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March, 1940, Quarterly Review of Military Literature


xx. No. 76





:3 February 1940


Ed1tor, Command and General Staff School Military Review, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth,

On behalf of the 1939-1940 Reeular Class, Command and Gene School, 1t 1S desired to express the h1gh regard we hold for the C and General Staff School M1l1tary Rev1ew, ThIS publicatlon has become unIque In Its field, being not only

the express10n of the sound tact1cal doctr1nes of the Command and General Staff School, but 1S perhaps the only complete and unbiased review of all mil1tary thought that 1S obta1nable today, ThiS is especially important , in these times when many of the usual sources of accurate Information are. silent. However, today, more than ever before, important events are occurrIng and are beIng developed In the art of war. It has become essential for most of us to reduce to a minimum the number of hours spent In keeping abreast of world-wide current events. Con足

sequently, the current trend to Digests and Reviews 1S as much appreciated In mIlItary lIterature as In other sUbjects.

It is apparent that the

Mil1tary Rev1ew of the Command and General Staff School is today performing such a serVIce WIth dIstinction. Concorning the artIcle on the German cam足 pa~gn In Poland, December 1939 issue, the Fore~gn EdItor of Newsweek recently wrote: "1 consIder thIS entire artlcle one of the most a cellant pleces of mIl ~ tary wr~ ting on th.lS war that I have seen." We believe no serIOUS mIlItary student can afford not to r ad care-

fully th1S 1nvaluable publ1catlon,

Spec1ally do we commend it to

11 pros足

pectlve stude~ts of the Command and General Stafr School -- the na es of

n the

such a great number of the distingu1shed graduates of this School prOesent subscrIptIon 11st are ample Indlcatlon of their opinIon at). esteem


The cost of the subscr1ption 1S still amazingly small, but that is due to the desire of the Commandant to make it avallable to all ml itary

students of our country and to advance knowledge of the m1litary profession, Multum in parvo should be its motto,


Mlauuo~ R. TOWNSEND HEARD\ Lleutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, Class pres1dent'1

Volume XX

Number 76





C. A. C., Editor

Infantry, Assistant Editor


CAPTAIN M. R. KAMMERER. rnfanh'y. ASsLstant Editmo

March, 1940 First Quarter

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL MILITARY RE­ VIEW-Published quarterly by the Command and General Staff School at Fort Lea\'enworth, Kansas. Entered as second-class matter August 31, 1934, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rate: One year in the United States anti. possessions, Cuba and Mexico, $1.00; foreign, $2.00 a year.




~I\O'anv Of U. s.


Soldiers In The Sun-By Captain William T. Sexton i,

Perish By The Sword-By Major R. Ernest Dupuy The Second World War; First Phase-By Duff Cooper The British War Blue Book; Miscellaneous No.9 (1939)­ Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affailjs to r Parliament I

Can America Stay Neutral?-By Allen W: Dulles and Hamilton ! Fish Armstrong Men In Battle-By Alvah Bessie Les Enseignements Aeriens de la Guerre d'Espagne [Les~on~ DerJved from Aerial Warfare in Spain] - By Camille Rougeron Abraham Lincoln: The War Years-By Carl Sandburg The Heritage of America-Edited by Henry Steele Comm'ager and Allan N et,ins Keogh, Comanche and Custer-By Edward S. Lure The Hundredth Year-By Philip Glledalla If Not Victory-By Frank O. Hough

Comments on the contents of the books found on page 66 following. \



may be














Digests of Important artIcles from foreign mIlitary perIOdIcals; the remaining artIcles for eaeh magazine are listed. Coopcration Betu'een Infantry ~ Artillery Defense of Infantry Cmts Agmnst Air Attack




Its Reality and tlf...e General of the Future




Military Land Warfare


Defense Against Armored Vehzcles






Baolu; recently accE'ssioned, whieh are of particular significance. ACAm~MIC :\OfES,

C. & G. S. S.


lurrpnt School material. \vhich affects Instructional procedure or tactical eloctrines.



the ()rganhalwn amI Employment of IlJechanr:ed Caralry


iH a p Problem and Discussion

Slralegual and Taf'lirollllobillly





A systematic reVIew of the contents of seIe{'ted milItary periodicals. Foreign~language perIOdIcals are dIgested to a degree to furnish an adequate idea of contents and signifieance. READERS' GUIDE AND SUBJECT I:-lDEX

All subJect-headmgs are arranged in alphabetical sequence and can be consulted lIke

a dictionary.

Note also List of Periodicals [,;dexed and Key to Abbreviations.



Mission The object of this publication is a systematIc review of current military literature, through cataloging articles of professional value, in selected mIlitary and naval periodicals, in the domestic and foreign field. Articles from foreIgn 'periodlcals are treated by translati~ns of titles and digests of contents; material of particular importance is covered more extensively in a section of "Foreign Military Digests." A "Library Bulletin" Section lists books, recently accessioned, which are of particular significance. This Revie", IS publIshed as a gUIde to modern military tendencies and to inspire vigorous thoughts on the subjects treated. The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in articles are solely those of the authors and are in no sense offiCial. '

Acknowledgment The editors desire to express their thanks and appreCiatIOn to the many persons who have valuably assisted the preparation of material for this issue. The work of,contributors has been done in addition to their regular duties and on theIr own tIme. We are very grateful to the following officers for their generous donations:





Zryezda (26 August-28 October 1939)

CAPTAI>! H. D. KEHM: M,litaru'lssenschaftliche Rundschau (Janu!>ry, March 1939)

CAPTAIN A. L. KEYES: Herue d'ATt,lle", (April, !\lay 1939): Ret'lle Militaire Suisse iJuly,

August, September 1939): Book Review . CAPTAIN W. E. LOR'ENCE: Bulletin Beige des Sciences ill1lit"'i,res (July, August 1939) MAJOR T. R. PHII.l.IPS· La France Milztaire III July, 7, 17 October 1939); Book Review MAJOR R. S. RAMEY: Notes on the Organization and Employment of Mechanized Cavalry; StrategIcal and Tactical MobIlIty

• The Cover 9th Infantry Co~bat Team.

Photograph by J. J. Gregor, Fort Bliss, Texas.




* "



The U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School now was ready

I for someone to visualize its larger instructional possibilities ~ and to give it a

considerable impetus. That impetus was to

'r'~ rome largely ~

from the mind of one of its instructors. First mentIOn is maue of this officer in Colonel E. F. Townsend's

• report of 1892, which says: "Captam A. L. "Tagner, 6th Infantry, one of the assis­ tant Instructors of this department is now at Cumberland. lId, by authodty of the War Department, engaged in pre­

paring a work on the suu.iect of


Tactics: for t1-]e use

of the school and army. It IS hoped that this will be ready to put in the hands of the next class."

The annual report of 180:1 records the development of I\"agner's influence in the school as follows: "The Department of :\lilllary Art during the past year ha' been in charge of Captain A. L. Wagner, 6th Infantry.

Captain Wagnel' has brought untiring zeal to the ac­ lOmplishment of thc WOI k in his department and with the ilelp of hh; aule assistant Instructors has been remarkably ~I\ccef' ...ful

in the instruction O:;'he class.

ThE' works of

\\hlCh he is the author. pi:: 'Ser C(OI of Security and Infor­

mation,' and 'Organization and- actics,' have been used as

tto teAt books of the course, supplemented by a ,mall portion

of 'Home's Precis of lIIoJern Tactics: This book will be tropped as soon as Captain 'Vagner's work is entirely com­ )ieted." Prior to 18D!, nearly all of the textbooks used at the ,rhool "o'e written by officers of foreign armies, The first


soon !:leveloped and has since maintained an international ,.eput~tion for the excellence of its military publications. ­ Captain Wagner continued at t~e head of the Depart· ment of JqlIitary Art until ~larch, 1897. In that year the results of hIS fOlll' years of instrucUon ,vork \vas .embodied in the revision of the course of instruction published in General Orders No. 4~, War Department, 1897. The Spanish·Am2riran War and the Philippine Insur­ rection eaused a fOlll'-Yl:'nr cc:<sation of systematic education of the Army, HO\\cver. the \\ar fm'nished much opportunity for considE'ration of the l'elluil'cments of such' a system of education and, it \\'a~ fOl'tunate that at its close. the problem came to as great and capable a man as Secretary of War Elihu Root. With the assistance of military "advisers, con­ spicuous among whom 'vere BrigadIer General 'Vil1iam H, Carter and Brigadier General J. FI'ankhn Bell, lIIr. Root analyzed the military educational needs of the .Army. As a result of the Htudy gl\'en to the reqll1rements of military education, a general scheme of in::;truction was adopted for the AI'my and Jlublished in General Orders No. 155, War Department, 1901. This scheme .provided that much of the prelimlllary instruction which formerly had been included in the Fort Leaven\\,orth' curl'iculum should now' be included in systematIcally organizeu and efficiently conducted post schools. The next step in the "education of officers of all branches exhibiting superior merit in the post schools was to be attendance at the Fort Leavenworth school which \vas to be enlm·ged and developed along the lines of a post-graduate college under the designatic}ll, "The General Service and Staff College." The final step in the school in­ struction of selected officers \"as also prOVIded for III these general orders \vhich requ!red the college 8tafi', upon conclu' sion of the annual exammations. to recommend such student offief1's as harl especial/y d!stinguished- themselves, for fur· ther instructIOn at the Army War College which had been established in Washington, D. C.

te\t prq,ared at the school 'vas ,vritten by Fil'st Lieutenant ; B. Batchelor, Jr., 24th Infant!"y, on Infantry FI1'e"""-Its roe !It Battle which supersected I nJantry Fl1'e Tactics by (aptain C. B. ~Iayne of the British Army. It was followed by Ca]lLlin \Vagner\; 1\vo text hooks mentioned above, The The regulations for The General Service and Staff Col­ next te=--t was on Field En!Jin~e}'ing prepared in the lege, together with a SUItable program of inRtru<;tion. was Departnlent of Engineering under the direction of Captain published in General O"ders No. 89, War Department, II" D. [,each, 3d Cavalry. Captain W. H. Ca!"ter's work on August 1. 1902, A one-year course of instruction was pro­ H'JlJ'o;".,y soon replaced 1/00'S(S and Stables by Lieutenant vided for. The College reopened as directed, the new dass numbering twenty-ninE' cavalry amI sixty-four infantry offi­ Genoral Sir F. Fitzwygram of the British Army and Seats cers. The student rank continued to he that of lieutenant ""d Sarl'llcs and Bits and Billinu by :lIajor Francis Dwyer and it was not until 1907 that it was raised to caPt:>in. "f the Austrian Army. Soon practically all of the books (To be continued) u<d in the school were American publications. The school





DAGER, Infantry



The ..ole of infantry has always been to take and hold ~ ground. ~Has this role changed? Have modernization. .~ motorization. mechanization and reorganization altered Infantry'S mission? Do new armament, new organization ~ and. g~solined stream-lining bring with them new infantry i tactH:S? ' 'low does the new element of speed affect ,command and staff procedure? What must infantry officers extract as guiding principles from the effervescent mass of tables, re足 porto of tests, "lightning wars," and enlightening comment in which we are submerged? .

The four years of. World War, 1914-1918, furnished infantry tacticians wIth a proving ground for their ideas . Massed formations, special-weapon groups, individual and small-group infiltration, battering-ram formations in nar足 row zones; these were ideas which resulted in heavy infantry casualties, , The prevailing concept of infantry organization, arma足 ment and tactics was brutal. The value of the 'individual soldier in combat was obliterated by the glitter of "massed men and massed fires" intended to blast a path through a similar group of massed men and massed fires. Like rolling





.... ht'l·t-:; ot molten ld\n the~ md. they fused. and de':-troypd each other lJ~ theil' hpat. Shift::- from m,l:-;~ to Jiue. to column. to giOUp. to COnI· bInatlOlls of men m;d weapon. produced simIlar destrllctl\'(' results 1l.11'a\\\\':-.' failed to come up to expectation:. m the last \Vorld \Val'. Alld. because It was the principal arm wIth thp r)rmcipul role of taking and holding ground, 1t~ :-'UppOI't­ ing arms ami ~er\'ice::-, were also a disappointment The arch was no oetter than itH keystone.

tallOn. as organically CUll:-.tltuteu and armed, was depenrieIL. ~ upou '\("'fl}lOlb othpl' th31l it:-. uWIl for maintenance of \E'10Clt~ ()nrE' bl'~ Olld l'Hllge 0.1 ,sUPPOl'tl;lg hIgh-angle weap'; ons It no longer had the mean~ to contend with targets cor{:_~ L'e::tied, defilatlt'd, or protecteu by defensivJ. organization fjl'-.1 the ground. Having reached those hostile main lines, it wa.,';; stopped. It lost contact with ito,; supporting weapons mo; of which were under the commalld (direct or mdirect) c


support \vere HOt. Maintenance of initIal velocity was im /~ llracticable.. The. defensi:'(> po\\:er of automatic 'veapm~:.~ fire was at Its zenIth. and It took Its toll. :~1

Wh,. did lllfant r,. fail to live up to expectations: M:l1nly because the support given t,p It was not an mtegrated part of

its 'basic baltle unit-the infantry battalion. With the ex­ ception of rifles. automatic rifies and grenades. the battalion had notllln~ of itt:, own with wluch,to overcome resi:::tancef> within and bphind the hostile main lines of resistance.

Furthermore. infantry in the World War was essentially a fiat-traJector,. arm. True. the battalion received high-angle fire support of a limited number of mortars and of artillery howitzers. but this support also failed to cope with the prob­ lems of mobility. liaison. and communications. The bat­



J 'i

higher commanders. The desire to support was the;e. bu ~ the mobility, communications. and liaison vital to continufl ~


The typical scheme of maneuver provided for a comb natiDn of fire and movement. It was a good scheme; it s ' is. and it probably always will be. Why did it fail in th last World War: Simply because. in application,' fire fail to keep up with maneuver. Infantry was tied down to time-schedule of fires without which it lacked the power t advance. It reached a limited objective. which in turn wa


-;:::"'"-" \,


Vol. XX N;:'76


Modern Infantry

Innited in depth by the average range of the mass of support­ mg fires. On the objective infantry halted, reorganized, marked time, and was finally ejected by hostile reserves who promptly took advantage of the lull in the attacker's protect­ lI1g fires to do so. The defender planned it that way. Maneuver, in its proper sense, was almost unknown. A true envelopment occurred only when a section, squad, or llldividual soldier became thoroughly disgusted with the constant failure and casualties incident to frontal attacks and "stalked" a machine-gun nest. Such action drew well deserved commendation" But it failed to indicate to the high command that a few infantrymen with simple weapons plus maneuver space and leadership, could accomplish what the Impl'essive mass could not do. lVIaneuvPf based upon the- fonvard displacement of rela~ tively immobile supporting weapons necessitated constant alignment to avoid the dang-erow; salient. Alignment, in turn, left infantry no choice of protecting terrain, and con~ ,tantly eXlIosed it to losses that it could have avoided. There is nothing/simpler to smother or enfilade, than an alignment. Maneuver of masses of infantry in peace~time is diffi~ cult. l'nder the concentrated gun and machine-gun fires of the World War it was impossible. The masses b,."ke; mass­ leaders became mere file-closers and the unit went forward -if It did not melt-under the leadership of platoon, section, and squad leaders. The well-planned "power-punch" of the large unit became a series of "dog fights all along the line, Dll'ection, control and coordination pasged out of the pic~ ture. The only immediate result wa~ cmmaltif'R. H


T\venty years of corrective experimentation be!(an 11 :-rovember 1918. The latest cl'Ucible now rests over the s]()\',:}v rising flame of the present war in Europe. It has been Ill'eceded by lesser tests, notably the invasion of China LJ~' J(lpan and the Civil Vlar in Spain; but modern organiza~ tlOl' illld equipment enters into those pictures to such a limit­ ed extent that the proponent or opponent of any particular \\ ":1POIl or tactical method could pick dates, areas, and l',·.. . ult . . sufficient to prove his case, verbal1y at least. The result of these years of experimentation, tbgether "lth t he modernization of weapons, mounts. and transporta~ • 1 lull has been a new organization of the infantry division in i Hie:" my of nearly every nation. Each is the approved solu­ ! tIOn ,\ ll1ch will take the next war out into the "fresh-air-and~ J :-un'!,Ine" of open warfare. In some cases the throes of mili­ : tar, ","olution have closely approached revolution. But, as ; lila ,. I (;eneral George Jc. Lynch, Chief of Infantry. stated on 114 )1."', h 1939-"We seem to be approaching the culmination ! of t! anges in armament, organization. and tactics that prel~ ~ ude ! ransformations in \varfare equalling in scope thosf> ~ intI' .luced by the invention of gunpowder and the develop­ mer.' of the musket and cannon. . . . Will gasoline now take ~ O\'el the position of primacy in military evolution and re­ stOI to mobility the decisive influence which it once had ovp: the issue of battle?" f n a recent comment on revision of our Field Service Re~':dations, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, sta. J: "In going over the Field Service Regulations the nth.·" day prior to giving it tentative approval, a few points


came to mind which I think might well be included in the next edition. / "There should hi: a paragraph on continuity of effort. The initial impetus is seldom conclusive in effect, and final success will only be secured by mainUaining the momentum once gained.~ Many factors enter into this, even the stabiliz­ ing effect of too early establishment of a complete command post. . . ." Experimentation has, then, been aimed at what? We believe the true objective of it all-no matter what the weap­ on, or type or size of unit-has been the restoration of .bat­ tlefield mobIlity and, as a proper prelude in preparation for battle, there has been extensive and successful experimenta-. tion in the field of strategic mobility-the movement of arms and troops to the battlefield. There has been a definite speed­ ing up and whittling down-up in movement and dow!! in :::.ize•. A NEW UNIrED STATES INFANTRY

We have a new infantry. As a result of the lessons learned in the World War' and of the experiments conducted in the intervening period, it is new in concept, new in Olgan­ ization, new in armament and new in tactics. Let us spend a few min'utes on each item and see if we can grasp the essential differences. CO:-rCEPT: In our Field Manual 100-5 (FSR). we find these statements: "The infantry is charged with the principal mission in battle. It is essentially the arm of close combat. . . . In­ fantry is capable of independent action through the employ­ ment of its own weapons. . .. ' "Infantry can move in all kinds of terrain; its operatiVe mobility can be greatly increased by the use of motor trans­ port. . . . In both attack and defense, it can utilize the terrain so as to develop fully its own fire power and minimize the effect of hostile fire. . . . Its combat power rests pri­ marily on the morale and fighting ahility of the individual soldier and the leadership of its subordinate commanders." There at;!) old as well as neW concepts of infantry discernible in these statements. Infantry still has the prin­ cipal mission in battle and it still is the arm of close combat. However, with the new organization, armament, and tactics which will be discussed below. we now develop those powers inherent in infantry which will enable it to accomplish that principal miSSIOn and close with the enemy. Infantry has been capable of "independent action,," but the action, as demonstrated in the World War usually re.ult­ ed in complete stoppage in front of hostile resistances which infantry, almost completely dependent on other arms, could not overcome~ The difference in concept here. lies in lithe employment of its o\vn weapons." That "its operative mobility can be greatly increased by the use of motor transport" implies both strategic mo­ bility to the battlefield and tactical mobility (mainly of weapon and ammunition) on the battlefield. Here, then, is the difference: provisions are made for conserving the strength of the individual soldier, for "getting him thar fustest in the bestest condition," for feeding him, supplying





c. & G.B-S. Military Review

MoHe'rn Infantry,'::'

him with ammunition and for evacuating him whIle he is Nor is he any longer the "ammunition ruule" for an auto~ fighting-by motors. matic rifleman or other sperialist in his squad. There are "In both attack and defense it can utilize the terrain so no specialists in his squad, It is Just a plain, honest group as to develop fully Its own fil'e po\ver and minimize the effect of twelve equally armed combatants, intent upon one thing of hostile fire." This statement encourages us to release in~ ... -advancIng the attack. It is essentially an organization fantry from phase-lines upon which it used to stop (to be based upon mobility and morale, It has but two functions; shelled and eJected) and permit It to utilize terrain and to de­ to defend itself as a group, and get itself forward as a group, The rifle platoon is composed of three such squads, plus velop fire power (bases of fire) and seek cover regardless of alignments, Veterans of the World War (1914-18) are a platoon headquarters consisting of a lieutenant, two ser­ deeply appreciative of the last concession, It is a healthy geants (platoon guides) and a private (messenger), Since difference. and it is tactically sound. it ~lso is essentially a front-line unit, it contains no special Even more sound is the importance gh\en in this Field weapons. Except for the one officer armed with a pistol, it Service Regulation to the single solitary soldier, who, 30t last, is, like the squad, uniformly armed with the Garand semi~ at'tel' twenty years, comes in for his share of glory. Infan­ automatIc shoulder rifle. Thus armed, and supplemented try's "comuat power rests primarily on the morale and by the occasional use of grenades, the platoon has all the fightillg alHhty of the individual soldier and the leadership means necessary for carrying out the infantryman's tra­ of its sllbordmate command~rs" This last cOHcept, is, in ditional mIssion of close combat. Any special weapon as­ my oplllion, the ba~ic concept responsible for the essential signed to the rifle platoon such as a mortal., light 01 heav~' differencef of them all. There is nothing in ally of the others machine gun, 01' heavy automatic rifle would require one or that exceeds or even eqllals this in importance. both of two thiflgs. Elther active front·line riflemen would become "substitute gunllers and ammunition caTriers"1 or the ORGANIZATION: We have new tables of organiza­ size and ammunition requirements of the weapon would ['. tion for the mfant)'y that are available to our readers. Their demand emplacement and operating or servicing personnel :~ vitalizlllg-efi'ects on infantry are a matter of great interest in an area so far to the rear as to be beyond the supervision to all. SInce renrganization has been based upon a consider­ of a front·line platoon commander. Since the squad has ation of our most valuable asset-the individual, pugnacious, been very intentionally and defimtely set free from ball-and- .: lnfantryman-we shall work up briefly from h1m to his chain weapons, there appears to be no logic in nullifying the :' CnlolleJ. mobility gained uy tying down a unit composed of three i! In what way have we Improved the lot of the soldier? squads and organized for the specific purpose of front-line , To begin with we have boosted his morale. Motors \vill fire and movement. \Ve now move up to the rIfle company. Again we quote' reileve hIm 9f the COI"tant foot-s]oggmg, He will be in .. better .physical condition and. therefore, more content to from the Chief of Infantry's remarks of 14 March 1939: I' "The greatest change in the character of the units of the !.1 fight if, in the interim. he can "march sitting down" and dispense \vith the hoL·nail express. He no longer ~tagger!'> ne\\' organIzation has taken place in the rifle company. The II ~ IInder a sIxty-eight pOllnd load, much of which he dItched commander of this unit. \vho formerly had only to deal with i anyv,'ay in the \Vorld \Var~alld would again if he had it to several homogeneou::-, platoon~ and \~'ho, when he had com· i carry. He wears loose~fitting clothing-no more choker mitted these to action, had practIcally finished his mission ~ collan:; and constrIcting "Tapped leggings. He looks at ease. for the time bemg. no\\" has the means of giving continuous ;~~ (~ and he i~ nt ea~e. In the war~strength squad, he is one of Rupport to his attaclong platoons."

! S


twelve comrades. His squad lpader now is a sergeant who. as~nsted by the usual corporal, looks after him and leads hIm in battle. It \"iIl take a lot of casualties to Cllt "his gang" down to the pornt of absorption by another Ul1It. He. lIke every othpl' member of hi~ squad, 1';; armed with the nt;!w Gal and .:~O CalilH'I' ,,~mi-alltomatic ~hollldf'T rifte Thi..; "'eapon 1:-; .lw.. t noS accurate R~ thE' 1!J03 Springfif'lrl; It has a ma'<.lmUlIl ~lIqamed rate of thilty aimed shots per rmnutp, and lt~ reCOIl. compal eo to that of our,old rifle. is milch le~s se'-ere Speaking of the Garand rIfle, the ('hlef of Jnfantry ~tatp:-.: .. the ~enll·aL1tnmatic rifle restoreR the infantry sol~ lilt'l ':-; individualit:.' It givl''' tht> infantry ~rtuad a tire power equal to 01' greater than that of any other army, At th'e ::-.ame time it rp! the soldier from bondagE' to the maehllle. It malH"s hIm ag-ain a fighting man." To this l'lfle If! attached a one· pound bayonet, training In the use of which ha:; a certain extent been suspended. It should not servE' merely as an excell~mt can~opener; it has combat value which requires a bit \If resuscIta· tIOn, Our doughuoy has been rut loose from the task of inchmg fon\ ard on his back or stomach, dragging a bipod, tripod, base-plate or gadget belonging \0 some heavy weapon,


~ .).~



USA Slqnal Corps.



• .f.,


v;l.ii No. '16

Modern Infantry

The rifte company is composed of a headquarters pIa· and three ,rifle platoons. The headquarters platoon includes the company head­ quarters, a 60~mm mortar section and a light machine-gun section. In the company headquarters there are a captain (commanding the company), two lieutenants (one 8€cond-in command and the other for the mortar and light machine-gun sections), one :first sergeant, three sergeants (communica­ tI011. mess, supply), one corporal (clerk) and eleven privates. In the 60-mm mortar section, headquarters of which consists of a section sergeant and two privates (chauffeur amI messenger), there are two mortar squads. Bach squad hal', a corporal (gunner) and four privates (one assistant gunner and three ammumtioll carriers). All the members of thIS section, except the chauffeur and messenger, are al'med with the pistol. Normally each squad operates qne mortar. although a third mortar i~ preRcribed for the flection for URe in defensive situations. A L~-ton tl'u~k is assigned ·to thi~ section as carrier for weapons and ammunition. Since we have here introduced a new infantry weapon WE' WIll describe it briefly. tOOIl

USA SiomJl Corps


It weighs approximately 51 pounds. It can be broken down mto two loads, the tube and bipod weighing 28 pounds. the base-plate and accessories 23 pounds. Shells weigh from 3 to 31/~ pounds each. Each ammunition carrier (3 to a squad) carrIes 10 rounds. The maximum range of this mor­ tar is 1.800 yards, therefore it is neither necessary nor de­ sirable to emplace it in or very close to an assault echelon. It is one of the rnE'ans given to a company commander to maintain the initial velocity of his platoorfs. It is an effective high-angle weapon for dealing immediately with concealed or defihided resistances which cannot be reached with the flat-trajectory ri,fie or machine gun. The light machine-gun section is compo$ed of a section headquarters (one sergeant and one private, messenger) and two light machine-gun squads. The light machine-gun squad' has a corporal (squad leader), two gunners, two assistant gunners, and two ammu­ nition carriers. Each light rriachine-gun squad operates-two light machine guns (total, four for the section). All but the gunnel'S are armed ,"vith the pistel. A new light machine gun ha~ not .,Yet been ::;tandardized. However, our Tables of Orgmdzation list as a temporary substitute, the BrO\:vning AutomatIC Rifle, caliber .30, modified. It is an air-cooled, g'.lS-npt'l·ated, magazine-fed. .shoulder weapon. As modified \vith hinged butt-plate, lnpod, new stock, and new sights, it 'weIghs about 20 pounds: Its effective use \vhen fired auto­ matically has heen increa:->ed by reduction of the cyclic rate from 600 t6 300 rounds per minute. ThIS is the second means given thE' company commander for maintaining th.e initial velocit)- of his platoons. He can send in these light machine guns behind an advanced platoon to enfilade resistallces holding up the rear pl;;ttoons. He can employ them in gaps between platoons. He can employ them in the zones of adjacent companies more advanced than his. own to assist his own. He can 3qSsist by fire the adjacent companies and receive coopel'ative fires from them more rapidly and effectively than has been our experience in the past. He now has ~;;omething in his own hands with which to influence company combat. A yast difference, and im­ provement over the mmal "request for fires" so tJ.''"Pical of the World War of 1914-1918. Our war strength rifle company thell, to sum up, con~ists of the headquarters platoon of 3 officers and 45 men, and three rifle platoons each of one officer and 39 men, making a l'rand total for the com~any of 6 officers and 162 men. The peace strength organization of 4 officers and permits of ready expansion to these war strength totals.




Modern Infantry~

The baFic battle tllllts of IIlfantry are battalions. They are the tactical lII!Ib of the regiment, the YHrdstick of a division commander, nllll the bnrometcl' of diVIsional combat­ power to a corp!" commallder In the llumber, condition, aud dispoSition of infantry battalions, hostile and fnendly, rebts a ba~ls of e::;timatC', dcchlOn, plHll, orop1', alld px€cution. In and al'OI111ct the mfantry hattalIOn are found the means, or~ ganic and ,>upportlng. for the appJiL'"ation of the Rpeculative illE''l (the ~('hpn1E' of maI1(>uH'l') to t hf~ lClT!l111. It COllS1~t~ of n IlPadquartC'rs of:1 officer~, a hE'udquarters detachmf'llt of 43 cnlistc>d n]P!I, three rIfle compallle~, and a hea\",}"' wcapons cumpany uf 6 officers and 1-1:~ enlisted men. Total for t he battalion at \\ ar ~t 1 eng-til b 27 officers and 672 enIiHted men. ~The b3thllOIl commander has a\'uilable one light p..l;;,sPllgel' C.H alld two motnrc~·L'I('q \yith SIdecars, The heay~ \vrapon::-. company is a new and notable fea­ ture of the wfantry battalion Ih hN\.vy wealJons are the .~o caliber maehine gun (8 ofi'pnsi\'l', 16 defensi\'e, machine guns), the ,50 cahbc'l machine gun (~ m,\( hiue guns) and the 81-mm mortal' (2 mortar;.;) At war ~trength It con-':lst;;; of a company headquarters of 2'officers and 21 Plllisted mPll. two calIber ~o machine-gun platoons, OIlE' caliber ,50 machille~gun platoon and one 81~mm mortal' platoon. The nllmbel' of weapon~ 1'emall111 the same, at lleace ...,trf>ngih ('ompany headquarter" has one light 5-passengel' car, and two motol'cycl(,q With t"ide car::-.. Each platoon headqtlal't('r~ haB- one he-ht i'i-puq'::'Pllger rar. Eaeh of the 1\\'0 cOllibel' :10 mflchillP-gnn platoons con­ SIsts of a platooll headqllal ten, of one officer and ~evcn en­ listed men, and t\\O spctions oft,\,o squads each. In addition to the 5-pa5senger cal', each platoon ha.;; one I 2-ton pick-up truck pel' squad, foul' pel' platoon, or a total of eight for the two caliber .30 machine-gun platoon.;; in the company. The calibel' .:W machine-gUll HE'ctioJ1 cOl1:;;ists of a spction headquarters (sergeant, ~ection leader) and two squads (total 17). The caliber .30 machine-gun :;,quad 'con"i&ts of? corporal (squad leader) fOlll' aml11l1tlition and \Vdter carriers, one chaufi'E>ul', one gunnel' and one a~si~tant gunnel' (total 8). Each fiquad has t\\ n caliber .~o machine gUllS but only one of these ,I1"un.;; i.:; u~pd ill the OffCll'-,t' Doth are used In the defenr;.;p The machine gun i", the Bl'o\\'ning hea\'~v machine gun, caliber .30, }lodel 1817. with which we are all familiar. It is an automatic, reeoil operated, helt fed. water-cooled weapon with a maximum rate:> of fire of 525 roundl" per min­ ute, and a sl1stmnect rate of l'e5 rounds pel' minute. It has a firm tripod muunt, and delivers effective bursts over small areas. For ohs€'n'ed fire its effeetive range is 1,800 yards, which is the limit of satisfactory obsenatton by eye, under favorable conditions. It may he used for effective indirect fire at ranges up to 4,000 yards.


C. & G.S.S. Military Review

These heavy machine guns are one of three means given the battalion comm,ander to maintain the velocity of his battalion in ,attack ~nrl to protect 11, both in attack and in defense Since 'h~ht machine gUlls are included in the com­ pany echelon, thu; hea\'ier gun iR no longer necessary with front-line mobile umt~ It is by its characteristics more "uiterl for long-range fire", qntiaircraft fire, flank protection and thE' final protectiYe linef" of th£> defense. Its weight with ammumtion, \\ ate1' and acr{ "'f,ori('~ reqUIreS transport of gun and crew in the ammUnItion and weapon carrier (truck) of the squad, which is used to move it as close to the battalion but'le of fire as conditions ,vill permit. From this point to emplacement, it can be broken down to loads within reasonable limits of man-handlmg for several hun­ dred yards. . The caliber .50 maehinp-gun platoon consists of a pla-l~ toon headquarters of one OffiCE'l" one platnon sergeant, one ~ agent and instrument corporal. one chauffeur. one mes- ~1; senger, and t.wa squad,:;:, . . i:~ The caliber .50 mach me-gun squad conSIsts of one f,"'-~ corporal (squad leader), four ammunition and water cal'·!'.~ riel's, one ehauffeur, one gunnel' and one assistant gunner, ~ : The sCluad has one gun, machine, Bro\vning, caliber, .50. M 2, flexible, and one ea1'rlf'f, weapon and ammunition~, (truck). The total strength of the platoon headquarters;:: and two ;;;qua<!F. is one officer and twenty enlisted men. t The Brownll1g m;:cIune gun, caliber .50, M 2, flexible, '., . has an pffpctive range of 6,000 yalds against personneL£,-:'''; Stepped up to a \'eloclty of 3,300 feet pel' second at the I,! muzzle. It penptrate:; DIll? inch of American armor (or 1 1/i- r...t/ inch foreign tank armor-plate) at 100 yards. It is ineluded!.'~ 111 the heavy \ycapons eompany of the battalion primarily tot g prO\~ide a forwalll echplon antitank \'t'€apon. It will be Ofij~ additional emergency \'alue when employed ;lgainst located't~ protected machine guns. It ,is another one of the three ~i means given the battalion commander. to maintain velo~ity ~11 in attack. and to protect the compames from mechamzed "l: attack. l The Sl-mm mortar platoon consists of a platoon head'f:~ quarters of one officer. one platoon sergeant, one agent and~-..~;,~ instrument eOl'pot a1. onp chauffeur, one messenger and two -;'.


-~ Th~ 81·mm mortar squad consIsts of a corporal


(squad[,j leader), four ammunition and water carriers, one chauffeur,f1' one gunner and one assistant gunner. The squad has one mortar. 81~mm. and one carrier. weapon and ammunition (truck). The total strength of the platoon headquarters and two squads is one officer and twenty enlisted men. The 81-mm mortar is the third of the three means of combat power included in the infantry battalion. Major General Lynch, Chief of Infantry, stresses the inclusion of this mortar in the battalion as follows: "Since the 81-mm

Vol. XX No. 76

Modern Infantry

mortar is 'habitually required by the battalion for the execu~ tion of its missions, it Reems clear that it should be a permanent part of the battal,,)n. It is the battalion com. mander's most powerflll means of supporting hiR attack in I'npidly moving situations and where liaison with the artil· lery has broken down."

complicated maneuver based upon a machine whieh he only' serves but cannot control. . (3) The platoon is now organized as it should be

-a ,mobile front·line unit, freed from that which impedes a front· line echelon-a heavy weapon.. It is' essentially a unit of mobile, maneuvering squadS. It contains three squads for the application of the principles of fire and move­ ment by formations in line, column, or echelon. The pla­ toon contain~ no Rpecial weapons. contributes no personnel to machine-g€'rviring functions and is, in conrept and fact. a unit freed from the unde~lrablc influence of weapon speciail'::>m and ltfl attendant delays of estimate of. requegt for. and application of, special weapon ~UppOl't. It is the smalle~t umt commanded by a commissioned officer. The per­ sonal contact made pOSSIble uy its size (1 officer, 5 sergeants,' 3,corporals and 31 privates). establishes and assures sympa­ thetic connection between the commIssioned chain of com­ mand and itf; enlisted personnel, productive of understand· ing, COhe5:lOn, cooperatIOn, and morale.' (-t) Our neW ll/le fomlWnJ( organIzation introduces

the first and lighteRt of the mfantry ,pecial weapons, the 60-film mortars and the light machine guns

In the head·

quarters platoon we find enlisted personnel and weapon carriers adequate for maintenancE'. transportation. and con­

duct of fire of these new weaponR. With a small but ade· quate compan{ command group of officers and noncommis­ SIOned officers, we provide control. This. group can con·

MA:N'-TR.\NSPORT OF "\1-M:-'l !.\10R1',\R

Before progre:::.:::dllg" furthE-I" it might be well to 5um­ maliZ€ what has been done withm our basic battle unit. the imttalion, alld see \vhat effect~ have resulted from the . ch,lIlge'i ill its organization. eqnipment and armament. Let n::. If this new battalIon if:; a solutIOn to the Chief of In­ fdllt!",} ':,., request for "elbow room, to give our units elbow SPi{l'\:', to f''{llloit a local SUCl'e'8fi and give full play to the leadership of all grades"? (I) The zndzl'iri1lal soldzez·.-We have lightened his Innd We ha\'e clothed, equipped, and armed him as a hght· lllg man, 110 longer an adJunct to a special weapon.

unleashed him from hiR bondage to the machine.

\Ve have We have

hound him, in the H'luad, to a group of 12, which only 50 per cent caHualties can dIsrupt. We have made him the . . t~md'1rd of mobility and combat power of the front-li'ne unit We have charged him with what, in l~ombal. we haye alwa\:". found in the Individual American soldw,r-initiativE',

centrate on the conduct of operations to the exclusion of all else. Our company commander is at last out of the command

post, off the telephone. and into the fight, where he should be. WIth a pO\verful weapon in each hand.

He can influence the actIOn of hu~ O\vn platoons, and assbt: by means of his light weapon::>. the actionR of an adJacent company. He, in turn. can expect similar assistance from the companies on

his flanks. Control of three mobile platoons, and coordmation of the supportIng fires of company mortar and light machine­ gun sections will require that the company commander be at all times in the forward area of battle. IlIs will be a mov­ ing COMmand post, and nevel' H fixed command post. These new platoons and new weapons can neIther be directed nor coordinated by a commander who sits-any,vhere_ (5) The bartalion.-We are back once more to sum­

We have steadfastly denied the con·

marize the basic battle unit. In the World War, and in the twenty years since, this unit gathered considerable moss, which the new battalion definitely shed.. :vIany of us can remember the days during the World War when we wrote a several page order for a battalion aUack. And we find

of foreign armies that the power of the squad rests in squad~serviced weapons. Vtle adhere to an American con­

battalion commandel's today whose penCIls are the important item of their equipment. We must now discard one of two

cept of combat-that our American soldier can "take it" if we provide him with the arms and mobility to "give it."

things-either the penCIl, or the battalion. ThIS new bat­ talion is also built for speed-speed of entl'Y into battle and velOCity durlflg battle. Everything tending to slow up this entry, 01' this forward impetus has been el1minated. In terms of mobility the "heavy weapons company" is definitely not heavy. It, too, moves weapon and crew within reasonable, distances of emplacements. Why should such mobility be tied down to a phlegmatic office-and·paper procedure such as ' we experienced ill the World War, and have even taught in service schools until very, very recently? Battalion lead­

l'OOptTative ability, fortitude.

(2) The squad


no longer gubject to that disruptIOn

so plevalmt in the eight·man squad of the World War. We havc' added a sergeant for thfl initiation and maintenance

of s'lllad leadership. tf'l1tl!)l1

So long as he feels that he is a potent factor in squad combat,

tnat he is an individual combatant, he is proud of what he can do. lie stands or falls, and accepts the result, on what he and his eleven comrades can or cannot do. It is his, and their, problem, and he wants to help solve it, Tie him down as "jzfth wheel" to a machine anq he loses interest-definite­ ly and disastrously.

He resents the delay, the inaction, and

inertia 'incident to planning, ordering and executing the






'Modern InfantrY'~~

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

ership must change. This commander. may have a command post and a telephone, but, if found dm'ing action in physical contact with either of them for OYer three minutes at a time. he should be "canned" and the telephone orderly or battalion runner whose job he has usurped. put in hifi place. The idea we set forth here is, that now, more than ever before. will these new mohile units require the actual presence of active directing minds with them, not behind them; to provide control, adVIce, SUPllOl't, assistance. and that vinle direction which is the only thmg that works beyond the Ime of de­ parture. \Vith a headqnnrt(\r~ Hnd headquarters detachment. ., three rifle corupal,ies and a heavy weapons company, all built for mobIlity WIth fIre power. the new mfantry battahon steps Qut of itB hobble-...,kll·h alld uecomes in reality a "King of BattleR";'ad of [t g't'ntll' "QUt'E'll," Becau..;p It <.,till 1.-. the b:J~IC lJaule umt, the rnea"1un' of power, and the frampwork upon which scheme of mant>u~ vel' is bUilt, it IK eVIdent that here 111 the battalIon we have made changeI'. Hffedinp- thf' combat powel'. battle-life. mobili~ ty and tm'til's of nIl UnIts from hattalion to army ('orps. ~u matter what ::-.ize the umt. lllfalltr~ ojJel'atj0116 of all types depend upon battalion efficiency and culminate in the solu­ tion of hattalion prohlems.

quarters (5 officers), headquarters company (8 officers and 176 enlisted men). service company (9 officers and 110 enlisted men). and the three infantry battalions. These three battalions must be fed three times a day. supplied with ammunition, commanded, communicated with at all times, protected from tank or mechanized attack, and occaSIOnally bandaged up and evacuated. Except for these latter two tasks, "hieh would be handled by attached medical personnel, all the rest are the responsibilities of the colonel, assisted by hrs small staff and the two overhead units­ headquarters company and Reryice company. Headqmu'ters company, completC'ly motol'lzed, contains the intellrgence platoon, the antitank platoon and communi­ cation platoon for the purposes implied, In the antitank platoun, besides platoon headquarters, there are three sec­ tions of t\\'o guns (and squads) each. an organization suitable for attachment of a gun section to each infantry battalion should such a disposition of weapons be appropri­ ate. These a re the only organic crew-weapons actually under command of the colonel. These are far too few, in the opin- • ion of many. but there they are, and "a bird in the hand" applies. If and when we include more of ~uch guns. we can expand our antitank theory and practice to the extent of our gain, Perhaps ingenuity in employment of six may ~nhance


r. r

, \\'Ith so mall.\· elHl<.,! ant propo-;ah:; fOl change in orgaIllza· tlOn it ig a plea;:un~ to tind that OHr next higher echelon. the Infantry regnllellt. ha~ romp safely through the mael­ strom of Idt:'a~ awl test~. and ,"> capable of being inducted, as no\\' org~ll1i/.E'd b... \Yat' Department Tables of Organita' tlOn No. 7-11 datf'rl1 Jalluary ID3D, in whateyer type mfall­ try rliviRlOl1 formed ·square, "vlth brigade headquarters, 01' triangular, \\ lthollt. Thif: fat t alone reflects great crt.'dit upon thos.~~ respon~lbJC' for Its development and is inci.irHtn·e of Round ba'-Hc de'~lgn whieh permits its Inclu~ion. \\·ithuut change, in elthE'r type {Ii\'bioll. \\'lth the I'/..'l L'nt Lonsolldation of I'PglmpntaI hands to form dh·j:-.ional or ~tatlOn bands. the Infantry regiment now has a war of 10:3 officers and 2.302 enli:;ted mf'n. ThesE' fIgure~ lllclude the perbunllel of regllllPntal hpad~

our audit,- to handle eighteen? maneuvers!

Let's watch the current

Similarly, in the communication platoon we find a pla­ toon headquarters, a l'-egimental section, and three battalion section:::::. all sections joining and providing communications to and for the echelon indicated, as soon as the need for same h, foreseen.

f ~

f, f

The intellIgence platoon of ten enlisted men operates to ~~~ collect and disseminate information, as directpd by the I'egl~ ~ ,~,. mental 8-2. :: The service company of the infantry regIment consists tt: of a company headquarter5. regimental hE'adquarters pIa- {\ t0011 (two sections: staff and supply). and a ttansportation :, platoo11 consistmg of a platoon headquarters, headquarters I~',

" ,








.. XX No.... 76 Vol.

Modern Infantry


company ~ection, maintenance section, and 'thret..> battalion sectIons. The two sections of headquarters platoon as their titles indicate, furnish petf'lonnel to plan and conduct the neces­ sary staff and admInIstratIve work. ami solve the vital and ever-present problems of supply, The transportation platoon does Just that-it moves everything up and brings anything back, "dead or alive." Its 5ections serve the units indicated by their title during' movement. in bivouac or in battle, and furnish the vehicle;.;; which serve to discharge the regImentaJ commander's new direct responsibility~the constant supply and reple-nish­ ment of rations, gasoline and oil, ammunition and other classes of property. The infantry regim€llt now has the mf'ans, and must use them, to carry these supplie::., to go bacl< Hnd bring up more, • The maintenance section of the transportation platoon 113 men) provid2s roerhamc-chauffeurg and mohilp repair l rews for limited repair and maintenance of the organic vehicles of the regiment. In the square (4-regiment) division, the regIment flpl'rate~ under a brigade commander. In the it iallgular di­ n'ilOh jt operates directly under the division commander. \' lth no in"termediate link in the chain of command, In either type division, square or triangular, in the future we will find the infantry regiment habitually iivmg, ~l'rYllh5. and fighting. as a co-partner in a combat team l lllllpo;:.ed of an infantry regiment and an al'tillel'y gun hat­ uti 1011. This. association, which we hope may later expand to llldude peace-time garrisoning together, h'l but Simple at'­ ,"ptance of the fact that infantry and artillery must work III clnt'\e contact. Otherwise the quasi-separate bodies ,yin lIndl'I'go inevitable strain and possibly disastrous rupturE' thrlJugh lack of coordination and cooperation, CORPS 'AND DIVISIONS

We have indicated that up to and including the regi· ment, OUr new infantry is fixed; that the type of diVISIOn Into which it is welded has no effect upon its organization, .u'manaent or equipment. The accompanying functional chart of the new triangu­ lar dI\'ISion shows clearly and effectIvely its organizatIOn and operation. \Ve have reason to believe that a type of army co,,]'" may also shortly appear in tables of organization. The tentative tables show one triangular and two square infantry divisions as the normal corps infantry complement. But it is neither improbable nor' impracticable that a corps organizatiop of all square, or all triangular divisions rna;

later rel'el\'e favorahlE' attention as a reRult of actual corpg tests in the last series of the' current maneuvers. (See Chart, page 14.) . In the triangular division, the short chain of command -- -.division commander dealing directly with infantry and ar­ ti1lery regimental commanderR-has. in the Provisional In­ fantry Division test and the Provisional 2d Division tes1, produced more favorable than unfavorable comment. vVhere, how eyer, attempt was made to inject the seI'vices of the ln~ fantry Section Brigadier or Artillery Section Brigadier dthe-r in a eommand or in a staff eapacity, the operations of the divhnon were retarded, rather than expedited_ NEW INFANTRY TACTICS

;\Iarshal Foch wrote that "the creatio'n of a new order of things in itself doeg not imply that from the outset we have the ability to impart life to the organization." Washington varied the eighteenth century tactics of line-and-successive­ \'oJIeys by SUdden attacks in hght order. He introduced mobihty to the battlefield. He had seen Braddock's regulars mowed down hy the fires of French and Indians, from cover. The men of the Confederate and Fede"ral Armies in the Civil \Var drew favorable comment from foreign military critics on their intelligence. They ~kirmishE'd, shot from­ rover, and avoided maSR tactics, though mass tactIcs (volley tiring by ranks) was at that time in thE' milit~ry manuals. Changes In combat tartics have bE'en developed since the \Vorld \Var, based upon experiences in that conflict. And maBS for Infantry, as a result, now refers to speed. t!ming, dIrection, flat and high-angle fire-support and general intenSIty of attack. HIstory repeats itself and we are now correcting the errors of the past, particularly those of the World War when \ve suffered heavily by trying to copy British and French tactics. The experiencE' gained was paid for heavily. vVhen we say we have new tactics· for our new infantry \ve are not implying the introduction or discoyery of a new <"'Clerree; the principles of war still exist, and we penetrate, envelop, defend passively, actively, or by retrograde action m general, about the same as \ve always have done in the past_ But, as General Lynch so tersely puts it, "Armament conditions organization, and - a tactical system is impJicit in the organization adopted. There seems, however, to be a'i rather widespread misunderstallding of the tactics than underlie the new organization of the infantry regiment, du~'­ perhaps to the fact that the new armament is known only· theoretically to most of the army; and tactical thought still

- 13








Vol. XX N~; 76

Modern Infantry

Images a t,ransfer to the new regiment of the tactics of the

the regimental commander may indicate positions from which weapons of the reserve battalion will support the ini­ tial phases of the attack by the assault battalions. During an attack; a rifle company commander may find >:anization, the success of which dcpends upon the modern npplication of the old tactical principle, fire and movement. that terrain and the situation favor establishment of from The organization is capable of faster movement, one to a half-dozen successive bases'of fire. Having desig­ from the largest to the smallest unit; it contains, organically, nated the successive objectives of the company, he may dis­ more fire:..power than ~ver before in its history. and while It pose his 60-mm mortars and light machine .guns during<the ::,till requires artillery support of all calibers, it is not, in the attack either in rear of his own platoons or to advanced posi­ area of close cQmbat, so completely dE;pendent on artillery as tions behind adjacent platoons. It must be remembered that

old organization." \Ve have briefly described the new armament and or­



has been in the past.

a company base of fire is not a point. It is an area in which





rom Rtar

200ft? 1000yd


Approx 1500yd.

Appro" lS00yds


Main Line










Infantry tactics of thp old nrganization envisaged an attack by infantry supported constantly by adequate artil­

IeI') tires. Artillery established a hase of fire in the vicinity


of Jloint A on Sketch No.1 an approximate range (in this ,plIrt'h arbitrary example) of 6.400 yards to point B. If in­ f..l lltn' was required. as it frequently was, to carry an attack to a ~l'('ond ba'ttle position, it is obvious that guns with an meragp effective range of 7.500 yarus <75-mm) must dis­

place forward. When they did so, fire was temporarily less l'tIl'l'tl\l'.

Small targets, machine guns, pill-boxes, defiladed weap­ nn,. mortars and concealed resistances could only be brought lIl"kl'

sion of weapon sites_

Tn one case the site of mortars- and

light machine guns may be almost coinCident. In another, lack of cover or observation mar require widely separated sites for the different weapons.

It is purely a question of

fitting the tools to the job, on the ground. Again, we may find situations in which but two suitable bases of fire exist for 60~mm mortars while a dozen or more exist for the light machine guns in an attack toward a given objective.

Nor is selection of company bases of fire a purely selfish

ortlllery fire by the long-winded process of designa·


hy infantry ('ommander to ~rtillery liaison officer, then tvll'pli!Jne. or radio (if it worked), or runnel', to firing bat­



porting his own platoons, also assist adjacent Company B, because if Company B goes forward, its company weapons will assist Company A by flanking fires. :-late also that the advanced location of Companr B clears and opens up terrain into which Company A can move \veapons to firing positions for enfilading resistances confronting Company A.



The time lag between need and delivery of fire was too

The weapons which stopped infantry were too small, too nHrnerous, and too well concealed. The attack bogged dO\\ n' Illth the field of infantry tactICS we now brint-in a


,mall"I' way-the principle of the base of fire. We introduce lhree purely infantry bases of fire on this same hypothetical batth field. <J The rifle company establishes a base of fire. The com·


mortars and light machine guns are sited ~nd from which they fire. Naturally the characteristics of the two weapons, range, type target, volume deSired and purpose of the sup' porting fires influence locations and the amount of disper­

pHny l'ommartder indicates the positions from which GO-mm

;; 11101'1;11'8

and light machine guns belonging to the company

It is to the advantage of thC'

of Com­

pany A to select bases from which he <'an, in addition to sup­

So, as the company commanders have selected bases or' fire and employed the principle of cooperative fires and weapon-positions


being no company boundaries). we

find that battalion commanders employ bases of fire to support the advance, and protect the flanks, of their com­

commander indicates positions from which .30 caliber heavy

panies and on occaRion assist adjacent battalions_ The bat~ talion weapons. being somewhat heavier and in greater num­ bers than company weapons, require that considerable more

mat hine guns, 81-mm mortars and .50 caliber machine guns bel"nging to the hattalion will support the 'advance of the thr{,(' rifle companies. The regiment in certain situations establishes a base of fire. When a battalion is initially held in regimental reserve,

care be given to the selection of battalion bases of fire. Whire company mortars and light machine guns may shift posi­ tion quite rapidly and frequently, the greater weight, range, and ammunition supply problem of the battalion weapons do not suggest short or frequent change of positions.

will -upport the advance of the three platoons. . The battalion establishes a base of fire. The battalion



The United States exceeds any other nation in the world today in tlie production of motor vehicles. Yet it is only in the past few years .that motor vehicles have been provided in sufficient numbers to permIt our Army to apply Its motor­ mindedness to movement of personnel. weapons and supplies in a big. effectual way. There is not a smgle motorized unit in the service today that has not tested and perfected a "standing operating procedure." Such procedure reduces to habit the processes of alerting, ordering, loading, forming. Rtal'tmg", moving, and unloading complete units \~/e have obse1'\'l'd regIments moving mto'a rented field for overnight bivouac, kitchens leadmg, and so accurately timed \vas the procedure that by the hour the usual rapid steps of erecting camps, gassmg vehieles and washmg hands for supper had passed, the fnod was on the serving tables and the companies \-vere limng up rapidly to take It away and "make" a dance in the village that mght Shuttli'ng, the expedIent method of using a limited num­ ber of tl'uclu; to move eqUIpment, ~upphes, weapons and persc..nnel. from 110int to point hy making one to one and a half round trips totaling 225 mIles per vehiclE" per day, has been found practical. It IS not fatigumg, nor IS It normal1y damagmg to vehicles. By such methods complete UnIts have been moved for distances up to 75 mIles per day. There IS nothing more exhilaratmg to officer or enlistl'd man than the experIence of one of these "motor-trek~." There exists a camaraderIe that ic; pronounced. There is no confusion, loud shoutmg of orders or thsorganization eVIdent at any time. The job:::. of advance and supply details, of troops en route alld In lIn'ouac, are planned for days and weeks ahead. There t'Xlsts a silent prIde in being ready for eac.:h succeedw mg hkp of the mo\(>ment. DrIvel'S and mechanics need no orde "5 for grea:--lllg, chec.:kmg, repaIrmg. They confer. con sult ....xamme, check and rppml' in sIlence and Without any supen:ll"lOn They kn0w that theIr vehIcle WIll rilove out agam \'en shOI tiy. ami they work all night if neressary to have lt roll past the I P wlth the column. To appreciate tlw Al my's abilIties in motor-moving. one "mm,t actually pat ticIpate, 01' oL.:;erve. It IS a revelation! There has been conSiderable comment and some doubt {'xpre8~ed in the past ff'\\ year;:) concernIng the value of com­ pletely or partly motorized or mechanized umts. We have by adoptlOn of the principle of '·pooling" veWeles in higher echelon.s. aVOIded the Clpatlon in every unit of a mass of vehicles which would be used only part of the time We havE' been careful to distillgui"h between the picture of com­ placent closedwu}J columns and the vulnerable all' target. h.nd we have bala.nced our organizations from company and. battery up to corps, army and GUQ reserves~' sO that the motol' and mechanized picture pyramids up to maximum possible reqmrements, but on a logical basis that permits fleXlbihty in actual tonnages available for supply and for reasonable tactical movements of troops. 'Ve have realized that soldIers Can neither enter upon a battlefield in an un­ armored truck, nor clear an area for detrucking troops by reconnaissance and screening operations in unarmored trucks. There is a place to get out and fight. though We occasion­ ally see evidence in maneuvers that this vital fact is over­ looked.




It is illogical to assume that horse-cavalry can keep

ahead of infantry or other arms \vhich now advance 50 to

300 miles or more a day. So cavalry has been reorganized

and mechanized units included-swift, well-armed and

armored, and capable of preceding and protecting the mutor

column. Nor do we neglect the faithful horse. We no"

have "portee cavalry"; and troops, squadrons. and perhaps

larger units will roll along in their special vehicles to operate

efficiently a' only horse-cavalry can, in those rough and

broken areas of terrain between roads in which horse-caval·

ry-and nothing else but-can perform the task.

JustlficatlOn of motorizatIOn and mechanization in actual warfare has reC'ently appeared before us, in Europe The heavily mechalllzed forces of Germany crashed through with startling speed and certainty to obJectives deep within the Polish lines. Followed swiftly by motorized infantry protected by light mechanized cavalry, the objectives were consolidated and advance to another was vegun. It has been i said that the German drive through Poland .might have ~ been accomplished in a week except for the desperate brav" ery of the Polish defenders. _ Possessed of definite air superiority. the Germans dis- _ carded the Douhet theory for one of definite support for their ; gTound forces. EmplOYIng ahout DO PCI' et?nt of their an' :~ force, they took and held complete mastery uf the an·. Well , knOWIng that the western PoliElh lines were but coYering M force~ fOi completion of mobilizatIOn and concentrations behind the Narew, Vistula and San Rivers. the German air force ,truck fi,st at the rail lines in the interior of Poland 1 and definitely ::.topped the Polish mobillzaOon and concen· k.: ..trations. The possibility of air as.sistancf> for Poland from England or France soon passed out of the picture, as landing ~. fields, airdromes, and air bases throughout Poland were :?: so systematicaHy pock-marked with bombs as to absolute I) prevent landing or taking-off. Air superiority provided German force::, with complete information of tocation, compo­ SItIOn. and movement of practically evel'y Polish force in the, ' Concentration, shifting, or employment of Polish;· field res\'rves for counterattack pm poses '\o'el e impossible. In t~ most cases located reserves were bumot.'d and dll;;per.sed r~ again and again. In rIng-parlance Poland ,vas hIt WIth r~/ everything' Ulit the water-hm kf't. and e\"t:,n that was OJ] ~3; wheels. f~ The entry of Russia vIa thf' hack'door was not necessary ~ ~ to a German victory. It simply added to the death agonies ~~ of an already paralyzed army. i"~ "But the ten·am of Poland was exceptionally suitable for such operation~" 've hear. Perhaps, but let us not for- tz~ get the estImate:;; of mIlItary experts of "three to six years" f.;-l for an Itahan conquest of Ethiopia! And 111 that campaign ~ motors and mechanization played a maJor rolt>-even though ~-W road.;; were pOOl' and III .;;ome places temporarily non-existant. '" ~ Harking back to the S}1anish Civil War we see a start·

lIng example of how not to use motors.


e r,




In March 1937 all Italian volunteer corps formed the spearhead of an attack by Franco's Insurgents against the main highway from Madrid to the south, then a vital link in the Government supply system. Guadalajara, the city from which this action takes its name lies at the intersection







of lh., Slguenza-;\ladrid highway and the Madrid-Valencia nOl1 h "outh highway. The oporation \\'as intended to ('ut til!" i:tt tE:'1' ~upply route TIH~ Italian ('orps consisted of two motorized divisions. e:-ll'h d two infantry reg'lments,l a machine-gun battalion. a hc1tt"ltnn of hg'ht tanks and porte€ artillery. This force con­ cellt /,11 ed un'oh~erved bv GovC'rnment forces near Siguenza. ahout 10 mIles northeas't of GuadalaJara. FI nm 8 to 12 March its attacks progressed to the line mill{ <llf'n on S]wtch ~o. 2, page lR. Government forces had not ~h""lOVl'rpd thp concentration of thE' Italian corps and \\Pit'llnllrepared. Italian advances were rapid.

Between 10 and 12 March Government GHQ concen­ 100 Russian planes at the all-weather airdrome at Abl" oe Henare,_ During the following week, these planes, approaching in rain, mist and heavy weather, delivered re­ Jleat('o attacks on the Itahan motor columns. On the 12th the It alian 2d Division motor column, stretched out over 12 mile, of muddy difficult roads, was surprised and heavily bombed and machine-gunned. O'v~r 500 hombs and 200,000 rounds of machine-gun bullets were poured into this column alone, in one day, 11\11<·d

It is unnecessary to describe the Government air attacks of the 13th to the 19th. They found the Italian motorized divisions in full flight, that is, those parts capable of motion.. The formations of the motorized Italian forees in retreat were eminently mo"re suitable for their initial advance­ thp air targets were dIminished in size and quite few in number.

Where Was the Insurgent air force1 Bogged down in mud at various temporary landing fields, unusable in heavy weather, north and east of Siguenza. There they stayed. Italian failure to provide air protection for this motor move­ ment resulted in a disaster involving the complete destruc­ tion of two powerful divisions! CONCLUSIONS

Our considerations of. the new inillntry have been gen­ eral in nature. We are concerned with principles only. Application invoh'es detail" more' suitably set forth through the medium of theoretical map exercises, or actual field maneuvers. lv',T e are entering a period of training at service




• ...,

'Modern rttfantry"",", - ----,;- -


­ ----- -----

schools and in the field which WIll produce many such medi­ ums in the next few month:;:. Rut it is important that "e prepare our minds for this shift to mental high 1!t'ar v.hieh is essential at present, \Ve cannot approach either theoretical or practical exercises


c. & G.S.S. Military Review

method of transport, rate of fire, range, site of emplacement, or employment. angle of fire, effect of fire. armor penetration. vulnerability? What is their particular I'Ole in the whole scheme of fire from bullet to shell. with reference to support of maneuver in ··fire and movement"? Who directs each weapon in combat? How is such direction applied? What intra-unit or intra-arID method of liaison increases the effect of aU weapons? \Vhat general principles govern their employment in base-of-firE' tactics-in attack, or in defense? How are they supplied in hattle? \\Te should view motor movements with a definite respecL While results to date are indeed startling they will become more so -as a res1Ilt of habitual usage. But they are of two kinds and they prosent definite and increasing dangel'~ as they Pl'Og'l ess from one (strategical) to the ~S other (tactIcal). And who. in the light of modern air and ~i mechanized threats, can Rny Jll~t where the line of demarca- ;~ lIOn begInS and enos '! That is an essential function of com- ~ mand. You determine It, or ~uffel' the consequences. We mnst keep in miml the point-to-point principle_ The ': movE'ment, :"hethel' strategical 01' tactical ~ust be' (between ~.".~ any two pomts) proteeted. concealed. rapId. undelayed and ~ completed within the time Iim;t, imposed by the situation ~; \Ve must provide air and mechanized reconnaissance, ,,~ maint'ain superiority of lJoth in the zone of movement, and _", perfect the details of "tanding operating procedure to the~' point where umts mm ed flom covert2d bivouac to assembly pOSItlon for attack are able to load, travel, detruck, clear,~' road. receive attack orders and launch an attack with f . machine-like preCision. ~ .. \Ve must adjust our ~taff procedure and command processE'S to aPPleciatlo11 of the fact that "while troops ride,; commanderI'> dCrlile." The terms "preconceived maneuver" ~ and "advance plannmg-" have long- ~een uut pretty theore! ' ical ('atch-phra~f'5. They will now find actual and complete :~ applIcation. Office procedure, written estimate, order,.: annex and mal'eh-table are fast becoming obsolete. Com'~~ mander and staff mllst thmk. move. and produce action in &,.­ terms that smell strongly of gasoline and its resultant speeds. ~'.~ Above all let us reah7.e What this shortening of timet,;}' means. It means that \ve must become familiar with road·;:, nets for days of probable future advance.. and WIth the inter- t-~~ vening terrain. It means that haying a fixed procf'ss4.00fr"~ moving to battle. we must have permanency of combat-teamstl to entel* iJattle. It means that an astounding amount of de- [~ centralization of contl'Dl mUFot exist while at the same time ;~] the hi;:h command has its hand resting constantly. though ~,i;j lightly. on the bridle-reins of itH "combat-teams"-ready atf~ all times to apply the directmg aides to coordinated a('tiont~ It means that infantry now rests, moves and fights~ while constantly protecting itself in tive directions-north.i east. south. west ·and o\'orhead, It means finally. that infantry has accomplished its own revitalizing and stands r€udy to take its place with its role unchanged-to Sl'lze and hold !J'i'ound.





properly, unless we haye a general concept of the effects reorgamzation upon what \\€ know and what \\ie must learn. We might approach OUI proillem uy a procedure somewhat as follows: Our til 8t efforts should ue to understand the purpose of the neW organizations. \Vhat IS their "raison d'etre," their particular ftlllltlOD. 111 the mfantr,'.' seht'me? How will we train thf'm. move them. fight thl'm '! \Yhat are their needf>. acting alone 01' at. part of a larg'el' force? How are they led. commanded. communicateo WIth? \\That changes in staff procedure arf' invuh'ed? \\'hat j" thf'ir baUle-life? How have thell' frontages been affected in attack. or {n defense. by the chnnge~ in strl'ngth and in fil'E'-lWwer? Our next step should be to know the weapons we now include as an integral part of the company. battalion. regi­ ment. \Vhat al'e their essential charactel'lstics? How do they differ from similar "-~orld \rar \\eapon~ in \\-'eight.




ar'ound the


WM. H. SPEIDEL, Infantry


France. Norway, Bohemia a~d Moravia were added to the list of the fifteen most favored nations on 21 October, la39. In that category 95 per cent of the imports from these nineteen nations may be admitted, to Argentina without re­ strictIOn. Imports of a second, less favored group are sub­ Ject in part to quotas. Those nations listed under a third and last group are subject to restrictions affecting more . lnan 75 per cent of their imports. (Foreign press)

heavy maehine guns are apportioned among the rifle com­ panies. Usually one platoon or company of artillery is assigned to the battalion. In the defense the frontage is· limited to 2200 yards and the depth to 1640 yards. The tac­ tical organization employs security detachments, a main lin~ of re.:;istance and a reserve. It prOVIdes for its own defensive obstacles. strong points and light machine-gun nests. In the second line it places heavy machine guns and infantry cannon; also reserve heavy machine guns and one­ third of the battalion reserve. Its offenSIve is characterized as being defensive. (Militar-Wochenblatt. 1 October 1939)


The population of Latvia, hithuania and Estonia con­ ::'1::.t5 mainly of peasants and a bourgeois SOCIety of Germans and Poles. jo'ollowing the establishment of their indepen­ dence the,y became organized as parliamentary republics, This form of government eventually developed into an au­ thoritarian form-LIthuania 1926, Latvia 1934 and jo;stonia l~~


SatlOnal Defense: Prior to the outbreak of hostIlitIes the Finnish Army consisted of one army corps comprising two infantry divi­ sions and one cavalry brigade. . Each infantry division included the following units: 3 regiments of infantry. 2 regiments of artillery (1 light, 1 heavy),

1 tank company.

1 armored-car company, Several battalions of cyclists,

1 pioneer battalion,

1 signal battalion,

1 dog company,

I battalion of light infantry.

The Letts and Lithuanians are blond, long·headed NordiCS, perhaps Indo-European. but are neither Finnish. Slayic nor German. At any rate they have occupied their territories for centuries. The southern part of Lithuania contains a number of Old Prm:;sians who had been entirely germanized by the Teutonic Knights. The Estonians are FlI~no-l'gn('. descendentF. of Finns and Magyars. The languages of Latvia and Lithuania are Indo-Euro­ The cavalry brigade consisted of: pean, but are entirely different from each other. the former 2 regiments of cavalry,

.~ ha\'illg been influenced by the German. Lithuanian is con­ I signal battalion,

:) sidered the oldest form of the Indo-European language" 1 battery of pack artillery.

~ older €\'en that ancient Sanskrit. The Estonian language is ;1 Finni,h, but the Finns can only understand them with great The coast artillery comprised three regimpnts. dIfficulty. ,..~ The religion of Estonia and most of Latvia is Lutheran; Aviation consisted of seven squadrons with a total 6f 150 planes, 165 officers and 800 men. . that IIf Lithuania and a smaller portion of Latvia is Catholic.

1 ;<

(Ret1W des Deux MOl1des. November 1939)


Finland Th, '''(flnt1'Y


• This unit consists of 500 men, about 400 rifles. nine automatic pistols, 18 light and 12 heavy machine g.uns. Its normal frontage is 820 yards; in the attack this is limited to 2200 yards and against a fortified enemy to 440 yards. It can be deployed in depth up to 1640 yards. Two companies are employed in the assault, one company and a portion of the machine-gun company in the reserve. The balance of the

The Navy had two armored coast guard vessels, five submarines, twenty-four gun bOats and patrol boats with 89 officers and 800 men. The police and forest guards totalled 4000 men each. The Civil Guard, a body of militia organized in local communities, consisted of 450 officers and J 00,000 men. The Lotta Svard. co.mprisiHg 80,000. members, is affili­ ated with the Civil Guard. It is composed of women volun­ teers who serve without compensation. performing various duties pertinent to hygiene. and defense against gas and aerial attacks.


(La France Militaire. 11 November. 1939)


c. & G.S.S. Military Review BELGIUM Antitank Gate: The Belgians have devised an ingenious tlUlk obstacle which consists of. a series of interlocked gates mounted on . steel rollers. similar to those used in levellmg tenTIlS courts. The base is so broad that the obstacle cannot he overturned. It can easily he transported from place to place by tractor. Instead· of smashing through the gate the tank can only push It along with increasing difficulty. The result is to slow up the attack and immobilize the attacking umts under the shell fire of the defenders It is believed by the Belgians that these gates can only be destroyed by heavy artillery. (Foretgn Press)

kiang, Kansu and Shensi pro\,inces to assist .the Chmese in the Sino-Japanese~confiict. They are said to arrive in trucks of twenty or so. As soo.n as they arrive in Chungking they are given regular Chinese military uniforms to wear and are sent to the front accompanied by interpreters. The group of Soviet military advisers who were recently reported to have arrived in Chungkmg by plane include two Major Generals. They are engaged in im;pecting arms and am­ munitIOn.

OffiCIal Russian sources at Chungking have denied reports from Shanghai that a Soyiet military mission has arrlw~d in the proYIsinnai Chinese capital, also that negotia­ tiong are being conducted for the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet military alliance. (The Japan Ch"onicle, 26 October 1939)

BOLI~IA Tweh'e per cent of the exchange accruing to the Govern~ ment from the sales of minerals shipped abroad will be set aside in the Central Bank for the pm'pose of improving It..C;; condition when hostilities in Europe ceasE'.


The results of the civil census taken on 5 J uly 19~8. the n.l'l-.t complpte aIle to be taken ~ince 1918, have been publighpd rerentIy. During lhof'E' twent~· rears the population has in­ creased by 2.846.816. or almost fifty pel' cent. rising from BRAZIL 5.855.000 to 8,701.816 Colombia is still predominantly aGreat Britain and Frann:> are making large pnrchahes rUl~al, 6,008.!)!)1 inhahitants heinv rlassified as countn in Brazil. Chilled meat exports have heen fLll'ni~hing dwellers. againRt 2,692,825 cJty dwellel'R. . espeCially large blocks of foreign exchange. The capital. Bogota, is the largest oity in the repubiIo, with 330.312 inhahitants It has more than doubled its (l.atw Amencan Fmancial Notes. 14 JanuaI;\ 1940) size smce 1918. ColombIa has six cities of more than 75,000 Ne-w All' Tran..c;p01t COU1jJUuy. inhabitants; the other th'e are Medellin. 168,266; Barran-, . \ A new air transport comval1Y, known as the Nave~a~'eo ~ ~uilla. 152.:348; Calr. 101,883; :Wanizales. 86.027; and Carta­ Aerea Brasileira S. A . io;; bein~ organized in Brazil with a gena. 84.937 Cl10fficial ligures released to the press stated that the capital of aiJout $600.000. PanaiI' do BI·asil. the present ail' transport company. is a suusidIary of Pan-AmerIcan Air­ Indian populatIOn of the republic was 105.807. divided among 398 tribes. ways. (Lat11l A111clican f'mandai Notes. 14 January 1940)


(The Aeroplane, 2:) December l:J:H»

(Bulletm of the Pan Ante)

Il'Ull [11,1011, Jilnllfil'Y




Tcl('phone Se?''i'lCP: The international telephone :-;ervice het\\cen Japan and Bulgaria was inaug-urated 25 OctoiJer. 1~39. Telephone mes­ sages will be relayed through the Berlin office, and the chqrges art~ 92 ,Yt:'TI fo!' three minutes on week days and ;)2 yen on Saturdaye.

At the close of the year 193~ the rates for eontIOlied exchange remained at 5.62 rolones to the dollar, while the rates for uncontrolh>d exchetnge rema"ined at 5.67. Th~ Cll&toms collection:; for the firt'>t ten months of 19~9 \\ ere 23.273,000 colones


(Latin American Pinancial Notes, 14 January 1940)

(The Japan Chronicle, 26 O('tober 1939)

CHILE The Exchange Control Commission require~ that im­ porters of passpngel' automobiles to ,,,hom an exchange quota in excess of. $20.000 is granted must import 70 pel' cent of the automobiles in Chilean ships.

CUBA At the close of the year 1939 the peso was quoted on. '. the exchange at 88 cents (U.S.). ~ (Lattn Antencan FinanCial Notes. 14 Janu:try :in10l ~J,


(l.at2n Amc1'ican Financial Notes, 14 January 1940)

DENMARK CHINA Russian Troops for China: Over 1000 So,,;et officers and men have already arrived ;n Chungking from the Trans-Siberian Railway via Sin­


The classes of 1934, 1935 and 1938, totalling 20.000 men, were released 17 September 1939. Theil' arms were taken up but they we"e permitted to retain their uniform; in order to facilitate mobilization in the event of their recall. (Militdr-Wochenblatt, 13 October 1939)


Military News Around the World ECUADOR

An InfantTY Regiment:

The f940 budget amounting to 113,050,000 sucres was ratIned by the Executive 7 :-lnvember 1939. That of 1939 was l17,OOO,OOO suc The rate of exchange i~ fifteen sucreS to the dollar. (Lntm .-ime?'tl'an j<'manc"'(ti Notes, 14 January 1940)

FRANCE .\'0(" ('rOt.r rir r;Uu'1e'

Presiuent Lebrun of France has approved a new Croix til' Gue....e which is simila.. to that of the World War except that It bears thp date "]939" and is suspended from a differ­ t'nt nblJon. The new ribbon is thirty-seven millimeters

itloail, down \\ hose red surface run four stripe-s of green '-t'I',.l ated from one another hy one and one-half millimeters,

ilud :-<J <.U I<mged as to allow two bands of red on the sides, t'dl h l'lght and one-quarter millimeters broad. For higher I :1111.. ..., the palm anrl ~pur will hp used as formerly. (lo'oreign Press)

Headquarters 3 infantrv battalions 1 intellig~nce section 1 ravalry or motorcycle section 1 infantry artillery section (8 guns) 1 antitank section (12 !(uns)" 1 ammunition {'olumn

An Infant"'J Battalion: Headquarters

3 rifle companies

1 machine-gun company

1 reconnaissance section


1 signal section A LIght A,·tillery Regiment: Headquarters

3 battalions (Abteilung)

1 intelligence section

1 range-finding section

1 ammunition column .4 n Arttll€1'Y BattalIOn:

The French mechanized division consists.of a mecha­ llP(ld hl'lgade of two l'€,:nments. a reconnaissance regiment. it il'!!lmcnt of motoriz('cl infantry, a motorized artIllery regi. nlt'llt of three battalions, one antitank detachment and the 1,Il'( ("., ... :tl~: P10l1€f'l'. signal and maintenance units. The mechanized regiments are equipped with the light "It <~f)" tanJ{s and the new Samna tanks; the reconnaissance 1 ~'~!lnJ(lnt employs the scout car. The motorized infantry is tllt' \\pll·].;.nnwll flraqnn,'{ lJm tPH. The antitank umt is 1 qlJJP1"'ti WIth the hp<lvy 25·mm machine gun. (Dte Panze1truppl'. November 1939)

f ,I(

I' WI'


rIll' three olncE:'l'l:'o appointed to assist the Chief of Staff l·.\lnl!'e rie }'Alr WIll be known as Deputy Inspectors of

of 1'1 eltch Sta!}:

(The Aeroplane, 22 December 1939)

