example of, as protesters often chant, “this is how democracy looks like”. The term “Radical” marks a shift from the expression Rebel Cities. It indicates that municipal movements are engaging with an array of political experiments. Democratic tools and institutions are tested and adjusted to the demands of urban struggles that spread over cities.

engagée | 9

Relocating Radical Democracy Theory



engagĂŠe | 11

Radical Cities


What Do Cities Have to Do with Democracy? //Clive Barnett


ecent political events, such as the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring in 2011, the activism of indignados around the 15-M movement in Spain and the emergence of Occupy activism in cities across the world, have prompted arguments about the importance of space, place and (perhaps above all) the city as an arena of political action (Ghannam, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2011; Critchley, 2012; Harvey, 2012; Thomassen, 2012). These discussions continue to work through a longstanding intuition that cities are important crucibles for radical democratic expression, an intuition only heightened by the observation that increasing numbers of people now live in urban areas (Brenner, 2009). What is notable about each of these cases, however, is the degree to which they take place in cities without limiting their political demands to urban issues, narrowly conceived, nor addressing only urban-scale institutions as the objects of those demands. The question addressed here is whether contemporary urban theory is adequately configured to analyse and understand this relationship between the contemporary politics of democratization and the contemporary politics of urbanization. I argue that in fundamental respects it is not, and suggest that an engagement with normative political theory that has tended to focus on ‘global’ scales might well enhance the capacity of urbanists to better grasp this relationship — not least by helping to de-compose ‘the urban’ into a set of analytically distinct dimensions of political action. The next section outlines the case for thinking about the relationship between urbanization and democracy in new ways, through a critical reading of existing approaches to this question. It identifies a persistent tendency in urban theory to avoid sustained engagement with normative theories of democracy. It is here that my own argument starts. The third section explores the tension between thinking of the normativity of democratic politics as either foundational or strategic, arguing that practices of justification are important aspects of social practices which help to explain why particular senses of injustice matter to people, and draws out the spatial implications of this argument. The fourth section shows how the transformation of the principle of all-affected interests by critical theorists of deliberative democracy opens a space for considering the generative force of urbanization in animating democratic contention. The final section then sets out how the transformation of this principle presages an agenda for developing a geographically sensitive investigation of the variable roles played by urban processes in shaping the geographies of contemporary democratic agency. The main claim of the argument here is that understandings of the relationship between contemporary urbanization and the prospects of radical democracy can be usefully informed by post-Habermasian critical theory and its distinctive treatment of questions of democracy, justice and participation. The spatial ‘pay-off ’ from engaging more fully with this tradition comes from attending closely to the importance of the concept of all-affected interests as a worldly norm of democratic critique. More precisely, I argue that ‘the urban’ can be creatively recon-

ceptualized as playing multiple roles in assembling potential and actual communities of affected interest around which democratic energies are organized. It follows that urban processes might be more important to contemporary radical democratic politics than is often acknowledged, but that ‘the city’ is not necessarily the key stake nor site for such politics.

Democracy in radical urban theory Recent research on urban politics has been marked by a sustained interest in theorizing the normative supports for thinking of urban spaces as sites of democratic possibility. This is most evident in the burgeoning literature on ‘the right to the city’ (Dikeç and Gilbert, 2002; McCann, 2002; Purcell, 2002; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010) and ‘the just city’ (Marcuse et al., 2009). This work often converges with arguments about urban democracy (Amin and Thrift, 2002), the ‘good city’ (Amin, 2006), the emancipatory city (Lees, 2004) and ‘spatial justice’(Soja, 2010). Democracy provides the rallying call of even the most radical of geographical analyses of neoliberalizing accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). The absence of democratic politics is increasingly recognized as a key factor in the reproduction of social injustice and inequality, and the exposure of vulnerable or marginalized groups to serious harm (Ettlinger, 2007). At a more abstract theoretical level, styles of spatialized ontology have opened up new understandings of ‘the political’ (Massey, 2005), and drawn spatial theorists into debates informed by a distinctive strand of contemporary political theory that focuses on the dissensual aspects of democracy understood as an ethos of contestation (Dikeç, 2007; Featherstone, 2008). Engagement with democratic theory in spatial disciplines such as human geography, urban studies and urban and regional planning has been framed by a contrast between the consensual orientations of deliberative democrats on the one hand, and the worldlier perspectives provided by post-structuralist theories of radical democracy and agonistic pluralism on the other (Purcell, 2007). Debates around communicative planning best exemplify this framing, in which the communicative paradigm is found to be inadequately attuned to the operations of ‘power’ (see Campbell and Marshall, 2006). On the one hand, agonistic approaches define democracy in a one-sided way, in so far as they reserve democratic energies for the contestation of identities and hegemonies (see Karagiannis and Wagner, 2008). By contrast, the defining issue for critical theorists of deliberative democracy is how to conceptualize the relationship between the identities, issues and opinions generated in agonistic public action, and the institutionalized exercise of legitimate power (see Cohen and Fung, 2004: 28–31). Both sides of the democratic problematic — contestation and legitimate concerted action — are kept in view by the tradition of critical theory that underwrites contemporary theories of deliberative democracy, and its offshoots such as ‘communicative democracy’ and ‘discursive democracy’ (see Scheuerman,

engagée | 13

Radical Cities

t d a t S f u a t h c e R Vom zur ie t a r k o m e D n le a radik

//Daniel Mullis


eit den späten 1990er Jahren findet der Ruf nach einem Recht auf Stadt in vielen Städten der Welt erneut Widerhall.1 Formuliert wird ein breites Unbehagen an gegenwärtigen städtischen Lebensrealitäten. Thematisiert werden das Schwinden nicht-kommerzieller Freiräume; rassistische, sexistische und homophobe Ausgrenzung; die Minderung der demokratischen Teilhabe; der ausbleibende ökologische Umbau; sowie steigende Mietpreise und Verdrängung. Die globalen urbanen Revolten des Jahres 2011 von Kairo über Madrid, Athen, Tel Aviv bis nach New York markierten in diesem Sinne einen emanzipatorischen Aufbruch in rebellischen Städten (Harvey 2012), die die Verfasstheit von Gesellschaft insgesamt in Frage stellten und demokratische wie soziale Teilhabe radikal einforderten. Die Parole Recht auf Stadt, die in all diesen Kämpfen immer wieder auftauchte, formulierte Henri Lefebvre 1968. Er verstand darunter einen Schrei danach, nicht aus dem städtischen Leben exkludiert und vertrieben zu werden und verband damit den Anspruch auf einen selbstbestimmten, nicht von kapitalistischen Interessen und staatlicher Kontrolle beherrsch1 Bei dem Text handelt es sich um eine überarbeitete und ergänzte Fassung eines Essays, den ich 2015 für CityLeaks – Urban Art Festival in Köln geschrieben habe.

ten Alltag (Lefebvre 1968: 158). Unweigerlich, quasi als andere Seite der Medaille, ging für ihn damit die Forderung nach radikal demokratischer Selbstverwaltung – der Autogestion – einher (Lefebvre 1966). Recht auf Stadt ist noch heute „mehr als nur ein guter Slogan“ (Holm 2010) und bietet Anknüpfungspunkte zu den aktuell intensiv diskutierten postfundamentalistischen (vgl. Marchart 2010, 2013) Überlegungen zur radikalen Demokratie etwa im Anschluss an Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe (2006 [1985]). Ziel des Textes ist es, Lefebvres Recht auf Stadt sowie Autogestion genauer zu beleuchten und die Potentiale ihrer Verknüpfung mit der radikalen Demokratie zu benennen.

Das Recht auf Stadt Der französische Marxist, Stadtforscher und Philosoph Henri Lefebvre (*1901- †1991) verfasste seine Texte zur Stadt zwischen 1968 und 1974. Seine Reflexionen sind eingebettet in eine zeitgenössische Analyse der 1968erUnruhen in Frankreich, deren Ursprung er in der sozial gespaltenen urbanen Gesellschaft und der Politisierung dieser Spaltung erkannte. Gleichsam von Bedeutung war engagée | 15

für ihn die Thematisierung der Stadt in den Marx’schen Texten sowie seine eigenen Überlegungen zum Alltag und zur Dialektik. Eine seiner übergeordneten Arbeitshypothesen, die sich auch im Recht auf Stadt niederschlägt, formulierte er bereits 1939: „In jedem Konkreten gilt es die Negation, den inneren Widerspruch, die immanente Bewegung, das Positive und das Negative aufzuspüren.“ (Lefebvre 1969 [1939]: 31) Lefebvres Arbeiten zur Stadt waren in den späten 1960ern nicht zuletzt auch von der Situationistischen Internationale beeinflusst; mit der Betonung der Spontanität und dem Erkennen des Alltäglichen als Ort der Kämpfe vertrat er eine sehr eigenwillige Marx-Interpretation. Gerade sein Verständnis von Produktion ist aufschlussreich: „Die Produktion reduziert sich nicht auf die Herstellung von Produkten. Der Begriff bezeichnet einerseits die Erschaffung von Werken (einschließlich der sozialen Zeiten und Räume), kurzum die ‚geistige‘ Produktion, und andererseits die materielle Produktion, die Herstellung der Dinge. Er bezeichnet auch die Produktion des ‚menschlichen Seins‘, durch es selbst, im Laufe seiner historischen Entwicklung. Das impliziert die Produktion der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen. Schließlich umfasst der Ausdruck, im weitesten Sinne [auch] die Reproduktion.“ (Lefebvre 1972 [1968]: 48f.)

Die Stadt ist für Lefebvre ein Produkt gesellschaftlicher Praxis und konkreter Auseinandersetzungen (Schmid 2005: 27). Dabei nimmt Stadt, in späteren Arbeiten Raum (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]), die Rolle als Vermittelndes zwischen Prozessen ein, die einerseits auf der Ebene des ‚Globalen‘ zu verorten seien, wo abstrakte Beziehungen wie der Kapitalmarkt oder die Raumpolitik zum Tragen kämen, und andererseits auf der Ebene des ‚Privaten‘, die die alltäglichen Aushandlungen und Lebensrealitäten umfasse (Lefebvre 2014 [1970]: 85-112). Gleichzeitig stelle die Stadt auch das Terrain für den Kampf gegen die Vereinnahmung des Besonderen durch das Allgemeine dar, womit gemeint ist, dass sich auf der Ebene des Städtischen die Alltäglichkeiten der verallgemeinernden Wirkung der ‚globalen‘ Prozesse entziehen und – bisweilen – widersetzen (vgl. Mullis 2017: 90-105). Historisch betrachtet waren Städte, Lefebvre folgend, lange Zeit eher Orte des sozialen und politischen Lebens sowie der kollektiven Produktion und weniger reine Macht- oder Handelszentren. Im Zuge der Industrialisierung und der damit einhergehenden Urbanisierung hätten aber tiefgreifende Verschiebungen stattgefunden. Analytisch fasst Lefebvre diesen Prozess als Implosion-Explosion. Damit versucht er den uneinheitlichen Prozess zu benennen, wonach in Städten einerseits eine massive

Konzentration von Menschen, Tätigkeiten, Reichtümern und Gegenständen zu konstatieren ist – Implosion – und andererseits die städtische Wirklichkeit auseinanderberste bzw. ihren Bezugsrahmen verliert – Explosion. Wie Lefebvre (1968: 70f.) unter Rückgriff auf die Marx’schen Konzepte von Gebrauchsund Tauschwert darlegt, wurden Städte im Zuge der Ausbreitung des kompetitiven und industriellen Kapitalismus immer mehr zu Orten des Tauschwertes. Die sozialen Beziehungen, die mit Stadt als Tauschwert verbunden gewesen seien, würden nicht mehr gelebt, und Stadt als soziales und materielles Gefüge daher nicht mehr verstanden. Was für Lefebvre daraus folgt, ist die weitreichende Pointe, dass Stadt als soziale ‚Realität‘ verschwindet (ebd.: 148). Unter den Bedingungen kapitalistischer Vergesellschaftung behalte die Stadt aber in der Funktion der Zentralität eine unmittelbare Realität: „Der Begriff Stadt entspricht keinem gesellschaftlichen Objekt mehr. […] Dennoch besitzt die Stadt eine historische Existenz, die nicht ignoriert werden kann.“ (Lefebvre 2014 [1970]: 65). Die Stadt nehme jedoch diese ZentrumsFunktion nicht auf Grund einer Eigenlogik ein, sondern weil die kapitalistische Gesellschaft Städte als Zentren hervorbringe. Theoretisch, so Lefebvre, kann jeder Punkt zentral werden und jeder Inhalt die Zentralität füllen. Bestimmend ist die soziale Praxis, was bedeutet: Zentralität (und das, was Stadt ist) ist stets umkämpft und politisch. In „The Production of Space“ (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]), seinem letzten Werk zum Urbanen, in dem er sich analytisch mit Fragen der Raumproduktion auseinandersetzte, hebt Lefebvre hervor, dass Raum nicht nur als konstitutives Element für Gesellschaft zu verstehen ist, sondern dass dieser ein historisch notwendiges Produkt von sozialen Prozessen, Strategien und Projekten darstelle. Raum wird Lefebvres Verständnis nach innerhalb des gesellschaftlichen Erkenntnishorizontes und der bestehenden Normen mit Bedeutung aufgeladen und produziert. Er ist somit einerseits gesellschaftlich strukturiert, prägt andererseits aber durch seine Materialisierung eben auch die Bedingungen der gesellschaftlichen Strukturierungen. Kurzum: Raum ist erstens ein soziales Produkt, in dem zweitens abstrakte soziale Prozesse und Strukturen in einer spezifischen Weise konkret und wirkmächtig werden und drittens ist jede Raumproduktion stets umkämpft (vgl. Mullis 2017: 77-90). In letzter Konsequenz bedeutet dies nach Anne Vogelpohl (2011: 234, Herv. i. O.), dass Gesellschaft nicht im Raum, sondern über den Raum produziert wird und Raum in einer dialektischen Weise Voraussetzung und Produkt einer jeden Gesellschaft ist; dass Emanzipation also nur gelingen kann, wenn auch eine emanzipatorische Raumproduktion initiiert wird. Lefebvre bleibt an diesem analytischen Punkt nicht stehen und begibt sich auf die Suche nach Alternativen. Das Ziel ist, eine gesellschaftliche Utopie zu entwickeln. Dafür bestimmt er den Begriff der urbanen Gesellschaft bzw. kurz des Urbanen. Das Urbane steht für eine neue soziale Realität, die durch die veränderten Beziehungen hergestellt wird und die überkommenen

sozialen Gefüge der Stadt emanzipatorisch aufhebt (Lefebvre 1968: 103). Lefebvre folgend ist dieses Potential im Prozess der Urbanisierung als Möglichkeit bereits angelegt. Damit es sich aber realisiere, bedürfe es einer tiefgreifenden sozialen Revolution – der urbanen Revolution (Lefebvre 2014 [1970]) –, deren Träger_innen die Klasse der Ausgeschlossenen und Verdrängten sein werde. Das revolutionäre Subjekt entsteht für Lefebvre, ähnlich wie in operaistischen Konzeptionen, in der städtischen Alltäglichkeit (und nicht in den Fabriken), zumal in ihnen die kapitalistische Vergesellschaftung in ihrer vollen Wirkmächtigkeit erfahren wird (Lefebvre 1968: 178). Das mit seinen Arbeiten zum Urbanen verfolgte Ziel war nicht, ein kohärentes Modell der Verstädterung, verstanden als einfache Ansammlung von Bauten und Menschen, zu entwickeln oder diese lediglich einer Kritik zu unterziehen. Vielmehr sollten auf der Basis der historischen Untersuchung und der Analyse der Gegenwart Möglichkeiten – ein Begriff, der anschließend eine genauere Spezifikation erfährt – formuliert werden. Das Mögliche bildet den Zugang, um zu verstehen, wie Lefebvre gesellschaftliche Veränderung denkt bzw. wie er diese auch unterfüttern, anregen und herbeiführen will. Möglichkeit hat für Lefebvre daher eine doppelte Bedeutung: Einerseits beinhaltet sie einen Fokus auf das Machbare; dass Veränderung möglich ist, auch wenn das Ziel noch eine Utopie sein mag. Andererseits wird betont, dass Praxis nur auf der Basis der ‚Realität‘ entstehen kann, also auf den materiellen und ideellen Verhältnissen im Hier und Jetzt aufbauen muss (Brenner & Elden 2009: 39). Daraus ist zu lesen, dass Lefebvre zwar fest davon ausging, dass durch (alltägliche) Praxis die gesamte ‚Realität‘ verändert werden kann, jedoch die Möglichkeiten dieser Veränderung nicht beliebig sind. Denn die bereits vorhandenen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse regulieren das Feld des Umsetzbaren. Um Perspektiven zu öffnen, versuchte Lefebvre mittels seiner Arbeiten stets das Gegebene zu untersuchen, um dann einen potentiellen Schritt nach vorne zu gehen und mögliche Utopien zu entwickeln. Und genau hier kommt das Recht auf Stadt als eine mögliche Strategie ins Spiel. Das Recht auf Stadt verstand Lefebvre als ein übergeordnetes Recht, ähnlich den „Menschen- und Bürgerrechten“ (Lefebvre 1990), als Recht auf Freiheit, als Recht zur Individualisierung in der Sozialisation, das Recht auf Wohnen, das Recht auf Partizipation und Aneignung (Lefebvre 1968: 174). Dazu gehört auch das Recht auf eine andere Zentralität, auf Orte des Zusammenkommens und des Austauschs, das Recht auf eigene Lebensrhythmen und Zeitverwaltung sowie das Recht darauf, die Räume und die Momente in ihrer Gänze zu nutzen (ebd.: 179). Es beinhaltet das Recht, sich die aus dem kreativen und schöpferischen Potential des Urbanen entstehenden Überschüsse gesellschaftlich anzueignen, sie damit den Profitinteressen zu entziehen und der Allgemeinheit zuzuführen (Gebhardt & Holm 2011: 8). In der „positivsten“ Begrifflichkeit bedeute es, so Lefebvre (1973: 194f.), das Recht der Stadtbewohner_innen, auf allen Ebenen von Netzwerken und der Zirkulation von Kommunikation, Informationen und Aus-

tausch mitzuwirken. Um es umzusetzen, so Lefebvre (1968: 179f.), muss der Gebrauchswert den Tauschwert als leitendes Konzept ersetzen, wobei es darauf ankomme, sich die Betriebe, Märkte und Produkte gesellschaftlich anzueignen. Lefebvres Forderungen sind nicht isoliert zu betrachten, sondern aufs Engste verbunden mit einer gesamtgesellschaftlichen Perspektive der Überwindung der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft sowie der staatlichen Unterdrückung. Dafür bedürfe es der Etablierung von egalitäreren und direktdemokratischeren Strukturen – bei ihm unter dem Begriff der Autogestion [ins Deutsche am ehesten als autonome Selbstverwaltung zu übersetzten] behandelt (Ronneberger 2011).

