Focusing on the phenomenon of terrorism in the age of ISIS/ISIL, Terrorism and Counterterrorism investigates this form of political violence in an international and American context and in light of new and historical trends. In this comprehensive and highly readable text, renowned expert Brigitte Nacos clearly defines terrorism’s diverse causes, actors, and strategies; outlines anti- and counterterrorist responses; and highlights terrorism’s relationship with the public and media. Terrorism and Counterterrorism introduces students to the field’s main debates and helps them critically assess our understanding of, and our strategies for, addressing this complex and enduring issue.
New to the Sixth Edition:
• Additions to terrorist developments since 2016, including the rise and decline of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
• A significant expansion of the analysis of intelligence gathering and the growth of the U.S. intelligence community in the post-9/11 era.
• Discussion of increasing activities of extremist groups in the so-called alt-right and the Antifa movement in the U.S. and abroad.
• More explanations for the making of terrorists, including rational choice theory and new research revealing childhood trauma as a risk factor.
• An enlarged chapter on women and children in terrorism to include suicide missions as family projects.
• A new section on human rights violations in counterterrorism.
Brigitte L. Nacos teaches political science at Columbia University and was a longtime U.S. correspondent for newspapers in Germany.
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Sixth Edition
Brigitte L. Nacos
Sixth edition published 2019 by Routledge
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First edition published by Pearson Education, Inc. 2005
Fifth edition published by Routledge 2016
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Nacos, Brigitte Lebens, author.
Title: Terrorism and counterterrorism / Brigitte L. Nacos.
Description: Sixth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018046368| ISBN 9781138317628 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138317635 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780429455100 (e-book)
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018046368
ISBN: 9781138317628 (hbk)
ISBN: 9781138317635 (pbk)
ISBN: 9780429455100 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK
Detailed Contents
1 Introduction: The Terrorist Threat 1 Terrorism Trends over the Last Decades 7
2 The Perennial Debate: What Is Terrorism? 17
The Meaning of Terrorism over Time 20
The Definitional Potpourri 22
Downplaying and Emphasizing the “T”-Word 32 State Terror(ism) 35
The Meaning of Terrorism in this Volume 37 Is Terrorism Ever Justified? 37
Terrorism Studies, a Field in Search of Theory and Methodology 39
3 Terrorism in the Global Context 45
Different Types of Groups 46
The Roots of Modern Terrorism 47
The Post-World War II Wave 49
1968: The Advent of Modern-Day Terrorism 52
Groups that Transcend the Average Life Span of Terrorist Groups 54
The Decline of Left-Wing Terrorism 57
The Rise of Catastrophic Terrorism 60
Unrestrained Terrorism and Counterterrorism after the Cold War 61
The Disintegration of the Communist Bloc 62
Modernization, Globalization, and the Proliferation of Religious Violence 64
4 Terrorism in the American Context 72
Right-Wing Terrorism 73
The Ku Klux Klan 74
Christian Identity and Neo-Nazi Groups 78
The Patriot and Militia Movement 82
The Sovereign Citizens Movement 85
Left-Wing Terrorism 87
The First Anarchists in the United States 87
Modern-Day Anarchists as Part of the Antifa Movement 89
The Weather Underground 90
The Black Panther Party 91
The Symbionese Liberation Army 92
Single-Issue Terrorism 93
Antiabortion Violence 94
The Animal and Earth Liberation Fronts 96
The Jewish Defense League 97
Puerto Rican Nationalist Groups 98
Ideological Waves 99
5 Religious Terrorism: Political Violence in the Name of God 105
Defending the Faith in “Cosmic Wars” 111
The Proliferation of Religious Violence 113
Alienation, Humiliation, and Fear 114
The Jihadi Movement and Political Violence 117
Muslims 118
Islamists 118
Salafis and Wahhabis 119
Jihadis 120
Jihadi Ideology 121
Homegrown Jihadis in the West—Including the United States 126
6 The Making of Terrorists: Causes, Conditions, Influences 135
Terrorism as a Result of Rational Choice 139
Terrorism as a Result of Personal Traits and Experiences 141
Terrorism as a Result of Social Interaction 143 Differences between Leaders and Followers 145 The Lone Wolf Phenomenon 146
The Lack of a Universal Terrorist Profile 148
The Stages Leading to Terrorism 148
The Roots of Terrorism: No Simple Answers 151
7 Women, Children, and Terrorism 155
For the Sake of Love 162 Demonstration of Gender Equality 162 Can Real Women Become Terrorists? 164 Tactical Advantages of Female Terrorists 165
The Making of Child Terrorists 168
8 Common Threads: Goals, Targets, and Tactics 174 Do Terrorists Achieve Their Goals? 175
The Selection of Targets 176 Terrorist Methods: From Primitive Bombs to WMD 179 Most Common Methods of Terrorist Attacks 180 Most Likely CBRN Weapons in the Hands of Terrorists 199
9 Organizational Structures and the Financing of Terror 205
ISIS: Organized Like a Police State 212 How Terrorist Groups Decline or End 215
Terrorist Groups’ Big Helpers: State Sponsors 217 The Case of Saudi Arabia 221 Failed and Failing States and “Brown Areas” 223
Involuntary Host Countries 224
Financing Terrorism 225 Narco-Terrorism or Narco-Funded Terrorism? 229
10 Terrorism and America’s Post-9/11 National Security Strategy 235
President Bush’s National Security Strategy 240
I. Making the World Safer and Better 240
II. Preemption before Threats Become Imminent 241
III. Unilateral Use of Force 242
President Obama’s National Security Strategy 243
President Trump's National Security Strategy 245
America’s Controversial “Drone War” 246
11 The Utility of Hard and Soft Power in Counterterrorism 252
Military Hard Power 255
Military Retaliation/Reprisal 256
Military Preemption 259
Commando Raids 261
Assassinations 262
Hostage Rescue Missions 264
Nonmilitary Hard Power: Economic Sanctions 266
Drying Up Financial Resources 267
Soft Power and Counterterrorism 268
Deterrence 268
Diplomacy 269
Talking to Terrorist Groups 271
Public Diplomacy 274
Conciliation and Peace 275
12 Balancing Security, Liberty, and Human Rights 281
U.S. Anti- and Counterterrorism Laws 285
Edward Snowden: Hero or Villain? 290
The Rights of “Enemy Combatants” 294
Torture: Leaders and Followers 298
Obama on Torture and Rendition 302
The Drone War and Human Rights Violations 303
13 The Crucial Role of Intelligence 308
The U.S. Intelligence Community 311
Post-9/11 Changes 316
Domestic Intelligence in Post-9/11 America 318
Congress and the Lack of Effective Oversight 322
International Cooperation Needed 323
Preparedness for Man-Made and Natural Disasters 325
PART III
Terrorism in the News Media and on the Internet 329
14 Terrorist Propaganda and the Mainstream Media 331
Publicity: The Universal Terrorist Goal 336
An Alternative View: Contemporary Terrorists Do Not Need Publicity 337
Terrorism and the Triangle of Communication 339
Media-Related Goals 340
The Attention-Getting Goal 340
The Recognition Goal 343
The Respectability/Legitimacy Goal 345
Bedfellows in a Marriage of Convenience 347
Media and Terrorist Contagion 348
Defending the Media 350
Treason or Public Service? 352
15 Terror and Hate in Cyberspace 356
Social Media as an Ideal Alternative to Mainstream News Media 363
Radicalization, Recruitment, and Incitement 364
Preaching Hate and Violence 366
Self-Reporting of Violence 368
Planning and Executing Terrorist Operations 369
Retrieving Valuable Information 372
Raising Funds 373
16 Conclusion: Living with Terrorist Threats 377
Appendix: Major Terrorist Incidents since the
1.1
14.1 Mainstream Media Reporting on ISIS before and after Foley Beheading: Articles about or Mentioning ISIS 332
14.2 Mainstream Media Reporting on ISIS before and after Foley Beheading: Number of Articles with Islamic State, ISIS, or ISIL in Headline 332
14.3 News Coverage January 1, 2014–December 31, 2014: Articles about or Mentioning Particular Issues 343
Preface
More than two decades ago, when I put together the syllabus for the very first terrorism course I taught, it was difficult to find good articles and chapters—forget textbooks—that covered the whole range of what I considered important aspects of transnational and domestic terrorism and counterterrorism. After September 11, 2001, there was a flood of new publications that dealt mostly or exclusively with: 9/11; the perpetrators of that horrific event; the motives of bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and like-minded individuals and groups; the implications for American domestic and foreign policy; and the impact on U.S. foreign policy and/or international relations, and so on.