GERMANY S"IiI' H,'('( ut P'f-Imo(".., un the Organization of the Gennau ..1))'11

JII .lld/II



mfantry dIvIsions Corps artillery Corps engineers and other corpR troops

~i J,/ f'o/lfnt} y Dit'ision:

~~~ ~l

1 infantry brigade of 3 regiments 1 light arullery regiment 1 divisional reconnaissance unit 1 antiaircraft group 1 pioneer battalion 1 signal company and administrative services The full establishment of the division is about 12,000.

3 batterie,; (4 gun-howitzers each) Thr A} mnrcd Dl..mswn has various lesser components and 1 brigade of 2 armored regiments.

An Armored Regl1neni: Headquarters 1 intelligence section 1 reconnaissance sectlO11 (of motorcycles) 2 battalions

Ail Armored Battalion: Headquarters

1 intelligence section

1 reconnaissance section

3 lIght companies

1 medium company

An ATmored Company; H€ a dquarters (4 tanks, 1 command tank, 1 radio tank) 4 platoons (5 light tanks, 3 medium tanks) The armored battalion-98 tanks; the armored ..egiment­ 204 tanks; the armored brigade-over 400 tanks. Weapons: It is calculated that the German division now possesses 450 machine guns, fram 54 to 72 antitank guns, ' 18 antiaircraft guns, and 24 mortars. The 77-mm fi~ld gun of the Great War has been replaced by a 105-mm gun-howitz­ er of modern construction. The corps and army artillery has been largely increased and rearmed with most modern ordnance. (Jom-nal of the Royal United Service lnstttution, November 1989)

The Heinkel He 11:2 Sin,ole-Seat 'Fighter (1150 h.p. Daimler­ Benz DB.601A motori: Dimensions: Span 29 ft. 10 in.; length 29 ft. 7 in.; wing area 183 sq. ft. ; aspect ratio 4.86 to 1.



'~ ..""' Military News ArfJund the World

C. & G.B.S. Military Review

Weights: Empty 4200 lbs.; pilot 200 lbs.; radio 44 lbs.; fuel, normal range, 126 gallons, 943 lbs.; oil 88 Ibs.; arma­ ment, oxygen, etc., 265 Ius.; disposable load 1540 Ius.; nor­ mill· loaded weight ,,740 lbs ; overloaded weight 6490 lhs. Loadin!!s: At normal loaded weight. Wing 31.4 Ibs. per sq. ft ; po\\er J VR n". per h.p.; span 6.15 Ills per "'1. ft. Performa"ce. ~Iaximum speed 358 m.p.h. at 12,300. ft.; cnrising speed 282 m p.h. at 13,120 ft.; stalling speed 90 m.p.h.; ini(121 rate of climb 2760 ft. per min.; time to rated heIght (13.120 ft.). 5 minutes; service ceiling 31.170 ft.; duration (normal at 282 m.p.h) 2.65 hrs.; range 715 miles; duration o""rloaded at 236 m.Jl.h., 6.85 hrs.; range 1555 miles. (The


16 November 1939)

The H,,,,"'" II, 111[(. Jlk III (two 1,0GO h p. Daimlel'­ Benz DB 60l\..,): SPU1l 7.J. fept, 3 mches_ Length 1)7 feet, 9 Inches. Top 01'""'( (<iu,tbm extended) 236 m.p.h. at 13,100 feet. Sel\'icc' ceIlIng 31.000 feet. Crew 4. Three movable mach me gun~ Retlurtable dustbin underneath fuselagE' The ,hlJll,'('II- .[11 ,<.,'.<.,g (two 1,200 h.p. Junkers Jumo 2110) : Sp"n 56 feel. LenVth 47 feet, 7 inches. Top speed 317 m.p h at 10.600 feet. Se!'vlce ceiling 29,800 feet Cre" 3 01'·1. Thu:'e muvaLll~ machine guns. The lIru",}" I H, 120 (one 880 h.p. B~1W 132 Dc) : Span 47 feet, 7 inche, ].pngth ~5 feet. 7 Incheg. Top speed 221 m.v.h. at D.850 fe,-t. ~kn'icc ceIlIng 28,000 feet. Crew 2. One tn.. ed m:tt'lufll' !-!lln. one movable machine gun Th( JunbJ<, )11 .....' ; (one 1.200 h.p. Junkers Jumo 211): Span 45 rep\' J inch," .. Length 33 feet, 6 mches. Top speed 242 m pJ1, at }.!,oon fpl'l Ser\'lce ceiling 27.000 fet;lt. Crew '2. T\\o tixed m:llllllle guns, one movable machine gun.

2. All other commissions 'granted during the war will be "emergency commissions in the land forces for the dura­ tion of the war." 3. It is hoped at the end of the war to offer permanent Regular commissions to selected officers who are serving on other forms of commission and who wish to make the Army their career, and that such officers will be given ante-dates fo,' all purposes to correspond with their length of service tlnring the war. (Fighting Forces, December 1939)

British A irei'aft : Forty-six BJ'itlsh aircraft constructing firms and eight­ een aero-motor constructors are engaged in the production of nmety different types of airplanes and thirty-three different type of aero-motors. Forty-five of the planes are military types, of \\hich thirty-one are tirst iinp type~_ Of the thirty­ three aero-motors, three types are liqUiri-cooled and thirty air-l ooled.; and ~t'\"en are uf 1,000 hop. ai' more, (rhe Aeroplane, 15 December 1939)

Rc(omrrnunt m the



This has been planned on the assumption that Italy might Join Germany in the war. African colonists are now urging ~that the defenHP l)1'ohlem of British Africa be treat­ ed as a whole. It hag ueen suggested rccently that a unified IITlperial force be created in British Afl ira, a!1d that It ue otficETed hy mpl1 pl'~'flared to spend their llvt's in the country. At 1'1 e'ent the King's African Rifles, the West African Frontier,Force and the other forces in the African depend­ "cnCle~ arp ofilcered uy serondment from the British Army, and officers return to their ."egiments just as they are be­ ginmng to leal n the luug-twge and to unoerstand the African

t The ANoplmU', 22 Dec-prober 1939) /'

At the outbreak of the WaI' six­ teen Gt'rman vt'~~t'l:; \\ el e In l\ledltel'ranean, Aegean and .Mmn'lOla Sf·a" and \\en' ()rdt'l't'd ttl take refUge in the Black Sea_ German pre'dtH. t~ are uewg :-;hlPped down the Danuue to Black Sea po1'1'-. \\'here tht'y are picked up by the Gel'man ShIP~ no'" l'ng-aged III a coastal trade in the Black ,sea. They are RUnlilllian coal he( aUse it is cheaper than that supplied by the :5o\'let. BlfI(l.

Sill ('r,/1/II0


t '(JI}U}tlSFllOn8:

The War Ottice announces that: 1. No further permanellt Regular commisslOn.:; arE' bemg given durmg the \var, "nth the following exceptions.: (a) Cau('t.~ who wele already in training at the cadet colleges at the outbreak of the war and any other candidates from th(> ul11verslti(>~, ofTIcel's of the Supplementary Re~erve and Territorial Army, and Army cadets who had l'h'eady qualified for permaneut commissions or been a(>cppied for admission to the cadet colleges. (h) Selected warrant officers who will be promoted to fill peace estahlishmellt vacancies for lieutenant and qLiar­ termaster and similar categories. ')')

Rco1'1i1f11llcnt in the Enste;'n Colonie's: .


In the mandated territories Palestine hag a military police force, and Tran::.-Jordan a l,"'rontier Force and police (th" Arab Legion). Aden depend, for protection on the ~"vy, but albo has a little army-the Aden Protectorate Levies, \vh-ich have recently been enlarged. and reequipped. \ Ceylon also relies largely on the Navy, but there is a strong Ceylon Defense Force under the command of British officers. During the last year this colony has increased its military pxpenditure o\'er 100 per cent. The modernization and extension of the naval and air base at Trincomalee re­ duces the "ulnerability of Ceylon to a large extent.' The great strategical value of Trincomalee as a halfway base hetween Aden and Singapore is now fuli y realized. The Straits Settlements iR not content to rely on the Singapore Basp alone It supports a volunteer force and an armed police force. and has recently formed a Volunteer Air Force and a Royal ~aval Volunteer Reserve. Malaya as a whole has voluntarily made large contributions to the cost of lmperial oefen"e, while the various states-Federated and Unfederated, ha\'e each enlarged and reequipped their mili· tary fol'cPs_ A Malay regiment of regulars, Malay seamen i in the local naval veSRels and volunteer Malay forres in alii . th"pe Sen'ices stand as tokens of Imperial loyalty. (Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, November 1939)





i7ol.XX NoJ6

Military News Around the World


of foreign exchange. No improvement in this 'situation is

Australia Rem'gwdzation of the

anticipated in the immediate future.


and militia sources. The strength of the Militia Forces has been raised from the previons total of 35,000 to 70,000 troops 01' all ranks. The permanent mobile force is to constitute a

total strength of 7500 and will comprise two ritle battalions, a field artillery brigade and the requisite auxiliaries. RCCl

HUNGARY }<"ollowing the introduction of universal military service the peacetime army now comprises seven army corps, two

(Juurnal of the Royal ended Sennca I~"lttttttwn, November 1939)

cavalry and two mobile brigades. The recent calling of re­ servists has enabled most organizations to attain almost full


strength. There exists, however, a great shortage in arms

and equipment.

Recruiting of' the Secolld Austrahan Imperial Force, the Sixth Division, waR recently announced to be complete.

(Milttar-Wochenblatt, 10 November 1939)

The establishment of this division will probably be between 15,000 and 18,OOO-a figure that is in accord with modern Ideas of divislOns of lowe!' man}lO\Ver. Lut higher fire-power and mobility, provided by quick-firing weapons and mecha­ nizatIOn. Ample reserves are also permitted by this figure. The AustralIan Minister for the Army estimates that by the ellll of June 100,000 men will have received intensive train· lng,

(Illustrated Lm7don Nell'1J, 23 December 1939)


Iraq has ordered 15 Douglas attack bombers to cost about $1.250,000. A military mission from Iraq, which visited England, has been in the United States and was ex­ pected to buy American machines, as orders could not be

fulfilled in England. Previously Iraq has nearly always . bought British machines. (The Ae1'oplane, 22 December 1939)

Canada Flyiny Schools:

It has been announced tha't SIxty-seven air training ~eht)nlg. manned by a ground cl'e\v of 40,000 men, \"lill be required to operate the Empire a'ir;trmning program in Canada. under which flyers from Great Britain, Canada, Australia, .New Zf::tland and Newfoundland will receive ad­ tanced training for war 6ervire. The training program will

cost the participating governments approximately $600,000,­ 000 dUllng the three and a half years of the agreement.

Canada has agreed to assume S350,OOO,OOO of the estimated co,t, $48,000,000 of which is to be spent during the first year of OPl?l"J.tlOn.

The ground establishment wIll consist of 2,700 officers, 6,00<1 Cl\'ilialls and 30,000 aIrmen. An average of 4,000 pilot;;: will be able to undergo training simultaneously when the [n oglam is in full operation. It is estimated that the cour::,t' \Vlll laHt twu months, making it posgible to turn out 24,000 flyers, gunnerR, observers land ,vireless operators each H'dr

ITALY A-rmy Commanders:

In the homeland the Army is divided into two army groups. One group, consisting of two armies (Generals Marinetti and Grossi), is commanded by Crown Pt'1nce Humbert; the other by Marshal Graciani. The latter also consists of hvo armies, one commanded by General Ambrosio

and the other by General Eastico who tool< part in the Span­ ish War. A,·t,llery: Italy has 400 light batteries, 200 heavy batteries and 60 antiaircraft batteries. comprisIng

In ~all

1600 light and

800 heavy field pieces and 300 antiaircraft guns. The artil­ lery is being rapidly ,-e-equipped with tlat trajectory weap­ ons. This also applies to the heavy weapons of the infantry.

The army and corps artillery are completely equipped.

(Foreign Press)

Moim'ized Division:


In addition to two infantry regiments,

The new industrial mobilization law provides the Gov­

~ ernml'nt with extraordinary powers,.


(Latin Amencan F'tnancial Notes. 29 December 1939)

The Australian Army is essentially a citizen force, but commanders and staffs are provided from both permanent



battalion, one tank battalion, one machine-gun battalion,

The prime minister is empowered to regulate foreign comn'lerce in accordance with

one pioneer battalion, one signal company, one kitchen de­ tachment, and auxiliaries, the motorIzed division consists of

the requirements of national defense, to effect changes in

one motorized artillery regiment (two battalions 75-mm guns and one battahon 100-mm howitzers) and one battery

agricultural and industrial produc~ion and to control sal­ al'leR, wages and prices. (Mditdl'-Wachenblatt, 27 October 1939)

of 20-mm antiaircraft guns.

The division contains a total

of 36 field pieces and 36 infantry cannon. (MiltUjr~Wochenblatt.




Motorized Division:

HONDURAS The exchange situation


about the same as in

recent months, if not worse, due to !the prevailing shortage

2 regiments motorized infantry

1 battalion motorcyclists





MllUity N"iiws Ar(Jund the World 1 1 J 1

C. & G.S.S. Military Review MEXICO'

battallon light tanks

motorized machine-gun battalion

regiment artillery

motorized tr,ain





The Celere Division:

TOTAL $294,692,833

This is a highly mobile force consisting of two regiments of cavalry and one regimE:>nt of Bersaglieri. (Rassegna dz Cultura Mihtare, July 1939)

A new South AmerIcan transcontinental air service was inaugUl"ated by the Linee Aeree Transcontinental Italiane 22 Decembel 1~)3D The imtial trip carned only mall and reached. Rio de Janeiro in three days. The route will be op­ erated ill four Htagee, a different machine being employd for each stag-e. The service is flown in both directions simul­ taneously. Stages: 1. Rome-SeVllle---,-Llsbon; 2. Lisbon­ Rio de 01'0 (Sale Island); 3. Rio de Oro-Recife (neal' Pernambuco) : 4. Recife-Rahia-Rio de Janeiro. (The Ael'oplanc, 2tl December 1989)


$3,148,916 2,609,7&9

Jlf chml1;ed CUltS:


pu~~~~N:A~1:R MFR.

The Japanese Army has three mechamzed regIments, :::.trll equiPJled partially with transport and ,veapons of an experImental character. Development is be111g directed to­ w~Hrd the inclusion of one mechanized regiment in each . peacetime dh ision. During the attack again:';t Shanghai . tank uetachmeuts conslsted of from thirty to 11fty tanl{s. In the })l'e::<€'nt campaign pursUlt companies have heen organ­ ized ron..,istlllg of a mechanized company 1einforced ,vith mot'onzerl lIlfantry and artillery. Japan IS emlllo):ll1g the medium tank ",:\1 Q3," \\l'lght 11 tons,.armed with 011P 3T'mm gUll and threp machiue gUlls; and the light tank "M 25n3," "eight (' tons, armed WIth two machine guns. The latter are amphibians.








1,686.992 1,632,939 1,544,06& •





2,604,845 2.499,294


5, 4, 3, 3,

1,541,5_3_7_ __

COTTON GLOTti 1,377,466 1,292.936

(DIe Panzertr'Uppe, November 1939)

NICARAGUA NETHERLANDS \\'lth "630,000 men undpr arm.s the defen::.C' of the Netht~r­ lands l~ cu~ting that country over one million dollars daily. Her 'VeallOl'.lS are modern and have been acqUlred primarIly from Ellglaml, the U111ted StateR and Sweden, and to a lesser extent from Germany. She has 1000 airplanes and"40 sub­ marines availuble. On the eastern border there are more than 1200 hunker.:; (plllbox(1~) and other defen~h'e works A portion of the province of Utrecht has already been inundated.


Two-thirds of ~icaragua's coffee crnp of last year wa~ ~~! purchased by the United Stales fur 81,700,000. Germanr's ,; purchases of S500.000 were flecond and those of the Ne\her- <l lands and France third and fourth .-;­ ~~

On 7 Nove~ber ?939 Nic~ragua imtiated steps to pro· l'~ VIde for the natIOnahzatIOn of her raIlways. On 10 l\ ovember 1939 this republic announced plans ki for the immediate establishment of a national military r~ academy. .­


(F orE'lg'" Presq)

(Mtlttar-Wochenbratt, 13 October 1939)

Balloons for Hnlluud: Holland is to have a balloon barrage. The Netherlands Minister of Defense has announced that a number of barrage balloo]]s has bee]] ordered from abroad to reinforce the anti­ aircraft defense of Holland. (The Aeroplane, 22 December 1939)



National De!enBe' Norway has a population of almoRt 3.000.000, of which t"o-thirds live ill the COllntry. With the exception of 20,000 Lapps and 10,000 r'inns in the North, her people belong to

: ,:\r -.:: . Vol. XX No. 76 .• ~

Military News AJ;ound the World

the Scandina~lan br:n~h of the G~rmanic race. Durmg the World War Norway mobilized more than 60,000 men to pro­

tl?rt her neutrality. Improvements were made in the mili­ tary organizatIon. but later met \"ith discouragement as a I'P,ult of the Disarmament Conference. T,he ~ing is the nominal head of the military forces. The National Defem~e Department controls the administra­ tion of the A1rmy, Air Corps and ~avy. The General Staff L" concel"ned ,,-jth liaison, mobilization and operations. In 1033 a, assisted by seven .aides, was pnwided for by law. :\lihtar;"r prpparation is facIlitated by the organization OJ 'ports, of which the Norwegians are extremely fond. CllOll attaining the age of t\venty every Norwegian IS sub­ Ject to military duty, nn obli~ation \vhil'h extf'nds for twenty­ four ~-f'al's-tweh'e active and twelve in the reserve. Con­ :-rIf'lltlOUS objectors are required to perform civil service, unilel' the 1\IIimstrv of Ju~tlce. for a corresponding period The Army co'nsIst< of one battalion of the Royal Guard, 11> JIlfantry .r~giments plus one battalion. three regiments of dragoons and on€' squadron of L.and1'crn. three regiments of field artIllel y, three battalions of, mountam artillery, an ?ntWIl ctaft regiment (60 guns). a 'section of fortres:o: artil­ lery. one engineer regIment, one engineer battalion, and t-e\en-Il companies of Lanrll'(Tn engineers. The <1YeragE' 1I1fantry regiment CCTIsists of a ~taff. three hilt' hnttalions and Ol1e re~el"ve batU.l.lion. Each hattalion is compo&ed of three rifle compames'and one machine-gun rom­ panr (!) !rnns). The cavalry regiment is made up of fOUl" sqmullOns (nne of which b, machinE' gun). one company of lYl..iJ"t,,,, a :-'fluadron of motorized machine g-ung and a section



Types of Vessels

I November 199~ November At~ to '--I-­ I to Pacific

-::o:"ce-a-n.-g:"Oi:"ng-co-m-m-e-rC-ia-:l-t-ra-ffi-C-II' , Small commercial vessels under 300 net tons Noncommercial vessels: United States Government! Colombian Government


! J





Paciji< I'

Total; 1988












. 1




2323 2


2_1_.____ ..

__ Fo_r_r...:pp...:a_il'>.:-_ _ _ _ _ t_ _ 1_!_ ____ I TOTAL

__ 1_32.2



272 .. 594 _H15


(The Panama Canal Record, 15 Decpmber 1939)

PERU Cal/ao Pori ('ampletcd: Built at a CORt of between $15,000,000 and $20,OOO,OOO ..over a period of twelve years, the Callao harbor ,\'orks reached its comp1etion with its in­ auguration by President Oscar Raimundes. Benavides on 2 December 1n3n. The first sections were pl~ced in Rervice nve years ago. The new~ section will provide for three addi· tional liners and will give the ancie:nt port of Callao one of the most magnificent waterfrunts in the world.

of m mOl"cd car~.

The Air Service is not a ~wpat'ate arm, but di~trihuted the Army and the Navy. Its organization is a regInwnt consisting of om~ "lombat squadron and one reC0n­ na!:-:-nlh't' squa(hon, and one squa,dron (corps aviation). The prInclpal mllltary p.:"tablil3hments are the central ar~""l!dl at Oslo; the ::tr~enal:-:: at Kristiansand. Bergen, Trnndhe!m, ~orthern ~or\Yay and Raufuss; the- aI'ms fac­ tor~ ,:It Kongf,berg and the ammunitIon factory at Raufuss. Tilt' prmcipal naval Im<;es are, Karljohansvern (near Ho! h Il), Oslu, Bergen and Trnndhelm. Arrordinr to the figUIl''' of !D36':\or\yay had four hattleships, three (torpedo uuat) destl'ovel's, 25 tOl'pedo hoats, three Rea-gomg torpedo hoah.' i:;ht l;atrolllJat:". n1ne -;ulJma'r1nes and 15 other types rf "'.I, lart (mine laypl'''::', tenders. etc.). The person~el IS made IIp of 134 officers (two admIrals) and 1898 sallo1's. Tht' t,'lllltIY'S IJPst nand defense' hes in the ruggedness of Its lO;l ... t lIne and In the tholl,,-ands islands scattered along its l'oil'tal fringe


(Foretgn Press)


POLAND Three out of PDland's four destroyers got away after the fall of Gdynia. and are now co-operating on active ser­ \ ice with the British Navy. The Polish Rubmarine O"zrl, after escaping from Tallinn, where she.kad put in for re­ rail'S, cruiled about for weeks, and finally crept out of the Baltic and through the Skagerack. These &hips have reno rle-red valuable aid jn patrol work and the rescue of sur­ "ivors from mined and torpedoed ships;­ (Illtistratro Lcmdon Ne1J:s, 16 December 1939)



,(La France I"lthtah·t'. 14 December 19J9)


PARAGUAY "Ille fiftieth anDlversary of th~ founding of the National Lll1\\ rsity of Paraguay was celeBrated 25 September 1939 at a -perial aSRembly in the auditorium of the university. In flll'ther recognition of the anniversary the Post Office D{lrdl tment of Paragua>, authorized the iSRuance of a seriefJ of commemorative stamps. (Bulletin of the Pan IAmerwan Union January 19-10 I

Total Rumanians Germans _ Ukrainians ______________ _ Bulgarians . __________ , Russians' ___ ~ __ _ Turks '______ -; ____________ _ Hungarians (Magyars) ___ _ Others _ .. __ , ____________ _

19,500,000 14,250,000 . 750,000 800,000 450,000 500,000 250,000 1,400,000 1,100,000



.... '



'Military·News Ar{)und the World

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

The former Russian territory of Be-ssarabia contains a population of 2,700,000, divided as follows:

Rumanians _______ _

1.300,000 500,000 415,000 225,000

Ukrainians ___ . __ . _. ____ _ Russians _______ _ Bulgarians _ ___ _ Germans _________ _ Others ... __ . _____________ _

New Consc1'iption

~aw: \

The new cons~ription law published 1 September 1989 provides for the foHowing:

The period of active service of noncommissioned officers in the army and th~, air service is increased from two to three years. All young men who are eighteen years of age will be inducted into the service immediately upon graduation from high schooL ' Men wi'll be :required to remain on reserve ten years longer (until the age of 50). The resen'es are dh'ided into two categories, the second consisting of specially trained and qualified women. The training requirements of the reserves have been increased. ' The period of acth e service for officers of the regular military establishment has been lowered considerably. Pupils from the fifth to the sev~nth grade, inclusive, are to receive preliminary military training. In the coast al'tiJIel'Y and coast guard services aU men, including noncommissioned officers, are required to serve four years. The period of sel'vice in the Navy,s five years, The period of service of the line soldier in all branches, exclUSIve of the ail- sen'lce and the units of the frontier guard. remains unchanged (two years).

no,ooo 170,000


(Krct-s1taya Zvezda,

2 S'ePt~IVber 1939)

• Black Sea-Baltic Highway:




'~I Model


: ",eight (tons) I

i ,


4 5

"BA 27"

-=--l -Length


Breadth: Height




' I


i (MPH) I' Speed




(36 H P I motor)..

' \




of armor Crew plate in I Armame-nl tnches I 1 24-. 51 1 87~mm gun I I MG 1




- iCruunng



14 8 ;--5-9- --8-' I



The Dnieper-Rug Canal, now under constrl,lction in the western regjons of Sm·iet White Russia, will' he com· pleted by 15 Ap,ril 1940. The new canal connects' Wl'stern White Russia and the L'kraine with the south of the Soviet Union. Oil, saJt and other mass freight will gO by thIS waterway. The canal in the Pin~k-Rrest LitoVRk ~ection. connects the Pripet and Bug Rivers. From the Pripet vessels will reach the Dnieper and thence the Black Sea,

range '[ abihty in i n , D'-We males tnches



I ----~=.. I Remark$ ;

~ ~ '-B-'-in-g-g-ra-d-U-al-Iy-r-'-Pl-' ac d axle, by more modern equlp: ment I


--32;-122:-5-4-1631-47-5a-;~3 'I 351't=-2MG\--;55I-~ ~-II MOderntypewftltre';Ohr~ I i I I 1 aut?' I axle ing turret

~ : \ ' , : :::~l 6~wheeled -(7" -j W 2-1~--1:- -0--(435- ; -4-14355i~~mm .,Iss 123-6 -! Both 1'~ilitY. Resen; Light· Scout ~ar "Bromford "I Scout Car (Ford chassis) ,

(85, H






, , Motor) I ! ,







"1173-! I






7;-j~lj- 4 - ; i

MG or I \ 21gun 45--mm




55'~ ;:m

!! ~ 2







,rear I', axles




wheels may be employed to install fourth axle. Mobility may b,e incr~ased 1 by attachment Of chams to


: Buoys;h \ ant : rejr 270 degrees _ _ . ___ cl_u_x_es_-'-____--'-_ _

(Die Panzerlruppc.



A~gust 1939)

Vol.}X No.7(J.

Military News Around the World

During the short period before 15 April eight locks, nine dams and 'fifteen miles of canal and other structures must be built. Up to 4,000,000 cUbIc metel'S of embankment must be constructed.


(Pravda, 9 January 1940)

SALVADOR The new expropriation law issued 2~ July 1939, relatIve to property or works declared of public utility, has been en­ larged to include patents and mining. No change affecting other items was introduced into the new law, (Bulletin of the Pan America.n UnlOn. January 1940)




Thc RlI.ssian Army: I

The territorial organiza~ion of the Russian Army com­ prises fifteen ;\iilitary Distritts' and two Military­ sarlats. These districts extend from the western borders of European Russia, where the conce.ntrations are heaviest. to Eastern Siberia. In mov~ng from west to east the con~ cpntrations become lighter ~nd the areas covered by the ·di..,tnct~ correspondingly larger.

The peacetime army consIsts of 100 infantry diVIsions, :~o cavalry divhdons and five: mechanized divhdon~. Of this force 77 Pel' cent are regulnrs and 23 per cent territorials. ;\ The total number of trained, effectives probably amounts to 6,()00,DOO men. It is beIieve~ that Ru"sia can mobilize from II to 12 million mono Thel number of conscripts in each cia" approximates 1,200,000. From this figure must be deducted at least 300.()OO, who for one reason or another are ('\l'mpt from military ~~rvice~ Of the remaming 900,~ 000 a little O\'e1' half If! t:tl}n mto the regulal' army; the I e.. . t 1'-- absorbed in the ten It rial force ~I TI,ese figures do not inc ude any of the frontier guards ~l I or police detachmenb. I .~ I At the beginning of 19~7 Ru~sia had approximately " I 46,000 officers, of which 4:500 had belonged to the old ~ : Impel ",I Army, 25,000 had Fome from the Soviet mi.litary school.. . and the balance had ~eveqgone beyond the prImary ~ I or fleumdary schools. I ~ I According to press repods at least 30,000 officers have ~ :been liquidated. The numbe* includes:



3 marshals out of 5,

13 generals (with rank of army commander), 57 generals (with r~nk of corps commander). 110 generals (with l1ank of division commander), 20,l! generals (with ~ank of brigade commander). (Fo'l'eig1t Militn.ry Notes)

Large' appropriations have been made for the construc­ tion of a new merchant marine. A new board has been created to reorganize the navy and speed up naval'construc­ tion. Two smal! warships have already been launched . . Particular attention has been given to the development of . aviation, the importance of which was proved during the Ci"i! War. An Air Ministry, cre3ted in September, has de­ veloped a new code of aviation regulations. The interest sho\vn in aviation was indicated recently by the keen compe­ tition between contestants for the 400 air' pilot vacancies. The Falange, in connection with the Air Ministry. has under­ taken the 'organization of youth interested in aviation. Fly­ ing clubs are being revived. The Spanish University Syndicate has undertaken many flights in gliders, steps preliminary to the training of future pilots. (La France Militatre, 25 November 1939) F~'anro-Spanish

Trade Treaty:

France and Spain, after several months' negotiations, oigned a trade treaty 13 January 1940 to replace an older treaty that had become dormant as a result of the Spanish Civil War. Under the terms of this treaty France ·com. menced shipment of wheat to Spain 15 January. Spain will also receive rice from Indo-China and a variety of manu­ factured goods in exchange for a large portion of her orange crop. France \vill get liberal quantities of minerals, iron 0re, pyrites, mercury, lead and zinc. (Poretgn Press)


The Army: Compulsory military service. required of men between twenty and forty-two years of age, has been in effect since 1901. Active servic" for enlisted men varies from 140 to 225 days, for officer candidates 260 days, aud for officers 33 months. Land,,/orm troops (ages 35 to 42) ha\'e periods of voluntary instruction. Numerous spprt and rille associa" tions (180,000 members) contribute to the pre-military training of recruits. ' Because of the ruggedness of the country. numerous forests and lakes, Sweden concentrates on mobility rather than on large concentrations. Light animal-drawn vehicles are preferred to heavy vehicles The tactical unit is the division. composed of thr~e regiments of inlantry armed chiefly with automatic weapons. At war strength the army would comprise 600,000 men. The air corps consists of a few hundred modern planes of French, British or German manufacture. The antiair­ craft defense is a model of the latest development.




• .f.,




Milit~ry News Aro'und the WJrld

C. & G.S.S. Military R!vieu;



The general

~taff i~

('oml1osed bi carefully f'eipcted offi­ i~ Lleut~na!lt General 01"1 Ger­ hard Thoernell who. during his lI'ecent ,iRit, deeply impresseci General Gamelm.


The Chief of Staff

(La Pmncc M,ta;,-c, ~ December 1940)

S"eden's ]wact:'timl:-' army (om.. ist~' of four divisions; 35.000


l! OO]lS

dnd 100,IlOO reMrY"s. It



that she can train. ('l}lIl}>. and ol'pl11iz¢, 25 to 40 didf,ions. S\veden, NOf\\8V ann DUlmcnk coule{ provHle ahout one millIon tr8med 'men, al> mt :)00 fighting plallef-, 1~1 coa~t . defense RhlJls 0l' old hattl{'~hllh. ;~5 sU9marines, and. almost 150 small na"al ,t'F.:-.el . . A. great aRset to Sweden is the giant eofol'~ nrm.:; fac­ tory. At Boerkhol'll h lOlHtpd the latge:-.t pownel' factor~.. in Europe. Tanl{s and llianes are manufnctul'ed at Lands-­ kOl'na and LmkoPpll1g. Reeelltl.': fiOO,Oon gu" ma,j,;:, \\'PI e di::;tribllted to :lir raid prec~ution umt~ ~LIl1Y cill/en,", have pUl'chasf'd thpil' own masks Tl1f' GO\ eillmellt ha~ allotted. 52.880.000 fOl' air raid

Black Sea have foreediher to assume the responsibility of the greatest sea power ill the Balkans. Her Navy of approxi­ mately 56,000 tons, which Includes a number of excellent German ships, is seconded only by Greece with a tonllage of approximately 43,200 tons. Bulgaria has only a: small Danube patrol, Hungary has no navy at all, Rumarjia has but 11,000 tons and Yugoslavia 13,000 tons. (A1"1l1aments Yeal'·BIJok, Gesa1utweitrk1-iI./te Allc1' Stuatrm. and Forcagn Press Reports) I


SWITZERLAND Swit'lf'lland ha..., hCf'n 1I1 a "tate of mouihztlt ion sinc\.' ~8 August In:~0 On 11 :\O\'('mhel' If>!1fl General Guban was empowered IJ.\ till' FedC'r:d COtltl{,ll to call all able-bodIed men to the colors ,\ h('nt'vPl' he nltty ueciue the df'f.l:mse of the nAtIOn l'equil'l'S It (Fm ClIJll 1>1 (s~ I

The nt'W Fourth A rmy (\~rp~, provIded for m the new tables 01 org-alllzntion for the S\\l~" Army. hecame cfft-:'ctivE' 1 Januarv Hl40 it is c,)l11m:mded h~' Colonel Lat'hard. form·


erly Ch,,:f of (he Geneml Staff.




(La Fmnc(' llhllt,ft/t, 29 Dt'('embcl



fl ....

a nalltnll Po;cel':

Of all the Bcllkan JlO\H'I'R Turkey UlHiouutl'dly IS thp most powerful. tilt' mO;i1 IlHl<~prlldpnt :1nd t'n,l0Ys the ),!1't'ates1 spht'l'f' of infillL'nc(' Tn lit' ~ur(', her Balkan ten'itol r con­ SIsts onl\' of TurK\.:'\ l!l EUrLlJlfl. an area of but D,360 square mIles as· nmlpalcd \\I1h Bulgal'ia, thp ~l11alle:::.t among the other BallGlll ::::t.ltV,", \\ ith im area of 39.8~5 square mIles; hut 1hlS is lomprn-,ated foJ' h~ the f<let that this limltt"o al'PH plus her great A natolian teITlt'\I'~' of 285, 1;~2 sqmu e nule,:.; are sufficient to l on11 01 thf' Dal'danelles and the Bospol'uS and rival thr infiuC'nep of RU8~Ia in the Black Sea. In 1934 Turkev, RLlmania. YugoslaVIa and Gl'ecce formed the Bnllwn r:ntente, org..anized at that time for the

purpose of IInllting the


of the great European

powers in the affmr::,> of the Balkan States.

Although her re&"I'\'e' are smaller than those of Rumania and Yugofilavia. TUl'ke~' has an active armed force of approximately 200,000 men a,:.; compared with

Rumania's 162.000 and Yugosla\'ia's 134,000. Her defense of the Turkish straits and her rivalr,. with RusRia in the


Dollars are stIll scarce for the majorIty of lo('al hank" ann are bemg used solely for collections. Banks having _c~ any exchange to spare sell to tho,:.;e in need of it Ore bank'~ :~ dollar shortage if: understood to be "lightly more ahlte than }



in previous months

(Latm Ame1'lCan Financial Notes, 29 December 103:))



SelectIOn of A"my Officers: '

Appointments to the rank of second




ill the

Regular Army of Yugoslavia are made from amomg:

I Men who have completed their studies at the pre paratory school of the Military Academy. I 2. :\!en who are Yugo"lav subjects and have ~ompleted their studies at a foreign military school of the ~ame class as the preparatory school of the Military Acade"l.Y' if they apply to enter the national army in the course

following their leaving the school.


Of . I

the year




Military News Around the World

4. Second lieutenants of路 the rese~'ve and serge~nt.. 3. Sergeant-majors: . II (a) Who have served iIn that rank for at least four majors of the rf'serve allowed by their. superior officers to years. take the examination for the rank of second lieutenant in (b) Who have been selected by their superior offi . the regular army. cers and have passed the examination for second lieutenants., (Armaments Year-Book)



'" ' "

,c. Military NYiW8 Around the World

C. & G.S.S. Military R 1Jiew

Spain signs n~w treaty with France


N"icarag'Ua natlOnaJH~e..., rall\\-ays


Port completed

Chile restricts auto imports





'Vol. XX No. 16 \->

Military News Aroun4 the World

Chma receIves RUSSIan Mlhta'ry Commis~ion J3:panes~

rapture Nanning

N(lv.1.l, 1939

.. .... .. ".





South Africa pro\'ld('~ for rearmament




)1 31


The Sino-Japanese War

iI :~ ; I




The Sino-Japanese War By LIEt:TENANT COLONEL



EUl"Ope'B t\\O wars ha\'p monopolized the hearllines Ie, ('111 h, but the connil t in Af>la \vhich has heen raging for Il\ PI


tt \\ () .;



year!"! and has already taken a toll of

nOO.DOO dead and \\ oumled, i;:o, ~tiH the -net eest and

hlond'\'f,t Rtrugg-!c since the

gl eat

Epic of 1914.




the morning of 15 November l!t39, picked

J~f1aI'Pse mllital'Y and naval umts effected a successful sur­

pII'i:-:.e landing llear Pakhoi, at Lungmen Island, and on

the l'."tern shore of Chinghow Bay, under the protection of tl;t' guns of the Japanese Naval Squadron in South China. J\1tf'1 deaning np local,Tesistance, the invaders occupied the POl't "f Pakhoi. and drove inward capturing Fangcheng on

the I',th, Yamhshien on the 17th and Nanning on the 24th. The Chinese claim that their plan never contemplated stiff lesistance along the coast where the Japanese enjoyed e g"reat advantage of protection ,afforded by their naval

t i

Coast Artillery Corps

armament, and that accordingly they withdrew to the north where the mountainous country between Kwantung and K\vansi Provinces offers excellent defensive lines. The ease

with whIch the Japanese occupied "'anning was disappoint· ing to the sympathizers of the Chinese cause; however, the

Invasion of Kwangsi Province i~ vie\ved·by the Chinese G€n­ eral Staff as another chance to tie up a considerable' en~my force. Pakhoi was opened to foreign trade in 1876 under tbe Angla·Chinese Chefoo Treaty. At that time. its trade pros· pered. but declined as the local center of commerce was gradually shifted tp Haiphong. The city has a population of about 65,000 and the foreign residents number but a mere dozen. Since June 1939, when SwatQw and other ports were occupied by the Japanese..Pakhoi's import and export tralle suddenly increased as it was practically the only sea­ port through which Free China received arms, munitions and oil. With the! capture of Pakhoi all the important sea­



C. & G.S.S. Military


K 0l...'_1.J..?_~2P MI.







ports of Sonth China havl?


t'lthel" occupied or cut off by

the Japanese and the minor port::; may be considered either lost or nsele~.s. TllUt>, the lilte::-t Japallese operatIOn will tighten the bloclcnde and fl)r tlll'


of thE> war Chma

\vill have to l'elJ. chit:>rly upun O\erland comrnulIicatiollR for provisions of ~llpplJe~ aIHI "ar matpriaIs Since the Ol'CUp<ltlOll of :Kulilling', the have engaged in




0 ;:;tron~ offelll:'>ive th1'11:4:: ill South Chll1a,

both of them designed agnlllst the cation.

Chllle~e JIIIeR

of communi­

The oCL'upat ion of .N"aHlllllg rut a Chinese line of supply along the highwars from French Iudo-China mto Kwansi PrQvince. The railway from Ind.o-China into Yunnan Prov­ ince, however, lieR. much further inlanrl. From Nanning, Japanese planes are able to bomb this railroad with greater facility. despite obstacles impo~pct h~' ll1stance and high mountains. Tn fact. this railroad \vas damaged by raids early in January, leading to a French protest which was re­ jected by the Japanese authorities. It is doubtful whether


Lombing raici:::. can entirely cripple this railwa although It may be closed through Japanese pressure fon Frencb auth()ritles. The ne\\ Burma- Yunnan highwa~ is so far mlalld '" to iJe virtually impregnable; it can belclosed onll If Br~tain succumbs to Japanese prelSsure. I· The R€cond Japal1(~ge offensive-northward ~f Canto 11­ Im~ re~ulted m a Chinese military victory. as prushing as that reglstered last fall at Chansha.' These two campaigns bear striking- 5iimilarities. In both cases, the Ja nese forces weI'£' seeking' h c'\tend thpir ('onilol over the anton-Han· ko,," Railway. Except for limited areas around nkowand Canton, Chinese armies hold the interveni~g 400-mile stretch of this impOl1:ant railway. In SePtemb~r. the Japa· nese command sh'uck at Changsha and failed;~' December. the attack was shWed to the southern end of e line. By late December the Japanese forces had advanc d 80 to 100 miles from Canton intb Kwantnng Provin e. Ch~nese

' t


'See C&GSS Mi;itary Review, December, 1939,

pa~e 21,

Sino-Japanese War -----;, counteratt~cks

not only halted the advanclllg Japanese col­

uml1R, but forced them to retreat and by the mIddle of Jan­

uary the Chinese forces had fought back to within twenty­

five miles of Canton where they are pressing hard on the retreating, Japanese troops. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

Chinese guerrIllas continue their activities and are prov­ mg to be a thorn in the SIde of the JaPfnese military machine. , In the Shanghai-~<Jllklllg-Hant'ho\t· 11 iangle, thE' oper­ latIOns of China's mobile fOi cef, continue to make life miser­ able for the invaders, while fighting is prev~ent in every provillce of occupied China. The- Japanese troops are scattered over sllch a large area and their line).j. of cummuni­ Ication and supply are so extended that, even if the guer­ Irilla,:; may never actually win the \var, their hit-and-run Itactics are keeping a large number of Jallane::-;e troops back :from the front li~nes to guard the snpply routes.



If China If> tQ hard out against Japan for at least another i'ear ,he must bollve two ,erious problemR:.the extensIOn and impro\'ement of her hiland communications and that of (lome..;tic war financi.llg. The loss of the Lung( ho\v-).;;mning Route le;JV('s Free (billa only the Indo-China-Yullnan Ruihvuy, which is to be ~ ~upp}pmellted by a motor road; the Burma Road, whh'h h~ bemg practi'cally doubled by a rallro~HI under cOIl:::;trtlction, and till' variOUS northern rOlltl':-> into RU~Hian territory. This h not nIllch, out it might he <.;ufIkient for China's transporta­ tIOn requII'f'ments if mlall(l commUlllcatlOns me (urther 1111­ 1)J·oyed. Ca1~e and servici1lg of motor yehicle..., mu::.t be greatly improved; closer (wopeFation should he e~tablishet1 1I£'t\\C(,11 military and civilian motor service~, and pl'otheer­ Il1g 011 national through-communication on the pal't of local and }ll'odncial authorities must be abolishpd. In ! eganl to nnanl'(,s, it ha~ been ('f>timated that the (l}.PE'l1tlitul'E'!'l- of the ChinPRe ~atlOnal GOYf'rnment amount .~ to apllI oximatply 8275,000.000 monthly. According to expel't-, Fref' China's J e\~enlle from ta.\atioIl, government ~~ en1(>l'pn:;:e" and other souneR havp l)('en somewhat less than 1.'1 $100,000,000 per month, "0 that abollt $180.000,000 monthly ~ must bl' provided for. This amount may ue outained Ull IJugh iS5UE'''' of dom('st ic bOl1(ls, foreign credIts, donations and slmi­ . lar tl'<tL..,actions. So far, the National Goverllment haH man~ '~ aged, t hOllJ!h precariou~ly, to make both ends meet; but it ~, ma~' Ul' readily seen that Chma's Finalll:e l\IIUlflter, Dr. H .:.~I! H. KlIlI~, has a real prohlml on hI" hands .~ Jclpan. however, is facing a difficult ~ltl1ation as well It t::l apparent that hope for an overv.:hclming victory is now fading, The Japanese have not succeeded yet in setting up a central go\'ernment in China, and have been reluctant to deal directly with Chiang Kai-Rhek, who is in fact the o~l)' Hilthoritative repreRentative of the Chinese people. Th~ efforts of the new Cabinet to deal indirectly with him through Wang Ching-wei, prospective head of the puppet govel nment in (,hina hy 111'e~enting peace tfl'mS to the Chin,",e Generalissimo through him, WIll undoubtedly fail, beeau'e those peace term. will probably prove to be un­ acceptable to the Chinese leader. The terms offered are


reported to Le as foIlo\\ s: Chinese I'('cognition of Manchukuo; North China and Mongoha to be a " for defense and economic development for Japan"; recognition of Japan's economic predominance ill the rich lower Yangtze Valley and in islands off China; Japanese garrisons to be maintained in China; rerluction of Chinese Army and police forces. As the Wa!' continues. the .strain on Japanese ec-onom~T hecomes mOle severe. Since the begmning of the unde­ clared \Val III China, on'l' thirt~'-one months ago, the prices of fuel, clothing and lIghting ill Japan hm'e increased 90 per cent, de::.pite the 'tIl'rl~tIC mpa~m,:e~ t?ken by fhe Tokro Gov­ ernment to chee~ the steady upward trend. The failure of the, rice ClOp in t1e-l'tain drought-stncken a'reas has further . complicated a phte-ntiallv dal\gerolls f'ltuMion. Leather. which io;;: needed 'for soldiers' .bo()t~ and knapsacks, is no longer availablethe general public. Shoes are made of toad and snakE' sbns and of synthetic !'uhLer. 'Gnder the term~ of a decl'e~ promulgated last summer, all exportable food:-.tuff, such a~ Pggs, huttel', canned fruits and fish are heing rationed fott the domeRtic market.· The situation con­ cerning conRtruct.}nn materials, fupi anel agricultural tools IS evell more dls{!!. Gasoline has been rationec;:l for more than a year.. and the daily qUJta is being steadily re­ duced. The Rhortnge of gasoline dealt a heavy blow to Japan's important ti~hing industry Nippon's fishing motor craft today find themselves forced back to Rails and human pOV'ier. There is lIkeWIse a shortage of nets and fishing eqUl}lITIent. Agricllltu!'e is ::;ufff>ring from a shortage of manpO\\'el', which IS ea~I1y pxpl;unt'd, by the fact that since thp begInning of the China "ll1rldE'nt" .Japan has mobilized about a million clnd a quartel m('n in addition to the 30Q,OOO ~tatioIH't1 in :\lanchuna l\lo~t of the soJdien~ were drawn from agrICultural area,;, Thi<.; widp"pread olf'o..;atisfaction caused the downfaJl of the Ahe f'ai.Jinet on 14 January, the third politIcal cnsls in Japan WIthin a ~'pal'




Fol' more than a v('ar there h<:wt' been fl equent reports that "rang Ching~wel: \\ho wat-> once Plemier under Chiang Kal"shek and desel'ted 111m m V('cembel' 1!J3~, ha,s been about

to launch hIS {lew J a}laneRe"~pon"ored Central ChIna: regime. \Vang's plano.., lun"e been t.m~IHtl'ntly a.~d strongir opposed bv the Pelpmg "P1'OV1"1011<11" govpnmwnt and uy the Nan­ king "refol'med" government. the t\Vl} Japanese puppet regimes now functionmg in China. In o1"£1e1' to eliminate this regional Opp0:::'ltIon, Lieutenant General JU"lO Nishlo has been appointed commander-in-chief of all Japanese forces. In Chma. Ont' of the main plirposl'H of the unItied command IS to faCIlitate Japnn',s 1l1~tallation of' 'Vang Ching.:.wei in is" anking- as the president. premier· or leader of that portion of Chma occupIed hy Japanese troops. Japan realizes that Chilla will have to ue ruled thruugh puppet governments as she if. too .large to he, ruled hy an arn:y of occupation. COMMENTS

\\'Ill thlR war that haR ul'ought RO much destruction, misery, and 10.:iS of life, last another J·ea.l''! This question

has been asked in the past; first, after the fall of Nanking and more recently after the Nipponese capture of Canton



~ .,~



. Whl='



c. & G.S.S. Military


and Hankow. Observers believe that the year 1940 will an early termination to this conflict which is sapping apan's bring serious economic and financial difficulties to China; .wealth and manpower. I but indications are that they will be overcome' as they have The Japanese adventure in China commence1' as an been overcome in'the past and that China will continue "incident," but is taking on the aspect of a national c lamity. fighting with determination to the hitter end. China's resist­ ance is far from di.integrating, as proven by the fact that Japan's forces are bogged in China, while at home he gold there has been recent fighting in all twelve provinces of reserves have been depleted and her war potentia~'greatly o,cupied China and that In spit€ of the terrific air bombard· impalred. It is the task of the military lEiaders to e tricat. ments, the Chinese "re .till ahle not only to put up consider­ themselves from this situation, either by establishin ,puppel ahle resistance evel'ywhere. but even to take the offensive, gowrnments. or by direct peace negotiations with IChiang as they have done at ChangRha, north of Canton and in Kai-shek. Either alternative presents difficulties, and the Central China, Frep China'R continued vitality illuminates euccessful solution of a problem upon which the iife and the weakness of the Japanesp position and it i~ not surpris­ prosperity of the Japanese Empire depends, appears to Le ing that the Japane8E' leaders now realize the magnitude of beyond their grasp. The destinies of Japan and China are their task ann art' h('ginning to show .a Sincere desire to pllt at present firmly harnessed to the chariots of war. I

No '"ar plan extend..; he) ond the first military engage­ ment with the hoslile main for~es. Only Ihe layman believes that the course of the campaign has followed a predeter­ mined course, \vhich has been planned in detail far in ad­ vance, and has been. dung to tenaciously to the hitter end. -~IOLTKE (the elder).

The opponent usually does not assume the role he has been expected to plal;.-voy Schlieffen.


i\ I


"1M World Phofo


The operations of this war have, up to the present time. heell lonfined chiefly to air raids, intensive mining and tlulHHdl'ine warfare. A false alarm, similar to the one that \Va::. I'revalent last November, caused acute tension in Bel­ giuUl md Holland in January, due to the reported increase of C'" man troop concentrations well equipped with artillery, ml'}lb~!es and tanks, along the frontiers of those two eQun­ tne. :,ut the feared attack failed to materialize. I" order to understand events at the Western Front, egpe. "dly the warfare of patrols and raids which is now d{:\wj', ,ping, it is necessary to put aside memories of the Great Wal' "f 1914-1918, particularly those of the period of trench warL,,·e. The struggle between the Maginot and the Sieg­ fl'led Lines is a war of position, but it differs in some respects from the front-line operations of the World War. The fol· lowing abstract from an article published in the Gazette de

Coast Artillery CorpS

Lausanne (Switzerland) 15 October 1939, gives an idea of the type of warfare now being waged on the Western Front. "What strikes the veteran of 1914-1918 most, if he has occasion to visit the firing line of, 1939, is' the emptiness of the battlefield, and the great dispersion of troops as he nears the front lines. These front lines are covered by outposts, each one occupied by a mere handful. of soldiers manning one or two automatic weapons. The flanking groups are often more than 300 yards to the right or left. Behind these out­ pOols there are additIOnal positions which are closer to each other. Instead of having continuous lines of fortifications facing each other and sometimes separated by only 50 yards, as in 1914-1918, the opposing positions are today echelonned in depth wiU> flexible and powerf;Il dispositions. Individuals are no longer elbow to elbow in the trenches, as formerly, but are deployed in numerous small detachments. It is the HZ

" ...


EUI'Opeal; War8'--'

C. & G.S.S. Military /tev!ew

!"Rf'\.lH .\R\l\ Hl\\i \RTlJl~HY -.LH)·\PI PiFer: ,srnIEI\llFRF. !'\f:,\lt

IHr: FIl.b:-"t H nW~1 Till"> PJl"'itltf, \\ \:- PA:-HD BY THE


pxtl'aunlill;H'Y lllL'l'l'a . . . t> ...... incf' the last \yal', of the I1t1mUer

of automatic weapons 111 the illfantl'~ that llermlb thl:-. (h:-::­ pel'sion of troups. Thallks to It. a company today has fire­ power Sl1pl'l'lor E'\ \.:'11 It) that of a t\Il'mer battaiioll. The~e advance Jlo~b plIltert·c:-, mLttoaHy h~; flanl\wg fire eovel'llIg a cOllsHierahlt' art',!. 'No mall·" land' is much broader thall ill the la..:.t war At "nnw points, it i:;;; more than one or two miles WIde. It is consequently an ideal field of action for opposing patrol-; or l'PCOlllIaISSanCe groups, which have become extremely acthe sillcE' the halt of the French i!UVaJllP' ,\ftl't till' III:'t two \\eek:-- of September. Be('nl1~e of thf' l l'L'al l''\lellt nf ':\'o mall'.., lnnd,' thl~ patrol activity ill ad\ Hncp the 11l1E' of OlltJlO:::;t~ has led· to. a form of wal'fare \\ tuch, altllollf'!'h llot HnkllOWll. lll"\'er hefore wa~ u!;ed on ~() large a .,.c,dc-th,tt h. mm€' \\':tl'ful'e." Thl:' most imporHml qllP... tlon that is: being debated today IS ,,-hat actIOn will he taken by Germany in the spring. when the fog~ clear and weather conditions hecomc favorable for large- scale opeJ'atitln~ Three lines of actions are possible: 1. Hitler may choose to consolidate hhf conquest of Austria. lzeehosla\"aldn and Poland and let the British and the French tnkf' the offensive if they rare to do flO. He may thus save foodstuffs. petroleum and raw materials and be able to defy the Allied blockade for at least two years. T



~_ A plung"e through thl' :\Iaginot1...ine. Gf'n ir al Duval. \\ ho l'ommandl'd thp Fl'pnl'h All' Fol'lP lim'ing he WOl'll!: War, belie"," that Hitler wIll attack in the sprinJ, and that' he \\ ill uttach "traight nlldi hard thlough the Maginot Line instead of around the fian~s. He maintain, that the SChhef'l ffl'n Plan 1:" lm;;;pd upon t~t" element of surpris~ and that today tht" Dutch. Deiglan!4 and SWIgS are very much on the alert. l\'IOl'(,O\ ~~r. the }la~in{)t Line cannot bl? outflanked, , hecaUse since lal"t September it has iJeen extendGd to reach the English Chrtnnpl III thE> north and the Jura Imountains m the south. : 3. The ma]onty of French military experts believe th,t tlw S('hli('f/\'n Plan. rrquil'ing a fiankmg' mo\emert through Belgium or through the N~therlands and then soutihward into BelgIUm, is ;:;tll1 the UCbt I!11cthod of invading France. It is a (:ommon hf'lie-f that e\'en a thrust involving Uie loss of a million lives will fail to n,ake an apwecIable dent in the ~!agmot Line.




In 1914, the German General Staff had ev~rything in their favor; the surprise of numbers, due to the incorpora' tion of reserve units in the fighting line; the burprise of direction, secured by the invllsion of Belgium; tM absence of I I




Vol. XX No. 76


any fortified positions to ('heck them, once LiegE', N amm' and MaulJatige had been outrun, and the fatal error pf the French Offensive in Lorraine unde! the famous Plan XVII. Today, the French Arm;y. more than equal to th€ German at my in the numbc1' of reserVes and unexcelled in quality, is waiting for the attack on the ~lagmot Line. considered the mORt impl'f'gnable defensive system yet devi~ed by human Illg-enuity. In 1914. the British relied wholly on voluntary enlIstment, and 1t \vas not untIl aftel' the opemng series of French and Belgian disaRtel"S, that the need of employing large Bntish forces on the contment oecame apparent. In Ifl;~n. conscrIption was Immediately un opted, and unity of

European Wars command, which took four years to achieve in the World \Var, was accepted frbm the outset. On the other hand. many experts befieve that blockade alone win never bring Germany's'collapse, although e.CQnom­ ic measures will play an important part in this great struggle. The fear in 1939 that the war \vould start with devasta­ tion and massacre from the Ull', seemed warranted by the examples of Spain. China and Poland. Military observers are puzzled and in \'ain try to guess what form this conflict will talie. Their opinions agree on one respect, namely. that there will be intensive righting with the coming of the spring. the result of \vhirh may de('id~ the outcome of this war.

Wide Wmld Photo

I J,!JSE-l'P OF 'lHE STFF"I. NF'rWtlRK 1l\'FR TilE Rl'.\j-WAYS ON A SECRET BR11'I'>H



'I TIE ~'fF:U. ~IlP['ORTt:'1 P!{FVEYff. THr Pl \ .....T WHEFLS FROl'f1 BEING BOGGED DOWN A!'.n THE. LRA::'S f.ORi\l:> A .... ffrLt'nVE (A'\1Ht'FLAGF. PFdU)n'NI',\l. DE,HCE H.\.:3 BlF!'. ftlL'!'.Il s-\nSFAl"fURY WHERE THF SUB-SURFACE IS HARD. PICTURE PAS$ED EY THE BRITISH CU.,SOR.






European Wars \~-..J

C. & G.S.8. Military elliew



i I



MAP No.1







~ob 1 .1


", r'


Ix No. 76

European Wars






W1d6 Wo,..ld Ph()to


KAMMERER. Infantry

( I 1 September 1039. the armed forceR of Germany laune' cd a "blitzkrieg" which. following an eighteen-day camp. l)ln. fo,md Poland added to that list of nations which. ill l'PL lit ye:.=trs. have lost their freedom. Three months later " the \\ rId wondered if another small European nation was g ahou' to .loin the ranks of th~ "has-heens," for on 30 Novem­ b~r 1 ··m the ·armed forces of Russia in an attempted repe­ 1 llliol> of th€ German campaign in Poland. attacked Finland. . 'nt Russia. endeavoring to follow the details of pro­ cedul.· of a blitzkrieg, as exemplified so successfully by the Gern illS in Poland. forgot that. Finland is a vast forest. trav,· sed only by narrow. muddy roads which offer constant


obstacles to motorized' troops.' In winter, with deep snow ('overing the country, the rapid advance of tanks and motor­ ized troops-a blitzkrieg-is a patent impossibility .. In both campaign$. the opening step wait the attack and bombardment b:r airplanes of hostile installations in the interior. These installations included commun}cations, rail­ roads, arsenals, bridges and other areas of military impor­ tance. Coordinated with this aerial attack was the bom­ bardment of border fortifications by artillery as well as by airplanes. While fortified zones were being bombed and while activity behind' these 'zones was being crippled by aerial attacks. troops moved into. weakly defended areas in


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C. & G.S.S. Military •

an '~~~n,pi to envelop. outflank, or encircle the main hostile forGE;;). >' 3he careful execution of such a plan by any nation rich in, nu,npower and ,materiel would prove ~uccessful against four out of five nations of the world today. And a com­

parison of the resourc~s of Finland and the U.S.S.R. would se~m to indicate overwhelming chances of immediate success for the U.S.S.R. in such an undertaking against Finland. FINNISH RESOURCES AND STRATEGY

'"fhe regular army in Finland, ill tIme of peacE.>, com.:;ists of appro'\imately 33,000 officers and men, dbtributed among !) infantry reg-iments, 2 cavalry regiments. 4 field artillery and 3 coast artillery reg'lmenh; aud I antiaircraft regiment. This :-.mall force. upon mobilization, was expanded into. three ("or})" of two dJ\l<;ion:-. each. totalling about 127,000 men, These Cl)J1"tltllteri the nr:-.t line t1'OOl)" ail of Whom had had at lea:-.t 111'( .\ em 01 cOnlpul ...,ul \ IllIlltal.\ traimng Six addltlOllal resen'e dlYisions of approximately 100,­ 000 try.en were ab.o mobilized. Finland als) ha~ i'nilitlble. III time of' \\aI'. a Civic Guard. This Gum'd, e.... tlfl1ated at 100.000, consists of JocaHy orlfani7ed milit a 'nnih \\ lllrh drill amI maneuver at l'e-g'lllar intel'rab. ThlT are l hnl C'{ d \\ 11h mHlntal1l111 g' order. ami, in t1llne of \\3r, \\lth tlw d('fen ... p of the country. It was these! Ulllt" that hl'ld UJl the RlI:--~I.tll .1(hallre~ in no!th­ ern finland m the mitlal ~tage<; of the pr.. .'~ent war, / If we add to the furegoing the naval units, customs

officials, the Frontier Guard. the forest guards, and the local p~lice, Finland's defensive manpower approaches 340.000. all controlled by the National [Jefense Council. Mention should be made of the "Lotta Svard" organiza­ . tion, affiliated with the Civic Guarll. It is a women's organ­ ization of about 72.000 members. SubSIdized by the Nallonal Defense Ministry, it b rE'~ponsible fur the health f'ervices, mihtary admulllStratlOn. and the riefensp against gas and air ~writol'ions ~el'vice already in the pregent war. At the outun'al, of hostilIties. Pl'eqident Kallio of Fin­ land delegated his powers of Commanuer ill Chief to General Carl Gustaf Emil :JiannC'rhpim. General ::\lannerheim was,

attacks. It has performed


at that time, presIdent of the NatIOual Defense COllucil. As an offiCer 111 the Russian army hE' had seen service in the Rw.;so-Japane:-.e \\"n1' -and 111 the \\'Olld \Var,a::; Lieutenant General. He it \Va:::: \vho commanded the \Vhlte l·j'inns against the Reds in HH8 and \\ 1111. \\ Itil Gel man help, gampd for the Finns their indepenctcllcC' from RU~Sld., A:-, the head of the National Defense CounCil he '\',l~ largel.).' responsIble for the development of the fortificatit)n~. Learillg' hb nam~. across the Karelian lsthml1s, between the G111f of Flllland a~d Lake


Finland's chief natural feature is her 40.000 lakes, network over a large portjon of the surface, particularly in the southern haJf. Numerous I'zvers and 24 ('anah; connecting' these lakes give Finland an inland communiration syp-tern 'whirh, ,vheH nnt frozen, supplement.:; ih; efficient l'ailrOfld "'.\'stem :l

Seventy-five per cent of the count,." is cO\'ered b,' for­ ests which furnish most of Finland's wealth. In most places


little room for the maneuver of military forces of any sizE'. During N'ovember in t.he north and Decembe~ in the

south the Finnish lakes freeze and snow appears. Th spring thaws arrhe in April whereupon the snow and i e melt

rapIdly, and all transportation is limited to the road. :\!ost of Finland's industry is concentrated in th south­ ern half of the country and ~ver 95 per cent of its po ulation resides in thjs area. It is ,only natural then that [innish strategic pJall8 should concentrate on the defense ,of this area (to the neglect Dr the nqrlhc'l'll half of the countr*), Wlth an effort to keep open the r~llroad running along the "ostern and northel'll shores of tIle Gillf of Rothnia into Sweqen. A study of ;\Iap N~. 1. reveals the effectivenes}' of the

railroad and road s~,.~tpm n{~\elopt:'d in this Importan south­ ern half of Finland Troop;.. and supplies ('an ue quickly movpo m nny nlJ'ectWl1 to un,}" thl'cntened front fr many mllitarv centt'l'. Af' a re'mit, fronti(>rs can be lig tlv de fended by local 111111t1R units whIle regular units are held m lendiness iO the Interiul' Eor a movement to thos~ areal) ,,'here the enemy tIll eat. is most uangerous.

This was "",sentiaIly the plan for Finland's defe,isf' Of the three regular army corps, onE' was sent v.rith a lR.eserve

Corps to defend the


line where a major blow

wa~ expeeten, one was ~eld at Viipuri ready to mov~ to the eastern frontier, and the tfiird, concentrated in the ::;outh near Helsinki, \\ it:' IHepared to rno\'e either to the north or to the reinforcement of the othpl' two corps. I RVSSIA!\ RESOURCEs AND STRATEGY


That the resources and manpower of the U.S.~.R. are enormous is well known to all.

Estimates have plak:!ed the

total of her military manpower as high as 18,OOO,OQO mell, more than fOUl" times Fmland's popUlation. This fi/gure is

conside~ably exaggerated, however, and It is more lik~IY that V,OOO,OOO is a closer estimate of the number of men who have had military traming.


The active peacetime army cunsi~ts of 130 divi$ions of

about 10,000 men each. These divisionR, highly mec~anized. are ~('attered thronghout the 17 military dJstrictf> intp whIch Russia (il1cluding Siberia) is divided. Naturally ~he mao Jority of these are concentrated along Russia's }vesterl1 frontier::.. :

At the outbreak of hustilities the conduct of the Russ,an

rampuign agulURt Fmland was delegated to the lhie1~of the

LeHingrad Military District, General K. A. Meretskpv.. He

had available 2" regl1";r diyiRiolls, slightly expande/:! peacetime strength, and 15 of these were in action dUI'mg >he fil'gt WE'e-k of the campaign.

In theory each of these dIvisions had 60 light field guns,

Finland's topograph.\' and climate play an il1lportHnt role in her defen8ive operations. which extend like.

these forests m'e extrf'meJy dense. Adding to this urfare the 11 per cent of the surface covered by lakes leav s very

15 heavv gll:lS, 40 tanks, 100 armored carr;;; and 20 ~i}'('r.dt.

What the~e diYlsions die not have were the rdads ~or movement of themgelves and of supplies--except Ion the Karelian Isthmus. Access to any other pOint on the rinniSh frontier is difficult. A Ringle railroad, 845 miles in lenpth. is the principal line of communication from the ibase at

Leningrad to the most distant point of attack at MUl'mansk Furthermore, with the exception of the last 165 mil.jg {K"ll' dalaksha to Murmanskl. this road is single-track. Two trainloads pel' day are necessary in modern war for ~he sup,

European Wars plying of each division. It is thus evident that not many troops could be launched against Finland along her northern frontier.


Furthermore. there are only a few second-class roads between the Finnish frontier and the more important towns on this railroad: Petl'olavodsk. Kern. Kandalaksha. and i'iIur· mansk. from which the Russians had to operate. The dis­ . tance of these towns from the border vanes from 50 to 150 miles.

through Summa to Lak~ Ladoga taking maximum advantage of the natural defenses fUl'!lished by Lake Suvanto and its outlet into Lake Ladog~. the Taipale River. The use of the word "line," in speaking of these defenses, is misleading, for the Mannerheim I ine. like the Siegfried line in western Germany, is a system of fortified centers of resistance, ar­

ranged in depth. There are several explanatioTIH for an attacl{ by Russia through this Isthmus. Ground needed to be gained in this immedIate al'e.1 to keep the Fillns away from Leningrad, 20

The plan of the RUSSIan board of strategy called for attacks on Finland's northern and ea~tf'rn frontiers from as mIles from-the bordeI\ the second largest city in Russia, and many points along the Leningrad-Murmansk railroad ab the terminus of the railroad uppn whieh are dependent all could stand troop concentratiOl1R and in such fprce as could forceb engaged in the campaign against Finland. An ad­ be transported and supplied by this railroad. These attacks. vance at this point also gave Russia a chance to set up on of a secondary nature. \vould attempt to cut across Finland'R .Finnish territory a puppet "Finnbh People's Government." 135-mile waist-line and capture Gulu on the Gulf of Bothnia. This was done on 1 December 1039 at the insignificant village At the same time they would draw Finnish forces away from of Terijoki a fe\v milesrinside Fmnish terlItory. the southeastern frontiers \vhere the maiu attack would be .A very Important reason fot' attacking through the launched with Viipuri and other southern cities as objectIves. Karelian Isthmlls was that, transportation and supply con­ A na,al and aerial blockade of the Gulf of Finland. along sidered, it was the shortest and eaS-lest route (despite forti­ with aerial bombardment of Finnish railroad::; and concen­ fications) to their Ob.lecitlves~the southern cities and towns tratlOlls completes a plan \vhich has most of the salient where Finland's power and \vealth were found. features of Germany's attack on Poland. General Mannerheim held his III Corps of regulars The blockade of the Gulf of Finland hact little opposition ready fol' the thrust in this sector, but used reserve units in from Finland'g na\'y of ] R vessels some of \vhich are in Lake the actual defense of the fortifications on the Isthmus. Ladoga. Her coast defense:5 and minesAlid, however, cripple These units bad no intention. however, of permitting 3 Russian destroyers, 2 submarines and a number of auxili­ ary "essels in addition to infhcting heavy damage on the without oppo:::.ition a Russian advance to ever.! the most for­ ward elements of their fortifications. \Vhen the Reds start­ battle,:;hip Of(olJ( I R('I·ldI t/(J1/. The bombardment of communicatIOns and concentra­ ed their advance the morning of 30 November 1939 they tion.., by Rug~ian aviators was less ~uccessful than that of found themseh'es forced, as a result of Finnish demolitions the Germans in Poland. Military ohjectiveg were seldom in the lake regions, into narrow cOl'ridprR, trapped with hIt. The Russian planes operated from both Rm;sian bases mines, studded with barriers, and covered by machine gtms and antitank guns The l't'sult \vas slow progress accom­ and fi'om Esthonian treaty bases. ()ne of thE' Finns' chief weaknesses thus far has heen her panied by heavy losses in personnel and in tanks. Over­ lack of ail' equipment. Haying only 150 planes when the powered by both personnel and materiel, the Finns, intent undedared war began on 30 November, her aviators have on sacrificing as fe\v men as possible, withdrew gradually to showll considerable ability in their ~truggle against a nation occupy, at the end of a \veek'f, fighting. the advanced posts who::.;p air force possesses at least 3,000 first-class ShIPS a~d of their fortified zone. ' Reinforced by the reserve divisions, the RURsiaus, dur­ appl'n\.imately 7,000 more of inferior quality. ing the second week. struck at the flanks of the Mannerheim A~ a ,·esult. Russia's bombers have been active when­ ever weather would permit, chiefly m the southern areas Ime WIthout succes~, and WIth .eonsldel'able casualties. By 20 December, 17 Russian divisions \\ere reported to be con­ and n\ e1' coastal to\vns. .Attempts have been marle by the Russians to drop para­ centrated at the Karellan Isthmus. although It is probable chute lroops. These troops failed mIserably. If they were that this included the five divisions that had suffered heavily not ~llt)t while descending, they were mas~acl'ed before they in casualties and been withdrawn after the first week of the campaign. could form united front. During December the main efforts of the Russians were h discussing the land operatIOns it is deemed advisable, fo:~ t111' sak~e of clarity, to proceed by sectors, starting at the direrted at the eastern end of the Mann(ll'helm lme where Lake Suvanto and the Taipale River fUl'l1i'shed the necessary Isthmus and proceeding northward. means of defen>e to the Finns. . KARELIAN ISTHMUS It was not until the end of the month that the Russians, The morni~g of 30 November lV3V. as Russian airplanes after many suieidal attempts to turn the Finns' left flank. flew "Cl'OSS the Gulf of Finland to bomb Hango, Helsinki, began a concentration of fresh troops opPosIte th~ir right and \ .ipuri. an estimated eight Russian divisions (including wing in an apparent effort to break through to Viipuri. This three In reserve) moved through the Karelian Isthmus, force ,"vas dra\vn from varlOUS milItary distril'ts and included eros>, d the Finllish border and started to advance on the many tanks and much heavy artillery. Man, "l'heim line_ (See Map No.2) Numerous attacks were launched along the entire line. This line of fortifications, at the western end, is based particularly on the left flank. Slight advances were made. on the town of Koivisto about 20 miles south of Viipuri. but casualties continuedl to mount and maTlY'"tanks were Front that point the line runs generally east-northeast destroyed or crippled_ Artillery bombartlments roncen­ J



~ ,~ -!~ European Wars ,--

tl"ateo on th€


I C. & G.S.S. Military Rvieu;,

tifiunion:- a:-. \\ell a::: on Vllpuri .... ~n miles

behind the line Severe rold weather 111 mid-Jannary rauspd a lull in activities. The Russians took advantage of this occa:-.ion to consolidate their posItIOns. and reorganize for a new attack at the Mannel'heim Ime whIch. at the end of January. rests intact with two corps of Finnish troops a\vaiting further Russian onslaughts. It is estimated that 200,000 Russmns are concentrated on the Karehan Isthmus. LAKE LADOGA

To the north of Lake Ladoga, in an attempt at coopera­ tion with tile forces attacking the Mannerheim line and in


an effort to outflank its d.efenses. two of the foul' RUS:-(~Ul d1VISioliS. operating out of Petrozavodsk. cro.ssed the frontler

and mowd on Salmi and Suo,lurvI.

(See Map No. 2.)


tween SalmI. on the lake. and Suo.larYi, about 50 miles to the northeast. the Finns have a hne of fortifications consist ing

chiefly of scattered plllboxes·and blockhouses. Data as to the strength :of the Finns opposing the Rus­ ::'lan threat m this area has been mIsleading. Howt'ver m view of the importance of preventing an advance around the

lake, of keeping the railroad through Sortavala open, i: is believed that the II Corps was directed to that area to rein­ force the reserve units that were being pushed back by the Red divisions.





1X No. 76

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3 -SC(l!'l1.USf>ALlvll

Ie Russian divisions on the right had, before running mto l!Il'h resistance. succeeded in penetrating as far as Tohd .t)"\ i. At this point some of the fiercest fighting of the \l'ar 1 ,k place,' The Finns were able to regain the Tolvajar­ \'1 sel or on 13 December after practically destroying an entil, Rus~·dan division. They pursued the Russians to the Alttu 'ki River which line they have been able to defend agah t repeated Russian attacks. he second Russian threat of importance in this area Wa;, d~e along Lake Ladoga. They pushed to Salmi on 4 Deco Iber and by the 11th had r~ached Leppasilta, All atten. pts to advance further than that were repulsed by the Finn 1,


Between these two main thrusts by the Russians, numerous attacks of little importance were made particular­ ly in the vicinity of Loimpla. Early in Janual'Y the Finns were holding the line: Pit· karanta-Loimola-Aitta.loki· ·llomantsi. At this time the Russians started moving reinforeements (the other two divisions from Petrozavodsk) up to the line, Hundreds of tanks and armored cars were concentrated in this sector-, to support attacks which were made daily' at many points along the 80-mile front, Deep salients were oreated, and the mobile Finnish re­ serves, moving to the flank of these salients, wrought un­







C. & G.S.S. Military ~eview

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U. S.S.R.



, 颅_ _2~5_ _ _ , -,~_O_ _ _ _ _--,1?O mi. .\IA!>



beJic\aule destrnction in the waves of solIdly packed Russian infantry CE Nl RAJ. FRO NT

It has ueen generally beheved that. by cutting Finland in t\\'o at the Watst. Rusf:1a (auld bring her campaIgn against Finland to a rapid conclusion. That both Rus:-;ians and Finns failp{] to cOTIl'piYe of sUl'h a step as of great ",tratt'glc importanlc may he gathered from the weakne::;::=; of the Russian effort and from the relatiyely few numhel' of Finns sent to that sector.


Three Russian dIvll;;ions \V,ere reported ope:'ating oul of Kern on the iVlurmansk railroad as a base .. Two of these dIvisions l'pached SuomusRalml on 8 December 1939. (See Map No.3.) Four days later. this force. subbornly oppooed


by militia units and fin<ling; advance difficult in the her-vIii ~ wooded terrain had advanced 20 mIles westward to Hyryn i, salmI. Here thev ,vere md bv one division of Finns seDt~~, from the II .Cor~s which "as ~orth of Lake Ladoga. Thl! '; didsion c01lnterattacked and rlrnvt} the Red divisions bad,'" to Suomus:.:;almi and Lake Kianta where they succeeded ID

making a penetration between the Russian 44th and 163d Divisions. While small detachments were making demon路




'vol. xx No.- ,76 __ J


'tralions,agaillR1 the 44th Didsion 'On the right, the bulk of the Finnish forces attacked and droye the 163d DIVision out nortiheastwarct onto the frozen lake \\ here it was cut to pit-'c~s, ao Decf>mber 1!l3f). The remnants retired to Juntus­ randa. 'The' Finns then proceeded to the destruction of the 44th Dh I~!On which had rt.'nwined inactive during the preceding h:,ttle.. Troo"s PUl'SUll1g the 163<1 Di\%ion had been able to ehcI1'de the 44th DIvision. cut off ItI'> communications, a/ld iblow up bddgt f, on it:;; Jm€:' of r('treat An f-lnveJopment 11\ tlw Finm; of the puemy right fl~~nk put the Rug~:dans to 1;,u1 7 January 1840 The tactles of t he RU~~Jans at guomu::>salmi recall to minI! tllPir defeat hy IIll1denhulg at Tanllenbe!'g in August 1!11.t.,. TIl hoth battle:-> the Ru;;::;ian forL'{,~, after initial . . lll l Ql'-he~ that might have beE'n follo\\ ed up to great ad­ \illl!age. allowe.l themselves to be split in t\l;O. In pach euse the QppOSIl1g I..ommanders took advantage of this situatIOn to dl1fe81 fir~t one and then the other of the divided armies. Following the defeat of the t\VQ Russian divisions. Fllllllf.h forces pushed on, routed reinfol"l'emlmts a}'riving tn(l latl:.' to help the ::->cattered dh i:-ions, and hRving cleared all R!l~ . . i.:.II1~ 011t of that m'p,l, \\el"!:', at In.. . t rl'TH)rb, holding the IllW of the f1 DntleT, ~IIn<lr engagement;... on this eastern front have taken Jllall~ 111 the vlcimty of ~llrrnl:'''' ah'}llt 100 milps south of Snprnu ..,.....dmJ A smflll RlJ~sJan fon p. npparently a part of tht> dlll Ii RU~~Han di\'bion at Kern and probably not larger than ,1 regiment, reached XuI'me..:: on ~ Del'ember. The FlIlll~ Ihu\t' thi" force s mthe<l~1 tf) tLIPl\:",a wht.'re onp bat­ taliun IIf Red:- was de~troyed ~O December. By the end of the't..'tlJ 1he FIIlns had cleafE'd t hi" area of Rm;8ian troops • allli '\\ l'l e 0I)('rating Ht'l"Ogg the hord<lJ' in Ru~sian territory on tlrl' I nad:-. out of Lieksa. 1


AlolJ~ the An'tic cIn.'le a fourth RlIssiall colunln made all 1I1\i.\:-'lon of Fml1lsh it'tntnr:v, (Se(.1 :\lap Ko. 4.) The SlI{' of t hl' original fo}"ce ha~ not been determ1l1ed. although It \\,1'" J)ot mlll't-' than a dlVl::->IOn It was opposed by units of thl' I ,\ IL Guard, ..til good sklel g and well trained and t'lIU1j'p,'d 1'Ol' Winter \\Ial fare. Thl'Y were unable" hov,:e:·er. to :-1 >I' thl." Hcl\'ance of the RU8~lan column wInch seIzed Kuol,. 1,11 \ 14 Decemuer 1030, IHu;;hed on through Sa11a: OCcU~ !Hed ):.\1"kalUy\'i 15 December. and a few days later were

thH',1I IlIng.' KemiJarvI. northernmost terminus of F'lnnish nilho,. /'''.

KemIlokI. a river running nurth from the town, g,t\I.: the F~nns tl. good natural defensive position, one whit h lit'\' could have held agaInst overwhelming numbers. <wE! "I. Illl ~thls Ime U1l'Y wert' prepared to defend. '{ l \ arIi\'al of one dIVISIon fron! the I Corpg, which Gellt'l ,:I :\Iannel'heIITl had been holding a.s a strategic reserve. cham>, { the ~Ituation matel'Ially. The Russians, 150 ntiJes fron! llt"lr lJa~t' at Kandalaksha. and low on supplie" as a l"t'~uh uf the actlyitlE'R of Finnish 'E>ki troops along theit } line;.. Ii t'ommllnication and !'upplies were forced to fall back ;1 19 Ull 1'11111f'1' The" final!} took up po~itlOns in the vicinity of S~.,ld , limn engagements took plaee in the vicinity of SarIa fron, J ,Janual'Y 1940 until the middle of the month when "I, "


European War8


Russian reinforcements were beginning. to arrive. These forces succeeded in advancing their front Hne to Markajarvi. The Russian penetl'ation to Kemi,arvi was their most seriOUS threat to the Fmns' railroad communications with Sweden. the only country through which supplies can reach Finland. The Finns ~ pparently had not expected an attack in this difficult counh'y. and the Rllssians likewise expected little opposition for there were fewer tanks concentrated here than elsewhere.' In command of the Finnish operations in the north around Salla is the young energetic M.ajor General Martii \>Vallenius \\ ho. in ] 9a2. was' tried fOl" leading a Fascist revolt against the democratic government of Finland. His 3-year sentence was suspended, and he has been taken back in the army. II's headquarters are at Rovaniemi, although' he is seldom there, pr'efel'ling to obtain fin,t-hand info·rma­ tion of the situutIOn u.\' pL'f..;onal recolmRlbsanc-es of the front lint·s. ARCTIC FRONT

In the far north, the Russlano;; had concentrated one dIVIsion at l\ll1rmans~(, railroad tel'minus on the Arctic Ocean. Here. aB .at Salla. the only Finnish troops available for initIal defl~n5e \\ ere the ClVIC Guard. On 30 November 1039 the Russian..:: moved acro~s the uorder. The next day. as:sisteu by se,'efe aerial bombardment. they seized Petsamo. The" Finns fought stuhbornly and claimed to' have recaptured the town the foIlo\\ing; ctay. 2 December 1939. This success was short'lived. however, and they withdrew the nf'xt day. Ill' the middle or" the month. the mechanized Russian force had pu~hed thp Finns south of SalmUafvi, wher.€ the rich nickel mines arf' IDcated, It Was here. at Salmijarvi• that the Russians had made thei!' first attempt. a futile one, to dt op parachutt> troops, 3 Decembel. On 18 December the Rus~ian~ Wert:' at PItka,iarn, and 5 days later they were at :\aut~l. 65 miles from Pei::,amo and oVer 125 miles from their ba~e at MUl'mansk,

Ome again the rru~," found that their f:upply system was madequate. The only road in the far north is the Arctic High\,i,ay bet\"E'en Petsamo and Rmaniemi. raiJroad tmvn on the Aldie drcle, The Russians fell back to Salmi. JUl'\'1 with anvanct?d t>h~ments IDeated in the vicmity of Pitkajan'i. The extremely cold weather has limited opera­ tions in this area to recDnnai~sance patrols. CO:\111ENTS AND CONCLUSION

The sucres'::: to rlnt(' of the Fmnish operations can be. attributed largely to thell' inte.nse "tudy of the art of war applied to their country. The lmportance of a thorough knowledge of the tCl".'::un ha..:: heen illustrated, and the plan of lea\ ing the con<llnct of operntlOnfl in a partIcular sec­ tor to the inhabitants that ~pll'l!)1' has been fully justified. The local Civic Guard jUBlt..:: hau? hail both the incentive to protect their own homl'~ 'and the <1dvantage of havmg drilled and mancu\'erprl In the \'PI''\' Incahties wherB they are 19ht­ ing. General l\!}lnnel h{'~m'~ indtrurtiom~ to troops operating in the north (Duntl'Y wel'e: :'Hit them in the stomach." Thel::>e in.structions Wen' carried out by the sjrnple process of avoiding any "erious engagement, of permitting the




and sup­

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

Russians to stretch their lines of rommllniPation~ army in recent years. yaluahle experience and stability ha\e

plies to the limit, and then leisurely working small patrols been sacrificed. Replacements are required to Jearn, not

around the flanks to eut those lines. These tactics, aided by from the experiences of their elder::>, but by their own efforts

a climate to \vhich the Russians were not accustomed. have which t even in the present campaign, have led to natural

been successful on the threc nothemmost fronts,- Petsamo, mistakes and-another purge. General K. A. Meretskov

Salla, and Suomussalmi. conducted the campaign against Finland until 22 December

In their observance of the principle of mobility, stra­ 1939, when he is understood to have been called upon for

tegic or tactical, the operations of the Fmns and of the an explanation of his failure to score more impressive suc~

Russians have shown marked differences. Thanks to cesses in Finland. He was replaced by General G. M. Stern,

their excellent interIOr lines, the Finns have been able to one of the younge"t of the mIlitary leaders of the Soviet

move reinforcementR from one point to another as, and if, Union. General Stern was a leading figure in the border

required. As preyiou~ly stated. the Rnssians havE' been wars against Japan. According to a report lacking con­

,dependent upon a smgle-track railroad for most of their firmation, he was relieved 5 Janilal'Y 1940 by General S.

movements of troops and supplws, with the result that their M. Eudenny. famous cavalry general. Such frequent

strategic mobility has been reduced to nil. changes in command may be satisfactory from a political,

This lack of strategic mobility might have been compen­ but never from a military. point of view.

sated for h\~ mamtainl1Hf some st'mhlance of tactical mobility, According to foreigr\ ,",ounE'S, the task of the Russian

i.e., mobility of troop:-; l~ contact \\ ith enemy forces. 1\lpcha­ army officer,~ has not bee~simplified by the "political com­

nized and motorIzpd ~imts are. howl'ver. restricted by terrain, missars," agents assigned to units as low as the company and

and the Russians found out that Finnish terrain permits of theoretically responsible for the morale of the men.

movement in only two ciIrpcilOn::--straight forward or ba~k­ lt would appear, at fil'Rt glance, that the Russian board

ward along the ·road. And whlle the Russians have been of strategy had erred !n starting a campaign in Fmland at

moving regiments. even divh::ion::-. along these narrow )'oads the beginning of winter. The error, if any. seems to have

or through the rranow corridors between lakes, Rmall quick­ been one of slight delay "ather than of haste. The best

moving Fmmsh patl'ols have been operatmg fl'o!ll all direc­ season of the year for the mon~ment of Russia's mechanized

tions against the front, rear, and flanks of these hottled-up fOl'ces in Finland it) that period of freezmg \veather pre­

forces. This. of COllrst', refipl'is once again the mtimate ceding the heavy snows. The snows arrived a bit early this

Finnish kno\\ ledge and the Rtls~ian ignonmce-compal'a­ v.'inter in Finland, and, Russia's motorIZed units .were re­

tiyeIr speaking-of the teITain. ! duced to inactivity. Arrival of spring Will not improve the

Outstandmg lhffcl'pnces ~an be seen m both the mental situation materially. for Finland's numerous lakes, swamps,

a,:nd phYSIcal maI\e-up 01 the Finnish and RUSSIan soldIer. and dense forests will keep an movements on the roads

The fOl'ml'r, it mu~t"Le admitted, has more to 10~e and is ~ Even the Leningrad-Mul'mau8k railroad will have to be used consequently mOl e determined III hIS actlOI1.s. He is enjoy­ with caution, for \vhole sections of track have been known to ing that psychological stimulant whIch alwR,}'s ill<;pire.s those sink or tilt to a dangerous angle during the Spring and who are thdendm~ their homelnnd. Furthcrmore, the Finn Summer months. has had hlcl dltJi{ Ultll'fl WIth the Ru<;sian for the last 200 Henc'e It can hardly be claimed that RURsia made a big

year6, and dlll'l11g' that }ll'lilld lIb 10\ e of indt'pendencc nustake in deciding WHEN to attack. It was not a question

and his hate of hi . . ~la~tpnl n"eivhhor have been 1Yradua~­ of selecting the best time to move, it was a matter of choos­

ly increasing. The Fum's lo\'c fOt' SPl)l'ts i..:; rcfipeted not ing the least undesirable moment-subject. of course, to

only in his ph) slcal ('Ondltion Lut abo in hh~ initiatI\'~ and those political developments and policies which influence and

aggresf,ivt-'ness. If iJlt\'lhg\'lll"t' is added to the~(> admirable determine mIlitary strategy.

qualIties (thert;;' i~ k::;b llhtenHY In Fmland than many It would also appear that H.u~sia·s maIn objective was othm' country in the \\'ol'Jd), it is ea~y to see why the Fmns to cut Finland in two at the \vai~tline, and that her mam make ideal soldierR, and why they have been '0 successful attack was being made there. It must be admitted that such to date agaInst the Rus.slans. a "tep, if Ruccessful, would be a serious blow to Finland, The latter. accordmg to n-"'pOl 1.S, have ocra..,ionally been for an important f,upply line would be severed. Howeyer, ignorant of \\here, \\hy. 01' whom tllPY \\t'1'C' fightmg. Tl,lcir as pointed out several times previously, the supply problem morale has not been me! t>used all) uy the lal'i{ of dothmg, precludeR a main effort in that area even if the topography food and .shdte1' whICh are es~entIaI in 'an an-tic winter permitted it. . cam~aign. This lark applies e'luall} to quantity altd qualIty, It is a more likely probability that the numerous attacks Small wonder, then, thnt the Russians haw not exhIbited the along Finland's northeastern frontier \Vere secondary -enthusiasm and wlllll1gness of the Finns ~ efforts, intended to draw th? Fmnish forces away from the The material with \\ hlch they are working may be southeast where the main attack was to be made. In modern plentiful, but observers report that it cannot compare in warfare, geographical objectives have attained quite as quality to that of other maJl)}' powers. Tank arm~.r lS p.~o~·; much importance as troop object;,'es, The destruction of :\ break-downs are frequent. The perrentage of duds m the hostile army, ~o. essential to capitulation, has, in modern artillery ammunition IS unusually high. times, become dependent upon the speed with which those ,e1 And what of the abilIty of the Russian offi.cers? As a geographical centerR, unon which the armys depends, <aj~ be destroyed,-or forred to capItulate, " re~ult of. the purges" that have o(,curred in the R~ssian The geographical obJectives that Russia seeks lie in I *See Mihtary News on Russia in March 1939 Review alid cur­ southern Finland. The only door to those objectives is in rent issue,






'Vol.'XX No. 76

Europea~ Wars



1 he

southeast. Bombing them from the air will partially dp..,troy them, but more than partial destruction is necessary TO bring a determined nation to terms. Finland'R weakne~s lies in her lack of supplies and in lH.'1' lack of manpower. Unless she is able to obtain supplies uf all kinds, unless outside help i, given her in the form of . . ohiIers. it is difficult to see hf)\\ her excellent little army caU hold out for long.


\ Some of the \Veaknes,~e~ of the Soviet military est'ablish~ ment have been point~d ont. Russian ,authorities were not aware ot'. thE' detE'rri1ined opposition they would encounter from the Finns, and expected a "pushover" despite their weaknef;ses. The speed and ability shq,wn in correcting these deficIencIes may prove to be a big factor in the results of future operations,

A:<. we go to pre::>::;, there are changes in thE' Finnish lmes established early i;, January because of terrIfic attacks launched by the RusHian,:; ~mt'e the begmnmg of February, Soviet bombers ha\p unloaded their bombs daily over Fin颅 msh roaRtaI towns, raIlroad centers, and \'ilIageR of any size. Troop~ nnd matt""rlel ha\'p been' hurled against the FInnIRh dpfellse:-:; III l'\'er~lllcrpa:-:;lllg IjUantltIeS in a desperate drort to break Finni . . h morah-" and reSIstance and bring the 'war to a close.

An antiquated Arm), can sene only as a millstone upon the bark of a tax'paying public.-Secretary of War Wood路 I ing, before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. 4 June 19:1~.




Foreign Military Digests Digests of impoJ tout fI1 tlcle,'{ 110m foreign military periodicals; the remaining articles for each magazine "1'e listed ill Clltniog of Sriectc~ Periodical A,·ticles.

Cooperation Between Infantry and Artillery [TrainIng CIrcular !'Jo. 10,200 issued by the i\Imlstrv of War Genf'ral Staff. 3 June 1030. Con­ den$(·d -from l\'aziolli PO' l'addestmmento al Com­ hrtttl1ltcnto, August H,3D ]'" B't LILl'TF~A:-'T COLONEL E. M

The purpo~e of tIl1 . . TrainIng C'll"L'uim IS to In~UrL' clear­ ness, safety anrl pl'omptnp~" In the lflentificatinn and rl(~ . . ig'·

nation of ollJectl\'e~ and to Rccm'e adlve cooperation and coordinatIOn hetwPPll the Illfalltrv Hnd artillelS offirprs in the combat zone; PRELIM1NARY ARRA.NGEMENTS BET\\LEI\: INFANTRY AND




Coast Artlllery


(4) Effects to be attained against ca'h objective (de­ neutralization) and time IimitR '\'ithin ,vhlch they should be a~complished. (5) Barrage zone.s in the 0efense. (6) SucceRRi\'c command posts to be occupied. (7) Means of communication with the artillery com· Olander in case of. tempol'ary lack of direct communication between thE' two commanders_ ~truction 01'

Upon receipt of orders. prL'liminary arrangemE'llt~ Will The arllllr}')/ ('o}}/ol(JlIdrr, in turn. acquaints the III b~ made between the infantrr commander (regiment or bat bmtry commander ,vith ~he following detaiIH: taliun) and the artillery commalldel· 3-:,:.igned to the Rame (I) The po:-.sibihti(l~ of intervention of his unit. sector. Thp~e :l1Tan$H'mpnV;; are u,;;uall.v ma1e at '3 point ~ (2) Pl'obahle €ffect~ again1'.t €ach of the ob.iecti\e~ from where it 1~ pns:::-ihlt' to obtain a goODc/ view of the tel'~ indicatE'd by the infantry commander, rain, the varlOUS refl'rence points and the combat. Tlll,{ (3) Safe distances to the front and flanks, with respect ]Joint should be. as a I'ule. the common obsel'Yation post. t·) each objective. I.'onsirlering the characteristics of the tel'­ where the two commanders will find them~elve~ at the begin­ lain ning of the battle. (4) Pl'obable duratIOn of each fire action, includin~ or The commander of the oh:;;ervation-rummunicatwn pxcluding Rcljllstrnent tll'e, (O.C.) platoon should al5-o be present when the above men­ (5) Artillery patrols to be sent out. tioned al"rangemE'nt'4 are marie,

