MULTILATERALISM |DI SPATCH E S
Charting a new D10
To effectively tackle today’s global challenges, a new strategic framework is required — one that brings together likeminded allies in a standing entity focused on advancing international norms. What would such a framework look like? A diplomatic initiative launched by Canada and the United States in recent years provides a useful conceptual model. In 2008, policy-planning directors from several democracies gathered in Toronto to launch a new dialogue on global challenges. Those invited to participate were committed to addressing certain threats and maintaining democratic values, with the requisite economic, military and diplomatic resources to act on a global scale. The resulting group included major transatlantic and transpacific allies — Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and South Korea. Subsequent meetings in Washington and Seoul were productive, but higherlevel engagement is now required. It is time to convene the foreign ministers from these nine states to endorse and reinforce this construct. With the addition of the European Union, the D10 would account for more than 60 percent of global GDP and more than 75 percent of the world’s military expenditures. The D10 would provide a mechanism for like-minded states to develop concrete strategies to address current security challenges and advance global norms — preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, deterring state violence against civilians, promoting democracy and human rights and countering terrorism while protecting civil liberties. Such a forum would also encourage a better alignment of strategic capabilities and enhance intelligence sharing among close allies — a noteworthy priority in light of the recent NSA spying allegations. The West versus the rest?
But would creating the D10 come at the diplomat and international canada
cost of encouraging a West-versus-the-rest dynamic that could further polarize the international community? Could such a forum undermine the already complicated efforts to work with Russia and China at the UN? Might it not antagonize rising democracies, such as India, Brazil and South Africa? The D10 is premised on the assumption that prospects for meaningful action at the UN and other inclusive institutions on major security issues — at least in the near term — are dim. Russia and China are fundamentally opposed to the expansion of many of the liberal norms and principles long championed by the West. And while they share some common val-
it is important that the West seek ways to maintain and expand co-operation on issues of common concern. A smart and carefully balanced approach in organizing the D10 would ensure that such co-operation is not undermined. First, the D10’s public presence should be muted. It would not entail high-publicity leaders‘ summits. Rather, the focus would be behind-the-scenes strategic coordination, guided by foreign ministers. Second, the West should emphasize the importance of the UN and the G20, and continue to work through them. The D10 would supplement, not replace, the G8 or any other existing multilateral framework. Finally, the West should deepen bilateral dialogues with rising powers to encourage their co-operation on issues of common concern. Canada’s multilateral legacy
FABIO RODRIGUES POZZEBOM / ABR
curity issues. And while the G20 group of the world’s leading economies holds promise on economic and financial issues, it lacks the consensus to take on an expanded agenda. With few other options, allies have looked to ad hoc coalitions, such as the Friends of Syria. While they offer flexibility, such groups are all about tactical co-operation on discrete issues rather than strategic co-ordination across global policy challenges.
The need to deal with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s treatment of his own people has flagged problems with the G8 and prompted calls for a D10.
ues and objectives, India and other rising democracies have been ambivalent about supporting Western-led actions to advance these objectives, particularly when it requires using coercive diplomacy. Cognizant of these differences, it is unlikely that China, Russia or other powers would curtail co-operation with the West on issues they deem important to their interests, e.g. terrorism, global trade, simply because some states have added a new venue for consultation. From NATO to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summits, an array of overlapping fora for multilateral engagement among major powers are already in place. Adding another to this list is unlikely to raise serious diplomatic concerns. Still, as emerging powers gain influence and expand their global capabilities,
Canada has a long tradition in support of multilateralism. Its external affairs minister, Lester B. Pearson, played an instrumental role in the founding of NATO. Former prime minister Paul Martin served as an early advocate for what would become the G20 leaders summit. Given its multilateralist tradition, its close ties with the United States and its geostrategic position as a transatlantic and transpacific power, Canada is uniquely situated to help bring the D10 to fruition. The 2008 Toronto gathering highlights Canada’s important role in promoting co-operation among the like-minded. D10 participants will not agree on every issue. Differences over strategy and tactics are certain to emerge. But as a new multilateral platform, the D10 would encourage policy consensus and strengthen co-operation among states that share common values and interests and continue to retain a preponderance of global power. In time, such an entity could serve as the core of an expanding circle of global partners committed to advancing a liberal world order. David Gordon, a former director of the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, is head of research at the Eurasia Group, an international political risk research and consulting firm. Ash Jain, a former member of the policy planning staff, is a non-resident fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based German Marshall Fund and author of Like-minded and Capable Democracies: A New Framework for Advancing a Liberal World Order (Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013). 67