Autogestion und radikale Demokratie Autogestion als Konzept stammt nicht von Lefebvre selbst, wenn auch er im Frankreich der 1960er Jahre ein Protagonist der Debatte um diese war (vgl. Brenner 2008; Ronneberger 2009, 2011). Für Lefebvre (1966: 150) umfasst Autogestion eine ganzheitliche Perspektive der radikal-demokratischen politischen Organisation. Sie erlaubt, sich über kollektive und lokalisierte Organisation ‚von unten‘ der totalisierenden und homogenisierenden Wirkung von Staatlichkeit und kapitalistischer Verwertung entgegenzustellen. Lefebvre verstand Autogestion dabei eher als Methode, denn als Modell: „The concept of autogestion does not provide a model, does not trace a line. It points to a way, and thus to a strategy. This strategy must exclude maneuvers and manipulations that render practice illusory; this strategy must therefore prevent the monopolization of the word and the concept by institutions that transform them into fiction. In addition, the strategy must concretize autogestion and extend it to all levels and sectors. This perpetual struggle for autogestion is the class struggle.“ (Lefebvre 2001 [1979]: 780) Um Autogestion zu erkämpfen, müssten die Möglichkeiten und Momente des Eingreifens spontan und kreativ genutzt werden, wenn sie sich ergeben. Lefebvre dachte das Potential der Autogestion pluralistisch und multipel, als einen fragmentierten Prozess des sukzessiven eruptiven Vordringens. Jedoch dürfe eine solche Praxis nicht darauf hinauslaufen, sich auf die „schwachen“ Punkte bzw. die Nischen der Gesellschaft zu reduzieren. Um die demokratische Praxis zu verallgemeinern, müssten auch die „starken“ und gut geschützten Bereiche von aktueller Gesellschaft – wie Staat und Kapital – angegriffen werden. Lefebvre gibt sich keinen Illusionen hin und verweist darauf, dass auch Autogestion keine idyllische oder gar herrschaftsfreie Gesellschaft etablieren werde. Vielmehr werde eine andere Ordnung eingerichtet, die egalitärer, demokratischer und gerechter, aber nicht herrschaftsfrei, sein werde (Lefebvre 1966: 147). Es geht ihm nicht darum, politische Konflikte in einer Utopie der Harmonie zu glätten, sondern darum, einen Modus zu finden, der Konflikte offen aushandeln lässt (Brenner & Elden 2009: 16). Autogestion ist für Lefebvre ein permanenter Prozess, „eine ständige Bewusstseinsbildung über die Beziehungen zwischen der sich selbst verwaltenden Einheit,

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Radical Cities

Radical Democracy and Municipal Movements Alessio Kolioulis and Rahel Sophia SĂźĂ&#x; in conversation with Jeremy Gilbert


In the last two decades, Western democracies have been witnessing a steady rise of anti-democratic trends and disappointment with politics. Faced with these challenges, contemporary democracies appear vulnerable and unable to defend themselves. At the same time, a radical change is taking place. Movements in cities around the world – through platforms and transnational networks – are experimenting with new forms of democratic practices and political institutions. This reminds us that the radical history of the last two centuries brought about new theoretical toolboxes which activists have used to overturn and change those concepts that undermine key political notions. To what extent do current political movements challenge traditional notions of democracy, power and social change?


That’s a good question and arguably it depends on what you mean by ‘traditional notion’. If by this we really mean ‘mainstream liberal-democratic notions’ then obviously, these are being challenged. But in many ways the demands of these movements, and the basic desires and assumptions informing them, are nor particularly new. There isn’t much in the ‘new’ radical municipal politics that the Barcelona anarchists of the 1930s, or the Paris Communards, would not have recognised. Internationalism was always a part of their ideology as well. Even in the UK, we have traditions that have been suppressed for decades but which have roots going back to the 19th century, such as the tradition of the Independent Labour Party (the single most important component of the new federal organisation that became the Labour Party in 1900), that was always committed to ideas such as the democratic management of the economy by workers, and was always hostile to all forms of militarism. The details of the demands and the challenges, the range of power relations under discussion, and the necessary theoretical frameworks continue to evolve, but the basic demands and organisational ideals are the same; partly to the extent that the basic problems and obstacles to real democracy (plutocracy, liberalism, capitalism, patriarchy, nationalism) remain the same.


The new transnational and municipalist networks such as the network of fearless cities, sanctuary cities and rebel cities seem to respond to the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, of austerity politics and of European asylum and migration policies. Through alliances, platforms and international

networks, they experiment with new forms of democratic practices and political institutions. In which way do these movements lay the foundation for new visions and practices in developing a real democracy? How do they expand or even enhance a radical democracy through their visions and practices?


Well, this is a huge question so I can only offer a very sketchy and mainly conceptual answer. Broadly speaking, any form of democracy must enable the emergence, on any scale at all, of what I call ‘potent collectivities’: which is to say any kind of group that is actually capable of making collective decisions and enacting them in some way. This sounds banal – and to some extent it is. But it is also the case that neoliberal society (like all hierarchical societies, to some extent) works very hard to deprive most people of any such experience in any area of their lives. So, to the extent that any of these institutions or movements enable potent collectivities to emerge at all, they have positive effects in promoting the development of democracy. At the same time, I think that these municipalist movements contribute in a particularly important way simply by asserting the status of the city as a key site for democratic energy and invention.

It’s no accident that the Left almost always has its bases in the cities. Hardt and Negri say that the metropolis is the home of the multitude, and in this they have a very important point. One of the key cultural operations of bourgeois and anti-democratic ideology since the late 19th century has been to denigrate the city, to present the city as fearful, as somewhere to escape from, as somewhere that most people should not want to be. In simply making the city a beacon of hope rather than on object of fear, these movements are playing an important role in counteracting that ideology.


What challenges do you think these movements face? What are the potentials and limits of their approaches and what are the obstacles that prevent the full realization of a new and more radical democratic order?

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Movement Parties: New Breed of Radical Democratic Politics? // by Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen


fter the financial crisis and the square movements of 2011 and beyond, we have seen the emergence of a new breed of political parties: movement parties. These parties include SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Left Unity in Slovenia and Alternativet in Denmark. Even traditional parties such as the British Labour Party has a claim as a ‘movement party’ thanks to Momentum, the group that sprang from Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership campaign and is now one of the most powerful formations within Labour. While these parties are often grouped together by laypersons and academics, there are, however, important differences between them. The first thing to note is that movement parties are not an entirely new phenomenon. In a chapter published more than a decade ago, Herbert Kitschelt defined movement parties as a hybrid between movements and parties, having in mind the Northern European Green parties.1 The Green parties rose out of the environmental movement, which, like other new formations, was critical of the ways in which the state, as well as traditional parties and interest groups, did politics. Their concern with a more horizontalist and participatory form of politics was brought into the Green parties. For Kitschelt, movement parties were transitional phenomena: they were basically movements on their way to becoming parties. The German Greens would be a case in point. After the financial crisis and the square movements of 2011, the relationship between movements and formal politics has been reinvigorated, and a new phenomenon is emerging: movement parties. Such parties can be seen as a response to a general crisis of representation,2 the crisis that some associate with the post-democratic condition of the last thirty years,3 but they differ from the movements of the preceding decade by accepting the need to engage with formal political representative institutions. This new phenomenon raises a host of ques-

1 Herbert Kitschelt (2006), ‘Movement Parties’, in Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics (New York, Sage), pp. 278-90. 2 Simon Tormey (2015), The End of Representative Politics (Cambridge: Polity). 3 Colin Crouch (2004), Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity).

tions, including whether it is possible to combine radical politics with formal political institutions. Like Kitschelt, Donatella della Porta and others define movement parties as hybrids of movements and parties where organisational and environmental linkages between the two are close.4 Their main examples are SYRIZA, Podemos and the Italian Five Star Movement. Movement parties thus differ from traditional (non-movement) parties. For instance, historically, socialist and social-democratic parties have emerged from social movements, most of all from trade unions. But, in these cases, parties quickly emerged as hierarchical structures firmly embedded within political institutions, even when retaining close links to trade unions. Movement parties differ with their insistence on keeping the links to social movements and organising in a more horizontal and participatory way. While it is useful to define movement parties in this way, we argue that there are important differences among them. Those differences are important when we assess the strategies developed by, and available to, these parties, and when we assess their future prospects. While there are right-wing variants of movement parties – such as the Tea Party Movement and the Republican Party in the US – here we focus only on left-wing variants. The brief typology we develop here is developed in a bottom-up fashion. Rather than providing a set of clear-cut distinctions, we use the typology to raise a number of questions about the nature and prospects of movement parties, based on how their relationship with social movements was shaped at the point of origin. The first type of movement party arises when a particular movement becomes a party but self-consciously seeks to retain key characteristics of a movement. The Green parties would be an earlier example of this, as are the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) and the African National Congress (ANC), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and possibly the United Front (UF) in South Africa. As it is also clear from this list, the risk of reproducing the logic of the

4 Donatella Della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki and Lorenzo Mosca (2017), Movement Parties Against Austerity (Cambridge: Polity), p. 7.

formal political system – verticality, closure, and so on – are huge, and the question is to what extent they differ from socialist and social-democratic parties with their background in the labour movement. In the European context, the Five Star Movement in Italy would be an example as it has emerged out of different protest movements, among them the protests against the privatisation of water. But, at the same time, the movement/party has centred on the personality of Grillo, and it is not exactly a party of the Left. Whatever the case may be, the choices they are facing after the March 2018 elections regarding forming a government reflect the strategic dilemmas of most, if not all, movement parties. These dilemmas are accentuated because this type of movement party undergoes a mutation from movement to movement party, and therefore the identities of activists and potential voters are tied to the grassroots nature of the movement. The second type of movement party consists of parties that emerge on the back of social movements or protests with the aim of tapping the energies of the latter and transpose them into electoral politics. Podemos would be an example, although there is an important time-lapse between the 2011 Spanish Indignados Movement and the emergence of Podemos in 2014. The United Left in Slovenia would be another example. The dilemmas facing a party like Podemos are slightly different. On the one hand, they are not a movement that became a party, and so they are not tied to a movement identity. On the other hand, they presented themselves as a different kind of party from the very beginning: more horizontal, more participatory and more inclusive. Perhaps more importantly, they presented themselves as the party of the Indignados, or at least the party that would carry forward the spirit of the Indignados movement. This is also the reason why today so many people have become disillusioned with Podemos. The Indignados movement opened up space for an alternative form of politics, and Podemos took advantage of it occupying that space. In the case of Podemos, we have a highly mediatised (but unconventional) leadership who connects with the broader population in a direct manner through mainstream and non-mainstream media and through new social media, including platforms for direct voting on policies. This allows for a combination of vertical and horizontal structures, but it does not rely on the active participation (and influence) of large numbers of activists. While Podemos initially relied on local and thematic “circles”, these have gradually lost influence. (Having said that, there is a marked difference between Podemos at the national level and some of the political movements at the municipal level, such as Barcelona en Comú, which has retained more of the horizontalist and participatory structure.) This is perhaps one way in which Podemos differs from movement parties that have emerged more gradually and organically from social movements.

in the latter. The link between party and movements was reaffirmed in the declaration of the Founding Congress of SYRIZA in 2013 when it was stated that SYRIZA’s aim was not only the parliamentary presence of the movements of the squares but also the involvement in the creation and support of a strong united popular movement. Thus, when the 2011 protests erupted, SYRIZA sought to tap the energies of the protests and transpose them into electoral politics, similarly to what Podemos attempted, but with a time-lag. However, SYRIZA has experienced the same disjuncture between leadership and activists faced by Podemos, especially after the formation of the Greek government. The 2013 SYRIZA Congress Declaration states that “the transference of powers to elected representatives leads sooner or later to stagnation and retreat, if not destruction: those who entrust them are transformed into passive accepters of a policy that opposes their interests and desires, while those who assume the responsibility of such an assignment are mutated and corrupted.”6 Despite this attempt to materialise a more horizontal and participatory structure inside and outside the party, the Congress did not represent a break from traditional forms of party organization: the resolutions were voted by delegates elected from SYRIZA’s local groups. The final type of movement party is the case of a party being taken over from within by a movement, using the party as a platform and trying to change the party’s structure, in order to promote its own line and a more participatory form of politics. This is the case of Momentum and the Labour Party in the UK and, to a lesser extent, of Sanders and the Democratic Party in the US. In these cases, the shift is not from the movement to a party; instead, activists enter the arena of formal party politics in order to change the party into a movement, both in their politics and in their structure. As a result, those involved have usually accepted the vertical logic of the political system from the start, as they try to influence these parties in a more horizontalist direction, amplifying their influence within these structures.

The third type, often associated with Podemos but quite different, is the case of SYRIZA. In Greece, we are dealing with a party that pre-existed the protests and movements of the squares. From its inception, SYRIZA sought relations with social movements, and especially the youth wing of the party was very much involved in the European Social Fora, leading to the formation of the Greek Social Forum in 2003, and finally the hosting of the 4th European Social Forum in Athens in 2006.5 In this respect, SYRIZA already had problematized the relationship between party and movements while actively engaged

This typology opens up an interesting field of inquiry regarding the different expressions of movement parties, and the difficulties they face in bridging electoral with grassroots politics. Although the typology refers to the origins of movement parties, we claim that this shapes how the movement party engages with participatory structures and electoral politics. The typology is not the final word on the differences we can observe between different movement parties. We have also not considered a number of new phenomena such as Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche! and Jean-Luc Melenchon’s La France Insoumise. Both share characteristics with movement parties but may be seen more as electoral machines supporting a particular political leader, even if Melenchon’s movement draws on the anti-labour law protests. There is also the question of the relationship between movement parties and populism. Many of the movement parties mentioned here are also (seen as) populist, which raises the question of what populism shares with a movement party. In particular, one would have to ask how the vertical relationship between leader and masses interacts with the horizontal organisation of movement parties. What is clear is that the appearance of movement parties constitutes a challenge to those who associate radical politics and radical democracy with horizontalism, but also to those who insist that radical politics is only effective insofar as it works through existing institutions.

5 Myrto Tsakatika and Costas Eleftheriou (2013), ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’, South European Society and Politics, 18:1, 81-99.

6 Launching statement, accessed 18/03/18.

Praxis of Rebellion

2 engagĂŠe | 23


Die Stadt als Ort des Politischen?


n den letzten Jahren ist eine verstärkte Ausrichtung emanzipatorischer politischer Bewegungen auf die Stadt als Aktionsraum zu beobachten. Mit den diversen Rechtauf-Stadt-Bewegungen, dem Solidarity-City-Netzwerk im deutschsprachigen Raum, den Transition-Town-Initiativen oder auch den munizipalistischen Plattformen in Spanien sind nur einige Beispiele genannt. Diesen Initiativen dient die Stadt nicht nur als Bühne, sondern auch als Ansatzpunkt für progressive Politik. Politische Kämpfe werden nicht nur in, sondern auch um die Stadt geführt, d.h. um die Art und Weise, wie sie konstituiert ist und wer in ihr ein gelingendes Leben führen kann. Das ist an sich nicht neu, urbane politische Bewegungen und städtische Kämpfe haben eine lange und vielfältige Geschichte. Insofern aber derartige Stadtpolitiken dezidiert Perspektiven über den Nahraum Stadt hinaus eröffnen – die Stadt also explizit auch als Ausgangspunkt umfassenderer Transformation begriffen wird –, sollte verstärkt auch ihr präfigurativer und damit auch rebellierender Charakter in den Blick genommen werden.

Vor dem Hintergrund der in den letzten Jahren geführten Strategiedebatten der politischen Linken lassen sich die neueren Stadtpolitiken nur schwer verorten. Die in der mitunter unversöhnlich anmutenden Debatte propagierten Dualismen von Exodus und Stellungskrieg, Horizontalismus und Vertikalismus oder Autonomie und Hegemonie eignen sich nicht recht, um ihnen gerecht zu werden. Vielleicht aber zeigt sich in den in ganz Europa zu beobachtenden Stadtpolitiken eine Art praktisch vollzogene Synthetisierung des transformationstheoretischen Diskurses. Schon das Paris der Commune von 1871, dieses „arbeitende Laboratorium politischer Erfindungen“1, war ein Ort, an dem marxistischer Jakobinismus und föderalistischer Proudhonismus in eigentümlicher Weise produktiv verschmolzen.2 Nicht mehr horizontal oder vertikal, sondern als querend – d.h. in, gegen und jenseits der etablierten Herrschaftsstrukturen agierend –, könnte eine Transformationsstrategie bezeichnet werden, die ihren Ausgang von den Städten nimmt. Um das zu plausibilisieren, ist zu klären, was solcherart stadtbezogene Politiken ausmacht. Man könnte zunächst versucht sein, sie als bloße Rückzugsgefechte zu interpretieren, als einen Rückzug aufs Lokale, um sich den Zumutungen globaler neoliberaler

Paul Soerensen Dynamiken zu entziehen oder repressiven Migrationspolitiken von Seiten der (supra-)staatlichen Ebene zu verwehren. In diesem Sinne deutete Michael Walzer unlängst die US-amerikanischen Sanctuary Cities und deren Kollaborationsverweigerung bei Abschiebungen als rein defensive Politik des Widerstands. In Walzers Augen entbehren derartige Praktiken bei allem Wohlwollen jeglicher offensiv-transformativer Potenzialität, welche sich letztlich auf die Übernahme der Machtzentralen im Staat richten müsse.3 In dieser Einschätzung, die der vertikal-hegemonietheoretischen Strategieperspektive Chantal Mouffes entspricht, kommt den Sanctuary-City-Praktiken keinerlei transformatives Potenzial zu. Nach meinem Dafürhalten übersieht dies jedoch einen Aspekt, den man als präfigurativen Zug bezeichnen könnte.

Präfiguration Das Konzept der Präfiguration entstammt dem anarchistischen und rätekommunistischen Denken und erfuhr zuletzt vor allem infolge der Platzbesetzungsbewegungen wieder ein reges Interesse. Auf die Entität »Stadt« kann es nicht ohne Weiteres übertragen werden, wurden damit bisher doch in erster Linie kleinteilige »Mikropolitiken« gefasst, performativ-verräumlichende Akte der präsentischen Vorwegnahme einer alternativen Welt im Klein(st)en. Van de Sande beschreibt das Konzept wie folgt: „»Prefiguration« or »prefigurative politics« refers to a political action, practice, movement, moment or development in which certain political ideas are experimentally actualized in the »here and now«, rather than hoped to be realized in a distant future. Thus, in prefigurative practices, the means applied are deemed to embody or »mirror« the ends one strives to realize.”4 Dem gegen ein passivierendes Warten auf den großen revolutionären Bruch gerichteten präsentischen Beginnen kommt dabei eine zentrale strategische Bedeutung zu. Gustav Landauer, ein früher Protagonist dieses Diskursstrangs, vermerkte dazu in einem 1908 verfassten Flugblatt, mit dem er für das Präfigurationsprojekt Sozialistischer Bund warb, folgendes: „Wir warten nicht auf die Revolution, damit dann Sozialismus beginne; sondern wir fangen an, den Sozialismus zur Wirklichkeit zu machen, damit dadurch der große Umschwung komme!“5 Ausgehend von einem rela3 Walzer, Michael (2017): The Politics of Resistance. In:, Zugriff: 22.09.2017.

1 Ross, Kristin (2016): Die Pariser Kommune – jenseits des »zellenartigen Regimes der Nationalität«. In: Historische Anthropologie, 24, 3/2016, 376-395, hier: 376.

4 Van de Sande, Mathijs (2013): The Prefigurative Politics of Tharir Square – An Alternative Perspective on the 2011 Revolutions. In: Res Publica, 19, 3/2013, 223-239, hier: 230.

2 Vgl. Castells, Manuel (1983): The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley: UC Press, 21.

5 Landauer, Gustav (2010): Antipolitik, Lich: Edition AV, 131.

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Radical Cities

Täglicher Widerstand?

Wir wünschen uns eine andere Welt und wir sind davon überzeugt, dass sie möglich ist. Eine Welt der Solidarität und des Miteinanders anstatt vieler Konkurrenzen und Grenzen. Wir sind davon überzeugt, dass wir hierfür unkonventionelle und radikale Wege gehen müssen. Aber was bedeutet es im Alltag und in Städten an den “Wurzeln“ von gesellschaftlichen Herausforderungen anzusetzen? – Das wissen wir als Schreibende dieses Textes nicht für euren Alltag, können es auch nicht für andere wissen, haben aber ein paar Ideen davon, was es heißen könnte es zu versuchen und möchten diese mit euch teilen. Wir sind davon überzeugt, dass es nicht DIE eine Lösung gibt, nicht eine überall passende Strategie existiert, und erst recht nicht eine gleichgeschaltete Form sinnvoll ist um eine radikale Veränderung in unserem Alltag umzusetzen. Radikalität im Sinne einer transformativen Praxis im Alltag bedeutet für uns nicht nur kollektive Strukturen zu schaffen, die den Status Quo mit Aktionen, strategischer Organisation und durch den Aufbau von praktischen Alternativen in Frage stellen, sondern auch individuelle und situative Improvisation, Reaktion und gelebte Solidarität. Veränderung bedeutet immer Auseinandersetzung. Vor allem mit unserer Umwelt, mit der Gesellschaft um uns herum, aber – nicht zuletzt – auch mit uns selbst. Normalität zu durchbrechen, um eine andere Welt aufzubauen ist auch deswegen eine Herausforderung, weil wir alle – oft ohne es zu merken – vorherrschende und gewohnte Normen und strukturelle Unterdrückungen reproduzieren und weitergeben. Ein Appell das zu ändern und die Formulierung des Anspruchs, dass sich an den bestehenden Verhältnissen fundamental etwas ändern muss, reicht allein nicht aus. Anders gesagt: Eine – und wenn auch gut gemeinte – „weltverändernde Praxis“ allein reicht nicht aus. Veränderung muss immer auch bei uns selbst stattfinden. Bei dir, bei mir, bei uns allen. Jeden Tag. Gleichzeitig bleibt bei aller romantischen Illusionsbereitschaft und jedem nett gemeinten Pragmatismus, der uns zur Praxis des Handelns drängt, eine alles entscheidende Frage:

Was kann und will ICH tun? Was kann ICH tun, damit eine konkrete Unterdrückungssituation aufhört? Was kann ICH tun, damit die Welt “besser“ wird oder sich etwas strukturell ändert? Und: Was will ICH tun, damit ich mich nicht handlungsunfähig fühle? Das wissen wir nicht. Das können wir auch nicht wissen, denn das kannst nur du allein entscheiden und umsetzen. Jede*r von uns kann das tun, macht es sowieso die ganze Zeit, auch wenn es uns nicht auffällt, – denn: auch scheinbar NICHTS zu tun ist ein individuelles Handeln. Wir können nicht NICHTs tun, sonst wären wir nicht existent. Daher fragen wir nur:



Was und wie kann ich etwas tun und was hilft uns dabei etwas ganz Bestimmtes (und aus ganz bestimmten Gründen) zu tun? Hier ein paar Ansätze in der Hoffnung voneinander zu lernen und euch durch das Teilen unserer Perspektive dabei zu unterstützen, euren Weg zu finden.