Fine textbooks by single authors are often written for readers with special interests, for example, students in criminal justice courses or members of the emergency response community; others cover all conceivable topics in too short sections; and still others are exclusively devoted to transnational terrorism. Even the best among edited volumes seem less suited to serve as basic texts than as valuable supplements to a basic textbook written by one author.
So, I decided to write a textbook about terrorism and counterterrorism to serve as the core reading in pertinent lecture courses or seminars. The students in my terrorism/counterterrorism class were in the past and are today predominantly political science majors, mostly concentrating on the study of international relations, American government, and comparative politics. I have also had students who majored in sociology, history, urban studies, and psychology. I wrote this textbook with these undergraduate students in mind, but even graduate students who have a good basic knowledge of the topic will find here the background and tools with which to study terrorism and counterterrorism at an advanced level. Teaching graduate courses on media and politics, for example, I learned that many students did not study this area as undergraduates but could be brought up to speed for more advanced studies by working their way through a good textbook.
New to this edition
• Updates throughout the volume include developments, such as the decline of ISIS after a spectacular rise based on its control over vast territories in Iraq, and Al Qaeda. The new edition also discusses and puts into context the latest terrorist tactics—in particular, the many cases of lethal vehicular terrorism with copy cat incidents in the United States and Europe.
• Additions in Chapters 3 and 4 address the increase in violence carried out by extremist right-wing groups and by left-extremist parts of the Antifa movement in both the United States and Europe.
• The rise of children in Western Europe carrying out terrorist attacks, suicide missions as family projects, and childhood trauma as a risk factor are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
• A new section in Chapter 12 addresses human rights violations in counterterrorism, especially with respect to the killing of civilians in drone strikes and in the use of torture during the interrogation of terrorists or alleged terrorists.
• Most of all, a rewritten Chapter 13 is devoted to the central role of intelligence and interagency cooperation in efforts to counter terrorism and protect the homeland.
A successful textbook is a work in progress. While the first editions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism were well received, comments and suggestions by instructors and students who used those volumes were instrumental in extended revisions, additions, and changes for the much improved second, third, and fourth editions—and now the heavily revised fifth edition. This edition, too, is not simply an updated version of the previous one but offers important additions and improvements.
Acknowledgments
The topics introduced and discussed in my seminars on terrorism and the notes prepared for lecture courses on terrorism and on the media in American politics informed the organization and the content of this volume, as did the thoughtful input by my students at Columbia University and Barnard College during our lively but always civil class discussions.
I am very grateful to the following reviewers for their detailed comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism:
• Sean K. Anderson, Idaho State University
• Victor Asal, SUNY Albany
• Vincent Auger, Western Illinois University
• Shaheen Ayubi, Rutgers University, Camden
• Peter A. Barone, University of Bridgeport
• Jeffrey Bosworth, Mansfield University
• Tom Brister, Wake Forest University
• Sabina Burton, University of Wisconsin, Platteville
• Rachel Bzostek, California State University, Bakersfield
• Timothy A. Capron, California State University, Sacramento
• Lamont Colucci, Ripon College
• Michael V. Deaver, Sierra College
• Julian Droogan, Macquarie University, Australia
• Larry Elowitz, Georgia College and State University
• William Eppright, Columbia College, Orlando
• John Fielding, Mount Wachusett Community College
• James L. Freed, University of Maryland University College
• Hasan Kosebalaban, University of Utah
• Tobias J. Lanz, University of South Carolina
• Jecek Lubecki, University of Arkansas, Little Rock
• C. Augustus Martin, California State University, Dominguez Hills
• Dennis W. McLean, Keiser University
• Dean A. Minix, Northern Kentucky University
• Tricia Mulligan, Iona College
• Thomas R. O’Connor, North Carolina Wesleyan College
• William Rose, Connecticut College
• Gabriel Rubin, Montclair State University
• Stanley E. Spangler, Bentley College
• George C. Thomas, Marquette University
• Ronald Vardy, University of Houston
• Michael Joel Voss, University of Toledo
• Carlos Yordan, Drew University
For the sixth edition, the following reviewers provided helpful input:
• Jeffrey Bosworth, Mansfield University
• Julian Droogan, Macquarie University, Australia
• Dennis W. McLean, Keiser University
• Gabriel Rubin, Montclair State University
• Michael Joel Voss, University of Toledo
The encouragement, guidance, and cooperation I received from Senior Editor Jennifer Knerr at Routledge made all the work involved in a comprehensive book revision as pleasant as possible. Thank you!
The author posts her observations and comments about terrorism, counterterrorism, the mass media, and current events on her blog, reflectivepundit (www.reflectivepundit.com). Readers are invited to visit her blog, comment on posts, or email questions and comments.
About the Author
Brigitte L. Nacos, a longtime U.S. correspondent for newspapers in Germany, received a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, where for more than twenty-five years she has taught and continues to teach courses in American politics and government. Her research concentrates on the links between the media, public opinion, and decision-making; domestic and international terrorism and counterterrorism; and, more recently, on social movements. Besides publishing many articles and several book chapters, she is the author of The Press, Presidents, and Crises (Columbia University Press, 1990); Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing (Columbia University Press, 1994 and 1996); Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, 2007, 2016); (with Oscar Torres-Reyna) Fueling Our Fears: Stereotyping, Media Coverage, and Public Opinion of Muslim Americans (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). She is also the coauthor of From Bonn to Berlin: German Politics in Transition (Columbia University Press, 1998) with Lewis J. Edinger, and coeditor of Decisionmaking in a Glass House (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) with Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isernia. Finally, she is coauthor with Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Robert Y. Shapiro of Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
Apart from teaching, researching, and writing, she loves playing golf and cooking and barbecuing for her family and friends, as well as tending to her indoor and outdoor flowers.
