oxygen | 19 — 04.2013
a debate that started within the intelligence apparatus, drastically reorganized in the years following the war on terrorism – in spite of the difficulties and mistakes – into a complex structure that must prove to be more capable of gathering, sharing, and processing information in response to failures that still smart. One of the products of this transformation, in theory, is an extensive yet little-known analysis by the National Intelligence Council, Alternative Worlds, devoted entirely to outlining the alternative worlds of tomorrow. Created in 1996-1997, it is not a typical dispatch of the secret services, even though it was developed under the auspices of the National Directorate which coordinates the American intelligence network. Rather, it is a document of real policy, the compendium of an open debate that is also taking place abroad, involving civilian experts from different backgrounds. The latest and fifth version, announced just recently, examines precisely the goal of 2030. And right from the very start, it clearly delineates the horizon within which the dynamics of conflicts and peace will develop: “In 2030, the world will be radically transformed with respect to the world today. By 2030, no country, neither the United States, nor China, nor any other great nation will be a hegemonic power.”
The two key concepts used to conceptualize the dynamics are the mega-trends, namely the major trends that appear to be of great impact, and the game-changers, i.e., critical events that are not necessarily predictable which can dramatically affect the reality that will take shape. A separate chapter is required for the new disruptive technologies. The interplay between regions and issues, whose solution can generate stability but whose degeneration threatens to be the driving force of local crises that threaten widespread contagion, is identifiable starting from its elements. There are three major trends that will undoubtedly become “driving forces,” starting with the emergence of multi-polarity. In addition to China, countries such as India and Brazil, as well as regional players including Colombia, Indonesia, Nige-
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ria, South Africa, and Turkey, will play greater roles in the global economy. In general, there will be an acceleration of the phenomenon of the spreading of power, thanks to the reduction of poverty, higher levels of education, and better healthcare, that will generate an expansion of the global middle class, able to be a tectonic movement at the base of this new balance. The demographic change ahead is less certain: the population will increase from the current 7.1 billion to perhaps 8.3 billion, with an aging population in developed countries and an increase in population in developing regions, accompanied by a growing migration, including the relentless march of urbanization that will bring 60% of the world’s population to live in mega-cities. The demand for resources such as food, water, and energy, following similar demographic trends, will multiply in the end. The increases will be by 35, 40, and 50%, respectively. Climate change will exacerbate the risks of scarcity, particularly in regions such as the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. A NASA study has already noticed an intensification in the last six years of crises concerning the access to water for millions of people in the Middle East. The game-changers are the unknowns, in every respect: these include the “black swans,” which have a high potential to cause sudden shocks. First of all, the global economy is subject to crises and imbalances between different areas, a situation highlighted by the 2008 financial emergency which devastated the world economy. This framework can become a breeding ground for the explosion of tensions or opportunities for more controls. A crucial role will be played by global governance institutions, in this regard, if they are inspired by the behavior of the major powers, capable of creating an atmosphere of cooperation with emerging countries. Two regions that particularly raise the threat of instability and contagion for global security will still be the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Historically, the last two decades have seen a decline in armed conflict and a reduction of the victims. An open war between great powers is unlikely, due to the large risks that would ensue. However, regional and local conflicts may continue to appear and worsen once again. Concerning the Middle East, much will depend on Iran: an Islamic republic devoted to nuclear arsenals will keep instability high, whereas a moderate and democratic transition in the region, and the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could be possible by 2030 with the birth of a Palestinian state, would advance development and peace. Tensions with minorities – ethnic, generational, or
Tensions with minorities and a lack of natural resources can also easily degenerate in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, with risks of also involving China and India