becau~e hIS

platoon WIll IH'

required to e::;tahli~h communication between the infantry and artillery commander:::. and he mu..,t, thf'l'pforp. fanul­ lar with their plam~ of art ion. I The inrI/utili ('OlJiiJlflllrlll acquaint:-. tlw artillt-'11.\' com­ mander with the fol1O\ving riptail . . · (I) The situatlOll, ol'del':i l"l'eelvpd, lllfol'matlOn of thl' enemy. (2) His own plan of actlUl1. t'Aplculling hb mlsbion so that the artillery commander mny be .aule to mtervene effec­ tively with his fire, e\'en un hi~ O\\n illitia1i\'e. h{Jth in the rase of an obJectl\'e prp\'iotlsly ue:-'lgnated. or in cage that he ('an no longer l'e<.elve l'cquc::,t.5l fur fire from the mfantl''y commander due to a temporary lacl( of communications. (3) Enemy elements-known 01' assumed-to be taken under fire by the artillery during- the preparation or COllnter­ preparation phases:, as wel1 as m Hw attaek or defense


*The ltahan army is paying ('lose attention to cooperatlOn he hveen infantry and artilll~ry III battle Although no detaIl.:; tire Dvail­ able. it is unde-r">tood that such cooppratlOn was \'f>ry effeetivply and efficiently carried out bv the Italwn troops ill the war in Spam and it is probable that this Clrcular is the result of the experIence gained in that war.


The Nco commauriel's agree between themselves the follOWing:

a~ to

( 1) Reference points. (2) :\fethods of designation of unforeseen objecth'es (~) lItlethods for the trammllSSlOn of request:::; for fires, and rhangp~ of fires_ (4) Method::; to secure coordination between the ad­ \ ancing infantry and the supporting artillery (setting watches, fiare.;;; and similar means)_ 'Vhen there is ::.ufficient time. the two commanders pre flare together or exchange the gketches and documents which they conSIder useful for a' better and more complete co­ o}leration between the two arms. In the attacl{ with large forces against an enemy or' gamzed on a defensive line. cooperation takes place on the hasis of precise arrangements. which are set forth in a plan of fires. more or less detailetl,~ according to the information obtamed of the enemy'f, uefemdve position Preliminary arrangements are often· based upon a few known elements and. in most cases, upon assumptions which ~

· :\. Vol.


XX No. 76

. .:.

often do.not conform to the-actual situation. In such a case, It will be necessary to make new arrangements dUring the course of the action, which should be an easy matter if the i.\\0 command post.., are in the same locality or close to­ ~etlier. Such location of command posts should invariably he the rule. Preliminary arrangements and requests for fire are two III the greatest responsibilities of infantry commanders; but In battle the unforeseen case is usually the normal rule, 111:'11ce, the artIllery commander should be a man of iniUa· tiW.

Foreign Military Digests for whom the panoramIC vision of the terrain in the vicinity of the objective is almost the same, wilfbe able to understand each other more easily than two observers far from each other for whom the panoramic vision may be entirely dif­ ferent. The following points shOUld be borne in mind by observers ,,,hen designating objecti~es: (1) He who Imhcates an objective must try to imagine in the place and condition of the person who must identify the obJective. (2) 'In referring the objective reference points. use preferably the mctiC'atlOll: yaras to the north (south. west. east) of pomt X."' Do not use: to the right or to the left, as these mdlcatioJls refer to the observation point and therefore they are different from one obRervatlOn point t6 another. (H) It IS always ad"isahle to add a short description OP the ten ain ('}o":e to the obJectivp. (4) The inuication of an obJective is made easier when every observer has on hand a panoramic sketch made from the pOSitIOn of the other ohserver. hml~elf





Artillery objectives are tho<:;e enemy elemehts llpon \\ hlch It is necessary to concentrate artillery fire. They may he: (1) Known-thm~e alrearly identified and ascertained hE' active. 12) Supposed-particular localitIes or zone, which ell'e ,;;uPPof>ed to be occupied by the enemy-either oue to their naturE' 01' on ac':ount of somE' -enemy. activities-terrain fE'atnres, or again. on aceount of the general situation, par~ ticularly if the,,. appear to he suitable for defensive use by tht'{,l1E'my. (3) Unforeseen-those discovered during combat ano. agall1...:.t \\'hkh no action could have been possibly planned in advance. to

Known and supposed objectives are, as a rule, indi­ l'ateti by l'ollvehtlOnal numbers or names. Rf'ff'ren~p points are easily identified and dearly vbi­ ble jl{)lllt.::. of the terrain, selected by common agreement hv JllfulJtr~' and artillery commanders working in close L'O· npel'<-ltJOn, to which refel't'nce always must he made (at lea::-.t (IBe point) for the designation of unforeseen objectives The\' al'e riesigllated by a letter or by a conventional mime. \\ hen a detailed topographic map is available, in addi­ 11011 tu reference points marked on the map and viRib1e ftom a dht.>I1ce 13 bell tower, an isolated building to be identified \yithollt mh;,take, a typical hIill, it i:-:; advisable to select ahm o1her jllllnts which, even If not Visible from a distance, arfl JucllHI",1 within the area to be covered by infantry in its ad­ \ance "nd which ran easily and definitely be located on the map ,1111/ on the terrain-:"uch as road crossings. junction of !'l\\ I'.., and water courses, and the like. II .1 topographic map is not handy or if thetOe are no eha,'''' toristic points marked on the one available, well adapt. ,I details of the terrain must be selected-'llch as hou""p-. trees, rocks, bushes of special shape or aspect which '"'!oil)" casily identified. Such points are noted by artillery ObSE'1 \, I S and marked on the documents necessary fo1' prepa­ latiol! ,f fires. :Ienever possible, reference paints should also be inrIl· cated Ii a panoramic sketch (or panoramic and planimetric) to be ~sl1ed to the commanders of the two arms concernfld and tl Ihe artillery observation posts. de indication of the objective to another ohserver may be me,. e or less difficult depending upon the distance between thet"" observation points; two observers close to each other,

! ." ~




DeterminatIOn of an objective IS the exat't indication of the topographic position of an obJective, with its coordinates and altitude, l"ef"lTed to a givcl\ map. The determmation of nn objective (not comdrlering the compie-x topographic methods \vhiC'h cannot be employed by advanced patrols) may he made with rapid methods by l'efer('nc(' to an nbSel"V3tlOn post the position of which IS w('l1 defined. It is then unly nect'l"sary to mea-:::ure: the direction. the lli«.tance ~nd thE' altitude. REQUFSTS 1"OR FIRE

Thf'> reqllE'st for lire concerning an unfol'e~t'E'n oO,lective must contam. If pos~lble, the followmg informatlOu: (1) Type and location of the objective. (2) Time itmlt& (lJeJ!,'"inning and duration, or beginning


and ending) of the al'tilJery action. and result~ be ~ecurf'd (normally. neutralization; exceptIOnally, destructIon). (3) Position of the mo~f advanced friendly troor" "ith respect to the obJedn e. (~) IndIcation of the tactics to be adopted by lllfantt·y troop'"' for conquering the ohJective. Requests for hl'e must be made wdng the minimum num­ ber of words. . Practically, wht'll arl'ang-ements have been made well

ad\·ance, a request for fire may bE' ve~'y brief. It it:; not al\\ays easy fOI"the infantry commalJder to foresee the duration of artIllery 111'£' that vdB be required to sccure the dc:;ired re)":ult. A~ rule, ~uch information can he a~cel'tained onl~' when in~~ntry resumes Its advance. which caw;es the reaction of enlm}' fire. It is therefore. advisable 0 ag-ree m the preliminarY al'range~ent:; upon a normal Ul'ation of fire ·(so~e ~in­ utes) ~ufficient for the neutralIzation of the u~mal obJectlves which are genE'l'ally pncou!ltered in war. \Vhen necessary. the l'erlllf'st for nrp may ml'dify slwh normal driration of fire or the request for fire may he rereated. \Vhen usmg concentration of fire. a duration of fire longer than from 3 to 4 minutes is not advisable. as a rule, In





)'orei'gn Military;Digests

C. & G.S.S. Military Review I

because, aside from th(> r(>sultmg numbpl' of rounds rpquir~d, it can be assumed that after such le'ngth of time the men still uninjured will ha\'€ mo\'ed outside of the rarllll<.:. of ac~



During neutralization fire. infantry advances to the limit of safet,· and halls until the agreed number of minutes of artillery fire have elapsed, then suddenly jumps fonvaIjd, ~upported by the tit e of its ll\','n arms. ' In some ca~t\S mfantry WIll request al'tlllery hl'e <;,ll)1­ pori. in orneI' to rome riO:<'PI to the oh,l(>cti\'e and It wIll not ah\ay" be p01'>sIbie to indicatp the nece.., . . ary llumber of mill­ utes; therefore. neutl'a1!zatlon tIre WIll last untIl the m­ fantry, ha\ Ill$! attamed the ~afet.Y limit, gin's the ~ign~l for shiftmg tire (in thI:-;' ChSC neutralization will last longer, but It will be It>s~ mtcmnve). The end to be attamed IS a perfed s~'nchroni~m Let\H'en f:hifting artIllerj. fire and rei-uming the advance on the part of mfant]~;. Requp.. . t for fl1'r 1<;;, made by the lllfantry command~I' (genenlll~' battalIon commander) directly to th~ eommander of the supportmg arOller,\' 1I1lit (p-en(lrally the commander of the l"peclfic "HJlportlIlg gUHlp) \\lWIl they .up cln;..e tog-eth~ eI'; If thlf: IS not the cU:-,f', retllte1'>ts \\,111lJe made by means Df the artlllt:'IY 0 C. patrol , The artillen 0.(' (ob;"('f\atioll~COmml\l1lCatlOll) patrol attached to the Illfantl'Y commander b . . .tatlOned nt the hearlqnHI tPI . . of the l,itter :md l11u ....t lIlyanably 1I1sure com~

municatlOll with the artillery headquarters from which it i ... detached. If necessary, it is also connected with any obsel ~ vation detail which the infantry commander may have stH~ tioned m some other locality. Tbe flare alone is not sufficient to indicate a request for tIn's as it cannot indi('ate the objective unlesg such signal was determined and agreed upon in advance. TherefO! e the flare is employed for requesting fire against a target preVIOusly agreed upon (beginning and endmg). fnr rpqne~t­ ing an increase in range or for end of fire. ~ormallY. the transmission of a request for fire is made hy radIO, telephone 01' other means of commUDlcatlOn aV911­ able, and mu~t ::.peC'lfy the following: (1) The line reached by infantry. (2) The objective against which fire lS requpstf'd. (3) Subsequent requests for lllcreast' III ran~e O}' end· Ing nre.

Anyone means of communication may, by itf-elf. be in"'ufficient. It is therefore necessary that various mean'l, uest ,suited to the bituation, be prepareu, so that there will always UP more than one available. Artillery is responsiLle for ~llch communications WIth its own pel sonnel and eqUip ment. It is. however, ad\'isable for infantry to co~perate with Its own means, partIcularly in the advance phase whl·n then' IS a. gleClt demand for communications and g'l'eat urgPllt ~ of artillery support.

Defense of Infantry Units Against Air Attack {"La d",fpn"'e ('ontr~ ,lYlOnS dans les umtes t!''fu'," by Capt:llll X Cllnd('nsed from Ret'llc I/f', S<'ptf'mucr 1~l:J~ Ttanslat~d from the Frpn('h m the HlstOrTcal SectIOn, The Arm~ Wal Coiil.'gf', W,'l<;hmptton, DC]


B\ ('APT41"1 ~l R

Thi' \\.Il 111 Sp.1I11 h.t"> ~hn\\'n ImpOl't,l111 chang'p:o: 1Il all' tact its hy I ea"'un of th€' technical PI Og'l ef'f. of aviatltl11 and of tIlt' pl'rfectlnn of :-Ill'ciai illlftaircraft armament. The lattel' h~Lo.., {'c1l!":l,d dlI11111ltIP~ tn aiq)lalw~ abovE' -1,500 ·to 6/100 feet All plane~ han' . . nught to 3\'Old thiS danger by U1'jlTIg 100\t'1 al-tltudu:; and b~· "hedge-hopping"; at thef.e 10\\'f'1' altltlHks antwll'cl'<!ft nrll11l'Q lm:es much oj It" effl;'c­ tivene:.-\~ and cannot e\'en operate \\ ithout dallgel to its oWn ground troops. Henel' mtnll1ry ~h'Ould he highly lOlll't'l'ned in assuring its own defell~e Con-;icierahlf' effort has been made in recent p'ars to acqIUl'1..' the- n{'n'....... al'~' (l'llIlpment, and tl1l5 ohlecti\'p b about to Ill" I eached. Hilt the employment of thl:-< mat~l'iel is not ·yet \\pIl unth'I'-toud for lack of a defimte tnduing policy, And for lnl k of a broad YICW of thiQ pI'obIem, com~ manderH ~ho\\. at timp:--, a certain indecision ~n the instruc­ tional proce:-..s to be follO\\'ed A stuuy of the followmg l:IubJects should furnish a kno:o..vl edge of the principle" underlying Infantry antiaircraft tac­ tics and instruction: (I) A\'iatinn mbsions. (2) What should infantry fear from these Val'IOUS mis· sions?



(3) \Vhat chal'actE'l'btic"> should anttall'craft \VpallOm


(4) How should lllfantry employ weapons '! 15) The be~t system of lllgtrUCtloo~}n antiairrrnft de fense .?


All' miSSIOns can be g-roupe<l under mI1'>HlOnS of (lest I U(­

tion and mIS::;lons of reconnais::.anc€'. The formpl' melllde.

for our discussion, bombardment and hedge~hoppin~ rtm


Bombardment missions have for their ol>,lectives the'ultion of g10lmd targets. by homh. torpedo, mac1t1ne gun 01' cannon. One can consider that infantry i~ concel ned only with air attack" unde;' 4,500 feet ;.above that altit·lde. antiaircraft artillery becomes really effiCIent. SUlt \h]e targets for bombardment attacks at low altitwlf's are as.. em· bled troops. troops in column, convoys, mechanl'zed tl'O'lpS. : /: general headquarters, raIlroad 5tations, wal'ehouses, etc On account of the cont'ussion from the explosion. the::it at J tack" are seldom made below 3,000 feet. ~ Attacks at very low altitudes (unCleI' 1.500 fet,!) and.J hedge-hoppmg (under 150 feet) seek the same ObJeetIVeSj/ TheIr efficiency IS inereased by the great moral effect and


Foreign Military Digests

Vol. XX No. 76

II" the surprise element. They can be used against anti­ altitude ships have much more difficulty in locating the small .tll'craft artillery to protect formations passing at high elements that make up these columns. If warning be "ltitudes. They frequently attack with maehine gung or gIven m time to permit the troop~ to disperse there will be few casualties. The nQi,. of the motor can be heard twenty ! nnnon which seem to have an eRpecially great moral effect. Re~onnaissance missioml. hy sight or photography, are to twenty·five seconds before the arrival of the attack. In ,p,t effective at altitudes below 3,000 feet. To locate foot ten seconds the dlspersed formation can be taken, provided l k'11ents .in column, they are not effec-tive at altitudes ahave the warning system is properly organized. Columns on 'l.lH)Q feet. foot. therefore. take lIttle ri<;k of observation or attack' from Cro In order to identIfy elements and detachments of troops, the air. ", 0' del' to locate the presence of. hidden installations and Nevertheless, frequent attacks on a column have the ]lll'CPf;:! of artillery, ships mw~t fly at altitudes of less than effect of slowing down the march considerably, and ships :: (jon feet. Location of elements dlspersed in combat, the flying slowly at low altitudes have little trouble in locating the nlll mal liaIson mis.;:;ion. rertuire~ ShlP::3 to fly below 2,400 column. Therefort', it IS nece"sary to organize a defense fu.>t To observe enemy troops trying to conceal thE'mselveo:;, agamst these two conHngencies. ,hip' mIl have to descend to a very low altitude. (1,500 to Troops at a halt need \vorry little about observation o~ loll feet). attack from the air provided meaSUl'es for passive defense It IS qUIte reasonable. then, to expect that avi~tion, haye been taken to screen the troops from the air, to diFlperse \\ lwther attacking; or observmg mfantry troops, will be con­ tnem to a maximum. to protect them in houses or in deep lC'l'Ilt'd especially "vlth assembliE's of troops on the march or trenches In case of an alert. If ar.e bivouacked they. :It a halt. \vith ('onvoy~ and columng, and with bivou:1(,~. It ~hould be well Hpread out o\"er the area and put under cover. , '\\ ill ha\ e the greatest difficulty in attacking or observing \\'hen tlO()P~ ate in the combat zone, thl~Y pass pro­ t]'()"p<;, at a halt or movinP.' ahout, in a dIspersed formation, gressIveIy from column to a dispersed formation. Danger \"\l'll by hedge-hopping methods_ from the ail' !Jecomes then of secondary consideration and they devote to air defem:p only such weapons as are not II-WHAT SHOULD INFANTRY FEAR? needed for ground combat. During fhe approach march, lnfantr} will be brought Hear to the field of battle bv \vhile gaining contact with the enemy, and during the at­ 1'.111, by truck or on foot. Columns On foot and motor .co;­ tack, infantry will have lIttle to fear of hostile observation or \0\'" can m'arly alv,iays move by night. But as far as move­ 8.1r attack. The deployed formatIOn of mfantry troops make:; the fOJ mel" almost impos;?ible and the latter imprac­ I11l2l1t hy rail IS concerned. this invol",es a general circulation ticable. It is "ell known how hard it is for a ship on liaison plan \\ hiCh cannot he interrupted by haltmg durinv the day Thl' defense of railroad trains against air attack must be mISSIOn to locate Its own front hne. Obviously, It IS much pl'l,\ Hi1.,'d. A" has heen previously stated, heavy autian"­ more dIfficult for an obsprver to locate an enemy of\vhom lIttle or nothmg l~ vIsil}le. Preferably, an observer, and rial! materIel IS not satIsfactory against low-ft.ying attack -hip.. , ~md the use- (1f .<,uch materiel tf) l"f'lllforce the defense the attack pilot too, will turn all efforts to locating the move­ ments of reserves and Hupply columns. of l I1tl funing and detraining zones is a matte]" of opimon Troops in an organized d€fensive positwn have little In t1tiwl' words, rluring the movement by rail from entrain­ to fear from ail' attacks, although observatIOn aviation can m~ 11\ detlalOIDA', it i~ against the lov.-flying attack ships be troublesome. DiSCIplinary steps must be taken around thll ' lntuntry mu::.t provide Its O\\ll defense. . Chere \\ III be oc('asion~ when motor columns. especially command posh, to avoid signs of activlty.~ But in general during defen~ive combat, danger flom 'the aIr is only \ 11111' ,able to air attaeks, will have to mOve by day. Ech­ secondary, flt)]l, d even at a number of mIles, they are readily observed I,,· ,I 'I" flymg as high as 15,000 feet. It is necessary to III-INFANTRY DEFENSE AG\lNST AVIATION a-"'\[lI.' theil' protection without delaying their movement. Against Obs(,1 ration The' I' oblem is eH'l1 more involved, masmuch as the assail­ The greatc:::.t Rl'otection is afforded by the U$e of passive ant. I' \'1l1g' Rplected his oDJective. can choose the most favor­ alli!' , .Imt to make hIS lo\v-flying atack. Especially critical defense: movements by night. use of cover, dilSpersion of umts, camouflage. These devices should be employed under nt In:, .t ... are those at points of entraining and detrammg. Thl' , • uulem is not quite as serious as that of a movement all circumstances, Against observation at high altitudes, infantry has no by I. t. however, for it is possible to decentralize motor load",,,,, 01" unloadmgs over a large area, \Vhere drcum­ means for active defense. It is a matter of resorting entirely to our passive measure::.. "t~Hh ~ 1H_'l'mlt such decentralization, the only protection Against observation at medium and low altitudes, pas­ llt'( \' I ry is' against 100v-flying ships. ,]umns on foot are much ]e8s exposed. Ships cannot siye measures are still the mo'st effective. for active meas­ ures would disrlose by their fire the presence "f units that ob~rl c short columns at altitudes above 9,000 feet. Troops mak lr good use of cover (roads bordered by trees, for would otherwise remain invisible, Actlve mE'a&ures would eM" ·Ie) can pass along very well concealed. Horse·drawn be taken only to oblige observation to take altitude and ,0 prevent detailed observation. traIl .ortation is especially vulnerable, but horses, for the Against abservation at very low altitudes, active meas- • rno,- part. will be in eonvoys, defense of which should be ures should be tai<en in every case Rince in such cases it is org",",zed in the same manner as that of motor columns. \Italks on foot colupms would be of little value. To be often impossible to kno\\' whether a ship wishes only to ob­ effe•• ne, they should be made by low-flying planes; at this serve or to attack. 0

. 53


. \.


c. & G.S.S. Military Review

'Foreign MilitaryoVigests

inaccurate sight require the

Agwnst Attacks


of a large number of these

"eapons. The automatic rifle lacks stability. It would be Here again' mf:'aSUreB render groat SP1.i ylc€' :md advantageous to equip it with a stahle support (a pOt't) each should be usen to best acinmtag'l' Active defel1'~e must, timl?- it goe>:; into posltion. "Off-hand tire from the. shoulder" ho:wever. be proVlcit:'d fOi ull plt'ments not only agaill~t h(:'(hre~ is not very effective a5 it p::ive::-. too :nuch dispersion, hopping attacks hut also again:-.t 1hlJ8e at n·ry lo\v a1t1tllrles. The machine g'un, equippeo. with a ~table mount and Organic weapon~ of elpmenh engagE'u in their normal mis­ . having much greater accuracy, is !t much more effective sion should ah\ayt- he t!l\en an ~Intiaircraft missIOn. In weapon than the automatic rifte. Its f'lght has been im~ Ilarticuiar, automatic \\('apOll';: "houln be out In front at proved uy }'ecent modJf1cat1on~. It~ weaknesi is the longer specIally cho~en pOll1t~. . time required for going into action, The til'~t defen:-.p. hm\ e\ e1', mu~t he th~ ol'!mnization of In the ca::;.,e of th~~€' thr('-€' w€apon~. it would be an in­ a hlgbl~· alpr! \\arnmf." . . t"n']tp J-\dl\e Ol' pa":;":'l\\.' mea"tlre<:; tpl'e~ting experiment to w'l'!fy and correct their til'e by the against attack aVlat'oll :11 e inpfTp( UH' unlesB dif'position" use of tI acel' ammUnItion, And it would c1emonstrate the are made ::;wIftly ann ollly when thl' situation requires it to danger 10 ground troopf' from uulletc;; falling back tn the aY0id lOBS of tim~, ground, One might be aule to rlel'l\'e a safety formula fo!' Let U~ I->f't', now, \\ hat so!'t ot' chm actel'lstlcs weapons Imnt ing tire In occupied areas. Bnt could sl1('h ruleg be ap­ should haYe in order to provIde a :-pcure acth p dpfen~e. plIed \vithout renrlel'ing thIS fire llleffective? \Voulrl it be The..,p chala('tf'fl~tJ("" \\JII bE' eXdT1lillf'd IJ1 thPll' relatwn to l'o~::-Iule to {'amply \1,'lth the SpIrIt of such regulation~ in the the altitude ()f attack. LTlSI8 \\hkh 19 alway}, present on th{' appearal1L:e of an at· (1) Attacks IIIl to 1.5l)() fl'et III such '"-ltuatlOn~ infan~ try mu!'>t defend It . . elf 111 ('\err ca...;e Infantry alltIaIr­ taCk~'ip at a \'erY low altitude? e emplo,yment of the three mf:mtrr \\papong ~hould craft weapons, III ofl.h'r tn be df'ectl\ e a~ain:'-t these !O\\ at· ue go "ern eo uy the following rules' tacks, ~hou!d: lH' ablL' lu \)" plan'li In PO"'lt.on lllo;;tnntly; be ahle- to follow or l;\l'n nntH ipate thf> movement" of the hos­ ( ) In all open Ill'£' with the maXlllltlm numher of tile ~hi}J: be pl'o\'idt'd \Yllh it ,.i'lll)!e dnd flt.:'.\.lhl l, aimIng "'y:-.­ weapon},. tem~ employ no ",o-laJled n1L'a"'1I1'<?-menh, 01' ca\cUI:;ltlOn of tZ) DUlmg mo\ement.-:;erunty i-.;pn,..,~i\J\!2't~llough riflE' data, but be lontf'nt \\ltl! aPJlIOXlmatlOn~: be ablt' 10 place and automatk tire. Thank:--. to their availability, thui2 the maXimum numlJt'1" of pr()jl'llilL's in the \'Iclfuty of till' weapons can prevent sUl'pri:"e \vhich al\\Cly.. . th1 eaten~ tl',Jop., tar~et in the lime ~l\"ailabh': I)c ablp t·) place th(' ho..:.tde "lhIJl'" on tht' march, Automatic rifles should be out of theIl' l'a~e" under tire at a maximum range of t;OO yards WIth Sights ~et The f..oidier cal'rying the mount ::,holl~d ; (2) Attack~ bet\H'en 1.500 and -L500 f'f't't Inf:l.l1try march ueside the man carrymg the gun, Machtne gun~ can has nothing to flom thl:- "'Oil uf dangel' flom the eliI'. Tie employed thl:' same as at a halt, sent out ahl'ad, g~attered J .unles~ It is In column, lOIl\ ny. Ol" halted ch)~l:'d Ull Dl'fen~ive alon~ the lint' of mal'lh {'8P('c1aHy at I.' pomb m the \\l:'ftPUlb Hg-ain . . t :-'Ih'h <lttil 1\" leqllllt' llllre<l<>eu fie:\ilHlIty column, (3) At halt1" machine guns Will be the basl~ of the- de­ and preClf;lOl1, FIl'lIlg" clatR ",honld he calcllla1L~d WIth CM·t.' The m(TPa~t-'u "~J1ge I'PlpJII\:''' ... malil'l dl"'pel:-.ioll In onll~l' to tense and they WIll cover the mo~t dang-el uus aH'nUl'f> of ap­ proach, TheIl' tIre should he supplemented by the Uf'E' of keep the dl'n~lt\ of thl' Jll'll,ll'diles \\ lthm t'tfectl\"t..' llmlt:-. automatIc rifles to augment the TIre of the machine guns, to Rate of tIn.> ~hotlhl he \ t'J ~ l,qnd On [lll',HlIlt 01 the £langeI of fallmg pro,lectlit-'.:;, It I.. . Ilt'l{'>":"~:lr~' fol' lht.'m tn t''i:pludL' In impi ove the InterltJr uefen::-.e of' the area, or to covel' avenues of ap)roach not protected by the mach me guns. the air antomatically. (4) In tomLa!, advancE' elements, ao,;: \\e have fleen, need Such weaJ:olls <ire s}lC'naIized and con~titut('- d. part of the organIC weapons of nntIaIl'll'ai't nrtlllelY. It hping 1m· WOI1')-' little auout attacks t'lom the air, J;tpar clem('nh. re· practical to a..,~igll sudl \\e~l}lons tIl infdntIY unit . . , the qtle 5­ flen'e element::;, shollid t'mpioy their nfiC'" ~nu automatlc tlOn arigef, a:-< to \\ hetlwr ul' not the PO\\'('1' of t h(' wfanll'Y rifle:::; and consider ..::u(h use the normal mbS!On of tht'se machme I{un could ve Illcl'l'a:-.ed anti :-.lIh...tllutcd fUI such guns, mal'hine gun" 5ohouId be u~p{l if thele IS tIme tl) mount hea\,Y \\eapon...,. It" not, infantry r.lll:-t 1'(':--OO1't to a pi1S~I\'e them Buliets falhng balk to tht' ground are a danger not to VI:' neglected. hut it IS difficult to .see how efi'ecth-e meas defen~C' agallbt .:ur attatk~ frODI alltl\'e 1.500 feet ure" can be takell to aVOid tillS uangel, I\,_~E;\lPLtn:'vILNl or llHGANIt \\'EApn~B

The nrle firl'~ olll,Y a :-.iUgll' bullet. Rut the snlluitant'ou::-, fire of a large nmnlJe'1 pf the'I' \\ t'npon.., build.:; up ,i uem;l' zone of proJectile'" about thl' <lllplant.', L':::;e of tlie nfie If; almost instantHneou~ Th . ., lack of a SUItable sight makes the rIfle dlihcult to L1~(' at the }1l'P::-.ent tIme, The method of ('OlTel tion, aiming a l'el ta 1 11 llumber of fusela!!c lengths ahead of the ship. I~ s\.:allely practlcable agall1st hedge-hop­ ping attacks and l an nnl~' 'Le plft:.'ctIve under H~l'Y faYol'able conditIOns again~t \('r~' I. \\' rt~'l11~ planes. The automatic I ille I~, \\ ithout a doubt, bcttt-'l' :-.uited to the condItIOn'{ of the III oblt-m thnn the nftl' It l:an go mto action very rapidly Its slow rah.' of fire. Its dl.spel'sion, its 0


As we haye :::;(>en, thl' attive defense again:;t 11lane~ dt­ tacking at altItudes aho\'c 1.500 feet devo!\'es upJn weap­ ons not assIgned to Infantl}, umtB, Employeu In relativl'ly few numbeI~. their the nIU~t he anllrate. they must h.\ve sights pel'mltUng prt'Clse adJuHtments, theIr proJectIles ~hould explode in the all'. Tlwir normal miSSl.Oll wlll be pl'O' tectian of tl"tlOP concentrations, whether infantry, a"tillery, or I)ther branches, ThIS miSSIOn mdude~ units on the march or at a halt. If protecting troops on the march they ,hould he located at sen,-;itive pnlDt~ where an air attack would be pal'tH:ularly remuneratIve, \\'hen protecting a bivouac area, the gun positions should iJe on the most likely avenuef; of ap­ proach of the attacking planes. They should be at a suffi­





'Vol. XX NiJ.76

Foreign Military Digests

cient dlst~nce from the area and should be occupied 8uffi· llPntiy in advance to he able to tirE' un hostile ships before 1he)· reach effertive range (4.500 feet) from( the troops to lJe defended, Good visibility in all directIOns'is nece,%ary. and a hostile ship should be cO\'('red by two sections of de­ ft'l1se guns at any time, V-lNFANTRY INSTRUCTION IN ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRING A~

far as the defen~p against very low flying attack concerned, the war in Sp:' showed that antiaiI'­ rt aft meaRures were not effective, The following ex plana­ tl1111~ of this weakness arE' advanced: :--hill~ \\'as

(1) t

No adequatp warning system was org-anized, WIth ~mrprise and telTor among those unarcuF;tomed

tt, I'e"ultmg

to "'!lch atta('kF;,

(2) A lack of Instruction, Rho\\n by th(, failure to use \\C'aponF. and the slo\vnf'sF. in tlsing special \\papom:;


The.;:.e h\'o \\eaknes..:,es emphat-.ize the nece~';'lt:v for in­ ..;tlllltlun In tmw of peace aiong certalll line!'. \\'hatever the Imaginary Rltuation may be. and whe-1'­ ('\t'J Illl .... t-.ible USIng frIendly ",hips to rcprt'sent the enemy. lhv 01 ~al1lzation of a warning ~\ ~tem should be ~o perfected th;\t ali are familta,' WIth It and itc; op!?l'atit)U hecomeR a t! ll\' rl'tiex action .-\11 units should bel'ome t-l;ccu.;,tonH"d to ha\'ln~ ships fly ml'J tht'm In <::.imulated hedge-hopping attack ">0 that they \\ til I t'.... train their normal J efte\'" vf uroppmg to the ground n~ qUllldy ag pOSSible- and thl1f:. ,'mn thell' l·hal1L'es for de­ fen ... t' Dy fl equent E''\.prCl:<.et-. \\ lth th'e aY13tlOTI thpj' ~hnuld ,(lclImpli.-.h this. LurIng such exerCIs:es every illdi\'iuual ::;houl!l be made 'In I'eall/t' the importantt' of the u-,p of the maXImum number uf \\\·,qlOn . . to a"'~lI1'p this ciefenst' \\Ithuut l("ttlll}!; It dt.'­ ),!"l'llPI«\{' mto a u-.l.eless "frpe-fOl'-all."

Every effort should be made to score a large number of hIts on slee\'e targets towed by low-flying'ships so that the men become accustomed to this kind of fire. and. by the results obtained. gain confidence ;n their 'weapons, It would be well to note III this connection that if un­ satisfactory results are obtained in thie firing· at towed targets" it is prohably because. for safety reasons, the firing waf; done under difficult circumstances, the <:;hip passing at right angles. thus lellUil'ing a large sight correction. It seems certain that It 1S possible to get plenty of hits under fa\'oraLle conditions, by making the ShIP follow a cou'rse rea.;;onably parallel to the axis of fire and not too perpen­ dicular. It IS well to l'emmrl solciiel's that the aviator i..;; interested in the target only when he is flying directly to\Htrds it and not when he i:-. detouring to one SIde, It· should be sho\\n that it iq much HHJre pIofltahle to shoot at greater !'anges at ships (oming directly toward the firer tha'll at clooSer ship::- passmg to nne side, Infantry It-. far from being helpless against air attack. prOVIded it fortihes itse-If In iti" own domain. It will never be assured of an adequate defenflc untIl it organizes its anti­ aircraft defen:~E' in the m08t minute detail~. translates this schoolIng mto reflex actIOll of all concerned and puts this in­ Rtruction on the san.e footlllg ao other kindR of combat firing. If. in the face of an air attack. each man is I.mbued WIth the Will to defend hm1Oelf. to fire eSl'ecmll; when directly attacked; jf the maximum number of weapons are employed; if ImmedIate ail' secUl'ity and the USt? of overhead cover are carefully ('ool'dmated; if an adequate warning service has been de\'bed; If commanders keep In mind the best passive defense rnea5Ul'eS, onE' can be a::,:-,ul't:'d th;~.t enemy ships will adopt a much more prudent altitude. Again they will believe as they did at the end of the war of IUlI·1D1S that mis­ SIOns at low altItude,::, an' the mo",t difficult and. the most dan,l!eI'OUS, and thell:: mclmatlOn wlil "be to pasg by rapidly_

War in its Reality and ·the General of the



und Zul~unftsfeldh€'rr," by General Wt'tzE'll CondenM.'d from MtlduJ-·lVocbl'l,­ /dlltf,3 lVlar('h 193V,] By MAJOR WILLIAM H. SPEIDEL,

Tb, ·'Portrait of the Model n General" sketched by me 1i1\..(!\ from actual conditIOns whi(,'h existed during the World \\'al', the actual disposition of the armies in 1914 and t1 e elllll1Y 81tuatlOn as known on 15 August. It is not based nil trr ·...;chlieffen Plan of 1005, which wn,,", never ('arl'wd out. and \\ j lth. hS Ludendorff sayf'>. "did not even fit the situation ""\f':l '\.Isted -In 1914," No,v it is qUIte possible that my ill Optl~, d dispositions might have heen misinterpreted and mlSapltllf'd by individual subordinate c9mmanders: These fau!ty ,onceptions are obstacles which cannot be overcome i:-.

~T. IS IS the third and concludmg article written by G€'nerai \Vetzel! under the mam title Das Blld dell modernen Feldhe1'j·u [Por­

tralt 01 the modern general]. The first two Installments appeared In prt'\'iQu~ numbers of Mtlttar.Wocltenblatt. published 17 February and 24 FeLl uary 1939, respectively. The "Catalog of Selected PerIOdical A.l'tlcIp,," in the COllmtand and General Staff School Military Ret'lew contam~ abstracts of thf'se two installm€'nts m the Deeember 1939

and current issues.

bt/ant1 {/

by the commanner III ('hief, if he remains at his desk and relies solely on the> telephone. Not only Moltke. but Goltz. Schlieffen. Freytag-Loringhovell and 'others continually \\arll against such a situation, -cautionhtg that each army commander in \var as well as in peacetime exercises and general staff rides will have his own personal operations plan, To overcome these obstacles requires personal inter­ vention and oral discu::;;sions. the example as set by the great Moltke. Thi~ is my conception of the modern general, for this is the way in which Ludendorff generally exercised his com­ mand_ In spite of the excl'ssive responsibility forced upon him and that which he a5Rt\med voluntarily, he was never bound to his deRk. Whenever the situation permitted be hastened to his armies in order to discuss personally his objectives and intentions and to learn the opinions of the


, . \. Foreign Military Bigesis commanders at the front, their chiefs of .staff, etc .. as well as the vIews and wishes of the troup~. Now. it is unfortunate that General von Falkenhayn. III a~sumlllg hIg most dIfficult l'gle. acted otherwise. Hi~ ::,.trategic conception was thoroughly sound and promIsed great succe..::~ Had he \'181ted the decisive right flank Immediately, preferaLly the Second Army and the much maligned Field lIlarshal von Bulow, he would have found the best foundatIOn and support for h" new, highly prospectl\e strategIc idea. Instead he remained at his desk at G.II.Q .. and, a» hIS predeces>or had done four weeks previously. permItted hIS Chief of Operations to 111fluence him in changing hb muul. He allowed him~e1f to be persuaded to commIt the fatigued troops of the First and FIfth Armies to a fl"ontal attack and to ISSlle ominoll" ordrl''' "to paf,S through the hostlle artIllery tire." This \\'as the begInnIng of the confidence CflSIS, which W(lq aggravated stIll more by the unsuccessful "race to the sea" and the effects of \'erdun III 1Dl6. It finally Cdnle to an end with the entry of RumanIa mto the war. Such were the con~equence~ of a command exercIsed from the dbh Itldis]JpnsaLle con· tact \\-'ith the front \va::, often inckll1g. In thiH respect our history of the \\-TorId \\'al' fllahps ll~e of the tf'rm "stranger at the front." The commander III ChlPf \\ Iii Ile\'er bel'ome a strange! at the front If he mamtulI1s the llece~sary close contact with his illstrumellt of war. If he shuns the role of the solitary, learned thll1ker at the de~h and \ IS1t:::; the \'anous army head· quarters a.s often a::-. pOSSible, hi':! ~OUl1U cOBceptIOn of war will fore\'pr spare u-; the recurrence of . . uch a SItuation. The attitude as..;,t1med by the commandlllg genprals III J"emainm£" as much fiS t\\'el1t~ miles behl11d the frol}t on the .. important day::, of a battle, cOlldul'tmg thpir operatIOns without maintaining close COil tact \\,Ith the l'oq)" commander::. at the fr{mt. hall at the begllln1l1g of the \Vol'id \\'ar the worst pOSSIble effect not olll~ on G H Q , but Oll the mdl\ iOU,11 armie::- <1::. well During the \\llItel' of IDl'j·lnlg, pertment to the conduct uf the sprlllg olfl'n~l\,p. the ThIrd High Command ordered: "The iOC:ltIOJi 01 thp command po..;t I~ of \'Ital importance, All :-.tafT::-. tho~e ot corpf: allti army. belong OIl the hattletield The dlVIsIOn command post...; must ue \vell forward" EYeli after four year~ of \val' the..;,p orctel'~ \vere partially di~re!!arded \\'Ith dptJ intent.!! pffE'L't. For example, the gap at AmJells alld the olle at Montdidier were neIther l'ecogmzed nor e,\ploitf'tl opportlll1f'ly. 1101' \\'l'l'l' the} reported to thE'- IIhrh C\)mmand at llealU} A\e.. . nf:':-., it Sltu~ ation which created all ob~tacl(' to ultimate :-.ucces..... The conduct of the E;ghlh Arm) b)' lhe lIilldellUUl'g.Ludelldol'ff combination durll1g thp BattlE> of Tal1J'lt'lluerg senes as an outstanding and p\'el"la:-.tllW: examplt' tor the exa.rClse of a high command. Contrary to the Op1l11011 ot F()er~ter, I believe that the modern general. like the older l\.foltkE'. shollld play an occasional game of whist or, n, "ii' the halHt of one of our most prominent army commanders. a gal1W of bridge, if he COl1sidpr!' it heneficIal to lu" mental 1'pla\.,11inn \Vith :1pparpnt effect it was the custom of the French Generalissimo Joffre, a man with l1erye~ of "itf'el-Liddel1 Hart refers to him as the "nerve tonic of the Entellte"-to retIre at 10'00 PM to the exclusion of all ,ubsequent caller, Pel'hap' thilt may be l'iOmewhat extreme, stIll the more spnl'll1g' the responsible commander in chief is of his phy::;ical condition, the more 56

C. & G.S.S. Military Review WIll his mental condition be improved. He will profit IJY following the words of the ancient Roman: "M2'nirna ~U·fl Whenever possible Foch unburdened him­ self upon his chief of staff and confidant-Weygand. Speak­ mg from my personal war experiences, if I may venture Lo say, it would often have served us profitably had we acted likewise from the beginning of the war. Upon the outbreak of hostilities the military commander of the future WIll be confronted WIth the most difficult proh. lem produced by the World War-the breakthrough, whIch today must' consist of penetrating permanently fortified frontier zones. I again disagree WIth Foerster that. "during the preparation of this highly complicated method of attack. the commander in chief must remain far behmd the front and that personal reconnaissance of the terrain or even the hostIle situation h; superfluous and useless." It is my belief that the opposite IS true I refer to the activities of the Third Iligh Command durlllg the winter of 1917-1918, when It Wm., preparing for the great spring offensive of 1918. Without a personal general knowledge of the probable battle lone. without an intimate personal collaboration with the <::,ubordlllate commanrler:. concerned and without regard for their requests and opinions. insofar as time permits, such a tremetldously difficult task as the attack against a modern fortified ZOlle can never be 5uccessful. It will not be the "commander at the desk," but the one with the carefully belected ami tramed 5taff covering all parts of the front, who WIll hring detory to hb colors. Today, even before the ontbreak of hostilities, extensive use should be made of the automobile and especially the airplane (particularly durIng the PE'l'lOrl of concentratIOn). It is the personal leadership emanatmg from the commander during intimate cooperatIOn which b. the ,ource of that subliminal confidence between hIm :Hld hIS instrument. eyen down to the youngest soldIer. a confidellce th3t IS .so essentIal to success m war, and one nUlt pre\"ailed ill InI8. But the task went bpyond our strength; IIOW we were fighting ag'lll1st practically the en, til p world. at last even the Americans. To .quote Moltke, "the military commander is the fate of tlw llation," Regardlest-> of the magnitude of the head of the !-tate. succe~q or faIlurE' 1Il \val' depends solely upon the capacities of the military commander \ Only the seasoned soldier. the general staff officer \vho has received a thorough training in \var or de\'oted himself t6 serious study, and who has beel} tested in a great \'ariety of peacetime assignments. WIll qualify in !-uch a capaCIty. He \\-'m have to safeguard against those political demands which are opposed to the nature of \var Even the great German mllital'Y statesman in ]866 made a f'eriouf> military error in cau~ing Vogel von Falkenstein to march on Frankfort on the :!'\il~in, instead of establishing contact with the hostile forces in South Germany ~ and defeating them. This'mistake waR averted only Lya,t change in the High rommalld. Again in 1870 Bismal·ck. .] despIte his eminent military qualifications, was respon~ible for the faulty concepHons which arose after gedan relative to the contllluatlOll of the war. It was onlv due to the heen militar~' perception of the king that these ~concePtiol1s ,'ere finally corrected and the war was continu£"d as proposed by Moltke. In accordance with all our experiences a selection of the commander of the armed forces' from the very best material cw'(/f praetor."



Vol. XX No:76 available should be made during time of peace. The state.­ man should make a definIte declaratIon of his political alms at an early time in oruer that the military commander may have a definite basis on which to construct. his peacetime preparations, the plan which will determine the military­ l)olitical objective to be gained in the evellt of war. In time of \\~l.r the miIitar:r commander alone fulfills the \"'Ilnf tl1P . . tatt'~mafl. Therefore, since the military commander must :'lIuol'dinate him~eJf to the head of the :-.tate (statesman) With regard to the dynamic aml dl'c!..,l\(' policy ill peace and It:- nOjedlvct. In \var. the heHd of the .sL1:te accordlflgly mnst . . l1bnnlillate hlm~elf to the mliItar,r ctlmmallller lIlsofar 3<:-> the .Iccompli"hmt.'nt of the mllital) victory 1:-. concerned. WIth()ut thIS condItIOn the poiIc.\ (,<lIll1ot achieve its cruwl1lng ...lllLE''''''' 111 war, In order to attain this cOfl!'(irllatlOn of the pohtIC3l <-I lid military ~llm::, find ~tctll)llS III Will', it is necessary Ih,lt 111 tIme of peace·the head of the ~ta1e apprme the opel:­ atJ01J"" draft lJl IH'lIlelple. Such a condItIOn l'xIstf'd at thr tlOW of Bbmarck und :\Ioltke, It I" \ ital to the welfare of 1ft' IlJtlc)ll, therefore. that the head of the state bl~ competent to ,lPPI'Pl'latr thE' milItary sltllatU\1l :tntI HlHt the mllltarv cumrnrlnder he able to ulmpJehl'lJ(l thp affail''' of politic">. on~ eql1.tlly [l':; well a" the other. \Vhile thi:3 cowlitlOll e'\isted dill ill)! the period 01 BI~mar('k nnd ~\,Ioltl:l" It ~lllfol'tLmately \\,(" larking in the yean~ plt'cedlt1g ,111(1 during the \Vudd W(lI'. \Ve ~hcdl need It rlgalll, If t'W'l' We art' confronted by ,l "'lmJlar "ituation. During his peacetime prepardtion for \\ur the military commannel', ill edncatin1,! and tl ,1l1l11lg Ill . . :-.uhonlmate lom­ mandel'S flnci theil' staff". mo:-::t '-trin;;' to harnlrl!1l7l' theIr VH?\\;-, with hi:-. OWl!. In theory tl1l:-; nIdY lJP HCt'ompli"lht'd h.\ E'vahwtI Ilg' the experience gal1lf'o 111 \YiU'Up to the m()~t l't'celll . tlnw.... h~ fo:-:.tering thl' ~ttlrl) IIf' military . . cjei1Cl~ <lnd h~ par­ tlcipdtillg activply \\ith hi . . chipf:-. of :'-l'dioll ill '-taff ndp:-., \\.11 )..:,1111(>;:' and tnctlL'id e\.ell'l~e ... All t~'}l(':- III tleh1 p~el'l'he:-., lllcilldu\!! JOlllt m..ll1ellVt~1 ~ oil a ldrg"l:' ~c~ie cOllducted l'e.II1:-.­ l1c[,IL. ;I1'e of ('qual im[liJ1'Lll1L'P III thl . . l'Ollllt'i.'tl011 I wj"h ttl ..fl·e ..... 1;'l' \'i.l,lue of :-.heletoll e'\.t'n'l""p.... Ill\'OI\'J)1g <Ill In'<-lnche;:-. rJf ll,illtJllal defellM:'. tor thf'~ COIl:-.tltlltC .1 COl1n'r.. . 1tl11 of thE' t!"l'\lt .. Cdf I'Hies into the "practilitl t:ondlld of hWh corn­ Ill,UIIl. • ,;ccomlJ.tlllcd b~ .tIl the t rictI')]} pl'c ...ent 111 Hetti:!! \\;11

Silt h d thorough ml'thod vf tl"tining WIll dt'Vl'lop an

of W,11' \\Itll cllmmantiC'r:-; and trnops p1'l'pared for nn emcrg-cnc.. .·. StIll 111 onlel' to employ thl~ Will' ma­ rhine ".lH'rtl~· llnrJl'l' actlldl condltlOll:--, 01H' must have .l tommclu(/('I' 111 chlf'f who i" familwl' \\ith thl' U'lE' of thE' \'UrWll ~ technical aids of a high command. He must 1l0t be <l gellt'l',d who "makl's hi:-. plans ~t <-l dl?~l\ III ~ome distant Warm IJITIce," but a leader mentally J.lert, heepll1j! hlm:o:;elf aile! hl~ ..,tuff con:-.tantl.\- 011 the move. ]1o~:-.e .. ~illg the cOllfi~ dencE' nf hi~,.subol'dinatl? commdnder~ and troops. l'pmnining I'/;".ll l1.t, front and Illstl11I11g mOl alp ill hi~ :!l'mit'..;-a mall of fict)OJl1. His appeai<:lllce at the .spot where tht~ main blow !, neiJ"el'Po mu..:;t be opportune: wherever l1ecC'~sarv, mn ,t ue prf'pared t~ as~ume command personally, impo~­ BIg'!ll wIiI upon the conduct of operations alld the war ill genel',d, for it Ls he who :-:;olely is responsible to the state and ib dll~l~lh Our !treat German mlhtan' hi..:.tory. in this re­ specr. nifers Ll~ the best c'{amples in :-.uch character::;; as Fredel Jcll the Grpat, Blucher. (;npisenau and the g'l'eateRt of lIbtiUllH'Il1


Foreign Military Digests all, Field 1I1arshal Count Moltke. Following the instructions ot the latte1' and the tl'ammg which he received from SchUef­ fen, Ludendorff, the greatest German general of the World "Tar. conducted Ius operatiom; during the greatest struggle III the history of the world, Judging from my own exper­ iences in war, It appears to me that the latter presents the mo~t worth-while example and a realistic war-time portrait of the modern general.


III the AprIl l!Xm l~tme of lVt.'i~'H'n und lVehr Colonel Foerster presents a reply to the series of articles written by t~el1elal \\,'etzellllnder the main title Dos Rlld def; Jindcrnen Fe/dl"" /'/1, ThiS reply employs the same title, but adds the SUbtItle, A 11'(H dot De/elise {Iud EX]JlmwtlOlI [Ein Wort der Auwehr unci Verstandlgllllgj, Colonel Foerster's article in condensed form is pl'et>ented as follows. The twenties aud thirties of' the nineteenth century introduced an (,I'a Df inventIOns. Even though the roots of that era reach well into the past, the fact still remains that a ma::,~ of 1I111ovatlOll~ appeared suddenly. affecting funda­ mentally the eOlldltioll~ of lIfe in peace and in war. The cOlldltlOlb and IJo:-,sibilities of milital'Y command were influ~ ellced to "'lIch iill e::-.tent that we may be Justified in speaking of a "lIew period," In hIS in...,tJ'llctio118 to 'Co~nnwlldel's of fAil rtf Clld." :\Iolthe. ill 186b. states: "The progress made in the fit>l(l or I t'l'h1l1l}lIe. Impru\ ('ment~ in communications, the Illtrnuuetloll of lIe\\ arms, uriefty. the complete change in cOI](htlOlI~ appear to prohibit the employment of means for~ n1t'rl,)- n~t'tl to ~pCUl'e \'H:tory and even to upset the rules as 1.1Id dm\ II hy the greate':->t militar..... leaders" A repetition {)f thl~ :-tutemellt ill hb re\ igion of 1885 mdicates that he attached a la ...tll1g' TI1eallll1g to it. Although iVIoltke \\ as Hot the first military leader to make u~e of the I dllroads to 5hift troops quickly from one POHltIoll tl) anotlwl'. he \V~h thE' fir~t general to execute a sys­ tematicall) planned concentration by rail. It was through hb efforts and that of his clo.sest collaborators that the rail­ roads were developed into an instrument of warfare. A quotatioll flom :\foltke. "as the raIlroads serve transporta­ tion <'lI1d HlOH'mt'llt. ::.1) thl' telf'graph serves the transmiSSIon of information." indicates that he attached equal importance to the tei('g-raph ~\~ a strategical aid. I cannot admit that Napt)leon or any of his opponents made allY defillite effort to effect all ideal battle strategically planned At that hme operatIOns conducted with separate I armie,s weI e regardell as a necessary evil. When joint action was effected it \vas 110t the result of a strategic plan, but from challg'es ill the original plan injected by the inspired intervention of the commander of one of the separate armies. To prove the influence of technical improvements upon the actions of the modern military commander. I mentioned that the military commander must make far-reaching prepa­ rations in time of peace in order that at the outbreak of war, when confronted by the initiath'e of the enemy, he may ex­ pand or alter his plans m order to create by gtrategic means those tacticdl requirem~nts fayorable to battle. Errors in the concentration are an entirely different matter than con­ centration measures \vhich, due to some cnang~ in. the situ­

57 _

C. & G.S.S. Military Review


ation, require the aId raIl llam,port:-.. III the case- of the concentration of nearly one-half the Austl'o-Hungariall armies on the Bal1\clll Front at the outset of the \Vorld \\'ar, we have an example of an E'lTor in thE' Ol'lginai ('oncentratioll which was Imposfiible to COl rect by fiuusequent rail transport. I maintam that thp priJll'I]>.l1 work of the commander in chief is finiflhed a~ . . 0011 (1'" the fon'e'" are eng-aged III battle.

in the sense \\hich



cOl"idcr<, Ideal.

Although the

commander does lIot retIre completely from <.hrecting the operation itself, hi~ :o.uusf'(]llent dfort-:. \vill be Rmall in com­

parison with his pre\ lOllS fUllctIOIl a . . the dirpctor of the central will The uattIp rem,Ull"> t\;(' P.sSC'llLP of his will. but the main part (rt' hi~ ac1l\'itie~ pll~ce(lp..:: the lmttlc.

With reference to the Bettle of rolomliey,



not issue hlfl directivf> aft!!!' hE' had c1arItled the situation of the Second Arm~ On the cOlltl',!!';' hI' wu:-. completE'ly in the dark cOllcernlllg the ho"tIle ,,"li~wtl!1!1 awl \\"J ... 11111!bh' to clarI­ fy the 51tl1atIOn d~~"'P11f' hi~ pn·..,ellL'P Ilil the h.lttiE'1ipJd rtllring the foregolllg Ud~ It \\ ..... l!!lh hi.., plfqrh JlI inl' ttl the dt'" On the follu\\­ C'ISI\'e battle- WlllCh m.:dl' \ IL101 \ }In'''~ll)1e Ing daj., accortlllW to l',t' cll<'lul II;-.t'll'ril .111(1 l,..,t1matt-' of the General SLlfr. 1r.(' IIlgil Cllnlfll.'1ld pLt~Ni thl' role of the oDservPl' "ho">p lIl!iu[,llce \\d'" \\ lifltll:m Ilir('m t\;[' (our<.,f' t;f action df':-,pilf> I;Ul11l'l'tH.h ,!ttl'l1lPl~ 1{) 11111..'1 \'t']H The Ge1l­ eral Staff III it... ... 1\1(1\ of ~ed III ;-.1.lh.''''1hdt "tht' t'~e('lltlt)]1 nt this hattie l'e":;llited :-.0 l'ol11pIetl'ly In'J11 tht' pl'L'l'cdlllg oper­ ations that 1I0t a ~1Il~dl' III dp!, hom t hl:' A 1111~· Commalldpl' was neces.,ary dUI ill,\! t lw I) 111 It' ":0 it...,...,ll re lI111fnl nut \' of the




In the 18R5

, 1'1;'\'h1011

of t hf>

ill<"() /i('t If)))~ tOt COIiI})lltllfi< I <..

Lm'{J( rUlf::.. ;\Inltkp ,,'..:,: "A~ a IlIle thf' ..;upprviFioll of a part of the frnnt 1<;; of lIttle ath·.wlage tn thp com'mande]' • in Iarge-:-.cale OI1CI'.1tion... Ht' ..::tIll mu ... t dppcnd Oll me~.:;age.s and. if he reU:'I\l'''; hi..., illio1'llldtlO!l f'qu~dl~' from all parts, hiR concept lOll of th(> "Jtudtivn otten wIiI ue clerl.rt'l. At a diRtancp from tIll' l'OIlt'lhlll,IT im}lJ'(' ...... lllll of the fightillg- he may mnk() hiS d{'(,I':;I!Hh \\Ith gTt'nter lalm. Even after the final deCl.~lOll ha . . !)PPli rcaehed iill commanders mll"!t he com­ pletely at E'.l:--l' lTIt'lltallv.h \\t,lI as Ilhy .... leall,r ..

Vi.Then I :-'}leak of Ll1tlendortf I l'L'aitzp \\'hat It means to Wetze-II, ''i'ho for tuo .\<,[11':-' "I..'r\·t.:'o thJ<., great general a~ hh first ab,slstallt 111 the tllleratloll:o. "'l'cllOl!. I beliCH' that hI"" prote-stR are due PlItirf'ly to ml..;llIl1ipr.... tanrhllg and erroneous interpretatIOn. At no lime did I "'pt'ak of a "stranger at the front" or of a "Ie,tt Heo t Illllkel' ",hI) I t'irt:' ... :-nl{{\ Oil technical mean" of eommlllllcatlOll. ~dlrl OI"'IH'Il"':lllg' \\Ith pel'~onal di-.;­ cm;~ion~ with hi..:. ",ubordllwlP comm<llldel .... I'pnU\llh uound to his nc::.k." I (lId "a~ thdi. 1'1)1' mall\" \(',P':-, to come. the Rtrategist who plall . . ea}'()fullr and ci!l ert~ the m~lleuvers from a central loccltioll \\ ill remain tiIl' tYPical figure of the modern g-eneral a<., pn'''Plited til lh in the \Yorld \Val' ~f'ar

the cloee of the World \\'a1' practlcally e\'c1'!, wlSh of the commandE'r in chlpf with re)!ard to dll"t"ct r0I111TIUllicatlOll o,yer long distances could be met. He was 1I0t subJected to excessiye ph.\'sical t'itr.UJI. Hi,;; deciSIon" were made in a warm, wen~li)!hted room ;It I1b map tauIe. On the othE'l' hand. the ease of tran ... mitting nrdf'l -:: .tlll] m('~""ageg increa~ed greatly the flo".. of incoming- and vutg-oing communications. The effect of this wa", a cOITP"'ponding ll1crpasE' ill his mental tasks. The military commml(ler of the \\~or1d \Var period

was confined to hIS office almo,t cOl"tantly, He had to de-


pend to a large extent on his staff, which lneanwhile had groWll conSIderably. His actIvities were not limited to the COIlduct of upel'atlOns, He waS required to make decisions in technical, economic, IJohtical aud educational matters. Thi" type of military commander is represented by LlIdelidorff, \\'ho in his ToiulitnrioH IVOl {ro'e writes: "The military commander is a solitary figure. No matter how cle\'er and mtlllllJ!ent his staff may be, his thoughts remalll Impenetrahle." That i" precb,elj. what I inferrerl v.·hen I wrute that "the milItary commander may well utilize the auvicp of t.)thl:l':' There art' sufficIent intelligent minds cap­ able of Ct""'I:-.ting him III '\llr\,E'yill~r tl1P entIre extent of the field of \'1":;1011. To mallltain hl-::: self-respect the military commulIIleI' C;UlI1ot tolerate allY foreign plement wIthin hiS pel :;,ollalit~."

\Vith It'feh'm't' to tlit' "military commander who l~ a .st l\l1Jgel' at tre frt>llt." Jl1} ..,tatf'ment implied a "separatIOn If nllt an p...trmwenlP1l1 of the tl'OOp'-l from the com:pmndel' ill chlpf" I h,t\l' i!l mllld olll~ tiw commander ill chief of thl~ cnmblllPd f-Il'nlle:-, nnd llUt the higher or low(>r commalHi­ PI:-. .... Ilhurdlll<-lled to hnll Evell thuugh the milItary com­ malldf'1 ha ... lWUJl1w In\'i:-:'lule to tIw troop:::. and assumed the persDllality of ~l :-.oiltan· fi~m!'e. "';tl heart he rem'1in~ c1use to hi" troop..," To quutC' Ll1dl~lIdol'ff, "the \vill of victory still mtl..,l IcldLltcijrom hIm dud lll~Jllre tr.p army and the nat 1011 to lWl'oir dpcct" .. Of "thf> leanlt'rl m\UtHl';': commander," our kllowlelige of Fredericl, thl! Glt:'at. 'Napoleon and Moltke indicates clear­ ly how pager they \\ ere ll1 acquiring knO\vledge, yet hO\\ P\'en mOl e IH?enly they eon"!luered the nped of emploYlllg ..kno\\ ledge as a meml~ of mental training and pasRing judg­ mPllt. A" Ludellc1()}·ff ('AjJiains, "the military commander mu"t lIot permIt tc('hnrc'd dptails to ob.:;truct the wide :::;cope of' hI!:) thoughts The particular resulb. hOWC\'el" gaiut'rt from thp atl\'icp of hlghlr tl'<.lIlWrl .spet;ialist:-::, mu~t be cl'y:-.taJ· hzcd h~\rmolliou ... l:. III a ~il1gle mind." Of "the tlunkt'l' iit the desk," It cannot he denied that 010,,1 uf the ,J.ctl\'itif's of tht· modern military com­ mandpl I:t:'ntt:'l' at hi ... tIp"lt. Thh dops-not imply, hm:ve\er. that hi ... timf' mu:-.t hp "I1lent eutirely at hI"> hf'adquart('l'~

Dnrilli! the \Vorld \\':n' ht' oft~ll had to re:-,ort to personal WIth the l'PjlI t':--Plltat1'·p.... of the Allied high com­ mand..., iilld hi" -:::uhol'dinate commander-:::, nece:->sitating frpquelll iILsl~l1Cef, from hI:... hf'adqwirtE'r~. Cnfortunately thiS \Va..., not the C<1"1..' WIth the ~'oungpr Moltke. Still this essential mobility of the military commander do('t" not alter the fact that hi:; Uf>ciSlOll:o. '\ere made "m a warm and \\ell· lig;lted I'oom at thp map table." Tannenoel'g' was the 'only di:-,cJl~SlOn,,;

h.lttlr which Hindenburg and Lltdendorff did not direct ~olely from theIr headquarter"!, and even then It was the map rather than obsel \atlOl1 011 thE' ground which determIned the fe\\' decbions other tha.n tho.;;e Is:-.upd from headquarters. EYen on hi.:; wpll·knowll tOUI' of the front prior to the grea~ drive on the \Ve:;terll Front. Lndendorff did not visit the troops ill thf> field, hnt the office.;; of the "1;uiou~ staffs

In concludlllg my article I indicated that the militarY commander of the futllre will occupy a position within the framework of the- g'O\'Pl'nmpnt rlifferent from that which he

occupied during the World War, Today he m~y be required to earn" out ol'df'rs 10 which ht> obJects for f:;trictl,r military reasons, and thus uecomes more or less dependent upon a


, ''1,._ .~ ''Vol. xX No. 76

Foreign Military Digests

::.uperior WIll. In hi::. interpretation ~etzell has missed com­ pletely the sense of my statement. Interference by the head of the state in the command of military operations is not to he inferred, but rather in the decision where certain oper­ <IlIOn" .<hould be conducted. In this respect I adhere merely to the principle as stablh:hed by Clausewitz: "War is not

an independent matter but a continuation of the policy with altered means." On the whole I am convinced that my con­ ceptIOn of the modern general closely resembles that of Gen­ eral Wetzel!. Our differences of opinion are concerned more WIth historical details rather than with the nucleus of the problem.

Military Land Warfare ["La lutte mlittaire terre~tH~," by General Dame Condensed from Rn'ue des QIlr-stlOns de Dtfr'n.'le VatHlnale, August lD3!), Transla~erl from the French In the HIstorIcal SectIOn, The Army Wal' College. WashIngton, DC.] By CAPTAIN M. R. KAMMERER, Infantry

Thl' obJectl\"es .;;ought hy land warfare can, In general, .lttailH'd only hy occupation of territory; ~omething" for WhICh Ilelther naval forces nor-for the time bemg at lea~t­ ;Iel 1.11 hH'cP,s :1I'e adRptabJe. Admiral :."J"elsoll, in 17fl6, ad­ mitted t hdt: "It is unfortunate that the fate of nation~ ia !lot cit clfled upon the sea." Whenever a naval ,power comeR 1I1tt) coUtilct WIth a land adversary. the former must ~end lar~(' al mies to the continent; witnf'ss England, during the Int" "f the RevolutIOn, of the F.mpire, of 1914-1918. l'lll(>~s aviat IOn obtains deCISl\'e results through surprise dt the begll1ning of hostilitie~ against an advE'rsar,} who is nelt her prepared for nor armed againc:;t aerial danlIer, it can not nutalll the capitulation of a natiolI determmed to fight. f'1'<1hCe is. of course, a maritime power a:-. \vell a.s a .LOlltIEt'lltal power. She has, however, been able to carryon na\a; lnlltilct and realIze colonial expanSIOn. only \vhen ::-he ha ... Lt'lItrnlized pu~~ible enemies on the continent or when .;jw h<l~ been encouraged in these colonial aims by such be


It it-, on her land frontier:::. that France has defended her t>\l ...tencp Hud. more especially. on her northerJl and nOl'lill';l-.;tern frontiers. where she has been unable to attam hel' 11.11111',11 boundarie~. That is where she clashes against her mn... t puwel'ful enemy. where France's destIllY is at stake. 11 J-, certainly not our llltention to mlllimize the impor­ tnllre tit' naval or aenal confliCt, both of which are illdi::-:;pen­ sablr f,)1 thL' sustenance of land warfare and for maintaining the Jil! Ilf a natIOn at war_ Howevel" in France. land \var­ fatp it] 'jll'db to a characteristic national COl1t-.Pfvati.;;m. Hence Its SIlCt ml imllortance. OIlL' of the consequences of thiS speCIal importance is that J.I nil warfare is the prime focus of French war plans. But 1:1 tid warfare is only one of the factors of total warfare_ Lant! '"trfare must adjust its'elf to the other factors. A generil! polky must be determined by the government. It is th(' goyernment \vhich must determine the goals to be attailll d by military action on the ground. A ..,(w1y of the German \val' plan in 1D14, or of the inter­ alliet! war plan fOI' 1018 would reveal the aspect of land warf:lI e as it appeared to the higher echp.lons which were respu!l-.ihle for the military conduct of the \var. They answcr a question which must be solved at the outset Given the pohtical situation and the probable or possible adversa­

fles, given the general policy which has been decided upon, the question I~: what general distribution of efforts must be d.ecreed? In answering thIS question. two points deserve particu­ lar attention. These are: the number of theaters of oper­ ation and the attitllde which ~hould be maintained on' each of these ACTION ON SEVERAL FRONTS

The mere act of multlplymg the numbe'r of theaters of

operatIOn-provided :mfficient forces are available to man them-IS deSIl'..lulE', sillce it makes it possible to attack the enemy 011 several fronts and obliges him to divide his forces. There IS 110 doubt that with 110 cause for uneasiness conCf'rnmg the f1'011tler of the Pyrenees nor that of the Alps, the t:'ituatlOn of France in 1914 was v:el'Y secure. Germany, on the contrary. was obliged to fight on two fronts. As a consequence, the RerlOllS threat of the Russian armies against East Prussia induced von Moltke, on 26 August 1014 to draw two army corps from the right wing of the German armies in the \vest, The~e two corps were sorely missed at the Battle of the ~Iarne, and they might well have changed the outcome of that battle. Fmnce has frequentl)" been obliged, durmg the course of her hi::'>1ory, to fight on se\·eral frontiers. France has always .sought in the East some counterbalance to the power dominating Central Europe, either to ward off danger from her own eastern frontier or to diminish the importance of such danger. This i~ a bondage which strategy imposes upon polttical policy. . Defensive and OtJe'tl8ire

To this idea of multiple theaters of operation, of fight­ ing on ,",,,,\'era} fronts, must be added a conception as to what attitude flhould be maintained on those fronts: offensive or defensive. If \\-'e a8sume the conservative point of view examina­ tion of this question will prove interesting. In the first place, the integrity of the national territory must be main­ tained. During the course of operations, it is necessary to assure the solidity of one's own front before undertaking the offensive. We may therefore conceive of successive series of applications of the offensive and the defensiv<l.


, .


C. & G.S.S. Military Review

'FortJign MilitaryFJigests However, this is not a' hew idea. Jt may be found ex­ pressed in a very striking manner. by Clau.5ewitz, a~ early as 1827: "If the defent;;ive IS the stronger form of conductmg" but has a negative object, it follows of itself that we must make use of it only so long as our weakness compels u::-; to do so, and that we must giY€ up that form as boon as we feel streng enough to aim at the positl\€ object. Now a" the state of our CIrcumstances is usually Improved 111 the event of our gaining a vIctory through the assi.stance of the defell­ SIve, it If> therefore the natUl'al course in 'Val' to begm \,'nh the defen"ive, and to end WIth the offensIve. , . ,"



the ;:lIm~ and gl'llf'rai m('thod~ of land Wa! fare have been determined by the Government, the next ~tep i:-:; the pl'epal'dtlOll of praqffcal plans for atta1l1ll1g' tho..;e aIm.:'. The cummander ill J.hipf of the land force~ h, le::'pOll'5iule for the conduct of operations 111 all of the \'arlOn::; hUlll the· atel'S He trallspose~ the ~um~ which haw:' oeen tb.ed uy the government into a specificall.v military lealm It b hert' that contact iJetween polley and strategy occur:::., He establishes the theaters of operation, designate..; theil chief~ aIld a;-,~ign::. mi~~iolls to them He al.. .o fnrllbhe . . the means Thereafter the commander of each theater IS resllonslble for the actual conduct of operatlUll~ in hIS own theater amI mnst there haH' freedom of action Tht' actiom, of'the commander HI ('hlef ,~re III the sphere of ~trateg'Y \vhere<-l ... tho..,e of thp theater cnmmandt'r~ ai'p III thL' tlt.'ld of tactics. Stratf'g~ and tactIC", constitutf' military art and science and are in::.eparauie. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATION::;-STR4.TEGI

A study of dOl'Uml'llb left uy the gTt'ut le,uler:-. of the \I\'orld \Yar brl11g's Ollt two WOl'OS WhICh :ll'l' repeated con· stantly: "oUJt'ctlve'" and. "dIrectIOn" It ~ho\\;-, dlt-.!Jlucpment::. of fol'l'C>:-' flom one lhlillt to another to pmpha ... iL.p the elfort...; whIch are to be takell These arc the e.......entlal ba.. . e.. . of any strategic maneU\ Pi" The OlJ}CCtl1..'t'S

The ob,lectl\e 1;-, the materialIzatIOn of the goal to ue at­ tained. Insofar as land \yarfare l~ concerned, the destruc­ tion of the arlversal'Y'~ armiet' delIvers hIm to the mercy of the VIctor. Thl<; '0.., why Napoleol1lc doct rIne de~ig'llate~ the principal ma~:-. of enemr trooJl~ as the strategic ohJective HO\vever, g-eogTftlJhical obJcctIveb are Just as Important as troop obJective.. . in the lallrl warfare of today. In ordE'1' to be able to live amI to fight, modern armiet- lequire impre~~ive tonnages of matermls, 'which can be ~uppherl on Iv hy rail and road lines of communicatIOn. These lIne.::: of communica­ tion are equally indispellsable for maneuvering. ('on~e­ quelltly, they constitute choke oUJPttl\t;'<.:; III land \\al'fare

Dil petioll Any question of au objective al~o I1l\ohe';? a choice of the direction to be followed III order to ~el'tlre it. Thf' prob­

lem ,is not a simple one, As a matte!' of fact. "when the ob­ jective is geographical, a ~traight line will not always be the quickest nor the SlIrest way to reach It. Use of this line may


be denied either by the situation or by the defenses of the enemy, or the terrain may render it impracticable. When enemy armies constitute the objective, hostile reactions or maneu\"ers make it even more difficult to fix direction. \Ve may say that \ve here find ourselves in the presence of one of the most delicate problems in gtl'ategy, one of those which put the powers of perspicacity. of Judgment and of deciSIOn of thp Jeader to the most severe test."* , It becomes ::tIl the more Important not to PI'r ill the de· tl'l'nlll1atioll ~>f directionR becam~e, today, once those direc­ tlOllR haw' ueen estaulisherl. it i~ difficult to modify them. At the present t1me modern al'mIes are not only large in mallPower, hut also have enormous amounts of buppIi P 5, The~' call no longer operatE' e}..cept in ZOlle::: to which "train~, tled to the raIlruad tnlcks, and motor trnck~, tied to the milI­ tary traffic·controlled highways, Impart rigIdIty. This g~n· eral condition doe . . 110t readily permit of sharp or ~udrlell change..:! of directIOn; It Impose~ the l1ece::;~lty of }110\i'ng RCl'Onirng to a direction \vlllcll Ita;.; been rather carefllll~ cho.:.en at the outset, and which will maintain a quasi-rIgid eilanlcter." 'I' PI OjJOI

tiol/wfJ of




How, theil, can the commamlpr in chief' eOllcentrate the llece""an meanR on the cho~en oU,Jpetive: Thl.:. vdll iJe dOl1f> hy 1'E'l1lfllrcIlIg the army, or the cHnlle which are Qperatlllg ill thr rlirectloll, or diIections, le,ldiug' 10\valds that ohJ('c­ 1n(' He "manem'er,s" b.\ vnryll1g the proportioll of forces oppratlllg' in different, separate directlOllg~ thl~ irk'a mu:;t ~ IJl' unrlle fn nllud while, at the S:;Ime time, we mnst remember that :.uch a maneuyer i~ pO..:!9ible only hy illtell~in:, ll;:;e of l'<-II!load... and of motor truck8 organized for 1hat Pll1'I)O"'P Thtb, chOIce of objectives, de1ernunatlUli of dIrectIOns. l'roportiolllllg' ut forces. these are the lMSic factors mto which a strategic maneuver' can oe brol{('l1 OOWI1. At tin..t glunce. thIS appear::, very :simple and ~Rpoleoll actual" wlUte that: "The art of war h:1 ::;Imple art ,. Howe'l'l, he hastened to add: "aIHl cnl1::;li)t~ entIrel~· of execution Therr IS llothing \aguf' about It. 11 all make . . good . . PlhC'. thert' I' nothing of ideology about It." Q



The aim of land strategy i~ to gIve battle undel' farof· able C01H.lItlOIM. Battle i:::. the es:::.ential act of Wal fare. Its 1epprcu~siol1~ are extellslVe. It is characterIzed ill modern \\arfare by the qnest for maximllm fire powpr, the eifer!" of which are of a material ann a moral nature at the :same time The maximum fire effects can be obtained onIv from the coordinated fire..:; of all arms-artIllery, mfantl';}:, tank,!; nno (t\latlUll-orgunized dlld regulated hy the commallnel' m chief "Attack mpan.s nre which results in adu:U1ce~ rlefen;;e means tiI e which halt~,"j:

To fire effects may be added the action of smoke, of mines, and, e\'entnally, of comhat gas, which appeared as II new weapon in the last war. "General DuffoUl. "Cours de. strab§gi('," tGeneral Debeney: liLa Guel'l'C et les Hommes." 'tBpl'ger·J.£'vl'ault. "Ino;,tluction fUI }'cmploi tactulue Jes gwndes unites."

r J



": Vol. XX

No. 76

Foreign Military Digests DEFENSIVE FIRES

The basic principle of the preparation for defeuse is the creation of a barriE'l' of nreg III front of the position which i< to be held. "The efficiency of this barner depends upon its density dlHl upon its depth," "The density of fire is a fUl1ctlOn of the forces which h.lH' llt'en put

1~1tO tht;> IlDe,"'" 01, rather, of the weapOll~

\\ hleh they 8erve. However. the fIre l11l:I8t be able to maintain its efficiency dUrIng the enpmy attack. It is therefore neceRsary to shelter the defenders. The al~iIIery establishes itself in such parts ~f the terrain as are defiladed from the sight of the ene­ m, '" observers. The Infantry burrows into the ground in tl'~llches. and so echelons its automatic \veapons as to con~ ,tit ute zones of defense rather than lines of defense. This ltiell of echeloning has murh more importance in connertion n ltll ntta( ks hy means of armorf'd machines. "The depth of the fire barrier IS a function of the range of tllE> weapon~ ...~ Starting from the pOSition whIch is to be defpllded, it includeb: . A ZOlle of infantry fire A zone of combined infantry and artil1ery fire A zone of artillery fire. I l' we add thereto the fire from aVIatIOn, It WIll bp seen attacker can Of> 1 eacheu from afar hy fire and that. in PI'O]h)1'tiol1 as he progre~sE's. a fire of increasing dens}t\' make..., It possible to conclude \Vlth accuracy \\hen he will be

tlI~lt t lit'


F1I1 ther to im,ure stoppmg hIm. attempts are made to ,,1m\ lip the cllerny within the zone of fire by mean..., of Ile"tl'llLtllm-: and oh~tacles of all kind::; Of these, a network of b,lrhl'd·wirl' b tht, most t'fficient agam~t enemy infalltry­ mell

Silch a Iletwork is illsufficiellt against an adversary who athe!\-.. with tanks. In this case it oecomes desirable to use natUl,d obstacles sHch as streams to ('ovpr the defenSive pO~ltWI1. \Vhen imch natural obstacles are lacking, it 18 lleCP""-"dl~ tn rreate artificial obstacles: ditches. antitank po..:t... nlllle.s and fields of rail.::;:, similar to those in front of thf' :'I1.1).onot Line. Dl'jJt/{-{ nf DrfclI-..ll'r Positio1J.~

111 ;-.111te of all tl1Pse precautlOns. if the enemy brings the nwnns IIlto actioll, there i~ the risk either of sflemg the P""ltlOll forced or, in order to hold it, of being obliged to en/lIJ!-"I· reinforcements in such quantity that thE' defensive battlt' \\ III be transformed into a battle of attrition. The defell"j\e thus loses one of its chief valufls--ecollomy of fo!'cp , h order for a defemH\'e ttl be economical, there flxi:;:t:o:: a.jJl'Olt'dul'e which cOll~ists in prpparing se\eral echeloned PO';'Jtll!llS and in emploYll1g them in such mauner that the enem.\ will be unable to know upon which of these the real dele,,,,, i, to be made. The enemy bombardment preliminary to the attack lVould thus fall upon a zone which had been practically en­ I eCl"'"''-:t!·\

tirely evacuated. The attacker might perhaps capture it . without any difficulties. but he would then come in only to be crushed under the fires o\, an artillery which was intact and of an infantry which was sheltered in a solid line of resist­ ance. The disadvantage of such a defense is that it involves consenting to the relinquishment of terrain. In cases where this cannot be done, recourse must lJe had to permanent fortifications where, with a few men, it is possible to cover a large zone of terrain with very violent fire. Thus is re­ gained the economical defense. which o/€ seek.

Continuity A defensI\"e system will not offer the resistance which

is expected of it, if it can be turned by the enemy. The Ger­ mans turned the French fortifications on the German fron­ tie!' m lDl4 by passmg through Belgium. A continuous front is necessary at the beginning of operations to guarantee the national territory. Continuity IS understood to include continUIty of fire and continuity of obstacles as well' as continuit;y of the de­ . fensive orgamzations themselves. To summarize: the essential factors governing defen­ sive combat are dense and deep fire barrages, depth of the l",[fietieid and contmUlty of the f!'ont. The conduct of this uefense will, in most cases. resolve itself into maintenance or into reeHtablishment of the continuity of that front. TIlE PROBLEM OF ATTACK-SUPERIORITY OF FIRE

How can a defensive system such as that which has just beel! delc>cnbed be overcome'? How can the problem of attack be soh·ed? In order for the attackmg force to ad\ance and take over that terrain WhICh is a tangible sign of VIctory, it must silence the fil'e of the defender. It must gain superiority of firE' over the defense This requires: Fll'st, an attack upon the enemy artillpry. 01' counter­ battery cOllcentratiollS; Second, the neutralization of the infantry weapons of the defense. To accomplish these ends considerable means are needed. The \i\,"orld \Var proved that, in comparison with dpfense. attacl~ required--per mile--tW'ice as much mfantry resources and about six times as much artillery resources. This proportion shOUld bE' noted because it influences the' orgamzatioll of the land forces and because it leads to the idea that it IS hardly possible to take the offensive-with succes~-unless it can be backed by a heavy industry, oper­ atillg at full capacity. Fire superlOl'ity over the enemy should be constantly maintained. But, against an enemy dlsposed in a series of resistances, it becomes apparent that there wiH be pauses in the fire, necessitated by the forward displacement of the artillery whenever the infantry attack has progressed to the effective limit of the range of artillery. Offensive combat is therefore resolved into actions by successive forces sepa­ rated by such indispensable periods of delay as may be re­ qui red for successive preparations.

"Col. Lemome: "Cours de taet__i=qU~e~g~e=n=er_a_le_.'_'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _• • • • • • • • • • • •








Forergn MilitarYc/Jigesis Employment of Tanks Are there any means available to avoid these periods of delay which cause a loss of that element of :-.l1},prI~e which b

so. important in gaining a decision? What are the possibIlitIes of tanks'!


c. & G.B.S. Military Review -ha\'e at one's disposal as many attack zones as possible; -organize these zone~ in advance. from the point of view of tran~portation. of communication. of hospitalization, of evacuation. For an effecti\'e defensive organization of the front, it is necessary to provide for the reinforcement of a given sector without a minimum of time. A rei~lforcement plan should be prepared by the commanders of groups of armies The establishment of a plan for military works is the corol­ lary of the es'tabli~hment of the plan for reinforcements. The procuremE'nt and supply of the llecessary materiel of the rear areas is Just as important as the equipment of the front lines. Resel'VP stocks. destined to meet any un­ foreseen circumstance. mll"t be pstablished. Field and heavy artillery must be supplied with ammunition for several days of fire ill additioll to the full loads carried bv the ,'ehieles of the combat units. The flow of tools and eq;lipment to engi­ nef'l' depots must he maintained. Stores of surfaci~g ma­ teria}:;; for repairing roans must be created as far forward as l)ossible. It i:-; necessary to bear \vell in mind the role pJayell in nlodf'rn warf:'re by preparation. The I'e~ults obtailled 111 the "ario us r hasE's of th{-' oreration" are in direct proportioll to 1 he complC'tlOn of the prelimin'1l'Y estimates, to the matet ial means which ha\'e ueen as~embled. anrl to the degrec of preparation which has bpen realized towards putti_ng th('m into effect.

The tank is a war-machine \Yhich. by its armor-plate. shelters the combatant from hostIle fires. Consequently, prior to the actual assault such fire no IOll~er needs to be crushed. Moreover. since t~e tallk carriE'S the fire into the very ranks of the enemy, the attack IS no longer forced to wait upon forward dIsplacement of the artillery system. DoE's the tank. in \. iew of this fact. rOllstitutl' the mean..:; whereby attack can recover its speed? This question might have ueen answered in the affirma­ tive twenty years ago hefore thf> development of antitank weapons. But for every l1e\V offen~lve weapon, a defense i~ e\~entually developed, and "today the antltnnl{ weapon rI8e~ before the tank as, during the last war, did the machine gun before the infantry.'" The armored machine can 110 longer go forward over thp battlefif'ltl \vith impul1lty. ThE' wars III Spain and Finland have proved that. It IS now admitted that an offpl1sl\ e actIOn would be carried out by mixed groupings compo::.ed of infantry and light tanks. thE' latter known a:-. infantry acct)mpnllying tanks. The~e gl'Ollpmg:-:. \vould be preceded by mOl e llowpr­ ful tanks, and this whole comlnned forre would operate under the protection of all artillery s~'''i,tem which would specially devote itself to the de:-ltrllctlOn of antitank wea110mi Displacement would be bj· bound.. , i1llth.'l' the protec:ion THE :lIoRAL FACTOR IN LAND WARFARE of the arti1lery during thf' flntire timp occuplf'd in the jllte-riol" Mar::;hal Petain ha.s written: "In wal'far(' there is one of the enemy's uefenslve system, and ollly after dlf;olganiza­ "::-tahlt> element, Man. In addition to a vel'\, active rna· tion of that s,}141t:.'rr!\V!lllt be pOQ'HIlle to ('tl!lC(>!\'l' of all HctIOl! tel'ial PI epL'I'aticll, it is llt~ct'<;sary to plan for m~ral prepara' in depth by armored machines which might then be SlI":;CCP­ tion." In 1017. \vhilp commanrling the French armies, he tlole of ootalnJ!lg' decb!\'e reflult::. ~tatt'd: "In all arm~ and at all echelons, the officers and tht' Although the PI'a of tpchnical ~lIrpl·l . . e. lIl:--ofal' a" the lllen WIll bf'come In('reasillgly ("onOdent of succe;::;s hy reahza· tank is concerued. has pa..,.:;pd. it i"i" 1l0lle the Ie"':'., all indi::;pel1­ tton of thE' Importance of the mC'ans whirh are hl'ollght Intu sable auxiliary weapoll \,lllch i14 de . . tllwd-hl\f' tIll' artJllt'l'~" play. Thl~ must Impl'e.~s them to the point \vherc thc~ -to assist the mfnntl'r. wIll ue anxious to attack." Anutlflll Any argument over the l'l'iatrve importance of Morale \Ve must Hot neglect the n;,ry lmportallt role \~'hICh and :"latcriel can l'e~mlt only in the l'pali7Htion of the ":-due aviation wIll play in land \\ud"cll'e in intm1att~ liai:--,on \vith of each of them There tihoult~ he no ('Gnflh:t hetween tht' the armles. Aviation WIll be the long-I'nllge "eyes" of the two: matel'lel !:- at the service of mowle. They are in­ command. the observatory of the arullery, the iJidlspensable !--f'par:1hle and the purposf' of hattIe If' to hn'11{ the material scout of the tanl{s. the lightning-hke ma8S launched upon tht­ !,ower and moral ~trength of tht> enemy: remote dE'pth~ of the el1l-'my to cau<.:;.p df'Vn"tatlOJ1 nnd paraly­ CONCLUSION sis. It v:ill also act as a sh!pld again~t ~imilar enterprises Land warfarc is of such importance that the greatE'l' on the part of hostIle avintioll. B) it::. .1dllll1 it \\ ill incrf'a"e rart of the natIOn m arms is caHed upon to devote all dforts materinlly the potentIallt!e~ of thp othl'l' arm..:; to Its direct support EQUIPMENT OF THE FRONT

In what has preceded, therE-' stands out a CI}llCeptlOn of the power of materiel \vhich, in mOdel'll warfare, has reached a magnitude whose \'ery possibIlity was um;uspected in the wars of the past. Putting thIS matpriel JIlto efficaciou.;; oper­ ation requires a pre\'iou"i, equipment of the front. \vhich '\viII permit of flexible and speedy maneu\'pl', offpl1sl\'ely or de­ fensively. For an effecti\e oifen<;jy€ organization of the front, it

is necessary to: *"lnstruction sur l'cmplol tactlque ties Grandes Unites," Berger· Levrault.

One does not fight with manpower alone, but also witll matpriel. The growth of mechalllzatlOn reqUlre~ hl~hh developed qualitieR in thp Ore1'3tOl' It imposes upon the . . 1ratcgist some delIcate problcm~ in the conduct of opera­ tIons'in securing the best conditions for the initiation anJ development of battle. In orde1' to become a master of military art, whi-:h is m a perpetual state of evolution. it is not too much to consecrate to it-throughout an enUre life·time-thE best part of one's ,elf. Military leaders will do this all the more faithfully "'hen they feel that they have t)le support and encouragement of the entire nation,



': Foreign Military Digests

Vol. XX No. 76

Defense Against Armored Vehicles [ExtHlcts from 1:.130 A/dc-.'l1emol/e de l'Ojficwr




Lt, Col H. 1\1. Rayner (Cuv.) G S.]


Even when at a great distance from the enemy's main uouies. the infalltry must anticipate a possible Irruption of armored cars or lIght fa.:3t tanks accompanied at times by motorized elementR. In 'most caRes these detachments have a reconnalssance and 110t a combat mIssion; they move by large bounds; the armored cars which accompany them generally operate by patrols (3 to ;, vehicles} on the main axes of the road net. The~e vehicles are often weakly ftrmored and tied more or les-; to the roads; even when trea.d vehicles they are unable to operate over all types of terrain, nor at night, they must halt for observation or for firing; finaily, they are appre­ ht'r<;ive of inhabited localities, routes which favor the cre­ ation of ambushes, and of cover which m~y cOl!ceal antitank weupons. Contact ,vith seve'ral armored detachments therefore shol11d not paralyze an infantry columBo as it is possible to lTI:ml'€ its security e'\1:en while marching. On the other hand. the \'erified approach of numerous mechanized units (Panzer DiVl..;;ion) 'will caul:<e changes in the 1 OIltes of advance or a general halt (prepared for action) of In rge columns.

U'hile on the Mill eh Seek informatlOn as far out as possible of the ap­ proach 01' proximity of enemy armored vehicles. by means of a\l,ltion, cavalry, motorcyclists. I ~) Establish an echelonment in the advance guards. at the head and on the flanks of the columns. fixed antitank PORt::, barring the road uet. Hold out tanks to counterattack the enemy vehicles. (l) Designate the bounds of the units at natural ob­ ~taclp", or emplacements favorable for resistance such as stl'e"",,. ravines and inhabited localities; eventually estab­ h'h "llJhushes thereat. The antitank defense mea~ureR taken by important· COlullJas should. to be coherent. be organized by the Com­ mallUel' of the Large Units and especially by the Infantry Di\i~l!.n Commanders. 11)


fOI InfOl matlOn

conducted by the aviation (army corps organ) and th!~ I'ecopnaissance detacr.ments sellt out by the infantry ; UIVISl, '11'): the infantry regIments. in their Jul'll, make use i. of thl'!1' motorcyclist f.cout f:ection; between infantry units. ~ alfi.J·t <.,lgnals (the best are luminous or sound signals such a~ . rockeh. Klaxon horns) ; between the aviation and the in­ fant! \. pvrotechmc RignalR connrm radio or dropped mes­


Translation by


By L1E.t:rE..>"\!\T (OLO!\F.L F. ~L BFNITEZ, Coos( A,tdll'J!f

Thlcl IS


Use of Obstacles (Na/Vi 01 or A"iificial)

Infantry divisJOl1s in their approach marches fix the bound.., of their advance gUal d.s and main bodies on natural

obsti:lcle~ WhICh al'e tal1k~ IS reporteu."




('usc that an irruption of

Similar actlOn is taken by the small units forming the advance guards (companies, \>attalions). They anticipate halts at places favorable for resistance (cover. banks, inhabited places). .:-leal' the enemy. when the halt may be ~omewhat prolonged, they bar the routes c~mpletely in both directions (carts placed aeross the roads). or prepare am­ bushes, El'(IIt1pfp of Ambush



The village appears to be unoccupied; a lookout in tower "C'" reports the approach of enemy v€hicles, A fixed barri­ cade BAH (wagon:") is placed across the road at "A", at the end of the village around a bend In the road or under a crest; riflemen concealed nearby should fire on the car crews at~ tempting to dh:;mount to remove the barricade: A mobile barrier "E" is prepared 110 yards or ~ore above barrier "A" (wagons, farm vehicles. telegraph posts) and put in place after the mechanized vehicles have passed towards "A." Then attack the lmpl'l::loned vehides by grenades, or fi re at t he eye slits. When natural obstacles are lacking, the leadIng ele-, ments of the advance guards and columns carry along port­ able obstacles which are put in place by the regimental piolleers, viz., requisitIOned wagons, rolls of wire (Brun) spread rapidl, across the roads. portable mines placed on the ground slIl'fan\ WhlCh form Instantaneous barriers.t Antitank armament is echeloned in the advance guards and at the head of the columns of the infantry division. This is formed especially by the 25-mm antitank guns of the lead­ ing battalions and by those of the regimental weapons com­ pany in the advance gual'ds, by the aivisional eompany and antitank battery for the main bodies of the infantry division by the infantry regimental commanders, The pieces are *These obstacles lImit the successive fields of battle chosen by the

Command tRolb of wue fOlln ,'n lml:-!hlc balllf'l, lay them across the road WIthout attemptlng to attach them; even broken they tangle In the treads of the mechamzed vehIclE'S and hmder their movement. Portable mines (11 pounds) are placed on the ground so as to assure effective explosiOn; If possible, they are concealed behmd a road bend 01' crest; five mmes are sufficient to bar an ordil)ary road, while double that number are necessary to bar a highway... .


C. & G.S.S. Military Review echeloned to successively interdIct. at favorable point" frontal or lateral route~ leading to the column; their mo\'€­ ment by bounds most often reqtlll'(>s the u~(> of "cheJ1Jllett('~" by which they are drawn, . The use of armor-piercing ammUnItion by machllle gUlM or light machine guns is effectiye only against ,veakly ar­ mored mechanized vehicles (armored cars); hO\yever, its use shou)d not be oYeriool<ed. f'RpeC13l1y 111 {'ontact operation..,

of advance guards,

E,mmple of Anti!n"k GI", L(AO'NG COM"'NY RtCONNAISSANC.£ EL£M[NT





433 YAROS ,(400 METERS)





\ JptbRTAR



Sh.ET'H Xo 2

. The C,O of the leadmg platoon sIgnals the aPIJloach of mechamzl'tl vehicles (rocket or Llasts on buglp) The Command Pbtoon H:pl'at'3 the conventIOnal alert s1gnal. At the mam body of the leadmg ecllf'hm, 'I the pIOneers and thp mortar cart block the load. The pl.1toOIl'> ~lattel in the dltches.lea~:iing ltght machme gun" ready to fil'£'; the alelt '-lgn,tl i~ repeat~d. A 25·mm antitank gun (m hattf'ry, 01 tlmtnt' dra\"n) bars the road permanently in real' of the Company

"'). The infantry diVISIOn, for its part, C()\'erf; the artlll('r~ of dIrect support on the march axes \\'ith its own antitan]{ units, which march hy bound~ ill the interval between the main bodies and ad\'ilncp gUal'd::;: it also aSf;uref; the flank protection of the diVIsion. Finally, it is ad\'nutugenuf, to reinforce the advance gllard:! with tanks armer! with cannon (D Type prrferably which are able to coyer long distances on tread:--) which fol­ low the infantry on theIr tl't.'ud~ by I.JOllnd~: 1hey come Into action eventually to cOllnteratlac1{ enf'm,\' tanks which mity have broken through, NEAR THE ENEMY

As soon as the enemy if; in contact alld the "front is stabilized. massive interYention" of tallks become posQihle, especially \vhere the terrnin pf'rmltB such actIOn: these at­ tacks may assume the form of succesgive waves (the Ger­ mans indicate densities of from 110 to 1~O tanks per mile in several echelons) and take place on extended fronts: our own attacks may be stopped by the ellem~; cOllllternttacks supported by tanks,

Antitank Me((s'llre~

diU ill!!

the GamiJ1g of Contact

As soon as contact appears imminent. the commanders of the advance guards ad,'ance their antitank elements by


echelons so fiS to permanently constitute a mobile first bar­ rier facing the ctangerou~ directions.' The infantry divisioll eventually places divisional antitank fractions at their dis· posal. The infantry division \vith its own means assures the secunty of the artillery deployment and of the column· mail bodies.



in the O(/ensit'e