1 Introduction
The Terrorist Threat
New Year’s Eve in Manhattan’s Times Square. In spite of record cold temperatures more than 1 million people wait for hours to celebrate the departure of the old year 2017 and the advent of the New Year 2018. Finally, as the famous crystal ball drops with a burst of confetti and fireworks the crowd erupts in deafening shouts of excitement and joy. Shortly thereafter the celebrants begin to melt away from the famous venue of this annual media event that is witnessed by many millions across the country and around the world on TV and computer screens.
What got lost in the worldwide TV crowd were the massive security resources in terms of manpower, equipment, and expense provided by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and its formidable counterterrorism experts. Manhattan’s downtown had suffered three months earlier, on Halloween Day, a truck-ramming act of terrorism. Now, sand and garbage trucks blocked all access streets to Times Square. Spectators had passed several layers of security checks where officers utilized metal and radiation detection devices. There were also so-called “vapor wake” dogs trained to sniff out explosives. Rooftop observation teams and snipers looked out for possible attackers. Beat officers had seen training videos and read bulletins on how to respond to suicide attacks. With well over 5,000 police officers deployed in the heart of New York City the Times Square area was the most protected piece of real estate in the world.
According to NYPD Commissioner James P. O’Neill there were no direct threats against the New Year’s Eve celebrations on Times Square. “Out of an abundance of caution, you’ll see a stronger police presence out there than we’ve seen even in recent years,” he explained nevertheless. Some extra security measures were added because of a seemingly non-terrorism-related mass shooting in Las Vegas three months earlier, where the lone gunman sprayed bullets from an upper floor window into a crowd of concert goers killing forty-nine people and injuring hundreds. Perhaps the counterterrorism community considered that a terrorist might try to copycat the Las Vegas massacre.
How serious was the threat of terrorism in New York and elsewhere in the United States of America at the time? In all of 2017 there had been three
lethal terrorist attacks in the country with a total of ten fatalities that were politically motivated and carried out by ideological extremists. The most deadly incident was the mentioned vehicular attack on October 31, 2017 in New York City by a self-described follower of the Islamic State that killed eight innocent persons. And there were two terrorist acts by White Supremacists—one in Charlottesville, Virginia, and another in New York City, both resulting in the death of one person. It is not clear whether the shooting and killing of a guard for the Denver Transit Authority in February 2017 was politically motivated by jihadist extremism.1
The point here is that there were few lethal terrorist attacks in the United States in all of 2017. Compared to the more than close to 40,000 individuals killed in car accidents and the close to 13,000 dying in gun homicides every year in the United States the number of annual terrorist fatalities is small even in years with major terrorist attacks. Yet, the threat perception of the American public tends to be far greater with respect to terrorism than car crashes or gun violence. Equally or more important is that public officials’ risk assessments tend to be alarming. Testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security in November 2017 the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke said: “Today, the magnitude of the threat we face from terrorism is equal to, and in many ways exceeds, the 9/11 period.”
Nothing could be more disconcerting even more than sixteen years after the catastrophic attacks of September 11, 2001 than referencing 9/11 in such a grim threat assessment. As one expert notes,
The 9/11 attacks have become what psychologists call an “anchoring event” which, owing to its vivid and dramatic nature, is long remembered because human memory and perceptions filter out less dramatic or contradictory information. Moreover, the anchoring event shapes subsequent analysis and the degree of probability that are attributed to future events, in this case, the extent and nature of the terrorist threat.2
The horrific attacks of 9/11 transformed for most Americans and many people in other Western countries the perception of terrorism from fictional scenes in disaster movies to images of real-life horror. Never before had so many people—about 3,000—died in one terrorist operation. Never before had a terrorist coup inflicted so much grief, so much devastation, and so much fear of further, and more lethal, attacks. It was a most painful conclusion to the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The terrorism of the past had turned into something much more catastrophic, much more threatening—into what has been called the “new terrorism,” “superterrorism,” or “postmodern terrorism.”
Just as important, never before had one terrorist attack reshaped the priorities and the actual policy agenda of a victimized state as drastically,
3 and impacted international relations as severely, as the assault on targets in New York and Washington. Not the 9/11 attacks but rather the U.S. responses to the incident had far-reaching and lasting effects on the global and domestic realms. This was possible, according to one scholar, because “the myths of American Exceptionalism and Barbarism vs. Civilization” shaped the post-9/11 narrative of the terrorist threat and led to a “shared, mythologized understanding of the significance of 9/11.”3
In response to 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush, backed by most members of the U.S. Congress and a vast majority of the American people, declared war, not against a conventional enemy, a foreign country, but rather against a violent activity—a war against terrorism. Less than four weeks after 9/11, military actions by an American-led, international coalition commenced in Afghanistan against the assumed masterminds of the terror on American soil, Osama bin Laden and his close associates in the Al Qaeda (meaning “the base”) terror organization, and against the ruling Taliban that had harbored Al Qaeda terrorists and their Afghan training camps for many years. According to President Bush, Afghanistan was merely the first battleground in a long and difficult campaign against a web of terrorist cells and organizations scattered around the globe and against states actively supporting terrorist activities. Furthermore, the president, in a speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, and the White House in a comprehensive follow-up “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” formulated a new doctrine of preventive wars that justified preemptive military actions against “emerging threats before they are fully formed.”4 By citing evidence of existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and the threat that the country’s ruler, Saddam Hussein, might place such weapons into the hands of terrorists, the Bush administration followed the new doctrine when it decided to invade the country and force a regime change.5
Even before the dust had settled around the totally destroyed World Trade Center and the partially demolished Pentagon, people in the United States and abroad began to recognize that this terrorist assault pushed the United States and much of the world into a crisis that seemed just as dangerous as, or perhaps more explosive than, the Cold War conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies in the decades following the end of World War II. In some quarters, the end of the Cold War had fueled expectations of an era of greater international understanding and cooperation and a “peace dividend” that would better the economic conditions in the underdeveloped world and bring improvements in the industrialized nations. But during the 1990s, such dreams did not come true. Instead, there was a troubling wave of conflicts in many parts of the world.
