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Copyright Š 2016 Kyung Lee Trotter. All Rights Reserved. No part(s) of this book may be reproduced, distributed or transmitted in any form, or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval systems without prior expressed written permission of the author of this book. ISBN: 978-1-62217-886-5


Introduction

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and of the free? Home of the brave? Liberty and justice for all? Not from where I’m standing. It’s most definitely the home of the brave because I once signed on the “dotted- line” to die to protect those virtues which I actually believed existed in America. But, as far as freedom and liberty, well, I’ve learned such can easily be taken away with a stroke of a pen. And justice? Well, if it’s the government or people in power that have taken your freedom away, don’t count on retribution. Nobody will do anything to help you. In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided in Troxel v. Granville that a state involving itself in the fundamental right of a fit parent was “not a problem.” This single declaration destroyed my life and the lives of fit parents across America. The Court never gave this destructive decision a second thought. This decision paved the way for grandparents and other third parties to drag fit parents to court and seek forced visitation or permanent “custody” of a fit parent’s child, based solely on a judge’s discretion as to what he or she felt was in the “best interests” of the fit parent’s child. I’m one of those parents. My parental rights to my first born child were terminated by the state of Georgia without the due process I was entitled to, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution—the infringement which the U.S. Supreme Court declared “wasn’t a problem.” This book describes how the Court, entrusted to interpret and protect the constitutional rights of the American people, succumbed to considerations other than the Constitution of the United States or prior precedent, in order to serve a single group of people. I will break down the unconstitutional actions of the Washington, Georgia, and United States Supreme Courts in deliberate actions in Troxel v. Granville, in order to thwart the due process rights of fit parents and for the states to maintain their so-called grandparents “rights” statutes on their books. These unconstitutional grandparents’ “rights” statutes were never about staying close to grandchildren. These statutes were a means for grandparents to seek revenge against, control, devastate, or completely destroy a fit parent and the United States Supreme Court disarmed the fit parent in order to aid the grandparents to do so. Recently, a judge and court of appeals stood up for the constitutional rights of fit parents in Pennsylvania and Alabama, respectively. Although Judge Harry Smail, Jr. of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania and the justices of the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals are still heroes in my book, the United States Supreme Court that decided Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) will not be shielded. There is no such thing as a permissible way to infringe the due process rights of a fit parent. Either the state has a narrowly tailored compelling interest to do so, or it doesn’t. There is no in-between. More importantly, the burden to prove that such interest exists is not on the parent. It is squarely on the state. This book is what I’ve learned while having to fight zealously, for four years, on my own, to restore my rights and bring my child back home, to no avail. It describes the unspeakable practices, activities, and


system that the state of Georgia has in place to ensure that its third parties who utilize its statute Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) § 19-7-1(b.1) will be successful. This system also ensures that the parents who are deprived will have no means to seek relief at any level, not state or federal lower, state or federal appellate, and certainly not at the U.S. Supreme Court. I will break down the inconceivably corrupt, beyond unethical, practices of this state’s court clerks, lawyers, judges and justices, in order to keep this unconscionable system of depriving the Fourteenth Amendment rights of fit parents for profit afloat. I will show many of my attempts to seek help from the traditional agencies or organizations which an indigent, aggrieved person would turn to for help reversing this manifest injustice, committed against me by this state, but show how each declined to help a good mother who served her country honorably for nine years. I would be continuing such service today, with my eyes upon retirement, but for this federally sanctioned obliteration of my life. While certain people frown upon those that supposedly don’t work hard enough to achieve that “American Dream,” know that no matter how hard one works to change her economic circumstances, America’s system of government is designed to oppress people like me and to keep that dream far out of reach. Ambitious, able-bodied people cannot be successful, when the federal government has given states unchecked power, to invade their homes and take their children away permanently without cause. I am not a lawyer. That goal was cut short on August 12, 2011, when the state of Georgia terminated my rights. As my pro bono attorney claimed she didn’t know how to do an appeal, my voyage upon my paralegal degree as a life raft, into the hurricane sea of federal law and procedure, to secure justice for myself began. I have not attended a real law school. However, as I understand it, law school teaches one how to read and comprehend appellate cases. If I had a dollar for every appellate case that I’ve had to read, comprehend, and apply to my facts with written arguments, every defendant named in my un-adjudicated, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wouldn’t have to pay me the potential $96,000,000 in damages that they still owe me, for depriving my Fourth, Fifth, and most importantly, Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of law. Such doesn’t include the punitive damages I asked for, to discourage any other state that wished to damage the lives of fit parents and their children in the manner explained herein. So if anybody would like to verify my education, you may contact: The University Of Money-Making Georgia 123 Go Along To Get Along Lane HandsTied, GA 45678 Or you may call the Dean of the school at (404) KP-QUIET


Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s Introduction......................................................................................................................................iii Disclaimer.......................................................................................................................................... v Dedication........................................................................................................................................vii Table of Authorities........................................................................................................................xiii Appendix......................................................................................................................................... xxi Chapter 1 The War on the Fundamental Liberty Interest of Fit Parents................................................. 1 Troxel v. Granville, The Red Carpet For “Grandparents’ Rights”............................................... 2 The Washington And U.S. Supreme Courts Rewrote § 26.10.160(3)......................................... 4 The True Federal Question ............................................................................................................ 10 The Process Due To The Parent’s Liberty Interest....................................................................... 11 The U.S. Supreme Court Deliberately Avoided A Collision With Strict Scrutiny................................................................................................... 13 Chapter 2 The True Facts Of Trotter V. Ayres, 315 Ga. App. 7 (2012).................................................... 17 Chapter 3 The State Of Georgia Terminated My Parental Rights Without Due Process................... 27 Georgia Interprets Troxel As The State Having The Power To Terminate The Rights Of Fit Parents Under A Sole Best Interests Standard.............................................. 27


The Clark Court’s Purported Constitutional Justifications To Advance Its New “Bond” With The Child Process................................................................ 33 The Clark Court’s Lehr v. Robertson Claim ................................................................................ 34 The Clark Court’s Quilloin v. Walcott Claim .............................................................................. 35 The True Statuses Of The Fathers Of Clark v. Wade ............................................................... 36 The Noncustodial, Unwed, Biological Fathers............................................................................. 38 The Nationwide Fallout Of Troxel V. Granville......................................................................... 38 Chapter 4 Georgia’s Subsequent Organized Crime................................................................................... 41 The Cover-Up Starts—The Georgia Supreme Court Shirks Its Exclusive Jurisdiction.......... 43 Chapter 5 The Cover-Up Continues To Federal Court.............................................................................. 47 The Gist of My Arguments On the Federal Level....................................................................... 47 The Georgia Sop.............................................................................................................................. 48 The Specific Shenanigans Of The Georgia Sop............................................................................ 51 Shenanigan 1: The Motion Into the “Round-File” Solution....................................................... 51 Shenanigan 2: Send In the Magistrate.......................................................................................... 52 — How the Magistrate Got Rid of My Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)....................................... 54 “…The Magistrate Judge Usurped His Authority Under 28 U.s.c. § 636(B)(1)....................... 54 Shenanigan 3: Search Your Own Precedent to Find Any Way to Deny Relief........................ 55 Shenanigan 4: If You’re a Judge Being Sued, Fuck the Federal Rules ...................................... 55 Shenanigan 5: Send In The “Big Guns”......................................................................................... 57 Shenanigan 6: When All Else Fails Just Sua Sponte Dismiss the Entire Action...................... 59 Shenanigan 7: Avoid the De Novo Review At All Times........................................................... 60 — My Reconsideration Of The Sua Sponte Dismissal of My Section 1983................... 61


Chapter 1 T h e Wa r o n t h e F u n d a m e n t a l L i b e r t y I n t e r e s t o f F i t Pa r e n t s