Die Umgebung bewusst sehen und sich in Beziehung setzen

Sich selbst als handlungsf ähiges Subjekt wahrnehmen – Was ich tue macht einen Unterschied.


Von vorne beginnen


Während (und davor und danach) dem Handeln nachdenken! – Reflektieren ist besser als sich dogmatisch verrennen.


Theorie- und Utopie-Entwicklung: Wofür stehe ich?

In Aktion treten – Ich handle und weiß warum,

– auch wenn ich mir nie 100% sicher sein kann.

Einen Versuch ist es wert.

engagée | 27

Inhalte sichtbar machen

Wo und wie werden die Konflikte dieser Zeit verhandelt? Die hier gezeigten Tätigkeiten sollen praktische Erfahrungen von Versuchen skizzieren, in kleinen und großen Schritten durch eine individuelle und kollektive Praxis die Welt zu verändern, in der wir leben. Sie können niemals vollständig sein und müssen immer weiterentwickelt und situativ neu angewendet werden.

Stadtbild gestalten Welche Möglichkeiten haben wir, gegen Unterdrückung und Diskriminierung aktiv zu werden? Individuell oder kollektiv, spontan oder im Voraus geplant, subversiv, kreativ oder militant: Vieles ist möglich und beinhaltet doch sehr verschiedene Herausforderungen, Fragen, Potentiale und neue Verhältnisse, aber eines ist allen gemein,- es sind Beispiele für den Alltag in dem wir leben (können).

Diskurs voranbringen

Protest auf die Straße tragen

Zentral für täglichen Widerstand gegenüber körperlicher und psychischer Gewalt, struktureller und individueller Unterdrückung und systematischer Ungerechtigkeit ist Solidarität und Notwehr.

Situativ agieren Kollektiv arbeiten

Wenn die Nachbar*innen von nebenan zwangsgeräumt werden, wenn ein Mensch an der Straßenecke rassistisch beleidigt oder sexuell belästigt wird, dann schreitet ein! Wenn der nächste Park einem Einkaufszentrum weichen soll oder wieder ein kleiner Laden an der Ecke den Miethaien zum Opfer fällt, dann schreitet ein! Helft einander! Ohne Solidarität sind wir alle allein.

Widerspenstig bleiben

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Radical Cities

Ein Dogma wird nie die Lรถsung sein.

Das Handeln ist immer jetzt und keine Situation wird werden, wie sie gerade war.

Kein Ziel ohne IrrtĂźmer, kein Utopie-Versuch ohne Scheitern.

Konzept: Team Sowieso Zeichnungen: blackpenimages

Radical Cities

Von Freiräumen


freier von freier für

prai schützen und schonen, gern haben und lieben Freiheit, Freundschaft, Frieden Schutz Freiräume schützen Freiräume schützen Freiwilligkeit Selbst bestimmen Selbstbestimmt Aushandelbarkeit Handeln Nichts tun Freiräume für alle und alles Aneignung ohne Ausschließung Freiräume freiräumen Freiräume freiräumen!

| Miriam Nessler

Wimmelbild „Recht auf Stadt“

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Radical Cities

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// Wimmelbild „Recht auf Stadt“ von Marc Amann und Markus Wende

Taking back the city

Ne da(vi)mo Beograd - Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own Initiative

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he Belgrade Waterfront project, the latest incarnation of Bilbao-inspired “urban renewals”, is among the most grandiose examples of “investor urbanism”. Its costs for the taxpayers and the potential risks linked to the construction are immense, as are the various regulations violated by the planners. Yet, the Serbian government instigates a frightening social consensus for the project.

The Belgrade Waterfront was presented in 2012 during the Serbian parliamentary and re-emerged in the elections of the 2014 campaign. The media presented the project as a vision to turn the devastated and neglected part of central Belgrade, the Waterfront, into a 2-million square meter commercial complex: the project included hotels, office buildings and luxury apartments for 17,000 people, the largest shopping mall in the Balkans, and a Dubai-style 200-meter tower. The Belgrade Waterfront project wants to impose a new face on a city whose identity has been evolving continuously through the centuries. This program was promoted as a ticket out of the crisis, to a country in which thousands of

people are without a permanent housing solution, where the number of people below the poverty line is increasing, and on a city with numerous empty shops, including the city centre, where entire buildings are vacant and decaying.

Project concerns Behind the 2-million square meter area called Master Plan is the Abu Dhabi-based investor Eagle Hills Company, a real estate firm established recently. Eagle Hills Company’s main projects are in low and middle-income countries. The financial plan is based on equity and debt financing and therefore without assets that could serve as a collateral. When Eagle Hills Company announced that it will invest $3.5b in the Master Plan, the obligation of the corporate partner was to build commercial and housing objects, but no guarantees were provided in return. The Serbian government promised to provide infrastructural support to begin the constructions, as well as to lease more than 100 hectares of the most valuable buildable land in Belgrade to the private investor. As the proposed

solution was impossible under Belgrade’s urban planning policies, the Serbian government declared the project to be of “National Significance”. Although the nature of this significance was never explained to the public, the project was legalized to go on the fast line. Instead of changing the investor’s proposal to comply with the city’s recognized needs and the long-term development planning, urban policies were rapidly changed. The city of Belgrade has amended its urban plan to suit the needs of the corporate partner from United Arabic Emerates (UAE), breaching dozens of its own laws and regulations. Belgrade’s Master Plan and its accompanying clauses were amended to deregulate the urban plans of the designated project area, suspending regulations on maximum height limits and incorporating the private firm’s Master Plan into the city documents. The Serbian government amended the “Law on Urban Planning and Construction” to legalize the breaches of the Master Plan, and declaring investments from UAE to be exempt from regulations on public procurement or public-private partnerships. The supposed urgency to sign the

deal with the investor was given as an excuse to implement the Lex Specialis – the exceptional law, thus evicting hundreds of families living on the site, leaving many of them without a permanent housing solution. The government managed the Waterfront issue without any obtained permissions and paperwork (or obtained a posteriori) and without a single signed agreement between the legal parties. The contract between the Serbin state and the Abu Dhabi-based company was eventually signed more than a year after the project began. Although the details of the contract were unknown at that moment, it became obvious that the extensive promotional campaign was a bluff. The information available from the contract revealed that the previously announced four years to finish the Project was stretched to 30, enabling Eagle Hills to speculate with land value. In addition, the $3.5b were announce to be only €150m, while the public investment of clearing and preparing the land equalled $1b, and for which the Serbian government took a €280 million loan from the investor.

The full content of the contract was revealed to the public only a week before the first foundation stone had to be laid. The authorities signed the contract behind closed doors arguing that the land had to be prepared first, in order for the investor to start the operation. The contract also states that profit will be divided into two parts, 68% to the private investor and 32% to the public. The result is that one of the most valuable pieces of land in Serbia was given under the lease of 99 years for only €150m, with the lessee becoming the landholder. Meanwhile, the implementation of the project was followed from the beginning by a strong PR campaign, which included billboards and flags occupying public spaces illegally, promotional TV shows, unregulated refurbishment of the most prominent heritage building for promotional purposes, as well as a temporary exhibition space turned to be an exclusive, privately owned restaurant and bar. These elements of the show represent on a smaller scale the big image of the project: a rise of private businesses and profit through the appropriation of public space and funds.

Few months after the contract was signed, the field works have started. More than 200 hundred families were removed or evicted from their houses, parts of the area were demolished, and the massive riverside development began. On the night of the parliamentary elections, the 25th of April 2016, about 30 masked men and bulldozers tore down part of the Savamala district, including half of the Hercegovačka street, and destroyed structures on the proposed site of the Belgrade’s Waterfront. Night guards and random passers-by were tied down and harassed by the masked group of people. Although the citizens called the police and reported the entire case, the police did not react ultimately and redirected all calls to the municipal police, who also refused to intervene. State officials and media have been silent about the incident for days. Some days later, the public advocate ombudsman published a report about the destruction in Savamala. According to the report, an organized, well equipped and motorized group of people took control of a street in the neighbourhood of Savamala. People engagée | 41

were deprived of liberty and personal belongings, including mobile phones. In two hours, the entire street was torn down. Examined audio recordings have indicated that the citizens have undoubtedly reported the case to the police. On the same night, after the departure of masked people, it was reported that witnesses and victims spoke to the police. After a conversation with superiors, a police telephone operator told one citizen that an order “from the top ranks of the police” informed to redirect all calls to the municipal police. However, the municipal police sent requests for help back to the state police and officials were not seen at the scene. The Ombudsman concluded that this was not an individual mistake, but, on the contrary, the result of a plan. The report assesses that “it was an organized violation of citizens’ rights, coordinated on multiple levels and between more state and non-state actors.” The government initially denied any involvement by city or state institutions, but none the less the Serbian Prime Minister told that the mystery was solved: top city offi-

cials gave the orders, but they did so out of “personal motives”. The case is still ongoing.

The resistance - Initiative “Ne da(vi)mo Beograd” The citizens’ initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd1 (Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own) was formed in reaction to the imposition of the project Belgrade Waterfront. Today, this informal group comprises of people of different profiles, professions, and beliefs, who share the responsibility for taking care of the city, its processes and problems, its present and future. Their activities have one common objective: stopping the degradation and the depletion of the city space in the name of ostentatious urban and architectural mega-projects in Belgrade and in other Serbian cities. They aim is to promote policies for the sustainable development of cities and argue for a more just dis1 The name is an untranslatable play on certain Serbian words, the closest translation would be Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own. The brackets suggest two sentences, one meaning “We’re not giving Belgrade away” and the other “Do not sink Belgrade”.

tribution of common resources while enabling the inclusion of citizens in the development of their environment. The first public action of the Initiative was to submit objections regarding the changes in the Master Plan of Belgrade. To this purpose, members of the collective “Ministarstvo Prostora” [Ministry of Space] invited the citizens of Belgrade to a workshop analysing the details of the project. Based on the ensuing discussion, the participants wrote a text and, as a result, the citizens of Belgrade filed over 2000 complaints to the proposed changes. During the public hearing, over 200 people discussed these complaints with the representatives of the city authorities and professional institutions. The session lasted for more than six hours and all the complaints were rejected or only superficially taken into consideration, thus giving the citizens a valuable lesson on existing democratic participatory tools that proved to be only a simulation without any effective power. Several months later, the activists of the Ne da(vi)mo Beograd Initiative

opted for different tactics to oppose the new Plan for the Sava Amphitheatre area. Proposed by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade, the new Spatial Plan stood in opposition to the current policies. The Plan was based on the renderings previously presented to the public across newspapers, television screens, billboards and trams, which also aimed to legalize the design shown on the model of “Belgrade on Water”, uncovered at a ceremony held several months earlier to portray the direction of the new identity of Belgrade. This new identity was envisioned by an anonymous author, without prior consultation with professional organizations or the citizens of Belgrade. The activists of Ne da(vi)mo Beograd have chosen not to give legitimacy to a process that was itself illegal. In one of their acts called “Operation Lifebelt”, activists were equipped with inflatable armbands and lifebelts, threw beach balls to each other, and sang songs about Belgrade, all in order to interrupt the illegal Public Hearing session. Contrary to their expectations, and despite the noise, the interruption didn’t occur.

Instead, the members continued their work, complaints were again rejected, and the session was deemed successful. Once again, this has proven the non-permeability of the stakeholders to open forms of public debate. Parallel to the institutional struggle, the Initiative organized events on the streets of Belgrade. Protests, constantly growing in size, have been organized to mark each stage of the pompous project. The visual emblem of the protests became a yellow duck (now the logo of the Initiative), representing what can float when everything else is sinking. Moreover, in Serbian slang, the word “duck” also denotes a trick or a deceit, as well as a male reproductive organ. A large yellow duck (2x3m) was positioned in front of the Serbian Parliament during the session in which the Lex Specialis was passed. This special law, which is not supported by the Constitution, gave for the first time the right to the state to expropriate private property in favour of a commercial project such as the Belgrade Waterfront. The duck was also the theme of the protest “Let’s show them the duck”, held in front of the

building where the contract for the Belgrade Waterfront was signed. During this protest, the city authorities ordered the operators of the public transport network to halt two trams, thus hiding from the view of the media and the officials the thousands of protesters gathered in front of the building. Initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd once again organized a protest the first day of the construction works. Cordons of riot-geared police blocked the city centre preventing citizens from approaching the construction site where the prime minister and investors laid the foundation stone of two new residential towers. The protest was accompanied by chants and several architects and urban experts who participated gave speeches about the problems linked to the regeneration project. Soon, the very appearance of the yellow duck and the words “Ne da(vi)mo Beograd” became subject to repression. Finally, the trigger for the series of massive protests in 2016 was the violent demolition of Hercegovačka street, two days after the Ombudsman published the report. Citizens came in great num-

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bers and demanded the resignation of the people behind the demolition. With the Initiative announcing a series of actions if the Government kept ignoring the protesters, Ne da(vi)mo Beograd was able to gather more than 20,000 people on the streets of Belgrade, the biggest show up in a public political protest since the 1990s.

Taking back the city Over the past decades, professional politicians turned politics into a sludge that no one wants to enter. Attempts to challenge such politics have been dismissed and those who raised their voices against the regime have been accused of “practising politics”. In these circumstances, the Initiative decided to channel and intensify the voices and demands of the citizens and to put an end to the dominance of private and individual interests constantly overriding the public good. Ne da(vi)mo Beograd wants to end the system in which public resources are used for shady deals between investors and politicians, and in which the citizens always end up as a collateral damage. Hence, inspired by different emerging municipalist platforms in Europe, such as Barcelona en Comù, and Zagreb je nas, the Initiative decided to take back the city and to make its first appearance at the municipal elections of March 2018 for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade. The Initiative wants to change the way in which we, as a society, pursue politics. The Initiative will serve as a platform that would enable democrat-

ic dialogue on the form and content of various city policies. Furthermore, it wishes to open a dialogue at the level of local communities, blocks and quarters, in order to define common priorities for policies that must result in a better life for all, and not only for some. Thus, Ne da(vi)mo Beograd is determined to fight against the appropriation of parts of the city for the private interests of non-transparent actors, for whose accounts, once again, the citizens of this state would have to pay vast amounts of money. Finally, Belgrade is our home. But a home also for the ones to come: our children and their children too. The Initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd bears the responsibility for the present but also for the future. And for everything that we leave behind. Every decision made today will impact what happens tomorrow, and the decisions we denounce today are not in the interests of the citizens. The Initiative is the call to take back the city and an invitation for those who are interested in creating a better and just city to join.

Eye to Eye with Freedom

“Eye to Eye with Freedom” enabled the citizens of Rijeka ...

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to be lifted 22m high with a crane up to the bronze partisan figures ...

of the Monument of Liberation in Rijeka ...

in order to stand eye to eye...

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Radical Cities

| Luiza Margan Action in Public Space, Rijeka, Croatia 17 and 18th of May 2014 Monument of Liberation by Vinko Matkovic, 1955 Produced by: Spajalica Copula / MMSU Rijeka Special thanks to Fire Brigade Rijeka / Vatrogasci Rijeka Photo documentation: Markus Krottendorfer

with the central, female partisan that represents the allegory of freedom.

Für-ein konfrontatives Miteinander Interview mit der Architektin und Stadtplanerin Gabu Heindl über radikaldemokratische Stadtplanung

engagée: Wir haben lange nach einem Raum für das Interview gesucht und jetzt treffen wir uns in der Kunstakademie: Gibt es öffentliche Räume in Wien, wo man sich im Winter treffen kann, ohne etwas konsumieren zu müssen, ungestört, ohne Musik?

im Stadtkino ist so gestaltet, dass man nichts konsumieren und keinen Eintritt zahlen muss, um es zu nutzen. Das ist so gelöst, dass alles, was aus blauem Leder fix installiert ist, zum Stadtkino gehört und alles, was aus Holz ist, gehört zur Gastronomie.

Gabu Heindl: Leider kaum. Deine Frage impliziert ja eine sehr grundsätzliche Machtfrage, nämlich die nach der Durchkapitalisierung von urbanem Raum. Was nun aber die konkretere Frage nach konsumzwangsfreien Orten betrifft: Spontan fällt mir das Stadtkino-Foyer ein, nicht zufällig, da ich das gestaltet habe. Mir war dabei die Pflege des Gastrechts wichtig. Das Foyer

é: Wird der öffentliche Raum dort genutzt? GH: Wie es nun mal so ist, läuft das Nebeneinander nicht ideal. Die Gastronomie ist dort sehr erfolgreich und dehnt sich immer weiter aus. Wenn der öffentliche Partner nicht stark genug ist, dann wächst der privat genutzte Raum auf Kosten des frei zugänglichen

Bereichs. Öffentliche Räume sind umkämpft. Für ihre Offenhaltung braucht es starke öffentliche Institutionen, die aufsperren, heizen und verwalten. Es braucht aber auch das Wissen darum, dass diese Räume öffentlich sind und Besuchende ohne Geld oder auch mit eigenen Getränken hingehen könnten, sich verabreden, eine Pause einlegen, arbeiten oder ein Buch lesen könnten. é: Der öffentliche, städtische Raum steht also unter dem ständigen Druck der möglichen Privatisierung? GH: Das wird besonders deutlich für Menschen, die auf den öffentlichen Raum angewiesen sind. Weitaus gravierender

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Theorizing Municipal Movements

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Why is municipalism thriving? Norma Tiedemann


ince a few years, the radical left, party members and the manifold in-between around the world witness and take part in a considerable fuss around the concept of rebel cities and new municipalism. Thrilling promises keep being made: reinventing democracy, re-modelling institutions into structures for self-organization, overcoming national exclusions, building bridges into post-capitalism and so on. What is rarely dealt with is where this tide of municipalist fervor comes from and how it can be understood in the current phase of multiple crises. Asking such questions could help not to fall into the often-observable oscillation between progressive euphoria and ‘left melancholy’ (Brown 1999, Bailey et al. 2018). They support a perspective that understands the emergence of municipalist projects to be entangled in the neoliberal rescaling of nation states. A bit more modesty when it comes to rebel cities should however not keep us from recognizing that something interesting is happening and that the density of exclusions and struggles in urban, local spaces might create room for subverting national representationism and institute new democratic practices.

Human activity deserves attention There is no value in illusions about the radicalness of structural transformation that can be reached in municipalist projects. Compromises are inevitable whenever engaging on the field of struggle that is constituted by the complex of state apparatuses. Pushing such aspects aside

because actually one is longing for the immediate implementation of societal emancipation, will only lead to another tale of how the left devoured its children and amplify a view of the state and legal institutions as nothing but anti-democratic, oppressive instruments. Thus, one should also not partake in the choir which claims that institutionalization per se implies that progressive elements are doomed, because history has proven this many times.1 History is not governed by iron laws. Human activity that is dissenting, resisting, contesting plays its part and deserves attention. We should be sincerely interested in what happens concretely whenever movements seek stabilization or greater political impact and that means to acknowledge that with municipalist projects, solidarity cities, progressive city councils or local workers’ cooperatives from Spain, to Italy, Germany, the UK, Argentina, the US, Croatia or Poland something interesting is happening that requires explication: Why is it that in so many dispersed localities the municipalist promise grasps imaginations? And is there something to be won in terms of social advancement? Studying the municipalist instances tells us something about the nature of the politico-economic and social crisis of neoliberal capitalism and the corresponding changes in forms of states and political domination. Municipalism thrives because of the neoliberal rescaling of nation states and its multiple crises, where

1 Though of course the disappointments of social movements and marginalized groups regarding their city governments must be taken seriously, e.g. in the case of Barcelona En Comú’s approach to migrants living in the city (cf. Delclós 2017).