Instant commentary in the media compared the events of 9/11 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sixty years earlier, claiming that both
incidents had been as unexpected as bolts of lightning from a blue sky. Indeed, two months before the kamikaze flights crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a former counterterrorism specialist in the U.S. Department of State wrote in an op-ed article in the New York Times, Judging from news reports and the portrayal of villains in our popular entertainment, Americans are bedeviled by fantasies about terrorism. They seem to believe that terrorism is the greatest threat to the United States and that it is becoming more widespread and lethal . . . Nothing of these beliefs are based on facts.6
But others had warned for years that the United States and other Western countries should brace for catastrophic terrorism that would result in mass disruption and mass destruction.7 For example, Walter Laqueur, a leading terrorism expert who had characterized terrorism in the past as an irritant rather than a major threat, came to a different judgment at the end of the 1990s, when he concluded,
Terrorism has been with us for centuries, and it has always attracted inordinate attention because of its dramatic character and its sudden, often wholly unexpected occurrence. It has been a tragedy for the victims, but seen in historical perspective it seldom has been more than a nuisance . . . This is no longer true today, and may be even less so in the future. Yesterday’s nuisance has become one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.8
Several horrific incidents in the 1990s and certainly the events of 9/11 proved the pessimists right and ended the threat debate. One could argue that the age of catastrophic terrorism began in December 1988 with the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, caused by a terrorist bomb that killed a total of 270 civilians on board (most of them Americans) and on the ground (all of them Scots). This was, at the time, the single most devastating act of terrorism in terms of the number of victims. Actually, nearly as many Americans were killed when extremists of the Lebanese Hezbollah drove an explosive-laden truck into the U.S. Marine barracks near Beirut Airport in 1983. But while the victims were deployed as peacekeepers and thus were not combatants in the sense of fighting a war, they nevertheless were not civilians like the passengers and crew aboard Pan Am Flight 103 and the people who died on the ground in Lockerbie. As I will explain in the next chapter, whether civilians or members of the military are targets and victims figures prominently in the discussions of what kinds of violent acts constitute terrorism. The fate of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 along with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 that caused the deaths of 168 persons represented turning points in the lethality of terrorism. Until these events, the widely held
supposition was that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead.”9 But after Pan Am Flight 103 and the terror in Oklahoma City, this assumption was no longer valid. Another terrorist incident fueled fears of even more deadly terrorist strikes and changed intentions on the part of terrorists: In 1995, members of a Japanese doomsday cult named Aum Shinrikyo (meaning “supreme truth”) released poison gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing twelve persons and sickening thousands of commuters. As devastating as the consequences were, experts concluded that the release of the nerve gas sarin could have killed far more people had members of the Aum cult handled the poison differently. Pointing to the Japanese group’s ability to develop nerve gas and to acquire toxic materials and know-how from sources in Australia, the United States, Russia, and elsewhere, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn concluded that the Japanese case signaled the beginning of “a new era” in terrorism. He warned that WMD could spread indiscriminately and fall into the hands of terrorists.10
For Americans, the threat of a major bioterrorist catastrophe hit close to home three weeks after the terror of 9/11, when letters containing anthrax spores were delivered to several media organizations and members of the U.S. Congress. Although in this case “only” five persons died and a dozen or so fell sick as a result of inhaling the finely powdered biological agent, an anthrax attack designed to kill as many people as possible could have easily caused a much more lethal catastrophe. Even before the anthrax case frightened the American public, New York Times reporters Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad published a book in which they called germ weapons “the poor man’s atom bomb” and warned that
the threat of germ weapons is real and rising, driven by scientific discoveries and political upheavals around the world. As Aum Shinrikyo’s failed efforts [to inflict far more harm than planned] suggest, the crucial ingredient in a successful biological attack is not advanced laboratory equipment or virulent microbes alone, but knowledge. Such expertise is increasingly available.11
Several months after 9/11, high officials in the U.S. administration warned that terrorists would inevitably acquire WMD. Testifying before a Senate committee, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said terrorists “would seek to obtain nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ultimately would succeed despite U.S. efforts to prevent them [from doing so].”12 Worse yet, in June 2002 the U.S. government announced the arrest of Abdullah Al Mujahir, an American citizen who years earlier had been a Chicago street gang member named Jose Padilla. The Brooklyn-born Muslim convert, who had allegedly trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, was accused of conspiring with fellow terrorists
to acquire and detonate a so-called dirty bomb in Washington, DC, or elsewhere in the United States. Although this would not trigger a nuclear explosion and would not be as lethal as sophisticated nuclear weapons, a dirty bomb would nevertheless release enough radioactive material over several city blocks to harm many people and contaminate the affected area. As it turned out, there was no evidence that Padilla had planned to get his hands on a dirty bomb but the news of such a threat contributed to the American people’s worries.
In the following years, there were many dozens of failed and foiled terrorist plots by jihadists and right-extremists within the United States but no major attacks. The Fort Hood shooting in 2009, the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, the San Bernardino mass shooting in 2015, the Orlando nightclub mass shooting in 2016, and the deadly New York City truck ramming in 2017 renewed Americans’ anxieties about the threat of jihadist terrorism in the homeland although far more terrorism occurred abroad without involving Americans. In Europe, hundreds were killed in jihadi attacks with the most deadly incidents occurring in Madrid, Spain, in 2004; Breslan, Russia, in 2004; London, U.K., in 2005; Paris, France, in 2015; Nice, France, in 2016; Manchester, U.K., in 2017; London, U.K., in 2017. However, tens of thousands of civilians were killed and maimed in very frequent attacks in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan were particularly hard hit. By 2006, when the deadly sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis expanded into a civil war, terrorism was the preferred method of attack. Similarly, terrorist attacks increased in Afghanistan, especially after the bulk of American and coalition forces were withdrawn. Most of all, ISIS unleashed a reign of terrorism in both Syria and Iraq starting in 2014. All of these developments supported the notion that terrorism— and counterterrorism—had entered into a new, most dangerous phase.
But although the faces of terrorists and their brand of violence change over time, the calculus of terrorism remains basically the same. This terrorist calculus, or scheme, is driven by a set of assumptions:
• Groups that are too weak to fight nation-states openly in conventional civil or foreign wars will realize some and perhaps all of their objectives by striking against civilian or noncombatant targets or by merely threatening to do so.
• States and governments are ill prepared to react to the type of psychological warfare that terrorists wage against their citizens. While capable of fighting and winning conventional wars against other nation-states, the military forces of even the mightiest states are not suited to fight against elusive enemies who strike at unpredictable times, places, and targets by equally unpredictable means.
• Because of their openness and far-reaching civil liberties—especially press freedom—liberal democracies are far more susceptible to terrorist
activities and propaganda than authoritarian systems. By striking seemingly at random, terrorists transmit the false message that everyone in their target societies is a potential victim.
• In reaction to serious acts of terror, decision-makers in constitutional democracies are likely to overreact in efforts to prevent and counter terrorism, at the expense of their country’s fundamental values and civil liberties. Such overreactions will motivate citizens in democracies, or at least part of them, to oppose their own governments.
The basic rationale for political violence of this sort guides unsophisticated amateurs and sophisticated professionals, lone wolves and formidable organizations, the arsonists inspired by the Earth Liberation Front, and the 9/11 kamikaze terrorists dispatched by Al Qaeda. This volume describes and analyzes, in the first place, the most important facets of the terrorist scheme and, second, how the governments of targeted countries and other institutions (e.g., the news media and international organizations) react—and how they should react—to actual terrorism and threats thereof.
