Elsa BERGERY Erasmus student January 2015 First Semester UMCS
NORD STREAM, a Pipeline Through the Baltic Sea : Source of Gas or Source of Conflict ?
8th November 2011, German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Ministers of France FranĂ§ois Fillon and the Netherlands Mark Rutte, and EU Energy Commissioner GĂźnther Oettinger inaugurate the opening of the Nord Stream Pipeline
ABSTRACT This article exposes the political process of decision about the construction of the Nord Stream Pipeline. This pipeline built through the Baltic Sea reveals different points of view about some economical, political and environmental issues between the countries of the Baltic Sea Region. Indeed, we will see that this project had been developed between Russia and Germany only, creating by the way some tensions between them and Baltic Sea Region entities which have the feeling to be boycotted. That's why the Nord Stream Pipeline is a good example to show the limits of European Union solidarities and the economical priorities above environmental or diplomatic ones.
INTRODUCTION Despite the recommendation of the European Commission to diversify and increase the production of local resources especially within renewable energies1, the demand of hydrocarbons doesn't stop growing in Europe, where energetic supply relies only on importations. The European Union imports more than the half of the consumed energy.
Commission, Russia is the first gas provider through the EU countries 2
Thus, Russia is the first provider of gas of the European Union, but even if the gas stocks of Norway are declining faster, Russia is not the only provider. Still, the trade of hydrocarbons between both is big enough to have a real economical impact and political stakes. By this way, the construction of a pipeline between Russia, the gas producing country and Germany is a result of the more and more important need of gas in Europe, and especially in Western Europe. The socalled “Nord Stream” pipeline operating since 2011 is a totally offshore one, which means that it crosses only the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, but no territory of any country between the producer and the consumer. In this situation, we already can guess the advantage of Germany to secure its supply of gas, without any country which could trouble the way of the gas in case of a political problem. Moreover, Russia has also many political and economical advantages in avoiding to cross other countries by the pipelines. We have to know that before Nord Stream, only two other pipelines used to provide hydrocarbons in Europe. The first one “Yamal-Europe” crosses Bielorussia, 1 S. Nies, L'énergie, l'UE et la Russie, “Hérodote” 3/ 2010 (n° 138), pp. 79-93 – at <www.cairn.info/revueherodote-2010-3-page-79.htm> 2 European Commission, EU Energy in Figures, Statistical pocketbook 2014, European Union, Luxembourg 2014, p. 15 – at <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf>
Poland and arrives in Germany, while the second one, “Brotherhood” passes through Ukraine, Slovakia, Austria, Czech Republic and ends in Germany again.
Major European Gas Pipelines, 2010 3
We easily can imagine that more than an increasing of gas supplies, the construction of a pipeline through the Baltic Sea allows Russia to work less with some countries whom the political situation is not in favor of Russia like Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Baltic countries. Moreover, some countries around the Baltic Sea used to criticize the project because of the environmental issue brought by the construction of the pipeline. That's why, we will try here to answer to some questions by studying the main purposes of the countries : How does the Nord Stream pipeline show the link between political and economical interests of the states ? Why does Nord Stream put a stop to the establishment of a common energetic policy among EU states
3 Maps Gas Oil Pipelines – at <http://www.sayuncleinc.com/picsgymi/map-gas-oil-pipelines>
Nord Stream and the network of pipelines between Europe and Russia : securitization of energy supply ? “Nord Stream” refers to the recent offshore gas pipeline which links directly Vyborg in Russia and Greifswald in Germany, putted into service in November 2011. A second one has been operational in 2012. These pipelines cross the Baltic Sea over 1224 km, but they include and concern only the two countries at the origin of the project, not crossing other states. The project, promoted by both of the governments, has been acted on the November the 8 th, 2004 between Gerard Schröder, the former german chancellor, and Vladimir Putin, president of the russian federation at this time. However, the pipelines are owned and exploited by the private company “Nord Strean AG”. We have to know that Nord Stream AG is shared between several holders from different countries : the russian Gazprom owned 51% stake, two german companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas hold 15.5% each, the french GDF Suez, 9% stake, and the company N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie owned 9% too. Also, the chairman of the shareholders' Committee is the former german Chancellor