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the dysfunctionality of routine patterns grows to an untenable extent and something must replace worn-out institutions (cf. Jaeggi 2015: 20).

Waging war against cities In the crisis of neoliberalism, cracks within the ensembles of state apparatuses widen. On national and supranational levels a hardening and de-democratization of institutions can be sensed. Though there has never been perfect harmony among EU members, within the last years new dividing lines kept emerging and manifesting rapidly. When decisions are taken, it is by pushing them through in sometimes hasty, sometimes openly authoritarian ways against parliamentary (sub)national entities. In the USA, cities, states and the federal government have never been on the same track. There have always been deviations and contradictions, but nowadays, e.g. when it comes to sanctuary cities, mayors sense a war being waged against them.2 With material concessions having ceased to be the prime stabilizer for hegemonic rule subaltern interests are rarely considered. And those corridors decrease more and more while mounting repression is well underway. Police and legal tactics before and during G20 in Hamburg or the long-term application of emergency rule in France or Turkey illustrate this. However, materialist state theory alerts us to not simplistically equate the state with the will of the dominant class or the unmediated political institutionalization of class domination. Instead, state apparatuses are fields of class struggle themselves. According to Poulantzas, the state cannot be straightforwardly deduced from the capitalist mode of production. This “idealist and voluntarist conception of the state, which identifies it with a ‘machine’ […] created solely for the purposes of domination by a class ‘will’ is utterly contrary to Marxist scientific analysis of the state” (2008: 75). Instead, its set-up, the ensemble of state apparatuses, the distribution of competences are the contingent outcomes of struggles and therefore specific to concrete space and time.

2 “It really feels like they’re waging war, that there’s a war on cities happening in this country and right here in this state”, Austin Mayor Steve Adler, quoted in Edelman (2017).

The (neoliberal) rearrangement of state apparatuses In this line of research, a major focus has been the internationalization or Europeanisation of states while an engagement with subnational, specifically subregional levels is lacking. This however is required to fully understand the rivalries between differently scaled apparatuses. Only then it comes to the fore that dissent is growing on the municipal level against the decisions of nation-state executives, fuelled by the neoliberal rescaling of the state. The dirty work of neoliberalization has been shifted to the urban level where the infrastructure of social reproduction (housing, education, mobility, job creation etc.) is supposed to be maintained without appropriate means to carry out such tasks. Whereas federal states or the central state can cut expenditures without immediate effects, this does not work at the local level, where the reduction of collective social infrastructures is felt by broad sections of society. The growing contradiction between entrepreneurial city management on the one hand and austerity urbanism on the other emphasizes the spatially uneven development of capitalism. In local spaces, growing inequality is apparent. The gap between rich and poor does not have to be illustrated via the detour of statistics and numbers, but manifests in the built and daily experienced environment – feelings of dispossession and exclusion emerge more directly. But grievance alone cannot mobilize bodies and minds on a long-term basis. Every political and social movement has to spur people’s imagination of a better future. Therefore, it is a question of what kind of (plausible) imaginary can be put forward – whether it grasps the fears and desires of people.

A narration that works In the multiple crisis of neoliberalism and its political forms, making the city a nodal point of mobilization and hope is exercised as a strategy of many different actors all over the globe. The new municipalisms function as a narration that binds together different disruptive bits. And the fact that this works is not arbitrary. Forms and contents of struggles are linked to rifts in political, economic and social constellations. The kinds of outcome the crisis of neoliberalism and its ‘management’ were producing are reflected in the practices of resistance. An aggravating cri-

[Un]settling the City Friederike Landau and Nikolai Roskamm


rbanization is always a process of both creation and destruction, emergence and disappearance, order and disorder, presence and absence, conflict and dialogue, movement and stagnation, colonization and emancipation. The [un]settled is a possible link to capture and contest these urban dichotomies. By bringing together political theory and urbanism, we assume the [un]settled not only as a basic urban configuration, but as its very (pre)-condition. We propose a reflection that works toward a critical engagement and reconstruction of urban theory.1 Being unsettled takes place on multiple layers of meaning and feeling. We all know conditions of the unsettled – objects, places, weather. Unsettled may be the name for

1 This text came into being after many fruitful discussions at the 2017 TU Vienna conference Unsettled. Urban routines, temporalities and contestations (we would like to thank Ed Wall for putting the notion of the unset-tled on our agenda).


abandoned and deserted areas, potentially resulting from environmental pollution or economic decline that affect our sense of place. Beyond these spatial imaginaries and connotations, the unsettled is a state of mind, retrieving memories, animating past stories and emotions, (re)activating positive and negative affects that become particularly prevalent in times of uncertainty and perplexity. Historically, the condition of unsettledness has engaged the minds of philosophers, lawyers, educators and natural scientists for a long time. As early as the 17th century, preacher Jeremiah Whittaker (1642) fervently promoted Christ as the ‘settlement of the unsettled’ believers of the time. John Stuart Mill (1844) titled his reflections on political economy as Essays on some unsettled questions. Contemporary accounts of the unsettled discuss the term in debates about law, precarious citizenship and unstable statehood, as well as in literary studies, critical sexuality studies and postcolonial theory. These versatile

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disciplinary engagements underscore the multi-faceted applicability and societal relevance of the [un]settled. It stands, now and then, for ‘being out of joint’ and represents complex sentiments, actions and reactions in processes of political and social transformation. The settled designates a materialized and discursive ‘normality’ as opposed to the pathologized or stigmatized unsettled. States of settledness with expectations to ensure and create stability, regularity and regulation seem to prevail despite growing social pluralism and injustice. We take the unsettled to include the status of those literally unsettled (i.e., without fixed abode, be it in consequence of homelessness or flight) in addition to the piercing political dilemma of [un]settledness, which characterizes contemporary urban life and politics. In our approach, the unsettled is, first, a prerequisite for urbanity. Paradoxically positioning the city as unsettled (Roskamm 2017), we infiltrate the assumption that the city ‘is’ a spatial settlement in the literal sense. While the city undeniably consists of dwellings, buildings, housing estates – settlements – they cannot conclusively establish fixed, durable, or safe states of urban totality. This is because the city is, this is our second point, always in flux – a process, a contestation, an event. Our hypothesis of the unsettled is based on the diagnosis that the concept of the city is a floating, uncertain, finally in(de)terminable entity, fluctuating between settlement efforts and the impossibility to finalize these aspirations. The city is thus endless and excessive beyond its own borders. This excess is not an additive feature, but the city’s constitutive condition. Settling activities and its unsettling counterparts as sedimentations and dislocations (Laclau 1990) constitute the city as a system of meaning and power. While the transitions and transformations between the settled and the unsettled are practically impossible to detach in life and politics, we analytically distinguish between settled and unsettled urban conditions and institutions with the aim of theorizing the city. The settled as urban state of mind and practice operates under premises of institutionalized, routinized or normalized rules, policies and plans that latently or explicitly structure and govern urban life. As unsettled, we understand contestatory or tendentially less systematic practices of urban dwelling and politics. Unsettling urban practices challenge and subvert, rather than consolidate, the dimension of conflict in everyday urban life. Altogether, we propose to think the city as a

[un]settled, [un]settling and [un]settlable phenomenon. By disambiguating the irrevocably interrelated topos of the [un]settled, we propose four analytical approximations to which we refer as vectors: Vector #1 The Post-Foundational City Vector #2 The Spectral City Vector #3 The Post-Political City Vector #4 The Affective City.

The city is a floating, uncertain, finally in(de)terminable entity, fluctuating between settlement efforts and the impossibility to finalize these aspirations. The city is thus endless and excessive beyond its own borders. Following Henri Lefebvre’s (1996) quest for a new urban ‘science of the city’, we propose these four categories to span open theoretical avenues to understand the urban as a space of multi-layered contestation. Notably, the proposed vectors overlap and interpenetrate both conceptually and empirically. Vector #1 The Post-Foundational City situates our approach to a radical concept of urbanity in post-foundational political theory (Marchart 2013; Laclau 1990). This way of thinking is based on the premise of non-determined history. According to Ernesto Laclau, history is the result of alterable power relations between forces that cannot be reduced to any kind of unitary principle or essence. Every power relation is contingent and depends on conditions that are equally contingent. Because no power relation is conclusively determinable – and this is the optimistic element in Laclau’s theory – there is the possibility of changing these relations: “If social relations are contingent, it means they can be radically transformed through struggle, instead of that transformation being conceived as a self-transformation of an objective nature” (1990: 35).

Against Radical Tourism Alessio Kolioulis in conversation with Paolo Mossetti on Naples

engagée: Naples, a city where you grew up and returned after years spent in the UK and the US, is often celebrated as one of the global rebel cities. In many of your recent articles, however, you somehow portray a different picture. Can you explain your take on and your involvement with the municipalist movement in Naples? Paolo Mossetti: Firstly, I’d like to say that by ‘municipalism’ we include a wide array of responses to the narrative of the so-called ‘neoliberal city’: the way this notion is shaping the Left in New York and pro-immigration ‘sanctuary cities’ is very different from, say, the way a city like Barcelona sees itself. As for Naples, this very sparse movement started as a populist alternative to the rhetoric of the neoliberal centre-left, on one hand, and the mafia-ridden centre-right coalition on the other. When the current Mayor, Luigi de Magistris, first run for elections in 2011, Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement was still in its embryo phase, with limited support nationwide and a strong component of green, New Wave and post-workerist ecologism. When I returned to Naples in 2015, de Magistris was at the apex of popularity: the city was bustling with nightlife, the centre was literally flooded by tourists in a once disregarded garbage-covered gangster town; Erasmus students were finally coming to study here and low-income families were discovering Airbnb. There was something really unique in the relationship between the Mayor and the radical left, too. De Magistris allowed Marxist collectives to occupy huge complexes once run by the government or the Catholic Church, now in decay. These places were occupied and transformed into beautiful labs for mutualism and cultural centres (working much better than the average enterprise run by the local department of Culture, by the way). De Magistris did try and is

still trying to give municipalism a party base, calling it DeMa, echoing the word demos and obviously the initials of the Mayor himself. A sort of hard-left version of Emmanuel Macron’s En March. This party, other than disappointing in local elections, did not do much to offer a solid vision of its future, or about its economic/political theories, and I don’t feel persuaded by its membership, although it includes many trustworthy activists.

Although I consider myself more anarchist and liberal than many of the people there, I was excited to collaborate and establish friendships with some of these social centres supported by the Mayor: especially the Ex-OPG, a former psychiatric hospital in ruins now transformed by a Marxist collective into a place for arts, social services and discussion. I liked the way they were open to the neighbourhood, to non-militant people, way more inclusive than the typical 1990s-social centre. I liked the sense of easy-going comradeship feeling around. I helped them organize meetings and talks and raised some crowdfunded money for them – another first, for a Communist collective! The lows were a certain rigidity over protocol structures – the neverending assemblies, the refusal to go beyond voluntarism – and a certain reluctance to criticize the Mayor even when the limits of his populist propaganda were evident – as the degrading quality of life and culture in the city is before everyone’s eyes. I had several arguengagée | 57

ments with the comrades, some of them see me with suspicion. But I think there is still mutual respect, after all.

é: In one of your articles, you refer to Barcelona and Naples as two cities that were able to market themselves to “rebel tourists”. While I can agree that tourism is potentially destructive, with a scarcity of good examples of how an autonomous left can win, don’t you think that such view can damage the efforts put by the municipalist movement into a new momentum? PM: We, as materialist, or wannabe ones, should have the guts to ask ourselves one fundamental question: ‘Where are we getting the money from? Do we have the means to fight for a more generous tax regime state-wide? Do we want to re-open state-run steel-making factories, or believe in autarchy?’ The cities we are talking about, just like Naples, are facing a steep economic decline within a globalized world, with a shrinking middle class, pretty much no white-collar jobs, no financial services, there are not many options other than tourism as an easy way to survive. Yes, tourism is really a cheap kind of business: poorly paid jobs, shitty hours, mostly low-skilled roles and what is worst, new dynamics of exploitation within the city: I really don’t remember seeing waiters literally dragging people inside restaurants back in the 1990s, or people kicking students out for making space to hostels or B&Bs (which is something I did, too – but only because those students were insufferable douchebags). But let’s try not to exaggerate the effects of gentrification. While many people treat tourists as mere talking wallets, and foreign students bring booze drinking into an otherwise pretty sober cultural nightlife, and the quality of street food is definitely less authentic than before, I can’t say the City is kicking communities out or is getting as nearly as expensive as Milan or Rome. So, I think we can use this opportunity of globalization as a path for some potential, for connecting activist groups and academics around Europe and the World to offer better solutions before it is too late.

I am just not sure if what will come out of this will be actually a radical process or just the middle class getting richer and researcher finding their love in the city. So far tourism has turned the city centre in a much more controlled, clean and boring place. But the opportunities offered by the municipalist momentum have nothing to fear from it: movements should rather worry about the nature of this momentum, its class composition, and the lack of a coherent economic doctrine.

é: You have argued that some of the activities carried out by social centres in Naples are similar to the ones you can see in humanitarian crises. But aren’t social centres better than the state anyway? PM: It really takes a huge leap to call these centres ‘better anyway’. Or maybe depends on what do we mean by ‘better’. If you ask me if sheltering homeless people in an occupied church instead of letting them die in the dark as the state services do is inherently bad, sure I can’t say that. However, if you think about health services, the hardships posed by the lack of state-sponsored equipment are huge. You can’t take a proper ultrasound of a pregnant Roma woman just because she feels more comfortable visiting a squatted space rather than a government clinic: you need to have a safe way to process medical waste, you need to print tests in a very precise way. If you follow incorrect procedures or encourage people to do so, just because ‘bad is better than nothing’, you risk creating more problems for the social services than there were. You will mess things up. You need to have really skilled workers who know what they’re doing and be sure that people are informed of all the options offered by State services. Sometimes the problem is communication. Radicals think austerity cut all free health care in Italy, but there are many services you can still get for free, and many prenatal testing clinics are deserted for no reason other than ignorance. I think movements, while initially they offered a huge range of welfare works, had second thoughts and now they’re focusing more on the quality, on things they can really do well, such as breast screenings, legal counselling for migrants and informal workers, and so on.

é: In a country like Italy, where the nation-state was imposed from above and belonging to a city is important than being Italian, is there a risk that such identities will overlook the non- and peri-urban? PM: It must be surely recognized that the municipalist movement in Naples has characteristics similar to the xenophobic, localist movements born in the 1980s and 1990s in the North. Sadly, it is also much poorer, more culturaloriented. In Naples’ municipalism we can find young utopians who look at the Mediterranean as an apt political horizon for the city’s ambitions rather than the European Union; old royalists who romanticize the Bourbon’s period (neoborbonismo); folk lovers; a proud, educated and Napoli-centred aging middle class who can’t leave the city for too long. It is a soft, porous ideology rooted in the belief that the Italian South was ransacked by the North during the Unification and used as nothing but political reserve after WWII. There’s a lot of victimization, some

reasoned post-colonial theory, some Marxist thinking and way more magical thinking. But what is lacking is the industrial élite or a powerful upper class supporting city autonomy, as in the case of Barcelona or, on a whole different level, New York.

é: Naples is famous for the violence of its municipal police, which often can operate unpunished. What is the relationship between municipal police and municipal politics in Naples? PM: I would say that police brutality in Naples is not greater than in Rome or Milan, but here the police operate in a very different kind of environment: a mix of petty and big crime, from teen gangs to large scale mafia operation. In Naples the police deploy a special division called Falchi (‘Hawks’) who move around the city on motorbikes as a way to deal with hit-and-run offenders. But the way they operate is very obscure, they often use excessive force on teenagers, as most of the police do against migrants when caught stealing or jumping the metro’s turnstiles. Some of the Falchi are former convicts. There is a lot of informality in the police repression, like in the local economy. Funnily enough, we have very few CCTV in Naples. Perhaps the State has a certain degree of tolerance for petty crimes as a social valve, to avoid excessive social tension. The striking aspect of the law enforcement bodies is the lack of education and skills to deal with the increasing cultural diversity. Very few officers speak English, let alone other languages such as French or Arabic. The police are mostly white and Italian-born. The ubiquity of military in the city centre reminds a lot that of Mexico City or some other Latin American megalopolis. It is really disturbing to see armoured vehicles and soldiers holding machine guns next to Renaissance monuments: but when this was implemented by the centre-left government as a demagogic way to deal with terrorism, the Mayor, as usual, was really wary of protesting. He probably thought this could help tourists feeling safe. But de Magistris is always like this: rebellious on Twitter but pretty reassuring for the bourgeoisie status quo in everyday actions.

é: Your observations of Naples as a sensitive insider pose some challenges to any future municipalist movement. How can these criticisms turn into elements of an emancipatory politics? PM: What I am saying is that a municipalist movement alone, without a strong, growing economy, without a credible political class, can pose serious risks of de-legitimization for the Left. Naples is a bit like Cuba, where great solidarity and a fascinating informal economy stand side to side to the de facto neoliberal politics, a widespread laissez-faire where people are

renting their houses without paying any taxes, where bookshops are turning into booze drinking venues, etcetera. The market is actually the King here, more than in many neoliberal cities where the State is actually strong and present. Having said that, Naples is a city where the rent is still not so unaffordable like elsewhere, the food is great and relatively cheap, the city centre is still a great cradle of arts and humanities and intellectual connections, and there’s space for a certain improvisation, for a certain type of social organizing and solidarity that in Milan or Rome is now a mirage. It is a great gym for radical politics. And it is worthy to spend a few months here, or even more if you find a good remote job or love. But be careful not to take for emancipatory elements what are, in my opinion, elements of savagery and regression.

é: Is there a place for arts in municipal politics? PM: Look, I am no fan of private-sponsored art, like in Milan or Rome, so I would say yes. Of course, you cannot expect in Napoli the same type of art market and audience you have in Milan or Rome. We have few galleries and most of them destined to an ageing, aristocratic élite. The biggest contemporary art museum (MADRE) is a decent one but very often empty. People go there mostly for the aperitivi and the DJ sets. You can say this happens pretty much elsewhere; yet again, you must prepare to face a series of obstacles in the process of being part of Naples’ art world. There is less competition for sure (all big talents dream to fly abroad) but this sometimes means people have no choice but to attend really mediocre, locallyoriented folk music concerts. For any talk that starts two hours late, you will have people filling beautiful streets for average performers that in the city centre of London would be banned or replaced by the depressing after work curfew. It’s about perspectives. For any lazy, self-absorbed comrade who makes art without any interest in networking or exchanging ideas, you will find social centres hosting great experimental theatre for free. I always recommend emerging artists planning to move to Naples to keep strict schedules, a certain work discipline, and to put a lot of effort in establishing connections with local people, because this is way less spontaneous than they might think (especially if they are over 30 like me). People here already have their friends, their habits, and they are more close-minded than you can imagine. Also, do not expect any kind of private or state sponsor, that is for sure. But perhaps this is exactly what artists escaping from the Anglophone world hope to find.

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Movements post-hegemony:

How contemporary collective action transforms hegemonic politics

// Alexandros Kioupkiolis

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ost-hegemony’ has become a cri de guerre among theorists who take issue with the modern politics of hierarchical organization, representation, unification, the state and ideology: the politics of ‘hegemony’ (see e.g. Arditi, 2007; Beasley-Murray, 2010; Day, 2005). The term ‘post-hegemony’ purported, initially, to capture transformations in both the dominant regimes of power and in various democratic resistances at the turn of the century (Arditi, 2007; Beasley-Murray, 2010; Lash, 2007). These transmutations seemed to spell the end of modes of domination and organization which could be grasped through the lenses of Gramsci’s (1971) and Laclau’s (2005) theory of hegemony. ‘Hegemony’ turns on the construction of a collective identity out of a plurality of groups and demands, the interplay of force and consent, representation and discourse (or ideology), and the need to engage with both civil society and state institutions in order to bring about historical change.

The crux of the ‘post-hegemonic’ arguments is that neither the global nexuses of power nor the democratic mobilizations against them are now configured in such terms. They are networked, dispersed and immanent. They operate directly on bodies and they work through habits and affects, beyond discourse and representation (Arditi, 2007, pp. 212–224; Beasley-Murray, 2010, p. x, 7; Lash, 2007, pp. 55–56, 60). The label ‘post-hegemony’ can be justifiably extended to a wider spectrum of contemporary thinkers and scholars who do not place themselves under this rubric but they assail the same dominant forms of power and they track the emergence of new structures in global networks and social initiatives (see e.g. Day, 2005; Hardt & Negri, 2004, 2009; Holloway, 2005; Maechelbergh, 2009; Newman, 2011; Nunes, 2014).