Antitank me-a::;ure.. . are fore::;een even during the prepa~ ration of an attack. The artilielT prepares the fires against probable tank assembly points, and def;tro,Ys located antitank guns, The illfantl',Y organize;:; an ~l1titanl{ barrage in front of lhe line of departure (Battalions and Regimental Weapons Company), The dl\'islOnal company and battery assure the depth of thf' di:'::poRition;;1; mines may even lJe placed. Hma<;.sing night tile (artIlI<"I'Y and infantry) hinders thp creation of mme fiehls oy the enemy. During the attach: the infantry battalions and regiments engag-ed form \vith their own means a firgt mobi1e echelon \\ hlch follows by bound:-. the leading nttacl\ elements. The IIIfantry dh ISlOll t orms a second echelon \VhlCh In\eJ .... the imlHHt'lllt (,p'~ dno huld..:: ont (>vf'ntllall,\' a 1'1'­ sene 01 tanks for cDunterRttack. Tlw artillery assures it::; immediatf' ~ecul'ity (thm' echelon ), Antdllllk Mfll . . . 'ucs /II thr


attacks of armored yelucle~ "amit<lllk l1ll'a~Hrr .. l " ... Ilme clll.~ud,-'ntlJle llHportnnce in th del\'!1"'L' ,lnd an' prn,gl'e ....,sh·t,l~ d.'Yt:'lo!'erl ;t..; the front :-;tabll )Les FII'~t IISP I'" made of ob.staeles \\ hich form at once favol'.tllle POillt..:. of re:-btJJlce: at tlie :-.ame tImE'. an actl\'e defel1:'t:' in dt'ptl1 i~ formed. eSl1eciall.v ~o along the front It b llndH'l1pll ttlh:1rci...-; the l'car a~ :-.oon a~ the organizatIOn of pa~;.,in' zone . . hn~ ul'cre-,1.,C'd the front on whiC'h a posHlble irruptIOIl of t!ll1h" nl1l!h1 tahp place. The tr.oc(' of an~ pO... itioll of re~it.tan('e (main line and re:-.ene line) :,h1l1Jd. to .1 gn'ate}' extellt'11Jall formerly. be pl~!l'ed on natural olJ~tacles (cuts, 1'3\ ines, Rtreams, woods. viIl,lge") : "l'titictnl Ohf'tfl('le:-. complete them as soon aR pas· :->lble Hl ordpr to create pas~I\'e ZOI1P":: The determinatIOn of the~f' Ime..:; ~!flct of these z.olle~ (passi\e and active) pertains normally to the dh i~ion commander. The establishment of the illtlncial nll':o:tacle.; lW1"tains to the mfantry as fa"r as abatIS (at thp rdg-e of pel'meahlp wood..,), triangular or t1<lpezO(lwl ditche~ (by ttr rcglmental plOneers) are con­ cerlled; hut th(> finodlllg of are IS, f1~t 'lbliRhment of mine fields (shells placed in checkeruO'll'rl fat-hion pl'eft'rablv on reverse 61of.,es concealed from the e'1emy arti1lcl'Y obgervation). smoke ::.creen~. tank trapR {cf!mouflaged ditches at crossing pomts}, all require an amount of personnel. which thl? large nnit::; alone can furnil::h. nnd considerable time. Barrage fires by 25-mm or 7S-mm C9.l1non are echeloned in real' of the mam line {If 1flsi"'t:mcp. The follmving are normally POlltemplated: in untlCllwtlOlI of


A qiscolltimlOu:-, echelon at the outpost. in ordE'r to

dislocate a massive irruption of tanks;

Foreign Military Digests A continuous main barrage in hont of the main line of resistance;

Interior barrages; A barrage in front of the resen'e line covering the C.P's; A rear barrage covering the artillery.

Mines, concealed from "lew (cover, reverse slopes) are placed in groups or chains, according to the location of fires and cover (three-fourths mile requires 1500 mines and the work of 20 men during 8 hours. '\i\~ork is performed by the I'egimental pioneers and the Regimental Weapons Company). Tanks armed with cannon constItute a mobile reserve to counterattack the armored vehicles whIch might have suc足 ceeued in penetrating the position.

Geneml Organizat.ion of the Deiense This is prepared by the infantry division. The infantry regiments engaged are generally charged with the organization of the first balTages as far as the re足 serve line inclusive; they are reinforced by elements (pla足 toons) from the division antitflnk company, which is pref足 erably used on the reserve line. The pieces are distrihuted in "platoon nests" in closed strong points. The organic 75-mm artillery regiment prepares the rear barrage; it is normally reinforced by the division antitank battery which is held grouped 'and not dispersed. The emplacement of mine fields is communicated as SOOn as possible to the commanders of the division infantry and artillery. The infantry division controls the action of the artillery and the launching <,( the tanks in coUnterattacks.


Book Reviews


. 2H7 pnge:,


Harrisburg, Pa . )l1htnry Service



Rt'\ IPwed by MaJur Thoma.;; R. Phllhp<;;, Cna"t Al'ull£'l"Y Corps

advantage. 'Thp Fdlpmo \\ ho RtuC'l{ his hpad above a trench was almof:l certain t ) be hit ann this finally rel'iulted in the Filipinos puttll1l! their riflc~ over thf' trench and firing without aiming The Philippl!1f. Influl'l(~ction ('ould have been ended in a fpw months WIth aC1n'e and competent leaders. The tim· orous course pUI'~ul2d aud the constant limitations imposed on commrmders III the 1ield de"tloyed the, initiative of sub­ ordinate commandels and prevented them from taking ad· vantage of opportLllllties thnt \vere offered. Bl"aver\" and patroonl'l.'·, of frIend ann foe are both set forth. \Ve find a compan\' of Americall Reglllar" surren­ dering without firillg a ...,hot. We find junior officers later to b('('ome fa.mou~. such as Per~hmg, Harbord, McCoy. Preston Blown, and nullaI'd, t':-..hli)itillg the ~amc great qualities they later \\ere to show m command of corps and armies :..,'olrlit,},'-i In Th(' SIIiI IS as Illtel"('stlllg as a romance, not alone to the 50Idlt:'l. 0111 to evC'l'\' American. Captain Sexton has rendered a publIt :-.el \'!lE.' III producing thio;: book.

To thE' a\erage Ameril.'an. the Spam:::h-Americau \Var He does not know that the Cnited State' then had to eonqUf'!' the Philip­ plne Islands. which revolted immedi,ttel} ngain~t American overrol'd~hip. Captam Sexton's bool<; l~ n i'.ascillntlIlg. OD­ jective and accurate hit"tory of the AmC'ricali conqtJe~i of the Philippines. It is the first and only hi~ton' of Ithe Philippine InsurrpctlOn. The> co-nquest required fOllr Yt'ar", uunng \\hich 126,468 soldier~ and otfic(>l'S W'l'l'~ tran~llf)rtcd elYer 1.000 miles from tht'il' home.... It co-<t the ll\es of ,t,~31 AJ11pril':w ...:oldlel'''' and otheer.c;, the dl'ath of some 16,000 Filip11loS In 2,811 engagements. and resulted In tht> extml timl of ~ome 100.000 Filipino~ from famme and pe~tdence Imlicatmg American hfnol'ance of the ta~k to iJe ~'lc(ompltshed t:-. the I eLommenda­ tion of Gtmeral ~f'lsnn A .MIle:-, o..,e111O}' (}rlh.·<;.~l· III the Army at I'ERIRH BY THE RWORD that time. that tht' eXl1edltion ConSI:;;;t nf auout fi,O()O men, four-fifths of whom wpre to be \'oluuteer!"1, By R. ERNEST DuPt'y Captain Sexton hag \vntten h~~tOl,\· a . . It :-.hou!d ue 302 Pages . . . Hnrll . . burg. Penna.: The :\1jhtary SerVIce Publr.;;hmg written He ha::. no bIaS and tnkth, no sidC'.... The readP!' ('an Compan J draw hif: own ~onclusions from thf' fact"i g"/yell. This readel R('VI('\wd b\' ;\I.lJOI Wilham II Spniupl, Infantry londndes that Aguinaldo. th(l FilipllIo pntllOt. V'::l" tricked into supporting AnwrIcan actIVltles ag:unst Spam by prom· .-\~ W(' read toU.I~' of thp nll ...... iull operatlOn~ agamst iseR of independence. both direct and lmpilecl, by tlw Ameri· can Con~ul Genrral at Smgapoll'. 1\11'. E Spencer Pratt, Finland In the <-ll'ea Wl'F:t. ot the :\lurnlansk Rathva...•• wonder­ and Admiral Dewry \Vhl'n he found that these promises ing perhap~ whet hpi the forcE'S engageu are peculiarh \\'ere not gomg to be kept and had beel] gl YC'n without adapted to t'THlurmg tIlt' hal (hdlIp~ of \\>ar undeI~ conditions authoritr. Aguinaldo revoltpd agaiw'I,t ellited States lust where the tempel·.atul'e is often forty df'grees helow zero, as he previously had agaInRt Spain. few of m; v,;ill realize that III EH8 and Ifl19 an American Volunteer officers and soldiers can be ::-t'L'n to have per­ expedition operated under ~inillar (omhtions. Just why formed equally as well UR Rt>gulars. The yolunteer. Funston. Amel'iclln; troop:-- partlClpatl'tl In the Archangel ExpedItIOn rlnally captured Aguinaldo, The hIgher commanders 'werr and the rra~on for thp operations of thf A, E. F. in Siberia mostly Regular officers who ill~i:5ted upon :-.1 rid oherlience under Genel"al GI'a\'(Is from Vladh'ostok to Lake Baikal are to regulation~ pl'oblems which many Mudents of the World Waf never Rations became the property of the company at ship soh'ed. :Ua.Jor lJupu.\, in /'('1 i~h fly the 811"01 d, ansv{er... all side. In the hazardouR Journey frl)m ship to shore. "1.·ationo;;; oc­ the qU(>Htlon-. Aftel' the ~J~Wlll!! of the t}'patr of Blest· casionally \vere lost from the cap::.izlIIg of :-.mall hoats. No Lito\'<4k thl'l'l' lea' t'd t, he an pastern front. a RituatlOn more were allowed to be iSfiued until a board of officerR could which f"nablt'd Gel m~tn~· ,to inl'rea..,e hpl' conCt'ntratlOllS III the we ...,t In ot dl'l' to l"E'lTlate an ea~tl'l'n fl'(,nt the net. That the <;!oldlf'l'''': werE' wlthollt food \\ hile rOlltine pur­ Allies sei7.~~d up(ln the opportunity uffeled by lIlt' forma­ ~ued its iron-1JOund cOllrse \\'a:;;; of mmor Importance com· pared to proper conduct of IH:lprr· work c\'en AdmIral Dewey tion' and de\elollml'llt of the C~eeho-Sloyak force. knmvn a~ the C{:chka DI'uz nn. 1h(> r ute to\\'ard the west waS .wa~ loath to open the doors of hIS refrIg~·ratnr ..,hip except at blocked by the Germans. To return this force of some' Htated interval:::. The Fihpino prayed himself tn bp no mean antag-omst 40.000 mpn to tho We'telll F"ont they would have er05, Sl and l1e\'er lm'ked In courage Half of them welt> without be ria, so on 3 :\Iarch, 1018, Masaryk ordered them to VladivO' arms. so their ~upenor numberR frequently \vere not a real stok. In. extflt.:nting them<.,el\'l~~ from the trap there was ~mp['riol'ity. American nfle markRman.. hl}) \va.:; much Ruper~ comllderahle tighting again.:;t' the Bolsheviks; a situation was ior to that of the Filipinos and this proved a tl'emendous developi~g which \.. · ould he of advantage to the Al1led caUse ended WIth the treaty of lH.'mp \\ lth S}Jam.


'\. "Vol. XX


No. 76

hecause it would

Book Reviews

',---4 neces~itate

the demand for tmpplie,::; and

mnteriel 1ll RU'4sia and thm; prE'vent their acquisition by German;:. Masaryk wa~ prevailed npon to keep the (,-;('.;;IClI .DIII:ina in Russia. ThiR fune proceedeu in itc; attempt to conlIuer Siberia and the "longed~fol' E'a::;tern front wa~ re­ est:1blisherl," What part the American expeditions plal'ed In establish­ llWa r.rllying point for the Czech troops ill Russia. III guard­ ill),!' ::-.tores which had been assembled for the Imperial RIL","Ull armles, in prC\'entillg the> l'stablit,hment of (-;erman suhmarine ba:::es ann thp assistallcP rendered the Czech..;; in the l!reatest anaha~i8 in history are all ably pi e"<t'utcd u~' ~Ialot' Dupuy mlus thrillIng- account, well dOl'umented, ('are· fully mrlpxf'ri 2nd gf'l1erollRlr illw.. tratptl. Thp nlan\' pl.'I'· SOlhti l':-..penence,:; unilergone by the American offi('cr:-:. and enh:-ted mtn Involved hl'l' ImplC'%n(> of the l'ollrage and lef'nUlTefulne~s of the Amel'H'dn . . oldiel fal'ed \vIth t' ymg ,UIl! difficult i-Iltuatioll.... The entire affaIr i.::: "the most top:,y­ tuny. irrational drama of CI r, ....... ·purpos(><; that a f't'\er·

rad'l,t! brain could iJ11:1)!Jlh'" To onmnJz(' the material andt'mb°cl~'lt in a dlgestlhle fOl'm must have bl'en fl tl'emt.'l1d­

tween Great BIitain and Germany, 3, Septemher 19'39, It include~ the Hl1tl.'dl TV/rtc PaW'I', Germany No. I (1930), an appendix (pageR 251 to 282). covering Sir Ne\ iIle H~nderson's tin:!l report on thu (')rLllnIstances Ipad~ lllg to the ternnnat~on of his mi~sion to B€ r bl1. A study of tJ,e,c paperR will enable the reader to follow the develolJment of those condition;;', whirh effected the widen­ .ng 01 tlw lH'l'mh hei\\t'pn Lfllluun and Berllll. amI the n~eless efforts by other pO\\ ('I::;' to lI1tl'n rnp He] cal e the telegrams exchanged h,v Lord Halifax aiHl the Bdtl~h Amuagsadors in Germany and Puland, the decument~ Whll h lmhcate Britain's desir(' for a ~ettlement at-> \, ell <:to:; hcl' u(>tei mination to fight in defense of Poland. ann the GCl'mall f.})f'l">c1'p:-. and Jlroc1a~ matlOn~ WhlCh pxpl'es~ G(>rmany'~ ft'al' of f'ncl1Tlement flnd her demand for a trcl' hand in the Ea--.t " The \'a!ut' of Hus book iR enhanced as a I'cfl.:'l enee work by the incluRlOll of .:llll'iaLJol att' table of l' Inlt'I1H anel <l unef :-..ummc!r,) uf the IIOlnment:::.. also


011 .... ld--k


DlLLES A"D H\\lILTO:-' FhH AR!\l'iTRO:-'L


First Phase

RI'\!C\\cd u:'o )'I.1Jo\" '\V!lham II.




'\,IG pages, , . Nc'fV YOlk: Chmles ScrIbner's fion.;;

RevIC'.wd b;...' :'I1aJOl' Wilham H. SpE'lueL lnf..mtry

lJllff ('oo},l'], hnd l)('('n Sl'CI ptary of Sta1 p fOt \\' .tr but. \\ht'll ('\inlllherinin ttll'lllt d hlg cabinet In 1~)37, ht' ''!If. trans­ fel r(eI 10 the office> of r'-\I':<t Lord of the Bl'ltlgh Atl:-uin-llt:v, Di.:>d~!tl'·n~' \\Ilh ~rl' (']-:amllt'rlalil over the rc':>ults of th(, :UIIIlI!t ~lgl~-\.'n1t'nt, Ill' J'W::'J!.!'Ill'tl Sm'£, then hp ha.., \\tlttell dl1l1 ~!HJ1\ell cOJl':::lllcl'IUly 011 mnttel'S pertalllillg" t,) BritIsh fOlt'l~ll! pn!It,\' ~!nd \\"'1'111 affull:'>, lIIclurhll~ a number ot .lfl'

bc1orL' AnwrIcan Hudlt'lll(':<' Tlu Sf'(f);/fl U'(jl'lrl Irr/J \ ')n:;;I~t~ lal \.!'dY of .\11', Duff Cooller':-:, "pl'el'he~ and <ntH h..., In the ~'1'.11' prl'cl'dlllg the ollthl eal\ of the \\ HI'. In the la:; t of ('velltR which fnllO\\'ed the final chaptel" the book


1'E'nt.ll'kably }ll'Uplwtl( '\I~' Cnopf'l lh"':d~ 11'H!lkly In hIS l rit!cisms of BIlti",h polh \ IJIlth before ,llld after tIll' opening of' the war, In hi'> C;Pl11111n till' f,tillllL' ot Great Britam and Fiance to }.!,din the "HP]HH't of Rll~':Hn re,<!u!tf'd in the ullthrt-'al" of the lJ1P:-.ent \\ar IIp had daimed "that thp Ilnlr \\a~ to prf'\'l'nt the war \\<1" 1.. I 011\ llllt' Gt'nnam that t->ht' w;".tdd lo ... e It" \\hl'n Gernl:I!I\' UeCtlme :t...,~utetl of Ru~s!all nf-'uhalJty "thb \\';1-; no 10l!:-'t:r ro::.sihte," The way hao been pi epareri and "she felt tll,'11 that the 1'l~1\ could be taken. . So endpd the Pl'rIod Ilf unopposed a~gl'pt->"-"'ion and b~oorlles::; \'iL-tory The SeUln!! \\tlrld \\:tl' entt'l'l'd upon a new pha~{'." 1"



)liscellaneolls X 0, 9 (19:19)




251 pages,. ~ew York: Farrar and Rmehart Revwwed by )"laJor WIlham H Speidel. Infantry

Til' volume ('ontains the document~ concerning thl~ Gel'm,U1-polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities be­

In th(' PIO\ltH tIOn of th·..., !'o)'Ik Ok loJ:,tboratol'-'; have certain . . ectwlh of their book ('/11/ It, h, ;Y('utJ'ul, plIuhshed in 1D~;-l. to whieh t ht,y h:wl' nddl'd. a hL..,torIcal I'l'col'd of .\meI'JCClll nelltr.1.l.t~· Je~, .. I[ltwn <111<1 ('xpel'lence \\hiLh han' tlnn--.pllt'd <.:\I!,seque-nt thC'l'ctd Tlwy pl'Pse-nt theIl' ~tPPl :.ib,d of tilt' \.t1 Olb PI'OPllf.:lt" \\ hh:!l h:tH' !It'en dferf'd .1" a g'UUl':llltee tll the proh'ctillit 0:' Amt.'ricaJl n\.·t1~ trillity A 110ll1t llpon \\ hll'h thr\~ IdY )~l't}at l'mpha:q.;; IS th!t "tllP popul,Il' Amf'11C<lll COIIC\!pli(l!l t]".11 IIt'lllr.tlih is a I'!p,tlly dellnl'cl ·t.ltl] . . I..., L'j rent',I!! . . " . ThE' authorf. ('0\1."'" bril'!' fl'\tl'\\ ,It \nll'ILan 1i1'utl'ali­ 1y In the eD.!'l\' d~!~'s of Olll lOllnt! \, awl t h·.' contributions made uy \\·".. . hmp'ton and ,JeffC'r~t)n to\\.II.! p:-taLlishing a dehntte polilY Th('y'\\I~l} IH'l~l'llt a d'.!!l' t uf tlw policy of American Ilf'utrality dUl'mg the perhHl1!J11-1917, which emplo~'ed

thl'Y eonelndr \\lth. the \\alning-"If




nllj .... t


wi"h to enforce

u ....e nul' ArnJ\' :!lld 1\;1\\'


354 pnges.



Charles SCl'1hnpr's


Rednvpd by ?;laj'll Wilham H, Spell]el, Infantry



Hattie J<! trw


of the International Brigade

alld t~mt varied assortment of Amt'l'lr.lll \ulunteel's known

as the Lmco!n BauaJ.on. Alvah ~k,,\~le hi:to gone to Spam Inte: national \,o!LI.l1et'i' l<h;Y in 1!):~8 and took part in the letreat t,) tlu" ...,ra and the offcn~,ye of thp. ELro Rh'PT. He tells the t-Vl! ~ as he and the memher" of the Lincoln Battalion l1el'sonally eXI)el'ienced it. Regardless of our personal opinions concerning the general character of the

,,'> an




C. & G.S.S. Military Revieu'

Book Reviews men who l'ompo:-\L'd thIS group of Amerlcan \'Olllnteers, it must he conceded that t lw unok has a dpfimte \'alue as a record of human expel ienee ill War, There are no'1itpral'~' (lmiwllh-.hnwllts and no attempt is made to romanticize the Lmcoln Battalion. Roughnecks and saboteur~, 1.)I'a\'p mell and CO\\ ards; all of them lumped togethel' into u rna" . . of unusual soldiers that gepm to be­ ever cOlrsciotlt' of what they IllC hg-htlng for. Thcle it:! much conVel"SatlOn and the ::.peech IR rathel ('oarse but effective in its production of tt'rrifymg' lmpl'eSl'HOll'l. The narrative deal­ ing with tht:> holding of Hill 666 on the 1':bro is a close up ::>tudy of' raw material in lmttle

LES El'(SE((;!':E'IE:-ITS AERlbi'iS DE LA mlERRE


[Let:!son:-: Derived trom .\erial \Yarfarc in Spain.] By CA \llLLr: ROl.GERO!'.

248 page-­

He)ow\\t'u by C.lpt<un A. L KeF's, Flehl Al tillery



of the SPHllif.h finJ \Val' are lIot all­


nnlh . . hlp . . WPle relucLtnt to U:-.l' PUI-';OIl12'Rses and hondJ;" Unl II I ;l'rnUll] .... .1.lI{l italIan.., furnIshed th.e Xal lUllalI:-.b Wit h malt'nellimltl'd III quantity ami QualIty llllt'luJfan

alld J<ept thPIl' bte~t \\·eapon . . i1 ....ecrN to then' allips a:;; well as 10 po....... !bll, Pllt'mit':., ~E'\el thl'il' . . ~, mall.' new trE'lId~ can J;e Iltlted Wl1h aCl'lII,l,,\ alltt man,\ ol(l Oll(-,~ confirmed as has .. Uel'll dOlll' III thl'-- C!ll'f'tul and ",l'iPJltifie :-.lwir of the recent war. Both ,til' antI ,lllti.lllCl'ilJ't ntJtl"I1l'1 ,tIlet operdtiolls filE' :lIlah I.t'd :lpd C()llclU-..ltlll'" <11'.1\\'11 ThE'''p arl' too llumel'OU" to li~t and tlJll 1I1\'uht'd to {b.. . l'lI"' .... Inll it i:-; uP!le\en that the iJoo]{ \\ III fm·IlL·.. h it \ailubll' addItIon to recent puLlications 011 thl:-- 1"Iub1l'ct. TIll' HHthnr I" a nUll of . . cientJ1k attain­ ml'llh alld all ('\.1 It'! H~l1cpd "lutit'llt of Ill ........ \lUwC't

A !{({.\II A:Vl I.l:'liCOL:\l

, H{\I,\\lcl L\ :'-1..Jo\l \\"1iilo.1.llI H

Sp(,ltl~l, Inf~lUtJ~

The Il:.lnw of C .rl S<-llldLprg' will ul\Yay~ ue do~el.' as::-o­ dated ,,\ith that of Abraham Lllleoln Pel haps no one person l...:; IJPttpl' qualltled to pre;:-ent to postel'lty that pano­ l'.lma of hi..,tonc hlghlightf. mal . . haduw:-' through which Lincoln mmed as a my:-.tpriOlI" character of American folk­ lore. A:-; a hoy, Salldullr~ kne\\ Lmcoln's lIeighLol'hood and the men who had lwen closph' associated with the Great Em;lllcipatol' He gathered material from e"€or,\" available source until hb libral.' c!}llt:tincd more than h\o thou:'!und \'olume!" and m:lJ1\l~(,l'ipt ... on LlIlcolmana J.~ifteen years of exhausting and ron ...\. iPJltiDllS re"l'urch went into the pro­ duction of The Pilli/if YeOI"i and an additional thirteen

years were reqtlIred to assemble the material for the last foul' years of Lincoln·s life-The l-Var Yemi'i. The IVaI' Year.": !:j,tarts where T/zp P~'ail'ie Yeal'S ended. The PresIdent Elect and his party have entrained at Spring­ field, Illinois, and have commenced their eleven-day Journey to Washington. The nation is on the threshold of a great endurance test through which it is to be guided by the patient hand of Lincoln. Perhaps these volumes add little to what IS already known of the period of Lincoln's Presidency There is little that can be added to the assembled facts. Thpir chjef value, however, lies III their contribution in pre~ senting a human and rentalized character in a literary bl, ography sO comprehensive and so precise that we may assume that there is little more to be said regarding President Lmcoln and hi~ contempol'aries t han that which Sandburg has produced. The research bcholal' may be diHappointed to find that, in spite of the 414 halftones from photographs and.249 reo productions of cartoons, letters and rlocuments. these vol· urnes contain no footnotes, appendix or bibliography. For satisfaction he need but reflect upon the rare quality of the biographer, or else take recourse through reference to the record of assembled facts. The reader will find that he spends little time on the battlefield, although the engage­ ments of the Clvil \Var are concisely summarized \vithin the body of the $tor,v. Tactical comdJel'ations are not involveu. as the ~l1bJect i~ devoterl to th~ qualities of ~tatesman~hlJ1 of the prI11cil1aI charactel'.




1,152 page's.


Little, Brown and


Thl' editol',s of this .1t1tobingraphy of Ameril'a-re,lliz­ mllch history has b('~'n made ill Amencd Sll1ce the fil'i'>t expltH er.., and colonisb renched It:-; Hhores: how hrlJad. 11l~ "ht)'\\,

how richly multiform, huw full of ad\~nturE', drama, an~ color thIS histol') has been"; and also "how much of thiS hr:.-.tofY has been \vritten by actual partlclpants and ob· servers; hO\\' many thousands of rat',\', Vivid. and veraciou~ naIT~ltl\p";: ha\'e Ul'pn fpnned t)y Ihc settlers. the ~oldlC1"f:. the traders, the boatmen, the gold hunters, the fill' trappers, the railroad builders, the merchants. the eUlIcalol's, the p1'l!ach­ ers, the politicIans"-set about to produce a broad sun'f>" of thI~ great ma:-.s of historic f'vent", told through the \\ol'ds. mainl .... of mew and women who were there at the time the E'\'ents took place. The fnllts of thi~ tremendous ta:-.k J~ pre~ented as ~nch in Thr' H, llt(J!I( Of AlI l prifll. ,The lJlbliograph,\' of 252 li::.ted sources may gh'c . . ome idea of the vast amount of material which is inclurlerl wlthUl the pa12'e:.-. of this Sll1gl£' volume. The pallOramn opens With the voyage of L~lf F.l'ic...,on to Vineland and the discovE'I'~' of Amt',',ca by Christopher Columbus and expands quite rapid· Iy until after the War of 1812. Then, as the <,,,e,nb of American history seem to gr.ow mOl'e complex, f>ubject::- are picked out. These subJectR cover such €'\'ents and incidents as \"haling, steamboats, ~arJy American sociaJ life, the reo




Vol. XX NQ. 76

Book Reviews

forming period, the westward movement, the CivIl War, the

conquest of the West, the devel~pment of cities and indus­ tl'les, the Spanish War, the World War, Franklin D. Roose­ ,'eit and the W. P. A. The material is presented from original sources wher­ e,'er possible. The editors make no comments and draw no conclusIOns. The reader has the advantage of first-hand Illf'unnation and is permitted to form his own opinions.

pha"e of contemporary Britbh history. a period marked by a great climax and by momentous events of transition in the destiny of the great empire. It was the year in which Ger,

many reoccupied the Rhineland, Italy triumphed over EthIopia, Spain became involved in a ciVIl war, President Roosevelt became reelected and Edward VIII abdicated the royal and imperta1 throne of Great Britain. These events form, the pattern upon which he has con~tructed his histori­

cal drama, but the pl'incipal theme about which everything KEOGH, COMANCHE AND CUSTER By EDWARD S


127 pages . . . Samt LoUls. Mo.: John S. SWIft Co., Inc

Revlewed by MaJOI' WIlham H. SpeIdE'I, Infantry

(aptam F.d\vard S. Luce 1'- the commander of the St'\t'llth Cavalry G(/n y OICeil Veterans. PrIOr to his retire­ mPHt he ~en·ed in the Seventh Cavalry for many years, an E'\jll'IICnCC that umpired hIm later on to present to the pub­ lic II! book fQrm the story of the three personalitie.::: respon­ ..,lule fur the Garr1! Oll'fn traditIOn. The resultR of his dIlI­ gellt I't':-.earch among the hl"toricai file-; and record.:; of the Seventh Cavalry have given u.::: facts about these characters hCletofo1'e unknown, or el~e colored sensationally by de­ lHlIlhlllg authOl'R whoge exaggerated accotints na\'l~· nO foun­ datwlI III factual hi.:::tory. Comanche IS the central character, who:-;e life IS mftu­ ellct'u br the romantic c.HPer.::: of two great cavalrymen­

Cdpt,lI11 (Dre,.! Lt. ('01 ) Myl., Walter Keogh and Brevet

;\1il.101' Gpllt:'rai George A. Cu:::;ter Though only a cavalry

mOtlll(, Comanchp uecome:::. a great per:-;onality ll1 the life of

L'apt<1I11 K(~llgh, who purchased and trained hIm and re­

lllulIll'll hI:;, clo~e companion untIl he fpII WIth Cu.:::ter In the

Ratth.- 01' the T .lttle Big Horll Comanche Ih'ed on anu be­ . Came tlw ":-.econd commanoillg" officer of the Seyenth Cav­

ally," tinnily dymg ill mello\\ old age at Fort Riley, Kansas,

Xu\emuE'l' 6, IxDI All thE' world kllowl" about Clt~ter's La.:::t Stand, hut it du! -l,ut 1\110\\ alnllt thl' part--. }lImed III thi~ tragerlv by ('ap· '.Ull K,-ngll. who:-l' (O1ll :1)!P;'lI<;' ~tamI can::-.po the SIOU:'{ (,hief Rt:ll H·\r~~' to (hum that Kt'o~h ",'ttl'> thf' bra\'~~t man thl..' ~lo\lI\' "\l'l t'lJught." ci.nrl C(lmallllw, the only h'·mg <:'111\·1\'01' ,]1' thl' hattll' Cnfoltllnatl'ly. 11 also kno\\s much ahout ('ll~t~'I· \\'hlth the cl'l'old'- IlH1ltate to be gJ'O~:-' e.\.agg'el'atlons, Thl, 1- 110t Olll~ an 1I11l'1l~t'h· hllman :-;tory. but a nduahle. cilh.1p', nt~!l'\ llHltnlllltlOll 11) thp hi..,tol'Y of otlr Indian \\'ani




else revoh'es i:::; thE' abdkation of the king. !\'lr. Gueualla relates the :-:;tory of the events which led up to the abdlCat ion \\ ith great warmth, ulHler.:::tanding and

pathos. The other e\'ents which are ::,-;multaneously taking place merely form a shadowy background for the principal characterb ill theIr mo\'ements acro::-;s the :3tage in the tra~ic anticipation of the grand climax. The POll1t of view is that of a fnend of the kIllg, of one who 1(J1ew the story in inti­ mate of'tail and of one: whose o..,ympathy enabled him to tell it with delicate treatment and (hscl'etion, , In the light of recent e\·ent:-;, the emphasis on politics now seem::; somewhat di.:::torterl, but that is a criticism which might br attalhed to much that was written before the closing days of August, 1939. The author has presented a

phase of Britl,h history that should not be slighted or over­ looked.


New '1'01'1-- CarrIck & Evans, Inc R",yw\\",d b). Major \VLlliam H Rpl'lu",l," InfantI)

II Sot \'/Cfll1!1 I~ a stor) of the Am.?l'ican Revolution along the Hurlson Rher III the \'lCIlllty uf N'e\v Yorl{ and \i\re.:::tcheliter COllllt). The tale i:-. woven about the episodes of three \Vestchel"ter boy" who .10111 11}> \\'ith a company of ~e\v York \ollinteer__ ~the \Ve.;;tche--tE'i· Cuide" 1\11'. Hough R1:>':::U!'e:-. LIS that the jJrincipal charactE'l's arc real people and that the source upon whIch the episode.::: ale baRed h; authen­ tic Abe Kronkh,} teo the principal chardcter, \VaYer~ oetwf'PIl ,loinll1g the CaU:-::e of the LoyalIst::. or becoming a revolutioll­ ary. Finan)', howe\er, he becomes thoroughly devoted to the cau:-;e of the lIE'W American nation. HE' realizes that thI~ is his countn-, «lid the licople are hi,:-; people.

l,.\ge, . :-.l'('w York, Doubleday, Doran & Compan», Inc.

Hl'\ll'w('d by MllJnr WIlham H SpE'ldel. InfantlY

ThE' novel indicates that the a,uthor hag devoted much time to a carE'flil study of the hi.:;tory of the American Reyo­

Philip Guedalla ha,:-; .selected the hundredth year follo\\'­ th!· coroll.ltioll of QueE'n Victoria in which to present a

Jut 1011, the character uf the people of that period, and the nature of the c1Hmtl'j' in and about Westche.:::ter ('ounty.


Library Bulletin



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h,<lM<\f; "1<1'(' Hl~l"rwal ';;,,(,),'1; - Annals of Shawnee Methodist Mission and IndHU\



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htt"l"t in tho B,ble? \ i'las~Iflf)rj f"l1(',·',ol) of ,h(' odd, a'in1L4,ng, .:",u~\)<, ,Il'~ _un n~l1\or \I, m~ ,,\llUman '''If'TI'~1 '" Ih!"' B,I)I1', mall\ ofWh,rb ha~I?('~\'al"'d 'lw""""'.,.n"llh'Il",r(l",r,·ud"r I<)J3 :220: 1."'I,~"(1 'lair)' l,n"on.111 I A R P ar-d higll explosive 1<13." 1M ,}OJ·{·h! L '"'' '" nr IIccm,-,"" The revolution of Nih'''sm Warr-Ing to the west . TT...ln_ln. , ..r I ~ f \\ I >,01,('0' l'IJ'l .'J 1\. \' H, "I' i"n" I\, W,1rlare Th~ r.. la\.(1'l "r I" ~," "")! I Tr:m~I"""tI l>~ r::~ward I','z. 1"",,1<j. \ql'J \I '0\· \1131 II'''' " 1. Thl'Torguts 1'1l'J 1\1 %17·'1 'I ,I.,l-.J,~'n TheLlncolr-Battallon, Th~st"q ,,1'Jl! \,,,.'t,,"n~,,I,,r"ughl"'~I'U" " , I ~, ,n" rl ,"""'al hn)!arl,'>' \<I,}~ 1\1 'l\fl_ \1 I{. u," ""', I Les enSI"gnements iler'cns de 1.1 guerre d'Espagnc \Ir I('s~"n.i; of Iltp " " ' ' ' .... [';1'. I I"\') 1\1 'Hb·\l ~ I{ .. ""w r·)1 1,r,,, r II J Les Haut!. de Meu'>e et Salnt-MlhleI1914~1918 : [l,t hnl"h" 01 ". \1, U" "r,d n). \1 h,ol 1'111 Plll>l I \'1\'1 1:>1 9~O,l .. J Ii. \1 1\ ','Il"~l 'U" "r In', n,,:\1 .,'lal \\T",... SOIJthcas"tnrn Europe \ {,"I ""'a! ..1"lr('" I' m.~ _up, , 1') ~'I '1111 -'I ....,,··.j\U'V I it" Abraham L,ncoln Thewar years In 1 \"lun:l<'~ 19J!! !'l;J_Btll ,J.1'1 ""c~'" 1 I.. ",. I ,,"'aid B .1\ br,cfsurvcyofthe growth of nullIfication and its relat'on 10 seQ"~'>lon I'Hl< ,3~:! :11 ... , I .1". Iluc" O,e Gc~alT1twerkkraftc atler St;:!aten ITh,· 1." •• 1 <I, f<'n~, ~!r, n~'" "I ,lin,,''''''',' 1"1'1 \\')l0( II' -." " " I .. ,.,,, . \\ ,Ill ,lll Th"dJ,'I.~ Sold'ers in the sun \, l,b. n' ue, 'n lmr,rrlal m









Thc Ur-ltedS"tatf'S In world affairs 1".J9 1127 ';'3 I \ 'I \rn"'HI \>Uh' , "I 'h.hls"Jr'ral I"]'! 1\1 'Ii:>I \:

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. 70


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Ch'ldrrn Of GOd An .I\.""r,cln epIc 1"1" I~I>" Tow'rd .'n ,,"drrst of thC' U S S R



Ilr I',l"h Germany'S war chances as plc"tured in German literature 1'1\9 \1 rql,. \' ! .,J<j. I' Bur' The defencf' of BrItaIn Ig III 1\1 ll)j-\ 121 1 "", \I.rnr ,\ \rm1'l Fal.5e prophets of peace 1939 1:.1 111J l lJ·JI I U' 1.,"';1'1) l:dw...r'J :'"",h Keogh, Comanctle and Custel' \ In" il"·,,un! ,,[ ,,' .em, "'''n "no h.~ aero, Jh,r~(' as 1,,\1<'11 irnm I hI' rf'~nrds "r 'he 711, {' !">. t"ilHllq.. I~I'I'I . '1 ':J~j·{l-'\.?L!v \1,1 "', ,IdS' "h (, Histo~ic 5ketches of the cat"tle "trade at tl1e west and southwest. '",.u,h""", H'~I"rhal"r'''s \,,1 \IIII iod"l'dh\ Halphr l~Ii'b"r 1910 1\.197\"1 \1.1.""1,, H -~A n('w d'c"tlonary of "the Portuguese and English language tIn 2 ~'>I­ um"~1 1<)~2 Ilb'>l ,. II r raul (. H'St.Orlll de Puerto RICO IH'~I"ol "I I'u""'" itl"" 1 l'IJ9 1')729,' "".<1 \\ 1'1 "11,,-,, International law situations, with solut.ions and notes, 1937 I'l'j'l 1\lilII ..I , ' ''''''J I "'l'ol~·1\l.'n\ Reqls"ter Of commlss,oned and warrant officers of the Ur-Itcd St.."tt's Na~y and M.,r\ne Corps, July 1, 1939 l<\jq '\1820\1.( 7J-I,I-( .. .'on. - , hvl"o R For gold al'd glory Ttl" ~'.>r\ "I I~"r<luortl"r'-'d ~'I"'q: '11 \"" ",ra J'Il'! 1\llOl·CI7;l1 I' ,,, i Il-"',ul,,,, If" b," ~ No"t('s on "the framIng of tactical cxereises for Qfflcers of the Terrltor'al .l\rmy )\13\) 1\\ :,01 \1 ~21 ',. ,pc \ '].,1\11 It.\m~a\ \\, ~I"l) The Armies of "the First Frencll RepubliC and th~




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T;letlcs a"d technique of s,gflal commu.ucat,C)n for "tho tr,an. "'~",J I "'P< .... ,h",,1 p"ml'h1,( Nu l!,l' flqJ<) \1 ~lI-JI-1 I "'m,,~,'" I·~\,r '" Th(' EJ,do Ml'1I1co'swayout l'l'j'} ' 1 ' SOLlthAmcrlCa" h.lndbook,1939 ::;"ull·and(, "Hal \m,nr ,\lc>.1<" 'ul", 191:1 'Ill>, "I ",,1.1, I!. llr!! I" n, r", , 11 \,' 1.lm", Ahrlman A study I aIr bombardment '93'1 1\lln9JI.\.J. ~,"u"s~', t"m" ...." Thc hVIl'g traditIon Change and America 1~.J'1 ,'1, I· 'I ";'"rom, e""}' ~ \l,c \1".I1;l VanIshed Arizona ItH" If" ,,,"~ 01 th ... "rm}" lIfe or" -",v. l'~I.tI"J ","ma,' \'111 1'1 zn3..c 73-B1\11 • "T ,)n-I",~"n, Ldv.ur<l New roads to riches In the other .l\mericas 19J9 !980~

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'i"r, ,", l'""."r J DiplomatIC relatIons between the Un'ted States and Japan \0\ III 189,3·1'10;' 1~'3t< 1327.3 1 ;;211 ,j, T" ""nmn, r.,,".~al Ethr La;~ ll',,'~'''n du h· ( 0"P5 dan~ la ba!llIl1r dps fro"""T~ 10 \"ul au 22 :-"I't, mbn 1'1111 It Ihr Th" 71h lJ"'~IO" of eh,· 1\ Corps durln\,,_.hc llElll, ,,( 'Iw FTre.",,,~ ·11l \ugu~' 1" 22 Srvtrmbr" 1911\ I 1')31 11\.1 9403·J 11 t" >1 United States Code Anflotated 1'.l]P 11 Bankruptcy Rl'(' 2{l1 rOl'I'd 1939 liP, 21 \ "S'8i, S .J."lrl The Old Santa Fe TraIl' 1939 19'b] We we~e there B~ T"pl\(' For, ,go l'orrpspond(,llts, 1939 l~h191 ",'lim"" raul I -=- The trampling herd TnI'" story of Ihe '·:lln", r:mgf '" \m, rlea 1'13!1 19:/>' \\f'ndl, lI.J.n~ Frnnkre'ch heute ,",nd W,r. ,Fralwe ''''lay and w,] 19J9 j9H-AI \\, ,I. '\(l.lh"lnlrl an'l "'~I~,a - The ,.econquest of Mexico Thl' ;.pars or L,.zaro ('<l"ua,. 1<)J<)


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19'19 19801

Academic Notes

BmG-\Dn,;R (iI:.:NiLRAL

L. J. :\iC:JAIR, t", S. Army,


l 'OLO~EI. K. B. EDMeND8, Cavalry, Assis{(wt ('o1lltJIrwriallt LILtTlI~!\ANT COLO~El.

P. R.


Cavalry. SrcJ(tar.y


Regular Class Special Class and Extension Courses


CIIlEFS OF 1. Offensive OperatIOns II. Intelligence, History and Strategy Ill. Defensive Operation< IV. Supply, Eval'uation, and Logistics

V. l\Iiscellaneous



LIEL r. COLO:-1EL R. E. MCQUILLI!'!, Cavalry


LIEUT. COLO".o!. G. R. COOK, Infantry LIEt::T. COLO!'!EL L. K. U!'!DERIIlLL, Infantry


LIEUr. COLONEL J. CO!'!SIDINE, Cavalry LIEt::T. COLONEL C. F. WILLIAMS, Corps of Engineers LiEUT. COLO!'!EL S. E. BRETT, Infantry







Academic N ote8~

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

Notes on the Organization and

Employment of Mechanized Cavalry

By MAJOR R. S. RAMEY, ('a>'a./ry

1. !:-;TROD1XflO1<. In every walk of life lt lS a common tions. The motor vehicle has been substituted for the horse With fallIng to become f,0 engro:::.seu wIth our Immediate problems a correspondi~g Illcrease In the speed of movement and distances that we are mdlfl'erent to € \ 'ents or developments WhICh influence to which units can be sent. The fundamental missions of mecha­ materially our own affatrs. Or, rer-ognizmg them, \ve calmly mzed ca\'alry are the accepted missions of cavalry, ignore curt E>nt happenings until their Import IS abruptly, some· Merhanized em'aIry umts al e equipped with speCIal type times brutally and tragIC'ully, thrust upon Uf" \Ve in the mIlitary armored vehIcles which require time to produce or replace. The professIon are not Immune to thiS same laIf,sez~faire attitune. personnel i5 highly speCIalIzed and requires time to train. Oper­ A numbrr of recent occurrence::., abroad and at home, should ating agaIn!:>t modern antit;:mk weapons, \'ehicle ao;;, well as per­ have sen'ed to shake officers of the Army of the LTmted States sonnel casualtIes may be ('omparatlvely great. Conseqp.ently. out of the lethargy which results from routme peacetime train­ ronsIderations dictate that mechamzed cavalry umtsFihould mg, Events of the past fev,' months should have awakened us only be asslgnrd lmportant missions which other avaIlable troops to the neceSSIty for orie-ntm)! and acquainting ourselves WIth cannot satisfaC'torlly expcutc-. . re&pect to the full ImplicatIOns of mechanizatIOn, one phase of

Again, the effecth'eness of mechanized cavalry WIll usually whIch i& mechamzed ca\'alry as developed In our Army. be greatly enhanced by lts surprise employment. To gam this As an ohJert lesson we may regard at a dlstanrp the amaz­ deSired surprise it IS Important that the terrain permit the utih­ mgly rapJ(i conquest ut' Poland by German forces 111 September. zatlOn of the inherent moblhty to rlose rapidly with the enemy 19:1!1. for whtch a major share of thp credit IS directly attnbutablf> and utIlize the shock and fire power of the umts before the ho.tile to mechanized forces comparable to our mvn mechanIled eav­ force IS able to disposE' antItank weapons or shift other forces to alny, Cumin~ closer to home, we have the recent First Army protective disposition... . :\:Taneuvers at Platt~burg. :\ew York, where, in most difficult The mobIlIty of meehamze-d .cavalry umts enables them to tf1rram, the JnlpiIcatlOns of the demoralIzmg ability of the 7th mDye relati\-ely long distances under cover of darkness, eIther Cavalry BrIgade, MechanIzed, was uncomfortably brou~ht home ..from a dIstance in redr or from one Aank to another of large to many of the other umts and indn'iduah:;. forces. I n this manner both strategical as well as tactical sur­ If our Army" to be tramed properly and adequately, lead· prise may be f,!ained, ers of p\'ery grade must ha \ e a general knowledge of merhamzed As \ve WIll see \vlIen ..\e conSIder the orgamzatIOn of umts, (,~l\'alry. It IS \"itlt tl1b 111 mind that the pre~ent al'ticle!5 \Vlltten the Inherent mobIlity, the eomparati\'e speed of move-ment on to pronde. espeCially for thot>e officers who have not hau the roads or l'ross country either In the march to contact 01' in the opportunIty of ObSel'VIllg It, a general appreCIation of the com~ actual attark, demands posltwe measure:;, to control units ann pOSItion and method of emplnympnt of mpehamzed cavalry In rapid functloning of le:1der~. OtherWI&e, unIts may disperse raplrlly. And If leadel::' are ~low With uensiOm, and orders, the the l'mted States Army. 2. TIles .111-rl'llill=:"d ('IlI11lry is a component of the opportUluty for surpl'lse Will be lost. These consllierations have Cavah'Y Arm OJ~Jnized and equipped for the express purpaSl', materIally InfiuellCell the Ol"!!nnv:at Ion ann compo:;ition of mech­ on favorable terram, of (>xtendmg the sphere of artlOn of cavalry antzed ('3\ airy UllitS. E:::'J1ecIally ha\'e they dIctated ample, raplri orgamc mE':1n:::. of rpronnaiss~:m('p. ('ommunt('~tIon and sup­ to mueh greater du:;tance:::. and of in('rea~ing the ~peed of perform­ ance of the usual fundamental mlS~lOn of ("m'alry. The principal ply. 4. PRI"'CIPLES 01 ORliANIZHION. n. The doctrll1e that Item at eqUipment of mechalllzed em'alry ('onslsts of armored. mechamzeo ('ayaJr)' ~hould extend the sphere of action to much ~f>lf-plopE'lied motor \ehlCles, designed for combat. On eaeh of the mechanized ea\ all y combat \'ehlcles are mounted weapons greater dlt:.tances and ll1l'rease the speed of performance of ac­ of various cahben;, Broadly speakmg, mechamzed ea\'a1ry com­ cepted ca\'alry miSSIOn:::. has demanded self-contained tactical umt:;. Independent or semI-Independent operations require pn~E'S unit~ a~ follows' a, Self-contmned mechamzed ('avalry regIments or brIgades that the larger units be self·contained admmistl'atIve!y as well as tactically, These conditions are met by providmg ('ertam capable of operatmg mdependently or semi-independently. h. Essentially rE'connais:-.ance units such as the mechamzed equally mobile, aUXIliary tal,tieal and admini&trative elements, reconnaIssance squadrons contained in the Cavalry DI\-ISlOn and These orgamc 5upportmg element5 are: command, reeonl1atS­ sance, fire-support, commUntCatIOn, and service Untts. \\'hile the Composite Corps Ca\'alry Regiment. c. Small me('hanized reconnaissance groups such as the the mechamzeu ea\:1l1 y regiment contains some of these required Scout-car Platoon, orgamc 111 eaeh horse cavalry regIment. aUXIliaries and can, therefore, operate on limited mdepe-ndent In this article. howe\,er, we are concerned primarily with mIssions, the reinforced meC'hanized ca\ aIry brigade is the umt the first t}lle, I.e., the larger "elf-contained mechanized cavalry m which IS inrorporated all of the auxIhary means neeessary fol' units such as the regiment and brigade and their components. execlltion of dIstant Independent missions. h. Before examimng the detaIled l'ompot:.ition of mecha-, ~. DOCTRI"E OF EMPLOYME"T. The application of mech­ anization to cavalry has been along Imes to enable the arm nlzed cavalry units, let us \'lew the broad features. BasicallY, better to carry out its prescribed tactical and strategical func­ the orgamzation of mechamzed cavalry provides for:




,," ....

)rol.XX No. 76 .,-~ (I) Powerful strilnng and hol!ling elements whIch can be grouped into several combat teams. (2) Reconnaissance elements. both ground and air, capable of I apid distant reconnaissancE'. 13) A s}'stem of command and communication, including a verv specialized voice and key radio system, capable of control­ ling highly mobile and widely separated elements. (4) An adequate mobile system of supply and maintenance. \5) Supporting arms and services such as artillery. engi­ neers, signal. and medical troops sO equipped as to be equally as mobile as mechanized cavalry. c. The basic combat 'veh'Lcle of mechanized cavalry is the combat car. Grouped either in the regiment or the reinforced brigade are fire support elements such as artillery, mortars, rifle and machine guns (both caliber .30 and .50), the combination of which with combat-car units make effective combat teams. d. The basic combat umt IS the platoon. Keeping in mind these general principles of organization,let us examine in some detail the mechanized cavalry brigade and its component units. S. MECHANIZED CAVALRY BRIGADE. - a. General.­ Under recently proposed tables of organizatIOn for the brigade, the largest mechamzed cavalry unit, it is to be constituted as follows:




Brigadf' Headquarters, Headquarters Troop and Band Signal Troop ReconnaISsance and Support Squadron composed 0(' He-adquarters MotorcyclE' Troop Machine-gun Troop Reconnaissance Troop Observation AViatIOn Squadron (Spparatp) (Not organic, normally attached)




M~~~~~~~ED~ (PfRce)

Engmeer Troop

2 Mechanized Cavalry regiments. each cuntammg Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Service Troop Reconnaissance Troop Machme-gun Troop 3 Combat-car Squadrons, each of two ('ombat~car troops ME'chanized artIllery battahon compnsmg. Battalion Headquartprs. Hf'adquarters Battery and Combat Tram 4 75-mm Howitzer Batte>rles. each of SIX 75-mm HOWItzers


Ordnance Mamtenance Company Quartermaster Maintenance Company Medical Company Attached MedIcal (wIth each major subordmate umt).

'1 he grouping under echelons is in accordance with tactical funct ming only. /, Let us examine briefly each of the component echelons of the p. oposed brigade. The ('ommand Echelon 18 comp08ed of: , i) The BrIgade Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and I'and composed of: (a) The Brigade Headquarters consists of. Commander. two aides. E f'cutive, S-I, S-2 and assistant, S-3 and 9...<;sistant, S-4 and asSIStant, 'B gade Motors OffH'pr (b) The Brigade Headquarters Troop' (4 - 0, 1 - WO, and 147 E' n. The troop commander is 301,,0 Headquarters Commandant. The tr ·op contains: HeadquartPfS and Staff Platoon Intelligence Platoon Supply and TransportatIOn Platoon Pioneer and De>mohtion Section Band (attached for administrative purpose)

Academic Notes (2) The Signal Troop (4 0, 111 -- EM). The cbmmand­ er of this unit as Brigade Communication Officer supervises the training of communication personnel and coordinates the em¥ ployment thereof. (3) The Recpnnaissance and Support Squadron consisting of: ::;lquadron Headquarters (3 - 0, 8 - EM) Motoreyrle Troop (6 - O. 176 - EM) of Troop HE'adquarters 4 Platoons, one or more of WhICh will be equIpped WIth 3x2 motorcycles whup the other platoons wdl havE' solo motor­ cycles. Machme-gun Troop (6 - 0, 183 - EM), conslSts of Troop Headquarters 4 Marhine-gun Platoons ReconnaIssance Troop (6 - 0, 14 - EM), comprises. Troop HE'adquarters 4 Scout-car platoons (4 SCOLlt cars each)

(4) The ObservatIon Aviation Squadron (Separate) (30 0, 150 - EM) contains three flights of 4 planes each and certain supply, transportation, armament, communication and photo­ graphic means to enable it to operate separately; operating strength, normally 10 planes. WhIle not an organic unit of the brigade, it is an essentwl normal attachment. c. The Combat Echelon of the brigade comprises: (1) An Engineer Troop (4 - 0, 128 - EM), conSIsting of: Troop Headq!larters

2 Operatmg Platoons

(2) Two Cavalry Regiments (each of 64 - 0, 1050 - EM), each organized as follows: (a) RegImental Headquarters and Hf'udquart~rs Troop (12 - O. 124 -- EM) containmg:

Regimental Headquarters

Troop Headquarters

Staff Platoon

Commumcatton Platoon

Mortar Platoon

0, 98 - EM) comprIsmg' (b) SerVIce Troop (4 Troop Headquarters Supply Section TransportatIOn Platoon Maintenance Platoon . (c) ReconnaISsan('p'Troop· (6 - O. 114 - F.M) cOMIstmg of, Troop Headquarters Four reconnaissance platoons of 2 sectwns 'of two scout cars each O. 1~3 - EM) ('omposed of. (d) MachmE"-gun Troopf (6 TrooP HeadquartE'fs Three Machine-gun Platoons One Rifle Platoon te) Three Combat-car Squadrons (12 0,177 - EM) each con­ tammg. Squadron Headquarters (2 - O. 9 - EM) Two Combat-car Troops (5 - 0, 84 EM) each of • which compn1'lPs: 0.44 - EM) Troop Headquarters (1 Four Combat-car Platoons (l - O. 10 . EM) (3 com­ bat cars each)

(3) A mechanized artIllery battalIon ,32 - 0, 767 composed of:


Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Battery and Combat Tram Four Batteries (of SIX 75-mm Howitzers each) Each battery con­ tammg: Battery Headquarters. Three platoons of two hOWitl'ers ea('h and a fourth platoon contaming an ammUnItIOn section and a mamtenance- sec­ tIOn

d. The Service Echelon of the Mechanized Car'alry Brigade

comprzses: (I) An Otdnance Maintenall,ee Company, for the repair and higher echelon mamtenance 'of the weapons and cambat vehicles of the brigade. . *Nat to be confused with the Brigade Recomiuissanre Troop which is an organic unit of the Reconnaissance and Support Squadron. tNote that this is the Machine-gun Troop of each regIment. The brigade commander also has a Machine-gun Troop In the ReconnalSsance and Sup¥ port Squadron.




< C. & G.S.S. Military Revieu;

., r-

, Aca'aemi';Notes-" (2) A Quartermaster Maintenance Company for the repair and higher eche10n maintenance of the 81tpply and administrative vehicles of the brigade. . , (3) A Medical Company to assemble casualties, provide ambulance service and lImited hospital treatment pending evac­ uation of casualties by higher echelon. (4) Over and above the Medical Company thete is medical personnel (both officers and eniIflted I attaC'heo to each of the major components of the brigade. e. Flenbll1lij of OlgUlI/:ntlfm.- The OlgamzatlOll of themech­ anized cavalry brigade lb along hnes which wIiI permit the sub­ dlVl510n of the \\'hole IIIto temporary olg'anJwtlOns 01' ('am bat teams. Thus, two 01' more combat teams, CO!llIH'I~Ing tl1E' orgallic mechanized ('a\3ky combat elf'llwnt wIth atLll'hel~ reconnaIs­ sance. tire SUppOll, engmeer and mpdwal elempnb may be formed antI opewte :'.lmultaneousb' l~I! ht-'t' In I OOpt'ratlOn or on :-.eparate

b. The Scout CaT is an armored, four-wheeled·drive vehicle without turret intended for two main purposes, \!) Used as a reconnaissance or command vehicle it IS equipped with the followmg machme guns' 1 rahber .50 mJachine gun 2 cahber 30 machinE' guns (one for antIaIrcraft) 1 cahbf'r 45 suh-machmE' gun for close-m vehicular defense

12) The Scout ('ar u.sed usa personnel cartier III the I\.1:achme­ gun Troops carnes the same weapons as m b \ 1) above. together WIth the necessary ground mount, for both the caliber .30 and .50 machme g~ns.


A... J. dl'fpl1Gf' .,gumst hoc.tll" ,antltanl, gt1l1S, I'lli'll rf>glTIlPllt of l\1pdla­ lilLoI'd (',t\,lir~ I:'> P"lllPPl'ti \\lth ... hI. <l :!-llH'h rln".! mnrtflr~

(' 1/,(' Jl(J(far (·nrlw'lr t~ a ni'"mlrflE'd 6rou! -{'al chaSSIS wlllrh {'arne::. one 4.2" mortar mOUlntrd on lhe \ ehH'le and one cahber ":10 maehm€' gun for the 11l:oleC't101l of the erew.

T\crw\l. 1 ;-.[' or' \ t: 1111 I,> Pl!nl'lpal th!htlllg Of .1,,;,..,alllt \e\m'le of meehanll:ed C~1\ .lln It I";' an arnU)l eJ, I r:ll'I\-la~ I ~'! \ ph'e'e With turret and carne~ the fol1owlIl!! rnachllle ZUI1''': flo ,-\R\t\\II:\f,

a The

T\Pf;~ \'\[)

(,11111'01 ('01 It'.


1 ('.illbpr ;jn m,lPhHlP gun In tllrrp(

I cahlwr 30 ma(h!!lt' gUll In turrpt

I ('alibpr .10 antlalrcrdft m.H"hllw gun

1 call1wf .J!) rnM'hulP )!un 10 huw .

1 l"Lhb~' .t5 "lllJ-m,L' hUIP gill} f,}r c!n"p-lll \ (-'llIr'U!,lr ",pfpo.. ,



1 ",(,,,,,


Mornltl \\ u, TIl} ),fll 11,;,1/1 n CA\ AiR\

I':QCIPPED \\ITfi THo\H''iO''\ 45 CAl.Im.R Sl B-\IACHINE: Gr'\

\1CCH\l\IZ}0 CA\ \lIn Srol'T C\R

I'" \ .... ,,-t1! ("OTT'S

C"<t',l for \'E'(.lIlt1al.."alH'p, a,... ('nmmana cur" ••md pc>rs<mnpl r'.:trrJ('rs, pac-h rpgimPllt of Rl"gular Army lwr<;p ('[1\ nlry ha,<,.1'lI)n of S(,lJut (',Lr<;, anrI thl? Mp('hamzerl Squarlroll of thf' CompoSl!p ('orp" Rp('unn,l.ihsaJH'e Rl?glmpnt IS to be equlpppl\ with <;lmlJdr velllrlf's.


d. Each motnrq/f'/p, both solo and ~3x2,.carrles one calIber.45 sub-machme gun mounlep on .the machme for use when in motion. The weapon can I be removed and used by the driver away from the vehIcle. The 3x2 motorcycle may carry additlOnal

Academic Notes fire llower in the form of either one Galiber .30 machine gun or a seml-automatic riflp for each enlisted member transported. p. The artillery, half-track vehicle, Wlth front-wheel propul­ sion as well as in thej1alf-track, has armor similar to that of the >cout car. It is dual purpose: (1) to tow the 75·mm howitz­ ers and (2) to carry howitzer crews, reconnaissance personnel and ammunition. f. Administrative "ehicles for the most part consist of four­ wheel-drive trucks of commercial design and capable of relatively great sustained road speed but very limited movement off roads. The) are grouped generally accordmg to their use as follows: (1) 3 1 :-ton trurks \4x4) u<;F'd as cargo vphwl£'<., wah mpchamzpri

cavalry rf'glmf'nts

(2) 2 1;:-ton truCkf; on \';hich arE' mountf'ri unit kitrhpn<;, capable of preparing hot meals whIle In motIOn (3) 11 rton trucks (4x4) III mamtenance platnon4 of ccna!ry rpgl­ ment~, III artlllery batt.limn as cargo vehi('jp,> {4) Ordnancp and Quartprma1'lter ..... reckf'r~ for varIOUS <;alvagp nper­ atlOns (5) Special ('ollVf>rtf'ri tr\lcks I -ton, 11 _-ton and 2 I :-tlll} typps ust>d by thp Ordnance. Q1.tartermUf'tf'r Cornpames and Signal Troop <1.5 rnuchmt> shop... part:;., Vl:'hldps, offict> trucks ..nd other <:pf'\,lal tl"lP5 III mallltammg ami rppaJring tlIP pqUlprnpnt ,If ti1(' mechumzeri ('avalry bngadp in thp fit'l<i

Mr{IlA"'llfll F1T:ID

A ';"5-mm I',,\\luq \\lth





E:u.:h group 01 ~dmII11::;tlatIye \'ehldes 1& proVided wIth a limited number of calIber .~)() and .30 machme gum;, and seml­ automatlc rIfles for then' Immedlate ground defense and protec­ tIOn a).!amst au' attack. 7. CHARAC'IERIS1ICS AND I~rLlTE::-,;cE OS EMPLOY~E:sr.

a C01",(,,/ztZ's. The follOWIng factors have a bearIng on the capabllJty of mechanized cavalry' II, Moblhty, one of the outstanding features of mechamzed ra\'alr~. enables umts to move relatively great distances in a ~hort tllne either on roads or croS& country. Proper exploitation or thi... capability permIts the utilizatIOn of units at an unex~ peeted time In an unlooked for localIty. Th,s capabIlIty permits either; :lctical or strategical surprIse. 12 FIre pOifer.- The tremendous volume of fire power from orgallil automatIC weapons of mechanIzed cavalry units can be ueil\'eJ d promptly either from weapons continual1y mounted on comba' vehicles, or from the lIght and readily maneuverable ",apo< , dIsmounted from vehicles and placed on the ground Whlle tile VehlCle& are concealed nearby, available to shift to 'nothe: loeality. fn tddition to the large number of caliber .30 machine guns, 'her, a' e caliber .50 machine guns on each fighting vehicle. Then, on eae], combat vehicle and motorcycle is the caliber .45 sub­ machm!;' gun as a personnel weapon for· close defense. In each cavalry regiment is the platoon of six 4.2" mortars, r,latlvely as mobile as the other combat" vehicles. It may be


employed to blmd hostile observation and antitank weapons, to screen approach of own vehicles, or to reinforce own automatIC weapons or artillery fireS. And finally, in the brigade we have th~ mechamzed artillery battalion capable of moving over the ~ame terrain with the same rapid,ty as the fighting vehicles of mechanized cavalry. (3) ArmllT.- The advantage of armor is apparent, especially against troops armed prIncipally with small-arms weapons_ Against hostile antitank weapons, rapid maneuver In mass over favorable terraIn will permIt hostile groups to be overrun with sufficient remaming strength to demoralize enemy formations. (4) Communicntio11 jaclilfif's. The largp numb~r of radios down to include platoons, motorcycles. and l'ars, aSIde from reconnaIssance and fighting velucles, vrovide ample rapid means of communication. These means faeihtate dlt3po..,ition of units over wide fronts or in depth and permIt rapid change of disposi­ tIOns; the communication means enable maXImum exploitation of mobIlity. (5)" Anllazrrraft protect1On. :\Toblht~· ami armor, com­ inned wIth the presence of one maC'hme gun dispo"",ed and manned on each combat vehicle for mstant W:ie agnlTIst low~flymg aIr~ cruft, ('nable" mechamzed C'tlvahy unlt~ 10 operate more fl"eely by da) than nthel' troops. b_ I Wl1tllfJlI"S. In connectIOn with the rapabtlllle::" -('er­ tal/I 11/l1/(rJfIllII::: of meChal1llPrj {~:1\ :--Ilry shnuld be eleal'ly and properly appl eCIated 1 \ Flirt and f/UonmUIIIH/ supply ale a con~tant ron::.idera~ tlOn. Pf'llodlc replelllshmpnt of fuel I':'. of cours€, a nE' ee3sIty. To lIl""Ul'f-' timply l'l'plellIshment of n.~hlde tanks, tt IS npl·e..~sary for adequate combat traIn \'elut'le:::, carrYlOg <fLlel. to accompany combat t'olumns The), together With eel tam nel'e:::;~ary main­ tenanrp eleml?nts wah the combat ('olumr.s, reqUire protectIOn t'~pf:'(·lall.\ agam~t an equally molnle pnPIllV. 121 \'/Ililcra/ll/lfu_ Thl' I'elatlvely brgp qlhouelte of most mecha11lzed cu\ulry combrlt vt"hlcle;::. mal{P5 them comparatively \"Ulner~lble when eXllO,'-E'd to antilank 1ire of all l'ahbers, wlthlll effectl\e rangp (3) Pers{)t/t/fl. ·The l'elatJ\ely Hmull ~trength III personnel and eqUipment 1In1lt:-. till' effeCllVenpl'>s of merhanizeu ca\'alry In certain types of rombat, notably dpfen~l\'e exrppt delaymg a('tlOn. (4) T},p IWlS!' of the combat \ elllcle~, p.-;ppcially "" hen mov­ mg rapidly In large groups, Will chsclot-.e then' ptesence or ap-. proaclL ThiS fact must be l'onsidered In movements to POSItWllS from which 8urpris.e attaeh.s aJ p' to be iaullelied. (5) Tcrr«w. treather and darkUfSS mtiupnce very definitely the employment of mechanized cavalrj. ('erlam type::, of ter­ rain arp far more favorable than others III pxploitmg mobility and surprise. \Vhile umts can ope~'ate over l'omparati\ ely rough terrain, IOl'alities WIth thl('k, heavy t1mhpr, frequent large boul­ ders, steep slopes, deep 01' muddy bottomed watercourseto> or streams wIth.abrupt banks ;,lle definitely unf.Ultable areas for . mechamz.ed cavalry Again, mud will restrict el"QS& country mo\'ement, varying \\Ith the relatIve seriousnps~ of the conditIOn. And cross country offen&ive action of mechanized cavalry umts at night, except by moonlIght, wIll be exceptIOnal. olIght reconnaIssance III the presence of the enemy will be chiefly by dismounted patrols. Reconnaissance and combat yehicles may operate at night on roads and engage t he.enemy by fire, but they rIsk ambush. .


q I

c. 11lf11l(!1/ce 011 employmnll. _.. From the foregOIng analysIs of d1€ capabIlItIes and limItations of mechanized cav.alry, it shouJd be apparent that mechamzed cavalry is. (1) Especially sultpd for pel forming missions which permit tne maxImum exp!oltatmn of the mherent mobIlity. either< inde­ pendently or in cooperation with other mobile forces. (2) ).{ost effectIve in the execution of offensive missions where mobIlIty can be utrllzeu. (R) Capable of operating defen>lvely eIther for short periods or under condItion::; wlHch permit olTenslve action by combat-car elements in con]UnetlOn \vnh defenSlye actIOn by orgamc fire [''Up port element::;. ~. SUIT-\DLE ':\lISt'lO~S fOR ;\lECHANIZED CAVALR.Y. -


Independent 111lSsiolts. Frequently the most remunerative em­ ployment of the mechamzed ('avalry Will be on independent or seml-mdpppndent ravalry-type mISSIons Examples of thIS type of employment are' (1) "r st;atpg:lc ree'''1Il315b31}('f' mvtll\mg probable combat to nutam wfurmatJl)n (2) S(>jzurp of dl..tant an-'.)~ pf'nrlmg arrl\ al of other for('Ps (Gt'r­ m,m armort-'d groups 1Il Poian.I \"pre pu..,lwd hl)ldly far forward.) (3) Intf'rfprpn('e ndS:"lOn;" such a" (.1) DeJaYlIlg, ('nntallling ur actlllh agamst largp hos­ tile furcl-' ....,

(hl Aetion to nputralizp ho"tJ!p mpchamzed or motorized forces, (11 Atta('l{ of hO<;tlJE' ("mcpntratlOns, lines of commUnICatIon awl ntht-r Tf'ar {':..tablishmrnts. (Gprman armored and mechamzed f,lrmatl,)ns m Poland appear t<l ha\e operatpd most su('rE'ssfully on :ouch


(d) Pursuit and ('xp\nltatl<J1l "uch as performed by German nwch.U11zerl drvhlOlls In Poland In Sf>ptemher, 1939.

, In the performancE' of elthpr mdeppnuent or seml-indepen­

ue~t mISSIOns, It mu~t be apprec-Iated that mechanized ravalry IS.TIot orgamzpd or pqUlpped for prolonged holdIng or defenSIve action on one pm;ition or Iorahty. Arcordingly, in the aSSIgn­ ment of such mISSIons, the higher commander should not hesItate . to attarh addItIOnal troops to the mechanized cavalry. Infantry In trurk~, motonzed artIllery, additlOnal engineer::., aVIatIOn and porte? hOI'.:<e ca\'ull'Y WIll all be valu<ible m certam situations. If the mlb~lon 1:-. of l'.utnCl{:'nt Importance to jm,tlfy the use of mel'hamzed l'avalry, It IS essential that suffiCIent means be pro­ rl~~


b. hi ft)!l]1f'rnflon other troops, SUitable


frf)ups,-\\'hen "Operatmg WIth fnr mechamzed ('avalry are;

If/) ot/lrr


(1) Pn,1r to mam hattl.> ReConllals~an('p



COH'fmg t hf' a<h 1I11"f' SI'-Izmg Crltlcal J.rpa." IntF'rfl-'r&n('E' "ith liIIstllp mO\'(>mpnt, I-'spe(,lally by offenSIve actlllll agam...,t h<l."tl!P flallk~ and Tt'ar (~) Dunng th{' mam IMttle. Parll('lpatlOll in tl)(> (IN'ISI'>'e attaf'k r:x\t>Jlrimg tbt> elnelupment Att.t(hmg :ot1lt,~ble ImpllTtullt ubWCtl\-l'& Fouch a~ command p{)'lb, n'sPT\t':>, artJIlpTj, or the Hanks and rear ,)f hostile Jefensl's I'n)tE'f'tmg the !lank, IlItf'rlt'ff'ncf' With ho<;tile m<JVPDlents. Ci) }'olhmmg thf' mam lmttjP {ill

If SllCC€ ' ·;hful. r:xploltJltlcn and pursuit €'lthpr thrOlfgh a gap or by enC'lr­ dmg maflt'llvPr Interff'Tence v,lth hostile rearward movement SeIzure or attack of SllltJlbjf' fPar obJectlvf's CO\enng till" f/(ha.n('e IIf other mobile f'nclrcimg forces

iill If un~uc{,f'''if',f\ll Coullterattack. Covering .1 \\lthdruv.aJ (Plthpr by offelislve or defenSive acttoll} Intt'rff>rpnf'P With h(li;tile movement:=,

In the eXE'CutlOn of many of the foregoing missions the derisive art ion will be greatly enhanced by the close cooperation of mechanized and horse (.'a\'alry. In thIS manner. the mecha~


C. & G.S.S. Military Review

J~ ~obmty

mzed cavalry can exploit by operating on the ID(IS: favorable terrain whi1e th~ Ihorse cavalry operates in the more !I broken terrain. 9. EMPLOYMENT. - a. General. - (1) The brigade is lhe largest mechanized cavalry unit. As a basic unit of the brigade, the mechanized cavalry regiment is sufficiently self-contained administratively and tactic<llly to operate independently. 1\ or· mally, the brigade will reinforce the regiment, depending on the mission, with additional firf support, reconnaissance, and engi­ neer elements. The comhat teams should be constituted about the mechaniz~d cavalry regiment as a rule. Except when the mmor groups operate within mutual supporting radius. subdivi~ SlOn into combat teams smaller than the regiment will be excep· tional save for minor reconnaissance missions and for security detachments such as flank, rear and advance guards. (2) Mechanized cavalry units are espeCIally concerned with terrain in terms of suitability for maneuver, cover, and conceal· ment, fire positions, and final assault areas. b. Routes. Tn order to explOIt mobility to the maximum, mechamzed cavalry seeks to move by a hard surfaced road or roads where there are ample lateral routes to afford inter('om~ munication between columns, Closely adjacent parallel routes are advantageous. Where practicable, routes WIth defiles, dIffi· cult stream crossings or other obstacles are avoided even though longer routes result. c. Rates and length oj march. - Cntil enemy activity re­ qUires operation cross country. movement is on the best m'at]· able roads in order to make the best time. On good roads, without oppositIOn, umts no larger than a troop can move at a sustamed rate of 35 rolles per hour by day, or at mght with lights, Untts larger than a troop can move at 'a sustained rate of 25 miles per hour either by day or with lights at mght. Without lights, maximum sustained rates at night will not exceed 10 mIles per hour on roads or 5 miles per hour cross country. In movement cross country by day, track and half-track vehicles can attam 15 mIles per hour on favorable terrain Reconnaissance elements may cover up to 200 mIle, per day, other combat and admmistrative elements not to exceed 150 miles per day as a rule. Time lengths for mam columns or groups of vehicles may, for practi~able purposes, be taken as eight l\linutes per hundred vehIcles regardless of the speed. This rule of course is not apph· cable to security detachments such as advance guards whfl'e the various elements are extended in distance. d, Reconnalssance.- There are three t~Y'Pes of re('onnai~sance elements in the mechamzed cavalry brIgade: Observation aviation in the brtgade • *Scout-car units. both brigade and regimental Motorcycle units in the brigade ReconnaIssance and Support Squad­


The three types must be closely coordmated to insure the rapid procurement of necessary mformation. to conserve e~ch, to insure adequate examination of routes and areas, npa to prevent delay of main column,. Generally speaking, the varIOUs reconnmssance apenCI€$ WIll operate as follows: ill The obser\'ation aviation will perform the more dIstant reconnaissance, up to a dIstance equal to two days' ma,ch of mechanized cavalry. It will furnish not only information to the main columns but to th~ ground reconnaissance detachments *Formerly were armored-car units.

Academic Noles In ~,ddltlOn to reconnaissance of routes and areas, the aviation orieots at a distance and assists III the control of ground elements by J 2porting locations and provides a rapid means of communi­ catl' >D by drop and pick-Up messages as well as by radio.. 12) The hrigade ground reconnaissance detachments, either motorcycle or scout car or a comhination, are assigned the more dIstant missions for ground reconnaissance. Zones are assigned together with control or phase lines to designate responsibility for areas and to coordinate the rate of advance. ReconnaIssance detachments should normally precede main columns from one to s.e\~eral hours. (3) Regimental reconnaIssance groups perform the closer-In reconnaissance both to the front and flanks. They supplement the hrigade reconnaissance when operatmg as a part of the brI­ gade Of perform the relatIve hngade reconnaissance functIOn when the regiment operates independently. As combat beeomes Immment the regimental reconnaissance groups intensify theIr actl\ltv to furnish necessary information of terrain, routes, and enemy·dlspositions. ,4) Individual motorcycles or groups thereof operate as scouts, liaison agents, or reronnaissance detachments. 15) Reconnaissance vehicles avoid combat in the execution of mISSIOnS wherever practicahle by detouring enemy groups unlf'bf. required by the mission to engage In combat. 16) Night reconnaissance by either scout cars or motor­ cycles will be restricted to roads. However, patrols may be mo\ ed by vehicle to the vicmity of enemy dispOSItIons, either by day or night, then dIsmount and operate on foot. . 17) A scout-car troop or motorrycle troop is capable of reconnoitermg three or four main routes with intersecting cross­ road:, on a front of approximately twenty-five miles at an aver­ age rate of advance of not to exceed 15 miles per hour. tS) llsually at least one platoon in each reconnaissance troop should be held in reserve initially for emergency use. . ,9) Engmeer and artillery detachments may accompany thE' "econnaissance detachments to secure early; information afTec1 mg their respective units. f . Secunty. Observation aviation and ground reconnais­ banCT, both dlstant and close, contribute greatly to the security of columns by providing early warning of hostile disposi­ tIon, which may affect the main hody. The immedIate secunty of 1lI,ll"ching columns IS furmshed by advance, flank and rear guard.... 11 Ad,'ance guard. The advance guard for a hrigade in one \ 't\umn may condbt of not to exceed a squadron of combat rars \. Ith an attached machme-gun platoon, an engmeer detach­ men1 md possibly a sectIOn of mortars. A platoon of two 7!l-mm ho\\i, ~en; may be attached and march with the reserve of the adHI'.ee guard. For a rpgiment, one combat-car troop with an attal If'd machine-gun platoon, a detachment of engineers, and asec' ,on of mortars Will usually suffice. Like an ad ..ranre guard :or tl " brIgade In one column a section of one 75-mm howitzer, or a I latoon of two hOWItzers may be attached to the advance gual'l for a regiment. . he advance guard for mechanized cavalry columns nor· malI~' precedes the main body by from live to fifteen minutes. l'ntIl contact is imminent the main body usually regulates the rate, [ march, thereafter conforms to the rate of advance of the adva',ce guard 01' covermg detachment. ~ Iechanized cavalry advance guards are subdivided mto apprc'priate advance party, sunport and reserve. Limited flank

reconnaissance is usual1y performed by motorcycle scouts accom­ panying the advance guard. (2) Rear guard. - Due to the speed of advance, rear guards for mechanized cavalry may be relatively smaller than for other troops. It usually follows the main column more closely than the advance guard preceges. For a brigade, the strength will seldom exceed one combat-car troop; while one combat-car pla­ toon w111 constitute t he rear guard for a regiment. The rear guard is especially important at halts. (3) f"lank guard. - Flank guards usuaUy have reconnms­ sance elements attached to extend reconnaiRsance to the flanks or to maintain contact with any hostile force. Depending on the nature of the probable threat, machine-gun umts, elements of reconnaissance or combat-car troops are suitable for assign­ ment to flank guards. Flank detachments march by bounds from one key locality to another. (4) Outguards and "Ultposls. - wl At temporary halts, tbe advance, flank and rear guards establIsh march outposts cover­ mg possible enemy pointR of observatIOn and avenues of ap­ proach, espeCially roads. It is espeCially Important to hold hostile detachments beyond a dIstance from whICh they might brmg fire of antitank weapons to bear on mam columns. ~Lb) Mechanized cavalry bivouacs in areas andJormations suitable for all-around defense. Hostile avenues of approach are covered by observatIOn group::. on a radm::'. of five to ten miles with weapons rovermg natural obstacles and road blorks closer Ill. \Veapons on vehicles in the bIvouac are laid for all-around defense and personnel bivouacs m the Immediate ViCInIty of vehicles. Trams and service elements art' parked centrally under protectIOn of other elements. In many situations, a part of the outpost for the brigade may be furnished entirely by the Rf'C'onnaIs~ance and Support Squadron from the machine-gun troop and motoreycle troop thereof. ¥I'here these umts are Inadequate or not aVaIlable, sec­ to", of the outpost WIll be allotted the regiments whIch will normally also utIlize machn1e-gun troup elements for the task. l5) ProtectlOn aga1nst (711 attack. All combat vehicles and a proportIOn of tram and service vehicles are equipped with machine guns whIch cun be employed for antImrcraft fire. Some of these weapons are hablt"ally manned and prepared for antI­ aircraft fire both on the marrh 'ilnd 1I1 bivouac. At long halts or in bnrouac It IS routine for air scout~ to be posted and some of the weapons of machine-gun Ul11ts to be placed in suitable dismounted pOSitions, prep~red fol' prompt dehvery of antiair­ craft fire. When threatened by mr attack on the march or at short halts, umts may move off the road, dl8perse and seek cover. In bivouac, protection IS afforded by dispersal In small groups which utliJze all aVailable cover supplemented by camouflage. J. March jormat70fls. March formatIOn::. are designed to faCIlitate rapid movement and entry Into actlon. The mam body of a 'regIment or smaller umt u~ually marches roads in one column; a unit larger than a regiment in two or more columns which Include combat teams of self-contained tactICal umts marchmg on closely adjacent routes. Maintenance elements of indiVidual troops and of the regi­ ment, together WIth a certain number of fuel and ammumtion vehicles, habitually march with theIr units until combat is immi­ nent when they are grouped In a protected area in the sen-ice park where deta~hments of the Reconnaissance and Support Squadron may supplement'1.he weapon strength in the combat trains. .







A~e1iirc Notet!.

d. & G.S.S. Military Review

Kltch<!l1, baggage, other oupply vehicle. and service ele· ments may march wIth then' respecHve umts when combat IS unlikely; otherwt~e tllC'Y march separately or are grouped well to the rear. A tYPIcal fOr"mation for a mechanized cavalry brIgade marching 111 two columns IS at> foUm"s: 11) Brigade reconnaissance elements precedmg from one to ::.e\(~ral hourf,. (2) RegImentail('('onnUls::.ance df'tachments engaged prin­ t'lpally on I nUll;:' I econn:lIS~aIlCP to front and flank of their respee­ tn'€' l"olumn~. ,:~l An ~.H.hance guard c0n::-istll1g of a combat team of com­ bat-eal, mal hine-gun, mmlar and eng-meer elements precedmg each maIn column L,' from five to fifteen mIDute::.. Depending upun the ~ItuatIOll, tilt' :nlvanL'e !-ward ror a column nHl~' vary from a combat-eal or rn ..H'lllne-gun tJ nOJl les:> u platoon to a l'E'mfol'('t'd squadron. .41 Hll),wdt' and 11l'i11t'lpai 1I11lt C'oml1landerh' group m,ually marc·h. \\lth t1w malll ('olumn. 111 the mtenal between the ad\ :lllCt' gwu d :ll1d the m:lln body vnth remaInIng reC'onnal%J.nce \ehwle!:.. 15) T!l(' lllillll both of l'<H h l"olumn \"llIlomr)lI~e d ('ornbat teJ.Dl of a I Plllfol'll-'d 1t")!Jnwnl. It"....... <:'P('Ullty dpI :ll'hmenb, With order nt m:lnh (.11 Cnmbdt-('ar ~'lua'irnn k1>~ deta(hmpnt~

;~:{ ~~I~~'~1~~Pi{~~7:~:r~!;17J~~T~; It/;:l~~ftShan ,1 battpTY av,uiatJip ril) Rt m,lln<\"T of (,nmbat·('ar ph'mt>rlt~ :\It,.h(.11 ~h·t ..dlJl!t'nts. fup1 and ammumUon ::,<.>(t}011 of ('ornb,lt tram.. . , n".wtf 11.tJ1tV plat,lUll« .It rf'ar of ('ombat team ('0l1umn, or If I<lmil;]! 1!uJd,ply, all mmhat trams grouppd at rf'ar of



rt"!:~;\~:t~> ~~;:l:;:::l;.


{'h'n1t'nt~ folk"",ing




!g) Rf'ar gll,lrd The formulHm for a bl'lg,lIie OJ regiment mal'rillllg 111 one column IS .... mlll:tr tn Ih3t mdl('atpd for one of tlw l'nlumns debcnbed ~bn\·t:'. \\ hen' the- bl'lgadt' malche::-. III one mall1 l'ol­ umn, plempnt~ I)f Iill" Ht;'( IlllllaI"'S,IlH'e and Suppurt S.Iluadroll. not en}!agl'd on nll"'Hlln~. fl1,t~' Illal cll ne"n the head of the mum column. In .1 TlI)!llt m:u l It llH' IH'l\!'",l!Jl' \\'111 n11rlllally utIhze one route 111 order to concenlmte rel'Onn.lls~ance ('ontrol and l'ommUl1lC[l­ tion theJ'f:1oll. a Jl (,"'fJ!/~ of ilIff II~II ((111111;nt ,11 A::. mechalllzed C~l\ ­ airy, ('oveled b\' It:-; lelonnai:;')-"lnCf' and ::-eeurHy detachment::., appload1E'~ hn;-.tIie contact, rel'onnalssanee elements \\lthdraw to ftank~ and I'l'ITI.HIl Il1 Oh~t'J'\ ~llon. trains and sen ICp elements are separatf'd trom l'ombat elements and concealed well back wherE' tl1(',Y may pi 0\ Ide thell' O\vn defense agmn~t both ground and all' attack, or aduItlOnal pmtectlOn may he plo\ Hled by element:::: of the Heconnai::.sanle and SUPPOI·t Squadron. (2) The combat plemE'nt~ mOVE' to the attal'k, i-upported by mUl'hllle gun~, artlllpl'Y and smoke. If the maXImum surpn::.e i~ to be gained by rapId maneu\ Cl, E'vcry means mu::::t be utlhzcu to eliminate del.lY and to hpped up the final a~sault. Tlw normal emp]oympnt of mechanized Gn'alry \\-"Ill approximate that of hor~e cavalry as modIfied hy the additional speed pOSSible and the infiuence exel t'i:-.ed hy cl"rtain terrain fa{'tors ,;~) Pn·oJ<:, of maneuver and fire support ale prOVided by mal'lllne-gun and mort3r units of the \·anuus ('om bat teams ThI~ ma\, b~ I emforced by all 01' part of the Machine-gun TIOOP of the }{e('onnal~~an('e and SUPP01't Squadron. ,4) Attached altillery, preferably from po,itlo'ns \>rondmg dIrect observation. rell1forces the fire support groups aud gives


attention to hostIle antItank weapons, Becau!,e of the mobIlity of the attack, the artillet'y should he emplaced well forward initially and echelon forward promptly as required. Tn the brigade, part or all of th(> artIllery may be retaIned in gen~ral support where adequate support of the attack is practicable by this means. \Vhen the main attack force cannot be supported adequately by artillery under brigade control, one or more bat­ ten€s will usually be attached to the maneuvering mechanized eavalry combat team or teams. 15) Since the advance of meehanized eavalry vehicles lS capable of be-ing extremf'ly rapid. coordmation is assured by the as::'lgnment of 5uccf'ssive phase lines or objectives where combat teams qUIckly reorganize and report. 16) To pre\ ent undup dispersal of attacking eiements,lllll1ts uf pllfS1l1t \V111 be prescribed \vhere a definite limiting objectne hah not been designated. 17) And in order to pronde for prompt assembly of Widely lilspel ~ed l!roup~ and subsequpnt reorl!anizatlOn. assembly pOInts are u~ually preSCribed for the prinCipal combat teams.' Both the lmllt of }JlIl'sml and assembly powl should be well defined. f'a511y recognIzed terram featurps; the latter should pro­ \\lIe . . ome coyer or defilade. I til The attaek order will also pres(,llbe the 10 tion of theF,/'Ii'I(r lmJI.. 10 whIch maintenance and combat trm elements will assemble The loration ~hould be In an easil) defended lorahty under I'over and beyond effective range of~ e hostile artIllery., J,. ndetISII'f' comhat) The defensive combat of mechanized cavalry. like horse cavalry, is characterized by lack of depth of disposItlOm, and by the fact that the bulk is disposed III such a m<lnner as wlll faCIlitate- offenSIve action counterattack. ~ Machme guns constItute the framework of the defenSIve orgam­ zation MachInP-gun t!'Oops can occupy and defend a front up to 4.000 ~·ards. Some rombat-car elements may be placed In thp defenSIve hne where, from concealed or tlefiladed positIOn. they ,onstitute mobile machine-gun nests. TI1P reCOnnJlioiSanCe elements provide frontal and flank olhPI'\'ution. Part of them may execute'harassmg or delaymg actlOIl in ad\ anee or or on the flanks of thp main position The artIllery from positIOns well forward InterdIcts hostile routes and generally lemforceb the fires of eavalry weapons, A~ for horse e~valrv, the uefem,\\'p sacrifi('es the most Im­ portant rharacten~tlc of "mechanIzed cavalry - mobIlIty. There­ fore. mo;-.;t effectivE' defem,ive aetion by mechamzed ravalr: will accrue from Its executIOn of delaying actIOn. In this type of action. thE' fire support element ean operate defenSIvely on the fl'Ont of hostIle eolumns while the combat-car elements operate offensively agamst the hostIle Hanks and rear. i. ('ommunicat1Ons In the hIghly mobile units SUI h 35 mechal1lzed cavalry, rapid and efficient communIcation I') eX­ tremely Important The brigade and its various compnnent umts employ, in order of importance, radIO, motorcycle mf'.;;sen­ gel', \~I~ual, panel, drop and pick-up messages, pyrotechnic-.;. and light~ togpthrr with a vpry limIted amount of WirE' in the arl Jller)' when'condltions permit. The radIO net is capable of includmg platooJl leaders ,.here requin?d by the ~ituatlOn. Both VOIce and key ran be utliJ'7.ed To expedite transmission. and a!;sure secrecy, simple prearranged eodes are used. Key transmis::.ion, while slower. is more reliable than voice radio and better adapted to the use of code. Frequently, however, radio"must be silenced d)jring eel talll phases of operations in order to maintain secrecy. In such cir­

~' .••





ix No. 76

Academic Notes

cumstances, motor messengers, espE)cially motorcycle, are relIed tam supply vehicles must accompany colum'ns. In aqdition, up!m. Once the attack is launched, tne rapidity of actIOn fre­ there are mamtenanre vehides in each trooP. a maintenance quently will allow much greater resort to radIO messages in the platoon in each regiment, ana. the ordnance and quartermaster clear. maintenance companies in the brigade. In brigade operations, J. ('ontrol. - The mobility of mechanized cavalry units de­ the latter two serv:ce companies together with kitchen, ration. mands positIve means of control and coordination. Depending and baggage trucks and the medIcal company may be left well upon the situation, any or all of thp following measures may be to the rear in a protected location. ' Second and third echelon maintenance is continued until utlhzed' . [1) The deSIgnation of control hnes beyond which reeon­ combat is immment and resumed as soon as' practicable after nm...;sance, !'ecurlty elemC'nts amI elements of main columns (If combat. mO\'ement III two or more columns) successively advance only During the attack. all mamtenance vehicles assemble, WIth on orders of the malTI rommander. any fuel and ammunitIon vehl('les present, in a deSignated ser­ (2) PerIOdIc reports of locutIOn either by tIme schedule or vice park where protectIOn is provided by weapons carried on the trucks and m the mamtenanee platoon. Within the brigade, from designated localitIeS. each regiment may establish separate serVlre parks, or a com­ (:~) ResponsibilIty for mamtenance of contact bttween col­ bined park may be dIrected. umns deSIgnated. ~ (<1:) Liaison of1kers and mot orcyrle messengers'i It is deblrable. but not always possible, that all vehIcles if)) Personal observatlOn by commander. enter combat WIth full fuel tanks. ThIS serVIcing IS usually (6) Sperial or peno(lie report by observatlOn aviatIOn. accomplished prior to the time trains detarh from the combat (7) Prompt reports of change of tlirection or unexpected echelon. It can be accomphslied in about fifteen mmutes. delay. vVherever practIcablE', mamtenance and reservicing can be IX) :\Iovmg rommander's groups In intervals between ad­ faCIlitated by establishment of mechanized cavalry night bIV­ yance guard and malTI body of respectIve columns. Oftentimes, ouacs under the protertIOn of other friendly troops. prIOri pal subordmate commanders WIll he a~sembled and march 10. St·MMARY. n. Mechanized cavalry, on favOlable ter­ wlth the command group in 01 del' to expedite transmission of rain, extends the sphere of actIOn of cavalry to much greater ol'df'I'f>. distances, and inrl'eases the speed of performing missions with­ l~}) In somf' sItuation::-. a~f>lgnm€'nt of zone::::. rather than out, however. altering the fundamental miSRlOn~ of the ravalry routl'S for columns in order 10 allow the maximum freedom of arm. actIOn in aVOldmg or overcommg obstacles. b. Thp characteristwf.; of merhamzed eavall'Y make it a k. nrdrrs.-To take max.imum advantage of mobility and pmploy it propprly rE'qulre~ rapid deeit-.ion. transmission, and powerful striking force of great strategical and tactical mobility. c. The merhamzed cavalry regiment and'hrigade are organ­ execution of orders. Consequently, brief, fragmentary, and most ized as relatively self-contained tactical and ~administrative often oral. orders are the rule WIth mechani7ed cavalry. DistrI­ butIOn of orders wlll be by the faste,t means avmlable. In addI­ group;;; rapablp of either partIally or entIrely independent opera­ tIon to radIO, staff officl'rs and motor nwssengers are frequently tions, or performance of misSIOns 111 conjunctIOn With other large . used Ordf'rs to onE' or more major portions of the command forces. d. Sinre mechanized cavalry units, berause of their stra­ \\rlll frequently be in the form nf miSSion orders designatlOn of an objer-t1\'E'. ]pavmg full freedolll of method to the com~ tegical and tactical potentialItIeS, ran eXerCISf' such decisive influence in combined operatIOn, hIgher commanders should mander concerned. insure that the mechanized eavalry is assigned those miSSIOns Fmal advances 01 as~uults "'lIII oftl?n be launched on pre­ arrallt!ed SIgnals rather than hy mf'am. of a time of attack desig­ that other available troops cannot sallsfactor!!y perform; the natf'd 111 advancp. 1n squadrons or smaller combat units, the mpchamzed {'a\'alry should not be absent. or frittered away on final order may be given through personal example of the com· ummportant operations, when Important deciSIve mISSIOns arIse. e. Because both the vehIcles and .personnel are hIghly spe­ mander, by VIsual SIgnal, or hy leadll1g elements moving in a clahzed, mechamzed cavah'y umb are difficult to mamtam at recog-nizpcl combat formatIOn. strength durmg active operations. It must be appreciated that .'. .f"ldrniUlslralll'(, arrangements. In order to assure timely replfnishment of fuel amI ammUl11tlOn of combat vehicles, cer­ frequent periods for maintenance should be afforded.

The road to glory cannot be followed with much bag­ \Ve can get along without everything'. hut fuel and ammunition. gage.

Para}1hra:-,ing a maxim of General "Dick" Ewell




• ..£,

. ':4cad"emiclvotes v-'

C. & G.S.S. Military Revielr

Map Problem

Paragraphs ~'ECT10N


and f'lIst ReqUirement _________



(383-6~9), on relief from the screening mission during the night 1-2 June, is to assemble and operate, under control of

IH-=~eso;tetl~~e~fak(>~~::t;te~u~;;~~ni ----~ ~ ~: ~:[-: ~ -.~ .4~~ IV_-DlScus')ion __ • ________________________ __ .. ____ '\-11 the V Corps in conjunction witb the latter's attack, as ~

SECTION I Sit untinn and Fil'E.t Requirement raragrGph

General sItuatton _________________ . ______ ~ __ ~ ___ . ______ • _____


~·yl:~~a~e~~~~~~~t .::~::_. __ :_::::::::=~:~~:=:=~::~===:==:~::


follows: (a) The 18t Cavalry Division (less 2d Cavalry BPi· gade) : assemble in the vicinity of hill 885 (356-677) and advance, at daylight 2 June. in a zone immediately southwest and west of the Patuxent River; mission-to facilitate the advance of the V torps and protect its right (west) flank. (b) The 2d Cavalry Brigade: assemble in the vicimty of Syl<esville (375-692) and initially protect the east flank of the V Corps; but prepared to operate to the southeast in the ZOlle east of the Patapsco River, (3) 951.-;f tfll'oll y Brigade r1tJechallizedJ. )·einfm·ced.* -The 951st Cavalry Brigade came under control of the V Corps at Hallover (372-745) and, during the night 1-2 June, was moved to and concealed In the general area: New Market (348-695)-New London (349-699). (4) Combat tlrmtion.-Flrst Army plans for- the em­ ployment of all available combat aviation on 2 June prOVIdes. initially, for its (.'oneentrativll on counter air force opel'

1. GENERAL SlTcATlON.-a. Mal's -Specml Maps A and B herewith. b. BOIl1Idm 1I.- (Special Map A) -The Susquehanna ltiver 1" the boundary between t \va bellIgerents. Blue (north­ east). and Red (southwest) . c, ~U/llll trH as -Blue maIn force~ comlJleted concentra­ tion earlier than Red main forces and invaded Red territory. advmlcing towards the lmportant industrial and maritime citIes of Baltimore and Washington. The admnce of the Blue mam forces \vas checked late III May north of Baltimore ations. along the generallme: (;wym1brook (3~2-702)--Texa8 (405­ b. Summary of el'etlts plio( to 4.-15 AM. 2 Juner-­ 70ij l-King"vllle (426-704). (l) Rd.- . (a) Early 1 June a considerable body of d. 2d ('ttl'ol1 l! IJtl'i,'>lOll_-Concurrent \vlth the advance troops of all armH was discovered in the area: Herndon ta~6of. the Blue main forces. the 2d Ca,alry DIVisIon advanced "44) -Hunter (343-640)-G1'eal Falls (348-648). Eydark, . rapidly lU the Cumberland \-alley to the Pot{lma~ Rh'er "1 June It \\"a~ €'~timatetI that approximately one Red division where it 1S covermg the C'ros8ings over the Pvtomac River as W8" a~ . . embled In the Great Fans area. far east as Point of Rocks (321-681), confronted by elements (il) A Red mechamzed force. estimated to be a rein­ of the Red 2d ea,alry IllVIsIOn, disposed ,outll of the Poto­ forced regiment, was observed in the vicinity of Chevy Chase mac River. (365-6451 during the afternoon, 1 June. f' All uctll'ltu.-Bfue aviation has recently gamed (2) RlIII'.-(a) The \' Corps began its advance .' superWl'lty and has been able to limit Red oOf>ervatioll of planned at 3:40 AM. 2 June. Blue rear areas en:--,t of the . \. -lonocacy River. Blue bombard­ (h) The bt Clnalry Dh ision (less 2d Cavalry BrI­ ment aviation has surceedE'd In interrupting the }'mlway gade) comple-ted itt; asspmbly and mltlated its advance bl'icig(>s and in damaging hlgh\\aj lJridges over the Potomac shortly after daylight from the vicinity of hill 885 (356-677). River at Washington. (c) The bull, of the D51st Cavalry ,Brigade remained 2. SPECIAL SlTlIATIO.N.--f1 FII~t AUJIlI plul/s tor 11". concealerl in the ViCll1lty of New Market (348-695) with FIIHI/dull! nf til(· u!lclI$irc -First Army prepal'atioll amI instructiolI~ to bt:' prepared tt> mOye \Vlthout delay on rei eipt plans to launch a new offensive. on 2 June, to de.stror tll<' Red of further' ()rder~ from the V Corps. In accordance with V .\1 my and capture BuitlU1orp. emhr<lced the followmg pertl Corps lllstl'UetlOlls, the Rec9jmaIssance Troop. 'il51st Recon­ nent features: naissance and Support Sq~kdron. together with a d'C~ach· (1 ~ J!l:-'-:IOII of tht' {' COllI'> -The \' Corps, l'ell1forcpd, ment of the ~Iot()rcycle Troop. mU\'ed out at daylight, 2.lune \\'hich had secretlv a"::"l'mbled 111 tIl(> gellC'ral lwen: ~ew to reconnoiter to the southeast as far as the general line' Market (:l·lB-6~5 )'--W"odbine (;l63-6~3) -Winfiald (367­ Great Falls (34~1-6471-Che\'.v Chase (365-645). 702) )-Now Wind",r (:\62-711) Libert,·to",n (348-707). (d) By 4 :00 AM, 2 June, air reconnaissance 01 th' i..:; to COllstltute the manL'uve"JIlg mas~. It will advance. at Great Falls (34V-647)-Ch~vy Chase (365-645) area dis­ 3 :40 AM. 2 JUIle tn the ~Olltl1Qu.;;t betWf'f'll the Patuxellt and closed: Pal<ll'"CO R"'ers along the mds: ~lol1nt Airy (358-6D4)­ (j) A Red concentration of all arms north of th,' Po· Dayton (~n-678)- Harmans (401-668); misSl011-to sever tomac River In the vicinity of Great Falls (349-647). rail and high\\'a~ clImmunications between \\7 as hingtoll and (ii) A 'large number of trucks in the western ed"e of Baltimore Hnd operat(l agaInst the rear of the Baltimore Washington assembling in column on the highway paI.11lpl­ Reels. ing north bank of the Potomac River, head of column ill th' (2) Jri""iOll (l( thr 1'){ ('1I1'lfTI'lI nll'iKlOJi -The 1st Ca\'­ direction pf Great Falls. alrv DiviSIOn. which had cO\'ered the concentration of the V "For detall.. of 1J!'ganlzD.tlOn, -"('e pages 73-74 of article !le::!d Co;ps by screenillg along the general line: Monrovia (347­ "Notes on the Organizabon and Employment of Mecham 693)-Kemptown (350-68~)-Morgan (367-G92)-Oakland entItled Cavalry_"


Academic Notes

,e) As a result of the reports contained In (d) (i), (ii) abO\v Brigadier General M, commanding the 951st Cavalry Brigalie (MechanIzed) reeE'lved telephonic instructions. at 4:15 .·\~I, from the Chief of Staff, V Corps to move at once

to tht' ,",outheast by




of the general line:

Kemp',,,,'n (350-680) - - Damascus (352-683) - Woodfield 1353·' ,7) - Norbeck (:165,663); mission - to operate agalll I the Red force north of the Potomac ill the Great Falls (349. 1 l7) vicinity and IH'e\'ent it'4 interference with the adva, ,'of the V Corps. ( Advallce uf the 9S1 ..,t Cm'"lrjl BriD(ldc {i.lfechanized}. -Tht, ~151st Cavalry Brigade (less brigade reconnaissance detac1 'llents dispatched to the south at daylight) initiated its ad\ mee to the southeast at 4 :30 AM in two main columns.

The ~, r'vice elements and all except essential combat train and TIl intenance \'ehicles remained concealed ill the vicinity of Ne London (34D-6DD). The D51st Observation Squad­ ron (~'\I» began reconnaissance of the brigade zone of ad vance \ ith two planes. A machine-gun platoon and a detach­ ment f motorcycles, both from the D51st Reconnaissance and S 'pport Squadron, constituted the right (west) flank guard ,mder brigade control. Left (east) flank protection IS beil ~ provided by the east column. Motorcycle detach­ ment, (from Motorcycle Troop, D51st Reconnaissance and w

Support Squadron) \vere maintaining liaison with advallce elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. Detachments of regimental reconnaissance troops, oper­ ating under their re~pectrve regiments. preceded the advance guard of each column. d. SituatIOn at 5:20 AM,:2 J""e.-(Special Map B)­ (1) Red.-Map messages from plane of the DS!st Observa­ tion Squadron (Separate) indicate Red dispositions at 5:10 AM (portrayed graphically on Special l\Ilap B) as follows: (a) Red mechanized vehicles in the vicinity of Hunting Hill (352-660) and Redland (358-666), (b) Detachments of Red mechanized vehicles, either personnel carriers or combat cars or both. observed in Gaithersburg (353-666), Washington Grove (355-665), and Emory Grove (356-667) together with antitank weapons. (c) A battery of artillery is firing from the edge of woods immediately west of Washington Grove (355-665). (d) What appears to be the bulk of a Red mechanized cavalry regiment is halted in dispersed groups in the vicinity of Derwood (356-662). (e) Foot troops assembling along the Great Falls­ Potomac (351-650) road and transverse roads in that area, A column of ~rucks a~out seven miles in length, coming from