Gerard Shröder. Nord Stream AG has been established in 2005, and is based now in Zug, Switzerland4. In this situation, we see that Russia has an important part, and enough power to influence the decisions, while the western Europe countries have less influence. However, the Gerard Shröder's presidency is weighed against this domination. The capacities of the pipelines are quite huge, indeed they are enable to bring in Germany 55 billion of cube meters per year, namely more than the half of the annual consumption of the country. Soon, it could meet 25% of the Western Europe demand in gas, while the Yamal pipeline used to bring 20% and the Brotherhood one 80% of the European demand, before the construction of Nord Stream. Several countries are concerned by the route of the Nord Stream pipeline, but as we can see on this table, some are more concerned : Germany and Russia have the less long parts of the Nord Stream in total (respectively 78 and 118 km) , whereas Sweden has the longest (482 km). But it's only about the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is not a part of the Official Territorial Zone. We have to notice that Russia and Germany are the only states really owning a part of the pipeline because it's in the Official Territorial Zone. 4 Official website of Nord Stream AG : “About Us” - Who We Are, at <https://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/>
NORD STREAM ROUTE THROUGH DIFFERENT LEVEL OF COUNTRY AREA Country
Official Territorial Zone (km)
1196 Source : Olivier Crone
It means that according to the law, Germany and Russia are the only states that have the power to decide all the ins and the outs of the pipeline, even if they are the less concerned about the longer in the economical zone. At this point, we can imagine that it created a lot of disagreements : some countries used to dominate the debate, made the final decision, while others used to be dominated even if they were, and are still, directly concerned. Moreover, we can use here the theory of “securitization” from Buzan, from which we can call the issue of energy supply as the energy securitization will. Indeed, the energy security in the Baltic Sea is a regional issue because as Buzan says : “a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”6 Moreover, the securitization of energy supply is now very important to understand the international political relations, not only based on military issues. The securitization of energy is managed by the politicians of each country, that's why I will illustrate the evolution of Nord Stream by explaining the political actions of the countries and the reasons of the protagonists and the opponents, the dominants and dominated.
5 O. Crone, Nord Stream, le gazoduc germano-russe sous la Baltique du point de vue suédois, “Outre-Terre” 2/ 2007 (n° 19), pp. 219-228 - p.221– at <www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2007-2-page-219.htm> 6 B.Buzan, O. Weaver, J.De Wild, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner publishers, Londres, 1998, p. 188
“The new gas supply route for Europe” : Which advantages for Germany and Russia ? According to Nies, each country try to get a role in the gas supply, to get the role of the “joker in the game of the energy business”7. We can see on this map that the russian gas has to cross several countries before to arrive in Western Europe, but not all of them are in good terms with Russia, however, they have to receive some royalties because the pipelines cross their territory.
European gas constraints in perspective © Philippe Rekacewicz, Le Monde diplomatique, 2007 - source : Journal of International Affairs 8
So we can understand the economical benefits for Russia which wants to avoid these third-role countries to save some money in the exportation. 7 S. Nies, L'énergie, l'UE et la Russie, op. cit p.3 8 C-A. Paillard, Rethinking Russia : Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence, “Journal of International Affairs”, vol. 63, no. 2, printemps-été 2010, pp. 65-84 – at <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europesmutual-energy-dependence/>
Moreover, Nord Stream pipeline enables Russia to extend the consumer network to Western Europe, like France or UK in the future. Indeed, these countries used to be too far from the previous pipeline to be costumers. But there is a geopolitical reason, much more meaningful. At first, to understand the russian policy of gas, we have to know that the russian gas company Gazprom is seen as a “Kremelin Weapon”9. Years after years, the company is more and more owned by the russian state, and serve the russian interests in its international relations. The country can play with the gas dependence of its costumers to submit them under some political actions : as we can see on the previous map, Russia has some political disagreements with especially Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Republics. Now, we can considerate any action from Gazprom as an act from the Kremlin. This power and political ability have a meaning in some historical facts, as the Ukrainian case for instance. The two countries had to meet about a territorial problem after the USSR splitting in 1993, but Russia decreased the gas exports to Ukraine by 25% a week before the summit, while publicly declaring that this decrease was due to Ukraine’s unpaid energy bills. Needless to say, Russia’s use of Gazprom as an “energy weapon” worked, as Ukraine ultimately agreed to give Russia the ship, and thus, the entire Black Sea Fleet. 