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Vol. XX N;:'76
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Modern Infantry
Innited in depth by the average range of the mass of support mg fires. On the objective infantry halted, reorganized, marked time, and was finally ejected by hostile reserves who promptly took advantage of the lull in the attacker's protect lI1g fires to do so. The defender planned it that way. Maneuver, in its proper sense, was almost unknown. A true envelopment occurred only when a section, squad, or llldividual soldier became thoroughly disgusted with the constant failure and casualties incident to frontal attacks and "stalked" a machine-gun nest. Such action drew well deserved commendation" But it failed to indicate to the high command that a few infantrymen with simple weapons plus maneuver space and leadership, could accomplish what the Impl'essive mass could not do. lVIaneuvPf based upon the- fonvard displacement of rela~ tively immobile supporting weapons necessitated constant alignment to avoid the dang-erow; salient. Alignment, in turn, left infantry no choice of protecting terrain, and con~ ,tantly eXlIosed it to losses that it could have avoided. There is nothing/simpler to smother or enfilade, than an alignment. Maneuver of masses of infantry in peace~time is diffi~ cult. l'nder the concentrated gun and machine-gun fires of the World War it was impossible. The masses b,."ke; mass leaders became mere file-closers and the unit went forward -if It did not melt-under the leadership of platoon, section, and squad leaders. The well-planned "power-punch" of the large unit became a series of "dog fights all along the line, Dll'ection, control and coordination pasged out of the pic~ ture. The only immediate result wa~ cmmaltif'R. H
EXPERIMENTATioN
T\venty years of corrective experimentation be!(an 11 :-rovember 1918. The latest cl'Ucible now rests over the s]()\',:}v rising flame of the present war in Europe. It has been Ill'eceded by lesser tests, notably the invasion of China LJ~' J(lpan and the Civil Vlar in Spain; but modern organiza~ tlOl' illld equipment enters into those pictures to such a limit ed extent that the proponent or opponent of any particular \\ ":1POIl or tactical method could pick dates, areas, and l',·.. . ult . . sufficient to prove his case, verbal1y at least. The result of these years of experimentation, tbgether "lth t he modernization of weapons, mounts. and transporta~ • 1 lull has been a new organization of the infantry division in i Hie:" my of nearly every nation. Each is the approved solu ! tIOn ,\ ll1ch will take the next war out into the "fresh-air-and~ J :-un'!,Ine" of open warfare. In some cases the throes of mili : tar, ","olution have closely approached revolution. But, as ; lila ,. I (;eneral George Jc. Lynch, Chief of Infantry. stated on 114 )1."', h 1939-"We seem to be approaching the culmination ! of t! anges in armament, organization. and tactics that prel~ ~ ude ! ransformations in \varfare equalling in scope thosf> ~ intI' .luced by the invention of gunpowder and the develop mer.' of the musket and cannon. . . . Will gasoline now take ~ O\'el the position of primacy in military evolution and re stOI to mobility the decisive influence which it once had ovp: the issue of battle?" f n a recent comment on revision of our Field Service Re~':dations, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, sta. J: "In going over the Field Service Regulations the nth.·" day prior to giving it tentative approval, a few points
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came to mind which I think might well be included in the next edition. / "There should hi: a paragraph on continuity of effort. The initial impetus is seldom conclusive in effect, and final success will only be secured by mainUaining the momentum once gained.~ Many factors enter into this, even the stabiliz ing effect of too early establishment of a complete command post. . . ." Experimentation has, then, been aimed at what? We believe the true objective of it all-no matter what the weap on, or type or size of unit-has been the restoration of .bat tlefield mobIlity and, as a proper prelude in preparation for battle, there has been extensive and successful experimenta-. tion in the field of strategic mobility-the movement of arms and troops to the battlefield. There has been a definite speed ing up and whittling down-up in movement and dow!! in :::.ize•. A NEW UNIrED STATES INFANTRY
We have a new infantry. As a result of the lessons learned in the World War' and of the experiments conducted in the intervening period, it is new in concept, new in Olgan ization, new in armament and new in tactics. Let us spend a few min'utes on each item and see if we can grasp the essential differences. CO:-rCEPT: In our Field Manual 100-5 (FSR). we find these statements: "The infantry is charged with the principal mission in battle. It is essentially the arm of close combat. . . . In fantry is capable of independent action through the employ ment of its own weapons. . .. ' "Infantry can move in all kinds of terrain; its operatiVe mobility can be greatly increased by the use of motor trans port. . . . In both attack and defense, it can utilize the terrain so as to develop fully its own fire power and minimize the effect of hostile fire. . . . Its combat power rests pri marily on the morale and fighting ahility of the individual soldier and the leadership of its subordinate commanders." There at;!) old as well as neW concepts of infantry discernible in these statements. Infantry still has the prin cipal mission in battle and it still is the arm of close combat. However, with the new organization, armament, and tactics which will be discussed below. we now develop those powers inherent in infantry which will enable it to accomplish that principal miSSIOn and close with the enemy. Infantry has been capable of "independent action,," but the action, as demonstrated in the World War usually re.ult ed in complete stoppage in front of hostile resistances which infantry, almost completely dependent on other arms, could not overcome~ The difference in concept here. lies in lithe employment of its o\vn weapons." That "its operative mobility can be greatly increased by the use of motor transport" implies both strategic mo bility to the battlefield and tactical mobility (mainly of weapon and ammunition) on the battlefield. Here, then, is the difference: provisions are made for conserving the strength of the individual soldier, for "getting him thar fustest in the bestest condition," for feeding him, supplying
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