The paper will come to grips with those critiques of hegemony which bear specifically on social movements and a nascent radical-democratic culture. ‘Post-hegemonic’ accounts hold that collective democratic agency today is horizontal, i.e. non-hierarchical, networked and plural, and it undertakes prefigurative politics which enact here and now the values of a radical democracy to come. These figures of political action are said to have superseded older, hierarchical forms of agency in political parties, governments and movements. Critical responses to the ‘post-hegemonic’ thesis object that contemporary democratic resistances do not attain, in effect, a full rupture with hegemony or they should not attain it, lest they condemn themselves to insularity and inefficiency (Prentoulis & Thomassen, 2012, pp. 1–19; Stavrakakis, 2014).

The following argument seeks to recast the post-hegemonic thesis, arguing that a movement beyond hegemonic politics drives, indeed, collective action and movement culture(s) over the last two decades (and much earlier, in effect). No doubt, constitutive elements of hegemonic politics, such as representation, concentration of power and unification, are endemic to various instances of anti-hierarchical self-organization. But these gesture effectively beyond hegemony insofar as they transfigure its political logics in distinct ways, opening up representation, leadership and unity to pluralization and non-hierarchical interaction. A ‘bias’ in favour of horizontality marks them off from most modern types of collective organization in parties, trade unions and state institutions.

Post-hegemony (1): inaugurating the debate


ost-hegemony’ was introduced as the description of a new modality of power at a time when the era of hegemony is ‘beginning to draw to a close’ (Lash, 2007, p. 55). The theory of hegemony was shaped mainly by the writings of Gramsci, Laclau and Stuart Hall (Lash, 2007, p. 56). Laclau’s conceptual elaborations used to provide the key reference, in cultural studies at least (Beasley-Murray, 2010, p. 40). ‘Hegemony’ captures a regime of power which dominates by combining coercion and consent. It relies on discourse rather than ‘facts’, and it is exercised ‘extensively’ over its subjects rather than ‘intensively’ from within social relations (Lash, 2007, pp. 55–56). Lash (2007, p. 60) drew also a link between post-hegemonic politics and the self-constitution of ‘multitudes’, who co-operate in political action and contemporary labour. But it was the work of Jon Beasley-Murray (2003, 2010) and Benjamin Arditi (2007) which popularized ‘post-hegemony’ as the name of a new pattern of resistance and collective agency in our times. Others, including Hardt and Negri and Richard Day, theorized the overcoming of hegemonic logics in the ‘multitude’ and new anarchist currents, although they did not endorse the terminology of post-hegemony itself (Day, 2005; Hardt & Negri, 2004, 2009).

In all these bodies of thought, various figures of egalitarian activism and social experiment are contrasted to a ‘hegemonic’ model of politics. In Gramsci’s thought, hegemony designates a political practice which seeks to construct a majoritarian national-popular will and to ‘become state’. This objective is pursued crucially through a gradual ‘war of position’ in civil society (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 181–182, 239, 418). However, the main antithesis against which contemporary post-hegemony defines itself is Laclau’s recasting of the Gramscian concept (Arditi, 2007, pp. 207–210; Beasley-Murray, 2010, p. 40; Day, 2005, pp. 8–13; Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 175, 305). In Laclau’s theory, hege-

mony articulates a contingent plurality of autonomous struggles around a ‘chain of equivalence’, welding together a common political front. It is the political process whereby a new social formation is put in place through an antagonistic fight between the dominant regime and an oppositional coalition of forces, or between rival political projects (Laclau, 2000b, p. 207). In political struggles, diverse demands, conflicts and activities may become equivalent through their common opposition to a particular enemy, forging thus a ‘chain of equivalence’ that extends beyond their substantive differences. This chain will coalesce into a ‘collective will/subject’ if a particular force within it rises to become a ‘general representative’ of all equivalent antagonisms and claims. To turn into a hegemonic power, the name or the aims of a particular member of the equivalential chain must be partly emptied of their distinct content in order to become a wider symbol that represents and binds together the entire community of differences (Laclau, 2000b, pp. 210–211). A particularity assumes thus the function of a universality, turning into a force that acts and speaks for a broader community of interests (Laclau, 2000b, pp. 207–212). Hegemony is premised on representation and the uneven distribution of power. Hegemonic practices are inherently processes of representation as they mobilize a particularity which takes up universal tasks in the name of an entire bloc of forces. Laclau has also insisted that political representation is all the more indispensable under actual conditions of increasing social fragmentation, whereby representatives play a key part in constituting a collective will out of disperse social identities (Laclau, 1996, pp. 98–100). Finally, hegemony implies asymmetrical power. Within the community of struggle, a particular agent must operate as the leading force of the counter-hegemonic bloc, and its enemy (‘the regime’) must be excluded and eventually overwhelmed (Laclau, 2000b, pp. 207–208). In sharp contrast to this picture of transformative praxis, ‘[h]abit, affect, and the multitude are the three components of a theory of posthegemony’ (Beasley-Murray, 2010, p. x). The ‘multitude’, a term derived from Spinoza via Hardt and Negri, encompasses a heterogeneous collection of bodies, resistances and agencies. This collectivity self-organizes, cultivates new habits and changes history. The immanent processes of the multitude ‘incarnate a logic from below that requires neither representation nor direction from above’ (Beasley-Murray, 2010, p. x). The same absolute dichotomy between the (post-hegemonic) multitude and the politics of hegemony is asserted by Hardt and Negri. Their ‘multitude’ names a new mode of social production, a collective subject and a political logic that have arisen from post-Fordist ‘biopolitical’ labour, which produces new common knowledge, communication and social relationships (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 66, 109, 114–115, 198, 219). The multitude embodies a distinctive figure of collective organization, which informs not only biopolitical labour but

also contemporary resistances to imperial biopower from the Zapatistas onwards: the distributed network. In it, no principal agent stands vertically above other differences and represents the whole in the hierarchical manner of Gramsci and Laclau’s hegemony. Participation and collective decision-making take the place of unaccountable representatives and leaders (Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 337–340). The ‘multitude’ captures also the ‘internal organisation of the latest Arab Spring, Indignant and Occupy movements’ (Hardt & Negri, 2012, p. 5). All these established ‘distributed networks’ in which connections expand horizontally, without definite boundaries and the command of a single centre. In the 2011 insurrections, the multitude set in motion new constituent powers which strive to emancipate the self-government of the many from top-down leadership, closed ideologies and representation by political parties, enacting instead plural processes which ‘agglutinated’ divergent views in contingent ways (Hardt & Negri, 2012, pp. 44–45, 64). Hence, ‘the multitude is formed through articulations on the plane of immanence without hegemony’ (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 169).

Richard Day was one of the first to proclaim the ‘death’ of Gramsci and hegemony. This dying logic pertains to ‘the politics of representation, recognition, and integration’ (Day, 2005, p. 18). Hegemony is animated by the desire to implement a universal model of social transformation and it is ready to enforce this model upon dissenters (Day, 2005, p. 14, 45, 65). Day illuminates, by contrast, a kaleidoscopic mix of tactics, organizations and initiatives which have surged forth over the last decades in the landless peasants’ movement in Brazil (MST), in indigenous communities in Latin America, in social centres across Europe and in various other sites. These enact new schemes of communal life and political interaction which evince an affinity ‘for non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments’ (Day, 2005, p. 9). They strive to block, resist and render redundant both corporate and state power by carving out minoritarian alternative spaces. They seek to configure open and horizontal associations which manage directly their affairs through consensus and decentralized decision-making. They do not adhere to a master plan of social restructuring nor do they seek to forcibly generalize their values and schemes (Day, 2005, pp. 24–45, 156–157, 172, 186–197). Day (2005, p. 215) does not advocate a ‘total rejection of reformist or revolutionary programs in all cases’. engagée | 63

The circular horizon of municipal movements: Democracy, capital and radical politics

* //Alessio Kolioulis, Rahel Sophia Süß


ooking at the history of the radical left, the twentieth century was marked by two opposite political strategies: the vertical strategy of party structures and the horizontal strategies of social movements. We argue in this article that the new strategic horizon is circular.1

In the last two decades, we have witnessed a steady rise of growing distrust of political parties and representatives and a growth of anti-system rhetoric and political extremism. Faced with these challenges, contemporary democracies appear vulnerable and unable to defend themselves. At the same time, new democratic movements in the cities have raised. They strive to back control, influence politics directly and change the conditions under which politics operate. How can the new municipal movements be studied and analysed? What key principles constitute their practices and how can their strategies be distinguished from previous struggles?

1 This is an edited version of an article that appeared on OpenDemocracy. Alessio Kolioulis and Rahel Sophia Suess, ‘Circularity. A New Strategic Horizon’, OpenDemocracy (blog), 15 January 2018,

The idea of social movements has been exhausted Historically, new streams of theory and political activism have constantly overturned many assumptions underlying concepts such as power, agency and democracy. Vertical and horizontal principles have been deployed in the past to differentiate political practices and theories. This opposition underpinned debates around key concepts such as hegemony, post-hegemony, exodus, autonomy, representation and spontaneity. Neither of these categories can be linked in a definitive way to one particular movement or political strategy. However, an attempt to simplify political tactics and strategies under the umbrella terms of verticality and horizontalism could bring clarity to the old question: “what is to be done?” There are a set of principles we would like to highlight in order to define these two broader tendencies. Following David Harvey’s reading of the Capital’s structure in Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Reason, it is possible to distinguish three economic and political paradigms, which also correspond to the three volumes of the Capital

and the historical development of capitalism. The first paradigm hinges on mass production and large factories. It is the era when socialist and communist parties were shaped against the verticality of production lines, mobilising the masses to confront capitalists with a workers’ vanguard. The second paradigm is characterised by the increasing importance of the sphere of reproduction for the expansion of market economies. The struggles move outside the factory and in favour of horizontal alliances. Movements and autonomous formations fight for a new set of objectives such as against racism, patriarchy, heterosexism, the destruction of the environment and colonialism. The third paradigm invoked by Harvey is based on financial capital and the redistribution of realised value in the second paradigm. Struggles are over the extraction of the commons, rent, wages and borders. The extraction of the commons, because the cooperative production of subjectivities creates economic value. Rent, because gentrification denies the demands for social housing. Wages, because the job market is transformed by new technologies. Borders, because new forms of colonialism and climate change are displacing large parts of the global population.

Given the current circumstances, how can we respond to these transformations? Many contemporary initiatives are driven by a strategy that escapes both the verticality of “early socialism” and the horizontality of autonomous movements emerging around the struggles of the long 1968. These political horizons cannot longer be understood within the existing framework, and it is for this reason that the idea of social movements has been exhausted.

Vertical strategies and horizontal strategies What is behind the shift from the opposite political strategies that marked the division between party structures and social movements? While the vertical movements strictly adhered with the Marxist tradition, favouring party lines linked to state-based models of social change that reduced antagonism to class struggle, horizontal movements followed a community-based model for social change. People took back control of their own lives through constant struggles, moving away from the objective of a revolutionary event. Previously, the strategy of vertical movements and unions was primarily or ex-

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Radical Cities

clusively class-based, addressing ideal concepts, while the revolutionary force was represented by the political party. The ends of social change were seen as prior to the means: strikes, the destruction of machinery and the activities of revolutionary intellectuals were the only viable way forward to achieve a communist revolution. Horizontal movements, on the contrary, were quick in capturing and implementing autonomous strategies, organizing without leaders in a non-hierarchical and decentralized fashion. This was a type of organisation in line with the democratic principle of self-realization. The strategies focused particularly on anti-representation, the politics of everyday life, individual transformation and on a non-authoritarian society. They engaged in a variety of protests and did not focus solely on class as the fundamental axis of oppression but addressed a wider range of adversaries. In horizontalist struggles, the ends of social change had to be consistent with the means. In today’s circumstances, however, vertical forms of organizations and horizontal movements do face important challenges. Isolated strategies, the incorporation into the conventional scripts of the state and the balance of power between the movement and the political party are serious challenges for those who want to bring about radical change. Even when these movements manage to take power, this does not guarantee effectiveness or radicality, as the cases of Syriza and Podemos demonstrated. Too often those who take power ended up engaging with the practices of those from whom they take power. It is from this strategic and theoretical perspective that the municipal movements’ right to the city should be analysed. The new wave of municipal movements can be seen as a result of the experiences of the left and more specifically of previous forms of protest in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the struggles against austerity politics, and the experiments with Podemos and Syriza. With this in mind, we suggest a call for a new circular horizon.

A call for a new circular horizon The new circular horizon highlights the shift from vertical and horizontal strategies towards practices which go beyond the dichotomies of hegemony/autonomy or

representation/spontaneity as they change the underlying assumptions of democracy, power and social change. For instance, the new municipal movements challenge the traditional notion of democracy as a form of governance and competing political parties.

They call for a democracy which identifies social relations, everyday praxis and democratic experiences as a characteristic core of democracy. Moreover, these movements do not subscribe to traditional notions of power, as they see it as the capacity to bring about continuous change and adjust to new circumstances and experiences. And yet, they challenge the notion of social change that confines the achievement of radical transformation either to self-transformation or the ‘occupation of institutions’. Rather than looking at these strategies as isolated principles they regard both as part of what makes meaningful change possible. The strategies of the new municipal movements are shaped by constitutive practices, self-transformation, long-term visions and responses to social emergency. They are questioning the leaderless strategies that guided social movements and replacing them by combining elements of non-hierarchical strategies and tactical leadership. As advocated by Hardt and Negri in their recent book Assembly, tactical leadership is limited to short-term action and tied to specific occasions, whereby movements are responsible for constructing the strategy appropriate to new demands. In more concrete terms, what we suggest calling circular strategies can be defined across five key dimensions: radicality, pragmatism, plurality, openness and experimentalism. Circular strategies are radical insofar as they aim to deepen the democratic principles of liberty, equality and solidarity to increasing number of social spheres. It is about expending the democratic horizon by a simultaneous inclusion of excluded people, groups and ideas and the attempt to keep them autonomous. Circular strategies are pragmatic in the sense that they aim at solving concrete

problems and respond to social emergencies by providing access to housing, healthcare, food, water, education, and data sovereignty.

Circular strategies are plural because they connect a plurality of agencies in a circulation of struggles following the idea of co-producing, co-management, co-ownership. The fluid relationship between new alliances of activists, citizens and politicians allow for multiple levels of organised conflicts, coordination and continuous learning, without having to pass through a rigid central leadership. Circular strategies are open and experimental as power is circulating and moves out of the centre as the circle becomes bigger and bigger. These practices aim to continuously test and modify democratic principles, procedures and policies by critically reflecting on their practical consequences for the improvement of democratic experiences. For instance, the ends and means of radical social change are continuously adjusted in order to test how social freedom and equality can best be implemented under specific circumstances. Finally, a call for a new strategic direction intervenes in the critique of the relationship between democracy and capitalism. Away from old and new separations between economics and politics, we reject both social democratic temptations and the autonomy of radical political experiences.

concrete problem solving. It responds to social emergency by providing access to public services, by solidarity-networks, reduction of costs and removal of bureaucratic barriers. Looking at the networked shape of so-called platform capitalism or the gig economy, circularity represents a tactical horizon that can confront the re-appearance of institutionalised racism and the precarization of life in the spaces where they appear. With a circular democracy, the gate-keeper democracy gets replaced with a democratic ‘co-production’ based on the idea of the commons. Plural practices move beyond the idea of state sovereignty towards a sovereignty of proximity that can co-manage basic needs such as energy, water, food, housing, education and digital sovereignty. If the extractive nature of financial capitalism is able to exploit the cooperation from below of autonomous subjects, the challenge of horizontal and democratic movements is to rethink the construction of institutions able to confront the macro transformations that impact them. Methods for including collective intelligence inspire and inform new democratic practices and institutions that foster lasting structures of discussions and decision-making: What should be our future investments? How do we want to produce? To conclude, the coming circular democracy is open and experimental: democratic principles, procedures and policies are tested in short intervals and adjust to new circumstances by reflecting critically on their practical consequences for the improvement of social relations and democratic experiences.

Coming up: a circular democracy? The new municipal movement can be seen as a prefiguration of a circular democracy to come. In a circular democracy, social relations are becoming the ends and not the means of democratic politics. By maintaining a relevant anchorage in the everyday practices of people, the function of political institutions changes. They improve both the quality of social relations and democratic experience by allowing conflicts to appear and involving people in the decisions that affect them. By doing so, a circular democracy moves from a democracy of bureaucracy towards a democracy of

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Mapping Radical Cities

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s e s s : e s r t r m o o f o t r no living t u b Radical Cities


ies o t i c How

ork w d l ou c r e t shel

UK e h t in

//Pearl Ahrens

Borders as processes, not lines


olitical theorist Angela Mitropolous has written that it’s more useful to migrant solidarity to think about borders as processes, not lines. She says an obsession with the geographical location of a border as a fixed line means “we stop posing questions about what the border does”.1 Although border processes contain objects (papers, detention centres, walls), the less obvious – but just as sinister – parts of border processes are temporal events (raids, arrests, filling in forms at the hospital). Or sometimes they’re neither: rights, checks, rules and regulations, suspicions and exceptions.

In the past, old cities of Europe were surrounded by city walls, to mark and guard the boundaries of the city. As capitalism developed, and its side-effect urbanisation occurred, the point of the walls was undermined by statecraft and they became a half-knocked-down historical feature of the city centres. Nowadays, cities commonly peter out towards their edges – they don’t have boundaries to stop people entering or leaving.

1 [Emphasisadded].Mitropolous,Angela.InBasePublication.“OnBorders/Race/Fascism/Labour/ Precarity/Etc”.(2016).

However, the fact that a city doesn’t have distinct geographical borders doesn’t mean it has open borders, because borders are state processes. In that case, what would it mean to be a ‘City of Shelter’ for migrants in the UK? How could a geographical demarcation defend against a temporal process such as immigration detention, and how would it stop state border processes seeping in through the suburbs? The Radical Municipalism group is a research cluster of UK organisation Plan C. We think a City of Shelter should be an active process undertaken by the municipality and radical civil society, to enable migrants to live their lives and make roots in the city.

What shouldn’t a UK City of Shelter look like? There are currently no Cities of Shelter in the UK. In 2007, Sheffield declared itself a ‘City of Sanctuary’, which means local charities and the council work to make asylum seekers and refugees feel welcome in the city. This is great, but all residents of Sheffield have their lives interrupted by state border processes, no matter their immigration status.2 The ‘sanctuary’ 2 Boutaud,Charles,Cantwell-Corn,Adam,PaoloMancini,Donato.9October2017.“ThousandsofBritishcitizenssweptupinimmigrationspotchecks"

in the name is meaningless if the municipality is ineffective in preventing state border processes from unfolding in the city. Based on Sheffield’s example, there’s a risk that a much- needed UK City of Shelter would end up meaning nothing to most migrants, in the face of powerful state border processes. We, the Plan C Radical Municipalism research cluster based in the UK, believe this liberal model of a refuge city could be more effective if a declaration of City of Shelter committed the municipality and radical civil society to not just protect all ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’ migrants from Immigration Enforcement, but also to make an active effort to provide everyday solidarity to migrants. The idea of working with the municipality to help migrants may seem strange, given the fact that it’s the council that so often is the enemy of current migrant solidarity activities by activists in the UK. Aside from the brilliant work already being done by Anti-Raids Network3, Schools Against Borders for Children4 and Docs Not Cops5, there is a tendency for some migrant solidarity efforts to favour squats as a way to capture and protect a portion of geographical space against the ravages of the state. Despite the constant danger of eviction by the council or the courts, it can feel good to barricade the doors and protect a piece of urban terrain as our own. From the short, sharp squats of banks and million-pound homes to the more open community/social centres, London has had plenty of practice defending a territory. Recent squats such as Sisters Uncut occupation of empty council house in 2016, or Focus E15 mothers occupation of an empty block of council flats in 2014, were antagonistic to their respective borough councils, but unfortunately did not last more than a few weeks. In Brighton, the Labour-led council has since 2017 introduced Public Space Protection Orders (PSPOs), which criminalised the erection of tents and the parking of live-in vans in certain areas of the city. These new control orders predominantly affect homeless people, and due to the large number of migrants living on the streets, will negatively impact the ability of migrants to survive in the city. In this way, it’s clear that attempts by migrants and non-migrants to work together to provide mutual support and shelter are frustrated at every turn by the council and the courts. Across the UK, the ever-present danger of eviction, a process, means even well-defended squats are time-limited. It might even be unhelpful to try and set up a squat for migrant children and their asylum-seeking parents, say, if it advertised their whereabouts thereby making them vulnerable not just to eviction from the squat, but to eviction from the country. The ruthless dispensation of fines 3 Anti-Raids Network website

and evictions against people with no choice in where to live demonstrates, surely, that the council is the enemy. It seems like the onus is on the municipality to do less: step back, and allow radical civil society to cover migrant solidarity without the intrusion of institutional processes.