10 Moreover, Russia has obliged several times Belarus and Ukraine to pay more for the gas, while these countries are really dependent from russian gas and have a huge debt toward Gazprom. Each time, Russia threats the supply to reach its purpose. But it's also a difficulty for Russia to manage with these countries because they mustn't compromise the exportation to Europe, whereas the whole gas pass through Ukraine or Belarus and Poland 11. That's why Nord Stream is the perfect solution for Russia in securitization of exportation. Facing this threat, the consuming countries and especially Germany have some troubles to secure the gas supply. EU needs good prices, and stability of the transit, but when some problems occur between the transit-countries and Russia, the prices increase and the securitization aim fails. In this case, we can understand that both Germany and Russia have a real interest in the direct pipeline. 9 M. A. Bos, Gazprom : Russia's nationalized political weapon and the implications for the European Union, Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2012 p. 54 – at <https://m.repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/557642/Bos_georgetown_0076M_11565.pd f?sequence=1> 10 M-A Bos, idem - p. 64 11 S. Nies, L'énergie, l'UE et la Russie, op. cit - p.3
Nord Stream, a source of disagreements between the countries of the Baltic Sea Region The European Union has given a clear recommendation for the Nord Stream project : Brussels said that the pipeline is a priority for the energy policy of the EU. Actually, the partnership between EU and Russia began just after the ending of USSR. In 1994, Russia signed the european Energy Charter Treaty, but never ratified it cause the Charter does not allow to interrupt the transit even in case of disagreement about the modalities. In 2007, The European Council asked to the European Commission to focus more on the security of the supply but also on the solidarity between all the members about security issues. The dialogue between EU and Russia has often been presented as a “success story”, because “The active engagement in EU/Russia energy diplomacy is a mutual acknowledgement of their interdependence”12. That's why, in case of a crisis like the ukrainian one in 2014, it's very difficult to negotiate, for both parts. Indeed, the european economy relies in some parts on the russian gas. But we have also to know that several crisis between Ukraine and Russia encouraged the EU to diversify the sources of energy. Moreover, the russian economy relies also on the hydrocarbons exportations, and in the case of the gas, 90% of the exportations are sent in the EU ; the Union is the first economical partner of Russia. So we saw here that, despite some political tensions, the EU wants to keep Russia as an important partner, and the Nord Stream pipeline might be seen as a symbol of this cooperation, as much as a need of securitization. However, before the construction, many voices in the EU gave an opposite position about Nord Stream, especially the countries around the Baltic Sea. For each country, the issues created by the Nord Stream pipeline are different. Indeed, we will see here that their position depend on their traditional political relations with Russia, their habits of fulfill their need of energy, and their economical situation. Moreover, their positions depends also on their sensibilities, their culture, especially on the ecological topic. Poland and Baltic Republics Poland and other ex-communist Baltic Sea states such as Estonia and Lithuania have expressed their disagreement since the beginning of the project. We can analyze their situation through their will of securitization of their energy resources. The problem is that on one hand, 12 L. Pick, EU-Russia energy relations : a critical analysis, “Polis Journal” , vol. 7, summer 2012, pp. 336 - at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/lisa-pick.pdf>
these countries are traditionally dependent of the russian gas, but on the other hand, they are nowadays clearly reluctant to Russia. So the problem here is as much political as economical : Poland and Baltic Republic try to get an economical and energetic independence, because they also want to get a strong political independence after years of USSR domination. Lets see more precisely how Poland and Lithuania reacted to the Nord Stream pipeline. At first, Poland pointed out that Nord Stream is more expensive than the land option. Indeed, in January 2010, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski labeled the Nord Stream pipeline project “a waste of European consumers’ money.” 