Terrorism Trends over the Last Decades
David C. Rapoport concluded that “September 11 marks the most important date in the long and bloody history of terrorism. No other terrorist attack used passenger planes as bombs [and] produced such staggering casualty figures.”13 But while at the time unparalleled in scope, the terrorist assaults of 9/11 came on the heels of more than a quarter century of consequential international terrorist incidents that targeted Americans, mostly abroad but also, beginning with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, at home. Although Americans were certainly not the only victims, the United States was the target of “approximately one third of all international terrorist attacks over the last 30 years.”14
Apart from their venues, the nationality of the targets, and their domestic or international nature, individual acts of terrorism have caused more deaths and injuries in the last several years of the twentieth and the first years of the twenty-first centuries than in several of the preceding decades combined. Whereas the number of incidents with respect to both international and domestic terrorism decreased markedly, the total number of casualties increased significantly. Thus, as Figure 1.1 shows, in the five-year period from 1988 through 1992, a total of 2,345 international terrorist incidents were recorded that caused 4,325 casualties (persons killed and injured). The number of incidents decreased by 552 during the following five years (1993 through 1997) to 1,793, but there were 8,767 more casualties, or a total of 13,092 killed or injured victims. Finally, the next five years (1998 through 2002) witnessed a further decline of terrorist deeds to a total of 1,649 and yet another jump
in casualties to a total of 16,807.15 These trend statistics end with the year 2002 because of a controversy that arose after the initial release of the numbers for 2003 by the U.S. Department of State. The 2003 numbers reflected a rather sharp decline in international terrorist incidents and casualties, encouraging a State Department official to tell the press, “You will find in these pages clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight [against terrorism].”16 But it turned out that not all relevant international incidents were counted and that the true numbers in the revised report represented increases in both casualties and incidents. These and other problems led to the suspicion that the numbers had been massaged to support the claim of progress in the war against terrorism. Whereas the State Department had prepared the “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report for years, the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center, a creature of the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and Department of Defense, was in charge of the 2003 issue.
Up to 2002, then, the statistics showed increases in major terrorist incidents, or what have been called “terrorist spectaculars,” and a decline in less dramatic acts of political violence by nonstate actors. In fact, the tendency toward fewer but more spectacular and more lethal incidents had already begun during the 1980s. The change coincided with the growth of what is commonly called “religious terrorism”—the use of violence for political ends by groups whose motivations and justifications are couched in religious convictions, terms, and symbols. However, the
Figure 1.1 Trends in International Terrorist Incidents and Casualties
Source: U.S. State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism”
1980s were in this respect only a prelude to the far more pronounced developments in the post-Cold War era, when religious and pseudoreligious terrorism became significantly more prevalent than the secular variety. The total number of significant incidents of domestic and international terrorism around the world increased from 74 in the 1970s to 122 in the 1980s and 157 in the 1990s. Here, too, the number of killed and injured victims jumped from about 2,000 in the 1970s to more than 3,000 in the 1980s and to over 15,000 in the 1990s.17 All of these numbers were far surpassed in the first two decades of the new millennium as Table 1.1 shows.
Following the controversy concerning the 2003 statistics, the National Counterterrorism Center gathered and analyzed relevant statistics before the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) began to prepare the statistical annex for the State Department’s annual “Country Reports on Terrorism.” Since open sources, most of all news media reports, are the major sources for the gathering of pertinent information, it is very likely that the actual numbers are higher. In a number of countries plagued by high incidents of terrorism (i.e., Syria, Yemen, or Somalia), there were and are no reliable sources. Nevertheless, the reported numbers seem to reflect by and large the actual trends. That seems also the case concerning the statistics about countries with most terrorist incidents and victims. As Table 1.2 shows, in 2017—as in previous years—five countries with overwhelming Muslim majorities (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria), one nation with a population evenly divided between Muslims and Christians (Nigeria), and another country with a significant Muslim minority (India) were mostly plagued by terrorism with incidents in Syria most certainly underreported due to civil war conditions and lack of media access.
Source: U.S. Department of State and START
Table 1.1 Trends in Terrorist Incidents and Victims
Table 1.2 Ten Countries with the Most Terrorist Attacks in 2017 Country
Source: U.S. Department of State and START
As one would expect, acts of international and domestic terrorism have significant impact on target societies when they are particularly lethal. But in the past, there were also many incidents that did not result in large numbers of casualties, or that resulted in none at all, but that still achieved the status of terrorist spectacular because political leaders perceived such incidents as acute crises and reacted accordingly. In early 1975, for example, members of the Baader-Meinhof group kidnapped Peter Lorenz, a Christian Democratic candidate for mayor of West Berlin. Four days later and after the West German government released five jailed terrorists and paid $50,000 in ransom, Lorenz was released unharmed. This was not the first time the authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany had given in to terrorists’ demands. But, according to Peter Katzenstein,
two months later the government stood firm when West German terrorists seized eleven hostages in the West German embassy in Stockholm. It refused to make any concessions in 1977 when terrorists kidnapped and eventually murdered Martin Schleyer, one of the most prominent business leaders of the Federal Republic.18
The boldness of Lorenz’s kidnapping and the fact that, for the first time, a politician had been targeted elevated the Lorenz case in the minds of the West German public and government to the level of a major crisis— even though no one had been killed or injured. As a result, the West German authorities altered their response to terrorism, decided to make no more concessions to terrorists, and stuck to their new policy of toughness. The kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister
Aldo Moro in 1978 by the Red Brigade had a similar effect on the Italian government and public. In this case, the terrorists killed their immediate victim (the well-liked Moro) and, during the kidnapping, five of his bodyguards; the incident was quickly perceived as a major crisis. This was not simply because of the number of casualties—after all, Europe had witnessed far more lethal terrorism before the Moro case—but because the Red Brigade had laid bare the vulnerability and impotence of the Italian authorities to protect even a former head of government. As Jeffrey Simon observed, “the subsequent crackdown on the Red Brigade by the Italian police and security forces was not seen as repressive by the public, but as a welcome response.”19 In the summer of 2006, when members of the Lebanese Hezbollah crossed into Israel and abducted two Israeli soldiers, this kidnapping triggered massive retaliation by Israel and a major military conflict between it and Hezbollah.
Over the last several decades, anti-American terrorism incidents have had significant impact on American decision-makers, U.S. politics and policies, and, just as importantly, the public at large, regardless of whether the immediate victims of terrorism survived their ordeal. Thus, although none of the Americans held as hostages died during the 444 days of the Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981), this incident had tremendous effect on Jimmy Carter’s presidency and on U.S. policies and politics during this period and beyond. By demonstrating that the American superpower— short of military action—was impotent, a bunch of young Iranians held the United States hostage, as the media reminded Americans day in and day out.
We enhance our understanding of many aspects of terrorism in general if we know the most pertinent details of those terrorist incidents with outstanding characteristics and effects. But younger generations do not know about many incidents of anti-American terrorism abroad that older Americans remember very well. Younger Americans certainly have no personal recollection of the Iran hostage crisis or the long ordeal of American hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s. For this reason, this book’s appendix (“Major Terrorist Incidents since the Late 1970s”) provides readers with a number of both extensive and brief summaries of terrorist events in two categories: (1) major incidents that targeted Americans and/or American interests, and (2) major international incidents without American targets and victims.
Following this introduction, the rest of the book is divided into three distinct sections: Part I: Terrorism, Part II: Counterterrorism, and Part III: Terrorism in the News Media and on the Internet. Chapter 2 addresses fundamental definitions and disagreements surrounding the terms terrorism and terrorist. This includes an often heated debate about the question: Is terrorism never or sometimes justified? Although in the past it was rarely as serious a threat as it is today, terrorism in one form or another has existed in every time and was typically committed by
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PHYSIOLOGIE DU MARIAGE, OU
MÉDITATIONS DE PHILOSOPHIE ÉCLECTIQUE
SUR LE BONHEUR ET LE MALHEUR CONJUGAL.