~~~ f,,~,~~gga~i 9~2il;~~ ~c8*,~£J't~v~~hlati

Mortar Plat 952d rav

~~\;fF~a~B~; ~~21f~vA.1 &Tr MAIN BODY \\'ESl COLt!\iN IN onDER

Fv.'d.Ech Rf.>&tl fill 9515t ('av Rcn 951st rav« 3 Plats. MG Tr 951st Cay 1--1st Plat) -c Mortar Plat 9.51st Cav Btry A 951st FA {Bn~ (~1 Platl • 1st Plat 9615t Engrs 1'l"I"r"T-----dl"O» Ist 1(' ('ar) Sq 951st Cav 1- B) 2d Ie Car) Sq 9515t Cay 3d cr Carl Sq 9515t ray Rr E('h HQ Tr 951st ('av Mt'dDet Mamt Plat. ~f'rv Tr 9515t ( av WIth elempnts C Tns 951st Cav






1 Plat Btry B/' 2d C Sq 952d

;~l~~f~';;'~'t;f~~i:,~';., Mtcl Tr. Rcn & Sup Sq 1- Del.'>. 951st Sig Tr.{"-Dets) Rr Ech Hq Tr 952d Cay Rr Erh Hq Th, 951st Cay Bng Med Det Mamt Plat. &orv Cay With elf'n;.f nts C TU5 grouped

Tr 952d

.sPE.CI SITljA710N AT 5'20AM,

jfi~~~'R~J~r.~lI.~'f),~,£~N~T.~:J~·..:!J~O~L~U~T~/~O~N~O~'F~j~J~f~&~~~~'!!;~~m;1 C.OMMAND AND GENERAL 5TAFF- SCHOOL Fort Leavenwo~th, K'an!lQs 19~: 19'TO



c .,.. '....W l. eu:coml'''''?Y SeC f lv, •


c. & GS.S. Military Review , the directIOn of Washington, is moVblg west on the River Road with head approaching Potomac (village). (2) BllIP.-Brigadier GeneralM. with his S·2, S-3, Air Liaison Officer, prill<.>ipal subordinate {'ommanders; and ad­ vance guard commander of' the east column. under cover of the ridge 1000 yards east of road Junction 399 '(353-670) is familiar with the following as regards his own forces: (a') The advance guards of both columns. on meeting resistance along Great Seneca Creek and Cabin Branch, pushed forward agg-re,,,ively bllt are held up (along the line indicated on SpecIal ;Vlap B) by heavy fire from hostile anti­ tank weapons ami machine guns disposed in the localities indicated, and by artillery fire from the vicinity of Washing­ ton Grove (355-665). (b) ,The two ma1l1 brignue ('oIullln~. comprising units imlieate(l on Spt'cial l\lap H, are halted in march formation with head of west column at ThlIdcllebrook (349-670) and that of the east column at road ,Junction :,49 (:l52-673). (c) The two ftnnk guards haH' reported from the locali­ tIPS indicated on Special i\lap B. (el) The Reconnni..:,,:;ance Troop.

Bngade Reconnais­

sallce and Support Squadron. ha~ reported. from vicinity of Falls Road three mile, ,outhwc,t of Rock\llle (:158·658), that its advance has been stopped along the g-eneralline: Watts Bmnch-GleIl (~51-6M)--cro"road" 389 (~55-653) by strongly defended road blocks ~l11rl that the bulk of the troop (1e~s 1 }Jlatoon) is endeavoring to detour to the east and south. , (e) Troop A, D~l,t ('n,'alry has reported from the vicinity of Quince Orchard (347-66:\) that the banks and bo'ttom of :;\luddy llr:mch mal{e crossiJl!!s difficult. .. (f) A piatooll of Troop A, 952d Ca"alry has reported, . from the woods south of Avery (360-661), that the woods and stream (Rock Creek) ttl the west and sQuth,vest of Ay€l'Y are practicalJle for passage and maneuYer of groups of mechallized vehicles. . (g) The 051st Observation Squadron has located a landing field immediately southeast of New Market where fOLlI'

planes arE'

111 rpadmes~.

e. 11]i8ccllfI1lC011~.-

(1) Tl'cfltht.I.-The weather is clear and warm: fOl'eca~t, no change. (2) Rood"!, In/dyrQ, mul cIIll'(rts.--Alll'oads are dry, All bridge..;, ano cnlvert..;; located on roads indicated by solid lines on Special Maps A and B permit passage of all mecha­ nized yehicle..:::. 3 FIRST REQUIREME:<T.-The decision of Brigadier General A!' commanding the 951st Cavalry Brigade (l\!echa­ nized). reinforcpd, at [) :20 AM. 2 June.

SECTION II Second Special Situation Parngrap'l

SpeCial situatIOn. continued " ___ . _______ ~ ____ •. Second reqUIrement ______________________________________ __ ~

4 5

4. SPECIAL SITUATION, CONTINUED.-Brigadier Gener­ "I :II at 5.20 AliI. 2 June decides to attack without delay with the bulk of t lIe brigade, em'eloping- the hostile east flank in order to destroy the hostile mechanized cavalry force prior


to continuing to the south to operate against the Great Falis concentration. 5. SECOND REQUIREMENT.-The orders as actuaUy issued by Brigadier General M to carry out his decision of 5 :20 AM, 2 June.

SECTION II! A Soluton of Second Requirement Paragr~ph

A solutIOn of seeond reqUIrement __ ~ _________________________


6. A SOLUTION OF SECOND REQUIREMEN1'.-After dIS­ cussing the situatIOn briefly with the assembled Command Group and receiving recommendations from the CO 951st FA (Bn), Brigadier General l\!, on the ridge 1000 yards east of road Junction 399 (353-670), at 5 :25 AM, .issued oral instructions to the assembled group [present: Aides. S-2, S-3, Air Ln 0, COs 951st and 952d Cav. 951st FA (Bn), Rcn & Sup Sq, 951st Sig Tr and 951st F.ngrs (Tr); all of whom were familiar with the existing sitnation], as follows: "Make necessary notations on your maps. f "We attack to destroy the opposing mechanized cavalry force, enveloping the hostile east flank. "(To S-2 and Air Ln 0) Provide promptly one plane for brigade command missions; one to 9518t FA. and" one to 952d Cayalry. Continue observation enemy main columns vicmity Great Falls and report location of any enemy anti­ tank weapons 01' detachments--direct to brigade ReconMis­ ;ance Troop south of Rocln-ille and to 952d Cavalry. ";If ajar R (CO Rcn '& Sup Sq), have your Reconnais­ sance Troop move at onCe to this area [indicating area 21 ~ miles SF. ?f Montgomery C'JUntry Club (357-650) J block the two roads leading to 'Vashington and delay any moye­ ment of Red forces to the southeast. Balance your :Vlachllle· gun Troop and Motorcycle Troop attached to and join the reserve. "Colonel B (951st Cav) have your 2d and 3d Squadlons join and follow the cast l'olumn to the vicinity of AYer)" (here) as brigade reserve. Have S. the senior squadron commander report to me en route. Retain Battery A and the engineer platoon; take over both advance guards and have them continue the attack by fire only against the Red detachments in the villages; send a detachment by conce ded routes north of :lluddy Branch, to attack from tbe rea! the Red battery at the earliest practicable moment and cu' off enemy village detachments; smoke the vicinity of Wasl; ng· ton Grove to screen movements to the flanks. "Colonel C (952d Cav) , your engaged advance g,'ard elements continue action. WIth attached umts, move raj IdlS by this route [Indicates: Claysville (360-672)-RJ 526 (360.670).....:RJ 497 (360-666)-RJ 425 (360-663) J t.. an assembly area in this vicinity [indicates Avery (360-,,61) and area to the southwest thereof], and attack and des~.rOY the main Red mechanized force. Inform 951st Cavalr; by radio and plane signal when ready to attack. "Colonel H (CO 951><t FA Bn), as you recommend,.lan to have the bulk of your artillery in general support, imtial­ ly, in the vicinity of Avery.

Academic Notes "Captain E [951s1 Engrs (T~ll, balance of your troop aCt ,lrnpany the reserve. "Limit pursuit to the general line: Great Seneea Creek -l.'ghway from Quince Orchard ,to Rockville. "ARsemble promptly after the attack; 951st Cavalry in vic.nity of RJ 506 (indicates 1 mile south of Washing­ ton Grove) ; 952d Cavah'~' in the vicinity of Derwood. "Following the attack, be prepared for prompt move­ ment ag.ainst enemy forces in vicmity of Great Falls. "S-3, send Aide 2 to g-roup the combat train elements of hoth columuR. and conduct them by routes east of main col­ umlJ-- antI estab1i~h combined fl€ I 'VICe park in this vicinity [m,hrates lilt Zion at (362-670) J. URe the pl'esent eaRt flank guard to plovide additional lll·otection. "l'olonel B (D51f:t Cftv) report loration your command pO'-1

"I will accompan,' Colonel C W52d Cav) to the vicinity of A\l'I'Y. ",\n,v qUf'~tiom;'? ::.\Iove out!"






7 8 :o.Iown,f.'nt of the !J51st Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) D Dec,'l"n of BrigadIer General M at 5:20 AM. 2 June.. _____ . 10 The plan of attack __ " _____________________ ~. _____________ .-- 11 \Its~llln

____________________ ~ ____________________________ - - -

of thp 951st Cavalry BrIgade (Mechanized) _____________

:- Pl'RPOSE.-Tht> })urpoge of this problpm is to pi esent a "ltuation in whIch a reinforced mechanized cavalry hri­ ~acle, made available to a hIgher commander. IS uspd to fld llwl' the deciSive actJon of the Im'gel' force by m~signment of a -..eparate mIssion. Further, the problem portrays the . dl tum of the mechanll:ed cavalry brigade \vhen, in the execu­ iiOli ' f the asslgnf'd mission, an inferior hostile mechanized CJ.\ il11'\' force interposes. ".' ~IISSroN OF D51ST CAVALRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED), RFI!\I"ORCFD.-n. Attach);}('nt to r Corps.-(1) A mecha+. nile!! ,,1\'ulry brigade i~ not an org&mc part of a reinforced COlllIt i", OIganizl'd a,:; GHQ or al'my troops and may be attfh \ 1.:(1 to ",uhoromntc> lln1t~ such as ('Ol'P~ or dh+~10n5 for . . pe(]. ; nlls~ions To Ju::-:;tify <:;lIch attachment, the subordi­ natt' ,1lIt ghould ha\'e nppropl'Iate mis.;;iong-in ~uHable tel'l') " 1. directh' conn€'ctcn WIth the dprisive effort of the \\hqh :'llce, and warrant1l1g employment of the mechanized tU\i:\!' I

III til rOIJl' laplI:

:-,urrn lorp :;e" t1'091'

\\ith' whid

from \\oul(i nized


Bf'C,UlSe the V Corps. IS making the deci~I\'e t'ifort t'nC'weli nffen~i\'e. Hrmy hag made a\'ailahle to the ',mmander an addltlOnai powerful means to aid in the lcomplishment I)f the assIgned mission. ) In order to I eap the maXlmum benehts from the 'C employment of thIS hIghly mobIle force, the V 1I10\e,1 the DUbt Cavalry Brigade forward to the .<l·ket' area and held it concealed Lehind other friendly From this location the brigade could be launched L' minimum delay on any oppprtune, suitable mission !tl\'eloped to the southwest. south or southeast Too, he New Market al'ea. the 9515t Cavalry Brigade ,)e able to move rapIdly to counter any hostile mecha­ ",airy action from the direction of Chevy Chase. ')


b. Ppsdble missiQrlR fd,' the .9518/ C(l1'alry (Mechanizpd).- -Prior 'to the receipt at daylight, 2 June, of the information regarding the movement of the Red con­ centration across the Potomac at Great Falls the V Corps Commander probably considered several possible missions for the mechanized cavalry brigade. Among these may have been: (1) To attach it tn the 1st Cavalry Division with the mission. for the composite cavalry force, to protect the flanks of the V Corps (2) To send the hrigade in adnmce either to seize the area of the ultimate rUl7ps ohjecuve or to Interrupt the high­ ways and railways in that area, This mission was 'likely rejected as impracticable due to th" nu'mber of difficult :-,treams III the area an.ti the fact that the brigade could not be supported by other troops for a cOIudderable period. (3) To dispatch i1 to the southeast with the mission to prevent movement of Rerl forces. pspecially the hostile mechamzed cavalry, that might interfere with the advance of the V Corps. Snch premature disclosure of the presence of the 9515t Cavalry Brigade \\oltld have sacrificed surprise. (4) To hold the Lrig-ade in corps regerve pending devel­ opments which would permit utIlization of the mobile force at an opportune momen~ to further the deciRive I}ction qf the ('orps. C. illi.".':;]un (lfll:>l!fnf;(i ot 4:JO A.1I. -! .Twl(,,-( 1) On receipt of the informatIOn . . hOltJy aftel· daylight. 2 June, that a definite threat was developing flom the direction of Great Fall:;:;, \\ hich. if not countered, could serioLlsly inter­ fere WIth or po~slbl.Y l1f'utralize the V Corps operation. uncertainty as to a propel' mls,sion for the m~chanized caval ry was removed. Here \\as a highly important mission which no other available troops ~ould perfOl'm adequatelY and promptly; a miggion of dtal importance to thE' advance of the V Corps. It was a typical eayalry mission; one for which its mobility and armament ef:lpeclally fit the mecha­ nized cavalry brigade. , (2) On the informatIOn ;l\·..i"i1ahle shortly after day­ light. the corp.:; commamder C:lnnot hno"\\' in \\ hat directIOn the Reds along the Potomac will move. From Great Falls they may move either to tlW.flOlth, northeast or east. For this real'lon the miSSIOn' aSRIg-neil to the D51,st Cayalry Bri­ gade is general in natutp; i e • to ruO\'P at ont'e to the south­ east by routes lllItJaUy west of the general line: Kemptown -Darnascus-"\"\'oodtielrl-};orbeck. to opel'ate agaInst the Great FaIls Red~ and wre\pnt their intelference with the advance of the V Cor'ps" (31 By specif,ing that the mechanIzed cavalry brigade rno\'e to the sou1hpast hr 1'0lItPR generally west of thp line: Kemptown-Dama:::<<'l!<::--\\'oodtield" KorLel'k. the corps commander assured that there \\ouid be no interference with the l~t Ca\'alry lJI\'I~Hm ('(mversel). initial freedom of movement for the ~}5L"t \u\alry" Bri.gad€' "",8<:; slmilarly assured, 9. MOVEMENT or TilE D51sT CAVALRY BRIGADE (}IECH· ANIZED).-fl. ~"""I{7I'('h Illnrr,zIfJP.-(!) \Vhenever practic­ able, it is preferable th~t ground reco.IJ.naissance elements precedt" mechanized ra\'alrv mm'ch column~ by from one to several hours: and tnnt air reconnaissance .)f the zone of march be initiatf'd in a(h~anee. In this situation the V Corps had directed that ground reconnaissance in the direction of w




c. & G.S.S. Military Review

Academic N utes Gl'eat Falls be initiated at daylight by the 951st Cmalry Brigade. In compIianc(', the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop


(from the 951st Rf':'rmul.l-';'iance and Support Squ~dron)

Gmthel'"burg, Washington Grove. and Emory Grove. Under the ""curity afforded by these deta~hments. a battery is fil'­

had been moving to'the ""utheaot ""icc 3:40 AM (daylight). Elements of the Reconn?i..::s:mcp and Support Squadron normally execute the mOl t' di::-tant ground reconnaissance of the brigade ZGIW of .:I(l\aDlf' \\hile the regimental recon­ nai~sam;l' tl'OU!H; {Troop A ill each mel'hanizen eunllry regiment}, operatll1).! 11llClpl' l'l'!!,lmental control. reconnoIter fOl' theIr rl'''pedl\l' Icglm('n1s and malor fiuhilivisi(")TIS thelc­ of. Thp j'e)!imental H.'l·lmnal..::~anu.), troops may alF-o a<;;

Detachments of this force are occupying extremely

strdng localities- protection aff..,rded by the villages of

mg from the vicinity of the 'woods west of \Vashington

Groye. Flank protection is evidently being provided by the Red mechanized detachments reported ne",' Hunting lhll and Redlands. The bulk of the Red mechanized cavah'Y 1 reg-iment is apparently around Derwo'Jd III readiness to sup­ POit Its forward detachments, to move llrOmptly either to the \\ p:-;t or east to "Count€I' Blue mo\'ement. or to fall back to the Village of Rockville.

by pro\itling lo(~ll tid')}" i11oteltl[ln and lIan:;on; the latter espe, ially if the regmlL'llt ad\'<lllCl'" In mon~ than one column. c. Tcnai1l.-(l) From available information. lIiuddy (2) In arlditlOll to till' ::l'·,"I~taTIt·(' rcnderNi IJ\~ 0htalll­ Dl anl h restl'lcts move~ent of Blue units agamst the hostile ing rarir mfornwt IPH ell the hngadp zone of ad\·anee. the \\ est flank to a relatively close-in envelopment of Red fol'­ Supp0l'ting aVIation I" 111\ cliuaGle to mcchaflll.ed cm'alry fol' \\ ani rletachments, as~unng- rapd contl 01 :Ind coonlmation of ground rf'connals­ (2) Reports from reconnaissanee detachment... inciicate sance group..:. and l11arrh lOlllnlll", as well a~ for I"IlLSl''1Uent the pral ill'alniIty of tel'rain west and southwest of -Avery Imttlf' rl>eOl1naIS:-'c~nl't' for the maneuver of mE'chnnized vehicle;:.:; (3) The road IlPt pprmittlJlg, a~ It doe~ in this :-.itua­ II P()'~~lbl(' 11/0118.- A1::> the picture of the hostile Ritua­ tIOn. the meChHlll%\,l ul\itlr:. hngadc may mal'fh in two til)ll tool.. form, BrigadIer General M undouiJtedly considered column::., l'<lL'h lOllljlP"l'd of :\ lOfllplt't~ lomuat team eapabh.' a nnll11wl' of plans, Among these lIkely were: of rapid dc\~'hJlIl1l'llt ;llld Independent aLilOl1 or mutual (1) To contain the Red mechanized cavalry regiment support. WIth part of the D51f't Cavalry Brigade while the remainder l4} Till' IJilgativ I tlll1ll1itlltltC'1 normal!r \\ III mal l"il at J1lm'l'd promptly to operate again,&t the main Red columns the head, or III till:' liltl'nai llpt\\een thl' heiHI and tl1l' sOllth\\('st and Routheast of Rockville. advance guard. of OIW of tht' malll columll'i. He is L1::.u,dl~' Tlu . . plan had thE' advantage of prompt action against acc'~)mpanIPd 11\' rrlPl1lhl'I'- 01 tht' III i~adt> \oltafT alld tlw pi !n­ cipal ~ubonlinatc l'lmh<tt 11l11t l'{)11lmallticn, 01' thl'Ir I'l'illt:'­ the m,lln Ref! forces. It had, hO\vever, certain extl'pmeiy dang(,ll)u~ dl!'arlvantages; to contain the Red mechanized ,se11tatives. Under ~uch an arrullg'emellt, the bnguue com­ manrler ran i~sllt' Ol rft!r.s dll'Cl'th 10 appropl btl:' eIPlllellts. ..forc(' \\ould be dUticult, if not impoRFoible; it would play into therE'by as"urillg r,lpid C\t'l III iO;l of dell5;lOn:-. aud capItal­ t hI' hanilEl of all ag-gTcSSl\'C hostile mechanIzed cnvalry com­ Izing on tht' mnlJdit\ III In . . command. Thus we 11l1d. in the In<llH1el' h,\ l'l'dtlcll1g the Blue mechanizt'd detachment;;; to situation at f):~O A,:\1. ~ JllIW, III a Inl'atlOn \\pll forwal'rl, ;tIl L'qlldlit:., or e\'en inferiority, In Rtl'ength with Rerl f:.ll1ce !:rigudiel (~(;,llt'ral :\1 i;-. etlithll'd to nwiH' a prompt ,c1eL'I~lnll ftll'thl'l' dn blon of Blue fOITe WJtild ue ne-ceSRal'Y to initJate and i~"'I!l' the llLll',...... ,H\ IIhlI1htlC)}l:; for a prompt att8ck­ tll'l<l,\ \.f Red mam l'olumng, Also, it ri~ked the SPrIOUS frum a kno\\lrdgl' nt the' '-ltll'lt1(lll fllrnishcrl 1)\' tlIt' ad",l1l! c d;lllgt'l uf the Red mechanized. cavalr,t· forcp e\'arling thE' (on­ guards, 3\ iatil..lll, In q.!nde amI regimental reconndif' . . aIlll' l:1'1l1l1g' tOI"U: and stnkmg the rcmmndel' of the 9filst em'nl­ 1\' DI ig.ldt' III 1par or flank rletnehmcllt'> (2) To ~l\'oHl th(' Red mechanized lU\'alry regiment 10_ DeCISION 01 nHIC'DILR GENERAL ),1 AT fi:~O .\),1. ~ ami mme diIectl~' to intercept the main h01:ltile Gleat Falls .IUNr:.-rl Til 1'1 ...... I I " fir U/f ',>{t ('(IUd/uBIIIIIII'" (,ll((h­ fOl'll~S (lnl::i(I). ",;lI/(J}('"l,-Tlw Jl1j"~lOli of tlw fHjl,;;t Cm'all'~' Bn­ SHdl uLtlOn ll~kf'd the Rame dangerou~ e\'entualiti{'~ as g-ade b to Ill'lVl' at Ollu' to 1hi..? :-,olltl1l'a:-.t to op('rate :lgain~t the Grt"at 1"all:-. Ret! ... alill pl't'\ent theIr ll1terferf'l1tt:' with en\ l .... a!!E'd in the precPliIng paragraph. It would surrf'nder the initiative to the Inferior Red mechanized fot'ce, leadng the aovan;(' of the \' j 'OJ P"', h. £III'!I' 'I " tlll/tlll/l,-\ 1) A rmi:;lfit'rablf palL at It'fti't, it fl ee to choo!'e the most OPPol'tunr times and place~ for of the estimated Hed dn iSl{,1l b north of thL' PotOnItlC Rn'el. attach of 1h!:' I£'ar and flanks of the !J51st Cavalry Brigade, A long truck t·olllJ11n 1-; ilPIH'tlRChmg the Red fl)l't:'l'. The p:'lrtitulm lr ,'\ hen the latter would be most vulnerable.. trucks may Iw t fll r~ mg' I elllfol't:ement::> or may Ire for tht~ (:n To attack at once to destroy th~ hORtile mechal'ized pUr)jose of tran"IH1I t \f,~ the Grcat Fall..:. forc(-'s. In thp lat­ (':1\ airy, In order to permit prompt operations against the ter cafle, movement n1'!" he to thl' north. northea:::t or to thl' Red fnl ces in the \'irinity of Great Falls.. southeast \'ia \Y::n·hlllfl'toll Bt'cauf'e of thl~ la~t po::-'::::Hhihty EYery moment of inaction by Rrigadirr GeneralM oper­ it is ("xtren1f'iy InIp,n'tant to block promptly mo\'ement of ated to the advantage of Red and complicated the execution the Great FHlls- Pot{!mae tni"tL'S ttl the or southea::-.t. of th~ ct<;signed ml~SlOn of the mechanized hrigade, Sormel' If the Red 1"01'('(';;> mU\t! i1l an~· lllhcl' din:>ctioll. the pl0hlem of OJ' later. the hostile mechanized cavalry will probably ha\'e to Brigadier Genernl ..\1 I~ not <':'0 dIfficult. be engaged By immediate rapid destruction of this Red (2) But, iJltf'I,}lo.... t tl lWtWf'l'l1 Hw nlalll oh,lE'cth't' and j'n.rce. the 951st Cavalry Brigade would be free to concen­ the !)3Ist Cavahy lki!,!d<ie It'> a Red mechanized cavalry trate it" efforts again"t the Great Falls hostile force. This fo}'('e t'~timatPd. to hp a l'pgmH'nt-prolmbly the same foree plan adopt-ed ; the 1<,I1(d. lI.'lwn ~nd 1(1/1 y of the decision having previously 1 epol'1ed at ("hl'\'':'; Cha~e, which has been ordered been detE'l'mined, it remained only to decide the how and the forward to protect the Great Falls forces by countering our w/zele. <



Academic Notes (a) For reasons previouflly noted [paragraph 10 c (1) ]. a wide envelopment of the wcst flank appeared imprac­ th . .d However, the terrain JUd rel"mit a close-in enM \'eldpment of Red fonvard detachnlents by routes generally nOI th of Muddy Branch. (h) Additional reason~ for making the main attacl<: :l.g'..lin"'t the east flank of the Red mechanized cavalry regi­ ment are: I J) The dl"P08ition of' the bl'lgade with the hulk in the column. (ij) The 05h.t Cavalry BrIgade will interpose between the of the \' Corps anc! both the Red mechanized caval­ ry nnd the Great FaliR for('e~. (Iii) Furthermore. the hrigade \\ ill be in a better loca­ tlOll to mtercept any attempted movement of the Great Falls '~:l ... t

Rpd, til the eaRt or southea;-.t.


(d :From an t'xanunatlOn of the terrain and ront-es. a mO\l'nwnt of the bulk of the 1)1 hrade to the (>a:-.t flank could ue e:\t'cuted by cnnc(~al(>d routes, g"Pherally beyond the range of till' hO..-tllc hatten", t(' a :"!U1table a-sscmbly pOSItion from \\hllil to nltad< the main body of the hostile mechanized w\\lh \. Stich a movement could, It appeared, best be made \\Ith "peed by roads rather than Cl'Osg-C'ountry. A choir! llf t\\{) rnute~ "as llrest-'ntpd: the one \ia 'C}ay::-;vi!1e-Olne:y -~()I hl'lk-R()(.kvlllf' whH.h would take the en\'ploping "Ol'Lt' \\ Ide from the hold1l1g attal k i, or a doser in route via Cla"'\ lllp-l'oau JUIIL'tinn 426-Av~1~' when>. the enveloping [!tt<!lk could al\\"a~'~ turn In promptly against any advance 11\' tilt, ho~tile main ml'chanl7ed cavalry force (el) It \\a"- impnrta!lt to kf'Cll the advance Red elements l'ng.q2.l,d III the ,·,lIages. The ad\"unce guards must, there­ fOIl'. \ l)llt11111Q thl'll' al'tlOll A frontal advanl.e againl"t anti­ t.lIlk "Uil firr from tlw \\('11 Pl'otcct(;'d localities provided by . !be 'llklge.-. would r<.>''''llJt In tlnnt"cc'.ssary lm.:;<.:;po;. But a firf' "ttill!\ by thp ,!ll\ ,lilli' l~\la1'(b, reinforced by artillery. in ('(}Jl:IJl!l tillil \\ Ith an L'nvl'inpmpnt of the \\e8t flank and rear, by }llutl'S lmmeriJatel,v north of )'luddy Branch promised sur­ Ie...", 1'\\1 only lw contammg thf' village detachments but even dt'"tl u\ JIl~ 01' capturing the Red battery and separation of tlw (,!l\dllCe element~ trom the bulk of the ho::.tlle regiment. ThiR ~l'L{lIHIary attack. cl05f'ly coordinated with the enveI­ opmt'llt of the east fhmk. appeared to promIse the most de­ rI~1\l rc-,ults. 11 THE PLAN or ATiACI\ -0, Sutll1"r of O1drl's.-In mo~t '11C<.:hanized cavalry actIOns, oroers will be oral, frag­ nIl'nt, I). and lc,slIed by t he rommand~l' in person either rim.'cI il\' radin, il.',,' ",taR otJkers, or lJy messengers. As in thI.~... tlatlOn, the bngade ('ommander may cause principal "'Uhol'l'llatl' l'ommallden, to Join him or send fltaff repre­ ~enta' ,\e~ to join the bl'igade command group. To acceIer~

ute al !(In furthcr. prinCipal subol'd'inatfl commandEll's may at thl' ~amE' tlnlP arrange to have their squadron or similar umt ( ",mm;mder~ move to or march at the head of the !Jl'lIhJt'al rotniJat tectitl COlt1111lH~ ill order to receive orders proJYl) 1\' • I, .1iai1l

rtttack,- The bUik vf one mechanized cavalry l·eglnJ. lit \\'a~ designvted to make the main attack. And thE' p. t eolumn wa.;; qplected for reason~ outlmed before

[P"I,,'raph 10c (1). lOd (3) Ib) and (c)]. Coordination of till main attack with the prineip~l effort of the holding

attack was pl'operly assured by requiring a. signal to the holding attack forces when the east flank attack was ready to be launcheo. The distance which the main attack force had to move In reachlPg 118 assembly position, and the possi­ bility of changes developing in the situation during the move­ ment to pOSItion. \Varmnted the mission type orders to the main maneuvf'ring forre. c. Hold;n" (/ttnrl..-The holding attack force included the advance guardf: of ooth columns. In addition, to provide added f,tl'1km~ powcr <thn necessary command and communi­ cation facilities the !l51,t Cavalry. less two combat-car squadrons, \\ a:-:; assigned to the holdjng attack. While a mission type order to the 051st Cavalry might have sufficed. BrigadIer General M had suffiCiently definite information as to enem,Y diRPOSltlf)i1f. and the telTain restrictions to war­ rant the detailed Ol'dCl'S gl\'en. He desired not only to tix but to destro} the Gaithersburg Reds. Since it appeared that the mortar platoon of the 951st Cavalry could assist in maintaining deSIred secrecy of the movement of the main attark force, the lJngadl' commanrfer prescribed that terres­ trial ob::-;ervation 111 the vicmity of Washington Grove be blanketetl vdth smol<e. . d. Artdlcl')/ S"'lJwlt.-Two platoons of artillery (two 75-mm howitzel's each); one with each advance guard, were already in action at 5 :20 A:I-!. The remainder of Battery A with the we81 column Fas allotted for direct support of the holding attack. The r~!"ainder of the 95l8t Field Artillery Battalion mig-ht have been placed in general support in the area no) th of the :H]V~mce gwnds. However. Brigadiel' General ill p,'p,cl'iued that the artillery battalion move to the east flank. Why'! Probably for the following reasons: (1) From the area southwest of Avery the artillery will be able to fhe Oil any withdrawing Red mechanized cavalry ("Iemellts. (2) The unll< "f the artIllery WIll be available promptly for lllteniIctlOll of I'OHte~ h) the south. and southeaRt of Rock­ \'ille shollld an,· threat develop from that direction. (3) The artillery will be available more promptly for any future mo\"(~mellt of detachments or other action to the south agaill~t the t;reat ~Falls forces. e. E:lIgiutrl'".-A platoon of engineers was left with each of the cavalry l'egiml'llts to render required assistance. while the remainner of the V51st Engineer Troop was as­ signed to accompal1Y the reserve. f. A vifilloll.-Ont' ail'plane was made available to the !.l52d Cavalry to Hid III reconnaissance of routes to the as­ sembly area for the' attack and for continued assistance during the attack. Anbthe,- airplane was made available at once for artlllery missio1ls. And one airplane was directed for brigade command mi$~ions to keep the brigade commandw er informed not only of the locatIOn of units but to direct the action and speed up control. At the same time, S-2 was in­ structed to contiI;tle the reconnaissance missions. The bri­ gade commallder llldicated the essential elements of infor­ mation In the same instructions. g. Rese,."e.-ln order to be able further to influence the action promptly. the two rear combat-car squadrons of the V5lst Cavalry (west column) together with the remainder of the machine-gun troop' of the Reconnaissance and Support Squadron were de~lgnatpd a~ brigade reserve. It was directed to fonow the milL} ma~euvering force to th~ vicinity of


C. & G.S.S. Military Revlew Avery from which location it will be able to reinforce the main attack. meet any unforeseen d~velopment. or to move \'apidly to the south against t he Great Falls Reds, . h. Brignrie awl I ('gU}1f lltfll reco1l11aissance f1"OOps.- (1)

The brigade reconnaissance troop was so located sOllth\ve5t of Rockville as to be aple to moye most readily to 'intercept and block any movement of R(ld columns to the east or south~ east from the Great Falls-Potomac area, It should be able to accomplish thIS misslOll until other brIgade elements can be concpntl'ated flgainst these Reds. (2) One platnon of the 952d Cavalry Reconnaissance TrOOI), operat IlIg under l'e~;imental control, has constituted 'i.1w nght rlanh protertion. Bngadier General M earmark,;; thi:-< platoflll to Join the .sen ice parks. (!q The rcmaindel of the regimental reconnaIs::-;ance troop:-. al e


available to the


regiments where,

wlih combat Imrnm('lIt. theIr need 19 especIally urgent for flank and adnl1lcr "'PCllrity mh:..ions, battle reconnaissance and Iiai,«:)ll. I. Linllt ... cd jllfl...,/Iif /l1/(1 (I,"',"" IIthly Iwillt ... ,-ln order to prevent llDrlUC' dll'>PPl'sion Rlld IDsI'> of control. it is usual. with mechallhed cavalry. to prescl"ihe a limit of pursuit III attack .situatiol1~, Thr II/Ilit of ]111/ >;1fit, and for the same reason the /I ... ..;('IIIb!tl ,Joint. should be well-defined, easily fieen and recnglliz,lhle teiTuin features j, PI nlll/J( (I,'>.-:(/Il!Jl!1-Becuu~e time was vital, all were \val'ned til a..,~emble p1'omptly, p1'epan~d for suhseqllent action again"t the Great Fall" forces. , k, S('I'l'ice !I'll k.--At the real' of mechamzed cavah'Y cniumm~ march the maintenance platoon:;:: and a lImited num­ her of fuel and ammunition \'{"hides A.. combat is joined

these groups of ,ehides are ~ssembled, together with troop repair trucks, m a protected locality-usually beyond the range of ho"tIie artillery, designated as Sel;'flioe Pm·les. Eat h regiment in the brigade may establish a separate service park; or a combined park may be established. In this situ­ ation. Brigadier General :\I prescribed the latter procedure and designated the indicated elements tb accompany and proyide protectIOlI for ihe trains. supplementing the machine guns which are on a certain number of the train vehicles. I. SpJ'vice tl0o]l~.-The Ordnance Maintenance Com­ pany, the Quartermaster :'laintenance Company, and the Medical Company compl'i::;.e the sen Ice echelon of the mecha_ nized caHtiry brigade. N,ormally. when the brigade marches to combat. the sel'yice compames wiII be left well to tne rear, as in this :-.ituatlOn--concealerl in the New Market area, \Vhell their :-.en'ice<;. are reqUIred. elements of these com­ pUllies \nIl come fOl'\varo; e~pecially the medical company which \\'ilI likply ..,elld forward detachments to the Service Park Ht :\1t. 2ioJl to heg'in as~emiJly and evacnatIOn of person. npi casualtie:-, 1'11. LIJ(,fftirlll flf ('OJJnllffJlnrl' - ( 1) It is usual with mechullized c<lvaln to dilect the principal .subordinate unit and comuat team commaniler.s to report the location of their tesllecti\'p commanrl Jln~ts. (2) The britrade commallder often will accompany the principal attack force to a location where direct observation over the large;.:;t expanse of the terrain of combat i~ available In this situatIOn, fr(lm a location 011 the east flank, in close pl'o'\imlty lIot only to the maneuvering force but to both the l'esen"e ...:;qllddroll!" alld the bulk of the artillel-Y. Brigadier General 1\1 will be ill a po:->ition to inflllence and control most rapidly th'" action of the bulk of the brigade,

Strategical and Tactical Mobility lAs 111nstralrnl)?1


of the 7th

rUl'alry Bnganr, Zl1rc1iamz('d, in tl,f Fnst Arm?1 By ;.\IA.I0R

R. S. rrl\;\IFY.

DUrIng the month of AUJ:]lst 1939, one olthe largest peace­ tlme conC'pntrations of thE' three components ofth£> United States Army took place at Plattsburg, New York where the followinl! major umts assembled: ~6th

DIvision 1 ~';'th Djvil'ion JOrgamz p ,1 as a two corps army (Black) for 4311 DIVI!llOn I thp Army Phasp of thp Maneuvpr 4.1t h IhvlSIon I • If'lt DIvision IMh Infantry Bngildp Orgamzed as a prO\If>IOnal ('orp~ t7th Ca\alry Bnga(i£>,: (Blue) for thf> Army Pha<;f> of Mf>challl2'pn I ManPllVf>r

*Excerpb from an oh~E'npr'''1 report (Major R S Ramey. Cavalry) on the operations of the 7th Cavalry Bngadf>, Mechamzed, m the Firf'it Army Manpuvprs. tComprised: Brigade Headfluarters anrl Headquarters Troop 1st Cavalry 13th Cavalry 68th Fif'lld ArtIllery (En) 12th Observation Squadron Company E, 5th Quartermastf'r Rf'glmpnt, Mamtf>nance 19th Ordnance Company, Mamtenance O(1tachmE'nt Mpdicai Corps Company E, 1st Engineers (attached for Maneuvers only).



('rs, August lfm,f))'"

('(/1'0/1 1/

1\H3t Cavalry


~~~~~1 ~~~d~l~~\:~~~t Artillery (AA) tBlack ~~~~a~~f~,~~~d!~~~!a~;~~nizations comprising' \ tr~~~s Ordnanc(>, Quartermaster ObservatIOn A vlation and Signal Units


1\1 any of the rearlers participated in these Plattsburg exer­ cises but perforce had only hmited knowledge of operations ,)ther than tho5e pertaining to their own immediate organizatl'ln or assignment. To supplement the partial picture of the comhined operations po:::;sessed by many of the partiripants and to pr,)vide a general appreCIatlOn of the strategical and tactical possibJiities of mechanizE'd ra\'alry, a resume of the operations of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechantzed, III the Army Phase of the I'latts­ burg ~1aneuvers. IS presented in the succeeding pages. TERRAIN OF :\iANEUVER AREA

The Plattsburg Maneuver Area (see accompanying map) consIsted of a tract approximately 20 miles Wlde by 30 miles long to the west of Lake Champlain, It was divided into two contrasting areas: the eastern section along Lake Champlain,

. '\. ....., Vol. XX N"O~76


Academic Notes








Academic Notes'~~

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

Sf ilL



Sh.E.TCH No 1

\('\'<LC' FR, ~TH C\\ AlR\ BRH,.\lJ£

P. ~I.. ~:J At'b{ ~T

...lopln~~ upwaltl to the Adlll)n(b('k dbolit one-thud of the area, the le11laInlllg lwn-thll'fb of t1w ~Ilpa \\:1 .... p,\llpnw·l~' hroken, roek stl ewn and heavily wooded Although ttle nmll Bet "'as ex('ellent 111 the eastern part of thE' area the moum..:.lJI1S and fore~tf, of the 'South amI west SE'dlOn werE' anything but favOl'able for mechanized operatIOns. The hlH ma5t.e~ of the maneuver area were- cut by three lolling.



to the

\H'~t. c()mpll~ed

more or less parallel river valleys which coursed generally from southwest to tlie east mto Lake Champ!am; in orderfrom south to north these were the Ausable, the Salmon, and the Saranac Rivers. MANEUVER RULES

For the exercises at Plattsburg certnin ground rules applied.

Only eXlstmg arms and equipment were permitted.

::\0 chemicals, ga..:; mas.ks or impregnated ('lathIng were u~pd Defensive positions, ruad block::, and demolitions were out­

lined only.



judged by umpires arrordillg to

preparatIOn made. availabilIty of pprsonnel, materiel and e.qUlp­ ment. Actual combat was "restrIcted to areas covered by trp:-.paSS agreement but troops could move on roads anywhere wlthi'l

their march capability. Artillery fires were mtender to be represented by smoke pots and candles. :'\0 combat aviation was a\'ailable to either side. SITUATION

(See Sketch No. 1.)

Briefly the general situation for the Army Phase was:

Academic Notes



P. M., 23 AVGUST

,\ Black Army. detached from main forces operatmg else­ In the Platts-burg vlrimty pl'ep,lI'atory to an advancE' to the ~outhwest. \ Black Unit::;. mdH<lted on accompanying sketches by hachuff!d symbols.) To oppo::,e thl::; force, the Blue PrOVISIOnal Corps was hastIly constituted and moved towards Plattsburg WIth the mission to <'onLIITI RlacK until additIOnal Blue forces could be as,embled to de,troy the Invader. Durmg the mght of 22-23 August the PrQ\ 1'lOnal Corps (less 7th Cavalry Rrigade. mechanized) moved whel<.' In :\ew England, wa;.; u%embled

Into ,·oncealed bIvouacs in the western part of the maneuver

area. The 7th Cavalry BrIgade (Mechamzed) was scheduled to




The ProviSIOnal CQrps udyane-ed shortly after noon. 23 Augu::.t, to seize the ::-,Iopes along the general line indirated on Sketch ~o. 1 In order to contam Black. ('of/cu.rrently, the 'Ilk Cawlry Rngade, 51echamZEJ, ll'as (hrected to moce from BLACK BROO1\. to t.he northea3t to operate agaznst the hostile south }Iank and rear. The general plim of ad\ance employed by the mecha­ nized ("m'alry brigade IS mdlcated on Sketch No.1. OPERo\TIONS,23 At'crt-'f


August and pass to control

It had been antIcipated that Black would make a strong

of the Provisional Corps; the brIgade commander and stat! was assumed as preceding the brigade and receiving instructions for

thrust north of the SARANAC. Since a river crossirtg in the vicinity of ELSINORE was required as a training exercise it became neces·

the employment of his brigade.

sary to stop. arbitrarily t~e rapid advance of elements of the 18th

an'n f' at


at noon.




C. & G.S.S. Military Review Infantry Brigade north of the SARANAC. Immediately south of the SARANAC, rendered hazardoUs by frequent temporary bridges the SARANAC, however, the RIack 10Ist Cavalry moved rapidly and fills on a road which flanked the river. At SARANAC, regimental and similar commanders joined the to the west, gained contact with the 18th Infantry Brigade and brigade commander who issued instructions calling for the fol­ very effectively delayed its advance througHout the afternoon . . On its front the 1st Division made very' effective use of lowing: The brigade to march via PICKETTS CORNER to DANNE· motorized detachments by way of the SALMON R[VER valley to the PATTON SCHOOL vicinity, southeast of which point junction MORA. From there the bligade, less 1st Cavalry reinforced by with the 7th Cavalry Brigade was established about 2:30 PMI a battery of artillery and platoon of engineers, to march on (See. Sketch i\o. 2.) In its front, the 7th Cavalry Brigdde RAND HILL; the 1st CavalrY,to turn north at DANNEMORA, mo'-e reconnaissance elements qUIckly made contact with Black motor· via LEDGER CORNER on the line: WEST BEAKMANTOWN-­ ized detachments in the vieinity of CU:N'TONVlLLE, north thereof BEAKMANTOWN where it would report arrival and receive orders and near HARKNESS; and developed the fact that the CLINTON· (a further wide swmg of about 30 mIles). On resumption of the march there occurred one of those VILLE - H.\RKNr.SS defile was effectively blocked by demoli­ tions. Parallel trails to thE' east and west of this defile, over contretemps which can so easily occur at night with all troops. COLD SPRING i\!TN and ARNOLD IIILL, were not blocked and and especially with fast movi'lg columns. Instead of proceed· permitted the mechanIzed cavalry to debouch mto the more ing to DANNEMORA as required, the 13th Cavalry took the wrong turn at P[CKETTS CORNER and was headmg northwest for some favorable terrain to the northeast of H \RKNESS. \VhIle reeonnaissancp elements had cleared the CLINTON­ time before the error was discovered. As a consequence the

planned maneuver was delayed for better than one hour. The forward echelon of the brigade arrived in D~NNE"ORA at 5:15 A;'l but it was 6;00 Ai\! before leading elements of the 13th mined late in the afternoon to concentrate Ius effort to the north­ Cavalry aITlved - and then hadly mixed as result of reversal

VILLE - Kr.CSEVILLE defile of h05tile motorized and antitank detachments and were operatIng well to the north towards LAPHAM ).][LLS, the '.\!erhanized Brigade Commander deter­ east towards P,.r::RU and eventually against the hostIle main south

of directIOn on the road. In the meantime the 1st Cavalry was

flank and rear. The afternoon had seen a succession of isolated - en route north of DANNBMOR~. actions agall1st enemy tlela,Ylng detachments operating in the OPERATIONS DURING DAYLIGHT 24 AUGUST

almost continuous defilE'S of this section.

(See Sketch


3.) Shortly before dark the 23d, the 13th

The unfortunate delay had two Immediate consequenees,

Information was received about 6:30 AM that Black troops were crossing the SARANAC on two blidge, to the west of ELSI· ('overing the hl'ilZude rIght flank by detachments in and north NORE and CADYVILLE respectively and that there was a large of !(CCtiE\ ILLF-. The 1st Cavah'y, by a double envelopment was truck movement in the same vicinity. iThis was the 43d Dni­ successfully occupymg PERl' at dusk. At tillS time (about R;OO sion, the llIack Army reserve, which had been moved by motors PM) the CG 7th Cavalry Brigade, by means of staff oflicers, during the night from BEAKMANTOWN and was undertaking an directed that the combat E'lernents \vithdraw at oncE', moving envelopment d,rected against the north flank and rear of the without lIghts, to concealed bivouacs in the J!eneral area: CLIN­ Blue position.) The 13th Cavalry moved east from DAK:<E' TONVILLC - AR:\OLD HILl for reservicing, rest and feeding in MORA, in the direction of the hostIle river crossmg. About 2 preparation for the follo\\ing day's operations. The bivouac miles east of DANNEMORA progress was effectively halted by area was outposted and liaison w11h 1st Division maintained. hostile demolitlOns and antitank dispositIOns hastily prOVIded I nstructions had already been g-iYen by messengers for after daylight. Earlier an armored-cal' platoon had been in kitl'hen and fuel tl'Ul'ks to proreed to bl\rouac areas when orders possessIOn of this bottleneck but through some mixup was With· were receIved {as troops were arriVing in bivouac areas} directing drawn. As a consequence the advance of the 1:3th Cavalry for the brigade to move to the west thence to the nOl·th flank (north the next two hours was a succession of Hmited objective flankmg pf the SARA""C RI\ERl prepared for new operations at daylight aetlOns agamst antitank diSPOSitions in a continuous del-ile. 24 August. The change of mission for the 7th Cavalry Brigade Combined trains and service parks were halted at DANNEMORA apparently resulted from the discovery shonly after dark, of a whence they operated until late in the afternoon of the 24th. serious threat to the llIue north ftank by Black troops beginning By 9:00 A:\r the 13th Cavalry had succeeded m PUShlM to to move from the viCinity of B£AKMANTOWN. ThIS new mission RA."D H[LL but was held up by a Black battalIon strongly ,up­ called for assembly of the brigade over difficult mountain trails, ported by antitank artillery. The 1st Cavalry was ordere,l to a night march of neally 50 miles. all without lIghts, after some assist by flanking action from the east. then resume its advance. 9 hours of strenuous operations, and a'gain resume operations Following the combined attack to complete the occupation a~ daylight on the opposite flank. of RAND HILL, terrain that dominated the entire area northeast Prev10us orders were countermanded and new orders carried of the SARANAC, the 1st Cavalry was directed to seize the lugh by staff officer::;, Asspm hly of march serials was completed and ground about 2 miles northeast of WEST PLATTSBURG to assist the march initiated at 11;15 Pi\! [preceded by reconnaissance) the movement of the 13th Cavalry to the southeast. There was with an amazing lack of confUSIOn and minimum of delay -, another purpose behind this plan - to clear the area in order though the bulk 0/ t he brigade had to be moved over rough to permit fuel vehicles to move safely to make urgently reqlured mountain trmls without hghts. For route of mght march, see replenishment of fuel. Sketch i\o, 3. By the middle of the morning it was apparent that the About 2:00 AM the brigade was halted in march column entire area north of the SARANAC was infested with Black anti· , between REm'oRD and SILVER LAKE; kitchen and fuel trucks tank detachments ranging from single 75-mm guns supported joined organizations to provide a hot meal and refuel. The by infantry to entire batteries supported by large infantry march was resumed about' 2:45 AM over a narrow road along detachments. These detachments were installing road blocks Cavalry was monng to the northeast of COLD SPRl;\lG l\1TN and


Academic Notes




C. & G.S.S. Military Review




and completmg aR5urned demohtlOl1S at the frequent defiles. From thIS time to the end of the maneuvPl' the ImpresslOn was gained that Black efforts were directed primarily to protection against the mechamzed cavalry. Actnally It is believed that a large part of lhe Black 75-mm artillery was dispersed in his


rear araas as antitank guns. 'By 10'30 AM the Blue mechanIzed cavalry was deep in the Black rear area, moving rapidly from north to south upross the rear installations. By 12:30 Pl\I, 24 August, the main body of the 1st Cavalry had reached the road: MORRISONVILLE - PLATTSBURG, with

· Academic Notes

, reconnaissance elements south of the SARANAC (which was read­ ily fordable in several places southeast of MORRISONVILLE). About 12:30 PM the 1st Cavalry surprised a Black tank com­ pany going into what would have been an excellent ambush. While in the ensuing action the hostile tanks were ruled out, undoubtedly this head-on engagement would have been costly to both groups of vehicles. By this time (shortly after noon 24th) the Mechanized Cavalry Brigade had been continuously in action since 1.00 1'1\1 the preceding day. Part of the units had had one hasty meal l\ec€5sary refueling and maintenance had been sketchy indeed. All ranks, but especially combat vehirle drivers, were fast ap­

proaching exhaustion though still filled with admirable enthu­ Siasm and aggress1veness. Accordingly. orders were dispatched to withdraw all elements of the bngade well to the north to the vicmlty of \YEST CHAZY for rest, reorganization and refueling.

IActually It is believed that this move was in conformity WIth the desiJ es of the :\1aneuver Director in order to prevent the complete collapse of the remaining scheduled exercises the extension of ,the Black envelopment combined with a mght attach, Blue night withdrawal, and a daylight attack by Black on the 25th smee the mechanized cavalry was in pm,ition to The 7th Cavalry Brigade completed its assembly in the WEST CHAZY area late in the afternoon in a to'rrential ram, trams

joined units. all elements refuelled, the area outposted, much needed rest gained. and plans announced for a resumptIOn of

the advance early 25 August. OF

and machine guns) which were being reduced when the exercise

terminated. Here the lSth Cavalry surpnsed and captured important Black installatIOns. The 1st Cavalry was moving to the south of the SARANA¢ as were reconnaissance elements deep in Black rear. The exercise was terminated shortly after 7:00 AM, 25 August. LESSONS

In drmving any eon("lusions from the operations .recounted above, it must be apprePiated that: this was a peace-time maneuver with ('ertam necessary ground rules; Black units did not po:::,:;es:::, mobile antItank means; an~ a large part of the terram of the maneuver area was admIttedly highly unfavorable for mechanized operatiohs. Nevertheless, certain general les­ sons WIth regard to mechamzed operations, important to' the components of our Ar~Y, stand out. 1. The exercise sh uld have impressed partIcipating com~ roanders and units wit the potentialitles of this powerful, hard

hitting, hIghly mol:>de rce ~ mechanized cavalry. 2. The stratel'ical as well as the tactical pOSSibilities of mechani7.erl ca\'alry \\'E're wen llluf.trateu in the operation

rontmue dIrectly across the Black rear areas.)

OPERATIONS, DARK 24 AnGusT 10 END (See Sketch 1\0. 4.)

Rhortly afterwards, the ~3th Cavalry encountered serious resist­ ance at the bridge at MORRISONVILLE (batteries of 75-mm guns



tured. InItially engaged WIde against Black south flank and rear, the 7th Cavalry Brigade later was shifted rapIdly to meet a seriou~ threat to the B1ue north flank. The executIOn of the

changed miSSIOn reqUIred assembly of the brIgade in darkness and its rapId march with put lights to the threatened flank. 3. Terrain must be extremely difficult to constitute a com­ plete barrier to mechanized cavalry. More unfavorable terrain

the SARANAC, seize the high ground as far as the RALMI)~ RIV:CR, then t urn to the southwest to strIke the .Black left flank and

than the western part of the Plattsburg area would be dIfficult to finu. Yet the 7th Cavalry Bri!mde was able to reach the flanks and rear of t he opponent in a locality and at a time that would have been disastrous to the Bla~k forces 4. The problem of <;lefense against a hIghly mobIle force surh as rnerhanized t'avalry i.., extremely difficult. Dispersed


antltank dispositIOns

The plan of operations for 25 August provIded: The brigade to adyanre to the south. fOfeE' a 1.'1os;.,mp: of

Rf'~ments to

advance abreast in more than one column, the

13th (,m'alry on the nght; advance guards crossing the outpost


retard the movements of mechanized

cavalry but in the end will be ineffective.

AntItank groups

lme at 5:00 A 1\1: reconnaissancE' detachments movmg at 2:00

held centrally may, when disco\"ered, be contained and out­ maneuvereri. It would seem that the answer 1S merhunlznfio1l


to {"ovuter merhanization.

. One Combat-car Troop 13th Cavalry to follow 1st Ca\alry

as re8E'rve.

Trains to assemble and awaIt orders In bivouap area l vicin­ ity of WEST CHAZY). ThE' advance to the south was Initiated as planned. By dayltght, reconnaissance elements had prossed and *ere south

of the S'RANAL North of the SARANAC the main b<igade col­ umnl:: t>n('ountereu frequent antitank 75-mrn guns and groups of guns "hlch were promptly reduced by flankmg maneuver. By 630 AM the brigade was crossing the SARANAC at the bridge northp."t of BM 294 (about 5 miles southwest of PLATTRBURG).

5. Powerful, highly mobile forces such as mechanized cav­ alry umts exerCIse a definite morale influence on troops; it gives

confidence to and raises the spirit of friendly troops while mak­ ing enemy troops apprehensive and subje(>t

to sudden demorali­

zation. Therefore, maXImum opportunity should be afforded components of our Army 'to observe and train with mechanized units. .

6. The 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechamzed, demonstrated its high value and effeetiveness in mobile operations - though the maneuver terrain was far from favorable to its best and most effective employment.


Directory of Periodicals

.Included In this directory are only those periodIcals from whH.'h articles havp heE'n sE'lE'cted. See ah:,o, "List of Periodicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations." MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS

Joint Forees


Flghung Forces (Great Brltam) ..

Journal of the Royal Untted Servlf'e InstltutlOn ,Great Britam)

General Military

Arm J QuartE'rlJ (Great Brltam)



Bulletin Bpige des SClE'nces !'.hlitalres tBelgium)

La Franc£' Mlhtmrt> (Franc!?)

Journal of the AmerH'an ;'vTllitary Institute

Krasnaya Zvyezda (Russia)



107 109 109

97 Mlhtar,.,. Engineer 98 PlOmere '.G(>rmanyl _ RassE'gna dt Cultura ;\1ihtare 'Italy) Royal Engmeers .Tollrnai (GrE'at BrItam 1

97 90



Revue rl'lnfanterle (Franf'P)

98 113

Arm;. ~Iedlcal BullE'tm Journal of thE' Ro)-ai Army 1tcdlcal Corps (Great Britam) ~ ~1l11tary Surgeon

98 107

Infantry Journal



MiI4tarwlssens('haftilchp ;\11ttellungpn 'Austria)

Mlht.J.iWlssenschaftliche Rnnd<;chau (German;'"

Mthtur-Wochenhlatt (Germany'

100 102 115

Revue Mlhtmre SUiSSE' (Swltzerland]

Wissen und Wehr fGprmany)





Army OrdnancE'

Arms and Services




Coast Artli:er,.,. Journal

FIeld Artiller~ Journ:ll

Ra5S p gna dl C'ultura MilItare (Italy'

ReVllf' d'ArtIlJerle {Fran('e~

97 97 109 110



iew T,\NK:3


Pamertruppp \Gf'rman~ \

Navy and Marines


Cavalry J aurnal


Manne Corpo; GazpttE' Naval Institute Proceedings




100 107 General

ChemIcal \\ arfarp Bulletin



Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles Th,S section catalogs the art1cleR selected from Library period1rals for the current quarter. arranged alphabetically. ARMY MEDICAL BULLETIN







L1E'ut ColonE'1 Duncan


\RiIlS E\tB4RbO



Gf'neral George C Marshall, ChIef of Staff,

t- S



ARMY QUARTERLY (Great Brltam \

January 1940

OF POLAND Compiled from German statements m the nE'U­

tral press, GE'rman commumques, press noticE'S and conversations.




July 1939 GER\U."J T.\!'..K T\CTICS.

January-February 1940 ~iE~TA1S









Colonel de Watte,nIe


November-December 1939 THE STATES


Dr Fritz StE'rnhE'rg

October 1939

TInN IN '1'E\,\5 \ .... Il

Periodicals in this catalog are

ITartif'jue allpmande dE's. Ch:J.N dp comhats 1 Major Callens

1914-1918, Germany was slow to rE'CognlZe the lmpor­ tatH'e of tanks At the close of the 'loar Germany only had about 50 tanks III Sf'f',H'E' Germany has since mtenslfied her efforts on mechanized forces an~ In 1938·had () mpchani7.ed dIviSIOns. She prohahly has from 10 to 15 sue dIvlSlons today German tanks arE' of three types lIght, mE'dlUm and heavy. They:a re

IJllrmg th{l war,

~~~~:,r~~l~h~~~a~ ~~a¥et'o~~~~~~;y°r\~g~~ ~~~~I~:~~~~~th~~~dIJ~e~~~

of 12 to 15 tons carry:! hght machine guns and a 37-mm gun; the heaVY tanks of 20 to 25 tons carry 2 hght machme guns, a 37-mm and a 75-mm gun, Photographs of all three types illustrate the article




Vol. xX No: 76 German tank tactics favor independent tl},nk Rt'tion. This differs from the French school of thought which favors dose cooperation with the infantry The Germans say that a close coopt'ration of tanks and infantry would deprive the tanks of thpir mobility. and m (,prtam ca~e8 make them hkeI~ pre) for the hostile defense. Tanks and mfantr~ generally have the !:lame objC'ctlve, namely the hostilB artillery However. terram m a de(,isivE' factor as to whether tanks will move in the Rarne direction as the infantry or follow dlfft'rent routes. During combat thf' other arms must coordmate their activities to those of the tanks. During a tank attack, the infantry takes ad'\nntage of the attack to quicken theIr progress, the artillery intE'.l'dlcts hostIle fire. observation and cover; the engineers remove obstacles and assist tanks acros's difficult terrain. aviatIOn supports the tanks by spotting hostile antitank weapons, artillery and res.erves and Signals the approa('h of hostile tank attacks. Smoke faCilitates tank attacks. Surpnse is essential to success. Preparations pnor to comhat mcludes prop.,r reconnaissance of the tE'rrain and coordinatIOn with the sllpportmg arms III order that movements to attack pOSitIOns and the Jump~off conserve the great benefit of surpl"lse. The Germans employ massed tank attacks wluch smngh through by sheer weIght. During the attack, tanks are dISposed m thrpC' <;\raves, each WIth a defimte objective. The first wave's obJectIVE' usually IS thl' hostde antltani!: guns dnd the artillery; the second wavf', the hostile front Ime, and the third wave, the close support of the attackmg Infantry Single tanks, hke scouts, precede the first wave in order to draw the hosUle antitank fire and force the disclosure of theIr positIOns' t:mts mo·w forward towaru thf'Ir oilJectlvPs by a .,enes of short bounds Tank attacks dre marked by audal'lt), rapldit~ and Ilexlbility The author then procf'f'ds to illustratp the .l.\Jove pnncIples b:r glvmg three short, illustrated prohlf'ms drawn frum recent German articles m "DIP Panzf'rtruppe "

Catalog of Selected Periodical Article8 THE ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL HACKGROUND OF THE BELGIAN ARMY. {Origines et filiation de I'Arme-e beIge.! (II) Colonel Verhaegen The second !nstallment of the historical development of the Belgian regIments ThIS mstallment covers the period from 1830 to the reorgamza· han in 1913, and discusses the organization of the infantry, cavalry and artIflpry regIments since 1913. BELGIAN MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATER EXPOSITION AT LIEGE. IParticipation militaire beige l"Esposition IRternatlOnalede l'Eau, a Llegp.l Major General Van Daele . Thp author, who was Ptf'sldent of t-he MIhtary Commission appointed to the EXposlhon, descnbes the mIhtary exhIbIts at the International Water ExpmntlOn held at LIege m 1938 The exhibits included models illustratmg protective deVIces ag3:inst m~ndations. samtaty m&tallations for "barracks, army water purificatIOn umts, engineer ponton eqUIpage, river crossing expedIents and field shower haths u!'led durmg the War of 1914-1918



November-December 1939 THE SE.\<ENTH CAVALRY BRIGADE IN THE FmST ARMY MI\NEU\F:RS, Brlg<tdlPr General ChaffeE' AN OBSER'wER AT THE FIRST AR~t'l MA"lClJ\ERH Major Heavey C.\ VALR'I Dl\'ISlON \tANEU\ERS, O! 'TOBER. 1939" LlPut Cn!onpl Schwlen THE GER\tA~ CMlJ>AIGN IN POI Al\lU 1..1I'llt \ninnpl von Wedel, German ~




ILe guidage par T S.F de-" uvwns miht.urE''3 I (aptalll de ('alIata~'

A tf'chmcal artIcle on navIgatlOn by radiO for mlhtary airplanes. TIl(> autl1ur dlsC'usses the USf' of the radIOgomometE'r. the rudlOgomo,,('op(>, radlo bedcUns, the radlo~COmpa'ls and their application to aViation,

HowE'ver, there IS no doubt of the great mterest III the pussiLlhty of "ueh protectIon. Unfortunately, armored prote('ilon me.l.ns mCrf'd,,\l'u weight The 'wul­ nerabll' parts mIght be given partial protectIOn, hut onl~ at the expeu"e uf spped \VhlCh IS itself the best form of protectIOn Gas tank" of ('lastl{' .mall'rl,ds, which closed up after the passagp of a bullf>t, 'Ner{l trwd m 1917 and \\pfe Said to have had some df'grf'P of SUC('!''''' Armored prot(lctlOn of the eHgmes would interfere with their coohng syt>tems Snmt' protel tlOn might \'e developed to protect the- pilot from the rPar Allm .lH, a (hffiC'ult prnbh,nl, but one that should hp conSIdered.

THE ORIGIN AND IIISTOlUCAL HACl\ltIWl'Nl.ltW nm Hh.ll.I~"" Am,1\ IOrtgmes et filIatlOn.dE' l'Armee (wlge I .1) Colonel \erhaegen 11, thp first installment the author traces the ol"lgms amI histOrIcal devel­ opmf'l,t of the Belgian regIments from the Ume when Cae<;ar conquered Gaul to 163" when it ""a& known a" the Holland-Bf'lglun Arm)o, or tn(' Arm~ of thf' LlI\ Countrws. August 1939 RAID ON A GERMAN OUTPOST IN rRONT m !\ml'PORT. h-9 APRIL 1918 iRaid sur Ie P.P I a.llemand en a"ant de ~[(>upt)rt, 8~9 avnl1918J Captam CorVllam A dl'scrlptlon of a r,ud hy .1 &mall party of nlnetcen mPIl Oll a German outpo~' m front of Nleuport durmg the mght 8 9 April 191h, m ",,\u<'h eight Wprp h lied and tf'n wounded.



October 1939 THE BIW4.D \"IE'\o OF' LHE:'UCAL WARt ARE, '\lajlH Gelleral B.l.kf'r CHEMICAL SUPPORT OF INFANTR'I LIP-ut Colonpl Prpntl!'l" COAST ARTI LLERY JOU RNAL'


,Le blmdage des a~s L Colonel Desmet

l'rdctically no airplanes arelPro-tected agam"t ]JulIet« dUU shell sphnters

Pratt t


November-December 1939 GERMI\N AA AlaILlERY rOllA'!. Major Rol)('rt<: THE NEW DIVISION I.leut Colonel Ingles LITTLE PHIL Part II F'letchf'r Pratt THE GERMAN CA'ofPAWN IN POLAND Lleut Colonel vou \\\.. del STOR'( OF .\RflLLER'r THROUGH THE AGES. W A Wll1das January-February }940 NATIoNAL llE~E!'II~E AND ANTII\IItl'ltAPT nEFEN~~ MJ.JI.JI" rl1\l!ir~'" HuPF'tANN. 11 A DeWeerd

RKKGROt:ND I,'OR LIGHTNINt: \\AH Bngauler Gplwral H,pdly

\\7. A \Vmd,l'>







1939 ,

MA..RCHING ANIMAL-DRAWN FIELD ARTlLLEH'i Majnr General Danford THE GER"tAN CAMPI\IGN IN POL.. . ND Lip-ut Cllionpi .. on Wedel, Gf'rman Army Gl.'NNER IN LUZON Brig General Scolt, Retlrt'd OPEN WAHFAUE. Colonel Lanza FIGHTING FORCES :GrE'at

December 1939 GENERAL RENNE!><KAMPF JUDGED BY HIS BROTHER OH ICERS ILe General de Rennenkampf juge par ses ('ompagnons d'armps J (I) J. Savant T:.\· first installment of General Rennonkampf's carper collected from many ~ources by a historian who has speCialized on Russian military opera­ tIOns d mng the War of 1914-1918. T!\I' General graduatPd from the Mlhtary Academy m Ib73 and wu-; commlc'>loned as a sub-lieutenant of the 5th Uhlans of After grad­ uatmg .It the head of hIS class from the War College III 1882, hp held various lIJIport mtstaff appomtments. In 1891 he was chief of staff of the 14th Cav­ airy l1''llSIOn; In 1895 Colonel of the 36th Dragoons: and 10 1900 was pro­ moted 10 GeneraL Dunng the campaign against the B02'..ers III 1900-1901. Gener.J Rennenkampf commanded a column of RUSSIan troops III Manchuria w-hf're Le distingUIshed himself by making several su('('e:.&ful forced marchps. T~e aI, thor documents General Rennenkarnpf's operations In Manchuria With n1any interesting a('('ounts wntten by brother officers of the General

PULlSH CAMPAIGN Lleut Colonel Burne



THE WAR IN THE AIR. By Our All" Corrpgpolldpnt



By MAJOR T B. PHILlIPS. Coast Artillery Corps


11 July 1939


lL'utlhsation kilO'S 'l1chhlues en cas de guerrp.J

The Berhn correspondent of the Swedish newspaper. "Daghens Nigh~ eter," IS among the best in~ormed of foreign JournalIsts in Germany. While having close connections ~ith governmental circles, he retains ('omplete





2Q <

. Catalog of Selecfi'd Periodical Articles independenee and his correspondence is read attentiveh. not only by otheT JournalIsts. but also by diplomatic and poht1('al agents He has recently received mformation on Illtlpr's plans {'oncprnmg thf' new European eolony of Germany. It 18 to bl? expected that the set-pn million Czechs will be included in thp preparatIOns for war and usrd for labor at the front In casp of war But the mill tar:. nwhilization of the Czedis runs into considprable diffieultIE'~ of whH'h thE' prE'spnt lpadl?rs In Germany are pprfl'C'tly aware If the Czechs are sent to the front they will pags over to the enE'my. that is to their frIptlds, and ~Ill ~tart the formatIOn of tnf'lr IpglOns agamst Ger­ mam. to the e:)i.tE'nt of theIr strength, and under any nrculT'stancps thp:\, will hE" an dement of dissulutwn and sabotage In the" German army • In consequencp the Czpchs, ac(,ordmg to thp mformatIOn of the Swedish Journallst, are destIned to lw('omf> thp prmnral f>lement of a "Clvii army" The lahor of the Czechs '\\rIll be u~ed III the develupment of {iNman industry and agncuiture partICularly, durll1g war But In order to prp\pnt rpslstanC'P and sabotage III cunslderable dimenslOns, It has been resolved to distribute progrp<;slvP!y almost all tlw Czech popul",tlon fit for Jabor all OVf'f Germany and 10 p1a('p of Czechs, GPrmans v,ill h{' Installed In Bohpmla and Moravm. By thiS procedure three objPClS are att,uned U'3e of Czeeh workers fur war, weaKt'nmg of Czeeh reSistance, and finally ('ornplpte dif-pf'rslOJ) of the Czech natIOn Tins procedurl;' Iq \\pH kno,," IJ to the Gl'rman~ ,1IJd mdrp than once has given guod rf'sults III thf' cour<,f' uf lu"tory The prmclpal mIlot-IOn of vIm NE'urath ('U11'>lsts prl'('l~ely In dlf{'ctmg the admmlstratne s.;.stf'm of tlw "protpf'" fnr the mdustnal mobilIzatIOn of the Czpchs ,md at the samp t1me III preparlllg tlwlr com pi pte iI'lUld'ltlOn .l'; a lld.tiun The S'ke>dish corrpspnndent pnds IllS dlspatrh hy .llfirmmg that the NaZIS, m spIte of all theIr efforrs, WllllllJt !"u(,(,f'pd 11l destruymg the CZE'ch natiOn. In tImp of 'kar, I-htll'r must surmount thf' rf'~I;,taIH'e and sahotagf' not onl~' of the CZf;;'eh;:;, hut of thE' Gprmans thprnsplw<; ··In the mlddlp of all thl' prp!"ent mquletudt,s," Ill' 'knte';, ··th£> 'kIll of the Gl'rmdn ,'PO')!e fur pp.lce I" m{lt>xlhle. The man i1l tl,f' ~tn,pt. the maga­ zme df'alf'r, the 'kaltt'r III til(> cafp, thf' !:'alf's glfllwhmd her <'ountf'r, <til openly and clearly expn.. !";, t1jt'1r 0rnmnll' 'Wf'' 'kar 'WE' do nut want war Wt> can be foref'd to go t,l tin> front. but whitt gn,)d wtll It rio') III 1914 we Lf'liE'ved In victor-., T<ld.l\o \\t' all ! that \\,n ,annnt f'nd fur liS pX('f'pt m catastrupl,p , ,. 7 October 1939 COUPERATlON


C. & G.S.S. Military Review Mlhtary servIce bas been prolo~gea and the numerous exemptions from military servi('{> has bepn radiCally suppressed. the work of fortification of thp frontiers has bpen accelerated and the eqmpment of the army has been reinforced in the domain of field artIllery, antiaircraft artillerY, machine guns ~~gr::;~~~n~n~e%~~~ \~;e~~t has b:in developed bJ' the addition or many Holland POSSE'sses at the prt>sent tlme 1.000 modern airplanes and more than 40 submarines. Her war matenal, which has heen constructed in the larger part In Amerl('a, England, and Sweden, and some III Germany,ls most modern Four months ago it was offiCIally stated that thf're were only 42 forts and ('asemates along the frontier. today, according to two competent obser­ wr">. thf>re are more than 1,200 casemates along the samp frontier. Holland can raise 1,600.000 soldIers. of whom a mlilion have already re('Plved military mstructIOn and are fit fur service at the front Cprtatn districts III the region of {itrecht have already been mundated. Parallel to these measures of a military order. me<J.sures have been taken in the mtenor, notahly tn the domains of economics and antuurcraft defense; new taxes have heen Imposed to augment the power of the army, the navy and avmtlOn. the mhabitants of each house have received cards for rationing food The authorIttes of old Amsterdam hdve authOJ;ized an expenditurp of four mllhon ilorms for the con<;truction of shplters against aerml attack and other cities like thp Hague and Rottf'rdanl have followed this example. Some private enterprises ha"e done tht> same. huslllf'qs estabhshmE'uts havE' allotted five millIon florin& to prtltE'et tht>lr places, for the purchase of sack~, sand and construction of shelters, tllf' larg!'r p-art of the hanks and nf'wspapers arf' surrounded hy sand bags. the lllterior of the banks rt>sE:'mhle trenchps. Vvlth only narrow paSSd.ges to gPt to different counters dnd bureaus. ThE:' parks and gardens of the Hague and other CIties are crossed and dug wtth trenchs and sheltf'rs; instru('tlons for nurses arE' bplng conductf'd and eva('uatlOn of the large CltlPS Ita)" been prepared Night and daj, mine la~f'rs are .It work around Dutch waters, so well that fishmg bOats cannot If'aV£> their home ports, a sortie bemg so filled With penl Against aerIal actIOn over thP1T terntory winch IS happenmg, aViation pat roll> ha"e teen detachE'd along the frontIers, and on the other hand, the CltlE'S arE' brIlliantly hghtpd, sometimes the hghtmg lastmg hoth daY" and Illght. and on mdny Luildmgs have hpf'n placed enormous Dutch flags whl('h arp lighted at mght \\lth sparchhghts m orde-r to warn foreign avmtors


Ch,lf~ f't aVlatlOn ! armlE'~ has recently explamed, In hght of a ~'on~rete ('USf', ho\\o German d'ldtlOn and td.nkq d.lded the progrl;'ss of Gprman trnop8 m P1)ld.nd The corrrspnndent cid.lm!> to haH' obsPf\pd tllh hlmsplf m suut!it>astern Pold.nd . A battahon of German t,tIlk$ found Itself at the pdge of a woods lInd!>r he.a\'.;. fire from PoiJsh artillen; It 'kould have heen npcec;sar.;. to cd.ll on Gf>rrnan hpavy artillery for rountprhatt€ ' r:y, hut thIS Wd.S far away and It was necet>t>ary for the column of tankt> to progress rapid!> Th€' IOf'al ('ommd.nder, mformt'd of til€' sltuatwn. wnt fur hplp from an aerial ~quJ.dron of "Fi€'seler St,)rch" d.lrplancs \\11I("h had heen USE'd m Spam to test thplr [lprfurmalH'f' The "'Itladron 'lplpf'ted a !J,fldlllg fif'ld ('losp to thp combat arra dnd 1n.1 fp\\ hnm", with the> Iwlp lJf ,t lr.Ul"I'"rt <..qu,lliron, had ~upphed It \Hth suffi,IPnt g'I~UIIll(>, IHJmhl- dl1d munltllln,. TIlf' <;quadron proc€'edpd then a<, fl)llows III exa("tl~ "lxtPPil mll1ute<; tht' mrplanf>S reached the corollat ZOIlf', drollJ'f'd tht IT homhs J.nd rf'tl!rned for mOff' TIllS md.neuvpr '''as fa(,lhLttf'd h~ radlu ('()mmllilicatllm bet\';f'<-'n lin' assault tWUp'i\, the d.vmtion and the nmml,\ndf'f The squddrun,hhpd 111 t\\O 'flights, the fir::.t droPi'iIIg bomL~, ,,,}ulp thesecund, !l';'lI1g at low d.ltItudl;', firpd lIs mach me gun!" U1to thE' wood>; AftN the first attar!, \"lth I IO-pound !tomb\-' thpfurel>t l~('an1P ob<,Prvahle .md It \\0<1.9 P08S1bll' to loeatp the Pnh"h ud.tteflP» In thp sPl'und flight, more bombb "~re dropj.Jed ,md tlH' mJ.ciHnt'-gunnmg planes t!pw ,lt 50-foot altitude. The set'rpt the forest prutp~,t('d Wdf then dl'i\('(wered four batterIes of hpavy arUllery emered a bngaJe of ('.lvalry whICh 'kW" l!i\OU,lnng III the ,,"oods The homb f'Xplcl'llOnS had dp"tro~f'd trpp-.. turnpd ovpr gun", hit horses and cannoneer~. The pldllf'S "'Ith rn.l<,h!lw gun~, ,dnrh kept t"ontlllUd.Jiv returnlllg, anmhJlated the rest All hour I.ltpr all Ilj,spnatlnn pldnp tuo\<. a photograph of thp part of thp woods that had bpt'll .lttMk\:'d Tlw four llilttf'nt-"s h.tu ht'en reduced to siIencp, till;' ('fP\\'" had ('f'ured ,md tln' route \hlS Opl'll AlmO'lt all the aJr!Jlanes had bcen lut, f-.Omp U\ldton, hud bren \\ound!-'ri. hut the motors hud nnt lwen damagpd 17 October 1939 THE MILlT.l,.U\ SITl.\TlON Of HI)LJ.A'\'t>

!La SltLlatl!m mdltalre dp 1.1 Holland,.. I

The ·'Bund" I Bprnf" of 3 Octolwr pubhshpd a ('ommUllJ{'.utlOn from Amsterdam of the E'nd of SE'ptPmilPT un t11e rE'markable military effort acC'om­ phsht'd by Holland • More and more, statps thl<; ('ommulllc<J.tIon, the Dutch frdr for the,lr ('ountry, despite the stnctpst nputrahty thpy are ablp to a!'.sure, and WIll df>em themsplvps fortunate If they are not mvulwd III the ('onfhct, pspe(,lally on a(·count of the blof'h.ade and the lll('ldentf> urought auout h~ aviation. Thus It IS not astolllshmg that Holland ha" made ever.;. effort to defend hersplf In case neutrahty fd.lls ThiS people of ::.PWIl mllhon hJ.s mobilized 650,000 men, at a ('ust of 15 mllhon r:orm~ and tlw uP\<.t>f'Jl of thIS army amount'S today tu tv.o mllhon florins a dd.j. . Without any dvuht the Dutch can assure a portIOn of thelr defense, thanks to theIr geographIC sltuatwn, for thp)' ('an mundatp (,prtam parts of the country and thus make it Impossihlp fur thp adversary to f'mploy hiS tanks and hpavy artIllery: hut the ('ountry has not omitted, In rf'Cf>nt years, to take measures for its deff'nse.