13. Moreover, Poland warned Europe several times about the previous aim of getting independent from russian gas ; according to Warsaw, this project was against the european economical aim of finding other gas providers and also of reorienting energy production on renewable ones. But still, gas represents almost 14% 14 of the polish energy consumption, so even if Poland tries to limit its russian gas consumption, it's a big deal to get a real independence. Secondly, the country considered that Poland hasn't been consulted for the project, that's why the Minister Radosław Sikorski, Defense Minister at this time said in April 2006 “Poland has a particular sensitivity to corridors and deals above its head. That was the Locarno tradition, and the Molotov-Ribben trop tradition. That was the 20th century. We don’t want any repetition of that.”15. But the EU Commission gave a contrary opinion about the topic and reminded that this project have been built in association with all the concerned countries. However, more than a suspicion from the personal History of Poland, the polish government warned Europe about the political consequences of a disagreement. By instance, in a letter to the Financial Times on May 29, 2007, by the Polish Minister of National Defense and two others, Nordstream was described as “the most outrageous attempt by Mr Putin to divide and damage the EU, it would be an economic and geopolitical disaster for the Union.”16 . By the way, The German government maintain that they invited Poland to participate in the project but Warsaw refused 17. But finally, 13 Nord Stream 'a waste of money', says Poland, “Euractiv website”, 11/01/2010 – at <http://www.euractiv.com/energy/nord-stream-waste-money-poland/article-188727> 14 EU Energy in Figures, Statistical Pocketbook 2014, European Union, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 at <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf> 15 F. Cameron, The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and its Strategic Implications, “Petitions of Policy Department C” - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels 2007 – p. 3– at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2007/393274/IPOL-PETI_NT %282007%29393274_EN.pdf> 16 Russian Gas Pipeline would be a geopolitical disaster for EU, “Financial Times”, May 28, 2007 – at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/db259cf2-0cb7-11dc-a4dc-000b5df10621.html> 17 F. Cameron, The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and its Strategic Implications, op. cit, p.3
the pipeline doesn't cross the polish EEZ, so the weight of the polish opinion is even lighter. The baltic republics were also really reluctant against this pipeline, even if it doesn't cross their EEZ, they are still sensible to the ecological to the fact that Nord Stream avoid their territories. In 2007 Nord Stream approached Estonia and applied for permission to investigate a possible route alignment in Estonia's EEZ. The application was rejected by the Estonian government after a lively public political debate 18. Then, to get independence from Russia, the Lithuanian state had to find other sources to supply the demand of Gas. Nowadays, Lithuania has much more partnerships with Norway, an important gas exporter. The price of the Russian gas is expected to be higher than the price of the Norwegian gas for 201519. More recently, the country has developed a solution to convert liquified natural gas into burnable variety, and as the journalist James Kanter says : “It represents a direct challenge to the Russian way of doing business as many other countries in the European Union have dithered over how to deal with President Vladimir V. Putin and his attempts to reassert Russian influence over parts of the former Soviet empire like Ukraine.” 20 So, we can see that the Nord Stream pipeline is not a big deal anymore for Lithuania because the country knows now how to managed the importations of natural gas. We could even say that Lithuania has succeed in dealing its independence from Russia, as Dalia Grybauskaite the Lithuanian President says : “Nobody else from now on will be able to dictate to us the price of gas, or to buy our political will, or to bribe our politicians.” 21 Sweden Sweden has been one of the most virulent opponent to the Nord Stream project, for several reasons. In the country, the debate about Nord Stream focused on the environmental and security issues. Actually, this state didn't really debate about any potential benefit from the pipeline. The russian company PeterGaz used to study if they could build a ramification to organize the gaz supply of Sweden. The swedish minister of Energy allowed PeterGaz to study the plan, but the minister of Foreign Affairs didn't pay any attention to the project and wasn't 18 F. Cameron, The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and its Strategic Implications, op. cit, p. 2 19 A. Sytas, Lithuania to pay more for Norwegian LNG than Russian gas, “Reuters”, 13 Nov. 2014, Vilnius – at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/13/lithuania-lng-idUSL6N0T268X20141113> 20 J. Kanter, Lithuania Offers Example of How to Break Russia’s Grip on Energy, “The New York Times”, 27 Oct. 2014, Klaipeda – at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/business/energy-environment/lithuania-offersexample-of-how-to-break-russias-grip-on-energy.html> 21 J. Kanter, “The New York Times”, idem.