Looking to Europe for inspiration Examples of squats on the continent show us that when the political will exists, the municipality can take action to provide actual support for migrants. They show us that the problem in the UK is with the exact processes, of criminalisation and eviction, rather than with council intervention full stop. If done correctly, the municipality can create or use new by-laws and processes which actually help migrant squats last longer than in the UK. An example of one such strategy is Naples, where the new Government Resolution no. 446/2016 effectively legalises the squatting of empty buildings for “civic use” when turning them into social centres.6 A law like this, framed as an explicit promise not to evict squats housing migrants, could allow radical civil society provide more sustainable places for families to live. In Dijon, despite threats from fascists, 60-80 asylum seekers co-organised a squat with the autonomous left which has survived in a disused hotel for 15 months. Although it has been dragged through the courts numerous times, it has benefitted from two rounds of a law loophole called the “trêve hivernale” (winter truce), which effectively prohibits eviction notices during the cold seasons. In contrast to Naples, the trêve hivernale is a legal convention, not a municipal law, yet suggests the possibility for municipalities to introduce more relaxed eviction processes. The point of these anecdotes is that municipalities have some official powers that civil society does not. Naples’ new by-law did not come out of nowhere: Naples is an excellent example of ‘radical municipalism’, which is where radical civil society and the municipality “discuss together the proposals for new municipal laws, in a process of co-deliberation of the regulations that govern the city”.7 The election of Mayor Luigi de Magistris was one event in a long process of “direct contact, open meetings, popular assemblies in the neighbourhoods, observatories, and by keeping a direct relation with social centres and spaces of activism and active citizenship”.8 This groundwork meant that Naples’ declaration of ‘City of Shelter’ was accompanied by concrete commitments from the municipality and radical civil society to both put work into migrant solidarity. Combined with the case of Dijon, both show that for the state and for radical civil society, ‘defending a territory’ 6 Connected Action for the Commons. (2017) “What makes an empty building in Naples a Commons?” P2P Foundation.

4 Schools ABC website

7 European Alternatives. (2017) “In Naples, We Are All Illegal Or No-one Is”. Political Critique.

5 Docs Not Cops

8 Ibid.

engagée | 71


enseits der neoliberalen Smart City: Commons und demokratische Alternativen

// Evgeny Morozov und Francesca Bria


ie Diskussion über alternative politische Maßnahmen und sinnvolle Interventionen auf der lokalen Ebene sollte vor dem Hintergrund vielfältiger sozialer Bewegungen und Kämpfe geführt werden, die vielerorts zu beobachten sind.1 Sie richten sich gegen das herrschende Austeritätsregime, den zunehmend offen räuberisch auftretenden Neoliberalismus und die allgegenwärtigen Versuche, möglichst alles zu kommerzialisieren und zu kommodifizieren. In Europa streiten soziale Bewegungen unter dem Motto «Recht auf Stadt» für die Wiederaneignung urbaner Ressourcen als Commons sowie für andere, kollektivere Formen der Verteilung und Verwaltung von öffentlichen Ressourcen vor allem in den Bereichen Wasser-, Energie-, Wohnungs- und Gesundheitsversorgung. Dies sind Initiativen und Bündnisse, an die wir uns wenden und die auf jeden Fall gestärkt werden müssen, sollen auch Kämpfe für eine Wiedererlangung von Technologie- Souveränität auf der kommunalen Ebene erfolgreich sein. Diese meist lokalen Bewegungen kämpfen seit Jahren gegen Zwangsräumungen, Energiearmut, die zunehmende Prekarisierung von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen sowie für die Rekommunalisierung von privatisierten Infrastrukturen und Versorgungseinrichtungen. In manchen Fällen haben auch kommunale Regierungen sich gegen das neoliberale Projekt einer 1 Ausschnitt aus “Die smarte Stadt neu denken” von Evgeny Morozov und Francesca Bria; herausgegeben von der Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 2017:; der hier zu lesende Teil wurde insbesondere von Bria verfasst.

fortschreitenden Finanzialisierung gestellt. Einige haben zum Beispiel damit gedroht, die Dienste von Rating-Agenturen nicht länger in Anspruch zu nehmen. In Madrid wurde die Zusammenarbeit inzwischen tatsächlich eingestellt. Die dadurch eingesparten Mittel fließen zum Teil in soziale Programme. Eine verantwortungsvolle öffentliche Politik zu betreiben heißt, sich dem Vorhaben einer undemokratischen und privatisierten Smart City entgegenzustellen, da dieses Modell vor allem die Interessen multinationaler Konzerne bedient. Es heißt darüber hinaus, die Monopolisierung von intellektuellem Eigentum zu bekämpfen und insbesondere den Prozess der privaten Aneignung von kollektiv produziertem Wert durch profitorientierte digitale Plattformen umzukehren. In einer wirklich demokratischen Stadt hätten die Einwohner*innen ein Anrecht auf den freien Zugang zu verschiedenen Wissens- und Open-Data-Ressourcen sowie zu öffentlichen Informationsinfrastrukturen. Mit ihnen gemeinsam würden Vertreter*innen der Kommunen dann um qualitativ hochwertigere, besser zugängliche und den Bedürfnissen der Bürger*innen angemessenere öffentliche Dienste und Einrichtungen ringen, die das Leben aller erleichtern. Das setzt jedoch voraus, dass wir uns das kritische Wissen über Daten und technische Infrastrukturen (wieder) aneignen, das derzeit hauptsächlich von einer Handvoll multinationaler Service-Provider kontrolliert wird. Eine weitere Voraussetzung, um so etwas wie Technologie-Souveränität zu erlangen, ist es, konsequent Open-Source-Software, offene Standards und offene Systemarchitekturen zu verwenden. Nur so lässt sich eine wirklich demokratische und progressive

Technologiepolitik umsetzen, die in der Lage ist, einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Herausbildung einer neuen produktiven Ökonomie zu leisten und einen kontinuierlichen Wissensaustausch zwischen Städten, Ländern und Bewegungen sicherzustellen. Was also können Städte tun, um den Übergang hin zu einer nicht-neoliberalen Smart City zu befördern? Paul Mason hat während einer Veranstaltung anlässlich des Starts der Barcelona Initiative for Technological Sovereignty (BITS)2 die Bedeutung eines ganzheitlichen Ansatzes betont. Eine fortschrittliche kommunale Technologiepolitik sollte deshalb folgende Punkte und Maßnahmen beinhalten:

Städte sollten sich einen gemeinsamen globalen Bezugsrahmen schaffen, sich darin zu Orten der Commons erklären und sich der gemeinschaftlichen Schaffung von Werten verpflichten. Die Praxis der Privatisierung und Übertragung von öffentlichem Vermögen in Privatbesitz gehört beendet. Maßgebliche Infrastrukturen und Dienstleistungen sollten rekommunalisiert werden. Es gilt eine demokratische Öffentlichkeit aufzubauen. Die Wohnungspolitik, der öffentliche Nahverkehr sowie das Gesundheits- und Bildungswesen müssen so gestaltet sein, dass auch für sozial marginalisierte Teile der Bevölkerung eine volle Befriedigung ihrer Grundbedürfnisse gewährleistet ist. Es sollten datengestützte Wirtschaftsmodelle verfolgt werden, mit realen Inputs (inklusive der Nutzung von Echtzeit-Datenanalytik), was komplexe Entscheidungsprozesse transparenter und demokratischer gestalten würde. Im Falle öffentlicher Industriepolitik und Wirtschaftsförderung müssen kollektive und genossenschaftliche Formen Vorrang haben vor zentralisierten Formen staatlicher Kontrolle sowie vor Marktmodellen. Einführung eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens, mit einem Fokus auf Armutsbekämpfung und Zurückdrängung sozialer Ausgrenzung. Schaffung von «City Data Commons», wobei rechtlich geregelt werden sollte, dass Daten der Bevölkerung, die im Zuge der Nutzung von öffentlichen Diensten gesammelt werden, nicht

2 BITS ist eine strategische Partnerschaft, an der das Hans Crescent Symposium London, das Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3/UOC), das Institute of Government and Public Policy (IGOP/UAB) und ein Netzwerk, bestehend aus Repräsentant*innen sozialer Bewegungen und Akademiker*innen, beteiligt sind. Ihr Ziel ist es, weltweit eine Debatte über die veränderte Bedeutung von Souveränität in Gang zu setzen und herauszuarbeiten, wie verschiedene Typen von Souveränität – die von Bürger*innen, Städten und Regionen – mit dem Aufkommen und der Wirkmächtigkeit globaler Technologien zu vereinbaren sind.

Eigentum der Anbieter dieser Dienste sind. Ein Beispiel dafür, wie erste Schritte in Richtung einer solchen innovativen Technologiepolitik auf kommunaler Ebene aussehen könnten, ist die «Digitale Agenda» der Stadt Barcelona, die ausdrücklich das Ziel der Technologie-Souveränität verfolgt und dies mit der Philosophie einer commonsbasierten lokalen Ökonomie verknüpft.

„Digital City“ Barcelona In Barcelona findet derzeit so etwas wie eine demokratische Umwälzung statt. Die Stadt ist Teil eines internationalen Netzwerkes von sogenannten rebellischen Städten, die dabei sind, das Feld der öffentlichen Politik umzukrempeln und den Status quo infrage zu stellen. Barcelonas Bürgermeisterin Ada Colau steht einer der weltweit radikalsten Stadtregierungen vor und setzte sich zuvor lange Zeit an vorderster Front als Aktivistin für eine gerechtere Wohnungspolitik und gegen Zwangsräumungen ein. Sie gehört der Bürgerplattform Barcelona en Comù an, die 2015 nach verschiedenen Kämpfen gegen die in Spanien vorherrschende Austeritätspolitik in der katalanischen Hauptstadt die Kommunalwahlen gewann. Von daher repräsentiert sie eine neue Generation von Politiker*innen, die sich gegen die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Eliten des Landes richtet, die für Spaniens Finanz und soziale Krise verantwortlich sind und dafür, dass Hunderttausende Familien ihr Zuhause verloren haben. Unmittelbar nach dem Wahlgewinn begann die von Barcelona en Comù angeführte Regierungskoalition mit der Umsetzung von mehreren Sozialreformen. Zuvor hatte sie unter anderem mithilfe einer kooperativ organisierten Internetplattform die Meinung von Tausenden Stadtbewohner*innen darüber eingeholt, welche Maßnahmen zuerst ergriffen werden sollten. Ganz oben auf der Agenda stehen der Stopp von Zwangsräumungen und die Erhöhung des Anteils von Sozialwoh- nungen. Rund 550 Wohnungen und Häuser, die Banken nach Zwangsräumungen leer stehen ließen, wurden inzwischen dem Wohnungsmarkt wieder zugeführt. Die Stadtregierung hat zudem beschlossen, keine weiteren Lizenzen für Hotelbetreiber und andere Anbieter von Touristenunterkünften auszugeben. Und sie hat versprochen, Unternehmen wie Airbnb und mit Bußgeldern zu belegen, wenn diese weiterhin illegal Wohnungen anbieten, die nicht im lokalen Tourismusverzeichnis eingetragen sind. 80 Prozent der verhängten Strafgebühren können erlassen werden, wenn die frei stehenden Wohnungen dem «Social Emergency Housing Consortium» von Barcelona zugeführt und dann bis zu drei Jahre lang an Bedürftige engagée | 73

La Révolution Est en Marche Challenging France’s Neoliberal Colonialism in Paris

//Cosimo Lisi


Paris or the Capital of Neoliberal Colonialism

‘colonisation’ as a particular, statebound form of organising hierarchical territorial relations. […] Rather than a delimited historical era of European territorial expansion followed by non-territorial imperialism, ‘colonisation’ in Lefebvre thus refers to the role of the state in organising relationships of centre and periphery. […] In twentieth-century neo-capitalism and neo-imperialism, formal decolonisation goes hand in hand with a ‘world-wide extension of the colonial phenomenon’. […] It also extends to ‘internal colonisation’ of peripheral regions in metropolitan countries. […] Most importantly, ‘colonisation’ in neo-capitalism includes a transformation of cities according to the vulgar modernist ‘model of isolated units’. This model orders space into a hierarchical ‘collection of ghettos’, facilitates the dispersal of workers” (Kipfer, 2013: 94-97).


rance is the country where the rigour of disciplinary institutions (which originated here) and the harshness of colonial history graft perfectly in the new mechanisms of neoliberal control. Without a doubt, Paris is the physical and symbolic space where these dynamics are most visible. Haussmann’s original gesture – which inaugurated policed urbanism (in a sort of a large “original accumulation” represented by his travaux) and sought to get rid of the dangerous classes through organized forms of urban space experimented in colonial Algeria – defines a trajectory that, notwithstanding differences and breaks, prolongs previous experiments. The “Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne” (SDAURP), a 1965 project by Paul Delouvrier ordered by De Gaulle, represents the functionalist translation of the objective pursued by Haussmann. The SDAURP was amply criticized by Lefebvre (1978: 170-86) as part of its scrutiny of processes of territorial planning, that he read as a mode of colonization. As Stefan Kipfer aptly underlines “In his four-volume work on the state, Lefebvre explicitly conceptualises

The resort to the term colonization is not metaphorical: in his 1970s texts, Lefebvre underlines how urban planning projects fill the gap between the imperial centre and the territory of the colonies. During the second half of the Twentieth century, Lefebvre argues that the neo-colonial model asserts itself in the field of urban planning: a form of colonization that organizes spatially the territory of “internal colonies,” resorting to tools that had


been experimented during the terminal phase of colonial wars. Examples of such tools are isolation and hierarchical squaring of territorial units, zoning and director plans. For instance, Paul Delouvrier, director of planning for the Parisian region, had directed the “Plan Constantine,” one of the provisions enacted to pacify Algeria that failed not long before independence (Fredenucci, 2003b; DeluzLabruyère, 2004).


Neocolonial Urban Policies

hrough the use of decentralized governance and of mixité sociale (social mix), 1980s urban policies that implement neo-colonial strategies within a specifically neoliberal context came to represent an answer to the crisis of French Fordism and the 1970s political struggles. Specifically, the mixité sociale and the militarization of working-class areas stood as an answer to the destabilizing integration of non-white immigrants in working-class housing during the 1970s. Functioning as instruments of gentrification of the banlieue proche (near suburbs), the processes of urban destruction recently adopted as mass-measures in the context of Grand Paris (the project of administrative rearrangement of the Parisian region

that follows the competitive model of neoliberal global cities) exemplify, as Kipfer has aptly demonstrated (Kipfer, 2016: 603-625), a form of “neocolonial urbanism” aimed at striking the “internal enemy.” As Rigouste has shown (2009) notions such as “internal enemy” used during the colonial wars of the 1950s have been rehabilitated since the 1980s when, in police schools, techniques and principles of the “Revolutionary War Doctrine” or DGR were reintroduced. The DGR had been theorized by generals of the IV Republic, that directed war actions in Indochina and Algeria, in order to justify the brutality of the repression. Formally eliminated from military schools’ programmes after the purge of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète of officers from the army, DGR counter-insurgent techniques reappeared through the 1970s and 1980s in a completely different context: the neoliberal transformation of French society. It is at this point, when the deployment of deindustrialization processes took place and unemployment began to rise, when the welfare state lost power and the penal state strengthened that public discourses began to focus on the problem of the banlieue. Contextually, Rigouste talks about practices of “sociopoliced” or “endocolonial” segregation and introduces the notion of “socioapartheid”.

engagée | 75


Urban Transformation and Counter-Power in Bologna


n Medieval Age, the famous popular motto “Stadtluft macht frei” (“City air makes you free”) addressed urban spaces as sites of liberation from feudal duties. Nowadays cities seem to be an effective ground to experiment with emancipatory practices within and against the post-democratic neutralization of politics and the neo-liberal market economy. Indeed, there is a strong connection between the valorisation of the urban dimension as a space for re-production and the development of experiences that pose themselves as an alternative to social exclusion, poverty, and exploitation. Such ambiguous transformations are flourishing everywhere in Europe, and Bologna is among them.

What are the present duties and constrictions from which cities need to free themselves? Generally, municipalities have been politically reduced to administrate the effects and the normalization of austerity policies imposed (often undemocratically) by central State powers or by EU agreements. At the same time, urban spaces became sites for capitalist profits as real estate investments and platform capitalism expansion. Local institutions often act as partners1 in these processes of valorisation, trying to attract companies and financial funds and changing the geographical profile of cities through infrastructural transformations. Moreover, security policies2 – that are imposing controls and barriers inside cities – are a tangible sign of democracy erosion, in favour of governance and administrative procedures. Ironically, their task is to manage one of the consequences of urban over-exploitation: social exclusion. In recent years, Bologna attracted many of such vectors of transformation and radically changed its economic vocation3, moving from motor industry and third sector to tourism and food business. Symbolic of this new urban imaginary in Bologna is Fico Eataly World, the so-called Disneyland of food: an agribusiness park built in the suburb of the city thanks to private investors, cooperatives and a municipality that promises “a unique and authentic experience” of Italian food specialities. At the same time, the city centre is increasingly crowded with restaurants and major brands shops for tourists, thus replacing students and inhabitants. Digital platforms offering host or food delivery services are rapidly expanding, not by chance. Several new infrastructures have been planned. Some of them have been completed but largely criticised (such as the new high-speed train sta1 See David Harvey, ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of urban governance’, Geografiska Annaler 71B, pp. 3-17. 2 See Marco Allegra, Anna Casaglia, Jonathan Rokem, ‘The Political Geographies of Urban Polarisation: A Critical Review of Research on Divided Cities’, Geography Compass, 2012, 6/9, pp. 560-574; Ralph Brand and Sara Fregonese, The Radicals’ City: Urban Environment, Polarisation, Cohesion, Ashgate, 2013 3 See Struggles in Italy, What is really happening in Bologna, https://

tion), while others are under construction (such as the shuttle service to the airport). Other projects have also been abandoned. In response to these transformations, multi-level urban experiences developed, re-inventing social and political participation. Bologna turned into a contested zone, with many evictions against squatted houses, social centres, collective spaces, thus whitewashing the so-called “Red City”4. In the last few years, different phenomena took place in the urban spaces of Europe, such as occupations, innovative unions and local voting coalitions, which allowed to contrast austerity policies and to renew democracy. It is possible to categorize three different directions of city radical innovation: experiments of self-organized welfare, social unionism, and municipalism. In each case, the long history of socialist and working-class practices is brought and re-invented for the neo-liberal city. These experiences highlighted problems and gaps in public intervention: the lack of housing policies, the inefficiency of migrants’ reception system, the requirement of places for public and social life instead of private instances. The practice of occupation5 acquired new energies in last years, especially in countries harshly affected by austerity policies. At the same time, practices of urban regeneration widely spread not only in the form of neo-liberal gentrification but also fostering citizens’ commitment to the city as collective good. Squatted or regenerated spaces host medical ambulatories, small-farmers’ markets, workers labs, migrant hospitality, free cultural production. The volunteering works as a form of practical social engagement in the construction of a community welfare from below, opposing policies of privatization carried on by central governments. Different urban subjects started to self-organize beyond classical trade union forms: food delivery riders’ protests, housing movements, peddlers, and migrants. Experiments of horizontal and urban unionism allow for the definition of new rights and the overcoming of exclusion from city life and benefits. In particular, the so-called gig economy represents both a field for capital real subsumption through digital platforms and the site for labour struggles: since 2016, riders’ resistance6 in food platforms spread all around Europe cracking the narrative of the end of work because of digital technologies and collaborative economy. Moreover, it is at the city level that we saw forms of popular voting coalitions flourishing7. Spanish experiences, 4 See Darren Patrick, Bologna’s latest eviction threatens to whitewash the ‘red’ city’s political legacy, The Guardian, 14 October 2015, https:// 5 See Squatting Europe Kollective, Squatting in Europe. Radical Spaces, Urban Struggles, Minor Compositions, 2013. 6 See Callum Cant, ‘The wave of worker resistance in European food platforms 2016-17’, Notes From Below, 1, 2018 7 See Bertie Russell and Oscar Reyes, Fearless Cities: the new urban move-