!Travall en commun eutrp


The correspondt'nt of ··Pol1olo d'Italm" ,,,,11h the Gl'rm,tn


November-December 1939 FIRE POWER MA.N POWER fiIANEt'\ER. Major General Lynch LITTLE PHIL. Part II. Fh-'tcheI' Pratt THE NE\\' DIVISION Lll'ut Colont'l Ingles SlJPPLY IN THE NEW REGIMENT Ll('ut Colonel LtVE'<;d.Y THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND. LIE>Ut. Colonel von Wedpl IRON AND STFEL. Dr. Fntz StE'rnberg JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE




en ILIAN CONTROL, T. Harry WI1ham..,


AMERICAN MILITARY DRL5S IN Tim 'VAR OF 1<:)12. Hugh C M ('Barron


I: Introdu(·tlOn.



(Grl'dt Brltmn)

November 1939 AeSTRALlA'S DEFENCES




26 August 1939 OVERCOMING WATER OBSTACLES IN DAYTIME. IPreodolrnyt' vodnoy pregrady dnyom.] Colonel KoIesnikov In additIon to the u::.ual elementary prmciple::. of preparmg a regIment for crossmg a water obstacle, the author pOints out the necessity of rccon· nais:.anct>. conducted pt>TSonally by thp reglmental commander. ThiS n~oon·

~~:~~:: ~f h~S r:~~~~IE'aad:r~f~V~~h: ~::i~~~~U;~o:~I~~:~~~l a~d~:cl~~

detachments. The conference should take place at some conwnient vantage pOint, whenep the enemy front hne of resIstance IS VIsible.



Vol. XX


No: 76

Catplog of Selected Periodical Articles 23 Sept~mber 1939


ISovmestmye deystvya konmtsy I tankov.! Brigade Commander Nlkltin Not infrequently situations arise In action when close cooperatlO~ be­ twet'n tanks and horse cavalry IS mdlspe-nsable. During recent years tht>r~ WE're several examples illustratIng thiS pomt. On 29 October 1936. tank units of Spamsh Republican forces advanced, and after passmg the hne of Insurgent trenches at Se:;,ena, reached a pomt some 6 to 7 miles in the enemy rear and dispersed a battahon and a half of msurgent mfantry. No prisoners WE're captured, however, and thE' tanks ""ere compl'lled to return to their own hnes \Vlthout retammg the terntory thus captured. AnotbE'r example. On 18 N'ovE'mbpr 1931. the Japanese 2d Infantry DIVISIOn was advancing on T"ltSlkar. The Chmese 54th Cavalry cleverly turned the Japanese flank and penetratt'd mto the rear of the Japanese dIVISIon The Chmpse movt'Illents, howf'\ er, procf'f'ded too slowly due to con~tant reSistance, weak though It was, from the rear plements of the JapanE'"e. Thus, thp surprise ft'aturp of the ChmE:''5e manE:'l:lvE:'r was rpndpred meffpctlvP, and the Japanpst> command gamed suffi.rlent time to make good uSP of Itb last reserve - aViatIOn, which sa.ved thp SituatIOn. In eal'h ca!';E' results rould hav~ beE:'n \'Pry much dlffE:'rpnt had cooppratlOn between horsl' cavalry and tank" ilPf"n orgamzed




llnzhC~~!~ae~bf{~rbc~:h:: nastupatelnoy o~peJ:atsn.l


IMasklrovkaIQgnpv)"kh PUZltSI,} artilleni I Major Badanm Elf'mentary prinrlples of camouflage, and partlrularly the use of natural mE"ans trf'e,>, brancne$" hushes, etc. 1 are dlscusspd rn thil'l artlrlE"


IPrpodoll'nye avangardnym batalyonom polosy tnzhE'nf'rno-khlmi­ I'heskikh zagrazhdpmy I Major FmltsklY All l'xpo<,e of commonly known prmclples of antlgas dpfensf' m combat 12 September 1939 PLANNI~G FIRE FOR



:Plamrovanyt> ognyu arttlh'rlysiwy gruppy podderzhkl pE'khoty.) Colonel L!'bedf'v theories on thr SUbjl'Ct Sl'em to be wpll Illustrated III the following flxamplt·, quoted by the author. Fmng IS being plannf'd agamst groups of targets. The artillery prepara­ tIOn IS to last 3 hours The arttlll'ry battallOn Con~l\lts of two 76-mm bat­ teries, and one 122-mm battpry. Thp average expenditure for one hectare: 300 round~ of 76-mm "hf'U", 200 round" of 122·mm shells. The posslbihtle<; arp calculatpd thus

27 Septem bel" 1939

THE~EAR OF A TANK BATTALION ITyl tankovo1lP Imt,liyona 1 Major Shchegorev In order to plan propPTly the work of the rflar urea of a tank battalion it is necessary . (1: To establISh ti1w exact quantity of ammulIltlOn and fuel, and the

orde~20: Tglfoc::~~;, {~r'h~ro~:,o:~'l~~ df'Slgnate thp order of thf'lr transft'r

during combat • (3) To orgallize renalr and evacuatIOn serVIce durmg combat.

{4 \ To orgalllze mif'dlCal help and (lVu{'uatlOn of casualtIes

(5) To deSignate n'l~thods of command of the rear area, the organizatIOn of observation, liaIson $ond supply.



H.120t90+90) - -

- _. -

=H hf'ctarpo;





""'- 4 4 hf'ctarp,> ~oo

Total area of 12.4 hletarel' Will thus bE' covprpd. 14 September 1939 Pt:'I~SL'lT


rbtrpbite-h V bo,}u.1 Captam Semyonov

In r!'('ent \vurs pur~mt a\lation ha;; Let'n ba::.pd rno::.t frequently III the 11Clr.lty 01 largp mdustnal amI commUnlCatlOn {,pnter::., and III the direction of actIO]] nf own land for{'es and bombmg alreraft. Thf' ei'fpctivenpss of pur::'U1t l r,lft ul'pend." m a gfl·at ml'a:-.urp upon thl' distanC'e bf'twt:'t:'n its bast:' and th, front Basl'''' arc ::'l'l, ctl'd upon the- prmciple that pursUit craft must not be lIthN late or premature m takmg off for ('ombat, When con('('n­ trated for df'fen.,G of mdustrml eputers, pursUit craft should be- baspd 6 to l/S mlllOi:> trom the lattl'r, f'nabUng It to cover thE' distance in 3 to 8 mmutes. to gam prnp...r altttude and f'ngage thE' enemy On the othpr hand, bases for purSUit craft which are deSignated for pro­ t~Cflon oj operatIOns of the land forcps must take mto account not only the pnnclph- of bemg ablE' to rparh th" front hne m .,hortE'st tlml:' pOSSIble, but abo to L,· placed bE"yond the range of enemy artillery fire. DIstance of 5.5 tc b mil",> lwhmd the front hne should protect purSUit craft from such fire.


!Poddf'rzhka tankov ognyom pekhotY.1 Captain KolomeytsE'V

Bf'c"tuse antitank guns are usually so placed as to render them fairly ImmUnE' to fire, the author recommends the use of own antitank guns against

l~:~~es~~;~nr~i~~t~;;,i~~et~~~~;~~e~~r ~~f\!n~:~~r~ff:~~v~s~~~l~:~r:~~ ~nemy

antitank guns at medIUm distances (800 to 1,200 yards). The applications of the machme gun, mme thrower, rifle grenade, hand grenade, ,md the bayonet, in joint a{'tion with tanks, are also discussed.


During the period.!of combat mside of the defenSive zone, mfantry and tanks nE'pd artillpry sU port It will be necessary to ('feet passages for the artillery through 0 • Tracks for artillery columns will be needed, when changIng pOSition same tracks will he used by the advancing forces for commUlllcatlOn he rear Although tanks will advance en masse, passages will have to r made through antitank and natural oLstucles. For artillery and other veh~clE'8 one ('olumn track wIiI be required tor E'ach 1 to 2 kIlometers of the brr\lkthrough. One l'ompany of 'PIOneers WIth mechamzed eqUlpment for each column track {at the tE'.mpo of luymg 1 kIlometer of track per hour'. Altogether, six. COmpaUlf'S of pIOneers Will be npeded m the area of advance. PIOneers are detailE:'d by Ule {'orps'l~nd engineering units by the arm~.

11 October 1939


!Boy V naselYOl1nom punktye I LlE'utenant KurLatov

On the baSIS of pe~sonal observatIOns made durmg a rE,'cent two-day engagement bfltWE'fin the SOVIPt and Pohsh forces'for the possessIOn of the city of Grodno, uttlmat€>ly captured by thp Red Army, the author draws the followmg conclusIOns


ulation, etr. Before luunchmg attack, the commanders. of respectIve Ullits arf> to le aSSIgned miSSIOns of a sttll'tly hmIh·d cH'OPf', such as clearmg of a strf'et, or the capturf' of a dE'slgnatl'd bulIdmg Captured plates must be wt'll pro­ • tected, or at least patrolled. The commander of e"-'flry unit must have a plan of the whole City, and JUllior offirf'rs should have un outline of the stref't~ where their Untt IS m actIOn. ' Upon pntermg the elty the unit commander should send out a rE"con­ nalssanre purty WhICh gael> over the streets, placmg douhle sentrIe,> at cross­ mgs The sentries remdln. at their posts untli the advance of the entire unit, to pre'\lent the enpmyfrom attackmg the columr. from the flank or rflar When prevented from ad\ancmg through ,}ards and gardens, as required by the SOVIet FIeld RpgulatlOns, jnfantry should proeeed not In the middle of the ~tI'f'pt. but along SIdewalks, observmg wmdows on the oPPosite Side. If fire IS opened from wmdows or roofs on one Side, the group advancmg on the opposite SIde of the street replies with portablt' machine-gun fire, while the sel'ond group qUickly ~nters the bmlding and hqUldates the enemy. Tanks never should be spparated from mfantry Handleapped by hm­ ited VISibility th@ tanks runnot alWayS notl1'f' the source of f'nemy fire, especially from upper stotles or buIldmgl'l, attics and roofs. Experience shows that mfantry will II\dlcate to tanks the majority of targets. Also. WIthout mfantry support tanks can easIly fall mto traps, while the infantry deprived of tanks suffern m').necessarily large casualtIes RegImental and antltauk artIllery should move along city streets either through motor-drawn means, Dr pullt'd by hand power In conditIOns of strppt combat, horse-drawn )'nean'> are not practica.ble, because they preclude speed m deplo~ mg Firmg: posltlons should be selected at crossmgs, III gardens and parks, which a!fi'ords wider scope of horizontal fire. , 22 October 1939 THE MAGINOT Lnm AND THE SIEGFRIED POSITION.

JLinya Mazhmo I Pbzitsya Zigfrlda.1 DIViSIOn Commander Karby­ s~ev : DisCUSSIOn of thE" comm:only known features of the t'Yo hnes of fortIfi­ j cations :28 October 1939 ANTITANK DEFENSE! IN THE GERMAN ARMY.

[Protlvotankovaya Oborona V Germanskoy ArmiL] Press Digest T~e antitank defense in lthe German army IS very carefp.lly organized.

For thIS purpose 37-mm


guns are used exclusively. The shells





.'Catrilog of. Selected Periodical Articles

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

pierre armor 3:3-O'Im 10 thickness at a distance 01 600 J'ards. The guns are moved by six-wheel C'aterpillar vehwles Before the war the Germans have experImented With a hght t)pe of 12-mm antItank gun. The Gf'rman mfantry regIment has an anhtank ('ompany WIth twelve 37-mm guns. Besides this, the mfantry diviSIOn has a motorized battalion of 36 guns of till? S<1ll'lf' ('uhLer Thus, thf' Gf'rman mfantry dIvision has a total ot 72 antitank guns


lKriegswirtschaft.! Major Oswald

One of the most valuablt:> concepts of modern tImps is war economIcs At the outbreak of hostilitips the combatants entpred the World War \\lth practically no organizat,lOn for the produ('tlon of war material. Later on plans for industrial mobIlization were developed. and today everything 1.'" so "'ell regulatf'd that every man, woman and child IS famHia.r with the part each must play 111 war.


November 1939

IDeI' Konflikt in Ostasien.] Major General v.Lerch

Thi" i<; a continuation of a series of articles on the Sino-Japanese conflICt. ThiS instaimpnt covers thp period 10 May to 15 July 1939. The April olTf'nSlVe conducted by Chiang Kai-sbek against Hankow proved unsU('­ cf'ssful. The Japanese countl;'rpd in May northwest of Hankow, a movement which led to a battle on the Han river Twenty-six Chinese divisions were Mlt..lTARWISSENSCHAfTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN I Au-.tri.11 engagpd and they lost heaVIly. FollOWIng this battle, whICh proved to he Ih 1\1 A.JoR \\':-'J H SPEWEL, Infantr,} one of the mo<;t dpClsive of the war. the Japane'>e occupied thl' ports of Swa­ tow, Fooehow and Wencho\\,. Thl'u came the IsolatIOn of the Britl<;h and JUly 1939 JOrpneh conce:..slons m TIPntRm .md ('iaRhes With the Russians along the ''\lanchunan border. !\IIlITAR\ Al Ll,\NtE \G\IXSTENClktLL\ll<.NT September 1939 :\llht.lrhundnIS gpgl n Emkrt'l~ung i I\.L1Jor Gem'r<ll PascilPk In thIS rp\'lpw of thp mlhtJ.f.) and po:1tI('J.1 <;It'l('1tlOll for thE-' sec-ond quar­ THE GE.RMAN·H.t:;;;;IAN NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT ter uf 1939. GC'lleral PJ. ...CLl·k IJrP!:.l'nts it dp\,criptlull uf lhp BrItish pohc,} of : Dpuu,ch-Ru<.,Slsf'!1Pr Nichtangnfts\,ertrag ,1m Voralwnd 4kr gr"~'Pll Ent>1<'iw](lung 1 I\.Iajnr Gcnl'ml Pa'l{'h, k ell(·lrdemltnt ag"dlll:q till' CI IItr,\! I'oV>oI'rs Stre".., h !.ud Ull till' ("ollntprstrohe'" Ilsf'd to tlm.ut th' I'nl IfI Il'mPllt, l-'artICuJdrly OIl till" Of'f'lIpatlOll of Alb.lnl" Tht-' final days In Augu.-.t c.lrry till-' ht-avy burrlpn of fate; It IS tho PH 1ly Ital~ IIf tht' grl'at dpClslon \\ IwtllPr \\ p shalllmvp ppa('f' or \\-ar. The non-aggr!,~siOll agrt'l'mpnt of 23 August WIth RU<;''';lllls G(>rman~ '91.ltl'<,t suc{'ess and pprhap~ th(' "trongt'st world·pohtlcall'\pnt since 1919. It ha,> brokl'n tllP t.'nnrcle­ TEOINOLot.\ ANV THE \IIlITHO fORI F'-.

mf'nt m the F.ast ITechmh UIHl Wehrmacht 1 Ck'neral \I Eimannsbprger

Till' artlcle lead<; up to thp stormy dn£'lopmpnt lllvolvmg DanZIg and In thE' past tlte dttltudE' of til{' Gp;rnan ilrm~ r;gainst tecllmca! m,lttE'rS the Poh<;h Corndor Can ppucp bp J'Xppdl'd in thp final hour') Poland has .laE. been lacking ill ::lpprE'nation. tlH.' apphrutlOn of technical SCience was a undpftahen thf' ('omplP1e mobilizatIOn of 1l1'r .lrmv. ('unc('ntratiom, haw matter llf work<;hop ('on!:-.ldl'ratlOn Thp ....rmy dId not takp r£'adlly to mnu­ alrt'ady hpgun She IS m a positIOn from \\ hl('h. pl'rhap,>, she can no !ungrf vatlOns. It took the Au~tro·PrussIiUl \\ ar to ('on"tn('p thp PruSSlUl1S that thp \vlthdra". In France th£> \\ ar matprmi mdustrlp-. hav£> bl'pn opPTatlng under nepdle gun \va~ to be regardpd a<:, a "alliahle \Wap<Hl In HIG7 OJ!' F'rpnch mlhtary f,Uper\l'3lOn for thn-'I;' ypar<; F.ngland, a~ "lIP 111(1 twpnt\'·fiVf' ;y!,;ll"< mtrodut'pd the RE'fi.'rp mltra!llf'u::.t> ""hle-h tf,e~ uo;;ed m thp Fr:lll('ll-PrUbl:llall ago, ,lgaJil {'ontrol.; tlIP dp(,lrlmg votl' War. Thf' emplu:.m('nt of thIS WPdIHlfi Hl hattf'fJes as thl)Ug'h It were a Plf'(,P of artlllPry pro\pd to he unsound tactlcall~ {'on<;P'Iuellt!v the devf'lopment of the mJ.('hin(> glln w,w, rPt,lrdl'd until thl' \\'urlJ War CHANCE. ESTIMATION AND Lt't K IN THE E\ENT5 OF WAR. IZufall, BPTP('hllung und Gluck 1m krlPgt>rlschpn Gp'5chE'hpn.] lolo· npi v \\~Ittl('h LES"'u,,",:> of TIll: ~I'ANI~H W ,\~

Thl~ .1rudt' Jf, a jl-'ngthy dlssprtatlOn on tllP SUbJl<Ct whethpf dl.1ll('e or DIP Lp\1Wll aus dem Spalllsehell Krwg; \Ll.jor tll'lwral v Lerch

upportumty l<j a prplimmary form of fatf'. ~l.lUY il1<,toflcal illu",tratlOn<, and Tlw artlrlf' ('\ln~ll>tR uf .dJ<,trart~ from a book pntItll;'d "Lps !r'!:uns de la qU{)tatlrm-. art-' prp5l'ntl'd for thp rpadpr to dr,l\\ In., O\\n ('oncJut:.lOm" TIIP guerre tl'!:sf,agne," b~ General Du\al,.11l f'~l' \\ltn('h<' to the OI'enltiono;; In '-< the farmN, mu.;;t dt'pf'nd to d grl'at pxtJ"nt on tht-' condltlOn~ of Spam up to Ortobf'r 19:3~. at whh'h um€ ' lw \\<.\,., al>lt' to predi<'t the final 1\,..ltfWr and tl-'rram Till..,'" art' mflunl.('J'''> that mu-.t Ll" rl'ctonl'rl \Hl!l N.ltionaht:.t \Ictor;y. in a ('nd \hlT thl' upposmg l,artle~ ,lIt' Hllprf'parl'd .l.t thE' outbrl'J.h Ilf ho~tlIJtlt's. ';!ld hlr tiMt rPa"un til{> le..".,OllS> til I,t-' lrarll('d from a war of that I.:hantcter an: Ilf let:.", Yulue than thow t" 1,(' If'.trllf'd from <I "".-t,r :\tII 1l'4RI5'1 A:-TO NATIONAL SOnALlSi\!.

betw('E'Tl t"-o leglt1l11ntl:' j>UllI'en, T!le Lo~.tlJsts h.lJ no f'l\.j>tT!£'Il(,pd offi('t'r~ :Soldat,'ntum und ;.JatlOna].,oZI.l!t.,mu,! Colonpj POpp,LUf'r

and .>,eft' u!thged to pl1r'>U(llhc '>',lr WIth 11ulitlnans Hodlf',. of troup... who Thfl author tlf'fint>'\ thl' Germd.n {'oncppt of m!htarl~m ,md outltnp~ ~t, offered t !wlr S(-'f\ I\'P'> WHt' Jl"'.J.rml'd and the otfit f'rfo t:.hut Th(> "J.liuro. \>, ho .Ii'\ llopml-nt from ib. p.lrht"r con('l'ptJ!m., to its pr";'l'nt pl~cl' of htJIHir A revoltPL and jomed the LO~'a!l<;t ('ausp mUrdf'TPd theIr ofhrE'r'.> In contrast. ]u<.,tlfic.ltlon for Gl-'rman NJ.tlOnal SO{,lUho;m 1;, pr(,,,l'ntl'd wlth .1 rl'],t!hl'1 of the r-.;,\Uunah"t" J,.ld C''],l.l'J1c€'u oftlter.. <Inti ('ou!d deppnd on tlw lo~alt) thl" pll11tl('al doetrmp to tIll' milltarv (,har,ll'tl'r of the nat!OJl.. .\l,d rpllahlht:. of t}(f' ~I<lro\(,Jn truo!,;, CflrNTERBATTERY I}, A LANlJlNG OPFI~ATION Lleutt'nant Hendero;;on SO)lE OF THE CAl SES OF ANnE-NT A.ND MODERN \\ ARS ~NlI SfnlE OF THE HEAsoNS rnH. THF'lR nUT,O\l£: l\lu]l)r GpnN.J.i LpjC'ul1P

TUE PltvLlL'CTlu;-'"



\ND ~TF.n,





\l1! JT\ID. FUIU.b,":'

,Th-r r~~$inUK~eh:.1h!prZ~ugUng, un{' Grund!age dpr \\'f'hrmarht


Th~ pflntlpa! }l~M?t to thp IIllllt.HY ~trPHgth uf d ll.J.tlOn 1~ hf'r pruductltm of mm and stppl. Dunng a protnt('ted W,lr, till'> prouuctlOn mut:.t.. lIe m.ull­ t,uned to the utmost. In tillS \al',1l1t~ r:ngland ha-\ madp '>uch httll' progress durmg l;e'.. eral th-'CJ,de,> that ,,111-' \\:1"; iorrpd ffl)m th(> forp~roul1d uf Iron and ~tf'el PnldUctlO1l and final!~ 5Hfpa::-<.,l'u hy Germall) llegmnmg m 1932 she shot ahead, hut ""l~ 1lC\£'r .J.bJ(> tu rbtch the ("lpa,nty of productIOn Willdl had been e~t.J.\)hs)1t'u oy GE'rrn,w~. In 193<.1, thl' Engh:-.h output 5uiIerE'd a. re('PcsslOo. whIle 111 Gprmany It (,Dill loued til rJ<;e untJilt ",urpa~<;pd that of thE' Gllltpd Stall'''' TIll' Ilfl?UPdtllln of Au<,tna .1nd Czpcho",lovakHl. .1dded to Germany'& ('apaClty for the productIon of lron .l.lld p,tf'd. 3::' \"ell as h<>r acql1lSltlO1l of 11PW sourcps of Iron ore



!Marltlme....f roLlpmp tm Osibef>raum I -\dmlraJ Gladl<,dl This artlclp, a('mmpanlpd l.Jy thTP,. !:>h,tchl''>. btrt'~'>t':;' the value of thl;' Raltlc Sea to Gprmany Throughout tltl> World Wtlr Gprmtlny \va", tlb!t" to retain rommand of tins g"a IhlP to trw importJtlon of ra\\ mat!?fial" and Iron are fTom f\\vcdpn the B,lltlC IS of particular valup to Gl'rmany. It IS also of Vital ImportancL' to Scandma\ IJ. and the Baluc StateR. RUsSJa IS self-supporting w1thout ht'r Bnltlc tradp. In tht' e"H'nt of a war With Ger­ many she would bl-' hkply to rt'sort to thl' uS!i'of submar1ll8'" III ordpr to dISrupt German commumeatlOn<:, In a rpstri('tpd ",ea. lIke the Baltic. It would bf' difficult to offset tht' eift'cts of ~mbmanne \\arfare by resortmg to the convoy system. Lltt1p IS knO\\-n as to what efIf'<>t might be expected from aV1.J.tioD. It IS bellPved. howevf'r, that It WIll tend to dpcrpase til£' vaiup of the KIPI Canal.


MILITARW1SSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU (G"]'m.t1.\ 1 B"I: ('\I'nir-. H l> KEflM, FH'ld Af\\lj,.r~ January 1939 ("OOPERATIO~


!Dae, Zusammf'nt>'lrl,pn gPtrl'nntr>r Hpp.r(lstPllf> 1 (I) LII'ut (;pnrral Erfurth TillS article a~8uml'" that tht' ,'gy of Napoleon "as l'::.c, p ntl.1l!j that of gpttmg on mtprlor hnC':, and asspmbhng hIS fOfcc<:f prlOr to the' b.ltth\ so that Ill' ('ould bp <,urp of ma,"smg hi'! pO\\E'r at till' deCI";lV(' powt. ;"lo!the.on the othpr hand. mOY(Jd spparatl'd forces from dlvorsf' dlr,'ctlOrtS. unitltlg them on tlw battlefield WIth 0\ t>r\\helmmg po\\er \Dot np(,pssanly numbpr"l. The current mfotallment ('owrs the period from Frecll'rick the Great throttgh tbp BattlP of Lplpzig Had It not bl'en for the If'thargy of thl' \Ictorl'>. r.; Jpojl'On would havP sufIerptl the fatE' of the Romans at Canna!'. Aft!?'r LelpZ-lg, mlhtary ~tratt'gl!>ts should have apprp{,latpd the l-chpmp of ('onVl-'rgwg [om", on the batt1pfield. ON THE NATl'RE or THE SOLDIERLY SPIRIT.

IVom W{'spn dps Soldatentums] Major General von SodplJ"tprn

Thl' national character can be greatly strengthf'nf'd and improvpd b} proppr trnimng nnd 1padprshlp In the ml)ltary for\~pg Thf'rB is no place w" Nattonal SO(,lahst Gprmany for a corps of officers whJ(h confines It~ trairung solrly to the USE' of weapons.

rri':dE;;'O~~~rMMR;r~~~bewpgungen mit IlllfE'des Motors,l In general, troop movements by motor should be handled somethilledg hke movements by raIl, the equipmpnt bemg assembled. routed. {'ontroll


Catall)g of Selected Periodical Articles I I.

and operated by othel'S than the commanders of t)11:' troops being transported In order to do this efficiently there should be- an organiz:ation of slO'verai ('chpj(1us, some of them bemg m control of arf;'8.& WhICh correspond to poiltlC'al subdl\'isions of the country. In time of war these dIstrict commanders would havp charge of the routing and control of all motor traffic through the-ir arpa In time of peace only the higher echelons would exist: their chief fun<'lion would be in planning an effective system to be put into operation promptly on M-day. It IS also contemplated that plans be- made for organ­ !zmg umts capable of taking ovpr areas in hostile territory and Instalhng ~y<;h·ms similar to the Oll('s outlined above-. The aIr threat IS the greatest menace to marching columns, but It it, rl'dul'"d by the spe-ed of motor £>qUIpment. It IS bphevE'd that marrhmg at I'xtP11,If'd mtE>rvals is thp most WIdely aC(,E'pted method of guardmg agam!'lt the d,Lnger of ho!>ttle air at~ack and is almost certam of preventmg ho.,tIle Ob);l'n atwo of columns at mght Till' chief aSSE't of the speed of motor mOVf'ffients 11\-'''l m tht' fact that the Irngth of timE' on thE> roads IS rpdu('(>d Dndpr Europf'an ('ondltIOns "lpped \:'\ wrof,lary; great dIstances would take the column out of the combat area, If nut I rtlrely out of Europe. ATTACK [N THE ITALIAN ARMY.

IDe>r AngrlfI im ItaheOischpn Ht'pr.! Infantry diVISiOn carrlf'S out a serw':> of attach" m the zonp of actIOn of the corps. Its orgamzatIOn IS espeCIally sUltE>d for the offensE' Since the dn:""n has no mfantry rp"lerVes available, It IS not 10 a pOSitIOn to E'xplolt M, SUl'rt".,<;e" Ex.plOltatlOn I" a corp':> functlOn Ordinarily thE' corp", attackR wlth \\\0 dnl<;lons In Imp on a front of about 2,200 yard::. each, and thE' third m n~' n t' ThE' lattf'r IS u5t,d a'i a maneuvenng forcf' for thp corps. [m h diVISIOn pmploy<., Its anill(>ry in dm·et support of the infantry for .,p,·rIaI artllfpry mI<.,.'-\lOns In thE' zonr" of thf' diVISIOn.:;, addItIOnal bat­ talum.., al'l' made aVaIlable. Long-range ml':>Stons and countprbattery arE' <,xpcut. d by the corp~ o.rtiUt>ry undf'r command of the corpf' artillpry com­ mandt'r An attack begIn'> WIth an approach toward the pnemy The attacking troop,. mo'\p In many column:, pmploymg as many roads as poc;sIble ThE' appruJ.(h march develops mto contart With the enpmy, which is the task of 'l'conn.ll"san('E' df>tarhm!:'nts (ca'\'alr;y, cychi:>u, or mechamz(>d forces) attachf'd to rorp., and of mfantry reconnalssancf' detachments gent fonl;ard from the dl\1'»u'l-' dS_ tht> c]rcum...tancps rpqmre The Illfantry rf'COnnaIssance df'tach­ mt'r,t, (lln"lst essentIally of a reinforced battalion If armorpd vehiclp5 arp ava lah!" to th", dlvl':>lon, a company of lIght tank", or a portion thpreof, IS grnc'rallv attaclwd to thp battalion AftE'r contact Is gampd and mformatlOn bpcom,'~ a\'atiable, ad\ance rif'ments are rl'qulrf'd to take obJectivl's \l;luch 11111 f,,(Jlitate the attack of the bulk of thl' dlvl5IOn iatpr on. ,... rt .'1' the advanct' pl(>m(>nt~ haw driven back thp ho:=;tllf' outpost" and TIlt'

~~:~~ ;,~lt~t>hl:~::~abl;T~~'a~~I;Ph~h~o~~~~;t~o~hl;f ~~s~~bf~P~r'p~~Pl~d~~~I~~ 1~t'lJ

01, fln.,d In the 1tallan as in the German army. The Itahan tf'rm If "Imp p,lrturf''' PrpparatlOllS for the attack are made as qUickly a<; po,>,nblp th,1t 1 he enpmy may haH' th(' It'a'>t posslblp time to prpparp hi'> defpm,p • It.than "Ie\\~ on thp atta('k com{,lde v.ith tho5€' of th", German FrE'­ \!uC'1tl! thp Itahan dlvi-;ion,,> attack in columns on account of themountainou5 1'IJarart 'r of th£' Italian tprram The attarkmg forN> IS a5S\gned a Im(> of d,'paitlln" a boundar) \\Ith Its neIghbor, ntermedmte obJectives, a b.tttil rOjt'rt " and an E'ventual objectlvf'. Thp lattpt 1'3 to be rf'achpd If clrcum­ 'tant'(" permIt. PrOH'non IS made for J. mobIlf' command post in h05tlk nrl-\l~ " Ill'n a pl'nf'tratlOn hd." b!,pn eft'ectpd E\i,austpd Ulllt& ar!.' to bp rpht',\pd promptly. 1,'\\-0 schools of thought on :In~ ~Ul.l'\('t prpvail. Accordlllg 10 onp thE' rellPvmg unit passE'S through the O'l!' bllllg rf'hevcd. TillS can UP a('comphshed vnth succ!'ss only when thprp l' adt'."u,.te "'pace betwf't'n our troop" and tht' (>nemy. The other plan IS thp ordmuT' plan of rehd Tlwr(> h mu('h controver<,y In Itahan mlhtary htl'r­ 'H'prnmg thE' firqt-nampd srht'mE' Many bE'hE'vp thE' plan dangE'rou-, t Ion and that It sf'ldom can bp accomphshed WIthout IOvolvmg the troop~ In an unplanned fight undpr unfa\'orablf' Clr('umstancps ('orps exploits thE" suc('ess of a brf'akthrough by one of Its front-hne dl\~~I01'" II:,. employmg th@ ('orrs rpSE'ne and hlghty mohll!? troops IBE'r­ sag,l!'r1 , I.u\alry and hght tanks" PurSUit IS the functIOn of highly mobile tlf iii ,0


The organIZation of sl~nal commumcatlOns, the repair of roads, traffic regulations, ammunition sUlP.lY, etc., are accorded. special attention. Italian leadershIp 10 thIs field, whi h they ('.all "loglstica," IS mastprftJl. The dIffi­ culties which they O\iercam 10 Lybia and EthiOPIa have j;lven them exten­ 1 sive experlPnce. Tanks may be asslgnedl to particular umts or they may be employed in mass (tank bTigades) to effeh a breakthrough. Ordmarify the tank bTigade is emploYE'd in cooperatIOn WIth other large units It has no, separate mIs­ sion., After the proposed re'brganizatlon of tank brigades into tank divisions

theirB~:~~~sofiih~eI~:~~~1~~mpf'rament and the peculiar pOSItIOn of the ~~l;t{?:;o~~h It~~i~~t:~k.y -Ph~ed:fe~~~~ ~sdce~:!ild~r~d l~~t~~ ~~~e~ie~~i~~~ must be forsaken for the offtSlve whenel,-er possiblf' counterattacks are a part 0 defenSIve fightmg bf'Ing their form, thE' strength of , he for('es employed and objectIves The counteroffenSIVP should tprmmat€' the fresh attacks March 1939·

('ounwrofi'enslve and' dIfferentiated oply 10 m the deSIgnation of defensE' and introdu('f'

TIRPIT7, \'ICf> AdnUral v.Trotha ThE' author traces the c{lree-r of the G-f>rman Admiral from hIS buth


1849 through hiS retirement ftom a('tlVeSf'rVI('e 10 1916 to hIS death 10 1930.

Tlrpltz E'ntE'rrd the nav:,.~ 10 1865, at a,tIme when Pruqgia was Just commg to the reahzation that to bp('ome a wor~d ower she must be strong on the '3ea Before he was 30 YE'ar'> old, TIl'J.H z was placed In chargf' of torpedo hoat development, a proJE'ct which he Ie ntrolled for I:! years. It was during this duty that he pursued hl$ studies f sea strate/iS" and of the relations of sea powpr to national df'velopment ~ After thiS tour of duty hi,> was pIa ed III command of a crUiRer squadron m the Far East LeadUlg the first i'mp tant md.lllfestaUons of German sea pow!:'r m ASIa, hp was largelty in!;.trumpntal 10 the acqUiSItion of Tsmgtao by Germany. I ~ In 1897 he was named s~cretary of stute or tpe navy to repla('e a man who was unable to secure RpH"l)stagapproval of rograms for naval expallS1on. Like von Moltkf', TlrpItZ- appear,> to havE" ef'n possessed of an mtense patriotism, a consummg faith ,that the navy (aslMoltke conceived the army) was a great ulllf:,.mg force among GPrmanst:a d a .drl'\mg pnergy to push ;ned'ods arE' too well kno\\rn through hIS plans The f'ffertl'tenpss af \' TIrp to reqUire rf'petltlon hpre j . , AdmIral v Trotha gop<; to:som!:' length t show that German naval polley dId not brlllg on the World WM, He quotes from a speech made by Winston Churrhdl III 1934 to prove hIS pOInt The author pomts out th<),t the oPPo<;'ltion of politi('al1eaders, E'specially Bpthm.;'lOn Hollwrg, frustratptl TlrpltZ' plans to wage an aggressive war on thf'se-a and led to ~ \-acillatmg polic:,. on the use of the navy durmg the War. After hIS retIrpment, Tlrpitz hpramp tJIP head of thp "FathE'rland Party" and III March 1918 attE'mptE'd'to stimulate a "vI('tory' or death" movement. Hf' fUllf'd m thiS attempt and fQund no comfort in the new order that obtamed aftE'r Yersallle~ He died protestmg agalll&t thiS system ..lOd urglllg a return to till" <;ptrlt that made pre-wQ.r Gf>rmany a grE'at flower· SF.P~RATED PARTS VI I\~ ARM\, ,II) Lieut. Gen~ f'ral Erfurth ' ­ In thiS, the ~econd m\-t.ll\ment, till' author explain., the doctrine':> that 'Were <lcrepted nn tlllS sulqect It). the tImE' betv.een Napolf'on and von Moltke, and ('oncludps h,} pxpoundlng ,M0ltl;,e's thpory and practlCe.


IDd$ Zusammenv.u1..fn gf'trennter Hf'f'rf'stplk]

THE TIME. F ,\l 'TOR rl\j ITHE ,\TT ACK, )l:lwr (he Zf'ltrlaller \ton Angriffsgpfpchten I General SE'yer The wntf>r pomt>' nut that the tImE' eJemf'nt IS gerfel'ally ne-glected III lJf'acetlme prohlpJl1& and that there IS a gf'neraIImprp%lOn that m war every­ thing dop" and must mo\e mOrE' slo",ly than III ppacf' '


M" tmg eng,lgement'\, as rontemplatf'd III German regulatIOns, acrord­ Irg to h .1i,1O ('onrpptf>. \\Ill <,pidom o(,cur It If> thp Italian view that onp 01 the 1 ,\ \1 ho<;tilf' forcf't> marching ~oward each other Will usually halt and lakE' Ill' the defenSIVE" III order to utlhzp a grven pIece of terram, because the llcstlir IpprlOrlty lS recognized or 10 comphance with the ('ommand of hlgbt'r .I!thority Meetmg f'ngagf'ments will materialize only when two ,p('ond,,") attacks m!:'!:'t ea('h othf'r, >;uch as both SIdes attemptmg to seIze I~e sam d.sRembl) area preparatory to somE' other action. In 1 i1p attark agamst pOSItIOns the prmcIples of mass and surprIse arE' stN'5SNt The frontagE's arE' reduced I for a diviSIOn 1,600 to 2.000 yards 1 dnd dl~"nsitIOn m dppth is mcreased The attack IS to bE' wry closely ('on­ lrolll'd "rid orders must be in conSiderable detail as to the mlSsion and obJec­ tiVE' of" Ich umt. The plan of attack IS based on the results of rf'('onnalssan('c and mIlitary lUtE'lhgE'nce The- malO attack (breakthrough \ is supported by 'i'Mnd(l";' attacks designed to dect'ive and immobilize the enemj. The ap­ Ol'Qa/'h I ,the hostIle pOSitIOn follows the normal proredure untIl the assembly ~rf'a IS ,r-ached, thE' advance to the attack prbpE'r is made under cover of ~arknE'~_ or smoke. ArtIlIE'ry has the same mISSIOn as It has III the atta('k In open tE'rr,lln The orgamzation of fires and the resupply of ammumtIOn must bl'raTf'f,dh planned and f'xe('uted. They require more time than in other attarks The actual artIllery preparatIOn is of 10n~er duratIOn and may bE' '~Pport' rl hy atta('ks- of bombardment and pursult aVIation on the hostIle POSition

1Hf'~;~~!~ (~~~rH~I~~~~tl~~~A~~ ~~~~;~~~nINs!:k~I;~?~~~U~~A~ Weltknege.] d" Vice Admiral Aszmann Thb study conslde-rs the ~uestlOns why the wa~ at sea was ('onducted as It was and whether It could hay£> bppn conducted otherWISE' In thiS mstallment the wrJter ('onslders pre-war organiza.tion and ron­ eludes that It was faulty. 10 th~t thp cpntrailzatIOn of control whIch TIrpltz realized v"J.R nerf'<;sary and thought would takf' placE' III war, could not be effected ' --,


, THE PENETRATIu~ A&,APPLlED IN rHE BATTLES IN THE 'iI~AR :OE'r D~rchbru('h~angrlff, dargetan an den Kampf@n 1m


Jahre­ Lleut, ('OlullPI Soiger TIlt' ppnptratlOn of "Mong <~o<;tile pOSItIOns bpcame the most Important. ta,,1.. confrontlllg commanders ~arly m the War. The lact that penetration on a WIde front was a prerequipltf' to a suc(,essful brf'akthrough was recog­ , llIzed even bpfore the War The pomt <;eif>cted for the brpakthrough ~hould, among othrr thmgs, permit of the tactical enVf'lopm~nt of plf>mf'nt5 of the hostile forcf'. It should . be one lightly or Improperly held the s~~~~~norht~h:r~~t~~igtbnot~~I~Z~~i~. bf'CaURP any operation reqUIres 191h.J 1,1,




.. \r. <.~: , Catitlog Selected Periodical Articles



C. & G.S.S. Military Rel,iell'

Surprise IS of supreme Importance. Detailed prp('autlOns must be taken • to prE"vE"nt the discovery of concentrations of troops and supplIes at thE' point of the proposed attack Hence btvouacs and arpas must be prepared in advance, then supplies and pqqlpment must be aS~lPmbled. and finally the troops must be brought,up. . German f'xpenencp in the World War dpmon~tratpd that a hrpukthrough can be assured only after a penetratIOn of the forward o.efpnslvP hnes and a decisjVe defeat of the reserves whICh are Ill\'unahly brought up• . HIGHLY MOflILE TROOPS, THEN AND NOW.

ISchnpll& Truppen emst und Jetzt 1 General GuderIan The author traces the hIstorical devE'lopmE'nt of fast troops, With special attpntlDn to cavalry, III a study to determme \"hat history mIght mdH:ate for the futurp of our prp<;pnt hIghly mobllp UUlts Thpre an' t\~O genl'ral thporlP'" on t1w pmplnyml'nt of tanks Thf' fir~t considers them as an auxtllary to the mfantn to facilitatE' oppratlon<; of the lattpr Though nationb \\ho hold thl<' thpory do not rule out tlll'IT mdeppndpnt ('mploymf'nt. they IllcorporatP tank<. III mfantry umt" and havp fp~\ lTIde­ pE'ndpnt tanh l.lmt':l. RU::'::'la I'" the grpatp"'t exponent of thl'" theon·. hf'r tank units arl' a part of the infantry and are lTIcorporated m the dlvlslOn anri the corps. In Francr too, tanks belong to thp Illfantry, but thpy aTp GHQ umts to be allotted whpre reqUlr('d. Thpy are emplo)'\·d In closp cooppratlOn With mfan­ try. ;\lechaDlzpd units sUltablp for rp("onnal<;.<,an("e PXl"t and hru'Vy mE'cha· D12pd Untts arp prpdlctpd The second th('ory. that tank., ",hould IlP u'>!,d mdpppndpntly,ls r>mbraced

.in E~f~~~~I~~~E'd~\'~~~~~~ '~~dO~tih;~;f~l:v:r~o~h~u1d~ll;k~\ank~. bl' con­ sidl'rpri fast troop" Thp Importaurl' \\hlch thl' WP'ltPrn po\\pr~ atta('h to tank;: N pVldpncrd by the fact that till' Trt'.l.ty ()f V, rqm,lp<" forbadp thplr con.,tructlOn and u;,e by Germany " A Grrman ml'chamzpd dl\l<,lOn consi<;ts. I's,s('nnalh·, of a tank brigade. rp{'onnalssance. nih,. and motorc,)-cilst battahon<.,. artlilpry, antItank, pngi. neer, and signal detachmento,; aIr q(>n J('I', JntJalrcraft umts and <,prVICl'S Thpy arp ('ornplf'tPjy motorlztd I Thp light dlVl;,lOll"i havp a grpJ.tflT proportlon of rp('onnal%an('p and rlp{' umts and hp-ncl' a !'.mall proprrtlon of tanh ... TllPY \\"l'rp piannl'd to bf' u"'l'd hke ca\alr~ dl\lSOn", on dIstant rf'('OnnaJ~f>anel--', amI .trl' \\pak m attack PO\\PT, It dppears that mr sen ice has tahen O\l'r much of their primary miSSIOn. Motorlzed mLmtn dlvHlons are "'lrnpiv infantry dl\I1Siom III truc}.." • ' Antitank troop" should al"l) hl' mcludl'd In nur f'om,ldpratlOn Earh dh ISlOn I~ .':>uppilt'd With them. Thplr strpngth and thp mf't hod of thpir emploympnt m ('ooppratlOn \\lth ('ngmp"r'l and artJilpry mu~t br conqHh'reel III any <,urvp~ of tank tactics Tht' gpneral ('onc!u';'lOn mu">t bp that I.mll" may bp pmploypd m conjun(>­ tlOn \'vIth, and to a'lSI,"t. the lOfantry, but tht'y mu.;,t be "upported by artillpr:.'. <,Ignal troop,;, nilemen, and ,'ngllll'pr<, : motorlzed or mp('h,lDlZl'd) to E'nable th!'fi to ('arry up(l<'j\P attal'h<., [Without wmtlng on ~lo\\'('r UTIlts) depp mto the pnrmy'!,. territor) to prp\,put or hlndl'f tlw ('mplo"mpnt of hl~ re~,'rvps, Employment m mas~ anel \\lth ...urpn<;p I~ a guarantee for 'U("("-,,,



riPUt~c1l1'l1 Rmnpn\\J.<.,f>pr...tra",,,-pn 1m <,ehaft I Dr Klnnp




dl,r \"phrwlrt·



24 February 1939 PORTRJ,.,\,ING 1Hz.; :'IfODER"J GENERJ\L

II}a"" B1Jrl


modf'rnpn Ft-Idhprrn,' tIl

lil-'nerul Wl'tzplJ


Dunng thp World War, "hortly aftt'r the outbrl'ak of hostlhtl(>~, thl' ho'ltllp qJtuatlOn \\a.'3 {'lttrempi} favorablp for the German lhgh Command to haH> gampd a ';;\\lft dl'(,lslOn on thp Wt'<;trrn Front Thl' brpakwatpr cr(>atf'd by the trIangle of thp fortlhcatlOnq of 1\1pt2 Dwdl'nhufpn NIPd had spht the French armws mto t\\O wldrlv ,,>pparatpd group'" Almo'>t one-half of thf' Frrnch forch WE're t'ngaged In the invasion of Alsacp-LorraInf' wherfl thf'Y Wf>r(> oppospd by 3 strong Gf'rm311 forc€', Th(> dl'fpat and repulsion of those for('p,> agamst thp Vosgps MountalOs and tht> Gf'rman Rhine would havp IDl'ant thf' fu\filimpnt of onp-half of th(.> grpat ldp;l whIch Sehhefien had incorporated III his oppr<ltlon'> plan of 1905 Ludpudorff I'> of thp opimon that the entirp sltuatlOu on thp Wp'>tprn Front m thi.~ mannf'f could havE' bf'pn dp('ldpd III our favor at the Vf>ry out"f't of thr war. Another deCISIve blow ("ould haw bepn ...truck m thp arpa bptwepn thp Mrusp and the Mosplle. regardl(>sf> of whl'tht'r thl' Frr>o("h Il'ft flank pxtpnded bpyond the Mpuse or not, for thp vther half of the attacking French armip~ wa", bound to be In that ur<'a For a tIml' Gl'neral von Moltkl' II f.avon"d tlus plan, but he finally pprmitted IllS Ch\f'f of Opl'ratlOn':> SN·tion, \'oho eou<;idt'red the application of thE' Schlieffen Plan of paramount Importance, to ('hange hIS mind to the dptrlment of the pntire coursE' of the war. Schlil'f{en's plan, as originally


.:\lAP No.1

concPI\('d, had emanatpri from an pntlTt'ly dJlTprt'nt dl"po'>ltlOn of thpopposmg forcP'" Prior to the departurp of tbl' HIgh Command from BerlIn, 16 Augu~t 1914,* the following dlfl'ctlVe"l .,hould haw 1)('l'n l'-isuI'd, firf>t by telpphone, thf'n by tplpgram: (1) To the FIfth Army, Thp XVI anrl XIII Curp,>, VI RpsL'rve Corp~, mciudlllg Main Rf''lprv(' "Mf'tz" and ali hor'lp-dru,V,n umts of thf' h(>avy artillery reserve at Metz to be plac{'d undpr thp command of thp Commandmg Gpnerai XVI Corps ThiS group to taht' up posltiOns in rl'adiness III the fortlfipd area of Met2 Nwd. It!; TIght fianl. rl'stmg on thp Seille, to be prf'pared to attack In a southpastprly dlrpetlon toward Lunevillp on the morning of the 19th. Thp Commandmg General Group "Metz" to rpport to me at Saarbrueken, 5 00 P.:\-l, 17 August. (GHQ actual1y arrived at Cohlf'nz at 4'30 PM. 17 August It could have rpaehpd Saarbruclwn at the same hour by routmg the operations '>taff Via Frfurt - Frankfurt - Kreuznach,l (2) To the Slxth and Sevf'nth Armips Thl' main forct's of th(' Sixth and Sevpnth Armies to Withdraw berond the Metz - Strassburg railroad to the Imp Rol('hpn - Saarunion and the arpa east of the Vosges Mountams Furthl;'r instructIOns to be l'lsued upon my arrival at SaarbruC'ken, 5.00 PM, 17 August. The Anny Commanders. their chIefs of staff and the Command­ mg

~3reT~ ~~O{F¥r:~~~td'~~~~~3 ~~~k~:to~P~~~~o~~ r:;~dt:re~i;e command

~~nt:r~ISdi~~t~;~r fi~~~~~~erc!~t~:ll~~!~nu;i:cD~~ui~e ~i:t~tS~:ff

to arrive tomorrow at Headquarters Second Army for further oTlPntatlO:l.

C~~p;oa~d~~a;~PR~s(';:: 8~~~~~oA;h!YT~irdelA~~yt~~;or~o~PsTK:iTx Reser'VE' Corps and two Er!>atz dlVi!;;lOnS to bp transferred to the SecoJnd

~~~ls ~~~e~!j~n6~i~h:~~~~rfl~i~{ aT~JIRtc:~~I~YT~:r~sa~bI: r~!'!!~

from Alsacp-Lorrame by rail and shifted to thp right flank. Boundary to be

arra~~~dT~i~et'ThTra:r~o~~'tlr~:s~:r~hmA:~l~~~ ti:i~~~g l1NA~~~t the Second Army to release to the Third Army the X Corps, Guard Corps and Guard Rf.>sf.>rve Corps. The Third Army to transfer the XI X Corps t? t~ Fifth Army. The XVIII Rf.>serve Corps of thf.> Fourth Army to be assIgn

- - ;They should have left three to four days earlier. The operations could have been directed from Coblenz just as well as from Berlin.

CatalOg of Selected Periodical Articles to the Fifth Arrny. The IV Cavalry CorpstojDin the- FIfth Army Boundary between Second and Thud Armies. approximate line Malmedy _. Namur. between Third and Fourth Armies: Ime St. Vith Laroche - St. Hubert, all to the Fourth Army. The Fifth Army (less Group "Metz") to occupy the area Wiltz - Luxemburg - TrIer. Thp advance guards of the three armu's to reach the apprOXlmate hne Narour - Marehe - Bastogne­ Luxemburg by 20 A~gust. In rear of the armies of the right flank two second Hne corps of the Thll'd Army and one corps ea('h of th!" Fourth and Fifth Armies to remain temporarily at th£> disposal of GHQ In the event of a hostile attack the Fifth Army to retIre in the dIrectIOn of Wiltz - course of the Sauer. The Fifth Army to be reinforced by four Ersatz divisions. moving from the Rhmel~nd by rail, In the area Trier - 8aarburg. One of my staff officrrs to be assIgned to €'aeh Army Headquarters tomorrow. Early on the mornmg of the 20th I will arrIve at Hf'adquarters Fourth Army.


! NE1H.


'. •

V'-·-·.... ·~rCnen lEGE



25 Miles


MAP No.3

commanders and assuring hikself of a harmonious coordmation between the three armlE'S under ~he command of the Crown Prfne'e of BavarIa. From 7 August on, officers from GHQ should have been sent to the front in order to SUtik:~h/:~~~~i!Wo~rd ~fr°~~!~~t~fn~h~ftrJrta:h!!l~~o main battles of thIS proposed ope~tlOn (In 40rraine and the Ardennes 1 probably woulq. hav€' taken place Within a feWrday~ of each other. It was. 18 A~gust before thp. French Third, Fourth an FIfth ArmIes crossed th€' Belgian border. Vnder these conditions certal UUlts might have been Withdrawn from the fortified zone of Diedenhofen' - Metz and employed agamst the eastern flank and in rear of the French armjes that had invaded Belgium. MAP

No ::!

cond~g;:lb~PC~~n~~q~hi:~ffego~!oh~sS~~fft~d~:i~tf~~~'~fn~h~9~~r gF~~

20 August on, General von Moltke. accompanied by the Emperor and a small operations staff, should have eftabhshed himself near the Fourth Army. for example at 8t Vlth In the evpnt of an early Freneh attack III the direction

~~t~t~~:;nt~~~~~;h~o;.~~e~rclfth;?ru~~rdh:~d ~~~~;t~ ~r;:I~snb~~\~~!ed:J


a satIsfactory advance of thtlr hnes. March 1939 PORTRA\ING THE MO ERN GENERAL. THE GENERAL OF~ THE FUTCRE


IDas Bild des moder~en Feldherr~ Knegswirkhehkelt und Zu­ kunftsfeldhf'rr 1 n III Gpnpral Wetzell lSE'e digest, page 55: also ,'MIhtary ReVIew" No. 15, Dpcember 1939, page 95.) , DELAYING ACTION.


!Vom hinhaltenden Wi derstand.l The defense which seeks a I, ecision IS carried out WIth the idea of Involv­ ing thE' enemy In a bloody defe t, of crIpphng a portIon of his army to such an extent that the bulk of our force can advance from either Its J)resent or some other position. In orde to accomplish this purpose the enemy must





'Caitdoy of Seiecti!'d Periodical Articles

C. & G.S.S. Military Review

be entice{! to resort to a heavy concentration of his force dose to the scene of actIon, whPre he can then he stfhjected :to a constant and accelPratf,d annihilating fire of all weapons This method of defense can be carned out in any terram Even though highly d{'sirahle, a dpep field of firf' and covpr In rear of the main battle PO-'HtIOU are not absolutely nec(?ssary. In an~ ey~nt no pO~ltlOn should he blocked by close-In defilade. The mam Ime of reSIstance wIll otten lw' df'termmf'd on the spot, outlmed along the position ",hpre the forward and·rearv.ard movempnts are taking place \heginmng of trench warfare, 1914 I. The troops. espec'lally the heavy machme guns, f>honld UP PC'hploned in dE'pth Conducting a delaYing artlOll If> to pfP\f>nt a deCISIOn, to hold off thp enemy, inainl~ with strong sUPI.orting fires ThIS requlrel> a deep field of fire and cowred mear,s of eXit Lacking t!lPse, as a rule, we mu"!t conduct withdra\\al!> under co\pr of darkness, If local catastrophps are to be aVOided The 1Prram should afford thp advantage of obsprvatlOn, othprv.%e suceess u, questionalliP from tIlE' wry hegmmng 'Vhen the rOBltIOn is oceupled the crpst &hould Ill' ftnorpd It affords the advantage of ohsen'atlOn as well as ('ollcealmpnt Drad angles )Ul>t beyond the front <:hould \1(> a VOldpd 10 March 1939


,S('hlltz dPr St,d



LIPlll ('olonpJ Braun

Un IS]!);'; CI""IAl\fl POST SI:Cl'REn AGAIN8T


nications personnel and eq,uipment (translator's note; in real~ty an advanced message center). The mam division command post located III the village of A is occupied by the bulk of the staff (also called second echelon). The gaiilSon should consist of at least one company organized as follows: 11) One antItank platoon (four 3T-mm guns) equipped with an ample supply of mines and rolls of antitank obstacle wire. (2) One motorcyclE" platoon With three light, modern, efficient machme guns, that can also be adapted to antiaircraft use; three antitank rifles or armor-plercmg machine guns effective against scout cars. This platoon should be rE"mforced with one scout car patrol, as raridly acquired intelligence secured during the hazy and mdefimte conditions of combat IS an important E"lemE'nt of spcunty \3) One engmeer platoon mounted on light. hill-climbing, mobile, cargo trucks eqUipped v. Ith matE"rials adaptable to the easy and hasty construction of obstacles. also eqUlpment and materials for chemical defense against gas. both f\io]ectpd and \4) One antiaircraft muehine-gun platoon (fmr 20-mm guns), capable of being separated into sectIOns. The advanced landmg field personnel of the aVIatlOn liaison offirer and the personnE"1 at the station for dropping and pI('kmg up mpssagE'S ean be attached to this platoon. othE'rwisp these men v.Ill have no IdE"a whO,IS to post thE'm or where they should be posted. rnfortullatel,,'r the total comprIsing this company is a combined mass, To t hIS must he addE.'d the Impedimenta of this company" - everything that H\.ums m the path of tlJP dl\If>lOn eommandE'i. With a brIgade. or diVISion f>tdff It I~ hhpl~ that the followmg may he dispensed with: \1/ The antitank p},l,toon, replacmg It hy remfoicing the motorryc1e pl.atoon v.\th tv.o addltlOn,,1 antItank rifles and several mines. (~, Thp E'ngllll'Pf phtoon, il'piacmg It by further reinforcement of the mutoiQcle plutnun an engmeer sf\uad (on motorcycles). The tv.o rPlllfoiced platoon';. (motorcycle and antiaircraft), however, are mad('ljuate for til(> "prunty of staffs of lugllPi umts, includmg corps, as thpse f<taff., arE' "uliJect to <::tJiI grE'ater vulnf'rahility from thp air because, inasmuch ,lS thplr ov.n troups must oecumi an area more e~tenslve than that III the dl\ISIUI\ alid lmgadE", thpse troops are lE"sS aceessible from a standpOint of ,:;('runty If thiS mE"<ln':> of ~f;'curlty IS not asslgnrd permallE"ntly to a higher ~t,tf'f, tlwn It will be forced to ae1luirt> them by having them detailed from thE' troops, a Clreuru"tdllCP that ,tlways has an adverse effect on their combat E"th('lenC\ Clprkf', hor<;£'holdpTS and ordf'rlws, duE.' to the weapons With which they .arp .unlPd, are of 110 grl'at value III mawtammg tl~e local Becurity of the staff. Thf' of thp,;p ~pCl!rtt} forces. espeCially on the march and dur­ mg Oppll \\arfarE", If' difficult Thpy cannot be employed to enhan!'£' the Importance of th(' dl\ ISlOn C'ommander, followmg him about dressed up in all thplr (mery and "plendor They must be echeloned in rear of the hmited st,lfT, about Olll"' mot()rc~cJe squad With a pair of antitank rifles and a few ro!lf> of 'i\lre W1thlll a half minute they can orgamze the first necessary protE'ctl\P mpaSUfPf>, follov.pd by addItIOnal remforN'ments from other por~ tlon'; of tIlt' protE'C'tl\e fOfCt' ThiS applies to the main as well as to the acl\an(,pd command post. of Important con'lideratlOn IS that the company I,e gn Pll .an .Imple !>upply of radiO pqUlpment, espeCially of the portable type, !H ordpr to farliltn.tP harmolllou~\y the conduct of t he advance. 17 March 1939 TRUNII\G Of THE. RIFLE rm.IP,\N"r SQUAD DURING DARKNESS

; Ellllgpq ubpr Au,,,IHldung 1.E'1 Dunhplhelt wahrend der Gruppenaus­ hlldung dpr Srhut2('lli.ompanip I LIPUt General Boltze 24 Maich 1939 COtJPERATI{);>; BET\\EEN HORSE AND \IOTORIZED CAVALRY.


clll1"truch'd ftlad Llo!'hs WIth indl\)dual antitank guns nr antltanl, ma('hlnp gun", j

Sh,dlO\\ trpndw" ("Imnuflagt'd and affordmg ("o\p{ agam~t arttl­ I!'ry [,rl'.



,,('<'tlOll" vdth oh"pnathm and al,lrm pprsoll­


T,mk nllnf' Of \\ue ol'st,lC'ip

Hprsel. <md motor vph1c!t'S of tllP ,ldvanC'l'd C'ommand post aratpd and camouflaged


\ l' The dlHfHon in open \\-<trfare 1& advancmg its attack slowly to\\-.arcls thE' north The obJP'dlvP has almost i-ppn rpuC'hf'd Enpmy, v.nh v.pal:: ground support hut strong 1Il till' aIr, \~ co\ermg hIS ..... lthdrawal to the rear v.Ith stubborn rpslstallce Tprram normal level country. Time' E"arly aftH­ noon, summPf 1 . 12: The right fla:r.k is I"'xposed hut securf'd h;y hlockadf's and personnl"'l from the mtl?lhgf'nrp tletaehmpnts (3J A SE"flOUS ta.nk threat eXISts III the of the 3d Infantry, hut onl~ slight in the zones of the other two regiments and agamst the exposE"d flank (41 The advancpd dl\1SlOn command post lS o('eupled by a limIted staff (also caned first echelon) WIth command cars and the most essential commu­


L'b!."f da,", ZusammpnwHkpn IIf'rlttener und motorisierter KU\lal­ lerlp I Genpral von Pospek Bngadler Gplleral H S HawkinS, a recognized Ametlean cavalry lpader, I" of the- OPlIllllll that t hI" combinatIOn of hor'lp and mechamzed cavalr) rna)' Iw u~('tl a'> foUm.. ." .. 1 On iel'Ollll.l.I<.'>.am;t-> and as secunt~ for large mfantry UnIt". the borsp ('a\ulrv should marC'h III front of the mel'halllzed cavalry, pxcpptmg such armorE'd cars u,nd ~l'out caf'" as Can be uspd on or near roads When hostlie rp'listancp Iq pncolmterpd by emjllo~ ing the combat cars on the flanks, or If tht-'rp IS m~uffrnrnt ro,)m f,n the Wide maneuver, the hght tanks rould preC'E'dp and bp follo\\-f'd II) thp horse Ulllts This also 13 efficacious for attacks of cavalry III ComlHnatll)n WIth mfantry ",2 Durmg an attMk agam"t a hostde mechanized force in positIOn by a r.l\.l1ry forcE' contallllng buth horsp and rnechamzed cavalry the actlOO IS dp\E.'loped as prp\}()UsI} upscnhed WhIle the duel IS taking place bl'tween thE' antItank gun.", thE" hor'>E' umt.:; 'separated from the combat cars and drtillen l after the dp."tructIon of hostile tanks. will be employed against the enpm\ m.achme gun:.. and ritlemen and will thE'n attempt to get in iearofor on t!lP flank of thp f>llf>m~ and destro~ his machme-gun and artillerv uniUi thpr(>, while the holding .lttuck contmues in front

unsu~~';I:I;fo:~;~h~uizedt:i\~~~y~(~~~~~Jhi~ ~hich ili~a~~til~~eSehg~:~

cavalr\' j" obhgpd to fight hy firE" at long rangE' Roads leadmg to the rear are uspd by the mechanized cavalry whIle the hor:.e cavalry operate!> acroSS country, a l'omhmatlOu that "hould provp Vf'ry effectIve. "'4, In dE"ff'n~l\e combat the meChalllZE"d cavalry backs up he horse cavalry as a rf'senf' piPparpd to counterattack. In these ('ombmat ons both portlOns must remam always III supportmg dl~an('e of each other, otherwwe


~~;5t ~\t~~~~t~ ~fu~~i~~~~~llt~~~~sall~vairyoperatIOns,

the meehanized cavalry can render much more important ser-vice III combination WIth horse cavalry, than If It were operating aiOllP,

of Seler;ted Periodical Articles "The difference in speed, especially, on ,good roads, IS a sourrp of trouble. There will always be the temptation to send the mechanized ca" airy far ahead, where often it WIll become involvpd In feal trouhle before the arrh"al of the horse cavalry." The foregoing mdicates that lU Amenca there 1S a wIde cIrcle which is com:lnced that the combmatlOn of horse and mechanized cavalry offers posslbIlities, especially in its tactical employment. It appears as though France also favors thIS attItude, f(jr the cavalr,} corps consISts of horse cavalry, lIght mechamzed (road combat ('a~s and tanhS) alld motorized (dragons partes and motorcychsts) cavalry dIvISIOns Tlw lllstructlOns for the tactIcal employment of large units prOVIdes for the coroumed employment of horse and mechanized Units. Italy likewise shows no intention of doing Without her ('avalry and assumes along With the hargam the dlfficultlPs entailed in the control of the remf,)rcpd mobIle divISIOns. In England, except for the coionlf's and Pale:::.tme. the cavalry has been thoroughly mechamzed ThE' Cavalry Trammg dIScouragE's the combmed t>mp!oyment of cavalry and tanks. In thE' attack combat cars :::.hould eithpr be t>mploYE'd mdepE'ndentiy or III combmation with other weapons agamst the rl'ar and the flanks. Dp':1pIte thIS thert> are many m England who favor a combmE'd operatIOn. In Rusl>la. th(> terram. roads and brldgps fa\or the retl'ntlOn of largp cavalr..)' Units. In rf:'connalssance operatlOm, the advantages and effects of E'ach must be rp('ugmzpd. The motorIzed umts havl' an operatIve efff'ct; the horse cav­ alry Units, whpn l;lmploypd tactIcally for dO"'I'~m rt'connaI:;.sanCf', havf' an tncontf'stable value. Thu; al:;.o appbes to the large umtl>. It would be a ml:;.take not to explOit the great "ph'd of motoflzed army umh tlurmg operations and sacrlficf' spel'd out of regard for "Iuwer movmg troop" But th~&P rapIdly movmg for('e<; are not com,tltuted for rr'connOitpr­ mg about a broad no man's land unsppn Moreo,"er, the initial contact WIth tht' Similarly rapidly movmg hostile force \\Ill take place 'Hthm a very :;.hort perlOlI of timE' It IS then that the proper tactical opt'ratlOn mu">t be re~ortt'd to, tlk tactIcal combmatIOn of tht' horsf' and mpC'haDl'Zt'd cavalry Will thpn bec(lmr' <'lgmficant. 1 April 1939 PRESENT-DAY STAFF EQUIPM}::NT.

IAusstattung neuzelthchE'r Stahl' I Dr. \VIm Brandt

The command of a mechamzed dlVI<;wn \\lthout divl:::.lOn aViatIOn I~ fraught With great dlfficultles and delays. .l\lany a high commander m the luturL' IS bure freqUl:.>ntly to take advantage of thl' opportumty to ob"l'rvl' hiS anJ thf' hostile command from the air. At least one general staff officer of the dn I"lOn should be III the aIr. Autogiros or other slower planes hkl' tht' "Fw<:a ~ Storch" appf'ar to be particularly adapb'd for this purpose. A portIOn 01 thl' lilV1SIOn :;.tafI bhnuld bp gnren high moblbty m armored command car:;. Tht'~t' {'Ommand cars enablt' the dlvlblOn commander, or hiS ~tatr ufficprs. to obs! n ,. operatIOns far tu the frunt. Hadto commullicatlOn WIth tht' rear echplon IS mdlspE.'llsable to thE' forward as \Hll a'> the rt:'ar dL'ments. These "r!'arl'! ffit>ntsmight ',"pll be prOVided wlth whldesoutfitted as livmg quartprs_ TIll' supply of wpapOllS ...hould parallel thl' strl'ngth of tht' diVISIOn staff A grr,lt number of bicyclt's i:;. n!'ct'ssaf,} to all stafis uf ml'challlz\:rl umt:;;. FoHu" 'ng halts and dlsmountmg the sta1I,> of mr>{'ha1ll2pd umts are twd to tb~ gruund BICYclps Will :;.ohe thh problpm and Cdn eJ.:;'lly accompany tht' trurh­ 7 April 1939 MARCHING CROSS-COl'NTRl AND BY NIGHT­

[Marsch querfeld und bel Na('ht.] Lleut CoiollPI Braun I: .., a fact that \\ar, tht' gr!-'at tL'aclwr. ga\p us thl' cru",...-country mdrch. but to a gn'at extent, unfortunatl'ly, thl'; t'xpf'Mf'nCe I:;. forgottpn. Tht' pf'r­ \armul'r.. . and schoolmg m thIS phasp of trammg arp dl'mgrpf'able and fatigu­ mg. p, "hdPS also :;.om(>\\hat tpdlOUS The goall~ nut to bt' attamed through headlultg and rash approach. The good German roads are too entlcmg and one IS .,0 (,omfortable rtdmg III trucks WIth good spnngs. The mpthod of ''''~Ulhg orders and the formatlOn::, arc partially nvw. Csually cros,.,-('ountry ':larch 'Ig :;.hould follow order>' Ii'>o,ued by leader" mountt'd on hor,>eback. and 'hoJ.ld 'nvolw patrolhng and dl':,tant ObJl'ctlH'S PractIce m the approach TI:arch " not much help. It \'> the old story Olll' IWsltatl'S to trcad on strd.nge l',uth Furthpr r~asor, ~ the eqUIpment of the tTOOpS \\hl('h, dpo,pltP much p~ogrt':;.s !owards d!'r;t'a-Ili.g Its w(>\ght and effL'ctmg frl'edom of mo\'t'mt'nt. stIli contmut's to br l'I..IT ilt'fSome ThIS Is particularly notIccable m transportatlOn, whdheT animal or motorlZed. For l'xample, ther!:' IS thp nE'W "Brontosaurus" combat ~r of llw mfantry With Its splpndid ballonn tlrli~. fabulous compartment spaCfl and pxqUlSltp innpT decoratIOn; ~tln it IS but httlt' SUited for long cross­ Countr drhing. T".. o Anatolian buffalo cartfi ",ould be prticrable. they COuld I-"pp pace With the mfantry. An Important reqUISite of the cross­ C~untr' march, onE' that hostile aircraft \VII1 force upon us m a future war, 1<; that th·· baggagl"must be light and fleXIble. In the wars of the future, as everyone may see, there Will be more march,',g by night than by day. Here agam it IS discomfort that pla('es Its llmltatl()ns on thIS phase of trammg. Many belIeve that oncE' a month Will ,ufficp, ,md pven then thf'rp IS nothmg ~tTf'ssed except the march itself. But the mght program of the war of the future WIll be morp complex. A regIment WIll m.lrch at night and, 'v hill' it is still dark, wlll enter Its billets. ThE'n, aft!'r s\ 'trcely being settled do\\n, It v"lll be subJerted to bombmg by hosttlp a'latlO', LIghts must be extmgmshpd, dvtl population she,ltf'n~d, actlvp and pa,~ive antiairt'raft defense estabh':)hed. wounded prOVIded for, and pi!rhap.< new billets or bivouacs selected whIle the forel', scattered by the ar,nal attack, is being reorgamzed. Nightfall may also bnng a surpflse attack by parachute - numerous bedevIlment from the an will be possible

e must also think of chpffilcal attacks from the in the war of the future. air. There will be loading cargo trucks and railway cars. shifting of posi­ tIOns mvolvitlg ('ro~-count'y marching, reliefs of a defen.slve pOSitIOn, a night march of a column of infantry tanks. night marches by compass and landmarks 19:..ited by the ilendiary action of friendly artIllery. and/many other variUes. I . t.


14 April 1939 CONCERNING THE




IUberden "};rschapfungspunktdesAngnfIs.·'] Lleut Gpneral Marx It is the difficult task ot the command£'r to recognize opportunely the tImp when the force of the ittack has reached Jts culmmatton and then to t'trect a pause. durmg which time - it being ImpOSSible to bring rpplacements

~~~;:f~en~~.IT~tb~~~:t~rsnt~~eI~~~l~~sg:id~~c~~o:~~ ~h~~:~~I~~e~~~ ~:;;e~e~~~~h~eh~ghe~t f;~~~~d ~h~~de~r~~~~ti~~Ua~I~~c~lOthe\~~~~~~~va:

the case of Pnnce Frederick Carl at Le Mons - and we art;) a\\are of numer­ ous occasIOns when thp higher command only achIeved \\ hat Id commonly

~~~ff!e!~oth~ ~:~~~!nl~ ~~~p~s~~~~"~~atcl~~~ sIp~~:;~i t~~;ll~i~nth~e c~~~h~f

~~~~~~~et~~i~~~ ~~ !!l!'Jt~l~nn ~~ds~~~~l~;s ~~~~~eu~ ~Ife~~~~~~~~t~~~

the conduct of the attack to be neglected The value of supply carinot be strE's:;.pd too lughly. For examplE', III tacllcal exprclses a battalIon Of artillery IS represented as a red or blue worm 1,000 .rards long, crawling uninterrupted and unbroken across entlrt' ,>pctl.Ons of a 1.100.000 map. But untier actual conditIOns 'illch a battalIon (not to mentIOn the mfantry) IS a warin traihng a thrpad that must nelthPf be too

~~tl~~:tlcnar;;e~~I~~s J~dtd1r~~~t~~l ~~~~i:redo~~~~~~~tI~~.rIT~~~~~~;i~r~

takp.s for granted that one myst pn"'pare coffep, cook mpal", eat and drink, but It.would be vpry pleasant ~ndeed If OTIe mIght read abqut 1t occaslOnally QUf'~tIOm might be asked, su~h as, "When did your battalion eat? .When were the horses \\atered and ff.d? How dId your field lutchem; procurf' theIr mpat, vegetables and coffee?~ Whpre WIll they be locatpd at 6:30 PM?" MilItary publicatlOns should ~ontam supply problems and artIcle::, pertment thereto. Without the unmterrupted supply of fuel dn the broad :OBnse of the word) pumped through thp tlt1read tratlmg rf'arward. there Will br> no Ted or blue ",orm crawlmg across a sectIOn of the 1.100,000 map - IDstead thf're Will be the well-known point ~nown as thp £'UlmlllatlOn of tht' attack. 121 April 1939



IPanzerabwphr-Artill ne und PanzerJ8,ger.} The attItudes of vanow>ilpo\Vers to\vards the Impurtanct' of antitank defen<;{1 ha,., been responSible for a gf-lneral tendency to\\ards spE'{'lahzatIOll The tactlcal employment of ai'l.tank artIllery ha:;. gl~en n<,r> to a nl'\\' con­ ceptlOn Recogmzl'd for a Ion tim£>. but untIL no\\ mamly a drt'am of desirf'. thh concl'ptlOn has found ne hfe m the purSUIt tank. But of pnmt' con­ :;'lderatlon E'\'erywhere is thp dpslre to have a ltght antitank cannon for the Infanfhe ~:pl;~~e~~~r~~t~:~~kmc~~~~~~ ~yr37~~m to 50-mm cahb8r dol''> not seem to be entirely satlsfac~ory. Range and firp ptfec): haw bppn remark­ able, but these weapons are capable of playmg an mSlgmficant role m the dirpct support of thp infantty They are too hl'avy. too dIfficult to trans~ port. and are too conspICUOUS. fOn1Y on ocCaStoDS, then'fore, \\ould tht'y bp pmployed m forward POSltlQ S Moreover, they are compelled to be held out m ordl'r that thf'Y will no be obsf'rvf'd and dp<;troypd bpfore thl' tank umts gpt mto actIOn ,If its most favorable rangps arp to be utlitzt'd, It \VlIJ