DÉDICACE.
Faites attention à ces mots (page 367): «L’homme supérieur à qui ce livre est dédié» n’est-cepasvousdire:—«C’estàvous?» L’AUTEUR.
La femme qui, sur le titre de ce livre, serait tentée de l’ouvrir, peut s’en dispenser, elle l’a déjà lu sans le savoir. Un homme, quelque malicieux qu’il puisse être, ne dira jamais des femmes autant de bien ni autant de mal qu’elles en pensent elles-mêmes. Si, malgré cet avis, une femme persistait à lire l’ouvrage, la délicatesse devra lui imposer la loi de ne pas médire de l’auteur, du moment où, se privant des approbations qui flattent le plus les artistes, il a en quelque sorte gravé sur le frontispice de son livre la prudente inscription mise sur la porte de quelques établissements: Lesdames n’entrentpasici.
INTRODUCTION.
«Le mariage ne dérive point de la nature. — La famille orientale diffère entièrement de la famille occidentale. — L’homme est le ministre de la nature, et la société vient s’enter sur elle. — Les lois sont faites pour les mœurs, et les mœurs varient.»
Le mariage peut donc subir le perfectionnement graduel auquel toutes les choses humaines paraissent soumises.
Ces paroles, prononcées devant le Conseil-d’État par Napoléon lors de la discussion du Code civil, frappèrent vivement l’auteur de ce livre; et, peut-être, à son insu, mirent-elles en lui le germe de l’ouvrage qu’il offre aujourd’hui au public. En effet, à l’époque où, beaucoup plus jeune, il étudia le Droit français, le mot ADULTÈRE lui causa de singulières impressions. Immense dans le code, jamais ce mot n’apparaissait à son imagination sans traîner à sa suite un lugubre cortége. Les Larmes, la Honte, la Haine, la Terreur, des Crimes secrets, de sanglantes Guerres, des Familles sans chef, le Malheur se personnifiaient devant lui et se dressaient soudain quand il lisait le mot sacramentel: ADULTÈRE! Plus tard, en abordant les places les mieux cultivées de la société, l’auteur s’aperçut que la sévérité des lois conjugales y était assez généralement tempérée par l’Adultère. Il trouva la somme des mauvais ménages supérieure de beaucoup à celle des mariages heureux. Enfin il crut remarquer, le premier, que, de toutes les connaissances humaines, celle du Mariage était la moins avancée. Mais ce fut une observation de jeune homme; et, chez lui comme chez tant d’autres, semblable à une pierre jetée au sein d’un lac, elle se perdit dans le gouffre de ses pensées tumultueuses. Cependant l’auteur observa malgré lui; puis il se forma lentement dans son imagination, comme un essaim d’idées plus ou moins justes sur la nature des choses conjugales. Les ouvrages se forment peut-être dans les âmes aussi mystérieusement que poussent les truffes au milieu des plaines parfumées du Périgord. De la primitive et sainte frayeur que lui causa l’Adultère et de l’observation qu’il avait étourdiment faite, naquit un matin une minime pensée où ses idées se formulèrent. C’était une raillerie sur
le mariage: deux époux s’aimaient pour la première fois après vingtsept ans de ménage.
Il s’amusa de ce petit pamphlet conjugal et passa délicieusement une semaine entière à grouper autour de cette innocente épigramme la multitude d’idées qu’il avait acquises à son insu et qu’il s’étonna de trouver en lui. Ce badinage tomba devant une observation magistrale. Docile aux avis, l’auteur se rejeta dans l’insouciance de ses habitudes paresseuses. Néanmoins ce léger principe de science et de plaisanterie se perfectionna tout seul dans les champs de la pensée: chaque phrase de l’œuvre condamnée y prit racine, et s’y fortifia, restant comme une petite branche d’arbre qui, abandonnée sur le sable par une soirée d’hiver, se trouve couverte le lendemain de ces blanches et bizarres cristallisations que dessinent les gelées capricieuses de la nuit. Ainsi l’ébauche vécut et devint le point de départ d’une multitude de ramifications morales. Ce fut comme un polype qui s’engendra de lui-même. Les sensations de sa jeunesse, les observations qu’une puissance importune lui faisait faire, trouvèrent des points d’appui dans les moindres événements. Bien plus, cette masse d’idées s’harmonia, s’anima, se personnifia presque et marcha dans les pays fantastiques où l’âme aime à laisser vagabonder ses folles progénitures. A travers les préoccupations du monde et de la vie, il y avait toujours en l’auteur une voix qui lui faisait les révélations les plus moqueuses au moment même où il examinait avec le plus de plaisir une femme dansant, souriant ou causant. De même que Méphistophélès montre du doigt à Faust dans l’épouvantable assemblée du Broken de sinistres figures, de même l’auteur sentait un démon qui, au sein d’un bal, venait lui frapper familièrement sur l’épaule et lui dire: Vois-tu, ce sourire enchanteur? c’est un sourire de haine. Tantôt le démon se pavanait comme un capitan des anciennes comédies de Hardy. Il secouait la pourpre d’un manteau brodé et s’efforçait de remettre à neuf les vieux clinquants et les oripeaux de la gloire. Tantôt il poussait, à la manière de Rabelais, un rire large et franc, et traçait sur la muraille d’une rue un mot qui pouvait servir de pendant à celui de: Trinque! seul oracle obtenu de la dive bouteille. Souvent
ce Trilby littéraire se laissait voir assis sur des monceaux de livres; et, de ses doigts crochus, il indiquait malicieusement deux volumes jaunes, dont le titre flamboyait aux regards. Puis, quand il voyait l’auteur attentif, il épelait d’une voix aussi agaçante que les sons d’un harmonica:—PHYSIOLOGIE DU MARIAGE! Mais presque toujours, il apparaissait, le soir, au moment des songes. Caressant comme une fée, il essayait d’apprivoiser par de douces paroles l’âme qu’il s’était soumise. Aussi railleur que séduisant, aussi souple qu’une femme, aussi cruel qu’un tigre, son amitié était plus redoutable que sa haine; car il ne savait pas faire une caresse sans égratigner. Une nuit entre autres, il essaya la puissance de tous ses sortiléges et les couronna par un dernier effort. Il vint, il s’assit sur le bord du lit, comme une jeune fille pleine d’amour, qui d’abord se tait, mais dont les yeux brillent, et à laquelle son secret finit par échapper.—Ceci, dit-il, est le prospectus d’un scaphandre au moyen duquel on pourra se promener sur la Seine à pied sec. Cet autre volume est le rapport de l’Institut sur un vêtement propre à nous faire traverser les flammes sans nous brûler. Ne proposeras-tu donc rien qui puisse préserver le mariage des malheurs du froid et du chaud? Mais, écoute? Voici L’ART DE CONSERVER LES SUBSTANCES ALIMENTAIRES, L’ART D’EMPÊCHER LES CHEMINÉES DE FUMER, L’ART DE FAIRE DE BONS MORTIERS, L’ART DE METTRE SA CRAVATE, L’ART DE DÉCOUPER LES VIANDES.
Il nomma en une minute un nombre si prodigieux de livres, que l’auteur en eut comme un éblouissement.