grown in 2015 with a strong connection with the Indignados movement, inspired many other European political groups and movements to enter institutions. This wave of municipalism could not be understood – in the modern state scheme – as the representation of a social composition; rather, it is a way of common and downwards-oriented participation beyond representation. Bologna has a long history of squatted spaces and a solid background of volunteering associations. Despite increasing police repression and law restrictions, new experiences were formed in last years. Làbas8 is the most well-known: an abandoned military barrack squatted in 2012 which hosted a kindergarten, a weekly bio-market with a local farmers association, a brewery, an urban vegetable garden, a bike shop, a carpenter’s shop, and a dormitory for migrants and the homeless. In August 2017, it has been evicted because of state property administrators and private investors who wanted to replace it with a luxury hotel, shops and a car park. Nevertheless, a big demonstration of more than fifteen thousand people crossed the streets of the city in September 2017 reclaiming Làbas back and city government had to give up and in February 2018 had to grant a new space where to host all the activities and projects. This dispute triggered a larger public debate9 on models of urban development and democratic participation pursued by the city’s administrators. Moreover, since Autumn 2017, food delivery riders of many platforms as Deliveroo, Just Eat and Glovo started to gather and organise to protest against their exploitation. They gave life to Riders Union Bologna, an inter-platform and self-organised collective to bargain standard and better conditions of work. The first breaking action they carried out had been a sudden and wild strike during a snowstorm in November because platforms wanted to force them working despite safety risks. In the following months, they continued to protest promoting public rallies and critical mass biking. City council had to meet them and partially welcomed their requests so to promote a confrontation with

companies’ managers. The result is a ground-breaking attempt of urban collective bargaining which aims to write a Chart of Digital Labour for food delivery workers that could standardise and improve working conditions, wages and rights. Finally, the same Làbas has been involved – together with other collectives, associations and parties – into a local project of left-wing voting list10 named “Coalizione Civica” (Civic Coalition) that firstly imported in Italy the model of Spanish civic platforms. As result, one of the activists has been elected as district council member in 2016 and two representatives in the city council. To conclude, I would like to propose some remarks inspired by these experiences and changes. The city reveals to be a central political stage, both to trigger economic and social innovation and to produce contradictions and struggles. Neo-liberal transformations evolve alongside with resistances that do not limit themselves to oppose power but that build autonomous lifestyles and practices. While neoliberal policies are eroding forms of wealth redistribution and democratic participation, urban resistances are promoting new forms of engagement, commonalities and collective decision. Urban activism has been socialized – as new forms of engagement come from practical action – and social sphere has been politicized – as these experiences of mutualism sometimes do not limit themselves to welfarism but demand to decide about city life. These forms of counter-power, therefore, do not develop simply as another power that contrasts the institutional one, but as another way to build relations, to do society: whereas neo-liberal policies impose hard concurrency or pretend to manage from the top the social cooperation, urban movements are producing autonomous institutions and forms of organization. Coalition and intersectionality are the ways in which to reinvent a hybrid type of politics. Finally, the attempts to create rebel cities’ networks embody the real possibility to design a transnational European political space beyond state and sovereignty, as the latter seems to be increasingly caught into neo-liberal governance and rightwing populisms.

ments, Red Pepper, 16 August 2017, 8 For a brief history and a political evaluation of Làbas see Conflict and Autonomy in Bologna, 9 See Maurilio Pirone, Defending the Red City: Why the Fight for Làbas is a Fight for the Future of Bologna, Novara Media, 5 September 2017,

10 See Dana Berg, ‘Podemos auf italienisch. Bewegungslinke in Bologna starten Marsch durch die politischen Institutionen’, Neues Deutschland, 13 July 2016,

/ / S N T R E D E H A D C T N S A MA Spekulative Thesen zur Praxis der radikalen Stadt //Anton Brokow-Loga und Gunnar Grandel (Kollektiv Raumstation)


ir wollen nicht darauf warten, dass sich die Stadt von alleine verändert. Wir wollen es selbst machen.« Unter dieser Devise erkunden wir als Kollektiv Raumstation den städtischen Raum, den wir nicht nur als Produkt, sondern auch als Grundlage gesellschaftlicher Prozesse verstehen. Wir glauben an die dem Stadtraum innewohnenden Potenziale politischer Ermächtigung.

In diesem Beitrag möchten wir aus unserer Perspektive als Raumpraktiker*innen das Verhältnis unserer Arbeit an der Schnittstelle zwischen Aktivismus, Kunst, Planung und radikaler Demokratietheorie herausarbeiten. Dazu stellen wir spekulative Thesen auf, anhand derer wir radikale Ideen in der Praxis denken. Denn die radikale Stadt benötigt eine aktive, ortsbezogene und direkt praktische Haltung zum öffentlichen Raum – auch wenn eine solche Haltung unweigerlich Widersprüche produziert, die kritisch reflektiert werden müssen.

Die radikale Stadt geht nur jetzt Das konkrete Erproben alternativer Raumpraktiken steht im Mittelpunkt unserer Arbeit – schon seit der Gründung der Raumstation 2013 als interdisziplinäre Gruppe Studierender der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. Dieses Erproben zielt auf eine Auseinandersetzung in und mit herrschenden Raumpraxen für die bewusste Umgestaltung vorgefundener (räumlicher) Situationen. Dies bedeutet das Risiko, sich für ein konkretes Handeln immer

in Abhängigkeiten begeben zu müssen. De Certeau (1980: 85ff ) beschreibt diese Praxis als eine Taktik auf »feindlichem Terrain«. Im Gegensatz zur Strategie, die einen Ort hat, der eine Differenz zum Anderen erzeugt und damit eine Machtposition sowohl voraussetzt als auch schafft, muss sich die Taktik auf die Zeit verlagern, die Gelegenheit »im Flug erfassen«, um einen »Coup zu landen«. Wir glauben, dass es nötig ist, dieses Risiko einzugehen – auch wenn dabei immer Widersprüche produziert werden, keine klaren Erfolge gefeiert werden können. Miessen (2016: 50ff ) spricht hier von einer »nicht-illusionären Form von Pragmatismus«. Er plädiert gegen eine »hektische, prekäre Aktivität« und dafür, in diesem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis normative Verständnisse, Rituale und Codes nicht einfach abzulehnen. Stattdessen gehe es darum, eine ausbaubare Rolle des uneingeladenen Außenseiters in der Raumproduktion einzunehmen, durch die »agonistische Felder der Begegnung« geschaffen werden können. Radikalität wird insofern von uns nicht als eine radikale Abtrennung von bestehenden Praxen und Institutionen verstanden, sondern als das Anstreben radikaldemokratischer Momente im Jetzt. In diesem Sinne arbeitet die Raumstation immer wieder mit bestehenden Institutionen zusammen, will dabei aber eine Rolle als Problemlöserin ablehnen. So begaben wir uns im vergangenen Jahr für das Projekt Geras Neue Mitte in eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Internationalen Bauausstellung (IBA) Thüringen, um statt der (geschlossenen) Begleitung einer städtebaulichen Planung eine

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Alternative ZukĂźnfte erfinden Die munizipalistische Bewegung in Barcelona // by Andreea Zelinka

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Mit den Platzbesetzungen durch 15M artikulierte sich 2011 eine harsche Kritik an der spanischen Regierung. Die Unzufriedenheit der Protestierenden richtete sich gegen die soziale Ungerechtigkeit und die prekären Lebensverhältnisse. Ab 2008 war immer deutlicher geworden, dass das Leben vieler unter dem Diktat der Finanzsysteme stand und viele Hypothekenbesitzer*innen einer Existenz lebenslanger Schulden überlassen wurden.1 Die Protestierenden wehrten sich gegen ihre Ohnmacht, die sie auf einen Mangel an Demokratie und politischer Repräsentation zurückführten. Sie wehrten sich gegen die ‚alte Politik‘ bestehender politischer und finanzieller Eliten und begannen, ‚neue Formen von Politik‘ zu praktizieren. Damit regten sie Innovationen politischen Handelns und Denkens an. Die hegemoniale (oder normative2) liberale Demokratie und ihr liebstes demokratisches Werkzeug, die Wahl, wurden in Frage gestellt. Die Stimme des Menschen schien den Protestierenden in der Massendemokratie Spaniens zu einem Stimmzettel verkümmert, den es alle paar Jahre auszufüllen galt, der jedoch keinen wirklichen politischen Einfluss bedeutete, sondern allenfalls zur Erhaltung des Status Quo beitrug. Die Protestcamps von 15M etablierten einen Ort, an dem neue politische Visionen geschaffen wurden. Nach ihrem Ende wurde jedoch deutlich, dass die Forderungen der Proteste in den Institutionen verteidigt werden mussten. Es kam zur Gründung neuer Parteien, wovon Podemos sicherlich die bekannteste ist. Die anfängliche Begeisterung ebbte allerdings schnell ab, da es den Parteien auf nationaler Ebene nicht gelang, auch parteiintern demokratische Strukturen durchzusetzen und eine ständige Verbindung zur Basis aufrecht zu erhalten. Vielversprechender schienen hingegen die Entwicklungen in den Kommunen. Im ganzen spanischen Territorium kam es zur Gründung von Bürger*innenplattformen und Initiativen, denen der ‚Sprung in die Institutionen‘ gelang. So

1 Der Fall von Lehman Brothers im September 2008 hatte starke Auswirkungen auf die spanische Ökonomie. Ähnlich abhängig vom Immobilienmarkt wie die U.S.A., vergrößerte sich nach dem Platzen der Immobilienblase das Prekariat und der Wohlfahrtsstaat erwies sich als unfähig, die eigenen Bürger*innen vom verursachten Schaden zu schützen. Als Teil der EU entschied sich Spanien dazu, Austeritätsmaßnahmen einzuführen, um internationale Verpflichtungen erfüllen zu können. Folglich wurden Löhne von Beamten gekürzt, das Pensionsalter angehoben und die Wichtigkeit herausgestrichen, Investoren zu schützen, wohingegen öffentliche Schulden erhöht wurden. Reformen des Arbeitsrechts umfassten die Schmälerung historischer Siege der Arbeiter*innenbewegung, wie z.B. Tarifabkommen, Mindestlohn und Abfindungsvereinbarungen. Außerdem kam es zu Kürzungen im Bereich der Bildung und des Gesundheitssystems. Siehe zur weiteren Information: Rocafort, Victor Alonso/ Medialdea, Bibiana (2013): Presentación, in: Colectivo Novecento (ed.), Lo llamaban democracia. De la crisis económica al cuestionamiento de un régimen político, Barcelona: Icaria, p. 5-8; Montanyà, Miguel (2013): La respuesta de las élites: del “giro keynesiano” al volantazo neoliberal, in: Colectivo Novecento (ed.), Lo llamaban democracia. De la crisis económica al cuestionamiento de un régimen político, Barcelona: Icaria, p. 16-22. 2 Nugent, David (2008): “Democracy Otherwise. Struggles of Popular Rule in the Northern Peruvian Andes”, in: Paley, Julia (ed.) (2008): Democracy. Anthropological Approaches. School for Advanced Research, S. 21-62, S. 56.

entstand seit 15M ein konstituierender Prozess3, der dazu führte, dass die neuen politischen Akteure der munizipalistischen Bewegung in die öffentlichen Institutionen gewählt wurden, um diese zu demokratisieren. Die Demokratisierung umfasste die Herstellung einer neuen Institutionalität, das heißt öffentlicher Institutionen, die ein offenes, partizipatives Verhältnis der politischen Koproduktion zwischen Bürger*innen und Regierung schafften.

Zur Notwendigkeit neuer Institutionen 15M forderte Mitspracherecht, das Recht auf Stadt und das Recht auf Zukunft. Die Aktivist*innen bedienten sich existierender politischer Protestformen und aktivierten die Bürger*innen, Interaktionsformen zu kreieren, die die Realisierung dieser Rechte ermöglichten. Um neue politische Visionen zu entwerfen, wurden Versammlungen abgehalten, in denen jede*r zur Teilnahme ermuntert wurde und in denen es nur erlaubt war, für sich selbst und nicht repräsentativ für eine Organisation zu sprechen.4 Mit Tarrow und Tilly lassen sich die Protestformen während 15M auch als contentious politics verstehen, da die politischen Akteure auf bestehende Protestrepertoires zurückgriffen und diese weiterentwickelten, um dadurch Forderungen an die Regierung zu stellen. Abseits der Institutionen stritten ihre innovativen kollektiven politischen Handlungen die Legitimation der spanischen Regierung an.5 Anstatt das bestehende politische System zu zerstören und auf den Trümmern dessen ein Neues zu errichten, wurde der Beschluss gefasst, dass es mit friedlichen Mitteln möglich sein müsste, Veränderung herbeizuführen. Diese Motivation liegt den neu entstandenen Bürger*innenplattformen zu Grunde, die nun Prinzipien partizipatorischer und radikaler Demokratie in den Institutionen implementieren möchten. Indem neue Formen politischer Repräsentation erarbeitet werden, die die Mitsprache der Bürger*innen als Ressource für politische Entscheidungen nutzen, um die unmittelbaren Lebensumstände in den Nachbarschaften zu verbessern, wird versucht, die Legitimation demokratischer Regierungen auf lokaler Ebene wiederherzustellen. In Barcelona gründete sich zu diesem Zweck 2013 die Initiative Guanyem Barcelona (Wir gewinnen Barcelona) und später die Bürger*innenplattform Barcelona

3 Lorey, Isabell (2012): „Demokratie statt Repräsentation. Zur konstituierenden Macht der Besetzungsbewegungen“, in: Lorey, Isabell (ed. et. al) (2012): Occupy! Die aktuellen Kämpfe um die Besetzung des Politischen, Wien/Berlin: Turia+Kant, S. 7-49, S. 11. 4 Corsín, Alberto/Estalella, Adolfo (2011): #spanishrevolution, Anthropology Today, 27/4, p. 19-23, S. 19. 5 Tilly, Charles / Tarrow, Sidney (2015): Contentious Politics, Oxford University Press, S. 7.

en Comú (im folgenden Text Bcomú), die 2015 kandidierte und wider Erwarten die Wahl gewann. Seither regiert sie mit einer Minderheitsregierung im Stadtrat und stellt mit Ada Colau, einer ehemaligen Aktivistin der PAH,6 die Bürgermeisterin. Die meisten Mitglieder* und Aktivist*innen von Bcomú kommen aus sozialen Bewegungen und Nachbarschaftsvereinen. Einzige Ausnahme sind die Politiker*innen der Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (katalanischen Grünen), die bereits Erfahrungen mit institutioneller Politik (katalanisches Parlament, Cortes Generales) gemacht haben. Diese machen aber nur einen geringen Teil von Bcomú aus. Bei dem Großteil der neuen politischen Akteure handelt es sich weder um professionelle Politiker*innen noch um Personen, die eine professionelle politische Karriere anstreben. Im Gegenteil, letzteres wird dezidiert ausgeschlossen. Die Aktivist*innen fühlen sich in den Institutionen als hätten sie ‚die Seite gewechselt‘. Sie, die nun die Regierung stellen, sind von der demokratischen Revolution in den Alltag öffentlicher Institutionen geschlittert und erleben dort nun nicht nur Erfolge, sondern auch die alltäglichen Enttäuschungen ihrer politischen Ideale und Erwartungen und jene ihrer Mitstreiter*innen. Es ist deutlich geworden, dass ein Großteil der politischen Arbeit auch den Umgang mit diesen Enttäuschungen umfasst und der tatsächliche Austragungsort demokratischer Praxis die Gegenwart ist. Ihre Politik der Allmende gründet nicht auf Interessen einzelner Gruppierungen, sondern auf der gemeinsamen Sorge um das Allgemeinwohl und kann auch als eine „anti-utopische, pragmatische Politik der Gegenwart“ verstanden werden.7

Zur Innovation politischer Organisation Die ständige Frage innerhalb von Bcomú ist: Wie lassen sich politische Partizipation und Konsensbildung in die Entscheidungsprozesse integrieren? Wie muss das Verhältnis zwischen Bürger*innen und Institutionen, ob Rathaus oder Partei, organisiert sein, um dies zu bewerkstelligen? Wie ist es möglich eine neue Institutionalität zu entwickeln? Schon 2002 prognostizierten Rucht und Neidhardt das Entstehen einer ‚movement society‘, in der soziale Bewegungen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle in (westlichen) Gesellschaften einnehmen würden. Dadurch würden klassische Strukturen nicht verdrängt, sondern vielmehr zusätzliche Formen politischer Organisation eingeführt. Das heißt, dass Bewegungen zunehmend Teil

des institutionellen Apparats werden.8. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die ‚movement-party‘ – eine politische Organisation, die versucht, traditionelle, hierarchische Parteistrukturen aufzulösen und diese mit den horizontalen Organisationsformen sozialer Bewegungen zu verbinden.9 Das heißt, es handelt sich um das Bestreben, gleichzeitig Bewegung und Partei zu sein. Eine Unternehmung, die auch unter den Aktivist*innen von Barcelona en Comú nicht immer als umsetzbar gilt. Jedoch lassen sich die von ihnen instituierten partizipatorischen Räume und Aktivitäten in Barcelona als Orte zur experimentellen Erarbeitung neuer Formen politischer Handlungsfähigkeit verstehen, die eine neue Institutionalität ermöglichen, politische Imagination und Auseinandersetzung fördern und damit als „Laboratorien alternativer Zukünfte“10 fungieren. Der politische Innovationsdrang ist in der spanischen Linken eng mit dem Begriff der Feminisierung des Politischen verknüpft. Zentral ist die Umsetzung feministischer Politiken und somit die Forderung nach Diversität, gemeinsamer Verantwortung und Sorgeaktivität.11 Die radikale Verwundbarkeit, Interdependenz und Mit-Verantwortung der Einzelnen wird als notwendiges und universelles Risiko in den humanen und post-humanen Relationen betrachtet – und dies in scharfer Abgrenzung von neoliberalen Ideen. Gefordert wird eine Ethik der Verantwortung, die nicht davon ausgeht, dass die Menschen autonom und selbsterhaltend sind, sondern voneinander abhängig, um zu überleben. Damit stellt die Sorgeaktivität dezidiert keine feminine, sondern eine zivile Tugend und eine öffentliche Pflicht dar. Zentral ist ein Begriff von Mitbürger*innenschaft, der die Verantwortung gegenüber den gelebten Verhältnissen des Werdens übernimmt.12 “Responsibility, then, is a matter of the ability to respond. Listening for the response of the other and an obligation to be responsive to the other, who is not entirely separate from what we call the self.“ Dieses Verhältnis des Relationalen soll lokal gelebt und institutionell umgesetzt werden. Wie also können traditionelle, hierarchische Parteistrukturen vermieden und stattdessen eine neue Ins8 Rucht, Dieter/Neidhardt, Friedhelm (2002): „Toward a ‘Movement Society’? On the possibilities of institutionalizing social movements“, Social Movement Studies, 1:1, S. 7-30, S. 24. 9 Kate Shea Baird (2016): „How to build a movement-party: lessons from Rosario’s Future City“, open democracy, 15.11.2016,, 15.11.2016. 10 Rose, Nikolas (1999): Powers of Freedom. Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge University Press., S. 279.

6 Die PAH (Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca) ist eine Initiative, die sich 2009 formierte, um sich für die Rechte von Hypothekenopfer einzusetzen und diese rechtlich, aktivistisch und psychologisch zu unterstützen.

11 Galcerán, Montserrat/Carmona, Pablo (2017): „Die Zukünfte des Munizipalismus. Feminisierung der Politik und demokratische Radikalisierung“, in: Die neuen Munizipalismen. Soziale Bewegungen und die Regierung der Städte, Hg. v. Christoph Brunner, Niki Kubaczek, Kelly Mulvaney und Gerald Raunig, Wien (u.a.): transversal texts, S. 105-112: 108.

7 Greenberg, Jessica (2014): After the Revolution. Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia, Stanford University Press, S. 26ff.

12 Dolphijn, Rick/van der Tuin, Iris (2013): New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies, University of Michigan: Open Humanities, S. 52.

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titutionalität entwickelt werden? Mit dieser Frage rückt die Organisation politischer Repräsentation selbst in den Fokus und damit das Verhältnis zwischen jenen, die an entscheidungstragender Stelle sitzen und jenen, die das nicht tun.