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here was a war on parental rights and that war was won. We, the American People, weren’t aware. The American people remain unaware and parents who have their children with them only pity parents like me who don’t. They don’t realize that their rights have also been clandestinely, unconstitutionally

abolished. Grandparents didn’t think that we, fit parents, should have a liberty interest to our children anymore. They wanted the fit parent’s liberty interest to change from so long as we are fit, we’re entitled to care, custody, management, companionship and control of our children, to so long as they have a relationship with our children, we should be made to preserve their relationship. Grandparents wanted our fitness out of the equation. They wanted us to be made to do what was “best” for our children, but no longer wanted us to have the power to decide what that was. Not only that, grandparents wanted to be declared the new initiating powers as to when, as they felt, a parent wasn’t acting in their child’s “best” interests—as opposed to the state’s child protective agency. This was a “tall order” and the states fulfilled that order, by enacting “grandparents’ rights” statutes. Such enactments by the states is a monumental deviation from America’s concept of ordered liberty.1

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that, “No State shall…deprive any person of… liberty…without due process of law…” The “liberty” 2 of the fit parent was defined by the people as a whole, as so important that it must be declared fundamental, as without it there could be no justice nor order. 1

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (U.S.Wash.,1997). Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” id., at 503, 97 S.Ct., at 1938 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”), and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937).

2

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). “…we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own...”

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Kyung Lee Trotter It is only when states have been practicing something for so long that it cannot later be said that such practice offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However, never in our history has it been tradition for the states to start practicing something repugnant to that which is already protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to overrun and eventually phase out a protected right, for the benefit of a single group of people. Nevertheless, this is exactly what’s happened.

Troxel V. Granville, The Red Carpet For “Grandparents’ Rights” At quick glance Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) appears to reconfirm the Fourteenth Amendment rights of fit parents, but don’t be fooled. It actually laid out the “red carpet” for grandparents to drag fit parents to court and take their children. Here’s what this case really says and what this Court really decided. The Petitioners of Troxel v. Granville, were the grandparents of the minors Natalie Anne and Isabelle Rose Troxel, born to Brad Troxel and their mother, the respondent of the petition, Tommie Granville. The couple broke up in 1991. Thereafter, Brad would visit their children. During Brad’s visits his parents would also visit with the children. Sadly, Brad committed suicide in 1993. Thereafter, the grandparents, the Troxels, in spite of Tommie Granville’s offer of visitation, felt that they should have much more visitation with Granville’s children. They brought suit in a Washington state Court requesting such increase in visitation. The state Superior Court judge granted their request pursuant to Washington’s statute § 26.10.160(3) which merely says: “…Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances…” Tommie Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision and dismissed the Troxels’ action. The Troxels appealed and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. It found that § 26.10.160(3) (1) impermissibly interfered (2) “…with parents’ fundamental interest in care, custody and companionship of their children…��� The Troxels then filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court. It affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s decision holding that the Washington statute was (1) breathtakingly broad (2) unconstitutional “as applied” (3) and an unconstitutional infringement upon Granville’s fundamental liberty interest to her children. Both Courts mixed “apples with oranges”. When a Court speaks of a statute being “impermissible” or having “sweeping breadth,” it’s an indication that the Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine to a challenged statute. The overbreadth doctrine is a standard of review used to assess the validity of a statute which affects a person’s rights under the First Amendment. A statute that sweeps too broadly, as in “sweeps up” not 3

Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31, 43 S.Ct. 9, 9-10, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922) (“If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it”) Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2269, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (U.S.Wash.,1997)

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NOT AT ALL only expressions under the First Amendment that present a clear and present danger,4 but also restricts a substantial amount of forms of expressions that don’t, will be found by the reviewing Court as overbroad.5 Such a statute has a ratio of impermissible restrictions of forms of expressions, which substantially outweighs those activities which the state has a legitimate interest in regulating, to protect the public.”6 Subsequently, the reviewing Court will declare an overbroad statute wholly or facially invalid and strike it down in its entirety7. The burden to show that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or may not be applied in any permissible manner, is on the challenger.8 If the state legislature can rewrite an overbroad statute into a narrower version which will only regulate the activity which falls under its legitimate public interest, then it may only be challenged “as applied” to an individual challenger’s set of circumstances.9 A reviewing judiciary is only to interpret the constitutionality of the statute or lack thereof. Rewriting the statute to a narrowly drawn version is the duty of the state’s legislature.10 The overbreadth doctrine is limited to statutory challenges within the context of the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.11 It is not the balancing test applied when state action threatens a fundamental 4

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).