—Ces myriades de livres ont été dévorés, disait-il, et cependant tout le monde ne bâtit pas et ne mange pas, tout le monde n’a pas de cravate et ne se chauffe pas, tandis que tout le monde se marie un peu!... Mais tiens, vois?...
Sa main fit alors un geste, et sembla découvrir dans le lointain un océan où tous les livres du siècle se remuaient comme par des mouvements de vagues. Les in-18 ricochaient; les in-8º qu’on jetait rendaient un son grave, allaient au fond et ne remontaient que bien péniblement, empêchés par des in-12 et des in-32 qui foisonnaient et se résolvaient en mousse légère. Les lames furieuses étaient
chargées de journalistes, de protes, de papetiers, d’apprentis, de commis d’imprimeurs, de qui l’on ne voyait que les têtes pêle-mêle avec les livres. Des milliers de voix criaient comme celles des écoliers au bain. Allaient et venaient dans leurs canots quelques hommes occupés à pêcher les livres et à les apporter au rivage devant un grand homme dédaigneux, vêtu de noir, sec et froid: c’était les libraires et le public. Du doigt le Démon montra un esquif nouvellement pavoisé, cinglant à pleines voiles et portant une affiche en guise de pavillon; puis, poussant un rire sardonique, il lut d’une voix perçante:—PHYSIOLOGIE DU MARIAGE.
L’auteur devint amoureux, le diable le laissa tranquille, car il aurait eu affaire à trop forte partie s’il était revenu dans un logis habité par une femme. Quelques années se passèrent sans autres tourments que ceux de l’amour, et l’auteur put se croire guéri d’une infirmité par une autre. Mais un soir il se trouva dans un salon de Paris, où l’un des hommes qui faisaient partie du cercle décrit devant la cheminée par quelques personnes prit la parole et raconta l’anecdote suivante d’une voix sépulcrale.
—Un fait eut lieu à Gand au moment où j’y étais. Attaquée d’une maladie mortelle, une dame, veuve depuis dix ans, gisait sur son lit. Son dernier soupir était attendu par trois héritiers collatéraux qui ne la quittaient pas, de peur qu’elle ne fît un testament au profit du Béguinage de la ville. La malade gardait le silence, paraissait assoupie, et la mort semblait s’emparer lentement de son visage muet et livide. Voyez-vous au milieu d’une nuit d’hiver les trois parents silencieusement assis devant le lit? Une vieille garde-malade est là qui hoche la tête, et le médecin, voyant avec anxiété la maladie arrivée à son dernier période, tient son chapeau d’une main, et de l’autre fait un geste aux parents, comme pour leur dire: «Je n’ai plus de visites à vous faire.» Un silence solennel permettait d’entendre les sifflements sourds d’une pluie de neige qui fouettait sur les volets. De peur que les yeux de la mourante ne fussent blessés par la lumière, le plus jeune des héritiers avait adapté un garde-vue à la bougie placée près du lit, de sorte que le cercle lumineux du flambeau atteignait à peine à l’oreiller funèbre, sur
lequel la figure jaunie de la malade se détachait comme un christ mal doré sur une croix d’argent terni. Les lueurs ondoyantes jetées par les flammes bleues d’un pétillant foyer éclairaient donc seules cette chambre sombre, où allait se dénouer un drame. En effet, un tison roula tout à coup du foyer sur le parquet comme pour présager un événement. A ce bruit, la malade se dresse brusquement sur son séant, elle ouvre deux yeux aussi clairs que ceux d’un chat, et tout le monde étonné la contemple. Elle regarde le tison marcher; et, avant que personne n’eût songé à s’opposer au mouvement inattendu produit par une sorte de délire, elle saute hors de son lit, saisit les pincettes, et rejette le charbon dans la cheminée. La garde, le médecin, les parents, s’élancent, prennent la mourante dans leurs bras, elle est recouchée, elle pose la tête sur le chevet; et quelques minutes sont à peine écoulées, qu’elle meurt, gardant encore, après sa mort, son regard attaché sur la feuille de parquet à laquelle avait touché le tison. A peine la comtesse Van-Ostroëm eut-elle expiré, que les trois cohéritiers se jetèrent un coup d’œil de méfiance, et, ne pensant déjà plus à leur tante, se montrèrent le mystérieux parquet. Comme c’était des Belges, le calcul fut chez eux aussi prompt que leurs regards. Il fut convenu, par trois mots prononcés à voix basse, qu’aucun d’eux ne quitterait la chambre. Un laquais alla chercher un ouvrier. Ces âmes collatérales palpitèrent vivement quand, réunis autour de ce riche parquet, les trois Belges virent un petit apprenti donnant le premier coup de ciseau. Le bois est tranché.—«Ma tante a fait un geste!... dit le plus jeune des héritiers.—Non, c’est un effet des ondulations de la lumière!...» répondit le plus âgé qui avait à la fois l’œil sur le trésor et sur la morte. Les parents affligés trouvèrent, précisément à l’endroit où le tison avait roulé, une masse artistement enveloppée d’une couche de plâtre.—«Allez!...» dit le vieux cohéritier. Le ciseau de l’apprenti fit alors sauter une tête humaine, et je ne sais quel vestige d’habillement leur fit reconnaître le comte que toute la ville croyait mort à Java et dont la perte avait été vivement pleurée par sa femme.
Le narrateur de cette vieille histoire était un grand homme sec, à l’œil fauve, à cheveux bruns, et l’auteur crut apercevoir de vagues
ressemblances entre lui et le démon qui, jadis, l’avait tant tourmenté; mais l’étranger n’avait pas le pied fourchu. Tout à coup le mot ADULTÈRE sonna aux oreilles de l’auteur; et alors, cette espèce de cloche réveilla, dans son imagination, les figures les plus lugubres du cortége qui naguère défilait à la suite de ces prestigieuses syllabes.
A compter de cette soirée, les persécutions fantasmagoriques d’un ouvrage qui n’existait pas recommencèrent; et, à aucune époque de sa vie, l’auteur ne fut assailli d’autant d’idées fallacieuses sur le fatal sujet de ce livre. Mais il résista courageusement à l’esprit, bien que ce dernier rattachât les moindres événements de la vie à cette œuvre inconnue, et que, semblable à un commis de la douane, il plombât tout de son chiffre railleur.
Quelques jours après, l’auteur se trouva dans la compagnie de deux dames. La première avait été une des plus humaines et des plus spirituelles femmes de la cour de Napoléon. Arrivée jadis à une haute position sociale, la restauration l’y surprit, et l’en renversa; elle s’était faite ermite. La seconde, jeune et belle, jouait en ce moment, à Paris, le rôle d’une femme à la mode. Elles étaient amies, parce que l’une ayant quarante ans et l’autre vingt-deux, leurs prétentions mettaient rarement en présence leur vanité sur le même terrain. L’auteur étant sans conséquence pour l’une des deux dames, et l’autre l’ayant deviné, elles continuèrent en sa présence une conversation assez franche qu’elles avaient commencée sur leur métier de femme.