Die Versammlung als Motor der Demokratisierung Die Platzbesetzungen von 15M wurden auch als „sich entfaltende Landschaft von Versammlungen“ beschrieben.13 Die Versammlung, asamblea, ist fester Bestandteil der politischen Organisation von Bcomú. Es gibt sie in jedem Bezirk und sie wird von vielen Aktivist*innen als wichtigste Innovation verstanden. Sie nimmt eine vermittelnde Rolle zwischen Bürger*innen und Aktivist*innen und jene, die in den Institutionen arbeiten, ein. Während meiner Feldforschungen in Barcelona 2016 besuchte ich regelmäßig die Versammlung von Ciutat Vella, der Altstadt Barcelonas, die alle 15 Tage stattfanden. Die Versammlung von Ciutat Vella findet in einem Nachbarschaftszentrum in El Gòtic statt, das Räume für verschiedene Initiativen, Vereine und politische Gruppen bereitstellt (z.B. CUP, 15M). Durchschnittlich nehmen zwischen 12 und 20 Menschen an den Versammlungen teil. Der Verlauf der Debatten ist durch eine Agenda festgelegt, die vorher online gemeinsam bestimmt wird. Ein paar Tagesordnungspunkte sind dabei feste Bestandteile, wie z.B. die sogenannte Rückkehr der Munizipalgruppe (retorn del grup municipal), bei der die gewählten Repräsentant*innen, zu der Versammlung ‚zurückkehren‘, um darüber zu berichten, was sich die letzten zwei Wochen ereignet hat. Nach einer Beschreibung eines Mitglieds14 versucht die Versammlung Augen, Ohren und Stimme der Organisation zu sein. Sie wird als eine Verlängerung des Rathauses

gesehen. Jedoch dient sie nicht als Ort für Politiker*innen, um Reden zu halten, sondern um Begegnung zwischen Bürger*innen, Aktivist*innen und Repräsentant*innen zu schaffen. Dabei ist es nicht notwendig Parteimitglied* zu sein, um teilnehmen zu können, und „du musst die Partei nicht einmal gut finden. Du kannst kommen und nörgeln und du wirst immer noch deinen Platz haben.“15 Jedoch gehen hier die Meinungen auseinander und andere sehen die Versammlung in erster Linie als Ort für konkrete Verbesserungsvorschläge und effektive politische Arbeit. Auch bezüglich des Zugangs zur Versammlung gibt es verschiedene Ansichten. So äußerte ein Mitglied der Versammlung, der auch Repräsentant im Rathaus ist, Bedenken, da in der Versammlung auch viele interne Themen der Organisation besprochen werden und die Teilnehmenden absolute Freiheit haben sich auszudrücken. Auch wenn es relativ einfach ist, Teil der Versammlung zu werden, ist es wichtig aufmerksam zu bleiben, um die interne politische Organisation nicht zu behindern.16 Nichtsdestotrotz, durch die Rückkehr der Munizipalgruppe, ist die Partizipation und Präsenz der gewählten Repräsentant*innen ein permanenter Bestandteil der Versammlung. Ein Mitglied erzählte mir, dass er früher, wenn er ein*e Politiker*in des Rathauses treffen wollte, ein Formular ausfüllen und abgeben musste und die Politiker*in entschied, ob und für wann ein Treffen vereinbart wurde. Nun gibt es ein institutionalisiertes, regelmäßig stattfindendes Treffen innerhalb der regierenden politischen Partei, das es ermöglicht, problemlos persönlich mit der Repräsentant*in in Kontakt zu treten. „Das ist etwas, das kultiviert, erhalten und genährt werden muss“17 – damit verwendete er Wörter, die Wachstum bezeichnen, das Zeit braucht, um sich zu vollziehen und um das sich gekümmert werden muss. Die institutionalisierten Begegnungen von Bürger*innen und Politiker*innen ermöglichen so das Wachstum einer demokratischen Kultur über die öffentlichen Institutionen hinaus. Ein Wachstum, das sich nicht

13 Corsín Jiménez, Alberto/Estalella Adolfo (2014): „Assembling Neighbors: The City as Hardware, Method and “a Very Messy Kind of Archive”, Common Knowledge, 20/1, S. 150-171, S. 151.

15 Interview mit Mitglied der Versammlung von Ciutat Vella (Barcelona, 9.6.16).

14 Zum Schutz der Informant*innen wurden alle anonymisiert.

17 Interview mit Mitglied der Versammlung von Ciutat Vella (Barcelona, 9.6.16).

16 Interview mit Mitglied der Versammlung von Ciutat Vella (Barcelona, 17.3.16).

let me

you include

//Zuzanna Zajac


n the era of globalisation and rapidly changing circumstances, designers often turn to the physical environment to find solutions to issues of tolerance and functionality. Focusing only on the material surroundings is, however, a safety net, which is only seemingly effective. The installation of products, services and facilities ticks all the boxes of safety and inclusivity and calms down the conscience of designers, who feel they have answered all the required standards, but only address the surface of the problem. Functionality is a complex, layered concept and ‘form follows function’ is no longer a sufficient approach to a theme which faces a new, unprecedented definition.

Inclusivity is fundamentally understood through the concept of disability, which has always been a controversial topic, and remains a taboo in a society, which seems to prefer keeping it on the peripheries of most pressing social issues. Although seemingly treated with utmost care, mental and physical disability are still the cause of huge separations within the social structure. The question, which must be therefore asked is whether or not disability and thus lack of inclusion for the disabled is an inevitable part of our developing society. The first factor which should be considered is the oppression of the disabled not only by the ones considered ‘healthy’, but also

by themselves in their own groups. What is created is a power struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which throws all disabilities into one pot and forces individuals to identify with this singular group they have been associated with. An approach like that may or may not lead to the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy, where disabled individuals see lack of inclusivity everywhere they go thus causing the concept of absolute inclusion to be unreachable. This dispute is unfortunately advantageous to many and has become, as Grossman has suggested, a political imperative. Campaigns are based on promises to bring equality to those who are still being placed in ‘special schools’ or isolated from the society. These guarantees of liberation from the basic forms of institutionalized oppression becomes thus a perfect strategy for politicians. People who feel like they are being denied the access to basic human rights are presented with a future of equal labour market, access to education and processes where it is the environment, not the individual, which is forced to change. We notice, however, that one by one, head of states take office and little change is visible. Additionally the media is still pumping the same criteria of success where individuals must perform physical activities to: save the environment (cycling and walking schemes), be seen as powerful or attractive or to be diligent contributors to the economy. It is difficult to imagine a human being feeling included in

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More infos:

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Autor*innen & Künstler*innen Radical Cities

Pearl Ahrens lives in London. Her text is presented on behalf of the Plan C Radical Municipalism and Directional Demands research cluster. The cluster seeks inspiration from international municipalism to pursue taking the conditions of life into common ownership. They can be contacted at Marc Amann ist unterwegs in sozialen Bewegungen zwischen Zivilem Ungehorsam, kreativem Protest und solidarischen Ökonomien. Clive Barnett is Professor of Geography and Social Theory at the University of Exeter in the UK. His work investigates the intersections between democracy, public life, and urbanization. Clive´s current research includes work conceptualising the relationships between democracy and urbanization; work on the contemporary ‘urbanization of responsibility’; and research on the geographies of contentious public action. Francesca Bria ist Chief Technology and Digital Innovation Officer in der Stadtregierung von Barcelona. Zuvor war sie Koordinatorin des Projekts D-Cent zu direkter Demokratie und sozialen digitalen Währungen. Sie war Beraterin der Europäischen Kommission zur Zukunft des Internets und zu Smart-City-Politiken. Sie ist seit vielen Jahren in sozialen Bewegungen aktiv und publiziert in unterschiedlichen Medien. Anton Brokow-Loga studierte Politikwissenschaft in Berlin und Dar es Salaam (Tansania), um die Notwendigkeit emanzipatorischer Stadtpolitik zu begreifen. In Weimar verbringt er seine Zeit mit politischer Arbeit in unterschiedlichen Zusammenhängen, pleniert mit der Raumstation und studiert nebenbei Urbanistik. Initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own) brings together organizations and individuals interested in urban and cultural policies, sustainable city development, fair use of common resources, and the involvement of citizens in the urban development of their environment. Belgrade is our home. We are responsible for each of its parts, processes, and problems, both for the present and for the future we will leave. Jeremy Gilbert is Professor of Cultural and Political Theory at the University of East London. Jeremy has written and spoken widely on politics, music and cultural theory and writes regularly for the British press. Gunnar Grandel Nach Umwegen in Stuttgart und Berlin zog Gunnar Grandel 2013 für das Urbanistik-Studium an der Bauhaus-Universität nach Weimar und stieß direkt auf die Raumstation. Mittlerweile in Wien wohnhaft, lässt ihn glücklicherweise trotzdem weder die theoretische noch die praktisch Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema Stadt selber machen los. Gabu Heindl, Architektin und Urbanistin in Wien, Lehre  an der TU Wien und der Akademie der Bildenden Künste Wien.  Ihr Architekturbüro GABU Heindl Architektur bearbeitet öffentliche kulturelle und soziale Bauten, alternative Wohnbauprojekte, Ausstellungsarchitekturen sowie Freiraum- und Stadtplanungsprojekte. Ihre Vorträge und Publikationen fokussieren auf das Verhältnis von Planung, Politik und Popular Agency in Bezug auf öffentlichen Raum, gegenhegemoniale Planungsstrategien sowie Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität als Planungsparameter.

Alexandros Kioupkiolis is an Assistant Professor in Contemporary Political Theory, at Aristotle University, Greece. His research interests focus on modern philosophies of freedom, contemporary philosophies of justice, theories of democracy, analyses and critiques of power. Alessio Kolioulis is a Doctoral candidate at Paris 8 / Rome La Sapienza and Visiting Research Scholar with the Sonic Research Group at London South Bank University. He studies techno cultures and has a background in the third sector. Alessio is an editorial board member of Eterotopia France and engagée. Dr. des. Friederike Landau (*1989) ist politische Theoretikerin und Stadtsoziologin. In ihrer Dissertation (2015-2017) beschäftigte sie sich mit den politischen Organisations- und Repräsentationspraktiken freischaffender Berliner Künstler*innen sowie mit deren Einwirkungsstrategien auf die Berliner Kulturpolitik. Friederike arbeitet an der Schnittstelle zwischen Kultur- und Stadtentwicklungspolitik, (künstlerischen) Interventionen im öffentlichen Raum und neuen Momenten des Politischen in einem angeblich postpolitischen Zeitalter. Oskar Mayböck wurde 1991 im oberösterreichischen Raab geboren und lebt in Wien. Er studierte dort Philosophie und arbeitet als Lyriker, Sound Poet und Musiker. Er ist Gründungsmitglied des Kollektivs Philosophy Unbound. Im Dezember 2016 veröffentlichte er bei Gully Havoc (Berlin) seine Debut EP „The Lane“ unter dem Namen Oskar May. Cosimo Lisi is a PhD student at the Department of Aesthetics, Sciences and Art Technologies, Paris 8. Cosimo is an editorial board of member of Eterotopia France and is currently curating a book by Stefan Kipfer on the neocolonial character of processes of urban transformation. Luiza Margan Die bildende Künstlerin Luiza Margan (Wien und Rijeka) verschränkt unterschiedlichste künstlerische Formate miteinander, die von öffentlichen Aktionen und Interventionen bis hin zu raumgreifenden Installationen mit Objekten, Film und Fotografie reichen. In ihren Arbeiten untersucht sie die Beziehungen zwischen politischen Ideologien und persönlichen Erlebnissen und ihren Verschiebungen und hinterfragt kritisch, auf welche Art und Weise sich Geschichte darin manifestiert. Felix Maschewski ist Mitglied des PhD-Nets „Das Wissen der Literatur“ der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Wirtschaftsgestaltung (Berlin). Aktuell forscht er zum „kybernetischen Realismus“ an der Princeton University. Neben akademischen Publikationen schrieb er zuletzt als freier Autor für die Neue Zürcher Zeitung, SPEX, agora42, Public Seminar und Merkur (Blog). Evgeny Morozov ist einer der profiliertesten Kritiker des digitalen Kapitalismus und beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie große Technologiefirmen unsere Gesellschaft und Demokratie umbauen. Er schreibt für diverse Zeitungen, u.a. The New York Times, The Economist, The Guardian und die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, und ist Autor mehrerer Bücher. Paolo Mossetti is a writer from Naples. He collaborates for many newspapers and magazines such as the Huffington Post, Domus, Il Tascabile, Salvage, and N+1 writing stories that span from anthropology of food to urbanism.

Daniel Mullis ist promovierter Humangeograph. Seine Interessen liegen in der politischen Philosophie, Sozialprotesten sowie Krisendynamiken, aktuell arbeitet er zum Neuen Autoritarismus in Deutschland. Miriam Nessler studied and studies cultural anthropology, urbanism and urban studies in Hamburg, Paris and Weimar. She likes to explore material and immaterial Freiräume (open/free spaces) in a theoretical as well as a practical way. Anna-Verena Nosthoff ist freie Autorin, Philosophin und Politische Theoretikerin. Sie arbeitet derzeit an einer Dissertation über die Kybernetisierung des Politischen. Akademische Aufsätze erschienen zuletzt u.a. in Cultural Politics, Critical Research on Religion und Culture, Theory & Critique sowie in Sammelbänden; journalistische Beiträge u.a. im Feuilleton der Neuen Zürcher Zeitung. Maurilio Pirone has a PhD in Politics, Institutions, History at University of Bologna and participates to the international collective research project Into the Black Box. He is an activist of Bologna Social Centre TPO. Marina Prentoulis is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and Media at the University of East Anglia. She completed her PhD in Ideologies and Discourse Analysis at the Department of Government, University of Essex. She has been working on contemporary social movements and European radical ideologies. She has been involved in numerous campaigns and movements. She has been the UK spokesperson of Syriza and of ‘Another Europe is Possible’. Kollektiv Raumstation 2013 in Weimar gegründet, ist die Raumstation heute auch in Berlin und Wien eine interdisziplinäre Plattform für kreative und engagierte Köpfe, die die Stadt aktiv gestalten wollen. Stets vernetzt agieren die drei Raumschiffe Weimar, Berlin, Wien unabhängig voneinander und mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten. - - Instagram @raumstation Nikolai Roskamm lebt und arbeitet in Berlin und Erfurt. Er ist Mitglied des Redaktionskollektivs von sub\urban, zeitschrift für kritische stadtforschung. Seit 2015 ist er Professor für Planungstheorie, Stadtbaugeschichte und Städtebau an der FH Erfurt. Zuletzt erschienen ist von ihm „Die unbesetzte Stadt. Postfundamentalistisches Denken und das urbanistische Feld“, Bauwelt Fundamente 158. Valerie Scheibenpflug ist am 03. Juli 1991 in Korneuburg geboren. Zurzeit schreibt sie an ihrer Dissertation mit dem Arbeitstitel „Gemeinschaft. absolut-sein. unmöglich-sein“ und arbeitet als Lehrerin in Wien. Sie hat Philosophie, Psychologie und Germanistik studiert. Während ihres Studiums verbrachte sie Forschungsaufenthalte in Nottingham und Heidelberg und war in verschiedenen Studierendeninitiativen tätig.

Rahel Sophia Süß is a Lecturer in Political Theory, author and initiator of engagée whose aim is to transform the theory/practice divide into everyday knowledge and experience. Rahel lives in London where she is a Phd Visiting Scholar at the Centre for the Study of Democracy doing research on radical democracy. Das Team Sowieso“ setzt sich aus Aktivist*innen, Künstler*innen und Theoretiker*innen zusammen, die sich gemeinsam über ihre Praxis austauschen und mit anderen Menschen die Ergebnisse dieses Austausches teilen, diskutieren, reflektieren und in Frage stellen. Lasse Thomassen is Reader in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. He is currently working on representation and new forms of radical politics, and he is the co-editor of Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack (Manchester University Press, 2005). Norma Tiedemann is a PhD-student and research assistant at the University of Kassel’s Political Science Department. Before that, she studied Global Political Economy and now attempts to bring together critical urban studies, radical geography and materialist state theory when analyzing social movements and the local state. Contact: Markus Wende ist Animator, Illustrator und Comiczeichner in Berlin. Er verabscheut Autowerbung und beschäftigt sich künstlerisch gerne mit menschlichen und politischen Angelegenheiten. Zuzanna Zajac has a background in Interior Design, completed in Kingston University, London. She is currently studying MA Social Design in Universitat fur Angewandte Kunst, where she focuses on mappings, urban innovation and collaborative projects. Her main interests revolve around participatory design, construction, education and material science. She has worked extensively in architectural practices in London, Poland and Malta and is currently engaging in a variety of political and academic undertakings in Vienna. Andreea Zelinka ist Masterandin der Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie an der Universität Wien und der Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Ihre Masterarbeit befasst sich mit Demokratisierungsbewegungen in Barcelona. Darüber hinaus ist sie in Menschenrechtsbewegungen aktiv.

Johannes Siegmund (PhD student, Vienna) creates publics at the interface between arts, theory and politics. He is part of engagée, philosophy unbound, Academy of Fine Arts Vienna and University of Vienna. Paul Sörensen, Dr. phil., ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Fachbereich Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte der Universität Augsburg. Kontakt:

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engagée #6/7 „Radical Cities“, 2018. ISSN 2413-4279 Wien | Berlin | London Medieninhaberin: engagée – Verein für politisch-philosophische Einmischungen (ZVR-Zahl: 807011148). Hermanngasse 19 - 1070 Wien. Prozesskoordination: Alessio Kolioulis, Felix Maschewski, Anna-Verena Nosthoff, Valerie Scheibenpflug, Johannes Siegmund, Rahel Sophia Süß, Zuzanna Zajac. Kontakt:, Offene Redaktion: #6/7: Pearl Ahrens, Anton Brokow-Loga, Gunnar Grandel, Alessio Kolioulis, Felix Maschewski, Miriam Nessler, Anna-Verena Nosthoff, Maurilio Pirone, Paul Sörensen, Valerie Scheibenpflug, Johannes Siegmund, Rahel Sophia Süß, Norma Tiedemann, Zuzanna Zajac. Beiträge: Pearl Ahrens, Marc Amann, Clive Barnett, Francesca Bria, Anton Brokow-Loga, Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own, Jeremy Gilbert, Gunnar Grandel, Gabu Heindl, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Alessio Kolioulis, Friederike Landau, Cosimo Lisi, Luiza Margan, Felix Maschewski, Evgeny Morozov, Paolo Mossetti, Daniel Mullis, Miriam Nessler, Anna-Verena Nosthoff, Maurilio Pirone, Marina Prentoulis, Kollektiv Raumstation, Nikolai Roskamm, Valerie Scheibenpflug, Johannes Siegmund, Paul Sörensen, Rahel Sophia Süß, Team Sowieso, Lasse Thomassen, Norma Tiedemann, Markus Wende, Zuzanna Zajac, Andreea Zelinka. Die Verfasser*innen sind für die Inhalte selbst verantwortlich. Die darin vertretenen Positionen spiegeln nicht zwangsläufig die Meinung der Redaktion wider. Die Beiträge dürfen von Dritten nur unter der Bedingung der Rücksprache mit den Verfasser*innen verbreitet werden. Gestaltung: Oskar Mayböck, Rahel Sophia Süß. Cover: Alessio Kolioulis, Oskar Mayböck, Rahel Sophia Süß Erscheinungsweise: 2 x jährlich. Preise: Einzelpreis: 10 € / £ 9. Jahresabonnement 15 €: Das Jahres-Abonnement umfasst zwei Ausgaben von engagée zum Vorzugspreis von 15 € (inkl. MwSt. und zzgl. Versand). Druck: Sieprath, Aachen. engagée ist in ausgewählten Buchhandlungen und über erhältlich. Eine Liste der Buchhandlungen ist über die Website aufrufbar. Kontoinformationen: Erste Bank: engagée - politisch-philosophische Einmischungen IBAN: AT96 2011 1827 7441 6100 BIC: GIBAATWWXXX engagée wurde gedruckt mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Studienvertretung Philosophie der Universität Wien.

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engagée Magazine #6/7 Radical Cities  

The first international double issue combines the ideas of Radical Democracy and Rebel Cities. 128 pages and 20+ political and philosophical...

engagée Magazine #6/7 Radical Cities  

The first international double issue combines the ideas of Radical Democracy and Rebel Cities. 128 pages and 20+ political and philosophical...

Profile for engagee