interested. In reality, Sweden has not so much interests in natural gas importation : 90% of the national electricity is from national nuclear energy and also hydroelectricity. 22 Already, few gas is imported from Denmark, and nowadays, also from Norway. So, most of the deputies in Sweden were opposed to the construction of Nord Stream. Indeed, Russia and Germany have built up the route of the pipeline without asking the opinion of the states around the Baltic Sea. Moreover, a political scoop made the debate more complicated at this time : the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007 (in the opposition at the time of the debate in 2005) used to own some stock-options from Vostok Nafta Investment Ltd., a company belonging to Gazprom capital. Even if he sold it after the scandal, he has been accused of collusion by the opposition. According to several polls, more than the half of Swedish citizens were not in favor of the pipeline crossing the Baltic Sea 23. Why are their so reluctant to the project ? At first, the pipeline could be a security and military issue for Sweden. Indeed, several politicians from both political colors, have expressed their fears about Nord Stream : the Russians may be able to spy more easily Swedish activities, and also all the commercial and military traffic in all the Baltic Sea. Before, only the Kaliningrad enclave was a feet in Europe, but now, with the artificial island created near Gotland coasts, it seems much more easier to keep Sweden under surveillance by installing some radars and sonars. Swedish scholars were very worried about this issue : for instance, Bo Hult, from the Swedish Academy of Defense used to say : “Nobody will travel now through the Baltic Sea without Russia is having informed. The Baltic Sea will be divided one more time, while it was finished since the end of the Cold War” 24. The Russians deny totally this accusations, and explain that they don't want to spy Sweden, and in the case they did, they could use satellites and no more radars. Finally, this argument didn't count in the final decisions about Nord Stream. Secondly, Nord Stream created a debate about the ecological and environmental issues that it could bring. On this part, Sweden, as a traditional sensible country about ecological issue, has been the most virulent opponent to the Nord Stream Project. In the center of the Baltic Sea, there is the very particular island of Gotland. Particular and precious for its natural riches, its white beaches, but also particular because of the radical opposition of the 55 000 inhabitants of the island to the Nord Stream pipeline. Indeed, even if Nord Stream AG committed itself in the 22 O. Crone, Nord Stream, le gazoduc germano-russe sous la Baltique du point de vue suédois, “Outre-Terre” 2/ 2007 (n° 19), pp. 219-228 - p.222– at <www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2007-2-page-219.htm> 23 O. Crone, idem – p. 223 24 Rysk gasledning säkerhetspolitisk problem, “Dagens Nyheter”, 14 nov. 2006
respect of very strict ecological measures, according to the ecologists, the construction spoiled the local submarine fauna and flora. Moreover, it could stir up toxins long dormant near the island, endangering the fish quality and quantity. As a result, it could weaken the fisheries economy25 .Then, the greatest concern was over all the chemical and dangerous weapons left at the bottom of the Baltic Sea after the World War II 26. But finally, very few problems about the chemical weapons have been encountered during the construction of the pipeline. On the other hand, we still are ignorant about the real environmental effects of the pipeline cause the construction is still too recent. The pipeline is still a big risk, and "the environmental impact is questionable. Nord Stream has to address all possible scenarios. So far, this has been neglected", according to Asa Andersson of the Swedish World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 27. We can notice through the article of Torsten Schäfer, that Sweden has even succeed to federate some protestations from environmental groups about the ecological fears, because some Finnish and German counterparts have joined the opposition. However, the power of Sweden on the decision about the route is very limited because the pipeline doesn't cross its national maritime zone. So the germano-russian agreement have been stronger than all these critics. Finland In an interview with Deutsche Welle on 4 May 2007 President Tarja Halonen said that the main Finnish concerns about the pipeline were environmental rather than political. She added that she thought these concerns could be dealt with. Mr Vanhanen has stated that : “First, we need a new gas pipeline between Russia and Central Europe. (...)At the same time it constitutes a part of our strategic partnership with Russia – this is the most important argument”
Denmark At the beginning, Denmark was quite reluctant toward Nord Stream, but an agreement has been quickly found : normally, the pipeline should had been built near the Bornhold Island, but finally it hasn't been. Denmark approved pretty early the Baltic pipeline comparing to the other countries29. 25 O. Crone, idem – p.227 26 T. Schäfer, Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline Meets European Resistance, “Deutsche Welle”, 17 Febr. 2007 – at <http://www.dw.de/baltic-sea-gas-pipeline-meets-european-resistance/a-2345720> 27 T. Schäfer, “Deutsche Welle” idem 28 F. Cameron, The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and its Strategic Implications, op. cit, p. 4 29 Nord Stream Gets Go-Ahead: Denmark Approves Russian Baltic Pipeline, “Der Spiegel Online”, Oct 20, 2009 at<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nord-stream-gets-go-ahead-denmark-approves-russian-balticpipeline-a-656229.html>