—Avez-vous remarqué, ma chère, que les femmes n’aiment en général que des sots?—Que dites-vous donc là, duchesse? et comment accorderez-vous cette remarque avec l’aversion qu’elles ont pour leurs maris?—(Mais c’est une tyrannie! se dit l’auteur. Voilà donc maintenant le diable en cornette?...)—Non, ma chère, je ne plaisante pas! reprit la duchesse, et il y a de quoi faire frémir pour soi-même, depuis que j’ai contemplé froidement les personnes que j’ai connues autrefois. L’esprit a toujours un brillant qui nous blesse, l’homme qui en a beaucoup nous effraie peut-être, et s’il est fier, il ne sera pas jaloux, il ne saurait donc nous plaire. Enfin nous aimons
peut-être mieux élever un homme jusqu’à nous que de monter jusqu’à lui... Le talent a bien des succès à nous faire partager, mais le sot donne des jouissances; et nous préférons toujours entendre dire: «Voilà un bien bel homme!» à voir notre amant choisi pour être de l’Institut.—En voilà bien assez, duchesse! vous m’avez épouvantée.
Et la jeune coquette, se mettant à faire les portraits des amants dont raffolaient toutes les femmes de sa connaissance, n’y trouva pas un seul homme d’esprit.—Mais, par ma vertu, dit-elle, leurs maris valent mieux...
—Ces gens sont leurs maris! répondit gravement la duchesse...
—Mais, demanda l’auteur, l’infortune dont est menacé le mari en France est-elle donc inévitable?
—Oui! répondit la duchesse en riant. Et l’acharnement de certaines femmes contre celles qui ont l’heureux malheur d’avoir une passion prouve combien la chasteté leur est à charge. Sans la peur du diable, l’une serait Laïs; l’autre doit sa vertu à la sécheresse de son cœur; celle-là à la manière sotte dont s’est comporté son premier amant; celle-là....
L’auteur arrêta le torrent de ces révélations en faisant part aux deux dames du projet d’ouvrage par lequel il était persécuté, elles y sourirent, et promirent beaucoup de conseils. La plus jeune fournit gaiement un des premiers capitaux de l’entreprise, en disant qu’elle se chargeait de prouver mathématiquement que les femmes entièrement vertueuses étaient des êtres de raison.
Rentré chez lui, l’auteur dit alors à son démon:—Arrive? Je suis prêt. Signons le pacte! Le démon ne revint plus.
Si l’auteur écrit ici la biographie de son livre, ce n’est par aucune inspiration de fatuité. Il raconte des faits qui pourront servir à l’histoire de la pensée humaine, et qui expliqueront sans doute l’ouvrage même. Il n’est peut-être pas indifférent à certains anatomistes de la pensée de savoir que l’âme est femme. Ainsi, tant que l’auteur s’interdisait de penser au livre qu’il devait faire, le livre
se montrait écrit partout. Il en trouvait une page sur le lit d’un malade, une autre sur le canapé d’un boudoir. Les regards des femmes quand elles tournoyaient emportées par une valse, lui jetaient des pensées; un geste, une parole, fécondaient son cerveau dédaigneux. Le jour où il se dit:—Cet ouvrage, qui m’obsède, se fera!... tout a fui; et, comme les trois Belges, il releva un squelette, là où il se baissait pour saisir un trésor.
Une douce et pâle figure succéda au démon tentateur, elle avait des manières engageantes et de la bonhomie, ses représentations étaient désarmées des pointes aiguës de la critique. Elle prodiguait plus de mots que d’idées, et semblait avoir peur du bruit. C’était peut-être le génie familier des honorables députés qui siégent au centre de la Chambre.
—«Ne vaut-il pas mieux, disait-elle, laisser les choses comme elles sont? Vont-elles donc si mal? Il faut croire au mariage comme à l’immortalité de l’âme; et vous ne faites certainement pas un livre pour vanter le bonheur conjugal. D’ailleurs vous conclurez sans doute d’après un millier de ménages parisiens qui ne sont que des exceptions. Vous trouverez peut-être des maris disposés à vous abandonner leurs femmes; mais aucun fils ne vous abandonnera sa mère... Quelques personnes blessées par les opinions que vous professerez soupçonneront vos mœurs, calomnieront vos intentions. Enfin, pour toucher aux écrouelles sociales, il faut être roi, ou tout au moins premier consul.»
Quoiqu’elle apparût sous la forme qui pouvait plaire le plus à l’auteur, la Raison ne fut point écoutée; car dans le lointain la Folie agitait la marotte de Panurge, et il voulait s’en saisir; mais, quand il essaya de la prendre, il se trouva qu’elle était aussi lourde que la massue d’Hercule; d’ailleurs, le curé de Meudon l’avait garnie de manière à ce qu’un jeune homme qui se pique moins de bien faire un livre que d’être bien ganté ne pouvait vraiment pas y toucher.
—Notre ouvrage est-il fini? demanda la plus jeune des deux complices féminines de l’auteur.—Hélas! madame, me récompenserez-vous de toutes les haines qu’il pourra soulever
contre moi? Elle fit un geste, et alors l’auteur répondit à son indécision par une expression d’insouciance.—Quoi! vous hésiteriez? publiez-le, n’ayez pas peur. Aujourd’hui nous prenons un livre bien plus pour la façon que pour l’étoffe.
Quoique l’auteur ne se donne ici que pour l’humble secrétaire de deux dames, il a, tout en coordonnant leurs observations, accompli plus d’une tâche. Une seule peut-être était restée en fait de mariage, celle de recueillir les choses que tout le monde pense et que personne n’exprime; mais aussi faire une pareille Étude avec l’esprit de tout le monde, n’est-ce pas s’exposer à ce qu’il ne plaise à personne? Cependant l’éclectisme de cette Étude la sauvera peutêtre. Tout en raillant, l’auteur a essayé de populariser quelques idées consolantes. Il a presque toujours tenté de réveiller des ressorts inconnus dans l’âme humaine. Tout en prenant la défense des intérêts les plus matériels, les jugeant ou les condamnant, il aura peut-être fait apercevoir plus d’une jouissance intellectuelle. Mais l’auteur n’a pas la sotte prétention d’avoir toujours réussi à faire des plaisanteries de bon goût; seulement il a compté sur la diversité des esprits, pour recevoir autant de blâme que d’approbation. La matière était si grave qu’il a constamment essayé de l’anecdoter, puisqu’aujourd’hui les anecdotes sont le passe-port de toute morale et l’anti-narcotique de tous les livres. Dans celui-ci, où tout est analyse et observation, la fatigue chez le lecteur et le MOI chez l’auteur étaient inévitables. C’est un des malheurs les plus grands qui puissent arriver à un ouvrage, et l’auteur ne se l’est pas dissimulé. Il a donc disposé les rudiments de cette longue ÉTUDE de manière à ménager des haltes au lecteur. Ce système a été consacré par un écrivain qui faisait sur le GOUT un travail assez semblable à celui dont il s’occupait sur le MARIAGE, et auquel il se permettra d’emprunter quelques paroles pour exprimer une pensée qui leur est commune. Ce sera une sorte d’hommage rendu à son devancier dont la mort à suivi de si près le succès.
«Quand j’écris et parle de moi au singulier, cela suppose une confabulation avec le lecteur; il peut examiner, discuter,