5

New York v. Ferber, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3362, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (U.S.N.Y.,1982) “…a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications…” See also: Michael A. Inman, Constitutional Law-Clear and Present Danger Test Applied to Overbroad Unlawful Assembly Statute. Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477 (1971), 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/12 “...overbreadth may be conceptualized as legislative failure to focus explicitly and narrowly on social harms which are the valid concern of government and are the justification for interfering with expressive activities.”…Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 859 (1970)…Is the statute too sweeping in its coverage?...”

6

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (U.S.Okl. 1973) “…we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep…”

7

U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) “…According to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.

8

U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1987). A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”

9

Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (C.A.9 (Cal.),1998). “…An as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to others…

10

U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (U.S.,2010) We “ ‘will not rewrite a ... law to conform it to constitutional requirements,’ ” id., at 884–885, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); omission in original), for doing so would constitute a “ serious invasion of the legislative domain,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479, n. 26, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995), and sharply diminish Congress’s “incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place,” Osborne, 495 U.S., at 121, 110 S.Ct. 1691. To read § 48 as the Government desires requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation. See also: Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638 (1971) “It is the function of the judiciary to interpret statutes. Rewriting them is the function of the legislature”. citing. Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 459, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1956).

11

U.S. v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1987) “…we have not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v. Martin, supra, at 269, n. 18, 104 S.Ct., at 2412, n. 18. See also:

3


Kyung Lee Trotter liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional standard of review for a challenged statute which threatens a fit parent’s fundamental liberty interest in her children is strict scrutiny. Under this balancing test, the state has the burden—not the challenger—to prove that it has a “narrowly tailored compelling interest,” which invokes its power as parens patriae, to do what is best for the parent’s children. If the state cannot meet its burden, then the state may not infringe the liberty interest at all. 12 Notwithstanding that both Courts applied a doctrine that is not constitutionally applied to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Amendment, both Courts found this statute facially invalid. With such overbreadth test, that should have been the end of the review—albeit still the wrong standard of review. However, it wasn’t. Instead, both Courts proceeded to take on the role as state legislature and rewrite the statute. This is why both Courts applied the unconstitutional doctrine, so both would have an opportunity to narrow the statute, an opportunity which would not exist under the strict scrutiny standard of review.

The Washington And U.S. Supreme Courts Rewrote § 26.10.160(3) All three appellate Courts construed what they thought the state legislature meant to write. The Washington Court of Appeals focused on the “any person at any time” verbiage and declared that the legislature must have forgotten to amend what either term meant.13 It claimed that it had to construe the language of the statute with its literal meaning, however, where the statute would “lead to an absurd result,” it had the power to construe what the legislature’s true intent was.14 The Washington Supreme Court came behind this Court and punted that claim. It declared that the Court must construe the statute literally, as in, the statute meant exactly what it said and gave an extensive history of the verbiage of the statute never changing whether under §26.09.240 or § 26.10.160, over a period of several legislative sessions and approximately four decades.15 “Nevertheless,” it too defined what the state’s legislative intent was but focused more on construing which state authority it meant, may abridge the fundamental liberty interest of the parent.16 Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)”…Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression…” 12

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (U.S.Wash.,1997). “…the Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the government to infringe ... ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 507 U.S., at 302, 113 S.Ct., at 1447. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 815 (C.A.11 (Fla.),2004). Laws that burden the exercise of a fundamental right require strict scrutiny and are sustained only if narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S.Ct. 673, 682, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). (rev’d on other grounds) See also: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).

13

In re Wolcott, 85 Wash.App. 468 (1997).

14

Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963)

15

In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 1-13 (1998).

16

Meyer, at 399.

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Not At All - by Kyung Lee Trotter