Finally, we can see a real difference between western Europe countries like Germany France, Netherlands, Denmark, and the eastern countries like Poland or the Baltic Republics. First of all, all of them have different energetic policies : the german economy especially relies tremendously on the russian gas. Ten, for instance Netherlands or the United Kingdom try to diversify their gas providers because the Norwegian gas stocks are decreasing. For Russia, we can see that their most important clients are in Western Europe : as we can notice on this figures, 57% of their exportations
countries. That's why it's important for them to ensure the exportations to this region, and to ensure the trust of these countries toward Russia, by building Nord Stream. Moreover, some analysts say that Russia tries to feed and to take advantage of the dissensions in the EU, it could prevent the european countries to find a final agreement about a common energy and environmental policy that many parties used to ask for since several years. However, such an agreement could compromise the commercial partnership with Russia. By the example of the tensions about Nord Stream pipeline, we see that sometimes, the private interests of a country are stronger than the need of coherence between EU countries. Here, Germany protects its own interests despite the opinion of Sweden and Poland. Moreover, we see the limit of solidarity between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because of some economical interests. As we can see on the front page picture, Nord Stream is definitely a project between Russia, Western Europe companies (Germany, France, Netherlands), and Western Europe clients (United Kingdom, Denmark, France). In this picture, the politicians act in favor of an economical partnership, which is against a common energetic policy and against a kind of solidarity with countries around the Baltic Sea.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Scientific literature : – Bos M.A , Gazprom : Russia's nationalized political weapon and the implications for the
European Union, Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2012 – at <https://m.repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/557642/Bos_georgetown_00 76M_11565.pdf?sequence=1>
Buzan B., Weaver O., De Wild J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner publishers, Londres, 1998,
Crone O., Nord Stream, le gazoduc germano-russe sous la Baltique du point de vue suédois, “Outre-Terre” 2/ 2007 (n° 19), pp. 219-228 – at <www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre12007-2-page-219.htm> - DOI : 10.3917/oute.019.0219
Nies S., L'énergie, l'UE et la Russie, “Hérodote” 3/ 2010 (n° 138), La Découverte, pp. 79-93 – at <www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2010-3-page-79.htm> - DOI : 10.3917/her.138.0079
Paillard C.A., Rethinking Russia : Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence, “Journal of International Affairs”, vol. 63, no. 2, printemps-été 2010, pp. 65-84 – at <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europes-mutual-energy-dependence/>
Pick L., EU-Russia energy relations : a critical analysis, “Polis Journal” , vol. 7, summer 2012. at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/lisa-pick.pdf>
Official public reports : – European Commission, EU Energy in Figures, Statistical pocketbook 2014, European Union,
Luxembourg 2014 – at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf
Cameron F., The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and its Strategic Implications, “Petitions of Policy Department C” - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels 2007 – at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2007/393274/IPOLPETI_NT%282007%29393274_EN.pdf>
Websites : – Euractiv website, Nord Stream 'a waste of money', says Poland, 11/01/2010 – at
Nord Stream AG official website : “About Us” - Who We Are, at <https://www.nordstream.com/about-us/
Articles in newspapers : – Kanter J., Lithuania Offers Example of How to Break Russia’s Grip on Energy, “The New York Times”, 27 Oct. 2014, – at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/business/energyenvironment/lithuania-offers-example-of-how-to-break-russias-grip-on-energy.html>
Schäfer T., Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline Meets European Resistance, “Deutsche Welle”, 17 Febr. 2007 – at <http://www.dw.de/baltic-sea-gas-pipeline-meets-european-resistance/a-2345720>
Sytas A., Lithuania to pay more for Norwegian LNG than Russian gas, “Reuters”, 13 Nov. 2014, Vilnius – at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/13/lithuania-lngidUSL6N0T268X20141113>
Nord Stream Gets Go-Ahead: Denmark Approves Russian Baltic Pipeline, “Der Spiegel Online”, Oct 20, 2009 - at<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nord-stream-gets-go-aheaddenmark-approves-russian-baltic-pipeline-a-656229.html>
Published on Nov 30, 2014