:~~~~~h~r~f~~~:~~~~I~~Sp~;I~%l; t~('~i~~ i~~ i~f~;t!~n;S~e\;~ I~;~te~e\~~~~~

With whIch It can df'fend mdppE/ndpntly the posltmns in front of thp mam Ime of

rE'i~t:~~e~vent the developkent

must he dIrected to\\oards an antitank

:~r~~~e,b:~deh~vi~O;~~ :a:e ~~~~tl~l}~;T~;aOgi~~e~T~~t: asselt~r~~p~l!~~ dismountE'd gun The employment of combat·c.ars for thiS purposp is Without a doubt only an emergpncy mali:eshlft, tf no actual ar.tltank countprattack is planned. At least it would bp unWise to burden thp pursuit tank WIth thE' weIght of armor plate of usualilthicknpss. A saving m weIght would afford the advantagp of carrymg extra ammumtIOn. It IS appart'nt that thp

~~~il:~e~d~~~~% ~~~UI~~ :e~~Wa~I~\~~I~nW~~~dc~naI~e~~l~~i~~fad::~t~~!~

due to Its SImIlar quahfic.atIOns, hes In Its abIlity to select pOSItIOns clos!;'r to the enemy WIthout bemg placed In thl' hazardous pOSItIOn of the dismounted . gun, subject to immobility and destruction In the case of the antitank artillery the objective appears to be a new weapon of at least 50-mm calIber, resembhng m othf'r re.;perts the prf'sent antitank cannons. Its mission will be such that It can lay down fires from the depths of the infantry zone and from posltIons in front of artillery em­ placements. This weapon will permit of the indhidual immobility of the weapon Itsplf, WIthout Its bemg unnecessarily subje'Clf'd thereby to prema~ ture destructIOn. This weapon will also ellmmate to a great pxtent the present tank threat imminent to a,rtl11pry. It has been accepted generally that the artillery, m the event of a tank threat. can take care of Itself quite adequately. Of course a certain amo~nt of emergency defens.e is "possible, even though grea~Ifficultlesare presented by the limItatIOns of traverse, the tIme required . ~ in laymg and entrenched emplacements. Of far greater importance is an attack b~ tanks in grea~ mass agamst the artillery positions, affecting automatIcally the fireplan of artillery fire being laid down in entire isectors forward of the main line of reslstance_ In



';.Cat~Qg ';P Selected Periodical Articles such an event ·the fact that a single gun in eat'"h hattery has been assigned the missIon of antlt~mk defense is of no help. The combmed guns of the ..... hole batt.ery. or even the entIre batlahan. will haH> their hands fuJI attempt­ mg to engage in such a duel succeS5fuUy The greatest ~lgnlfican{'e at this mornE-nt is that all counterbattPfY operatlOns and artlll('r~ tire agamst the hOl>tlle mfantry 15 termmated. If such a pOSSlblht) hpcome:o a. featlty. then mu('h can Le SaId for t hp. sur-cess of tlw f'mplo,Ym{lnt of tv.nlu, The ahoy€' mentioned triple dllocatlUn v.lll be ("anted out ~o thdt thp mfantr~·.

and other arms hkeWl&t:', \\ilJ be eqU1pped wIth a half, or full,) auto­ mall(> antItank cannon In order to be ahlp to defpnd ltsPjf adf"lIl.lteJ~ agamst tank'" Tlw pursuIt tank Ulllt, on the other hand, ,\\-IUhf> a\ail.l.ble- to the troop commander ,1$ a mt:'ans of defl'n ...p m thrt'atE'nf'd "f'ClUr~, <I.e. far forward as po"slble, and for dl'stro.\lng hea\~ ('<Jmr,.l.t ('urs In front of the mam Ime of reslstall('t' The mdlvldual mfantr:. rpglmpnt \\ III rrokdlJ~ ('ontrol Its own Unit of Hmliar wpaplins It 1<., the ('u'11mon mhf-ltln of !Jot h \\-f'apons to prevent hostll", tank pem,tratlOn. Thl' antitank artllll'r~ must he a"<'lgIlt'li tlw mlSb10n of t1lf' deft:'nsp of the arullpq.', re,::prves. command pUo;ts, stairs, lUll'''' of cummunl! atlOn. f'tc,. prm­ clpally to preH'nt ho"tllr tank penptrathlll It v.,otild lll'pear as though thiS v.eapo!! shuuld helong organlrall~ tu a 5P\:,( lal dt't achmf"nt of t hp drtlllf'r}. hut ahuw' all should lH' .1.\ •.IllaUe to' the truop (t,mm.mUer

28 AprIl 1939 tll LSTlO'S t'U'lER'IV" \l\PS

Zur hdrh-nfragl-' i L!p!..t Gpnpr.l.1 \Lu\.

E\I:.r~ lll"utf'nant and ('andnlatp fur l"mml"'~HIY'\ ,If !,,~ lar..."r I'> n"t IlIterruptl'd, e\pnt'!diJ~ must mdkl:'.u'-l' tlf d m6i' In ('Iml ",t 1 mil '>clch tlmp he must, thf-rt'furt', bf'('ome w, pru!lCIPnt a"> r,""',lj,lt., In -IYJ a f'-:'l'ddmg, hp can ne\er gpt pnough tnllnlng III thl, <.,Ut"IJPCT Durmg opf'n \\drfare thp ltf'utpn"nt P\\·lu"l\ .. 'If adJl.. Ltl1h , till:' lIon­ {"ommbsJOnf"d ',m('pr and the pn\,ltp Leld n<l map" It \\a-, \Jnh d.itf'r the llf'gmnmg <If tft-nl h \\"rfaf!' that !t t,( {,1m .. fH",.,JI.!t- t" 1;,,,'11, thf-rn at II'd."t

}~r:~lf~~:iflt~u~{~~:~-;J,'~t.~~1 ,~~~~~~lll, J~:~ ~;~~:-r~ ~~l~{;\;~~~' p~;'~:t~~'lr~~~h:~e~ were t;'mplo\l'd dunng l!'l· \\,(r d.'> mUlnkd mp-...pngl'f;, \0 gll ..ti(,ng \\Ithout mdP:: The;. ran du that mUlh h(-ttf'r If tfH';' ),d'Jmt f.:lml:laf \\lth map" durmg l,eal'pllme Fuf Jt I" an undhl,utlJ f.let -hit th"..1" ~\f-,o mu"t rull' or dTI\t v.ltht)u\ mafl~ aitpr tj,t-<~ hd\t-< mem<)ilzl-"d till mdl' lIr ["pIPd.l "mall "ket(,h. mu<q fi"'t hd.H' lea.rn .. U tu rFad maT'" Thl' m"fl- hl ha... hr.-HI tnt,ned m mrlP-rf>admg. thl- hpthr ""llJ he hE' dl,:~' to Tldp \\lth(,,,t mdr.~ PracLlcall-'hI'rns(:'" ('.",n liE: gl\f'n on tb[- I :O!),Olllj ITld! Thto- PUI,I]., aTl­ rpqulrf>d ttl m ..n:onzt> .. \tr) rntlcal landmark \, tv.1> P<)lnh ThpD onp of tht-m Ib rt-'llulrpd tv dr.-';rnlw the r'lllT~ V.lll''''lt U I-' ITl..l.I', thf' 'Jt!,(-r PblpJi"" foll<mll1g thE: r()u\(" on tht" map • Un tbe m",rch, nOl1CUm1Tj'~ll)rf'd nffi{~r" af1d nffhH Co.indlJatl~ (".an hE' Cdilf<d to tilt' 1l\--8.d 111 till- l'o!urnn ().lt~ldp uf a \ lllagp thp,; Cdn he gl\ .. n tlmp to mt;'monze the rn..l.p, thel! "np of tLt'm 1'- !t"jUlrp<1 to g,!:ut: tht' {uiumn through tht- \l11agt: Yolthout a n,af' Otld~I"nan tl,('; rno.i~ l,p re4U!reJ to mahe u'Oe of the map )n gUJu\ng r.\ ,'r\ upp"rturlf\ ,hl,]j!d b> tJ.!"\ n to m-!ruU In r.,il"g ,\nh and '\l{.huut map~ Certa,n ~VHI"~", ,uciJ a' tn"" ("Il(' r(l,ng dn.!l, r,' d.nd "lmllar pdtrvb. vL~, ;\.J,lIVn PJ.lfvl., an .tft,]]."~'Jr, v!TIl' r "b- r\ lng; Ift/m a d\.fInl\< ()h·.n..ttl"r, 1""t, «r, !mpp·-lhl. ,·nll"'""t mal" 1'1 f'l?"rtwg "n "ltuat1UI:;, the' numb, r vf map- ..t\ dllah\.- 'houJll h' Ind" al' d ..t- <\ell a" thl' umdnl\JI, ~)t tf!J'JP~, th' d.nlnJur llliJtl ~ltUd.t"m, lie _\ ft-'\ "",·1, ml~ht h. rp.r.\lvn.oj In f,.1.",r "t th. 1")".,)1)11 m<tp I-. no\\ bpmg u-\ol .10 d m,lIt,r ·.1 ''\p\rlm,r.t in diu Iratlfl!!: r)r"bhm" Th!­ melp n1'gnt!u ir. rn,:)n, u! r,t ,1)tl!l[,g Ih, dd\"I1Tdg'~ ,\0<1 .j'.,,­ of lhl I lqlJ,II\l\l nldP" uh'i lh, 1 .:5,I)UII map.., Th· G,, I l\J(),IJ~J\! I­ an extraurdlrar~ map, It pr. ,. nl - a d\.ar pHtur' ,1 g:-()und jprm· dnd ('u[,taln<; ~uffiClt'nt <1t-lad to h ... U-I-U a~.t gwdt' In pa~,'ngthru;Jg':l qjJ.1g'.,' te In thb rt:-p.<ct 11 '" pn f. rab],.- 1:' th... Fr. f,. h I "II 1)111), h~ I <111- ...,it 11 ( r:t~m" t ... r rt-pr, ­ "... nt~ ont' hdllrrw\.r fur purp()-,~ 'If al'Ufd.t. tjft' ((,!"r"l.t ,'a.~ I)f t"ur,,· It''''' adaptuhl.-, .i'o .i churcf. tJr a ) 'gh \.:1.' had t<l b, r~pf' "'cnt- J b.) a -Ign almo~t 1011 md'r~ If.. ,\~'ith lIt!'" tt,l- 1 25,!JUlJ ,\.1- a h-!p It gln- a \\un­ d ....rfulh dl-ar plC'turt- ttl grtlUnu j,)rm. J.r.,llf- ... hunrldnt' (,1 {"JnT"ur hn('~ ~·nahl':Th.· rl-;lrhr til d,t.rmlr.<- aH '\'\<ltl(JD' .\,Ih altUra" Thl- I 50,IJUU map UUb nut Pit,' r.1 a- r\.u d p,(lur·. but it ila, ,hI-' a,hantag' If';. th... t man' map- (d.n t,~ c<lrrlt-rj Stlll I I an[,.IT r, (.)mrn .. r:d tho- abar.donm~ nt uf Ih" 1 10tl,UO(l map- Th, df' ~,ql!lr, d b\ tho hlgL, r t"mrr.dr,d d1_,j th, g~n, rdl ~!dtf Th~ qUI _,·,,1, ,_ ,I h, tn, r I, ,!, .. uld pr, j, r p,- 1 ~),Uuu t,l th' I .)U,OU'J, ,-,. n I hough ·r r -I-l!rp,:\ m·,r... ~P<\!'

C. & G.S.S. Military Revie,/; Thp artlile-ryman IS required to undvrgo instructIOn Ul rifle marksman· ",hip ('o\'pnng thrpp positlOn'l, namely: 11) Pron!' \\o~th rlftp rest hand, standing

NO\\, If thiS trammg of the


Prone \\!thout rIft£> re"t.

artill~ ryman

(3) Off

is pff'faceu with the word!>

"LimltatlOns dl~('lo<,\· th~· mllslpr." thf'n \\t- ha\(~ gra<;ped the substance tlll'trammg_ Thf' follol\mg pomt" "ihould bp {'onsldl'rl'd:


,11 ThE' foundatIOn of all nilp ~huutmg ('on"l~t~ of a faultlt>'>.") position \\Ith thf> small of the ~to('h. gra.-,pl:'d propl'rl), ('urr(:'ct "qUe('zmg of the tnggl-r ' a fm .. tt'chmqup III holumg thl' brpath and ''0,\\-, atmg It out" qUlpt!y. • 2J Only th\· threl:' PO"oltlon l')I,l.'rC\"":', ,\hleh t1w recrUIt can make !he of durmg actual finng In th, thrp\' positions, should be pracuced. 13· ~lakmg tflangh -'. J,lmtng pra{'tic! 1\lth thl.' nftE' r('.:,t and firmg LXI r. else.:; \~Ith blanl-. c-urtrHlgl·S are Ju,-t as Important In thl- tnunlng of the artilltcry rl'Cfu,t as tht'Y are for th\:' ,4) Small cahbl·r practice h pl'rhap'" of gnatL:' ::>lgmfirum'l' to the artli. If'r} man than to the mfantr;.-man. a.~ thl"l rang. i'> 10 barrack,; and tht'rt-ltore '>avp,> mu('h tlmp \\hl('h \\ould oth,·f\\lv: Il,- dt \'ott-Ii til marching to and frbm th" outdoor rangl-'. Shootmg 1<, a math r of practl(,"', dnd thl' ne('('<;~ary prac­ tl('1-' can bl< acqUired b\ thl: aftliiE'r) man III till" \\a~ 15) If the arulh f}man fIrl'" unly hI-. thrl'" PO,>ltluns. thl'n he has flfl'~ hut nlllt' rounds Thh 1'> m~uffi("][·nt fur him to e~t<lhli,>h confidvnce m hu,' 'l.H apon Each t'Xl-'rChP ~hould ht· prl't',·,kd h.,. prl'ilmmary fmng unc1lf rhl·'· cond1tlon;, d,> th<l~(' ,lhlCh art· to b,' follo\\~'rl <Jurmg .,Uh.,l·qupnt (mng pra('t 1 (,p ,6, ;'>.1.llllpul,ltlOn! ",prel-.',> art· nlc'·... ..,ar~ t'l f' lilA thl Jomhand ~tr{'gth(>n thl- arms and (mg\ r mu,>ch" '[h.,,,, {'an b,' d.«('<)mpll... h!,rl by u-,mg fiv,· mmutf'S tlmp {' l'r,r da} dunng driB pc rl(1I1~ (7 J It IS a ('ommon fart that trammg III rlll( marhman:,hJp, hkt: all other umt trammg, I~ dl-pl'ndt-<nt on thp d,·grt-t' of trammg p"rfp('tlOn of tht' non­ comml'>'Wlllpd offic\·r.., That tlll~ 4t [Jr,..,' nt ]<, not v,hat It ~hould bto Is "'f'1I kno\\n ThIS condit I'm I~ c'rt.unh <lggnndt,<lln lh,· ca...,!.. uf the artlllf'ry nuncommu,~lOnl?d officpr I\h, n h, h rt qUlrt>d to a~,>um{' th,· rolp of an jnfantry m~tru{'tor In nfll- md.rh..,man-.hlp In .lddJtJ'IU to hI" pur-,Ult'l In the kno\\Jedge of thl'of(·t·cal and practl('al ~rtlllt rj Thh I ' I\h' TI thl' battc'ry commandtr mu..,t apply hlm,t-lf.. HI' baft. i\ ",h'Juld CtJntdlll at !v'l~t (,n.' h,-utf'nant. who as a .,,~-rgt'ant n-rl'l\I·d hl~ marh ... man~hlp trammg In th.- lOIJ.()UO-m~·n arm), and t\ho can br.- utlhz"d a.' an m.,trurlur fvt Ul \, lopmg thl"' noncommls.'>lOntd officer::. Into flfle mark~man"hlp m~tructuf'" If t h~ batt, r) commander dn"ldes hiS noncomml"~JOned OfiH" Into gruup- and w,"lgn., hlm"t'if. thp hl'utt'nant, the mo<;t I xpl-rH·nc[,d ..,l rg:t ant and thp '>r.-rgeant Instructor m marbman"hlp d..'- m';tructor~, a grpat tlt·al (an b,.. acrumph~hed In an hour 0, tim!? If thl' tIm. b ..t'\llln thl fd.ll dhcbarg:"'" and thl' enli!:>tm(-nt of rt"crUli3 I:" utlhz.~d.lf unto hour d. ,\to h h <J.·\"t, tI to m~tru{'tmg non('ommls­ "Ion I'd otih·,·h, In Tlft!- mdrk."man,h,p, If ~'\pry non('umIhb"lImed officer fires t·\, ry t-<XI'rCl"f' con{'urr~ ntl~ \\uh till- r'trult" If the battery command!'r pr<nldl-"s "pP{,lal traming for hl5 subl)rdlnatb. thIn every frunt hnl non­ cummH,:on~·,l olnCtr '\Ill haH: a(qUlTl-d Lll,forl tht ".,mhr \5 half UVl:f the ground \\ofk nc('!'>;<,ary for an Ill...tructur In flth marbman.,hlp, a ba,~l~ upon \\hH~h lmprnVeml'nt ('an hI> made dunng "uh,,-'lU< nt \I-ar"



THA1'1,r" In THE \!'-TIT,\'K flj\lP.V'I

Ih \u'h,Hung ,I, r P... n2· r.tll,,' hrh',mpam' ~ CarJtam H('ut< r In t hl- dud II, I ,\ .• nIh· I,,'")h .tn<} I h, 'Ipp"~lr,g tr<Ji.}p" tht re h t J h~ ('un-ld>:rIJ but unl- roll· "f nr·, a".<} t~at 1- th, f<l-t, ... t that rna} pl)"~II':y b" {"IllCtlH.!, on'· Ihat h th· r- ull ·,f pro pantlhr. I,i th' ft, Idol fir •• that ('1m­ ~Id.-r~ tho. tank from fll,- p·,lr.t ',f <1, t .. ,"if" ar," \\,If,,ltt\ and allol\'-, flul orji' adju-tmt-nt uf hn th,tt 1., hl( h· !f. <.1 ,th' lotal ,j, ,truct·',n of Iht- OPP',"lng tank~

12 May 1939 l,,, (If r;ER~fA,\ flIERS \P,'U' ,HIf!, T(I THE PItE<;E.'T-DA\

Do THE. W(,HLD \\ -"It lil14·191" f.\Pl:ltIE'\\ <:'TlLL H;I,\I: ,\ 1-'f?;I,tT!, AL i.,U\l\I;I,'lJ~

IK"nnen dll 1m W,Jthn,g 1914-191", \f)tl d'-n u.-rut'lh.n Fj,'g~rn g ....,amm' hI n F.rfahrung. n <.HHh h"ut,- Tluch fI' f Fuhrung \QIl \:ut2ln SI-Ill" Ll"ut C'Jlf)nd \ L"'Hn~t'-fn Gennan airc raft III USE: 111 191.~

1 Th!:" Iight"t 'i}' 'Hll d.- th- h'3'\' -t 6,·1,1 L,1t! r.'" dr- ,ubpct to attach. b~ truup~ dropp' d m Pdrachu,!-, .2 Fa."t, mobIl, mur',nz...d. hu~tJ:1- forl' drl:1 pu ... ",.r.t thr,~H to tht­ fidnb and th", ftaf uf ~n·!l ...n POQIHJll­ ,3 tlk( all tJtller combatant brrn- thl- d.nlll .. f\ mU-f prv"d... fuf lt~ o\\n def{<n$t aga\l.,.-t hp~tlh· dlfcraft

! 1, Bombr.-r" Gldnt al'"(fart four m"t',r", 260 If P. b';' mph, dura­ tIOn ';' to 10 hour~. l' 11ll1g 10,O!)\) fl d.,., atlng ('apa£'lt.,. ... mt-n, bllWlil1 g load 2.640 pound~ A E G. Gt rman G"'m raj l:!"Ctrl( (.1 1\' t'\O m'J1:Or". 260 H P \Itr­ cpdp':;, 102 mph, duratJon 4 - _ huur-, c. ding 14.76(J tri 16.41JU f.-t-t, atmg capaclt} 3 mpn, bomhwg load, 2.200 tf, 2,fl40 pound~ , Gotha G \" t\\O m"t"r.... 260 H P .)<7 mph, duratlun 5 hour", (, ilm~ 18.000 ll'pt. bomi.lmg luad 2.200 poun'} 2 Rh'onnal"'anCt plan"'., Hump!' r C \'II 112 m.p h. duratl',n 5 to 6 hour,>, ('Himg2,31)0 h .. t, "",atmg ('apacJt\ 2 m.·n. 2 machm. gun.,; (,uD .dpred thE: best re('Qnnal':."am.r.- plant> uf th. \\ t;r1rl War 3 PUrsUIt plar.t'~. F r D \'II :\htlut 125 mph, ('tlhng aboul :?,300 fpt't; In ~5 minutt's It ('vuld attain an allltuup of ahlJut 20,OUII ff<~t

The H f } fa("t that t\"';~ arr:J1I-f\ r· ('ruit I' r('qumd t') und~rgo firing practice In thrfl: m"r},o;man",hlp po.":tlon,,, mahp, rr,an.-man,hlp trammg during peaf'.cHrnp a n>c-('t»sary pha;,,.. nf arnllf-i',. 1"1-f'rult m,tru{'tlOn rnfor­ tunate}) thl-' artllll-i\ ('annot dl'\otl- a~ much tlmp to nft,. marh.~mamhlp as the infantr~. Th,- qu.'~tlon 1'0, bu\\ much should It adopt and, ha\·mg adopted It, ho\\ .:,hould It b. ar('ompl~"-h,,d"

1 :hghting unit, bombarrlm .. nt '-quarlrtln" --' To attack tht> pnnclpaJ comrnt>f('ml and n,..r\t ("f..ntprs of th, !;'npmy mdu.,tr~, mmp«, PO\\f;'f plJ.nts). harbor entranc"'". '-upply ha«' ,,; anr:lhllawm of thp ho"u!e air forct'. Empl~Y­ mtnt in cornhat in (ll"d..r to fnrCl a d{--(,I~lOn on th .. ground - to attach.a\1a­

5 May 1931j I'F"'TR'l 'HRh~'I .. 'SH!P IRAl'l", I' HIl:.. \RTILLf.H'l

V ... Ir.t:,.nt~ff-t'-,'h' Stl:.,- du !)lldurg h,! d· r 'l.rIJ .. ' rl>' .\r pr' ,n' tn.r, ,Xl·t- H r.,,j f,r "IU1Pp'>',g art Ill, T\m, r, ,'th nth·, bl>('au~~



oh ~rtl\e5 and all',r.atlvll of flymg 1,Jmts




tot. xx No:'76

Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles


g~~:~~~~mmand POI:tt.<:>. all t),PPII of di:,trib~ting points, I;amp::., billetll, The hombardml'nt '>ljuwlron .. lfightmg ~mh) "'Nl' as3Jgn~>d til G.H Q They were employed to Opt rate with thl' armw... makmg th(> mam effort. Dur­ mg pau~es in combat thl'Y Wl'fe attachul ttl individual armies to engaga tar­ gets previously t>plt'ctl:!d by G,ll.Q. 12) Ohsprvatlon squaurons DIstant uusprvatlon was p{>rformed by arm~ and G.H.Q_ 8.viatmn. 1'he ~l>tent of the- ulli;e-rvation mISSIons wal:.-\ coordmated jointly by the army groups. Simultaneou'31y the Mmy high command designated defimte IllJund.lrles for hmltwg the hnps of observa­ tion Thpse steps securpd thl;! various umts agamst duplicatIOn of effort Corps aviation was assigned ohserv.ltlQn mis~lons withm the corps, Combat reconnaissance miSSIOn., were assigned to squadrons comprising th(> dIVision aviation Battl~ squadrons, formE'd 1n groups, v.t:'re requlrE'd to cl)operate wIth the army m hath aerial and ground com hat to the extent of th(>ir wchni~al l!mlta~lon~ Pursuit f,ianpl:>, d.S part of a s'luadrnn, group or flight Unit were alum- re-spons)\,!£> fHr mamtammg suprE'macy m the air hy attemptmg the destructIOn of ho<:tlle aViatIOn 'lr rendHmg assIstance to fnendly planps returnmg to thf'lr ha'Sf' These rnlSSlOn!l are 4ulte SImilar to prE'sf>nt-day letju\rrm12'nts in contra!>t tu thf> '::>lmplpr ml~~]uns uf toda.v. thftSt.. JrroportlOnately dlffi­ rult ml~,,,lons had to lIP and wpre 8"lVl-d Then thE're WE'rt' nO German effiClt·nt da~ tIme \'um}jer.. or dpstrlJYHs. 01) UUlt" IIf diVing fighter ... at that tm1£' d portion of thel:ll" rnl"'>WIl,, fell tu ttl" lilt uf tht" hattiE' planE'S and the bombulg squadrun,> If, at pn..tspnt, fhp Wurltl \-Vdr aCt'umIJhshmcot<. of <1VtatlOU ar£, rl!('l"lvmg le~l) ... nd It's" consldf'ratlOn, It Il'i 1,1"("1101::'1' ur' to now tUt) lIttle JS knowl1 In general of the vast amount uf valuahle m,ltt'TJ,.d \\ !lit h that pl'riud prOduced In addltlun to Ib I:'mpl"jmC'nt <.I'" an ()fff>n~Iv(> weapon, the aIrplane ha" becum... a rnC'ans uf tran"rulrt ("ummumC'utlUn bl'tWl'pn ('ontmr-nts Just how theem!,I.!~m(>nt .!f aircraft as a hlJ<>tlit-' l'uunt{ r<lllt..n...l\t' weapon will d(lveiop, IS still "mattt'r of th... ury It M"Pln.<;. huwl H't, that many ~perl(>ncaS, PSjW­ tlal\) t\"lo::,~ \If 191'i'~191'l'>. ml~ht IJt' !'llu::'ltierl'd of 'l.d\uahle rl'ference Of praC"tlta! ImrllJrtance 1... thp Immen:;e slgnlfleanct' of the pmploympnt of air­ craft In the dlrL'(>l ..,ut,purt 1)[ thl- oth(>f tv.-o mam .tf'll" of Ithe f>eTVICe even "t tho nutllrt'uk til h"...,u!Jtw.., and (-,'If'f'dall~ durmg thl' struggle for Uw final d~cI~I"n In the accomph... hml'nt uf thl-Ql' tnl'"l"lOn'"l the I:'XJl~nences of the \\Ilrld War still ha\il' d u...l·ful aPr)lll·atltln, a~ the aIrplane IS stIll confronted I'.lth tllt-' sarnl' ml<;SlOn~ Tpl'hnlcai Improv(>menb have mcrea..'ied It!'. effi­ c!pn("~ alld madt> <lcce';o,lhl(> obJ(>ctive" h('ret!Jf<lre unattamablt', E'\lpn though thpy I J."\'P comphcalPd thp munnpr of an'omph"hmlo'nt A rpfi('rtwn upon thp ('<tmIJlt·Xlty uf u("('urrt'n('e~ In thp World Vv·dr. Ii recun<'ldt'ratlon of thE' apenPllce" of tll'l"l:' timp" wHi as"I<;t the' high commdnd In thp ct)n'>tructlOn. dl"\chlr,rnlnt anci cml,lojm£>nt tlf th(> air Wl'<.tr,,)n .l.f1d WI!! <,prvt> it., crpwa... a practical mdt,x ill t},(- ,H'clJmphshm{>nt I)f it~ miS"lun'"l

H, M, Cole


Lieut. Colonel



VIlle, Bntish Army




December 1939 THE TRI}t'j(.!\L UI::.E.ASES FitO\t Tiff'. STA..... OPuINT or rUb MEIJIj',AI. un ICElt


Llt-ut Col<,me1 Ca.riJdlit'ria

January 1940 THE MEDICAL SE:R\lf Eo \\ lTH THE STRr.A\f~UNr:u !JI\ ISItlN

Darby, and Captam ZUYl'r THE NE.W HEGI\lt.l\TAL


AI lJl~T'\{ H~mNT


LIl'ut f'olum·J Wilhams

February 1940 HObPlTAJ. i'LAl'.NINI.



Il'. MILlTi\ilY


Lleut Colun!.'l Lt·hmaH SVPHli.Jb, ITSbU,!\.If'll ;\N( 1-;, I\fi"JItTANI..E Al\IJLUNTliul IN THI~ MIJ.ITAH't


November 1939 RAlIH~TtR,


Lwut {'omrnun!ll'r Ru('(,er C(jmmu.nd~r lJunn

A \ HAPTCR IRq\! {,I."'l'..::.I'" fll< TIU~ WAlt lIl· 1«.t2.

December 1939 THf.

I mfoT 1 I,\E. :'>1l(bl'.UTHj<.~~ PM.;·A\Il.JtJ( ,\N f'flill 'I'

Lov(>tte N,'hILL11~'::' HR~l lJLlI:..\T


... Rl)ill"rt W lhdy-

Japuary 1940 Till-; EFl £1 T5 OJ \lLH;IJIWl.!H.JCAI. (.oNIJITIONi> (}I\j TA' Til AI. uP~J{ATIONS AT .JLTLAr.lJ Ll"'Ut Cummanupr TrUl' ME.W HA"IT MAltl'''. Tl{i\lI\IN"I. 1-:n~lgtl HI~I,{'tAN OI~lt-\NI7A1l01>; Hilt THE NA\J" Dr.PAltT\lCNT Rear Admiral Tau::l~ig CO-S:O>Ol.lVATlON OJ THE LI';}:lTHOPf>J.: SEIH-It!:: \\I'JlI ,H1~ CUAbT Gl'AIW,

R{l\Jl'Tt H Mae}'

19 May 1939

Gl A\f

{leH \\E.:-.TLKN I !1.'I'IJ:::'1

Lwut (\lmmandt>r NI'!slJn

PIlLA!>.£) A/'.U BElt Alt'n

:Po}{'n und 5eme \\\'nrmacht I M ajur Glonl'ral Zq!:-\s Thl'::> «rUell;' CO\erb till' urg:dn!;:ation uf the PlJlish Army, the l'thnvluglcai rr,mpfi-,tlvn vf the (ountry'~ I,u\>u.luttun, thfo transltl(m of deve.loIlment from PI!~U,j,kl tu R).d'l'-Smlgly, the Datum! rp~our('.e<,. the mrlu~tnal deveiupml'nt. "at~rv,olJ"" rlllh"'d:t':J and g'f'lgrapnHdl Uf':'-(T1t!tlqn at a limp which v"a'> !Jut !ltllr m·,nth~ pn"r tu tLt- Gl'rrnolfl 1n\d.~ltJn

February 1940 A 1t~~5Ulr; !If t-.\"fI\J!\AL' L"'TLI~b::'Tb IN nih CI\ltlUllI:A,,< A1U..A

CummandlT oll'h THE ML!tlIlANT Oll\t t,lt':-, I'LA' r; I.... ,til'. (~NaJd, Rf'tu....d Till>: :-'AI,A 111 A \!'/PLh"< l>ld itA!!'h"

lh \L\,JIJH \\ \1


Em~atz d t-", Granatwer[erzugp'l d!:'r MG -Kumpanlf' S('hlltZtnnglffi('ntc, 'illut,],! Cdptam \.L'!;;edom

lJpr takt,sd,p empl>

Ole srh'W(>d1.s('hl'n HI-'rf.~tman',v{'r Ig:1l:$ J ..! Tl ,,> art1{'le wlth f1\'1"' mal'''' prplof>nt'> a ('lImph·tt> out Imp .md Crltlque of 5\1., dl!-.h mam·uwt fT1Jm ltl tv 21 SqltpmlJl.. r 1938 'fl.. mant:uvt·r ltl\v!\{'1! l4,.JOU In. n, 3,OUO hor&"'!1 anu 1,00U motor <-h,dl' I'(lrtltJnf> uf thO;' l-\r:.t, &'\uwl and ThIrd Dwtslons and uf the an I~rti' r".rt!{ipatl-'d Tht· coa~t artIllery c')Uperated Jomtly

Sl'hulgefF-chts!'chlPsSIo"n und GI·fl'l'htsschl... s<;Fn I


November-December 1939 p... at~I,~~~~~TC~~p~OL)ETII. ::.t.'H\F.V - IT::,PI\RT IN THE!'.ATIONAL DEF'E.N::'E

Major HE-ave)'





January-February 1940 ,


. August 1939 (U\IJIAT MbTHOlJ "I !t11


lr.;lll-> J1'. f1H_ ATTJ\E...K \\-HEN \ o'lLsI~E.U

\'t>r"mqun~ mit Panzcrkampf· wag!'I' ....ngn ifl'ndph S(hUlzem-mhutt n J Ma)f)r v M.l1)teufi"el It frequ~'ntly hdl'P'''ll;' that manr-uvenng rt'.'Iuits In a <lurprlSlo' attack COnSE'4ut'ntly, It h ImI>ortant th.l.t th? vphH'\l':,; should dunN a formatIOn With greater dhtanu''> and mt1:'rv.... t".I'~IJt'("!a.lI:y in uPt'O ('()untr-".Ju~t as soon aJ, thf>;y begm tu pnf'I!Untt'r hU'"Itlh· r~~lstanu' UthprWI"e all thl' advanCl"d elemeUtb wllIl,e ;:,uIJ}\·\.t, d hlmuhdw:ou,>l~ to thl· t.fI«(,t$ of the hU1'<tlk rel)lst­ aM'U'. The ('umhat formatlun.,; mu... t takt> thpw ('undltlOns of battle Into '"Qn~ldl"ratlnn

When at;:tlun \'l'('umt·:) lmmint'nt, the katlers of the rifle UnIts should rIde fotv.-ard tu a Il'Jo.,]tlIJn whl-'Tt- ('ach !'I:'k'ct till' mUb.t advantageous gruund for hIs unit '1,JatuQ(1, ('ompany. {'te ! and mdk,- a fH!l';bonal and early tecunnaIS'>dnr(' of tht· I!rl'df'terminpd hattte puS.ltttirt. Thu" is mueh h(>tter than df'[Jl'numg lin tht- hl';,t rt'fJurb aru"mg from othl'rs,mrccs of infurmation. The personal mfllH-n('t- of tht-If>ad(·!"'> f>hould be cunUnuf>d eV(>n after the umt", havE' bl"t'fi a"slglwu tlf'fimte qt'JP('tIVf'S In uruI·r that they may be in a posltlon tu make qu]{k df,cl::,ion.. , durmg tbp pvpr-changtng hltuatlOfis of hattie. relatl"'" to thp aSi.lgnment of nt-w oh}edlVl'S Peculiar tv this method of comhat arto prumpt a.nd cuneL,,!: ordf'rs ['ultablo to the r<illld motnilt;}' of r-u-chumts. Of grl'.lt Iml)tlrtam't' u" thl' steady £;.'mploj. mt'nt uf auxlhanes. :,uch a~ the


SCf{OOLI!'.f., A!'.£) TRAII>;I!-;l, I!-; ( lJ\lllAT fiRl...-{J




l her dab Gdr'{"hb\-Hfdhnm der m


THE jJ,'J,'rS (Jf THl.: H!<:.TfJRIC PANA'fA. Klrkpdtrlck

("mmolnder Hrn~n

""Ifl! TA"-.k.S '

26 May 1939 THE SnEIJISH I.\LL \!.' ..... hV\-1-;l(. 1938

Tfli. tOHPS II'.



l:n;"lgn Flt1:"




THL fM..TH At. L\Il·UJ\ \tE.~r 01 TItE }.lqRTAR PLA.Tuu/'. qf THl. MAlHl~r.-f.,T.'" l"\II'4N't of TIn; 1!',}<AN.ICr It£G!\IEN1 J\lOTOI~­

1\\\,\) \\(JIU.!I,

LOI At (,ONDlTIONS iN FINLAND ,\ND Tm::m INF'LllEN(E ON WA~FARE. ulonel Zil1iacus, MIlitary Attache at the LegatiOn of Finland

~i~~~ri:n~a~f~~n[~~~h~'t'I~~I\ 1~~et~ff;~~~v~n~~l:~t~~e~h~::li~~~ ~~f~n~!

these units and have bf'E'n trampd to explOit the r€'bult of theIr ohsp.tvatlOnB with fire. Although It L" {'ustomary fOT the battalion Lommander to have a defimte plan ot fire for all Unit:, uurmg th£ f'arty st~geB Qf the attaek, thm procedure alway,,,, tw ('awfully adhert'd to when the troups are directly supported by tanks FIre" of all weapons should n.ot hp ('on trolled hy sched­







Catatou of Selecteil Periodical Articles ule, beca.use the perlOd of halttng and the moment of resumptIOn of the forward movement depend on the will of the advanced elements and that of their subordmate leaders. TheoretIcally the movements of troops should be carried out accordmg to prl'd(ltL'rmmed plans. In order that they may be­ gIven adequate fire protpctlOn and so pre\ Pilt the dangpf of theIr being routed by. hoshle firf'

TIl(> movement <"hould not be oH'rp:;tlrnatpd; the hO':>tlip fire

(non-l'xbtent m ppacetlffiPl ::.hould not be l..mdere'>tlmated The <;.upportlOg fires are coordmated imtlally. Thplr control, as the actIOn develops, I':, subJE'ct to the \... 111 of the commanrlpr. H~' develops a plan of fire that mu,>! be changpd frl4]uently and enlarg.. u upon not only aft..r till> fu'>t objl:'ctlvp hns .bl'l'n rl'achl'u, but eVl'ry tJme 11<' becomt'::' ..m are of a change in thl' hostll!' .,itnatwn: Jf one assum~", that the tdllk Unit'S \\111 seldom ha\e tlw opportunlt) to rl,ducp completl'ly all hu<;,tIll' Ir.fantr~ rp"htancp l\ltllln their o\\n zonp of attacl~ \&ucb actIOn \\,JUhl npCI'&i'>ltate undue d, IdYl, It df'volvl'll upon the ."U{c('('dmg rlt1(' trll\)p" tl) dpstro~ thE' l'rll'm~, \\ho mpanwhlll:' has b(,pn tl'm­ poranl~ dwch.pd, \\lth th.. greatl''-t p\J~<'lblp \oluml' of firp power If hI' ralhps hf-' mw.t bL' "Ubjel"tl,d lmmedwtl'ly to h, a\~ fire amI kept ulldpr Its ptI!;'ct Hostllp troop" \\ho .,till rl:'mdlll \'llntntO' ~huuld bl' sublpcted to ('Oll­ cl'ntratf'd flrt' III orlil r to lh'ny t1wm till' u"'" of tbnr \\eapon<., and to prevpnt thplr rall)mg ditler thl tdnks hd\" pas~,'d un tu thl' I,,"\.t \V,lVl' It I'" t!1Pn that thl' prmnpd.1 ml~'lltm 01 thp ntip trodp;, thl' d'·... trurtlOn of tht' Pllpmy -­ mu'-t be accomphslwd by .1~::,aultlng hIm \\Ith all fnall,l.hll fir!' po\wr. In ad,iltlOn, ~hOft pprlOd... of cumtMt may bp dp\otpri tn thl' n<'utrahz'ltlOn of th(' ho<,tih' mfantr~ dpfl'nsp Bp('J.\1;-c It 1'- 1\111)\\n from l'Xpl'r1l'nc(' that thp l ~~~~,:I~:!n~o~fai ~~I:l:~tjl~;"'~~ t~l~~) ~II~~:h;l,~~{;~~~~'r~ u( ~~~~l~~~~:I ~~~a!~d~~~'~ hl'aV)' \"'I'apon~, thl' nil", squad" "hnu!d be PqUlpp,'rl. \\Ith t\\U !tght m.l.dnnl' gun,... l'arh In.1:-much a" th" ::,quad In It", pr"<"'T,t ."trlngth mu<;,t bl' as'>lgnt'd two Hhle],.", dnd the tran::.purtatlvn \\ hJ{'h 1<, o('cuplf'd b} tht' flftp troop::, L:­ not compl('td~ load, d, thcrL' I~ ~pa(v a\'.IlIJ.blp fur an arhhtlOnal I1ght machine gun. It 1<., not ('on."ldl'rl,d ad\ \"abl~~ thdt tlw d(>cl".lon to pmploy tlw... e troops elthpr as rille or light machmp~gun troops .,hould rl'mam a mattpr of ('hOi ('I', The se('ond hght maMllnt' gun ",houhl Imml'dwtely accompany them into ('umh.l.t along With till' eqUlpmcnt np('essary fur Its oppratIOn I t follow!> that th., plTl'et of till' nfll" trIJop,-, \\ltl1 tile p:xtra equlpmpnt at the next phase \"lll bp grpatPf than that of tll., a'>:-.ault \\olth nfte butt'l, <'palies, daggE'r~ or 1~1ll\E'<> Intht,':.qu.l.dafn\ lIldnlrluals should b,' as'>lgnl'd to t\\O ma('hme guns \\1th pknty of ammUJutIOn and a fe\\ ,.hould 11f' 1'l}Ulppf'd \Hth auto­ matle pI:'tols and pll'nty of hand gTl'naue'" In orrIa to prevpnt thl' pnemy from takmg CO\ I-r provld,·d hl' has not bpl:n tlp'>troyed completely by tlw tank attac\.. \ and thu<' neutrahzmg tht> dft'ct ot our mdtlIlm'-gufl tUl', the rllk Ufllts should be pqUlPPl'd \\Jth plf'nty oLhlgh·anglf> \\I'dpon~ mc1utl'l1g pknt) uf nmmullitlOn TIll' nfle troops cornbmL' fm'pO\\l'r With mo\cm,nt F.'Pf\ mo\pmt'nt ""n,'s to r{'nd,"r th!' firt>po\\lr mdrl' l/Tectnp, A Fr,"nch arudp pmpha<,\ZI'"



~~~~1~~ ~l~!O~r:>p'~~~; ~r~~~'~~l~~il~\~~;P~~ b~l~l~ ~;l~ ~~~~~~t~~~~~t~I~~ ~~\~~~:

ority appiLeti uy th!' Unl\ I\ho ~11('('\',·dl'd In gammg it ' Durmg th I ntr~ mto, and tlw I'Xploltd.tlOn of (', tI,I' tr<ln::'lt,,1IJ from tIl(' dcployt,d ddv.l.nct' Oil trud,~ to tbl> 3tta('\, mu~t b.. ruplfi, Lr>('antop t'vt'ry lh'la\ prt·",'llt,- to tl1<> unrh·f('<itl'ti pI)r!lOn., of tilt·, lll"m~ thp OpP'lrtumtl' to rpc,n ,'r tftlm dlt' IkmoT".lltzlIlg I Ifl'ct of till- tdoni-. ",ttJ.d~ Ih.. IHI1 th, n find time and npport!llllt) In "IIJ(,ll to pfl'pare hi" <ld,n<,l\t' 6r.'. Thp mor" troop~ tramcd m th1::. fl':-,prlt, thl gft'atlr \\111 be thp fPriurtltm in thl" factor of tIm,> Tntill1g: h)"~l'''' mu~t nlJt rpsult In prl'matufl' UEmountmg. a <,tl'P \\l!lch \\ould IM\l a t""ffilodnu<'h Uth\rb~ pfttct un thp dctlon .1::, a \\hok. The for\\ard mu\\ml·nt of tIlt, flani~,> ",1.lOu lS nfttn "utnn,'nt to ('ausp the opponpnt to d.l.ckl'n hI." rl,':.,'>t,mcl', alld tim" grl·"tly a<.,sl.;;t thp ad"ancl' of UUf ,)\vn truup'~ rh,' dlpct of til!' talll, attach mu.,t UP l'XplOlh·d rapI.ll,r and dl'(hl\'l'ly h~ till' <.,upportmg nfl'" of til!" d"plo-" ~.t1 trOUP." ,ma the hea\ Y \Wdpun::. In thu mU'lt l'xpe,htl<lu'> m.l.nnlr until th, uft'a In 1\ hich the tanks have gd.lllt"d bUpdlOflty hab b,..\:n mupppd up Thl<., ~upportmg firt' 10; only pIN"lhh> when c!o"pl,r l'oord'natpd \\Ith that of tlw advancl"d E'h·ment:-. The r!;'urward h,.,a\'y \\,'.lJllln<', p<,p"l'la\l~ tlo,,>1-' III d!'flladpd P,l"!tlon<;,, must 1)1' ordered fon\ard as .':.uon H<, pO""lblt DUring fhl pad;. stdgPo; thplr jpUdpfS h"tong 1\"1 H It)P\ ,Ird \\ ht rt tilt J l-dll ,,,,H'Cb,' mort' l fl(\('tl\' ('ontrol, \\ herf 1hI' plau)()n am:! cnmpany COnlI1UllH.I, ~~ can h.1"<'P up \\lth tIll' SltU.l.tlun and l'tit'rt tlw e,)ordloatltHll)f fin'pol\1'f and -,trl],1I1g p')\\l'r Tlw) mu<.,t Cl)ntmue to mall1tall1 a C\.ll;" ched\ un tlwl! Ull1t~ - machmp-gun "l'ctlOn", mortar ::,qu,td.. . , mdn Irilldl infdutry trolJp" ,in,l antitank gun~. III order tv shIft thf'lr fire'> to rf'l.\ targA-., il.'> till' rup,tlly cl1.lngmg ';'Itudtl,m dl;;"vl'j,)p::, An accuratp ub::wf\'atlon or thC' pfi,'et of firt' and till' mdt'pcntit>ncp of o;,ubOl:dmatp Ipadpr~ mU'lt T!'pl,lCl' tlil' d,·la\ mvoh prl b) \ l'>lt~ to tlIP firmg po..;ltwn" It IS bcllf'vl'd that 1Il thiS pha,...,· 01 thl' attuck thl'fl' \\ III dl'\'(>lop a numbl.-'r of local a<;sault~ bt'cause, whlle the oppollt'nt might bp ~topp,·d at on(' placl.', Ill" \\111 ('ommpn('p to rally r>1:;,pwlwr(>: on th" fian\.. ... lh' r(> Will ('rop up rpsl~tancp that Pltlit'r Iia"; rl'mamed unnntieeri or ha:. hl-'I-'n combatted again~t inpffectiveiy. ThIS I:' no cause for ('on,>,dpnng that tlIP attack or the fire b bpcommg dlsorgamz(>d or di.'lconcertcd By I<;sumg combat ortlpr,> direct to th" a:;,~ault companwo, and by con­ -,.tant obSl'rvatlOo and. control of fm), the battalion commander from a pO~I­ tlOn \\ell forward cuntmu{'s to mamtain hIS mfluencc. A f1cxlbI~' control and applicatIOn of thl' fIrp of thp hpavy \\Papnm, i'> npepssary ThE' aim of thp attac1~ IS to stnkl::' tilE' pnl'my \\Ith tl1(' combml'd firepo\wr of all \\ipapom, at dpcreasmgly cto<,,'r rang!'s. uSing the mo<,t f'ifpetl,'e m~an::, aVailable, for <;uch firf>po\vcr re.;;ult"> m f'/TectI"e '>tnhmg powt'r during the npxt phase of the attacK. Inasmuch as the fin' of dttack}ng Infantry 1£ rpndpred rno"t effeC­ tively b;y thp l'OrnhlnatlOn of h1gh and low angle fire, It IS nE'Cebsary that thp battahon commandt>r proYlde for a '-yo,tpmatlc orgamzation of firE'::' either by th(> asslgnmpot of defimtt> tash.::, to the h('avy \\ papon" or by appropriatE' mstruction::, tu the as,:,ault compame,>. The first consists of zone::. of obser­ J


C. & G.S.S. Military Review vation and fire assigned to the heavy weapons by the battalion commander. hiS appropriate tlmB and pla('e employment of these weapons at the beginning of the attach. and asslgnmpnt of fire and obsr>l"vatlOn miSSIOns through fragmentary orders dunng the progress of thp attack. He must also give thought to the seif'ction of the npxt po,>itlOn in order that the protectlllg firf's of the mfantry can keep up with the attack. It frequently happens that tllf' heavy weapons must be split up or, after bemg dismantled, set up again at some dIstant pomt. They should be permitted to follow the assault Units as soon as possible in order that they may occupy pOSitions as far forward a5 possible III sufficient time to engage targets of opportunity, oftpn of dl'cjslvf' ImportancE', and especially to bp able to cover qUickly WIth a m.l$S of fire the more difficult targets, tl1U!> aVOIdmg the necpssity of transmlttmg long-dIstance fire orders, a process which, III addition to other hazards, intro~ duces a :;,ource of f'fror Into the concpptIOn of the objectlve. The battalion commandpr wlll hold out a portion of his hpavy weapons as a mobile rf'st'rvp of firepower In order to pngagp targpts III the rpar arpa In thiS respect grpat Importancp should bt> attachpd to thE' hght and bl'avy mfantry ~annons till additIOn to attd.ched artlilery and portion~ of the machme-gun company) which. on account of thpIr grratf'r size and wPlght, callnot be placed so far forward.. For E'xampit'. the mortar~. on account of their trajectory and moblhty are psppdaliy fittpd for complemf'ntmg tlw firrs in thp forward atpas and lendmg eifoPctlve support by covering dt>ftIa.derI and more or less imp,'ne­ trable areas, and ar~ thprpforp used mor{' frpquently III thIS rpspect. Often thl? tprram and thp largp numbpr of ho<,tIlp group'l t'ncOlllltered will dpmand thl' rmployment of muchmE'-gun <;pctions and mdl"ldual mortars, to \\Imh dpmand thf'Tp l>hould bp no obJPctlon. If onp adherps too strictly towards mamtammg the mtt'grlty of thp umt, tlll'sp wpapons, due to unfavorable terram and tlw abwncl" of a fipld of fire, durmg Important <.,tagps will rE'mam metlpctn c or ehw J.rri\,f' too late to bl' of any" alup TllP usp of common .;;"'nsf' will guarantee f,U(,Cf'S~ ARM) REGL'LATIO~.s lAu\; d{'m Hel>re">- '·erordnungsblatt I EffectIVE' 19 SpptpmbPf 1939 thp meeh,mizpd forces and thp ra\d!ry \wre incorporated in J. <;,mgle umt known a.;; "Schnf'lIl' Trupppn" (l\Inbllp troops), The SchnpllE' Truppen 1ll('ludp' (} I Panzl'r Iml'chamzpdl rl'glmpnh (2) Antitant detachments. 13) Motorlzpd rlftprpglmpnt<;. (4) Motorcycle rifle battalions 15) lI.lountpd and ('avalry reglmt'nts {6) Bicycle dr'tueh­ ment<;. (71 l\loton:wd rf>COnnaISSanCE' dr>tal'hmpnts, All umt:, of mounted and cavalry rt>ginwnts, as wplI a<; the LIC~ cJp dl't<!rhmflllt. wIll be gtven the dt''llgnatIOn "Schwadron" (troop)' OftkPTS of the~p umts of the rank of captam WIll be dpsIgnatpd aq "RittmE'r-.ter" \('dptam of cavalry) All othpr umt" wlll IlP glvpn till' dp<;lgnat1On "('om PUIl;'-,' theIr offi(,pr", in th", ranh of captam \\iJ1 be dp<;!gnated a'> "captain'>," September 1939 CO'IIPARISO:-l" or 'IHE Ft'NDo\lIIENTAL &TRATEGIrAL AND TACTICAL DOCTRINES CO~l'ERNING THE E\'PLOYMENT OF, ANDTHE DEfENSE A.LAIN5.T, 'lE.CH.I,NIZFD l'NITS I~ THE FRENCH, BRITI&J1 ,\ND Rt':'SP.N AR"IES.

:\prgiPlCh dpr grundsatzlll'hf>n operutiH'n und taktlschen Auffas· sungPIl uher Elmatz und Ab\VPhr von Panzprverhanden l1l den Hpprl'l1 FrankrPlchs, Eng-lands lIud Ruszland" 1 Captmn Sau­ \,mt Francp has dewloped hpr forml'r ca\a!r,r. dl\lSlOn into the "dl\I~!On leg~re mecamqup." conslstmg of approxImatel)' 100 SCOllt car~, 4 mot<lrJ:led hattalIons \dragons portf.':>l, 70 combat <,ars, 9 battprlPs and otheraU'l.lhan arms Thp b.~tt!(> ml"'SIOI1 of all typps of combat cars 1S to accompam the mfantry in ,combat m order to ladhtate closE' cOOpHatIOn in the destrlJ("t\on of all hostile .automatI(, \\E"lpons. The) are attached to the infalltr~ III ordf'r to form remforcpd lmttallnns Thpy Plther fight bptwpE'n sU('('l'ssiVl' mfnntry waws or £lIse precede the mfantry attack When u:;,ed as u{,com.. panytng comhat cars the) are emplo)E'u as a maneuvprmg force, ad\allClDg on tprram w}llch wou1d fa\or thp situatIOn . They arp aho pmploypd m cooperatIOn WIth artlllf>ry ThE' French nrgim~ Ize thPli artillery m groups' (1: Groups that support the mfantry I·r the combat cars, and are as:;,lgned Jomt miSSIOns with them: (2) Counterbattery groups. 13) Groups that employ haras.:;ing fire England. along _with th£> aCQmrempnt of new mechamzed equipml;'Ilt,bas reorganizpd the entire s)o!>tem of mechamzatIOn Tanks belong to mdepen" dpnt. mecham:zeu UUltS. The Bnt!:;,h tank company ('on tams a mixttlre of ilght, medIUm and cannon tilnl~,> The tank attack IS not dependcnt on artillery support, It penetrates depply into the hostile positions It 15 charactf'rlZpd by Its indepenrIen('e of a<.'t1On. It IS planned, howe\f>r. ~o orgallize some G.H Q tank umt", that Will he pmployed on mll.Swns 111 ('oOpf>ratlOn With mfantry. Russia pmploys thE:' tanks as a supporting arm of the infantry. THE E'\ TENT AlIoD ORGAMZATION OF THE MECHANIZED FORe BS 11'< THE SOVIET eNlON.

IUmfang und Gliedprung der PamprtruPPPll der SowjetUl1lon.J (See page 15, C. & G, S S. MilItary Review, December 1939.) STANDARDIZATION Of' ARMY MOTOR VEHICLES, REPLACEMf.;NT (IF SUP· PLIES AND INTERCHANGING OF PARTS.

[Vereinheitlichung, Ersatzteilhaltung und Austauschbau bei Heeres· kraftfahrzeugen.J Major Bernhardt




Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles


IDer Ursprung der Kraftfahrunfalle durch eIgenp.s Verschulden des Ktaftfahrers J F C. Roth, Govemmpnt Advisor on Construc­ tion October 1939 THE POLISH CAMPAIGN, A PAGE OF GLORY FOR THE MECHANIZED


{Der polnische feldzug ein Ruhmesblatt fur dIe Panzertruppe.1 Lieutenant v.Cochenhausen The artIcle con tams an mtroduction by v Scb@llandglves brIef ac('ounts of thf> folluwmg: (I) Motorcycle troops In the advanN' guard ~2) A heu­ tenant captures 400 prisonf'rs 13l The tanl.. as pionef'r, scoutmg agf'nt and tracttJr. \4) Tanks assist the mf,mU'J \5' An antitank gunner IS awarded the first Iron cross In his dIvIsIOn. 16; Tank surprIse attacks. (7) Anmhila­ tIon of a Lattahon by a few tanks. lXI A tank officer captur;:>s a pillbox smg]ph,mded. (9) Tanks mop up


;Zur [uhrung der kTiegstagebuchE'r durch mot Emhelten, msbe­ sonden~ kraftv.agE'nholonnen J W PaschaslUs rile artIcle contains four prmted forms whIch form the basi~ for dI5CU5S· mg a '>J- stE'm of recordl~g histoTical data and nOh'worthy events.


THE RADIO SECTION. IDer Chef einf'f Panzer~kompame

und sem funkmeisv'r J Captam

Mediterranean, need's iron. roaI,· oil and othet products. She can supply Germany with foodstuffs whlle Germany, III turn. can provide Italy with industrial prodUf>ts. ' THE PA("lFICATlON CAMPAIGN IN THE HARRAR PROVINCE. ILa campagna d·I grande pohzIa ne>l tt>rntOl:io dei Governo Barar.} Major Carragha Gene>ral Nasi, Governor of Harrar, was given the miSSIOn of suppressing

~l~~:~it~nthea;I~~;o\h~p~~!~~~n;ri~id ~~:~~M~~hj?G:a~~~~?' In a('cord~ The temtory conquered comprISed an area of 89,000 square miles WIth a populatIOn of 1,400,000 Great credIt should be gl'l,en to the aV1ation. which materially assisted In roordinatmg the march and objectIves of thf' columns. carried out rec()n~ naissance and bombardment mISSIOns, attackf'd ground troops. and dropped supplif's to those forces engaged 1n very difficult or.almost maccesslble terrain. OUR \\F.STERN Bot'NDARl

tAl nostro confine occidentale I ('aptam Cuneo A df'SCnptlOn, dlustratf'd lJy a map, of the boundary bptween Italy and FrancE' IJl the ~larlt1me Alp.;;. fixed hy Napoleon HI III 1860. ALBA~IA iI', Albania IS a mountall1OUS country, WIth an area of 11,000 Rquare mllf's. Although It IS one of the poorest countrlE'S of Europf> and very malarIOUS In parts. It Ius great POSsibIlities.


August-Sept-ember 1939 PIONIERE (Germanyl


THE GREAT WAR IN RELATION ViITH Ot'R E\.-ALUES. ILa no~tra grande- gup.rra nE'1 rapportl can gli rx ulipathj


MA.AS IN AI1Gl"S-r 1914 Jror 25 Jahren. DIe deutschen und franzoslschen rioniere heult AngrIff der deuts<.>h en 3 Armep uter dIe ~.faas 1m August 1914 J LIPUt Colonel Dmtpr This artIcle co\'ers thf' operatlOlls by both German and Frenrh engmeer umts.lTld mdudf'5 5iX slwtches and plans, two tIrnptahles and '>IX IllustratIOns.

Genpral Cor:,elli Whpn the tragpd J of SaralPvo on 28 Junl' 1914 \\as broadra:;,ted. httle thought \\a!:> thpn gn·;:>n 10 the P(J%lblhttt'''' of a \\'orld War. AustrIa deC'larE'd war on Sprbla Ignoring completely thl' tami partnpr of tht; TrIpiI' Alliance Ital J favored JomIng the sidp of th", Entt'ntc from tlJ.l' very bl'gmnmg of the war, but Ru,>&'a oppospd the Itahan !'>ntry on the gi"ounds that It would comphcate the pE'a<.>« settiE'ml'nt at thp pnd of thp \var. RUSSia hdd thE' Strait of Dardanl'lJes m mmd, and Bntrun and Fr:mcp !:-.Idf'd \\lth RW'>':>la. Thp treaty of London slgnpd 26 AprIl 1915, outhnpd the conrt'!iSlOnl> made bv thE' AIllE'~ to italy m r..turn for her JOInmg the EntE'nte. General Cor<;plll claim'> that Grt'at BrItam and Franrp d1d not kcpp all the<;fl prOm15f'S


IVor 25 Jahrf'n· Lutuch J Lleut Colonel \ton Ahlff'n 1'hl& IS a brief article covermg the hand-to-hand combat agaInst LIPge from ,l to 7 August 1914 SE\ENTY-FI\E lE.ARS I\GO


:\·or 75 Jahrrn. PiOlllere 1m Feldzug 1864.J Colonel Heye TI,e drtlc1e <.>0\ ers the Held englOeetmg operations of the allied Prul>bIan and Al!~trIan forces In the DanI~h War THOVGHTb ON ~tISSIONS, CO:'IMANIJ AND 1:.)IPLOYr.lENT OF ENGINEER


IGedanken uller Aufgaben. Fuhrung und \'erwel1dung der Plonif'rf' auf Grund vergleichendt>r BE'trachtung der deutschen, fran­ znsl&chen l1ud russlschf'n Gf'ferhts'\orsebrIft J Captam Mf'ltzpr


Il"uhrung \'on Straszenbautrupppn 1m Gefechtsgehlet J Major Gen­ eral von Schaewen QUARTERMASTER REVIEW







!Lp fl!.>ur,>t' l'cIJnnmlch... dl"i pal''>1 ml'dltt"rranpj J I I \ I Gpnprai Dpamhro<:ls Italy, Fran('p and Grt-,l.t Rntam arp titl thrf'e grC'at MpdlterranE'an

PO\\ prs ThllT commprcml ..,h1ppmg I;; In t h;:> ratlO 1 t 6, whllp their milItary

tonnagp 1<:' m thp ratIO 1 1 3 Thl'> piarf'" Italy 111 panty \"lth France and

mfprlOf to Grl'at Bnt.llll HIl\\t'\l'r, ltah'<" ('I'ntral pn<;ltlOn In the J\Jrdlte-r­

ranean g"l\lP,> lwr con~ldl rahk a.hantagl? 0\ I r hpr t\\O fl\d.b for supremacJ

In that spa


IUn t'unfronto btorlCO I'd un ill~I'gnampntn (,lrca la gUt'rra dl rapldo' cor.,o j Cnlon~l FJQcctl T\\o hghtnIng campaign;, art' compllfPd Napolplm'~ hlO\" at ('arcarp

lU 1,96 and the t\\ plfth battlp of tlil honzo HI thp ,lUtumn of 1917. In both

('ampalgn~ th'> "\J('{'P"" obtd.lnt'd !:>urprl5pd pVf>n thp \lrtor<;


/COTlCl'ttl dl tatt)('a ted;:>"lca p raffrontl con In roncPzlOn;:> rtahana Ii' franCI'M> 1 Major MaSCia Thp tacHcs of modl'rn armw,> i.;; a con'>tant adaptatlOn to the lmprovp~ ment5 in !:'qUlpmpnt and motors The G(>rman tactICS art' based npon bold­ ness and rapidity of action and, cOIlM'quf'ntiy, thf' German FIeld Service­ RegulatlOn'l tpnd to dPVE'lop InltIatlve and SE'nsp of rpsponsibIhty. 1Iajor M a5('ta dlscu.'>l>I-'l> thp doctrmE's of thps!' thre-e armIes as re-gards reconnai&san('p, security. mpetmg: E'ngag<'m;:>nt, attack, df'fl'nse, pursuIt and employment of tanl,s and arttllpry fiE' cuncludps that the tartles of the­ three armies have man~ pomts in common, but thf' dynamic character of the German and Itahan tactH'~ stand out In ('ontra'lt wah the mpa>lured and me­ thodIcal charactN of thp French ta,ctlcs.


ILe risorse economiche dei paesi mediterranei.l




Ti:1e author conc1udf's hiS Sf'rles of articles on the eronomic resources countries Italy, occupying a central position In the

~f the ~lediterranean



A dpscrlptlOn of the population, religion and languagE's of Albania The

Ghpg<;, inhabit the north and thp Tosks the south.

Thp prinCIpal CIUt'S of Albania are: Tirana (the capital), ScutaM. Valona.

Durazzo and AleSSIO.








C. & G.S.S. Military Review

'Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles THE ITALIAN ARTILLERY IN THE CAPTURE OF THE GURIZIA BRIDGE~ HEAD. IL'artlghena ltahanu nc>lIa prp,>u UI GorlzJa J G('t1{)rai DaUaTI

This 1\ as tiw fir"t o('raSlOn on \\hlCh til!' It.llmn artllll'ry wa~ numPTlrally superior to-that of thE" Au::.tnanl">. \\ hlCh gun> the> Italian.., a dl~tmct ad\ anlage (}VQT theIr pnpmH'S h-hLITARY ROADS.

!Strade milltarl Colonf'l Sh \npr

In th.. cuw-,truction of millt.1ry roMh. h)('al m.llt nalf' <,hould lip utlhzf'd as much a<; pO%lble Th.. grar1!eut.., may b!' ~kppr>r than thOSl> of ordmar) roadg, pro\ ldpd that qPI"p climbs are brnhpn up ol'i\lQunally b". tl.lttcr <;iopps. It j" prpferablp tIl com-trutt a rloubk ro..lIl, u"mg onl' for outgOIng and the other for returmng traffiC JM'O\IO Ft'5TI C,\STkIOTTI, \nLlT\I~Y ,\R( HIT[Xr A~[) IN\F-NTOR


Ilacomo Fu'>tl Ca"tnuttl arch1t,tto Imht"rl' I' In\pntort· 11501­ 1562, I ProfE':>sor Pro\uf-I A blOgrap!w:.l! skt,tch IIf thi., dl"tmgUl-IH'd mil1tolT) itrchltpct, \\iho hp\pI'd Ml('h(-Iangdv fort.fy tlw cd<,tk of St Ang")o ]n 1533 hI' \\pnt to Franrp and r.. . nrll'r(,d dl.'-tmgUl'llwd <" rVlct''- til !lpnr) II .wd hiS ,>u('cp,;"or<, durmg tilt' \"aT" .1gdm<,t England and Spam REVUE O'ARTllLERIE I Fr,lllf'PI Hi CAPTAIN A L l{LIF:S, h·,td Artli1! r;.

April 1939


r·: P agezv '

G('nl"raJ Pagez.} dWr1 16 {<'pbTuary 19,Hl 1-110.. mllttan ('an·IT 1" hrlPfly revlPwpd, partIru\ar!~' thr ouht::mdlng ro!p t h.... pi.;} I d n1 HlP dp\"E'iopmpnt ofantli.\lrcr,tft artllkry tl chnillue, both dUringanliaftnthp \Varof 1914-19HL GEI'.h.RAL

I Lp

Do \\ I' STILL NEED R~LL()()"'" OlhER\ A.TTO'\ <)

. A\on<,-nou,> ('ncor,' be"om rlP 1\lh"Prt.tt1(m par b,t\I,m? 1.lpu1­ Colonpi D'mnllaln , To judg'p from thl' tOIll' of th. art!rjp, tllPrp I~ a "tmng "l·nt!mpnt In Franrl'ln fa\or of ~upprt'<;.'ll(ln of nb"pr'lratlOn balloon" Thf' author makps a plea for mort> ('xhau'>tl\p '-t\1lh of tlw qup~t\tm \\1Ih a \jf'\\ to ri pt p rm1ll11lg tlxarth \\-hat mL<''ilOn" tlw tMll<lon has her....tufor.> hlifilll'd. hm\- \\,,,1] It can contmul' to ('arn them alit amI \\hat nthL'ragl nn,·" t'1.1"t or \\111 bt' rI!'\irloppd In thl' np.1r futurt' \\hlch can hp ('xP"ct, rl t.l pt-rfurm mort· .tdPfjuatt'ly than the balloon TllP ",'T\I('I"- Tl'nrll'rptl In tll\' ,Var ,If 1914-191~ arl" <l matt,'r of r! ror,1 Extract., from th. ·'HI,,,tor} of th,' l.,t al1d 2d Balloon H.f'glml'nt .. " .Irf' quoted to sho\\ tht' ('xf"nt 'to I\}l\('h b.tlloon obs!'n.atlOn \\,!,- utl\lz,'d and lts t'fficacy. Thl' author conplmho; tbat 1ll gpn(;-ral, 111 (,Jp<1r \\t>atllPr. ant"' balloon \\<1<' \\orth 1\\0 ""radnU(',> of plan!'s In thp pl'rtorm<lll('p oj mh!'lon" approprlatl' to It Th, J, mnnl'-trah·.I .vlvant.tgl''3 of ba1Joon~ 1\ lth r, '>p,·ct to Obsl'rvatlOn planP'> arl' I'Ontlfw,lU<, ,lbO;crv.HlOn from a platform which B practIcally fixpd, ulllntprruptpn v>I, phonH' l'llmmUllll'at!On \\Ith the agf'ncw., utlhzlng It;, Illform.\t,on. rapid and prl'l'l"" trlln .. ml~Slon of lllt1lrmutlOn: fn·edom from problt'm'" of navlgd.tlUn, o.pfpn".' . tbl<; Iwmg ,1 rl'... pon~I1nlItj. of ground agpn~ CIpS) ano CllmmU!llcutJon. dalh .l"lt'I,~I(m .. nf l""g durdtlOn III famlhar tpr­ rltory; ('ompipk rqUlpm"Ht \\\tl1 iat.''-t m<,p"', dMrt" and \)tlH'r aln'>, fip\d glass!'s, and mean" of pl(Jttmg or ~ltlwn\I"p rr-pordmg mformatlOn The planp, on till' nth!'r hand, p0.,<.I·-..... PO'; tIll' ali\,llltdgP of \prtJ('ul ob,>prvation at cio<;(> range At prp"rnt oh::,pt\ alltJII )<; It"" necessary to th,· army a'- It hal', bf'cn m the pa<,t and terf('... tnal nb,>pn'atlon may \wll lw a'> difficult to obtam as f"1.VE'r CnnilflmnatLOn of thr- bailoon g.'ncralh procPf"d" from cotnpan<;on of the baltoon of 191B With th\.' 'l.Irplanp and thl' .1.rtllll'ry of t\\l'nty ypars latef. The AVlatlOIl .Man,'u\-cr<; Regulatlllns of 1925 rpl"'ogmz{' thl> prmclplt's that farlhtw<; for mr ob'>t'T\ atlOn mu"t bp pconom12pd by rPflUlrmg of thp.m only thosp miSSIon., \~ hich ,)th,'r agpncl!''> Cdnnot fulfill and that airplanE'S must bl' utIilzpd ;.o\ply for tho'>\' .llr ml<,:-;lon" \\juC'h ar\.' Lt';,ond the capahlhtw<; of balloons. If mrplan p dr..... r]'lpml'nt has rl'nrli'r('rl th(' balloon of no furthpr usr, It is evident that l'ach arm\' corp~ mu.,t bl" PtlUlPppd With :J. ('('rtam lrrpduclblE:' mmimum of pi.l.npO; and fjualifh>d ob".·r. er., to furm<.h that mformatlOn \\ hlch tf'rrestrlal ob:;;l'ryutlOn cannot afTor!} A'> tlllS rf'qmrrmcnt dOl''> not appear to bE' capabh' of fulfiUmpnt for fiv{ or pvpn tpn vpar", balloon"l must carry out thplr traditIOnal function", or a <,atNfactory suh"tltutf> must bp found The SUb<;tItutl' must offf'r oh"prvation at h>ast af> E'ffecti\ E' as that of halloons: It must, III addltJOn, hI" 11",,-; \,ulnPTabJe and If'nd Itsdf morp rpaddy to dr>ff'nse. Thesl? rl'QUlu'mpnts mdudp thp ahl!!tv to ob.,pr\'(' durmg all dayhght hours, \\E'athf'r cond!tlOns and ho,>iljp actlvItlP'> pprmlttmg, stability m thp air, mamten.lllCP of ob'>l'rvation on ".pveral ohjf'C'th P'l concurrpnt!}, and pifpctiw, i'ontinuQu:;, ('ommunication" ThE' SUhStltutp "hould prpspnt a smallpr target than the balloon to hoo;tl1p air attacl~ nnd artlilpry firp or bE' bpttpr able to 3\Oid attack FmuUv. 1t shoulrl rngagp fp\"er mpn and lE'o;" materlrl for Its dpfrmse The onf SUb-.tltutp so far oifprpd for rOll'>ldpratlOn IS the autogiro, a machinr which ha~ not progrf'""pd hpyond the t"xpl'nmental stage for military use, At tllP prpwnt time balloon capablhtlf'-' aff' bpmg msuffirlPntly pxploited. ConSideratIOns of exppn::.e have hmdf'Tpri dp\,plopmpnt and both the artHle-ry and higher echelons of command and staff hav\.' npglectt.>d to uHhze this important service_


The essential problem undrr existmg conditions is to determine whether or not the banoon can be mamtamed m the alr; that IS, whethpr or not it can be defended In the War of 1914~191$ many were shot down; on the other hand, many compani(>s were able, through traming and dlSciplinE', to reduce losses to a very small numbpr in proportion to services rendered. By a curIOus qUirk of judgmpnt. however, (,ltatlOns and dp.('oratlons were usually awardpd to unIts m the mpasurp m WhICh they suifE'red losses On thp whf'le, the testimony of history is inconclusive and experimentatIOn must determme the capacity of modern equtpment and trainmg for defendmg the ballooh agamst artillery fire and aenal attach, SuccpssfuI attark by aVIatIOn dpppnds upon surpnsp An extpnMve warning sl'rvi("p E'nables the ground crew to rppl 10 the balloon befor(' the attack matpriahzes and to greet tllP marauder WIth automatiC' fire. In the last war, "ome corps commandf'rs dlSpospr!some of thplr antiaIrcraft artIllery bO that a vlsible barrage would discourage the ofIf'n~l\ (> spmt of the attacking airmen. \VhllE' present regulatIOns do not cowr thiS pOSSibility, its eifectlV(l­ ness cannot be o\iprestimated, Thf' qUf'~tlOn of e>ffiraclOUs dpfl'no;e cunnot. how(>ver, be answflred by hl.<;torical referpnce or arguml'nt; It must be answeTpd by ('xperlml'nt If adpquate protectIOn agamst hostile aircraft IS po",sible, the risks involved arp dlbadvantageous to thp attackl'r. The cost of plttmg a very eXpellf!!Ve plane manned by a pdot, hlghly tramed for tins specml work, agmmlt a balloon of comparativt'ly 1o\,; ('ost. capabI .. of rapid descent, and protp('ted by antiaircraft weapons, may \\ell b\.' prohibitive, Another problem to bl' sohrpd by p.xpl'T1mpntahon is that of the vulner~ abilttv of baJloons to artlllNY firt"' Balloons can, by rapId vortieai movpment, prp':.ent a flretmg target, thpy po<,:o;.pss also thp ability of identifymg ho~tlle battprl!'"' to fril'ndly cuuntprhattpry agpncH''>. The decl<:;lOn, Illvoh"lIlg as It dol'S till' Vital qUf';,tlOn of obsprvatton, must not bl? based on prPJudj('p or prpconcl'lv£'d notions. TllP Gprman army has reconstltutpd ItS "balloon battNIl''','' attachmg thl'm dlrl;'ctly to the artillery Lack of study and pxpenments should not be al!Q\wd to piace the Fn'nch army III a ">1tuatlon comparable to that of 1914 \\hen all of ItR field balloon compaml;'s had been abohsh('d and Its fortil'iN umt;, WPTl' on the \ierge of dlSRolutlOn. NOTES ON FIRJ~G IN THE VICINITY or FRIENDLY TROOPS IN MOl.'N­ TAINOUS TERRAIN•

[:NotE> sur Ie tir au vOlsmage ues troupps amjps t·n montagnp 1 Cap­ tamAIllf'rpt TllP problem IS to determme the minimum safe quadrant f'ievation \\hlCh may be uspd III firmg in support of mfantry m tprram \\hf're the great dlffer­ pncp In altltud(l hpt\\l'pn battpry and targPt rl'l}U1rps thf> f'mpioympnt of "ppclal mpthod., Frpnch firing regulation"'; for mountain warfare gh e a mathl'matlcal .solution ba~ed on formula" \\'h\('h till' d.uthor find" may bp difficult to rt'mpmbpr, to dl'Tlvp or to app!\' III tIl(' fipld He suggpsts a graphieal mf'thod of apprmnmatlOns III wlurh the errors are Said to hE' on the SIdp of safety_ A profi}f' of the terram h mg m the pInnp of fire betwPE'n the frIendl), front Imps and the target ,ared IS constructed •FIgure No. 1\ On the

FIGURE :r-..o, 1

horlzontal hne, L H, pa5sing through the most ad ... anced pOint of the front linps, a dlstan('€'. L A, IS laid off pqual to the effectIve hurst radius of the projectile used Through A a Ime IS drawn slopmg upward in the dIrectIOn of fire and making an angle of 45" With the horizontal Depending upon the configuration of the tflrrain, tillS Ime may intersect the profile in one or mor£' points (P, P', P", f'tc. I Bursts on Impact short of this line wIll produce shflll fragments effectIve at L

~~xi~~~ ii~:~~~~!fgh~s~}\~1~:t ~faen;r:o~~d;ht~b!eCredi~~d~:e~~~~d

The and to thIS is added th(' hnear value of four probable errors m heIght 1f

~~~~~,g~;r~11f'1 ~~ili:~~t ::d~~J~u(':~lJ:~ta~('!eb~~gn~~~ ~~~r~~\~~f!i

~~~~:inceg~:::~h~ ~~~n\~Oc~~~~~o~dl~h~oin~~rp~t1p~. o!t~~isl~i~heW~;~et~i perCUSSlOn fire_

eleva1~:vfi;~db~~;~ b~ t~~eIi~~i~hg ~Hi'p~~l;c!o~ {'~:~:{'~ft1~~~~:~~~ s~~~a~~~ldrrb:St~k~~n~r~~tliff~~~fi[~~gfi~~ ~~b~:~~l i~rt~r; ;~~~ti~~~~h~





Vol. XX No:76


Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles

Mean range =4632. Corre~ponding correction·= +263 Smce thE:' corrertlofls for the last two mean rangps has bpen the samE', the final corrected range is 4763

On the hOflzontalline P X through P (Figure No 2). a dIStanCf', P C. IS laid off equal to the range value of one fork. Similarly. on the vertical line •

y I

... ..... ~






"' .....



----- -----'C---X FIGlTRF



P y, through.P, a distance, P H, IS laid off ('qual to the wrtical dIstance be~ tW£'f'n the traJ(>ctorif's pasSing through P and C respE:'ctiveiy Points Band C are JOlnpd by a line whose InterRectlOn wIth the terrain at D gIH'S the POInt on the ground short of whIch firf' Will he dangf'rous to frlendly troops To determmean apprmnmate value for P B, we must calculate accurately the quadrant elevatIOn necessary to firp on P and that to fire on an ImagInary POint .1.t the RamP. range as P but at an altItude 100 yards higher than P. DIViding 100 by the dlfferencp between the two quadrant elevatIOns gIves th£' H'rtlcal E:'qUlvalent In yards of onf' mil dIffprpncf' m elevation Multl­ pl}lng h~ tht.> numlwr of mlh; III a fork gives us the distance P B.

The basIS of this prmciple is not discussed in the artirle but It seems evtdent from the ra~t that the range ~orrect1{ms eorresponding to a certai.n map range, as 4500, for instance, will be actually produced only on a trajec­ tory passing through the targf't and having the maximum ordinate given in the firing tables for a trajectory of that length of base under standard condItIOns. Application of the corrections theoretically gIves a trajectory passmg through the target, the trajectory itself has been altered. however, by conditions not standard and has a maXImum ordinate differing from that given in thE:' finng tables m the same Sf'nse as the trajectory which cor­ responds, undpr standard conditions, to the J::ange which we have called above the first corrected range Thus, th~ corrections which are actually appiled should corrpspond to a trajprtory haVlng the map range as a bas~, a quadrant elevation eorrespondmg to the correctf'd. range and a maXlmum ordinate midway hetv,.een the maximum ordinates of the two trajprtories under standard rondltions With hases of map range ahd corrected range respec­ tl\tely. Lieutenant Carrette proposf'S two methods. one graphical and one by formula, for performing III one step the calculatlOns described In the first paragraph of thiS diSCUSSIOn GRAPHICAL METHOD .. '

Vnder a gIven Jlap


of {'ondltIOns he plots hIS rurve as folIo,,":;,.


CalCllla/l'd CorreC/1Om,


+ 200


;Champ de tlr vE'rtical perspectlf 1 (II) Captain Crpspin Thw. artide, begun in the Issue of March 1939, is ('onduded In the April ISSUf' The follOWing IS a brIPf dIgest of the complete artIcle. A panorama, pamted or photographed, IS applIed directly or proJected by lantprn on a vertical translucpnt scref'n Bursts are represf'nted by small electric lights behind the screen, a trIangular red light indIcates a burst or lmpact Visible In Its entm>ty; a \\"hite circular hght mdicates an air burst compJptE:'ly viRihle; two vertlCal WhItf' hnt.>s reprf'sent an ··over" or any opaqup OblE'ct except for "over~" near the crest of a hill, for which a white ~egl!lE'nt of a Circle IS uRed The dIfferent color~ and forms arp obtamed With a shde mounted on the lamp for each piece. lt IS argued that thIS eqUipment prpsents to a group of students a much more reahstH' pleture of a target area than \s po~s1ble with a terram board . ar.d that from every positIOn 1ll fhp room thp tf'rraln IS seen as though from pxartl~ thp same obserVIng pomt. Thus, ,ll! observers see rounds in the same Telatlull to the ObJN'ttve as thf' pf'rson firmg It IS furthpr clalmpd that all e!f'mellt<; of a fire command can hi> appllE:'d u('("uratf'ly and rapIdly, that thE' eqUipment is not unduly expensive .md that it can hp readtly set up, dis~ mounted and transported. That the apparatus IS mgenIous IS incontE'stnble. It reqUlres, however, In rf'ur of the scrppn a dIfif'rpnt master chart for pvpry dlffE:'rent poslt1On of the battery With respect to the obseI'\ atlou post. On these master charts a Sl'nes uf Imps running m a general hOrIzontal direction rppresent thE' varIOUS tang€"- and carry, bpsidl's, an mdlCation of the ('orrectlOn gwmg a zero height of bur'-! at that range Anothpr senes of Imp~. genf'rally vertIcal, represents the nflOUS planes of fire corrpspondmg to dlfferpn! deflection settmgs The lDterSl'rtIOn of the approprw,te horizontal and vertlcal hnes marks the level POInt o)f any partIcular tra]E:'rtory Othpr symbols on the mastf'r chart Indicate crests and othE'r objects wluch mask ohsprvation on rounds beyond and helow thpm Effects of s!V', corrector and dISpf'rsion are provided for bysrale,:> affecting adjustment of the lights. A final refinement proYldes hnes on tl)(> mastf'r chart showmg the InChnatIOn to be given the light supports In lah·r..i l time fire In ordpr that the apparf'nt latNal dISplacement of rounds (lue to corrector changes may he ohserved In proper relatIOn Tl·ese conSideratIOns lead the reader to believe. Without further enlight­ enment, that the apparatus would reqUIre the serVIces of a full-time expert to de:;'l~n the mastE:'r charts and to operate thp mprhanism Wlthout ludl£'I'OUS d.nd great delay between ·'rounds "


INote au sujet de la determinatIOn de la distancp corrigee 1 Lieu­ tenant Carrette F rt'nch firing regulations state that, when determmmg range corrections fur rOlldltions not standard, greater accuracy can be expected H the correc­ tlons L'orrespondmg to the mean bptween the map range and the first cor­ te<:.ted range are taken and applied to the map range rather than takIng the first corrected range as final. By repeating the same process several times With £>.lch new corrected range obtatnE:'d for a given map range we finally arnve at a point where the final corrected range does not change by repeti­ tion of t he process. E" map range =4500. Corresponding eorrection= +250

1st corrected range = 4500 +250 = 4750

Mean range =4625. Correspondmg correction = +263

2d corrected range = 4500 +263 =4763



.\-coordmates of plotted po~ntl"·

4000 -

200 - ~ 3900 2

Y- coordinafes

. of ploued pmnts

+ 200 0

300­ 5000 - "2='1850




400 6000

.... 400










On hIS graph thp corrertIOn (Y-rpadlng) for any map range (X-reading) lS therefore equal to that obtamed by our series of mathematIcal approxlma­ tlOns ThIS IS shown 111 the artIcle both algeb-ralcally and by applicatIOn to a particular problem. . FORMt;LA METHOD

By algphr<u(' mpthotis Lleutf'nant earrptte> dpduces thE' formula. final computed COrtf'etlOn corrected rangf' = m<lp rangp.l.. -- a is the tangent of the 1 (! 2 angle bet,,"een thp X-axIs of thE:' graph in the grapillcal mpthod and the cor­ rection cunc, thE' ldtter bemg theOrE:'tlcally a stralght'lme betwe€n any two ranges whl<'h are even multIplps of 1000 yards PractIcally, It is det£srmined by subtractmg the correetlons rorrespondmg to thE' two evpn multIples of 1000 yards greater and less respectlvely than the map range and divldmg thiS dliIerenct.> by 1000 . Of the t\\O, the formula mpthod seems to be thc.more practical. The graphl('al mrthod would r(lqUlrt' th(l ('.on::.trurt1On of a ::,eparate graph for {'ach dIrection of fire on a ,"'('ather correcthm diagram and would consE'quently appear to economlzP Ilttjp tIme or ('fiort ovpr the origmal m('thod mdl('ated III the firmg regulatIOns. MISCELLANEOUS Il\oF'ORMATION.

IRen,>pignt'ment;:. dl\Trs I

Orgalllzation: United State:;: Orgamza:tlOn of the infantry d!vlslOn. Italy. Mlhtary forcf's Armamrnt: Chma' Thp Hotrhkl':(S AntIalrcraft machine gun. Yugoslavia: Artillery composition and armament. United Statps School of Stratpgy of Supply tArmy Indw",trJaI CoIiegpl. Grpat BI'Itam. Rf>orgamzatlOn of the Staff School. May 1939 AN HIS'IORIrAL ACTOl "11


IL'empiOl de l'artlllerte au cour" df' l'HlstOlrp. De Marignan :i Waterloo. I. Pendant les guerres d'italie. II. Au tpmps d'Henri IV.1 General Pf'yregne The War of 19-14-1918 was characterIzed in grf'at part by siE:'ge operations on a vast scale. 1t is to be expected that in a future war both sides will





C. & G.B.S. Military Review

. . Catfllog uf. Selected Periodical Articles

f~o~et~:i~n~ t~h~a~~~~r~~g~et~e~~::Cl~h:e ~:;i~~ ~!~~~e:~~{>th~~~tE'~~~ of the l'nem} 's rountry Tht'"p art> the considE'ratHms WhICh have lead the author to stud) the history of artillt·ry rmploymE'nt with particular emphasis on its USE' in op!'n Warfarf' In the Praneo-Italian Wars of the slxtp(>nth ('entury. cannon played an Important rol(> Thr.> proportIOn of artdlE'ry to Hlfantry. bptwf>p.n 4 and 7 pi('ces to every 1000 infantrympn ,\Va!, greater than was ever agam attained

until the War of 1914·1918 and gi'eat effort was made to keep thE' arttllery WIth thf' 3.rlvancmg army, evPn m,thp 11'l:o<;t mountmnous terrain Thf' pro­ tpetlOn of thpartillf>ry. on thp maroh. durmg thp deploymE'nt. and III combat, \\ a~ .a lll,tJor preoccupatllln of th~ ('ommandpr and It fully ]ustlfipd tbp!:.!'

ml','~Uf(''' b~ thp dCf>tructlOll wrought m th\:' ho~tll(' rallk~ and by thp demor.. ahzmg pliP('t produ(,pd, particularly wh('n enfiladmg the I?nf>my or taJ~mg hIm in t Ill' fear from po".ltlOn" mltw.lly cont't'aled Th£> hostllp mfantry wa!';, of np"l~'-lt), the ~{)lp objl'ctlve of thf''''!' parly pIN'es, thpir maccuracy pre­ \ rnt",} P/i,'ctl\ (' U">t' III ('Iluntprbattflr:. Thl' ma<,smg of fire'; on the front of tht mam d10rt ~\a" unthr:,tooJ but It!> (>XPC'utlOn, dup to short rangps and to tIlt' t'\pmrntarv "haractpr of tl1(' mate.rwl. dpppndpd upon physlCal groupmg of rna:,... .' '> llf artIllery ,m dIE' dl'CIS1\ I' front Thpsf' PH;-C(',:>, commltt(>d ImtJall) ~'n tilt:' lmt uf b.J.tth·, could not bp wlthdra\\n. thl' mam actIOn took pldCE' on tlw ground th,'}" ,I('cupwd and th,> guns had to llP dl>fendpd to the utmost if th \ kll Into tIll' ,'n(>m~ .., hands. thpy IIPr" qU1C'kly turm>d Upon thplT !..ttl' mJ.,t.!'r'- TIl<' mlJdprn develupmpnt of mpchaniZ0d attac1~ Illdlcatp,,> a rdurn [tl tlu,> t} p' of do,>p-rangp combat 1n l\lllch thf' artll]pl) \"Ill camp tn g\"IP" \\\th tIll' hw-tlh fO\"I;:I'.... , At tlu B.luh· wf i{,l\pnna. an attpmpt Ihb mad", to prp,>PT"I/p the frpPdom \If Mt\uO of th . . SPiLllI"h c~lmm,mdt>r hy tllP con<,tltution of J mobllp artlUrry r(-.,-T\, .. f tll,-nty nr "" (uh(nnf' on armorpd carTlagp,,: Failure to commit till .. r"",'np at thl' (It-n<'IV1 mumi'nt Tt"mltfod In fmlure of thl' (>xp!?nmf'nt Th,' n.. l'........lty of tp'lm\\,)r\{ hpt\\ppn thf' drtlUpry ami thp ,,;upportl'd Iflll)P'" \\.1" dfmon~\rat,d III "p\'eral actIOn::. \\ihen mfantrv and cavalry, ,Id\'anrmg h,'~ond thp r.lUg' IIf th!' <lrtlilpry and It'> capa(,lty of follolHng or m<I~\\lng 1t'> fir< , \, 1ft' '>('t upon hy tllP (>npmy and dp::.troypd ~,'.nl)- a ('~nt\ lat( r, IfFnr} of Navarrp \Hotr> a np\\, chaptf'r m thl' ll1-tory of \\arfar!' 111., trn,lp" '''f'rp fl'w In Cl)mparlSon \\'lth tho'w ht' fa(,pd dnd \\I'(f 1\{.J.h In arulkry, Bueh artlll€'ry <1'; he had I\a,,> not rf'addy dlSw pland 1·ro11, r th, '-,P unf<l\oruhlp ponfhtlOns Hpnry dl'3tmgUl'lhl;'d hlm::.plf by l)lghl~ ,1l"CIII(' U'.I' o! h'rT<Hn and manpUl.l'T HI'< t<lrtlC.s, rE'liuc£'d to 'lIm· plht t,·rm." (','d of ",-l<'rtmg ,\ "trong, commanding pO'<ltwn With una"­ -.,.ld,tol, lian\.. ~ on th,· !'n"ill\ S route til hi:; OhJPC'tl\P, opC'upymg thIS pO<.ltlOn \\1111 a rnn.mum oJ! In!4ntr~ ..trongi)- rnnforCPtl \\olth artllh'rh hara::.smg the ~'l'Ipm\ \\Jtil \I~,)r,)u~ .!ttad~::. by cavaln and lnfantry so u" to dra'\ him to\\<lrtu., tlw pu<.itllJn ~~h'ct,·d, anti then manpu"\prmg·t thl' ho'<t1]p. nanl,.."an,l fI.l.r "Ith th( ma<.~ of hi'> fore!';. \Ihpn th[> c'nt'my I\as ("Immltt,'d tl) aiU\f'k pi th .. pn"'lt1l1n


DmEn I'mr:: AND

p"nl1U { T J IRC

. .\11lf\l;', d" tlr tiP 1 arnlh'rJ" tiP D (' A Tlr OlT<'Cf Pt flf mdlfpct I C,tpl<1HI Ff'rn! r TI\o Ilppn"Jng \.jf-'\\]'- ar, prl'<,pntf'd \\Ithout ('omml'nt. I'af'h ofil'rl'fj a'l It mIght h" hI a pr<>\,tgnlJl"t o! tl11' ml'th,)d gn I'n Apr, hmmar.\ ,)ri,'nt,ltlOo I'Aptalll<' thut batter!!'" \\ihlch f>Xl'cutp d!r('C't flr,~ arp I-QUlppPfl \\lth an tn"trumpnt for tra(,\-lllg thf' targf't and WIth thp colkulat,'r ll' CP··-.,,)T\ tur htymg thl' PI1'f'P With rf'l,p€'ct to thp mstrumrnt "0 that a prnJP,td,' tind \\111, tiworl-'tle'llly. mf'd thp targPt at a prpdl('tl'd pomt, ilatt< rl< " l'(ll,lppl',l for indlII'('l flI(> art' i.l.ld b::. thl'lr cre'''s accordmg to trar\-l1,g und {'aklilatlllg opl'T<ltHln" w'rformf'(l by a (,pntrsl fir"-('ontrol <,pd),m Th,' firmg- umt undpr prf",\pnt tabIt''> of orgamzatlOn and COn(,pptJOn"l h th,' huH, r.\ of four PW('I'S, It pannot hI" ~ubdl"'l!iE'd When sound !<)('iltnr..... th"'l' mu-t h,' po.. . t1·d .l.l j, u"t 3 m}lf>'" III atlvancl' of tIll-' PI!'('!',>, mdl­ r, It fir" h,ltt,·n,·,> nnl.\ (',~11 ullhz, thl'm THE.. ('~""E FOR j"'DiRFfT FInE



allLlgp" ar,'

t I SIght til filM!p I~ ITI!!fh !nur.. dII'('tl\ 1', TIll' only ",It'mt'nt \\ hll'h llPpli hI" "It, 11 j,ll f.t\'llrablf> nb-.,(>rvatlOn IS the> (,pntml .firf'-('ontrol ".('t-up and tlll_, <;"Pdfllt"d from tlw PJ('P(,<', 1~ rpanlly ('amfluftag€'d, 2' Targ{ t d""'gn.1tlon and Irjpntllkatwn ('nn('(>rn" only thf' onp group \\Illl'h h under th,> dlfl'ct :;'UPCf\1..10n of thl' batter~ command .. f, no ('rror In 1,1,'nt!!lC.ltlnn ,U1rl rl':,ultant f'cattcrmg of fire occurs ,3' Th.. numb1 r of cnmpi1cutnrl In"t:rumpntf> ha!' bf'pn rpdu(,pd WIth '·C'(Hlom:'. {If mon"~, ~p"nahz('d ppr::.onnrl, and mamtl'nancp ('ffort 'i' Th,' firp-('ontrol group (lppratp~ at ,1 dl'lt.1n('p from thp rll<,tfactWg lllli~,' ane! actl\lt~ lJl tll" \lrmlt\ of thl' Plt'CPf',

It~ dl~aJ\'antag\"


1\ Thr> comphcutpd and e!ehc,l.t,· CII1UmUll1CatlOn s;}'m np{,p<;sary to tran'>mlt data to tIll' guns \'> rhffiC'ult to mamtam anrllt~ m!>tallatlOn Involve., bomp ddu::. III ('mpla(,lng a battpr\' Thi." objection obtain5 i'qually {or tlw othpr 'l~stf>m, hO\\P"Pf, a~ \'01(,<' communicatIOn during finng is uttPrly impraC'tlcabk. \~ I The difficulty of do"'!' dpf(>nsf' of thp battpry It..,e!f agamst dlrpct attach hy ho<,t1lp grnund {,lfCI''' To mf'f't till'>. objPction, t:'ach piecle' mu.::t be ('fjuippcd 1\ ith ~ightf' ne('f'~f;ar) for rhr('ct laying. (3) Tlw ('omphcatJOTI In a "'ystf'm WhICh rrqUIrl'S ('omputatlOn at a firl::'-contrnl (,pntral of mpan data for th.' battPfY as a whole On thl' othpr hand ~uch a mt,thod rEO"mit" m umform distributIOn of fire whIch compensat€'" in grpat mE'a<;urp for {'rror& that may come from the compleXity of operatIOns.


(4) Dppl'ndence of the batt&ry on a Single control sy<3tem which may be put out or action, This is the one real disadvantage that carries any weight. In both systems, df'pE'ndf'nce IS placed upon data rppol'tpd centrally a~ to altitude. speed. dlrection l and rangE' of the target. To meet the objectIOn, (>qmpml'nt and men for two fire-(,ontrol centers must be provided so that the second can take over If the first goes out Such a provision almost ml'!;:ts m part dIsadvantage number one preceding. The second fire-control group OCCUplP's a new posltlon and completes all installatlOns bpfore the battf'ry dlf>places from thE' old pOO;!loon. THE CASE FOR DIRECT FIRE



Flr:,t of ail, a dlstm('tlon must be made between the of antlalrrraft batterl('~ WIth the moblle forces In the fiE'ld and hose aSSigned to deff'Dst> of rl'ar arl'a:-. In tllP lattl'r case, nE'itll€'r thp adva tages nor the dlsad.. antagf's of thp mdlrc>ct fin· <;y'l!l'm carry any wt>lght, n gf'nf'ral the '<y&trm lS prpferablp. In the antnur('raft artllJf>ry WIth the field forces, the SItUatIOn is ({mho dllIprpnt Thf' commandf>f of an mdlrpct fire battery IS forcl'd elthl'r to staggf>r his battrry ov€'r a front of some 300 yards and. by computing mpan data for hIS guns sacrIficE' accuracy of fir€' or ebe, neglectIng the safHy of hIS gum, he mu."t concpntratp l'hpm anri E'XpOSf' th£'m to d(>structlOn. The filrt'ct-firc battpry, on thp othpr hand, can ble' wid('ly spacpd, tprraln pprmlttmg and. :'!n(,f' parh Pll Cf' i... indpppndl'ntiy ad]ustpd to place Its cent(>r of Impart on thE' targl't, more IUQ; ~hould rf'sult. It mu.;;t not be ove-rlooked, hOlwvpr, that thl::' \\idf' dl~p('rsmg nf PIf'Cl-'& crt:'atPs an jncr('a~('d possibility of error m targl>t Idl'ntlficatlOn. that It mal~('" th" pxerCls(' of command more dlfficllit, and that the t('rram frl'qlll'ntl~ restricts the choice of separatt'd gun PO::'ltlon'> Thp <:;oiutlOn to the pTt)blpm ~f'pms to he m comprOmIse or, morf' accu­ rakly 1·J\.pr""s~'d. III grl'utpr fl"Xlblllt)-, that IS. an orgamzation pl'rm1ttmg ('{>ntrahzl'u battf'ry control, ('ontrol by platoon. or thf',rl'rf>('t systpm. Thr advuntagps of such an orgaUizatlon arf' obvIOUS The ObjectIOns to this proposal are three-fold: first. each battery must bE' eqUlpp('d v.ith an mcrea::-ed numb('f of fire-control units: second. the fire of a platoon alonE' Oll a taq:~et 1'< hf'iu:,ved in some Quartets to be meffectlve. thm, negating part of thf> proposal's claim for ta('tJ('al flexiblhty; third, a platoon firmg at mght hy dirPct~fire met hods cannot bp adjusted by sound locators To the first Oh]ectlOli reply 1S maae tJwt que~tlOns of f'conomy should not bp allowed to interff're V.lth an t'ssentJaI improvement. that for cprtam hatterles hOW In 8€,rv\('E' (Itlly one or two additional fire-control units would be reQUlred, and that provi:'>lon of thi? neC€5..<;ary eqUIpment IS cE'rtainly 1f'SS dIfficult and costi;} than thE' replacement of entire batterles destroyed In war a<; a rp<mlt of lllcorrect lUltwl orgalllzatlOn As to thp pfi'P('tivenE's": of fm> by a smgle platoon. it appears that 1I thp method Villl allow greatpr aCf'ura('~, E'XPOSP thp pIeces lef>s to destructIOn. and pprmlt the engagmg of a large numller of planes With the same quantit)" of mate-rlPI, fire by platoon may mOrf' effectl'.ely nE'utrahzf' hostII€' aVIatIOn and nt'utralizatlOn of t hp ma!';~ rath€'r than destructIOn of slogle planes IS thp trup mlsswn of J.ntlaJrcmft ••(tiller) FII1,t1h. If platoons flring dm'ct fir(' cannot lIe adjusted by sound locators. th£> samp ohjPctlOn 18 equally apphf'uhle to any fire UnIt III the forward areas .whl're thp sound locators ('an not be SIted sufficlentl~ In advance of th" guns to furm"h u<.ahle d,l.ta a.nd where the confuslon of hattie renders <;Qund l'qulpm(,llt u:;plp~s anyhov. ~PEUAL I A~r;~ OF EFI ECT OF

\VIM1 ON PROJECTILE!), 1 Captam Lagardl re Tlw f'fi'ect of non-standard m.:>tE'or%glcul condltwns on artJllery fire and the mt>ans of correcting mltml dut,l to compPlJ&ate for It arE:' well covf'red In regulatIOns. Tv,(l ('a~f>'> arlO' trf'ated hf'rE' V.hlCh. nnlE'ss understood hy the batten command{'r. may gnp surprismg rl'sults, in agreement with the :luthor. It can be said that rhf> only solutlOn In these rasf'S IS a careful sur­ wlllancE' of fire b} any or all rn(>ans avallahlp and pOSSIbly, In the second ease. a s.usp€'llslon or postponpmpnt of fin> durmg the time that abnormal atmos­ phenc condItIOns persist Thf' fir>;t ca"'e IS that wlJE're a terram ma:;s of large proportIOns hlocks or rf'stncts the movpment oJ thE' \\-md, The pifert is best understood With reference to a mountamous mlge lymg pf'rpE'ndicular to the dlret'tlOn of mov{'rtlf'ut of the wmd The IOWf>f layers of the .atmosphere are compressed hetwf'f'n the UppfT la:ters and the ground surface and a hIgher velOCIty of the lowE'r layer'> IS produced ~u('h al" occurs In the venturI tube of a caruuutor The effect on a prO]ectljp pa&smg through the lower a1JmosphE:'ric layef<; IS to mrrea&f' or decreusf' the range, depl?nding upon the wmd dIrection ThIS effe(,t IS complkated by the In('r(lased atmospheriC density and the lu\\ered temperature In the regIon of accelerated wmd velOCity Another result that may affect fire for some dIStance ghort of or bpyond the ('rE'st 1S the c['{'aHon of eddies heneath the atmo'>pheric layers which succeed In passing the Cl'f'st Stlll another effect IS the dl?formation of wind movement where it paSSf!S lateraJl~' around thp rIdge The C'Ondltlons vary endlessly with changes In wind dlrf'('twn and varlatwns ill the form and In the POSItion of the tf'rfmn lea::. partlrullPr de l'il,tluencp du Yent sur leslProjectIles

~:~~;;itsho~~fo~to}Ot~~e ~~~t\~~ ~~ t~~lreu~:id~;~i~ ~~~~~1~~e"u~:ra~~id

conditlons, it IS es!';entJaI to undprstand thp causps of variat10ns produced

~h~n:~~ndb:~~~~:il~~s~\~:~t:del~u:h~t~fd:~~~d~~ ~~~~W~~~~mpanied

and by a rapid change lU direction a.nd :;peed of the wind, a correspondmgly rapId rJse III harometrl(' pressure and a decrease III temperature a!1~ otMr condiuo~~ seTlou~ly affectmg the flight of prOjectiles and the pOSSIbIlIty 0jf observatIOn, both terrE'stnal and aerIal. MeteorologiQaI readings are dltfiCU t


No. 76

Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles

If not impossible to obiam and are nullified almost lmmpdlately> When

observation fails completely, the only recourse appears to be to postpone operations until atmospheric conditions again stabili:ze




!Methode graphique de determination prealable des possibilites d'observation] (l) Lieutenant Chamouard The system described is intended to furnish a graphical representation 01 the area visible from any proposed observation post together with a panoramIc sketch so dIstorted that any topographical feature on the chart appE'ars on the hne joinmg thf' plotted position of the observation po'>t on the chart with the same topographical feature on the panoramic sketch. The chart carnes. not the actual contours of the terrain represented. but curves obtamed from intersectmg the ground surfaces with a series of cones, each bavmg the obsE'rver's eye as the apex and havmg its surface correspond wIth the successive positions of the line of sighting as the eye, fixf'd at a certain angle of site. scans the terrain. The resulting curves afe called equisite [equal site) curves. The construetIOn of the paraphernalia neeessary to form the graph, as well as that of the graph itself, IS qUIte complicatpd. It is difficult to see what object IS serv~d that IS not attamed more slml?ty and rapidly by con­ structIOn of the vislbIhty sketch famihar to our SE'rv]('e, when a bripf exami­ natIOn of the map or a personal reConnalssancp IS Illeffectlve


[Note sur l'efficacite dp-s tIrs d'arrpt dans Ia de-fense rontre les chars, I LlImtenant BrunSWIck This study }S less extensive than that of LieutE'nant Colonel Duval m the March Issue of "Revue d'Arttllene." and makes greater Uf>e of apprmn­ matlOns III applymg the theory of probabihtles. The,concluslOn IS that the probablhty of securmg at least one hIt from a 75-mm gun battE'ry, firing at the maXImum rate on a 100-yard front at a fixed range of 3,000 yards on level ground, agamst a hne of tanks. advancing frontally "'Ith an mtE'rval of 50 yards betwE'E'n tanks, IS only 3 h' , The tanks are conSIdered to be movlllg at a speed of about 11 mIles per hour and durmg the time that thE'Y are crossing thE' zone of dlSpE'fsion of the barrage, the battflry ran firE' about 13 rounds. To the study is appflnded a graph bJ- mE'ans of which the probability of obtammg at least one hit IS determmed WIth r!='o;pect to any gIven number of rounds and to any gl'ven probabIlity that E'aeh round has of stnkmg the target.

\\'hlle the chances of obtammg a direct hit are much reduced, the author .lttarhes great Importanep to thp moral effect on fnendly troops of ..uch anti, tank lMrrage fire and to the effect of smokE' and dust on thE' mobility of the ';anks MISCELLANEoes INFORMATION.

lRenselgnements dlVE'rs.,

Armament: England AntIaIrcraft guns ,9,8, and 12 cpntimeters i A machine gun eqUipped for automatic e1).change of a ('old barrel for a hot one durmg fire United States: Thompson light maehme gun. Hungary: Soluthurm machme pistol Italy Breda 20-mm gun (antIaircraft and antltdnkl Sweden. Bofors double-barreled antiaIrcraft guns (25-mm, 40·mm, and 75-mmJ. r..Iotors and tanks: UnitE'd States: .M-2 ('avalry tank and Christy light tank Armored car. SWItzerland: Saurer cross-country vehIcles SOVIet RUSSia: The new 33-ton tank, mobile esealator for loadmg and unloading cargoes REVUE O'INFANTERIE (France

B''i:' CAPTAIN M. R. KAMMERER, Infantry

June 1939


[Les R~rE's dE' l'infanterie et des rhars de combat.]

By J P. and

The authors of this article have delved into the numerous and very scattered documents and regulations on the subject of schools for officers and noncommisSIOned officers of the French infantry, and have compiled their findmgs m a clear, concise form. The French system of infantry and tank schools is based on the reali­ zation of: {I) The dIfficulty of obtaming the large number of qualified offi('ers and noncommissioned officers necessary in time of 'War. (2) The importance of finding outs.tanding men of all soeial and intelw lectual class% to handle the widely dlvefSlfied types of personnel.l1nd arma­ ment (3) The speetalization reqUired of certam groups of subaltE'rns as a result of the variety and complexity of modern materIel. . \4. The Importance of periodical instruction to keep up WIth the con­ stant evolution of methods and doctrmes. REC"OGNI1l0N AND IDENTIFICATION OF T'!\NKS IN COMBAT.

lLa reconnaissance et l'Identlficatlon des engms blmdes au combat.] (11) Captain Lehoux In thiS second and last artieie on thIS subject. possible solutlOns to the problems preVIOusly discussed are offered Notmg many slmilantlef>, though admlttmg CE'rtam dIfferences, a study of methods used by naval vessf'ls to dIstinguish fnendly from enemy ShIPS reveals means that can be applied equally WE'll to the identification of frIendly tanks. The numerous cases of deceptIon and misinterpretation of Signals occurrmg between vessels durmg thf' World War make It plain that no signal is perfect, nb single precautIOn is sufficient unto itself The problem of findmg a satISfactory SIgnal or syste-m of Signals for the identificatIOn of tanks IS not ea..y. It mvolves not only the recognItIOn of tanks between each other. but also reeognItion by fnendly obsE'rvers .on the ground and in the aIr The ideal IdentIficatIOn Signal should be: lllterrogatory (demand and reply;, easy to use. producible by a smail. compact. f>turdy machmp; usable day or mght; possible of vanatlon. RecogmtlOn of frIendly tanks by obsenatlon IS a matter of trainmg. particularly apphcable to gunners of antItank weaponf>, obsPTvers on the ground and In, the aIr. and personnel III armored vehl('lps, although all troops should be famliIarlzE'd WIth the appearan('p of fqendly. and If pOSSIble, enemy tanks. THE 23D INFANTRY VnISlON IN TIlE BATTLE OF VnTORlU-VENETO, 24 OCTOBER 4 N'o\·EMBER 1918.

ILa 231? D. 1. dans la bataIlle de \'lttoflo-VenE'to (24 octobrE'-4 novembre 1918)' Captain Ingold The Twelfth Army, pushmg north III Italy during the latter da~s of the World \Var, was forced to cross an elbow of the Plave III the VICllllty of Val­ dobbiadene. ThIS elbow, extendmg wE'stward' lOto the eastern half of the Twelfth Army sector, had to ue cleared of AustrIan troopf>, who held It stronglJ- and could havE' prevented the 1).rmy's advaneE'. The French 23d Infantry DIVISIOn, attached to tl;Je T",elfth Army for the pE'riod of these operatlOns. was gIven the miSSIOn of estublishmg the bridgehead to co"er Its own crossmg and that of two ltahan dhlslons, which, upon crossmg, were to resume the advance on the right of the 23d DIVISion. ThE' 23d Division, after crOSSing. was to advance up the eastern bank of thp Piave dn the elbow:. On the Opposlte bank was tl;1(> re::.t of the Twelfth Arm:\,. Alternatp efforts on either Side of the rtver would aS~lst the- ad\lance on the OpPOSIt!=' bank The author, after quoting the threcth:e~ pertment to the operatIOns of the 23d DIvision. discusses the actIOn, \vhlCh mcluded: The forcmg of the rIver under the convergmg fire .. of many battE'rip<;. of Amtrian artillery and practically under the eyes of Austrtan observers The protection and orgamzatton of the passage of three dIvisIons o\ler a smgle bridge whICh was built. demolif>hed, and rebUIlt on three succe-sslve mghts undN ho..tIle firp Nor did a swollen river facihtate the crossmg. The attack, as soon a::. the crosf>ing was completed. of fonmdable obJec­ tIves \\ithout much assistance from the dl\olslOn~ ",ho",e crOSf>mg had been prepared and covered. The advance mto mountams 5.000 feet hIgh. The capture of 3,000 prisoners. over 100 plece)'; of artIllery. 23 mortars, 150 machine guns. The loss of 139 men and officers killed. and 397 wounded. ThIS actIOn of thE' Twplfth Army is remmi"1cent of a Similar ('ro">Sing of the Piavp in 1809 by the army of Prmce Eug!='ne.


[Le marechal Joffre et l'mfanterie.]

Colonel X

The author, who signs hiS article "One of Joffre's Doughboys," pays g!owlllg tribute to his former commander in chief, who, though an engineer, ll1ad~ ['very effort to understand the infantryman, his mind, his character­ b"'tICS, and his problems. Joffre, one of the leflst commumcatlve of men ­ 1letaUu'd little, wrote less . was able to impart his own personahtg' to every lllfantryman serving undpr him ThE'ir fortitude W3,S a rf'fie('tlOn of his. Their quiet confidence, their resoluteness on the offensive, their stanrhness o~ the defensive are traceable to those same fine quahties in their chief. He Iild not conSider himself too important to sf'ek adVlre among Te('ruits if he thought they could furnISh the information he desired Their welfare and. progre::.s interested hun and only from them ('auld he learn about thenl.


lLe nouveau Reglement d'infantE'rtt'.J Captain de Linares The purposE' of this article is to outlint> tht> contents of the recently pubhshed "Instructions for Light Infantry emts." SImplicity and unifonTIw ity charactenzp these Instructions which arp clarified by anwle use of Illus­ tratIOns. Among the pomts emphasizpd IS that of the pOSltlOn of leaders. When hostile fire IS antIcipated, a leader should be \'vlth some fractional E'\ernent of the umt he commands III order to be able to initiate-, on a part at least of hiS umt, immediate actIOn of fire or movement At other times he shQuld guide hIS unit from in front.




\. -!:

C. & G.S.S•.Mil~tary Review i

. 'Cattdog of Seiectid Periodical Articles All instruction should be progressive. and in combat exerCISes of Units larger than the squad, attentIon should bE" devoted to the Instruction of the iea(iers and not to tbat of the troops. Such exercises should not bf' attempted, then. until the fundamental umt, the squad, has reached perfectIOn in tram­ ing. And perfection 18 not reached untIl each member of the ",quad IS able to gf't along by hunself1 without the guidance of a chief. Not only must hIS reflexes be developpd, but also his mteihgence and mitiatlve HIS combat mIssions have been reduced to three J;lmpie ones: fire. advance and assault, dpfend. InstructIOns concerning umts above the squad present no unusual fea­ tures oth!?r than m the method of prf'sl'ntatlOn ThE' text IS meant for prac­ tIcal ratnt'r than thf>oretical use. NATIONAL DEFEN&E ACT.

\La loi sur l'orgamsatlOn dp la natIOn pour Ie temps de gUf'rrf'.!

Captam Le Hingr3t Thl'> law IS basl,d on tht" expprIences of the War of 1914, and is mtt'ndf'd to prt>pare for the ImmE'dlute mobIhzatlOn. m tIme of war, not only of thp

military forc(,5 but <ibo of politiCS and mdu;.try. It It> ha.,ed on thE' follOWing prmcIplp;,. ! 1) War 15 a natIOnal affair, aiIecttng eVl"ry CltlZl'n. l2J E\t'rythmg and I;'vpry mdlvldual should be dpvoted to tht-' dpft'nsp of the natIOn. (3) No onE' ~hould dl'nve profitb from \\ar. {4} The conduct of a waf should be cntfush'd to the government, wht(·h ~hould {'antral thE> mlhtary forces. The law is truly onp of natwnal defenst>, for Its measures. III wholf> or III part, can be <,voked only III cases of mamfest aggreSf,lOn. of pxtenor tensIOn. or of upholdmg the prOV1Mons of thp League of NatIOn;, pact The Supenor CounCil of NatIOnal Dpfen,>e IS charged \vith the execution of the lal"., and l'l compoo,l'd of all the mml"ter... of the Cablllet Tho'll' of \\Iar, navy, and mr may be coordmated mto one department under a mmlster of natIonal d!:'fense who would be asslstl'd and advbed by a kmd of generahs~ simo clIO"E'n from the Chl!:'f" of staff of thl' army, navy and aIr SE'rVlce. E"cry frt'nchman over 11'\ year", of ag p may bl' called mto ~(>rVlce­ .mlhtary or othpr. 1'ht' sen Ice of women, though not reqUlrpd, I;:, not pro­ hibited The gO\ ernmf'nt l~ re:,>ponslblE! for the gpneral conduct of a war. It determInE'';' the ObJPctlves to be attaIned by force of arm::.. places the npees­ sary means at the dt~posal of the mlhtary forces and sup!'rv\se..s their use. The ('ommandl:rs Hf the mIlitary £01'('1''1 arf' rf'spon<;,ble for the conduct of opt'ratlOns 10 thl" vapffius theaters of war. Although a generahSSImO,_In command of the army, navy, and aIr servIce 1:;, not prOVIded for, thE' actIvltH:'S of the'lf' forces have, as previously noted, been coordmated under the Mm­ Ister of NatiOnal Dt,fense. Cabmf>t mmi"ters are rpsponslblf> for the admllllstratJve orgallizatton of the national resourC'l's. each III hiS o\,;n fif'ld, and'>l' of confilct or uuphcatlOn of effort::.. such at> might bp dl"1covl.'rl,d m the annual reports of the mmlsterl:>, a ne""}j creaku Supply Mllllstf'r coordmate~ the efToru,. Although the law may not be pl'Tfect, It h belwved that It wIll provlde for a ~att":.factory tramntJOn of thl' natlOn from a Pl'<lCP- to a \\ar-tlmp baSIS. July 1939 FRENCH TAt>.KS.

lLes chars franC;aJs.l By R P and.M :\1. Coneprlllng the use of tank.., the Frrnch ('on'aut'r t\\O gf'neral ca::.p:>. \ 1) dgamst an eneIn)o III an orgamzl'd deff'n'>i'>' l' po;,It\on, and 12) agamst an pn('my \~ho has had httle or no ttme to orgamze hIS pOt>ltll.m. In the ur~t casE' tanks mu<.t <lct m do&e iIal;,un l\1th mfantry, .lrtillery, and air 8prHce. MedIUm tank':>, capablf'of gfl'at speed and hl'avtiy armored, form th!:' auvancf' phpion Workmg With the artillery thplr actIOns arE' ('on­ trolled by commanderb of hIgher umts who art' respon<>lbJe for ('oordmatmg artillery fir!>>> and tank advancp" The m(>dJUm tanks arf' followed by hght t,mks accompamed by the Infantry. The actIOns of these light tanks are controlll'd by the commanders of the mfantry umbo SlUC€' the efTf·cts ob~ tamed by tank a~lOn are consldf'rpd as. fleetmg, It IS ab...olutely !;''lsf'ntlal that the mfantry explOit promptly any gams made by tanks. In thl' NlSl? of an pnl'my caught by SUrprI'lt> or dl'lOrgal11zed as a result of an attack on his pO'lltlOn. t,mks opt>ratmg alone or \\Ith httlE' assistance from oth!:'r ,nrns [partIcularly mechanIzed troopt» prow' extrpmely pJTPC'tIVP. They can el~h{'r Widen a breach already made or contmue the penf'tratIOn III depth \""lthout that c10sp cooperation of othi'r arms that 1" reqUired agamst an orgamzf'd PUf'my In time of peace. tanks are orgalllz.ed In bngade;, and rE'gIments which permIt of {-COnomy of personnel. supenor mstructlOn. and economical mam· tenance In tImE' of war. tanks arl' grouppd 10 battahons as.';lgnpd to corps The battahon organization 15 conSIdered powerful. maneuverable, easy to com­ mand, and self-suffICient in so far as repair and evacuation are concerned. French tanks are usually armed wlth a machme gun and one or two cannon-; whose cahber df>pends on the typP of tank. The tanks are not buIlt with a VH'W to '=>ensational "peflds for spf'ed demands thl;' .:;u<'rlfie8 of morp important and deSirable qUalitIes. Furthermore. the fire pOWN of tanks IS not f'ifectlve f'xcept at slow speeds. Great strides have been made in recent yean. toward Improvmg vlblOn, mechallical fun('tlOning, commUmcatlOn, and stream~Hning Qf Fr~n('h tanks THE l'SE OF TANKS IN FOREIGN ARMIES

IL'empioi dl's unites blmdees dans If'S armees etrangeres! Major B British tanks.- The British Originally vIsualizpd the tank as a strategic manpuver eiempnt whosE' speed and great radIUS of action would complete


the action of cavalry m wide envelopments and encircling movements. ThiS theory hill. been somewhat tempered by a careful exammatlOn in recent yean> of the tank's capabilitIes, and the result is a mISSIOn which. though still bold, is .$omt'what more hmJted In open country (British colq.mal territories, for pXllmple) tanks can be used in enwlopments. working in the enemy's rl'ar area from around the flanks or through breaches in the hostile line. The tank bngade. composed of both Ught and ml'dium tanks, IS used on such

mlss~he~~~h:~~;~a~ :~hS;i~n::~~a~~~~~rl~~,I~h~n~~tis~dt~k~e~ove

by bounds when at a distance from the enemy and by infiltration in the ('om~ bat zone This IS but an adaptatIOn of BrItish cavalry tactics In attackmg a well orgamzed defpnsive position the Bntish offer two solutIOns! an attack by a great number of small tanks armed with onf' machm_e gun pach. or an attack by heavy tanks asslstpd bN" infantry, artll!pry and aViatIOn . German tank" - The German ('ommand has placed Its tanks by brlg.ldes 10 armored dIVISIOns cons.isting of a brigade of tank.." a brigade of motofJZf'd

sn~~ht~~'~rfa~~ia~fo~~:o:~~~ti:~P;~~'i:e~~~~:'f':~da;ibi~~;~d :;t\~a~I~~~~

a front of 1500 to 3000 yards and to a dppth of from 4 to 6 miles where tf'Tram is favorable In unfavorablp t('fram, tank actIOn IS hmited to accompanymg ml<;~lOns. but once thp ddficult area 1<. pas'led. the tanks aTE! regrouped Imme.­ diately and thp motorized dIVISIOn moves fomard on a mISSion of explOitatIOn. In additIOn to the tank Imgades of the motoflzed dIviSIOns, Germany has tank regIments whose misslUns are essentially those of accompanyUlg tanks All tank units, ('''en down to the company and s('('tlon are ('omjJo-Sl'd of hght tanks (hghtl;y armed and armorE'd) anrl heavy tunks wInch protect the light tanks in actIOn Itahan Tanks.-TllP !tahan tanks, hkf> German tanks. are usually mte.­ gral parts of largt"f umts In thl' ('elf>re dl\'lsion they form a hase of fire, remforcmg the umts m'lking the prIn('lpal effort In the motorized dIVISion the) are the princlpal arm. supportE'd and prot(>cted by mfantry, artillery and E'ngIneefS, IndE'pendpnt battalIons of tanks may he assigned to corps. ltallan doctrine on the use of tank~ ('losely re~embleb that of the GermallS, except that the former do not contemplate indf'pendent tank actIOn. Their action is limited to a smaller radIUS and IS closely linkl'd with infantry support. RUSSian tanks The Russian tanks ha\e tIll' normal mission ofasslstmg infantry attacks by neutralIZing enemy automatic weapons. The RUSSians have also foreseen a more important USE' to which tanks may he put - cutting the hostIle lines of ('ommunicatlOn Having made <l. penetration, or taking advantage of a penetration made by other arms, Russian tanks are organIzed and prepared to movp mto enem:r rear areas, remain there as long as four days operaung agamst hostHe artillery, supply columns. reserves or tanks. RUSSian aviation, workmg With such tank Units, can assist thl'm by recon­ naissancf's and by dropping parachute troops Tanks. operatmg on such mi:>sions are called dIstant action tanks They form two brigades of a mechanized corps, t:'ach Lrigade composed of four battalions of light or hea vy tanks. Japanese tanks - In lts. prpsent war on Chmese soH, Japanese tanks have been used o(,~'asionall) No real concluslOnR concernmg thE' tanks' "alue and USf' hav!' bppn posslhlf', howf'Vl'r. duf' to the small numLer of tanla; possessed by the Japanese and due to the lark of opposition to tllPm by the Chines('. JapanE'se tanks have bepn ':-Uccel'lf>ful employmg cavalry tactiCS in envelopments and III E'li.piOltmg lOfantr} "Iu('cessp),> ThE')' have been USf>d ('onslderably In moppmg up "lliages The Japanese tanks are orgam;;::ed III reglment~ of two batta.lions each. Each tank regIment IS a part of a lmgade \vlnch a1,,0 mcludes a three-battalion regiment of Infantry trans!Jorted m tnH'Ks Thes(\ lmgades have uepn ablr to operate indppendently and "'IHt'I"'OSfully III Chmn due to thf' nature of thp terraIn and of the C.lmpUIgn.


TEMBE.R 1914

lVn combat sous bob au cours tie la hatadle de la Marne {'3t'ptem­ bre 1914J.\ Colon~l GUlgues Account of an aetlOn durmg the battle of the Marne illustratmg: The defenSIVe power of a fl'w comp<l.mes of mf:mtry carefully pluc{>d in positlOn and equipped with ~everal ",ell-concealed machme guns. The value of fire and mOVt'ment in c1f'amng out such a defenSive pOSItion. The importance of makmg a reconnaissance even though higher orders indicate ImmedIate actIOn ln thIS Il.lrtIcular caSE', If tbe commander had taken a few mmutes to locate the enem)- 's flanks he would have saved many hOUTo and lives that were lost trymg to strIke the enemy pOSItion fr(lm the Immediate front


lUne aVIation d'infantene est-pIlI' de~nrahle?! Major Laportf'

The conclUSIOn drawn here IS that unless closer cooperation call be maintamed betw£>en air and ground umts - mfantry, artillery. or cav~t1ry ­ the latter would have to develop thPlr own aIr serVl<,e. Such a plan IS not desirable for several reasons. The air servIce is not, how£>ver, eqUipped to render those serVIces refluired by the land forces· aerial observation of the battlefield, rapid communIca­

1i~~I~::ede~~ ~e~t~I:~~ ~W~~~:Ut~Pb!tde!~~~~d '::;;~h:~~~~t::

ground forces III mmd.

Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE BATTLEFIELD.'

IL'atmosphl'>re du champ de bataille.j Lieut. Colone.>l Armengaud This is in the form of an annex to the two previous articles on this subject by the same author. From the works of many authors hp has ('hosen and arranged quotations illustratmg both tht> physical and moral atmosphere of war


By CAPTAIN A. L. KEYES, Field ArtIllery


IDes quahtes du chpf subalternI:' J Major ('ouchepm In agreement with Montalgne, Major Couchepin finds that It IS extremely difficult to render a fixed and posltive Judgmpnt on the worth of any indi­ Vidual By the test of battlE' one offir{>r of exceUpnt reputatIOn IS found lackmg in some essential, another, on the v£>rge of forc£>d retIrement for mcapaclty, rlSes to an emergency and reveals hlddf'n depths of character WhICh lead hIm to the hIghest posts of command. In general an officer Judged E'ffiCIE'nt by pE'ace-tlmp ~td.ndards fulfills all E'xpectatlOns In war as well. BI.!-t, based on historical recor~s. there are all too many upon whom adver~e Judgment has Leen passE'd m school and garrison and who have sull reH'aied themselvf'5 m actIOn as leadf'rs of smgular merit ThE' task of those charged \\<lth mstructmg and passmg upon the capanty of camhdates for a commISSIOn and of JUnIor officers is a dIfficult one, A healthy Lody and phJSIC.l1 VIgor ar£> important to troop leaders out thE:' ~xaggf'rated esteem WhiCh athletic prowE'ss enJo)os at the present time should not blmd the authoritle~ to the atnhtlf'S of a ;) oung man otherwise amply endov.ed WIth the quahttes of leadershIp but mcapatlle of bemg a first-class athlf>tf' Where earhH perIOds of 11lstory confprrpd ('ommand upon the most ardE'nt m hand-to-hand comllat, modf'rn platoons and compamf''> have far greater need of "an mtelhgence v. hlCh understand& the capabilities of their weapOllS, thp skillful combmatlon of fire and movpment to attain a milItary obJeftl\·e, and the effective use of terram, E'w'en more must the present-day leadl'r I e Imbued WIth a SE:'nMe of duty, the &pmt of self~acrlfic(>,loyalty, and tllsqphne m the highest sense of the word. \\J Ith all of these quahtH:'s, one mdJ\·ldual of sterlmg charactE'r and grE:'at lttelhgeuce may often fall a& a leudf'r of mpn whtle a man of le&&er mf'r1t WIll be followed b)o IllS command to thE' elld& of the earth The SE'eret lIes m the ablltt~ uf the officer to prOject Ins pF'r"onahty upon hiS troops, a quality dlfncu:t to predIct stnct' there I~ no une method of exerclsmg leadershIp. Judgment as to the capacIt)- of jLlnlor officers and candldate& imphE:'s theref0re not only the determmatlOn of their \\<orth as mdlvlduals but also a sort of prophecy as to theIr pOVorer, actual or potential, of projecting thE:'ir person..lhty. "'~hen the )ooung officer takes over hIS first command, It is the daty of hiS superIOrs to glve him every opportumty to devE'lop hiS capaC'ltles along Imps Lest smt€'d to IllS charactpr ThiS m\olves giVing the subaltprn asfrf>e a rein as pos~lhle. gUldmg 111m hy ad'wlce only whE'n he cannot solve Jas 0 .... 0 problems and even then m such a way as to dE'velop hiS self-conn­ denep, Ins own partIcular pE:'rson,lllty, and thE:' faculty of eXE:'rClsmg command '!J accordance \l,.lth prm'clplp" III harmon).. v'l1th that pE'rl:>onahty A ('nalludgment :,hOlIld. nner be render(>d upon an officer until he oef>n 0\ ~ervpd undpf cOlldltlons re~(>mbhng somewhat thosE:' of thp hattlE'~ fip\J \ wpll-dlsclphnE'd and smartl) -drpst:>ed umt IS a pnmary mdlcattOn of agout1le.1dPr but tllP trut' tf'"t ('llmf'S whf>n an .1c('ldE'nt occurs, an unforesf'en dangpl thrp.1tell<.,. or &omt' IWllsual effort 1<; r(>quired Last of all. a true leadf'r h Ilot OIlE' who IS lum&E'lf a pllOr sut ordmate. l&adprshlp IS not an P'ld III ,,'wlf; It mcludps 10;),Y to CllllstltUtE'd J.uthontj. frum the IOWE'st to thE' hlg .t"<.,t, a loyalty V.hlt"ill<; tf<111sferrE'd I'd:"ll) tu SUC('{'SM~e commanders. THE PRUBLE~f U1' TIIP 'TNORGANIZED RESER\E" OF rRUl KS

Le proLttme des camWllS uUhsable& par l'armee 1 Captain Taper­ noux. In SWitz€'riand, as mother F.urop€',m countries, truck::., hke men, arE' hable t, cOllscnptton ill .t emergency, It naturally results that thp federal g'ovprnl]1£>nt IS Vitally mtprested III thf' typE'&, ages, and eqUipment of trucks 'lperated by clvilMn owners throughout the country. Figures are quotl'u to show that out of a total of 19,000 trucks now III operatIOn, fewer than 9:100 are SUitable for mllitdry u~e even 11) relaxmg the reqUlrements to the .:reatest possible degree. Tl ,. prehent artIclp. has two parts fir~t, a dISCUSSIOn of the advantages and dl<l.dvantages of raLI and motor transportatIOn With a conclusIOn that ralhval _ are stdl of Vital Importance to nattOnal dpfense, sf'cond, a rel;1PW of thE;' measures whIch th!' Feul'ral Counnl has tak!'n to Illcrpase the numbpr Gftrur:,~ III USP, to reduc" the aVl'rag(' age of tllp<;p l!E'hlclE's, and to normalize" the'llt'"ltlOn. Th" rallroads are capable of moymg large massps of troops and supphps \l,1th n,· great ch'ange in operatmg proceuurf' other than an mcrf'a~e m traffic denslt,\ Large truck movemf'nts, on thp contrary, reqmrf' many '>pP('tal arrang '11Pnt<> to prE'vpnt confil{'t WIth e<;sE'ntml Ioeal traffic, both civilian and .mllitary. reqmre transport personnel in far greater proportIOn to the troop'! .'r cargos moved than do railways, and consurnp pnormous quantitIes ofmot"r fuel Rain, snow, and night movement WIthout hghts havp much ~tpr "ffpet on motor '\'HhIcl£'s than on railways EIE'ctrlc powpr, utilized toa hWIl dE'gree by S\\I':>"<; 10comotlvPs, 1<; a national product whose source is ~_ar~d from hostile attack by the fleXible nl'bvork of powE:'r lines ~nd ,., ~ormahzat1on" IS not df'finE'd but It is believed to include measures forgmdmg manufacturers and buy('r'> along Imps }padmg to mutually advan­ \ageQu~ simplication.

b~ the location of :many power plants i~ mountamous terr~in accessible only WIth difficulty to enemy a'>;13tlOn. qasohne IS not a natIOnal product; its supply from abroad IS subject to senous mterruptlOn and reserves within thp country arp op€'n to bombardmE'nt A study at the rplativp vulnerabIlity of raIl and watpr routes and of the effect of interruptions to service over thp,>p Imps IS not unfavorabl~ to thE' railroads. Gr~ntmg that motor trans­ portaLlon IS essenilal to tactIcal movement, Captam Tapernoux finds that the rpcord of motor fallures III thf' 24-hour occupation of Austria by German troops last YE'ar c1e<l.rl~' indlcatf>S the danger of too great re.Jiancp upon motOrI­ zatIOn. As to mf'aSUrp5 takf'n by thf' Federal CounCIl to ImproVE' the motor RltuatlOn, the} consist prmcipally of subsidlP,> deSIgned to aid civilian owners III pro('urmg neVor vphlc1es of SWISS manufacture (for which parts will be rea~hly avaliable locally m case of war) equIpped With spE:'cml milItary acces­ sorll's and of capacities sUltl'd to mihtary needs. In addltlOn, these subsidies pncourage development and use of Vt"hlclt~s adapted to utilizatIOll of a ftiE-1 procurable \}lthm thl:" country, notably "'voQd gas. WIthout such subsidIes, makmg up, III part at Ipa~t, fLir E'xpE'n'lt's \vhlC'h c}vlhan owners \vould have to bpar Without pprsonal a..hantagp, therE' could bf' no apprp{,lUbh' advance toward,> tht" triph· obJP{'tn e prf>\,10usly mpntlOned. THE LANDSTURM AND THE



RECOLLECTlOl'><S. 'Land~turm

1:'t armel' de campagne tSouvemrs d'un tf'rrItorIal).] LIE'utpmmt Bo'Vet We hay€' iwrp a te::.tlmomdl as to the value of tram1:'d men who have pa&::,ed beyond thp age !tmlt for Immf'dlate &PfVl('t' m the first-hne umts but who are kept up to a relatIVely high ~tate uf effiCIE'ncy by brif'f annual rpfrf>5hpr pprIOds of field duty. The elIte of these troop::. "arl' the veterans of tht' yt'ar:, 1914-191h. wht>n S\vltzt'rland's status of armpd neutraht) placed her !\latIOnal Mlhtm on a footmg somewh.1t resembhng that of a regular army. Nt'xt m milItary effiCiency are the most recent products of the actlve fleld forn' \~ Ito haw' rl'CPI~ ed thplr mlttal traillmg durlllg the pa::t few years of illt1:'rnatlOnal SU'>pIClon and mihtary remllS&anCl'. Vanou~ aspt"cb of tJlP tramlllg ar.., dl,>cus~l'd bnpfly: The reader IS p<:;pCCIally . . truc!.. \\lth the short pf'rlod, two days at most, npcpssary for obtalnlllg a lOO!'~ rpL}ualificatlOn on thp rift€' range and With the abihty of the~p troop<; to perform difficult march('s m mountamous tE:'rram 'Undf'r

~~~i~~~~~~ ~~dt~'~~~~~~I~~~:~~:?eS~~~~:~~;~:dh~~dy~~~r ttg: g~~r~~!:~~a'l

attummpnts of ollicer.., and nonl'Omml';SlOlll,d officH::'


lVf'r<; l'eqUlhbre aerll'n I • H.eVll'\v of an artl('j(> by Gf·neral Armi'ngaud In th!~ French "Rpvup des D('Uli Mandt''> ' Gl'rmany, by thL' rapId (Tpatwn of an oVPf\~hplmmg aIr forc!:', obtamed Imtml 'iurpn<;e plit'('t III the llip\.)mauc mam'uver::. prect"dmg the dll:>mpmber­ mf'nt of Cz.Pl.ho~Jovah.ld. Tht· :.uddenly ft'Vt'ah,d thrpat of a mas..., attach thrllugh the air \Va::. -;uffiC'h'nt to pnahh~ th(> RHdl to obtalll Ib OhJP('tlVp \\Ithout combat. But Gener.ll Armeng<l..ud beIH.'v!·s tha.t panty III this ficld I.., "'0 pat:>tly rt"gaml;'d t h.1t Brltam and Francl' nl;'('u f1;'('1 no grp.1t d.ppr(>hemlon from a futuTl-' threat 01 'tht' '>ame kmd . Th, mateflPj no\\ b"lng pla{,l'uln 'wr\ ICl-' iJ)' th.. t\~O d!-'mo('raclf's IS the pqual or thp ::.upPrlur of that pO'>~(,<:;Sf>tl by thp totahtarian powers In thp final analY"'I.." hO\\I:'\(;'r. tramed Pl'n.o!lppi forms thp most impor­ tant P/('mpr.t In thp reaum!·o;s of an aIr force for combat Planp" lD serVIceable condItIOn may be kept In operatIOn for con'!ldemble pE'rlOds by relays of crE'\%, thus glvmg to a natIOn ..trang III traml-'u r"ql'rvp,,>, an actual prepon­ derance III tile air O'\f'r an advero;ary df'ficIPnt in thb rl-'sp1:'ct. Bntam and partJ('ularl~ Francp havp ~ur forcps of long expenence whtll' Gf'tmany and Italy. havmg pxpandpd titl'lr aVtatlOn arm "'0 rap)uly, cannot press thE'lr numf'ncal superIOrity wah any gl't'a.t l'xppctatlOn .of ~u('ce!)s In none of thp four countrlPS do!:',> serlOUS mIhtary thought bpbeve that a war can Lp won III th"" air The air force'S contnbutp enormously to the "'uccpss of thp tprrf''>trlal arms hIlt, aft..'r a cprtam limIt lS reached, no amount of aerlal SUp!·rlOrlt J \\-111 a~aIllf thf> army and navy confront IllVlll­ cIbl!' rp,,>!o;tancp COMBAT

1Du combat.. Gt'llf'ral Camon. French Army Ongmally pubh-.hed III "La France Mlhtalre;' 29 11ay 1939. Thp thpory IS ad\ancf'd that war has bE'come so complicated that, With due regard for thE' ps~pntlal}pdge common to both fields. the two phases of war, :.trategy and battle. call for general officE'rs speclahzed III one or the other phase. Thp buttl(> h'ud(>r rf'qUlrps In partIcular an mUmatf' knowledge of th!? capablhtles of tilt-' rlfif>s, machine guns, tanks. artillery, and airplanes undE'r hiS command and of the methods of employing them most E:'ifectiveiy. Nearly a centur} and a half ago, Napoll'on recogmzf'd and regularly practIced the t>ppclalizatlOn of general officers M"urat, Ney, and Manton were, undpT compPt£'nt high command, .pxcf'llf'nt IE'aders ,of assault troops, As supreme commanders III ~pcondary th{~aters of .operatIons. hov.-evpr, Napo­ leon pIcked Massena, Soult, and Suchpt, aU mE:'n who had shown special capaCIty as strategists. When circumstancel:> forced the Emperor to E:'ntrust Murat and Ney With somE:'what mdepE:'ndpnt miSSion" the rpsults wpre dis­ astrous. General Camon regrets that mstruction of troops and admimstration monopolize the time of French officers. A grpatpr dependE:'l}ce on noncom­ mIssioned officers at> instructors would dpVE:'lup thfllr capabihtIe" and self­






, Cati11og7if Selected Periodical Articles confiden! and would permIt officer" to gain a la:rgl'f mf>a~ure of mstrUl'tIon in comba , that is, cooperation of tht> combined arms. The author futther proposes hat, m additIOn to thp SE>rVlce. journals of the separate arms as now SUbsidIze by thp. War Ministry, a Gpneral MIlitary RevIe\\ be created to afford st dy of the taetH's and tpchmque of the combtnpd arms. .


[Places forte., pt plact'~ falbjl:'\-. I Revlf'w of Genr>ral Cfempnt-Grand('ourt';" book by C:lptmn Bauer -Thi;, is the st,)ry of French fortipssPS m the War of 1914-1918. After the Franco-Prus<;lan War enormous !lums wpre appropnatt'd to fortify thp frontlPr from thp S\\'I~S hordpr to thl-' F.ngl!",h Channt'l To\\ard'l 1900, a gem-ra! pl'::''olmBm a5 to thp valtlp of thp'>e fort1l1catlon<;, p::.t.1bll:,hed ltwlf m the mmd:::. of both dvJ\ and mlht,tr,Y chjpfs and thp forb \\er£' al!owpd to det€ ' florutp. Thl'> \\<lS the perIOd when the doctrln{' ot "rollenslve a outrancl'" bpgan to ammat!' thl' Fr,'neh war marhlnP. On tht' oth!'r hand. HI 1910. fortrt':>~ commanupr" ,\opre dt-"lugl'd \\ .1 m.1:;:::. of \prho";e and poorly com­ pm..ed mateilal relatlllg to thplr combat JUtips, lllm", of which tpnue-d to 1mbu,J thl' rpclpwnt'l wIth any fe"hllg of confld,'nc,' 1ll tht'lr m\S~lon No fortn·,.,';' IS c,trongl'r than thl' will of n.~ g,trTl'lOIl 1:\ pry mt an'l must be tai,en to impfl·"~ upun tllL' ('ommandpr of th\' ddt'll"" tlw lmport.1ncp of hi:; ta"k m tIlt' genpra! sch€'mt' ;-.;,) ",l(nnp!' '" u"pl"..,<;, If It dpprl\p,> tIlt' ho"ttle mam forcP" of a portlllll of thplr 'otrength .1t tlu' lntlcal momrnt A com­ mander IS alv.. u.y-; acutp]y ~l\\arp ot ill" u\.\ n pl'rll and grh f:-. hp mu-.t lwon hl'l gu,\rd lp'>t hp magmfy thpm .lnd f.111 tu ,dhN for th... m,'ntJ.1 ,lngHl,>h \\hlCh hi:;; opponent I~ l1ml,>rgnmg at th,' . . am" tim.. \Yh...n uoubt a::,.:;mlh .l h-J.dl r, hp should bed, gl1HbnCI' m thp t,\nrd" of ~pl"on \\ho ",Ild that tht' 1J..,t mund must ahayo., b,· firl'd flJr that round kdl'> tho..: "n\'m~ ~

C. & G.S.S. Mltitary Review should not be allowed to jeopardize the fulfillment of the essential mission.

!st;~~slrhl~efo~sth~t::~:~~t:~~ie~~~t~~tit~i~~~~~~o:~~;?:! fhe:l~in!::

tude- withm the-Ir provinces, and then, if they are manifestly incompetent, replaces the-m with more capable men.



lLes relations du peuple et de l'infantene.} Captain Klunge Infantry, as in <'f'nturil?s past, continues to be the "Queen of Battles." It alone can dose With the enemy and, having seized the ground, hold it again5t counterattack It must have courage, dash, and InItiative; it must have phYSIcal strength and endurance and, abOve nU, moral stamina and faith, to hear the- hardsillp of campaign and the blows of battle. Soldiers who me€'t thesp re~Ulre-me-nts cannot be- cI"f'ated; they can be developed hut only If th€' natIOn whi<'h sends them forth from Its midst IS composed of me-n of mental, moral and physlcal strength. The infantry is not an ehte which can be picked from the best of the cltiz~ns, it represents the mass of the peopif> and Its worth is no greater than theIrs. The SWISS, says the author. walk le:;s and less Sports, it is true, are popular, but Judgmg by the number of stragglers among the newer recrUits,

~~~ol~~;t~fo~l~~~edl~s:rJl!~ t~~~E'g~ r~1~~u~~~~~al0[~~1 ~a[h~~g~t~r ~g:

day, sports do not devE'lop the endurance nec€'ssary to equal the performances of former HmE's B€'Sldes modE'rn hff' encourages, n('c(>ssltates even, a dab­ bhng 111 everythmg \\oithout mastery of anythmg in particular and discourages patIent apphcatIOn over a period of time. Passing from the ph~ !;lcal to the moral, w€' see a perceptible IQvelhng proc€'ss III whIch the mdl\ldual gradu,llly dIsappears in the mass and the mob decrIes any deVI.1tlOn from its own medIOcre standards AuthOrity IS held m contf>mpt and such l€'aders as there are f€'ar to make demands upon their followen:. To mret th€'s£' unfortunate tend€ ' ncles, Captain Klunge makes a triple proposd.l· I} \ That the youth of the country receive some preparatIOn for mIhtary S€'r\'ICP :l That the OffiC{'Ib of higher grad€' make greater demands upon their JI.llllOrS, 'lpurnng them to a<'trve leadership

3, That all mfantry othcPY'S learn to the character of the troop" t hf'Y command, th€'Ir quahtlE.'s and their d€'f('cts, so as to know how much to demand from tht>m without. on the other hand, dnvmg thf'm to the pOlllt of exhau'>tIOn or discouragement TillS art]('!e I~ €'spP('lally intt'restmg to read III comparison WIth that of Lleutt'nant Bo\et III the July lS':>ue. The latter paint<; a somewhat rosier pH'ture of the pre<:;ent yalue of Ow Landsturm

August 1939 THe C\l'TAIN ILe capltame J C .1ptaln NIcolas The S\\oiss Arm) is E'sspntlally a hlghl~ -traInrrl milItia Thlth an actlve­ duty penod of rpcTUlt traimng hu,tmg forsewral Il10nthsand re('urrmgannual refre"ht>r p€'rl<Jd" Among the- OtftCN personnel there IS, to a crrtam de-grpp. the same conthct between thp upmands of Cl\ llJan cart>l'rs d.nd tbose of mlhtar:\­ duties that '€ Xlst m our own ~atlOn.11 Guard and officprs' RpSF'rH' Corps. WIth tIl is parallel 111 mmd, C.1ptam NiPo:as' articlp IS pspeclally mterpstmg

Troops ar€, as good or as l,oor as theIr commander" In thp final anal~ SIS tilt> effiClenC,.i of an armj IS proportIOnate to the alnhtj llf ItS captam... , thp men' who are fre-Ighted With accountlllllht:\- and r{'<;ponslhdlt~· fur valuable stor€'s t)f arm'l, l''lll1pment, and antmal~, \\oh,) direct tin> pnergIf'S III trUlnlllg and III combat of a con">lderablp group of human 11<'lllg~, \\ohu act ,l!> ,,0\ rrPlgn : arbIters m matters of dlsput€' betWl'l'n til€'lr 5u!JorJmates, and who eXf'rc\::,f> broad polict' powers With rpgard to mfractIOns of the dlH'lphne \\hich thcy themselves haye crpatpd Hut tlw captam I!'. morp than the rrprp<,€'ntatIw' of ('oni'tltutf'd J.uthont:\- hI? I" tllP ll€'rSOllifi('attun of tlw collpc1l\e bplnt, the Af\;flT,\Nl\. BARRIERS o\.NU DEI-'ENSE '\>spnt de- corp,>~" of thp group at who'>p head he "tand,,; It t.;, hI;' who iBarrage,> pt dE-fe-IIse antich~~r~! Captam Schenk exPL'ut€'s the proJectR vi the IngltE'r command and whv lH"plrp., 1.1'0 P1f'n to In the ~tudy of <llltltank de-fpnse, the mattprs uf utlhzmg terralll mtelh­ follow 111m ev€'n mto tile jawo. of d€' gentl\ ,md ofsltmg avmlabl€' v"eapon<;udvdntageou,>ly have rpcPlverlgenerous Not all t'omp.lll) comrn.mdPi<;, rI',dlZe thl:' fllll p'tt'nt of Uw<,r l)blJ~;ltlilll-' _ ,tttentlOn The paS'lIVe mpJ.,,>ure'S of dpfen"e, mcluding the erection of uamer,; Some thmk lllllj of their tactl('al dutil'S, f.1lllllb to uud<'rstand that tltr... p~ and road block::; and the Improvement of natural ohstacles, have bf'€'n fre­ fOl<rths of theIr pnprgIPS Will he dp\ oted III p<J,ml'41Ign to m,1l1lt.w111!g or que-ntl} mpntlOned but, w€' art' forcf'd to admIt, whtle we dIrect thp e'S.{'{'utlOD restormg the ph;)-Hcal ilnd mor,!l wdl-hplIlg of thpir tro"ps 1>",f{)re .1nd after of tht" \\orl\ III our ordprs and mdlcate tlwm With an ImperIOUS hand on our comuat Othrr<" arp J.pprl;'('\atl\\' unl~ uf the-u allmmlc:;trall\!' fanetlOn!'. J.lld operdtlOn map">, W(' huH" only <~ hazy idea of the amount of time,laborand '3tiU other;; arp hlind t,) tl1f' l'road socl.11.l"'pect of thplr p'!':>ltlon in tit€' 1l,1tJt)11 matt'ilal ul\o!yed III ('on-.trul'tlJ1g o!JstJ.r1e~ of any Importance and of am From all thl5 f" Idpnpp onfl conclus1on re-<..u!t<; 10 hf',lr"!llch hea\";... re!'>puuextellt sllnhtl(>b u!lt~t.1ndlllg me-l1 mu<;t he dpsignatt'd Th.. fir~t factor to con--Idt'r 1Il thl~ "tudy IS the type of vehicle against Men of the il'qul,>lte atialllmentb are- ftmnd ,tlmost (',dUBIVpl) III the ,\ hllh prott'dlOn 1,':; dC-,Ii... tl \Vl' can ,'limlll<tte tllP vcrs light vehid('<;, \\hO,f intt'llectua1 and among tlIP f'Xt'cutnes {If ('ommprcp and mdu<:;try .lrmor I"i \ uln'T<lbl. to th .. ordmary bmall-cahbcr Wl;!uponq, and the \Nl Since the:\- are not to,) 1l11merou~, the Arm;y should Lend eH'ry e-ffort toward Itl.l\ \ t.~nl\". "{",lr,,1' u<' till'S .lfL' and \\111 ill' due to th£,Ir hIgh cost and the enrolhng th€'ill and f,teliitatmg th€'lr ac"€'pt.lllCO ,If mlhtar~ uhhg.1tlO11';' m d!!hmlt} of then malntf'nancv Thl:' type of Vf'hlcll' which will mo~t affect adthtIOn to tho::.e IIf thpir elvl! o('cupatlo1l5 U'o h thp 1~ to 1~ ton typP, famlhar to aU arroit'S and possessmg certam h!11lta· At till' agp of;'!S to 30 ;}p.1rs, when most of thp qUJ.hfie-d young men me tillns as to -,pPLl1. armament, and ablhty to IlPgotlate drfficult terram. The read:,! fur d.dv..m cemellt, thl" are senUllsly engaged 1lll'<;t.1hh::.hmg them:..etve-s amphlblou:;, tanl~, which 10;. "'till III th" t'xpPTlm!:'ntul !'.tage, IS a future POSS1­ III cnd hfe ,md h;l.\e assumed obhgat!ons as !J\I.,[1::l.Ilds and fathers Mlhtary llllit) \\ ho<,1;' f'mpluympnt mu:::.t bt> f.}rE''5PE'n ,,;ervicp for a flPriOd of month" J<; all pponuml(' ImpO~~lh\ht:\- fllr.lB pxpppt nIP Havwg analyz.·d ~ht' capab~htlt;>s of thl..' vehiclps to be blocked, the next \\eJ.ltln qu'.. o.,tlOn I~ to dett-'immfl the locattou of dl'~lred barners, Reconna!ssanC{' \"arlOus proi'o~,tls lIa\8 ~l'f'11 marie to mt'flt the lll'l'ds of tI,€, 5"1,,& natlOn b~ qU.1hfipd p£'ro.,Dnnp} mll!"t fU~lll,>.h the ans,\oer; rl'hance upon f!1ap ;,tUlbes for a wclt-trallled h(ld~ of ofhl:'f>fo;.. Th€' formation of jlrof€'s!'.lOnal ('ad res and or upon rl'porb {If miht.l.ry or Clvlhan pprsonnel not p:x.p?rlenced m thf' work the ahAndonment of thl" traditlOnal mllitm s~f:,tem IS rp]pctf'd becausl" It would \\l1J not 'luffict'. definitely !>l?'paratP from tile arm;!. the profps'liona! J.nd mdustnal If'ade-r:::. Not only IS extrns)\'p reconnms:::.anc€' ne('(>s~ary to determme the tactICal whose experlC'nce III thplr O\vll fif'lds !:angularly fits t1lf'rn for mihtary com- ::.Itlng and extent of antitank defpllses but techmcal reconnalss~ncL' must malld, Bp<:;lde", a prufps,<..]onai ..rmy would 10:>e the Intlmate as'lo('mtlOn ddermme thp .1vllllablhty of matNtal" necessary to their executIon WIth thfl <'IV11 population which It f'nJ0:i-s at pr€,f:,ent, would Impn::,(l an addIHavlllg dptermined where antlmechamzl:'d "ecurity measures are needed tional burden on the budgl:'t, and wO\lld tend towarus creation of a hureau- and po<;sIble of eXecutIon, thl' next qUPstlOn to be deCided IS the time of their cratl(~ spmt III the arm:,! in contradlstlllctlOn to the spontaneous enthusiasm COll-.tructton. Thp r>ngmeer"l art' thp only troops f'qmpped and tramed to and spIrlt of self_sacrlfic€' which now 11l1lmates 1t erect barflers othl>r than ~l\mple blocks placf'd as a routine security measure

Slbili~;f~~~;a~~iJ~h~~ ~~~~1~hd.r~!nl;~:u('~~~th{::;~~~~:~~~{i~~narh:fi~ld- ~:;a~!n~oo~~n~~ ~h~a~Il~O;!~~ c~~:p~~te~;~rl:~yUf:r~e ;~er~~~i~!l;h:~all~

Training would he Cd-riled un bY' officerRi.nstructors speCially selected and schooled for thiS work Admlttlllg that better tram€ ' d troops might fesult, thel,ugge-_stlOD stIll has many outwelglnng dl<:ad\oantages At be-st the system

prionty for thE> constructIOn of harrier"! must be estabh<;hed and this derlSlon. too, ,-. In'lt'parable from the (>xercIse- of command Finally, the problem arises as to how the work is to be done. Engineer

of complHe The development of a spmt of respon~jbJllt~ and imtlUtl,ve in the captams IS an unportant part of the dutIes _of hlghpr ('ommand~r"t. DlfierenCt's of opmlon or a d€'slre for uniformIty, as III the award of punt~hm('nt&. should

to covpr working partw'S engagf'd III constructIOn of a more permanent nature, and mu<;t, in any ca&e, be rf'piaced by more solid and extensive barrier:>. Any obsta('}p, to be dfectIve, should be covered by fir€', preferably by fire from

of facilitating the junior's work and of organizing thp efforts of a battahon

vehicif's to dl<;lodge thl.' obstaclf's

;;~~~~:ilillii~. ~eh~~~~~l~u;~;a~~wgf~~';~~e~~~:~f ~~~~~~dng

~~~~e ~~~~~;l~~.a!¥~~:eta~~ ~aJ!n;lt~:~~ra~~nI~~~~~~e~~r~rf~:q~~~\~~~~

:;~kI~~~hct~:C~~I~~I~f h~cce:;;a~t~~~~!~dl?~~~e1:~~nh!sl'~~~bl!t~e-~Pr~ ~!:g~~~ ~l~~~l~\;ll ~:~~~ilr~p~~Il~~f~~\:;I~I~~~:sUioi~~:{gecf:~~r: 116



V'ol.X} No:'76

Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles

AmO~~\~~JI~h:O~~V~I~~o~~r\~U~h:Xltn~~~~ts~rt~slirr~yj~sr~~lii:b~;d cylinder. made up of barbed wire stretched on a frame of steel hoops, is the Ideal type, partieularly when one IS superimposed on a base of two others A one-half inch steel cable stretched obliquely across a road and securely attachpd to treps or other supports of strength equal to that of thp cable I.'> particularly effective agamst armorpd cars at night. Farm harrows laid upside down il! t""':o contiguous rows across a road WIn stop vehicles eqiupped With pneumatIc tIres. MIlle fields are partIcularly In favor III the SWiSb Arm)". It must not be forgotten, however, that min(>~ many con::'lderable number repreRPnt an enormous amount of tonnage, that theIr USf' must be closely coordmated With the movements of friendly ('overing forcpc;, and that thpy hmlt the frl'pdom of action of a defpnder \vho may d('sirp to pass to the ofi'ensi"ve Engmeer troops arp particularly concprnpd With demolitIOns, fellmg trpcs In wooded country, and construction of ~trong, c;ecureiy-anchored street barne-rs. Blockmg of roads and trail" In \\oodpd countT)" III particular ralls for a carpfu\ coorrlmatlOn of thp labor and eqUlpmr>llt avallablf> to ~p('ure a barrwr of the greatpst depth practlcable m thp allotted tlmp. Road 5urfacP8 are preferably destroyed before- dernohtlOn::. begm. Trpe'> must be- fpllpd so as to obtain maximum IntprioC'kmg of trunk'> and branche" If power ",av.-s are avmlablp, stump~ from thrpp to four f(-,pt high arp lpft standmg a"i addi­ tIOnal obstaclp5. All barrll.'rt, should, \\hene\pr practlcablf>, bp concl-'aled [rom dIstant observatIOn so that hO'ltile mechalllzpd Vt'hic}e::, pneount!;'r thpm unexpf>ctedly and on ground whprp thpy cannot rpadll.v rptrf'at or go around and, h('re agam, protectlvP fire" are of gTPat importance Thus far. ob::.taclps constructed by troop~ m the field ha\ip Pllgaged our attentIOn Another class should be tnl"ntIOnpd m clOSing, that rppre",'ntf'd b;} the 5tPpi rails of the Magmot Lme and by thE' ('oncrete ""tump~" of thp SlPgfnpd Lme Twse and othprs callmg for large quantltlt'..., of sppcJaI matpnal and for masses of labor are not to be ImproVl'wd. Th... y are a part of the permaOl'nt defE'osivesystem of the country, must bE' planned long In advanCe'. and must bp PltPcutpd by clvlhan labor not avmlahlp to thE' fidd forf'PS


STRATEGY. IDe la Strategll' I iAn artld£' b~ Gl"lwral Camlln m "La Franc£' Militaire," 23 May 1939.) Thr prinCIples of are tmmutable. They WI re dl<.;c()\ prpd by the great Ipaders of past centuries and Will contmue to gUIde bucce'lSful oppratjoll"i m the future m SPltf' of all dl'vplopmpnt::. III the arm5 placf'u m th.. hand~ of tmops Of thpse pnnclph,,,, the oustandmg oup IS that pl'rtammg to the masse:> of mean::. at the point whpre a decbwn b sought. SrhlipifE'n's plan ' .. as concelv!;'d on thiS prInCiple Molthp l'masculatpd 1\ by sl;'ehlllg to h(>pp hi.,: lpft ::-.trong:lt thp {'xppn,...,e of hi" right and by ~pndmg troops badly nepded on the Westprn Front to rf'mforcp the army In EaRt Joffre failpd to obsPT\ I' the prmclplf' both m hIS mlOal concentration and In Iw< dlSposItlOm; for the first Battle of thp Marlln and lo<;t thl' oppor­ rumty thm>by for a truly dpcl::'lve defeat of the German Army. LuupndoriJ t<;ays the authorllwut fhp Hus<"lans m East PrUSf>Hl d.nd agmr, ,n Polard by massmg hiS t>trength at thf' deClSl1.. . p pomt. Franchet d'Espen'y on the Ralomkan Front, anrI PiI"ud ... I,1 1Il 1920 o\\('d thplr <;UCCl'SS to thf' 'am" pnnclple Call thp prmriplp~ of war, if you \\111, c;lmple rulp,,> of ('<lmmon -"1 n..,p, ,till tn, ~ are vlOlatl'd and alway.., \\ lth (il."astrou,,; rl'"ulh September 1939 INFANTRi A.ND TANKS

IL'mfanterlf' et les chins de l'llmhat I Captum Delay Thll, artiCle IS a study of antitank dpfpll&e In ItS psychologH'al, as wpU aSlts tat-tlcal and techmcal aspects. The author finds that, wlule experienl't'd l'OOps mJ.Y, as certam authorities hold, be counted upon to rl'celve a tank attack .... lth thp same sangfrOId as thpy would an mfantry a~<;ault, the chances a~strongly agamst our havmg such sP(lsonpd troopc;, immune to surprl<;p, to oppose ,my particular operatIOns of thf' snrt. After four yt'ars of war, the ;Jhed ollE'nslve at Amlcns on 8 August 1918 broke through the German Imes on a fTl)))t of 19 mllps to a df'pth of 7 mlles With devastating efif'ct on thE' I~Gprm,m dIVISions m .. olved Apparenttv, a. ma<;<; attack of tankA. eXp('utt'd W~~h thE: necessary 5urpnse,lf'u\ies fe .... survivors on the opposmg Side Ps,\ , hologlCal preparatIOn must therefore come from a source othpr than :,ateefiE'id experwnce. Trammg must engender m the mfantryman a fpflmg o!securlty when OT)f'ratlng on tPrram unSUited to tank pmployment Antitank units should have a more extensive knowledge of tank t;'1 pes, [be:r armament, misslOns, and tactIcs, and the support that thpy receive from artIllery, aV13tion and othpr tanks eqmppecl WIth field guns As a final step m thf' psychnlngJ('ai preparatlOlJ of the mfantr;\- man, he 'hould \'ltness a demonstratIOn m which the capabilities and limitatIOns of latest tank models would be fully shown Commanders of the various @chelons mm,t. to a grpatpr nr less degrpe. make a "tudy of the tacUcs and techlllcal capablhtles of modern mpcha­ . Iy recommended as sources for fareJ••exammes

~~li~sintr:h~sdomain of prophecy


seac~~1a~lf th!e~:oab~ok~~s~f~J~~

The fDn Sclwll's "Kampf gegen Panze-rwagf'n" IAntltank operations], IS a tactical stUdy based on tbe antitank organIzatIOn of thp German Army A brief mnunarv of hIS premIses and concluc;ions follows. A German division mc1udes 54 infantry cannon: each of the three infan­ IlJi rf'giments has 9 and the division commander has under hiS immedIate tontrol three companies of 9 guns each,

Major von Schell examines the problem of antitank defense of this division under vartous condltions. (1) On the march he posts the antitank guns at or near the head of the column or columns The regimental guns are distributed by section while the dIvisIOnal companies are held under the control of the divisIOn com­ mander to he committed to the protection of the flanks as warranted by devel­ opmpnt~ It IS f'xpf'cwd that only hght, reeonnalSsnnce types of mechanized UDlts will be encountered and that theIr mission wIll not require combat AntItank measures should include the selection of routes on terrain unfavor­ able to mechanized attack. Smce infantry cannon at the head of the column should be constantly rf'ady to open fire, a questIOn wh1ch must be deCIded in every situatIOn IS that of dISplacing them by bounds. or of having them march WIth the other elements. Other consideratIOns are the possibilities of flank attack and thp vulnerabihty of the artillery; lateral routes may have to be blocked and mmed and denied to the enemy by fire. (2, Durmg thp approach the diVIsion is extended laterally III accordance with a plan which varies according to the situation. No one scheme of anti­ tank: defense IS apphcable to all conditions. DisperSIOn of the command re-nders It les'> \ ulm'rable to mechanized attack and. It IS probable that the enemy will not risk hI'> tanks m mass dUring thiS obscure phase of operations, Thp antitank guns will concpntratt? their attention on crItical pOInts along routes of approach and on vital pOlllts of the terram whose seIzure by friendly ad vancf' plpment'> IS psspntml to the commander's plan \3, In the dpfense the dIViSIOn must be most on lts guard agamst mass tank attack In addition to observatIOn for hiS artillery and fields of fire for Ius automatic weapons. thE' commander must seek terram unfavorable to tank err1plo~ ment Natural ob<;tacles must bp. Improved and mine fields estabhshed so as to canahze tank attacks WIthm the narrowest possible hmlts. Antitank weapons are concentratpd at the pomts of canalization and arp remforce-d when npcP5sar J WIth field piece5 The assignment of antItank guns to elements 10 front of thp mam Imp of rpslstance must be made m full coglllMnce of the fact that, ..... hIle they may be the sole means of barring a route of advancf', they may be sacrtficed by such employment. Wlthm the pOSItIon, antItank guns must he ready from the outset to open fire the speed With whleh assaultmg tanks can go mto a<'tion makes It lmprac­ tlc<lble to hold guns In reserve, even when motorized, and pxpect them to occupy pOSitIOn 1ll time to be effectIve \.4 In the attack therE' IS no nped to fpar rna&s emploympnt of the defender's tanks until hiS pOSItion has been entered and the tIme IS rIpe for counterattack To resist him successfully at this stage, the attackpr must UP m POS5PSSlOn of ground fa\'orable to antitank defense or be amply equipped With the weapons necPS&ary to combat him A possIbihty, which should not be overlookf'd Ii'> that of pncountf'ring tanks in ambush, used as mobile pillboxps (51 In the pursUlt we rna;\- f'xpect to encounter few hostile tanks. These will be committed only agam&t hmited oble-ctnes for tht? purpose- of extricat­ mg some hard-prpssed element (61 In the retreat, on the other hand, e.. ery measure must be taken to parry hlnw& by mt?chumzed forcps A properly-planned rf'treat WIll make maximum use of the terram, of demohtlOns, and of mmes to restrict mecha­ llIzed pUr&Ult SUcc('&sl\e posItIOns preVIOusly stockt?d ""Ith ammunitIOn will be prepared for antitank gum,. It should be remembered that tanks Will not halt to pngage m a firf' fight but WIll drIve straight towardJ'\ a hostilp weapon III actIOn to crush It to f'arth in the hght of Major \ on ScheU's st udles, Captain Delay finds that the S\\lSS dIV\<lIOn, with t""o mfantry cannon for each of Its nint? battahons and a diVISIOnal motorized compan;'1 of nmE' guns lS msuffidently eqmpped for alltlme('hanlzed defense He would add to each regIment a motonzed com~ pany of mile- antlt.flnk gun:;;, brmging the total Within the diVision to 39. Cartam Dplay also n>commends developml?llt of hght, portable tank mlllh to af'company automatic rifles and machme gUf,& ~n thf'U" carts Thp;) \\ould lip pmplaepd by gun crews m addltlOn to the mme fields l:ud by engi­ npers, \\hlch, while efiectne, reqUire an ellormous number of mmes and con­ sldf'rablp tIme for UlstallatlOll PrOVISIOn of hght minf's "Would obViate thp waJtmg of gn>at qlld.ntltlf's of grenadp..;; whlf'h afl? entIrel~ ullsUltf'd to defense agam5t tanks l)EfLNSE OF .... \ ILL-AGE B'I A RE.INFORfED {'OMPA.NY,

Defense d'un vIll,1ge par une eompagmf." renforcee 1 Capt am Verrey

For a number of reasons, the SWl5S Army, hke our o\\n, conducts Its manellwrs III rf'gllln& .... hll'h a,P, for the most part, unmhabited ThiS leaves it gap III the training of company and platoon commanders who, in oppostng an tn\aSlOn, WIll he f'xperh,d to turn to good account the natur:ll defenSive strength of vJllages so sltpd that they har the hostile advance. Success m such an enterprl5e call" for a high dpgree of profeSSIOnal knowledge to organ· Ize the pOSItion and for emment quahtif's of aggresslve leadership to carry tIl(> defense to a successful ('onclusion To' thp prmclples Illvolvpd. we arP gl\iPQ a theoretical Situation involVing the defense of the- \iiltage of Morrens by a rem forced company of a rf'ar guard battalIon Thp miSSion of the battalion IS to cover thp retirement of Its regiment to a npw defenSlve pOSitIOn to the east and to delay the enf'my'sarivancl'. Twoothprcompaniesof th~ battahon have r(>cP-IVpd de­ laYing ml".,ion<, farther to thp we::;t OUf company is to cover the with­ drawal of the rpmamder of the battalion and to delf'nd the Village of Marrens until further orders, thu,,> covermg the occupation of thp ne\\i reglmental pmHtlOn. The company commander IS well vI.'rsed ill thp tactics of the attack of dcfended V"Jllagl'l' III.' kno\\f\ that thp enemy wllilaunch both a frontal and an enveloping attack, each <;upported by the fire of artIllery and mfantry heavY weapon'> and a('compamed by tank5 and accompanymg guns. The villagp of Morrens IS well chosen to bar the enemy's adv:ance and to require him to attack in force. It is a road cent!>r between two nvers, one





C. & G.S.S. Military Review

'catatQg ufSelecte{1, PcriQdical Articles less than a mile to the north, thp other If's.':; than a mUp to thp c:outh. It IS covered from dIStant terrestrial observatIOn and from fire of flat trajectory wpapons by hIgh ground to the west which can be effpctlVf>Jy covered by fire Its ma~onry walls and its ('('lIars furmsh concealment and sh(>ltf'T and it is a natural obstacle to m(lchanizl'rl attack A wf'alth of matrTlals for road block., and for defensIve works is at hand. Thl' sole apparent dlsadvantagp IS that powder gUll!~ as \V011 as ('helnlCai agents cannot bE' readtly dlSpc1h,d within its confining walls.

The company commander hm" !tmlted mf'an:'l at Ill" disposal: three rdIe platoon!':, mne automatic nfles. three antitank flfle<;, SIX machine guns, onp infantry ('annon, and two Infantry hD\\ltZE'rS IlJ'l knowlt:'dgf' of thp pfinclpIt's involwd makE''' hIm rfJahzr> that hp ruu<;t bar and rlpfpnd thp pxit"! to tho village, t'nfilarle it,.., outE'r \\all... and tIw apPfllaciw'l, orgamzp thp mnl~r dl'fphSPS m depth, and maintmn a mol)lll' fl't"f'fVe dO"lt-> at hand. He mu ... t "tf(>ngth\;'n the dE'fpn::.p \\lth long rangf' \vpapons b(>yond thl' villagf'. <'ltpd "10 ae; to dE'hvl'f flankmg fifp agamst thp ho"tllp a:-".,ault plpml'nt.~ Hr mu"t al",o havf> a moht) .. fp",'fH' Ollt."'lrle thl' vJltagp to roul1tl'fatta('k thp pnt'm} \",hE'n hp ha", penPtrah,d to the mterlOr anrl ('an no long, r bp .,upportt'u b~ hb aftllll'ry A snlutlOn to HlP problpm of orgamzatlon I" ~ho\\n III p.lrt on the accom· panymg ",kpt('h Road blo('I~~. WIrE' E'nt,mgl('mrnt,. dl'mnl\tion"l and antItank mmp fil'ld ... 'lfP u::.rd to the gfPatp<;t (}!.l('nt pO"'''IU[P, Thl'\ arp d·pf!'nuI,d by fire from automatl(, anti otlwr \\eapons and by riflemen ampl~ ::.uppl!('d With clust\'T~ of grpnad,'~ and tnflammab!p "'ub"t,lnl'('''' TllP IH'av~' \\f'apon~ aTe protl,('tt-'rlll\ nfl,'m,'n On(l ntl!' platuon fUfm"hl'''' till' garn~on forthe Wl'st{'fn ('omlmt po~t". A "pC'Ond platoon pro,!dp,,; dr'pth ttl thp dpfpn<.,p wlthm tlw villag p and fUTm"hp'l a mobil!' rpo:,{'f\'p prrpaTt'd to run\-!' tu north or "'lluth hy thp dr·fllad,'d 4r".'t pa<:"llrlg hl'forl' th, ('hurch Th,' th1rn platovn, bl )-onri tht> ,\all"" prov\th'~ flanhlllg fifP-; alnng th,' \' l!mlt" and a ruohllf> rr''''''rVf> for count, rnttach Thr lnf,mtr.., hO\\ltZ.' ro; <4rp 1,)("at!'d to thl' P1i-.t of the villagf' ami prppafe firl''> a'" ... ho\\n on thp n1,UIl a\,'nU,"j of apprn ad1. To ('omplptl' tht Plduh' \\l' ruu"t lrnaglnl' all of th, numt'rou-. a('tnltH''> \\ l11ch thl' ('ompany ('ommandC'T mu"l <"I't In motlOll. prot ,~"lll'" for ~,'Cunty,

~~fi{:~~pli ;i~:I;t~l~~~"~~h:~: f~ll~l~gll;~;:f,I.~~h~; ~\I~I;)~I~~ ~:;~)n~l~l;r~~.:~,~I~d~~'~~ tagl'


Jomed combat. It seems that the diplomats and the soldiers are simultane.­ ouslY pngaged In a jomt mission. Thf' operations m Poland are ('ompif>tely dIfferent from those on the Franco-Gprman frontier. In Poland the "lightnmg war" of large mechamzed forcE'S came to futi fruItion Agamst a fop ill-prepared to counter its WIde and SWIft maneuvers and favored by weather conditions on terrain \~ hich rain could have renderlld utterly Impossible. the new terrestrial arm Jived up to highest pxpectations, paralyzmg Polish command agencil's and nru­ trahzing or destroymg the defendf'r's rrsprves. On thE' 'vestE'rn front the pI('turf' IS altogether dIfferent. Two strong defrnslvl> sy"tpms face p:l{"h othrr, nelthE'r of whICh IS BUltpd to Sf'rVe as an oiff'nslve base. Such actIOn mw:;t of DPl'es.."ity conSl'>t of oppratlOnf; \\lth hmltpd objectives SurlJri<;E'm any great degr(>l' l~ Impos~ible and the Fn'nch attack hIlS bpf'n mf'rely a rnf'thodlcai applicatIOn of the> prinCiples formul<lt('d m r('(,pnt regulatIon... bripf arttllpry prpparations and use of tanks in dos!.' cooperatwn \\ lth thE' mfantry, \\ ho.;:,e e<;sentml mission<:. aTr to occupy tf'rntory gatnf'd by the tanks and to rl'du('f' local rpsistancp The SWI">S nation ..hould not attpmpt to find a ('ompll'tf' Iln::'\\'I·r 10 lt~ d('fl'me prob\pm on (,Ithpr thp pastrrn or thp \\I,,,tprn front SWltzcrl,u'((1 hus no Imprl'gnable ~v~tpm of fortlfication~ on It~ frontl!'r,,; nplthr>r is Its tl'rrmn U:-. favorablp to manl'UVl'r as Poland. Thp opcratlOn<:'On both front:'> \\,11 have theiT \p,sRons for thp Sw,,,,.. but thf ultImate solutIOn WI]] nL'('P:::...arily b p ioast,d on thp ~ltuatlOn in thpir own land


IFmrp la gUf'ftl-' 1 ,An artIei,> bv Char],,, Kuntz in "La Fr,mce Mlilt,u;p," ·'?O·:!l Auguq 19:191 Tlw 1939 RpgulallOns :lil' undprgolng till' fm,ll I, ~t, trml b~ batt I" SIner r"l~uJ.ltlOn ... ,up <,0 oftpt1 "upprfil'lal and Ignorl' tho !, ...... t·nth.1l prm(,lpl,', or mlljtary "'UCCP'lS, It 1<; approprmt(' to r"\lI'W "'om .. of thl''''' prmf'lpl"" <:trlpp"d of thE' .1rttficJaI trapping, \\1t11 \\lHch PPtH,,,·tlmp pradh'" ha'< riP('i,p,1 th, m A ml!-mtf'rpret.l.tlOn till' Jp<,,"on,> of 1914-191:-- hth I·,d many p!'\.plr> to bl'iIP\'(' that holdmg on I'" tlw "h'rut-nt of ... lI('Ct' ...., In \\J.r. Notlung \\lhdrllJr fd.rtiwT from thl' truth. The> fi,r"t ('",,,pntm} h to find th~· gatp\yay on wiu('h tu ('onc~'ntratp fOTC'I' and, le::t then> be any ml<..tahe, this mu~t not bp ('onfu",C'd \\lth trYtng to baHN down a stonp wall. Thpn t hp rnrans mu.. t bl' found for forrlng thp gatp The necPssity of holdmg on whIle thE'':>(' ml'a3llrP<; jlre bplTIg carned to ('onciUf;lon IS undpmabh· but holdmg on by ItSP]f I'> futHp A~ '\3r becomcs mOTe and more t('('hnicai, the military {"arf'('r hpf'omps ::opL'cmhzpd to a gfPatp( dpgrp(> than eW·r bf>foTf'. ThE' (>-xaltl'd ma<;:-,rs of


~~~I~v\~~~I~~ ~~~{ thnr tz;1~t~~~prl'~~3t,~f~o!~ygua~dta\~~~d;t~~e>\~~~';~~~~

to tl'ducp hIS labor.. to a \\ ell-d"dlned <;Y"ltf'm In whI(,h detail.:; becoml' mor~ Important than prmclPl~<; and thp carl'ful mamtpnanre of ml'ntal {'ard lndexft, hhnd Illm to changing ('If("um"tan('\·~. In th.. ",f'fV1('f' ",choob in part1{'ular thp tpOIiPTJry IS to irnpo,1' doctnn" to the' nl'glpct of logIcal thinl~ing. In \\.1r a blrm mu<;t bp :-:.tfu("k. Th... arh'l'r~ary 1'3 unkno\\n, he apprar" from an unC'xpp('tl'ti nlrpctlOn and hh \H'upnn."l are unprrda'tablp. No mat· tl'T Thr> blm\ mu...,t hI' qruf'k anti "trucJ,. bpfore the <l.dve>r'lary {"an dFhv~r an,-ttPT on p h \\ar tiwn lu,t a bra\\llll which thl' m:'>Plration of thl' moment !.., all that {'ount~ anr! judgm~'l1t <Inri planmng an' of no avmI? No, thf' an<;\\,'r on('t' ag.un IS <:Jmpliclty, udhe>rl'llce to three, at most four, (''ispntmi prinCipiI'S, To ...tnvp faT marl' II'; to risk fm!ure in over· comph('utlOn Th!" first If> to arrang!' to mept the t'nf'my on ground of your O\\n chol(,c Thpn, dru\\< up fhp broad hnl's of u('tlOn accorrlmg to th, latest and bpst VC'nfied mformatHln, If thl'r(> I'> a comp!pte dE'arth of informatIon, It muc:t hp sought upfore commlttmPnt to any df'finit(' im(' of uctlOn. ThIrd, coml'S a .,tudy of onp's own <:trpngtlt anr! capabilttir'l a" opposed tn wra~ poinh In thf' hostll .. dl'>po'>ltlOn<.,: thIS <;hould rf'\l'aI tit.. place whpr!' and thp mf'Uns \\lth \\hich a dpCI"'I\'E' hIm,; can be ...trllrk It must, howPver, be d('cis{;e and not a merf' pu",h Fmally, pVf'rythmg IS thro\,;n into thiS Otl{' great l'ffort with a will to Win whlrh Imbuf'<; the troops from the commander to the la'lt rpcrmt Since 1914 '-'Ight has becn 10!'t of a vf'ryhuman and, consequently) a ,\H'\'Y

~~~S~~d'l:~d~;sn~~d ~~~ ~~~~~tcg~fi~f'~~~~h;~~:ri~~~ntl!e~~~~~~t;A~etb!

first battIp of the Mamf', a bE'aten army turnf'd as a man to drive back thp Invadf'r becau!'-(> the $oldlPrs wpre callfld upon by Il'aders, from corporals to general", who had lE'd th(lffi long h(lforfl Today th(>- officprs pa~ uncpasingly from po'lt to post; only thf' non('ommissioned officers staY to gIve some per­ manpn('p to orgamzatlOn, ThIS la('k of continuity is to be regretted.

~ra~~fnr;;~'iratI~::pnri~: ba~~~~ae~~~~l'~~N~in~~:dc~~s~s~sO~ibilit\~d~~

and every ('ontmgpncy a {'ourse of a('tIOn IS thought out and when the contmgl>ney ari,>\;''> thf' ne('Pssary action IS put pnerg('tically in pffflct. CUMMENTS ON TH& I'RE;SEl'<T \\ -\R, iC()mml'ntmrf>~ '>UT la gupril' actup!lp I The gfl'at al'flal offfln$,l\ e ... whIch. accoTdmg to prophpb of thp pa'>t fpw ytars, \"'{'TC to charadl'nz.e tlw opening pha<;(> of a nel, war, haH' falled to mat(>rlahzE' Not only haw the great ClUes and rrntl'fS of ("ommunicatIOn of thl' \\I:''rn bplhgPTent;; rf'mamed practirally fref> from bombardment, but the varIOUs. armi€''> have :11"l0 bf'f'n abll'> to ('omplet£' th(llf concentratlOns without intl'rff'Tl'nce. Anothl'r false prophl'{"J' was that which hf'ld that hostihttf's would Open WIthout a dl'rlaratlOn of war aftpfa brlPf P(>TlOd of intl'rnatlOnal tf'nSlOn In the present situatlOn. dIplomatic manpuven:. had scarcl'ly bf'gun when bo'3­ ~1;;;S commencE'd; diplomacy ('ontmu~o operate while the armed forces


df' gue>rrc.l (Ab'ltra('t m "La France Militairf'," 25 July 1939. of a r('CE'nt artlcle in "Militar-Wocben­ blatt.")

man~~v;~ !i~~!v~~ylt~'in~:;~~~rsre~h~th:~thadt~~b:!~~r~~uc~h~:;

battlefield. and YE't men familiar WIth thE' npw practIces being deyrlop~dh" France and Bfllgium WE're available as recruit instructors, The a~tlc1(> WlS, es to avoid a rp.petitlOn of these mistakes and proposes means of rapidly puWng lessons learned on future battlefields into recruit curricula.






Voi.X'x No; 76 ,~

Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles -i

MILlTARY POWER OF SOVIET RUSSIA: fLa puissance militaire de I'U R.S.S.} (From "La France Mili­ taire," 4 August 1939.) Statisti('S and other informatIOn regardmg RU.';.'lia's mihtary. naval. and aIr power. The sources of the mformatjon are obscure and the edItors make no claim as to authenticity.

attaC'k against the sea commerce of the enemy cannot be carried out other­ WIse. Decisive duels between fleets must be avoided.


The author discusses the attitudes of Russia. France, the Umted States and England toward fighting a prolonged war. Sevf'ral historical examples are Quoted. He concludes WIth the remark: "When the great powers of Europe, armed as npver beforf', become oppospd III battlt>, it will be impossible to deff'at one or the othf'r in one or two campaigns."

THE WAR OF QUICK AND DECISIVE CONCLUSIQN. [Der Krieg der schne11en Entscheidung.J Major General v.Tempel­

hoff December 1939 19J.l



June 1939 ~MOLTh.E

IN THE: RATTLE 01>' .t-.;ISlB ONE HUNDRED \EARS AGO. IMolthp "or hundt>rt Jahrl'n in dl'r Schlacht hpI NI"'lb I Eberhard K{'ss!:'l ()m' hundn'd ypars ago, 24 Junp 1h39, the career of the grr;>at Field Mar­ shal (jpnrral vun ~101tb.t.· bpgan \V1th thp dpft'at of the Turkish Army, WIth which hI' \... a~ ",prvmg a'l a mlhtary arlvlsor!"'> Thl' Turkish Army made the sam!' mistakes that iatpr brought defr;>at to thp French in 1870 at Met'l. and Spdun At NI'>lb, 1iolth.e had had nothing but thpory to gUlde him, herf' he rt'('l'l\pd hj" first great lesson III \"ar.

SUNTSl', THE CHlr-.ESE "'AR PHILOSOPHER OF THE PRE-CHRISTIAN ERA. Sun TSI, der ('hlUeSlsciw KrIPg"phllo~oph dl'r i,or~C'hi'Ifthchen ZeIt.] Ml'l.UYO Ashlya Th;f, 1'1 a dlge<;t of "Thp Boob. of 'Var," the> mlhtary claSSIC of the East. fPHl',Wt! on pag!;, 5l'\, (' & G S S ;"'hlttary